Pentagon Attack

Interview with William J. Haynes II
Part I - April 8, 2003

Cameron: This interview regarding the Pentagon attack is with the Department of Defense General Counsel, William Haynes, taking place in his office at the Pentagon on April 8, 2003. The interviewers are Drs. Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron.

Before September 11th, to what extent had you thought about a possible terrorist attack on the Pentagon and how it would be handled?

Haynes: I had thought about the concept of a terrorist attack because I had been generally aware of the world situation for the many years I had been General Counsel for the Department of the Army during the first Bush administration. At the beginning of this administration I was the head of the transition for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and during 2000 to 2001 there were all of the different terrorism commissions that were reporting—the Gilmore Commission, Hart-Rudman Commission. So, in general there was a recognition that it was just a matter of time before terrorists would do something significant. About an attack on the Pentagon, of the type that happened, I had no forethought whatsoever.

Goldberg: I was in the Pentagon for many years on the 5th floor and there were planes going over all the time. I did think fairly often about how easy it would be for a plane to drop a bomb on the Building when it passed over. To that extent I thought of it.

Haynes: They are still going over.
Cameron: What about general emergency procedures, even if it wasn't a
terrorist attack? Had you thought about what you would do in case of an
emergency or an evacuation?

Haynes: I had not given any personal thought to that. As the head of my office I
was aware of time-honored standard operating procedures—what if you get a
bomb threat on the phone, things of that nature. I'm sure offices throughout the
Pentagon had that kind of procedure in place, although I doubt whether
everybody in the office was aware of it. As far as a broad-based Pentagon
evacuation plan, I certainly wasn't aware of how that would be done.

Cameron: Let's turn to September 11th, starting with your morning activities.
Where were you? When did you first learn about the attack? Who was with
you?

Haynes: A lot of time has passed since that day. I have always been an early
riser, I have always arrived at the Pentagon at an early time. I think that in
September 2001 it was relatively late when I arrived, compared to my routine
now. It was still probably 6:30 or so. My recollection is that we had a meeting in
the special assistant's office, Larry Di Rita, to start the day off. Until recently that
was a 7:30 meeting. I think it may have been about the same time. In any case,
it was Di Rita, Steve Cambone, Tori Clark, Powell Moore and me, and a couple
of other folks—a routine meeting. I remember taking some jiving from some of
the folks around the table because the day before, September 10th, the Secretary
made a significant speech in the Pentagon about transformation. Maybe the
speech was entitled the "Wrong Bureaucracy," or something like that. I had seen
the speech beforehand and the Secretary *ad-libbed* and threw in a comment about how many lawyers there are in the Pentagon.

**Goldberg:** He has a tendency to do that, doesn’t he?

**Haynes:** He does, and he took the easiest shot about the number of lawyers.

That meeting finished and I remember leaving. I’m not sure if I left and came back, but at some point I was in the Secretary’s outer office, because I spend a lot of time down there. I saw the TV monitor in the outer office and saw one of the Towers smoking. I thought it was odd, the sound was muted, and it didn’t register very much. I did go back to my office and turned on the TV. I remember I spoke with David Addington, who is the counsel to the Vice President, about the possibility that this might be a terrorist attack.

**Cameron:** Did you call him or did he call you?

**Haynes:** I don’t remember. We speak frequently. He was my predecessor here two or three times removed. He is somebody with whom I work very closely. He was special assistant to Secretary of Defense Cheney.

**Goldberg:** We have interviewed him.

**Haynes:** You have? About 9/11?

**Goldberg:** No, about his time in the Building.

**Haynes:** I spoke with my wife. I believe I was on the phone with my wife when the second plane hit. I was doing paperwork too, I just had the TV on in the background. Some time around that time Di Rita called and we arranged to meet in the Executive Support Center, which is on this floor near the Secretary’s office. It is a secure video tele-conference facility. We were to meet there around 9:30.
I went down a little early, but first, again, I spoke with Addington. This was after the second plane hit. I remember on the way down to the ESC—and again my memory is a little bit fuzzy—I think I may have gone into the ESC and there were just a few of us there. We had the screens up. There were Cambone, Tori Clark and Di Rita and me and a couple of other folks. I remember leaving there and trying to run down Doc Cooke, wondering what the threat level was in the Pentagon at the time. He told me whatever it was. I don't remember what it was but I believe he said that he was in the process of raising it.

I went back to the ESC. We were talking about setting up a crisis action team. The Secretary had asked a number of people to look at how we dealt with crises, the notification process—totally independent of this type of event—in the weeks or maybe even months before. I remember talking with Staser Holcomb who is a retired admiral, Secretary Rumsfeld's military assistant in his first go-round here and still a close confidant of the Secretary. Staser and I had worked on redrafting some of the DoD instructions or directives on how crises or significant items are notified. There was significant attention to "does it have to go through the chairman always first, or should it go directly to the Secretary?" Staser and I were of the view that the Secretary has to know these kinds of things. We considered it to be inordinate attention to the notion that everything has to be communicated through the chairman. Sometimes that can be an impediment to getting information. So we were generally familiar with that kind of thing. Around the table in the ESC we were talking about setting up a crisis
action team and how we needed to respond to this apparent terrorist attack in New York City.

Apart from the fact that I had said something to Doc Cooke that we ought to be thinking about the possibility of attacks here, it was not a real possibility in my mind. I remember, in retrospect, when the plane hit and, frankly, for weeks afterwards, I didn’t put the two events together. I remember Steve Cambone making a comment when we heard a loud noise and maybe a shudder—I’m not sure if I really remember that because we are probably about as far from the site of the impact as one could be. His comment was something about that being a very loud HVAC (Heat, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) change.

Cameron: Apparently he had complained about that previously.

Haynes: It was something like that, and then shortly afterwards we saw on the screens that there was smoke coming from the Pentagon. Immediately thereafter there were all of these reports about a bomb at the State Department and maybe one at the Capitol. These video images on the screens in the ESC showed that, but they were from such a distance we really couldn’t tell. Of course, later on we found out that it was not a bomb at the State Department and there was not a bomb at the Capitol.

But things started moving pretty quickly at that point. The Secretary, we learned shortly thereafter, had been whisked out of his office by, I think, Giambastiani, his military assistant. I later learned that he went out to the parking lot in front of the River Entrance first and then he went around and helped pull some people out of the impact site. But at some point thereafter he
came back in. Obviously the tempo was high, the crowd was pretty big. The place that is now the site of the big secure video tele-conference I don’t think was wired for that at the time. It was wired for television screens, and so forth. But there was, and still is, a separate, smaller, secure tele-conference facility adjoining it. The people that convened in there were the same crowd that I described, plus the Secretary and Dick Myers, the then vice chairman—the chairman was out of the country.

Goldberg: And Giambastiani.

Haynes: Yes, he was there, and it was actually quite a full room.

Cameron: Was there screening for those who were authorized to be in that room? Apparently there was quite a crowd there for much of the day.

Haynes: There was. The whole ESC was full. It is a secure facility, where Cables is located. There is a secure door with a screening process. I assume that people were screened before they came in. But even within the ESC at large there is this small secure video tel-conference facility that has its own vault. That also was packed. But as to the screening, I couldn’t say.

At some point my military assistant joined me. He was a great help throughout the day because I didn’t have any materials with me. He arranged, probably about two and a half to three hours later, to get somebody to contact my wife to let her know that I was okay. The pace was just frenetic from that moment on. It really is a blur. I did jot some notes that are not very well organized and at some later point we can go back and look through them. But the significant events that I remember were that we convened at first up there.
For a while General Myers was shuttling back and forth between the National Military Command Center (NMCC) a floor below, and the ESC where the Secretary was. At some point the Secretary made the comment, "I've got to know what's going on." Myers would go back and forth to report things, but most of the communications were coming in through the NMCC. By the way, we had some screens up. We had the White House Situation Room up and we had about three other screens up—not all at once, not at the beginning. But eventually we had the place where the Vice President was, under the White House. We had the Situation Room. Eventually we had the President on the screen out at Offutt Air Force Base. I think we may have seen him on the screen at some other point, but I can't remember for sure. We spent some significant time up there and then the Secretary got frustrated, I would say, and we all went down to the NMCC, which was also crowded.

Goldberg: Do you have any idea what time that might have been?

Haynes: If I looked at my notes I would. That was a real gaggle of people. There was also a small SVTC room in the NMCC, but in the first place we congregated, everybody was standing up. I remember the Secretary was over in the corner with a red switch phone. I believe he was talking to the Vice President. I remember we went into their SVTC but we couldn't get any connectivity at all. Then we came back out. There was a lot of smoke starting to infiltrate the NMCC, which was surprising because it was supposed to be protected. Somebody expressed concern about whether there was a chemical in the smoke. It was at that point, I believe, the Secretary and the Vice President
were talking about other airborne aircraft. At that point I remember talking with the Deputy Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, who was in the larger room.

**Goldberg:** He had not left yet?

**Haynes:** No. We talked about dispersing people. I remember I told the Deputy that I was going to send Dan Dell'Orto, my principal deputy, with him and Larry Di Rita, who is the Secretary's special assistant. But the Deputy asked me, since we were having connectivity problems except for the one phone that the Secretary had access to, to go back up to the ESC where we had been and had secure video tele-conference capability. I remember going out of the NMCC and seeing all of the black-garbed individuals. I later found out that they were the Defense Protective Service (DPS) people. I remember thinking they looked like Ninjas—helmeted, machine guns, all in black dress.

**Goldberg:** Why were the communications better upstairs than downstairs?

**Haynes:** I don't know the answer to that, but they were. They were up and running. When I went out into the hall into the D ring on the second floor, the smoke was as thick as pea soup. It was very heavy. I remember walking up the stairs and into the ESC and thinking—actually holding my arm up—thinking that wall was where the next plane was coming through. That was the only moment I had like that for many hours.

**Cameron:** Were there conversations about the safety of the Building while you were there and whether you should evacuate?

**Haynes:** Yes, in the context of the smoke coming in. We had few communications in the NMCC. The smoke was coming in, and we didn't know
what protection level there was. Of course, dispersing the Deputy and a cadre of people with him—all of that was being discussed at the time.

Cameron: Did you contemplate leaving?

Haynes: I did not contemplate leaving. My place was with the Secretary. He was definitely staying where we were because we did have some connection. He had a job to do. That’s not bravado, it’s just a fact.

Goldberg: The Secretary sent Wolfowitz, but wasn’t he supposed to go himself?

That was the impression I got from Wolfowitz.

Haynes: I think that is a decision the Secretary is empowered to make. I didn’t think it was unusual or inappropriate in any way. The reasons the Secretary had for staying there are, I think, the ones that I just stated and I certainly didn’t disagree with him. To have departed then would have taken him out of communication links with other people, at least of the quality that we had, such as it was. The Deputy ended up going to Site R. I think he had a less than satisfactory experience, both in his travel as well as his connectivity, although when he got there we were able to connect with him. So, I went back up there and I was alone for a while. A couple of other people came up with me. We had connectivity to the Situation Room and to a couple of other places.

Goldberg: What did Wolfowitz expect you to do when he suggested you go back there?

Haynes: He wanted a senior presidential appointee up there so that we had that line open. There were a couple of folks who came up with me. I sent somebody
down with some word once about some development. It was not much more valuable than that.

**Cameron:** How many members of your staff did you have with you that day?

**Haynes:** One.

**Goldberg:** How about the smoke? Did it enter the executive suite?

**Haynes:** There was just a touch of a smell. It was much heavier downstairs. I don’t really remember much of it for the rest of the day until probably 7:30 p.m., or maybe it was 6:00 p.m. that we all came out and the Secretary ended up going over to the White House to meet the President. I came back into my office and the smoke was still strong but not thick. So, I stayed up there for a while and everybody, including the Secretary and the Chairman, eventually migrated up there because the connections were better. We spent the rest of the day—many, many hours—up there. What I remember subsequently is that up there we would go from the SVTC to where we had a kind of connectivity over to a semi-private room in the ECS. I say semi-private because I think there may have been open space above the door. We would go there for the Secretary to have his telephone conversations with the President, of which he had two to four, mostly when the President was traveling on Air Force One from Florida to Barksdale to Offutt and back to Washington. So we would shuttle back and forth between the SVTC room and this little semi-private room. The Secretary, Ed Giambastiani, Steve Cambone and I were the four in that private room. I don’t think Tori came with us. So those are the significant geographic memories I have of that day.

**Goldberg:** You have done well!
Cameron: If we have time, we would like to address what your professional
tasks were and what kinds of discussions you held with the Secretary or others
over rules of engagement or other legal issues.

Haynes: Probably that should be in the next round, because I need to decide
what I can tell you about that and also the classification and associated issues.
So far, I think what I have said has been unclassified. But I would be happy to do
that. Of course, going through my notes would help.

Goldberg: We don't really need much classified information for what we are
doing. On the other hand, it could be informative to have it as background. This
will be an unclassified study that we are putting out; it will be well vetted before it
is published. So if you want to say things off the record, classified, we can keep
it off the record. But it could be useful for the people preparing the study.

Haynes: I take it that all of you have security clearances?

Goldberg: Yes, top secret clearances.

Haynes: We can address that the next time and make sure we follow the
appropriate rules.

It is a great pleasure to work for the Secretary all of the time, but his mettle
really came through that day. I remember before he spoke to the President that
he made some remarks about how this was an attack of a different character
than other terrorist attacks.

Goldberg: Unlike Pearl Harbor.

Haynes. Certainly unlike Pearl Harbor, but also unlike other terrorist attacks like
the Marine barracks, and the need for the U.S. government to respond in a way
that was sustained and purposeful and principled, with an eye toward the world that we were now in, as of that day. I remember him speaking, as he thought about the bombing in Beirut, and how we needed to respond differently than we had then. Which, of course, we have.

Goldberg: Different situation, too.

Haynes: It certainly was a different situation and, of course, at that time we did not know who or how extensive. There were a number of questions at that time, including how many other planes might be up there, and was this coordinated with something else besides aircraft.

Goldberg: Always lots of rumors at such times.

Haynes. Sure. Of course, the legal issues that were associated with that were broader than just rules of engagement. We got into that right away—the appropriate use of the armed forces in the United States and how different in character this was from a law enforcement response. It came up even on that day. Sure, we can talk about that at some point.

Cameron: Terrific. Thank you.
Cameron: This is the second interview with Williams Haynes, the Department of Defense General Counsel, regarding the Pentagon attack on September 11, 2001. It is taking place in his office at the Pentagon on April 15, 2003. The interviewers are Drs. Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron.

During the last interview we talked mostly about where you were and what you did on September 11th. Before we turn to the legal issues, remind us where you were when the Secretary went outside to the crash site?

Haynes: I was in the ESC (Executive Support Center) with a few people, including Steve Cambone and Tori Clark. I believe Larry Di Rita was with us, but I can't say for sure.

Goldberg: What about Giambastiani? [Secretary Rumsfeld's military assistant]

Haynes: Ed was not with us. Ed was with the Secretary.

Goldberg: Who else went with the Secretary?

Haynes: I didn't see, so I don't know for sure. My guess is that Ed and Di Rita may have been with him—probably the whole front office.

Goldberg: Do you remember the communications man who was with the Secretary during this time?

Haynes: I don't remember him. I probably wouldn't recognize him.

Cameron: He was with the Secretary, as it turned out, because he was in charge of keeping the Secretary in communication. So the communications people, not his senior staff, were with him outside.
Goldberg: He apparently was on hand most of the time until early afternoon.

Haynes: As I said the last time we met, the Secretary came into the ESC after the plane hit the Building. At that point, there were a lot of people.

Goldberg: What were you all doing while he was out?

Haynes: I didn’t know where he was, at first. We were in a room that is now the location for our daily secure video teleconferences with General Franks for the Iraq War. I believe that room has been upgraded between 9/11 and this last business. I don’t think there was a secure video teleconference capability in the larger room, as there is now. We were in that large room with a large table and a lot of screens. The screens were up. We convened the meeting after the second plane hit the Tower. That’s why Di Rita may have been there, to discuss whether we needed to set up a full-time crisis action team right away. So there were some other folks there.

Cameron: Did you set one up?

Haynes: Oh, sure. The rush of events was such that, when the plane hit the Building, as I said before, it didn’t dawn on me right away what had happened. But all of a sudden things really sped up. The next significant event that I remember is when the Secretary rejoined us and we moved from that larger room into the vaulted secure video teleconference facility. General Myers was there, he was the vice chairman at the time, and others. Things were really clipping along. So, for many hours after that it was a high tempo of activity. We moved down to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) for a while and then into a secure video teleconference room for a while. It didn’t work very well.
The smoke started to seep into that area. I think I mentioned before how I went back up by myself, and then some others joined me in the ESC SVTC room for a short while. That was about the same time that the Deputy and my own deputy, Dan Dell’Orto, and some others left the Building and flew up to Site R.

Your question was, what were we doing while the Secretary was out? I don’t remember very much. We were watching the TV a lot. I was in the ESC right up until probably 5, 6 or 7 p.m. I think the Secretary went down and gave a press conference in the pressroom, which was an interesting discussion. Previously, all of the press had convened at the Navy Exchange gas station.

Goldberg: Victoria Clark was over there part of the time.

Haynes: Yes, I would imagine she left during the afternoon. There was discussion about having the briefing there. The question was, should the Secretary go over there and give a press conference? I think Senator Warner had come over at 11:00. For a lot of reasons that are probably obvious, it was important to say that we were not being run out by the enemy. So the press folks came back and we had the press conference here.

Cameron: Did you discuss any legal matters during the day?

Haynes: Oh, yes.

Cameron: Nobody else has had much to say about that, and it is very important.

Haynes: Well, they weren’t all that sophisticated. But we talked about—I need to be careful about attorney-client privilege here. I don’t think there is really much secret about the fact that . . .

Goldberg: The business of the public is the public business.
Haynes: But the privilege is important as well. I don’t think there is any secret about the fact that we had fighter aircraft in the air and they were authorized to fire at civilian aircraft full of Americans, which was a pretty heavy thing to think about. That was obviously on the Secretary’s mind when he spoke to the President and the Vice President.

Cameron: You also had discussed that issue?

Haynes: Not with the President and the Vice President, but with the Secretary. At some point, later in the day, we had some brief conversation about it. It was certainly more hypothetical than driven by a particular event, but we thought about whether there might be other attackers that were not in airplanes. Certainly, we had security people deployed in the Pentagon. I think I mentioned to you before that when I left the National Military Command Center to go upstairs to the Executive Support Center to man that other SVTC, the Defense Protective Service (DPS) people were deployed.

But later that day with the Secretary, and certainly in the follow-on days, we had a number of discussions about the proper role of the armed forces in the United States. Usually it is in a supporting role to civil authorities. There is an insurrection statute, for example, that has been implemented in a process that has been refined over decades, something called “garden plot”—a very refined, venerable framework for military support to civil authorities. There are different variations of it. Some of the more celebrated examples are the DoD support to the President’s representative in California for the Los Angeles riots in the early 1990s and, before that, the race riots in the ’60s and ’70s. But in any case, DoD
also supports fire fighting and disaster relief—hurricanes and things of that nature. DoD is always, in those circumstances, supporting civil authorities, whether it is the attorney general in case of riots or, formerly, FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) in disaster relief. It is always supportive to civil authorities.

Well, this is a different situation. The Secretary of Defense’s forces were potentially to be used on and after 9/11, in my view, supporting the President in his commander-in-chief role, as opposed to the chief executive role. That supports the civil authority of the President of the United States only, and not another civil agency. So, very interesting but timely discussions over weeks about exactly what was the proper balance.

Goldberg: The Secretary was involved in these discussions?

Haynes: Yes.

Goldberg: And the Deputy Secretary?

Haynes: There were many different discussions and they came up in many different contexts. I ended up writing a short paper on it for the Secretary that was really a refined product from a lot of different discussions, because it kept coming up from time to time. We really didn’t know how pervasive the Al Qaeda presence was.

Goldberg: We have done a lot of disaster relief abroad. Under what authority did we do that?
Haynes: You don't have the same constitutional questions when you are supporting a foreign country. The one that comes to mind is about ten or twelve years ago when we sent the Marines into Bangladesh.

Goldberg: We have done a lot of others. I remember one in McNamara's time. In Italy we gave them a lot of military supplies and materials. Apparently this wasn't entirely correct, so we had to really strain at the leash in order to be able to do it without any particular legal authority.

Cameron: Did you discuss any of these international legal issues on that day?

Haynes: Yes.

Cameron: How early did they come up?

Haynes: Certainly after we went into Afghanistan it was a big issue. I think we started the so-called kinetics on October 7th. We may be getting into some things that are classified now, but certainly we didn't do nothing between September 11th and October 7th. Supporting foreign entities was a difficult issue when we had to go into Afghanistan and provide equipment, supplies, and things of that nature to the Northern Alliance people. We had to work with the CIA. A lot of the authorities that you employ in peacetime are foreign assistance authorities, which are generally administered by the State Department, and they have a very highly regulated procedure for that. That is something that we, in this Department, know how to do, but in the context of war. For authorities we reached back to the World War II era, and even before.
Goldberg: In World War II, in 1940, when we gave destroyers to the British, they reached back to an 1892 statute that they thought gave them the authority to do it. It was still chancy but they used that as the authority.

Haynes: We have done that, too. There is an attorney general opinion from that time that discussed all of that. We relied on it for a lot of what we did, not only in Afghanistan but also recently in Iraq. The President's constitutional powers and his obligations to defend the country provide us with what we believe are additional authorities to whatever statutes exist. We really didn't discuss that on September 11th. It was more about the rules of engagement for firing on civilian aircraft, at what level the Secretary wanted to empower people.

Goldberg: That was the immediate problem.

Haynes: And also to make sure that he had the President's approval, even though he talked to the President a number of times during that day. I was with him, I think, every time. Sometimes they were scheduled, because the President was traveling from Florida to Barksdale Air Force Base, to Offutt Air Force Base, and back. In some cases, they were prompted by events. We had quite a few flights that we were tracking that later turned out not to have been threatening aircraft. But we didn't know at the time. Some of them were quite imminent at the time. So we would speak to the President. In my view, even though we already had authority, it would be appropriate to talk to the President before you took such a significant step. I don't think he needed prompting from me for that. But with so much going on, which continues to be the case, my view is that my
role with the Secretary is to chime in and remind him of things that I think he
might otherwise not remember.

Cameron: Early news stories indicated that the first authorization to shoot down
an American plane, if necessary, had come from the Vice President. Does that
seem accurate to you? I assume it shifted to the Secretary in the chain-of-
command. How do you recall that?

Haynes: I wasn’t on any of the calls with the President or the Vice President, but
I was present, I believe, during all of them. I remember when the Secretary
spoke with the Vice President. That was at least one time.

Goldberg: He spoke to the Vice President before he spoke to the President?

Haynes: I will give you the setting. We had moved from the ESC down to the
NMCC. There were a lot of people on the floor. There were very poor
communications in the sense that, at the NMCC at the time, we didn’t have
secure video teleconference capability that we had upstairs. As a consequence,
the Secretary was just on a regular hand set with the Vice President. He was a
little bit removed from me at that point. Those communications were private.
You should ask the Secretary about those kinds of things. That was actually
about the time that I was talking with the Deputy—certainly within that same
period. He was on the phone quite a bit with the Vice President. He could have
been on the phone with the President at that point, for all I know.

Goldberg: I think we have that pretty well worked out with the communications
man who was arranging the calls and trying to keep the Secretary in
communication. What did you do the next day?
Haynes: Let me finish off that day first. We stayed in the ESC until late in the day. I actually went down to the press conference and sat in the audience.

Cameron: Did you give the Secretary input about what he might say at the press conference?

Haynes: Not really. Well, maybe I did. As I said, I didn’t get a chance to go through my notes as I had wanted to, but I have documents here somewhere.

[NOTE: Haynes looked through notes at length.]

Cameron: Any materials that you think would be appropriate for us to have for the record would be appreciated.

Haynes: I think I should probably get these notes reviewed and marked for classification.

Goldberg: Let me suggest something. We would like to have what you have for the archives. We can make copies or you can have copies made, because this is the kind of material we do not often get. We can handle classified material. The only question is whether we can use it in connection with preparation of the book on 9/11.

Haynes: Well, I don’t intend to take anything with me when I leave. Some of this might be pure detritus.

Cameron: What is detritus to you is the historical record to us.

Haynes: I’ve got particular airline numbers that we were watching. There was one plane that was coming in from Korea that was dangerously close. They had the wrong transponder on—they were broadcasting the highjack code, and it was not true. Then they overflew the place where they were being escorted; they
eventually landed in Canada. There were reports of one coming in from Spain, an hour out of Washington. That was another reason to call the President, because we were very close.

Goldberg: The whole day must have seemed kaleidoscopic.

Haynes: It was wild. My own wife and children didn’t know for hours. I couldn’t get through and it was pretty busy. The kids had a hard time for months.

Cameron: What is your strongest, most affecting memory from that day? As you look back, does anything about your reactions or the reactions of others surprise you?

Haynes: I’d probably have to give that more thought. People were very calm, though it was very hectic in the midst of a lot of confusion. The first reports were almost always incorrect. I could see the Secretary first hand, the President derivatively, but also on the SVTC from time to time during the day. The Secretary and the President were level headed and determined right from the beginning. Some of the things that the Secretary said in those first hours about how we should respond stayed true even to this day. That was comforting. But give me some time to reflect and go through these things and I’ll give you more.

I’ll see what I can do about these notes.

Goldberg: Yes, please. They could be very useful.