Matloff: This is part two of an oral history interview with Dr. Harold Brown held in Washington, D.C., on February 28, 1992. Representing the OSD Historical Office are Drs. Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff.

Brown: If I remember correctly, we never got to many of my activities as Secretary of Defense; maybe we could do that today.

Goldberg: Can we do it in one session?

Brown: I don’t know.

Matloff: At our last meeting we discussed your service as Director, DR&E, and as Secretary of the Air Force. Today we will get on with your role as Secretary of Defense. First, by way of background, there was a hiatus between your stints in the Pentagon when you served as President of the California Institute of Technology. Did you have any contacts with OSD and the Secretary of Defense in that capacity?

Brown: Some; not very much. While I was President of Caltech, my principal involvement in government activities was as a member of the delegation on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. As such, I was not in any way connected with or responsible to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense had his own representative on that body. That was Paul Nitze, for almost all of that time. I was a non-government representative, although I was a WOC during my stint on the SALT delegation, which lasted from the fall of 1969 right through 1976 but occupied only a few four- or five-week periods a year during each of those years. During that period I had some interaction with the people from the Office of the Secretary of Defense who were working on that topic, with Paul Nitze especially, but also with the people who worked on his staff. I would occasionally see Secretary of Defense Mel Laird, and then Jim Schlesinger, but only very briefly.

Matloff: Were you trying to keep current during that busy period with trends in Defense organization, planning, weaponry, and the like?
Brown: To some degree, yes. Certainly strategic weaponry, because that was a subject of the SALT talks. I did receive the Current News all during those eight years. In fact, I probably am the person who has received it continuously for the longest time--ever since the beginning of 1961--so it's now over 30 years. One learns from that publication what is in the newspapers, nothing else, but I would also occasionally talk with people in the Defense Department.

Matloff: What were the circumstances of your appointment as Secretary of Defense? How did it come about, and what led to your selection by President Carter?

Brown: Others would have to describe that, but I can describe what my involvement was. I had met the then Governor of Georgia in 1974 or '75, when he joined the Trilateral Commission, of which I was a member and a member of its Executive Committee. When the 1976 campaign began and he organized an advisory group in the spring of that year, I signed on. After his nomination and his selection of Senator Mondale as his running mate, he held a meeting in Plains, one of the famous Pond-House meetings, at which he invited advisors down to talk about various issues. On the Defense issues I was one of six or seven people who journeyed down to Plains. I got the invitation when I was out at Aspen, in July, and I took the plane from Denver to Atlanta, stayed overnight, and rode down to Plains by chartered bus with the group the following morning. We spent most of the day there, and went back to Atlanta by bus; it was a long drive. We explored various Defense issues at that meeting, and different people said what they thought. During the campaign I was occasionally called on for advice, and after the election, when the President-elect started to organize for decisions about whom he would select, I had a meeting with him in Atlanta at the Governor’s mansion, where he was conducting his exploratory talks. We had a long talk there about Defense, State, CIA, and various activities. He was very thorough. I had one or two telephone conversations with him after that. He was very determined, as he has said in his book, to assure that the people he
appointed complemented and got along with each other. It didn’t always work out, but he gave a lot of attention to it. He asked what jobs people might be interested in and who might they be willing to work with and for. Finally, he called me when I was in Pasadena, in the latter half of December, and we talked some more. He asked whether I would be willing, if asked, to be Secretary of Defense and to consider having Charles Duncan as my deputy. He had known Charles Duncan from the earlier time when Duncan was the president of Coca Cola and lived in Atlanta. I said I would be willing to meet Duncan at his home in Houston on my way to Georgia, and talk with him.

Goldberg: Did you know Duncan at all?

Brown: I had never met him, but before I met him I called two people who did know him. One was Paul Austin, who had been chairman of Coca Cola when Duncan was president. I knew Paul because he was a member, and chairman of the personnel committee, of the Caltech Board of Trustees. I knew he would be a good person to ask, because Duncan had left Coca Cola in circumstances that suggested that Austin was not willing to commit to have Duncan as his successor. So if Austin said good things about Charles, I could believe them; and he did. The other person I called was Mac McCollum, who had been chairman of Continental Oil in Houston, and who was also a Caltech board member. He also said very good things about Charles. So I flew to Houston from Los Angeles and Charles was there to meet me. I stayed overnight; we talked about the world and how we saw it, and I was very favorably impressed. I became even more so later.

Goldberg: He was no longer with Coca Cola?

Brown: No, he had gone back to Houston, where he still lives. [When he came to Washington, he bought a house from a fellow Houstonian who was then moving out of Washington--George Bush.] He didn’t know much about Defense, but he was a tough, intelligent businessman of very high integrity. He operated his own business
in Houston at the time, partly investment banking and partly managing various business interests. He was the second largest individual shareholder in Coca Cola, after Robert Woodruff. He had gotten into Coca Cola when it had bought Duncan Coffee, a company founded by his family. It had been sold, but he reacquired it, and later sold it to Coca Cola. I liked him and we hit it off very well. We both went on to Atlanta, where the President announced our appointments. It turned out that although all the background checks had been done on me, the President had neglected to have any done on Charles before he made the announcement. That caused some stir, but was no problem in the end.

Matloff: How did you prepare for your confirmation by Congress? Did you consult with OSD or anybody there?

Brown: After my appointment was announced, the first thing I did was to call all the former Secretaries of Defense to tell them I would appreciate their advice. I got some advice from some of them. I knew most of them. I had actually worked for Laird for two weeks at the beginning of the Nixon administration, until Seamans could come down. I called McNamara, Laird, Schlesinger, Richardson, and, I think, Gates and Lovett. I went to see Rumsfeld, who made an office available for me. I moved to Washington right after the new year and stayed at a friend’s house. They put me in the office of the departing Under Secretary of the Army, Norm Augustine, and I started doing two things--reading the budget books and looking at people. I should have started looking sooner, but I didn’t know that I was going to be picked. Cy Vance and I were both directors at IBM and in April of 1976 we were at the IBM annual meeting in Phoenix. We and our wives had dinner together and talked about the coming campaign but didn’t really get into what might happen. At the meeting of the IBM board at the end of November, when Cy had already been picked and was starting to pick his people, he suggested to me that I should start thinking about the same thing--but I wasn’t named to the Cabinet until late in December. I spent several
weeks going through the books, because--although I would not be testifying on the budget until February, since we would revise it, as always happens when a new administration comes in--I knew I would be expected to speak knowledgeably about many defense programs and issues at my confirmation hearing, which would not be expected of someone who came in without any background in the business. So I spent a great deal of time on it and also working on people. The confirmation hearing was actually held before the inauguration. I had flown down beforehand to see Senator Stennis, Chairman of the Committee, on the advice of the man whom I had picked to be my legislative liaison person, Jack Stempler, whom I had known from the time that he was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the 1960s. I had laid the groundwork, and I flew down to Mississippi as a courtesy call. Senator Stennis wanted to have the hearing early, so that right after the inauguration I could be sworn in. Those were days when people worried a lot--more than they perhaps should have--about the need to have somebody in the Secretary of Defense’s job all the time who had the knowledge and the authority in a crisis with the Soviets to act, if necessary. It may have been overdone then; it is certainly much less necessary now. So they didn’t want to wait and go through a hearing afterwards. At the hearing Alan Cranston introduced me (as a Californian) and Lloyd Bentsen introduced Charles Duncan--we had the hearings together. All this planning on budget, personnel, and hearings was done on the advice of Stempler and of Tom Ross, whom I had picked as the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, and with a lot of advice from the transition team, headed on the defense side by Dick Steadman, and included Walt Slocombe, Lynn Davis, and John Kester, all of whom later joined my staff.

Goldberg: Did you know all of them before?
Brown: I knew Dick Steadman because he had been in ISA in the McNamara years, but only slightly. I had met Lynn Davis when she worked for the Church committee. She and Bill Bader had come to see me at Caltech.
At the hearing I had in front of me a piece of paper, which, on the advice of some of these people, I had written to myself. It said, “Say less; stop; keep cool.” When Lloyd Bentsen came around to sit next to Charles, he saw the paper and read it out to the committee members, so that they knew what I was going to try to do. It was very good advice and it probably didn’t hurt that they knew that I was going to try to behave that way. I was questioned about all sorts of things, and various programs: for example, the B-1 program, and my attitude on foreign assistance to various countries in Europe, Asia, Israel, etc. I had, to some degree, the onus of having served in the 1960s with McNamara, whom some of these Senators didn’t like much, particularly the older ones. The newer ones knew him only by reputation. I expressed my opinion on some things, and kept my options open on others. They may have pressed me on candidate Carter’s promise of reducing budgets by $5 to $7 billion a year. I was as supportive as I could be. Either then, or later, I kept pointing out that what the candidate meant was $5 to $7 billion less than it would have otherwise been--which might not actually have been the case. I doubt that most candidates’ remarks on these matters, including that one, were thought through to the extent of saying what the $5 to $7 billion meant. There were a series of questions of that sort. In the event, I was unanimously approved by the committee. Duncan was spared all this because he was presumed not to know anything about Defense. All they did was extract from Charles the promise that he would crack down on the Defense contractors--except the ones in their respective districts, presumably. So that was relatively uneventful. The hearing was in the middle of January. The inauguration was on the 20th, which was a Friday, If I remember correctly. The Cabinet was to be sworn in on Sunday the 22d, at the White House, but the committee and the Senate voted on my nomination the afternoon of the inauguration and I arranged to be sworn in in the Secretary of Defense’s office with only the Joint Chiefs (and my family) there. I couldn’t do it until the commission arrived. The commission has to be signed
by the President and the Secretary of State. There was no Secretary of State, so we had to get the Acting Secretary to do it, and that happened to be Phil Habib. This always happens when there is a party change. I’m sure the same thing happened in 1961 and 1969. It finally came over. They were sitting on it, because, as usual, there was some tension between the bureaucracies of State and Defense. The State Department people might have felt that it was improper for the Secretary of Defense to be sworn in before the Secretary of State.

The first thing I did, as a symbolic action, was to walk out of the office across the corridor to the National Military Command Center and phone all of the Unified and specified commanders, most of whom I knew. Haig was CINCEUR; Dick Ellis was CINCSAC; Mickey Weisner, who was CINCPAC, I had known slightly as part of the fuss over the TFX in 1961. Chappy James was CINCNORAD. Of the Chiefs, I knew George Brown, the Chairman, who had been the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense in 1961 as a Brigadier General. I knew Dave Jones, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, with whom I had had a mild set-to over the B-70 in 1961. I did not know the Navy and Army chiefs (Holloway and Rogers), or the Marine Commandant, but I did know the Vice Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Bill McBride, who was Vice Chief of the Air Force, had been my military assistant when I was Air Force Secretary. I had known Dutch Kerwin, Vice Chief of the Army, during the period of nuclear testing in 1954, twenty-three years earlier. In any event, I knew many of the senior people, but it didn’t necessarily make life a lot easier.

Then the question came of picking people; for example, Army, Navy, Air Force Secretaries, and I was given a free hand, with suggestions from the White House. The greatest stress is always about who is to be the Secretary of the Navy, because the world is full of people who want to be Secretary of the Navy, and candidates tend to promise the job to several people. President Carter had one, a man who had run his campaign in Pennsylvania, and whom he urged on me. But there were several other
people who were pushing for the job too. In the end, and this is not an easy thing to do, I told the President that the man he had suggested was not a good person for the job.

We picked Graham Claytor for Secretary of the Navy. He had been a guest in the camp at the Bohemian Grove where I am a member; he was brought there by my friend Tennant Bryan, the publisher of the Richmond newspaper, as right wing a paper as there is. I knew Graham; Charles knew him very well, and suggested him. President Carter was always suspicious of industrialists, as well as of lawyers and of doctors, but he knew Claytor was good.

Goldberg: He only fell into two of those three categories.

Brown: That’s right.

Matloff: Were you given any instructions or directives, either written or oral, by the President, when you took over?

Brown: As to what?

Matloff: As to the role, functions, programs, priorities, or the like?

Brown: The President’s staff came up with an enormous list of things to do, and some of them were Defense things, but they did not go to specific programs. I was not given detailed programmatic guidance by the President. I knew what he had said during the campaign. He, Brzezinski, Vance, and I had on various occasions discussed the purposes of military capabilities. It was clear that he wanted to press ahead on arms control, for example. You will also recall that in his inaugural address he, like Ronald Reagan after him, said that we should try to abolish nuclear weapons. Early on, the President asked for an examination--this probably was his own idea, rather than Brzezinski’s--of whether it would be possible to reduce the nuclear stockpile to a thousand weapons. That caused a furor in the Defense Department. Not because it wasn’t a good idea; it’s an idea whose time actually is now, fifteen years later, perhaps fairly close. The idea of specifying a number, rather than asking for a small
number, did not sit well with the military. We managed to calm that down, but not before it leaked out and made a big fuss.

Goldberg: Were you favorably impressed by the President at this time?
Brown: He obviously was very intelligent. He had some technical background, which I found congenial. I was impressed not only by that, but by his patent do-good character, which has served him so well in the public mind since he left the presidency. He struck me as a good man, and an intelligent man, who wanted to accomplish a lot for the country and for the world. He seemed to me to have a couple of characteristics which would cause him trouble, and did. One was the voluminous nature of his interests and the difficulty that derived from that in setting priorities. If you want to do everything, you may not end up doing very much. This list of things to get done, that ran probably to about 20 pages for the whole government, struck me as overly ambitious.

Matloff: Did he set any priorities for you, when you were in this post?
Brown: Arms control clearly was one; a greater efficiency was another. He knew, for example, from his own experience that the reserves were not terribly useful, a problem that has not gone away since then. For the same reasons, we found it hard to make it go away--they have a lot of political clout, they have a local effect, and they do have the advantage of connecting the military with the citizenry. He had a few things of that sort, but he wanted to get the budget down, to be more efficient, and to do something about arms control.

Matloff: Did you set any priorities for yourself, aside from those that you received from him?
Brown: Arms control was very important to me, as well. I felt that a rationalization of the strategic systems was quite important. Our relations with Europe and getting NATO to work more as one were important, but very difficult. I believed that our relations with Japan and the establishment of some sort of military relationship,
which was a very touchy matter, was important. So, three foreign policy-related areas--Soviet Union, Europe, and Japan--in their defense components, were important to work on. A thorough review of the procurement programs, and an intent to rationalize them, was important. I set some priorities for myself--getting a better grasp of the military operational matters and of the international relations and political-military matters. These were things that I had been involved in relatively little in the 1960s. As I may have mentioned to you, McNamara had pointed out to me that those were deficiencies of mine and that I could conduct these matters better if I had taken on another job in Defense after being Air Force Secretary. I decided not to, but I noticed the lack when I came back in, in 1977. On the operations side, Rumsfeld and Laird had strongly advised me to make sure that the DDOs, the deputy directors of operations, who are the duty officers in the National Military Command Center, knew they worked for me, so that we would not have a situation in which they told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but not the Defense Secretary what was going on in a crisis. Since the State Department crisis center told the Secretary of State, I would then have to hear from the Secretary of State or the President something that I hadn’t heard from my own people. Rumsfeld and Laird made a big point of that, and I followed it. It worked pretty well. The relationship with the Chairman of the JCS and with the Joint Staff is extremely important if you are to have an effect on operational control, which by law is the Secretary of Defense’s business. As it happened, the director of operations of J-3 was C.J. LeVan, a lieutenant general in the Army whom I had known when he was a major back in the early ’60s. He had been the briefing person for the Army on the Nike Zeus system, so I had gotten to know him then. Those operational and international matters were personal priorities for me to learn more about and get more involved in. I didn’t have any great problem with the force structure and the development and procurement, because I had 15 years of background in those areas. I needed to get up to date, but they weren’t new
subjects for me. Personnel matters--staff, manpower levels, personnel policies, the
details of procurement--I didn’t find as interesting, although they are obviously very
important. In the division of labor that we set up between me and Duncan, he took
those on and did very well. Any good businessman would have a lot of experience
with those things.

Matloff: Did you believe that the previous defense reorganization acts had given the
Secretary of Defense sufficient authority to run and control the Department?
Brown: Yes. I think that insofar as the internal relations and operations of the
Department are concerned, the Secretary has, by statute, all the authority he needs.
His problems along those lines really are with the Congress, which never gives up its
authority under the Constitution--which it interprets broadly. An example was my
attempt to streamline things by making the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs a
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Manpower. I combined manpower, personnel, and
logistics and wanted to put the Assistant Secretary for Health and Medicine
underneath. I got a big argument from the House Armed Services Committee, with
my old friend Sam Stratton arguing that health and medicine is the lifeblood of
command, and that the military couldn’t operate unless there was an Assistant
Secretary instead of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health. Although I
could legally have made the change, they threatened to put in legislation that
overrode it, and I backed away from the fight. In the event, it didn’t make much
difference as to how we operated. It just made it less efficient. It continued an extra
staff, an extra car, an extra chauffeur--typical congressional behavior. That’s the kind
of thing that causes the Secretary of Defense problems from outside the executive
branch in running his own show. Inside, he has to worry about the people in the
White House who try to go around him or, occasionally, people in the military who try
to go around him. The services, of course, are always up on the Hill using the
congressional insistence that they be allowed to go around the Secretary of Defense.
There was some of that. It got bad at the end of the Carter Administration; it wasn’t so bad early on. You also have to worry about people in the State Department or people in the NSC staff who try to deal directly with the military. One morning I got a telephone call from the duty officer, the Deputy Director of Operations, who told me that an assistant secretary of State had called him up and said that the President had put the Secretary of State in charge of handling the Idi Amin crisis and that this assistant secretary of State had told the DDO to move an aircraft carrier. I told him that he didn’t take orders from anyone in the State Department, or the White House either (except the President personally), unless they went through me. I got back to Vance and pointed this out. He hadn’t told the man to do that. That sort of problem, rather than the legislative structure, limits the formal power of the Secretary of Defense. Some organizational structures, for example the organization of the Joint Staff—the fact that the Joint Staff by law then reported to the Chiefs rather than to the Chairman—made it more difficult. The Secretary of Defense does not have the authority to reorganize the Department as he likes. At that time the legislation did allow reorganizations in Defense to be sent up to the Congress and to take effect if they didn’t act, but Congress has since removed that provision.

**Matloff:** You did launch a rather comprehensive review of Defense organization soon after you took over. What was the impetus for that?

**Brown:** I felt that the organization ought to fit the person, and I did make a substantial reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which the Secretary of Defense clearly does have the authority to do, although Congress has made that harder. To caricature it, they say “There will be no more than seven Assistant Secretaries of Defense, of whom the following eleven will be in these specified positions.”

**Goldberg:** You still had to get authority, though, for under secretaries.

**Brown:** That’s right, and that took a long time, but it clearly was worthwhile.
Goldberg: Were you satisfied with that reorganization?

Brown: In the end, it did what I wanted it to do. I considered a rather more elaborate one, actually, but I decided that the Congress would only swallow so much. I was determined to elevate the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to an Under Secretary position, and I wanted to have one on the Policy side that balanced it. What’s called the Under Secretary of Policy was deliberately intended to be the Under Secretary for Plans and Operations, but I didn’t use that name, because the military would have found it intrusive. Nevertheless, that’s the way we tried to operate, and it did with some success.

Matloff: You apparently favored the elimination of one of those deputy secretary of defense posts.

Brown: I was able to trade the deputy secretary for an under secretary. What had happened was that they had split off a position for Bob Ellsworth that really was just intelligence. When there are two deputies the question always is: “Is there one who is an alter ego?” I was determined that there was to be one who was to be an alter ego, that it was to be Duncan, and there would only be one deputy secretary of defense. The same problem has now arisen on occasion between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary for Acquisition in the current set-up, because the Congress made the Under Secretary for Acquisition an Executive Level II position. I was able essentially to trade the Deputy Secretary job for an Under Secretary for Policy, which produced a more symmetrical situation—the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary as an alter ego, and two Under Secretaries, one on the Plans and Op side and the other on the Acquisition side.

Goldberg: That Assistant Secretary for Manpower and all the rest of it, you really threw a lot in there. Were you satisfied with the way it worked out?

Brown: Probably too much. There were suggestions that it should be instead an Under Secretary for Resources, in effect, which would have been
The question was: "Do you put PA&E in there, and the Comptroller in there?" We decided that that would require an Under Secretary position and would also raise some questions, because the Comptroller, like the General Counsel, really needs to be a staff person for the Secretary of Defense. The same thing goes for PA&E. What would have happened is that the Under Secretary for Resources probably would have become a glorified PA&E, and I decided that that might or might not be a good idea. It wasn’t worth the trouble it would have taken to do it.

Matloff: How supportive was the President in your efforts to reorganize?

Brown: He gave all the support I asked for. There was only so much he was going to do. His agenda got choked, and I didn’t really feel that I could ask him to go to the mat for these things. The President has to send up legislation, and he did, but after that it was up to me, and I did it.

Matloff: You did get that October 1977 law passed. Did your philosophy of management, as far as you know, differ in any way from that of your predecessors?

Brown: Everybody manages to his own image, or what he thinks are his own talents. There was a big shift, as there tends to be between Republicans and Democrats, from decentralization to centralization. In fact, when Laird came in, he announced decentralization and decentralized in the first year. Then he spent the next three years trying to get it back. That’s how it looked to me, and he admits it to me privately. Elliot Richardson was there too short a time to do anything. Jim Schlesinger had a different approach. He was good at concentrating on just a few things and ignoring everything else. I can’t do that. I’m more like Carter, although not quite to the point of specifying who will use the tennis court. Jim is a pipe-smoking big thinker. He will pick a few things, make a few deals, and let the rest go to hell or let somebody else handle it. He ran into trouble when he wound up with a deputy secretary he didn’t get along with, and who was too willing to take on everything,
even to take different positions from the Secretary's. Actually, Rumsfeld and I may not be all that different. He, if anything, is more active than I and is intent on trying to direct everything. My own management approach is to pick people whom I trust, and there are never more than a few in a big organization that you can know very well and therefore trust wholly. Where that applies, let them have a lot of leeway but be very accessible and allow communication, even around them, as long as they are informed. When instructions are issued, issue them through the chain of command. In other words, have relatively free communication up but clear lines of authority on the way down. I didn't only hear from the Under Secretaries and the Assistant Secretaries. There were probably 20 or 30 people who were free to come in and see me any time, providing they kept their bosses informed. But when I made decisions, I always issued them downward through channels.

Goldberg: But you did have a lot of end running by assistant secretaries after you set up the under secretaries, and they didn't always keep their bosses informed, either.

Brown: They were supposed to. On the R&E side there was not substantial end running, because Perry was so clearly on top of the job that I would rely very heavily on him. It was a subject I knew very well; I knew he knew it very well; I knew he would bring all the important decisions to me--he always did; he knew what I wanted; it worked very well. On the policy side it was more complicated; the issues were more complicated. There was always some friction, even between the people who liked each other, like Resor and McGiffert, because McGiffert and the other people in ISA didn't like the idea of an extra layer. They were encouraged to bring stuff to me when I knew more about it than either McGiffert, Resor, or, later, Komer. When it got strained, I would call the people in and tell them that they were supposed to work together and keep each other informed. But on something like SALT, for example, Slocombe, who had the responsibility, would come and deal directly with
me because both of us knew more about it than any of the people in between. And there were probably quite a few things like that.

**Matloff:** I take it that generally you were satisfied that you had enough leeway in making selection of assistants?

**Brown:** No problem.

**Matloff:** In retrospect, after you left the post you made a speech at the University of Michigan, in March 1981, called “Managing the Defense Department--Why it Can’t be Done,” in which you indicated that there were limits to effective reform that one could make in the Department of Defense. You went on to say that it “can be led so as to preserve most effectively our national security interests.” What led you to say this?

**Brown:** I was saying that if you think of management in business or industrial terms, and you think of things as being directed entirely from the top, it is tempting to say that of all the departments of the government the Defense Department ought most to work that way because the military is an authoritarian structure. My talk at the University of Michigan was intended to point out that yes, the military is an authoritarian structure within the uniformed military, but the military-civilian interface is always a touchy one, because in many of the services, the chain of loyalty extends, at best, up to the Chief of Staff, and after that the civilian authority is not always regarded in the same light. The classic expression of that was MacArthur’s statement that “civilian politicians come and go; my loyalty is to the Constitution of the United States.” He had no Chief of Staff to report to, and apparently had contempt for the Joint Chiefs--Bradley and the other chiefs--he was able to say he had no loyalty to any military or any elected official. That’s an extreme version, and it was properly dealt with, but there is a little bit of that in the whole military chain. Beyond that, the Congress is, as every Secretary has pointed out, a rather unwieldy 535-member Board of Directors, each of whom, if he or she were a director of a
corporation, couldn’t act in the way they do. The government is a complicated business. It is not a simple corporate management structure. Indeed, many corporate management structures aren’t that simple, either, but that was what I was pointing out.

**Goldberg:** You have all the interservice rivalry and the intraservice rivalry, so the authoritarian element is very much diminished.

**Brown:** But when the Chief of Staff decides something, it generally happens—within that service. Even that’s been eroded, and properly so, by the shift that has taken place over time from the chiefs to the unified and specified commanders, so that even that is not so rigid as it was. I mentioned that we really did recentralize. Rumsfeld had already done some centralized programming and budgeting. I did more, and continued that way, in the usual sequence. When Weinberger came in, he completely decentralized again and greatly deemphasized the OSD staff, which perhaps was more sensible to do when budgets are going up very rapidly than when they are not going up. But you pay for it later, when you wind up with a program that is not coherent, but just a stapling together of separate programs.

**Matloff:** To turn, if we may, to your working relationships, you mentioned a division of labor with the Deputy Secretary. Did that hold with both your deputies, or was there a difference in the way you divided the labor?

**Goldberg:** Did you select Claytor?

**Brown:** Yes. In fact, the President tried to steal him, and did, temporarily, to be acting Secretary of Transportation, but I told him that he couldn’t have Duncan and Claytor both. So he let Claytor stay. It was well into his administration; it was 1979, so that it had to be someone from inside. The only two people I thought about were Claytor and Perry, and Claytor was more complementary to me than Perry. Claytor essentially picked up the roles that Duncan had established, so we didn’t redivide things. Inevitably, Graham paid more attention to the Navy, because he knew it
better, but in terms of function there was no change. He picked up where Duncan left off, and even had the same people. Colin Powell was his military assistant, as he had been Duncan’s. 

Matloff: How often did you meet with these deputies, and other top OSD officials? Brown: Every morning at 8:00 I’d have what we called a legislative affairs-public affairs meeting, but it was, in fact, a way of talking about the issues of the day. At that meeting there would be the legislative affairs assistant, the public affairs assistant, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, my military assistants, the special assistant and his deputy, and, on one occasion or another, there would be other people. There would be a core group of perhaps 8 or 10 that would discuss what was on the agenda for the day and what were the important topics of the week. That happened every day. Then there were the more formal affairs, like the Armed Forces Policy Council, which met almost every week. I would try to meet with the secretaries of each of the services every other week or so. I would meet with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff every day, separately, to discuss what operational issues were on people’s plates and also what policy issues might come before the Chiefs. I would meet with the Chiefs as a group in the “tank” every week and we would discuss military-political and force structure matters. Seldom would we discuss specific programs, because, though the service chiefs are involved in that, they were not involved as a group. They were supposed to work through their service secretaries for that. On such issues as normalization of relations with China, and SALT II negotiations, meetings with the Chiefs in the tank were the basis for those.

Goldberg: Were Duncan and Claytor in accord with your centralization process? Brown: Duncan certainly was. Claytor came at it from the service background, but given that experience, he was cooperative. Where you stand depends on where you sit, and when he became Deputy Secretary of Defense, working into an existing pattern, he was just as tough on the services as Duncan.
Matloff: Were you equally close with both Chairmen, Brown and Jones?

Brown: Yes. Of course, I picked Jones. I had not picked George Brown. The question when I came in was whether he was going to be kept on. He had made the impolitic, though accurate, statement, about Israel not being as much of a strategic asset as some people claimed--

Goldberg: And are still claiming.

Brown: It’s clearer now than it was then. They were a strategic asset; they were also a strategic problem. Though they remain a strategic asset, they are less of one, and still also a problem. The question of his retention came up, I defended him strongly, and I think he appreciated that. We had known each other a long time. I think we got along well. He was a little bit more stiff-necked than Dave Jones. In fact, many of the Air Force people feel that Dave didn’t, and doesn’t, stand up for them enough.

Goldberg: Not a true blue-suiter.

Brown: That’s right. I don’t think that’s true of either one of them. Neither of them was a strongly biased service proponent, but Dave’s style was such that it made them more suspicious of him. He tended to keep things close to his vest. George was much more outspoken and open, which is what got him in trouble. We were close personally, but I think George and I probably disagreed more often. He was old school, in a way. For example, on the issue of civilian secretary participation in promotions of senior officers, which was another thing we talked about in the tank, George’s position was that, “The Chiefs know these people, we should be the ones who decide.” I agreed that he had a point. On the other hand, the very fact that they know each other so well makes for too much of a personal basis for decision. Where the criteria, as they do in many, but not all, senior officer positions, include how well would a particular person be equipped to deal with a new situation in the world or with a new policy, the very fact that the chiefs have played golf and had drinks with their colleagues for twenty years reduces their ability to give adequate weight to
criteria set by others. The civilians, the people who for better or worse establish the
criteria, should have a large say. That was an argument I had with George which he
never understood or gave in on; whereas Dave understood it a lot better.
Matloff: How did you view the role of the JCS in questions like the budget, or
strategy and force levels?
Brown: They obviously had a lot to say about strategy and force levels.
Unfortunately, what they said as a group was useless because it just added together
all their wishes. Whereas, if you talked to them individually, and away from their
staffs, they were much more sensible. In the tank there was always one of the iron
majors watching to make sure that they toed the line, which, again, says something
about how the chain of command works. It works in both directions.
Goldberg: Maxwell Taylor had a good story about majors sitting alongside him.
Brown: Yes. I didn’t pay much attention to their collective product on force structure
or budgets, but I did pay attention to what they would say personally. On occasion I
would have one of them in with me alone, and then I respected very strongly the
views that came out of their personal experience and judgment. On strategy, there
was, I think, an equal give-and-take dialogue, because, again, what they had to say
was very important. On occasion I was, I think, able to lead them through an
examination of political-military matters to what I think was the right conclusion, and
in many cases they influenced me as much as I them. Two that occur to me are
normalization with China and what to do about the crisis in the Horn of Africa. Both
of these have been discussed fairly openly in public, but I adduce both cases as
examples of a good process and a good conclusion reached by a military-civilian
dialogue on senior levels.
Matloff: Did you ever have any problems getting information from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff or the services? and if so, how did you get it?
Brown: On operational matters I didn’t have any trouble. I could count on the Chairman and the DDOs to tell me what was going on. From the services and from the Chiefs, on issues of policy, there were occasional problems. But most of that was handled, in the case of the services, on questions of force structure, budgets, and so on, by having an OSD staff which would go and do the work itself, if it didn’t get the information. At some point the service understands that it is better to have an informed decision rather than an uninformed decision made. That is on the program side. Program officers will occasionally conceal things from everybody, while they try to solve the program problems. That’s what happened to the A-12. To some degree it happened after I left with a program that I initiated and considered very important, the cruise missile program. The admiral who ran the cruise missile office did a good job, but it later turned out that he was playing around with the numbers in terms of the size of the program, overruns, and so forth. On the operations side and on the policy side, the key is how well the ISA staff works with the Joint Staff. I think it worked pretty well. The test there comes when you go to the White House for a meeting of the various working groups of the NSC. The names change from one administration to the next. If the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman or the Deputy Secretary and the Chairman or lower level people go over to working groups that involve State and White House staff, and the military and civilians are talking the same story, then it has worked. If they aren’t, it hasn’t worked. It generally, but not always, worked for me.

Goldberg: I’ve asked almost every Secretary of Defense about this business of the Joint Chiefs withholding information, not necessarily the most significant things, but information that properly should have been recorded.

Brown: I can’t think of events or instances, but I think there was real trouble in getting Op plans looked at by the civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They won’t hold them back from the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary, who they
regard as their legally constituted superiors; they will withhold them from everybody else, if they can.

**Goldberg:** I’m talking about the Secretary, specifically.

**Brown:** There may have been some instances, but I can’t think of a case where they didn’t tell me about something they should have. I told me.

**Goldberg:** I know of specific instances, for instance, with McNamara, when he didn’t know about them, and he assumed that he was getting what he wanted one way or another.

**Brown:** You never know what you don’t know. That is part of the problem.

**Goldberg:** Precisely. And there were specific instances where a Chief would come back and brief his own people about something and say he had decided that it was not necessary to inform the Secretary of Defense about it.

**Matloff:** Did you ever have a problem with split views among the JCS?

**Brown:** They tried to avoid those, of course. Secretaries of Defense welcome split views, which is why the Chiefs try to avoid them. I can give you one case. Again, it’s not a major issue. They always disagreed among themselves about force levels, but then they would generally compose them. There were some split views on START agreements; for example, with the Navy sometimes taking a different view. It didn’t matter, because in the end the question was whether they would support the agreement or not, and they did support the agreement. They might have preferred different pieces; for example, the Navy objected to limitations on some of its warhead numbers; the Air Force took a different view. But I don’t regard that as serious. One case where things came apart because of split views was on the question of retired military pay. This is one that appropriately should have been taken up with the service secretaries, and we did, but it wasn’t enough. The arrangement that gave a member of the armed forces no retirement pay until 20 years service and after that a very high level just didn’t make sense. We tried to change it. The President appointed
a commission to come up with a proposal. The Chiefs didn’t like it, even though it would have applied only to people who hadn’t entered the service yet, because they felt, probably correctly, that once that foot was in the door they would start cutting down on benefits promised to people who were already in. We tried to get the service chiefs to come along, and there was a split. I think Claytor almost had Tom Hayward aboard, but he fell off at the last minute. As a result, nothing passed, and now the Congress has imposed a more restrictive retirement system than we would have suggested. The reason we didn’t get anywhere was that the services went to Congress and the Congress wouldn’t act on it. Under the stringencies of future budgets, which we foresaw, the Congress has imposed a less generous arrangement.

Matloff: Did the splits ever get to the attention of the President? Did he ever ask you about them?

Brown: No. I think that the President counted on me to handle the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by and large, I was able to deliver.

Matloff: How often did you see the service secretaries?

Brown: Maybe every other week.

Matloff: How did you see their role, and what use did you make of them?

Brown: They were supposed to manage their services and deal with the programs. It varied; some did better than others.

Matloff: Did you ever employ them on matters outside the traditional interests of their services?

Brown: Rarely. I did try to get to get Claytor, because he was obviously a decisive person, to shepherd through this retirement matter. It didn’t work, but he did very well at it, anyway. When Hans Mark became Secretary of the Air Force, he volunteered to look at the space issues, including the space shuttle and what we should do there, which went beyond his own narrow area. So there were a few of those.
Matloff: Did you introduce any changes in connection with the services' participation in the budgetary process?

Brown: What I recall is that at the Defense Program Review we had the service secretaries and chiefs present. That was not a change from before. We would review their work and then we would have a staff review, at which they were not present, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were present, and we went over the whole budget. Then the services had a chance to reclaim decisions, of course.

Matloff: On the matter of working relationships, what were your relations with, first, Secretary of State Vance, and then with Muskie, his successor?

Brown: My relations with Vance were very close, because we had been associated for 16 years before that. Even while we were out of office, we had spent a lot of time together. He, Brzezinski, and I would meet weekly for lunch, and discuss things. I would be in communication with each of them very frequently and we would try to resolve things that our staffs couldn't settle. Vance was so busy doing so many things, and was away, as Secretaries of State are as chief diplomats so much, that I think I was sometimes better prepared on things than he was. On the other hand, everybody knows that he is a better person, so we all deferred to him. That won him some that he probably shouldn’t have won, where there was a difference between us. He and I, I think, worked very closely together. Although there were the usual bureaucratic frictions, we damped them down rather than amplified them.

Matloff: What do you mean by “a better person?”

Brown: He’s a person of enormous integrity and trustworthiness, so people tend to defer to him.

Matloff: With Muskie, you didn’t have the same relationship?
Brown: It was a little different. I had known him as a Senator, for a long time. He was at State for only eight months and never got fully up to speed. All Secretaries of State have a sense of importance of the office of the first minister.

Goldberg: Not Secretary of State Haig, though.

Brown: No, he thought of himself as president. Al had an extra dimension, but he had the first minister syndrome, too. All of them have that; even Cy had it to some degree. But with Ed it was more pronounced than with Cy, and it was reinforced by the fact that he had to rely more on his staff, since he didn’t have the same immediate grasp or lengthy experience. So he was more the traditional cabinet officer who represents his department. He also had some very strong personal ideas, but they were not a codified set. They would be something he felt strongly about, usually sensibly, in one area or another. In dealing with Ed one was dealing more with the representative of the State Department bureaucracy. Our relations were good. The conflict is sometimes between State and Defense, on a personal basis; seldom between Defense and the White House; always between State and the White House (the Assistant for National Security Affairs). Sometimes it is eased by the personal relationship and sometimes magnified by it, but it is always there.

Matloff: Did your views on national security policy differ from those of the Secretary of State?

Brown: I was more hawkish than Vance; no question about that. Clearly, when it came to negotiating with the Russians, he was more willing to make concessions. That’s inevitable, perhaps, from his position. I was charged with the military balance, although I was equally committed to arms control and reduction. He was, as State Department people are, more committed to getting an agreement than I was. With respect to other parts of the world, he and I probably were more in agreement than disagreement, as in the well-known case of the Horn of Africa, where he and I agreed and Brzezinski disagreed. Brzezinski was much more inclined than Vance to be hard-
line with the Soviets. I found real difficulty with the State Department, and Vance, to some degree, reflected this, in the way in which they regarded human rights behavior of foreign countries, at least in some cases, as more important than their attitude toward the United States. You had Pat Derian going down and messing up relations with the Argentines and Brazilians, who undoubtedly deserved it, but U.S. relations suffered badly as a result. That was a frictional point. Arms sales were one of the few levers we had in foreign policy, and that created some problems. In fact, it was a good idea to say that the presumption should be toward the reduction of arms sales, but whenever we got into a specific situation or issue, the general principle tended to be bent. In any event, this was an area of some friction between Defense and State, although between Vance and myself we moderated it.

Matloff: Did the role of ISA complicate or help your dealings with State?

Brown: I thought that our ISA people were, by and large, good, and were able to work quite well with the State and White House people. Among their responsibilities was the National Security Council coordination role.

Matloff: In conflicts over national security issues was the President more apt to follow the advice of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or the Assistant for National Security Affairs?

Brown: It depended on the issue. The Assistant for National Security Affairs has the advantage of being down the hall from the President. The Secretary of State tries to get around that and to overcome that barrier by having frequent meetings, and through a written nightly report to the President—at least Vance and Muskie did. But you can’t get around propinquity. The Assistant for National Security Affairs spends a lot of time with the President, and mostly what they are talking about is State Department business, not Defense Department business, which makes life somewhat easier for the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense also, in the past at least, had the advantage of an enormous mass—his budget, size of his staff, and all the rest—
which is why, in part, the conflicts are as I described them earlier, always between the Secretary of State and the Assistant for National Security Affairs, and sometimes, depending on personality, between the Secretary of Defense and the others.

Matloff: Sometimes the lines between the jurisdictions of the two Departments become blurred on national security, too, particularly as you get toward the present.

Brown: The issues go beyond either one. Security includes political affairs, diplomacy, and military matters. Depending on the nature of the issue, one or the other predominates.

Matloff: How about relations with the White House and President Carter? How often did you meet with him?

Brown: Usually a few times a week. Often in large meetings, frequently in much smaller ones, occasionally one-on-one--although he almost always liked to have someone present from the NSC staff.

Matloff: Did you have to clear with Brzezinski when you wanted to meet with him, or did you go to him directly?

Brown: At least when I was there, the Secretary of Defense had the great advantage that he could call the President on the phone and arrange a meeting. Usually there would be somebody else there. I knew how to do it. I was usually in my office by 7:00 in the morning and the President was also in his office by 7:00. That was one way to get the President on the phone and be pretty sure there wouldn’t be too many other people around. As a general rule, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General can call the President on the phone. The other domestic Cabinet officers are generally put through to some assistant to the President and have to report through him.

Matloff: In Brzezinski’s case, he refers in his book to having been given Cabinet status. Did that complicate your problems?
Brown: It meant that he could sit at the table on Monday mornings. Cabinet status is a way of getting perks and prestige. You will recall that for years the UN ambassador had Cabinet status. That made life hard for the Secretary of State, because in principle it meant that the UN ambassador could go see the President around the Secretary of State. Depending on the personal relationships, it could be either a real problem or an empty one. For somebody in the White House to have Cabinet status doesn’t really change anything in terms of relations with the outside, because they all have access to the President anyway.

Matloff: How would you describe Carter’s style of decisionmaking in national security matters?

Brown: He worked by papers, largely, although he would have frequent meetings. He is the kind of person, and I am, myself, who likes to read the whole thing, think about it, and then decide. And sometimes call, talk to people, and have people meet. But he would use Brzezinski to send up a straw man or paper, or raise an issue. He would get the positions of the departments. They would stack up the papers, and he would read them all. The staff person in the White House [in this case, Brzezinski], always has the last word, the final access to the President’s eye or ear, because he puts a paper on top and others do not necessarily see what is in that paper. I think the President operated on that basis, but didn’t always decide on the basis of that top paper.

Matloff: Did the President ever consult with you on other than strictly defense issues?

Brown: He started out by trying to involve me in the Corps of Engineers business, but I opted out of that. I told him that he could deal directly with the Secretary of the Army on that, because it was a civil function. He would consult me on technical matters that were outside the purview of Defense, simply because he recognized me as being the only person other than himself around the Cabinet table with a technical background. He consulted me, for example, on whom he should appoint as his
science adviser. He would consult me on the so-called broad national security area, but I don’t regard that as being outside the purview of Defense.

**Matloff:** Did his interest in playing a strong personal role in defense decisions, particularly in the first half of his administration, put you in an uncomfortable position vis-a-vis Congress or the services?

**Brown:** Yes, from time to time. He did have strong views on some matters and insisted on reviewing them at a level of detail that I thought was not a good use of his time, and didn’t always lead to good decisions. On the other hand, it kept the people in Defense on their toes. As you suggest, it was mostly in the first couple of years. After that, such differences as I had with him were much more over the level of the budget.

**Matloff:** I might ask, while we’re on this, did the increasing troubles of his administration in the last years give you a freer hand to develop your own program for Defense?

**Brown:** They distracted him, and it was clear that, in order to get some of the things he wanted, he was going to have to be more conciliatory toward some of the congressional views. Since some of those happened to coincide with mine, that made life easier. He never gave up his interests. He just had less time, was distracted by other things, and also got less involved.

**Matloff:** Did you feel you had enough autonomy and presidential support on major defense policies?

**Brown:** Yes. I felt that the issue of the size of the budget in the last couple of years created unnecessary trouble for the President. He was genuinely trying to deal with the deficit. That problem was at a level which, in the light of what happened in the following four or five years, seems laughably small. He was, nevertheless, determined to bring it down, and Defense suffered as a result. His image, in terms of a strong
defense, suffered as well. I think that was a mistake, but within that, I had a much freer hand from the President than I had from Congress.

Matloff: Did this give you a freer hand in the last two years?
Brown: Yes.

Matloff: You mentioned your relationship with Brzezinski. Did you ever find yourself in an adversarial role with him?
Brown: We disagreed on a fair number of things, more at the beginning than at the end.

Matloff: Did you get the feeling that he was playing the Secretary of State off against the Secretary of Defense when he was having his differences with Vance?
Brown: He tried to use me as his ally. In the beginning I agreed more often with Vance, and toward the end I probably agreed more with Brzezinski. There is no question he was trying to do that, and I was aware of it.

Matloff: Through what channels did you handle White House contacts with the Pentagon?
Brown: There’s more than one channel. On national security affairs, the people who dealt with it were the people in Policy, usually; sometimes the Under Secretary, sometimes the Assistant Secretary for ISA, very often the Deputy Assistant Secretaries. Whoever was in charge of a specific issue would work with the opposite numbers on the National Security Council staff. On political matters I almost always dealt through my special assistant—first John Kester, then Togo West, then Peter Hamilton. They dealt with political people at the White House. I personally would deal with the President’s immediate staff on the political side—Hamilton Jordan, Jody Powell, and toward the end the management expert (MacDonald) that he brought in as his nominal chief of staff, who never really had any authority, as far as I could tell.

Matloff: Did you encounter any problems in your working relations with Congress, and on what issues did you find them most sensitive?
Brown: I encountered difficulties with Congress. It was an interesting situation. The Congress increasingly—in the ’70s much more than in the ’60s, but much less than in the ’80s—tried to micromanage defense. They will especially and understandably engage themselves when it deals with their districts. But the multiplication of congressional staffs has meant that on policy and program issues, which aren’t necessarily connected with their districts, they will get into it because some staffer, who wasn’t elected or appointed by anybody and who is not responsible to anybody and will go off to another job pretty soon, will play his own hobbies either for his own advancement or, more likely, just out of professional or intellectual interest, analysis, conclusion, bias, or preference. So life has gotten very complicated. That said, the system can still work. I found that I was able to work quite well with the chairman, ranking minority members, and many of the members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, and even better with the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, which had a long tradition of close professional attention, small staffs, and some of whom were still around from the early ’60s. Senator Stennis, for example, was always somewhat distant, but a courtly, kind, and straightforward person who obviously had the best interests of the defense establishment and of the country in mind. Oddly enough, Senator Goldwater, with whom I had lots of differences in the ’60s, was nevertheless a very helpful person on all these matters. So was Sam Nunn, who was gaining seniority. I had trouble with Scoop Jackson. Scoop was a disappointed presidential aspirant, one whom I would have supported for that office, actually, had he ever gotten far enough. He had become embittered and felt passed over, first by Kennedy, and then by Carter in a different way. He tried to undercut the administration’s policies on arms control.

Goldberg: He had a very strong staff man pushing them through.

Brown: I know. Richard Perle was there whispering in his ear. That was a special case. On program matters, by and large Scoop was supportive, except that he
thought there wasn’t enough. I was in a somewhat peculiar position, because the official position of the administration and one which I supported, although I was out on the edge, was to moderate expenditures and not engage in the kind of buildup that later took place in the ’80s. I found myself getting more support on the administration position from the Gary Hart’s and Senator Levin’s than from the Republicans or even a few of the then more experienced Democrats. At the same time my attitude toward Defense was much more like that of Senators Stennis, Nunn, or Warner than it was like that of Hart or Levin or Tom McIntyre. The latter group, the liberals, would be supporting most of the administration’s positions. The Republicans and some of the senior Democrats would be opposing them. I liked the analytical approach of some of the young liberal Democrats. Yet I knew that if the liberals really had their way, they would impose a defense program that I couldn’t agree with or support. So I was in an unusual position from that point of view. The same thing was true to a lesser extent in the House. On the Armed Services side, Mel Price, although mentally well, was physically feeble and gradually fading away, and I found myself working more with Aspin and others. On the Appropriations Committees, George Mahon was still House chairman when I started and he was a tower of strength. Other members of that committee were very good, too, including some of the Republicans. Jack Edwards was the senior Republican on the Defense Appropriation Committee in the House. The three of us could have come up with a defense program that would have been perfect. There were also staffers whom I remembered from before. When George retired and Joe Addabbo from New York came in, it became much more politicized. It was much more a political trade business—still not impossible, but not nearly so good. On the Senate side, we had the advantage that John McClellan, and then Stennis, was chairman, and there was a good staff on that side as well. I would say that my relations with the Congress were better than either I or they had expected when I came in.
Matloff: How would you characterize your style in dealing with them? Some Secretaries have been fairly confrontational in their presentations, particularly with the budget.

Brown: I wasn't confrontational; I tended to be somewhat didactic. That may have offended some. There was a little bit of the McNamara style of "I know it all and here it is," in me, but I wasn’t as confrontational as he, let alone as Dick Cheney has proven to be.

Goldberg: But you remember what a good impression McNamara made during those first few years.

Brown: Yes, but that style grated eventually, and that’s what was remembered. The members of Congress who were still around in the mid-'70s who remembered or had heard of McNamara did not remember or had not heard of the first few years. They remembered the last four years.

Goldberg: Indeed, you were more knowledgeable when you came in than McNamara.

Brown: But he learned very fast. In any event, my style was that I am a political appointee, a Secretary of Defense in a Democratic administration, and a Democrat, but this is not a partisan subject and I am setting it forth in terms of what is best for the national security and I’m not allowing political considerations to interfere.

Indeed, the Congress’s reaction was, “Yes, that’s what we want you to do. We don’t want you to help the President. You tell us the straight goods and then we’ll do what we want and we’ll put the politics in.”

Matloff: What degree of success do you feel you had with them, particularly on the budgets?

Brown: Very mixed. For example, and I will conclude with this, in 1977 the President told me to review the budget. This was in January, and by February I had reviewed it. I really scrubbed it; I think I took out $2 1/2 billion. Nobody else in the Cabinet was
able to help the President in that regard. Bert Lance and I agreed that it was the right thing to do. It canceled a few programs. We took it to Congress, and they accepted the size of the cut, but none of the cancellations. They reduced the budget by that amount, but took it out of the wrong things. That set the tone. That actually was only a fraction of the changes that they made, and the changes they made were not a very large fraction of the total. But they covered a lot of items. It was a fight all the way after that on specific programs and on totals. The Congress would complain that the President had sent up too little money for Defense, and then they would cut it. Now they don’t complain that he has sent up too little money any more, but they cut it a lot more, and they still take the money out of the wrong things.

Goldberg: They didn’t complain about Reagan asking for too little, did they?
Brown: No, as I say, it had already changed between 1980, when they were still complaining that we had sent up too little, and 1983, when they started to cut it again.

Goldberg: But you had projected increases in the 1980s?
Brown: Yes; whether we actually would have asked for them is not obvious, but we had projected increases. We will take this up on another occasion.

Goldberg: We have made very good progress.
Matloff: Thank you very much.