RECOLLECTIONS OF WASHINGTON

1947 - 1949

DONALD F. CARPENTER
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

15 June 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Interview with Mr. Donald Carpenter

On 12-13 June 1981 I visited and interviewed Mr. Donald Carpenter at his home on Hillendale Road, Mendenhall, Pennsylvania, at which time he delivered into my temporary custody his personal copy of his "Confidential Recollections of Washington, 1947-1949." I subsequently took his copy to Washington and Xeroxed it for inclusion in the OSD History files.

During my interview with Mr. Carpenter, I asked how and why he came to write his "Recollections." He explained that while he was working in Washington in the late 1940s, he happened to be meeting one day with Forrestal and Al Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff. Carpenter was not explicit on when the meeting took place, but said that it was not long after someone in the Air Force had published his World War II memoirs, which lauded the role of air power in winning the war. The Navy was in an uproar: Forrestal, much distressed by the situation, elicited agreement from Gruenther and Carpenter would never write memoirs because they only caused trouble. Some years later, however, after Forrestal's death, his private "diaries" were published. Carpenter said that at the time he did not write the memoirs, he felt that Forrestal had gone back on his word. He was not aware of the memoirs, he said, that Forrestal's family had arranged for publication without Forrestal's prior permission.

A few years after that, Carpenter was visiting some friends who kept dogs. One of the dogs gave him a severe bite on the leg, almost severing a nerve. A vigorous tennis player at the time, Carpenter found himself laid up in the hospital for months. He said it was a year before he recuperated. During this time, he decided he would write his recollections.

There are at present two other copies of the "Confidential Recollections"--the ribbon copy, which Mr. Carpenter deposited at the Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, Greenville, Delaware; and another Xerox copy at the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. At the time of our meeting in 1981, Mr. Carpenter did not feel the existence of his "Recollections" should be known generally. Our agreement at that time was that I could copy them and cite them as part of my interview. Hence, they form an integral part of the interview, but may not be referred to directly.

Steven L. Rearden

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.6
Date SEP 17 2013
Mr. Richmond D. Williams, Director
Eliothorian Mills Historical Library
Greenville, Del.

Dear Dick,

Confirming our phone conversation, here is "Copy II" of a document that I have entitled CONFIDENTIAL RELATING TO J. WILLIAM J. LINDSEY, 1947-1949. The document covers three periods:

1. Member of the "Industrial Advisory Group" to the Atomic Energy Commission.

2. Chairman of the "Military Liaison Committee" to the Atomic Energy Commission, and Deputy to the Secretary of Defence.

3. Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

There are also some letters and citations which were sent me personally.

I never intended that this document would "see the light of day", but since you request it, and since it was some 30 years ago, I guess you may put it with your more interesting papers on an unrestricted basis.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
10/11/75

Xerox of this book
in Harry S. Truman
library, Independence,
Mo. 64050

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDC, WHS
IAW EO 13826, Section 3.5
Date: SEP 17 2013

Corporation Development Committee
It's now more than eight years since I first went to Washington in a so-called "official capacity." I've thought it might be well to make notes of some of the interesting experiences I had but have hesitated to do so for several reasons. They were not particularly unusual or interesting, many of them were highly "classified", "secret" or "top secret", and I didn't want to start on such a task because recalling the past invariably makes one's mind dwell on the past rather than on the more important present and future.

Nevertheless, here I am on vacation at West Chop, Massachusetts. An injury prevents me from playing as much tennis as I'd like so maybe this is as good a time as any, and time has disposed of most secrets. Even the "H bomb" which we never mentioned except in the "bosom of our atomic family" is now a byword throughout the world.

Secretary Forrestal on one occasion suggested to a few of us that so many prominent officials had written memoirs about the war that it might be as well if we didn't. Well, his diary has been published and I don't propose to publish these, so jotting down a few items for my own satisfaction and for immediate family and friends can't be considered a violation of his suggestion. So here goes!

In the late summer or early fall of 1947 I was, by request, attending a meeting of the Board of Directors ofRemington Arms Company. During the meeting Fred Hess, the Secretary, told me I had a telephone call. It was Admiral Lewis Strauss who, by way of introduction, told me we had met in connection with some U.S.Rubber
business before the war.

He was calling to ask if I would attend a meeting of some sort of industrial group to advise the Atomic Energy Commission. He hastily touched on the nature of the group and the members. All I could gather was that it seemed a bit vague but that the membership sounded like an industrial "WHO'S WHO."

While he held the line, I asked the advice of the Board and as a result told Strauss I'd attend the meeting but without any commitment that I would become a member of the group.

That night, much to my surprise, the radio carried a story that Dave Lilienthal had appointed an "Industrial Advisory Group" to the Atomic Energy Commission and among others I was to be a member.

As I sat in the roof restaurant of the Hotel Washington a few days later looking over the city, which had been in such a turmoil during the war but which had apparently returned to normal, I wondered if this meeting which I was about to attend would be just an interesting contact or whether it would be a highly significant milestone. It proved to be the latter.

At the meeting were Dr. Oliver Buckley, President of Bell Laboratories; Dr. R. E. Wilson, President of Standard Oil of Indiana; Dr. Gustav Egloff, Vice President - Director of Research-Universal Oil Products Company; James Parker, President of Detroit Edison, who was chairman of the group; Walker Cissler, Vice Pres. of Detroit Edison, secretary of the group; Dr. Paul Fose, Vice Pres. in charge of Research of Gulf Oil Company; Isaac Harter, Vice Pres. of Babcock & Wilcox Tube Company; and Bruce Brown, President of Pan American Petroleum Company. We were told that Gerald Hunziker, Head of the Department of Mechanical Engineering and also of Aeronautical Engineering at M.I.T., and also chairman of the National Aviation Council of America would also be a member, but he was
present that day.

The meeting was addressed by Sumner Pike who gave a rambling talk on patents in the atomic field, by Dr. Jim Fiske who gave an excellent outline of the science of atomic reactions and by Dave Lilienthal whose remarks as to what he hoped to accomplish through the group were far from specific.

After the discussion it was suggested that we meet again at Oak Ridge where we could gain greater familiarity with the problem. We were very uncertain as to what it was all about. We were told we were "ad hoc", which I later learned meant temporary, and that we were a "goup" not a "committee." I don't yet know the difference. We wondered if we were expected to submit a report--no one seemed to know so I, at least, and I presume several others also, felt we might pursue this matter a bit farther and expected that through expert chairmanship the mission would be clarified. It never was.

We went to Oak Ridge and saw the amazing diffusion plant built and operated by the Union Carbide Company, also the laboratory operated by them. We saw the magnetic separation plant built by Eastman Kodak and evidences of the thermal separation with its huge boiler house. We saw the reactor built as a semi works by du Pont prior to the huge Hanford installation.

We got some ideas as to how industrial contractors worked with the commission and also how the community of Oak Ridge was operated under the restrictions of secrecy. Here was a difficult problem--running an entire village under most unusual circumstances. How could a young scientist and his wife and children carry on in a healthy manner when everything around them was owned and operated by a government agency and when secrecy permeated the entire atmosphere?
We saw "Nepa", the Fairchild Aviation Company project on nuclear propelled aircraft. Some said this was a development of utmost urgency and importance. Others said it was a waste of time, money, manpower and materials.

We met several members of the "M.L.C." which we found was the Military Liaison Committee. We sensed a certain lack of cooperation between the M.L.C. and the A.E.C. Each seemed eager to tell us its side of the story without interference from the other. It was a bit puzzling to us.

The group felt a trip to Hanford would be in order—for how could we comment intelligently without knowledge of our subject? Although the A.E.C. didn't appear eager, still they arranged for the trip and most of us boarded a N.W. Airlines plane at Chicago bound for Yakima, Washington, and thence to Hanford.

There was still no progress in clarifying the objectives of the group and on that plane Bob Wilson began to assert some leadership suggesting to Jim Parker, our Chairman, that various aspects of the report be assigned to different members. The idea seemed to be favorably received and I was asked to study and report on the organization of the A.E.C. in relation with its ability to deal effectively with industry. This subject had appeared to me to be important, and the more I saw of the cumbersome A.E.C. organization the more I felt effective industrial contact was hampered.

At Hanford we saw the huge plant built and operated by du Pont but recently turned over to the General Electric Company as a result of the government's agreement with du Pont to relieve it of any responsibility after the war was over.

We were impressed, of course, with the size and complexity both of the scientific problems and also the commercial ones. Here again we saw a community problem but it seemed less acute than at
Oak Ridge, perhaps because government control seemed to be much less rigid.

We saw the serious problem of shortage of uranium and the very low utilization of this precious material in the process. A means of recovery or a less wasteful method seemed highly desirable--in fact it seemed about the most important feature of the entire A.E.C. operation.

We found G.E. was working on this at Hanford, G.E. was also working on it at its Knowles, N.Y. Laboratory. Standard Oil Development Corporation was working on it at Bayonne, N.J., Blaw Knox was working on it somewhere, Union Carbide was working on it at Oak Ridge. Lots of people were assigned to the problem--so many it seemed to verge upon the hectic, and when I found that some of this activity reported in to the Commission through the "director of Hanford operations", some through the "director of N.Y. operations", some through the "director of Oak Ridge operations", and some through the Director of Research, I felt there was a sad need of some more sensible approach to this most urgent problem.

This further emphasized the importance of a change in the A.E.C. organization structure. Here was a problem of greatest importance reporting into the General Manager of the commission through four of his direct subordinates.

A trip was made to the Knowles Laboratory operated by the General Electric Company just outside of Schenectady. It was a very large and obviously expensive laboratory. We picked up a rumor that G.E. had agreed to operate jointly on the condition that the government would permit them to build a nuclear laboratory at government expense.

In the lab we saw "NEPS" which was to be a nuclear means of propulsion power of submarines. This project was more favorably regarded than NEPA because it was felt there was much more chance of
success and that the approach to the problem was sounder. NEPA seemed to have an atmosphere of amateur ballyhoo about it.

As I drove my car through a hard snow storm from Schenectady to Southport, Connecticut, I wondered what this group activity was all about. The visits were very interesting but we didn't seem to have any mission or leadership and I couldn't see that we were accomplishing a thing.

Although I was devoting only about one day out of every two weeks to this activity, the balance being on my regular duties as Vice President and Asst. General Manager of the Remington Arms Company, still I was aware that members of the company begrudged the time I was spending and I was eager to get something done and pull out. Others of the group began to feel this way also.

A meeting in New York was held to dig into the business of the group. An agenda was prepared and circulated to the members. Most of us, I am sure, attended with confidence that at last we would accomplish something constructive. Many of them had prepared their sections of the proposed report and I had prepared mine.

The meeting was addressed in the morning by Mr. Cox of the Naval Engineering firm of Gibbs & Cox. It was most interesting but I couldn't see how it was a bit constructive. In the afternoon, discussion rambled without any direction and the meeting adjourned. We hadn't once referred to the agenda and we hadn't taken a single constructive action.

A few days later I met Isaac Harter in New York to make a direct contact with some officers of Union Carbide Company to ascertain their views. Nothing significant developed.

I met with Carroll Wilson, General Manager of A.E.C., to outline my views of the A.E.C. organization. It seemed to me that when he had so many agencies reporting direct to him there was lack of
coordination. There was no one under him with sufficient scope of action or authority and he, himself, could devote so little time to any individual or any problem or program that this situation was proving to be a detriment to industrial cooperation. He didn't appear to share my viewpoint. A year or so later, however, the organization was changed very much along the lines I suggested.

Several other meetings were held with no specific results.

One Saturday we met in Washington. C. K. Davis, President of Remington Arms Co., phoned me that he had received a phone call from Secretary Forrestal and suggested that I contact Dr. Vannevar Bush.

I had known "Van" Bush for many years. He had been my teacher of electrical engineering at M.I.T. and I'd met him several times later when he was Vice President of M.I.T.

I met him at the Cosmos Club in Washington that afternoon. He told me the Military Liaison Committee to the A.E.C. was being reorganized; that it was to have a civilian chairman; that this individual would also be chairman of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research and Development Board and, further, that he would be Deputy to the Secretary of Defense on all atomic energy matters. In other words, he would be the top atomic energy official in the Military Establishment. All military matters pertaining to atomic bombs or any other atomic weapons, defenses or reactions would come under his jurisdiction.

Van told me Secretary Forrestal wanted me to take that job. I was stunned.

At dinner with the members of the Atomic Energy Commission that evening Lewis Strauss, a commissioner, and Carroll Wilson, G.N., urged me all through dinner to accept. Other members indicated their similar desires.

I took the sleeper and got out at New Haven on a very cold
Sunday morning. It was cold driving home and no one was awake. I went up to our bedroom, undressed and climbed into bed. When Louise awoke she was surprised to see me there, but I had a bigger surprise. I told her to brace herself for the shock and recounted the previous day's bombshell. Secretary Forrestal wanted me to be the top military man on all atomic matters.

It was only two years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The atomic bomb was held in universal awe. It was a mysterious monster that most people hoped didn't really exist but they knew it did. And here I was asked to take charge of the military applications of this monster for the most powerful nation on earth. I couldn't quite grasp it.

That Sunday morning we went to church. We did a lot of hard thinking. I talked it over with C. K. Davis. What should I do?

Aside from the awesome significance of the assignment, there were the considerations of what about my job with Remington Arms Company. True enough the request was for only six months to set up the new organization but there was always the risk that it might last longer.

Marcellus H. Dodge, Chairman of Remington, received a letter from Forrestal outlining the urgency of the assignment.

C.K. suggested that I go to Wilmington and talk with the du Pont people which I did. I discussed the matter with Ruly Carpenter, Walter, Jr., Crawford Greenewalt, Charlie Cary, Tom Brown and Ed Lincoln. It seemed obvious that they were sorry the problem had come up, but since it had, they felt the company should cooperate, but the decision was purely my own.

Phone calls from Lewis Strauss, Carroll Wilson and Van Bush urged me to accept, but I told them I hadn't yet decided, and that there were many negatives. The du Pont Company had tried hard to
stay away from military implications of its business in peacetime—particularly atomic energy. Remington Arms had a good record during the war and hoped to keep it so. With my connection with both companies and my name Carpenter there was a serious risk that unfavorable publicity would come to du Pont, Remington and myself.

I had just about made up my mind to turn it down and was returning to Bridgeport. I had made the decision but felt very uncomfortable about it. Then the phone rang in Charlie Cary's office. Colonel Hinds was coming to Wilmington to tell me something he could not relay by phone. At the R.F. Station he told me the Berlin Blockade had tightened. Decision had been reached to push through, and General Clay had been sent word to shoot if he must to get supplies through to Berlin. Military authorities in Washington were alerting for war, they expected it at once. The atomic bomb was their foremost weapon and the top military position on atomic matters was vacant awaiting my decision and arrival. He urged me to come at once and take charge.

Although I had already intended to decline, the combination of my uneasiness at this decision plus the urgency represented to me which I was in position to check at least partially because of the contact I already had with the A.E.C. and the knowledge that although there were many others probably better qualified than myself, still my industrial experience, education and A.E.C. contacts were better than most and if I could report promptly it probably would be helpful to the Military Establishment. It was a hard decision but I made it.

I told Colonel Hinds I would come, but I would not come for two weeks. The delay would permit C. K. Davis to return from vacation before I left and it would force existing military officers to make vital decisions in the emergency. I couldn't possibly be in position to take them until I had gained complete control of...
the entire subject. I had one further reservation: I wanted to visit each atomic energy commissioner, each service secretary and each military chief personally to ascertain if they approved my appointment before I accepted. This I did and was universally urged to accept.

There were many things to be done. I was to be on leave of absence without pay for six months. I would receive government salary during that period. We would rent our house furnished and rent a furnished house in Washington, for in spite of the prospect of a hot Washington summer, Louise said she’d come with me and move down as soon as Judy (then age 9) was through school.

Lt. General Leslie Groves who had headed the "Manhattan Project" during the war was retiring as head of AFSWP (Afswap) Armed Forces Special Weapons Project which was a tri-service operation on all atomic activities left to the military after the AEC was set up. His position was to be filled and General J. Lawton Collins asked me if I would approve Colonel Kenneth Nichols for this position. I met Nichols, learned a bit of his background as Groves' deputy and approved. He was appointed and advanced to the rank of Major General.

At a meeting with Secretary Forrestal I told him I had twelve (12) questions I would like to have answered. He asked me what they were and he gave me twelve (12) answers within ten minutes. Those answers still stick and I regarded his brilliance and clarity of mind as amazing.

Forrestal asked me to come to dinner at his house that evening. There were about eight men there and by the end of the evening I had identified all but one, a Mr. Hopley. I couldn't figure out what he was doing there. Later we drove back to our hotels together and found that Forrestal was urging both of us to
take a government assignment. Right then and there we "formed a
union" and worked closely until he left Washington. He had been
President of Northwestern Bell Telephone with home in Omaha, and
became head of the civilian defense planning agency which issued
the "Hopley Report." Although it was later quashed by Truman and
ignored by Symington, I believe it laid the foundations for this
vitally important activity.

Departure from Remington was with mixed emotions. True I
was to be gone only six months, but there was always the possibility
that the departure might be permanent. At a reception held for me
on this occasion I felt very uneasy. These were close friends and
business associates. We'd been through the depression, the New Deal
persecution and the war together. I was leaving them, but then again,
maybe I wasn't. I was undertaking a responsibility the dimensions
of which were unknown. I'm afraid I wasn't as gracious as I should
have been. I was disturbed and I left.

Dr. James Conant had been chairman of the committee on Atomic
Energy of the RDB. I talked to him briefly in Cambridge as I was
to be his successor. He expressed his pleasure at my taking over and
offered every cooperation. It was obvious that he was happy to be
relieved of this responsibility.

Louise had intended to go with me to pick out a house, but
at the last minute a bad back put her in the hospital. So I started
for Washington in my car alone.

At Princeton I lunched with Dr. Oppenheimer. I hadn't heard
much of him before but it was recommended that I see him because of
his broad knowledge and experience in the atomic field and his posi-
tion as chairman of the General Advisory Committee to the A.E.C.

He was most cordial and helpful. We had a long discussion
on the scientific aspects of atomic energy and he outlined the basic
theories on atomic fusion as well as fission and mentioned the huge potentialities in weapons utilizing the vast energy released from the fusion of hydrogen.

In view of later disclosures on Oppenheimer's attitude toward the "H bomb" it has seemed surprising that he should have voluntarily taken that occasion back in 1948 to tell me of the potentialities.

As I drove south it was as if I were in a dream. The vast change in my personal affairs and the overwhelming responsibilities had a sense of unreality and I probably was quite bewildered when I finally arrived in Washington at midnight in a howling rain storm.

In order to set the record straight I wrote Forrestal that I would receive no compensation from du Pont or Remington during my tenure in Washington and that I was a director of Seneca Falls Machine Company and a member of the Corporation of M.I.T. I would have absolutely no business connection with any of these organizations. I advised him I owned some common stock in various industrial companies which I would be willing to disclose to him or anyone he might designate. I did not wish to sell them because of the taxes I'd have to pay by so doing but I promised I'd buy no more while on government duty. Forrestal checked this letter with Tom Clark, Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and wrote me he was satisfied.

I told him I was a Republican, that I was not in sympathy with many of Truman's administration policies and that I proposed to give my opinion when asked. I told him I did not wish personal publicity and would refuse it except on occasions when the job required it. He was satisfied.

Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall had invited me to dinner with Forrestal, John Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy, and Stu Symington, Secretary of the Air Force. I greatly appreciated the opportunity
of meeting these officials, but nothing of any importance transpired. The fact that the dinner was held for me, however, indicated the importance of the assignment.

General Joe Collins invited Louise and me to visit their home in Washington to attend the reception for General Omar Bradley when he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army succeeding Eisenhower. This was before I went to Washington and we were unable to attend.

After dealing with Junior Officers during the war, I could not but be impressed by the courtesies extended to us by secretaries and "4 star generals".

At Secretary Royall's invitation I joined his mess. There were about forty (40) members consisting of the highest ranking officers and civilians of the army and a few members of the Secretary of Defense's offices. It was a most interesting group. I lunched there most of the days I was in the Pentagon although I later joined Secretary Symington's mess at his invitation and lunched there on a few occasions.

These contacts were both pleasant and very helpful. Here I could talk on an informal basis with the top members of the Military Establishment. Individuals who come to mind as most interesting and congenial are Ken Royall, Ike Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Joe Collins, Gerry Persons, Gordon Gray, Bill Draper, Arthur Hill, Jack Ohly, Bill McNeil, Tracy Voorhees, Ferd Eberstadt, Stu Symington, Louis Spatz, Hoyt Vandenberg, Art Barrows, Al Wedemeyer, Laurie Norstad, etc.

The atomic tests were to be held in Enewetok in the Pacific. General Hull was in command and Rear Admiral Deke Parsons was his deputy. Parsons suggested that I attend these tests and in preparation I took a concentrated series of "shots." I'm afraid that they added further to my rather confused state of mind and were
partially to blame for my general lack of energy and enthusiasm upon arrival at Washington. To offset this feeling I took heavy doses of vitamins prior to important meetings. They helped but the later reaction was very enervating.

Due to the critical situation of the Berlin blockade, my presence in Washington was more important than a visit to Einewetok, so the huge flying boat, the "MARS", which was set up by the Navy for me was not used.

My office in the Pentagon was an excellent one, very close to Forrestal's and I was assigned an excellent secretary, Miss Rosik, and a superb aid, Commander "Dick" Ashworth. My staff consisted of a tri-service group of about forty officers under the direction of Dick as director of the staff.

At the time of my arrival in Washington all members of the Military Liaison Committee were at the Einewetok tests. This gave me an excellent opportunity to become familiar with the problems prior to their return. In this, Dick Ashworth was an invaluable assistant.

The M.L.C. was created by statute. It came about because Senator Vandenburg had been fearful that the A.E.C. might be unmindful of the military requirements of atomic energy in which case the M.L.C. had the right to file its objections directly with the President. This made the M.L.C. a sort of "kibitzing" organization rather than a creative one. The A.E.C. gave it all the information it requested, but was always apprehensive of its actions. On the other hand the members of M.L.C. were always on the lookout for gaps in the A.E.C. program which might adversely affect national defense.

It was a situation fraught with possibilities of jealousy and discord, and I felt these emotions existed in substantial degree.
Added to this was the strong feeling which existed between the Military and the scientists of A.E.C. It was said, and with some truth, that members of the A.E.C. thought all military officers were damn fools and officers thought all A.E.C. people were damn crooks. This was an exaggeration, of course, but still there were strong feelings.

Forrestal, sensing this situation, told me my job was to bring about close cooperation. He pointed out that the Military was held responsible for the defense of the country, and its most important weapon was manufactured and held in custody by a civilian organization over whom the Military had no authority, and with whose members the military officers were not on speaking terms. It was my job to clear this up.

This was a very difficult problem but it was further complicated by the tri-service rivalry within the M.L.C. itself. This, I thought, must be cleared up first for how could we expect cooperation from others if we didn't have cooperation among ourselves?

There were six officers on the M.L.C., two from each service. I was asked to approve all these appointments. I advised that I wanted specific recommendations from the three military chiefs, each recommending two men from his service. These men were, however, to have important operational assignments at the same time. I made this requirement for two reasons, first to make certain they recommended a man of real ability, and second to make certain he was in close contact with his service's activities. On this basis a few previous members had to be replaced.

We had an excellent group of men. They were Major General Kenneth Nichols and Colonel John Hinds of the Army; Rear Admirals Parsons and Oftsie of the Navy; and Lt. General Louis Brereton and Brig. General "Bim" Wilson of the Air Force. General Brereton was later involved in the "China incident".
There was great jealousy between the three services. If an Army representative proposed an action, the Navy and the Air Force must both have a say in it. The Army generally was sympathetic with the interests of the Air Force, but the Navy was suspicious of both, particularly the Air Force. The Navy had its own aviation service. The Navy "Flat Tops" and planes had been vital factors in our victory at sea. They were afraid the Air Force would be told to operate all planes in all services. In this case the Navy would get a most serious setback.

The Navy had opposed unification and since the unification law was passed the Navy was "dragging its feet." Almost every time a unification program was suggested you could count on the Navy to oppose it.

So here on the N.L.C. we had seriously discordant elements, let alone the bad situation with the A.E.C. How could we tackle this problem? On this, Dick and I studied for the two weeks prior to the return of the group from Einewetuk.

When they returned we held our first meeting which was conducted strictly under parliamentary procedure. We were there for business not to just talk.

I thought that if we could assign each member a specific function which he was to handle for the group he would become so occupied with the development of his assignment that substantial progress would be made and service bickering and jealousy would diminish.

I proposed this procedure and to illustrate my point I suggested the following assignments:
General Nichols, Army - Production of fissionable materials
Colonel Hinds, " - Security
Admiral Parsons, Navy - Weapon Design
Admiral Oftsie, " -
General Brereton, Air Force - Personnel
General Wilson, " " - Atomic Power

Then the fur began to fly. The Air Force recognized Parsons' ability as a weapons designer but the atomic bomb was of primary interest to the Air Force so they should have a deputy with Parsons. Conversely, the Navy must have a deputy on Atomic Power because atomic submarines were vital to the Navy.

The Army had to have deputies in both activities. So it went and soon it seemed that all three services would have to be represented on each function. This would, of course, completely defeat the objective and make things worse than they had been. So I suggested they think it over until the next day, and in thinking it over try to decide one question "Do you want to trust each other and run an efficient operation, or can't you trust each other?"

The next day we met and approved the procedure. It worked, service bickering practically stopped. Each member was so conscious of his tri-service responsibility that he leaned over backwards to be sure that he was fair to the others. On a few occasions when the newspaper headlines told of fighting between the services, the M.L.C. members would chuckle and point out that we had no such fights. They began to take pride in our set-up which they said was the only one like it in Washington. We were making progress.

The M.L.C. and its staff had a very low "esprit de corps." It badly needed a psychological "build-up." Its activities had lacked importance and significance and an M.L.C. appointment had not been a mark of recognition--more nearly it was a "side-track."
The entire activity needed selfrespect. To start with we requested General Gruenther, director of staff for the all-powerful J.C.S. (Joint Chiefs of Staff) to give the M.L.C. a briefing on the war plans. This seemed a revolutionary move for only the highest officials ever saw the war plans. But war plans must necessarily contemplate atomic weapons and defenses and this was M.L.C. business, so why shouldn't we be briefed? We should and we were.

From time to time military chiefs or service secretaries would ask me of the status of certain activities. I invariably referred these inquiries to the M.L.C. member who was advisor on the subject. This helped to reflect the importance of their assignments.

In various ways we tried to build up morale and it was gratifying later that the services occasionally requested the opportunity of making new appointments to the M.L.C. or its staff.

One such request was from Secretary Symington. He sent a letter to me requesting that Dick Ashworth, a Navy man, be replaced by an Air Force man as director of the M.L.C. staff. The reason he gave was that the Air Force was the service most interested in atomic energy. I didn't agree with his reasoning; I didn't think it appropriate that Dick be replaced and I resented such a request from a service secretary. I didn't want to turn it down categorically so I took Symington's letter back to him and asked him to withdraw it. He did.

I made many trips to become familiar with A.E.C. and military atomic activities. With Nichols I flew to a faraway point to inspect the construction of a depot for storing atomic weapons. I presume its location and construction are still classified so I cannot comment on where I went or what I saw or what suggestions I made.
On another trip I stopped in on another installation which is little known to the public. I'm tempted to comment on it as it was of great interest, but security prevents me. Another trip was to make a more thorough review of Oak Ridge, taking in the gaseous diffusion plant, the laboratory, the reactor with its output of radioactive isotopes for industrial use and the NEPA operations.

It seemed time to come to grips with this NEPA situation. The Fairchild Aviation Company under leadership of J. Carleton Ward were making heroic efforts to accelerate this activity. The concept of an airplane propelled by an atomic reactor which could fly around the world without stopping and carrying atomic bombs was represented as a No. 1 objective. On the other hand, many people pointed out that the activity was poorly conceived and poorly manned, that nuclear fuels were too scarce to risk in a plane, that if such a plane were shot down over enemy territory it would reveal many important secrets, that the weight of the reactor and the necessary radiation shielding was excessive for a plane and that the whole business was a waste of time. This activity, being atomic power, came under General Wilson's responsibilities. He arranged for a complete briefing of the M.L.C. and some of its staff by the NEPA organization. When it was over we were confused but still skeptical. We had General McCormick with us. He was director of military applications of the A.E.C. I believe he was also skeptical. After this the A.E.C. arranged with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to review the activity and M.I.T. appointed Walt Whitman who was head of the Department of Chemical Engineering to head up the investigation. It seemed like a good idea, but the NEPA people immediately set up a protest and tried to discredit the
study before it started. This I didn't like and told Ward and his associate Richardson that I couldn't look with favor on a contestant who tried to discredit the umpire before the game started. The results of the study came out later and the opinion was expressed that with existing knowledge of radioactive dosages and shielding, airplane propulsion by atomic energy was not feasible and must await substantial development in both the science and engineering before it would be worthy of substantial activity. This, I believe, slowed this activity down or may have stopped it completely. I have heard recent rumors that lead me to suspect that the work may have been reactivated in light of new developments.

I don't believe it is being done under the same management.

Many members of the M.L.C. organization had engaged in very important phases of the Manhattan Project during and after the war. Admiral Parsons was the bomb commander who dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Commander Ashworth was bomb commander at Nagasaki. Many had been at Alamagordo. Most of them had been at Bikini and at Einewetok. The tales of the early days of atomic development would make fascinating reading in themselves but have no place here.

Shortly after I assumed my position as chairman of M.L.C. and Deputy to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy a crisis loomed. In the Pentagon they called such a crisis a "swivel."

Many scientists went to the Einewetok tests. It was considered very important that these tests be conducted in great secrecy, and the scientists were asked to conduct themselves accordingly. Since they were eager to divulge scientific information resulting from the tests, they were told that they could meet with the press and make radio broadcasts on these matters after the tests had been completed and when they reached Pearl Harbor on the way home. Under these circumstances they cooperated fully, although they were very suspicious of military officials. General Hull who
was in command of the expedition, did an excellent job in gaining and holding their respect. I heard some of them say that all military officers were stupid except, of course, General Hull who was an exception.

It was left that publicity could be released about two days after the tests, and everyone seemed satisfied. But then the matter got out of hand. I believe it may have started at a meeting of the War Council when someone expressed apprehension that this publicity release would be very helpful to the Russians in their activities on detection of atomic explosions. We had our means of doing— they probably were working along this line also and to give them information on a blast within 48 hours of its occurrence might help them greatly, so the pre-arranged plan of releasing publicity was in jeopardy.

I was called for a hasty review. Most officers with knowledge and experience in these matters were at Einewetok but I conferred with General Nichols who did not seem much concerned and then with Admiral (then Captain) Tom Hill who headed the Navy's atomic activity (Operation 86) in Admiral Parsons' absence. He was mightily concerned.

I discussed the matter with the full commission (A.E.C.) except Barker who was at the tests. They thought the military was too apprehensive. So did I, but I wasn't certain. Finally, it wound up that the Army and Air Force were satisfied to let matters stand as arranged and permit the publicity release, but the Navy was bitterly opposed. Forrestal left the final decision to me. I would have opposed the Navy position, but knowing my inexperience in this field and believing that in case of doubt the position favoring security should be preferred I ruled that there should be no publicity release at Pearl Harbor and had this word sent to General Hull.
What a protest came from the Pacific! The teletype worked hard and long until late at night. I asked Tom Hill to handle the matter since it was the Navy whose position was prevailing. At one occasion I overheard a question as to what authority I had to issue such an order. I placed on top of my desk a letter from Forrestal delegating to me all his authority in this field and left the office "to get a cup of coffee." When I returned the orders had been issued. I knew Tom Hill and others had seen the letter.

There was no publicity at Pearl Harbor, the Navy's position prevailed for what it may have been worth, but great damage was done. The feeling of the scientists towards the military boiled over. One said he'd never go into the Pentagon again as long as he lived. Another declared he'd never again trust a man in uniform, and so it went--the situation which was already bad became critical. What could be done about it?

A few weeks later when some of the high blood pressure had subsided I sold Forrestal on the idea of a dinner honoring the scientists and military officers in charge of the tests. He rather reluctantly agreed if I'd arrange it. I did, or rather Dick Ashworth did, although he said he had to study a lot of protocol to set up a dinner for "all the brass."

It was to be a top secret meeting Saturday evening in the Pentagon. The rooms were to be completely guarded with guards with "Q clearance." (A.E.C. clearance) In the room we had a display of maps, diagrams, and pictures pertaining to the Bikini tests. Cocktails were served by mess boys with Q clearance who also served the dinner. Invitations were sent in Forrestal's name to the three Service Secretaries, to the three Military Chiefs, to Admiral Leahy, the President's Military Advisor, to the five Atomic Energy Commissioners, to the General Manager of A.E.C., to the members of the M.L.
and to General Hull and his deputies and Dr. Frohman, Clark, Grave_*--*the top scientists. Some of these latter at first refused to come, but Dave Lilienthal, Chairman of A.E.C., requested them to attend. It was a stormy night. I wasn't certain how many of "the brass" would attend and I had many "hostess pains." Would this be a complete farce or would it do the trick?

One by one the guests arrived, all drenched by rain. I was delighted to see them--they all came, every one. When Dr. Frohman arrived, very suspicious and very much on his guard, he was promptly introduced to Secretary Forrestal and asked to explain the maps, diagrams, etc. to the Secretary. Similarly, Dr. Clark was asked to explain the operation to General Bradley, and each scientist was conducting and explaining and gathering about him groups of Generals, Admirals and Secretaries. It was difficult to break it up for dinner. Dick told me the seating was a real problem--how should a Commissioner rank with a Secretary? How should I rank--that was the tough one. That was easily solved, however, for I told Dick to seat me at the very foot of the table and I'd perform the introductions from there.

General Hull gave a brief report, then each of the scientists and Dave Lilienthal. When the scientists left I heard them say this isn't such a bad outfit after all. It had worked.

Louise had intended to go with me to Washington to find a house but a bad back prevented her from coming. I first stopped at the Hay Adams House for a few days and then moved to "1718 H" at the invitation of General Frank McCoy, an old friend of Uncle Ed's. Uncle Ed had been a member of "The Family" at 1718 H when he was in Congress in 1925.

It was an unusual little place. James and Julia ran it. There appeared to be no rules. Membership could be determined by the silver goblets on the shelf over the fireplace, each one of
which bore the signature of a member.

At breakfast, the only meal which was served there, I met one or two members each morning. They only stayed for a day or so and were gone. A most interesting group they were. Patchin of Unit Fruit Company; Harrison, Ambassador to Switzerland; Dr. from Boston; Hershel Johnson, Ambassador to Brazil; Joe Crew, Under Secretary of State; Walter Howe, an attorney in Washington; Eliot Wadsworth; Joe Alsop, a news commentator and writer; Frank McCoy, Retired Army General who was in charge of the Far East Commission of the State Department.

I had occasion to bring a few associates to 1718 H and they were both surprised and pleased to find such a place existed. It had a bit of "old world" touch to it.

Wives could stay only when with their member husbands and the only in the "icebox", a suite of rooms on the top floor completely separated from the rest of the building. Louise came to stay with me a few times.

The house was empty much of the time so I had the place to myself. I got my evening meals at the Metropolitan Club.

One Saturday evening I was quite lonely and phoned my old acquaintance, Admiral Harold Stark, who used to live in Wilkes-Barre and who had been Chief of Naval Operations. As soon as he heard my voice on the phone he said "Why Donald, what are you doing there, don't you know you should be out here with us?" I went and had many pleasant visits in Harold and Kitty's beautiful home. They were very kind to Louise, Judy and me, and their kindness meant a great deal to us.

Forrestal enjoyed tennis, so did General Grunther and so did I, so we got together frequently. General Court Schuyler often made a fourth. We would play at the Fort Leslie McNair
The courts or at the Army-Navy Country Club courts.

Al Gruenther and I played singles together on Saturday at 11 A.M., then we'd have a sandwich and a beer served by Grace Gruenther at their home and return to our offices in the Pentagon. There was generally much comment in the mess room at Monday lunch as to the outcome of the Saturday's game. We had a lot of fun and did a lot of kidding.

Forrestal also liked Badminton and I played with him in the St. Alban's school gymnasium. One time we were to have a foursome but only the two of us turned up so we played singles. Anything he did he did with all his energy, so we played hard. It was a strenuous game and when we sat wringing wet on the bench in the locker room I thought neither of us should play that hard, but at least it had taken his mind off of his work. Just then he looked up and said "Don, what are we going to do about the Air Force Budget?" Even a game such as that couldn't take his thoughts away from his heavy duties.

He was a dynamo of energy and amazingly keen and decisive. He followed a killing routine. He would frequently breakfast at 7:30 or 8 A.M. in his office mess room with some important visitor who was arriving in Washington by sleeper. He would discuss important affairs with his visitor and then hold his morning staff meeting which would be very quick and snappy, asking each member individually what items he had and answering them on the spot. If an item appeared to require a bit of discussion, the individual would get his answer after the meeting.

Then he would start with his appointment schedule. Most people in Washington run their appointments on a 15-minute schedule but Forrestal's seemed more like an appointment every 5 minutes. This called for keen concentration, judgment and decision, particularly so because the only visitors to see him were those whose
business had already been discussed with junior officials and had to go to Forrestal for consideration. Other callers might be some old friends or distinguished officials.

At 11 he might go out for a game of tennis for an hour and return for lunch with a few Senators. At this lunch he might invite someone in his department who was particularly concerned with the discussion. At the end of lunch he would issue a "coffee call" to some of his associates to come to his lunch table to learn of the decisions reached. I was frequently called for both lunch and "coffee call."

In the afternoon he might attend meetings of the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or others. On these occasions he would frequently introduce a new viewpoint for discussion and leave requesting that he be informed of the group opinion or decision.

Frequently during the day he would be called to The White House, to congressional hearings, or to other government agencies. His time was so fully occupied that if we wished to see him on an urgent matter which couldn't be handled by the "intercom", his secretary, Kate Foley, would tell us to get into his car at a certain time and we would discuss our problems with him as he was driven to or from one of these meetings.

At six he would frequently have cocktails served at his house at which time members of the press might be invited for off-the-record discussion. They would leave and another guest or two would appear for dinner to discuss some philosophical problems. If something of interest to one of his associates came up he might send out a "Scotch and Soda call." Louise and I were so called on a few occasions.

After his guests had left I have seen him pick up his brief case and his driver would drive him back to the Pentagon.
What a life! I've never seen a man under so much pressure and more conscientious. He thought he could stand it for a couple of years when he intended to retire turning his office over to someone else. He thought if he took regular exercise he could live through it. He tried desperately to find people in whom he had implicit confidence to work with him so he could give them complete responsibility and thus relieve himself. He was able to get very few. I believe I was one and felt honored. He delegated to me every authority he himself possessed in my field of operation. He supported me on every occasion. I've never had a superior who appeared to repose so much confidence in me. I'm told that he once told Van Bush that one of the most helpful moves Van made was to get me to come to Washington. Perhaps so, I hope so anyway for I had great admiration and affection for the man who was so right and fought so hard against such odds that his health cracked and he committed suicide.

Many people blame Drew Pearson for Forrestal's collapse, others blame tri-service bickering. Some say it was family anxieties. All these contributed but, in my opinion, his greatest anxiety came from the attitude of the Navy in opposing unification and the attitude of Stu Symington in constantly accusing him of partiality for the Navy. The Army and Secretary Royall seemed to be the only service to give him good support.

But I've gotten ahead of my story. During the time I was head of N.L.C. he was very active and vigorous.

Forrestal appointed me as his deputy on the "Combined Policy Committee." I'd never heard of it and it was difficult to find out anything about it. It had apparently resulted from the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at Quebec when the U.S. had undertaken the responsibility for atomic development and the committee was formed to maintain contact between England, Canada and the United States. There was a scientific sub group on which I was appointed as a member.
The first meeting was attended by Under Secretary of State Bob Lovett, Dave Lilienthal, Carroll Wilson, Canadian and British representatives. There was only one meeting held when I was there and I never had a very clear idea of its activities. It seemed pretty fuzzy to me.

Back to my big problem — to obtain cooperation between the Military and the A.E.C. scientists. One way to implement cooperation is to establish common objectives. This I started to do. First, we had to find out what were the most important development projects and who was working on them and where. The research reports being sent in to the A.E.C. headquarters from their various laboratories were very sketchy. It seemed to me they told only a small part of the story. The scientists had "gone underground" since the creation of the A.E.C. and because of the long investigation and debate when Lilienthal was appointed chairman of the commission. The men were working quietly but not telling much about their activities. Thus military laboratories were duplicating work in A.E.C. labs. without any exchange of information. I suspected there might be similar blind duplication between A.E.C. labs.

Before we could lay out a program of long range objectives we would have to find out what work had been done and what was under way.

This was proving to be quite an undertaking which we would have to organize to handle. I felt the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research and Development Board would be the best agency. It consisted of the M.E.C. members and in addition I appointed a leading scientist in chemistry, Dr. Conant, and one in physics, Dr. Oppenheimer. I also appointed a leading industrialist in these two fields, Charles Thomas of Monsanto and Bill Hosford, retired Vice President of Western Electric Company. It was a strong committee.
For the immediate job I appointed a "sub committee on long range objectives." This included Oppenheimer, General Nichols, Admiral Parsons, General Wilson and also Harry Winne, Vice President in charge of atomic activities of General Electric, and George Felbeck, Vice President of Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Company.

To get into the problem we chartered a C-54 (DC-4 type) plane and all of the above group except Conant, who was in Europe, started west. We visited the Iniskern operations. Here we were told by the resident scientists of their activities. At the end of the day we had a general discussion on the work in progress and its importance. We then flew to Moffett Field where we attended the meetings of the NACA (National Aviation Council of America) where the members of that huge laboratory described their work. Then to the University of California Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley where Dr. Ernest Lawrence and his assistant Cocksie and Dr. Seaborg told us of their work. Then to the Navy work on decontamination and other matters at Treasure Island and Alameda. Then to Hanford with Ernest Lawrence going with us.

At Hanford we dug into the progress being made on the recovery and yield problem. Progress seemed very slight since my last visit there. We looked into it hard and called on the group to turn out at 8 o'clock Sunday morning to go over it with us. I'm told this was quite a surprise and a stimulant to the people there as they had expected just a routine military inspection.

We then flew back and on the plane the basis of the findings and recommendations were roughed out for Dr. Oppenheimer to prepare a full report. I insisted upon one recommendation, i.e. that the report should be reviewed every six months. I did this as I wanted to make certain that the program recommended would not be too rigid.

The report was drawn and approved by the sub committee, then by the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Research & Development Board, then by the H.I.C., by the J.C.S., by the War Council and then...
Here we had a program of long range military objectives which had been approved by the highest authorities. We were now prepared to go ahead. There was plenty of work for everyone, in fact one of the most serious shortages was skilled manpower. From then on it seemed to me that the members of the Military Establishment and members of A.E.C. began to cooperate better. I felt we were on our way to the type of relationship we desired.

There was one other major source of irritation, however, that was the question of who should hold custody of atomic weapons.

The law provided that atomic weapons could be used only upon direction of The President. There was an inference that they should be held in custody by the A.E.C. and delivered to the military only when use was ordered by The President. It wasn't clear and the military deeply resented it. They couldn't understand why they weren't trusted to store the atomic bombs. They were very critical of the manner in which the A.E.C. stored them. They were critical of the A.E.C. personnel charged with the immediate responsibility. Why should a dreamy young A.E.C. scientist who might be a conscientious objector be trusted with "the keys" when a competent general responsible for the defense of the country was not? There was much merit in their position.

At the first meeting of the M.L.C. that I attended, even before I became chairman, I was asked my views on this subject. I knew little of it so merely said "I think it's a good idea to keep your powder dry." That seemed to satisfy them for the time. But later I dug into it further.

I investigated the A.E.C. custody procedure, their storage facilities, their "chain of command" for delivery to the military. I checked the military "chain of command" in receiving the weapon and using it. I studied the law, discussed the implications of a change in custody procedure with Bob Lovett, Under Secretary of State.
discussed the problem with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Van Bush and drew up a "statement of issues" outlining all aspects of a transfer.

From this I arrived at the conclusion that the weapons should be held in custody by the military but that a dual chain of command should be established. The Secretary of Defense could give the order for withdrawal from storage but the order would have to go down through two separate chains of command to prevent any single officer short of the Secretary of Defense from issuing the order on his own.

If I could get agreement from the A.E.C. to transfer custody, it could probably be easily arranged, but if the decision must be made by The President I hoped it could be presented to him as a joint recommendation of both military and A.E.C. The problem then was to sell the idea to the A.E.C.

A visit to a custody site was arranged. All A.E.C. commissioners and all N.L.C. members were to attend. At the last minute Lilienthal declined but the four others went. We jointly inspected the storage site, the personnel charged with protection, security, and transfer.

On the plane returning I tried to get the commissioners to agree to a transfer of custody. They held the opinion, however, that no change should be made but agreed to a presentation to The President at which time each group would present its position.

I then presented my position to Forrestal who studied it and asked me to draw up a recommendation to The President.

This was a difficult document to prepare. I knew The President was very busy and, therefore, the document should be brief and to the point. It should speak solely from the standpoint of national security but at the same time minimize the effects on international relations and domestic reaction. Forrestal approved the document and asked me to make the presentation to The President.

On July 21, 1948, (Forrestal Diary-Page 460) Forrestal, Royall, Symington and I, representing the Military Establishment, and Lilienthal,
Weymark, Pike and Barker, representing the Atomic Energy Commission, met with The President in The White House. I presented the military position and handed the President the statement I had drawn. Lilienthal then presented objections on what I thought were very intangible bases. The President appeared to listen intently and then stated that the use of the bomb could be ordered only by himself and he did not propose to delegate this responsibility. He did not comment on custody so we left wondering what his decision might be.

Several days passed and then one of the President's assistants brought me a White House press release for comment. It clearly indicated that the President had turned down our recommendation. I took it at once to Forrestal who had not been informed of the President's decision. He was very disappointed with the decision and annoyed that the information came to him in such an indirect manner. He asked me if I didn't think he should resign, saying he thought that more government officials should resign when their viewpoints were thus disregarded. I urged him not to.

I drew up directives for Forrestal to issue immediately to various military agencies to provide for maximum efficiency in handling atomic weapons even though the A.E.C. retained custody.

Although the A.E.C. won the decision, the whole affair had centered so much attention on their shortcomings of custody and transfer that they took effective steps to obtain maximum efficiency. The outcome was a vastly improved procedure even though the A.E.C. retained custody.

By this time Louise and Judy had moved to Washington and we were living in a delightful old house owned by Rev. Match Sterrett. Mrs. Sterrett was apprehensive about renting her house furnished with many interesting old pieces of furniture and china but after hearing that our house in Connecticut was also old she was willing.
We were very specific about the term of lease. It was to be until October 1st. I had started April 1st and was going to return home in six months, that meant October 1st. I was very definite on that point and made it known in all my contacts that I would leave on October 1st.

The house was on Springland Lane in a grove of woods right in the middle of the city behind the Bureau of Standards. I believe it was one of a very few which stood between Washington and Chevy Chase years ago.

Here our social life was very quiet. We didn't know many people and my government position being brand new didn't "rate" in the official protocol, so we had few callers or invitations. We did, however, entertain several friends who came to Washington. I recall Ernest Lawrence, Charlie Thomas, Carleton Ward, Bill Hosford and a few Washington people—Mr. and Mrs. Forrestal, General and Mrs. Frank McCoy, Harold and Kitty Stark, Freddie Hyde, General and Mrs. Al Gruenther, Rus and Helen Hopley and a few others.

The Atomic Energy Act was confusing on the intent of Congress relative to our disclosure to the British of technical information of military significance. To understand the meaning of Congress, Forrestal called a meeting with Senator Vandenburg, Senator Mickenlooper, Commissioner Strauss, Van Bush and myself to review the intent on this matter. (See Forrestal Diary—Page 471).

The discussion did not clarify the situation but confirmed the confusion. I had been tipped off by the Navy ONI (Office of Naval Information) that there was "something wrong at Harwell." They didn't quite know but they suspected a leak of vital secret information coming from the British atomic laboratory—Harwell. Here was a very serious situation. Our own position was confused and we suspected a leak. Under the circumstances I recommended to Forrestal that we immediately
stop sending the British further atomic information until the situation was clarified. He agreed so I called the British embassy. They sent over a Mr. Woodward, scientific attaché! I told him of our decision. He "hit the roof." Apparently he sent word at once to London and a commission was dispatched from London to register their objections.

This occurred at the time I was turning my job over to Bill Webster as my successor. My action put him in the best possible position. He could continue to refuse to give information and blame me or he could loosen up to any extent he wished.

When the word came out later that Klaus J. E. Fuchs, a Harwell scientist had traitorously disclosed very important secrets to the Russians, I was very glad I had taken a firm position.

I had set the date of my departure as October 1st. That was definite. I told Forrestal that if he wished it, I would be willing to find and train a successor, but if I were unable to do so, I would leave anyway.

I was very fortunate in finding Bill Webster for the assignment. He was an Annapolis and M.I.T. graduate who had left the service and become Vice President of the New England Power Company. He came to Washington as my assistant. Where I had been concentrating on problems of organization, he directed his attention to specific projects. I felt it made a good team. He worked with me for a month and was in excellent position to take over when I left.

Van Bush had frequently attempted to bring into more general use the principles of "operations analysis" which had proven to be very successful in many instances during the war, particularly in the Navy. Bush visualized a "Weapons Systems Evaluation" group which would apply scientific principles to the evaluation of different systems of defense. Since it was a highly scientific technique which frequently ran counter to typical military procedures, he felt it should be manned by civilians
rather than military personnel. He felt that the evaluations should play an important part in the plans and programs developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

One day Forrestal handed me a file on this subject and asked me to give him my opinion. I studied it over the weekend and although I recognized it as a very broad subject on much of which I was uninformed, still I had the feeling that although the techniques were undoubtedly of great value, still the preparation of the evaluations should be under the jurisdiction of the persons held responsible for operating the results—the J.C.S.

This I reported to Forrestal. He told me Bush wouldn't like my answer. He was right for within half an hour Van came storming into my office demanding that I mind my own business and refrain from interfering with his.

I told him I was answering a question asked me by the Secretary and that being a scientist he could not take offense if I answered it in just the manner I felt was right. He couldn't disagree, but he didn't like it. He was not at all well and went on an extended trip. The matter was far from settled.

The feud between the Navy and the Air Force was getting worse—it was reaching the point where it influenced nearly every decision. At the meetings at Key West the services had reached certain conclusions which helped to outline their roles and missions. But serious controversies were always cropping up. The conflict interfered with our N.L.C. business and I told Forrestal I felt it must be stopped before we could make further progress. My comment was, I'm sure, only one of many. He, himself, fully realized that another approach to the problem was a necessity.

A meeting was called at the Newport, R.I., Naval War College. Forrestal asked me to attend and I flew in his plane with Harold
Hinton, who headed the Military Establishment publicity, Forrestal, General Gruenther, and Jack Ohly, one of Forrestal's special assistants.

We put down at Quonset Airport where planes of General Vandenberg, General Bradley, Admiral Denfeld all arrived with these military chiefs and their planning deputies, General Norstad, General Wedemeyer and Admiral Radford.

It was a comfortable spot. I had tennis with Hinton, Colonel Bob Wood, Forrestal's new aide, and Al Gruenther. Forrestal, Admiral Radford and I had a swim and Radford and I went out for a turn about the harbor in a Navy launch. Most of the time, however, was strictly business.

At the J.C.S. meeting, chairmanned by Forrestal, the Air Force-Navy squabble was settled on the basis that the Navy would operate such aviation as was necessary for Naval purposes including a force to strike enemy submarine pens, navy yards and land based planes attacking naval ships. The Navy would not, however, conduct strategic bombing except to the extent that it was planned by the Air Force as an auxiliary to their activities. This seemed to me to be an improvement, but the Navy would never believe that the Air Force would plan any Navy strategic bombing and the Air Force would continue to suspect the Navy of exceeding its roles. It was like the forcible stopping of a fight between two boys who were ready to go at it again on the slightest provocation, but it gave a basis for some needed decisions and was, therefore, an improvement.

Another matter on the agenda was the status of AFSWP. This agency under General Nichols had been reporting to the J.C.S., rather than to any single service. The Air Force wanted it to come under its monitorship though remaining as a tri-service agency.
I had been studying the problem and Forrestal urged that I make a recommendation quickly. Because of the urgency I proposed, as a temporary arrangement, that the Air Force assume monitorship but that this be considered a temporary arrangement pending final determination. The Newport meeting accepted this plan although they accepted it so vigorously that I feared it would be difficult to move the Air Force out of their supposedly temporary advantage. It was!!

My later report recommended that each service be permitted to work on its own application of atomic energy, that the activities be coordinated by M.L.C. and that AFSWP be continued only to handle those activities which could not be delegated to the services. The reason for my recommendation was simple—I felt the most progress would be made by the people most interested in the results. So far we had thought of airborne bombs only. Why not let army ordnance work on atomic projectiles, navy ordnance work on atomic torpedoes, and other military agencies work on items of interest to them. I felt this would accelerate progress, stimulate atomic training and be much simpler to handle administratively. Some duplication of activities could be permitted without detriment and the M.L.C. would act as a coordinating agency.

I had discussed this plan with Dr. Karl T. Compton who had succeeded Van Bush as head of the Research Development Board. He agreed with my plan. General Nichols, head of AFSWP, opposed it as it would largely break up that agency. The Air Force opposed it as it would result in their losing monitorship over most of the atomic work in all three services. Many M.L.C. members were apprehensive that the move was too drastic. Some felt the transition would cause a period of confusion and weakness which could be ill afforded at that time - the Berlin Air Lift was at its height and
feeling against Russia ran high.

When Forrestal reviewed the plan I suspect he was hesitant to make a change. The waters had been muddy so long that he did not want to disturb them again even though the proposed plan might be an improvement. He, therefore, suggested that it should be deferred. It was. I doubt if it has ever gone into effect although two years later I was called to Washington to confer on a problem of organization on military atomic activity and told the officials that the recommendations of the previous report would solve their problem. They pulled the report from the file and expressed regret that the recommendations had not been put into effect years ago. They said that, although they felt them sound, they hesitated to make the move "at that time." So it wasn't made and for the second time the military stalled in doing what they thought was right.

But again I'm ahead of my story. Back at Newport the question of Van Bush's recommendation that a Weapon Systems Evaluation group be organized under the Research Development Board was brought up. This was the matter on which my advice to Forrestal had been at such variance to Bush's recommendation. Bush wanted civilian organization and control with reports direct to the Secretary of Defense. I recommended J.C.S. control but substantial participation by the Research Development Board in the organization and operation of the group.

At the Newport meeting Bush's recommendation was brought up. I withheld comment. After some very vigorous discussion it was apparent the whole evaluation group concept would be voted down, and Bush's recommendation would be completely defeated. I thought the evaluation program good and did not wish to see it discarded so I recommended that the group should be organized and operated by R.D.B. but reporting to J.C.S. This saved the day and they
to proceed along these lines.

Van Bush didn't like it much but couldn't be so annoyed as he realized the plan would have been completely abandoned if I hadn't proposed the alternate.

It was at this Newport meeting that General Al Gruenther made one of his best humorous remarks. He had a marvelous sense of humor as did Forrestal. A question of some procedure was brought up and discussed at length without any apparent progress being made by the three 4-star generals and admirals and three 3-star officers. At this point, Gruenther, who was only a 2-star general and the most junior officer present, spoke up "Mr. Secretary, it is apparent there is not enough ability here to solve this problem. I recommend, therefore, that it be assigned to their subordinates." A good laugh followed. Only Gruenther could have gotten away with such a remark. He was and still is an amazingly able man.

Many very serious problems of national security were discussed at Newport. The public did not generally realize their serious potentialities. Forrestal mentioned the difficulty in securing the services of competent civilians. One particular problem he mentioned was the chairmanship of the Munitions Board.

Gene Hargrave was chairman. He was serving part time, the balance being devoted to the Eastman Kodak Company of which he was President. He had agreed to serve for one year. His year was up and he was eager to be relieved. On the other hand, Forrestal had difficulty in getting a successor. Partially because of the general reluctance of business people to take such assignments and partially because it was close to election time. Everyone expected the Democrats to be thrown out of office so no Democrat was interested in accepting an appointment which might last only for a few months and no Republican cared to be appointed by a Democrat when he could wait
a few months to be appointed by a Republican. The matter was at a stalemate.

Forrestal approached me on the matter. He said I had gained the confidence of the military, I was fairly familiar with the ways of Washington and also with industry. He realized I had agreed to come to Washington for six months only but he urged that I accept appointment as Chairman of the Munitions Board for just three months to tide him over the elections. He promised that he would not put me under obligation to stay longer than that.

I told him I had come for six months only and didn't see how I could stay longer. I would, however, try to put him in touch with some recently retired members of the du Pont Company who might consider such an appointment.

Ruly Carpenter came to Washington and talked with Forrestal. He was greatly impressed with Forrestal himself and with the problem. A few weeks later he invited Forrestal and me to dinner in his home in Delaware at which a number of recently retired members of the du Pont Company were present. Forrestal was to present his story to them hoping to secure their interest and assistance.

He told his story, but much to my surprise, instead of urging them to serve, he urged them to permit me to do so. It was an unexpected turn of events. I was told du Pont would have no objections to my staying on but that decision rested with C. K. Davis, President of Remington Arms Company, and myself. I flew to Bridgeport in Forrestal's plane and talked to C.K. It was agreed that my leave would be extended to __________ and that I'd accept.

The entire matter was a great surprise to me. Of course, I was conscious of the honor of being considered for the chairmanship of the Munitions Board. I was also conscious of Forrestal's difficult situation and of the importance to national security. I was
unfamiliar with the activities of the Munitions Board but had confidence that I could handle them as I had apparently handled my other assignments. So I told Forrestal I would accept the appointment provided I would not be obligated to stay beyond three months. He said he would see that neither he nor the Republicans would put me under pressure to stay longer.

On September 16, 1945, I was sworn in as Chairman of the Munitions Board. Again publicity was withheld at my request.

I lunched one day with Forrestal and Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge. The discussion was on the transition in the Military Establishment from the Democratic to the Republican Administration. I didn't realize it at the time but Lodge told me later than when the Republicans won (as they fully expected they would) Dewey would look to me to handle the transition in the Military Establishment. Just what that would mean I'll never know as the Republicans did not win.

Bill Webster took over as Chairman of the Military Liaison Commission and deputy to Forrestal on atomic activities. I was happy to have such an able successor who was so thoroughly familiar with the assignment.

Gene Hargrave was delighted to be relieved of the onerous responsibility of commuting back and forth from Rochester to Washington, Forrestal seemed to be well pleased that he could live up to his promise to relieve Hargrave and also to have a full-time Chairman of the Munitions Board who would not have to divide his attention between military and industrial activities.

For us, however, it was a bit different. We had made all our plans expecting to return to Connecticut on October 1st. The lease on our Washington house ran out and we had to scratch around to
to find another. That was no easy matter and it was by the merest
coincidence that we were able to rent a house at 11 Grafton Street,
Chevy Chase. We moved and settled promptly and "set up business at
our new location."

Judy started school in The Cathedral School and we arranged
for another tenant in our house in Southport.

Knowing that our stay in Washington was temporary. Louise, Judy
and I spent busy weekends seeing the sights. We visited The Smith-
sonian, The Capitol, The Pentagon, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memor-
ials, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, the Great Falls of the Potomac,
the paddle boats in the basin, Mount Vernon and others.

Forrestal and General McCoy proposed me for membership at the
Chevy Chase Country Club. We never became members because our
name did not come to the top of the waiting list until three or
four years after we had left Washington. We used the club quite
often, however, at the invitation of our old friend, Freddy Hyde,
and Mr. and Mrs. Dillard Lassiter, all of whom lived at the club.
We had tennis there with the Roberts family, Captain "Brick" Roberts
of the Navy and his wife Virginia and daughter Barbara (Boots) -
have been good friends whom we have seen from time to time ever
since.

The responsibilities of the Munitions Board surprised me.
The name implies only munitions, but the board is actually a top
policy making and unifying agency in practically all non-operational
fields. It was responsible for determination of policy for the
Military Establishment in industrial mobilization, manpower, proc-
curement and transportation, and was an operating agency in stock-
piling strategic materials and unification of military facilities.
Very few, if any, people either inside or outside the Military
Establishment knew what the responsibilities were that were assigned to the Munitions Board. For that reason we were frequently in the awkward position of interjecting ourselves into activities already contemplated by others who did not know of our interests therein.

The Board consisted of Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of the Army, John Kenney, Under Secretary of the Navy, who was later succeeded by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Koehler, and Arthur Barrows, Under Secretary of the Air Force with myself as Chairman. The Board had a staff of about 400 officers, enlisted men and civilians. The director of the staff was Lt. Gen. Leroy Lutes. Under him were Major General Sidney Spaulding, Rear Admiral Dennebrin, and Major General Patrick Timberlake, a tri-service group each of whom was responsible for a sector of the staff activities.

Problems or proposed policies would be presented to the board or generated by it or its staff. They would be analyzed by the staff and a proposed decision presented to the board for consideration at the weekly meetings.

The Munitions Board was originally organized as a voluntary cooperative activity between the Army and the Navy. It picked up some of the activities performed in World War I by Baruch and his War Industries Board. During World War II it was very active in allocating materials between the services. When the "Unification Act" was passed the Munitions Board first became a statutory board with a chairman appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

The unification act also created the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, the War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Research Development Board. The
activities of these were quite clearly understood except the National Security Resources Board. It was always a problem to differentiate between the responsibilities of the Munitions Board and the National Security Resources Board. In general, it can be said that the N.S.R.B. was a service representing all Government agencies and the Munitions Board only represented the military. This was never entirely clear and we were frequently overlapping in our activities. Arthur Hill was Chairman of the N.S.R.B. The Board was made up of the Secretaries of Defense, State, Treasury and Interior (?). It never had a meeting while I was on the Munitions Board. I considered it a very vague sort of organization.

As Chairman of the Munitions Board I became Forrestal's deputy on the N.S.R.B., a member of the War Council and the primary official of the Military Establishment on all matters pertaining to industry, manpower and stockpile. As such I appeared frequently before Congressional Committees. These appearances are greatly dreaded, particularly by military officers who are frequently put through pretty stiff cross-examination. They feel that a civilian has a much better chance as a witness than does an officer and I presume they are right. Members of Congress seem to look on military officers as a sort of servant, regardless of their rank.

There were several occasions when they jumped on me but I didn't feel I'd fared too badly. Having given up all compensation except my government salary, I was in a strong position.

One episode that I enjoy recalling was when there were several bills before the House generally providing government funds for exploration and development of mineral deposits in
several of the western states. I didn't like the bills because they purported to use government funds for operations which are customarily handled by private enterprise. Furthermore, I felt there would be nothing forthcoming except the use of taxes raised largely in the east to pour down "rat holes" in the west.

The hearing was attended by twenty or thirty press reporters. They were just waiting for me to let a word slip that these bills would be beneficial to National Defense. The chairman tried hard to crowd me into such a statement by such questions as - "Mr. Carpenter, if manganese were found as a result of these bills wouldn't it be beneficial to National Security?" The answer, of course, would be "Yes," and the committee and the press would have just what they wanted - an opportunity to promote these bills in behalf of National Security.

I didn't want to say "Yes," I could say the bills were economically illogical as they would caution me that such a determination should be made by Keyserling of the President's Economic Council. I couldn't say they wouldn't find adequate supplies of manganese - that was for the Bureau of Mines to say. So I ducked and dodged.

Finally Congressman White from Idaho said "Mr. Carpenter, you aren't very sympathetic to our part of the country, are you?"

"Mr. Congressman," I replied, "there's nothing I would enjoy more right now than being in Idaho." That slowed him down.

When he asked what I knew about Idaho, I told him the first job I had after getting out of the Army in World War I was playing a fiddle in a barroom just over the line in Oregon.

"Oh", he said, "You are one of the boys, I thought you came from Wall Street."
"I've never been there in my life," I answered.

That quieted him but later he said - "Mr. Carpenter, is that all you know about Idaho?"

By this time I was getting a bit annoyed so I answered, "Mr. Congressman, I've walked from the southwest corner to the central portion of Idaho and surveyed much of it! Have you done that, Mr. Congressman?" That finished it.

The next day I was delighted to see newspaper headlines indicating that The Military did not favor these bills. They were never passed.

Another hearing on legislation pertaining to government purchasing procedure was very confusing. I couldn't make head or tail of it. Fortunately, Gordon Gray appeared with me and knew his subject more thoroughly, so he handled most of the questions.

When Forrestal presented the proposed budget for the Military Establishment it was the first time a combined Army-Navy-Air Force Budget was presented. He had his Special Assistant, Bill McNeil, present it and Dr. Compton, Chairman of the Research and Development Board, and I were present. As I recall it, the budget ran in the neighborhood of 15 billion dollars.

The budget is presented in several large volumes and members of all services and agencies are called to testify. It seems to me impossible for a Congressional Committee to handle such a huge matter intelligently. About all they can do is to detect a few "soft spots" and recommend reduction in these.

Experienced fiscal officers know how the committee will work and frequently they intentionally put in "soft spots" for the committee to find so they will not interfere with the more important items.

Every committee, no matter how hostile, always has at least one
member who is sympathetic to the viewpoint of the witness. Occasionally this member will ask what questions you would like him to ask in order to bring out your arguments.

A member of the Executive Branch of the Government is expected to present testimony according to administration policy. When he is asked a question, however, he is generally expected to answer it accurately. The method of planting questions is sometimes used by individuals to air their personal views when they don't "gee" with official policy. I never used this device.

Since I was unsympathetic with much of the administration policy I was frequently called upon to testify on a subject where my personal beliefs were in opposition. In these cases I would always tell Forrestal, and later Secretary Johnson, how I felt and how I would testify. If they wanted other testimony given, they should send someone else. They never did.

An extreme case of this nature was in connection with the "Spence Bill". This was practically the keystone of Truman's legislative program of "Economic Stabilization." The bill provided that the government should make surveys of the most important materials and services. If they found any which appeared inadequate they could urge the companies involved to push ahead faster. If they still felt the plans to be inadequate, then the government could step into the industry to construct and operate facilities. The steel industry seemed to be the prime target and the bill was best known as the one which would put the government into the steel business.

Papers on this bill were handed to me one Friday afternoon by the Munitions Board staff. They had prepared my testimony for me and I was to give it on Monday morning. Forrestal had asked that I handle the testimony for the Military Establishment on this bill.
This gave me only the weekend to consider it. I should have been informed earlier, but wasn’t, so all weekend I studied the legislation and the voluminous data prepared by the staff. I didn’t like the proposed testimony a bit so I wrote a new statement. I finished it Sunday midnight and was prepared to give it early Monday morning.

Monday morning the radio announced that Truman had returned from his vacation at Key West and was going “up on the hill” to press for his “economic stabilization legislation.” That meant the Spence Bill and I would be testifying against it at the same time the President was pushing for it. It was a very illogical situation, so I promptly pointed it out to Forrestal. He called in Louis Johnson who was soon to become Secretary of Defense.

Forrestal said he would assign someone else if it were embarrassing to me. I told him it wouldn’t be embarrassing to me but probably would be for the administration so they might send someone else if they wished. They jointly decided, however, that if I was willing, I should make the statement the way I saw it.

Half an hour later I was informed the hearings were called off. Apparently they couldn’t afford to have an adverse statement by the Military Establishment. The bill has never been revived.

On another occasion, Secretary Johnson asked me to represent the Military Establishment at a meeting of some kind where plans for subsidizing oil exploration in Mexico were to be formulated. I told him I’d attend if he wished but that I was opposed to the plans, and I told him why. He said the President had asked the cabinet to support the legislation. I told him I didn’t want to vote that way. He said he’d send an Admiral to cast the vote but wanted me there. I told him if the vote was to be cast in that fashion I didn’t even want to be there.
Next day Johnson told me he'd presented my argument at another cabinet meeting and now I could attend the meeting and vote as I wished. I went, but wasn't called upon to vote because the chairman, knowing my position, dropped the matter. It's never come up since.

Many times at a meeting I'd remain silent while a subject was discussed with an apparent agreement along lines which seemed to me to be unsound. Generally, my viewpoint would be requested and I'd say I didn't know anything about government or military but in business I'd think we would do it another way. Invariably heads would nod and frequently the vote would be changed.

This sounds pretty egotistical as I read it, but I honestly don't mean it that way. My point is that when a man with some sound industrial experience accepts a position in government, he can have profound influence over the actions to be taken even if he is fundamentally unsympathetic with the administration. I never felt so free to state my position and I never had better support. It's a great pity more people don't realize how effective they can be. These results get no publicity but unfortunately the confusion, the criticism, the futility and the public castigation do, so service in Washington has a bad name. It should be regarded as a privilege but, instead, a person taking a Washington assignment is regarded with a bit of suspicion, both by his associates in industry who thinks there's something wrong with him for going and by those in Washington who think the reason he came is that he was a misfit in industry.

The Munitions Board staff had more or less been the personal agency of the Chairman and the actions of the board were those of the chairman except to the extent they were modified by board members. The three service members of the board lacked a feeling of
unity with the board itself. I hoped to correct this situation by making them feel it was their board and that I was there as chairman only to carry out their wishes and not to dictate.

Forrestal frequently asked if I didn't want more authority. I told him I preferred it as it was as I wanted the board members to feel the responsibility of the board's actions. I'd try to refrain from expressing my opinion until the board members had expressed theirs. This method of operation appealed to the three board members and I had the feeling that we were making progress in getting their cooperation.

My new office was palatial. My handsome desk was the one used by General William Tecumseh Sherman when he was Chief of Staff of the Army. It was beautifully carved but was more ornamental than useful so I used it as a table for Board Meetings.

Throughout The Pentagon there are thousands of paintings of soldiers and sailors in combat. Some are excellent, some poor. They seemed highly appropriate in all areas except that of the Munitions Board. Here we were interested in the large army of industrial workers who had supplied huge quantities of ships, guns, ammunition, petroleum, uniforms, food, medicine and the millions of items needed by our armed forces and also for our allies. This part of the military effort was given too little consideration.

All military pictures in our area were taken down and replaced by pictures of men-at-work in industry. They changed the atmosphere of our area. Business men who came in would say "Somehow I feel more at home here than anywhere in Washington." The military offices gained greater appreciation of the need of industrial backing for their plans. General Omar Bradley on one occasion looked at the pictures in my office and said "Don, these
men did a big job for us in the war, didn’t they?"

When an industrialist called at our office we kept contact with him until he got his answer. On too many occasions in Washington a man is passed from one agency to another until he goes home without his answer and thoroughly disgusted.

The most specific activity of the Board was probably the stockpiling of strategic materials. The Munitions Board staff had made a thorough study of important items which would be in short supply during an emergency and had determined what would be needed in a stockpile which would serve the civilian economy as well as the military. That this was to serve civilian as well as military requirements was seldom understood.

There were relatively few items to be stockpiled and some of them were quite surprising. I could understand the need of stockpiling manganese and platinum and tin, but I never would have thought of pepper or sial. These were very important, however, and had to be procured.

We made up a large bar chart showing each item, indicating the amount needed and the amounts on hand. It was a very large chart, so large that when it was placed in a room it almost filled a whole wall. It was called the "pipe organ". We showed it to the War Council, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the National Security Resources Board staff, to Congressional Committees, to the Bureau of the Budget, and to the President’s Council of Economic Advisers. It did a great deal to clarify understanding of the stockpile. It showed very clearly how far we were behind in the requirements of our program.

At that time many materials were in short supply in the civilian economy. Industry was being hampered by shortage of copper and lead. Producers of these metals were allocating their
production and there was a great demand for larger quantities. This was a difficult time to procure quantities of these items for the stockpile.

In accordance with existing legislation the Munitions Board could work closely with the Secretary of Commerce in contacting industries. Secretary Sawyer and I called in the copper industry. The need was recognized but no company wanted to sell the government if its own customers were in need. If all companies supplied proportionately equal amounts, the "smelters" would be satisfied. We tried several arrangements but all were opposed by the Department of Justice. Finally I told them we would try to engage the services of Mike Swartz of Bridgeport Brass Company who had handled copper during the war. The smelters agreed to be governed by Mike's judgment.

Herman Steinkraus, President of Bridgeport Brass, agreed to grant Mike a leave of absence and Mike reported to the job and procured copper. It was the first copper entering the stockpile since the war.

The story was the same on lead, only worse. Lead was very scarce. My own company, Remington Arms, was badly in need of lead. But we had to secure some. This time we engaged Ernest Hawkins in whom the members of the industry had great confidence. Through him we began to procure lead. Once again this was the first since the war.

A year or so later Secretary Johnson, at a large dinner of the American Ordnance Association, stated that a substantial start had been made on the stockpile, "thanks to Don Carpenter."

In 1948 it was difficult to buy and prices were high. Later in early 1949, however, business dropped off and supplies were abundant. Prices fell and companies begged us to buy. It was
an ideal time to buy from every standpoint, but congress
wouldn't appropriate the money and we couldn't.

Later, when the Korean War broke out, I believe the stock-
pile was in somewhat better shape but still far short of require-
ments. At that time Senator McCarren of Tennessee, Chairman of
the Senate Appropriations Committee, issued a public statement
that the Military was lax in procuring materials and he was
going to institute a congressional investigation to uncover
the shameful laxity. I phoned Hubert Howard, then Chairman
of the Munitions Board, telling him I'd welcome being called
as the first witness so I could testify how the Munitions Board
had begged Senator McCarren to push appropriations but he had not
acted. McCarren never started his investigation.

Tin was one of the most important items in the stockpile.
In spite of restrictions on certain tin cans such as beer and
dog food, and in spite of the thinner coating of tin which had
been developed during the war, tin was still in very short sup-
ply. Furthermore, the sources of tin are remote. Most of it
comes from Malaya and the East Indies, a smaller quantity coming
from Bolivia. In either case, there was great uncertainty of
the friendliness towards the United States by the suppliers and
their workmen in case of emergency and the ocean lanes would re-
quire substantial naval protection, so stockpiling was important.
Tin, however, is very expensive and the quantities large, so
heavy appropriations were required. Although our "pipe-organ"
chart helped budget officials and congressional committees to
understand the situation, appropriations were never adequate
and when the Korean crisis broke out I learned that the stock-
pile was too small. I had the satisfaction of knowing, however,
that we had made substantial additions to it.
At this time Keyserling, then Chairman of the President's Board of Economic Advisors, advocated a plan which I could not endorse. He proposed a new corporation which would buy critical materials, then raise funds by borrowing, using the same materials as collateral. I couldn't see how we could properly pledge critical materials as collateral. It would be quite possible that when we needed them most some creditor might call them. The plan seemed to me to a subterfuge. We argued it out with Keyserling and he dropped it.

On another occasion, General Vaughn, the President's Military Aide, asked us to loan quantities of platinum to a company operating on a defense contract. We could not find where national defense would be served by such a loan and couldn't see any good reason for loaning platinum from the stockpile. I refused. I was told I'd be fired and I stated that I'd welcome being fired for then I could go home. That was the end of that.

Our estimates of supplies and requirements and those of the National Security Resources Board both indicated that aluminum would be in very short supply in an emergency. Only about half the needed facilities existed for the production of this important metal, and some of the existing plants were being demolished. It was a very illogical situation which came about because of the government's anti-trust suit against the Aluminum Company. Plants which could be used by Kaiser or Reynolds were sold to them. Plants which they could not use or would not buy were demolished rather than permitting Alcoa to acquire them. Thus in the face of a serious shortage, the government's policies were making it worse.

The situation required immediate action to stop the destruction of these valuable plants and then we could argue about it later.
So I ordered Major General Patrick Timberlake to do what he thought necessary to preserve the plants. He was in a difficult position for so many government agencies had become involved. One plant on the west coast was being sold bit by bit. The generators had been sold to a foreign government by some scrap dealers who bought it from our government. To stop the sale, the State Government and Paul Hoffman's E.C.A. had to be brought in. General Timberlake was able to save what there was but we incurred the resentment of the Department of Justice. A rumor was repeated to me that Mr. Bergson, head of the Anti Trust Division had threatened to complain of my actions to the President. I told my informer to tell Bergson to go ahead. He didn't.

Alcoa wanted to build a new plant in Alaska -- the government opposed the action so nothing was done.

I went to Tom Clark, Attorney General, to secure some resolution of the problem. He agreed but before I could get back to Forrestal's office to tell him, Clark changed his mind and so informed Forrestal. The next move was for the Secretary to take the matter up in a cabinet meeting -- he did so and that was the end of it, nothing was done and aluminum was in short supply at the outbreak of Korea. It was a shameful situation where national security was slighted.

There were many attempts to use stock pile funds for the purchase of non-critical materials. In 1949, when business was depressed, the wool people wanted us to stockpile wool. Others wanted us to buy scrap iron from Japan and there were many other suggestions and requests. We didn't adopt them, however, because our funds were inadequate to procure the items which would be difficult to obtain in an emergency.
Stockpiling required far more than mere buying. In one case we took steps to build up several hundred miles of railroad in Asia, in another we considered dredging a river in South America to get material out. In another we encouraged a company to plant and harvest new crops in the tropics. Through E.C.A. we got materials from several European and African countries, we encouraged some United States countries to set up foreign activities to produce some materials. We found the stockpiling activity called for many unexpected and difficult tasks.

In the field of Industrial Mobilization the Munitions Board was to set up procedures whereby the three services would not be overlapping in their procurement. There were three methods used. Single service procurement of an item was the simplest and most direct. All small arms ammunition for all services was purchased by the army. Coordinated procurement required a procuring office staffed by members of each of the services. A third type called for a company to work with one service only, other services working with other companies. Chance Vought Company, for instance sold planes only to the Navy and North American sold only to the Air Force. We were continually adding to the list of items which were handled by single service procurement, but it was a slow process.

A single catalog of all military items was considered a desirable objective. During the war there had been instances where one service ran out of an item when another service had it but couldn't identify it because it was called by a different name. The task of cataloging was huge. There were millions of items. Of course it was desirable to standardize on them as much as possible without interjecting undue delay and lack of flexibility.
There was one member of the Secretary of Defense's staff who had great ideas of cataloging. He proved to be an obstructionist until we found his objective was to set cataloging up as a separate sort of bureau hoping he would be put in charge. After we discovered this he was discredited but we didn't make as much progress in cataloging as we would have liked. It was a big job.

A satisfactory scheme of industrial mobilization requires the knowledge and cooperation of thousands of companies. As I recall, we thought contact with some 30,000 companies was important. Each company should know who to contact, what they should make, how, when, with what materials, what manpower, how to transport both materials and product, what power requirements, what new buildings or equipment would be needed and so on. This was about the most difficult selling job imaginable for it must be done so well it would be thoroughly dependable in an emergency.

Under my predecessor, T. J. Hargrave, Annex 57 (?) was prepared which gave all the details of the procurement contact procedure. The plan appeared complicated but was actually fairly simple.

Realizing that such a plan would not work unless it were thoroughly supported I called a meeting of the chiefs of all procurement agencies -- 19 of them. I'd never had so much "brass" in my office. They were asked about the plan.

They indicated that they had never been consulted on it and weren't very familiar with its provisions. A fine situation this! Here were the people who would do the actual procurement and, to say the least, they were unfriendly to the plan. We set out to correct that situation. One vital factor in such a plan is to ascertain our requirements. We couldn't tell what we'd have to prepare to
buy unless we knew what we would need. This was a matter for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine through their war plans. General Lutes kept pounding on this.

General Eisenhower was Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff and I arranged some joint meetings, he would chairman one; I, the next. It helped to establish a closer working relationship, but we didn't get our list of requirements. They always said they couldn't calculate requirements without knowing what kind of war we would have to fight. We said someone must set a figure and if it isn't the Joint Chiefs of Staff then we would have to. We didn't get them and some important companies refused to plan without knowing quantities.

The Bureau of the Budget assigned one of its members to study the mission of the National Security Resources Board and Munitions Board in order to clarify the confusion. After several weeks he came up with a paper which he read to me. It sounded to me like a lot of words which were far from crisp. Frankly, I couldn't understand what he was getting at. I don't know what happened to it.

In preparation of the budget for industrial mobilization we assembled and presented a combined budget for the three services. I was familiar with the ideas of Army Ordnance in the maintenance of present properties and the educational contracts they proposed. The fiscal officer of the Army cut the budget substantially. I intervened and they restored it. When it came to the Secretary of Defense fiscal officer the same situation arose and I got it restored. Then it went to the Bureau of the Budget. Here it was cut again. This time with Gordon Gray and General Jack Christmas we made a presentation to the Bureau of the Budget showing among other things that a contract calling for a few million dollars
could develop as much "readiness" as the procurement of a billion or so dollars worth of tanks. We won the argument and later I convinced General Bradley that tank requirements could be reduced because of these readiness contracts.

It is difficult for field commanders to place reliance on "plans". They would much prefer to see the "hardware" and have it under their immediate control. But to buy it is expensive. It costs money to store and maintain it, and there is always the probability of its becoming obsolete. "Plans" which involve pilot line operation and procurement of long delivery items are far less expensive and much better. That is what we sold, but I'm afraid it must be sold every year. It is difficult to build "readiness" in this fashion, but hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake.

I never became very much involved with plans for manpower requirements. The Munitions Board acted as a coordinating agency for the services and presented its requirements to General Hershey. I don't recall any special episodes in this area so it must have proceeded fairly smoothly.

There was some uncertainty as to the responsibility of the Munitions Board and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the field of transportation of supplies to the combat area. Some thought it should be done by the Munitions Board; others thought it should be done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I couldn't find anything in our "charter" which called upon us to do it. One day the Joint Chiefs of Staff brought the matter up for consideration. General Al Wedemeyer left the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting to phone me asking if we would do it. I said we would not as it was not in our directive. I think that had a wholesome effect on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as it clearly indicated we were not "empire building."
We always tried to get someone else to do a job for us rather than doing it ourselves. This is quite contrary to the practice of many government agencies who gobble up all they can just to "build empires." Such agencies are looked upon with suspicion by all with whom they come in contact. We avoided empire building scrupulously.

Forrestal had asked me to head the Munitions Board just long enough to tide him over the elections. Everyone expected the Republicans would win. But they didn't, and what a confusion there was. Houses had been rented by Republicans who expected to have jobs in Washington, hotels had booked their rooms to Republicans for the inauguration of Dewey, all manner of plans had been made, but to no avail -- Truman and the Democrats would stay for another term.

When I arrived at my office one morning my very efficient secretary, Mrs. Moser, told me I had an appointment with the President in the White House at 11:30 a.m. That sounded bad. Later she told me Forrestal's office called and asked if the Secretary might drive me over to the White House. That sounded worse -- I knew what was up. The big change in plans resulting from election meant there was no one ready to take the chairmanship of the Munitions Board and I would be asked to stay on.

In the car Forrestal said he was in a very embarrassing situation because he had promised me he would not urge me to stay but that the President wanted me to stay on. I told him not to worry about it but that I would listen to what the President had to say but could make no commitment without a lot more consideration.

The President urged me to stay for the four years of his administration but, if I couldn't, then for at least six months, and said he intended to write the President of du Pont to make
it possible. I told him I had been asked to come to Washington for six months only, then I had been urged to stay a few months longer and was assured I would not be asked to prolong it. Now I was being asked to stay longer, if I should, what assurance would I have that this time I could leave when my time was up. The President told me he would assure me I wouldn't be urged to stay longer unless there should be an emergency.

Forrestal and I left the White House with the understanding that the President was writing Crawford Greenewalt and I would write him. Crawford and I would talk it over and then I would give Forrestal and Truman my answer.

I was, of course, pleased that they thought well enough of my work to want me to stay on. I welcomed the opportunity to carry on some of the programs which we had gotten underway and was pleased to be of assistance to Forrestal and National security. On the other hand I was eager to get back to private industry to resume my activities there. There was also an important financial consideration because the salary I was receiving from the government was very small compared with my compensation from Remington Arms Company.

Rank in Washington is frequently judged by salary. Since all government salaries are publicly known it is quite easy to compare a bureau chief with a commissioner and with an assistant secretary. On this basis I ranked between a secretary and an under secretary, so my salary was quite high ($17,500 as I recall) but still with all the added expenses of living in Washington and the fact that rental on our Connecticut house was taxable as income, I estimated very approximately that the sojourn in Washington cost over $50,000.
Truman wrote to Greenewalt, so did I. Later I saw him. It was understood that my leave would be transferred from Remington to du Pont and that I would stay on until June 30th. Although there was no indication as to what position I would occupy in du Pont it was understood that I would not lose by the transfer. That was satisfactory to me and I told Forrestal and Truman that I would stay for another six months.

Later when Louis Johnson was Secretary of Defense he tried hard to persuade me to stay on but I declined.

Since I was to stay six more months I felt we could make some organizational changes which I had hesitated to do before. These appeared to be four distinct functions, i.e., industrial mobilization, procurement, and unification of facilities. Each was to be headed by a chief and an assistant chief. The first and last being primarily civilian was to have a civilian chief and a military assistant chief. The others were to have a military chief and civilian assistants. This would put a civilian directly in charge of industrial mobilization including the custody of government owned plants. This was a new concept which was looked upon with some skepticism by the military but hailed by such civilian agencies as National Association of Manufacturers, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American Ordnance Association, etc.

After a great deal of consultation and discussion, the Munitions Board agreed to the change and so did Forrestal. We drew up a new organization chart which he signed. All looked well and I was sure we would begin to make much better progress. But then came the hitch. I couldn't get good men to take the jobs.

There were only five important positions to fill with civilians and they were of extreme importance. One was to handle the stock-
pile -- the procurement of $2.7 billion worth of scarce materials. I considered it about the most difficult purchasing job in existence. Another was to take charge of over $12 billion worth of government owned plants. Some were to be demolished, some converted, some sold, some leased, some turned over to government agencies for their operation, and some put in "moth balls" to be ready for the next emergency. This job called for the highest type of industrialist. He would be responsible for a plant which in dollars exceeded U. S. Steel, du Pont, General Motors and General Electric combined. A third job was to organize the industrial mobilization activity, clarifying the plans and introducing them in 30,000 to 40,000 companies. I considered this about the biggest selling job I had ever heard of. Another job was to bring about unification of facilities operated by the three services all over the world. The extent of this was unpredictable but extremely large.

It never occurred to me that I could not find five high caliber men to handle these assignments, but I couldn't. I secured lists of possible candidates from many places. I wanted to be certain that we had men of the highest capabilities, these were not assignments for mediocre people -- we wanted the best. I wrote some, I asked some to come in for discussion, I went to visit some, I got others to contact some and after several weeks I had not secured a man. In the process I talked with the representatives of National Association of Manufacturers who had been so enthusiastic about our new organization. They arranged for some of their New York officers to come to my office for a discussion. I was very
hopeful. Shortly before the meeting they phoned they couldn't come. I never heard another word from them and concluded that National Association of Manufacturers had given me about as bad a "brush off" as I could imagine. Now six years later I am still thoroughly disgusted with N.A.M. for this action.

I talked with K. T. Keller of Chrysler hoping to get suggestions on some prominent men in that company. He sent in Hutchinson, vice president and chairman of their finance committee. They just couldn't see it. I talked to the policy committee of General Motors and got a long letter from Harlow Curtis on why it was impractical for an industrialist to serve in such a capacity. I talked with Charles E. Wilson, president of General Electric. He referred me to a very competent member of his organization who would have been excellent. That man, however, refused to come even for a conversation. It is interesting that he has since served in Washington and has told me he was completely wrong in his previous action. I talked with "Chief" Wilson, president of Alcoa who put me in touch with an excellent purchasing man but just then he had a severe operation and couldn't consider it. I talked to Colonel Walsh, president of the American Ordnance Association who said they would look into the matter and hope to come up with some ideas. They didn't. The National Industrial Conference Board indicated they would help, the Krueger economic advisors also did and really tried, Forrestal attempted to get some help but all of these activities produced nothing.

Many people speak of the frustration of government as due to politics, inefficiency, laziness and insincerity. My own greatest frustration in Washington had no connection with these but was entirely due to my lack of support from civilians. I felt sincerely
that we were trying to do the job in a manner which would be
of great benefit to the civilian economy. If we could accomplish
our objectives we would save billions of dollars and handle contacts
with industry in a most logical manner thus saving heavy taxes and
annoyance. But we couldn't get five men to help. It was incompre-
henisible.

One case comes to mind as particularly annoying. A well
qualified man was willing to come -- he felt it his duty and was
intrigued by the possibilities of the job. A week later he phoned
me he couldn't come because the President of his company after dis-
cussing the matter with the directors told him that if he took the
government assignment he should resign at once. To take the position
would, in that gentlemen's opinion, be the greatest disservice to
their stockholders that he could imagine.

Naturally I could never offer an appointment without first
clearing it with Forrestal. He told me to clear with Don Dawson,
the President's advisor on appointments. As it turned out I would
phone Dawson nearly every day about 4:00 to 5:00 P.M. It got to
be a joke and we called it our "teatime call." He knew well that
I was a Republican and that in all probability I would recommend
an industrialist who also was a Republican. In spite of this,
however, he told me that he would endorse any individual whom I
might recommend. He just wanted to be certain that the man hadn't
"just made a speech against Truman within the past week." I learned
later that Senator Howard McGrath, who was Democratic National Chair-
man, concurred in Dawson's attitude.

I never met either Dawson or McGrath until late in my
tour. In spite of our widely differing government philosophies
they gave me complete freedom in making appointments.
It was apparent that I wouldn't get the men I wanted this way so I studied the problem and developed a new approach. If we could first get the Board of Directors of a company to declare that service with the government was beneficial to the company, and then get the president of the company to work with us to make available the services of a top notch young man for two years, the man to come just at the time his promotion to an important administrative post was announced, and if we could get only one man from an industry, we might do the trick.

I wrote this up with care and tried it out in several places. It seemed to "click". Several company presidents told me they would go along if I put the plan into operation. General Eisenhower, then President of Columbia, gave several speeches on the plan, calling it the "Carpenter Plan." We were ready to put the plan into operation at about the time I left Washington. No successor was appointed for about six months and then Hubert Howard didn't seem interested in the plan so it was never activated.

More recently I've had some correspondence with President Eisenhower on it and Dr. Fleming, director of Office of Defense Mobilization has taken it up. He called for Carter Wellford to work up a plan which embodied much of the earlier one. It is at present awaiting legislation.

In spite of almost universal disappointments we did secure the services of a few men. Ernest Hawkins had been Director of Purchases for du Pont and had retired. Jean Hargrave engaged his services as a consultant and later when I could not get anyone to take the stockpile job I contacted Ernest. He was then in poor health, resting on a beach in Florida. I hated to urge him but the matter was urgent. In spite of his doctor's orders he
came to Washington and took charge. I had promised him I would keep right on trying to get a replacement for him and that he could leave at any time he desired. He stayed on for many months and did a fine job.

Paul Litchfield, President of Goodyear, put me in touch with Harry Blythe who came to Washington to work on the industrial mobilization plans. He had been vice president of Goodyear Aviation and had held some very important positions in industry. I wanted to be certain he was happy on his assignment so after he had been on the job for about two weeks I asked him if he was getting good cooperation. He said he had never had better. I asked him if he wished more authority. He said he already had so much authority and the problems were so great that he was scared. That’s quite contrary to the general concept of a government job but I wasn’t a bit surprised at his answers.

There are too many men who go to Washington on an assignment and upon returning home they serve their ego by telling how bad things are in Washington. The public believes it and service for the government is considered an unpleasant assignment. A great misunderstanding exists between government employees and civilians. I don’t know any individuals in the country who work harder, more intelligently, and with greater sincerity than the top Washington officials. The pressure is extreme and exhausting. But the public think they have a soft political berth. Many government employees think industrialists draw fat salaries, play golf most every day, have short hours of work, think only of their own personal profits and disregard the public welfare. They think the only time they come to Washington is when their own profits are being hurt and then if they are asked to help they refuse saying they don’t want any part of the “dirty business” of politics and government. On
the other hand many industrialists think government employees are lazy, intellectually dishonest, empire builders who think only of building up their jobs regardless of the cost.

Of course both sides are wrong, I hope some method can be found to bring about a better understanding and a higher level of respect for both sides. One creates the wealth of the country, the other administers the government. We must have both.

On Saturday noon, Under Secretary of the Navy John Kenney dropped into my office seething mad. He had in his hand a magazine article written by General "Ike" Spaatz of the Air Force. I presume it brought up the old fight and criticized naval air. At any rate Kenney was hot and said he would write an article and tell the public the truth.

On our way down the corridor to lunch he noticed I hadn't said anything. "Don't you think I should write such an article", he asked. I replied that if I were he I would write an article of one paragraph which would win complete public support for the navy. He, of course, snorted and asked what it would say.

"Just this," I replied, "The Navy has read General Spaatz' article. The Navy supports unification."

He didn't write any article.

When the appropriation for the Air Force for "fiscal 1949" was passed by Congress at a figure far higher than before due to the recommendations of the Finletter Committee, Congress was afraid the increased appropriations would permit some contractors to make "excessive" profits. It is said that Secretary Symington told the committee he would have all contracts renegotiated. Renegotiation was incorporated in the Air Force appropriation and a situation existed where an item purchased for the Air Force was subject to
renegotiation, if purchased for the Navy it came under the "Vincent
Frammel Act" which limited the manufacturers profits and if it were
purchased for the Army there were no restrictions. It was, of course,
an illogical situation and Symington was very vocal about it, advocating
renegotiation for all three services.

I felt renegotiation to be wrong in peacetime as it was contrary
to the principles of free enterprise, it removed incentive for
efficient performance, limited competition and distorted costs.

Forrestal consulted with me frequently as I presume he did
with Symington. At War Council meeting one day he announced that
the Military Establishment policy on renegotiation would be written
by the Munitions Board. I had won his approval, but I knew it was
a long hard row because everyone in government seemed to feel
industrial profits were wrong and renegotiation had saved large
sums and been highly beneficial.

We decided time was too short to make a thorough study of the
problem before the fiscal 1950 appropriations were passed so we
decided to propose interim legislation for 1950 and formulate a
longer range policy for 1951 and thereafter. For this purpose a
committee of military and civilians was formed and they commenced
their deliberations.

For 1950 they recommended that renegotiation should be limited
to those items of peculiarly military character on which competitive
bids could not be secured. This was passed by the Munitions Board
after considerable discussion but when it reached the bureau of the
budget it was badly "blue pencilled". The bureau was completely
out of sympathy with our ideas, so I asked for a hearing.

Director Pace of the Budget referred the matter to his assistant,
with whom Lawton who called in a dozen or so of his associates and Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, Jack Koehler and discussed the problem with
We showed them how a contractor could bid $75.00 for an item, have it renegotiated down to $15.00 and the records would show a saving of $60.00 when the item should cost no more than $10.00 - but due to the lack of incentive the costs justified the $15.00 and the government actually lost $5.00 rather than saving $60.00. We showed them that in an item like housing where they could get only one bidder, renegotiation removed most of his incentive, he was permitted to make only a small profit, he had no incentive to put his best man on the job and the cost to the government wound up at $10,000 per unit where it might have dropped to $8,000 if the government permitted contractors to keep their profits and competition resulted.

They were convinced and Lawton told me they had learned more of renegotiation in our discussion than they had ever known. They supported the legislation which was passed with the provision that there would be no renegotiation on competitive procurement. That appropriation bill is now frequently referred to as the one which began to make some sense in renegotiation. But that was the last because after I left Washington the movement fell apart, there was no real interest in furthering it and renegotiation came back "across the board." I feel it's a great mistake, and hope some day it will be corrected before it is too firmly established.

Forrestal occasionally told me he was going to retire as Secretary of Defense and on a few occasions he asked me what I thought of Louis Johnson as his successor. I told him I didn't know Johnson but I did recall the way he acted as Assistant Secretary of War when he had virtually waged a battle to undermine his superior. I didn't like such actions regardless of the circumstances. If Johnson were wrong it was inexcusable and even if he were right his public criticism of his superior was unpardonable.
So I didn't like Johnson as a successor to Forrestal. Of course, I didn't want to see Forrestal withdraw under any circumstances.

One noon Forrestal asked me to join him for lunch -- just the two of us -- and he told me he was going to announce in a few days that he would resign and Truman would appoint Johnson. He said he wanted me to continue as Chairman of the Munitions Board, Johnson wanted me to continue and Truman did also. I said I didn't care to. After considerable discussion, however, I promised Forrestal that before I gave a final answer I would talk to Johnson.

Since I have never refused a definite and reasonable request by a responsible government official, and furthermore I had promised Truman I would stay for six months, I decided I wouldn't say "no" to Johnson but would put up a set of conditions he couldn't possibly accept. So I told him I was opposed to the principles of the Truman administration and would speak out against them on any reasonable occasion. I said I would not permit the appointment of any politicians on any Munitions Board staff jobs, I said we would refuse any assistance to any agency for political purposes, that I wanted to appoint several strong industrialists who were probably Republicans. I don't recall any other conditions but I made it as tough as I could, fully expecting that he would be very happy to look for someone else to take my job. He didn't. Instead he said he would back me up in every one of my ideas. I was amazed. He had taken the "wind out of my sails" and I agreed to stay but left his office with the very definite feeling that words were cheap. I felt certain that he would go back on his assurances and as soon as he did I would resign immediately. To my surprise he never did. I never had as complete backing from a superior as I had from Louis Johnson even though some of my proposed actions were completely at odds with the administration policies.
The day before Forrestal retired I had a matter that I had to clear with the Secretary of Defense. I hated to bother Forrestal because I knew how tired and distraught he was, and that he would retire the next day. The matter needed prompt attention, however, and I knew Johnson wouldn't become familiar with it for a week or so, so I told Kate Foley I had to see "the boss" promptly.

I put my question to Forrestal. His mind wandered, I brought him back to it, he wandered again asking my opinion of several of his past actions. Repeatedly I brought him back to the question but no answer. Finally I said "Jim, why don't we do it this way," "All right, Don" he said and I had my answer. But what a tragedy. This was the man who a year before had been keen, quick and decisive, who had given me twelve answers in as many minutes or less. Now in twenty minutes he couldn't answer one question. His loyalty, his devotion, to duty, his strife with several jealous agencies, his apprehensions and his persecution by too many of his associates had resulted in the undermining of the health of one of America's finest public servants.

The next day Johnson was sworn into office with great fanfare. Forrestal appeared dazed. After the ceremony he wandered back to his office, realized it was no longer his so he went to the Hall entrance for his car. It was not there. It happened that my driver was there with my car and he took Forrestal home where Ferd Eberstadt persuaded him to go at once to Florida and arranged for Dr. William Kenninger to attend him.

A few days later Forrestal returned to Washington to enter the Bethesda Hospital. Soon afterward he jumped from a window to his death and I understand the Navy immediately urged Mrs. Forrestal to sign a paper absolving the Navy of any responsibility.
He was gone, the Navy, in my opinion, had been largely responsible for undermining his health and after he was sick the Navy was extremely lax in his treatment.

The Hoover Commission had been set up by the President and by Congress to investigate the executive branch of the government to eliminate duplications, to increase efficiency, and reduce expenditures. A "task force" of this commission headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt was to concentrate its attention on the Military Establishment.

In my position as Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee I was called to appear before the task force to describe the operations of the Committee and answer questions.

As Chairman of the Munitions Board I was asked to appear before them again and had frequent conferences with Ferd Eberstadt. I understand that the task force was very well satisfied with the steps I had taken and the method of operation.

Frank Leslie was designated by Forrestal to handle the contacts of the Military Establishment with the Hoover Commission. I became quite well acquainted with him and have seen him on several occasions since. In fact, when Eisenhower became President, Leslie without my knowledge recommended me for a government assignment.

One morning at War Council meeting, Secretary Johnson said he was going to recommend to the President that I be appointed chairman of the National Security Resources Board to take the post left vacant by Arthur Hill's resignation. He asked the opinion of the members -- Service Secretaries, Military Chiefs and Board Chairmen. They all expressed their approval. I had completely lost my voice having strained it speaking at an annual convention of very gay mining engineers and couldn't say anything.
Immediately after the meeting I sent Johnson a note stating "I sincerely and honestly do not wish to be drafted." He didn't make the recommendation and asked me why I felt that way.

I later told him that I was eager to return to industry and although the proposed position had high prestige still it would not work because reporting directly to the President I couldn't be as outspoken against his policies as I could when reporting to a Secretary. Johnson agreed and the matter was dropped.

John Steelman was appointed and nothing was accomplished, in fact many of the good men of the National Security Resources Board resigned. Some time later Symington was appointed and used it to gain much personal publicity.

The "Marshall Plan", later to be called European Recovery Program (ERP) and later Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) called for financial assistance in the rehabilitation of foreign countries. The question then arose as to what assistance of a military nature might be advisable, particularly since the Soviets had demonstrated hostility. The question was being considered as to how much aid we should give, in what form, and for how long.

The Munitions Board sent a representative to Europe to sit in on discussions of these problems. Before going I gave him instructions in very general terms. I drew him the following chart.

The solid line represented the growth of the military effort of the country, increasing over a period of say six years to the point where the country's economy would carry it on a more or less
permanent basis. The dotted line would represent the military effort of the country bolstered by United States aid. It would reach the same maximum, but in two years rather than six. Thus we might contribute an increasing amount for two years, then a decreasing amount for four years reaching zero at that time. The figures would depend upon the conditions in each country. That was the general policy which our representative was to take to the meetings. I never heard the results because I left Washington before the program was crystallized.

Several years later I was asked if I would accept appointment as head of a sort of Munitions Board of Europe to handle the logistics of the military build up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was not a very definite request and I indicated that I was not very interested. I felt that such an assignment would be extremely difficult due to language problems and inter-country jealousies. Furthermore I felt I had done "my bit".

On several occasions I was invited to attend the meetings of the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce. On one of these Louise went with me to Hot Springs for a weekend meeting.

I discussed with the Committee and with individual members our thoughts on the need of men from industry, our policies on renegotiation and on education for economy. They were very interested and helpful. On the matter of manpower they appointed a committee to work with me but without much tangible result.

When Johnson first went in as Secretary of Defense the Navy put on a briefing for him on the subject of "war at three o'clock in the morning." Johnson asked me to attend the briefing with him. The room was full of naval officers of all ranks, the meeting was opened by Assistant Secretary Koehler and the statements
were made in meticulous fashion by naval officers mostly of commander or captain rank, each speaking on a separate subject for about five minutes. Subjects such as manpower, shipyard capacity, steel, power equipment, etc., were handled. It was done in an excellent fashion and was most impressive.

After the first two or three presentations had been made Johnson asked me in a whisper what I thought of it, I told him I thought it unrealistic. Later he asked me again and I told him there was not that much manpower and steel available if the other two services were to be activated simultaneously. So Johnson spoke up saying "Mr. Secretary, you are wasting your time and my time as your presentation is unrealistic because there are three services to be served and there won't be enough manpower and supplies available to satisfy your stated requirements, nevertheless you may proceed if you wish. Assistant Secretary Koehler said he would prefer to stop, "Very well," said Johnson, "I'd be glad to listen to it again but please clear it with the Chairman of the Munitions Board before you give it." Never had the Munitions Board received such backing. After that our programs were more carefully observed by all services, particularly the Navy.

It was proposed that we endeavor to standardize on all "non-uniform" clothing and "issue". It was felt that if all items were placed on display and if a committee of high ranking officers from each service was asked to make their recommendations we could make considerable progress. The program was advanced by Gordon Gray.

Naps, jackets, breeches, shoes, blankets, cots and all manner of items were laid out in a nearby quartermaster Depot. No clothing items which represented the uniform of the services were included but only the clothing used on "fatigue duty." It was amazing to
see how many different types of work caps were being used, and
different kinds of shoes and it seemed there was a great excess of
every item.

The Committee reviewed and recommended a substantial reduction
in the number of items and then it was up to the Munitions Board to
approve. I was pleased with the progress made but was not satisfied
in two respects. First the Marine Corps had taken what seemed to me
a very selfish and unreasonable attitude in refusing to standardize
many of their items. Second, there were no cost estimates to indicate
whether the Committee proposed to standardize on the least expensive
or the most expensive item or some intermediary. Without this inform-
ation we couldn't possibly tell whether the recommendations would
represent economies or not. There was great protest that such costs
could not be ascertained. I recall stating that in my opinion
one experienced man from a company such as Sears Roebuck could
do the job in a week. We later got the information and the matter was
concluded with but partial benefits. I had the definite feeling
here that the assistance of a competent civilian in one of the
Board jobs would be a great assistance and that with his help we
could adopt similar procedures on many different classes of supplies.
But we couldn't get the man and the job fell far short of our desires.

In preparation for the fiscal 1950 budgets the Joint Chiefs of
Staff appointed a committee of three high ranking officers, one
representing each service, to work up a combined military budget.
When they were ready to report Forrestal asked me to attend the
report meeting with him.

The report was given as to what action could be taken with a
budget limitation of $14 billion, but that a realistic appraisal
would indicate a budget of over $17 billion. It was apparent that
a great deal of work had gone into this calculation. It also seemed to me that the President must have set a top limit of $14 billion on the budget.

Walking back to our offices, Forrestal said it was a pity the military officers weren't thinking constantly of economy rather than just at budget time. He asked me if I couldn't devise some plan to provide for more thoughts of economy. I told him that although he was asking not only for a program but for a "way of life" I would think it over and report to him in two weeks.

I did a lot of thinking on the subject. It seemed obvious that the Military couldn't be driven into economy, they should be trained to want it. They should want it not for any general reason but for reasons of national security, for that was their primary interest. They should have all possible incentives to achieve economy. Too frequently a man receives criticism rather than credit for economizing. Mention of steps toward economy should be of great importance on the individual efficiency record of each officer. They should in short be taught what is economy, why is it important to national security, how can it be attained and how can we create an atmosphere in which it will thrive. This teaching should be given in the formal schools such as West Point, Annapolis and Leavenworth and also in all training programs, and in addition training similar to industry's "Job Instruction Training" programs should be instituted. I thought a committee of four should be set up, one to be a member of the Munitions Board who would be chairman, and one from each service. This committee should "spark plug" the training program.

I presented these thoughts to Forrestal at a dinner he arranged at which Al Guenther, Bill Draper, Ferd Eberstadt, and Bill McNeil were present. They approved in principle if I could sell it to the
three services. I did, but with the understanding that the Munitions Board would get its man first and then he would work with the services in appointing their candidates.

This was logical and I drew up a directive for Forrestal's signature. He signed and I started to find my man. It seemed to me to be a chance in a lifetime to start something really fundamental which over the years would save the country billions of dollars. It also would be a job which some industrial engineer would be delighted to accept. The prestige of such a position would be outstanding. But no, it didn't work that way. Man after man turned it down. There wasn't one who didn't say it was an excellent plan, in fact many said it was the best they had ever heard of, but they couldn't take the post.

Weeks went by with no acceptance. Finally with great reluctance I wrote another directive withdrawing the program and asked Johnson to sign it. He was amazed but signed it. Lack of civilian understanding and cooperation really hurt that time. Several months after I left Washington the head of a well-known management engineering firm phoned me asking if I would recommend his company to the Air Force to help on some cost reduction activities. He went into great length to tell me how important it was. I asked him why he felt it was so important now and when I had urged him to help in a much bigger manner previously he had flatly refused. He got the point and said he guessed I was right.

In addition to my duties as Chairman of the Munitions Board, Forrestal, and later Johnson, called upon me to act as their deputy to carry out several specific activities. One of these came as a directive from Forrestal requesting me to submit to him a list of public works projects falling within the military budget. They
were to be arranged in order of their importance to National Defense regardless of the service advocating them. I told Forrestal this was certainly going to win the popularity contest for me for there are few matters which the services fight for more aggressively than their schools, warehouses, harbors, piers and airports.

There were about $9 billion of projects under consideration. Forrestal had asked for a list totaling about $600 million. We could have asked the Munitions Board staff to review and recommend them but I knew if we did we would have a severe battle both in the initial study and later in the bureau of the budget and in the Congressional committees because no service would be satisfied and each would do all it could to include more of its projects. So I decided against that approach and thought I would try one which had worked well in the Military Liaison Committee.

Each military chief was asked to designate a high ranking officer to act as my advisor. Lt. General Aurand was designated by the Army, Lt. General "Pinky" Craig by the Air Force, and Rear Admiral Keeland by the Navy. I suggested that rather than asking each officer to represent his service we should assign a type of project for each to sponsor for all three services. Thus Aurand would list all housing projects for all three services, Keeland was to list all Zone of Interior operational projects and General Craig all overseas projects. The research and development projects would be submitted by the Research and Development Board. We decided to allocate approximately equal amounts to all of the categories with the provision that each list would include a 10% excess so that we could determine whether some of the excess of one list might be more important than the bottom project on some other list.
A Colonel was designated to assist in the arrangements and particularly to report to me in the event there was any "back scratching" where one member made a deal with another. It was understood that each of the three officers could conduct hearings in any way he wished and could prepare his list any way he wanted. He could, if he wanted, list all his own service projects at the top of the list, but no lists would be approved until all three officers reported jointly to me and each would have the opportunity to comment on each other's list. So if there were to be any chiseling there would be ample disclosure of it.

It started off and was regarded as an interesting experiment. Each officer held many meetings and worked hard on his lists. Several times I was called in for consultation -- many times it was a case of the Marines fighting for one of their projects and refusing to accept the determination of the officer handling the listing. I got very fed up with the Marines.

At one time the Colonel tipped me off that one of the officers was being criticized by his superiors for not pushing harder for their particular projects. I invited the military chief of that service for lunch and told him how well his representative was performing -- that did it, we never had any more trouble of that kind.

When the lists were submitted there was complete agreement on 98% of the items. The last 2% they asked me to rule on -- they pertained to housing in Adak in the Aleutians versus housing at some other locations. I thought of a sergeant and his family living a winter in a beaten up Quonset hut on the rocky and wind swept shores of Adak and ruled to provide him with a suitable house.

The most serious question of the Research and Development projects was the extent of the radar screen. It was a matter for
Joint Chiefs of Staff decision so I asked them to advise the extent of the installation they considered necessary. It was a difficult determination as a complete installation would have been very expensive.

Finally the report was prepared, the projects listed in order of importance to the National security as it appeared to us. When I presented it to Forrestal I could see him sigh in a resigned sort of way thinking this would invite another inter-service fight so I suggested he look at the last page. On that page all the service secretaries had indicated their approval of the lists. Forrestal was amazed -- he couldn't believe it -- to have a combined report submitted to him which had tri-service approval.

When the report went to the bureau of the budget they assigned some of their investigators to look into it in detail. They blue pencilled many items, questioned others, criticized the estimated amounts on others and in general were prepared to upset the entire program. The military officers were very annoyed because they had tried so hard to be intelligent and fair in their investigation. So I asked for a hearing with the budget. I expected to attend with only the Colonel with me and was amazed to find twenty or thirty Generals and Admirals in the room when I arrived. I explained to the budget officials how the report had been prepared. I pointed out that this was the first tri-service report ever submitted. We couldn't vouch for the exactness of all the estimates but thought them reasonably accurate and if the Bureau of the Budget wanted to check some of them we had no objections, but if they wanted to dig deeply into the overall determinations they were welcome to the entire job -- we would wash our hands of it. They didn't. The military officers were surprised and pleased with this outcome and the report of the "Carpenter Board" as it was called went to
Congress. I left before it was acted upon and don't know how it fared.

Another unusual task appeared suddenly when Forrestal secretly flew to Europe leaving a group of civilians whom he had invited for an "orientation" in the Military Establishment. It was a very high ranking group of top industrialists, publishers, mayors and labor leaders. There they were, their programs had all been well outlined by General Lutes but Forrestal, who was to greet them and act as the host, was gone. So the job seemed to come my way and I had a few busy days in Washington but also in Pensacola where they visited the Naval operations. The main problem was to be certain the fight between the Air Force and the Navy on air operations didn't become active in the presence of this group for each service was burning to tell its story to any audience.

The Bureau of Mines of the Department of Interior had done work on the extraction of oil from oil shale near Rifle, Colorado. The Union Oil Company was interested in producing oil in this manner but they figured the costs would be too high to sell the product at current price so they asked if the Military Establishment would pay a premium for some of its oil so the process could be operated. If it were important to National Defense it might have been a worthwhile move, but we could not see that it was because the oil supplies from Texas, Oklahoma, and from California, with the new fields opening in Canada and promising exploration in Montana would take care of emergency requirements so we declined. There was a great deal of talk about it but it was our feeling that if it were desirable to demonstrate the feasibility of producing oil from shale it should be done by some other agency, not ours.
Kap Krug, Secretary of Interior, suggested that a three-man Alaska Development Commission be formed to study the commercial possibilities of Alaska, to recommend to Congress such legislation as might be helpful and to try to persuade companies to operate plants there. He suggested one member from the Department of Commerce, one from the Military Establishment, and one who would be chairman from the Department of Interior. Forrestal asked me to handle the matter. I thought well of the idea and after some checking I recommended Horace McCurdy, President of the Puget Sound Bridge and Dredging Company of Seattle. I gave his name to Krug as our member. A few weeks later Krug told me the Governor of Alaska didn't want anyone from Seattle as there was some feeling that Seattle looked upon Alaska as its province. I gained the impression that the Governor of Alaska was ultra "New Dealish", that he knew McCurdy was a two-fisted business man who would "call a spade a spade" and that was the reason he didn't want him, so I told Krug that we had no other candidate. If they really meant business they would take McCurdy, if they didn't mean business we didn't want to be a party to it. The matter was dropped.

Steve Early was appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense under Johnson. Naturally I had heard of him for years as an advisor to Roosevelt. More recently he had been in industry frequently contacting government officials. Johnson told me that although organizationally I should report to Early still in practice he hoped I would continue to report direct to him. It seemed a bit confused and I foresaw some difficulties, but they never arose.

I enjoyed working with Steve and recognized his wisdom and insight in handling episodes which involved the complications that existed in the huge government organization.
Jack Ohly was also very familiar with the ramifications of governmental procedure. Many matters which arose called for "coordination with many other departments. A matter requiring our decision would, of course, require coordination and perhaps endorsement by the three military services but also it might have to be coordinated with European Recovery Program, State Department, Department of Interior and Treasury or other agencies such as the National Security Resources Board or perhaps the National Security Council. Perhaps the Petroleum Council might be involved or the Bureau of Mines and other agencies would come to mind until action would seem impossible.

In this maze of complication I would frequently submit a proposed program to Jack Ohly, one of Forrestal's three special assistants. The others were Bill McNeil, who handled fiscal matters, and Marx Leva, who was legal advisor. Jack would study the proposed action for a day or so and then tell me the plan looked fine to him but "Don, you oversimplify" he would say, and I would answer "Jack, that is what this town needs." "I guess you're right", he would reply.

One time there was a question about the government selling some war surplus freighters. It had been understood that they could be purchased by a foreign government if the rehabilitation were handled in United States shipyards. This was done to keep those companies alive for otherwise they would have no shipbuilding business due to the postwar excess of ships. This time a company in a foreign country wished to buy some ships and have them overhauled in a foreign shipyard because the conditions at that location were desperate. The Maritime Commission opposed the action, the Navy opposed it, the Department of Labor opposed it, the Army favored it because it was responsible for economic affairs in that country. Steve Early at one of his staff meetings brought up the matter and
the Munitions Board lap as did most complicated problems that cut across several departments.

I conducted hearings to "determine the issues" (a good Washington practice). Then I conferred with Administrative Aide Sours who was secretary of the Security Council. It was to be discussed with the President and I was to attend the Security Council meeting to present it.

Then Steve Early came to my office to ask me if I had noticed that certain members of this foreign firm were also representing certain interests in the United States and had connections in pretty high places in Washington. Light dawned, it was a pretty slick scheme. We refused the request promptly. There have been several cases of questionable practices in this field that have since been disclosed. I have Steve Early to thank that I didn't become involved.

Many industrialists, coming to Washington, feel that their motives are being suspected and that their recommendations receive little consideration. They don't like the manner in which they are passed on from one agency to another, no one being interested in really studying and acting upon the recommendation. Many such industrialists are men of broad experience and responsibility who resent being treated lightly by government personnel who they consider far junior in attainments. They particularly resent it because their personal and business incomes and profits are being taxed to support this cumbersome and unfriendly bureaucracy.

This situation is most regrettable. It seems to me that it stems from two major causes, first because experienced civilians are not willing to contribute their services so the government must hire whom it can, and second because a young man making a career in government is subject to so many requests which he
considers selfish and contrary to the public interest. A politician will ask special treatment in his community which will help his local standing but may be a waste of government funds. A labor leader may threaten reprisals unless the government takes some apparently unsound action. A manufacturer may insist on special allocation of critical materials just to enhance his own profits. Thus government officials have learned to be "on their guard" and when a civilian comes to discuss a matter with them, they often wonder what "axe he is grinding." This becomes a habit, and frequently prejudices them against a perfectly sound program and is one of the reasons why industrialists feel they get the "brush off" in Washington.

The military officers have very high standards of ethics and are a fine lot of men. I never realized how much time they spend in schooling. One of the Lieutenant Generals of the Army told me he had spent more than half of his life in attending schools. They have the military academy, then the War College, the Industrial College, the General Officers College, and many more. They are exceptionally well trained for their primary mission. They are, however, frequently criticized for their lack of training and experience in other fields. I feel they overestimate their abilities in other lines of activities but all too frequently they must step in to very important assignments because industrial people won't do it and someone must. A Major General took charge of the $12.5 billion worth of government plants not because he was so well qualified but because we couldn't get anyone else. He did a perfectly sound, safe job, but not an imaginative one.

In total I found the senior officers of the services to be splendid men. I hope I can maintain contact with them.
A week or two before I left Washington the Naval officers invited me to attend a farewell dinner for John Kenney who was retiring as Under Secretary of the Navy. This was strictly a military affair and I was about the only civilian present. I sat way down at the end of the table with Admirals Radford, John Dale Price and Mort Ring. One of them, saying that I was to leave Washington in a few weeks, asked me to tell them frankly what I thought of the Navy. I tried to avoid the question, but they insisted so I told them. "You folks think more of the Navy than you do of the United States," I said. I told them that if they continued to defy the spirit of unification which was the law of the land and supported by the American people, they would sink the Navy.

The battle was on and we argued furiously for hours. When it subsided we looked up and the dinner was over, practically everyone had departed.

They are fine men, the Navy did a magnificent war job. Since I left Washington many of those who battled unification in the Navy have been removed from office or have mended their ways. Although there is still plenty of "disunification" it is understandable. Institutions with over a century of traditions and with the high service morale and rivalry of the Army and Navy naturally find difficulty in immediate unification. If Forrestal had insisted on it at once there would have been many resignations of valuable officers. It has taken time but good progress is being made.

Drew Pearson is given credit for far more influence than he deserves. Still his broadcasts are an item of importance in Washington. What he says Sunday evening is almost always discussed at lunch Monday. He criticized me on four different occasions.
When I was first appointed by Forrestal to be his deputy on atomic energy, Pearson concocted a story that Forrestal had loaned money to Remington Arms, of which I was Vice President. Remington then made ammunition for Bolivia for the Chaco war. He inferred that Forrestal and I were now getting together on some new kind of questionable proposition.

Later Pearson warned the Senate to look well into my questionable record before confirming my appointment as Chairman of the Munitions Board. When I refused a job to an applicant for a position of handling Munitions Board publicity because he was unfriendly to industry, Pearson built up a far-fetched story out of it. On each occasion my associates immediately told me "You've joined the club" meaning the club of those blasted by Pearson. It interested me that although Pearson blasted me four times, on each occasion none of my associates remembered that he had ever done it before. I concluded from this that what Pearson says is intently listened to but is forgotten in a very few days.

After each Pearson blast I would get mail from friends and from people whom I had never met. It was very significant that I never received one adverse letter. Most of them said they had heard the Pearson broadcast and hoped I would pay no attention to anyone so unreliable. So I concluded that a blast by Pearson was unimportant and not unpleasant.

When Pearson advised the Senate not to confirm my appointment, Judy asked me what I thought about it. I told her that would be fine for then we could go home. Later Judy brought me an envelope addressed to the President, White House, Washington, D.C. The letter inside read, "Dear President Truman, please tell the Senate to send Daddy home to Southport, Connecticut. I went to your inauguration, I ate two hot dogs, Love Judy." It was quite a letter and the next day she mailed it.
A few days later she received a reply "Dear" Judy, President Truman asked me to thank you for your friendly letter and sends you his kindest regards." She said she was going to frame it.

Later at a dinner for Forrestal I told Truman of it. He was delighted and asked me if I would send him the letter Judy had written. I told him I couldn't as it was in his files not mine. He turned to his Assistant, John Steelman, and said, "Damn it all, John, I've been telling you not to open my mail.

As time went on the work increased. We were being called upon for more services. It was gratifying, but exhausting. We were being called upon partially, at least, because we were a civilian agency and could handle problems with a civilian viewpoint. At the same time, however, we couldn't get the kind of civilian help we wanted, so the pace for the few civilians occupying important civilian positions became pretty stiff. My office hours ran from 9 to 6:30, sometimes 7 or 8. Frequently I would leave at 4:00, take a plane to New York, Pittsburgh, or perhaps Chicago to deliver a speech to a group, then fly back home to Washington that night. About twice a week I would be up at 5:30 A.M. to go over matters which I had been unable to concentrate on due to interruptions. When we finally left Washington I was more tired than I realized.

Word came that I should be in Secretary Louis Johnson's office at 11:00 A.M. on 24 June 1949. I suspected something was afoot in my behalf but wasn't sure. When I reported in the Secretary's office I was surprised to find it filled with officers and civilians whom I had known in my one and a third years in Washington.
Secretary Johnson awarded me the certificate of appreciation for EXCEPTIONAL CIVILIAN SERVICE and read a very flattering citation. General Guenther then read a commendatory resolution passed by the War Council and signed by all its members and many of its close associates. A sound recording on a record and a movie were made of the affair and given to me. Louise and Judy, then age 10, were with me to share my pleasure in this unexpected recognition of my tour in government. Judy busied herself getting signatures from many of those present. I didn't realize it until she showed me several sheets of paper filled with autographs of some of the highest ranking military and civilian officials.

The Munitions Board members presented me with a printed copy of a resolution of the board commenting on my services and the Military Liaison Committee had done the same.

President Truman sent me his picture inscribed to me and a very flattering letter. Secretary Johnson did the same as Secretary Forrestal had done before he retired.

At the President's request, Louise, Judy and I called upon him to receive his personal congratulations and farewell.

When I first decided to go to Washington I felt that there would be no pleasure and much frustration and criticism resulting therefrom. As it turned out I had but little frustration, very little criticism, and more praise than I deserved. My apprehensions had been ill-founded. My tour in Washington had been a year and a third of accomplishment, extremely hard work, and with substantial personal satisfaction.
As Louise, Judy and I sailed down the Potomac on the boat to Norfolk, and as the dome of the Capitol grew faint in the evening sunset, we knew we had passed another milestone.
APPENDIX NO. 1 -- LETTERS

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: SEP 17 2013
Louise, Judy and I listened to Drew Pearson telling the Senate to look well into my record before confirming my appointment as 'han.' of the Munitions Board. Without my knowledge, Judy wrote this letter, and a few days later received a reply from all assets.

Louise and I visited the Truman Library years later and were handed these photostats of the letter and reply.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13828, Section 3.5
Date: SEP 17 2013

WASHINGTON
JAN 25 630 PM 749

President Truman
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear President Truman,

Please would you tell the Senate that Daddy would go home to New York, Connecticut.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Chez Char [illegible]
Jan 24, 1949
I went to the inauguration.

It was fun. We saw the
bands and floats. I had two
hot dogs. We had a seat
in a stand.

Love,

Judy Carpenter
January 27, 1949

My dear Judy:

Your friendly letter to the President has been received. He asks me to thank you for writing and to extend best wishes to you.

Very sincerely yours,

MILLIARD D. HARRITT
Secretary to the President

July G. Carpenter,
11 Grafton Street,
Chevy Chase,
Maryland.
June 22, 1949

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

I have your letter of April 30, 1949 submitting your resignation as Chairman of the Munitions Board, to be effective not later than June 30, 1949. As you know, I accept this resignation with the greatest of reluctance and do so only because of the compelling personal considerations of which you advised me.

As Chairman of the Munitions Board, and previously as the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, you have done an outstanding job in strengthening the National Military Establishment and in furthering our national security. Under your direction, a close working relationship was established between the National Military Establishment and the Atomic Energy Commission, and great strides were made in the progress of industrial mobilization planning and in the coordination of procurement matters in the Armed Services.

You are to be congratulated not only for the large number of concrete accomplishments for which you are responsible, but also for your public spirit and your sense of duty in accepting these posts at personal sacrifice and in repeatedly, at my request, extending your services far beyond the date when you had anticipated returning to private life.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Harry S. Truman

Honorable Donald F. Carpenter,
Chairman,
Munitions Board,
Pentagon Building,
Washington, D.C.
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

17 SEPTEMBER 1948

Dear Don:

It is with regret that I accept your resignation as my Deputy for Atomic Energy Matters, as Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, and as the representative of the National Military Establishment on the other related agencies which you mention in your letter. My regret would be much greater if I did not look forward with such anticipation to working with you as Chairman of the Munitions Board and if I did not share your own confidence in the ability of Mr. Webster to carry on this work in an excellent fashion.

I am sure you know how grateful I am for the work you have done and for your willingness to stay on in a new capacity. There is no need to list the major accomplishments for which you have been responsible not only in the field of atomic energy but also in the many other areas in which I have sought your advice. These are matters of common knowledge, both within and without the National Military Establishment. I think I need say no more than that I am deeply appreciative.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ James Forrestal

Mr. Donald F. Carpenter
Room 3E 740
Pentagon Building
NCU (Columbia University)
NEW YORK, N.Y.
JUNE 24, 1949

HONORABLE DON CARPENTER
MUNITIONS BOARD PENTAGON BLDG=

DEAR DON I LEARNED THAT TOMORROW YOU ARE TO TERMINATE YOUR PRESENT TOUR OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE. I AM QUITE WELL AWARE THAT IT HAS MEANT MUCH TO YOU IN TERMS OF PERSONAL SACRIFICE TO CARRY OUT THE DUTIES ASSIGNED YOU DURING THESE PAST MONTHS IN WASHINGTON. BUT I TRULY HOPE THAT THE SATISFACTION OF HAVING DONE A GOOD JOB, OF HAVING SERVED YOUR COUNTRY WELL IN A VERY CRITICAL POST WILL FAR MORE THAN COMPENSATE FOR ANY MATERIAL SACRIFICES, NO MATTER HOW GREAT THEY MAY BE. TO THIS I ADD ONLY THAT YOU WILL ALWAYS HAVE MY ADMIRATION AND RESPECT FOR THE GREAT TALENTS YOU HAVE DEVOTED TO A MOST INTRICATE, DIFFICULT AND IMPORTANT TASK, AND FOR THE LOYALTY AND DEVOTION THAT HAVE CHARACTERIZED YOUR WORK. WITH AFFECTIONATE REGARD=

IKE EISENHOWER
APPENDIX NO. 2 -- AWARDS
A RESOLUTION
by the
MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE
to the
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

WHEREAS, Donald F. Carpenter served as the Chairman of
the Military Liaison Committee from April 6, 1948 to September
21, 1948; and

WHEREAS, during this period the Committee undertook new
and much larger responsibilities consequent to a new charter; and

WHEREAS, new and greatly improved relations were estab-
lished with the Atomic Energy Commission, its staff and its
operating agencies in the field; and

WHEREAS, in sum total the Military Liaison Committee
became during this period a far more effective activity of
the National Military Establishment and aided materially in
contributing to an improved program in the atomic energy
field; and

WHEREAS, these successful results were in large measure,
the direct result of the initiative, wise counsel, and able
leadership of the said Donald F. Carpenter; be it

RESOLVED by the Members of the Military Liaison Committee
that they express their warm and sincere appreciation of the
outstanding work of the said Donald F. Carpenter in the cause
of national defense by presenting him with this resolution
signed by all the Members.

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<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>/s/ K. D. Nichols Major General, USA</td>
<td>/s/ R. A. Ofstie Rear Admiral, USN</td>
<td>/s/ D. M. Schlatter Major General, USAF</td>
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF THE
NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
CERTIFICATE OF APPRECIATION
TO
DONALD F. CARPENTER

DONALD F. CARPENTER, for exceptionally meritorious service to the National Military Establishment from April 8, 1948, to June 24, 1949. At the request of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Carpenter left his civilian occupation to assume the Chairmanship of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. In this capacity, Mr. Carpenter demonstrated unusual tact and ability in developing military atomic energy programs and under his guidance and direction military atomic energy activities were materially furthered. In September, 1948, Mr. Carpenter was appointed by the President to serve as Chairman of the Munitions Board. Faced with unprecedented problems in supply, distribution, storage and procurement, Mr. Carpenter showed remarkable initiative and zeal in directing comprehensive studies and developing effective solutions. His service to the government is deserving of the highest praise.

LOUIS JOHNSON
RESOLUTION of the WAR COUNCIL
NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

WHEREAS Donald F. Carpenter has served the National Military Establishment faithfully and brilliantly from 8 April 1948 to 30 June 1949; First as Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee until 21 September 1948 and later as Chairman of the Munitions Board until 30 June 1949; and

WHEREAS in his capacity as the first civilian Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee he organized an effective agency for the coordination of atomic energy matters within the Military Establishment, established a sound and comprehensive program covering the military aspects of atomic energy, and materially assisted in the development of close and harmonious relationships between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Armed Services; and

WHEREAS in the role of Chairman of the Munitions Board, he has made major contributions toward a more efficient and unified Military Establishment and has greatly advanced the state of our materiel readiness for any national emergency; and

WHEREAS the Munitions Board, under his capable leadership, has made tremendous strides toward the fulfillment of the missions assigned to it by the National Security Act, including the planning of the military aspects of industrial mobilization and coordination and improvement of procurement and related activities within the National Military Establishment; and

WHEREAS in the capacity of a deputy to the Secretary of Defense during this entire period, he has performed a great variety of special and difficult assignments with extreme competence and dispatch; and

WHEREAS his wisdom, judgment and patience in the performance of all of these roles, have furthered the objectives of unification and strengthened the security of this nation; and

WHEREAS the qualities of his character and personality have won the lasting friendship, respect and affection of all those who have worked with him in the National Military Establishment; --

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that we, the undersigned members of the War Council and other associates of Donald F. Carpenter in the National Military Establishment, express our appreciation for his faithful and outstanding services and for the wisdom, energy, loyalty and devotion to duty which he brought to his work; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that we the undersigned desire to indicate our deep regret that circumstances compel his return to private life and wish him Godspeed wherever he may go; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that a copy of this Resolution be made a part of the permanent records of the War Council of the National Military Establishment and that a copy thereof be presented to Donald F. Carpenter

LOUIS JOHNSON
Secretary of Defense

GORDON GRAY
Secretary of the Army

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS
Secretary of the Navy

STEPHEN T. EARLY
Under-Secretary of Defense

OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chief of Staff
U.S. Army

LOUIS DENFELD
Admiral-Chief of Naval Operations

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
General - Office of the Secretary of Defense

STUART SYMINGTON
Secretary of the Air Force

HOYT B. VANDENBERG
Chief of Staff
U.S. Air Force

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Chairman - Joint Chiefs of Staff

KARL T. COMPTON
Chairman - The Research and Development Board

THOMAS R. REID
Chairman - Personnel Policy Board

JOHN SHERMAN
Secretary of the War Council

MARX LEVA
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

JOHN A. OHLY
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

W. J. McNeil
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
General - Director of the Joint Staffs, National Military Establishment

1 JUNE 1949
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESS:

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL PRESENTATION
AT 11:30 A.M., FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 1949

RE 6700 Ext. 3201-3202

DONALD F. CARPENTER AWARDED
NME APPRECIATION CERTIFICATE

Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson today presented the National Military Establishment Certificate of Appreciation to Donald F. Carpenter, retiring Chairman of the Munitions Board.

Secretary Johnson cited Mr. Carpenter for "exceptionally meritorious service to the National Military Establishment" for his work both as Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission and as Chairman of the Munitions Board. The Secretary stated that, under Mr. Carpenter's guidance, military atomic energy activities were materially furthered. He also pointed out that Mr. Carpenter was faced with unprecedented problems in his position as Chairman of the Munitions Board and showed "remarkable initiative and zeal in directing comprehensive studies and developing effective solutions."

The Certificate of Appreciation was presented to Mr. Carpenter in Secretary Johnson's office in the presence of officials of the Military Establishment and other agencies, members of Congress and other invited guests.

Mr. Carpenter is leaving today to return to the E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Inc., from which he has been on leave of absence since April 1948.

The citation stated:

"Donald F. Carpenter, for exceptionally meritorious service to the National Military Establishment from April 8, 1948 to June 24, 1949. At the request of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Carpenter left his civilian occupation to assume the Chairmanship of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. In this capacity, Mr. Carpenter demonstrated unusual tact and ability in developing military atomic energy programs and under his guidance and direction military atomic energy activities were materially furthered. In September, 1948, Mr. Carpenter was appointed by the President to serve as Chairman of the Munitions Board. Faced with unprecedented problems in supply, distribution, storage and procurement, Mr. Carpenter showed remarkable initiative and zeal in directing comprehensive studies and developing effective solutions. His service to the government is deserving of the highest praise."

Guests invited to the ceremony included:

Mrs. Donald F. Carpenter and daughter Judy
Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder
Secretary of Interior Julius A. Krug
Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer
NEWS RELEASE (Continued)
NME APPRECIATION CERTIFICATE

Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray
Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews
Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington
Senator Millard E. Tydings, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee
Dr. John R. Steelman, Assistant to the President
Frank Pace, Jr., Director, Bureau of the Budget
Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
Thomas B. McCabe, Chairman, Federal Reserve System
Under Secretary of State James E. Webb
Under Secretary of Defense Stephen T. Early
Under Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball
Under Secretary of the Air Force Arthur S. Barrows
Assistant Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Voorhees
Assistant Secretary of the Navy John T. Koehler
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, United States Army
Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Force
Thomas Reid, Chairman, Personnel Policy Board
Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chairman, Research and Development Board
Dr. Vannevar Bush, Former Chairman, Research and Development Board
Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Atomic Energy Commission
General Joseph T. McNarney, USAP, Advisor to Secretary of Defense
Lt. General John E. Hull, Director, Weapons System Evaluation Group
Lt. General LeRoy Lutes, Director of Staff, Munitions Board
Major General Alfred N. Gruenther, Director, The Joint Staff
Major General Leven C. Allen, Executive Secretary, Office of Secretary
Major General Sidney P. Spalding
Major General Patrick W. Timberlake
Major General Kenneth D. Nichols
Major General David M. Schlatter
Brigadier General R. C. Wilson
Rear Admiral Francis C. Denebrink
Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie
Rear Admiral Tom B. Hill
Colonel Paul H. Griffith, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Colonel Louis H. Renfrow, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Colonel John H. Hinds
Colonel Robert Wood
Captain Herbert D. Riley, USN, Aide to the Secretary of Defense
Captain Laurence A. Abercrombie, USN, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Captain F. B. Hyde, USN
Marx Leva, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
John H. Olly, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
W. J. McNeil, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
William Frye, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Harry B. Blythe
Ward Canaday
Elliot Cassidy
E. H. Hawkins
Harold B. Hinton
Clifton Mack
James C. Roop
William Webster

END