Goldberg: This is an interview with Lee Evey, the program manager for the Pentagon renovation, taking place on October 22, 2001, at 10:30 a.m. in Mr. Evey's office. [The interviewers are Alfred Goldberg and Diane Putney of the OSD Historical Office.]

As program manager, what are your key responsibilities?

Evey: I work directly for the deputy secretary of defense. I am responsible for virtually everything that takes place in the renovation program. The main activities that are accomplished by the program fall into certain temporal sequences. There is the requirements determination planning that outlines the scope, that is, what exactly we are to do in the renovation activities. Secondly, there is the preparation of what we call swing space, the space people move into that enables us subsequently to go into an area and perform the renovation work. There is the actual movement of people into that swing space, so it's the removal of people from the area in which we are about to do the renovation work. Once the people are moved, then we do abatement and demolition. We go in and remove bad materials from the Building, things like asbestos, lead, PCBs, mercury, diesel contamination, etc. Concluding that, we go through the demolition process of tearing down the Building, taking it back to bare concrete. When we finish an area, it looks much as it must have looked back in the early 1940s when it was in the process of being constructed. Core and shell construction is the first real construction that we do, the basic utility phase and the basic shell of the Building. Then you have tenant fitout, the secondary utility distribution, which is to carry all those utilities out to
the final point of placement in the Building. We have furniture, fixtures, and equipment that we bring and place. At that point we put in carpeting and install extensive communications infrastructure. We then repopulate the area. At that point we are finished. Throughout that process we have what we call "commissioning," a verification and validation with regard to capability and performance. It's very extensive, to insure that all the systems in the Building perform as they were intended. The heating, ventilation, and air conditioning must maintain the proper temperature and humidity, etc. and communicate information back to the energy monitoring and control system, for proper building control.

**Goldberg:** You were delayed in getting underway with the renovation and there were different dates given for its completion. Why is it taking so long to renovate it when it only took 16 months to erect it? That is the question many people ask.

**Evey:** I get that question a lot. The biggest challenge that we face, as well as the biggest reward that we receive from doing the work, centers around people. One tremendous advantage that Leslie Groves had when he came is that he did not have 25,000 people sitting there at their desks as he handled the work. That's the toughest part of our job. That presents a tremendous challenge. We have to keep all of the 25,000 people fully functional, performing their mission, etc. Recently I had the opportunity to make a presentation to some congressmen. They were laughing about the Building taking 16 months to build and 16 to 20 years to renovate. I told them that we could renovate it in 16 months... just how much money and how many resources do you want to expend? We try to achieve a pace to give us the best overall economy and
still get the job done in some reasonable period of time. If we try to increase the pace dramatically, the expense of doing it increases exponentially.

*Goldberg:* Where is the money coming from?

*Evey:* It comes from a revolving fund that is paid for by all the tenants in the Building. The agencies are charged on a square foot basis first, and second on a type of service basis. There is a basic assessment charge which increases in cost as the cost of operations and maintenance for that type of space increases. Storage spaces is less expensive than space used to support computer operations, for example. All that money goes into a revolving fund that pays for routine Building maintenance by Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), and also for the Defense Protective Service (DPS) and the Pentagon Renovation.

*Goldberg:* So money is a factor, also.

*Evey:* It always is.

*Goldberg:* How much attention have Deputy Secretaries paid to what you are doing?

*Evey:* It depends on the Deputy Secretary and the types of challenges faced. I have been through several of them now. I was originally brought on by Dr. John Hamre, who paid a great deal of attention to this program. When I came in the program was experiencing substantial difficulty, having a very difficult time performing its mission. We had some very challenging construction problems and didn't always acquit ourselves as well as we might have liked. I was asked to take over the program and find ways to improve that performance. Dr. Hamre personally suffered through some of the very difficult times and took a very strong personal interest in it. Mr. Rudy de Leon followed him, and he was quite interested in the program. The three of us sat down in a
number of meetings and discussed the issues and problems in great detail. Mr. De Leon had a great knowledge of the program and was very helpful and supportive. The current deputy secretary of defense, Mr. Wolfowitz, has not been actively involved with the program at all until recently, for a couple of reasons, one of which is a new administration with a myriad of problems to address, and those must be taken in some order of importance. When I look at the many things that this administration has taken on, it clearly has the intent of making dramatic changes in the Department of Defense. With all due objectivity, I have to admit that we fall several echelons down that list. I also take it as a compliment to the program. Earlier renovation required a great deal of attention, because we had significant problems performing our mission. I take it as a vote of confidence that we are no longer in such difficulty that we require that level of involvement by the Deputy Secretary. I would say that perhaps in this case benign neglect is a compliment. More recently, however, as upper management has managed to work their way through some of their most pressing problems, and certainly since September 11 and its direct impact on the function of the Building, he has become much more personally involved. I have met with him a number of times, and with the Secretary of Defense a number of times. Last week I had the opportunity to present a number of issues to the Senior Executive Council, the secretaries of their departments, and also their chiefs to discuss a number of issues of a security nature and what we might do to improve the security of the Building. So there is a high level of involvement at this point.

Goldberg: With good reason.
Evey: Yes, I think interest has been heightened. The realization that we had employed a number of significant construction changes in the Building as a function of the renovation, many of which people weren't familiar with, served to save a number of lives.

Goldberg: From your experience, Deputy Secretaries in general have been helpful and supportive?

Evey: Yes.

Goldberg: Was that true before, do you think?

Evey: My understanding is that individuals within the Building at a high level had been supportive of the program for an extended period of time. I had a number of personal conversations with Alice Maroni of the Comptroller's Office. Earlier in the program there was a group of senior executives that came together periodically to assist the Deputy Secretary in the process of oversight and top level executive management of the program, providing direction and assisting in problem solving and decision making. So I have every indication that there was high level and pervasive involvement in the program throughout the Building and a great interest in trying to insure that it was renovated properly and effectively.

Goldberg: What were your qualifications for this position?

Evey: That's an interesting question, and I have spent not a few minutes trying to figure out what I had done in my life to deserve this, and to try to ensure that I would never do it again.

Goldberg: Were you as gray when you started?
Evey: Almost. That has proceeded apace ever since taking the job. My background is not as a program manager. This is the first job I've ever had as a program manager. I have virtually no background in construction; I have done very little construction in my career. I am actually a contracts officer by profession, not in any way trained in program management.

Goldberg: That may be why you are having some success with it.

Evey: This is the blunder method of training, I think. I was invited into the office of Darlene Druyun, the head of Air Force acquisition. I am an Air Force employee still, not an OSD employee. I was the Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for contracting. She asked me to take on a special project. This was the special project.

Goldberg: You must be older than you look.

Evey: I had intended to retire January 3, but I have pulled the paperwork. I've done a number of special projects for Darleen Druyun, and she asked me to agree to do "a special project" before she would tell me what it was. When I agreed to it she asked me to be the program manager for the Pentagon Renovation. She asked me to interview with some people for the job. She had talked to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who had talked to the Air Force Secretary and had asked that they provide a program manager. Why they selected the Air Force, I don't know.

Goldberg: This was Hamre?

Evey: Yes.

Goldberg: I will ask him about it. We are interviewing him, too.

Evey: He will be able to verify the story I'm about to tell you. I had a series of interviews, and I guess I did okay, reaching people further and further up the chain of
command. Finally they said I had to interview with Dr. Hamre but they kept postponing it for one reason or another. One day I just happened to be at the copy machine with an article that had been on the front page of the Washington Post about the Ronald Reagan Building and cost overruns--front page articles. It ran for several days and consisted of a very extensive series of articles about the cost overruns and other difficulties on that job. When I saw that article I wanted a copy because if I was going to be in the business I needed to know something about it. I had just finished making a copy when I was told that I was wanted in Dr. Hamre's office immediately to interview for the job. Just by chance I had this manila folder with this article in my hands when I went in for the interview. Dr. Hamre is a very affable individual, expansive, pleasant, and polite. He has a coffee table in his office and a chair--I sit in the chair. He leans back in his couch and then leans forward, and in the very best interview technique 101, he said, "Tell me, Lee, what are your goals for the Pentagon renovation?" I knew nothing about the renovation, much less had any goals for it, but thinking quickly I opened the manila folder and took the front page article and placed it on his lap. I said, "I have one main goal, Sir, which is not to appear on the front page of the Washington Post." He took one look at it and said, "That's a good goal, I like that goal, and I would certainly hope you would be successful in that goal." We talked about that for a few minutes, and he offered me the job. I said I would do the best I could. We shook hands. The interview had lasted about ten minutes, and I had the job.

Goldberg: So it's been a continuing higher learning experience for you.

Evey: Yes, it has been. It's been one of the fastest paced, most remarkable jobs I've ever had. I've had a wonderful career and a wonderful life, but this is certainly the
culmination of a lot of prior learning and the opportunity to apply many lessons learned over the past 30 years. This is the most remarkable, wonderful job anyone could have.

Goldberg: What's the most important lesson?

Evey: Everything runs on people and teamwork.

Goldberg: It's important to get good people to work for you.

Evey: It's funny. We all sit and watch TV every Sunday, even those of us who are chagrined at the lousy season the Washington Redskins are having. It provides object lessons in how to run organizations. Every week with your potato chips and dip you're watching TV and over and over you hear, "It's so important to have teamwork. This team is winning because they're demonstrating the following principles and characteristics of teamwork.... The other poor miserable team is losing because they're not operating as a team." We all agree on how important teamwork is. Then you come to work so often on Monday and forget that lesson.

Goldberg: I have the impression that you have a competent team here.

Evey: They are, but each one of them being individually competent doesn't get you where you want to be. They have to be competent as a team. We've done a lot of things to change ourselves as an organization and make sure that a high level of teamwork and support of information transmission and cooperative behavior is present at the worksite every day.

Goldberg: What consideration had you given to safeguarding the Pentagon from attack in the course of your work, and did you incorporate changes in design as a result of studies of possible attacks? Did you make suggestions for improving security?
Evey: Absolutely. Part of what I inherited in the program was reflective of concerns about security. Many things the program had already done reflected a desire to improve security. For instance, the two south terrace bridges extending into the South Parking area ostensibly improve circulation of the Building and bring people into the Building without having to cross North Rotary Road. The North Rotary Road has 10,000 people walking in through it each day and 3,000 vehicles that traverse the same space at the same time. Clearly there is a danger there, and when we talk to people in the Building we emphasize that aspect of it. But clearly, there is another aspect of that as well. Incorporated into that design in connecting those two bridges is a strongly reinforced masonry wall. It's some distance from the Building, about 140 feet, and that whole design and that wall and all its features were designed to move vehicles away from the Building and keep that kind of threat away from the Building as much as reasonably possible.

Goldberg: How did you reinforce the wall when you did that?

Evey: It's reinforced with a considerable amount of steel. It's not a three-foot thick blast wall, but it provides a reasonable amount of protection.

Goldberg: You did that when you were Building the new entrances to the Building itself, the doors, etc?

Evey: That's correct. There's a protective wall right behind the bus stops on the south rotary road, and that wall is intended to help deflect blast and provide additional protection. Also associated with that is some rework of the approach route for vehicles coming to AE drive. It also changed the route for trucks entering the south loading dock area. At that time that dock was one of only two places where material could enter the
Building. There was a south loading dock, where all vehicle deliveries were made except for the cafeteria deliveries, which were made at another location in the Building. The intent was to try to make the routes, for vehicles going in either to the cafeteria loading dock or to south loading dock, a more difficult and tortuous approach to force them to slow down and provide additional standoff room, reaction time, and opportunity for security personnel located in that area. Subsequent to construction on South Terrace we were able to build something we had wanted to for some time, a Remote Delivery Facility. While that is not a renovation project per se, we were selected by WHS to be the organization to build that remote delivery facility, I think because we were starting to demonstrate that we were becoming increasingly effective at producing good high-quality construction on time and within budget.

**Goldberg:** Did you give it a name?

**Evey:** It is the David O. Cooke Remote Delivery Facility. That was very much a result of a personal expression by Secretary of Defense Cohen. Doc Cooke had been such a driving force in pushing for that very badly needed facility, which would increase in a dramatic way the security for this Building, that the secretary felt he should be recognized. A second reason was as a symbolic gesture for the many years of faithful service that Doc Cooke has provided this Building. It provides a standing memorial to the service he has provided the Office of the Secretary of Defense for so many years. The Secretary of Defense suggested the name, and the slightest suggestion in that direction was jumped on by many people. We thought, “What a fitting tribute to this guy, who is a living legend as the ‘Mayor of the Pentagon.’” So we have already cut his name into the side of the Building. We also will place a brass plaque on the parade field
on top of the Remote Delivery Facility recognizing Doc Cooke and capturing a goodly portion of the letter written by Secretary Cohen in specific praise of Doc Cooke and his achievements. We wanted to capture in expressive words what Doc has brought to this Building. As an additional security project at the Corridor 8 entrance there was an opportunity to provide, for the first time in the Building, a new turnstile type entrance, with slide cards providing us an opportunity to wire that kind of electronic infrastructure into one of the Building entrances—as the first test bed to employ that technology to help control people coming into the Building. We implemented a number of other activities to improve telecommunications capability in the Building in some of the construction we've done down in the basement area. We have also built a backup power plant, backup chillers, backup water towers, and they are in place. We are providing redundancy in telecommunications capabilities, and many other things of less individual consequence, which have a cumulative impact in improving Building security. Wedge 1 became the final culmination of our activities in that area.

Goldberg: What did you consider the most likely threat to the Building?

Evey: The things we've been seeing in the news really influenced our thinking—specifically the Khobar Towers and Oklahoma City blasts. Blast as a threat to the Building was very much on our minds at the time. We made the determination to provide additional blast resistance to the Building, starting with Wedge 1. The actual physical construction of the existing Building structure in some areas came somewhat as a surprise to us. We started with the intent to place blast resistant windows, because we saw that as a weak point. We worked closely with the Corps of Engineers, who have an office in Omaha that does blast studies. Through various computer programs
we modeled the blast characteristics we wanted to protect against in two areas—the A ring windows facing the inner courtyard, and the E ring windows facing the exterior of the Building. The expectation was that the blast characteristics that each one might face would be slightly different. A blast effect is driven by size of the blast, proximity, and rate of the overpressure, or spike, and how long that pressure remains working on the object of impact. The impact is sharper on closer objects.

**Goldberg:** I experienced some of that during World War II in the London bomb attacks. A blast would blow out the windows and walls of one building and leave the other two on either side untouched. It was freakish.

**Evey:** The effects are sometimes extremely difficult to predict, but clearly, the bigger the explosion the greater the impact, and the closer the greater the impact. Other things, such as how quickly it spikes up and down, are not quite as intuitive, but more or less common sense. We modeled the windows based on that, and had some models made and physically tested by the Corps of Engineers to insure that they would achieve the desired effect. However, when we actually did the demolition of Wedge 1 we discovered something we had not anticipated. The outer wall, unlike almost all the other vertical walls in the Pentagon, was not built of reinforced concrete, but brick.

**Goldberg:** We could see the brickwork on the fifth floor inside. There were eight inches of brick?

**Evey:** Sometimes there was much less than that.

**Goldberg:** It was supposed to be eight inches.

**Evey:** In some places it was only a single course of brick. We were faced with this unexpected problem, in that we had windows that were much stronger than the walls.
We had a situation where in case of a blast the windows would stand up but the wall would blow out.

**Goldberg:** If the wall blew, the windows would just go.

**Evey:** We also reviewed a number of recent blasts in the U.S. embassies in Africa and talked with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency discussing what happened at the embassies. We were aware of the fact that people are rarely injured or killed by the immediate concussion of the blast, rather it's the fragmentation of the building, glass, concrete, and furniture, which become lethal objects when subjected to that kind of blast event. We became aware that we needed to prevent things from becoming airborne if at all possible because secondary fragmentation causes the problem. We started figuring how to strengthen the exterior walls to make them more effective against a blast event. We came up with a system of blast windows anchored in approximately 6" X 6" steel tubes, that rise vertically from the first to the fifth floor, with horizontal steel members connecting them together and interconnected themselves by holes drilled through the concrete flooring, and all bolted together vertically and horizontally into a steel matrix on the inside. On the exterior of the Building, the limestone remained the same. The limestone is very impressive, but it provides virtually no structural support whatsoever.

**Goldberg:** How thick is it?

**Evey:** About four inches thick, typically. The sections we are taking down now, the cornice sections, are about 1 1/2 feet thick. The limestone exterior was hung on L-shaped steel hangers inserted into the brickwork and extended out from the Building. The limestone was hung on that, pointed up with masonry or grout. We put the steel
framework in, and there were still large gapped areas where there was no steel, and the brickwork opened up to possible fragmentation. We put a Kevlar-type ballistic cloth in those spaces, across the brickwork where it wasn't actually backed by steel or the window.

Goldberg: This was on the inside part of the brick?

Evey: Yes. The cloth was affixed to the steel framework.

Goldberg: The windows are very thick, aren't they?

Evey: The windows are about 1 1/2 or 2 inches thick, they weigh a bit over a ton per window. We installed the steel framework and then the windows were installed within that framework, initially bolted and then welded into the steel framework. The frame of the window is welded to the steel framework within the Building. The Kevlar-type cloth was stretched across between the steel members. Typically there is a flat piece of steel with holes drilled in it and bolts inserted through those holes, into the 6" X 6" steel framework members, all bolted together with additional pieces of flat steel serving to hold very tightly the ballistic cloth stretched in between the steel frameworks.

Goldberg: What purpose did the cloth have?

Evey: Ballistic cloth is a really tough, elastic type material, and slows down the projectile effect of fragments. The ideal is that the fragment expends all its energy stretching the cloth and then drops harmlessly to the floor. Everything has limits, but to the extent that we could do that, it would render harmless much fragmentation. I had no idea of just how tough this material is until last week when we had a 4,000 lb. piece of limestone held in place entirely by the cloth. It had broken loose and was caught up in this cloth, and when the workers went to remove it from the Building they realized that it
was held entirely by the cloth. The cloth looks sturdy, but I had no idea that it was so immensely strong.

**Goldberg:** How long did the steel structured windows stay up?

**Evey:** After the impact, explosion, and fireball, the Building stood for about 35 minutes before it collapsed. I heard estimates from about 15 to 35 minutes. One of my people actually punched the time off on his digital watch and it measured 35 minutes.

**Goldberg:** So that was a real godsend and saved a lot of people.

**Evey:** We have received a number of e-mails, letters, and calls from people who were directly in that area or adjacent to it. A number of communications were from people who were on the third, fourth, or fifth floors above the area of impact, and although they were considerably shaken up and some quite bruised, they survived. Some told of picking themselves up, walking to the door and exiting; others told of being bounced around considerably in their office but being able to escape from the Building. It's our belief that because of the fact that that part of the Building remained standing for the time many lives were saved.

**Goldberg:** Is there any way we could get some estimate of how many people were able to get out?

**Evey:** I can give you some general numbers. The closest numbers our program will come up with will come from Dr. Georgine Glatz, as she does her study. She is working very hard to interview as many people as possible who were in the immediate area. If you look at Wedge 1 and Wedge 2, we were about five days from completion of Wedge 1, and we were moving people out of Wedge 2 into Wedge 1 in preparation to beginning renovation of Wedge 2. Had both of those wedges been completely filled with people,
with a typical wedge having about 5,000 people, we would have had about 10,000 persons in those wedges that day. If you want exact numbers they are available from Stacie Condrell, of our office. She has written them down exactly. There are approximately 4,600 people within both wedges. From apex to apex across the face of the Building where the aircraft impacted, counting the people in Wedge 1 and Wedge 2, there were about 2,600 people in the immediate impact area.

Goldberg: To get back to you, when did you learn of the attack?

Evey: As it turned out, my brother-in-law had died the day before, so I had left quite early in the morning for North Carolina. I drove for hours with no radio. At Bristol, Tennessee, I stopped to eat, and the people served me with apologies for slow service because they were in the back watching the horrible events on TV. I asked what they meant, and they said that two hijackers had flown into the Twin Towers in New York. They said there was another airplane that had been hijacked and flown into the Pentagon. I was shocked and ran out to my car and got my two cell phones and between the two managed from time to time to make contact with my crew on site as well as members of my family and others to tell them what I was doing. I turned back to Washington, D.C., so I had been driving for 12 hours by the time I arrived back here. I got here about 6 o’clock in the afternoon. I stopped at home to change clothes. My wife G.G and daughter Caroline went to McDonalds and bought 45 hamburgers and 45 French fries, and took an ice chest full of Cokes to the Pentagon for the people on the site. The cars were still here on site and people could not get out or back, and I wanted to take as much food as I could. I arrived about 6:00 p.m. and most of our people had
been sent home. I had a limited number of people still here, and that was the first food
they had seen since breakfast. We ate cold hamburgers and french fries that night.

**Goldberg:** What did you do when you got here? What were your priorities?

**Evey:** I went over to the site to see what was happening. I had been in constant
contact on my drive in, so I was talking to my people about collecting the types of
construction equipment already available at the Pentagon. We had a number of work
projects underway at the time, among them the Metro Entrance Facility project, and had
some cranes available. At the work sites we also had some front-end loaders and back-
hoes and such. So they were collected and moved on to the work site. They started
going large electric lights for the night work and setting up the area for our
headquarters as a staging area. Our expectation was that the work site would become
very cluttered where the crash occurred, and that was true. In no time every square
inch was covered with tents, vehicles, and such, and there was not a great deal of room
there to collect and store materials. We established the PenRen location at our Modular
Office Complex, the Derrick Anderson Building, as a storage site for things like 4X4
pressure treated lumber, vehicles of various types, anything we thought might be
needed to support the work effort. That was ongoing by the time I got here, a great deal
of it had been accomplished, and I can't speak highly enough of the people who with
good sound judgment and common sense had made decisions very rapidly about what
needed to be done and just did it. I talked to my people at the site and tried to
determine our best role. By that time we had the Arlington County Fire Department, the
Fairfax County Fire Department, the Montgomery County Fire Department, FBI, FAA,
FEMA, and myriad organizations accustomed to dealing with disasters and tragedies of
this type. There was nothing we could add to that, so we couldn't contribute in that way. But we could contribute by being the one-stop shopping opportunity. Every individual who had the Pentagon Renovation logo on their hardhat became a supply resource. Recovery personnel could find a Pentagon Renovation employee and come and ask for whatever they needed, and we would provide it as quickly as possible. When you look at all the equipment in photos at that time, except for maybe one special use crane, we provided that equipment. If someone said they needed a front-end loader, five minutes later there was one there with an experienced operator ready to do whatever was necessary to support that recovery activity. If they needed 4x4 pressure-treated lumber, it was already staged here on location, so we picked up a phone and five minutes later it arrived on site. Whatever was needed we provided, and because of that people began to rely on us. I think because of the rapid response that we gave, the recovery activities were accomplished in a dramatically rapid fashion. When we talked with the FBI people they said they had anticipated eight weeks of recovery activity to clear that site. They cleared it in two weeks. They would come and tell us they had never had such recovery support before, it was incredible. They said what they needed, they got. It was there.

**Goldberg:** Because there was a lot on site.

**Evey:** And there was a ready conduit because it was our business. The kind of things they needed were our business, and we provided that in the normal course of work activity.

**Goldberg:** When you say you cleared the site in two weeks, what did that involve?

**Evey:** The FBI and FEMA had gone through the crash site--had cleared it.

**Goldberg:** When did you start demolition?
Evey: We began mobilization for demolition on the 12th of October. We could have begun sooner than that, but there was a great deal of work which we accomplished preceding the actual demolition. We had recovered debris, and such.

Goldberg: What did you do with the debris?

Evey: When the FBI and FEMA were involved in the recovery activities there was a great deal of concern about the 10,000 tons of debris we removed in direct support of their activity. We provided the trucks and dumpsters, using brand new ones so that the evidence would not be mixed in with someone's trash from the week before. We would truck them for the FBI from the crash site over to North Parking to a fenced-in area run by the FBI. Once we arrived in North Parking they would dump it on the lot and there a large group of people would sift the material by hand to recover evidence--aircraft fragments, human remains, etc.

Goldberg: That wasn't all done by hand, was it?

Evey: There were front-end loaders available here, so they could move large pieces. Everything they removed from that site and dumped in North Parking was gone through by hand and recontainerized before it was removed form the site. Ultimately it was moved to a final location at a treatment site in King Georges County, Virginia. We are still sending that material there. Now we've gone beyond the point of crash recovery and crime scene investigation and are into Building demolition.

Goldberg: They don't have to oversee that, do they?

Evey: If we find something we think is an aircraft part or human remains, or classified material that had broken out of a container and been misplaced, we put that in special containers and call appropriate parties to come back and look at it.
Goldberg: There was a lot of tonnage removed after the original debris that was brought here.

Evey: A tremendous amount. It's clearly going to be much more than 10,000 tons. One thing of interest is that we could have begun demolition earlier than we did, but it was an affirmative decision on our part to not start immediately. We had the victims' families expressing a desire to visit the site, they felt some need in terms of seeking closure to visit the site in a subdued manner. It would not be appropriate to have huge machines there tearing things down. So we waited until they all had an opportunity to do that by whatever means or manner that they wished before making these dramatic changes. Ultimately the Pentagon planned and conducted personal visits for family members who wished to come to the site, and although we had a lot of work going on at that time, it was internal work, not Building demolition. To ensure privacy and relative quiet, we provided lunch for all the employees who were involved in the work end of the site. We got them pizza and cokes and had an extended lunch period while the family members were there. So the site was virtually deserted. There was no work activity, no people bustling past them dressed in Tyvek suits and respirators, and all of that. They had the site to themselves and it was somewhat placid, peaceful, and quiet. Secondly, the Building began to plan the 11 October memorial service. We decided it would be inappropriate for us to initiate some full-scale demolition activity prior to that occurring. We were watching the Building closely, as it was an unstable structure, beginning to tilt and twist. There was some concern we would have to start work sooner, but if at all possible we would wait until the ceremony, to allow that final sense of closure to occur before the Building began to be demolished. The ceremony occurred on the 11th, and
we began limited demolition activity on the 12th. The pace picked up rapidly after that. It took a few days for us to get up and get going, before the extent of the activity really became apparent. Now we see the Building being demolished quite rapidly.

**Goldberg:** With whom did you confer on September 11 and 12?

**Evey:** I arrived here about 6:00 p.m. I immediately went to the site and talked to my people to make sure we had coverage and to establish a command center at our PenRen headquarters location. We also had a command center being established at the site. I talked to people at both locations to make sure of sufficient communications—cell phones, that we knew each others' phone numbers—and that materials and supplies that were wanted on the site and were being asked for were being transmitted efficiently and effectively. As you might expect, there were some disconnects and problems. With the frenetic level of activity as to who was in charge, and what was going on, it was all open to question and very unclear. There were instances where things that we wanted delivered to our remote site instead got delivered to the crash site, and organizations and people were helping themselves. Materials at first weren't always getting to the people who were expecting it. After dark, about 8:00 p.m., there was a meeting in the Pentagon proper, in a Hollywood-type setting, the most dramatic environment you can imagine. It was to be held in the Press Conference Room on the far side of the Building, between Corridors 8 and 9 on the second floor. They wanted representatives from all the various organizations, and I was writing down the names. There was John Kirk from FBI, Bob Blacksmith from FBI, Doug Marshall from the FBI, and a number of other people. I was to go there as a representative of the Pentagon Renovation. We all huddled together, and the meeting was first on, then off, then on, then off, and we stood
around for an hour or so waiting to see if the meeting would happen. Initially, we didn't even know where it would happen. We all went together and literally linked hands at some point and walked around to the Mall terrace entrance. The lights were all off. There were guards everywhere, the DPS, FBI, military, guns everywhere. No one knew what would happen next. Many were fearful of new attacks. We threaded our way up the massive imposing entrance to the Mall Entrance, stumbling across the steps in the dark. Some had flashlights, but most didn't, and we made our way through the heavy oak doors and threaded our way through the guard station there. It was pitch black. When we entered the E ring hallway there were some lights shining in the distance, but it was just pitch black. We could see very little. There was an acrid smell of smoke in the air, to the point that there was a choking sensation, and our eyes were stinging a bit. We threaded our way around from the E ring from the Mall toward the River Entrance through the dark, occasionally stumbling over things on the floor, and finally made our way around to the River Entrance side, where there were electric lights available. We filed into the room. Ultimately about 100 people were there. There were representatives from the military services and various echelons--OSD, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, FBI, Pentagon renovation, Washington Headquarters Services, the Defense Protective Service, reps from the Pentagon Building Maintenance Office and services, on and on. For the most part representing the Pentagon Renovation were myself, and a fellow from AMEC, our contractor for completing Wedge 1, Dave Kersey. We were representing the capability that the Pentagon Renovation and its contractors could provide. Jim Schwartz, from the Arlington County Fire Department gave us a briefing. He said we needed to get started working together, it would be confusing at
first. The confusing thing was that all of the groups there were used to being in charge, and were highly motivated—Arlington County Fire Department, Fairfax County Fire Department, Montgomery County Fire Department, DPS, military, FBI, FAA, FEMA and on and on. They all wanted to get the show on the road, and it made for a very frenetic and confusing environment, so we discussed what we wanted to do and ran through it a bit.

Goldberg: Who ran the meeting?

Evey: Jim Schwartz was doing it. He helped us start to get a handle on it. People from different organizations introduced themselves and talked about their capabilities, what role they were going to play.

Goldberg: Who called the meeting?

Evey: I honestly don't know. It just happened. Some people who were pulling the logistics for it were there from the Public Affairs office. They seemed to be helping with logistics and communicating with people, so they may have called it together. Certainly they provided an opportunity and a place to have it. They said that the fire operation status had withdrawn from offensive operation, where they actively seek to go in and put the fire out. They had pulled fire personnel from the Building and were just going to try to prevent the fire from dramatically increasing in size. The Building was dark with a huge amount of debris and very dangerous. At this point there was still a lot of sparking and arcing from the active electrical equipment in there, severed wires, etc. As the fire was burning it burned away insulation, leaving live wires, which would spark. We were very concerned about people wandering around in there in the dark. The water was already several inches deep, especially on the lower floors, and we didn't want people
electrocuted. At this point there were still people in the WHS Building Operations Control Center (BOCC). (You might want to talk to some of those people, Steve Carter, for example.) I understand there were people there communicating with the fire control teams. They were trying to keep the electricity up for things like Exit signs and such in case people were still trying to find their way out. There was a fire team beginning to get close to those areas and they needed to shut down the electrical system in advance of the firemen. So there were people working in the BOCC in choking smoke, terrible conditions, shutting down the system a few steps ahead of the people working their way through the area. They were a very short distance away from where there was tremendous damage and a terrible fire raging. They announced then that some of the FBI wanted to set up a Joint Operations Command (JOC) at Fort Myer and wanted to have it up and working by midnight. We talked about that a bit. People were standing up and introducing themselves, offering whatever capabilities they had. I introduced myself as the head of the Pentagon Renovation and stated that our task as we saw it was to provide whatever resources were needed to support the rescue activity, so whenever anyone saw one of our hats with our Pentagon Renovation sticker, they were to go to that person and tell them what they needed. If that person didn't have it, he would know where to get it. We would make all that happen for them. Call on us, we'll do it. Jeff Donaldson was there from the Fairfax County Search and Rescue Group. He talked about the ERT, Emergency Rescue Team Command Post that would be set up in front of the hole where the airplane went in. It would be a white truck with a blue tarp, and the FBI would be there, and they were to direct anyone that was asking for the command post to that location. There was some difficulty getting people into Fort Myer,
because all the military organizations were on alert. They made it a point to take the
telephone numbers for the command center as they were setting up at Fort Myer.

Goldberg: The MDW people?

Evey: Right. They were going to manage by areas and function and not by rank. This
is interesting, I have read about situations like this being managed by area and function
instead of by rank.

Goldberg: Who said this?

Evey: I believe the FBI said this--from my notes I hurriedly jotted down. We were going
to try to divide the areas off by the different organizations. We were told that if there is a
fireman or someone on duty, don't look at his collar for his rank, just give him support.
We got requests for dump trucks and dumpsters, we didn't have any place to put the
debris. We had already made the call and got the dumpsters on standby. We talked
about setting up an office command post, headed by FBI agent Christopher Combes.
They were looking to gather key decisionmakers at the Community Center at Fort Myer,
at midnight, and wanted senior reps and names to double-check. They established 12-
hour shifts to run 6:00 to 6:00.

Goldberg: What did you do with Real Estate and Facilities during this time? Were they
in the act?

Evey: Yes, Mr. Irby was there, and I think Steve Carter was still in the BOCC. I know
Mr. Irby had someone with him.

Goldberg: The Defense Protective Services people?

Evey: John Jester was there, and John Pugrud I had seen in that period of time. The
FBI was asking for witnesses at that point. We had a number of witnesses. One
PenRen employee was walking on the sidewalk area alongside Route 27 and had to actually jump prone to avoid being hit by the plane. We had another couple of employees who had been in the area so we made arrangements for them to talk to the FBI. We put out the word that no souvenirs were to be taken or you'd be arrested.

There were 110 firefighters on location at that point, and they were to be there overnight and be relieved at midnight by another 110 firefighters. They made the point, "Don't touch the bodies or try to bring the dead guys out." Exact words. They wanted to catalog where everybody died for future evidence work. They were trying to put together a unified search and rescue activity. Fairfax had a United Search and Rescue Team, which was composed of two teams, Fairfax and Montgomery Counties, who were at that point actively involved in the search and recon around the collapse. They had located bodies, many bodies, all over the place, but were not bringing them out yet. "Please make sure your people don't touch the dead bodies." They were very clear about that. They were very concerned about that. They did not have plans of the Building. We were the only organization that had clear plans of the unrenovated Building as well as the renovated Building, with access to the systems that were up and still running. We began turning out copies of the plans of that portion of the Building by floor. At midnight we took five sets of plans over to Fort Myer and thumbtacked them on the wall so people could see what particular areas looked like and could orient themselves and communicate with people on site. We had offices and locations identified for them.

Goldberg: What about the plans for repairing the Building and possible reoccupation of the site?
Eve: As you well know, the Pentagon is composed of five wedges, each one chevron shaped. We are essentially replicating the same order in which they were built. We were within five days of completion of Wedge 1. The aircraft struck the northwest side of Wedge 1 near the edge where it attaches to Wedge 2. So it is just north of the Corridor 4 entrance. The plane traveled approximately at a 45-degree angle across the face of the Building. It traveled inside the Building on the first and second floor at a 45-degree angle. The first and second floors, unlike the fourth and fifth, do not have rings, they are just very large individual rooms, whose limits are established by AE drive. The farthest point of penetration was the inner wall of the C ring adjacent to and bounded by AE drive. At that point the aircraft punched a hole in that inner wall of the C ring about twelve feet in diameter, and we assumed the nose of the plane had done that. We later found out that we could not have been more wrong. This was very confusing to us. They found the cockpit voice recorder not near that innermost penetration, but instead near the outer wall of the Building by the E ring. They found the tail data recorder near the AE drive, the farthest penetration. We couldn't understand it, but later we figured out that the aircraft disintegrated as it went through the Building, so the nose, which hit the Building first, stopped. It hit the Building and punched through the outer wall. That is where the nose of the aircraft stopped. The sections stopped as they penetrated the different parts of the Building. Then it traveled a bit further in and started to hit the interior columns. That's where the next section of the aircraft stopped. It broke through those columns and went a bit farther and hit the next row of columns. And another portion of the plane stopped. The portion of the plane that stopped last was the tail, and it's the portion that penetrated the farthest. In essence, the plane turned itself inside out
as it went through the Building. That was all very confusing to us at first. It didn’t make any sense what was being found and the way it was being found. The plane had just departed Dulles Airport, and I understand that it was a 757 and had about 10,000 gallons of jet fuel. That fuel immediately burst into flame and exploded inside the Building. The work we had done on the Building to increase its resistance to blast—always we assumed the blast would be on the outside directed inward, instead the blast was on the inside directed outward. Nevertheless the changes we made seemed to work remarkably well. The Building stood for about 35 minutes after the blast. Because the plane entered at a 45-degree angle, from right to left, a lot of that fuel was propelled in the same direction, from the end of the 1st wedge went into the 2nd Wedge, so apparently a fireball went through Wedge 2 up to the Corridor 5 area. If you walked through the Building after the fire to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth floors, the evidence of intense heat and fireball is very clear. The 5th radial Corridor is the dividing line. As you go past the 5th Corridor and start the turn into the second half of Wedge 2, all signs of the active fire rapidly disappear. But when you are very close to the 5th Corridor in Wedge 2, the evidence of intense heat is dramatic, to the point of windows having melted and pooled down onto the floor, so there are large pools of now solidified molten glass on the floor and the sides of the walls, etc. The interior is extensively charred and totally destroyed by the fire. Subsequent tests we performed on the concrete in those areas have driven us to demolish a much, much larger area within the Building than we had ever anticipated having to take down, because of the intense heat. The concrete has actually been microfractured, microfissured, and it takes very little force to cause the concrete to turn into a powdery substance. It is very easily
demolished and has nowhere near the weight-bearing capacity that is needed to continue to serve as a viable Building. We have to take the Building down all the way out to about the corridor five area. Most of the Building on the E, D, and C rings between Corridor 4 and Corridor 5 will have to be demolished. That's the better part of 400,000 square feet.