Goldberg: This is part IV of an interview with Dr. Harold Brown, taking place on March 4, 1994 at 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., at 10:30 A.M. The interview was conducted by Alfred Goldberg and Ronald Landa of the OSD Historical Office.

Brown: One point you asked about last time about which I have had additional recollection is President Carter's concern about U.S. funding of the relocation of Israeli airfields from Sinai into Israel proper after the Camp David accords. I was charged with working with Ezer Weizmann to determine what U.S. participation would be. I guess you got a comment from someone that Carter was afraid I was going to be looking for airfields all over for them. I think Carter was worried that I (and the profligate Pentagon) would not negotiate hard enough with the Israelis. We on the U.S. side managed to limit U.S. commitments to rather austere relocation. Afterwards Carter said to me that he was proud that I had managed to do that. That's just a footnote to something that you asked me about. Now you have a whole set of questions on organization, management, and people?

Goldberg: Yes. Perspectives on OSD organization and management and whether as a result of your experience and reflection you see the need now for further change in the structure, working relations, and functions in DoD. What would you do if you could make changes?

Brown. Some of it has already been done, as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols bill, which properly deemphasized the role of the service chiefs and made the chairman of the Joint Chiefs the principal channel for military advice. Also, by giving the chairman full authority over the Joint Staff, the result has been a substantial improvement in the quality of the Joint Staff. There were fears that the Goldwater-Nichols bill would elevate the chairman to a competitor with the secretary of defense. There's no question in my mind that the chairman now has more prominence, not only when he is a charismatic figure like Colin Powell, but
even if he is lower key, like Bill Crowe or Shalikashvili. That means that the secretary of defense has to know his business, or a strong chairman can take over some of the policy formation, or a good deal of the force structure decisions, and that should not happen. It won’t happen if the secretary has a strong civilian staff. On balance, I think that it’s worked out very well. As to the relations between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services, I believe that further centralization is desirable and, I think, more feasible as the defense budget goes down. The smaller an organization is the more appropriate it is to run it in a centralized way. The Department of Defense by the end of this decade is going to be half or less than half the size that it was in the mid-1980s. You can say a factor or two doesn’t make any difference, but it does. Moreover, the requirement for joint operations has increased in the past 15 or 20 years, and as a result the services have to work more closely together. They won’t do that without considerable help and encouragement from the center. So I think more centralization in planning and programming is necessary. Execution has to be, and should be, done through the services, and that leaves a substantial role for the services. The desirability of having civilian secretariats in each of the services is less, but there is probably a sufficient residual role to keep them around for some time. They do serve a purpose, insulating the military from some of the political problems. An incident like Tailhook shows how important it is to have a layer of civilians between the secretary of defense and the service chiefs. The only question is whether there has to be a large service secretariat to do that or whether you could do that with an under secretary in the office of the secretary of defense, which is the way they do it in the United Kingdom, for example. Goldberg: In fact, the service secretariats have grown substantially since Goldwater-Nichols, haven’t they? They are much larger.
Brown: In size, perhaps; but not necessarily in function. Actually, almost everything has grown. Part of the reason for that is that the oversight keeps growing. The more the Congress, the press, and the media pay attention to and second-guess the Department of Defense the more you are going to have an increase in the size of the various layers that deal with those outside institutions.

Goldberg: Do you have any thoughts about any further changes in the larger national security structure, beyond DoD?

Brown: I think that the National Security Council is the appropriate form and the appropriate way for the president to be served. The National Security Council staff has ebbed and flowed in competence, in importance, and in accomplishments versus mischief-making. It clearly served a mischievous role during the latter half of the Reagan administration. It served, in my judgment, a very effective role during the Bush administration. It’s not clear how it’s functioning in the Clinton administration. I wouldn’t say it is invisible, but it’s not easily discerned. The one thing that I think has been missing in past decades, and which the Clinton administration has tried to do something about, is the coordination of economic policy with national security policy. That has become an increasingly important problem during the 1980s and still more in the 1990s. By establishing a National Economic Council, President Clinton has, I think, effectively dealt with the problem of coordinating economic issues, and I have some evidence that the National Economic Council and National Security Council staffs are working together effectively. I have advocated for a long time that there be one representative of the economic activities or the economic sector of the administration on the National Security Council. The problem has always been who that should be, because in different administrations the leading economic figure has variously been the secretary of the treasury, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the director of the Office of Management
and Budget. (There is also always the chairman of the Federal Reserve System, who can’t really be included in such an activity because he is not a member of the administration.) The Clinton administration has actually done something about including economics, but I think considerably more attention is needed to it. It is part of a more general problem of interaction between domestic policy and foreign security policy. As soon as you get into domestic policy there are so many constituencies involved—indeed every constituency—that coherent policymaking is almost impossible. One advantage of national security and foreign policy that presidents appreciate is that there has in the past been a more restricted set of constituencies both outside the government and inside—State, Defense, CIA, the National Security Council. But as soon as you bring in economic policy you tend to bring in all of domestic policy, quite aside from the pressures that are exerted directly on foreign policy by various domestic ethnic constituencies, whether they are the Jewish community on Israel, or the Black community on South Africa, or the Greek community on Greece and Turkey, and so forth. That’s the biggest problem that I see. The rest is almost idiosyncratic to the individuals involved. If the president is directed entirely toward foreign policy as George Bush was, things tend to run quite smoothly, and they get a lot of attention. When you have someone like President Clinton, who has much less background in foreign policy, and may be less interested in it and less confident about his own abilities in it than he is about domestic policy, then things tend to get away from him, especially if there is no single very strong surrogate whom he trusts and who takes hold.

Goldberg: On the subject of the role of the secretary, based on your experience, how could an incoming secretary best go about getting hold of his job?

Brown: Again, it depends on who the person is and what his or her background and experience is. There are some general observations I can make: one is, that
it is important to pick three or four things that you want to accomplish and keep working on those because, like it or not, your in-basket is going to be full of crises and problems that you are going to have to deal with, and unless you’ve established some things that are your own initiative, you will be almost purely a prisoner of events.

Goldberg: In December of 1992 I sent Secretary-designate Aspin excerpts of interviews with you and four or five other secretaries. This was included, among other things. I was looking for exactly that sort of thing. Whether he ever saw it or not, I don’t know. It went up to his counsel, Larry Smith.

Brown: Larry has his own ideas about things. I don’t know whether it got any further.

Goldberg: It may not have, but at any rate I thought there was no harm and it might do some good.

Brown: A second point is that good people are more important than you think. That is to say, it is very important to have a good staff. The Aspin experience suggests that you can have too many good people whom you didn’t pick for their compatibility, but that, it seems to me, is a secondary worry; it is worse to have plodders. It is also important, in my judgment, not to bring in only people whom you know. This is something, actually, that members of Congress are especially prone to do. They will bring in their staffs and put them in all sorts of jobs because those are people they are used to working with. That can work well or badly, and it’s been true of almost all of them. Les Aspin did it, and Dick Cheney did it before him. Some of those work out well, and some not. It is actually a phenomenon not confined to Cabinet officers who come to those jobs from the Congress. It is even more characteristic of incoming presidents, who use not legislative staffs, even if they were members of Congress, but their campaign staffs. Those are the people who made them president, those whom they trust,
and they are gathered around in various White House positions, which leads to some interesting phenomena. I’m getting ahead of myself, but this is something I have wanted to get off my chest for some time. This produces a “them-versus-us” psychology, especially with respect to, but not limited to, the Cabinet members. The White House Staff or the campaign staff look at the Cabinet and say, sometimes with reason, that they are not loyal to the president, have their own agendas, have been captured by their bureaucracies and their own institutions. Then you sometimes start to get sniping in the media by the White House Staff at the Cabinet, and occasionally vice versa. The White House staff and the president see criticisms coming out in the media, which sometimes do come from the Cabinet departments, but seldom from the Cabinet secretaries, and they expect the Cabinet secretaries to be able, in the case of the Department of Defense, to control what any of two million people say. They have trouble doing that themselves in the White House, and so you get into that kind of problem occasionally. Then some scandal or major issue erupts or the president gets in trouble, and the reaction then is to circle the wagons. The staff, which was the campaign staff, feels more beleaguered, and pulls in on itself, and exacerbates the problem. I’m not sure what the solution is, but I’ve seen it happen in almost every administration of either party.

**Goldberg**: One solution might be to put the campaign staff out in other agencies and departments.

**Brown**: They do that, but very low level people. The high level campaign people want to be next to the president. It is also true that usually they don’t know anything about the workings of government; what they know about is getting a president elected, so they don’t do too well in the Executive Branch outside the White House.
Goldberg: There was a time when the campaign manager of the successful candidate was the postmaster general, and the others got jobs there, too. You gave a speech at the University of Michigan in March 1981 about managing the Defense Department, and why it can’t be done. What is your view on it now?

Brown: In your question you characterize that as poignant and pessimistic. That may be a misreading. The words “Why it Can’t be Done” perhaps were a poor subtitle, because what I was saying is that you can’t manage the Defense Department like a business, for various reasons.

Goldberg: Jim Schlesinger has been saying pretty much the same thing, hasn’t he?

Brown: That’s what I said then. There is no fiscal bottom line in Defense. As Jim points out, the government of the United States was set up by the framers not to be efficient, but to avoid the concentration and abuse of power. So far as the Defense Department is concerned, that means that the 535 members of the board of directors, namely the Congress, are in there making it as inefficient as possible; not intentionally, but they are serving a different purpose. Now, it’s more than that. It is the uncertainties of function, the providing for the common defense at a time of peace; it raises all sorts of questions--do you really have to do things, and so forth. Again, in that talk I did say that it can’t be managed in the way that a business is managed, but it can be led and you can get things done. So I’m not that pessimistic. I do have concerns, because it has seemed to me that the trend, both up through 1981 and probably even more since, has been toward a fragmentation of authority, an increase in media attention and congressional attention, without a corresponding increase in knowledge and expertise and capability on the part of those in the media and the Congress who are paying this additional attention. Now that the world is seen by most as not having any military problems after the demise of the Soviet Union, the tendency to say that
the Defense Department should serve purposes other than defending the United States, or that it's not very important to have a capable military, has gotten stronger and stronger. So in that sense I decry the trends, but I think it still can be handled.

Goldberg: Do you think cutting congressional staffs back would help?

Brown: I've said that many times. Congressional staffs now amount to about 20,000 people, which is about four times the number that existed when I first came to Washington in 1961. The other statistic that I use is that when I first testified before Congress the appropriations bill probably contained no more than about 50 line items, and now it's 5,000. You can say, that's made the government more responsive, but responsive to what? It's certainly not more effective.

Goldberg: More responsive to Congress.

Brown: You can say that Congress represents the people. But the people who exert influence on Congress are always exerting it for very narrow interests.

Goldberg: Talk about some of the officials who worked with you, beginning with your deputy secretaries.

Brown: I have the highest opinion of both Charles Duncan and Graham Claytor. Charles came to the department as deputy secretary of defense with very little experience in defense. He was President Carter's choice. President Carter urged him on me. I spent a day with Charles and concluded that he would do well and that he and I could get along very well, and it worked out that way. He had very extensive business experience, and he was a tough, good, capable manager. I have seen him stare down officials of other departments; I have seen him out-negotiate corporate executives; I think he did a great job. Graham Claytor, who had considerably more interest and experience in defense, and had served as Navy secretary for a year and a half or more before he became deputy secretary,
had some of those same characteristics. Graham Claytor was probably more volatile and outspoken than Charles Duncan, who was more the impassive, thoughtful type, but both of them were very decisive and I was able to trust them completely both with what I delegated to each of them, which was substantial, and in my absence to deal with things that I would have dealt with myself had I been present. I was very fortunate in both of those, and so was the nation. My own style was to arrange things so that the deputy was an alter ego, that is, was brought in on everything, but delegated some specific areas while others I would expect myself to take care of. The ideal way to have it is to have a situation in which the deputy knows what he can decide for himself, what he ought to take to the secretary of defense and not decide for himself. But if he decides something and the secretary disagrees, the secretary shouldn’t overrule him, he should let the decision stand. I think I behaved that way, both with Charles and with Graham. There were very few cases in which they didn’t bring to me something that they should have brought to me.

**Goldberg:** How about your under secretaries?

**Brown:** Bill Perry, of course, was a gem. That could have been a dicey relationship, because he was serving in a position in which I had served, and we were both of a technical background, but he and I never disagreed and I had so much else to do that I don’t think he had any problem with my intervening inappropriately. I have said, and I continue to believe, that he is probably the person who did that job the best of any of the people who held it, before or since, and I have known all of them and have been one of them myself. I’ve had no problem in recommending him strongly for the subsequent positions he has held in Defense. He is first rate—thoughtful; decisive when he needs to be; low-key. He is not a hyperactive manager, that is, he doesn’t pound tables, but he gets things done. I was very pleased with him. There were two under secretaries
for policy, first Stan Resor, and then Bob Komor. Stan is another low-key person, and I think he did a good job. I don’t think he was terribly happy at it, partly because he and McGiffert, who was the assistant secretary for international security affairs and who had served with him in the Johnson administration in the Army, did not have a completely comfortable relationship. McGiffert occasionally didn’t keep Resor informed. Perhaps I didn’t enforce the chain of authority clearly enough, so that Stan, who liked detail, may have felt that he didn’t have access to enough for detailed decision-making, but he did well while he was there, which was only about a year. Komor, who had done very well as assistant for NATO affairs, continued to concentrate on that in the role of under secretary, and did all right on the other things, as well.

**Goldberg:** He was very low-key, too, wasn’t he?

**Brown:** He was the opposite. He did extremely well in dealing with many of our foreign partners, and I think he accomplished quite a lot. I don’t think his subordinates liked him as much as they liked Stan Resor. One thing that he pushed for, that we didn’t get done, was a joint civilian-military team to look at operations and crises on a permanent basis—an operations staff. We didn’t succeed in it, but we did open it up to some degree for the OSD staff on the policy side.

**Goldberg:** The Congress has usually opposed that in OSD, hasn’t it?

**Brown:** That’s right. That’s why we wanted it to be joint staff /OSD, that would report both to the secretary and to the chairman. In fact, as I may have mentioned earlier, the term under secretary for policy is a euphemism; the intention was that it be an under secretary for plans and operations and that was the role that we worked into but we didn’t get far enough. So much for Komor, who, again, I thought quite capable.
The service secretaries: except for Graham Claytor, I think they were not at the same level of competence or capability. They were all more than adequate, but they just weren’t as good as Duncan, Claytor, or the under secretaries, in my view. Cliff Alexander got crosswise with some of the military people, but he also accomplished a fair amount, in terms of dealing with personnel issues. My only real complaint about him was that he tried to politic independently in the Congress and occasionally in the White House. He managed, for example, to keep Fort Dix open. But it’s closed now. Claytor was very good in dealing with the Navy brass. Ed Hidalgo did a good job of negotiating contracts. He was in the Navy’s secretary job for about a year and a half, and did all right; I don’t have any big complaints about him, or about Stetson. Hans Mark, the only one of these people whom I had known personally before becoming secretary of defense, did a good job as under secretary of the Air Force. As secretary, he became perhaps too much of an advocate for some programs, both for continuing the B-1—he did continue the R&D—and for the space shuttle, on which he had earlier worked very hard for a long time. He helped convince me that we should rely largely on the NASA shuttle for launching military and reconnaissance payloads. That turned out to be a mistake, for which I take responsibility in large part, although it was also pushed very hard by the Office of Management and Budget. Fortunately, we kept open the Titan launcher line so that we weren’t completely out of business when the shuttle proved to be able to fly only about 10 percent as often as advertised. I would say that the service secretaries were by no means inadequate, but they weren’t outstanding, except for Graham Claytor.

The military: I thought George Brown and Dave Jones were both very capable. They were very different. George was outspoken and that caused him trouble. He was in trouble during the 1976 campaign for having said that Israel
was a strategic liability to the U.S.--the same thing that got Strobe Talbot in trouble 15 years later. I spent considerable time and effort saving the jobs both of George Brown and of Al Haig. I was never sorry I saved George Brown’s and was seldom sorry that I saved Al Haig’s. George had a strong sense of the prerogatives of the chiefs, while at the same time being quite loyal to his civilian superiors. He actually became quite ill after his first year with me and was out of action for most of the final six months. He died in 1978. George was highly respected and liked by his military colleagues. We typically would argue in the tank about such things as who should make decisions on promoting senior military officers. He, representing the views of his colleagues, would say, “We know these people, we golf with them, drink with them; who’s better qualified to decide who should get a four-star job?” That had a certain weight. On the other hand, the insularity that that promotes suggests that, at least on occasion, it’s important to have somebody with different criteria make the selection, especially when what is involved these days in four-star jobs is quite a bit more than military command. It includes diplomatic responsibilities, interaction with the highest levels of civil government, etc. When new initiatives, programs, and goals are set by an administration, the people who were qualified to carry out the former ones may not be the best to carry out the new ones. We never really settled that; it was a kind of difference which, however, always remained friendly. Both George and Dave Jones would see me essentially every day, to fill in what was going on in operational terms. The idea of relying on the chairman more and more as the link with operational questions and with unified and specified commanders, I think, took hold during that period. Strictly speaking, though, the unified and specified commanders report to the secretary of defense; the chairman and the chiefs are only staff. That is the proper way to have it, in principle, and then you use the chairman as much as is appropriate to
actually be the link. Dave Jones was quite different. He had the reputation among his colleagues, not only in the other services, but within the Air Force, of playing things very close to the vest, of being too close to the civilians. And although that may have limited his effectiveness with his military colleagues, his ability to think things through from a non-service point of view and to look at things with a fresh view I found extremely helpful. I think it made him a very good chairman. He brought the chiefs along on the strategic arms limitation talks, for example, in a way that George Brown would probably have found it rather hard to do. Dave had an intellectual force that could be very effective on some things. He probably had less operational sensitivity than George Brown or some of the other chiefs would have had. I think both of them were very good. On the other chiefs I don’t have a lot to say; I thought that they were all quite competent. Rogers, perhaps a little too much by the book, a little stiff, but thoughtful, with high integrity. Shy Meyer, more brilliant, a bit erratic sometimes, inventive, didn’t always think before he spoke. Carter picked Meyer over Vessey, who was the Army’s choice and who would have been my first choice, because he was very impressed with Meyer’s articulateness and depressed by Vessey’s non-responsiveness. It was that same articulateness that caused Shy to coin the phrase “Hollow Army” which was interpreted in a somewhat different way than he meant it and caused us a lot of trouble. The only question in my mind had been whether Meyer should be the chief then or four years from then. He made some real and substantial innovations, and did a good job for the Army. Navy CNOs are always harder to understand, because they tend to be the most inward looking and protective of their service--Hayward, I think, more than Holloway. They were both aviators, which means that they are outgoing, unlike the submariners tend to be, but in my view pretty set in their ways.

Goldberg: All secretaries of defense have said the same thing about the Navy.
Brown: I've already talked about Dave Jones. He was not always completely trusted by his colleagues in the Air Force, who thought he would cut deals with the secretary of defense in the hall without consulting with them first. Well, that wasn't always a bad idea. Lew Allen I had known for 20 years, since he was a major. He did a very good job. Interestingly enough, for a technical officer, which is what he had been, I think he did a very good job on the other parts of the Air Force, that is, operations, maintenance, that sort of thing.

Goldberg: How did he come to get the job, since he was a technical man and there hadn't been one before?

Brown: He had gone from being director of NSA to being commander of Systems Command. George Brown also had come from Systems Command, but he had a lot of operational experience. I asked for two recommendations from the secretary of the Air Force, I got two. Lew Allen was one. I looked at several others, but I recommended him to the president.

Goldberg: Any assistant secretaries you want to mention?

Brown: There was a large group of them. One thing that I would note is that of the assistant secretaries, Russ Murray was very good at writing. He, Komer, and Woolsey were the people who could express themselves most vividly in writing, and that gave them an advantage in pleading their cases. Russ was very productive of alternative program decisions, and although I only supported him against the service proposals perhaps 10 percent of the time, that forced the services to be much more sensible the other 90 percent. John White, who was with me only for a year or so, before he became deputy director of OMB, set things off in a good direction, and Robin Pirie, who followed him as assistant secretary for manpower, did very well. Jerry Dineen, an assistant secretary who also served as Perry's deputy, did a solid job. There were also some people at the deputy assistant secretary level who I think did very well. Walt Slocombe and
Lynn Davis both did a very good job. Actually, at the beginning, because it took what then seemed a long time to get the presidential appointments through (it took several months, but now takes two years), for dealings with the National Security Council, the interagency dealings, Duncan and I relied enormously on Walt Slocombe and Lynn Davis, and they continued to do very well right up until the end of the Carter administration.

**Goldberg:** They are back again.

**Brown:** Yes, Davis is at State; Slocombe at Defense. Pirie is back in the Navy, as assistant secretary. So also is Rich Danzig, who was Pirie’s principal deputy, now as under secretary of the Navy. There were a lot of very good people there, and this underlines my comment that it is very important to get good staff, not only at the level that reports directly to you, but the next level down. Again, my own style was that communications between the secretary and all levels, within limits, was encouraged, although instructions were given down the chain of authority. In the event, a secretary of defense can deal on a one-to-one basis with as many as 15 or 20 people in the office of the secretary of defense, but he shouldn’t have more than half a dozen reporting to him directly, if he can help it, which is not the same thing—that is to say, the papers should come through a restricted number of people.

People outside--Vance, Muskie, Brzezinski--I don’t know that there is anything more to add. Brzezinski had what I would call childlike attributes: spontaneous, imaginative, very expressive, and he has turned out to be right more often than most people in predicting what would happen, at least in the Soviet Union and its successor states. He hasn’t been so successful in predicting things outside of there and central Europe. So far as I could tell he didn’t keep other people’s views from the president, he always included them. His paper always went on top, but with Carter that didn’t mean much because Carter
always read everything. Vance: not the same intellectual force, but enormous integrity, negotiating skills, and openness to listening. Muskie was rather uncomfortable in the Executive Branch, it was so different. He never could get used to the thought that the secretary of state really had to read all these papers. In the Congress you operate through your staff, and intuitively.

**Goldberg:** Do you think that may have been one of Aspin’s problems, too?

**Brown:** He read all of the stuff; I think his problem was that he was too used to thinking out loud in public, which is OK for a congressman, but not for a Cabinet member, or for the president. President Clinton has something of the same problem.

Presidents: The ones I served with, the ones whose styles as commander in chief I know most about are Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter, even though I served two weeks into the Nixon presidency and one day into the Reagan presidency. (Even the Reagan people were a little reluctant to turn the button over to somebody else before Weinberger was sworn in.) Carter was very detailed, really cared about the subject. Once he decided something it was not easy to change his mind on these matters. This was not his public reputation, which was that he wavered back and forth. On the matters with which I dealt with him, he thought about them quite a while but was then hard to change once he had decided. Johnson, everybody knows about. I was one or two levels down then, but saw a lot of him. He was intimidating, there was no question about it. Kennedy was a cold fish, but an attractive personality, and very much of a thinking person, with a skeptical attitude toward everything. I have known the others a bit, some more, some less. I have met Clinton only once or twice, but have met all the others many times. Interestingly enough, the one most likable as a person may be the one who was never elected to national office--Ford. I don’t think that’s an accident. I think there are characteristics--what you have to do to be president.
Goldberg: He also had one of the most effective White Houses, I think. He didn’t have a campaign staff to bring in.

Brown: That’s probably true. I’ve known him a long time, since 1961. He’s a very likable person, and a lot smarter than people think.

Goldberg: We’ve interviewed him, and I knew him at the Warren Commission; he was a member of that.

Brown: Eisenhower’s warning about the military-industrial complex. That’s often quoted, not least by people who were part of the scientific-technical complex about which he warned in the very next sentence and who never pay attention to that part. It is a pressure group that works for its own interests. I guess I’m prejudiced here, having been both associated with it and fighting part of it most of my life, but it is a group whose relation to and value for the national interest is probably closer than are most pressure groups. At the same time, they are going to try to help themselves. The national security state which has been decried as having damaged the United States clearly got to be a very big activity. It peaked, in fact, at about the time that Eisenhower made the statement, and has been declining as a part of American life ever since. The then 10 percent share of GNP went down. The Vietnam War brought it up near that again, not quite. It went down to 5 percent in the Carter administration, up to 6 1/2 percent, is down to about 4 now and will drop to 3. In terms of competition for resources, by the end of this decade the Defense Department will take a percentage of GDP that is about equal to the paperwork on health care. That is to say, if you take the generally accepted figure that 20 percent of health care is paperwork, then by late in this decade that paperwork will equal the Defense Department budget. So as a competitor for resources, it’s not very much. The degree to which it has distorted our thinking, industry, and technology, I think has probably been disproportionate to the percentage. Some of that’s been
good, and some of it's been bad. It's made us more aware of the rest of the world; it has probably contributed as much to our international competitiveness in economic terms as it has hurt. I think that the warning was justified, but that, in fact, the worst fears never took place. I think I did share that concern; everyone who was secretary of defense should have shared it, and most did; and I think the concern is considerably less now. My friend Bob McNamara seemed to think that all of our problems could be solved (this is what he was saying 5 years ago) if we cut the defense budget from 6 percent to 3 percent. That's happened, and our problems aren't all solved. Still less will they be solved by cutting it from 3 to 1 1/2. Is it appropriate to cut it to 3 or so? I think that's probably right.

Achievements. I would put arms control near the top. SALT II, even though it was not ratified, nevertheless was observed by both sides. The other side of that coin, actually, was the December 1979 NATO decision on intermediate range missiles. You regard that as an arms control decision, which it was, but it was also a decision that announced that the U.S. would continue to extend its deterrent umbrella over Europe, that it would remain engaged in Europe, and from my point of view that was part of the attention that we paid to NATO. To put NATO at a very high level, I brought Komer in, did all kinds of things, and spent a lot of time on it. That decision and the decision to deploy the missiles, in 1983, marked, in my view, a turning point in the life of the Soviet Union. Many people give a lot of credit to the Reagan arms buildup for that purpose, and even to SDI. I think those did have a marginal effect, but the principal cause of the demise of the Soviet Union was its own internal contradictions, especially in economic and governmental managerial terms. The people, as they learned more about the outside, just realized that it was not working inside, and Gorbachev was one of those who realized that.
Goldberg: Do you know who agrees with you on that? Richard Nixon has said that.

Brown: It's true. At the same time, however, one of the major elements in that decision on their part was a recognition that they weren't going to win in the struggle for Europe. That is to say, neither the appeal of their system nor their ability to intimidate was going to solve their problems for them. A part of that was the cohesion of Western Europe with the U.S. that was expressed by the decision to deploy the intermediate range missiles. It turned out a great many people into the streets to protest, but not enough to overturn the decision. That, I think, must have had a very strong effect on the Soviet leadership. That, arms control, and the determination to deploy what you had to deploy, was, I think, a big victory. Incidentally, the Carter administration made the December 1979 decision. I don't know whether in fact we would have been as determined to deploy in the '80s had we been reelected. But it probably would have happened anyway because, in fact, in the 1982-83 period the Reagan administration didn't have this as an extremely high priority. Some people did, but it was the bureaucracy that carried it out. It was at the Richard Perle level and below.

Other achievements—I think the basis for the military-technical revolution that became apparent in Desert Storm clearly was laid during the late '70s. Not just Stealth, but the combination of data communications, intelligence gathering, counter-electronic capability, and so forth. We initiated all of that. Much of it was actually purchased, trained, and deployed in the Reagan administration. The political-military decision to actually use it was made by Bush, and it is at least possible that it took each of those three administrations to do what it did, because it is not clear that either of the other two would have done the rest. In other words, it is not clear to me that the Reagan and Bush administrations would have developed them; it is not clear that the Carter and
Bush administrations would have bought them; and it is not clear that the Carter and the Reagan administrations would actually have used them.

Landa: So it’s the right administration at the right time.

Brown: Could be.

Goldberg: We interviewed Perry before he left office in 1981, and he gave us the full story on all of these developments that were underway at the time. He was obviously a very strong force behind them.

Brown: Carter came in saying he was going to cut $5 to $7 billion a year from the defense budget. I have often felt that I was not very successful in doing all that should have been done for maintaining defense capability. But others have said to me that Carter said he was going to do that, and in the end we got a 3 percent a year real increase, so that’s something of an accomplishment.

Disappointments, or things not completed: Clearly the Iran rescue attempt was the worst disappointment. Had that worked, I still doubt that the administration would have been reelected, but the U.S. lost a good deal of international prestige over that attempt. I still think we were right to try it, because it lanced the boil. Had we not done it, we probably would have gotten into some sort of war, or we might have. But there’s no way that it could be regarded as less than a disaster.

Another disappointment was that we failed to get a civilian-military operations and crisis team put together. Dave Jones was interested in the idea of a group that would report to the chairman and the secretary and not have to be created for each crisis, but be there all the time.

Goldberg: Did you push hard for that?

Brown: I pushed, but when Jones came back and said that the chiefs were going to make a big stink about it I knew that the Congress would do something very negative if we tried to do it overtly. So instead we opened up the war plans to
some of the people on a continuing basis. What we found was that what were supposed to be war plans were really just very general statements of, at most, logistics. Logistics is very important, but they hadn’t had enough input on the political-military side from the people in ISA, and we were able to open up some of that. So it was a partial success.

Finally, a failure to stem congressional micro-management, which of course is a Sisyphean task. That is probably a lot harder than managing the Defense Department, and it has since gotten a lot worse, so I guess I can console myself.

Relations and contacts with secretaries of defense in OSD. I guess I saw Weinberger once before he went to China. Before he took over, I mentioned to him four different programs that I thought he should really keep an eye on and push. One was Stealth; one was something that NSA was doing; one had to do with a certain antisubmarine warfare program; and one was cruise missiles and precision guided munitions. As far as I know, he never paid any attention to any of them. But that’s all right. The programs went on. His interests lay elsewhere. Fair enough. I spent a couple one-hour sessions with Cheney. Substantive, and I think he did face some of the issues I raised with him.

Goldberg: How about Carlucci:

Brown: He wasn’t in long enough. He and I knew each other, so I did speak to him a couple times, but I never went in and had sessions with him. Fred Iklé called me over a few times to fill me in and try and get my support for one thing or another.

Goldberg: He had trouble getting support inside, so he had to go outside.

Brown: Yes. I never felt it was incumbent on them to ask for my advice. It might have been wise for them to do so, or it might not. I have spent a lot more time with Aspin and Perry, but that’s because we worked together before, and I probably will spend a fair amount of time from now on.
On your last question, I have spoken and written about it. Clearly, our relations with Russia are very important. I look at things the following way: In terms of foreign affairs, not only the U.S. but the world has spent the 20th century containing Germany and Russia. That’s a long time, a whole century. Germany now is contained, and Russia well but not completely. The world has put so much effort into those during the 20th century that you could almost say that the 20th century has been wasted insofar as advancing the cause of humanity and making things better for most people. That’s not quite true, because technology has been operating and that has changed the nutrition level and the health level of probably two-thirds of mankind for the better. One-third is no better off, maybe one-quarter is no better off. But that has not really been the result of directed effort, it has almost been an accident. The next 50 years in terms of foreign affairs from the U.S. point of view are going to be consumed, I would think, in completing the socialization of Russia (socialization in terms of child development), and in trying to incorporate China into that same system in the way that Germany has been. Japan’s incorporation isn’t complete, either. And trying to do those in an environment that includes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the emergence of medium-size rogue states who may try to use them. I think that’s a tough agenda. But I don’t think it has the same probability, which wasn’t ever a high one but high enough to worry about, of a global conflagration that would have really messed up the world. That’s the way I think about the future.

Goldberg: Thank you very much.