Pentagon Attack

Interview with Paul K. Haselbush
October 19, 2001

Putney: This oral history interview with Paul K. Haselbush, the Director for Real Estate and Facilities, is taking place in his office in the Pentagon on Friday, October 19, 2001. [The interviewers are Alfred Goldberg, Stuart Rochester, and Diane Putney of the OSD Historical Office.]

Could you briefly describe your key responsibilities as the Director for Real Estate and Facilities?

Haselbush: In relation to the incident or just overall?

Putney: That might pertain to the kinds of things that would come into play on and after the 11th.

Haselbush: This organization is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the Pentagon Building as well as its security. The Chief of the Defense Protective Service reports to me. Because we are responsible for the operation and maintenance of the Building, we had a significant task after the September 11th incident to bring the Building back up to operational condition. It still isn’t totally back up to operational condition. But we were successful in getting a lot of it back, primarily between Corridors 2 and 3, and between Corridors 5 1/2 and 7, which were fire damaged and in smoke-filled areas in Wedge 2. We were initially engaged in, of course, the blast area helping to do anything that could be done to get people out. “We,” meaning the entire staff that belonged to Real Estate and Facilities, were out there.
Goldberg: What were the major elements under Real Estate and Facilities that were involved?

Haselbush: We have the Federal Facilities Division, which has responsibility for managing the entire Building and other buildings in the National Capital Region. We have the Defense Protective Service, which is responsible for security and emergency response. Federal Facilities Division has the safety responsibility. We have the Safety Office there that does testing to make sure the areas are safe for occupancy after such an incident. Those were the key ones. We also have a contracting activity that contracts much of the support that we need to carry on our primary functions—operations and maintenance, which includes janitorial services and a whole gamut of other things that keep the Building running. We are responsible for all of the mechanical systems in the Building. We take care of the air-conditioning, ventilation, heating this time of the year. If there is damage or smoke problems in those areas, they have to be cleaned. We hired an environmental contractor that came in here almost from the beginning and worked around the clock and cleaned up all of the smoke and soot and other types of damage in the Building. So, you can see that we are right in the middle of everything that happened. We don’t have a direct responsibility for renovation of the Pentagon, but we work in partnership with the program manager of the renovation program. We attend his meetings. We’ve worked together as closely as possible to work out the recovery operations also.

Putney: Even before September 11th, you had been thinking about terrorist attacks of some sort, had you not? Could you, in general, describe what type of
procedures were undertaken and building alterations made, just a few years before September 11th?

Haselbush: We established additional access control devices, card readers at all of our major entrances. In other words, you had to put your building pass in the card reader in order to obtain entrance to the Building or be escorted. A lot of people were unhappy with that—people that were used to coming to the Pentagon. We received a lot of letters and so did Doc Cooke on that change. But we were successful in carrying out that program. A lot of that was under the direction of Dr. Hamre who was the deputy secretary of defense. He was very interested and concerned about security. So a lot of things were done during his tenure. We had pop-up barriers at the vehicular entrances to the River and the Mall. You probably heard about the foreign dignitaries that had been lifted up, unfortunately, by mistake. We have taken steps to try to keep that from happening. We have been pretty successful the last year. We had a strong indoctrination program as well as some other things to keep it from happening. Those are important because it will stop a pretty good size truck—those barriers are installed underground and they pop up. They’re reinforced. The only way in, of course, to the River and the Mall is via a small roadway that is protected by these devices. Another thing that we have seriously considered and probably will be a reality very soon is a bypass to the Mall Entrance. In other words—let me show it to you on a chart. In this area right here where the heliport is, right now the vehicular entrance to the building comes right in here like this, and then there is another one that takes you right to the Mall. The plan is to close this entrance
here at the Mall, and then there will probably be something to divert traffic a little bit farther. It will probably start back here—right before you get to the heliport grassed area. Then there will be a guard station about right in this area. Right now, the guard is right here. So this will give you standout distance so that they couldn’t just mow the guard down. Because coming right off the highway, they could probably run right into that guard area. It would damage the truck because there are barriers there. This is close enough to the Building to cause a problem. So the idea is to move it back.

Rochester: This is an initiative in the aftermath of September 11th?

Haselbush: This has been discussed for probably about six months. I think it’s going to happen now. Another possibility is to move highway 110 farther away from the building—over into the North Parking area somewhere, because highway 110 runs right under the River Parade Field. You can also get a truck very close to the Building and do some significant damage with a truck bomb. So this is really under close scrutiny. It’s been talked about for a long time, but it could happen because of the incident. It is not something that can be done on a short-term. It has to be a long-term thing. There are things that have already been done to improve our security. We have moved a perimeter of the security line of the Pentagon, particularly in the South Parking area, away from the Building. The buses can’t park here anymore. This is based on what we call ForceCon. The Force Condition will probably be in what they call “charlie” for a long period of time. With “charlie” you are supposed to have a standoff distance to protect yourself from certain types of car bombs and that sort of thing. We
have already done that. Another thing that we have done is the Metro entrance facility. It is being constructed, and the bus station is going to be moved to a significant standoff distance from the Building.

Rochester: There had been some concessions to Metro patrons but from a security standpoint everything is satisfactory?

Haselbush: Yes. It is what our ForceCon and security experts recommend. In addition to that, there is going to be an entrance facility that everybody will have to pass through that comes from either the buses or the train station. So they will be screened before they even get into the Building. Security magnetometers, x-rays, and all of that stuff away from the Building. There will be another facility built out in this area. If public tourists come back to the Building that’s where they will be screened too. It is a big “if” right now, but that could happen in the future. The biggest thing that we have done is everything that is delivered to the Building must go through what we call the “Remote Delivery Facility.” That was constructed out in this area. Anything that comes into the Building now must be screened through this facility on the loading dock, and it is brought into the Building through a tunnel.

Goldberg: What is the name of that building?

Haselbush: D. O. Cooke.

Putney: Quite a bit had already been underway.

Haselbush: Oh, yes.

Putney: Was the thought that some attack might come from the ground—a truck, a car?
Haselbush: I think so. I don’t think that anybody was thinking about an airplane attack. That was somewhat a surprise.

Goldberg: Planes have been flying over this Building for so many years—and so many of them. I used to think that it would be a simple thing for planes to fly over and drop a few bombs if they wanted to.

Haselbush: Or crash.

Goldberg: I must confess, I wasn’t thinking about a crash.

Haselbush: It was on the security peoples’ minds but there was little we could do about it with the airport being right there.

Goldberg: No thought being given to restricting flights over the Building?

Haselbush: It is almost impossible because that’s the flight path. The alternative is to take them over the Capitol or the White House. You can’t do that.

Goldberg: What are they doing now?

Haselbush: They are flying over, but not as much. They are still coming over the corner of the Building as they always did—both taking off and landing.

Putney: Was there a crisis action plan fully or partially implemented on the 11th, and who was responsible for developing that plan?

Haselbush: Are you talking about the continuity of the operations?

Putney: That and other types of plans that were on the shelf.

Haselbush: Yes, John Jester is a source for that. We have a plan, where if something happens to make the Pentagon uninhabitable, we would go over to 400 Army Navy Drive right across the street and set up a command operations center, which we did do. On September 11th this Building was evacuated
because no one knew whether there were other planes on the way. Actually, there was another plane on the way. (Probably there would have been more if they had not ordered all flights cancelled for that day.) We went across the street and set up a command center. It was very tough to have telephone service, as many of you probably already know. The entire system was flooded because people were trying to call each other to see if they were all right. The families were trying to call and vice versa. So the telephone service was difficult, particularly the long distance service.

**Goldberg:** Who was at the command center?

**Haselbush:** Ralph Newton, my deputy and myself. There is a command center right in the Pentagon for the Defense Protective Service that was not evacuated. They call it the Control Center. So we actually had two control centers—two command centers. Then there was one set up right out at the site. There was another one set up at Fort Myer later.

**Goldberg:** Did MDW set that up?

**Haselbush:** That was a joint command center—not just MDW, a lot of different agencies, including us. We had representation there. That was because it was termed an “attack,” and the Military District of Washington then had the responsibility to protect the Washington D.C. area. So that’s why it was set up at Fort Myer under Major General Jackson—I think that was his name.

**Goldberg:** They had all of these command centers at the same time. How did it work?
Haselbush: For the purpose that they were set up, I think they worked pretty well.

Goldberg: They have different functions.

Haselbush: Yes. The Defense Protective Service Command Center, of course, was worried about security primarily, but they also channeled information about the incident. The one we had was a subsidiary type thing. The Federal Facilities Division participated with the Defense Protective Service. Their officers are not too far away. So they were able to communicate because they were close together. PenRen (Pentagon Rennovation) had some kind of a command set up, too, but they were held out for quite a while by the fire department, the FBI, and all of the other law enforcement agencies that were involved. They in effect took a lot of our parking spaces away. A whole tent city was set up. It stretched all the way around into South Parking. It took maybe a third of our parking away. We had to make arrangements for alternate parking, which we did. This chart here kind of indicates where that is. We worked with the airport. We set up Lots B and C on the top floor for the Pentagon employees. Remember now, the airport was not open, and those garages were available for our people. We are still using those slots because we still have somewhat of a parking problem due to North Parking not being totally cleaned up and because we moved our barriers back in South Parking, which eliminated a lot of parking spaces. In addition to that we made arrangements with Pentagon City Mall parking people to use some parking there. That is depicted here on this page.

Goldberg: We'd like to have copies of most of this stuff if we can get it.
Haselbush: Okay. You can have most of this stuff.

Goldberg: Good.

Putney: What were you doing right before the crash and how did you learn of it?

Haselbush: I had heard that the buildings in New York were being attacked—that one had been attacked. I didn’t have a TV so I went down to John Jester’s office, which is right down the hall. I was watching it on television, and the other plane went through. So, of course, it crossed my mind that it might happen to us. So the woman that was with me—I was having a business meeting before I walked down there—asked, “Should we go home?” I said, “No, that’s what they want us to do—to stop work and go home. So let’s go back to the office and continue on with our work.” So we came back here, and all of a sudden I felt the Building shake. This was fifteen or twenty minutes later. I looked out the window immediately, and I saw a ball of fire shoot over the top of the roof. I said, “We’ve been hit.” At first I thought it was a missile, but I said, “It couldn’t be a missile, it must be an airplane.” And of course, then evacuation proceeded in the Building. It was a jarring experience.

Putney: Did you hear anything?

Haselbush: Heard something and also felt the Building shake and saw the ball of fire—all three.

Putney: Did the alarms go off right away?

Haselbush: I don’t remember them going off right away. People just kind of spontaneously evacuated. Some of them were panicky. I saw some people running.
Rochester: Where is your location relative to the wedge that was hit?

Haselbush: Let me show you. This is the original chart that is a little bigger. The airplane hit right in this area. This green area is the big impact area. This is the first floor. I am located on the fourth floor between Corridors 1 and 10—pretty much directly across.

Putney: Did you have any Real Estate and Facilities staff in there?

Haselbush: They were actually located over here. This whole area was evacuated, and there was smoke, fire, and stuff throughout the area.

Putney: Were there any casualties among your people?

Haselbush: No. Everybody on this side of the line was okay. The plane got to the A&E drive. It had hit ground level.

Putney: Where did you evacuate to?

Haselbush: I initially went to Doc Cooke’s office. Doc’s secretary told me that he was in the executive operations room or whatever they call it. I knew that I was going to end up at 400 Army Navy Drive. Martha was in Doc’s office. She is handicapped. I said, “Come on Martha, I will make sure that you get out of the Building.” So, she and I headed out of the Building toward the Concourse exit. Several other people on my staff joined us. We took her all the way to the Metro. There is an elevator that takes you down to the Metro. I understand that the Navy people took her all the way to Federal Building #2, the Navy Annex, and took care of her and actually took her home.

Rochester: What time did the Metro stop running?

Haselbush: I don’t know.
Goldberg: We can find out.

Putney: Then, your intent was to go to your command post? You had known from the plans that that's what you would do?

Haselbush: That was my intent.

Goldberg: Walked over there?

Haselbush: Walked over there. That was easy because it was on the other side of the Building. It is about a five-minute walk from the Building.

Putney: Then, how did that work? Could you just describe what kinds of things started happening?

Haselbush: At first it was primarily accounting for people. People were calling in and reporting that they can't find individuals. We weren't sure for a while that everybody did get out. I'm talking about people who were near the area. We were not real sure at that time. We didn't go to the crash site. At least, I didn't go to the crash site.

Goldberg: Doc didn't either.

Haselbush: We weren't sure where it hit. We knew our people were in Wedge 1. We were waiting for all of the counts to come in—everybody to be accounted for. It didn't happen for a while. It took all morning basically for that to happen.

Goldberg: Do we have a full count of the people who were killed and those who were injured and those who got out of the area?

Haselbush: I don't know about those that got out. I'm sure that there were a lot that got out. Maybe more escaped than were killed.

Goldberg: I would think so—hundreds.
Haselbush: I don't know where that information might be.

Goldberg: We're getting some stories from them already.

Haselbush: That happened so quickly.

Putney: Does Real Estate and Facilities have a role to play in fire fighting disasters?

Haselbush: Not fire fighting. The Arlington County Fire Department comes in and basically takes over and controls the operation.

Goldberg: Did you have standing agreements with them and with the police?

Haselbush: Yes. The person to ask that question to is John Jester. He is the person involved with that. He meets with the Fire Department frequently. You know, we have fires here all the time. We just had one associated with the DoD Concessions area down on the first floor—maybe less than a month before the incident. So we had a kind of practice here. We had the Fire Department coming in, and we had fire and smoke in the Building. We had pretty good practice for this about a month before it happened. We did make a lot of changes in our procedures—how you respond to fires, what do you do, and who does what—that type of thing. We were much better prepared than we would have been if we didn't have that practice with the Fire Department a month before that.

Putney: When you go to that command site is that just for key individuals in Real Estate and Facilities?

Haselbush: 400 Army Navy Drive. It is just basically a command operations center—my deputy and I go there. We already have an area office there. We
are set up by geographic area where we provide facility management services for the entire National Capital Region. One of our area offices is at 400 Army Navy Drive. So we just went to the area office where we already have everything set up as far as what you would need for a command center. We just occupied it and took our calls there.

Goldberg: That used to be the IDA Building years ago, didn't it?

Haselbush: Yes.

Putney: What kinds of things then did you start doing? You said that calls were coming in. Who might be calling?

Haselbush: As I said, a lot of the initial calls—we were only there for one day. We were only there from the time of the incident to the end of the day. The very first order of business was to make sure that everybody was safe in our organization. The next order of business was to make sure that all of the operations that needed to get done to reconstitute the Building were happening. That was the second order of business. We already had people on the site addressing that. As I said, we had two other operations centers. What we call the Building Operations Command Center, which is for the facilities management side of the house and then we had the Defense Protective Service Control Center that took care of the security side of the house. So we already had that activity going from the very beginning. Now the Building Operations Center is the area where you can start and stop the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system—from that site.

Goldberg: Who was in charge of that?
Haselbush: Our people—the Facility Management people. Actually, our Assistant Building Manager has primary responsibility. What happened as a result of the crash and the aftermath, in other words, the fire on the roof and the wetting down of everything, we lost that Building Operations Center eventually. That was a new facility that had been set up. So we went back to the old one, and still had the capability in Wedge 4/5 to do that same thing. During this incident, within the first three or four days, we lost that new Center due to the fire basically and not the crash.

Putney: On one hand, you are trying to keep one part of the Building operating and yet on the other, you're trying to turn off the systems.

Haselbush: We have a system where you can exhaust smoke, but the fire has to be out first. If the fire is not out, then you ventilate the fire if you exhaust. Once the Fire Department says that the fire is out then you ventilate all of the smoke out of the Building through that Operations Center. The very first thing you do is turn it off. You don't want a ventilation system running when there is a fire.

Putney: You were able to do that rather quickly?

Haselbush: Yes. That worked very well. All of the power in that impact area was lost and all of the back-up power was lost. So what that meant was that people were trying to get out of some areas where they couldn't see to get out. There was smoke in the corridors. They were very difficult circumstances to evacuate in. I am speaking from eyewitness accounts from individuals who were in the area. When the plane actually hit the Building, it took out, not only the house power, but it took out the emergency generator. So it made conditions
very difficult to get out of the Building in the damaged area. One of the things in the new area are rolling screens that come out from the wall that seal off the area from fire. Apparently, to people without lights, it felt like a wall. It's smoky and dark. Fortunately, we had some safety people in the area, and they knew what it was and they were able to move the wall over, and people got out.

Goldberg: They activated if there was smoke?

Haselbush: Yes, it automatically activates with fire and smoke. That was somewhat of a hazard for people that didn’t know about it. They should have known about it, but they apparently didn’t, because we had some reports that people were panicking because they couldn’t get out. Anyone would who couldn’t get out of fire or smokey area. But everything from Corridor 2 1/2 to 3 was basically unharmed as far as the crash. There was really no significant impact damage there. That area is being restored, and we should be occupying it very soon probably as early as next week.

Goldberg: That’s where we were 2 1/2 to 3.

Haselbush: There were other areas that were more severely damaged and probably won’t be occupied for some time.

Goldberg: Have people started to come back in to use some of that space?

Haselbush: The only ones that I know of that are in there so far is the Marine Corps. In fact, they never left. They are on the E Ring adjacent to, about a corridor away from the impact area, and they never left. At least, I don’t think they did.
Goldberg: You expect to get a lot of people back in during the next several months, presumably.

Haselbush: I think it will probably start maybe as early as next week.

Goldberg: There will be a big job replacing all kinds of equipment.

Haselbush: Let me tell you another thing that has happened as a result of the incident. There was so much fire and so much water that you have a significant residue of hazardous materials in some of these areas.

Goldberg: Mold.

Haselbush: And then you get bacteria from mold and mildew and other stuff that forms. So it is going to be a significant cleanup. Eventually, we will probably have to replace many of the walls in the area because of the damage. We will have to do continuous air testing to make sure that people are not in hazardous areas when they move in. We have spent a lot of money doing that already.

Goldberg: You didn’t have any problems with having the money for the contracts, did you?

Haselbush: No. People move pretty quickly via the Comptroller’s office and Budget and Finance and our Resources Management office. We have been charging all along to the special money that was set up. So that has not been a problem.

Putney: Did you do anything with the FBI?

Haselbush: You should ask the Defense Protective Service, John Jester. I didn’t do anything. But the answer to the question is, yes, we did. We worked very closely with the FBI, but I have no personal knowledge of that.
Goldberg: Was FEMA involved?

Haselbush: I believe so, but they weren’t as evident as the FBI. The Military District of Washington, the fire department, and even the Red Cross were very evident. In fact, they were the ones that put up the Tent City, I think. It was really a Herculean effort on the part of the Red Cross and the Salvation Army. In fact, that is where my contribution went this year for the Combined Federal Campaign. They really did a great job.

Putney: What type of support services right after, and for a couple of weeks or so, does the Real Estate and Facilities organization provide?

Haselbush: We have to bring the Building back to operational condition. So many of the areas that weren’t damaged initially were cordoned off because of the decisions made by the fire department, the FBI, and our Defense Protective Service. They cordoned off the area between Corridors 2 and 7. You can see that’s a big area.

Goldberg: Half of the Building.

Haselbush: Approximately. So our task was to coordinate the cleanup operation and the restoration of the basic Building’s utilities in those areas so that we could get them back for occupancy. That meant that we had to contract for special cleaning. I can’t remember the name of the cleaning company, but they are an excellent company. We have been getting all kinds of accolades from the work areas where they have cleaned. They really did a super job. They wiped the walls and the ceilings, cleaned the duct work, cleaned all of the carpets—cleaned everything. That’s unusual in the Pentagon to get a special cleaning crew to do
all of that. Usually it is a hit and a miss. This contract was let almost immediately. They came in and worked pretty much around the clock. They cleaned up all of the smoke and soot damage. They cleaned all of the floors and all of the walls. I don’t know if any of you saw the Pentagon after the attack, but it was a mess. It was really filthy. When you walked down the corridor it was like walking down a country highway with black soot on it. Eventually, this cleaning contractor cleaned the whole Building—from floor to floor in all of the areas that we were able to get back from the fire department. We’re back to Corridor 3 and Corridor 5 ½ on the other side of the Building. So they have cleaned all of that area on all floors, and it is really remarkable. In addition to that, our engineers and other technicians restored Building power—cleaned all of the water up. They fought that fire for over three days. There were thousands of gallons of water that came down, particularly on the First Floor, but it came down through all of the floors. It was a mess. It still is a mess in certain areas. They haven’t been able to really get into the damaged areas.

Goldberg: They still have a good deal of demolition work to do in there.

Haselbush: Right.

Rochester: During the cleanup operations, particularly early on, how did you balance the need to deal with the cleanup and the need to check on or possibly retrieve records?

Haselbush: That was done simultaneously, but you had to wear special clothing and so forth. This was worked out between the Defense Protective Service, the FBI, the Military District of Washington and PenRen. Some of the areas were
turned over to PenRen for a limited construction order, so this was all worked together. You can talk to John Jester about the classified material. Early on, that classified material was taken out of there. All of it was locked in security containers—where there were security containers available. Some areas had open classified storage. That had to be taken out and secured.

Goldberg: Presumably, a good deal of that was destroyed too in some areas.

Haselbush: In some areas, but not as much as you think. A lot of it is still there. A lot of the damage was from water.

Goldberg: But in the area that was hit? There was a lot of destruction.

Haselbush: I'm talking about collateral areas nearby. Most of it was water and smoke damage as opposed to crash damage.

Putney: You had mentioned that the pumping out of the water—that was done by in-house people? Did you contract out for that too?

Haselbush: That is basically our own people. You will have to talk to John Irby in Federal Facilities to determine that. There might have been some contract support there too, I don't know. We have in-house janitorial services but it is basically contracts. But I am sure some of those people were used for that, but it was in-house.

Goldberg: Big job re-equipping these offices?

Haselbush: What do you mean? Furniture, desks, etc.?

Goldberg: Furniture, safes....
Haselbush: PenRen basically has that responsibility, because they furnish the offices. So they will have to do that, but I think special money for the incident will take care of that too.

Rochester: Did you handle the transition into temporary spaces?

Haselbush: Yes, we did. We have an office called Space Policy and Acquisition. They work in partnership with the General Services Administration and other Federal agencies to bring in furniture to get the spaces ready. I think it was occupied in two weeks. It was kind of iffy, because each service kind of handled it differently. The services were involved in it too. But it was possible to occupy it in two weeks.

Goldberg: About how many people were relocated?

Haselbush: I will have to get the number for you. I don’t know off the top of my head.

Goldberg: Pretty substantial for a while.

Haselbush: For a while it was much bigger than it is now. I think some of them have come back. As they open up these areas, more of them come back. Because of the fire and the damage that was caused, the schedule for renovation has been changed. The first stage is going to be recovery, and that is basically between Corridors 3 and 5 1/2. That is really all they are working on now in terms of construction. The plan was to vacate Wedge 2 that runs between Corridors 4 1/2 to 6 1/2. So we are getting part of that area back all the way to 5 1/2. Five 1/2 to 6 1/2 won’t be coming back for occupancy for at least two years or maybe longer—depending on how long it takes to recover that damaged area.
And at that we may have the equivalent of about one wedge that we can’t occupy.

Goldberg: That’s where the real construction will have to take place.

Haselbush: Right.

Goldberg: Reconstruction.

Haselbush: Some of that will be all the way to the column support. And others will be left in there depending on the damage.

Rochester: Have there been any changes discussed in the concept of the renovation itself in terms of long range plans?

Haselbush: There have been a lot of discussions in that area but I don’t think there have been any firm decisions made. In fact, there was a briefing done yesterday that Doc attended.

Goldberg: Evey gave it?

Haselbush: Evey gave it. I have a piece of paper. I can tell you what was decided and what wasn’t. [Tape recorder off.]

Putney: Air quality—there had been ongoing quality checks even before September 11th, so they’ve been continued or expanded?

Haselbush: Expanded because you have to check for different types of pollutants before you let anybody come back in and occupy an area so we’ve significantly expanded that effort of air quality checks. We have some in-house capability but it is primarily done by contractors. We already had the contract in place. In addition to that the Pentagon Renovation Office has their own contractor who assists in that so there is a crosscheck.
Putney: For Real Estate and Facilities are there any lessons that you have learned?

Haselbush: Yes, in fact, we have already applied some of the lessons. We have learned that we need to have regular meetings with all of the parties concerned within Real Estate and Facilities. We started that shortly after the incident. We continue them up until now. We had another one this morning. We don't have them every day any more, but we are going to have as many as required, but usually about two a week now. There are still a lot of things that cross division lines that need to be discussed and communicated. So that was a lesson learned. We started that fairly quickly. I would imagine that it was within three days of the incident. The Pentagon Renovation Program started meetings, which we attended. We sent two or three representatives. There was an interchange of information between all parties. There were reports made by individuals who represented each division. So everybody shared what was going on. It made it easier to accomplish the objective. We had a need for after hours coverage for those divisions that didn't normally stay here after hours. So we set up a watch system that was primarily staffed by our division directors and their assistants—high level people. We used those as roving representatives who could coordinate and make things happen after hours. That worked very well. We started that fairly late in the game, we found it pretty effective. We have an after hours presence with two divisions—actually three divisions already, because the Defense Protective Service is around-the-clock with after hours presence. The Federal Facilities Division has an around-the-clock presence during
emergencies. We pay overtime, shift work, and that sort of thing. What we started was an after hours presence for everybody else that wasn’t represented, and it is very effective. We have that person attend our daily meetings and bring us up-to-date on what happened after hours. We had the people that attended the PenRen meetings bring us up to date on what happened in the early meetings every day at PenRen. So it was a free exchange of information. I think it really helped.

Goldberg: What responsibilities are the Military Services undertaking during this period in terms of getting back into operations? Do they have any particular responsibilities?

Haselbush: Of course, we have already talked about the Military District of Washington. The truth is they didn’t do much as far as restoring the Building. They came in and messed around for a week or two, but I don’t know what they really did.

Goldberg: You mean the Military District people?

Haselbush: They came in after the FBI finished.

Goldberg: I guess we ought to talk with them.

Haselbush: I don’t know what they were doing, frankly.

Goldberg: Did they assert some kind of authority or responsibility?

Haselbush: Well, they had authority from the standpoint that it was declared a crisis situation and in that scenario to protect the Military District of Washington.

Goldberg: What did they do beyond making available troops to help out?
Haselbush: I’m not sure where those troops came from. John would have a good idea because they were working for him.

Goldberg: Well they picked a couple of MP companies and the National Guard was called in.

Haselbush: John would know all of that.

Rochester: Who had the overall command authority on the scene?

Haselbush: The Fire Department, initially. After the Fire Department finished, the FBI, then MDW, and MDW turned it over to us.

Goldberg: Over a period of a couple of weeks this happened.

Haselbush: Three or four weeks.

Goldberg: When did it get turned back to you?

Haselbush: It’s been a while—couple of weeks, maybe three.

Rochester: We’ve gotten conflicting accounts as to whether the alarm system was working or not. Did the alarms go off during the evacuation?

Haselbush: To be honest with you, I really wasn’t listening for an alarm. I knew what had happened. I think they went off in certain parts of the Building, but not in others. I think there was also a voice system later—after the fact. I think I was out by then.

Goldberg: Who knows best about that?

Haselbush: DPS and FFD—John Irby and John Jester. I am sure they will know.

Goldberg: We have a list of your people to talk with. Besides Jester and Irby, whom else would you recommend that we talk with?
Haselbush: Nancy Judd. She took care of all of the contracting for cleanup operations. She also took care of the childcare center. The childcare center was open and then it wasn't open. She made arrangements for the use of a hotel. We have use of the hotel right now over at Doubletree for the childcare center. The childcare center is very sensitive to a lot of people that use it. Doc lets me know all the time that he gets complaints. It is a very sensitive issue and still is. I think they have made the decision to let it come back in about a week.

Goldberg: Who else?

Haselbush: You want somebody that was really in the middle of it, right?

Goldberg: If possible.

Haselbush: John Irby and John Jester. I know that Mike Bryant was right in the middle of it because he is the building manager and his assistant, Steve Carter, runs the building operations center. I know he was in the middle of it. You would want to talk to somebody in the DPS control center.

Putney: Did anything good emerge from this disaster?

Haselbush: I think it was really amazing how people worked together. It didn't seem to matter who they were working for. It was a very cooperative partnership type effort. That's not always the case. We have a lot of inter-organization rivalry and that sort of thing. I think that was a positive outcome and probably will have some lasting benefits for the Building. People started thinking more about emergency preparedness. That's both good and bad, because they over react sometimes. Just to give you an example, we have a thing going on right now where somebody up in the headquarters—I'm not sure who, said that we need a
central screening area for all mail that comes into the Building. Somebody went to the Army and said, “Start worrying about this. Get a central area—get everybody together and start opening mail.” I don’t know anything about this. Doc hasn’t said anything to me about it. I’m not sure if anybody has said anything to Doc. So it’s just one of these things. I believe people over react. We haven’t had a single instance in this Building of anthrax or anything else. Why are we suddenly channeling all this energy and opening everybodies’ mail? But everybody is concerned about safety and emergency preparedness. And as a result—ever since this incident, things pop up every day. One of the big things is our leased facilities. We have a big lease presence here in the National Capital Area.

Goldberg: We know.

Haselbush: You know because you are in one of them. Everybody is saying, “What have you done for me lately?” In most cases, the answer is “Nothing.”

Goldberg: We have greatly increased security in our building.

Haselbush: Well, do you know why? We have leased that other floor. The private tenant organization vacated recently. So now, we can control the entire building. Before, you had commercial interest that didn’t want you to do that.

Goldberg: We spotted one weakness in security.

Haselbush: What’s that?

Goldberg: People can use the steps and get around the security.

Haselbush: From the garage?

Goldberg: Yes, and even from the lobby where there is a door.
Haselbush: I don't think they can do that as of today.

Goldberg: Probably not. They can still do it from the garage.

Haselbush: Usually, they put barriers in the stairs.

Goldberg: I know, but the gate stays open.

Haselbush: You can get out of them but you can't get in.

Goldberg: If the gate stays open, you can get in. But they do have the guard at the entrance to the garage.

Haselbush: That is one of the big buttons that Doc is struggling with. My deputy is working probably 30 percent of the time on security in the outlying buildings. It is a big job.

Goldberg: You've got a lot of buildings.

Haselbush: We have roughly—I think the round figure—9 million square feet.

Goldberg: It is a lot more than here.

Putney: Is there anything else that you would like to add about the day of the attack or after?

Haselbush: There is a concern on some people—and I had a hard time identifying with it, but some people are afraid to come to work. Some people are quite bothered by what happened even though they weren't in danger—they weren't near the place.

Goldberg: Are they getting psychological counseling?

Haselbush: Oh yes, we have a barrage of people down in the clinic. They're there to counsel people. Air Force had people doing the same thing. It's available if they want it. There are still people bothered by it.
Rochester: They continue to feel vulnerable in this Building.

Haselbush: Just coming to the Building makes them anxious. I never felt that. I can't identify with it but I can see it exists. The very next day we were back working, and that's what the Secretary really wanted.