INTERVIEW WITH NATHANIEL H. GOODRICH
10 April 1984
by
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GOODRICH: In the late 1950s, Lloyd Cutler got hold of me. He apparently had some connection with Governor G. Mennen Williams of Michigan. Williams apparently was thinking of a national race in 1960, or a senatorial race in 1958, or something, and he was interested in acquiring a series of position papers. In light of my background in Defense, Cutler asked me if I would get up a brief history of the first several years of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and, in particular, if I would try to identify the important issues that I thought still were issues. Now this was at least five years after I had left, but I had always as a matter of personal interest tried to keep in touch with what was going on.

In fact, although I left in 1953, I had been called back in 1956 as a special assistant to the Secretary for a study that he had set up to look into the cause of leaks of information. There had been a series of articles, principally in the New York Times, written by its Pentagon correspondent, a writer named Anthony Leviero. (He was a very good writer who unfortunately died many years ago.) There had been a series of stories about missile problems or a lag in missile development, and this might have tied in with the beginnings of the stories about the missile gap, so-called, something that I believe President Kennedy later made much of. This was 1956, and it appeared from the news stories that Leviero had gotten a fair amount of his information from an Army colonel, whose name I think was Nickerson. Secretary Wilson was quite exercised about the possibility of leaks, and he called back Charles
Coolidge, who had been assistant secretary in 1951 and 1952, and asked him to chair a committee whose other members were retired officers of considerable rank—Admiral Pechteler of the Navy, General John Hull of the Army, Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards of the Air Force, and General Gerald Thomas of the Marines. Colonel Carey Randall, who was still with the Secretary's office, called me down at the beach (I was there on a vacation with my wife and son) and said that the Secretary was looking for somebody to be director of staff in that internal inquiry; would I be interested? I got back and talked with the Secretary, whom I had gotten to know in 1953, at the time of his confirmation. I was very happy to agree to work with that committee.

With that background, which dipped me back into Defense matters fairly deeply some three years after I had left, and the experience of my six years in Defense, I felt in early 1959, when I got the request from Cutler to prepare a paper on the history and problems in OSD, that I really wasn't all that out of date; so I went ahead. I enjoyed getting it together and got it to Cutler's friend, Alfred Davidson, the man who was preparing this material, or sort of chairing its preparation for Mennen Williams, neither of whom I had ever met. Davidson later came to Washington and we had a couple of conversations and some correspondence about the paper. Davidson soon thereafter left for a job in Europe. My paper and presumably the others on which he had worked wound up with Adam Yarmolinsky, who asked to get together with me to review my paper. At that time, on first acquaintance he seemed like an interesting young gentleman, and he listened to it all very seriously. It later became clear that Mennen Williams was no national political figure, and nothing came of whatever
his interest might have been. Yarmolinsky in some way got tied in with either the Kennedy campaign or with some of the people who were briefing themselves on what they were going to do in the new administration. I was utterly amazed when I discovered that Yarmolinsky was going to be a special assistant to Secretary MacNamara. I prided myself to think that at least he was well prepared, not having had any prior connection with Defense but having that memorandum and having gone over it with me on several occasions. I hope that there was nothing in that memo that made him the so-called \textit{enfant terrible} in the Department that he later became.

\textbf{CONDIT:} I think that was within his nature.

\textbf{GOODRICH:} Now that you've mentioned his name, I did at that time have a sort of paternal feeling about the beginnings of the McNamara administration because of Yarmolinsky turning up where he did and the insights into the department that I at least tried to sketch out for him.

\textbf{CONDIT:} I'd like to go back to the department when you first came. When did you arrive?

\textbf{GOODRICH:} In February 1948, I believe. That would have been about four or five months after the department officially came into being. You might say I was a "first settler." They had no room, they had no desk, and they apologized for that.

\textbf{CONDIT:} You knew Forrestal?
GOODRICH: In the sense that he was Secretary and on some isolated occasions I would have some contact with him. Most particularly, my first assignment turned out to be very successful, and I remember when I was brought in to receive his congratulations. That was the writing of the Reserve Retirement Act in 1948, a matter that was of great interest to President Truman. Truman, as a veteran and as a non-regular military man, felt that reservists deserved some privileges of retirement. There had been a bill in Congress that the Congress had rejected, because they felt that its costs could become astronomical and they wanted something that could be controlled. I was just given this task: "See what you can do." I got the bills, and they appointed a committee to guide, assist, or counsel me. The committee consisted of the three assistant secretaries of the military departments: Gene Zuckert, Gordon Gray, and a really fine gentleman who was the assistant secretary of the Navy, John T. Koehler. I would meet with that committee and with the Judge Advocate's representatives, who were principally high ranking Judge Advocates.

I worked out a completely different approach to qualification for retirement simply by deciding to create or to define what was called a "satisfactory year," the definition being based on acquiring a certain number of credit points. I picked on 60 for a satisfactory year. One got fifteen points for being alive and being in the reserve—that was a subject which came up three or four years ago when the military was trying to find out where the 15 points came from and contacted me. It was felt that simply for being in the reserves, even if you did
nothing, you'd get 15 points. Then, you would get a point for each day of active duty, for each monthly training session regardless of whether it was a two-hour or a day long session. And you'd get a point for every so many hours of paper work that you would do, reading the various manuals and regulations and answering examination questions. You had to have a certain minimum number of points in order to have the satisfactory year, but if you were not on extended active duty you couldn't be credited with more than 60 points. In other words, you couldn't make a bonanza of the point system. The ultimate was, I guess, 60 as the upper and lower limit: If you didn't have 60, it wasn't satisfactory, but you couldn't be credited with more than 60 unless you were on extended active duty. On that basis, if you had 20 satisfactory years in the course of your reserve service, you then became eligible for retirement at age 60, but not before.

When that was accomplished, we went back and presented it to the Congress, which the previous year had rejected the whole idea of reserve retirement. They were delighted with it! Retired Army General Verne [D.] Mudge, who I think headed the first cavalry division in the Philippines, was then a staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and he was principally involved with handling this particular bill. He thought it was great. There was a retired Marine colonel, Joe Chambers, whose first name was Justice, who died about three years ago, who also was on the staff. They put the bill through the Congress without really the formality of a further hearing on the subject. They constructed a hearing that was reported in the Senate committee reports as a hearing, but it
was sort of a motion, and then a motion to adjourn, and they received
the new version of the legislation, the amended version, and it just
went right through. The White House was delighted. Mr. Forrestal was
delighted, and that was in the first few months of my time.

CONDIT: Was Mr. Leva delighted?

GOODRICH: Yes, he was. It was he who brought me in to Mr. Forrestal, who
was interested, but I thought it was in a curious way. I hadn't heard or
known very much of him, and later on, when his illness became more widely
known, I thought back on this. My principal recollection of being in with
him that day was that, when he put his hand out to shake my hand, there was
really an uncanny feeling of contact—his hand seemed formless and cold,
almost lifeless.

CONDIT: No response!

GOODRICH: There he was, commenting, and we had not seen much of him. A
curious thing, I had all three special assistants once—I was a bachelor
then—in my apartment one evening, just a group of people together, all
three with their wives.

CONDIT: This would be Leva, Ohly, and McNeil?

GOODRICH: And other guests. We were young then; so we were just sitting
around talking quite late, eating whatever I could offer. It went on
until one or one-thirty in the morning. That was the night that Forrestal
went out of the hospital, you know, and I've often wondered since whether
he'd been trying to reach any of them. The story that always went around the office was that they (the three assistants) could get a call at any hour of the night—he'd call them any time he was awake, which apparently was quite frequently. But there they were, all where he couldn't have reached them.

CONDIT: I've talked to all three of them, they've never mentioned this episode.

GOODRICH: That's where they were. I don't expect that they would remember, because their social life was a good deal broader, but that was the evening.

CONDIT: That night was a very traumatic night for them.

GOODRICH: At least that's one answer to where they were; the other answer I've never heard is where General Marshall was, on the morning of Pearl Harbor.

CONDIT I can't offer you any solution.

GOODRICH: Except on horseback. They were in the apartment, 2316 41st Street.

CONDIT: It's one of those things that you can't possibly know; do you think that he actually did try to contact them?

GOODRICH: He had been in the habit of doing it, and he had done it from the hospital. He didn't sleep very well. This is hearsay, I was told about that.

CONDIT: I know that Lava feels very bad that Forrestal was put on such a high floor, that a depressed patient really should not be put up there. And they also turned down the Menninger Clinic. Menninger went down to get Mr. Forrestal, and according to the story either President Truman or Mrs. Forrestal did not want him to go to the Menninger Clinic because it
was associated with mental illness, and they thought the story would be more contained if he went to a naval hospital. So they put him in the naval hospital, and apparently no one saw him except the Secretary of Defense, who was not the right person to be allowed out there. But that's very sad.

GOODRICH: Yes, it was all terribly sad, that a man of his achievements and accomplishments found so many problems that otherwise could have been simply difficult relationships but, in the context of what he was doing and a lot of people of his status in life were doing, normal relationships.

CONDIT: One thing that does strike me though, is the institutional worry that I have. I can't believe that it was just a sudden plunge! I think, here was a man who was Secretary of Defense in this country, and whatever the personal tragedy, the chance of a national tragedy is also inherent in that situation.

GOODRICH: You have a comment to the same effect about Secretary Johnson in the draft manuscript. That's the thing I've been reading recently about those years. It's a comment perhaps attributed to some other officials; but he later did have this operation on his brain; and there was the comment by Acheson.

CONDIT: That was a nasty comment. I really do not know whether it had any effect upon him so many years earlier. I just feel that the chemistry of those two men was impossible.

GOODRICH: In medical lore these brain tumors do send warning signals in advance, the only thing I've never heard is how long in advance the
manifestations of tumor growth become evident in behavior. There are people who later end up with precisely that kind of a medical problem, whose history leading up to the final diagnosis indicated volatility, strong emotional reaction, quick anger, sometimes irrationality.

CONDIT: I just hadn’t considered that Johnson was suffering from something at the time he was Secretary.

GOODRICH: Yes, many years intervened between his time in Defense and his later operation.

CONDIT: I have a feeling that his eruptions and nastiness were part of the entire anti-Acheson, anti-Johnson kind of relationship they had. There certainly has been a lot of discussion about how I have treated Johnson. Some people seem to feel I’ve been much too kind, and other people feel that I’ve been much too harsh. I know that Rudy Winnacker thought I was quite harsh in treating Mr. Johnson. On the other hand, when we were having our seminar the other day and Mr. Halaby was talking, obviously he did not feel I had even begun to plumb the possibilities. Surprisingly enough, very quietly General Nichols said to me, "I'm on Halaby's side." That stunned me. He’s coming here next week to do the same thing you’re doing. How do you react?

GOODRICH: That should be very interesting. I had more frequent occasions to be in meetings conducted by Johnson than by Forrestal. Everybody was much more junior, the department was really under way only about four or five months when I got there [in 1948]. You have to remember, of course, that Mr. Levi, Mr. McNeil, and later Mr. Nash had all been working with
Forrestal in the Navy, so that there were no new relationships there. There was a rather tried and true pattern of work relationships, and the basis for confidence was quite clear. It may well be that Forrestal as a result didn't have to go out and interrelate with everybody; it was sufficient that he did it with a small number of chosen delegates, which is a good way to manage. You delegate as small a span of control as you need, and you probably do a better job. Then, of course, Forrestal did not have a deputy or under secretary, it was just himself and the three special assistants. But it was a much smaller office. The only additional relationship that he would have had in conducting his work was to relate to the heads of two other departments, three really, Army, Navy and Air Force; but he previously had been Secretary of the Navy relating to the Secretary of War. Now he related to some splintering of the former two groups, which had split into four [including Defense], and he was the secretary. So his span of control really wasn't all that great! If you want to look at it, you could say he had three military department secretaries, three special assistants, and, since there was no chairman of the Joint Chiefs in his time, I don't know how he related to the chiefs of staff, whether directly or through the secretaries.

CONDIT: I think he also used Ohly.

GOODRICH: Yes, Ohly was one of the three special assistants in that span of control. That at least is what I can recall as the the reason for the lesser evidence of the Secretary, plus the fact that I was reasonably junior, as were most of the staff that was reasonably new to Forrestal. The pace of the Department was quite different as it geared up to becoming
later [August 1949] the Department of Defense; it was then the National Military Establishment. In any event, Johnson did interrelate with staff people in much broader groups. I remember that, either because my boss might have been away or for whatever reason, I attended a number of meetings in his office, and the groups in his room at that time could run to 15, 20, or 25 people. I never really counted, but you knew you were in a reasonably sizeable group. We'd be sitting in a sort of arc of chairs facing him at his desk and the principal thing I recall was his manner of acknowledging the end of what was being said to him by one person and indicating who was to comment next. What he would do was simply to jerk his head quickly, whether it was down-to-up or up-to-down is hard to tell. That's how you knew you had had your turn or you were next. He'd go right through the group. It was mostly a matter of people reporting to him, I really don't have any recollection of any comments from him in reaction of any particular nature. You usually come out of meetings of that type with something of that sort.

CONDIT: Did you go to the AFPC meetings?

GOODRICH: No, I don't believe I ever did.

CONDIT: These would be staff management meetings that you're talking about?

GOODRICH: Yes, the OSD staff. Of course I was in the General Counsel's unit, and that was the reason for being there. Anything I would have reported on or listened to would have concerned the legal aspects of our reporting.

CONDIT: Did you know Steve Early at that time?
GOODRICH: Yes, I did.

CONDIT: Did he come in on these?

GOODRICH: I can't really recall. I have an impression that he would have been there, but I can't recall.

CONDIT: But he didn't run the meeting. Johnson did—you were reporting.

GOODRICH: Steve Early was a completely different personality from Johnson.

CONDIT: Was he really an under secretary type, some people would say he was more a personal friend?

GOODRICH: I didn't really know enough about the overall activities of the department at that time to know what he was doing in his own role. He was a very relaxed type. He always appeared to know what was going on. If you had to talk with him about anything, it was a distinct pleasure. Normally, whether he had the time or not, you had the impression that he had plenty of time to discuss anything that had to be discussed. He had a great sense of humor and was very relaxed.

CONDIT: Everyone seems to have liked him. How did all this change when Marshall took over?

GOODRICH: For one thing, not only Johnson, but Early left. So did the one assistant secretary, Mr. Griffith, and the special assistant Louis Renfrow; both of them were really relaxed, friendly, unassuming, very pleasant gentlemen. There are various ways in which I have seen their
activities commented on, but they were very normal human beings. Ranfrow, to my recollection, was a former dentist.

CONDIT: I thought it was Griffith!

GOODRICH: Your text says Griffith, and I made a note that I never heard it.

CONDIT: That's a question, then. [Ranfrow was the dentist!]

GOODRICH: In any event, they were very nice gentlemen to deal with and none of us had any problem that I can recall. I don't know how the other people feel who were in positions of immediate responsibility to the secretary, heading various areas or offices. It may well be that the points of difference had to be fought out among them and the rest of us possibly were sheltered by the fact that we didn't have to engage in those debates. But they all left, and that was the principal hallmark of the advent of the new team. General Marshall came in very quietly, no fuss, Mr. Lovett with him, and the initial contacts of course were with the principal assistants who were in office then as assistant secretaries, with the one exception that one of the three assistant secretaries, Mr. Griffith, did leave.

CONDIT: He left in November, didn't he?

GOODRICH: I don't recall whether he held over a short while or not. His position was vacated. McNeil remained as comptroller, Lava remained as head of L&L (legal and legislative affairs), and I don't know the date of Griffith's departure. Of course, the Griffith position was converted to personnel and Mrs. Rosenberg took office.
CONDIT: Let's get on the record, because I've been told this but I lack on the record confirmation that Anna Rosenberg was the only person [official] in the department whom Marshall called Anna—called by her first name.

GOODRICH: She was the only person in the department who was named Anna. There were no high-ranking women except for Anna Rosenberg, that I can recall at all. He called Rosenberg by her first name but did so only in small, informal group meetings.

CONDIT: But did he call Leva, Marx?

GOODRICH: He called every man, military or civilian, without exception, by his surname. Whether that was his lifelong habit or not, I don't know. That's what he did at that time.

CONDIT: Including Colonel George?

GOODRICH: Yes. Colonel George was George, and you had to remember it was his last name. He was a major when this began. Clarence J. George. I'll say this about it—the use of the last name was never heard, and I never took it, as having any kind of a meaning other than that was the way Marshall addressed people. Whether it was easier to remember last names or whether he had an aversion to any suggestion of familiarity that might come of using first names, to me didn't seem to indicate any attitude on his part of wanting to be overly formal or wanting to seem removed or severe or disciplinarian in his approach. I'm struck by some of the references in the manuscript which quite obviously stemmed from the reports of other people about the way in which he expressed himself, his feelings or relations with others. I still have the feeling that he was a very warm person and that's the impression I got.
I never felt, except on one occasion which is sort of humorous, that I was on the carpet when I got in front of him or might be in trouble if I did something wrong. I think, on the other hand, there was a general feeling that—whether because of General Marshall's attitude or because of his position, seniority, or long experience—there was no warrant for anyone to be familiar with him and no call for familiarity or chitchat. But no one ever said, "These are the rules of the game." This was how he did business, and it was perfectly normal to interact with him that way.

The one occasion that I just mentioned occurred one day when I was in there, and there were a number of other people. One in particular was General Bradley, who was sitting in a chair just to my left. That might have been one of the early occasions on which I had been called in to small group meetings in General Marshall's office, and I still considered myself reasonably junior. I was an assistant general counsel—I didn't become a deputy general counsel until late 1951 or early 1952. General Marshall had been expressing a view on something or other in talking with General Bradley, and he suddenly turned to me and said, "What do you think, Goodrich?" I was so surprised to be asked that, when I started to talk, I discovered that my voice was extremely loud. It came out almost like the boom of a cannon! I noticed that General Bradley sort of lifted himself in his seat and turned to look at me. I was either tense or excited about getting a question of that sort, but I got control of myself and toned down quickly. I could see just the faintest smile across General Marshall's face. That is really the only occasion when I was sort of taken back and had a feeling like whatever you were describing.

**COMDT:** I gather you got to know him somewhat better after that.
GOODRICH: For one reason or another, I was in there quite frequently with him.

CONDIT: Did you help him with his confirmation hearings?

GOODRICH: No, it was Secretary Wilson whom I helped.

CONDIT: Let's go back to Marshall. Did Larkin help, or Lava?

GOODRICH: Lava would have been in charge, he was the assistant secretary. My particular recollection of General Marshall's confirmation is that I was given the task of writing the legislation to make him eligible for nomination and confirmation as secretary, because the law barred anybody who had done military service or had been a commissioned officer within the past ten years. Where we got the draft of the bill from I don't know, but I remember that night because we were in this building until two or three in the morning.

CONDIT: He was ineligible on two counts, wasn't he, because he had been a commissioned officer within the last ten years and as a general of the Army he was always on active duty?

GOODRICH: He was still a commissioned officer.

CONDIT: He did remain a general of the Army, did he not? They made an exemption, did they not?

GOODRICH: Based on something I've seen recently, principally in your text, the answer is yes.

CONDIT: I saw that somewhere, I have been trying to confirm that.
GOODRICH: That's where you pointed out that he got the magnificent sum of a little over $3,000 a year to be secretary, because his retired pay was almost the pay of the secretary.

CONDIT: And you realize what a financial sacrifice he was making, because he had had the Red Cross salary, complete. And when Truman asked him, he was giving up maybe $10,000 a year, maybe more.

GOODRICH: Yes, those salaries weren't very high in those days, but they went a lot further than things go today. Those of us who were on the staff as grade 15's, for example, in the years when the top officials under the secretary were the three special assistants, before the three assistant secretary posts were created, were making $440 a year more than our bosses because the salaries of the special assistants were fixed by statute at $10,000. Grade 15 was called at that time grade [P-8] or [P-9], they had a different system of grading.

CONDIT: When Marshall first came in then, he made one change. He no longer met with the management people. Did Lovett?

GOODRICH: I don't know.

CONDIT: I'm just trying to figure out what would be the next major thing that you would be involved in with Marshall; would that be the troops for Europe issue? Or were you involved in the Anna Rosenberg confirmation?

GOODRICH: We all were, but the people most directly involved were Leva and then Larkin, who went to the Hill with Anna Rosenberg during the hearings. Whether I and the other people in my level had any particular involvement, I don't know, except that it was the biggest thing going on at the moment and
everybody to that extent was involved. We were doing some research, and
I recall that I contributed directly to Larkin some information possibly
about one of the so-called principal witnesses against Anna Rosenberg.

CONDIT: What a mess!

GOODRICH: Those confirmation hearings were very distressing to her. She did
not regard herself as Jewish, by the way. I can tell you a story about that,
and you have someone in this town who will verify it since her remark was
made to John Adams. He was my opposite number as assistant general counsel
and then deputy general counsel, until he left to go to the Army as counselor
of the Army before that office became general counsel. When he left, my
post was the only one that remained as deputy general counsel, and to this
day there is only one deputy general counsel in OSD.

John had come into the department after the 1948 elections. The Republi-
cans had controlled at least the Senate and maybe the entire Congress. I don’t
recall, in the 80th Congress, between 1946 and 1948; and John had been a very
top level Young Republican worker in the 1946 campaign and was brought to
Washington by Senator [Chan] Gurney [South Dakota] as Gurney's assistant or
chief of staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee in the 80th Congress.
In the 1948 elections the Democrats regained control of the Senate, and
Senator Tydings of Maryland resumed the position of chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee. Then of course, he made staff changes, and he made
them on a political basis—and John Adams was out of a job. The story I got
is that Tydings, who had no personal feelings against John Adams, called
Forrestal and said, "Adams has good experience on the Hill which could be
very helpful to you in OSD." And Forrestal through Leva, maybe Leva taking

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the lead, brought John Adams into the Department, and he became the head of
the legislative section of the General Counsel's office.

Through that role Adams worked quite directly with Larkin on the conﬁr-
mination hearings for Anna Rosenberg, and he'd be up there fairly close to
what was going on and doing what he could do through his contacts with com-
mmittee staff and the like. He kept up his acquaintance with Anna, as some
others of us did, down through the years, and would visit with her.

Because Adams had his run-in with Senator [Joseph] McCarthy after he became
the Army's chief lawyer, he lost his post in the Army eventually [after] there
was word from the Hill that he had to go. Then he had some very, very difﬁcult
years. We were very close then, he would drop in downtown at my ofﬁce (I had
left the Department), and I remember what he went through very vividly. He
used to visit as he went around looking for a job, but he never could ﬁnd a
job—people were that afraid of having any contact with him.

Adams used to visit with Mrs. Rosenberg and so forth down through the years.
One day he told me a story, I think because I made a comment about her; and he
said, "She's not Jewish!" I asked him what he meant, and he said, "Well, you
know, we always thought she was." She had a Jewish father and I think a Catholic
mother, and while she was assistant secretary her mother was alive and living
in Rome—again this is my memory. Adams's story is that, when he visited with
her some years later, he referred back to one day when she returned to the Secre-
tary's ofﬁce with Mr. Larkin, reporting what went on in that day's conﬁrmation
hearing, and asked, "Do you remember, Anna, the day you were in the ofﬁce, in
tears, and you were saying, "If I weren't a New Yorker, if I weren't a woman,
and if I weren't Jewish, they'd never dare do this to me."

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She stopped him right there and said, "I never said, 'If I weren't Jewish'." That's Adams's story, and that's when we focused on the fact of her mother.

CONDIT: Mr. Leva thought she was Jewish, there's no doubt about that. And I have another story from Marshall Carter that he had advised her against the first group of nominees to be her military aide. Finally, she selected James F. Collins, who later became a general. When she did select him, Carter said to her, "Well, he's an Irish Catholic." And according to Carter, she said, "And I'm a Hungarian Jew, we'll get along just fine."

GOODRICH: That's fascinating. Now you must get hold of Mr. Adams, if only on the telephone.

CONDIT: When did she start saying she wasn't, though?

GOODRICH: The point is she never said anything, and that is the only time I have heard that. I should say that John Adams's story of what she said when she came back from the Hill that day is the only occasion until this moment that I have ever heard her quoted on that. In New York I'm sure that everybody thought she was Jewish. I don't think anyone had a bit of doubt about that. I do know from personal knowledge that she would contribute to Jewish charities in a, for those days, very handsome way. Whether she did this only because she was solicited, I have no idea. All I know, like others' [knowledge], is based on the assumption that she was Jewish; and her husband, by the way, Mr. Rosenberg, was Jewish. They later divorced, and she married Paul Hoffman.

CONDIT: Was Hoffman Jewish?
GOODRICH: No. I never had any question in my mind until John Adams's statement. I guess we were talking about something, I [myself] had never heard the Levi statement.

CONDIT: She was viewed as Jewish.

GOODRICH: And a good deal of the opposition to her came from the machinations of these fringe antisemitic groups that exist to dig up all kinds of material.

CONDIT: Including one Jewish man who had been converted.

GOODRICH: Yes, that was the man. So Pat Carter's comment is very interesting but, it's worth comment, and it wouldn't surprise me to hear that she'd say that.

CONDIT: Of course, strictly speaking, she could not be an orthodox Jew.

GOODRICH: Not all Jews are.

CONDIT: What I mean is, with her mother a Roman Catholic, it would not be possible to meet the qualifications.

GOODRICH: Assuming the correctness of that recollection, of her having said that. I might have gotten this from her secretary, or maybe from Mr. Charles Tyrold, have you ever talked with him?

CONDIT: No, I never have.

GOODRICH: Now there's a man who is very close to Paul Nitze. 1911 R Street NW, and I don't have his phone number.
CONDIT: You were saying one time on the telephone something about Leva that gave me a new impression—that he was sort of tough.

GOODRICH: Not tough. A quality that might be regarded the same way but should be described differently. He has a very deep, strong voice and a strong Alabama inflection. He is, like Frank Nash, very communicative, very communicating. He is extraordinarily bright. He invariably knows what he's talking about, and he makes his points in a very emphatic way. Behind it all, he is a complete gentleman, but he does come over very strongly.

CONDIT: He would impress a secretary [of Defense], I think.

GOODRICH: Beyond any question. One interesting thing that struck me was the nature of his relationship with Forrestal, the fact that it was close and effective, despite the traits attributed to Forrestal—his seeming recessiveness, withdrawal from a lot of contact. One wondered how.

CONDIT: And then he got along with Johnson, when Johnson came in.

GOODRICH: Yes. Marx is a highly successful lawyer. He went from the Pentagon directly into the law firm of Henry Fowler, who later became Secretary of the Treasury and, during the Korean war, head of OPM, whatever that was called, Office of Production Management.* Fowler is an urbane Virginia gentleman, I see him quite frequently. He is still active in business, although he has

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*In 1951, Fowler became Defense Production Administrator and later the National Production Administrator; the first was an independent agency; the second, a part of the Department of Commerce.
got to be 75. He commutes to New York every week. The other partners in Fowler's office were mostly Virginia gentlemen, one a Connecticut Yankee, writing a history either of Connecticut or Rhode Island, I forget. Marx joined that firm and became a very effective member. He's now the head of that firm. Fowler never went back to it after the Treasury secretaryship, he joined a New York banking house. Marx simply is an extraordinarily successful lawyer and he has clients galore and people love him, and so forth.

CONDIT: I gather that his success didn't really transfer to the relationship with Marshall. I'm talking Lava and Marshall. Lava's success with Johnson didn't transfer to another success when Marshall came in.

GOODRICH: I would have to say I really don't know enough to comment on that. Lava seemed to me to be effective with Johnson. How you characterize it in terms of success again is something I wouldn't know, and as for any lesser effectiveness with Marshall, I'd be surprised because I really don't recall as of that time any mention of any shortcomings. Lava makes friends very quickly and very effectively. Working with him very closely here in the department at that time, including the transition to the Marshall regime, was Admiral Houser, then a captain in the Navy, who was the department's principal liaison with the House Armed Services Committee. It just may be a coincidence, but the chairman of that committee, Carl Vinson, came from Milledgeville, Georgia; and Admiral Houser came from Milledgeville, Georgia. Their conversation, their inflection and diction, which sometimes
required New Yorkers to hold on tight, was completely intelligible when they talked with each other, that is to say Vinson and Houser, and to some extent that was true also of Leva, who was an Alabaman. The fourth interesting character in this quadrumvirate of characters would be General "Jerry" Persons, Wilton B. Persons, who was an Alabaman.

CONDIT: He had had Houser's place before Houser came, had he not? Where was Persons by this time?

GOODRICH: I can't place him directly, but the recollection I retain is that he headed for SHAPE when Eisenhower took over the direction of SHAPE, and he became Eisenhower's chief staff assistant. Whether he handled public relations or what his formal title was, I don't know, but Persons was as well known to us as Leva and as Houser. He was part of this team, at the OSD level, and he is another one of these very remarkable people who come up through the service, a very effectively communicating man, very adept at Hill relationships (Persons). Houser had a very slight speech impediment. He was very effective in his relations with the Hill, but he was not, I would say, at the same level of performance or achievement as Persons. Persons was another one of these remarkable characters. A very polished, gracious gentleman. He stayed at SHAPE and came back when Eisenhower became president. He was in the White House for many years as a very quiet assistant.

It was Persons and William T. Rogers, who became Deputy Attorney General, who got me in to counsel Wilson after he got into trouble in his confirmation hearings with the Senate committee. McNeil might have started that, I don't
know, because McNeil was close to Persons, who was part of the old OSD team. When Mr. Wilson made his famous statement to the Senate committee about "you men" and "what's good for General Motors," or whatever the version was ("what's good for General Motors is good for the country" and vice versa, etc), there was some feeling that he had created some difficulties for himself and perhaps ought to be counseled in his relations with the committee and what to say. They asked me to be his personal counsel, very much as Lovett did when he went into the ammunition shortage hearings [in 1953], although Lovett did that on his own, that was his idea. The counseling of Wilson was Persons' and I think McNeil's and Bill Rogers's idea.

CONDIT: Did you have any direct role in the troops for Europe controversy between January and April 1951?

GOODRICH: Yes. That was the period of the great debate. I gave you a footnote in my comments on the manuscript about a speech that was delivered by [Senator Brien] McMahon, and I'm pretty sure I wrote it. I have a little bit of conscience about it, because I cribbed something that John Adams had written, but I cribbed it with his permission. When the issue of troops for Europe got a little tenuous in the debates on the Hill and McMahon wanted to sum it up, we drafted those remarks for him. They started out with something Adams had written which I can't remember specifically, but Adams counted the number of days it took for Napoleon to return from Elba and then to march to Moscow, the number of days it took Hannibal to cross the Alps, something like that, and we used that theme of the passage of time, brief periods of time to accomplish great things, to [explain] the need for expedition in this debate on the Hill. If they could do it in those eras, we certainly could do such things today. Adams is a very accomplished writer, very fluent gentleman, a South Dakotan.
CONDIT: Is he still alive?

GOODRICH: Yes, and he's the author of a book that came out about a year and a half ago on McCarthy called *Without Precedent*. I asked him where he got the title of the book, and he said that was the caption on the editorial of *The New York Times* commenting on the McCarthy hearings. He was the Army's counsel.

CONDIT: I'm sorry that he had such a bad time after that; that was awful.

GOODRICH: Yes, totally inexcusable. It took several years for him to get out of it. We used that introduction, and McMahon did make the remarks. One comment I've made to you before, I recall, was the remarkable way in which Senator [Henry Cabot] Lodge, a Republican from Massachusetts (his brother was the Connecticut politician), and McMahon of Connecticut, used to team up in that debate. As McMahon said, "If you can't find me, get Lodge." They just worked that way, as a team. They put that thing through the Congress.

CONDIT: So they really helped the administration.

GOODRICH: They certainly did. They were on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, both of them, and at that time I think Senator Vandenberg was still around, I can't be certain, he might have left, I really can't recall. But Senator [Alexander] Wiley was there, and he was still quite vocal in opposition to many of the European programs in particular. I've told you some of the stories about Wiley, and McMahon and Lodge together were great.

CONDIT: How did General Marshall do in his testimony?
GOODRICH: My recollection is that it went over very well, I wasn't there when he gave his testimony. They asked me to write a first draft [of the Secretary's statement for military assistance]. It didn't survive. They finally prepared a much simplified version. I couched the first draft to a large extent in terms of what the two congressional committees had learned through their tours of the European countries, indicating what seemed to me to be the fact that they were quite satisfied with what they found and were told, because they met extensively with foreign and American officers.

Every time I hear the word "junket" about some of these trips abroad by congressional committees I think of those two trips. Whatever meaning "junket" has, it doesn't exclude working your tail off, because those committees met with people right around the clock. It's true that some of the meetings might have featured a drink or a sandwich or something, but you went in motorcades from meeting to meeting with sirens screaming and lights flashing, and that happened in the days when you never used to see that down on Pennsylvania Avenue as you do today. You went through all these European cities that way, and these committees simply were run ragged. There was virtually no rest. The House committee spent about ten days more or less, starting in Paris, where they were briefed by General Eisenhower at the Hotel Astoria.

In my notes I mention that sometime in the spring of 1951 I had gotten the impression through my work on one of the interdepartmental committees preparing the military assistance legislation that there might be congressional difficulties and I either talked with Leva or wrote a memorandum (I think there was a memorandum) to him. I suggested that the Congress would be much
better informed on the subject of the new legislation (the extension of the military assistance legislation) if it could get its own first-hand information about the extent, if any, to which the European countries that would receive aid had made any progress since the war ended in rebuilding their industry, tooling up, let us say, to produce whatever they might contribute to the rearmament of Europe, the effectiveness of NATO, and whatever else was involved at that time. I thought that we ought to get the important committees in the House and the Senate to go to Europe and take a look for themselves before they considered the legislation.

Leva thought it was a very good idea and called me in. General Persons was in the office, and he agreed that it was a good idea. In fact, since he had been the Hill man in OSD, his reaction was a very important one. He said that, since he was leaving in the next day or two, he would take it up with Ike as the very first order of business to make sure that this was agreeable to Ike in his new role as commander of NATO. We got word back approving it. Then the legislative people organized the project, the committees, and the House formed a joint committee, or a combined committee actually, of appropriations, armed services, and foreign affairs. I forget how many were in the group, I do have pictures that were taken by official photographers (they're also in the attic), at various points we stopped at.

Both trips started in Paris, but the House trip came in June 1951. I'd been sent over four or five days earlier. Literally, I walked in one Monday morning and I was asked if I could get to Paris to work with General Persons and General Cortlandt van Rensselaer Schuyler, who was another top assistant who was an advance man for these trips. They found a space for
me on an airplane leaving National Airport at 1:00, a Connie [Constellation] going over on a military mission; and, between 9:00 that morning and 1:00 that day, I had to get passport, money, pack a bag. I was on that plane and in Paris late the next day. Then I spent a few days with General Persons and General Schuyler, telling them who would be on the committee and what we hoped the committee would do, and General Persons would be back in touch with Washington on whatever system was used for direct conferencing. The committee came over a few days later; I was not on the plane that brought them over. We used Constellations in those days, those were the special air mission planes. They were greeted by General Eisenhower at the airport. They then met with him at his office. From Paris they went to Brussels and then London.

**CONDIT:** What is the date of this?

**GOODRICH:** In June [1951]. The committee then split, one group going to Oslo and another to Amsterdam, reconvening in Copenhagen, I believe. Then to Italy. In Italy we joined the Italian army in the field on maneuvers. From Italy, we came back directly to Paris, late one evening. Bryce N. Harlow was a representative of the House Armed Services Committee staff on that trip. He later became Eisenhower's assistant in the White House when Ike was President. It was a very full and active trip lasting nine or ten days; and, based on the cities that I can recall, I imagine that not much more than one day was spent in each place. We did have to get on the Autobahn in Germany because we started in one place and went down for a luncheon meeting in Heidelberg and then we went to where the American army was engaged in maneuvers in the region of the Black Forest, I think across
the Rhine from Mannheim. That was that trip, and then we came back directly.

The next month, in July, the Senate group went over. That was a smaller group, and it did not have members of the Appropriations Committee. It had simply the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee senators, not all of them of course, just a select group of about 10 or 11. Senator McMahon did not make the flight over, he came over on a PanAm sleeper plane; and Senator Lodge, I believe, did the same, joining us in Paris. They too started with a briefing by General Eisenhower (this was late in July). The Senate group meetings were quite different. They met at the very top levels—heads of government, heads of state. For example, the House group met with Departmental people, with the MAAG people (Military Assistance and Advisory Groups). The Senate committee was simply briefed in Paris. Then to London, where they met with Churchill and other current British government dignitaries. Either on the House trip or Senate trip, there was a dinner in the dining room of the House of Lords or House of Commons with a number of British officials, quite an interesting affair in terms of the exchange of greetings and remarks.

From there to Spain and the meeting with Franco at his summer palace outside Madrid—a meeting famous in my mind because that's where Senator [John J.] Sparkman taxed General Franco very directly and forthrightly: "If you want to become a member of NATO, you're going to have to convince the American people that there is no anti-Protestantism in Spain. There must be freedom of religion, and Protestant churches must be allowed to exist and they must be allowed to meet." One week later, when we got back to Rome, there was a statement in the New York Herald Tribune by the Spanish
government that there would be freedom of religion in Spain. These meetings, of course, were totally fascinating, to see people whose names had been in headlines down through the years and the way in which they were talked to, as well as with, by some of the Senators.

From there to Athens, Greece. At that point, this was a slightly longer trip, just about two weeks, maybe a day or two more, terribly hot. Athens really was an oven on the 21st-22d July. We were asked to the home of the American ambassador, who I think was John [E.] Peurifoy. He was later killed in an automobile accident in Indonesia. Mrs. Peurifoy had us outside in her garden and said, "I know what you've all been through. You've probably been drinking from morning to night (everybody really had been drinking orange juice, you didn't dare drink anything else); and you've been having this terribly rich food (which was absolutely true, with lunch and dinner and everything thrown at you); it's terribly hot; you must be terribly tired; and I thought you'd appreciate nothing better than a good cold American buffet supper." There was cold turkey and cold lobster, and it was so refreshing. The next day there were meetings with various Greek officials and department heads, and the next night the committee was invited to the summer palace of the king and queen at Tatoi.

That afternoon was free. Senator [Theodore Francis] Green decided he wanted to do two things. (He was then 83 years of age.) He wanted to take a swim—we wouldn't let him go by himself, we didn't feel that we should—so the principal staff man, one of the two staff men on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Carl [H.] Marcy, and I went along with him in some old dilapidated official Greek automobile. We drove down to a most beautiful
bay with a little beach, and Senator Green stripped down to his undershorts. We didn't swim; but he had a swim, got back into this car, dried off and put on his clothes and came out wearing tennis shoes. We were going to the Acropolis. He led us through the Agora first, at the base, and gave us a professorial lecture on everything there. I never knew that he was an archaeologist at heart. Then we climbed the Acropolis, and he really climbed it. On the rocks, with his sneakers, he knew what he was getting into! There we were—Carl Marcy and I were infinitely younger than him at the time, fifty years or so—and we were dressed to accompany a senator, but with short sleeves. We knew we had to be at the summer palace that night for dinner, and we simply had to quit about 4:00 to get back to the hotel and freshen up. He stayed, he had more climbing to do!

We met him later in the lobby and we went out to dinner at the summer palace in a group. When we got there, we discovered that the menu again was cold roast turkey and cold lobster, as the previous night, and caviar in great big sterling silver buckets. We had dinner on a terrace. This is a dinner where the queen really took over from the king, who, delightful as he was to listen to, seemed to run out of things to say. She would pick up as he wound down, and she soon was conducting the conversations with the senators, and it was very lively. There were two large round tables, and I happened to be at the one with the king and queen. Senator Wiley was at that one, and Senator Green. It was very lively and there were no holds barred. I took no notes and don't remember the details except the interplay of comments.

**CONDIT:** How did you feel the Senators reacted? Were they favorably impressed?
GOODRICH: Everybody seemed to be, where Queen Frederika was concerned, quite captivated. They were all, by the same token, in a political sense, I think, objective in the same manner that, for example, Senator Sparkman has to be described in his very calm warning to General Franco in Spain about freedom of religion. It was a pleasant conversation, it covered a lot of things. Greece wanted to get into NATO (Spain also wanted to, so did Turkey on that trip), and it seemed to me that the queen was able to comment effectively on whatever doubts might have been expressed by the different senators there. I remember Senator Wiley making a personal comment back at the hotel as we returned. Going up in the elevator, he was quite clear that, despite his sort of isolationist views at that time, he was impressed by what the queen had to say.

We went on to Turkey and spent a day and a half there. That was dismal heat. We had hoped to be in and out of that place rather quickly, and we left our bags on our plane and took just one bag into town, only to be greeted for the first and only time on this trip with the fact that the foreign minister was having a black tie dinner that night. Cars had to be sent out to the planes, which were standing in that blazing sun; and, when our bags got back that evening, [we had to dress] in about fifteen minutes. One bathroom on the entire floor to prepare for the dinner at the foreign minister's! Everybody pulled his tuxedo out of the bag, there was no one to press them, and they were all wrinkled and crumpled. That was the foreign minister whom the Turks later hanged for some crime. We were whipped around Ankara in that heat, in that day and a half, from meeting to meeting, up and down what seemed to be one
principal boulevard, at that time. It all looked pretty nice. There were some good-looking institutional buildings along the route. Later that evening when we took a walk, if you walked fifteen feet off that main street you were into the hairiest type of back-street-looking neighborhood.

CONDIT: Do you feel that the trip helped to get the next military assistance appropriation through?

GOODRICH: That was my feeling, and that was why in the first draft I prepared for General Marshall I tried to reflect what seemed to me to be the sense of the senators' comments, attitudes, and reactions. We then went to Italy, where we met with the Pope down at Castel Gandolfo, as well as with [Alcide] De Gasperi, the prime minister, and others, and again very intensive working sessions.

CONDIT: Did you have any chance to see general economic conditions in those countries?

GOODRICH: We were largely dependent on reports made by our people there, but we did get a sense of economic improvement from what we saw as we got around. From Italy we went to Germany, which had to be the principal sore point if one wanted to analyze the trip in that respect, and there we met mainly with American representatives. Whether or not the senators themselves met in private meetings with any of the German officials I don't know. We started out at the ambassador's house in Bad Homburg, which is close to where the airport was located. There were a number of German officials present, and there was an evening of discussion. These discussions went on in every single city and every single meeting. I mention the highlights.
CONDIT: This would be John McCloy, in 1951?

GOODRICH: Yes, I think it was McCloy. There were meetings all through the day at the different departments. (This was true also in Turkey.) You knew you were in an occupied country, and the attitudes then were very different than I imagine they are today, but the most interesting thing apart from what I have been mentioning, was meeting with the individual department heads, principal political people and the exchange of information. I really do wish I had taken notes, I simply didn't. Nobody was taking notes, unless the staff people later made notes, used possibly for committee reports. The concluding meetings when we returned to Paris included a lengthy session with President Auriol, with Senator Lodge acting as interpreter.

(new tape)

CONDIT: Let's start with the MacArthur hearings, because you had a direct role there.

GOODRICH: In my opinion, one of the best sources for information on the MacArthur hearings, particularly insofar as they involved General Marshall's testimony, would be beyond question Felix Larkin, who then was general counsel. Leva left office to go into private practice in the spring of 1951; Larkin was the man who accompanied General Marshall personally every day to the Hill. The briefing system involved two meetings a day—in the morning and during the lunch hour—so that, insofar as Marshall knew what particular subjects were going to be discussed, the concentration in the morning and the afternoon briefing sessions would be on that particular subject. He met with a group of us, both morning and during the lunch hour after he had had his lunch. The meetings would last anywhere from 10 to 30 minutes, depending on how much concern there was or information
that had to be discussed or provided to the general. The group that met
with the general usually included Nash, Carter, Larkin, Lava, me, and some-
times I guess Mrs. Rosenberg might be there, and anyone else who might have
been involved in a particular subject matter. I can't particularly recall
whether any of the chiefs would have come in on any of those sessions, some-
how they don't come back to me as being in that group. My principal task for
those hearings was the review of the cable correspondence between Headquarters
Far East and the Joint Chiefs. They were made available, after selection and
review here, to the staff of the committees holding the hearings. The hearings
were closed, conducted on a classified basis. The transcript of the hearing
was reviewed on a daily basis by [Rear] Admiral [Arthur C.] Davis for security
classification, and after his review the committee would release whatever
portions of the [cleared] transcript of the hearing they wanted to release.

CONDIT: This all got out in one day, is that right?

GOODRICH: I don't know whether the transcripts were released on a daily
basis contemporaneously with that day's testimony or whether there was a
time lag or not. Adm. Davis was stationed on the Hill in the committee room,
all during the hearings, and it is possible that he was able to review and
ask any questions that had to be asked.

CONDIT: I had heard that he allowed most of it out.

GOODRICH: A good deal came out. The only way you would really know is to
make comparisons, but there's so much detail that I can't recall. Of course,
there was extensive press coverage. The important thing was what happened
in the committee room in the interplay between General Marshall and members of the committee. There, I think, Larkin was the key man, he was there with him every day. That worked very well. If he needed something in particular during the daily session, he phoned back. At that point I was his principal deputy in these matters. John Adams was also involved to the extent that there was contact with people on the Hill and committee staffs, and the team worked quite effectively. If something had to be researched quickly, I had two or three of the lawyers working with me in a group and we would do what we had to do and contact whoever had the information.

CONDIT: Did General Marshall give you, by any attitude or by his questions, a feeling as to how sympathetically he was handled or how difficult it might be?

GOODRICH: No, again my recollection of him during that period is much the same as I described in my notes about my impression of him generally in his daily work. This was my own reaction, based on what I saw and observed and now, having read the manuscript, it is quite clear that I was only one of the number of people who would have seen and observed him in meetings and otherwise during that time.

CONDIT: Is this where the story with Frank Nash comes in?

GOODRICH: Yes, in these briefings, one day. It's a story that is very easy to remember. Nash was a man of great communicating ability, never at a loss for words, and always well informed; a person in whom General Marshall obviously had great confidence. As the chief international affairs officer in the Pentagon at that time, Nash played a very important
role in the briefing of information that the general needed and also in reacting to things that were under discussion. General Marshall, as the other party in this particular incident of course, is the gentleman we've all described as being very reserved and very well respected—a highly regarded person no one would take liberties with and with whom no one would exchange an off-color remark or the like. In a briefing one lunch hour, Nash was trying to explain something on which MacArthur had taken a position and it was a somewhat involved matter apparently, because Nash, who was never at a loss for words, got tangled up in his own words in his effort to describe what MacArthur had been trying to say.

In his effort to get along with what he was trying to communicate to General Marshall, Nash finally said, "Well, the only thing I can say, general, is that MacArthur got this ass-backwards." And with that, Marshall, who was sitting at his desk with the usual clean desk top and a single sheet of paper right in front of him, heard what Nash said. And the others of us who were in the room, there might have been five or six, really suddenly heard it the same way; and everybody sort of fell into a slightly embarrassed silence, because it didn't sound like quite the comment that was ever made to General Marshall. But in a fraction of a second Marshall, with a very straight face, sitting quite still in his chair, said, "Well, now, Nash," (Nash was in the far right-hand corner of the desk looking across at the general), "You know in about 30 minutes I will be back on the Hill before that committee of senators. Don't you think, when we get to this matter, it would be much better if I were to say 'ass-ackwards'?" And that probably was the only occasion when Nash seemed to blush and we
all thought he might fall out of his chair, but Marshall’s humor came across instantaneously and even Nash had to appreciate the way in which the general worked out Nash’s difficulty in what he was trying to say. But Marshall was talking to him as one would talk to a well-loved son.

CONDIT: As I recall, it took about 7 or 8 days, this testimony.

GOODRICH: More than a week, it ran nine or ten days.

CONDIT: You also said that Marshall appeared to you to be relaxed and steady.

GOODRICH: In light of some of the other comments in the manuscript, at one point I used the word compensated, but he might have been compensating for the demands on him, given his own health or whatever else. If it was compensation, it was very effective. By the same token, I might never have been in there when the real crises were being discussed, and that is quite logical as well as likely. My field having been the general counsel’s office, law and authority, and then to some extent Hill relations because that was always involved, I had nothing to do with other areas of operations, certainly not the operational areas, unless there was some question or special assignment to look into something outside of the legal field. And we frequently got a wide variety of special assignments. So we were asked about matters, really in today’s lingo described as management.

CONDIT: Did you ever meet MacArthur?

GOODRICH: No.

CONDIT Why don’t we go back to your recollections of Dan Edwards?
GOODRICH: He seemed a youngish, fairly rigid man who obviously wanted to be friendly. There were no personal difficulties with any of the lawyers with whom he worked mainly in talking or dealing, but he was always quite rigid and ramrod straight in his manner and appearance. Not that he seemed to want to be ramrod straight in dealing with people, he just held himself that way. His manner, while basically friendly, appeared to give some impression that it was difficult to talk with him. Whether or not he had difficulty in expressing himself, I don't know. He seemed to be somewhat formal when he tried to talk about things, but the impression got around that his relations with the front office were not the best. That was never connected with anything specific as far as the rest of us knew, but after he left there were some comments to the effect that somehow the relationship with the secretary and the deputy secretary didn't quite work out, and why is unknown, as far as I'm concerned. Whether there were particular relationship problems or particular bits of advice or counsel that he gave that might not have been received too well, I do not know. There were no specifics.

CONDIT: How about Mr. Coolidge, of course the opposite.

GOODRICH: Yes, Coolidge was very much the opposite, seemingly very relaxed, very cool, very much the picture of the senior law firm partner; very soft manner of speech. He, we guessed or assumed, had a close personal relationship with Mr. Lovett. His counseling of Mr. Lovett was on a very person-to-person basis. Anything they discussed they quite obviously handled on a man-to-man basis. Coolidge never needed to take
staff people with him for any discussion. He would grasp what was involved and he showed that ability almost as soon as he arrived. He demonstrated a real knack for getting the information he needed and being prepared for what he had to discuss or handle, and that’s the way it worked. He was very delightful and very pleasant in his relations with all people at virtually all levels that he came in contact with, and he was very widely admired.

CONDIT: You were saying at one time that he hid very much the reactions to his daughter’s sudden death, in late 1951.

GOODRICH: His daughter was killed in that accident very shortly after he came on board and just a day after he and his wife had left to join some friends for a five-day vacation in Bermuda or somewhere like that. The first break he had taken since he had come on board! It was a terribly tragic accident and he came back very quickly. I think he was back the next week, toward the middle or end of the week, very shortly after the funeral.

CONDIT: One thing that Leva told me was that he had been succeeded by two people, by Edwards and Larkin, that they divided the job.

GOODRICH: He was succeeded directly by Edwards, who came in as Assistant Secretary for Law, or Legal and Legislation, whichever came first, it was L&L [Legal and Legislative Affairs]. The next person in the Assistant Secretary (L&L) post was Coolidge, not Larkin.

CONDIT: No, I meant that they had combined the two jobs of assistant secretary and general counsel and that Leva was both, is that correct?
GOODRICH: No, that's not my recollection, although Levi certainly ought to be the best authority for that because Larkin became general counsel under Levi.

CONDIT: Yes, that's right. I didn't use that, but I was wondering because there has always been a question in my mind.

GOODRICH: This book has charts, I think it would show. Larkin was the successor to Levi as general counsel, and whether Levi for some interval after he became Assistant Secretary (L&L) continued to carry the title of general counsel, I don't know, I doubt that he would have done it.

CONDIT: What about Roger Kent?

GOODRICH: Roger Kent, as I mentioned to you on the phone, is another one of those people I call great men. He'd been a naval officer during World War II. He had great hopes of being Secretary of the Navy under Mr. Kennedy but didn't make it. He was an active political figure in California state Democratic politics and the chairman of the state Democratic committee in the '60s. He'd run for Congress twice, I think, in his home county, just north of the Golden Gate in Marin County, but never succeeded in an election. His father had been apparently a close confidant of Woodrow Wilson. And his father, having been a congressman from California, although a Republican, was appointed by Wilson to be the first chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. Roger Kent as a child lived here in Washington in what is now the F Street Club building. That was the home. So Roger came from a very knowledgeable political and public service background and was in his mid-40s or early 40s when he got here
as general counsel. That was after Larkin left, and Coolidge took over as assistant secretary. He was very much like Coolidge in terms of professional makeup, confidence, and view of his role as a lawyer; but in disposition he was a pepper pot. He was full of energy, a chain smoker. When he walked he was almost running—he had a vigorous, energetic walk. He was just tops as a guy, a great personality. He was very incisive on legal matters, organizational matters, matters of authority. That type of question would come up repeatedly in terms, for example, of getting things done, which you deal with a good deal in the manuscript. Roger would generally be involved with those.

CONDIT: Can you name something specific that you can remember that he was the chief honcho on?

GOODRICH: The best recollection I have is the question of ammunition shortages.

CONDIT: Was that in 1952 or 1953 or 1954?

GOODRICH: There is a memorandum which will have a date. Ron Hoffman has that memorandum. It's fairly lengthy. I recall last year he showed it to me and he wondered about its origins, and the contribution to it, so you can date the problem best that way. My hunch is that it dates back to when the problem or the question of whether there were shortages first came up and that, based on your manuscript, was in late 1951, when you had remarked that Lovett overreacted—when Lovett determined something had to be done and he got after the Army to place orders for ammunition. It may well be that that was the time, both Coolidge and Kent being new, that
they both jumped into that problem and Roger put together this thorough-going memorandum. Now, conceivably, he could have done that memorandum also in early 1953, as the hearings on the Hill under Senator Margaret Chase Smith were "giving up".

CONDIT: If Hoffman were so interested in it, I have a feeling it's the later date, because at the earlier date it would fall within my province and he should have brought it to my attention.

GOODRICH: It could well have come up in between. It's just very hard to guess at. The funny thing is, I probably have these papers somewhere on what I call a desk at home. I think Ron made a copy for me. I wish I could put my hands on them; if I can, I'll phone the date to you.

CONDIT: I'd like to ask your opinions about some people who were outside of legal and legislative areas. Do you remember when Marshall started the EXOS office with "Pat" Carter?

GOODRICH: General Laven Allen? Was he part of it?

CONDIT: The switchover from Leven Allen to Carter.

GOODRICH: Allen remained, if I recall correctly, and Carter came in.

CONDIT: How did that work, and what were the reactions to it?

GOODRICH: Again judging from your manuscript, there were adverse reactions, but I don't recall them.
CONDIT: Eventually they were adverse reactions. I went back to the Carter/Underwood interview, and Underwood particularly remembers how exercised McNeil was over it. He said that at a staff meeting where he, Carter or Underwood, had read aloud an Army paper explaining the idea of how finished staff work would come to the secretary, Mr. McNeil jumped up and said that that was the most subversive thing that had ever hit the United States Government because it only gave one opinion to the secretary.

GOODRICH: That's the old problem of the single sheet of paper. I can understand that and I can't tell you whether I recall that at the time, but it sounds completely logical. Under Forrestal and Johnson, McNeil and the others, Leva in particular; under Forrestal and probably under Johnson, Ohly also—without being an assistant secretary, these men had direct access to the secretary and they were in and out all the time. The Marshall Carter operation interposed what you can call a channel or bottleneck or whatever. And conceivably, those who previously had had direct access could view it as some interruption of their ability to get in there and say it straight out—and from their own point of view. Theoretically that might be an uncoordinated point of view. In a direct personal presentation, [how would one know] whether or not everybody else who might have an interest had been contacted and what their views were. The theory of the Carter operation was to make sure that everything had been checked out, was fully staffed and coordinated before a final recommendation was placed before the secretary. In terms of management theory there is nothing wrong with that; in fact, it's very good. But if you are cutting somebody off from the head shed, he
could see his authority being infringed on; and, for a direct actionist type like McNeil, that might have signaled a problem—things aren't going to be the way they used to be. We're going to get bureaucratised. I'm not quoting, I'm trying to imagine what might be said. Anybody could feel that way, everybody reacts to any management reform or innovation, whatever it's called.

CONDIT: But you yourself didn't know of any feeling, such as "Marshall is imposing a general staff system on the civilians here."

GOODRICH: It was called completed staff work, which is a good doctrine, military or otherwise; and it's good in any organization, but it was a military doctrine. I remember it from my time in the service, and even as a reservist. There is nothing wrong with it, it's the same thing that so-called management consultants today use in however they describe the process. But no, I don't recall hearing anybody say, "My God, we're having a general staff system imposed on us," because at the time one of the tenets of the organization, as much as it was striving for what we call unification, was, "Let's not make a general staff out of OSD. We're not trying to duplicate a general staff concept of the individual military departments. This is going to be a civilian office, and it is going to try to evolve policy and see to it that the policies are carried out, but we're not going to give orders." You see this coming up in the procurement section and the ammunition section of the manuscript. Based on that recollection my hunch is that no one really viewed the Carter operation as a general staff operation. It's just that where direct access might have
been the procedure until then with preceding secretaries, it might have appeared that it would no longer be the case.

CONDIT: General Underwood said, Carter didn't say this, we were acting more as a chief of staff than as a secretariat. In my understanding that would mean that, instead of just coordinating papers that came in, they were reaching out and saying, "You need to have an opinion on this and I want to hear it," and that kind of thing. In other words, they were initiating action as well as simply coordinating action that occurred.

GOODRICH: If they were initiating action, sending it back and saying give us more on this, or can you beef up point B a little more, and so forth, that would interpose another level of perhaps decision or final formulation of any recommendation, and to that extent it could irritate an assistant secretary who presumably is in a position to have the last word on any matter in his area.

CONDIT: It is Coolidge who complains, and who says to Lovett in the fall of 1952 that, no matter how superb the performance of the people who are in EXOS, it should not be run by military people. As a non-lawyer I think I understand his lawyerly concern, because the secretary is by statute denied a general staff, and if he has military men acting in a secretariat or a chief of staff way, it seems to me that it might be possible that this could be later used or claimed that he had simply bypassed the law. Does that seem to you to be far-fetched?

GOODRICH: That's a logical extrapolation of what the ultimate appearance might be to people outside who would be inclined to criticize, or people
inside who might be inclined to criticize. You could use that approach
to argue that, in fact, under the guise of a coordinating office, you are
creating a general staff—but I never had the impression that it functioned
that way. My impression was that they were trying to be certain that papers
coming in had been fully staffed and gave full credit or accounting for all
of the elements of the problem.

CONDIT: I was really very impressed by the system. Marshall had used it
in State, and I thought that it makes good sense. It's the way to handle
things. Perhaps combined with Marshall's reticence and rectitude, people
may have felt that it was difficult to get to him.

GOODRICH: That was my first experience at a reasonably high level, and I
really was not in the executive levels in DoD and OSD. But later on in the
FAA, and partially in the Atomic Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and then beyond that in my last organizational job at Amtrak, I saw many
occasions when officials would try to get to the top man. Particularly in
FAA, certainly in Amtrak, and to a major extent in AEC (NRC), the second-
and third-level officials were very numerous—there were many divisions,
departments, functioning areas—and theoretically all of the people head-
ing the offices or divisions and functioning areas were tops in their
field and expected to know all the facts relating to their performance.
Many of them invariably would try to get to the top man, whether it was
the president, or the chairman of the commission, or the administrator,
and say, "This is what we've got to do." Then the boss, who might be
attracted by the idea, would suddenly discover, when he announced what he was going to do in a staff meeting, that two or three other officers would say, "Hay, we never heard of that." And "Are you aware of A, B, and C factors that apparently haven't been considered?" There are a large number of factors in large organizations that simply have to be brought together and reconciled if the boss isn't going to go off on a wrong foot. Now, God knows, Defense was the biggest organization of all, and probably always will be. I gather from your description of what Coolidge felt that he didn't argue with getting all the information and reconciling the different information, but the appearance of its being the forum.

CONDIT: I'm going further, he just said it should not be done by military men, and I'm trying to explain this to myself.

GOODRICH: That's an interesting version of the civilian control doctrine, which is a perennial. My hunch, from what I read in the press, is that it continues to this day, and in fact has spread to many other departments of the government in terms of retired military personnel heading up what are commonly regarded as civilian agencies. But in Defense in particular, where you have clearly military organization and the doctrine—I forget its origin—that it be under civilian control, the meaning of that requirement is subject to all types of interpretation. I'm sure that, with changing personalities, you get a variety of interpretations. Coolidge's view as a counselor as well as legal counsel to the secretary is in the classic sense absolutely correct. If there is a doctrine of civilian
administration of the military departments and civilian control of the government, then appearances should conform to the statutory prescription. When you have the last hands that touch the paper before it gets to the decider, particularly when the decisionmaker himself is a military man or an ex-military man of unquestioned military background, the appearance might well be that civilian control perhaps is not in effect or is being jeopardized or isn't squeezing through, and there you have to look at how it actually works.

My impression of Carter at the time—again I seem to have a personal impression that is at variance with some of the others—is still logically consistent with what Coolidge may have said. The fact that Carter might have gotten on well with a few or many people becomes immaterial. That he worked carefully and conscientiously and let people have their say, that he ensured that papers, before they went to the secretary, had all the necessary inputs, whether from civilians or military, would not be inconsistent with what Coolidge said, which was that the appearance of it still was not good. And that might have been an ad hoc view. The system was started when Marshall, a military man, was secretary and now, as you point out, in comes Lovett, who was a civilian; and yet the same criticism seems to occur in Coolidge's thinking, notwithstanding that the top man clearly is civilian as opposed to military. That might mean that he was concerned mainly with the fact that the last hands on a paper before it got to the number one man were military hands.

CONDIT: I'd like to also ask you if you have any memory of General Burns.
GOODRICH: Yes, a very warm memory.

CONDIT: Was he a strong person in the department?

GOODRICH: Yes, in a very soft way—very soft spoken.

CONDIT: People have said that they didn't have any memory of any effect that he had, and yet I felt from the record that he had had quite a bit of an effect.

GOODRICH: I've never thought of him in terms of that type of comment, but it suggests to me to call him the navigator, if you will. I've heard him described in many other ways. People were told to go to him when there were problems. Did you need advice; is there some clash of opinion; difficulty in getting agreement? Go in and talk to General Burns, he's been around, he's seen a lot. He was in lend-lease with Harry Hopkins in World War II, he was the number two man, if I recall correctly. He'd had extensive experience. He was very much like Larkin, a very relaxed Irish quality: he liked people, he talked with them very easily, he wasn't stuffy. Nash was the same way, but Nash was a little more assertive, a little more dynamic—his voice had a little greater tone of command. Nash didn't command people, he wasn't issuing commands, it's just the way he spoke. When you got into a conversation with Nash, your voice sometimes took on the tones of his voice, because that was the level and you wanted to be heard. You have some comments by Tannenwald, even in black and white I can hear the emphatic quality!

CONDIT: I've never met him, and I can hear it!
GOODRICH: The emphatic quality was there, and it comes through even in
the few words of his comments in your manuscript. Nash, in a very admirable
way, was just that way; but Burns, in his very admirable way, was just at a
different decibel level.

CONDIT: Did you have any reason to know that he had any effect on Marshall,
that Marshall sought his opinion, or anything? He'd been brought in by Johnson.

GOODRICH: My answer to that would have to be no, in the sense that I
really don't know. I do not have any information.

CONDIT: I have found Burns writing memos to Marshall apparently in
response to verbal requests. Then people have said to me, "Well, he just
offered that," which is a great put-down. I can't quite believe it, it
doesn't ring right.

GOODRICH: I really don't know what his charter may have been under
Marshall. I'll say this, the problem of making the kinds of decisions
that had to be made during Marshall's incumbency was quite different
than during the Johnson incumbency.

CONDIT: It was much worse. [I meant, the problems were far worse, more
difficult.]

GOODRICH: You might say, although it might be a reckless way to say it,
Marshall didn't need a lot of military input.

CONDIT: This is on the matter of foreign affairs. NATO, there's a lot of
Burns in my NATO chapters.
GOODRICH: Yes, a great deal, because Burns was a prominent man under Marshall. During the NATO years Marshall was the secretary of state or in the period in between, and he was the author of the Marshall plan, the credited author, and that's only the other side of the military aid coin.

CONDIT: Would you question anything you've read about Burns? Do you think I've given him too much prominence?

GOODRICH: I can't say that you've given him either too much or not enough. I can only give you my personal reaction to him as one of the important wheels in the apparatus. A very well oiled wheel that fitted in and did its job. He was always approachable, you could always see him. I used to see him years later, after he was fully out.

CONDIT: You told that story about General Lemnitzer.

GOODRICH: Age 51 and training as a paratrooper—the young man who brought it up was quite exercised about this, and so I said, "Let's go in and talk to General Burns." The fear that was expressed was, "The military assistance program just won't get on without him." General Burns said, "If he died tonight, the program would go on tomorrow." The common sense reaction. One of the problems was that the successor to General Lemnitzer was a completely different type (Scott). Again, personally a very decent, shy, retiring, almost reticent individual, who I think was an engineer. In any event, he came from a post at Fort Belvoir, but I think his background was as an engineer officer, and he really seemed to us—he might even have told us—to be having difficulty in that job. He didn't like it, I believe he wanted relief, I think he even said so—"What am I doing
here?" That would have made General Burns more important as an adviser in that area, with the head of an office no longer Lemnitzer. The successor to General Scott, General Olmsted [George Olmsted, International Bank] was an insurance man, a banker, back in Iowa; a West Point graduate in the early 1920s. I know him very well, I worked with him in Defense and I did some work for him back in 1970 in my law office. For almost four years more recently, my office was in his building, I'd go up to see him and talk on numerous occasions. He is a very outgoing personality.

CONDIT: Should I go to see him?

GOODRICH: That could be very interesting. I think particularly during those early years—with the whole issue of unification and civilian control, the emergence of a third military department, the competition between the departments for funds during the first three years when the effort was to reduce military expenditures, the debate over roles and missions, the great 70-group issue involving the Air Force, the carrier (USS United States) issue—the rivalry between the services was always in the background, in everything that went on.

CONDIT: Let me get this right, now; is this true during Korea?

GOODRICH: No, I don't mean it as being true during Korea, but as one of the backdrops, out of the first three years of the department, and I don't think it disappeared totally in some of the types of things you have mentioned.

CONDIT: There was going to be a post-Korea.
GOODRICH: There was going to be a lifetime career, as distinguished from post-Korea, for all of the individuals involved, particularly the military. Roles and missions—as a subject matter, as a topic of discussion, as a debating point—was very important in those days, and I'm sure it is no less important today. You read about it in the papers, growing out of the invasion of Grenada. Roles and missions and getting together. The unified strike force. It's today's terminology for what was the initial problem of relationships by and among the departments. What did unification mean? And particularly with the early budget problems—cutting back the amount of money for the Defense Department, with each department scrambling, and a new third department of the Air Force in there for its share of the pie. Each seeing what it had to do to grow, or to be prepared. A great many of the specific problems that are covered in the historical manuscript are human problems.

I don't think there is any great reason to be surprised that some of the issues might have been more fiery than others, because they were very important issues to the people involved. Not that anybody insisted on a parochial fight while the war was on; but the decisions that were made undoubtedly were impacting on people whose thinking was involved with where they came from, where they were going, and how they were doing things. You can read the same thing about the campaigns in World War II. Do you use Army troops or Marines when you land on an island? Who moves faster when we get on shore? Who does the job better? Why isn't there better communication between units? The age-old problem.
CONDIT: That's true, but I also have the feeling that, when Louis Johnson was in, the emphasis on economy more or less promised or presaged the feeling that the Air Force view was eventually going to win out, that there was going to be a strong Air Force to deliver a preemptive or retaliatory strike and they were going to emphasize that. The moment Korea started, the need was for ground forces even more than air forces. Air forces were used, surely, but they had a limit. They had a Yalu limit. The ground forces were carrying the real burden of the fighting. In addition to that, where was all this extra money going to go? Really, the pie got divided up rather evenly: You bring along the Air Force, you bring along the Army, you bring along the Navy. We still see great budget fights. In 1951, for example, when the MIGs began to come in in great numbers in Korea, Finletter and Vandenberg apparently used this fact to push very strongly a philosophical approach. It said, "This country is in danger, and the only thing that can really save it is a strong Air Force. When you bring along everyone in tandem (which is what they were doing), you are cutting back on the very forces that are needed at the cutting edge of the first wave of the problem." That was their argument.

They'd get a promise of some increase in the Air Force, for planning purposes, but very shortly after that you have Truman saying, "No, we're going to keep a lid on this thing, we're not going to go beyond a certain point," and he put the $60 billion expenditures limit on it, and then the Congress tried to put an even lower expenditures limit. So you have a feeling, that, in essence, without its really being, strictly speaking, debated as a national security issue, a major policy decision was made right here in the Pentagon without the national security repercussions being totally threshed out.
GOODRICH: The 70-group Air Force was a pre-Korea problem.

CONDIT: They had 70 groups in the law.

GOODRICH: They were aiming for 70, they had a goal. There was a program, and my recollection of it was (that is about the time I was in McNeil's office) the great opposition in that office to the Air Force demands for money to reach that goal. The timing of the problem was such that the striving for that goal on the Air Force's part was simultaneous with the Navy's building of the USS United States. The carrier got canceled, and feelings crystalized around that cancellation, with McNeil the strong Navy man, Rear Admiral, in the reserves, and the Air Force was the apparent winner, because it didn't get cut back. Whether it got anything positive out of that cancellation, I don't know, but it wasn't the one that got its head chopped off or its pet project killed. That's another reason why in this very general way I've been referring to the jockeying of the services during first few years of unification, the defense unification years—a time when naturally everyone would jockey for position. Somehow in the background there was always that question—is this a real need; is this a real issue; or is it, on the other hand, just another grab for territory, or an effort to drive in the stakes and say this is my territory, I'm not using it right now, but don't you pitch your tent here? That problem was always there, it was in the background.

CONDIT: The Navy got its carriers, after Korea. They wanted up to 14 programmed, starting one a year. So that was decided. The Navy got it; and the Army certainly was improved and strengthened, from 10 to 20 divisions. It was doubled.
GOODRICH: During that year was when the Army began to be so worried about its lack of missile development capabilities. You had the new phase come in. The Army thought the Air Force was getting too much of whatever might be done, via missiles or the substitute for missiles, which were, of course, the aircraft. And that was the thing that led to the 1956 investigation under Coolidge of leaks, because Colonel Nickerson had this strong feeling that the Army was being shorted on missile development.

CONDIT: I'll have to ask General Nichols this next question—whether in fact there was an attempt to bring all the services along with regard to missiles and whether that was any part of K.T. Keller's doing. Mr. McNeil told me that in the Wilson era there was definitely a feeling to bring all the services along insofar as missiles were concerned. He had one hilarious story about the Pershing missile and how it was adopted. It was simply on the basis of this little missile that works all right, and it doesn't take very much money. It will make the Navy happy, and keep them in the business, more or less. Wilson took McNeil down to Augusta, where Eisenhower was golfing, and McNeil told Eisenhower, and Eisenhower said, "OK." So McNeil came back and told the secretary at that time, who apparently had a very funny habit of tucking and flapping his arms as though he were a little chicken. (McNeil imitated this beautiful mannerism.) The two men discussed what to call the missile and McNeil said, "Call it anything, call it Black Jack, for all I care." He went to a meeting that afternoon, where the Secretary flapped his little wings and said, "Some people want to call this new missile Black Jack, but we are going to name it the Pershing." It was a lovely story. The kind of
thing that McNeil excelled in. Obviously that story does illustrate something far more serious—the idea that you are going to pull all the services along simultaneously in this new field and not keep anyone out. Apparently one could say in one sense that this is a literal attempt to keep unification working.

GOODRICH: Or to make it work. You could look at it the opposite way, if you want to rationalize it.

CONDIT: You would agree, though, there are two sides to the coin.

GOODRICH: I've never really thought of it before that way, but the way you point it up now, it seems to me that you can look at it another way. What it probably turns out as, possibly, is not the most economical way.

CONDIT: But not necessarily the worst way.

GOODRICH: Yes. But by the same token I don't know who can judge whether it is the most logical way. Maybe it is, maybe it isn't.

CONDIT: It is the most pragmatic way.

GOODRICH: You get along.

CONDIT: More than that.

GOODRICH: And you cooperate.

CONDIT: There's a technical side to it, I think. That each service approaches the technique differently and you do have that variance. You may find one service is far more successful than another, just in managing.
GOODRICH: Each builds something into it. Since no one has a crystal ball, you don't ever really know what you're preparing for. You make the broadest possible guess and try to approach it on all fronts.

CONDIT: This leads me to a thought. I'd like to brainstorm a little bit, just to talk off the top of our heads, especially about unification. For example, do you think the Korean war, on the whole, was sort of a godsend to the idea of unification? It took people's minds off of their parochial problems?

GOODRICH: I never have thought of it that way, and I never would think of it that way. Psychologically and in other ways it mobilizes people and gets them to work together. It sort of overtakes differences and unifies sentiment. In terms of unification, logically therefore I suppose it should have had that effect. I never thought of that effect as having been a lesson in a book that people study today and say, "Aha, we really ought to do more of what we did when we were in Korea. We learned certain things about working together." I still don't believe there is sufficient evidence of that kind of feeling on the part of the elements in this department.

CONDIT: You mean now?

GOODRICH: I don't know the people in the department, I don't know what goes on in the meetings any more. You have to rely on what you read and hear—the meanings of newscasts. It isn't table conversation where I travel. So far as press reports, articles, any commentary—there isn't any demonstration of greater dedication to unification today. I don't believe. The only thought that occurs to me is that the concept of the special strike force might be today's step in the direction of unification.
Assuming that the strike force is conceived to be the operating instrument anywhere, any given place. That means you never know how you're going to have to get there, but you have to be sure you will. So if you have to get there by water, or operate on water, or from water, water bases or platforms, you've got to get all the operative forces in the group.

CONDIT: Do you think there is still a justification for an air force?

GOODRICH: I don't know enough about misilery and the big weapons.

CONDIT: I didn't mean it quite that way. I meant that the Air Force might be divided up between Army and Navy; both services already have planes.

GOODRICH: Conceptually you could, and it would work. Conceptually, the secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army could make command decisions that would involve sending out solely a bombing strike or deciding this calls for a missile barrage, or we have to land on somebody's shores.

CONDIT: Would it be easier to have unification with only two services?

GOODRICH: I suppose that is whether it is better to have a married couple or a ménage à trois; I don't know.

CONDIT: If that were the correct analogy, I suspect that we would have an answer!

GOODRICH: I'm not suggesting it is the correct analogy, but I think the more you simplify decisionmaking, assuming you get to the ultimate decision in a logical and well informed manner, the more effective you become, militarily or otherwise.
CONDIT: Why don't we pursue unification just from a little different standpoint, from one I believe you mentioned, the role of the service secretaries. They have really been downgraded, I think, quite a bit. The Secretary [of Defense] now really does have the chief voice in the department, I do believe that occurs. You don't hear much questioning of his voice by a service secretary any more.

GOODRICH: Except for Secretary Lehman.

CONDIT: Yes, I suppose that's true, but even he has been quiet lately. Do you feel that unification has been successful to that extent at least?

GOODRICH: I suppose the answer is yes, simply as a function of time and the kind of progress, whatever its degree, that comes in time. You then get to the question of your standards for gauging effectiveness and what about the money? Is the fact that you're spending that much more money today, leaving out the inflation factor, mean that it is not less effective or more effective? The fact that you are spending more money may mean that you're all that more effective and you've discovered that the product has got to be a better one if you spend more money on it.

CONDIT: It hasn't been tested, probably, since 1972.

GOODRICH: That's the major problem, you don't know what the test is ultimately going to be. The old problem--are you preparing for the next war or the last war? It's always the charge that everything that is going on is in the style of fighting the last war. That's always the criticism.
Again, who knows what the next war really is going to be, or where it is
going to be. Congress is in the picture, whenever you talk about whether
unification has been achieved, whether there has been any progress toward
unification, whether there has been any leavening of the friction between
the services. They do not operate solely in their own environment, mili-
tary or otherwise. In the political environment in this country, Congress
is in the picture. The services have their backers and sponsors for what-
ever reason, good or bad. Let's say it's all good. The Hill expresses
itself very firmly on what a particular service thinks, or wants, or
needs—it's our system.

I wonder sometimes what the Russian system is. Last year I read a
Machine*, by an English-born author who is a citizen here now, Andrew Cockburn.
A very interesting book, assuming that it is accurate, because it paints what
purports to be a very up-to-date picture of the Russian military. If you
believe it, the Russian military's effectiveness is affected by considerable
internal antagonisms and rivalry and power play, much more than we're occa-
sionally led to believe there is in this country in the armed services for
the dollars, the missions, etc. He paints a picture of a country where
the military leaders literally attach themselves to political figures
and those they think are on the ascendency in political favor. As a
result, some command posts have fallen to particular people only because
they have patrons to whom they attached themselves years earlier. Where
one of the patrons falls from favor, a whole cadre of military leaders
falls from favor. You have to hope it's correct. Ours is quite a
different system: the description of the Russian system, if you analyze it, sounds like a very political system. They attach themselves directly to civilian leaders in the communist party, which makes it completely political. We don't have that.

CONDIT: They have commissars with every group.

GOODRICH: Yes, and yet they have not had internal power grabs—well, power grabs, but not in the style of some of the Latin countries, where the military steps in and takes over, whether it's on the death of a leader or when the leader falls into political trouble. On your basic question of the progress that unification has made, I think it would be an interesting question for somebody who has had real continuity in the department. If I'd been in the Pentagon during the last 30 years, I would have had a lot more experience to draw on; the one thing I learned after I was out a while is that it's really impossible to pretend to have judgments. There's so much you learn and know [from the] inside. I don't really know how the fellows in the White House can have faith in how they are making decisions, because you're just so much better informed when you are in this building on a daily basis. Forgetting the forest and the trees problem, I still think you know more.

CONDIT: On a very superficial basis, I believe that the Korean war had a great impact on short term unification. I do think people pulled together for the war. That is not to say that there weren't strong indications of future friction. The whole Air Force approach
in the fall of 1951 is looking toward the next war, not Korea.

GOODRICH: I don't want to leave with you any impression that I at that
time had an impression or that anybody voiced an impression that that
kind of looking forward to what might happen later was going on during
the war. I think everybody was concerned with the conduct of the war.
We always are. You've led me to a thought that has occurred to me a
couple of times, and I must say it really sort of came out very strongly
with Admiral [Robert L.J.] Long's assessment of what went wrong in Lebanon
when the Marine barracks building was bombed. I read only what appeared
in the Times, and they probably printed the entire portion of the report
that was released. It was very interesting to read, and it suggested
one thing to me, because, as you know, in the old days we were writing
papers on organization and things like that. One always thinks about
how you're going to do it better, how you're going to run the department
better, why you always discover things after the fact. I really am
incensed at the effort to point a finger at Colonel [Timothy J.] Geraghty
because I think he knew what he was expected to do, regardless of whatever
was written or not written.

Col Geraghty was not expected to get into a fight. He was told that
he was there as the representative of a peaceful nation trying to keep the
peace among the squabbling local contingents. He might have been trained
in security, I'm sure he was, everybody is, but his mission was not really
a combat mission when he first went there. The White House, for example,
objected vehemently to the language the Congress wanted to adopt in rela-
tion to a state of war, or the congressional demand for notification from
the White House that the troops were headed for combat. In fact, one of the ludicrous results of that reluctance to communicate in terms of reality occurred when they awarded the purple hearts to people who were injured and to the dead. As I recall reading in the papers, the messages that went to the families didn't say they were injured in combat, or in something involving a war, or in a war. It had some ludicrous language about an "incident of the service," or an "accident." And there was such outrage on the part of the families of those who were killed that the department reissued the citations. You'll find that somewhere. Typical.

Getting back to Admiral Long's inquiry and what it all suggests to me, in part maybe this all comes of the Coolidge commission in 1956 on the subject of leaks. I remember sitting in on every one of those sessions and listening to those four retired officers; it was phenomenally enlightening. Maybe what we need is a permanent standing Admiral Long-type of commission. The Navy in the old days, for example, had a general board. Now, whether it was a place that they parked their superannuated officers or not, they had a general board. Might there be some value today, considering all the debates, in having a general board made up of retired officers drawn from the different services? You are going to get into a problem of whether each service is represented equally. Whether or not there is equal representation would not be a problem, I think, because my hunch is that they'd become statesmen just as the four members in Mr. Coolidge's group were statesmen. I think Admiral Long's inquiry into the bombing of the Marine quarters was a very statesmanlike document. That general board might well be a permanent fixture in this department,
and its membership might very well be confined to formerly very senior officers, although it is possible to consider whether you might want to include some former civilian secretaries. Their mission might well be to perform a continuing surveillance and review and analysis of what is going on in the departments without imposing great demands for separate staff and separate briefing, and then to issue doctrine papers if you will, or reports, to use a simple term, from time to time on what they have observed and where they feel there is reason for concern.

CONDIT: To whom would they report?

GOODRICH: That could be determined. You could start with the President as commander in chief which means to some extent jumping the Secretary of Defense; or you could have them report to the Secretary, logically with some requirement that the secretary would advise the president as commander in chief. But I think it might well be an aid to the secretary, and it might be very helpful in calming some of the congressional concerns or providing a very helpful perspective in which both government officials and the public at large could view congressional concerns and demands about what ought to be done in and with the military, organizationally and operationally. The very fact that, after something goes wrong, you go to a group of retired people and say, "Find out why and tell us" suggests to me that you might do it on a permanent basis. Why wait until something goes wrong?

CONDIT: I don't view Lebanon as a Pentagona problem, myself. I view Lebanon as a crisis in confidence between the White House and the Congress.
To me, Lebanon seems to be simply a place where the [U.S.] armed forces were being used to create a political presence—probably an unwise use, since they were [of insufficient size], in a very exposed position, and not told to be ready to defend themselves. The loss of lives and the public outcry have dealt the President a blow politically and I believe a well deserved one.

GOODRICH: Which he seems to have survived, and therefore it seems a questionable blow. It really rolled off his back like water off a duck's back. He finally said, "This is my responsibility," but he did it about two months later instead of the next morning.

CONDIT: And no one associated it with him, did they? But if you really think about it, it was not [Secretary] Weinberger's responsibility; and the Pentagon, as I understand it, was not eager to take on the task.

GOODRICH: I gather that. Perhaps that's a good illustration of what purpose might be served by a general board, but again you wouldn't want to throw the general board into a decisionmaking role on a proposed course of action because that would then create another decisionmaking superstructure. My concept of a general board is a group of officers who—after their careers are over, assuming their integrity and their intelligence and their competence demonstrated by their careers, and everyone knows who's who—are asked to exercise continuing oversight on an overall basis. The board would have a defined term of office and, on its own initiative, because of its long familiarity and deep understanding of all of the facets of military life and activities, it would decide what it would look into or could be asked to undertake a particular inquiry. And if there is a
debate over roles and missions, on the little Pershings and the big Pershings, and whether you divide them equally or whether one or another service is best suited or vice versa for a particular use, you might get some wisdom.

Let's say [it would be] raising General Burns to an immortal level, that there is a Burnesian "contraption" that continues in this department, hovering over it and helping it. An adviser's view, like a lawyer's advice to a client, doesn't have to be accepted; but there it is, assuming it might have value. Burns was put in here, and look what he did. Basically people were told, "Look, he knows a great deal. He's a wise man. He's out of immediate responsibility for a particular function. You have a problem? Talk to him, let him listen to your problem, and he'll tell you what he thinks, and then you can do what you want. Chances are what he thinks might be helpful to you."

Thinking back on that special group that Coolidge headed [in 1956] on the narrow issue of leaks of information, it came out with an ingenious recommendation after it completed its study. It said quite simply, "You'd have fewer leaks if you classified less information, and most of what is classified isn't worth it." There was a congressional hearing on this investigation, so there is a record on it. That group [provided a useful service]. I'm sure there have been other groups, Admiral Long's investigating group, a very small group that performed a very tight and very expeditious inquiry, obviously talked to a great many people and came out with a very tempered report, very diplomatically stated (in my view), of great meaning. Now the problem is, do we [plan to do these things ahead of trouble], when those with which we are familiar were always done after some event that caused difficulty?
CONDIT: I can see uses for a board, such as you present: For example, when there are divided opinions in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, splits as they call them: I can see a super board that would hear all the arguments and would give a separate opinion.

GOODRICH: Then you're getting them into direct decisionmaking, which is what I'd like to avoid. But there might be some JCS concerns where they could be helpful.

CONDIT: Statutorally it won't work.

GOODRICH: If it were ideal enough, hopefully you could get an amendment to the statute, but I'm not thinking of that. And you might need an amendment to the statute as a practical matter. For example, when Eisenhower was called down to review the budget, and whether or not there were other tasks, I can't recall, but his temporary duty did not require statutory authority.

CONDIT: When he worked with the Joint Chiefs?

GOODRICH: Yes, he was informally, and the word "informal" was used, given the title of chairman because there was no chairman by law at that time. There was no statutory authority for it. No reason why the secretary couldn't do what he did; he'd name somebody chairman of the group.

CONDIT: Do you remember, Lovett resolved the budget crisis in fiscal year 1953 by calling in an ad hoc group?

GOODRICH: You can always do that.
CONDIT: And he got some answers to certain questions that he asked, and then he made his decisions.

GOODRICH: That's like the White House calling in special commissions.

But my concept of what I, for want of a better term, call a general board, really derives from what I think the Long commission managed to do in relation to the bombing in Lebanon. But it would not just come in after something goes wrong; it would sit on a permanent basis to exercise oversight in areas of its own choosing based on what it knows about the operations and current decisions being made by the department—and it should and would have access to those—and what it can identify as, or is advised are, unresolved problem areas, or where the decisions made in current problem areas are suspected still to require more thought or longer range solution. If you will, go back to the basic question of unification. Would it work better with two or three departments, is your question. Very general questions, but generally looking to the future—what would be better for the departments, for the personnel in the armed services, for the defense of the nation, staying away from the political? Whether it's possible to have a council of elders that would keep its fingers out of current family problems, I don't know. The concept is that it would look at long range and fundamental current problems.

CONDIT: One thing is that unification implies status quo, and making it work better.

GOODRICH: The law constrains decisionmaking, the way it's written. To make a change, apart from the kind of administrative change a secretary
can make by calling in an ad hoc group, does require amendment of the act; otherwise you get all kinds of accusations. Maybe it's just as well that this to you before—in hindsight you wonder how you ever survived or the department ever survived. The first five years of the Department of Defense we had five secretaries of defense—five contiguous years.

CONDIT: Let's see, that's 1947 to 1952, and you certainly did have five: Forrestal, Johnson, Marshall, Lovett, Wilson.

GOODRICH: Even if you start towards the end or the middle of Forrestal's regime and count a five year period; Wilson came in January 20, 1953, so you go back to January 20, 1948, and Forrestal was in place, in fact only 3 or 4 months—so you're incorporating most of his term. But consider the impact of changing leadership five times in five years.

CONDIT: I don't think the Marshall/Lovett switch was such a change. They were not really a great change.

GOODRICH: You had a kind of continuity of function and Lovett did not change the principal assistants and all that kind of thing; but just talking about it in an abstract framework, as a way to run a railroad—five different chief executives in a five year period! Maybe we lucked out and, as you put it, we had a real team in two of them.

CONDIT: That gave you from September 1950 to January 1953, but then in January 1953 the whole shebang erupted, it was worse than any other change, I think.
GOODRICH: I got the impression again, having heard and read between the lines (having heard to some extent a little more, perhaps much more than today) that the McNamara years were much more turbulent than the Wilson years. Certainly at the outset, and persistently.

CONDIT: Because he was really threatening the Joint Chiefs. Don't you think so?

GOODRICH: I don't know enough about that; that's very intriguing to suggest.

CONDIT: The Joint Chiefs had not kept up in the decisionmaking process, using fewer resources, and McNamara brought in his systems analysts, the Enthoven bunch. When the Joint Chiefs came out with questions and not the right answers, as McNamara thought, I believe that he sought for answers that were logical, in his line of reasoning, from his systems analysts. There was great feeling there—you should hear what Underwood says about the "Whiz Kids," and so forth. There are all kinds of stories about bad feeling between McNamara and the military.

GOODRICH: There again, it's not that I'm a traveling salesman, but you have just identified an approach to problem solving in the department which really is the opposite of the thought that occurred to me in the context of a general board or a council of elders. But there's nothing wrong in a staff of whiz kids. It's kinder than Trohan's "Young Commissars" label on certain key OSD people in 1949.

CONDIT: Then you get another thing that occurs, I think. The idea that
McNamara, and especially President Johnson, actually picked targets for air strikes, horrifies me.

GOODRICH: The wisdom goes with the post, I guess. It's very tempting.

CONDIT: You have another problem here in this building, I think, because you have a lot of people. If you give something to someone you have to give something to someone else, whether it's military versus civilians, or Army versus Navy and Air Force or Marine Corps, or technical people versus different ones. It's remarkable that it works as well as it does.

GOODRICH: That is absolutely true, it does work out.

CONDIT: I do think that, if you have the right man in the White House, and he puts the right pressure on at certain places, this place works pretty well.

GOODRICH: The people in the service are indispensable to its working well.

CONDIT: They are, but they have to be used properly.

GOODRICH: Yes, there's no question about that.

CONDIT: I always thought that Johnson was pilloried for sending troops into the Dominican Republic in 1965. In my view, that was a highly successful operation. A brilliant use; but he sent enough troops—it was almost a division, wasn't it? They knew what they were supposed to do, they separated the Army from the insurgents, maneuvered around, prevented the bloody warfare that went on in Vietnam; it was a marvelous kind of operation. And furthermore, even though the more liberal people were terribly disenchanted by that operation, the Dominican Republic survived.
GOODRICH: Korea in a sense survived.

CONDIT: But at what a cost.

GOODRICH: Right, but there we jumped in immediately. We did not in Vietnam. Now the French, when they were in desperate straits at Dien Bien Phu, are supposed to have asked for help from us, and were told no. Whether that's fact, I don't know, but I've read that there was a request. Possibly that could have been cauterized at that time; it's possible. But later on, ten years later?

CONDIT: Look at some other differences between Vietnam and Korea. In Korea you will see that three sides of Korea are on the water. We controlled the navy; we had Japan nearby as a base, it became a staging area for us; there was only the area at the very top [where enemy troops could enter]. The moment we withdrew back down toward the 38th parallel, they had to come a long way and their supply columns immediately became vulnerable. The closer we got to the Yalu, the easier their task was and the harder our task was. We had less space in which to bomb, and they had less space to cover to get their stuff to their troops. It was different in Vietnam. General "Siam" Marshall, the brother of Charles Burton Marshall, who was there at the meeting, wrote an article in 1965 that I remember reading at the time. He said, "Anyone who goes into Vietnam and who doesn't control the Mekong River as a barrier cannot manage this fight."

Do you feel that we have covered the things that you wanted to cover?

GOODRICH: I was going to ask, do you have a list of items? Have we covered those that you wanted to concentrate on?
CONDIT: I have been checking things off, yes. I think we have, actually. We got on to unification and we couldn’t really settle it.

GOODRICH: I’ve given you the Goodrich plan: The general board or council of elders of retired military people who can, on a continuing basis, perhaps view the scene.

CONDIT: Would you have them specifically address unification?

GOODRICH: They could address anything they want. Not to make issues, but to make sure that what’s going on in the department is being done with foresight. I think it’s the look ahead, what you really have to prepare yourself for, to get a kind of forward strategic thinking divorced from interservice rivalry. There is, or was, by executive order,* a board of overseers for the CIA. It was not very widely publicized; I think Lovett served on it for a time. It might have been provided by executive order years ago, maybe it is changed now, but it was there, and I always thought that it sounded like a great idea—to get private citizens with no current connection to CIA intelligence activities, and they were there to meet periodically to be briefed and to advise the director of the CIA. It was a very closed operation, but it had very leading people. This department has nothing like it. The Joint Chiefs have a current job. And

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*E.O. 10656, 6 Feb 56, Pres. Bd. of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Eisenhower); E.O. 10938, 4 May 61, Pres. Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Kennedy); E.O. 11460, 20 Mar 69, Pres. Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Nixon, continued by Ford); E.O. 11984, 4 May 77, Revocation E.O. 11460, abolishing board (Carter); E.O. 12331, 20 Oct 81, Pres. Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Reagan).
given the problems of this department, which certainly include money (at all times, whether you're going down or up) but more importantly, national security, and military effectiveness, and then the political problems that impinge on all of the others, it would be great if we had something like that on a standing basis for the Defense Department.

CONDIT: That's very interesting.

GOODRICH: You have to divorce it from current operations, from direction; no role, just a bunch of wise men and women.

CONDIT: Can it complain about the secretary's actions?

GOODRICH: Sure. The thought occurred to me when we were talking about McNamara, and the impact of change coming in, and I mentioned the Wilson era. Certainly Wilson's arrival was smooth—he brought in a whole new team of people but it went smoothly. Although I was outside, I got an impression of a much more frenetic impact when McNamara arrived. It suddenly occurred to me that there was one characteristic common to Johnson and McNamara, two completely different people, and I think it was impatience. It never occurred to me before.

CONDIT: Henry Glass really admired McNamara.

GOODRICH: I think there is a great deal to admire, a most unusual man. But from what I heard during the early McNamara time, certainly, there was a lot of talk about frenetic activity. Maybe it had to be paced that way those days. McNamara did an about-face on the Vietnam war, and the issue of Cuba was an early, troubling problem.