

This is part IV of an oral history interview with Mr. Henry Glass, held in the Pentagon on November 4, 1987, at 11:00 a.m. Representing the OSD Historical Office are Drs. Alfred Goldberg, Lawrence Kaplan, Robert Watson, and Maurice Matloff.

Matloff: At our last session we focused on your service as Economic Adviser to the Comptroller in 1961-65, and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the McNamara era in 1965-68. We'd like to conclude this part of the discussion this morning and then move on to your later service in OSD and Rand.

What was the dominant attitude in OSD during the McNamara era toward the Soviet threat? Did it differ in any marked way from earlier eras in Defense? Did you agree with the dominant attitude?

Glass: Actually, as I pointed out in an earlier session, McNamara and Gilpatric finally came around to the view that there was no missile gap, and that was precisely the position of the Eisenhower administration. A lot of what Senator Kennedy said about defense in those last years of the Eisenhower administration was devoted to this missile gap business and our being the underdog, with other attacks coming from the Hill and certain newspaper columnists. What happened in the early days of the McNamara period here was that he dug into the intelligence data himself and reached his own conclusions.

Goldberg: What about the overall threat from the Soviet Union, as far as the United States and NATO were concerned?

Glass: At that stage, McNamara was new to this business and only knew what he heard, was told, and had read. He also knew what Kennedy thought.

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He was looking for the facts; he was very objective. The Kennedy administration did consider the Russians a grave threat to the safety of the United States. Kennedy ran on this issue.

Matloff: Did you or your colleagues in OSD consider Communism as a monolithic bloc?

Glass: At that point, yes. China and the Soviet Union were put in the same category. Later McNamara began to make a distinction. If you follow the posture statements, you will see that at some point we did not use the same terminology for China as for the Soviet Union. McNamara made the distinction between "Red" China and "Communist" Soviet Union, with the Soviet Union as less of a threat to us, in the sense of being more rational and predictable, than China, at that point. That language was deliberate. China was still the bad boy.

Goldberg: That was because of the Vietnam War.

Glass: That, and McNamara began to feel that we had to live with the Soviet Union. They could kill us; we could kill them. That had a bearing on his attitude toward the ABM and the whole policy of assured destruction. China was a nuisance, irrational and unpredictable, a people we couldn't do business with. But he began to feel that we could and must do business with the Soviet Union.

Matloff: Were you aware of any differences of views of the threat within OSD or between OSD and other governmental agencies, such as State, or the CIA?

Glass: I don't remember any big issues on the nature of the threat.

Talking in terms of the NIE, the CIA always exaggerated the threats from

both sides, the U.S.S.R. and China. Our own Defense intelligence people did the same thing. It seems that these intelligence people get a vested interest in their subject matter and tend to overstate. When I worked for Adm. Moorer, who was then Chairman of the JCS, I felt I had better dig into the estimates, get behind the figures, and talk to the people that did the original estimates before they were edited and went up the line. McNamara tried to maintain a very objective view of the threat.

Matloff: To go on to strategic planning, you have touched somewhat on the first strike notion, the ABM system, and civil defense; let's turn to the question of the change in the McNamara administration from massive retaliation to flexible response. Was this, in your view, a radical change from previous administration and Defense policy?

Glass: At the beginning, yes. That is why in the first year or so they gave so much attention and funds to the general purpose forces, to raise the threshold at which nuclear weapons, especially strategic nuclear weapons, would come into play. He ended up with assured destruction, and only assured destruction. That became the end-all of the whole thing. That ties in with the need for dealing with the Soviet Union. There was no alternative, as he saw it. They could wipe us out; we could wipe them out. It seemed to him that there was a common interest in never letting loose with those forces.

Kaplan: Was, then, counterforce a halfway house between massive retaliation and assured destruction?

Glass: I'm sure this evolution is all spelled out in the strategic competition study. McNamara came in with a clean slate. He had no

preconceived views. His last military experience was in World War II, with bombing the Japanese with the B-29, his last major assignment. When he was in the automobile business, he didn't keep up with Defense issues. All he knew was what he had quickly read and what Kennedy's views were. He was impressed by Kennedy's book, Profiles in Courage. He wanted to assure himself that Kennedy wrote that himself. He had the impression that he did. Was it written by Sorenson?

Matloff: Sorenson and Jules Davids, too, apparently.

Glass: In any event, he tried to understand the view of the administration. When I drafted the first Kennedy Defense message, McNamara didn't want to see it until it came back from the White House. He told me to talk to Sorenson. He didn't yet feel in a position to have an independent opinion. Later on, he would be telling the President what he thought.

Matloff: Are you equating flexible response with assured destruction, saying it ended up as assured destruction?

Glass: No. Massive retaliation to flexible response to assured destruction, at least as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. At the very beginning General Hickey, Bill Kaufmann, and Noel Parrish were all involved in the counterforce matter. You have to go back before McNamara, to the Air Force, which tried to develop a new concept of a future major war. They had a very distinct view of how the next world war would be fought with atomic weapons. McNamara had an open mind, and was not against the concept of counterforce, per se. He was interested in counterforce. The stumbling block was the lack of sufficient accuracy to give us a good

counterforce weapon. McNamara was neither a theoretician nor an ideologue, but a technocrat, a manager. He wanted to examine all the facts and then decide what course to follow. That worked for a while until he began to realize that he worked in an adversarial relationship with the Congress, and that his job was to present the administration's case. McNamara went over the Defense Department proposed recommendations to the President, a boiled-down version of the task force reports, and decided what he was willing to recommend to the President and what he was not. These task force report recommendations were circulated to the staff and around the Pentagon. He went over these reports very critically and decided for himself. He was interested in keeping the increased cost to a minimum, always with the assumption that we could afford to pay for whatever defense we needed. In his approach we needed to decide how much and what kind of defense we needed, and then try to acquire it at the lowest possible cost.

Kaplan: Did he ever accept counterforce as a doctrine in any specific way? When, in interviews, he was asked whether the critical Athens meeting in NATO in 1962 was an expression of counterforce, he denied it. He didn't see it that way.

Glass: He never precluded counterforce as an element in our strategic forces. In the first year we had a problem with "first use" in Europe. The issue of counterforce got confused with something Sorenson said about never striking first. Symington was on the other side at the time. This is the very same problem we have now, that without the willingness to use

tactical nuclear weapons first, the NATO forces stand the risk of being defeated. The same issue has threaded through the entire history of the nuclear age, for the same reasons. We had to prove, by culling through everything that McNamara and Gilpatric said, that we never precluded the first use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, which means that would be the principle anywhere else also. With regard to the strategic forces, once the Soviets began to put their missiles in hardened silos, it was a matter of technology. He never precluded strategic counterforce in a second-strike as part of the damage limiting effort. Very early on he showed some interest in a first-strike counterforce strategy--the Hickey report. But he dropped that pretty quickly with regard to the strategic nuclear forces. It never got into his recommendations to Pres. Kennedy in 1961.

Goldberg: At the same time, he never adopted it.

Glass: He began to vacillate. Look at the stellar inertial guidance for Poseidon. That was in and out of the program as he vacillated back and forth. The only purpose of putting in stellar inertial guidance in the Poseidon missile was to get sufficient accuracy to knock out a hardened silo. We should be clear on that. I made the assumption that you are talking about counterforce against hardened silos, not against soft targets of any kind. Damage limiting had two key elements to it. One was counterforce and the other was defensive forces. Counterforce offense knocked the other side's remaining systems out, whether hard or soft, so I don't know how McNamara could say he never favored counterforce. It

was part of the damage limiting concept. One way of limiting damage to the United States is to knock out any remaining forces of the opponent, thus eliminating or reducing any follow-up attacks, while trying with defensive forces to intercept and destroy the attack already launched. This is all laid out very clearly in the posture statements. McNamara felt it his duty to explain to the committee the logic behind everything he was recommending. Having established that, then, he would say what forces we needed.

Goldberg: The catch phrase in the early years was "flexible response" as an overall approach, is that correct?

Glass: The thing was evolving very quickly.

Matloff: We even pushed it on to NATO, where it was adopted officially in 1967.

Kaplan: Ann Arbor was considered the public expression of counterforce.

Glass: Towards the end of McNamara's time damage limiting got to be very unimportant, because he felt that there was no point in talking about fighting that kind of war, once the large number of weapons on each side became apparent. There was only one solution: never fighting a strategic nuclear war. How do you achieve that? Deterrence. How do you deter? By the ability to strike back even after absorbing an all-out enemy attack, a Soviet attack, and wiping it out as a 20th century nation, or words to that effect. You see this in all the posture statements.

Goldberg: What were your reactions to all this evolution of thinking on his part?

Glass: It didn't bother me. I had no particular arguments with these views.

Goldberg: Were you in general agreement?

Glass: Yes. I came from the Air Staff, and some of their ideas were quite different. Their three priorities were: to destroy Soviet strategic offensive forces; to destroy Soviet war production, and to support NATO. Having been exposed to that and to Gen. Whisenand's idea of preemptive war, I was pretty open minded, when I came down here, to a more reasonable approach to the problem. I didn't find McNamara's thinking out of line at all.

Goldberg: Did you support flexible response, assured destruction, and damage limiting war, while they were fashionable?

Glass: I felt that he had made an error in the way he expressed himself, because assured destruction was measured by the ability to kill at least 20 percent of the Soviet population--it's hard for people to swallow that sort of a concept--and destroy 75 percent of their industrial production. That was called the knee of the curve, where you begin to get into diminishing returns for the number of weapons you strike with. The Rand crowd that came into the Pentagon with McNamara had a big influence on the way things were expressed. But it was McNamara, himself, who wanted to quantify everything, including assured destruction. There was a much more sophisticated level of thinking, not only in concepts but also in structuring the forces to fit those concepts, than had ever been done before; even in the Air Force. They tried to relate the size of forces to the

strategy and the strategy to the national objectives. Although I used to argue with Enthoven on whether the national objectives were the genesis of everything else, he preferred to reason around in a circle. I thought that the starting point should be our national security objectives, to decide what objectives we should strive for in the world, and then adopt a strategy that would help us attain those objectives, and design the forces needed to support that strategy.

Matloff: You mentioned some of the Rand theorists that came into Defense. Who or what most influenced the development of strategic thinking? Was it the Rand theorists that came here, those who stayed outside like Wohlstetter, or other influences?

Glass: The reason I suggested that Hitch head up the strategic forces task force was precisely because he came from Rand. He was the highest ranking official that came from Rand. I knew that Rand had been working on this problem from the time it was first set up. It probably had thought more about it than any other group. Its members were far more sophisticated thinkers about strategic nuclear war than the people in the Pentagon or any other group, like IDA or WSEG, when they were under the JCS. The Joint Chiefs censored what WSEG came up with, which was unfortunate. WSEG was pretty sophisticated, because it drew on the university people.

Goldberg: Who, in addition to Hitch, was influential?

Glass: Hitch brought in the other people. He picked up Enthoven from DDR&E, people from the outside, and from around the Defense Department.

Goldberg: Do you remember Marvin Stern?

Glass: I thought he was in DDR&E.

Goldberg: Yes, but he was involved.

Glass: If you look at the members of the task forces, you will see who was involved. That was another characteristic of McNamara. He kept an open door to outside people and views. I would get all kinds of articles and letters to him from university people. He would tell me to look at them with a view towards incorporating some of the ideas into his statements somewhere along the line.

Matloff: Were there any in Rand or elsewhere in the think tanks among the strategic theorists who particularly impressed McNamara?

Glass: Wohlstetter did. Hitch was not a great strategic thinker. He happened to be the senior official from Rand here. That is why he was picked to head the Strategic Forces Task Force, on the assumption that he could then select the people who would make the greatest contribution--which he did.

Matloff: You mentioned Enthoven before. What was the role of Systems Analysis in strategy making during the McNamara period?

Glass: The Enthoven crew fitted in with McNamara because McNamara has a rational mind and liked to deal with numbers. He always wanted a reason for what he did and numbers to back up his position. The present administration does not worry about working out a detailed rationale, such as you find in the McNamara posture statements. Those statements are a reflection of the thinking of the whole organization, with McNamara having the last word on what went in there. The Systems Analysis people were able

to quantify and put numbers to things. That is what McNamara liked. That was his problem with the Vietnam War, trying to reduce it to numbers. Everything was calculated in his approach. Assured destruction really came into its own in 1962-63, when instead of offensive-defensive in general nuclear war they latched onto this new concept of assured destruction-damage limiting--the two sides of the same coin. The two were, of course, interrelated. We have the same problem with the Russians now, with the strategic defense initiative.

Goldberg: Systems Analysis exercised a very strong influence on McNamara throughout.

Glass: That's right. Given the strategy, they could quantify the forces, and the whole cost projected several years into the future.

Matloff: What happened to the role of the JCS and strategy making during this period?

Glass: The JCS faded out in the early years. They were out of the game. I mentioned that I urged the assistant to the Chairman of the JCS to shift the JSOP format to the program format in order to communicate with McNamara. There was a lot of boilerplate that they loved to run in. McNamara once told me that he had to go through a hundred pages before he got to anything that was useful. Even on an ordinary memo, they would have a page or two of references. McNamara resented wasting time wading through the boilerplate. That built up a lot of resentment in the JCS and among other military people, including the unified commanders in the field, toward the Enthoven group and everyone connected with it.

Matloff: What was the McNamara role in strategy making during the Vietnam War?

Glass: Around July 4, in 1965, the decision was made to go in with division forces. At that point we either had to get out or get in all the way. The South Vietnam army was being destroyed unit by unit as it tried to defend all of the cities and towns. I personally thought we would get out, and I had begun to prepare the way for that course in the record. But the decision went the other way. At that stage, McNamara and company had the leading role. He called a meeting of all the top people in the Pentagon and revealed the plan to go in with division forces. The JCS had started on the force planning only a week or so earlier.

Goldberg: What was the role of the White House?

Glass: The decision was made across the river very secretly, and very few people in the Pentagon knew that such a large-scale intervention was even under consideration. I asked McNamara later how I could have missed it. He said that it was never discussed in the Pentagon. That was the significant point. The first thing Hitch and I knew of it was when it was announced at that meeting in early July. Once the decision was made, McNamara played the leading role. McNamara worked on the forces. We ran up one blind alley. The original thought was to call up reserve forces. Senator Russell objected. It needed action on the Hill, and Russell would not go along with it. That caused a replanning of the forces.

Matloff: Did McNamara object to the commitment in 1965?

Glass: As far as the record shows, only Ball objected. McNamara went along with it, but it's no secret that he regretted it later.

Kaplan: In the interviews with Enthoven, he was asked if systems analysis was applied to the Vietnam War, and he said it was not and dropped the subject.

Glass: They tried, but that was a big problem. They couldn't quantify the Vietnam war effort in the way they had a potential strategic nuclear war, or even a war in NATO Europe. McNamara struggled with that problem all the way through, but it just didn't lend itself to that kind of quantification. Enthoven had a special Vietnam group in his office, under Vic Heyman. Odeen was in that group. He even had a separate intelligence office in that Vietnam group, which was to work on Vietnam-related problems across the board. The major programs which dictated how Enthoven's office was organized didn't fit into the Vietnam situation.

Kaplan: When was that set up?

Glass: The Vietnam group? In 1965-66. McNamara looked to that office first, to design the managing structure. Russ Murray, Enthoven's deputy, was in at the very early stages, as I was, when we tried to get this thing underway, as the services, OSD, and the whole government geared up for this operation. Russ Murray headed the Systems Analysis effort, and then they got the job of following through.

Goldberg: Who was pushing for our entrance into Vietnam, in Defense?

Glass: Ellsberg, who was in ISA, was the hottest of them all. I had an argument with him about a McNamara statement before we got into the war with division forces. He thought that it should be beefed up, that it was totally inadequate. He was the Vietnam man at that time in ISA, in the policy area.

Goldberg: Who else? How about in the Joint Chiefs?

Glass: When it comes to crises, the Joint Chiefs become very neutral and let the civilians take the lead. This is what happened that time. The Joint Staff report prepared around the 4th of July, when Wheeler was the Chairman, put together the first strategy. Johnson made a general statement on television, but that was a White House product with inputs from here. The actual planning for forces and the whole operation was done in the Pentagon. There were at least three successive plans for the first increment for Vietnam.

Matloff: In Enthoven's book which he wrote with K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough, he states, "The Systems Analysis Office did not have a prominent, much less a crucial, role in the Vietnam War. . . In Vietnam, no one insisted on systematic efforts to understand, analyze, or interpret the war." How do you account for the fact that "this most complex of wars never got serious and systematic analysis"? This is a statement by Enthoven and Smith.

Glass: That's nonsense. McNamara felt that way, too, but Enthoven and company were supposed to do that job and no one stopped them from doing it.

Matloff: They say that the problem with the conduct of the war from Washington was not over-management, but under-management.

Glass: But they were in the middle of that management problem, where else would it be done? That's nonsense. To the extent that the problem was amenable to quantification, it was done. Look at the detail of the reports that were prepared during that war. Ammunition was covered by

line item--the complete flow from production to consumption--inventories worldwide, in Vietnam and en route. In Korea we lost track of the whole ammunition chain. It was the most closely managed military effort that I know of. The planning and execution of the logistics effort, in the broadest sense, was far superior to that of the Korean War effort. But we were fighting a defensive war, leaving the initiative to the enemy.

Matloff: Was there any disillusionment with Systems Analysis on the part of McNamara or yourself as a result of this experience?

Glass: Enthoven and company enjoyed the intellectual aspects of the theoretical planning on paper, but when the blood started to flow, Enthoven was appalled. At lunch one time he asked me, "How many people do you expect that we will lose a week?" I said, "Having worked with the services through all of this, we ought to figure about a hundred fatalities a week." He said, "That's 5,000 deaths a year." I told him we lost that number per year by accidents in peacetime in the military, especially by automobile accidents.

Goldberg: That's an exaggeration; it's about 2,000-2,500 a year now. It may have been a bit higher then, from all causes.

Glass: I seem to remember a figure of 5,000 per year in the early 1960s. The point is that 5,000 fatalities a year is not out of line with the three division force, totaling 150,000 plus other support. That didn't bother McNamara at the beginning, because he had a job to do and was doing it. Brown came up with little explosive gadgets that would blow off a foot or a hand. There was a job to be done and most people addressed themselves to it. Brown was in R&D, and his job was to come up with

useful hardware, such as listening devices, and putting guns on the C-47s. There was a lot of work being done to develop special equipment, techniques, strategy, and so on. Enthoven's group was the center for the statistical effort--in Heyman's office. They were never precluded from getting into the business in greater detail. If they did not, it was their own fault. Nobody was debarred from making a contribution to this effort.

Matloff: Was Vietnam, in your view, a valid test for systems analysis? Or did it only work before war began?

Glass: As is usually the case, with all the war planning, nobody planned for this kind of war. Nobody had thought about this kind of war before the decision was made in July 1965 to jump in with division forces. We searched for what we might learn from precedents, but there was nothing in all of Enthoven's work that dealt with this kind of war on this scale. We did deal with the Green Berets and counterinsurgency. That came in before 1965.

Goldberg: This is the story of all of our wars, to date.

Glass: That's true. The war that we get into is never the war that we plan for. Even in contingency planning, nobody had ever conceived of this scale of operation in Vietnam, so everything had to be improvised from the very beginning. That might have disoriented Enthoven. He was away in the first weeks, and Russ Murray undertook the work. McNamara gave them a large part of the task of detailing out, in numbers, what was needed. When Murray came in with table formats, McNamara did not like them. He sat down, did them himself, and sent Murray back to complete the detail.

McNamara was the leader on this effort, and I picked up from him, sending out the memos to the services of what work was needed.

Matloff: Did McNamara begin to study counterinsurgency while this was going on, or did he stay only with the numbers part of things?

Glass: McNamara had to go before the committees once a year and had to have a statement on the policy and strategy part of it, so he couldn't avoid that.

Matloff: Did anyone in particular influence him in the matter of counterinsurgency? Where was he drawing his thinking from?

Glass: Taylor was around, as one source. Kennedy, himself, was attracted to the idea. There was much argument between Gen. Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army, and other members of the JCS. Johnson was opposed to the Green Berets and to counterinsurgency forces generally, arguing that the Vietnam War would have to be fought with conventional forces.

Kaplan: What about Taylor's report in 1961 when he went out to Vietnam with Rostow?

Glass: That was the beginning of our involvement there, just helping the locals to defend themselves. In July 1965, it was a different animal.

Then, it was a real war there with division forces. Prior to that, we were getting sucked in little by little. When Kennedy died, we already had some 20,000 military people there. When Eisenhower left office, there were less than 1,000 U.S. military in all of Indochina. The Rostow-Taylor report started up the whole chain of events.

Matloff: What was your attitude toward American involvement in Indochina?

Glass: My reaction in July 1965 was, "I hope they know what they are doing." I thought we would get out. In the printed record in the spring of 1965, in the House Appropriations Committee hearings, something was put in there laying the groundwork for our reasons for getting out, and stating that there were limitations on what the U.S. could do for Vietnam.

Matloff: The Gulf of Tonkin incident or incidents, depending on your interpretation, in August 1964 and the congressional resolution that followed gave the rationale for getting in. What were the OSD reactions at that point? Did you or your colleagues have any reaction?

Glass: It was clear that the nature of the attack was unclear. That's true of the Persian Gulf right now. It takes time, and the early information tends to be incorrect. There was a lot of confusion in the Pentagon as to what was really happening out there. As smart as McNamara was, he was at the mercy of incoming information. We had that problem with the Cuban missile crisis, also. It was still considered an incident, to which we had to react. We certainly did not know that it was going to lead up to a major effort. I think that the importance of those incidents is exaggerated. It produced the Fulbright Resolution, that we have the right to hit back if attacked. When July 1965 came along, there was an argument about whether we should rely on this resolution as the authority to go forward with the deployment of large forces to Vietnam, or whether we should go back to Congress and ask for a new resolution. I favored going back to the Congress, because it is always useful to have the Congress clearly on board if you can get them to come aboard. President Johnson decided that it was not necessary to get more authority to

move forward with this intervention. In retrospect, I believe they would have been better off getting a new resolution specifically providing authority for a large-scale intervention.

Matloff: Did you believe in the domino theory?

Glass: Yes, I did. As a matter of fact, Cambodia and Laos did go to the Communists. The people out there thought so, too. Eisenhower thought so. In his famous letter to Churchill he called French Indochina "the cork in the bottle" to all Southeast Asia. We picked that up and used that point in McNamara's statement explaining to Congress the need to intervene in Vietnam.

Matloff: On the call up of the reserves, what was McNamara's view?

Glass: The first problem was how large a force we needed to intervene in a firm way. We ended up with a three-division force. This probably was derived from that JCS study that was made in a hurry over the 4th of July weekend. A copy of this JCS paper should be in my files on Vietnam in 1965. I used that paper and the rationale and strategy as guidance in preparing McNamara's statement that unveiled that new plan to the congressional committees. The forces may have been derived from that paper. The JCS strategy was to occupy the coastal strip and the Saigon enclave, or most of the Delta. That area had most of everything that counted in South Vietnam--the railroad, the roads, the ports, the people, the industry. That was the original strategy, and if you read McNamara's statement, you will see that that was the strategy that we presented to the Congress. By September or October of 1965 the Ia Drang Valley battle occurred. It

was right up against the border of Laos and Vietnam. This was not in accord with our understanding of the strategy. I was so taken aback that I went to McNamara and asked if I had misunderstood the strategy. He said, "No, you understood it correctly. But I can't control the tactical war in Vietnam from here. We have to leave it to the commander in the field, Westmoreland." I talked later to Westmoreland, when he was Chief of Staff, Army, and he said, "We wanted to test our forces to see how they would do in combat." There were substantial losses but we came out the winner. We never could hold the territory in the hills. That's where that troublesome malaria was. It wasn't worth bothering with, except that the supply line of the Communists ran behind there, down through Laos.

To get back to the reserves, the original plan to get the additional forces was to call up some reserves. That meant some National Guard divisions and also reserve units of the other services. For example, the Marine Corps Division Air Wing was to be called up, and also units of the Air Force, to supplement the forces and reduce the requirement to create new forces from scratch. This is all in the files. I mentioned that somebody got in touch with Senator Russell, the key man on defense matters in the Senate. He was against it. It needed a joint resolution, an action by Congress. He thought that would be troublesome and that the reserves should be left out of it. But that's what the reserves were for, and it meant we had to turn around and build units from scratch, to replace those that we were sending over there. The Chief of Staff of the

Air Force, McConnell, said the air units were ready to go anyhow, and unless they were to be actually deployed, there was no point in calling them up. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Wally Green, said the same thing. So the whole idea of the reserve forces fell apart. So we had Vietnam I, Vietnam II, and Vietnam III, three plans in a row that were put through the whole organization until we got to the final configuration of the force. Then it was a matter of deploying existing units and replacing them with new people.

Matloff: Could you tell whether McNamara pressed this view about call-up of the reserves on the President?

Glass: Johnson had already agreed to it, in the first plan.

Matloff: What was the objection?

Glass: Russell's objection, which carried great weight with Johnson, goes back to the Berlin crisis, where we called up two Army National Guard divisions, one at Fort Lewis, one elsewhere, and Air Force units. There was an endless amount of dissatisfaction, griping, and complaints to Congress and from Congress to the Defense Department. He did not want to have to go through that again.

Matloff: But it was Johnson's decision to make, not Russell's.

Glass: It was Johnson's decision, but he consulted Russell, and to call up the reserve components in peacetime, the President either had to declare a National Emergency or get a joint resolution from the Congress.

Matloff: The usual explanation is that Johnson didn't want to upset the Great Society.

Glass: That had to do with asking for a supplemental appropriation in FY 1966, when it became clear that we were going to overspend the FY 1966 budget significantly.

Goldberg: They would have needed additional funds before that, if they were going to call up all the reserves.

Glass: Joe Hoover was the chief budget officer in OSD at the time. Joe and I went up to McNamara and told him that sooner or later people would notice that we were overspending the budget as we publish the monthly financial reports. McNamara said, "Why do we have to publish these monthly reports?" That surprised me, because that was unclassified information. I brought in to him the daily and monthly Treasury statements and told him we couldn't hide that information; the Treasury wasn't about to stop publishing those statements. At the end, we had to borrow money from the long lead time accounts to provide obligating authority for the short lead time accounts such as ammunition. This procedure is, to say the least, irregular, but the congressional committees let it go in view of the emergency. The minute you move to combat rates of consumption you need more ammunition, and you don't have nearly enough in inventory. This was especially the case with the 750-pound bomb, the key ordnance that the B-52s used in their sorties. We put in three new contractors to make the casings and reactivated the Army facilities to load the powder into them. We were expanding the forces and spending money right and left. We took ships out of mothballs. This might be considered unconstitutional, taking the money appropriated for one purpose and using it for

another. We sort of borrowed the money and replaced it when we came up with the 1967 supplemental. The President should have sent to the Congress a tax increase, like Truman did at the start of the Korean War. We urged McNamara to talk to Johnson about this and he did. The President said that if he did that, the Great Society programs, then before the Congress, would be eliminated because we couldn't afford them. As a result, we ended up with a large budget deficit, for that time, about \$25 billion, I forget what year.

Matloff: Did you sense a gradual disillusionment with the war by McNamara?

Glass: Definitely. He was affected by public opinion. His own children didn't like the war. He had a bad experience at Harvard, where his car was besieged. For the first time he realized that the cause was not popular. Public opinion turned by the third year. The lesson here is that if you can't settle the matter in two or three years, forget it; the public loses patience. This also happened in the Korean War. People like Fulbright and Symington turned around against the war effort, and support began to be lost. Later on, Russell sent a letter, I think, to McNamara, or during the hearings the question came up, that we should have called up the reserves. Whereupon I went to McNamara and said that it was my understanding that Russell had said no to the reserves. He said, "You're absolutely right. He changed his mind." It was unfair. The reservists were being paid to be available just for this sort of thing. Instead, the reserves and National Guards became a draft haven. The other men were scooped up, and it became a matter of economic and

educational class. It got to be more and more unpleasant. McNamara began to regret his original support of the intervention policy more and more. Vance early on was not for the venture. When I went in to talk to him and remarked that if McNamara had not increased the size of the forces we could never have moved them so quickly, he said, "I wish to God we had never increased the forces." He was privately opposed, but publicly he never let on.

Matloff: Did you become disillusioned with the war as it went on?

Glass: No. My feeling was that we simply did not fight this war properly. The Saturday before it was announced that McNamara was leaving this job, I went to talk to him. It was clear that McNamara was collapsing under the strain. His heart was no longer in it. He always said that we had to win the war in the South. He didn't like the idea of bombing Hanoi. He once told ASD/ISA McNaughton to figure out how many civilians we were killing by bombing the Doumer Bridge across the Red river in Hanoi. McNaughton came to me and asked how we could figure that out. I said that there was no way to figure it out. All we had were the reports of the foreign embassies about that. I told McNamara, "If you want to win this war, we've got to hurt them in the North, at home, and hurt them so much that they will be glad to sit down at the table and settle the issue." He listened but said nothing. He already knew that he was leaving.

Matloff: Your mention of McNaughton brings the Pentagon Papers to mind. Were you aware that these were being compiled? Can you shed any light on how the project came about and how it developed?

Glass: When I heard about that, I went to McNamara and told him that it was a big mistake, for three reasons: 1) inevitably, it's going to leak; 2) it brings in outside people who don't know anything about the events leading up to our intervention; and 3) it's too early to write a history, it's too close to the events. His response was, "It's not a history, I want to get all the relevant papers together before they get lost, so that historians in the future can write a history of the Vietnam War." He did not anticipate that the papers would leak.

Matloff: How about the appointment of Gelb to compile it? How did he come into the picture?

Glass: As the war continued, there were various people in OSD, even in Systems Analysis, who began to cast around for somebody to blame for it, like Westmoreland. I thought that it was terrible. To me, it was a simple matter. As long as he was there, you shouldn't stab him in the back. You want him to pay attention to his job there and not worry about what was going on in Washington. I told Heyman, for example, that I didn't want to hear any more remarks about getting rid of Westmoreland; that was the President's decision. I had no problem supporting the war once it had started. I thought that it was a mistake to go in, but that once you got into it, you had to follow through and do whatever was necessary to get the job done. In ISA there was a large group that began to oppose the war. Gelb was one of them, and Mort Halperin was another. Laird told me after he came in as Secretary that when he talked to Johnson during the transition, Johnson told him to get rid of Halperin, because

he was undercutting him in the Pentagon. Then Kissinger brought Halperin into the NSC staff; he was a former student of Kissinger's at Harvard.

As I mentioned earlier, Nitze and I agreed to let Warnke and his staff in ISA write the first chapter of the last Clifford statement. That's how far apart things had gone. The people in ISA were in the forefront opposing the Vietnam effort. There were also others in Systems Analysis. It was getting to be an unpleasant situation.

Matloff: Can you date that?

Glass: It was during Clifford's time, and even before, in some cases.

These things don't come about suddenly. More and more people begin to get disillusioned.

Matloff: Warnke came on as ISA director on August 1, 1967.

Glass: Did you interview Warnke?

Matloff: Yes.

Glass: McNamara could have done a much better job than Clifford in finishing off the administration. Clifford came in with the idea of pursuing the effort all-out. The President in consultation with Clifford and others decided that he [Clifford] and Taylor should go out and talk to all of our allies in the Pacific and convince them to raise their military contribution to pursue the war. He came back with nothing. He told me very frankly, "If they don't care, why should we?" From then on, he turned around. The Tet offensive was the key turning point of public support. If McNamara had been there, the outcome would have been different. After Tet people were frightened. The enemy invaded right into

Saigon. The message went out to Westmoreland, "How much more do you need?" It looked as if the half million people we then had there would not be enough. Westmoreland came back requesting a big increase. He told me later, when he became Chief of Staff of the Army, that he didn't expect to get that increase, that he would normally meet with McNamara and agree on what would be a reasonable number. But the ISA people seized on Westmoreland's request and told Clifford that a declaration of a mobilization would be needed, with all kinds of dire consequences, which would have been true if such a huge increase had been approved. I think the request was for about 200,000 more men. That also had a bearing on Clifford. The ISA people presented it in the worst possible light. As it turned out, Westmoreland settled for 25,000 more. You can verify the figures.

Matloff: In retrospect, what do you think went wrong in Vietnam? Was it a failure of military policy, national policy, or what?

Glass: Two things. One was not following the original JCS strategy, and just occupying the coastal strip and the Saigon enclave. That seemed to be a reasonable strategy and could have more readily been done. The second factor, as I said, was that we should have hurt them more in the north. I don't know how you win a war without hurting the enemy at home. The way they were hurting people in the south, we should have hurt them in the north. The Nixon administration did that when it laid on the carpet bombing with the B-52s of Hanoi and Haiphong. I saw the post-attack photographs and very few of those bombs fell outside the pattern. I was then working down in JCS.

Matloff: So you are focusing on the strategy, the way the war was fought.

Glass: That's right. You really can't fault McNamara on the management of the effort. Whatever could be managed, was managed in considerable detail—for example, the logistics effort and the medical effort. But the key to what would discourage the north and force it to come to the table was a matter of overall strategy, not of the management of the logistics effort. McNamara simply couldn't bring himself to spill blood. He kept talking about pulling back the bombing line. He was already eager to reduce the pace and scope of the war.

Matloff: To go to some of the other area problems, first to NATO. What was the attitude of McNamara toward the alliance? How permanent did he see the American military role in it?

Glass: He supported NATO all the way. He inaugurated the special meeting on nuclear weapons. He tried to bring the NATO partners fully into our business so they would feel that we were all together on this.

Goldberg: That was the purpose of the Athens meeting.

Glass: He fostered the Nuclear Planning Group. To educate them in nuclear warfare, was what he had in mind—disclosing to them a lot of information, I suspect, that we had never routinely disclosed to them before. He wanted them to understand the purposes of the policies that he was advocating on the Hill.

Matloff: Did you get any sense in that period that the threat to NATO had changed since its origins?

Glass: There were all kinds of scares along the way, but we never responded the way we did to the Berlin crisis in 1961. After that, they were handled more calmly, until the Czechoslovakian invasion.

Kaplan: Weren't there some critical problems with the allies over the handling of the Berlin crisis?

Glass: There were critical problems with the U.S. Senate. Some of the allies thought we had overreacted. There were complaints that we might trigger a war, and they got scared.

Kaplan: They didn't help or respond sufficiently.

Glass: We did deploy additional people there. Even though Gen. Norstad said, "Don't send me additional people unless you intend to keep them here." His reasoning was that if you send over temporary increases, the Europeans think we are deserting them when the temporary units are sent home. We sent them anyhow. I think 40,000 additional troops were sent to Europe during that crisis and eventually drifted back home. A lot of our allies thought we had overreacted, and as a matter of fact, we had.

Kaplan: Was there difficulty between him [McNamara] and Norstad over the MLF in any way?

Glass: Yes. Look for Charlie Murphy's article in Fortune Magazine, which refers to a top secret meeting with Norstad in the Pentagon to go over these things.

Kaplan: Was the MLF an area in which you had personal involvement?

Glass: Whatever McNamara was involved in, I got involved in, preparing his statements.

Kaplan: Did you find that he was lukewarm from the beginning toward the multilateral force?

Glass: There was tremendous skepticism. The argument was that we had enough trouble organizing our own forces, let alone foreigners with many different languages in the same unit.

Kaplan: That goes back to the '50s, and Norstad. Then it was changed under McNamara. The issue was a very lively one, the fear that if there wasn't something like a multilateral force, not only would there be the defection by the French but the Germans were demanding greater access to nuclear weapons.

Glass: McNamara was open-minded when he first came in and got more sophisticated as he got a better grip on the data, history, and background.

That idea just died a natural death. It was sort of a fad. A lot of these things come up and disappear over the course of the history of the Defense Department.

Kaplan: It was not a central issue, as far as you could see?

Glass: No. You didn't bring up the Pentomic division, which was Taylor's baby, another fad that came and went in the '50s. It was related to Eisenhower's policy of using tactical nuclear weapons.

Matloff: How about the OSD reaction to de Gaulle's removal of the French from the military structure of NATO?

Glass: The United States was so mad, particularly our military, because the LOC ran from the front on the Czechoslovakian-German border, right through France to Bordeaux. We had put a lot of money in that LOC--railroads, warehouses--that if worst came to worst, that would be the line of

retreat. That was a very sensible plan, with access to the Atlantic Ocean. That was a tremendous blow to the United States, and caused an enormous amount of upset. Our military were so mad that they removed from France everything that was removable, even the plumbing fixtures.

Kaplan: Gen. Lemnitzer was then Supreme Commander, and didn't believe that McNamara was mad enough. He had the sense that McNamara said that we could now function more efficiently.

Glass: The military were incensed, but McNamara took it very philosophically. De Gaulle was a tough customer. We weren't the first to discover that; Churchill discovered that long before.

Kaplan: But you didn't find conflict between Lemnitzer and McNamara over the consequences?

Glass: Lemnitzer was commander of the NATO forces. McNamara was the Secretary of Defense, part of the government, the administration. There was a matter of foreign policy here that had to be pursued. The decision was made as to how to cope with it and that was that. The farther removed you are from Washington, the tougher the line. Gen. Rogers, the NATO commander who recently resigned, spoke openly about the matter of the medium-range missiles. There's nothing wrong with that--the commanders are looking at such problems strictly from a military viewpoint. There's no question that the business of pushing us out of France was hurtful, and there was much talk. Wheeler felt that the two U.S. divisions in Bavaria, which were there because the housing and the casernes are there, not because they were supposed to fight there, should be pulled out. They

are supposed to move parallel to the front to the north to fight. Those were the two divisions that we had talked about taking out earlier, in the Eisenhower administration, and there was much talk about taking out those divisions after the de Gaulle episode. Why should we leave the two divisions between France and Czechoslovakia? Let France defend that part of the front. We would leave the core of three divisions with their back against the channel ports so they could get out if they had to. But without the LOC through France to the Atlantic the two divisions in the South of Germany could be trapped. The net of it all was, what could we do about it? Would we be better off to cut the French out totally? They were still part of NATO. It was a matter of whether their forces would be under the Unified Commander in peacetime. I think even in retrospect we had to take it the way it came, and leave it at that. But it was a pity to have to leave Paris and go to Brussels.

Matloff: You spoke about McNamara's canceling of Skybolt. What was his attitude toward shoring up the independent deterrent for Britain?

Glass: They finally made the deal to buy Polaris missiles and submarines.

Matloff: He wasn't opposed in principle to shoring up Britain as an independent deterrent?

Glass: I don't think so, although he always took a dim view of the military value of small, independent strategic nuclear forces. I don't think anybody anticipated that Skybolt would be such a big deal with the British.

Kaplan: Weren't those missiles to be committed to NATO?

Glass: No, they were independent British nuclear forces. They are not part of NATO forces to this day. This probably is a better idea in

retrospect than the Skybolt-Vulcan. It cost a lot of money, but we did everything we could to help them on that, as far as I can recall. We always got along well with the British.

Matloff: On Cuba, do you want to add anything about what was learned from the handling of those two crises and anything on the OSD role in connection with them?

Glass: The Bay of Pigs was not a product of the Defense Department. The plan was a CIA product; Defense was peripheral. The Chiefs had a look at it in the White House, but without an opportunity to staff it. The fact that the Chiefs looked at it doesn't make much difference.

Matloff: How could you tell? Did you see some papers?

Glass: I know what went on here. It was never staffed here. I talked to George Brown about it; he was intimately involved in it.

Kaplan: Do you feel that McNamara is wrong in taking the blame that he does take for it?

Glass: I think that he is taking on too much now. This guilt business is being overdone. He had nothing to do with the Bay of Pigs. Its planning started with Eisenhower, and the Kennedys, including Robert, picked it up and were gung ho. Just look at the inaugural speech of Kennedy. The whole tone of that speech was such that it was not surprising that they picked up this great adventure. With a little help from U.S. forces it could have worked. But I can tell you that McNamara had very little to do with that and it is ridiculous for him to take any blame for it. He was much too new to the business to have even an

informed opinion. Even the Chiefs were not responsible for it. It was not a DoD operation. It was a CIA/White House undertaking—a covert, undclared war, planned and managed by the CIA with means put under their control by the President. What's going on in Nicaragua is nothing compared to a blatant covert operation like this.

Matloff: What was the difference in the handling of the Cuban missile crisis on the OSD part?

Glass: Once it was learned in the Pentagon that they [the Russians] were indeed putting in offensive missiles, the government moved with great resolve and I think really headed off something that could have been a disaster for the United States. Taking a strong line on this issue was one of the best things that Jack Kennedy did. McNamara was cool as a cucumber--very forceful and masterful. I mentioned to you the press conference here at 7:00 p.m. in which they had all the foreign reporters and the photo interpreter Hughes, who had detected the missiles from photographs. McNamara had him on the platform with him and that man pointed out the evidence from the pictures. A German reporter asked McNamara, "What would you do if the Russian captain refuses to halt?" McNamara said, "We'll sink him." Just like that. For about 10 seconds there wasn't a peep as that sank in with the reporters. I've seen this mentioned without attribution. He said it so coldly that it made a tremendous impression. There was no question in anybody's mind that that was what the U.S. planned to do. There's no question that it made an impression on the Russians, that we meant business. The Kennedys, as is

now clear, were pretty scared and they wanted to make sure that the control over this crisis remained in civilian hands. I'm sure Kennedy told McNamara to take control in DoD and that only orders given by him were to be obeyed by the naval forces deployed in the blockade, what was called the quarantine. As I understood it, Admiral Anderson, the CNO, said to McNamara, "Why don't you tell me and I'll tell them. It's odd for a Secretary to give orders to the men at sea; send it through channels." McNamara took unkindly to that and that was the end of Anderson.

The Kennedys wanted to be very careful on this venture but moved with force and decisiveness. We sent two armored divisions from Ft. Hood, Texas, to Florida. We requisitioned all the flat cars in the region to move them, 300-odd tanks per division, fuel trucks, ammunition vehicles, and all the paraphernalia. We moved so much into Florida there was talk about the peninsula sinking into the ocean because of the weight of the armaments we put down there. This was expensive and disrupting to our regular operations, but it was done with real determination. The Russians could come to no other conclusion but that we were getting ready for an all-out attack on Cuba. That, indeed, was part of the plan.

Matloff: What role did OSD play in the Middle East crisis, in June 1967, the Arab-Israeli war, if any?

Glass: That was in the time of Nasser, wasn't it? McNamara was very cautious about moving militarily in the area, reflecting the climate in the White House. There was a lot of vacillation. The Dutch offered a destroyer or two to join us if we took our destroyers from the Persian

Gulf and brought them around the Arabian Peninsula up past the artillery that Nasser had emplaced in the Sinai, along the Gulf of Aqaba, cutting off the Israeli part of Elath. My feeling was that the Egyptians would not dare fire at these ships. No other nation offered to join us in this effort. There was no happier man in the Pentagon than McNamara when the Israelis took matters into their own hands and cleaned up the situation.

Matloff: How about the Pueblo incident in January 1968?

Glass: This was a Defense Department undertaking. Nitze, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was on the committee that approved these missions. The Secretary was not directly involved. They ran into trouble. The skipper, Butcher, was not an Academy man and the military took a dim view of him. They thought the ship should have never been given up without a fight. Butcher was not a regular naval officer and the disposal of the classified papers was botched up. McNamara went to bat for him. He pointed out that the water in the area is around 45 degrees and nobody could survive for more than 5 minutes in it. He did not blame Butcher for giving up the ship. It was an annoying incident. There were a lot of post mortems about whether we could have gotten forces up there from Korea or Formosa in time to be of assistance. It was settled and was just another incident in a long and continuing intelligence collection effort. In every incident like that there are people on the Hill that will make the most of it, specifically, the opposition party and the hard liners of both parties.

Matloff: In general, what was your reaction to McNamara's handling of the military during the controversies over weaponry?

Glass: McNamara was the most effective Secretary of Defense up to his time. Gates already began to move into some of the areas that the military considered sacred. The SIOP, for instance, was a tremendous advance; but it was considered an intrusion into the realm of the military.

McNamara took over military planning. The JSOP had little influence over the course of events. He was not one to waste his time on conversation. He wanted to see facts and figures to support points of view. He knew the merchandise--the weapons systems. He had thought out and knew the reason for virtually everything we were doing. The military had its own view. The services always have their own axes to grind--the Navy, for example, wants more carriers. Look at McNamara's ASW program as it evolved--filling in the gaps in order to bottle up the Soviet submarines away from our supply lines. The plans and concepts were worked out; we could provide a rationale and the numbers and qualities of submarines needed to do the job. We couldn't be sure the plan would work, but at least there was some reasoning behind it. McNamara made a sincere effort to lay things out for the committees, so they could make intelligent, or at least informed, decisions when they dealt with Defense bills.

Matloff: Do you think that he's been maligned in respect to his handling of the military when they differed with him?

Glass: Of course. He was perhaps not as deferential to them as he could have been. He was brusque in general; minutes counted to him. If somebody came around to just pass the time of day, he resented it; he didn't socialize much in the office. He doesn't drink much and didn't care for

cocktail parties in the Pentagon. He wasn't as deferential to the Chiefs as they expected him to be. He would deal with them man to man. Before they went to the President with the proposed program and budget, he would discuss it with them. I suppose they felt that he was censoring them because he would press his views on them pretty hard. He was not dependent upon the military's approval. It didn't bother him if all the military chiefs disagreed with him. Once he had thought the matter through, arrived at his own conclusions, he was satisfied to go forward with his recommendations and justify them before the Congress, the Chiefs, the President, or the public--anybody who was interested.

Matloff: How strong an interest did he have in arms control and disarmament?

Glass: He really was the initiator of SALT. When the ABM Treaty and SALT agreement were signed, I called him at the World Bank and congratulated him, because it was his proposal. He expressed great appreciation for my call. He was the father of the ABM treaty. There is a long memo from McNamara to Johnson dealing with the ABM program and the thinking behind it. It dealt with the advantages of assured destruction versus damage limiting and dealt with the cost advantages of the offensive over the defensive.

Goldberg: We cover that in the strategic arms competition study.

Glass: The interesting thing about it is that McNamara opposed the deployment of the ABM when it got to the point where we had to make up our mind. As I mentioned to you, the Chairman of the Board of AT&T told McNamara, "If you're not going to deploy it, save the \$300 million a year

you are spending on development, because we're just reinventing the wheel." McNamara had to make a decision, and he was against deployment. The Chiefs, the Congress, State, the President, Enthoven, all of us were for the deployment. I favored some deployment to keep the cost down, before they rammed it down our throats and we had to go on to a bigger deployment. There were two aspects, one to defend forces and the other to defend cities. The interesting thing is that he was right for the wrong reasons. He said with regard to a very limited deployment, "That's like getting a little bit pregnant." The minute we started the deployment around a few cities, all the other urban areas would want the same protection. Before we knew it, we would be into a full scale deployment because of the demand of the people for equal protection. He couldn't have been more wrong. When Laird became Secretary, the new administration picked up the ABM. Scoop Jackson said, "I'm for it, but not in my state." And that became the prevailing attitude around the country. The Laird administration made a mess of it. They spent \$5 billion and came out with nothing. So McNamara was right about not deploying the system. To do something, it was decided to deploy a thin system to defend our cities against the expected Chinese threat, which never developed. But to get back to McNamara's memo to the President, he proposed three things: spending the \$300 million a year for development; get ready for production but not start production; and open discussions with the Soviet Union to see if we can get an agreement to limit the deployment of ABMs. This is what went to Johnson to convince him not to commit to deployment

at that point. The President agreed and the three points went into his next budget message. When they went to the Hill, Wheeler and McNamara agreed that Wheeler should present the case for deployment and McNamara would present the case against deployment. They had agreed to disagree. Nobody censored Wheeler's stuff at all. Each presented his case to the committees. The final part of the story is the San Francisco speech. Johnson decided to change around and start deployment of a light ABM defense system and McNamara had to make a speech justifying the deployment. But at the end of the speech he again gave his rationale for not deploying ABM. That was McNamara's final position on the ABM. Right to the bitter end he was really against deployment and for opening up discussions with the Soviet Union. The last word was Clifford's. We had started discussions with the Soviet Union and they were advancing. Then came the Czechoslovakia crisis, and that froze relations with the Soviet Union until the Nixon administration came aboard.

Matloff: Would you describe what the working environment was like under McNamara?

Glass: I always figured that I worked a year and a half for a year's pay. That means I averaged 60 hours a week throughout the year and about 80 hours per week during the six weeks before we went to the Hill. We worked seven days a week for a period of time, and I was always here Saturday.

Goldberg: The rest of the year you took Sunday off.

Glass: Yes. McNamara was a great believer in taking time off, but no more than two or three weeks a year. I was entitled to six weeks; I had

a lot of leave at the end when I retired. He felt that every member of the staff should take at least two weeks. He took two weeks—one in the summer and one in the winter to go skiing. He set the pace; he was a very hard worker. He didn't work on Sunday except in a crisis. One cannot say he asked of his staff what he was not willing to do himself.

Kaplan: In the interviews with McNamara he mentioned that in all his relations with Congress he never lost any contest, that he won every case he presented.

Glass: That is really not the point. To be the winner all the time is not good, either. People on the Hill began to dislike him. The smartest fellow in the class gets to be disliked, especially if he knows he is smart and shows it, and McNamara did. I don't think Laird particularly liked him, but since he was a real politician, you would never know it.

Matloff: In your role as Assistant to McNamara's successors, did your functions change? Did you work on the Posture Statements?

Glass: Yes. Clifford picked up the Posture Statement where McNamara dropped it. We had other statements during the year. The scene of action shifted from Clifford's office to Nitze's office. I mentioned that Clifford presided, like Marshall did versus Lovett, and Laird versus Packard. Nitze was the in-house, day-to-day manager. Clifford was very effective before congressional committees and in the White House. He prepared himself for the hearings. He liked to have a lot of people around the office and was not hurried. He was very astute and shrewd, but did not have the capacity for work that McNamara did, and didn't get into detail the way that McNamara did. He was a pal of Johnson's when he first came in.

Matloff: Then you continued working on the Posture Statements?

Glass: Yes, I continued doing the same thing but the scene shifted. I looked more to Nitze. He is a bureaucrat, like I am. He would go over the stuff, and also wanted to see the transcripts. Nitze was very experienced, and his contribution cannot be overestimated.

Matloff: How about under Laird and Packard?

Glass: Same thing. Laird came in to preside. He began to delegate to Packard the review of the Johnson budget, to come up with the first set of Nixon amendments. McNamara would never think of doing that. He would run herd on the whole business, right from the beginning. What went to the President went from McNamara. He made the decisions on what the Defense Department would recommend to the President. But Laird delegated this to Packard, and I got the feeling that Laird never even read the statement before he got on the Hill.

Matloff: Were you dealing with Packard primarily?

Glass: Yes, for example, with the first set of amendments, I would sit in on Packard's review of the proposals for changes to the Johnson administration budget. That is standard procedure. Laird wasn't even present. The whole package was wrapped up by Packard, then I prepared the Secretary's statement. Laird told me that he didn't want to get into all the details that McNamara always got into. I told him that Packard would have to go present the details, if he didn't want to do it, because the committees now expected to get the specifics from the SecDef. Laird didn't want that. So he ended up with the specifics, but wanted to brush the details, like Secretaries used to do prior to McNamara.

Goldberg: He had the same attitude that Clifford had, then.

Glass: Yes, but Clifford lucked out; he never had to present a posture statement of his own. The last posture statement he left behind him for the record. Even if Nitze went to the Hill, Clifford didn't stand on ceremony; it didn't bother him that Nitze would get the credit. In view of Laird's being a member of the House Appropriation Committee for 16 years, not going up to talk to the committee would have been unacceptable to the committee, and Laird recognized that.

Matloff: Did Packard ever go to the Hill for any other reason?

Glass: When it came to the Hill, Laird was the one. On the Fulbright Committee hearings on the ABM, Packard pulled together the program. I was assigned to Packard as full-time Assistant to the Deputy. That's where the action went, at least my end of the action, other than the broad policies. As I told you, the Republicans made a mistake handling the ABM; they should have left well enough alone. When Scoop Jackson didn't want it, they could have dropped the whole program and it would have been on Johnson's doorstep. Here was a weapons system looking for a mission, if ever there was one. The first time around Packard proposed that we defend the bomber bases with this system. I pointed out that the bombers depend for their safety on their ability to get off the base within 12 to 15 minutes warning time. That's what you depend on; you don't try to defend a whole airfield, a soft target, with an ABM system. The next time he called a big meeting, the ABM mission had shifted to defending Minuteman missiles. The Chairman, the Chiefs, Secretary of

the Army Resor, Johnny Foster, and everybody was there. Ivan Selin, the man who replaced Enthoven, had prepared a study for McNamara showing how many Sprint missiles, as well as Spartan, we would need to defend the Minuteman sites. They ran into thousands. That was in the McNamara plan as an addendum, if we ever had to defend them. Here they were going to buy 400 ABM missiles to do this job. Packard asked me what I thought of the plan, and I told him that the plan was not sensible. Then I turned to Selin. I told him that more than 400 were needed to make any kind of defense for 1,000 silos, that he had made a study of it and had the numbers. Selin didn't say a word. When they got to the Hill, Symington pointed out that the draw-down curve meant that the Russians could exhaust the system with their MIRVs and we didn't have enough missiles in our plan to do the job. The Fulbright committee hearings on the ABM were on TV and Laird was the witness. There was a question on predelegation of authority to launch. In air defense the commander was authorized to use the nuclear-armed Hercules and Bomarc, if we were attacked by bombers. There was no problem of preauthorizing because if the bombers appeared he could use whatever defenses were needed and available. To defend against Soviet ICBMs there would only be 15 minutes warning to make a decision and fire the weapons. So the air defense commander had to have authority in advance. Nobody wanted to acknowledge that any authority to launch a nuclear weapon was ever predelegated. That came out and somebody said that some sergeant might have authority to launch a nuclear-armed ABM missile. It was an open hearing and the audience laughed. Laird came

alert and, with a stern face, said, "Mr. Chairman, this is a deadly matter, not a laughing matter." He is a great actor. The committee apologized for treating the matter lightly. Laird was a good man in dealing with the Hill. He had a direct telephone connection with the House Appropriation Committee hearings. I dropped in on him once and he was listening to the hearings in his office. It struck me as rather odd.

Matloff: Why did you decide to retire from Defense in 1969?

Glass: First, the Democrats lost the election, and I was a political appointee. I wanted to get out for a long time, even when McNamara was Secretary. The job grinds you down after a while. After the election Nitze said that it would look bad, as if they were trying to sabotage the incoming administration, if they let me go. I didn't have the 30 years, so they had to let me go if I were to qualify for retirement. If I had resigned, I wouldn't have been able to draw retirement pay. That was ludicrous, because I had 29 years and was short one year. I even tried a medical route, but it didn't go anywhere. But Laird eventually let me go because Baroody wanted my job. So I went to RAND, where I had already accepted a job, which was put on hold at Laird's request to Harry Rowen.

Matloff: Was what you learned working in the Pentagon a help when you went to work for Rand?

Glass: Harry Rowen was trying to find a place for me. I was supposed to work for Jack Vogel on public relations but I wasn't interested in that. Rowen gave me my head to make my own job, and so I ended up as a consultant to the Air Force. I set up the background papers for major weapons

systems, something Senator Stennis wanted while I was still a Defense Department employee. Then I ended up in the Pentagon in various consulting positions, to Laird, Chairman JCS, to AF. Most of my work for RAND was in the Pentagon.

Matloff: Did you have any connection with posture statements under Secretary of Defense Schlesinger?

Glass: Yes, and also with Richardson. I helped Baroody with Laird's first posture statement. I was out at RAND in California and I was called to come back and help him. Later Baroody felt he could handle it himself. At that point I was asked by the legislative assistant to the Chairman, JCS, to come in and do something for Adm. Moorer. Moorer wanted to do a more thorough job than Wheeler's statements and he wanted to use charts comparing the military posture of the United States versus the Soviet Union and China, etc. I was down there when Richardson came in as Secretary. I had known him when he worked for Senator Saltonstall. Jonathan Moore, Richardson's man, had also worked for Saltonstall. They discovered I was in the building and Moore asked me to look at the posture statement that Laird had left. I looked at it and said that it was not suitable for Richardson and I agreed to work on a separate statement for him. Richardson went over it three times before it was in final form. Then Moore wanted me to rework the posture statement. It was not in good shape. I had to redo the whole thing. Richardson departed and that was the end of that. Then Schlesinger came in from the CIA. He had also been with Rand. Kaufmann came with him, but had no official position.

He was the close-in adviser, like Ollie Gale was for McElroy. They were personal friends. I was called in to do the statements for Schlesinger. I did the specifics, the programs, while Kaufmann did the policy section. When I finished, I went back to Santa Monica. But then Schlesinger decided he wanted me in the Pentagon full time to work for him. I was attached to the Special Assistant's office and given a small staff. I worked on the statements until the time I got angry with Bill Kaufmann for not having his piece in on time. The deadline came. I talked to General Wickham, Schlesinger's aide, and told him Kaufmann's piece wasn't in on time. I asked him what to do, whether we should print just the program part, the part with which the services are most concerned. While we were talking, Schlesinger came in and I asked him what to do. He shrugged his shoulders and walked out. I made the decision and went to the printers that night. I expressed my annoyance to Kaufmann the next week and offered to help him with his section to speed things up. He didn't want my help. I was already tired out, so I quit.

Goldberg: Kaufmann told me that story about the time he was talking to Schlesinger, who was cursing Henry. Kaufmann asked what was the matter, that you were working very hard, and Schlesinger said he was cursing Henry Kissinger, not Henry Glass.

Glass: Kissinger and Schlesinger were contemporaries, and Schlesinger was very competitive with Kissinger. I felt that Kissinger was senior, having arrived earlier on the scene, and that Schlesinger should defer to him and get along with him.

Goldberg: The Secretary of Defense is junior to the Secretary of State.

Glass: In this case their competition showed up in the Yom Kippur war. Nixon was already in difficulty and left it to these two senior officials to decide what to do to help the Israelis. They kicked it back and forth but neither one wanted to make such a decision, and properly so, since neither one had the authority. Meanwhile, the military had gotten ready, they were poised waiting for the word, which came around lunchtime on the following Saturday. Nixon had decided to ship the stuff in our own airplanes, and that started the ball rolling. Later on the press criticized the indecision that became apparent. Schlesinger was asked by the press why he was dragging his feet. He said, "You can't move your feet very far if your shoes are nailed to the floor." But this kind of decision should be made by the President, and I think they were right in dragging their feet, but it created considerable acrimony. I never could understand why Schlesinger felt he must compete with Kissinger. Kissinger had risen from the position of NSC adviser and had already achieved great prominence. He had a head start. Schlesinger moved up fast, but not quite as fast; he didn't start as early in a top level position.

Goldberg: Schlesinger was Secretary of Defense before Kissinger became Secretary of State.

Glass: Yes, but Kissinger was a big wheel around here before that.

Goldberg: Schlesinger had also been Director of the CIA and Chairman of the AEC.

Glass: He started as Assistant Director in the Bureau of the Budget, while Kissinger was a partner with Nixon on foreign policy. This is the

problem of relationships; personalities get into it. Schlesinger was a theoretician, not a manager. I talked to him about it and he said, "I don't like to look backwards. My mind is on what's coming, not what happened." But you cannot manage unless you go back and see whether the troops carried out what you had decided to carry out. When we underspent by 2 1/2 billion dollars one year McNamara made Joe Hoover go back and find out exactly where we underspent. That's management. Schlesinger did not have the patience or interest to look back.

Goldberg: Historically he did.

Glass: That's different. He was an academic. But to go back and see if the plans were being carried out, and programs moving, he did not follow through. McNamara never neglected that end of the business, that was why he was a great manager. When it came to theorizing, Schlesinger was in his element. He was in the strategic business at Rand for six years.

McNamara had to learn on the job, but when Schlesinger came in he already had a good grip on things.

Matloff: Would you comment on which of the Secretaries in your view had the greatest impact or most enduring influence on the DoD?

Glass: McNamara, no question. But it's dwindling as time goes on.

Goldberg: What were your views on Wheeler and Moorer?

Glass: I knew Wheeler very well for many years. He was Chairman for six years. He was a sick man and wanted to get out after four years, when Clifford came in. Clifford said that he couldn't do without Wheeler, and when that administration departed, Laird said the same thing. I

first ran into Wheeler at Ft. Hood when I was making a speech to the Chamber of Commerce in the town next door. He was a major general and was taking over command. I met him there and he invited me over to the base for breakfast and I got to know him. The next time I met him he was Director of the Joint Staff, when we ran into the problem with the balance of payments and we got the back of the hand from the Joint Staff. I called Wheeler. He understood immediately what the problem was and withdrew the memo so it wouldn't go on the record as being so uncooperative. When he was Chairman, he was present at all the important meetings and was very informal. He horrified Clifford with his language. Within a small group he would not beat around the bush. He talked straight with the Secretaries. But the Chairman is one thing; the Chiefs, another.

Goldberg: Did McNamara appreciate him, too?

Glass: Yes. But Wheeler knew how to deal with civilians, and understood the place of the military in the U.S. government and the role of the Chairman vis-a-vis the Secretary and the President.

Goldberg: You would give him a high ranking, then?

Glass: Not only I, but the Secretaries also. They wouldn't let him go, and he was dying of heart disease. He had a doctor assigned to him on the JCS staff.

Goldberg: How about Moorer?

Glass: He was more of a plodder, more military and withdrawn, not as open and as free wheeling as Wheeler. Moorer was a very solid citizen and a stable influence on the course of events. I worked for him, so I

got to know him pretty well. He knew what he wanted in the way of a statement. He wanted talking charts; he wanted to get into specifics; he made his notes on little cards. I organized his text around the charts and that suited him very well. An interesting sidelight of relationships-- I thought it was only fair in comparing Soviet and U.S. forces not only to compare combatant ships in numbers but also the total tonnage of those ships. We were taking patrol vessels of the Soviet Union which were 1,000 tons or less and counting them one for one with a carrier of 90,000 tons. I had a chart for tonnage as well as numbers. Admiral Zumwalt, the CNO, objected to the tonnage chart because it made us look good vs. the U.S.S.R. He objected to Moorer and I got word to drop that chart. I went to talk to Moorer and said that it was misleading to give the congressional committees a chart just showing numbers of ships when our ships were much bigger with greater combat capabilities than Soviet combatants. He said, "He's a fellow naval officer. I can't say no to him." That's very understandable.

Goldberg: I don't agree with that.

Glass: Zumwalt succeeded him as CNO, so we dropped the chart. There are these special relationships of the school tie.

Regarding the interplay of these things between the Hill and the press--Moorer appeared before a committee on which Symington was present. Symington confronted him with an article in The Washington Post written by Getler, discussing a contract study put out by the Air Force to examine the Soviet SS9 Mark 3. The issue was whether it was a MIRV or like the

Polaris, with three warheads against one target. Whatever the finding was, Moorer had never heard of that study before and was caught absolutely cold. This was a Top Secret study. I also had failed to uncover the thing; it had not come to my attention. Here was another case of getting a study under the table from the Air Force, passing it out to a chosen source, getting an article, and then talking to the article. This was done during the Eisenhower administration with the triumverate of Symington, Gen. Phillips of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and Joe Alsop. They parlayed that one the same way. They would print the Air Force estimates of the buildup of Soviet ICBMs. Those would appear in the press, no longer classified, and Symington would pick them up and hit the administration people on the head with them. Moorer didn't like to be caught completely off guard. But that is the relationship between the service Chiefs and the Chairman. I suppose the Air Force would argue that it was a classified study and that they had just gotten it. They probably did, but must have made it available to Symington. Nothing changes in that kind of business.

Matloff: What do you regard as your major achievements during your tenure as Economic Adviser to the Comptroller, 1953-65, and as Assistant to the SecDef, 1965-69?

Glass: The greatest challenge was to design the Posture Statement. I had no guidance from anyone except that McNamara wanted to discuss each major program and system and that he didn't care how many pages it took. He was willing to handle it on a classified basis, to get it down to

Secret. I might point out one interesting factor about McNamara's management style—his decisiveness. The first time around on the Posture Statement we started at Top Secret so as not to limit the statement in any way. McNamara didn't want to deal with Top Secret on the Hill, too much red tape, so we agreed to get it down to Secret. To do that, we had to work through the originators of the data. The JCS took a lot of the responsibility for the data; they felt it was their prerogative. They had marked a lot of things as Top Secret which McNamara had already approved as Secret, and I felt were all right to classify as Secret. We were in Charlie's [Hitch] office and we sat down and went over the classification changes. I said that I needed him to go over them since I had no authority to change classifications, but that he did. He went through a few of them and told me to go ahead with my changes, that he approved them. That's the way he operated; he quickly disposed of problems. He declared those items Secret, and that was the end of that. That was the biggest challenge—to work out something that would do what McNamara wanted.

Matloff: Is there anything that disappointed you during that service or that you had left undone but would have liked to have finished?

Glass: One matter where McNamara didn't deliver what he promised, and let's let it go at that.

Matloff: Thank you for your patience, time, and cooperation.

Glass: It's only 3:20; I usually work until 4:00.

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