

Interview with Rich Fitzharris
December 12, 2001

Cameron: This interview with Rich Fitzharris regarding the Pentagon attack on September 11 is taking place on December 12, 2001, at the OSD Historical Office. The interviewers are Drs. Alfred Goldberg, Roger Trask and Rebecca Cameron.

Could you please describe your position and major responsibilities?

Fitzharris: My position at that time was chief of the operations group, the group responsible for all construction projects, whether it be the Metro entrance facility, the activities we have underway in the basement, the rebuilding of Wedge One, or the activities over at the Remote Delivery Facility (RDF). Every one of these teams has a leader, and I was the overall leader of those teams. In Wedge One Dave Gabel was acting, in the RDF we had Brian Dziekonski, Ken Catlow doing things in the basement, and Chuck Malacarne at the Metro entrance. All those people report to me and I report to Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Evey. That was the way it was set up.

Cameron: Where were you on September 11 and what happened?

Fitzharris: I was in our complex, which is north of the North Parking lot. We were trying to tune in a TV to see what was happening at the World Trade Center. I have a radio that has a short wave on the AM dial and I was trying to tune something. That is hard in our area, because the roof is metal. We heard an explosion, so I grabbed my hard hat and my police scanner, for some reason or other, and carried it with me. I took off toward the site.

Cameron: You had heard of the attack in New York?

Fitzharris: Yes, we were trying to tune in to those attacks when we heard the explosion.

Trask: Are those buildings the ones at the far end of North Parking?

Fitzharris: Yes, there is a two-story building, a one-story, and a trailer complex.

Cameron: That is the MOC?

Fitzharris: We call it the MOC. I went out front and saw a couple of individuals that were terrified because one thought her husband was there, and the other was worried about her children in the child care center. I turned to some individuals and asked them to take the ladies back to their offices or to the child care center. I asked that our two vans—red and green—block the gates, for whatever purpose.

Trask: Did you know at this point that a plane had hit the Pentagon?

Fitzharris: From the explosion and the smoke, we thought it was a plane, but we didn't think of a terrorist attack. I thought it was just the normal traffic. Over the years I have thought about a plane crash. I was TDY at the Pentagon many years ago when the plane hit the bridge. I was coming out of River Entrance side when the plane dropped in the river. I always thought that something like that could happen. When I thought that it was terrorists hitting us, I started walking toward the heliport area.

Cameron: Through the Building?

Fitzharris: No, up the highway. There were people coming down the highway as they were evacuating the Building and there was someone stopping anybody going the other way. I just went down the middle. I had my hard hat and police radio and people let me go. I got up there. The fire department was there trying to organize rescue teams. We grabbed a gurney and started organizing teams. We looked over where the plane went in, and I thought it must have been a small plane, because I didn't see much debris out there. I also looked at the fire station. That station was close to me because

it was originally supposed to be remodeled, then torn down and rebuilt, which was to cost about \$3 million. I had sketched something out at my house one weekend and said we should put up a Butler building with the heliport on top. That was still standing there, and the glass was still in place. I thought maybe the people up there were OK.

Trask: This was the heliport?

Fitzharris: Yes. The Building was still standing at that time.

Cameron: Did you notice that the fire truck had taken the hit?

Fitzharris: I remember the fire truck, because when we were building the fire station, J.B. Hudson wanted a new fire truck. The next thing I knew I had the Tank and Automotive Command calling me on the size of the truck, and pictures, so it was a personal thing between that fire station, myself, and a couple other people on the job. I saw that the truck wasn't in good shape and that the overhead door was blown off the fire station but the glass upstairs was okay. I wondered how the people were in the fire station, about the firemen. Later that evening the fire chief from Fort Myer told me that one of the firemen was burned but was okay, and that the two soldiers in the tower were OK but shaken up. I walked into the tower that night just to see how it looked. One of the things I thought about was that we had asked for thicker glass in the fire station than the original station had. One of our people at that time, Lt. Col. Grotke, was an aviator, and we always said he would fly in there some day and dump the chopper, so we'd better have thick windows. Those windows really helped, because a fragment did go through, but was up too high to hurt anyone.

Trask: Is the fire station just below the helicopter tower?

Fitzharris: Yes. We had a VIP lounge, a kitchen for the firemen and the people in the tower, and then we had the fire area.

Cameron: Did you draw the conclusion at that time that the fire, concussion, or fireball that hit the fire truck was responsible in part for blunting the blast to the fire station?

Fitzharris: Yes. That truck is a massive thing, and the firemen got down on the other side of the truck and were safe. Although the plane was massive, the truck was enough to take the force.

While we were organizing the gurneys, I was surprised at how fast people had gotten there with them. We headed down toward South Parking, and we heard the police and the radio telling us to get back because another plane was coming. They pushed us back up under the bridge toward Columbia Pike. Our team got disorganized. I met Brig. Gen. Webster, who saw me with my Pentagon renovation hat and came over and shook my hand. He said he had been sitting behind one of those windows and it had held. We were on the gurney team for a while and then were moved down to the middle of the highway, in front of the heliport. Then they said another plane was coming so we ran back up to the tree line near Arlington. That turned out to be a helicopter coming in. Then we moved back out front and out onto the heliport area, getting organized to go in. Then the fire really erupted and we got pushed back to the middle of the highway. We set the gurneys down and someone showed up with bottled water for everybody. That must have been about thirty-five to forty-five minutes after it happened, because we sat there and watched the area collapse and the fireball take off. We knew at that time that we probably couldn't get in from our side, and we were hoping people were getting out from the other side. We still didn't know that the plane

was not a small one, but a 757. Then Chief Jester came by in his car and people were moving out of the way. We were trying to set up tents and put them over the guardrail. In case anyone did get out they could take him to a triage unit. Mr. Jester told me to go to the command center tent. I went there and talked to the fire chief and told him how the roof was built. If it got hot it would burn all the way around, because underneath the slate is 1x6 wood over 4x4 roofing wood. They were in the original roof. He said they would cut a firebreak later because they had lost a Treasury Department roof downtown of similar construction. I also told him that up in the attic there was a wooden catwalk that under the pitched portions of the roof went completely around it. The wood is pretty old and in certain areas is not safe to walk on. If somebody didn't break those things in certain areas it could burn all the way around the roof when they thought the fire was out. He took that note but when I looked at his drawing, it was incorrect. I asked one of the DPS officers to go back to our compound and look up Stacie Condrell, who could get him new drawings and an assessment of the worst case number of people in that area.

The day before, at the same time, another IM&T engineer, Tony Konstant, and I had walked through those rooms to see how many were vacant and check on how many fans and good fluorescent lights and things had been left behind. If there was good furniture there we could use it elsewhere. Just the luck of it that it was the day before because we would have been right in the path of the plane.

Then I stayed with the fire team and tried to tell them that all the corridors weren't on their drawing because of some of the things we had done in rebuilding Wedge One. I asked them what they needed from us, because we had the two construction

companies in the area. I found that one of them had been told to go home. AMEC, our contractor for Wedge One, was there and wanted a forklift to unload some material on the fire truck. I got that done, then some people asked me if I could break out some of the cement barriers in the roadway so they could open the road both ways, so I had that done. Somebody had a backhoe and tried to push debris out of the way in order to get the fire truck closer, but the backhoe fell apart, so I asked AMEC to bring in larger backhoes, track vehicles, and cranes. The FBI asked for new dumpsters to put evidence in. The fire was then really taking off and we knew we had to get lights. We ordered them, not really knowing whether we had money for all this stuff. I ordered everything anyway. Here is a list of everything I ordered.

Cameron: May we keep this as part of our archival collection?

Fitzharris: Sure. I got there five to six minutes after it happened and left at 2:45 the next morning. I remember when I left because I said, "I took the train in today, how am I going to get home?" I sat there for a while and then somebody said I could take a government car home. I live in West Virginia.

We got AMEC, and the track vehicles, operators, dump trucks, and noticed that the fire department and FBI started coming to us for everything they needed. They said they were used to buying everything. Getting to a tornado, hurricane, or other disaster sites, FEMA set up some free things—telephone switches, for instance. But the FBI wasn't set up for this massive crime scene.

Cameron: FEMA was not on site that early, were they?

Fitzharris: No, they came in a little later. So we were asked to buy things like white suits, generators, masks, lights, cranes—

Trask: Were these readily available?

Fitzharris: I told AMEC to do it and they got hold of a contractor named Fachina, who pulled in an unbelievable amount of equipment. They would say they needed a police escort, I would go to DPS, they would get hold of the Virginia highway patrol or the Maryland highway patrol and get an escort in. It turned out that other agencies that were on site would come to us for things. We would go to DPS and arrange for a police escort to get their items in. First we put up some orange snow fence for the FBI. Then they wanted a more permanent fence, so we got a six-foot high fence. Then we got a fence that we put fabric on. People were coming through about three gates and we got them to come through just one. There wasn't anything delivered on site that the people didn't have to get us in order to get in. We cleared it with DPS, who then either told the DPS officer or the MPs at the gate that we were expecting it. Later on when the Salvation Army and the Red Cross were there in South Parking, we set up the perimeter fence. We had to get trucks and things out of the way to get other vehicles in. I'm not sure who it belonged too, but there was a pretty good-sized backhoe with ten tires. But they were thin and it blew one, so we had to get our bigger vehicles in and moved it and the fire truck out of the way. As the day progressed we got more and more material. That night when the fire was still blazing we had our structural engineer on site and the fire chief asked for someone to go in with him. I sent in our structural engineer, Kilsheimer. Other people wanted to go but I only sent him, plus a general officer from the Corps of Engineers. They came back and reported on what columns were missing. By that time we even had AMEC's drawings out there and were mapping

out what columns were missing and telling the fire department to stay out of certain areas because we thought we could have more collapse.

Trask: Did these people go in from the outside?

Fitzharris: Yes, there was a single door open to the left of the hole, and people used to go into that from the heliport. It was amazing to see how the blast windows and frames did versus the non-blast windows. The amount of people out there that were willing to go back in for people amazed me. I asked some where they worked and they were from Crystal City. They had walked down the highway to see if they could help. We had the firemen start into an area and I had to stop them. We had a debate with Fairfax County Fire and Rescue who said they were the structural experts, they did this around the world. I said that might be, but I helped in renovating the place. I am not a civil engineer, I'm electrical, and I told them to shine lights into where they wanted to go. The structure without the columns could go down, and I thought the debris that had fallen was forcing the Building to stay up. Kilsheimer said that was correct. We had them shore it up, going in from the outside versus going inside, shoring up, and coming back. We had already seen it pull away up at the top. That was the first night.

Cameron: You didn't have to clear the debris first?

Fitzharris: We did clear some debris. We cleared the backhoe, moved the fire truck over, and shoved some cars over. We had heard that somebody had walked out to smoke a cigarette, although we didn't see a body out there. It was days later when we were pushing more debris that we found the body and had to get someone in a white suit. There was a body in the debris, probably right where we were standing the first day.

Trask: Were there any injured people coming out?

Fitzharris: The only injured person I saw was one of the firemen. They wanted us to stay organized in case they said to go in from one end to the other. One thing we talked about was coming in through the RDF, down the 6th Corridor. The firemen didn't realize that came in essentially from under the Building. We called back to our compound and some guys volunteered to go over to the RDF in case they could drive electric carts in there to pull people out. It is the new David O. Cooke building, and later on it became the morgue. At first it was supposed to be for triage, but then reality sank in with the size of the explosion.

Cameron: You mentioned Allyn Kilsheimer. Did you bring him in?

Fitzharris: Jack Kelly called him and when he showed up I started working with him right away. I told him I was the government guy on site and we'd get things going together. We had another person who stayed around, Scott [Mohn], one of our contractors. Later on I saw Frank Prost, who had almost gotten hit by the airplane, but dove onto the ground as it hit the light pole. We were worried whether we had lost any PenRen people right there in that hallway, but we were very fortunate.

Later on that night around midnight the firemen asked us to get some of the sprinkler systems shut off. We had AMEC, the mechanics, and the firemen go downstairs and shut them off in our mechanical room. They asked if we could get some lights spotted in there and assess the electrical, so we went around the back that night with the electrical men into the electrical vault that had been destroyed. It was about midnight when Lee Evey wanted to go to Fort Myer to see the command post. We went

over there for about twenty minutes to find out what they were doing and took them drawings. I went back to the site and stayed there until 2:45 a.m.

Cameron: What was the command center supposed to do?

Fitzharris: The command center was supposed to do the overall coordination, but it didn't work out that way. It was better to coordinate where we were. We set up right on the heliport at first. We sat our drawings up on some plywood and worked there for about three days. Then a tent was set up back farther along the perimeter and we worked out of that tent. As the days progressed, whether it was the Arlington County or Fairfax County Fire and Rescue, FEMA, or FBI, all the agencies started using us for a lot of support. We came in the next day around noon and I worked again until about 3:00 a.m. That day we made plans to string lights inside and got more supplies and shoring in and started making the perimeter more secure.

Cameron: Were people going in at that point?

Fitzharris: Only the fire department was still going in, and some of the Fairfax rescue. The people bringing bodies out were not doing that on the second day. It was more mapping out the area, putting out residual fires, and trying to get more windows out. They beat on the new windows and they wouldn't break.

Cameron: How did you get those out finally?

Fitzharris: We had Masonry Arts take some out. We couldn't get all the water shut off. We thought it might be coming from one of the areas in the Wedge Two, so we got the Pentagon building maintenance office to send some people out with a five-foot wrench to turn the valves off. At that time, on the second day, we were seeing debris and water eight to ten inches deep in some places. We put some holes in the floor in some

places for the water to drain, and pulled some debris out. The FBI was worried about it being a crime scene, but we also had to get some water out because of the weight. All it did was go down A&E Drive and stop up the drains there. When we were trying to string the electric lights the next day we went down to the electrical vault because next to it was another room with spare parts that we needed. Getting in there the water was deep, the firemen were still dragging hoses through A&E Drive and going up through some of the windows to put out residual fires and hot spots. They still hadn't taken any bodies out. They were mapping where the bodies were. It was better organized the second day. The first day it was hard to find out who was really in charge. There was a two-star general out there who was helping and I asked him where he worked, and he said he was TDY. He was trying to add some organization to the effort. I didn't write his name down.

There were some moving moments. There was an Army lieutenant general, [van Antwerp? van Alstine?], out front, and after talking to the firemen I went over to talk to him about how we were bringing things in. He was the highest-ranking person on site. That's when the Marines had a formal ceremony and brought him the flag, so I backed out of the way. The first night around 2:00 a.m., I had an Army sergeant major and a lieutenant colonel and a major ask me if they could put the flag up. They told me I was the ranking man at the moment, so I told them to put the flag on the fire truck, chop a hole in the top of the truck and use the pole that was inside. They wanted to put it on the roof, but at the time the firemen were using the basket to survey damage, to see if any more had collapsed. So we took their picture as the two Marines and two Army guys put the flag up on the fire truck.

Cameron: That will probably be our next Iwo Jima memorial.

Fitzharris: Sometime during the night they took that flag down and stuck it up on the roof with the basket, which was fine. That was replaced later by the firemen's flag.

Cameron: Do you know if many photographs were taken that night?

Fitzharris: Brad Eaton put together what he thought were all the photos, but that flag portion wasn't in there, so I know there are more. Later on we weren't allowed to take photographs, but at that time Tom Fontana was taking them. He handed me a video camera, but probably nothing will come out from that. Brad Eaton and I are going to try to go through some boxes and find all the others that are not in the electronic file I have. Hopefully we can do that.

Cameron: I hope we can get copies for our archives.

Fitzharris: The second day Mr. Kilsheimer and the fire department and Fairfax County worked on mapping out areas they thought were structurally OK so that they could go in and bring out bodies. We also were stringing lights and securing the perimeter. The third day I came in later and had a request from the Navy for classified hard drives and materials out of safes right where the Building broke, on the fifth deck. We got the FBI person who was taking over more and more of the site, as it was going from fire scene to crime scene. He assigned a person to go with us. We had five Navy people, myself, and another PenRen person, Butch Wiles, and we went into an area where there were no lights strung. We went with Kilsheimer. We couldn't get to some of the safes. We did get to the hard drives, and some safes, and grabbed a couple of laptops and got a first-hand look at the damage. Two of the Navy individuals had worked in that office.

The fireball had gone the other direction. The sprinklers right there had not gone off, but we were on the edge of the collapsed area.

Cameron: We understand that some of those safes dropped out of the Building.

Fitzharris: Three of them that they wanted slid down later on. Knowing they would slide down, we got hold of DPS and told them to set up a cantonment area. Some people didn't have clearances. We were going to fence off an area down by our Wedge One trailer and set all the safes over there. We didn't do that because they wanted to put the trucks for body removal there. When a safe slid out we got it into a backhoe and took it over to the heating and refrigeration plant where we put it in a secure area. We had a plan to do that with DPS. We were working well with them, the FBI, and everyone at that time. Probably areas that were not PenRen's responsibility we jumped into anyway, because we knew the layout and we knew the people in Building and maintenance and DPS. We became the interface.

Cameron: It worked smoothly, and there wasn't too much turf battling?

Fitzharris: No. Just confusion when they first issued a different badge and a Pentagon badge to get on site and there was only one machine to do it. There was another badge to get into the crime scene. Who was in charge, Arlington County, or the FBI? Sometimes a procedure would change, and it was still coming through us but we would have to report to someone else. They brought the National Guard MPs on and they wouldn't let anyone in. So we had to get the DPS captain and he sat down with their lieutenant, who had his orders. We worked through it. We knew things were going to change, and no one got emotional over it. We were in good shape; the people inside were not in good shape. If someone got frustrated they took a time out. Later on they

would come to us for help to get someone in. Home Depot was fantastic, we got their representative a badge so she could get inside and take orders. We were called for extra lights, portable bathrooms, and so many things. We didn't order everything, but everybody thought we ordered everything. Things got more organized.

We started thinking about the weather, because the heliport was on very heavy soggy ground. When the fire trucks sank to their axles we had to get the backhoe to get them out. We started ordering gravel and building roads through there. We went to AMEC and asked them to do that. People asked us why we were doing that, and we told them that when it rained we would sink in mud just walking, to say nothing of the vehicles.

Next thing, the FBI asked for a John Deere tractor, and we did that. We were also setting up the compound in North Parking where they were taking the dumpsters and dumping things out to search through for evidence. We put up a fence with the green material and put barriers around the child care center. We ordered more barriers that they could place anywhere they wanted. When you look at this sheet [list of materials ordered], the item number is about the sequence that it happened. The dates are for the formal contracts. We looked at all the generators and fire trucks and knew we needed fuel, so we went around fueling people. Some auditor will wonder why we did some of these things. Somebody wanted better communication, so we knocked windows out of the heliport and put some plastic in there so it could be used as a command post.

Communication was a real problem. I had my scanner, but my batteries were getting weak. The FBI, Arlington County, Arlington Police, Virginia Highway Patrol,

DPS—no two were on the same frequency. We were all trying to use cell phones. In the first two and a half hours of the incident no one's cell phones worked, whether because they were overloaded or whether the cell companies purposely blocked calls. I would like to ask them some day. They can purposely block the cells. We had to get hold of Verizon and get regular phones in. Cell phones and my ears don't get along well sometimes, so we had to get regular phone service in there to be able to communicate.

We redid the tent areas many times. We were originally on the heliport but had to move back so the teams could get in there for their different investigations. After that things went more smoothly. There were sessions going on twice a day, briefings up at Fort Myer and our briefings at the compound, which, whether FBI's or FEMA's, were far better than the ones up there.

Cameron: Who was up there?

Fitzharris: There was DPS, [PBMO], I don't know the full list. Lee Evey, Mike Sullivan, and I were supposed to rotate eight-hour shifts up there. When we found out that they weren't making the decisions or getting the proper information, Mike Sullivan stayed the first night but after that we set up our command posts and did better. We had meetings a couple times a day with all the people inside our tent, and the FBI would meet on what they needed.

Goldberg: Where did you hold these meetings?

Fitzharris: We had a green tent that we eventually put behind the "H" at the heliport. At first we were right on it, but we moved back with our drawings. It was good to get the tents, because we got rain later on. Things were really getting organized by the 3rd or

4th day. I changed shifts during that time because I brought my sleeping bag in and slept on the floor that night for about four hours, got up, did another twelve, and then Charlie Richardson drove me back to West Virginia. Two nights in a row when I got off at 2:45 and 3:00 in the morning, the only way to get home was by government vehicle. I knew a guy on the train who was with the Department of Transportation, and he said it would make a good story.

Goldberg: How far did you have to go?

Fitzharris: Eight-nine miles. I live in Martinsburg, West Virginia. I normally traveled by train, but I've only done that about three times since the incident.

Goldberg: You don't get much sleep, anyhow, do you?

Fitzharris: No, I got sleep before, taking the train home, it's relaxing, you can do work, read, or get your thoughts together.

Goldberg: That's better than car travel, isn't it?

Fitzharris: We had some funny incidents. Everybody was hungry one night, and we had set up a command center at our complex. We would call and ask for more or specific drawings or an expert to talk to. They were all hungry, so I ordered food on the government impact card, which the accountants had a nightmare over and paid for out of the cup and flower fund so I wouldn't go to jail.

Goldberg: A lot of that sort of thing was happening.

Fitzharris: That's what I thought. With all those items I was sure some auditor would say, "You approved all these items and you didn't know if there was any money?"

Cameron: You did get some things from places besides Home Depot, and there were people cooking food out in South Parking, weren't there?

Fitzharris: The second or third night someone asked me if I had seen all the people in south parking serving food. I had just been walking to the Red Cross or the Salvation Army.

Trask: Were they all volunteer people who came in?

Fitzharris: They were all volunteers. That first day I came in to work at the normal time, about 7:30, and I stayed there until 2:45 the next morning. I walked by the Salvation Army for a cup of coffee and put a couple of dollars down. They said it was free.

Goldberg: They opened South Parking up so people could come in and do that sort of thing?

Fitzharris: Yes, and when they had to control it a bit they did it by the badges that were issued. Those were issued on the second or third day to try to control people out there. We went and changed badges again and changed entrances again. But it was amazing. No one, as tired as they were, ever got mad or impatient. Everyone was just working to help, thinking about the people that never got out. Going back to the electrical vault to get the materials out, it was a sobering thing looking at the damage to the offices of the two Navy people who got out of that office. We had further requests from people who wanted to go in. The Defense Intelligence Agency wanted to get some things. We set that up with the FBI to make sure that it was cleared. We wanted people to go through the highest levels on their chain, and then we went to the FBI. We worked with DPS on that. The FBI would go in and we would also, just to assess more of the damaged areas. We wore the respirators, and later on we wore the white suit and rubber gloves, as things got more organized.

Cameron: You are talking about the third or fourth day. Were the Fairfax County search and rescue people then taking people out?

Fitzharris: At that time they were organized to map the area. The people that were taking people out were suited up in white, and I didn't know whether it was FBI agents, a mortuary crew, or a joint crew, because there were so many of them and they changed them out because of the conditions. They brought things out in various size bags. We tried to help them screen things off so they could take bodies out, so that everyone couldn't see them. When we saw the people in the white suits and the white truck, everyone would get quiet.

Goldberg: What day was it that they started going in?

Fitzharris: I think it was the 4th day, but it could have been the 3rd day. We had helped set up a morgue down in the RDF. Then, we were thinking about whether they needed to have more refrigeration areas than just the loading dock area. We looked at our deep freezes to see what room we could make, but they told us that they didn't need more space.

Goldberg: Who went in the Building before that?

Fitzharris: The FBI, Arlington County Fire Department, our structural engineer, and Fairfax County. They didn't want to use our refrigeration units because, through a power outage or something, there was an alarm on one of them and we were working on shifting chilled water around to keep the place cool. But we found out they didn't want to do that and they brought in refrigeration trucks. They then took the bodies up to Dover.

We had more requests to help with the light in the North Parking and phone service there where they were doing the pre-assessment. Over the next few days we put more lighting and ventilation into the area. We brought in external units or dehumidifiers. The FBI took the whole area as a crime scene. But they took us into the areas where we didn't have people, where we discovered mold growing. As soon as the FBI turned over an area to us, we made plans to get people in there to rip dry wall off and get windows out to start the dehumidification process. All those plans were developing from the 16th or 17th on. My sheet here shows the material that we were ordering on the 22nd. We were getting Masonry Arts to take out windows and getting all the contracts awarded for all the things I had done. So I guess I won't go to jail. We looked at getting more ventilation and helping the firemen and making plans along with building maintenance so that when the rains did come we wouldn't get more water in there. We had some people trying to clear drains, and the FBI got mad at us for destroying evidence, but even they were getting tired of walking through eight to ten inches of water. We then moved the command center into the fire station along with the green tent, for the structural things. The FBI shuttled between our two tents.

FEMA showed up and wanted to assess some of the facilities. They asked us if we had hard hats and steel-toed shoes, and we said we built the place. We took them in and they decided that we knew what we were doing so stayed out of our hair. The cooperation amazed me. There was lots of confusion, but there was no one complaining, they all backed off and worked together. The chaplains must have thought all of us were sinners, because they came to our tent first to talk to people who had problems. We said they had come to the right tent, we were all sinners. We lined

them up with people over the next few weeks, because we found we had some employees shaken up pretty bad. Some were so busy working, like the guys from Singleton Electric, who had been blown over by the blast, but who were back that night helping us wire the generators that we were bringing in.

Goldberg: They had been working outside?

Fitzharris: Outside there was a generator and right next to it the backup power for Wedge One and the heliport. The plane hit that and right in front of it was a 10x20 trailer owned by Singleton Electric. They were getting ready to move that because we were getting ready to demobilize the whole site. A man was coming out of that trailer when it got blown over, but he came back that night. We weren't wiring inside the Building the first night, we were wiring outside to get all the lights in.

Goldberg: How did the chain of command in the renovation work?

Fitzharris: I got there first, and being head of the operations group just took over that site. Then I asked Chief Jester to go to the compound and ask Stacie Condrell to start working up the worst case numbers of people that could be in that area.

Goldberg: Evey didn't get there until evening?

Fitzharris: No, and Mike had stayed over at the compound. The first two and a half hours nobody got a cell call through. The first one I got through was to my wife in West Virginia, because I couldn't call the office. I asked her to call Mike Sullivan to tell him that I was on the heliport, that another man, Scott [Mohn], one of our contractors, had shown up and we were both out there, if anyone was looking for us. I would call back to Mike the things that I needed. We needed better cell service, towers set up by the cell phone companies, which PMIM&T was already doing.

Goldberg: Was Jack Kelly on the scene early?

Fitzharris: He stayed over at the compound and got hold of Kilsheimer. I called him to get dumpsters, and he got them and called AMEC to come to the site with management personnel versus the helpers. I would give them orders directly, and the first couple of nights I signed time sheets. They had written down everything they did and I was telling them to order things.

Goldberg: These were contractors?

Fitzharris: They were contractors that AMEC had brought in. They have all those in their files in more detail.

Goldberg: Did Georgine Glatz have any role to play in all this?

Fitzharris: She came on site the second or third night and had no role on the site. She was to be working up at Fort Myer. She worked there for a few days and then in our red room, our site at the north compound. Later on she did get a white badge to get on the site, but not a red badge to get into the crime scene. We were limited in those actions, so I don't think she had that. She had talked to Mr. Kilsheimer on the heliport the second night, and she told him how she thought the place was built, and they compared notes.

Goldberg: The crime scene was defined as what?

Fitzharris: At first everybody walked in. But as we put up the orange fence, then the permanent six-foot high fence, and then the screening material, it was everything inside. The second or third day they did a sweep and picked up little parts that they wanted to tag as evidence. There were already people in the way setting up. They

would cordon the area and define the crime scene better. Areas such as where the Army Library was to go wasn't a crime scene so they turned that over to us.

Goldberg: It's a crime scene since, because they moved them out.

Fitzharris: We put up another orange fence as a crime scene to keep people away from the body parts. So every couple of days the FBI changed the crime scene, declared an area cleared, and turned it over to us. We would go through and make plans about what we had to do in that area. The next Monday after the incident, over at our place, we were doing morning meetings on what we were finding. A week into that we set up where we were going to take people in from the various organizations. We would take ten people in at a time from center courtyard into areas that had been turned over to us.

Goldberg: Did the FBI control of the area interfere in any way with what was being done?

Fitzharris: At the time I thought everybody interfered, but we had to have order, and that third, fourth, and fifth day the order started to come and things were better. The first day there was someone walking through taking pictures, and we didn't know who he was. Finally we asked him, and he pulled out his ID; he was an Army photographer.

Goldberg: The first day?

Fitzharris: Yes, probably an hour after the incident. He had Army credentials. I looked in Soldier, and there is a picture in there. Someone also said they saw me on TV, but my wife said she never saw me. I think that if I blew that picture up that's me sitting on the logs at the heliport.

They needed order, and they needed to find things. We were just confused by the many agencies. One woman called me for a briefing. She was from the Forestry Department, on loan to Arlington County for something. Their interest was how to fight the fire. She was there for three or four days, but I didn't get to meet her. I got her e-mail and sent her one of our after-action reports.

Cameron: Was she sent because of the wooden structures on the roof?

Fitzharris: I don't know. I guess she was on loan to find out how to fight fires. There were so many agencies coming in and out. We asked why the Secret Service was there and found out that they were the ones making the badges. Another agency that showed up wanted to learn something about an assessment. We had a group show up—the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration—they did the mapping at the World Trade Center. They happened to have some people with them from Fort Belvoir, US Army CECOM. I had worked for CECOM at one time, and they told us they had mapped the World Trade Center. We looked at what they did and told them they should do it for this Building. Maybe when we put the Building back together we can say we matched it to the millimeter, or we could use it in case we have to do two passes if we see the Building shifting more than what we thought. We weren't sure about the structural damage toward the back. Kilsheimer knew there were columns missing, but there were certain areas that he wasn't into yet, it was so dark. With the number of agencies there, somebody had to take control. It went from Arlington County to the FBI. The real confusion was when it went to MDW for a few days. They stopped us from going in and we had to make friends with them. We got that straightened out.

Goldberg: When did the FBI pull out?

Fitzharris: After the tornado, or close to that. The tornado came about two weeks into the incident. I had walked up the ridge and started down the highway and police cars were flying down the road to the ramp that goes to Rosslyn. They were going to park underneath the bridge there. They said to get off the road. We jumped down and got under the bridge. There was nothing happening, but we saw a real dark cloud coming up from Crystal City. All the tents where they were sifting things out in the North Parking lot went down because of the wind. We were looking across those tents watching them go down and looked toward the Monument. We could see the funnel come down, form, and bounce up in the air as it went toward College Park. So I said, first the plane, now the funnel, I'd better play the lottery. We went to the Building and asked everyone who had been at the tents where they had gone. Crime scene or not, everybody ran into the Building through the doors that were open. That night we put the tents back up. It bounced there, but it did hit in the North Parking lot and took every tent down.

Cameron: It came to earth near the Building?

Fitzharris: We didn't see the funnel there, but it did form on the other side of the lagoon while we were looking down underneath the bridge.

Cameron: So it ran the FBI out, too?

Fitzharris: Yes, and they were saying they would be out in a few days. Then they would sift a little bit more through the North Parking lot. We kept that area and now we have the limestone there.

Goldberg: MDW had been in charge of the control center at Fort Myer, hadn't they? Do you know who headed it up?

Fitzharris: I don't know who was in charge. I heard that it wasn't very effective. I called up to them to have someone cleared to go into the Building, and they asked why I called them. I said I just wanted to slow down the people that wanted to go into the Building. I went to the FBI and told them the people from the DIA needed to get in to their space. I knew those guys because I had worked with them on other projects. But I wanted to stop the flow, because otherwise everybody would want to go in.

Goldberg: How about when MDW took over the site from the FBI?

Fitzharris: That's when we were taking people through at ten at a time. I was frustrated, because we told them to wear old clothes, and one Army person showed up with a walking cast on. She had no business going in there. They were in their nice green uniforms and had no business going in there. Another Army man went in, walked over to his desk, picked up some mementos, which was all right because the area had been released to us, and then he picked up his lunch bag, which had mold growing all over it. He brought it outside and realized that he should just dump it. We were in offices where there were doughnuts that had been brought in that morning. Mold was growing on them. We could see offices where people had just moved in where there were boxes of secret material that had not been put in the safes. When we took a group in I asked four or five people from PenRen and three DPS officers to go with us. We were almost one for one, but we made them stay in a certain area while we explored on our own. That's how we found a lot of secret material that was out. We got hold of the DPS guys to set up a plan on how we should handle it. Some of it was soaked. We had already set up a plan about the safes, getting the material for the Navy on the fifth floor where it had broken away.

Cameron: Did you set up a holding area for the classified material that you ran into?

Fitzharris: We would get hold of DPS and they would get a gray cart and take the stuff someplace. Some was in an open area where people could wander into it. In some other areas DPS worked with the person in that office to take care of that. One group we took didn't have the combination to get in the door. We then had to make sure that people had combinations for doors, safes, and such, so that if we did find something we could drop it in the safe and take it out later. When the Building sheared away there were some offices that had just been moved into.

Goldberg: Were there a lot of safes that survived intact?

Fitzharris: Yes. It was tough getting many of them open because the fire was so hot it damaged them and they had to be sawed open. The guys got the Jaws of Life and opened them. The fire had been so intense.

Goldberg: The locksmiths came in and did that.

Fitzharris: Yes, DPS had a crew that did that. We took those over to the heating and refrigeration plant to have a secure area inside. We were going to do it outside with a tent between our Wedge One building and our trailer area. But because of the gate over there, and it was lit with the generators we had pulled in from Fort Belvoir, we could take the bodies out there in trucks versus taking them out on the heliport side. There were still a few that had to be taken out on that side. That was always a moment when everybody on site stopped and watched.

The firefighters at first stopped fighting the fire because they thought another plane was coming in. It was fortunate that the plane hit that particular area, not only because of it being empty and renovated, but if it had hit on the River or Mall side we

couldn't have gotten the fire trucks there because of all the parked vehicles. It hit on the side where all we had to do was cut a section of guardrail out. First they could drive around it, but then we got the torch and cut sections of guardrail out. We took out some of the cement barriers going down the highway with jackhammers so they could get people in.

Goldberg: Also, on the opposite side they would have gotten the top leadership.

Fitzharris: Yes, and the fire would have probably been even more into the roof and attic and burned more before they were able to cut the firebreaks that I had discussed with them. And they couldn't have gotten the fire trucks over there. Later on we worked with DPS on site security. We put barricades out by the child care center and ordered the barricades that are now blocking off the two bridges. We got those barricades about two Sundays later, when we finally figured out where they wanted the perimeters. Every day we had people parked out on the grass along the lagoon, because we had fenced the North Parking lot. Every other day we moved the fence. We were working with Long Fence and we would call them up to order more, or have AMEC move or reinforce it if needed.

Goldberg: If the roof hadn't had all that wood it would have lasted longer, wouldn't it?

Fitzharris: I think the fire would have been out sooner. It kept popping up.

Goldberg: You know why the wood was there, don't you?

Fitzharris: To hold the slate on, originally.

Goldberg: Couldn't that have been done using something else?

Fitzharris: Not sixty years ago. That's all original.

Goldberg: One reason they used all that wood was the carpenter's union, and that's why the brick is there, too.

Fitzharris: The two layers of brick are interesting. They must have gotten behind in one area there, because we once had a section open and noticed that two layers of brick were not mortared together. To make up time when they were building the place, they just set them on top of each other.

Goldberg: A lot of things were done that way, to finish up.

Trask: Wasn't there a problem getting steel at the time, too?

Fitzharris: Yes.

Goldberg: The decision was made not to use the steel, but both the brick layer's union and the carpenter's union brought pressure on the White House and the White House directed that more wood and brick be used.

Fitzharris: In those days people were not worried about fire ratings and those things. Today we can use treated wood, but you couldn't do that back then because of the chemicals. Rebuilding Wedge One was interesting because there were areas that were leaning about four inches.

Goldberg: Given that it was built in sixteen months, you would expect some of that, wouldn't you?

Fitzharris: Yes, and working twenty-four hours a day. Think of the cranes and lights we have today, and the generators. They didn't have those.

Goldberg: They had floodlights.

Fitzharris: Yes, but we brought in stadium lights. It was amazing what we could do.

Trask: But you did nothing to the roof in Wedge One, correct?

Fitzharris: We did nothing to the roof in Wedge One. We got up there and had to cut some holes in the roof and discovered, under the slate, the one-by-sixes, over the top of four-by-fours, over the poured cement-type roof. That's when we told everybody in the Building that the roof needed to be replaced, the wood was starting to rot.

Goldberg: Are you going to replace the whole roof?

Fitzharris: Yes.

Goldberg: What are you going to use?

Fitzharris: I think they are looking at imitation slate, over a metal-type frame.

Goldberg: No wood this time?

Fitzharris: No, there are not that many trees now.

Cameron: So the pre-September 11 plan was not to touch the roof?

Fitzharris: We were not touching the roof. We had written some papers. I found in magazines some imitation slate that was set up by a historical society in New England for slate replication. It had been approved and we were getting some information on that, because when we cut new holes for wet stacks or stacks from the cafeteria, or the elevator shafts, or whatever, we had a hard time getting the leaks to stop wherever we cut those holes. We were trying to build the case for putting a new roof in Wedge Two, because we had to cut holes and it is so hard to plug the leaks. We had a cost estimate and we were trying to trim it down. We were working on that at the time.

Goldberg: What is imitation slate made of?

Fitzharris: Some of it is made of an asphalt fiber compound, and some is even metal that looks like slate. They stamp it out.

Goldberg: Would you use both of them?

Fitzharris: We were just getting information on different types of material, to see which material had a longer life. I think the metal has a longer life, which makes sense.

Trask: Replacing the whole roof is a big addition to your job, isn't it?

Fitzharris: Yes.

Cameron: Did you get a new contractor? We understand you will be working with some of the same contractors that did the previous renovation and rebuilding.

Fitzharris: Under AMEC they were doing the rebuild of Wedge One and a bit over in Wedge Two. That makes sense where we have to replace the structure. Hensel-Phelps won the contract for Wedges Two to Five. They are doing some work in Wedge Two now and they will eventually have what happens on Three, Four, and Five. Turner has been awarded the new POAC. It was supposed to go underneath the Mall parking area but I don't know whether they've been given the go-ahead to start their preliminary design. There was some question whether a command center should go underneath there, or whether the command centers would all be upstairs. As you know, we lost the Navy command center. We had worked with them closely on that, I can still picture those people's faces.

Goldberg: So they are doing the whole Building roof?

Fitzharris: I don't know if the whole roof decision has been made. The E-ring and A-ring would have to be done, they are both slate. The Pentagon Building Maintenance Office has also awarded a contract that has some good things in it to redo some of the flat roofs because of their leaks. I don't think that roof covered the A- and E-rings. There was also an offer from the Building Institute of America to do part of the roof and either throw in some material or their union would provide some free labor. I don't know

where that offer stands. I have been on loan to the Army to do an OSD project concerning other items since 22 October.

Cameron: Were you involved in the early planning about any changes that might be made in the new building?

Fitzharris: That assessment is still going on. I have gotten the Corps of Engineers report and have gone to some of their meetings. In March or April I will be back on my normal job, running all the construction. I read the E-mails on the side. Yes, we were involved in the early meetings on what teams to get in here to help us do assessments and the necessary levels of expertise. A lot of those decisions are now being costed out. I know there is some discussion about giving the blast-proof windows another layer of lamination. They held up, but an extra layer of lamination would mean that the zone around the Pentagon could be smaller to take a car or truck bomb blast. The highways are an issue, as they are so close to the Building. We worked with DPS before the incident, and are now, on whether to close off the entrance to the Mall from Columbia Pike permanently and change our entrance into the Doc Cooke building for the trucks. We had thought of moving Route 110. That seemed far out, but maybe it has picked up more steam since the incident. We could move it through Boundary Channel Drive and back up around. We had talked about a bigger buffer around the child-care center. A group meets about every other Friday, chaired by the Defense Protective Service, called PSAG, the Pentagon Security Action Group. It had been in existence for a couple of years and we had done some security enhancement—adding turnstiles, offset zones, building berms with some of the dirt from the construction, closing certain entrances and putting in pop-up barriers. Our problem was the

geographic area of the Pentagon. Between the two bridges, the bus stop wall is ten feet high, and is a bomb blast wall. It is two feet thick, ten feet high, and reinforced to take a car or truck bomb, which would hit and be deflected up and over the top of the Building. I don't think anything could go through those two bridges, except maybe one of those 15,000-pound bombs we are dropping in Afghanistan. The Metro Entrance facility was moved out because of the efforts of PSAG. It was something we had been meeting on. We had a list of things that DTRA had told us we should look at improving. We were working on certain things that we thought were workable and certain things were too high politically. Maybe DTRA's report now will get some people to look at those things in more detail.

Goldberg: Is PenRen doing an overall assessment and analysis of what happened, the effects, and what needs to be done?

Fitzharris: Mr. Evey set up three or four teams to do that. They are meeting and getting their reports together. The only one I've gotten so far is the Corps of Engineers' assessment. I don't have the other teams' assessments because I have been working on the special project that Mr. Evey loaned me out on.

Goldberg: Did the Corps of Engineers do an overall assessment?

Fitzharris: Yes.

Goldberg: And presumably we can get it from them?

Fitzharris: I would think so. That is available.

Cameron: Can we get it through you?

Fitzharris: Yes, Mr. Evey or I can get you a copy. It has a lot of calculations and pictures in it. It also says that a lot of things we did were right.

Goldberg: And some others are still underway?

Fitzharris: Yes, and some of those made the report, too. Last week I was only here one day. This week I have been here but working on the other site issues.

Cameron: Is the DTRA report classified?

Fitzharris: Portions of their report done many years ago are classified, and there is also an out-briefing that has a classified portion. John Jester or John Pugrud can tell you what PSAG is looking at and how they are prioritizing things that we do. There is another meeting this Friday on that. That group has been expanded. At first we sat around a table in a small group like this, and PenRen sat at the table. Now the group is so big that PenRen sits in the back. They decided to have an executive session the other day, so we left, and they called us back because we are the ones to implement things. The group got so big that they threw out the people with the hard hats and steel-toed shoes.

Goldberg: That's not a good development, is it?

Fitzharris: It was kind of funny, because Chief Jester and Pugrud were looking for me and Del Betts with DPS, because we were not part of the executive council. We took off, and then they realized we were needed. That's when we put the extra barriers along Rotary Road and all that. There is an assessment going on now about the Butler building in the South Parking lot. If they open Rotary Road, should they empty the Butler building or take it down? We built that because nobody would move to the buildings we rented in Crystal City. It's temporary, it was supposed to be down by now.

Goldberg: It's not very big.

Fitzharris: There has been more space rented in Crystal City, but people still don't want to leave the Pentagon, so it's sitting vacant. I think the Army now has agreed that at the pace we need to renovate and get on with Wedge Two, they need to move some people out. They will move to the Taylor building.

Cameron: We wonder where our Library is going to go.

Fitzharris: Yes, there has been a big argument over the Library. It is said we could have two types of libraries. For some things we could have one anywhere, and for certain things we need it near us.

Cameron: Can you say anything more about changes made after September 11?

Fitzharris: We worked with DPS to get everyone badges, but now we have tighter restrictions on people with red badges, where they can and can't go. We are constantly working with DPS. We are not trying to argue with them, we can see the big picture.

Cameron: I'm thinking of design or structural changes that you have made.

Fitzharris: I've been on another project, which is to create mini-Pentagons at different locations around the Capitol area that people go to. I have been working on that mostly from a communications perspective, most of my career has been in communications. But I was also asked to come back because the facilities here need some facility upgrades because of communications they are putting in here. Since I know both sides, I was asked to head up this team. Right now everything we are doing is for OSD, but the Army has been made the lead at a few different sites and I am on loan to the Army to get these actions done. I really can't comment from the 23rd on about some of the structural things. We have had sprinkler people in, saying that the sprinklers we had for offices were adequate. But if you want to put out a fire for a plane

coming in, you can't put it out, the fire is so hot the water vaporizes. We have learned some things. A man who got out alive sent us an e-mail about how a ship functions. And I've worked on underground command centers that have similar systems—primary power, backup power, and emergency battery escape lights. Maybe we need to put more of those in areas. Some people said it was dark, but the life safety power didn't come on because the generator had been wiped out by the plane. Later on the Remote Delivery Facility had those generators that would supply life safety to the Building, but if you have a catastrophic failure where things are blown apart you might lose your feed, depending on whether you have dual feeds or not. Those things are easy to do, but for the structural things to be done, I defer to the guys over there working the project right now.

Goldberg: It all adds up to spending a whole lot more money than originally expected.

Fitzharris: A lot more money. Even before, we were thin on life safety. We have one telephone switch in the Building, and the water built up so much that if it got to the telephone switch room we would have had to close the Building down for lack of communication.

Trask: There is just one of those in the Building?

Fitzharris: Yes, one massive telephone switch. In the wedges we have smaller switches, but they are all off of the one. When you look down Route 110, all the important circuits that come into the Building eventually go through a center down there. Years ago we were used to having one phone with the same number on everyone's desk, and you watched the light and used it when it was free.

Goldberg: It was a good system.

Fitzharris: Now we are used to having our own number and e-mail, and if we have to fall back to the old ways—like making a long distance call or in Europe taking a whole day to call here—we realize there may be another level of command and control that we have to make more redundant. Those are all things we have to put in the equation. We are trying to do a little bit on this job I'm on now, how to take the information around.

Trask: Would these be underground control centers?

Fitzharris: Some, and some above ground. Just some places to take our leadership to.

Goldberg: We have places like that already, don't we?

Fitzharris: We've had them, but a couple of places are not within viewing distance of the Pentagon, and people don't want to drive that far. We used to have the Greenbriar. We could all go there!

Goldberg: You might want to stay above ground there instead of underground.

Fitzharris: It would depend on what threats we were protecting against. During this incident DPS grabbed me and we went over to Andrews and had a special briefing from the Department of Energy and Bechtel Nevada guys on other things that could happen. It is interesting, because I walked in and saw a young man who as a lieutenant had worked for me in Europe and was here TDY from Nevada in case something else happened. DPS was keeping me in the loop and sharing information; that was good. I think at the end our relationship was far better with DPS, and good with the FBI and the other agencies that were there. I give everybody a lot of credit because even when someone changed the procedures, we just stopped and talked about it and did things the proper way so nobody got belligerent with each other.

Goldberg: Great emergencies bring out the best in people and organizations.

Fitzharris: I was surprised that it took three days to get organized. But the FBI said this was not like the usual crime scene. For a natural disaster it's FEMA. I worked at Fort Ritchie before and we did some things for FEMA so they could have some prepositioned units and packages go out. Maybe FEMA should have come in and set up phones and things and the FBI could have had their crime scene.

Goldberg: When did FEMA get there?

Fitzharris: I don't remember FEMA coming to our tent until the second Sunday. They were there, but they stayed out of the FBI's area, knowing it was a crime scene. They came to help, but they saw we already had a construction company here and contracts awarded. If the plane had hit a few days later we would have had the one firm not mobilized yet that had won Wedge Two to Five, or the other firm would have been gone. It was just timing.

Goldberg: No one contested the FBI's authority?

Fitzharris: No, they let the FBI have it. The military on the first day said it was their site. We said no, it wasn't. So they worked with the FBI and DPS helped with that. All the other agencies that came in, the Forest Service, the Interior Department, and others I have a list of, I have it someplace. I have a couple of boxes of things that I took home and I have to go through them. Anyway, I wondered what the agencies were doing. I found out they were having training exercises to learn about organization.

Trask: What role did Secretary Rumsfeld and the deputy secretary play?

Fitzharris: It was very interesting. They were out to the site that first day. We thought that was surprising and that the choppers would have taken them all out. The other

leadership, the four-stars, came out, and the congressmen came out. I got tired of briefing the congressmen and told Tom Fontana to help me brief them on how we had constructed Wedge One.

Trask: They came over early?

Fitzharris: They came over in groups of two, very early. Rumsfeld was there very early.

Trask: Why would the congressmen come over?

Fitzharris: They were busybodies. One of the four-stars came through and had so many bodyguards that we were amazed. Rumsfeld didn't have that many men with Uzis around him. Mr. Wolfowitz came through later, and President Bush came through a couple of times. We knew one day President Bush was flying up there in a Park Service helicopter. When a chopper would come in people would look. People were nervous. One day we heard planes overhead, but couldn't see them. We looked over toward the Potomac and we saw the presidential chopper coming down and they were flying cover overhead. We were nervous when hearing planes, or when a fire would break out again. The site would always go silent when the white truck would show up, because we knew that the white suits were coming out with the body bags. That was a solemn moment. People would break down and cry, especially some who had just gotten to the site for the first time. Then after a week, daily there were twenty to forty congressmen at a time, and we would brief them and they would give us cards or copies of the Declaration of Independence. One of them autographed one for me. It was a nice memento. They meant well. It was good that they saw what happened. Then organizations would come through. The last week of September and the first

weeks of October we had them going through Tom Fontana, whether they were congressional staff or different staffs. We were taking them into certain areas of the Building then, to see the debris in the hallways. You could see how the blast rippled down, the pressure, because of the way it took the ceiling out, or pushed the dry wall out.

Goldberg: That's good politics.

Fitzharris: It was important to show them what we had done, and that we needed more money to strengthen it further. We had done some things, but couldn't do other things because of the highway—things of this nature. The first two weeks of October it seemed like public affairs was what I was doing with Brad Eaton, Tom Fontana.

Goldberg: Fontana pulled out on you, though.

Fitzharris: Yes, but Mr. Evey and Mr. Sullivan are just like part of PAO, they do an excellent job. I let them do that and I go along to hold the slides and tell them where they can't go.

Goldberg: They are articulate people.

Fitzharris: Yes, and that is good. I'm not that articulate. But I have my role to do and they have their role.

Cameron: You have given us the clearest statement of what happened day by day that I've heard.

Fitzharris: I tried to tie it in to when I ordered these things. The sequential numbers are better because that is really when it happened. The date is the day it was made legal between AMEC and the sub. I was surprised that first day when the FBI said to get them clean, brand new dumpsters. Later I got dumpsters to put debris in and to get

material out of the way. The FBI was concerned that when they were clearing the floors that a man was going to drive the bobcat off because they had their guy do it. I said to let our people do the little bobcat, they knew what they were doing. Even though it was their crime scene, they had to trust us.

Goldberg: How much of a role has and will Jack Kelly play in all this?

Fitzharris: He is over with Kilsheimer and Will Colston doing the reconstruction, so he is doing a lot.

Goldberg: He is a contractor?

Fitzharris: Yes. The first day, when the plane hit, Jack ran outside and said that a plane had hit the Building. I grabbed my hard hat and police scanner and took off. It took two and a half hours to get back because the cells were overbooked or were blocked. When I started getting phone calls through, I was talking to Jack about what I needed from AMEC and others. Jack had Kilsheimer coming and AMEC said all their resources were there. I talked to Les Hunkley and he said Clark had offered all their resources. The big thing was that I asked for trucks and got with DPS and they got with Arlington County and the Virginia Highway Patrol to get people in. Even from Maryland they got escorts in.

Goldberg: Kelly has been a major player in this whole renovation, hasn't he?

Fitzharris: Jack and I are very close. The first day I worked until 2:45 a.m., and the next day I came in at 2:00 p.m. and worked until 3:00 a.m. The next day I came in at noon and worked until 2:00 a.m. I slept on the floor that night and the next day worked 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Then I got back to a daily schedule and Jack and I would meet for lunch and we were the two telling people to do things. You will see his name on that

list in a lot of places. I had him and Rock Viner, Butch Wiles, and Edwin Pickins. They were out there doing a lot of coordination. Me being the only government guy, I put my name in as approving everything so that if someone asked who did it, I would take the rap for it. (There are some nice government prisons, I saw some in Arizona! There is a nice one in Safford, where that guy wrote his book and made millions!) Jack and I would work the issues with DPS and the FBI. There was a long line for FBI badges one day and I had gotten there on a Saturday to try to get back to the normal shift. Jack said I didn't have to stand in line, and the FBI shoved me in line in front of all these people, and were going to put an "E" on my badge so I could carry a gun. I said I didn't need to carry a gun.

Goldberg: How would you describe Kelly's role in the renovation work?

Fitzharris: Jack is a very good consultant. Everybody thinks he is gruff at times. He would hold construction meetings at 7:00 a.m. when we got behind, with all the subs in the room. They would fight, and somebody would not show up, so Jack moved the meeting to 6:00. Someone said the "stupid meeting" took up his assigned work time, so Jack moved it to 5:00. Then he moved it to 4:00. One time he was going to have it at 3:00, so I brought my sleeping bag in and slept on the floor. It ended up that we had it at 4:00. Then we went back to 5:00 and 6:00. Jack got people to work together, that was his thing.

Goldberg: He had the authority to do that, delegated by Evey?

Fitzharris: Yes, delegated probably by Evey and me, because I run all the construction projects. I told Dave Westrick, who ran Wedge One, that it wasn't coming together and we were going to make sure it happened. I would go to the foreman meetings. They

had a problem getting the IM&T, the communications people, there. Because I was an IM&T person for 27 years before I came to work for Evey, I got those people to come to the meetings. We even had the furniture people. They would be there, but the IM&T guys would not be there to pull the cable through, or they wouldn't get there for three days and hold up the furniture crew. They were putting the ceiling grid in as soon as they put the tiles in. We said to leave the tiles out until the day before people move in and drop them in, in case you have to get into the ceiling for communications or air conditioning work. When we started the reconstruction work, Will Colston was originally on Wedge Two to Five as Wendy Thompson's deputy, but we needed to get Will over here. We had Dave Gabel in Wedge One in a part that is not too badly damaged, he had taken Westrick's place. Will could be over here with me. Then this other project happened and I said to put Will there full time with Jack. That's the way the team got aligned. We shifted the people we needed to shift with the joint venture. Les Hunckly and I sat down because Les is to run their crew and underneath him are the construction types and the PRISM type, Stacie Contrell, to do requirements and set design standards. The actual design crews on the different projects, the Metro entrance, or whatever, we're still working on RDF, were underneath me like they were under Les for all of his people. We work on shifting people where we need them. The Metro entrance facility was at a halt, so we called people from there. This weekend on the 16th we will open the bus stop out there, a little farther away from the Building. They are accelerating now to try to get the full entrance into the Building. We worked on shifting people and made sure we had coverage twenty-four hours a day for the first three weeks. The FBI could come to the tent any time and introduce their replacement

when they went off shift. Our prime people, Ed Pickens and Rock Viner, were supposed to work eight, and someone else work eight. They worked about ten to twelve, because if they had something going they worked it until it was finished. I did an overlap with both of them, I did fourteen or sixteen. We then got more people into that team and we got people to run out to find somebody. The big thing was communications until we got everybody with a cell phone.

Goldberg: That's your specialty.

Fitzharris: It's supposed to be, but the last few years I have been doing construction management. I think Evey had some confidence in me, because he was off for seven weeks and I sat in for him when he was gone because he had open-heart surgery a couple of summers ago. He went to the doctor and the doctor didn't let him back out. Mike Sullivan wasn't there yet. Dave Draffin had taken another job, so Bill Brasis and Doc Cooke drafted something up. They took it out to Evey in the hospital and I kind of ran the whole place for seven weeks. I just try to be quiet and not do the public affairs. We have a good public affairs team, and we have Lee himself. That's good.

Cameron: We're glad we finally got the opportunity to talk with you. Thank you for the good interview.