ISA
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

A Brief History

Joel C. Christenson
with a Foreword by Derek Chollet
Cover Photo Captions

*Left to right*

John Ohly (second from right) confers with Secretary of Defense James Forrestal (seated) and his two other special assistants, Marx Leva and Wilfred McNeil, 1948. (OSD Historical Office)

ASD/ISA Peter Rodman briefs reporters during a media roundtable in the Pentagon, August 2001. (Department of Defense)

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (right) congratulates newly sworn-in Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze (second from left) and William Bundy (far left), Nitze’s successor as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, November 1963. (National Archives)
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Foreword

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs has played a central role in shaping the national security policy of the United States since 1949. As ISA celebrates its 65th birthday and pivots toward the challenges of a new century, this study seeks to impart a shared perspective of the office’s origins, legacy, and future. Its aim is twofold: to spark a deeper appreciation of the organization’s history among its current members and to inform a wider audience of the office’s unique position within the Department of Defense, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and within America’s national security bureaucracy more generally.

This brief historical study chronicles ISA from its beginnings as an office devoted primarily to military assistance, through its growth amid the intrigues of the Cold War and the roiling debates of the Kennedy-Johnson years, to the end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 years, to today’s headlines. To produce this work, we partnered with the OSD Historical Office, whose historians combed through boxes of archival documents, charts, and photographs, and conducted oral history interviews with former assistant secretaries. Throughout the project, the principal author endeavored to sketch an objective account of the organization’s role in a range of policy choices, many of which continue to be debated today. It is not a comprehensive history, and the views expressed here are the author’s alone, and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense.

This project was the work of many hands. I would like to acknowledge in particular the OSD Historical Office, especially Dr. Erin Mahan, the chief historian; Dr. Joel Christenson, the principal author and researcher; and Dr. Amanda Kempa, who conducted preliminary research. OSD historians Sarah Barksdale, Ryan Carpenter, Anthony Crain, and Shannon Mohan provided valuable research support. Amy Bunting in OSD Graphics developed the layout. Within ISA, thanks go especially to Alton Buland, Stephanie Culberson, Pauline Kusiak, Shoshanna Matney, Lisa Samp, and Loren Schulman. These individuals shepherded the project from idea through drafting and deserve the lion’s share of credit for its final completion.

What follows is more than a story about the evolution of an important office in the national

Secretary of Defense William Perry meets with current and former Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1995. From left to right, Charles Freeman, Joseph Nye (then the incumbent), Perry, Paul Nitze, and David McGiffert. (Courtesy Joseph Nye)
security bureaucracy—it is principally a story about people. Over the decades, some of the nation’s most influential foreign policy players have led ISA. From Paul Nitze and William Bundy to Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, many leaders of ISA have left their mark as they helped propel America’s rise as the sole superpower. But more important, the legions of men and women who have served in ISA are among the most talented in the U.S. government, and many ISA alumni have gone on to serve in high-level posts in the Pentagon and beyond. These dedicated public servants have helped make America an indispensable nation in the global community. This is their story—of a proud Team ISA.

Derek Chollet
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
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The Early Years

“To the two great measures of our dynamic foreign policy—the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty—we must now add the essential military aid to meet the grave deficiencies in the equipment with which the free nations of Europe are now seeking to guard the boundaries of the North Atlantic Community.”

Louis Johnson
Secretary of Defense, August 9, 1949

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA) traces its historical roots, as does the Department of Defense itself, to the early Cold War period. Military power assumed a central place in U.S. foreign policy in the late 1940s, as rising tension between the United States and the Soviet Union reshaped the international system and shattered Americans’ comfortable notions of “peacetime.” Sensing a threat to their nation’s global interests, Americans responded to President Harry S. Truman’s March 1947 call to contain the expansion of communist influence in Europe and throughout the world.

Later that year, Congress passed and the President signed the National Security Act, which created the position of Secretary of Defense to provide unified direction, authority, and control over what was fast becoming a large, permanent national defense establishment. Increasingly, Americans realized that they were embarked on a long-term, costly struggle and that their nation’s security depended to a considerable extent on the ability of free nations to resist communism. Out of this realization, in September 1949 the Truman administration established the ambitious Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) to provide “friendly” nations with military advice and assistance. Needing a focal point to manage the Department of Defense’s

Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, U.S. Army (Ret.) (far right), takes the oath of office as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, 1949. Burns oversaw a large expansion in the role of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, the forerunner to ISA. (OSD Historical Office)
invasion of Inchon, Korea, on September 15, 1950. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States extended military assistance to nations of East and Southeast Asia and redoubled efforts to reinforce Western Europe against what appeared to be an imminent communist threat. (National Archives)

U.S. Marines use scaling ladders to storm ashore during the amphibious invasion of Inchon, Korea, on September 15, 1950. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States extended military assistance to nations of East and Southeast Asia and redoubled efforts to reinforce Western Europe against what appeared to be an imminent communist threat. (National Archives)
The formation of NATO increased the Pentagon’s involvement in U.S. foreign policy and underscored the need for an office to manage international security affairs. The escalating rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union prompted American participation in a multinational defensive coalition that demonstrated an enduring U.S. commitment to a military presence on the European continent, reassuring West Europeans of American protection from Soviet aggression or German revanchism. On April 4, 1949, the United States, Canada, and 10 Western European nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Under the treaty’s Article 5, the signatories vowed to regard an armed attack against one or more members as an attack against all. The treaty established a North Atlantic Council (NAC) featuring regular meetings of member nations’ permanent representatives as well as less frequent meetings involving heads of state or foreign ministers. Additional boards soon followed, including a defense committee, a military committee, a standing committee, and five regional planning groups, giving rise to an enduring organizational framework.

As NATO membership grew in response to mounting security concerns, ISA assumed greater responsibility for managing U.S. alliance relationships. By 1955, NATO contained 15 members with the addition of Greece, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). In the decades that followed, the U.S. nuclear arsenal continued to protect NATO nations. The Alliance also relied on conventional forces to further bolster its deterrence credibility and later used arms limitation negotiations to reduce tensions with the Kremlin. In the two decades since the Soviet Union’s collapse, member nations have continued to value the collective security NATO was created to ensure. Today its ranks include several former Soviet bloc nations, and Alliance relations that ISA still manages remain strong in the face of dynamic new security challenges.

John Hallowell Ohly served as one of three special assistants to the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, handling the diverse set of politico-military issues that would later comprise the portfolio of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Born in Brooklyn in 1911, Ohly graduated summa cum laude from Harvard Law School in 1936 and practiced law in New York until 1940. That year, as the United States mobilized for World War II, he joined the War Department as a special assistant to Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson. In that position, he organized and oversaw the federal government’s takeover of key economic infrastructure—private industrial plants, the American railroad system, and coal mines—to ensure the uninterrupted production of critical war materiel. Upon joining Forrestal’s staff in the newly created Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 1947, Ohly directed early U.S. efforts to provide military assistance to friendly nations, handled DoD policy coordination with the State Department and the National Security Council (NSC) on the secretary’s behalf, and managed day-to-day staff work on foreign policy matters within the Pentagon. He was an exceptionally capable operator whom Forrestal once called his “secret weapon” because he “could turn out more good work under great pressure than any man I have ever seen.” In October 1949, Ohly left OSD to accept an appointment as Deputy Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, where he had responsibility for the general direction of the worldwide multibillion dollar U.S. military assistance program. Thereafter, he served in a succession of high-level posts focused on foreign aid issues, rendering distinguished service to the nation until his retirement in 1968.
ISA entered a transitional period with the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency in 1952. A man with unparalleled experience in national defense, the new president insisted on maintaining close personal control over the development of his administration’s foreign and national security policies. Along with his influential Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and a newly resurgent National Security Council, Eisenhower crafted a broad national policy known as the New Look intended to check communist aggression globally by building a robust yet economical military deterrent. Its central feature was a reliance on nuclear weapons. Although charged with implementing the policy, the Department of Defense had little to do with the New Look’s formulation. In Eisenhower’s view, the job of the Secretary of Defense was to execute national policy and ensure the efficient management and administration of the nation’s sprawling military establishment, not to devise policy. For ISA, this portended an inward-looking period when accomplishments would be measured less by the influence it exercised on policy than by the efforts it undertook to streamline its operations. As H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA from 1954 to 1955, recalled, during these years he and his contemporaries generally accepted that “State was responsible for international affairs, and that we [in ISA and DoD] were responsible for carrying out what State wanted to accomplish.”

A Period of Reform

“The military action in Korea, the buildup of our forces everywhere, the provision of military aid to other friendly nations, and the participation of the United States Armed Forces in regional collective security arrangements, such as those under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—all these have supplied sharp tests of our military organization. . . . The time is here, then, to work to perfect our Military Establishment without delay.”

President Dwight D. Eisenhower
April 30, 1953
As a result, ISA devoted considerable attention to institutional reform and organizational development during the Eisenhower years. When he took office in January 1953, Eisenhower’s first Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, embraced a number of proposals to address organizational dislocations exposed by the Korean War. A former head of General Motors appointed for his management prowess, Wilson wanted in particular to strengthen the Secretary’s authority over the military services and extend his control over the Department’s sprawling business operations. Among his greatest concerns was management of the nation’s international security relationships, a portfolio that included a growing array of responsibilities beyond military assistance and NATO affairs—commitments such as managing the Department’s contributions to foreign economic affairs, negotiating military basing agreements overseas, coordinating the Department’s input to debates in the National Security Council, and addressing a host of defense-related United Nations issues. The increasing interests and responsibilities of the Department of Defense in matters of international security (the office had grown from 80 to 198 personnel as a result of the Korean War), Wilson believed, made it especially necessary to ensure that the head of ISA, who often represented the Secretary of Defense internationally, enjoyed clear, high-level institutional standing. Accordingly, within his first month in office President Eisenhower nominated Frank C. Nash, who had headed ISA and its predecessor as an “Assistant to the Secretary of Defense” since 1951, for the elevated position of Assistant Secretary of Defense, among the Pentagon’s highest offices.  

Subsequent DoD reorganization efforts during the 1950s reflected ISA’s importance in executing, if not in developing, U.S. national security policy. Seeking maximum efficiency in the administration of the nation’s growing overseas military assistance budget, in 1954 Secretary Wilson changed the nature of ISA’s role in relation to military aid by assigning it full authority and responsibility within DoD for “development, coordination, and establishment” of all policies, plans, and procedures governing the transfer of military hardware and expertise to foreign nations. Since the creation of the Military Assistance Program in the late 1940s, ISA and its predecessor organization had provided only loose policy supervision over aid dispensed more or less autonomously by the military services. After 1954, however, the office wielded broad powers over all facets of U.S. military assistance to foreign nations. Henceforth, ISA found itself at the center of these efforts, translating Eisenhower administration guidance into effective plans and policies, and providing close oversight to ensure that aid was distributed in ways that supported administration objectives.  

At the same time, recognizing that Eisenhower relied more than his predecessor had on the National Security Council, Secretary Wilson moved to increase the efficiency of DoD’s participation in NSC deliberations. ISA had always enjoyed lead responsibility for integrating and coordinating the Department’s views to the NSC, but Truman’s limited use of the council had meant that NSC affairs remained a relatively minor part of ISA’s duties throughout his presidency. Under Eisenhower, ISA quickly found itself consumed by a growing volume of NSC-related staff work. As a result, Wilson sought to consolidate the office’s control over NSC affairs within the Pentagon. In 1954 he assigned ISA “general supervision” of all DoD activities “in the field of National Security Council affairs” and placed a special assistant within ISA to serve as his representative to the council’s Planning Board. Together with the reforms that raised the office to an assistant secretaryship and equipped it with full authority over the nation’s military assistance program, this development helped position ISA for the 1960s, when a new generation of national leaders would call on it to help fashion a national policy aimed at responding to communist aggression with conventional as well as nuclear force.
U.S. efforts to contain communism in Southeast Asia during the 1950s set a precedent that would shape U.S. foreign policy, and ISA’s agenda, for most of the next 20 years. Needing French support to contain the Soviet threat to Western Europe in the late 1940s, the United States set aside its distaste for European imperialism and supported France’s efforts to regain control of its prized former colony of Indochina (Vietnam). In 1950 the Truman administration began providing military and economic support to France as it intensified its war against nationalist resistance forces (the communist “Vietminh”) that were fighting reintegration into the French empire. Despite more than $2.6 billion in American aid, including on-the-ground help from a U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group, French forces steadily lost ground in the years that followed. French calls for U.S. intervention went unheeded in Washington as both Truman and his successor, Dwight Eisenhower, refused to send U.S. combat forces in the absence of a broader international coalition. Increasingly desperate to secure a permanent hold on at least part of its colony before war costs became unacceptably high, the French government of Prime Minister Joseph Laniel opened negotiations with the Vietnamese in Geneva, Switzerland, in April 1954. The fall of the strategic French outpost of Dien Bien Phu to a Vietminh siege the following month struck a fatal blow to France’s hopes for ultimate military success. 

At Geneva, Vietnam morphed from a French colonial problem with a Cold War dimension into a full-fledged Cold War battlefront for the United States. The temporary partitioning of the country at the 17th parallel ceded control of northern Vietnam to the Vietminh and installed a noncommunist government in the south under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem. National elections were expected to unify the country in 1956. As the election date approached, however, the Eisenhower administration recognized that Ho Chi Minh, revered as a nationalist figure throughout Vietnam, north and south, was poised to win. Unwilling to permit communism to triumph at the ballot box, the United States urged Diem to boycott the elections. Subsequently, the “temporary” division of Vietnam took on an air of permanence. In the months and years that followed, Washington assumed ever-greater responsibility for building the fledgling state of South Vietnam into a politically, economically, and militarily independent nation capable of resisting communist aggression. U.S. policy was premised, as then-Senator John F. Kennedy noted in 1956, on the assumption that South Vietnam was the “keystone in the arch, the finger in the dike” that kept a tide of communism from washing over Southeast Asia. For all intents and purposes, he concluded, it was the United States’ “offspring,” meaning that neither Eisenhower nor his successors could abandon South Vietnam or ignore its needs. Elected to the presidency four years later, Kennedy would vigorously take up this charge, dramatically expanding U.S. political and military commitments to South Vietnam.

After the fall of the French outpost at Dien Bien Phu, a French commander at another installation surrenders his garrison to representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1954. With the French gone, the United States assumed responsibility for supporting the new, noncommunist government of South Vietnam, a policy that would dominate the nation’s security affairs—and ISA’s agenda—for much of the next two decades. (National Archives)

President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles greet Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam, upon his arrival in Washington, May 1957. In subsequent years, the United States provided ever-greater amounts of political, economic, and military assistance in an effort to strengthen South Vietnam in the face of a communist threat. (National Archives)
Herman Struve Hensel served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs amid considerable organizational development within ISA during the Dwight Eisenhower administration. Born in Hoboken, New Jersey, in 1901, he earned a law degree from Columbia University in 1925 and practiced law in New York before accepting an appointment as chief of the Navy Department's legal division for procurement during U.S. mobilization for World War II in 1940. Hensel remained in the Navy Department throughout the war, serving as General Counsel and then as Assistant Secretary of the Navy before returning to his law practice in 1946. In 1953 he reentered federal service, accepting an appointment by President Eisenhower to the position of General Counsel of the Department of Defense. In this position, Hensel provided critical input to the deliberations of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization, which among its numerous recommendations urged the President to abolish the Department’s Munitions Board and transfer its international programs division to ISA.14

Hensel again answered the call to serve in 1954, accepting Eisenhower’s nomination to succeed Frank Nash in the newly elevated position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He took up his duties during a particularly turbulent time in the Cold War. By then, the anticommunist frenzy stoked by Senator Joseph McCarthy had a firm grip on the nation’s political establishment. Despite finding himself ensnared in McCarthy’s dragnet for a short while, Hensel carried out his duties as ASD/ISA with singular focus. He devoted considerable energy and attention to the U.S. military assistance budget, which he viewed as necessary to counteract Soviet influence on otherwise vulnerable nations, and helped create the institutional framework for the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In all his pursuits, Hensel viewed ISA as an implementing agency whose proper role was to take direction on foreign policy matters from the State Department and carry it out to the best of its ability. He resigned from the Defense Department in July 1955 and spent the remainder of his career in private legal practice in Washington, D.C., and New York.15

During the 1960s, ISA moved to the forefront of U.S. national security policymaking. John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in January 1961 intent on fundamentally reshaping the nation’s defense posture, which he believed had become overly dependent on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation during the Eisenhower years. Compounding his concern that very month was Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s declaration of support for “wars of national liberation” in the Third World. Almost immediately, the President and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, pushed initiatives to strengthen conventional forces that would permit the nation to respond credibly along the full spectrum of potential communist aggression. In Kennedy’s view, the persistent, dynamic nature of the communist threat made foreign and defense policy issues inseparable. Accordingly, he came into office determined to give the Pentagon—and its politico-military office, ISA—a central role in fashioning and executing his national security policy of “flexible response.” To head ISA the President appointed Paul H. Nitze, a highly influential Cold War strategist who argued during the 1960 campaign that President Eisenhower had “never clearly faced up” to the need to build more robust conventional defenses. It was under Nitze’s active leadership that ISA, finding itself at the center of major policy developments time and again, earned its enduring nickname as the Pentagon’s “Little State Department.”17

With a staff that grew to more than 300, Nitze’s ISA assumed leading roles in the administration’s military buildup and in nuclear arms control efforts. Two major national security crises of the Kennedy administration, however, solidified ISA’s place at the intersection of foreign and defense affairs. The first was a showdown over...
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ISA sprang into action in August 1961 after the world learned of Soviet and East German efforts to construct a physical barrier to separate western and eastern Berlin. At the President’s direction, Nitze chaired an interagency committee to develop possible U.S. and NATO military responses in the event that Khrushchev moved to restrict western access to Berlin. The result of the committee’s fast-paced deliberations was the so-called “Poodle Blanket,” a concise series of graduated actions (from diplomacy through all-out nuclear war) distilled from an original list so long that one participant said it could only have been written on a horse blanket. Developed principally by ISA’s policy planning staff and approved in October 1961 by President Kennedy as National Security Action Memorandum 109, the Poodle Blanket’s recommendations served as the framework for both subsequent allied planning on Berlin and NATO’s eventual embrace of the concept of flexible response. Throughout these trying months, ISA moved quickly and efficiently to help craft the nation’s response to what Nitze later called the most dangerous situation to confront the Kennedy administration. 18

ISA further enhanced its reputation for sound, efficient policy work during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. It is a testament to the organization’s standing under Nitze’s leadership that he occupied one of the Defense Department’s three seats on the ad hoc advisory body—the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or “ExComm”—that President Kennedy formed to help him weigh possible responses after the Soviet missiles were discovered. In that role, Nitze quickly established himself as the ExComm’s leading authority on all issues connected to military response scenarios. The President not only valued Nitze’s judgment at the brainstorming table but recognized that the assistant secretary’s office was a “natural focal point” for coordinating a military response with such delicate international dimensions. From the Pentagon, ISA staff served as the ExComm’s main source of military planning and analysis as consensus emerged around a naval quarantine, backed by preparations for a full-scale invasion, as the preferred course of action. At each step in the ExComm’s painstaking deliberations, Nitze took members’ questions and concerns on military matters to his key staff in ISA, who in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services produced up-to-the-minute analyses to inform the committee’s frequent meetings. Throughout those 13 tense days, ISA operated at the center of national security affairs, making direct, indispensable contributions to the maintenance of world peace. It was arguably the office’s finest hour up to that point. 19

While immersed in efforts to maintain peace along the Cold War’s primary East-West axis during the early 1960s, ISA began to help sketch the outlines of the nation’s growing military involvement in Vietnam. The United States had expanded its military advisory presence in South Vietnam dramatically under Kennedy’s leadership, from 900 personnel in early 1961 to more than 16,000 by the time of the President’s assassination in November 1963. Despite

President John F. Kennedy meets with members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council regarding the crisis in Cuba, October 29, 1962. ASD/ISA Paul Nitze (seated at far right, back to camera) occupied one of DoD’s three seats on the pivotal crisis management group. (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library)

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (seated, left), ASD/ISA John McNaughton (center), and General William Westmoreland (right) receive a briefing during a visit to South Vietnam, 1965. As the Johnson administration escalated the war in Vietnam, McNaughton advised McNamara privately to pursue withdrawal even as he remained publicly supportive of U.S. policy. (Courtesy Alex McNaughton)
that growth, Vietnam remained a relatively small portion of ISA’s wide-ranging portfolio until Lyndon B. Johnson’s succession to the presidency. A dyed-in-the-wool New Deal liberal with little interest or experience in foreign relations, Johnson was intent on pursuing an active agenda of domestic reforms and preferred to devote less attention than Kennedy had to foreign and military affairs. As a result, on national security matters he relied even more heavily on a close circle of advisers than his predecessor had—none more than Secretary of Defense McNamara. This meant that ISA, which had enjoyed a heightened profile under Kennedy, would play a central role in shaping the Johnson administration’s Vietnam policies. Leading the office through this consequential period (Nitze had become Secretary of the Navy in November 1963) was John McNaughton, a lawyer and McNamara confidant who had served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control in ISA before becoming DoD General Counsel in 1962. His close personal relationship with McNamara solidified ISA’s position, as the Secretary later recalled, as “one of the two or three most significant posts in the whole department” during the Kennedy-Johnson years.

Like the nation it served, ISA struggled to make sense of Vietnam as U.S. causalities mounted and military victory remained elusive. As the nation’s commitment grew, McNaughton found himself caught between his personal conviction that the war could not be won at an acceptable cost and the Johnson administration’s position that victory (or at least a settlement favorable to the United States) was achievable if Washington could bring the right mix of pressures to bear. Forceful personalities, including McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, advised President Johnson that the war was fundamentally a struggle about communism, and that the key to victory lay in breaking the material ties that bound the National Liberation Front (NLF), known as the Viet Cong, to the government of North Vietnam. Even as he played the part of loyal subordinate, McNaughton argued otherwise. The fundamental points, he wrote to McNamara in April 1965, were that the NLF was indigenous to South Vietnam, largely independent of the North, and more interested in ridding Vietnam of foreign occupiers than it was in championing the spread of communism. Moreover, McNaughton suggested privately, “losing” one small country like South Vietnam to communism would pose little threat to the overall U.S. position in the Cold War. He continued to make this case at every turn from 1965 until his tragic death in July 1967.

As ISA Principal Deputy Townsend Hoopes later wrote, from the beginning of McNaughton’s tenure there had been “a detectable distinction between his public and private positions” on Vietnam. The distance between the two widened over time. He continued to press his dovish views with the secretary privately, but personally devoted to McNamara and convinced that he could do more good from the inside than he could by leaving DoD, McNaughton remained “punctilious in his public support of the administration” and its approach in Southeast Asia. Some have argued that by operating in this way, McNaughton helped lengthen the war and did the nation a disservice. Although his counsel and that of successor Paul C. Warnke eventually helped sway McNamara to push for a change of course in Vietnam, which opened a deep rift with the State Department of the still-hawkish Dean Rusk, the war dragged on for several more years. It would have profound effects on the nation’s defense establishment as a whole and on ISA specifically.
ISA and Arms Control in the 1960s

Throughout a decade in which war and foreign crises dominated its agenda, ISA made less visible but no less indelible marks on U.S. efforts to conclude the nation’s first lasting nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. ASD/ISA Paul Nitze arrived at the Pentagon in early 1961 with instructions from President Kennedy to pay “particular attention” to arms control issues and to undertake a thorough review of U.S. nuclear policy ahead of renewed negotiations with Moscow on a treaty to ban tests of nuclear weapons. He embraced the President’s charge with vigor. Nitze established a division of labor in which, as assistant secretary, he handled arms control and other high-profile “NSC-policy issues,” while his deputy, William Bundy, oversaw the bulk of ISA’s other work. During the spring of 1961, he also testified at length on behalf of the administration’s proposal to create a new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to provide centralized direction to U.S. arms control initiatives and coordinate policy at all levels with the Pentagon, the State Department, and the NSC.20

ISA’s most significant contribution to U.S. arms control efforts under Nitze came in preparation for resumed test ban negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1963. Kennedy’s efforts to jumpstart the talks during his first year in office stalled when Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev announced in late August 1961 that his government would break a nearly three-year-old moratorium and resume atmospheric testing. Only after the Cuban Missile Crisis late the following year did the two superpowers’ views begin to converge. For the United States, the agreement the two nations signed on August 5, 1963, became possible only after Nitze helped resolve deep disagreements between military and civilian authorities over how to best structure the U.S. negotiating position. On one side, the Joint Chiefs argued that any comprehensive ban prohibiting all nuclear testing (atmospheric, underground, and underground) would benefit only the Soviet Union. They maintained that the Soviet government was unlikely to abandon its staunch opposition to on-site compliance inspections and, because of Moscow’s inferiority in nuclear arms, would have every incentive to cheat on any agreement it signed. Voicing the opposite view, Secretary McNamara, his OSD staff, and State Department officials believed that remote verification using satellites and distant seismic sensors could suffice, and that a comprehensive ban on all testing would, in effect, solidify the U.S. advantage in the overall strategic balance.21

It fell to Nitze and ISA to break the impasse. The problem, Nitze later recalled, was that each agency with a stake in arms control “had a different view as to what the problem was” and employed technical experts with different ideas about how to deal with it. At McNamara’s urging, he initiated an exhaustive review of more than fifty technical issues in an attempt to isolate, identify, and forge consensus on the basic facts involved. Nitze and his ISA staff held individual meetings with subject matter experts from all interested agencies to determine what he called the “probable truth” in each area. Acting as arbiter, Nitze then identified resolutions for each problem and allowed the experts to contest his findings only if they could present new evidence that had not been available during their initial discussions. The most difficult issue was the Joint Chiefs’ persistent opposition to any agreement that did not include on-site verification. Nitze quickly determined that given military objections there could be no consensus within the U.S. government for a comprehensive ban. Military and civilian authorities could agree, however, on a limited ban that set aside underground testing. Once this became clear, Nitze later wrote, “policy evolved ineluctably” toward the position that U.S. representatives adopted in negotiations with Moscow. As one scholar has noted, although the resulting agreement was limited in scope, it represented “the first concrete achievement in postwar arms control” between the United States and the Soviet Union.22

Limiting the nuclear arms race continued to be a priority for ISA later in the decade even as the specter of Vietnam loomed large. Driving U.S. concern was the rapid expansion of the
working group tasked with developing the U.S. negotiating position. Johnson’s hopes for positive movement toward a deal were dashed, however, when Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia that August to crush a simmering reform movement.

Although it derailed limitation talks, Moscow’s intervention came too late to stymie progress on another Johnson administration arms control effort: the negotiation of a treaty aimed at preventing the worldwide spread of nuclear weapons technology. The interagency staff work that Warnke and Halperin coordinated throughout the spring of 1968 culminated with the United States signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on July 1. The agreement fell well short of what Johnson had hoped to achieve on arms control by the end of his term, but, like the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, it did represent a significant achievement. Together with the Johnson administration’s efforts to open comprehensive arms limitations talks, the NPT helped lay a foundation for future successful negotiations between Washington and Moscow, most notably the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms (known as SALT I) concluded by the Richard Nixon administration in 1972.

Soviet nuclear arsenal that began in 1964 and a steady, though far from catastrophic, erosion of Washington’s once-overwhelming strategic superiority. President Lyndon Johnson saw a treaty halting the growth of the two superpowers’ arsenals both as a way of reducing the threat of nuclear war and, especially late in his presidency, of burnishing a foreign policy legacy that had been badly tarnished by the war in Southeast Asia. Not until midway through Johnson’s last year in office, however, did the Soviet Union agree to open arms limitation talks. In preparation for those negotiations, during the summer of 1968 Morton Halperin, ASD/ISA Paul Warnke’s deputy for arms control, represented DoD on the interagency

John Theodore McNaughton served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the peak years of U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. Born in 1921 in Bicknell, Indiana, McNaughton was the son of a newspaper editor. He served as a Naval Reserve officer in World War II before entering Harvard Law School in 1945. Upon graduation in 1948, McNaughton earned a Rhodes scholarship and spent the next three years studying and working in Europe. In 1951 he returned to Illinois to take up editorials duties at his hometown newspaper, the Pekin Daily Times. McNaughton then taught

McNaughton’s service as Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA began when he succeeded William P. Bundy in 1964. He quickly became Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s most trusted adviser. The relationship, closer than that enjoyed by any of their predecessors, reinforced the office’s ascendance as a key player at the nexus between foreign and defense affairs. No national security challenge was more pressing during McNaughton’s tenure than the steadily expanding U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, which consumed the vast majority of his time and attention. As the scale and complexity of the U.S. commitment grew, he urged McNamara to reduce the combat role of American troops and pursue a negotiated settlement. Throughout, he insisted that the United States could extricate itself from the situation without further damaging its global stature. McNaughton’s efforts eventually helped
persuade the Secretary that the U.S. approach had to change. Unfortunately, however, he did not live to see McNamara take up the cause. In July 1967, shortly after being confirmed to succeed Paul Nitze as Secretary of the Navy, McNaughton was killed along with his wife, Sarah, and their 11-year-old son Theodore, when the small commercial aircraft they were riding collided with another plane in the skies over North Carolina.27

During the 1970s, as the United States distanced itself from the Vietnam War and wrestled with acute economic and security challenges, ISA reverted from its central policymaking role of the 1960s to a more traditional staff support role for the Secretary of Defense. Officials in the Richard Nixon administration (1969–1974) believed that under Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson the office had enjoyed too large a hand in shaping national policy on issues ranging from Vietnam to arms control. They took particular exception to the high profiles of Nitze, McNaughton, and Warnke, who came to epitomize the foreign policy establishment during the years of intensifying U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

President Nixon’s first Secretary of Defense, former Wisconsin congressman Melvin Laird, came into office intent on taking firm control of the OSD bureaucracy and ensuring that the Pentagon spoke with one voice—his own—to Congress and the White House. He was especially concerned that former Secretary Robert McNamara had allowed ISA to become “overexposed” on Capitol Hill, that the office’s public exposure had undermined its ability to provide sound advice to the Secretary of Defense, and that cooperation with the State Department and National Security Council had become more difficult as a result. The remedy, in his view, was to reserve ISA’s expertise and counsel for himself and limit its reach outside the Pentagon.29

To lead this new, lower-profile ISA, Laird turned to Professor G. Warren Nutter, an expert on Soviet political economy from the University of...
mid-1969, ISA convened regular meetings with the Secretary to devise strategy, vet initiatives, and assess the progress of measures aimed at building South Vietnam’s military capacity. Laird maintained tight control over the group’s deliberations and acted as its de facto chairman, while Nutter and his ISA team executed staff work, formulated recommendations, and reported developments to the Secretary. Throughout, the office operated with the quiet efficiency that the Secretary wanted. By design, its work bore little resemblance to ISA’s more heady days under McNamara.31

Nutter’s ISA played a similar role in connection with another dimension of the Vietnam War: the vexing problem of American personnel held as prisoners of war (POWs) by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. By early 1971, it became clear that the scale of the challenge confronting the United States eclipsed the ability of DoD’s existing mechanism—a POW Policy Planning Committee chaired by the ASD/ISA—to respond effectively. That year, Secretary Laird ordered the creation of a POW Task Group (under ISA’s “overall direction”) to support the committee and provide it with properly integrated policy recommendations, control over requirements and resources, and better general visibility over all of the Department’s POW-related activities. The chair of the task group, ISA’s Roger Shields, took a broad interpretation of its charge. Operating with latitude uncommon in the Laird Pentagon, he convened government-wide conferences to ensure that DoD’s POW efforts worked in harmony with those of nondefense agencies. U.S. prisoner-of-war policy was better integrated as a result and benefited particularly from the rigorous, systematic assessments of lessons learned that Shields directed following POW releases in 1971 and 1972. Importantly, he secured access to the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center, enabling the task group to communicate more easily during fast-moving prisoner release situations. Dedicated to ensuring that the Department of Defense and the rest of the
Despite this success, ISA’s organizational stature waned through the mid-1970s. The pattern began to change with the arrival of Harold Brown as President Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of Defense in 1977. Brown’s choice to lead ISA, David E. McGiffert, had served as Under Secretary of the Army during the Lyndon Johnson administration and lamented how far the office—once among the Pentagon’s most powerful—had fallen in the years since. He took an expansive view of ISA’s role and devoted himself to restoring it to a place of preeminent influence. To accomplish this, McGiffert focused anew on the bread-and-butter issues of ISA’s past—military assistance and NATO affairs—while seeking opportunities to make substantive contributions in other areas. He took the lead within DoD on NATO issues, for example, not only by dealing with traditional bilateral concerns like military assistance, but by promoting initiatives of broad significance to the future of the Alliance. He repeatedly delivered the Carter administration’s broad admonition to Western European nations to spend more on national defense. Later, when the United States began advocating that NATO countries invest in the U.S.-built Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), it was McGiffert who often made the administration’s pitch.

The key to his effectiveness, McGiffert believed, was his direct access to Secretary Brown. However, as the Cold War entered its fourth decade in the late 1970s, the need to maintain a permanently large defense establishment had bred organizational complexities within the Pentagon that made the enterprise more difficult than ever for a Secretary of Defense to manage. For years, DoD had added expertise and created new offices when emerging threats exposed deficiencies in its organizational capacity. By 1977 the situation had become untenable: 29 different offices reported directly to the Secretary of Defense, as did the commanders of the seven Unified and Specified Commands. To lighten this burden and make the Department more manageable, Secretary Brown proposed staff reductions and a realignment of OSD. The plan’s centerpiece was a new under secretaryship aimed at improving “integration of departmental plans and policies with overall national security objectives.” Given the innocuous-sounding name of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P), the position would take control of DoD’s intelligence and international politico-military affairs portfolios, including arms control issues, and would oversee a number of the Department’s functional agencies. Among its charges was supervision of ISA.

As press accounts at the time noted, the creation of USD/P ruffled more than a few feathers within the Pentagon bureaucracy. It was an especially bitter pill to McGiffert, whose energies since taking office had been devoted to restoring ISA’s luster and autonomy, and to guiding his direct reporting line to the Secretary of Defense. His resolve to defend both with all the tools at his disposal put him in direct conflict with President Carter’s nominee for USD/P, former Army Secretary Stanley R. Resor. An experienced Pentagon manager, Resor struggled from day one to claim his place in the Department’s upper management echelon. A proliferation of foreign crises in 1978 and 1979, most notably the Iranian Revolution, further complicated the situation. Sensing opportunity amid the international chaos to burnish ISA’s standing, McGiffert largely ignored Resor and continued to do business as he had before. Overmatched, the new Under Secretary tendered his resignation after only nine months. By contrast, Resor’s successor, Robert W. Komer (known as “Blowtorch Bob” for his tough demeanor), was eager to solidify USD/P’s standing. He saw ISA, busy with day-to-day politico-military matters, as ill-equipped to do the long-term strategic planning needed to rationalize DoD plans and policies with the nation’s broader security objectives. Never one to shy away from a bureaucratic fight, Komer took two actions to resolve what he later termed the “McGiffert problem.” First, he removed ISA’s once-influential policy planning staff and reassigned it to his own office. At the same time, he ordered that “every piece of paper” that ISA and other elements of USD/P generated for the Secretary of Defense proceed up the chain only after his personal review. Although McGiffert resisted these changes, Komer’s forceful presence made it impossible for him to continue the kinds of bureaucratic end-runs that he had made under Resor. In the end, “Blowtorch Bob’s” brief tenure, less than two years, solidified USD/P’s organizational standing and institutionalized its relationship to ISA.
The “Two Pauls”

Throughout its history, ISA—its people and their work for the Secretary of Defense and the nation—has remained largely outside the public view. It was thus unusual when an intensely personal dispute between two former heads of ISA, Paul Nitze (1961–1963) and Paul Warnke (1967–1969), erupted in a highly public manner in early 1977. Colleagues and friends during their Pentagon service in the Lyndon Johnson administration, the two Pauls had much in common. Both had graduated from Ivy League universities, and both had enjoyed lucrative careers in the private sector before entering federal service. In ISA and in other Pentagon postings, both had expressed opposition to the U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. Indeed, their views were largely harmonious in all areas except nuclear weapons. By the mid-1970s, Nitze had concluded that the Soviet Union was using détente and arms limitation talks as cover for its efforts to gain strategic superiority. In June 1974, as the Watergate scandal engulfed the Nixon White House, this conviction led him to unilaterally and publicly resign from the SALT negotiating team. Nitze feared that the embattled Nixon, desperate to save his sinking presidency, might make dangerously generous concessions to the Soviets to achieve a SALT agreement. Warnke, on the other hand, believed that SALT had not gone far enough. He criticized the process for trying only to limit, not shrink, the superpowers’ massive nuclear arsenals.

This feud burst onto the public scene in February 1977 when President Jimmy Carter nominated Warnke for the posts of chief U.S. arms control negotiator and director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Nitze had provided advice on defense and foreign policy issues to Carter’s 1976 campaign, but his increasingly hard-line views on the nuclear arms race ultimately ran afoul of mainstream thinking within the new president’s national security team. While other campaign advisers, including Harold Brown, Cyrus Vance, and Warnke, received top-level positions, Nitze was shut out. He proceeded to found an influential lobbying group, the Committee on the Present Danger, to draw public attention to the threat posed by the Soviet nuclear and conventional arms buildup. Prior to Warnke’s confirmation hearing, Nitze sent letters to key senators outlining his opposition to the nominee and followed with testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, charging that Warnke was not “a qualified student or competent judge” on issues of strategy, military requirements, and weapon capabilities. Nitze’s ire was fueled not only by Warnke’s stance on arms questions but also, undoubtedly, by his own disappointment at being passed over for a top position in the new administration.

The personal nature of his objections became clear when Nitze, exasperated by Warnke’s assurances to the Senate committees that he did not believe in unilateral disarmament, responded to one senator’s pointed question by pronouncing himself a better American than the nominee. Despite Nitze’s criticisms and those of like-minded senators, such as Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson (D–WA), Warnke weathered the attacks and earned confirmation by a comfortable margin. He served until October 1978 and helped negotiate the ultimately ill-fated SALT II (the success of which Nitze did much to impede). The nomination dispute ended the two Pauls’ friendship and opened a permanent rift, intensely personal as well as ideological, between them. As Nitze noted after Warnke’s death in October 2001, the two men were never able to overcome their own cold war.
Biography
David E. McGiffert

David Eliot McGiffert assumed the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in 1977 amid sweeping changes in the Pentagon’s organizational structure. Born in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1926, he served as a naval radio technician during World War II and after the war earned a law degree from Harvard. McGiffert then joined the Washington, D.C. law firm Covington & Burling and practiced there until becoming Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s assistant for legislative affairs in 1962. In 1965 he became Under Secretary of the Army, a post which gave him oversight of civil administration work in the Panama Canal Zone and Okinawa, as well as responsibility for Army intelligence, military and civilian personnel issues, and National Guard and Reserve forces. In this capacity, McGiffert had to contend with a rising wave of civil disturbances stemming from the Vietnam War protest movement and heightened racial tensions in the nation’s urban centers. He helped coordinate DoD’s response when 100,000 antiwar protesters marched on the Pentagon in October 1967. The next year, the Secretary of the Army designated McGiffert the Department’s lead authority on all civil disturbance responses, with full authority to act as necessary.

McGiffert’s tenure as Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA during the Jimmy Carter administration was defined by bold initiative, bureaucratic tension, and organizational change. He came into office intent on restoring ISA’s diminished stature in the Pentagon hierarchy. To accomplish this, McGiffert jealously guarded his direct access to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, which he saw as essential to restoring ISA to its former status as DoD’s foreign policy nerve center. To institutionalize ISA’s resurgence, he believed, the office had to provide the Secretary with a steady stream of high-impact analyses on such core ISA issues as military assistance and NATO affairs while steadily branching out into new areas. One of McGiffert’s top priorities in this regard was the Middle East, where President Carter’s success in brokering peace between Egypt and Israel had opened the door for DoD to expand bilateral defense ties with both nations. His designs for ISA met resistance, however, with the creation of the post of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1978. The new under secretaryship displaced the Assistant Secretary for ISA, which had evolved into the number three billet in the Department of Defense behind the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. With the end of the Carter administration in 1981, he resumed his legal practice at Covington & Burling and remained active in Washington’s defense intellectual community until his death in 2005.
“What I did . . . was enfranchise the officers and civilians that worked in ISA. I gave them a voice, responded to their memos, got them some face time with the Secretary, and, I think, raised the general level of the organization . . . that was a big change.”

Richard L. Armitage
ASD/ISA, 1983–1989

Harboring distrust for the U.S.-Soviet détente of the 1970s and vowing to wage the Cold War more vigorously than its predecessors had, the Ronald Reagan administration (1981–1989) leaned heavily on the Department of Defense, and ISA specifically, to shape and execute its foreign and national security policies. Rooted in equal measure in promises to foster economic recovery and rebuild the nation’s defenses, President Reagan’s governing agenda called for a dynamic Department of Defense led by a strong secretary to establish a new course for the nation’s security affairs. Reagan’s choice to lead the Pentagon, longtime associate (and former Nixon cabinet officer) Caspar W. Weinberger, embraced the President’s broad conception of DoD’s role and took a particularly expansive view of its part in conducting the nation’s foreign affairs. Indeed, during his seven years in office, Weinberger spent more time overseas than any previous Secretary of Defense. Moreover, he served as one of Reagan’s closest advisers on international matters and developed an enduring set of principles to govern the use of American military power abroad. For ISA, the Defense Department’s heightened profile and deeper engagement in U.S. foreign relations during the Reagan-Weinberger years presented a window of opportunity to emerge from the bureaucratic wilderness.

ISA’s ascendancy during the 1980s had its origins in organizational changes within the Pentagon and in the forceful personality of the Assistant Secretary who led it for much of the decade—Vietnam veteran and special operations expert Richard L. Armitage. The ISA that Armitage took over in 1983 bore little resemblance to

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger during a press interview, June 1983. Weinberger took a broad view of the Pentagon’s role in foreign affairs, and assigned ISA greater authority and responsibility than the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations had during the 1970s. (National Archives)
the one that had cut its teeth as a policymaking hub during the 1960s. Not only had it been relegated to staff support duty for much of the 1970s, it had lost a significant share of its organizational capacity as well. In 1981 Secretary Weinberger decided to remove the arms control and NATO portfolios (those directly responsible for confronting the Soviet threat) from ISA and assign them to the new Office of International Security Policy (ISP) headed, like ISA, by an assistant secretary of defense nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Driving ISP’s creation was the administration’s desire to enlist the services of arms control expert Richard N. Perle, a longtime adviser to Senator “Scoop” Jackson and a leading critic of détente, whose views were consistent with Reagan’s aim of taking a harder line in strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. Perle’s insistence on control over Soviet, European, and NATO issues within DoD reduced the geographic scope of ISA’s charge and left it, as observers at the time noted, with responsibility for “the rest of the world.”

With Cold War tensions still high and the Department’s resources for monitoring East-West tensions invested in a different office, ISA could easily have faded into permanent obscurity. That it did not is attributable mainly to Armitage, whose vigorous, enterprising leadership and regional expertise in Asia helped give the office a new identity. Armitage had become acquainted with Secretary Weinberger while serving on Reagan’s DoD transition team following the 1980 presidential election. During that period and throughout his subsequent service (1981–1983) as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs under ASD/ISA Francis J. “Bing” West, Armitage’s work so impressed Weinberger that the Secretary appointed him to lead ISA upon West’s resignation in early 1983. Over time the two men’s relationship strengthened ISA’s credibility and drew it firmly into the Secretary’s inner circle. In practical terms, the shift was marked by a clear change in the nature of the office’s work, from a primarily staff support function to an active role shaping policy debates among Pentagon, State Department, and White House officials. Indeed, with Armitage at the helm, ISA always seemed to be at the center of major developments: when the Secretary confronted momentous decisions with complicated international dimensions, when DoD had to provide the President with coordinated recommendations on matters with international security ramifications, and when the nation resorted to ratchet up international pressure on the Soviets to “change their behavior.”

Later that autumn, the Secretary called on the office to evaluate courses of action following the terrorist attack on the U.S. Marine barracks that killed 241 American military personnel supporting the Multinational Force in Beirut, Lebanon. That same month, Weinberger looked to ISA for input as President Reagan mulled using force to protect American medical students and forestall the growth of communist influence on the Caribbean island of Grenada. After the Lebanon bombing, Armitage led a “quiet reassessment” of U.S. objectives and “levers of influence” there that paved the way for the eventual withdrawal of American forces.

As important as these duties were, ISA found its full stride in support of what has since been dubbed the Reagan Doctrine, the administration’s policy of using security assistance and arms transfers to roll back Soviet influence in the Third World. The office had long been DoD’s central coordinating point for military assistance matters, and thus was well positioned to take a leading role in carrying out the administration’s plans. Accordingly,
Armitage and other ISA officials traveled the world facilitating arms agreements to strengthen friendly governments and resistance movements struggling against communism. The highest profile instance of this, U.S. assistance to the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, serves as an instructive example. Throughout his tenure as ASD/ISA, Armitage made regular visits to neighboring Pakistan to coordinate the growing security assistance the United States was providing, through Islamabad, to the Afghan resistance. On numerous occasions, he followed these consultations with visits to the border city of Peshawar to talk directly with its leaders. With each trip, ISA became more firmly entrenched on the front lines of national policy, carrying out initiatives it had helped to shape. It was a far cry from the buttoned-down days of the early 1970s.45

Not surprisingly, given its still vast array of responsibilities, the office also found itself at the center of international crises with less obvious Cold War dimensions. One of the more challenging situations unfolded between the Reagan administration and autocratic Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos, a longtime U.S. ally. Marcos had led the strategically important Philippines since 1965, but by the early 1980s his dictatorial methods had generated broad opposition, including a communist insurgency (the New People’s Army) intent on toppling the regime. Marcos’ ties to the 1993 assassination of exiled opposition figure Benigno Aquino shattered Reagan’s faith that he could contain the problem by increasing material assistance to the Philippine government.

Beginning in 1983, the Reagan administration, fearful that further repression could strengthen rather than weaken the anti–Marcos insurgency, dispatched Armitage, other ISA staff members, and senior State Department officials on a series of regular visits aimed at convincing the dictator to reform. Armitage later noted that during these visits he routinely warned Marcos that the New People’s Army was gaining strength, that the government’s own forces were mistreating its citizenry, and that as president Marcos had an obligation to take quick action. The Philippine leader steadfastly refused to budge until U.S. pressure became unbearable in late 1985. In the elections he hastily called to pacify Washington in early 1986, challenger Corazon Aquino, widow of the assassinated opposition leader, emerged as the victor. For the Reagan administration, Marcos’ attempts to manipulate the outcome and claim victory, despite clear evidence that he had lost, represented the final straw. His resignation and flight into exile shortly thereafter, along with U.S. recognition of Aquino’s government, signaled a major shift in Washington’s policy: Gone were the days ofAquino’s government, signaled a major shift in Washington’s policy: Gone were the days when the United States would lend unquestioned support to dictators who supported its Cold War interests. It was a change that bore ISA’s unmistakable fingerprints.46

ISA also contributed its expertise in key instances when diplomacy gave way to military force. For example, when evidence linked Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to the 1986 bombing of a Berlin disco that killed an American soldier and wounded scores of others, Armitage participated in an NSC-organized working group of assistant secretary-level officials from Defense, State, and CIA that developed possible military responses and recommended potential targets within Libya. The group, whose existence was a closely held secret, met regularly for three months and ultimately recommended an attack on a number of military sites with direct links to terrorist activity. The aim was to blunt Gaddafi’s ability to employ terrorism in the future, and in that regard the resulting operation (El Dorado Canyon) proved successful. In many ways, it also served as the exclamation point on ISA’s resurgence under Armitage. The office accumulated what one former staff member called “massive influence” within the Pentagon during the Reagan years. Once again, it became “the fulcrum, the center of gravity” for international policy issues within the Department of Defense.47
Although the size and structure of ISA has changed considerably over the years, no single modification has altered its mission and overall orientation as much as the Reagan administration’s decision to transfer arms control and NATO issues—the key portions of the office that dealt with the Soviet threat—to the new Office of International Security Policy (ISP). Prior to 1981, ISA rather famously had responsibility for issues spanning the entire world. However, Reagan and his foreign and defense policy advisers, many of whom (like the President) had been active in the Committee on the Present Danger in the 1970s, came into office intent on moving away from détente toward a tougher line on arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. They found the ideal representative of the administration’s approach in the person of Richard Perle, who had served as foreign policy aide to Senator Scoop Jackson since 1969. Perle believed that accepting détente meant accepting the permanence of the Soviet Union as both a political entity and a preeminent military power. Consenting to this status as the basis for nuclear arms negotiations, he argued, was tantamount to helping Moscow maintain the military power it needed to survive. The correct approach, in his view, was to regard the Soviet Union as “impermanent, deeply flawed, and illegitimate in a sense,” and to focus on prevailing over it in the race for nuclear arms rather than on finding a modus vivendi that would help sustain it for the long term.

To attract Perle, who had turned down two other offers to join the new administration, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Iklé, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the Reagan administration, 1983. Secretary Weinberger established ISP at Iklé’s urging to attract Richard Perle, a specialist in arms control and European affairs. (National Archives)

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Iklé recommended to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger that Perle be given a position with a specially constructed portfolio of issues. Perle had little interest in the full slate of ISA’s concerns, though, having specialized in arms control and European affairs. In coordination with Bing West, the Reagan administration’s first ASD/ISA, Iklé persuaded Weinberger to create a new assistant secretaryship with a set of responsibilities that matched Perle’s interests. Because the number of Senate-confirmed positions in the Pentagon was limited by law, the Secretary had to downgrade another position within OSD in order to vest the assistant secretaryship for ISP with the authority that Iklé believed it needed to be successful. ISP’s creation established a division of labor on international matters in OSD that, with some changes, endured for more than three decades. Perle and Armitage developed a cooperative working relationship, avoided battles over bureaucratic turf, and, as ISP staffer and future Under


Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Dov Zakheim later recalled, went on to become “two of the most powerful assistant secretaries in [the Department’s] history.”

Armitage impressed superiors, colleagues, and subordinates as a deft operator who could navigate the Pentagon’s vast bureaucracy and deliver results. Under his leadership, ISA again became a focal point of national security policymaking and enjoyed a significant boost in influence inside and outside the Pentagon. He went on to fulfill a number of special diplomatic posts during the George H.W. Bush administration, and after spending the mid- and late-1990s in private business, returned to government service as Deputy Secretary of State during the first term of President George W. Bush. He currently serves as president of Armitage International, a consulting firm he founded in 2005.

Richard Lee Armitage led a resurgent Office of International Security Affairs during a period of profound change in world affairs. Born in Boston in 1945, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1967. As a junior naval officer, Armitage served on board a U.S. Navy destroyer in Vietnamese waters before completing three combat tours in-country as a member of riverine and advisory forces. He left active duty in 1973 to accept an appointment in the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Saigon, where he worked as an operations adviser to the South Vietnamese Navy, Marine Corps, and Army airborne and special operations forces. While serving in the attaché’s office, Armitage coordinated the evacuation of naval assets and personnel ahead of the city’s fall to invading North Vietnamese forces. He then served as a Defense Department consultant in Iran and worked briefly in the private sector before joining the staff of Senator Robert J. Dole (R-KS) in 1978.

During the 1980 presidential campaign, Armitage served as an adviser to vice presidential nominee George H.W. Bush and after the election joined president-elect Reagan’s Interim Foreign Policy Advisory Board to assist with the incoming administration’s transition to power. In this capacity, he became acquainted with Caspar Weinberger, Reagan’s nominee for Secretary of Defense, and helped select personnel for appointments to senior Pentagon positions. A specialist in Asian affairs and a fluent Vietnamese speaker, Armitage secured an appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs within ISA. In that position he became deeply involved in crafting U.S. policy toward a vital region of the world, helping to reorder the U.S. defense relationship with Japan, articulate a new basis for arms sales to Taiwan (strained since the Nixon years), and strengthen bilateral defense ties with South Korea. In 1983 Secretary Weinberger tapped Armitage to replace Bing West as Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA.

Armitage’s imposing physical presence, work ethic, and bureaucratic know-how quickly established him as something of a force of nature as the head of ISA. Former JCS Chairman and Secretary of State Colin Powell, who served as military aide to Secretary Weinberger and Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci during the early Reagan years, recalled the young ASD/ISA as “big, bald, brassy, built like an anvil” when he arrived at the Pentagon in 1981—someone who “looked as if he could step into the ring next Saturday at the World Federation of Wrestling.” Popular perception within the building mirrored Powell’s, and Armitage’s rigorous daily routine only reinforced it. He began each work day at 5:00 a.m. by digesting overnight news and cable traffic before hitting the Pentagon gym for a 6:00 a.m. workout. Armitage would then consult with colleagues, diplomats, and military attaches around the world by telephone—all before most of his DoD colleagues began arriving at their offices. One of these calls always went to Powell, who by 1987 had moved on to serve as President Reagan’s national security adviser. Their regular conversations enhanced Powell’s situational awareness and strengthened his direction and control over the NSC’s day-to-day operations. All the while, Armitage maintained close relations with the Secretary of Defense, contributed to numerous ad hoc and standing interagency groups, and gave a level of attention to his own staff’s memos and analytical work that won the rank-and-file’s respect and admiration.

Richard L. Armitage

Biography

Richard L. Armitage
ISA in a Rapidly Changing World

“The decisive factor in how national security policy-making works is not what kind of procedure, or what kind of structure, but what kind of people.”

Peter W. Rodman
ASD/ISA, 2001–2007

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later, upended a generations-old global order and forced ISA—like the nation as a whole—to fundamentally rethink its long-held assumptions about American security. Spurred by an economic recession and confident that the nation’s triumph over communism had delivered a “peace dividend,” Americans focused anew on addressing vexing challenges like high unemployment, declining educational achievement, and a fraying social safety net. During the George H.W. Bush (1989–1993) and early William J. Clinton (1993–2001) administrations, this resurgent emphasis on domestic priorities pushed national defense, a leading national priority for much of the 1980s, firmly to the back burner. In the absence of a galvanizing, overarching threat, public support for high defense spending quickly evaporated. Suddenly, Americans were asking questions that would have been considered unthinkable just a few short years earlier: Why should the United States retain a large military presence in Western Europe? What is the purpose of the NATO alliance? And for that matter, should the United States continue disbursing large sums of Americans’ hard-earned tax dollars as military assistance to other nations? They were questions that cut to the very core of ISA’s mission as the Cold War had defined it.

Reflecting these broad concerns, the Clinton administration pursued a defense policy defined by strategic readjustment, downsizing, and budget reductions. Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense, former Congressman Les Aspin (D–WI), came to the Pentagon intent on shrinking the defense bureaucracy and making it more responsive to post-Cold War strategic challenges: the proliferation of nuclear weapons, regional conflicts with deep-seated ethnic and religious dimensions, the possible retreat of democracy in the former Soviet bloc, and the threat of persistent economic weakness at home.
In addition to his widely publicized “Bottom-Up Review” of the nation’s defense posture, Aspin initiated a far-reaching reorganization of OSD aimed at aligning his staff to better address these concerns. Key to this effort was the creation of two new assistant secretariats—one for nuclear nonproliferation, and one for democracy and peacekeeping.

To make room for these new offices, the Secretary ordered the consolidation of ISA and ISP, which had been split apart in 1981, into a single office of Regional Security Affairs (RSA). Driving the change was Aspin’s belief that DoD could afford to devote less attention to traditional East-West security concerns and enhance the nation’s responsiveness to smaller contingencies in regions of the world where, during the Cold War, superpower tensions had helped ensure a modicum of stability. Although most of ISA’s functions lived on under the RSA structure, the brand name the office had built over the course of 40 years took a significant hit.

The disestablishment was short-lived, however. After a brief hiatus, ISA was back.53

The arrival of Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye as ASD in 1994, just as the Clinton administration began to find its footing in foreign policy matters, caught ISA on the upswing. A widely respected analyst of U.S. foreign policy, Nye brought to the office a keen understanding of the importance of the U.S.-Japanese security partnership as “the cornerstone of stability throughout Asia.” Such a result had seemed almost unattainable prior to Nye’s tenure in ISA, and it stands as one of the office’s most significant achievements during the 1990s.54

Under Nye and his successor, Franklin Kramer, ISA helped advance another priority of U.S. security policy in the 1990s: enlarging the NATO alliance. The future of European security had been an open question since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and in its wake, some questioned the continued usefulness of the Alliance since the threat it was founded to confront no longer existed. Early in the decade, however, the United States concluded that a robust, cohesive NATO could be a stabilizing presence as nations of Eastern Europe emerged from communism and sought integration with the free market democracies of the West. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of a protracted civil war in Bosnia underscored that real dangers still confronted Europe, and bolstered Washington’s resolve to strengthen the transatlantic alliance. At U.S. initiative, in 1994 NATO created the Partnership for Peace to provide aspirants with a path toward membership. The next year, President Clinton decided to begin pushing the Alliance to invite three new members.55

Along with Nye’s efforts to fortify the U.S.-Japan security relationship, this emphasis on NATO enlargement helped redefine ISA for the post-Cold War era. Nye and Kramer took leading roles in consultations on enlargement during regular meetings of NATO’s defense ministers, and both forged productive, cooperative relations with ASD/ISP Ashton Carter, the DoD official with responsibility for NATO issues with a nuclear dimension. Together, they helped DoD and the administration walk a delicate but critical line: working to advance the administration’s priority of expanding the alliance’s membership eastward, while allaying Russian concerns that a larger NATO represented a clear and present danger to its security. ISA and ISP helped pave the way for the May 1997 establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, a consultative body where the two sides could regularly discuss these concerns. When Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic received invitations to join the Alliance that July, it represented a triumph for NATO as well as a
substantial achievement for ISA in support of U.S. policy.57

ISA’s decades of experience in bilateral and multilateral military relations positioned it well to help the United States navigate the uncharted strategic environment of the “post-Cold War era.” Like the nation more broadly, however, the office’s conceptions about that era were shattered by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Under the leadership of ASD/ISA Peter W. Rodman, ISA made indispensable contributions as the nation entered a new strategic era. Within days of the attacks, Rodman helped articulate an approach to combating terrorism that would define American military operations—and U.S. foreign policy more broadly—for most of the decade that followed. Together with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, Rodman prepared a memorandum for President George W. Bush urging that the United States confront “the entire network of states, non-state entities, and organizations that engage in or support terrorism against the United States and our interests, including the states that harbor terrorists.”58 Approved by the President less than a week after 9/11, the policy resulted in a substantial commitment of forces in Afghanistan, where a U.S.-led coalition attacked al-Qaeda and toppled the Taliban government that had given it safe harbor. Little more than a year later, it led also to the more controversial decision to invade Iraq and topple the regime of Saddam Hussein.

In the years since 9/11, ISA has remained at the forefront of national security policymaking and has helped shape the U.S. approach to a vast array of global security challenges. At the end of the Bush administration, ASD/ISA Mary Beth Long, the first woman to hold the position, mobilized ISA’s energy, talent, and resources in support of the increasingly difficult war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. She was succeeded during the first three years of the Barack Obama administration by Alexander Vershbow, a former ambassador to Russia, NATO, and South Korea, and one of the nation’s most experienced diplomats. While helping implement the administration’s new approach to Afghanistan and Iraq, during his tenure Vershbow also took a leading role in crafting U.S. policy toward European missile defense and in charting the future of the NATO alliance. Upon his departure in early 2012 to become NATO’s Deputy Secretary General, he was succeeded by Derek Chollet, who had previously served in the Obama administration at the State Department and the White House. His tenure under Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel has been defined by the U.S. response to an arc of crises in the Middle East (from Libya and Egypt to Syria, Iraq, and Iran), tensions with Russia over Ukraine, and further work on NATO’s post-Afghanistan future.

Peter Warren Rodman served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during a period of seismic shift in the strategic outlook of the United States. Born in Boston in 1943, Rodman took an interest in world affairs at an early age. As a youth he taught himself Russian in order to listen to Soviet broadcasts over shortwave radio. A natural intellectual, he earned his bachelor’s and law degrees from Harvard, and in between the two, a master’s degree from Oxford. As an undergraduate, Rodman wrote what his faculty adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger, called a “brilliant” honors thesis on the Cuban Missile Crisis. The academic relationship he and Kissinger developed at Harvard evolved into a lifelong friendship based on mutual respect and professional collaboration. Indeed, Kissinger came to refer to Rodman as a “surrogate son.” After law school, Rodman joined Kissinger’s National Security Council staff in the Nixon White House, where he served for eight years in progressively higher-level positions until Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, lost his election bid to Georgia governor Jimmy Carter in 1976. After leaving the NSC, he pursued scholarly interests as a research fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and helped his mentor, Kissinger, pen his memoirs before returning to government service on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in 1983.59

In 1986, Rodman rejoined the NSC staff, where he served through the end of the Reagan administration and into the tenure of President George H.W. Bush. He continued to influence the formulation of national security policy even after turning full-time to scholarly pursuits in 1991—first as a member of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s Defense Policy Board, and later as the director of national security programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom. By the end of the 1990s, Rodman had solidified his place as a thoughtful, deliberate foreign policy “wise man” in Republican circles, and it surprised few when President George W. Bush nominated him to the position of ASD/ISA in May 2001.
Throughout his tenure, Rodman enjoyed a close, productive working relationship with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (a former Nixon and Ford administration colleague), and by virtue of that access and the broad respect he commanded, Rodman quickly established himself as one of the administration’s leading voices on foreign policy matters. He was one of the principal architects of U.S. strategy against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The next year, when momentum began to build within the administration for military action to topple Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, Rodman urged attention to how the country would be governed once that objective had been achieved. His was a “quiet presence,” Secretary Rumsfeld later remembered, but when Rodman spoke, “it was with unusual precision and insight.” His reflectiveness and unfailing civility won him allies even among those who opposed the policies his labors supported. In 2007, Rodman again left government for the lure of scholarly life, joining the Brookings Institution, where he wrote the book Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush. His life was cut tragically short by leukemia in August 2008.

Epilogue

Positioning ISA for the Future

by Derek Chollet

Once described as an office at “the crossroads of foreign-military affairs,” today ISA remains a vital contributor to the nation’s forward-looking defense policy in the face of a complex international security environment. After more than a decade at war—the longest such stretch in our nation’s history—ISA has helped guide the Department through a major transition in Iraq and has aided in managing the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The ISA team has also assisted in developing U.S. responses to events in Libya, Egypt, and Syria stemming from the “Arab Awakening” and the rise of ISIL, even as unrest has continued to unfold throughout the region. As Africa has gained new prominence in the locus of U.S. security interests, ISA has innovated low-cost, small-footprint partnership efforts to address vexing security issues there. Closer to home, in the Western Hemisphere, ISA has focused on developing security partnerships to address the problem of the narcotics trade as well as humanitarian crises throughout the region. These multifaceted global challenges underscore the importance of ISA’s historical emphasis on upholding and strengthening the nation’s ties with allies—close associates like the United Kingdom and France, newer partners like Poland, and steadfast allies like Israel. NATO’s efforts to wind down nearly two decades of international operations while facing both an aggressive, revanchist Russia and falling defense budgets among member states underscore the importance of ISA’s efforts to help define the Alliance’s future.
Defined by the emergence of new technologies, the diffusion of power in the international system, and growing connectivity among actors and events, today's complex global security environment makes ISA’s “inbox” issues (covering 148 countries) among the most fast-paced and difficult in the Pentagon. Given the enormous breadth of its responsibilities, ISA works closely with the Secretary of Defense, senior White House and State Department officials, foreign delegations, and members of Congress. In the last year alone, ISA managed over 50 bilateral meetings for Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and coordinated 10 foreign trips, including to the Persian Gulf and three NATO defense ministerials.

Like the Department of Defense more broadly, ISA has had to meet its mission amid an uncertain fiscal environment. With at least $450 billion in cuts to the Department’s budget projected through 2021, and 20 percent mandated reductions in DoD headquarters staff, USD/Policy has recently undertaken a troop-to-task-driven reorganization aimed at streamlining resources dedicated to international engagement. Under this initiative, ISA assumed responsibility for Western Hemisphere Affairs while retaining African Affairs, Middle East Affairs, and Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Affairs along with European and NATO Affairs.

While President Obama’s Strategic Defense Guidance of 2012 and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review highlight the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, they also stress the United States’ enduring interests in and commitment to the regions of the world under ISA’s purview. As the United States continues to maintain its role as the world’s “indispensable nation,” it remains dedicated to sharing that responsibility with allies and partners, building partnership capacity, and continuing toward President Obama’s goal to move America “off a permanent war footing” while maintaining the effort to disrupt, degrade, and ultimately defeat terrorist organizations like ISIL. Toward these ends, ISA will remain poised to be the national security policy staff of choice for the Department’s and the nation’s senior leaders on defense issues in Africa, Europe and Eurasia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Appendix 1

Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs and Predecessor Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>John H. Ohly</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Frank C. Nash</strong></td>
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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frank C. Nash</th>
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<tr>
<td>February 11, 1953 – February 28, 1954</td>
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<tr>
<td>H. Struve Hensel</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 5, 1954 – June 30, 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Gray</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 14, 1955 – February 27, 1957</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mansfield D. Sprague</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 28, 1957 – October 3, 1958</td>
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<tr>
<td>John N. Irwin II</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 4, 1958 – January 20, 1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul H. Nitze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 29, 1961 – November 29, 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William P. Bundy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 29, 1963 – March 14, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John T. McNaughton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 1964 – July 19, 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul C. Warnke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1, 1967 – February 15, 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Warren Nutter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 4, 1969 – January 30, 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Eagleburger (Acting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 31, 1973 – May 10, 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert C. Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11, 1973 – January 5, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Adm. Raymond E. Peet (Acting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 6, 1974 – April 1, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amos A. Jordan (Acting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2, 1974 – June 4, 1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert E. Ellsworth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5, 1974 – December 22, 1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amos A. Jordan (Acting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 23, 1975 – May 5, 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugene V. McAlulife</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 6, 1976 – April 1, 1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>David E. McGiffert</td>
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<tr>
<td>Francis J. West, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 4, 1981 – April 1, 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard L. Armitage (Acting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2, 1983 – June 5, 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard L. Armitage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 1983 – June 5, 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry S. Rowen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James R. Lilley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12, 1991 – January 20, 1993</td>
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</table>
Position abolished in 1993, with some functions transferred to the newly established position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Security Affairs. It was reestablished in 1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles W. Freeman, Jr.</td>
<td>April 11, 1994 – 14 September 14, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin D. Kramer</td>
<td>March 29, 1996 – February 16, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter W. Rodman</td>
<td>July 16, 2001 – March 2, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Beth Long</td>
<td>December 21, 2007 – January 20, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander R. Vershbow</td>
<td>April 7, 2009 – February 10, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derek H. Chollet</td>
<td>May 24, 2012 – Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Appendix 2

ISA at a Glance

Number of Senate-confirmed ASDs/ISA since 1953: 25
Average age of ASDs/ISA upon entering office: 49 years
Average tenure of ASDs/ISA: 829 days, or approximately 2½ years

ASDs/ISA have gone on to serve as

Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Paul H. Nitze, 1967–1969

Secretary of the Navy
- Paul H. Nitze, 1963–1967
- John F. McNaughton (confirmed by the Senate; died before taking office)

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National Security Adviser)

Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Paul C. Warnke, 1977–1978

Deputy Secretary of State
- Richard L. Armitage, 2001–2005

NATO Deputy Secretary General
- Alexander R. Vershbow, 2012–present

Notable ISA Alumni

Morton I. Abramowitz
- DASD for Far East and Pacific Region, ISA, 1974–1975
- Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, 1985–1989
- U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, 1989–1991

2 For text of the National Security Act of 1947, see Alice C. Cole, Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucket, and Rudolph A. Winnacker, The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978 (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 1978), 35–50. On the early role of the Secretary of Defense relative to the armed forces and the defense establishment as a whole, see Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947–1950, vol. 1 of History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense series (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 1984), 1–27. U.S. national security policy during the early Cold War, including the National Security Act, was guided by what has since become known as the Truman Doctrine, which (articulated by President Harry Truman) committed the United States “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.” Truman's March 12, 1947 speech had been prompted by Britain's announcement that it would no longer provide economic and military assistance to the governments of Greece and Turkey, both of which were struggling against domestic communist movements. On the Truman Doctrine, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 24–86.

3 On the composition and structure of Burns' staff, see Doris M. Condit, The Test of War, 1950–1953, vol. 2 of History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense series (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 1988), 20–21, 395–400. On page 20, Condit writes, “When Congress passed the military assistance program in the fall [1949], [Secretary of Defense Louis] Johnson ordered that all relevant DoD dealings with other departments, except for certain overseas operations, would be ‘to and through my office.’” In August 1949, Johnson ordered the creation of a State Liaison Section within the Foreign Military Affairs office to conduct liaison with the State Department.


5 For Marshall's order increasing OFMA's staff and resources and establishing a new section to handle NATO issues, see Secretary of Defense (G. C. Marshall) Memorandum on "Organization for the Handling of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense," January 11, 1951, folder 89, box 10,
On DoD’s growing responsibilities in international affairs during the early 1950s, see U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (First Session), on the Nominations of Frank C. Nash, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense; John A. Hannah, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel); Earl Dallam Johnson, to be Under Secretary of the Army; Charles S. Thomas, to be Under Secretary of the Navy, February 4, 1953, 2–3. On the increasing size of the ISA staff during this time, see Condit, War, 488. For Wilson’s thoughts on the value of a high-level position covering international security matters, see Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to Senator Leverett Saltonstall, February 3, 1954, box 616, ISA 1949–1956, Subject Files, OSD Historical Office. For the establishment of three Assistant Secretary of Defense positions by 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, see “The National Security Act of 1947 as amended by Public Law 216, 81st Congress, approved August 10, 1949,” in Cole et al., The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978. On Nash’s role as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs since August 1951, was confirmed by the Senate as an Assistant Secretary of Defense (and assumed control of the ISA portfolio at that level) in February 1953. See DoD Directive 5132.2, “Designation of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs),” February 11, 1953, folder 89, box 10, Rochester Papers, OSD Historical Office. At the time it was raised to the ASD level, ISA was one of only three assistant secretariats in OSD. Richard Leighton notes that during his first month on the job, Wilson appointed “a committee to recommend improvements in DoD’s organization. Chaired by Nelson Rockefeller, the committee recommended, among other things, the creation of six additional assistant secretariats to perform essential staff functions.” See Richard M. Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953–1954, vol. 3 of History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense series (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 2001), 21–43.


On Nitze getting swept up in Senator McCarthy’s dragnet, see Paul H. Nitze, interview by Roger Trask and Maurice Matloff, October 3, 1984, 32, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection.


A detailed 1961 organizational chart shows a total ISA staff of 328 (229 civilian and 99 military). See “Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense


7 For Forrestal’s quote on Ohly, see Rearden, Formative Years, 65.


10 On DoD’s growing responsibilities in international affairs during the early 1950s, see U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (First Session), on the Nominations of Frank C. Nash, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense; John A. Hannah, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel); Earl Dallam Johnson, to be Under Secretary of the Army; Charles S. Thomas, to be Under Secretary of the Navy, February 4, 1953, 2–3. On the increasing size of the ISA staff during this time, see Condit, War, 488. For Wilson’s thoughts on the value of a high-level position covering international security matters, see Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to Senator Leverett Saltonstall, February 3, 1954, box 616, ISA 1949–1956, Subject Files, OSD Historical Office. For the establishment of three Assistant Secretary of Defense positions by 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, see “The National Security Act of 1947 as amended by Public Law 216, 81st Congress, approved August 10, 1949,” in Cole et al., The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978, 89. Frank C. Nash, who had served as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs since August 1951, was confirmed by the Senate as an Assistant Secretary of Defense (and assumed control of the ISA portfolio at that level) in February 1953. See DoD Directive 5132.2, “Designation of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs),” February 11, 1953, folder 89, box 10, Rochester Papers, OSD Historical Office. At the time it was raised to the ASD level, ISA was one of only three assistant secretariats in OSD. Richard Leighton notes that during his first month on the job, Wilson appointed “a committee to recommend improvements in DoD’s organization. Chaired by Nelson Rockefeller, the committee recommended, among other things, the creation of six additional assistant secretariats to perform essential staff functions.” See Richard M. Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953–1954, vol. 3 of History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense series (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 2001), 21–43.


16 Paul H. Nitze, interview by Roger Trask and Maurice Matloff, October 3, 1984, 32, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection.


18 A detailed 1961 organizational chart shows a total ISA staff of 328 (229 civilian and 99 military). See “Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense


For increase in U.S. military advisers to South Vietnam during Kennedy's tenure, see George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 726–727. On the priority Johnson placed on domestic affairs, see Herring, America's Longest War, 108–113. On McNamara's background, see White House Press Release (announcing McNamara's appointment as ASD/ISA), February 29, 1964, box 617, ISA 1957–1968, Subject Files, OSD Historical Office. For McNamara's quote on ISA's influence, see Robert S. McNamara, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, April 3, 1986, 21, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection. 

For an excellent treatment of McNaughton's private and public conduct on Vietnam, see Benjamin T. Harrison and Christopher L. Mosher, "The Secret Diary of McNamara's Dove: The Long-Lost Story of John T. McNaughton's Opposition to the Vietnam War," Diplomatic History 35, no. 3 (June 2011): 505–534. For McNaughton's April 1965 argument to McNamara that the NLF was largely independent of North Vietnam, see John McNaughton to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, April 25, 1965, Document #17, box 7, File MCNT XV, Paul C. Warnke Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. For Hoope's recollections of McNaughton in ISA, see Townsend Hoope's, The Limits of Intervention (an inside account of how the Johnson policy of escalation in Vietnam was reversed) (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1973), 33–56. (For quote on McNaughton's "punctilious" public support of the Johnson administration's approach to Vietnam, see page 51.) Note that McGeorge Bundy was succeeded as National Security Adviser by Walt W. Rostow in April, 1966.

For Kennedy's instructions that Nitze pay "particular attention" to arms control, see Paul H. Nitze, interview by Roger Trask and Maurice Matloff, October 9, 1984, 7, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection. ISA had been given limited arms control responsibilities in February, 1959, and assigned a deputy assistant secretary (DASD) to the arms control portfolio in March, 1960. See Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960, vol. 4 of History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense series (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 1997), 727. In his memoir, Nitze writes that Kennedy told him that he wanted ISA to be the administration's "focal point" on arms control. From very early on, Nitze's involvement in arms control issues and crisis management (especially Laos and Congo) meant that he "turned over more and more of my other duties" to Bundy. For the division of labor he established with Bundy, see Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 182–183. Also, during the administration's transition to power, major newspapers reported on Kennedy's desire for DoD, and Nitze specifically, to play a central role in fashioning and executing his administration's arms control policies. For example, see Jack Raymond, "Pentagon to Play More Direct Role in Arms Sales—Military is Expected to Take a Major Part in Planning for Disarmament Talks—Nitze to Guide Policy—New Kennedy Defense Aide Holds Informal Meetings—Studies Underway," New York Times, 26 December 1960, 1. On the establishment of ACDA and Nitze's role, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961–1965, vol. 5 of History of the Office of Secretary of Defense series (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 2006), 325–327. Prior to ACDA's establishment, the bulk of the nation's arms control work had been done by an office within the State Department that reported directly and solely to the Secretary of State. The authors note that ACDA was set up so that the director, rather than reporting only to the Secretary of State, would serve also as the President's principal adviser on disarmament issues. In a 1984 oral history interview with the OSD Historical Office, Nitze noted that under the pre-ACDA arrangement, other elements of the State Department and agencies outside of State (DoD and NSC) could exert little influence over the development of U.S. arms control policy. See Nitze interview, October 9, 1984, 10.

For a brief, sound treatment of escalating Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and of the Kennedy administration's arms control efforts, see Ronald E. Powskis, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1959 to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 93–112. On the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble. On the change in U.S. and Soviet attitudes toward arms control following the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Powskis, March to Armageddon, 106, and Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 319–338. On divergent military and civilian views of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, and for McNamara's and Nitze's process for bridging those views, see Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 191–194.

On Nitze's role in resolving differences within the U.S. government ahead of renewed test ban negotiations with the Soviet Union, see Nitze interview, October 9, 1984, 8–9. See also Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 192–194. For the Limited Test Ban Treaty as a "concrete achievement," see Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, McNamara Ascendancy, 356.

Although the United States maintained clear advantages in the overall numbers of warheads and delivery systems, by late 1967 Moscow had cut the
American ICBM advantage to fewer than 300 missiles, prompting Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to acknowledge that year that "neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can attack the other without being destroyed in retaliation." For McNamara quote and for coverage of the Soviet nuclear buildup that began in 1964, see Povarski, March to Armageddon, 113–114. On Johnson's desire for an arms limitation treaty, see Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 332–345; on the Johnson administration's efforts on the NPT, see 328–332. On the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, see Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 207–209, and Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 340–341. Commonly referred to as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and abbreviated as SALT I, the actual name of the agreement the United States and Soviet Union signed on nuclear arms limitation in May 1972 is the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. In the text, I have adopted the slightly shortened version embraced by historian Robert D. Schulzinger in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 2, Crises and Detente, eds. Melvin P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See Schulzinger, "Detente in the Nixon–Ford Years, 1969–1976," in Crises and Detente, 380.


28 See Melvin Laird, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, part 2, September 2, 1986, 11, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection.


33 There is a clear consensus among scholars, participants, and first-hand observers that ISA's stature and influence went from marked decline during the Nixon and Ford administrations. For example, see I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 235–238; Geoffrey Piller, "DOV: Office of International Security Affairs: The Brief Ascendency of an Advisory System," Political Science Quarterly 98, no. 1 (Spring 1983): 59–78. See also the OSD Historical Office interview transcripts for Melvin Laird, Robert Pursley, David McGiffert, and Robert Komcr. Having served as special assistant to three secretaries of defense (McNamara, Clifford, and Laird), Pursley's oral history is particularly instructive on this issue. He observes that Laird was "disappointed and surprised that Warren [Nutter] was not more effective than he was" and that, in Laird's view, analyses that came out of Nutter's ISA were "fragmented and loose." See Pursley, interview, August 15, 1997, 29, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection. For particulars of McGiffert's tenure, see David McGiffert, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, April 30, 1998, 18, ibid.


35 Leading national newspapers such as The New York Times and Washington Post reported on ISA's discomfort with the creation of USD/P. For example,


37 On Nitze’s service to the Carter presidential campaign, and his founding of the Committee on the Present Danger, see Thompson, *The Hawk and the Dove*, 252–254. See also Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 352. For Nitze’s testimony that Warnke was “not a qualified student or competent judge” on military matters, see Nitze’s testimony in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on Nomination of Paul C. Warnke*, February 8 and 9, 1977, 136.

38 For Nitze’s assertion that he was a better American than Warnke, see ibid., 265. See also Strong, *Working in the World*, 28; and Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, 355. For more on the depth of the dispute between Nitze and Warnke, see Thompson, *The Hawk and the Dove*, 265–266 (see 273–275 for Nitze’s efforts to sink SALT II). For Nitze’s comments after Warnke’s death, see Bill Keller, “The Lives They Lived: Paul Warnke, B. 1920; A Separate Peacenik,” *New York Times*, 30 December 2001, SM47.


40 For McGiffert’s vision for ISA, see McGiffert interview, April 30, 1998, 18. For his efforts on Middle East issues, see ibid., 29. For USD/P’s place as a Level III executive post in the Department of Defense and its oversight of ISA, see DoD Directive 5111.1, “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,” 27 October 1978.

41 See Richard L. Armitage, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, part 1, January 8, 1997, 8, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection.


43 On the division of labor between ISA and ISP, see Richard N. Perle, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, part 1, October 29, 1996, 17–20, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection. See also, Armitage interview, part 2, January 8, 1997, 8–9. For a more senior perspective, see Fred Iklé, interview by Roger Trask and Alfred Goldberg, March 6, 1995, 9, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection. Iklé attributed the makeup of Perle’s ISP issue portfolio—specifically the addition of NATO issues—to Bing West. The characterization of ISAs responsibilities as the rest of the world after ISP’s creation is Iklé’s.

44 George Herring notes that during Reagan’s first term, “the Cold War reescalated to a level of tension not equaled since the Cuban Missile Crisis.” See George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 866. Armitage’s access to Weinberger (and Weinberger’s reliance on Armitage’s ISA) is readily apparent both in the Secretary’s memoir and in his oral history interview with the OSD Historical Office. For the circumstances of Armitage’s appointment as ASD/ISA, see Armitage interview, part 1, January 8, 1997, 5.

45 For Weinberger’s instructions to Armitage following the KAL shoot-down, see Armitage interview, part 1, January 8, 1997, 25. On Armitage’s role in reviewing U.S. Lebanon policy, see Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 167–168. For the “Reagan Doctrine” and the ratcheting up of U.S. assistance to the mujahideen in Afghanistan, see James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History

46 For a solid, brief treatment of the evolution of U.S. relations with Marcos between 1983 and 1986, see Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 128–135. For Armitage’s characterization of conversations with Marcos on reform, see Armitage interview, part 1, January 8, 1997, 23.


48 This description of ISP’s creation is based on OSD Historical Office oral history interviews (cited elsewhere in this study) with Perle, Iklé, and Armitage. Zakheim’s quote comes from Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 120.

49 For Powell quote, see Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 252. For an overview of Armitage’s day-to-day routine as ASD/ISA, see Armitage, interview by Ronald Granieri and Joel Christenson, February 25, 2014, 16–17, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection. James Mann has also covered Armitage’s 1980s Pentagon routine. See Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 150–151. Evidence of rank-file respect and admiration comes from reminiscences of Dr. Lewis Stern, in conversation with the author, 26 September 2013, and from a brief manuscript Dr. Stern prepared for the OSD Historical Office.


54 For Nye’s view of Clinton administration economic policymakers who favored a harder line toward Japan, see Joseph S. Nye, interview by Thomas Christianson and Amanda Kempa, part 1, April 25, 2013, 2–3, OSD Historical Office Oral History Collection.

55 In their fine book on U.S. foreign policy from the fall of the Berlin Wall to September 11, 2001, Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier conclude that the Clinton administration’s foreign policy efforts during its first year were “disastrous.” See Chollet and Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11—The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 53–84. The “Nye Initiative” led to the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, signed by President Clinton and Japanese prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in April 1996. The Joint Declaration reaffirmed bilateral security ties as codified in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan. For presidential quote on affirmation, see “Remarks to the Diet in Tokyo,” April 18, 1996, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton—1996, Book I (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1997), 596.


57 Discussion of ISA’s role in NATO expansion is based on OSD Historical Office oral history interviews conducted with former Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye and Franklin Kramer. Specifically, see Nye interview, April 25, 2013, 5–6; and Franklin D. Kramer, interview by Joel Christenson and Ryan Carpenter, October 17, 2013, 10, 17, 21–22. On the NATO Permanent Joint Council, see Hyland, Clinton’s World, 103.


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