This is a continuation of an oral history interview with Mr. Henry Glass, held in the Pentagon on October 23, 1987, at 10:40 a.m. The interview is being recorded on tape and a copy of the transcript will be sent to Mr. Glass for his review. Representing the OSD Historical Office are Alfred Goldberg, Richard Leighton, Lawrence Kaplan, and Robert J. Watson.

**Goldberg:** We want to continue with the discussion of the contributions that McElroy and Gates may have made to the organization and management of the Department and any permanent legacies they may have left in your view.

**Glass:** I don't recall that McElroy did anything basic on organization and management, but he did a lot to pick up the pieces after Sputnik. The creation of ARPA was his big contribution. Gates set up some of the other new agencies, the Defense Communications Agency, for example. He did the groundwork for the establishment of DIA. It was in one of the budgets after McNeil had left and Lincoln was the Comptroller, maybe the last budget under the Eisenhower administration. Earlier Reuben Robertson, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, had tried to get a grip on the whole intelligence picture, down into the services, to see if there was duplication and whether savings could be made. At that point each military department had its own intelligence establishment, as did the JCS, the State department, CIA, NSA, and all ancillary organizations. Within the Defense Department there were four intelligence agencies and four estimates of what the Soviet Union and other countries were doing. We had four projections of potential enemy forces, and that always caused a good deal of difficulty. At one time we asked the services to cost out each of its own projections. The Army was to project the cost of the Soviet military forces for which they were responsible for making the estimates; the Navy...
and the Air Force similarly. These projections went to the CIA. Then
the CIA made an estimate of the amount of money in equivalent U.S.
dollars and in rubles that the Soviets were spending for defense each
year. Someone thought to put the two things together and McNeil agreed
to confront the CIA with the costing of the individual service projec-
tions, measured against the CIA's projection of how much the Soviets were
spending on defense. In rubles or equivalent dollars, or as a percentage
of GNP, no matter how you sliced it these individual service projections
in the aggregate far exceeded what the CIA said the Soviet Union was spend-
ing on defense. That had a very wholesome effect on the whole intelligence
community to stop hosing around with these estimates and stop exaggerating.
One time McNeil sent me up to talk to the Navy Intelligence Chief about
the 100 submarines the Navy said the Russians were building each year.
We pointed out that even at $20 mil each, the Soviets would be spending $2
billion per year on subs, about our total shipbuilding program. All of this put
pressure on the intelligence problem and also made it clear to the top
management that we had to get a better handle on it. Reuben Robertson,
as I recall, made the first attempt to at least put together in one place
what the Defense establishment's intelligence efforts consisted of.

Goldberg: This would be 1956?

Glass: Earlier, 1955 or '56. That effort petered out, but the problem
remained. It must have been the last Eisenhower budget. Maurice Stans
was the Director of the Budget. At that time Eisenhower sort of delegated
to Stans the authority on the preparation of that budget, so we had to
deal with him; he had the last word. They, Defense top management, were
under great pressure to cut the Defense budget and we went through slicing off everything we could. Gates decided to take a look at intelligence. We had Lt. Gen. Erskine, Marine Corps. He had a Colonel who got into difficulties for spending money unofficially in Southeast Asia.

**Leighton:** What Was Erskine’s job?

**Glass:** Special Operations. Lansdale was in that organization, and the Marine Corps Colonel I just mentioned. Erskine was in charge of Special Operations. This was over and above the four intelligence groups that we had in DoD—a sort of coordinator. They even had a Comptroller, Clyde Elliot, who earlier was in McNiell’s office, in charge of putting together the Army budget.

**Goldberg:** What did Gates do?

**Glass:** He got hold of Erskine and his people on a Sunday morning in his conference room to find out from them what all the pieces of the intelligence operation consisted of. It became clear right off that they didn’t have the slightest idea of the total cost of the intelligence operations beyond their own small area of responsibility. They had no idea of what the services were spending or how many people were involved. Gates simply decided to cut, no matter what the actual cost was, ten percent of the total intelligence effort within the Defense Establishment, excluding the Black Budget. That cut became part of the effort to meet Eisenhower’s pressure to cut the budget. We simply assigned a dollar figure to that budget cut, allocated to each of the military departments.

**Leighton:** That’s just the three services?
Glass: JCS also. That experience convinced Gates that we needed an over-
all intelligence agency and that was really the beginning of DIA. The
ground was already prepared when McNamara came in. That was another of
Gates's legacies. And, of course, the SIOP--his ability to go out to
Omaha, knock heads together and come up with a single integrated plan,
which was a real advance.

Leighton: You told a story about Gen. Taylor being turned down flat when
he was going to protest the budget to President Eisenhower. When did
that occur?

Glass: The second McElroy budget, 1960. You have to look at the 1958
supplement, the 1959 budget, and the amendment to the '59 budget to see
how the U.S. reacted to the Soviet Sputnik.

Goldberg: Taylor was unhappy from the beginning. He sponsored later on
an exercise by the Joint Chiefs of the 1960 budget where each service did
the whole budget for all of the services and allocated the forces, each
specifying what each service ought to have. It really showed their pref-
erences and biases.

Leighton: That was done often, earlier, in the JSOP.

Goldberg: This was a big and detailed piece of work done at Taylor's
insistence. Let's discuss the nature of McNeil's power and influence
in the Defense Department. Do you want to add anything?

Glass: In those days, whoever controlled the budget controlled the
whole Defense program, because we managed through the budget and not in
terms of programs, as under McNamara.
Goldberg: What accounts for the fact that almost all the secretaries for whom McNeil worked gave him that power and let him exercise it and that neither the Secretaries nor the Deputy Secretaries sought to master all of that to the extent that they could exercise that power?

Glass: Because this is the way it developed from the beginning of the Defense Department. Lovett got into the Budget preparation process in much more detail, because it was in the middle of the Korean War. Decisions had to be made that were beyond McNeil or any Comptroller at that time. Nobody had any real concept of what was needed to fight the Korean War, plus the buildup against the Soviet threat.

Goldberg: With Eisenhower and the New Look there were very big decisions being made that also had a profound effect on the services.

Glass: Yes, but the overall Budget decisions were made in dollar terms in the Eisenhower administration from the beginning.

Goldberg: So McNeil was refining what had already been decided?

Glass: No, it enhanced McNeil’s role. All that Eisenhower would do was ask that Defense expenditures or NOA not exceed certain amounts. He laid down some general guidelines.

Goldberg: He went beyond that on occasion, didn’t he, in specifying about forces and weapons systems?

Leighton: He had in his mind the notion, apart from dollar problems, that the big ground forces we built up in the Korean War had to be cut back, because we were in peacetime. That’s one reason he hit the Army so hard.
Glass: Yes. At the beginning of his administration—with help from Adm. Radford, Chairman, JCS—they tried to develop a concept of strategy—"more bang for the buck"—massive retaliation. That benefited the Air Force, oddly enough.

Goldberg: Why oddly? Almost naturally, it would.

Glass: You would think that an Army general would lean towards the Army. If you think back from the end of World War II up until the time Eisenhower came aboard they had the Army and Navy on one side and the Air Force on the other, with regard to the very concept of what kind of war World War III would be.

Goldberg: But Eisenhower had already developed a considerable interest in nuclear weapons, which were, in the main, the province of the Air Force. Basically Eisenhower was following the policy that had pretty well been accepted prior to the Korean War.

Glass: The Eisenhower administration in its very first year cut the Air Force FY 1954 budget (NOA) from $19.1 billion to about $14 billion, or something like $5 billion. It was a terrible shock to the Air Force. At that point Eisenhower was considered an enemy of the Air Force. Then, in the next round, in readjusting the program, they again put the burden on the Air Force, using it and nuclear weapons as the main vehicle for justifying the reduction in the budget.

Leighton: I think he had another reason. His notion of the threat that we faced was not of piecemeal aggression, which would be the main Army function, in peacetime.
Glass: I think you are wrong on this. That's precisely the kind of wars that Eisenhower thought that we ought to fight with conventional forces. His point was that we would never again fight a World War II kind of war in Europe or anywhere else, so you don't need a big Army.

Leighton: But you need a medium-sized and diversified Army. This comes up in Taylor's regime, because he favored that type of force.

Glass: Taylor went in a circle, too. The Pentomic division was his, too. The Kennedy administration abandoned the Pentomic division. Eisenhower had a very clear view, right or wrong, as to the nature of war in the future. It all emerged in the exchange of letters between Wilson and Eisenhower which turned up in one of the budget messages.


Glass: Wilson sat in at a meeting and was very impressed with Eisenhower's informal talk about the nature of a future war. He told his aide, Col. Randall, that we ought to get this in writing from the President to serve as guidance for the Defense establishment, as there was a dearth of that kind of strategic thinking to guide the Defense establishment.

Goldberg: There always is.

Glass: Not in McNamara's time, there was a surplus. But during the Eisenhower administration we had the basic National Security Policy Paper, which was very general; the JSOP, which had no relation to reality; and nothing in between. This was very important to Wilson, as he knew nothing about strategy. This concept emerges clearly, that we are not going to fight another World War II kind of war in Europe, regardless of NATO. I
might point out that Eisenhower wanted to cut the NATO forces. There's
a whole story there about his attitude towards NATO.

**Goldberg:** We have all that from Goodpaster, in detail.

**Leighton:** That letter you were talking about—you said it was Wilson's
idea. I thought you said that Eisenhower did not actually write that,
that it was written by Randall.

**Glass:** Yes, based on his notes from that meeting and maybe further dis-

cussions with Goodpaster. It went from here to the White House, which
was normal. That was nothing unusual. They tried to reconstruct what
Eisenhower said informally. I took that letter from Eisenhower and incor-
porated it into his next budget message. It wasn't incorporated verbatim
in the budget message, but in a more formal form. This was the basis,
the concepts or the principles on which we were organizing the forces.
The feeling was that the letter was too informal, that we had to use a
vehicle that would set it into the official record. And what better one
than the Defense portion of the budget message where the President expressed
his views on Defense policy.

**Leighton:** In connection with Eisenhower's views of the nature of the
kind of war we would have to fight, you told us about a letter which
Eisenhower wrote at the solicitation of Secretary Wilson. It was dated
January 5, 1955, and set forth views expounded in previous meetings.
Wilson asked him to put it down on paper because it was such a cogent
expression of his views. What were the circumstances surrounding that
letter?
Glass: We touched on this earlier. The beginning of it was a meeting in the White House between Eisenhower and Wilson. Randall was there. Eisenhower was holding forth, explaining to Wilson his views on the nature of future war and how we should approach the whole national security problem and the Defense program. When they got back to the Pentagon, Wilson decided to get it in writing. Randall prepared the first draft, sent it to the White House, and eventually got a letter from Eisenhower incorporating his informal discussion. That was in early January and was too late to have a bearing on the budget being sent forward to the Hill at that time. The sense of that letter did not get into the budget message for the 1956 budget. The essence of Eisenhower's thinking in the letter he sent to Wilson was clearly usable to fill a gap in the way in which we were handling the Defense program and budget, namely, to give a conceptual strategic structure to the forces and programs being proposed. It might be worthwhile to see whether the guidance sent out by OSD to the services for the '57 budget incorporated some direction along this line, whether the services were to use as a guide the contents of this letter in preparing the 1957 budget. It certainly served the management, McNeil and the Secretary, in talking to the service secretaries and chiefs, giving them guidance, and in reviewing the budget. We were prepared to say when we sent the 1957 budget to the Hill, "Here is the strategic foundation, the conceptual foundation on which these forces and this budget were developed." These principles served for the rest of the Eisenhower administration as a foundation and direction in which the program had to go.
Goldberg: Any further budget questions?

Leighton: This goes back to our discussion of budget preparation procedure. In preparing the 1957 budget, about December 1 the OSD staff and the BoB staff got together and pulled together preliminary budget estimates. Was that device directly connected with that meeting in McNeil’s office?

Glass: No, the meeting in McNeil’s office was around Thanksgiving. What you are talking about sounds like what we would prepare for the annual NSC meeting on the budget.

Leighton: It was too early for that, and less formal.

Glass: Early December was when the President would get his preliminary look at how the budget was shaping up. Those may have been the notes that they took to Augusta to go over the budget with the president.

Leighton: Things were a little different at this time. The President was recovering from his first heart attack. Simultaneous with this, on December 1, he, Wilson, and Radford had a meeting and talked about the spending ceiling and approved personnel strengths. But there need not have been a direct connection, I suppose.

Glass: No. The budget process is an ongoing flow, where you take an instant photograph of where it stands at a particular moment if there is a need to go over it with someone. I don’t think the meeting was overly significant.

Leighton: No other types of meetings resulted in a comprehensive document like this.

Glass: It sounds like an early draft of the Defense chapter of the budget.
Leighton: But it was greatly changed in the few days following.

Glass: What fiscal year was that?

Leighton: 1957, and a similar one for 1958.

Goldberg: If they were greatly changed in a few days somebody must have brought about those changes.

Glass: There must have been a major question as to how we could get from where we were at the time to what the President wanted.

Goldberg: But we don't know who then reviewed that budget and made the changes.

Glass: It was probably DoD and BoB jointly, then it was probably for the President.

Goldberg: The Director would get a full budget to chop on, too, wouldn't he?

Glass: Yes, but for some reason the BoB and OSD people, who had jointly developed this budget, decided that someone in higher authority, above Defense and BoB, had to make some decisions. This would have to be the president.

Leighton: This document was too detailed and too messy to take to the White House.

Glass: Maybe this was a backup to another document. I would have to look at the paper.

Goldberg: What relations did your office have with strategic planning during this Eisenhower period?

Glass: At the beginning the Comptroller's office didn't have much to do with strategic planning. McNeil had his contacts, particularly among
Navy officers. He was able to get information as to what the Chiefs were thinking and have some influence by feedback, expressing his views to them. When the "NSC paper" system started up, and Humphrey insisted on a financial appendix to every paper--some were very broad and others dealt with an individual country, a whole library--these papers all required a financial appendix. The only agency that could do the costings was the Defense Comptroller's office, so we began to prepare the financial appendices. But we had to know what the programs and force numbers would be, and we had to get the details on that from the services and the Joint Staff. We had to understand the policy also. The costs of the programs being proposed were way out of line, and McNeil got drawn into policy and strategy discussions, which he relished. We got into force structuring, equipping policies, and very often basic national security policy, as in the case of the paragraph talking about rolling back the Iron Curtain. McNeil objected to the rolling back policy from the beginning as being totally unrealistic in the light of Eisenhower's policy of a balanced budget and holding down the Defense budget. The Hungarian uprising provided an opportunity to nail that issue. My memory tells me that the paragraph on rolling back the Iron Curtain was deleted from the next go-around on the Basic National Security Policy paper.

Goldberg: So the Comptroller's role was primarily pragmatic and empirical. You were looking at the practical aspects of the proposals for programs and policies. Did you have any people really knowledgeable about strategic matters, per se?
Glass: No. It was McNeil who was the prime mover. Max Lehrer and I helped him. Some of the budget examiners had a broader view than just their particular areas.

Goldberg: You were concerned primarily with economic and budgetary implications?

Glass: Yes. Because of these financial appendices we attended NSC Planning Board meetings chaired by Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's NSC Advisor. Bonesteel was the Defense Department Planning Board member. We would meet in his office with the representatives of the rest of OSD and the services. There was a JCS representative, later Commandant of the Marine Corps, Wally Green, who was then a colonel, involved in this part of the planning. I got to know him pretty well.

Wally Green was the JCS man involved in this team, which Bonesteel headed. Bonesteel was a very intelligent man, a Ph.D., if I recall correctly. Take the case of the strategy in Iran—the original plan was to defend the first chain of mountains facing the Caspian. This would force the Russians to come around the Caspian to invade Iran. There was considerable discussion as to the strategy in defending Iran. Where to defend? Eisenhower asked about the feasibility operating carriers in the Gulf. The question was, could we bring carriers through the Straits of Hormuz into the Gulf and operate them, using naval air power to support the ground forces? Radford, Chairman of the JCS, said no. Another problem was the fact that the literacy rate was extremely low in Iran. This raised the question of the kind of equipment we should provide the Iranians.
Everything had to be oral and visual, but not dependent on reading. That was how we got back into the question of what kind of strategy and what kind of U.S. forces would be needed to back up Iran in the event of a Soviet attack. This was part of the "Northern Tier" strategy.

**Goldberg:** Did people in the Comptroller’s office keep up with the strategic debates of the time on massive retaliation, deterrence, and that sort of thing?

**Glass:** Yes, because all of those issues had to do with the budget. Therefore, we were in the middle of the problem. Our particular office, where we drafted the budget statements, also had the followup responsibility, to assist the congressional committee people in defending the Eisenhower budget, writing their material for them. I remember one time about the Atlas. Max and I wrote three speeches—one for, one against, and one down the middle, for three different senators to use in the debate on a Defense Bill. In that connection we served a client, like a lawyer. We did that to maintain good relations with the committees.

**Goldberg:** Both the majority and minority parties?

**Glass:** Yes. We were looking for friends, not enemies. If they asked us for a speech to use on the floor, we obliged. We got deeply into the debates on the Defense Appropriations bills because we knew the budget, the programs, and interrelations of the policies. We were among the principal legislative-public affairs people. From that time to the present day, the Pentagon public affairs people come back to the working people for information. They don’t take off on their own. We were a primary source on the budget. After the press conference on the budget by the
Director of BoB and our own press conference in the Pentagon, I would have an informal, off the record press conference with the key reporters covering the Pentagon, about 12 people, in my office, and go over the budget with them. I inherited this task from McNeil. He started it. I would explain what the administration thought it was doing in its various budget decisions.

Goldberg: Did you and the people in the Comptroller's office have any contacts with the Rand theorists, and were you familiar with their work?

Glass: I was. I ran into Rand the first time when I was still at Wright Field. Some RAND people came over to present a study which had to do with where in a formation of bombers you would put the airplane carrying the atomic bomb. This was at the time when we had a lot more airplanes than we had nuclear weapons. That was the first encounter with their theorizing. When I worked at the Air Staff we were getting a lot of stuff from them. In the OSD Comptroller's office it didn't cut much weight at all. I don't recall the Rand studies having much to say of interest to McNeil, and I was one of the few people in ASD Comp. who looked at them. I don't think McNeil ever paid much attention to them.

Kaplan: I've been reading Enthoven's interview with this office and his writing, and he criticized the Eisenhower administration on the issue of the absence of total costs. The example you gave of Ethiopia, where your office intervened on the grounds that if you send all these trucks who's going to man them, is precisely what Enthoven says was not not being done then.
Glass: That was the foreign aid program. On our own budget program, what Enthoven was saying was when you want to build a carrier you should ask about the cost of the whole task force and its operation over, say, a ten year period. That nobody attempted to do. The longest projections made were those of the Air Force, which covered three years, the budget year plus two more years. They used to project, early on, three years ahead. I think there was some work done in trying to cost out the total Air Force over a period of years. Certainly, with the Eisenhower-Taft agreement on a $60 billion budget, it became important to get some idea of what a 143 wing Air Force would cost, in total, each year, over a period of years. But the Rand people perfected the techniques of doing such a costing with the help of computers. It was a tremendous undertaking. When the Kennedy-Johnson administration started they brought in an army of Rand people to get the procedural machinery installed to do that kind of a job.

Goldberg: From your perspective, what officials were particularly influential in setting strategic policy? the President, SecDef, JCS?

Glass: President Eisenhower, there's no question about it.

Goldberg: Who else exercised general influence?

Glass: On the broader scale, John Foster Dulles had an enormous influence on the thinking of Eisenhower in the massive retaliation sort of thing. Going to the brink also was one of the Dulles concepts. Adm. Radford also worked closely with the President and was very supportive. I don't recall ISA having much of a say. In the processing of the budget, there the fight was between the Comptroller in OSD and the other parts of OSD.
that had a special interest in getting more money for their areas of responsibility. But the battle over strategy, to the extent that strategy was more than a facet of the budget, was with the military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services. Charlie Wilson used to meet with the JCS downstairs and have informal discussions with them. McElroy followed that policy, also.

**Goldberg**: We know Gates did it.

**Glass**: You can check it out when you talk to Randall. I remember informal discussions where the Secretary talked to the Chiefs directly.

**Goldberg**: He usually dealt with Bradley directly, and sometimes with the Chiefs. But it's assumed that Gates began this matter of going down and talking with the Chiefs.

**Kaplan**: Gates gets the credit for it among the Eisenhower people.

**Glass**: I think Wilson, too, dealt with them, and certainly with the service secretaries. He looked at the service secretaries as the heads of the operating divisions, just like the Chevrolet Division of G.M., with the OSD staff being the corporate headquarters, like General Motors' corporation staff. He had those weekly meetings with the secretaries.

There was another weekly meeting with the Assistant Secretaries and the Chiefs. There were two groups. The Armed Forces Policy Council and the three secretaries alone (the Joint Secretaries?).

**Leighton**: There's one point to be made as to what definition of strategy you're talking about. ISA as such was involved institutionally, but the Assistant Secretary didn't concern himself much with strategy, per se; he was mainly concerned with foreign aid programs.
Glass: That's why I say I can't remember ISA getting very much involved in this.

Leighton: What we're left with is the Bonesteel connection through the Planning Board, which comes up to the NSC. That is operated primarily on basic national security policy. Those papers were the ISA Policy Planning staff which provided the channel between the SecDef's office and NSC.

Glass: Wally Green, JCS, was the man that we would discuss strategy with as pertaining to the particular countries, because he was amenable to discussing things like that with civilians. I suppose it was just that simple. It depended on the military man, but to make it clear for the record, we fed on the rest of the organization. What we didn't know, we found out. That's the trick in this business, to know who knows. You couldn't possibly know everything yourself, but if you know whom to contact, who has the most information on a particular subject, no matter what his rank, civilian or military . . . you could get the information you needed.

Goldberg: What role did the Comptroller's office play in connection with Defense policy on logistics?

Glass: McNeil's role was to bring realism to it. That area was totally unrelated to the realities of the budget. The planned buildup in the event of mobilization was to 45 divisions, which gave rise to a whole train of requirements, particularly ammunition, which simply could not be accommodated in the budget. That is the big problem of logistics, acquiring the war reserves.
McNeil also had a distinct view about the machinery for the day-to-day supply operations. ASD(I&L) McGuire favored the single manager. McNeil argued that each military department was big enough to get all the benefits of large scale purchasing. We ran into so many examples of duplication among the services, one service selling precisely what the other service was buying, that Wilson felt something had to be done. McNeil was overruled by Wilson, who went along with the single manager concept. In that arrangement, one of the services was designated single manager for a commodity group, like petroleum or clothing. That was the basis on which we ended up with the Defense Supply Agency, which McNamara put into effect. In effect, he took all the single managers and put them into one organization.

The big money and the main issue on logistics was war reserve stocks for mobilization. There was simply an arbitrary decision as to how much money we put into war reserve. That had to do with spare parts and other things, the consumption of which would rise very rapidly in the event of a conflict. With the restraints put on by Eisenhower it was difficult enough to build peacetime forces, and do the necessary training and level of operation of them, without getting into the mobilization requirements. When the Eisenhower position on the nature of future war became crystal clear, that reinforced McNeil's position that we really didn't have to pay too much attention to conventional ammunition, supplies, and everything else that goes with mobilization. Since the JSOP still reflected some of the mobilization planning, the wartime force was the peacetime force. The greatest power you had was right at the beginning of a war.
Leighton: What was McNeil's position on the debate over a broad versus narrow industrial base?

Glass: I don't recall the Defense Department doing very much on industrial mobilization planning. I came from that business, at Wright Field, and it was not an interesting topic here.

Leighton: It was an Office of Defense Mobilization matter. Defense was involved because it came down strictly to a question of procurement policy in peacetime. Whether you went in for multiple suppliers or single source.

Glass: It also had to do with stockpiling plants and machine tools. We did have a strategic mobilization reserve, and there was discussion of getting the longest lead time items and buying them in advance and keeping them in stock as a fast start on mobilization. It never got very far in that time. I don't recall giving it much attention. You can see in the budget messages that the money put in for it didn't amount to a much.

Charlie Wilson had a very definite view on how to handle this industrial mobilization problem. His view was that every large peacetime hard goods manufacturer, the automobile and machine tool industries particularly, should do Defense work. He opposed the concept of specialized Defense contractors, like Boeing and McDonnell. He felt we would be better off lodging it into the peacetime industry, like automobiles, because in time of war, looking at World War II, we converted the whole automobile industry and all the appliance industries to war production. So why not let them provide whatever Defense production there was in peacetime. He lectured
and spoke on that, but the dual-purpose plant concept didn't get very far. The tanks and other combat vehicles were, however, built by the automotive industry, Chrysler in particular.

**Leighton:** You remember the squabble over having warm production lines, whether you have machine tools and so on stashed in a shed outside of the main factory ready to go into a conversion in wartime—I thought Wilson was very much embroiled in that and took a lot of flak from the press.

**Glass:** That's because he wanted to use peacetime industry. He wanted every automobile manufacturer to be in Defense production so that they could quickly expand and convert to defense production. The warm production base also had an influence on planning production programs, stretching them out instead of producing at the optimum rate. Sometimes it is cheaper to produce a given number of airplanes in a short period of years, cut it off, rather than spread it out and carry the overhead for more years. The overhead is very important in this business. Sometimes it can be half the total cost of an item. In order to maintain a warm production base, sometimes we deliberately ran a production schedule at a lower than optimum rate to stretch out production for a longer period of years, as with a fighter, until its replacement can come into production. That policy was applied to all kinds of things.

**Leighton:** What about the issue of whether you have a single source or several smaller ones?

**Glass:** It pays to have more than one source. Unfortunately, with the cost of airplanes, or ships, there is a limit on how many sources you
can support with a given sized program. That was the practical problem with having more than one source.

Leighton: What was Wilson's view on that?

Glass: Get it into a peacetime industry, with built-in expansibility.

Second source is still an issue today.

Goldberg: Was the Comptroller involved in such matters as base closings?

Glass: Yes, because the budget was involved in that. McNeil always favored squeezing down on the number of bases, and Gates had a formulation of that—that you never close just one base, you close a lot of them across the country, involving as many congressmen as possible, to spread the pain. If you happen to pick one, and the air defense problem was a typical case in point in McNamara's time, where only one congressman is hit, he is going to raise hell. He has to, in order to maintain his relations with his constituents. Save them up, get your list together, and then close a lot of them at the same time.

Goldberg: The Comptroller provided the data, presumably.

Glass: Of course, what you would save by closing a given list of bases. Every budget review ended up with a list of installations that should be closed to save money.

Goldberg: What about such issues as weaponry? What role did the Comptroller play?

Glass: The Comptroller got involved because everything costs money. Duplication was the question—can you avoid some duplication and eliminate a given weapon system. That was the case of the Army Hercules versus
the Air Force Talos, which came to a head in the McElroy administra-
tion. Symington jumped on McElroy to clean out some of the duplication.
McElroy unfortunately said, "Yes, I agree. It's time for you to hold our
feet to the fire." That remark became a public relations problem for a
long time--it seemed to indicate a weakness in Defense management.

When you are reviewing a budget and trying to cut things out, you
use any excuse that might turn up, including strategic need, duplication,
anything to knock something out of the budget. That's how the Comptroller
got involved with strategic weapons. When it came to carriers or the
Nike Hercules, Eisenhower made the decision. The really big decisions went
to the President.

**Goldberg:** What role did Comptroller play on issues of manpower?

**Glass:** Again, the budget. If people could be cut out, for whatever jus-
tification, civilian or military, costs could be reduced.

**Goldberg:** Do you have a specific instance?

**Glass:** The manning of the ships, for example. The Navy wants every ship
manned for wartime operations. If you look at a carrier operation, you
don't need ammunition handlers unless you are fighting. There are 500 of
them on the carriers to handle the bombs and other munitions. The thought
came up frequently that we should have a peacetime level of manning to
operate the ships; if war came you would supplement that level of manning.
In the Army the issue was always to what extent you could depend on the
reserve units to flesh out the active Army units. In that connection,
Eisenhower had a very distinct view on the reserve forces, that is, less.
That connects to his view of the nature of a future war. For three fiscal years running he recommended a 10 percent cut across the board in the Army Guard and Reserve components and lost each time because he did not have a clean rationale behind it. What he was after was a cut in the paid drill reserve. The Comptroller tried everything to back him up, but the Congress was opposed. NATO was another one, to find a way to reduce the U.S. overseas complement. That would reduce the manpower requirement. We once made an attempt to chop out two divisions from Europe, at the personal direction of Eisenhower. It was an exercise to see how much money we could save in foreign exchange outlays by withdrawing two divisions of the five in Europe, disbanding them, and ascertaining the effect on the balance of payments and the budget, and likewise, the effect of bringing them back and keeping them in the force at home. That latter option would help the balance of payments, but it turned out it would increase the budget because some new facilities for those divisions would have to be provided in the U.S. We did that exercise, sent it up to the Army for review and comment, and they leaked it to the New York Times. It came from high up, either Sec. Army Brucker or the Chief of Staff. This was an Eisenhower initiative, but he let it go. At his very last NSC meeting on the Defense Budget, Eisenhower said to the assembled group, "I've been telling you men for years that we ought to reduce our forces in Europe." I said to myself, "You were the President, why didn't you do it and make it stick?" We did look at it. The idea was to take out the two divisions in Bavaria, because they had to move horizontal to the
front where they were supposed to fight. That would have left a corps of three divisions to the north, where they could be supplied and reinforced by sea.

Goldberg: He didn't do it because he was always being persuaded otherwise.

Glass: That's right. When all of Eisenhower's advisers leaned strongly in one direction, he tended to go along with them, even against his own judgment.

Kaplan: Konrad Adenauer would have been putting pressure on Dulles with respect to divisions in Europe.

Glass: Yes. But you may be interested in what triggered Eisenhower on this matter. When Lodge was chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Senate, Eisenhower was called back from Europe, where he was SACEUR, to testify on the troops for Europe resolution. There was a hearing on that before the Lodge Committee. The question was put to him, "Is this to be a permanent deployment?" There was nothing in the North Atlantic Treaty that required the United States to have permanent forces in Europe. Nothing whatever.

The decision to deploy large U.S. combat forces to Europe came about as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War. That event frightened a lot of people, and led by Sen. Symington, that group favored all-out mobilization and positioning the United States to prepare for a new world war. In that connection the Truman administration decided to deploy four U.S. divisions of combat forces in Europe, and ended up with five. They were scared into the decision to deploy major U.S. combat forces to Europe.
At that time Eisenhower pointed out that this deployment of combat forces was temporary. He said, "I can't promise that we will reduce to nothing, but we are certainly not going to have large forces over there indefinitely." Later on, when Eisenhower became President, again in connection with the question of McNeil getting into strategy, pushed by the need to find some more reductions in cost, the thought occurred to us that we ought to remind Eisenhower of what he told the Lodge Committee. So we extracted from the public hearings one paragraph containing Eisenhower's statement on the temporary nature of the NATO deployment, duplicated it, and gave it to McNeil to give to Wilson to give to Eisenhower, who said that he remembered it and still meant what he said then. Aligned against him were all our European Allies and the people here. The Army had a vested interest in maintaining those divisions in Europe. If you bring them back here, you don't need this big an army.

Kaplan: The Army had the support of the State Department on this one, because Dulles was as firm as any military person would be on keeping troops in Europe.

Glass: As the State Department is to this day. In this particular case Eisenhower gave way to the people around him, which, I am told, was characteristic of the way he operated when he was SACEUR. He gave a lot of weight to his principal advisers, against his own better judgment. We are still there with the same forces. This one attempt to get two divisions out collapsed by airing it too early.

Goldberg: He respected his staff and generally followed their judgment.
Glass: The Navy also had a stake there, because moving troops and supplies in support of those divisions and the whole concept of the land buildup, was the job of the Navy and justified a big Navy. The only service that was not dependent on that was the Air Force, because they were going to win another war in Europe by strategic air power.

Goldberg: To go back to the "open skies" business in 1955, do you remember Eisenhower's speech on that?

Glass: I think that had a lot to do with the feeling that we were going to have some satellites eventually.

Goldberg: Do you think he was already thinking in these terms?

Glass: What did the Killian committee report say? Didn't that have something in it about space? It was a very far-sighted report.

Leighton: It was very low key if it was, because it was shortly after that that they sent up an observation satellite.

Glass: The Killian committee looked into the future and may have foreseen an ability to look from up above. And also, of course, we were looking with the U-2.

Goldberg: In 1956 we got the U-2, but we had other things.

Glass: The open skies proposal was an effort to find a way to peace. To be able to plan against reality, not against our fears. It's the same today, the openness, except it's on the ground now.

Leighton: What killed it was that Khrushchev was running things and that they wouldn't cooperate.

Glass: The Russians never wanted to cooperate in that time. That business with Rusk and the old foreign minister, Gromyko, who had the idea of
publishing our respective Defense budgets. We took it so seriously that we worried about having to disclose the black budget. How could we explain to the Russians that there was something hidden even in our published budget. Rusk talked to Gromyko at the UN once and Gromyko said, "We published our Defense budget." It got nowhere. We published so much about our defense forces, and they published just one number, and that number doesn't include about half of what we consider military expenditures. The more we know about each other, the less contingency we have to crank into the forces to protect against the unknown.

Goldberg: What do you regard as the major decisions on weaponry and manpower in the Eisenhower period?

Glass: On manpower, the reduction from the 20 or 21 divisions during the Korean War to a force of 14 divisions, three of which were training divisions. So we had eleven combat-ready divisions. That's where Eisenhower left it knowingly, with his approval. That's how Eisenhower kept the pressure on the Defense budget.

Leighton: There were static divisions, regimental combat teams scattered around with a nominal divisional affiliation.

Glass: I don't recall that it was anything we used in discussing the budget.

Goldberg: It just proves that the Comptroller didn't know everything and that some of the numbers they published didn't really tell the whole story.
Glass: You can see the forces to be supported at the beginning of the Defense chapters in the annual budgets. Everything that we thought was factually important was incorporated there.

Leighton: With reference to your talk about the rollback provision in the NSC papers, I brought in a copy of NSC 162/2, October 1953. Could you have been referring to this so-called Annex, which was carried over from an earlier paper? This Annex is objectives against the U.S.S.R. in the event of war, which is what we have been talking about, isn't it?

Glass: I don't think so.

Leighton: Take a look at it later, because this would be a typical BNSP paper. It's sort of a bible of the New Look.

Glass: A later one might have it, this is an early one. There were national security objectives listed, I'd like to see a later paper.

Leighton: If anything, they backed away from that concept, not into it, in subsequent papers. This is the most militant of the BNSP papers. The 1955 one was soft-line.

Goldberg: They backed away in practice, but it took them time to get it out of the document.

Glass: We're talking two separate tracks. The budget program did not reflect the rollback policy. The forces it financed were much too small to achieve that goal, so the policy was inconsistent with the means. Rolling back is in some of Dulles's speeches. So obviously, there was something in the basic national security policy paper.

Goldberg: That goes back to the campaign of 1952.
**Leighton:** Dulles never thereafter claimed anything like a rollback policy, in fact he tried to soft pedal it.

**Glass:** I recall that that paragraph was dropped. It was a solid paragraph having to do with that particular problem. After the Hungarian uprising, following the East German business, it became clear to everybody that if we didn’t take advantage of the Hungarian uprising we had better clean it out of the policy paper, so that the military couldn’t use it as a reason for asking for larger forces.

**Goldberg:** My recollection is that things were said after the campaign, perhaps not publicly after the East German uprising, but they were in the first six months of the Eisenhower administration.

**Leighton:** In the solarium exercise, 1953, they chose three task forces and three committees and gave the green light to the middle one, a moderate type of policy. It was containment.

**Glass:** The major weapon decisions: The carrier was a high cost item and went all the way up to the President for decision. The ABM, Nike Zeus, was big money. Oddly enough, Eisenhower did not resolve that conflict, he left it to the Pentagon. The atomic cannon was in and out. It became clear it could not be maneuvered on European roads.

**Leighton:** Was there a battle over the development of that weapon? The Army went ahead and did it, didn’t they?

**Glass:** They did, and nobody objected to it. The irony is that Truman kicked off the tactical nuclear weapon program and Eisenhower went ahead with it and was a big supporter. That had to do with the general war and
limited war concept. Limited war would be conventional only. A general
war would involve nuclear weapons across the board, Army, Navy, and Air
Force, and we did build a lot of tactical nuclear weapons for Europe.
When McNamara came as I remember his expression, all accumulated during the
Eisenhower administration. The cannon; 8-inch rounds; demolition charges;
air weapons; missile weapons; Honest John and Corporal; large numbers of
nuclear warheads physically in Europe. The total inventory was a huge
number. These decisions were really guided by Eisenhower, to get into
tactical nuclear weapons. This is crucial, again, to the cost of defense--
substituting nuclear weapons for conventional forces.

Leighton: Do you include ICBM in the decision?
Glass: That was hardly a substitute for tactical conventional weapons.
One interesting thing on the major weapons systems was that Eisenhower
didn't have to confront the cut-off of the B-52, the end of the bomber
era. The switch from the B-47 to the B-52 was really an Air Force
decision. It became clear that the B-52 was far superior, and Wilson
went along with that decision.
Goldberg: The only issue there was the rate of production.
Glass: On the fighters, the Navy was way behind on jet fighters. In the
Korean War, they had no jet fighters on the carriers. They were out of
the game, it was an Air Force show. The Air Force had just introduced
the jet fighters. It was the North American fighter that really made the
difference.
Goldberg: The Air Force used P-51s initially in Korea, also.

Glass: We went in there with the Lockheed F-80 jet fighter. That was a big disappointment. But the North American P-86 F came in soon after and saved the day with regard to air-to-air combat. A big effort had to be made during the Eisenhower administration to get the Navy up to speed so that they would convert to jet powered aircraft and bring themselves abreast of the Air Force. So there was sympathy with the Navy in building up its air power.

Goldberg: The Navy had been working on jet bombers for the carriers before this. In their effort to compete with the Air Force they tried to go the jet bomber route and neglected the fighters.

Leighton: I want to ask you about the decision for concurrent development of two ICBMs during late 1955 and during 1956.

Glass: This goes back to the roles and missions problem, to history where the Air Force picked up its group of Germans and dumped them out at Wright field, and the Army had its German gang, and you had two teams of people working on the same problem.

Leighton: The Air Force didn't have any Germans, did they?

Glass: Missile people, sure.

Goldberg: The Air Force got more Germans than the Army did.

Glass: The others were more prominent. I remember that in Dayton, Ohio, they kept them in a place on the back roads there, in the years immediately following World War II. The Air Force mission to round up these people was "Operation Paper Clip" and the Army had its Von Braun group. The Air
Force had Dornberger. It's imbedded in the history of missile development. Is the missile an Air Force weapon, or an extension of artillery, as the Army argued? At the beginning they went both ways, to see who could come out with something useful.

**Leighton:** Why was it that the Army was the only service to develop ballistic missiles? The Redstone Arsenal was the only ballistic missile arsenal in the country.

**Glass:** Early on, because there was still a big argument within the Air Force. Even when I was in the Air staff there were the "bomber people." It was like the battleship people in the Navy versus the carriers. The pilots were very skeptical about the missiles. The flying personnel really had their hearts in the bombers. Nobody was pushing the missile program too fast. In 1951-53 the Air Force had to be pushed to advance the Atlas.

**Leighton:** Wasn't Trevor Gardner the one who really got that started in the Air Force?

**Glass:** That's right. He was an assistant secretary of the Air Force. He worked on Wilson, and sold him on ICBMs.

**Goldberg:** That's why he got tossed out on his ear eventually.

**Glass:** By the Air Force, yes. But he sold Wilson on it and Wilson put his shoulder to the thing and it began to move.

**Goldberg:** The real push from the Air Force came after the Von Neumann Committee demonstrated that there was a good chance of getting lighter weight warheads, and the Air Force decided it was worth doing. Up to
that time they thought that warheads were going to be so big and the
missiles would have to be so big that it wouldn't work. This may have
also been the reason why the Russians wound up with so much larger mis-
siles and so much larger carrying capacity and capacity for weight throw-
ing than ours had. We waited until we got the light warheads and the
Russians went ahead and developed the big missiles in expectation of
carrying heavy weights. Beginning in 1954 the Air Force really began to
push, and the other thing that impelled them was the recognition that the
Army was making progress and represented a real threat.

**Watson:** Why was that committee called the "Teapot Committee?"

**Goldberg:** The real name was the Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee,
SMEC; I'm not sure why it was called the Teapot, but I'll find out for
you.

**Leighton:** Was that decision important, concurrent development of two
missiles—one by the Army and one by the Air Force?

**Glass:** I don't see any other decision that could logically be made. So
little was known about these weapons systems that any prudent person
would not depend on only one approach in the early stages.

**Leighton:** Is that why Eisenhower bought the decision?

**Glass:** I don't recall him making any big fuss about it.

**Leighton:** Wilson persuaded him against his better judgment.

**Goldberg:** Was he skeptical about two, or about either one?

**Leighton:** About two.
Glass: You are arguing Thor and Jupiter, or the Atlas? The Thor/Jupiter was really a two-service proposition. It wasn't very clear as to which service should have it.

Watson: Actually it was a three-service decision, because the Air Force would do one and the Army-Navy would do the other jointly. Then the Army-Navy one split.

Goldberg: And you got Polaris.

Glass: The Navy never really was serious about putting a liquid fueled missile like Jupiter in a submarine. They dragged their feet and did nothing. It turned out they were right. They were horrified at the idea.

Goldberg: The Air Force would have liked them to have put it on an aircraft carrier.

Glass: That idea was kicked around for a long time. The Navy had the Regulus and a follow-on that got dropped along the way. But it was a reasonable decision to go with, especially when they hadn’t yet decided who should have the limited range missile. The Russians were already coming up with their SS-4 and SS-5. There was some reason to move ahead on it.

I think we tend to overlook the fact that Wilson came in during the period of great revolution in weaponry, namely, the emergence of the missiles. He handled it calmly. There was enormous pressure to move fast with these systems. He appointed a “missile czar.”

Watson: Except that he was careful to say he was not a czar.
Glass: That's what we called him. He was to coordinate the missile efforts, because there was tremendous competition in the air defense missiles between the Army and the Air Force, each with their own system.

Goldberg: It began before this.

Glass: But the Air Force did not want to waste money on the missiles. They wanted bombers. Wilson presided during that time when missiles began to emerge as the future weapons. When was the Killian committee appointed? The Killian report is worth reading. You will see how well they grasped what was ahead. I told McNamara to read that report when he first came aboard. Wilson held the missile developments under control.

Hoffman: Wilson was the one who made the decision to concur in parallel development. Eisenhower didn't want to do it but deferred to Wilson.

Glass: Eisenhower also deferred to others from time to time, like Tommy White, Air Force Chief of Staff. There was much merit at that time in parallel development for ballistic missiles because no one knew much about the business.

Hoffman: That decision could rank as one of the three or four most important defense decisions made in the entire Eisenhower Administration.

Glass: Why is that?

Hoffman: To go ahead and develop simultaneously two missiles. Jupiter and Thor and Atlas and Titan, two IRBMs and two ICBMs.

Glass: Atlas and Titan were both Air Force. That's not parallel. The Atlas was the Model T of the ICBM.
was above ground.

Leighton: At the time they were regarded as twins; the Titan was an alternative in case the Atlas fell on its face.

Glass: The Titan was much more advanced, especially the Titan II. It was not cryogenic any more, but had storable fuel. Basing it in the ground was a big advance over the Atlas. McNamara got rid of the Atlas as soon as he could. It was the first interim ICBM weapon system.

Goldberg: They never went too far with the Titan. They developed it, produced some, but skipped to the Minuteman.

Glass: That's the way technology was moving. The biggest problem with regard to duplication was the Hercules air defense system versus the Air Force Talos system. That was strictly duplication, service competition, and tripped up McElroy. The Hercules had already proved itself and another air defense missile system was simply not needed. The strategic missile problem was quite different. The Army's Jupiter was coming along but was not ready for deployment. The AF Atlas program was also coming along but not ready for deployment. The U.S.S.R. was already deploying their IRBMs--SS-4 and SS-5. The Republican administration was under great pressure to get some kind of a ballistic missile system deployed within range of the U.S.S.R. Hence an offshoot of the Atlas system, which was to be deployed in the U.K. So we had two horses in the race, with the hope that at least one of them would prove out. Both were deployed-- in the U.K.
Goldberg: What do you think was the impact of interservice competition during the Eisenhower period on policies, plans, operations, etc? How much of a problem was it for your office, and OSD?

Glass: It certainly created a demand for more weapon systems and more forces, to the extent that each service felt it was within the scope of its mission. The air defense issue was the big one, until it settled down. That culminated in an NSC paper, in a special study, where the NSC directed the Defense Department to come up with an overall air defense plan encompassing Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Navy had a role here, you remember, the sea extensions of the radar lines. We worked that one in our office, with the services, for the first time piecing together what we considered to be the air defense of the continental United States. This was before NORAD.

Goldberg: What was the competitive aspect here?

Glass: Each service would push its own programs, and we began to see all the overlapping and the necessity to eliminate some of it. That might have been a reason for undertaking the study in the first place. But I think the overriding reason was to get some idea of the cost of this air defense system which had an enormous scope. We had the Dew Line, the northernmost, the mid-Canadian line, and the one on the Canadian-U.S. border, together with the sea-based and airborne extensions on our flanks. Then we had all the various weapon systems—aircraft, missiles, antiaircraft guns, etc. This certainly exposed the competitions with the overlapping weapons systems and the need to make some decisions as to what to get rid of.
Goldberg: Was the Comptroller's office brought into discussions of these interservice competitions and the problems they occasioned?

Glass: The budget examiners jumped on any excuse to cut the budget and if you could show duplication that would be one thing to jump on.

Goldberg: What about the roles and missions aspect here? Did you get involved in that?

Glass: McNeil did, working with the missile coordinator, but our office did not. That was a political thing. I think Wilson personally did a lot of that himself. He was credited by the Chiefs as being an asset in helping them to arrive at an arrangement on roles and missions. Wasn't there a meeting in Puerto Rico that he attended?

Goldberg: At Ramey Air Force Base.

Glass: That was one of Wilson's accomplishments, to help to moderate and to mediate among the services. As I recall, they came up with something useful.

Goldberg: It didn't make them all happy.

Glass: That never could be. But he certainly met with them and settled some of the outstanding problems so they could get on with the business.

Goldberg: Now for some of the international problems that arose during the Eisenhower period, and the role that the Comptroller's office may have played. In reference to NATO, for example--to what extent were you and the Comptroller's office involved with problems and issues involving the alliance?

Glass: NATO is a big chunk of the forces and the costs. To reduce our NATO costs was always an objective of the Comptroller. One of the aspects
was the Deutschmark support business, which McNeil personally carried through. I think it amounted to $2.5 billion, into the U.S. treasury, or a reduction in our expenditures for the troops abroad. There was a constant effort to see how we could reduce the NATO costs.

**Goldberg:** What about other alliances, SEATO and others?

**Glass:** To the extent that they were in the budget, we were involved. Reuben Robertson had another project, which was to cost-out the forces that were needed to support these alliances—NATO, Far East, Middle East, etc. We found there the great difficulty was in allocating common or joint costs. The cost of maintaining the forces of NATO depends on what assumptions you make. If we didn’t maintain them, would we have as big an Army, Navy, or Air Force; cut tactical air wings? Of the common cost, how much was allocated to the support base, training? This was what Robertson tried to push through, with the Comptroller being the middle man with the services. The data came from the services, and it was a matter of working with each of the services and picking up piece by piece and deciding, for example, what was part of continental air defense and should be charged to that, and what was chargeable to NATO, etc.

**Goldberg:** What was the Comptroller’s attitude toward the mutual security program?

**Glass:** To keep it’s cost to the minimum. McNeil was sent on the Van Fleet mission to Asia to hold Van Fleet down and keep control of the costs. Van Fleet was out there to encourage Asian countries to raise military forces. Max Lehrer went along as support to McNeil.
Goldberg: General Stilwell came in and asked for a copy of that report a few months ago, and I got it for him.

Glass: Col. Stilwell was the support man for Van Fleet. He and Max wrote the report, as a matter of fact. Van Fleet felt the more forces, the better, so he felt it was his mission to talk South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand into maintaining as large a force as they felt they could. He was the salesman. McNeil's job was to keep the cost in mind. They were going to take all the Koreans, the KATUSAS, and whatever they had and form them into 20 divisions. That's a big force. There was a long repercussion from that decision when they came back. The question was the TO&E for these divisions. The Army logistics people took the U.S. infantry TO&E and applied it to the twenty divisions. They came out with an enormous number of vehicles, laundry companies, printing companies, telephone exchanges, all kinds of things. They used the same TO&E of a U.S. division which has to be prepared to operate overseas away from its base of supply, and multiplied it by 20. We jumped on that right away. We couldn't get the Army to budge on that issue so we took the TO&E and red-lined items line by line, with McNeil's full support. We were coming down to 14 or 16 U.S. divisions ourselves. Then we presented this markup to the Army logistics people and said, "now calculate the equipment requirements based on this modified TO&E." They took a look and got the message and came up with requirements for specially designed TO&Es for the Korean divisions, at much lower costs. We got into that Korean force in great detail and moved on to the other countries.
involved, to try to contain the cost of these decisions. In the Van Fleet report you can see some of this emerging already. Stilwell was very understanding of the Comptroller point of view, he understood that money was a limiting factor.

Goldberg: To go on from the Korean War, did your office have anything to do with the Suez crisis in 1956 and the Quemoy-Matsu and Lebanon crises in 1958?

Glass: Only the additional costs. But we were always involved in defending the programs and policies of the Defense Department, whatever they were.

Goldberg: But you had no input to policy, as such?

Glass: No. One of the key decisions which we had nothing to do with, in connection with Quemoy, was the deployment of the naval forces, to put the carriers behind Formosa. Not between China and Formosa, as was one of the proposals. McElroy carried the ball on that. He was Secretary and he was out front on it. Then there was the crucial problem of the inability of the locals to unload the boats of supplies and ammunition fast enough, keeping in mind they were under artillery fire from the mainland. Although the policy was not to involve U.S. troops in this crisis, they made an exception by landing Marine Corps Beachmasters, which solved the problem. So we had U.S. Marines on shore there in the middle of everything. It looked pretty grim for a while, but then it subsided into an exchange of artillery fire, no invasion. Talk about competition on roles and missions--Lebanon really needed nothing more than the Marines, because
they landed unopposed right across the beach at Beirut, in the midst of
the bathers on the beach. The population was not greatly stirred up by
this landing, nothing like the present situation, although the father of
the current Druze chief was the major troublemaker at that time. He
precipitated the problem in the Eisenhower period, but Eisenhower took
charge of that one and moved decisively. However, the Army and the Air
Force insisted on being included in this venture, and they were.

Goldberg: Let's move on to the McNamara period and your role in the
Comptroller's office and The Special Assistant to the Secretary there-
after--specifically your roles and functions.

Glass: At the beginning it was different from later on. Either McNamara
asked for me or Gates offered my services to McNamara and Gilpatric during
the transition period, before they actually took office. About December 20
I ran into McNamara when he came into the Secretary's office to talk with
Gates. I had been at Wright Field in 1945 when he was there. I think he
pretended that he recognized me. I introduced myself and he said he was
glad to see me. This was McNamara at his most charming. He was new and
glad to see anybody that looked familiar. I was assigned to him to help
him and Gilpatric get into the business fast. One of the first questions
he asked me was, "How do we get a handle on the budget?" He and Gilpatric
were always together. The three of us would meet around a table, like
this. We began to explore how they would tackle the budget revision,
because as a result of the Kennedy campaign the public and Congress expected
some major changes in the last Eisenhower budget.
Leighton: Did they inherit a ready-made budget, the way Eisenhower did?

Glass: Yes, and the first order of business was to amend the Eisenhower budget, because Congress had to act on it during the next several months. The outgoing Comptroller, Lincoln, prepared a statement for the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and put it into the record. I think Gates did not want to put one in, but he and Douglas did want to make the transition smooth and be as cooperative as possible. I suggested to McNamara that he ask the Chiefs what changes they thought ought to be made, since Kennedy had great confidence in the military view of the Eisenhower budget as being totally inadequate. So we asked Col. Ed Black, the Military Assistant to Douglas, to go up and orally ask the Chiefs, and I warned McNamara that everything Gates and Douglas threw out the Chiefs would want to put back in. Black talked to each of the Chiefs, and they came with their suggestions in writing to McNamara. McNamara said later I was right, that they were listing everything that Gates and Douglas had thrown out. But the problem remained, how to amend the budget. I suggested we look at some of the increases the Congress wanted. For example, the House Appropriations Committee and the Congress had been pressing the Defense Department to up the rate of production of the Polaris from five a year to seven. McNamara wanted to know the rationale for doing this, that the Congress favored it was not enough. So I said if we knew what the Soviet forces would look like over the next several years, we could match ours against theirs. McNamara said why can't we project Soviet forces some years into the future and build our forces to contend
with that estimate. I said we would have to make some guesses based on the NIEs. He said, "Why couldn't we work within a range of estimates, maximum and minimum?" We kicked around several ideas, but he wanted the staff to make a projection of the opposing forces and develop a program to contend with those forces, projected well out into the future. The next question was how to go about it. I suggested that three task forces be appointed to prepare these studies—Charlie Hitch and the Rand crowd on the strategic forces, because they had done a lot of work in that field.

Goldberg: At what point was this, in January 1961?

Glass: Before he took office. He wanted to make maximum use of the time before he took office so he could get off to a running start. He had other problems. This part of it would take some weeks for the task forces to work up. Nitze had done much work on the conventional, non-strategic forces, which we then called "limited war forces," and he was to be the Assistant Secretary of ISA, so he was the logical man to head up that task force. Herb York, head of R&D, would head up the task force for R&D. Later, Tom Morris was appointed to head a task force on logistics.

I said I would go back to my office and prepare the statement of work for each of these three committees. McNamara said, "Let's do it right now."

I was stunned, for I could not think that fast. He called in a secretary, and Gilpatric, McNamara, and I dictated the statements of work. It was unnerving to work at that speed. I took the copies, polished them up, McNamara and Gilpatric worked them over, and the statements were sent
out the next day. That started the ball rolling on the revision of the Eisenhower budget. Enthoven was transferred over to Hitch, and with some others undertook to make a study of the strategic forces, offensive and defensive. Nitze organized his own group. Within a matter of weeks they came up with their conclusions and recommendations. These studies formed the basis for Kennedy's first defense message to the Congress in March. These studies turned out better than I thought they would, they came up with specific recommendations, item by item, together with a rationale for each recommendation, most good, some bad. But the whole approach was a good demonstration of McNamara's ability to get at the guts of the problem and his logical cast of mind.