Matloff: This is part II of an oral history interview with Mr. Paul R. Ignatius held in Washington, D.C., on April 27, 1987, at 9:30 a.m. Again representing the OSD Historical Office are Drs. Roger Traak and Maurice Matloff.

Mr. Ignatius, at our meeting on March 31, we discussed your roles as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics, 1961-63, and as Under Secretary of the Army, 1964. We had begun to talk about your service as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, 1964-67. We would like to resume the discussion of that role this morning and go on to your service as Secretary of the Navy, 1967-69.

On the question of threat perceptions within OSD, about the time that you came into the ASD(I&L) position in OSD—do you recall what the dominant attitude was toward the Soviet threat, and whether you agreed with it? Were you aware of any differences within OSD as to what the threat was? For example, was Communism conceived as a monolithic bloc? Did you view the state of Soviet logistics as a serious threat when you took over?

Ignatius: I think Communism was viewed more as a single bloc, and it was only later that people began to have a better understanding, particularly of the differences between the Chinese and the Soviet Union. One of the events that I think helped to shape policy and the perception of the threat was the Congress—it may have been the 20th—of the Communist Party, in which there had been a declaration and dedication on their part to wars below the threshold of declared wars involving irregular
and guerrilla forces. This had an enormous impression, I believe, on
the policy-makers in the Department and in the government as a whole,
and it gave rise to emphasis upon special forces in the United States,
such as the Green Berets; mobile units, such as the Army's air assault
divisions and units; and the preparation for what eventually became
involvement in the war in Vietnam. I think, also, there were domestic
political aspects to all of this. The Democrats had been charged with
the "loss" of China, and had smarted under that for quite some time.
Moreover, as I recall, early in the Kennedy administration there was
consideration of intervention in Laos, but Governor Harriman's mission
resulted in the decision that it would be next to impossible to mount
any kind of a serious effort in Laos, given the landlocked nature of
the country and the apparent unwillingness of the Laotians to do very
much in their own behalf. So when Vietnam came along, coupled with the
perception of a changing threat with irregular and guerrilla forces,
and the presence of Diem, who appeared to be a stronger leader with better
support, the memory of the loss of China, and the decision not to go
into Laos, all came together with the result that we began what became
an increasingly heavy involvement in Vietnam. All of this affected
what we were doing. On the logistic side it affected what we were
buying—with many changes in requirements, quantities, etc.; greater
emphasis on readiness; in the Defense Department a lot of interest on
fast deployment logistic ships. That was never popular in the Senate.
I remember testifying before Senator Russell on those ships having very
difficult questions raised by him. So far as Soviet logistics were
concerned, I don’t think of anything particular in that connection. So far as war in Europe was concerned, the Soviets had a much easier job, because they didn’t have as far to go as we did. We had to tailor our forces with a great deal of emphasis on sealift and airlift.

**Matloff:** Were you or your office drawn in on the problems of strategic planning during the Johnson administration?

**Ignatius:** I was not involved in strategic planning, but was certainly involved in logistical planning. One of the great problems in the Vietnam War was the lack of a logistical infrastructure to support the degree of involvement that increasingly became evident. We lacked ports, airfields, and just about everything that was needed. So there was a lot of planning effort and implementation of those plans, and that was a major preoccupation of my time as ASD(I&L). Strategic questions—no; we didn’t get into those.

**Matloff:** Did the Joint Chiefs ever consult you on the interaction of strategy with logistics?

**Ignatius:** There were some discussions that I had individually with one or more Chiefs and certainly with the J-4, but I don’t recall any formal meetings with the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body. Usually we talked about specific items—like Ambassador Martin in Thailand needed something—situationally oriented case-by-case matters, rather than questions of broad strategy.

**Matloff:** This was a period of great ferment, in and out of the Department of Defense. There were Defense intellectuals, people who had been
brought in from RAND, and those who had stayed at RAND. I'm sure you were aware of the debate. Were you keeping up with it?

Igna: Yes, I was, but I was also very busy doing my job. I don't think I have ever worked as hard and, I hope, as productively, in my life, as I did in that 3 1/2 year period as Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L). That was an enormously broad and comprehensive assignment, at a time when we had to get so much done without the usual tools that one had in a mobilization effort of this kind.

Matloff: About the impact of interservice competition on your office's operations, policies, and programs—how serious a problem was it?

Igna: I don't think that it was a serious problem. What was serious was accomplishing what we needed to do in the Vietnam War effort in the light of previous policies and perceptions. We had to establish a number of production lines for 500, 750, and 1,000 pound general purpose bombs, for example. There wasn't any tooling to build them. The Air Force had owned that tooling, and had gotten rid of it. I suppose the fellow who did it and got 10 cents on the dollar for the tooling probably thought he had done a pretty good job, because if there was ever going to be another war the last thing anybody thought would ever be needed was the old iron bombs. So we had to begin this tremendous effort starting from behind the goal line, so to speak. You can't fault the Air Force for that. They were acting on what seemed to be national policy. When the time came to get going on all these things, the industrial base responded reasonably well. We had some problems sometimes, because individual services owned their own inventories. I may have
gone into the question about the need to take from the Navy certain ordnance in order to make it available to the Air Force and to carry on the bombing program at the level that Admiral Sharp wanted. The Navy didn’t want to give that up, and I had to insist that they do so. I wouldn’t call that rivalry as much as "These are mine, and I don’t want to lend them." There was always rivalry, and I saw that perhaps more clearly later on when I became Navy Secretary, between naval air and the Air Force. The naval aviators always wanted to make sure that naval aviation got the proper attention. I sensed rivalry there. I don’t recall any negative aspects of rivalry between the Army and the Marines. We tried to establish, and did succeed at least nominally, in establishing a construction czar in Vietnam to supervise the enormous construction program that involved the Corps of Engineers, the Navy Yards and Docks, etc. I ran into problems on that. They didn’t seem to want to do that. Cy Vance and I insisted that that be done, and we did end up with someone, I think an Army officer, a general officer of the Engineer Corps, in charge. There was rivalry there and it tended to be the kind of thing that, "We know what we’re doing, and we don’t need someone over us to tell us how." Our feeling was that there had to be more coordination of this program of construction in Vietnam.

Matloff: How much impact and control did the Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L) have over the formulation and allocation of the Defense budget in these areas?

Ignatius: I spent a lot of time going over the requests from the Services. I remember particularly, at McNamara’s direction, working with the Air
Force on the amount of money in their budget for general purpose ordnance, some of the bombs we were talking about earlier. There was interest in making sure that they were putting enough money into the budget for these purposes.

Matloff: Were there differences of views, perhaps, between you and the Comptroller, or with Mr. McNamara, over the amount of money for the installations and logistics area?

Ignatius: There must have been some, but generally speaking, the money that I thought the services needed and they thought they needed for the consumables associated with that war effort were not controversial items. Generally speaking, my recollection of this period was getting out the production for which the money was budgeted, rather than getting the money in order to place the contracts. We were doubling and tripling some of our production rates for major items, such as helicopters, etc. In the case of ammunition, we were going to extraordinary lengths to bring general purpose ordnance into the inventory. The budgetary aspects were really the usual bread and butter type of effort to make sure that the amounts were correct, and so forth. I don't recall any major allocation problems on dollars. There must have been some, but nothing immediately leaps to mind.

Matloff: Were the funds appropriated directly to the services, or through your office, or both?

Ignatius: They were funded directly to the services. My office was involved in overseeing this process, and we also had a number of budget exercises where supplemental requests were involved. I remember all
kinds of planning efforts; for example, McNamara would give me certain assumptions that had been developed, and then I would meet with the Army Secretary, Stan Resor, and tell him, "I hate to do this at 4:00 in the afternoon, but by 8:00 tomorrow morning we've got to have the Army's view on a whole set of new things." They would come forward with budget numbers that would eventually be the basis for a supplemental request.

I suppose what triggered all of these things were requests from Westmoreland and others in the field, that they needed further augmentation, and so forth. So I was involved heavily in matters of that kind.

Matloff: Do you recall what percentage of the Defense budget was allocated to I&I?

Ignatius: I would not be able to give you a ready answer. Manpower was always a large part of the budget.

Matloff: That was the next question—who received the greatest share?

Ignatius: Manpower was built in. You had the number of people times what they were paid, etc. The procurement budget in those days was far less than what it is today, but it must have been $25 or $30 billion for the major items, and for the secondary items another $5 or $10. I would guess we were at some level like $40 billion or so, but I'm not sure of these numbers. Inflation has had such a heavy toll that it's hard to compare those numbers to today's numbers.

Matloff: In connection with manpower and weaponry, this was a controversial period, with the integration issue, the merging of the National
Guard with the Reserves, and a number of weapons systems which were controversial. Were you drawn in on these matters?

*Ignatius:* When I was an official of the Army, I got involved with the Reserve and Guard questions. In the case of I&L in Defense, I don't remember anything particularly noteworthy. We were equipping them as we were equipping the regular forces, but I don't remember any specific policy questions.

*Matloff:* Do you recall any differences of views with various offices of OSD on the questions of weaponry?

*Ignatius:* There were questions in Enthoven's office always about nuclear forces for the Navy, particularly carriers, and also frigates. That was a matter of controversy between Enthoven and the Navy. Johnny Foster was the R&D Secretary at that time and there was beginning to be a raging controversy over the TFX, later the F-111. I wasn't involved in that matter because it was in an R&D stage. I became involved at a later point as Secretary of the Navy. As OSD I&L, I was not involved in that.

*Matloff:* About foreign area problems and crises, beginning with NATO—this was the period when France was taken out of the military command structure by de Gaulle. Did this lead to problems for your office? It certainly had an impact on that line in communications and logistical support of the Alliance.

*Ignatius:* Yes, it did. I remember making a couple of trips and meeting with some of the logistical commanders as well as the overall commanders in Europe. I think that we were able to cope with that all right.
There was always a feeling, I think, that if war broke out, we would be able to work with the French and with their installations, even though they had made those changes. One question that I remember being involved in with respect to NATO logistics had to do with prepositioning. There was a lot of talk about whether to preposition and if so, how much. I think we decided on two divisions worth of equipment and selected what would go in there and made sure that it could be stored properly, particularly to ensure that it could be brought out in time to be useful.

Moreover, there were some coproduction programs—for example, the NATO HAWK missile was a coproduction program. I and my Office were involved in that. I had a lot of responsibility for the production sharing program with Canada and would host meetings of my Canadian counterpart here and then would head the delegation going to Canada to meet and review commitments under this program. The ultimate aim of a lot of that, of course, was for NATO.

Matloff: Do you have any impressions about whether the allies were pulling their weight in this field? Where the integration might have gone further?

Ignatius: There was always a feeling that they could do more than they were, and that continues right up to the present moment. I think we shifted during that period to the 7.62 round rather than the 30 caliber. There was a lot of NATO committee effort designed to get a more common logistical system and more common items, but how much progress was made on that, I don’t know. My recollection is that it was fairly limited.
Matloff: What role, if any, did you play in connection with Vietnam, in your capacity as Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Johnson administration? Were your views sought; what did you recommend; how were you drawn in?

Ignatius: I don't remember that my views were sought with respect to matters of strategy—should we go into Vietnam, and if so, how? I was heavily involved in everything having to do with implementation of the decisions as they related to equipment, shipping, construction, the production base, strikes, and defense plants; everything having to do with carrying out these decisions, as opposed to the basic decisions themselves.

Matloff: What were your reactions to two decisions that President Johnson made in this period; one, to commit American ground combat troops; and the other, to bomb north of the 17th parallel—both made in 1965?

Ignatius: The decision of President Johnson to go in with more forces seemed to me to be a continuation of what had been going on before, and whether it was a difference in degree or a difference in kind, I suppose that one could argue, but it certainly was a major event. The decision to bomb, as I remember it, was initially thought to be very limited in nature. People had some concern about it, but it was a very explicit grant of authority in the belief that if the designated targets were bombed, there wouldn't be any need for further bombing.

Matloff: Did you agree entirely with Defense policy and strategic planning during the Vietnam conflict?
Ignatius: I always thought, going back to my time in the Army, that there were elements of nationalist struggle, along with the Communist aspects, in the war in Vietnam. I had read about this and knew about the long history of Vietnam—the French occupation, the general xenophobia of the Vietnamese people, the long struggle of Ho Chi Minh over the years—so I always thought there were some elements of nationalism involved there, along with the Communist threat.

Matloff: Let me ask you about the Dominican Operation, which also took place during this period—in April 1965 we intervened with troops. Were you or your office consulted, or did you have any recommendations?

Ignatius: I don’t remember being consulted or asked for recommendations. I think that I was at the White House that night at a reception that President Johnson was holding for a large number of people. He was getting messages from the Ambassador down there, who was under his desk, as I recall. Red Raborn was the CIA chief at the time, and they were all caught up in this thing. It came and went pretty fast, as I remember.

Matloff: How about the Middle East operations, particularly the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967? Did you or your office play any role in that connection, and did that war have any impact on your office’s operations, policies, or planning?

Ignatius: The conflict had impact in the sense that McNamara and others in Defense were enormously impressed with the results of the Israeli army—the readiness of their reserves, the effectiveness and readiness of their forces. General Moshe Dayan visited the Pentagon at the end
of that conflict and was appalled to learn about the ammunition procure-
ment that we were involved in and the rates of expenditure of ammunition.
That, I think, had some effect on everyone. There were a lot of compara-
tive statements made about what the Israelis did, per round expended so
to speak, against our rather more wholesale use of ordnance. My office
must have been involved in some specific aspects of that 1967 conflict,
but I'm having trouble recalling just what they might have been.

Matloff: A general question on Mr. McNamara's reforms in management—
what impact in general, or in particular, did they have on the operations
of your office? Did they make your relations with the military more or
less difficult?

Ignatius: I think his reforms were enormously important. On balance,
while some of them were controversial, they made my job easier. In the
first place, McNamara gave enormous backing to the I&L function and to
me personally, and he expected that there would be similar emphasis at
the service level. As a result, the Assistant Secretaries in the services
and I in Defense worked together very effectively as a team under McNamara's
overall managerial policies. It seemed to me it would have been harder
under a philosophy that said that the services really could do their
own thing, without Defense involvement. That would have made a Defense
job, in many ways, harder. We weren't running things out of my office,
except possibly for the ammunition program. But you can't run many
things out of the Defense staff. These are enormous enterprises. They
have to be run by the services and delegated at the high levels of the
services down to the operating offices.
Matloff: Was it your feeling that your office was primarily formulating or implementing policy in the field of installations and logistics?

Ignatius: From the beginning of the McNamara period, when Tom Morris was the first incumbent of that position, through my period following Tom for another three years, we were formulating policy to a large extent. McNamara believed that operating responsibility should be put at the service level. As he put it to me one day, he thought that you should have the brightest people that you could find at the OSD staff level, in order to be involved in the formulation of policy and the review of implementation. But the idea that you would run something out of Defense was foreign to his thinking, and mine, with the possible exception of the ammunition program, where for a lot of reasons there was a need for direct and heavy involvement at the Defense level. I must say that I didn’t encounter any particular opposition to this from the services. We worked effectively and amicably together as professionals. You can’t run the services, and the Defense establishment as a whole, out of the E ring and the OSD spaces.

Matloff: What do you regard as your major achievements in this role?

Ignatius: Accomplishing Defense production programs of World War II magnitude in an economy that did not enjoy the priorities for Defense materiel and production that normally characterize an effort of that magnitude. That, I think, was the major accomplishment of my period, and it related to all of the materiel, particularly the ammunition,
helicopters, aircraft, and secondary items as well. We established a very responsive logistical system to support a war of quite large scope.

Matloff: Any disappointments or frustrations?

Ignatius: No, there weren't many frustrations. There were day to day problems, but there was a sense of accomplishment. We probably would have made more progress in some of our procurement reformation and improvement programs but some of those things in fact got deemphasized. Bob never wanted to deemphasize them, but in fact they were because of the need to get on with the urgent priorities of the Vietnam War.

Matloff: Now to your role of Secretary of the Navy, September 1967—January 1969. What was the background of this appointment? What were the circumstances—who recommended you, what instructions were you given?

Ignatius: My name was considered by McNamara and discussed between McNamara and Vance, but John McNaughton was selected. McNamara told me that he thought my job as Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L) was far more important than any job of service secretary, particularly at that time of the Vietnam War. He acknowledged that the service secretary's job was probably more prestigious in the public's mind, but so far as substance was concerned, he said, "Your job is more important, and I want you to continue to do it." He recommended that John McNaughton be made the Navy Secretary. Within a very short period of time, four or five days, John, his wife, and one or more of their children met a tragic death in a collision, when a small plane ran into the airliner
in which they were flying. After that, McNamara reopened this question with me and said he felt that he had to offer me the job because I was entitled to it. He still thought the I&L job was more important, but Cy and he felt that they were duty-bound to offer it to me, in the event that I wanted it. I told him that I did want it, for a number of reasons. I had been in the I&L job for 3 1/2 years; the Navy job was a new challenge; and I wanted to do it. So McNamara arranged to move Tom Morris out of the Manpower Assistant Secretary job into I&L to replace me. I had replaced Tom in 1964, and he replaced me in 1967. So far as instructions were concerned, the one thing I remember particularly that I discussed with McNamara had to do with the whole question of budgetary planning in the Navy. I told him that as an OSD person for 3 1/2 years I had been involved in reviewing service budgets and working with the Comptroller and others on them. I said, "When I go down to Navy, I am prepared to work with the Navy in a tough-minded manner on the Navy budget submission and come in with a tight budget. If I'm successful in doing that and your Defense staff then whacks that budget, you've got to get a new Navy Secretary fast. So I will go either way. We'll come in with the traditional budget planning and OSD can do its thing, or I will do at the Navy level what I have been doing here. But if I do that, you've got to make sure that we get supported." He said, "Fine. I want you to do the job there, and you go ahead and do it." I told that to Tom Moorer, who was the new CNO, and in effect he said that he would go along with me. Rivero, the Vice Chief, simply wouldn't believe it and said that we would be making a mistake if we did it. We
came in with some pretty tight budgets. I acted as Navy Secretary as though I was an OSD reviewer, Moorer went along, and we did fine.

We did very well and over a period of time probably got more programs started and funded than had occurred in a long time. In short, it worked.

Matloff: Did the experience with the Army prove useful or a handicap in the new post?

Ignatius: All of these things merged. It probably helped. All that you learn from any job that you are in helps. I came in to the Navy job with 6 1/2 years of experience in the Defense Department. Each element helped the next one.

Matloff: What were the problems in the Navy when you took over? How did you conceive your role as Secretary?

Ignatius: I conceived my role as working effectively with the Chief of Naval Operations and trying to inculcate the thinking of my civilian staff with the thinking of the military staff, with Moorer and me working hand and glove together. I had seen an example of this with Bus Wheeler, when he had been Chief of Staff of the Army working with Vance as the Secretary. One of the ways my Army experience helped was seeing the effective way that Cy and Wheeler had worked together. Moreover, I had an absolutely first-rate group of Under and Assistant Secretaries in the Navy. Bob Frosch was the R&D man. He later became the head of NASA, and after that, Vice President of General Motors in charge of all R&D. Jim Bannerman, a great professional in procurement, was my I&L Assistant Secretary, later replaced by Barry Shillito, who became
Defense I&I. My Comptroller was Chuck Bowsher, now Chief of the General Accounting Office, the Comptroller General of the United States—an outstanding official. I had, among the military people, lieutenant commanders who became 4-star officers. Of my two military aides, Worth Bagley became the youngest 4-star admiral in the history of the Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations. He was replaced by Stan Turner, who also went to 4 stars, and later became Chief of CIA. There was a young captain named Tom Hayward, who was in charge of aeronautical affairs in my office. He became Chief of Naval Operations. Harry Train was a lieutenant commander; he became Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. I mention all of this because they were first-rate people and we worked effectively, together with the CNO and his people, and that was the general philosophy that I wanted to follow.

Matloff: Are the civilians that you named mostly people you brought in?

Ignatius: I brought Turner in to replace Bagley; Bagley was there before—I think Paul Nitze brought Bagley in. I recruited Chuck Bowsher with the help of Bob Anthony, who was the Defense Comptroller. I brought Barry Shillito in when Jim Bannerman died. Bob Frosch was already there. I made an Assistant Secretary, Chuck Baird, the Under Secretary. It was a mixture of people already there and those I brought in.

Matloff: Did you have a free hand in these appointments? Was there any pressure on you from the administration or from McNamara’s office?

Ignatius: In eight years in the Pentagon, in four different jobs, I recall only one instance where there was any pressure from the administration to appoint a person to a Presidential appointee level job.
There was no pressure from the administration or elsewhere with respect to political party affiliation. Nobody ever asked me when I came whether I was a Democrat or a Republican. There were people who were Republicans in what were Democratic administrations. There was only one case—this fellow was quite good, but he wasn’t good for the Defense Department. We opposed the White House on it, not me personally, but my views were consulted. Vance and McNamara handled it, but he was nevertheless appointed. As we predicted, he did not work out. He would have been fine in another Department, but they kind of ate him alive in the Defense Department.

Matloff: What problems did you face when you took over as Secretary of the Navy, and who set your priorities?

Ignatius: The priorities particularly involved new weapons programs in the submarine and antisubmarine warfare areas and the resolution of the long-standing controversy involving the TFX F-lll airplane. The new weapons programs originated among the uniformed side of the Navy, by and large, and the controversy with respect to them involved differences between the Defense staff and the Navy staff on various items. The resolution of the TFX problem was necessitated by events. I became involved in that for the first time when I was the Navy Secretary and it became evident to me that the Navy wanted no part of that airplane. They had very strong feelings about it. It became my responsibility to get the matter finally resolved.
Matloff: Did the problems and the priorities change in any way when Clifford took over from McNamara in March 1968?

Ignatius: I remember one specific instance where there was a change. There had been a lot of opposition to a nuclear frigate program. These were large ships that were part of the nuclear task forces. During the McNamara period and through Alain Enthoven's office there was a lot of opposition to them, but there was very strong support for them on the Hill. I talked to Clark Clifford shortly after he took over as Defense Secretary. That was in my early period as Navy Secretary. We decided that maybe we ought to go along with that, that Defense ought to support these Navy ships. Clifford seemed more anxious than McNamara had been to deal with this issue in a way that was supportive of the Navy view and in consonance with the views of key people on the Hill. Moreover, Clifford seemed to be spending a tremendous amount of his time in the whole process of resolution of the Vietnam conflict, working directly with President Johnson, so that I found as Navy Secretary that I was working perhaps more with Nitze as the Deputy Secretary of Defense than would have been the case had McNamara still been there. Paul Nitze, in part because Clifford was so involved with White House matters, but also in recognition of his mastery of all aspects of the Pentagon, was a day-to-day general manager of the Department. It was quite fascinating to have the privilege of working for McNamara and then for Clifford. They were very different in manner, style, and experience, etc., each outstanding in his own way.

Matloff: Did you work more closely with McNamara?
**Ignatius**: Yes.

**Matloff**: How often did you see them?

**Ignatius**: With McNamara in Defense I had one weekly meeting on I&L matters. The phone, the direct intercom, would ring every day, on various things, or I would find myself going into his office for special meetings. There was very frequent contact. In the case of Mr. Clifford, there was less; it tended to be more with Paul Nitze. I still had the weekly meeting as Navy Secretary with the Secretary of Defense, and Clifford was often there, but sometimes he wasn't.

**Matloff**: Had you known Mr. Clifford before?

**Ignatius**: By reputation, but not personally.

**Trask**: Clifford apparently met almost every morning that he was in the Pentagon with a Vietnam steering group of some sort. Were you involved in that?

**Ignatius**: No, I was Navy Secretary at that time, and to the best of my recollection nobody at the service level was part of that. I think that Clifford worked very closely with Paul Warnke, who was Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, and there were perhaps others involved also, but I was not.

**Matloff**: Were you meeting more often with some Assistant Secretaries than others; for example, with the ISA head, and with Mr. Morris, your successor in I&L?

**Ignatius**: I met as Navy Secretary more with Johnny Foster as the Defense R&D man because questions came up involving submarine procurement, etc., and with Alain Enthoven, because of the controversy over the
frigates and other matters. There were some meetings, but I don’t remember many, with Bob Anthony, who was then the Comptroller. Moot came in as Comptroller at the end. He had worked for me in I&L, in charge of shipping and transportation. I brought him into I&L from the Defense Supply Agency.

Matloff: How about relations with the other Service Secretaries—Resor of the Army, and Harold Brown of the Air Force—how often did you meet with them, and did you ever have discussions with them about the changed role of the Service Secretary vis-à-vis the Secretary of Defense?

Ignatius: Zuckert is a student of that subject. He’s written articles in the Harvard Business Review about it. He and I have talked many times, and I talked with Harold at times about it. As I remember, we would entertain one another at lunch from time to time. It wasn’t a particularly organized session, but informal, and we would talk about a lot of things. We saw one another at the Monday morning staff meetings, and I occasionally got a phone call from one of my counterparts. There was consultation, but not much of a formal sort.

Matloff: How about the JCS—first of all, Admiral Moorer?

Ignatius: I was determined at the beginning that we should work hand in glove together, and we did, very effectively.

Matloff: How often did you and the other Service Secretaries meet with the JCS, when Wheeler was Chairman?

Ignatius: I don’t think that we ever did, if you mean the formal corporate body. Moorer would keep me generally informed about JCS deliberations. By the way, there was a back door out of his office into mine,
we called it "coming through the woodwork." Moorer could slip in through that door and I could do the same. That's not a bad administrative device, incidentally, when you have, so to speak, separate staffs—a Secretary's staff, a military staff, and a bunch of people surrounding the Chief of Naval Operations, everybody involved in his own area of responsibility. It's useful to have some ways of getting around all that to have some informal discussions.

Matloff: This seems to be in the tradition of Marshall and Stimson, who worked so closely together. How about the State Department, did you have any dealings with Dean Rusk, or anyone in State?

Ignatium: I had some dealings with State as Assistant Secretary, I&L, as they related to procurement programs that had foreign policy implications or balance of trade implications. Again, I'm sure there were some things in the Navy job, but I don't recall anything right off hand.

Matloff: How about with the White House, any direct or indirect access to President Johnson?

Ignatium: Normally we didn't deal directly, nor do I think we should have under the Defense Department organization. Under the laws and practices that developed, those contacts were handled by the Secretary of Defense. President Johnson did get in touch with me about a trip I was going to be making to Vietnam and asked me to try to see Chuck Robb, his son-in-law, and see how he was. I made it a point to visit and chat with him and reported back to the boss on my return.
Matloff: How about Congress? How much sensitivity did you find in Congress on issues involving the Navy?

Ignatius: There was a great deal of it and I did have to appear. I had always made it a practice to prepare my own backup book indexed in a way where I could find what I wanted. In the Navy, there were people whose sole job in life was handing notes to the Secretary on each question. I said, "Let's get something straight right away. I'm the witness; I've got my book; I will answer. If I don't know what the answer is, I don't have any hesitancy in telling them. We can always get some note up to them later, but I don't want a paper thrust in front of me that I'm seeing for the first time." I didn't like that system at all. The Navy people are adaptable, and they are there to help you. It all worked out fine.

Matloff: Do you recall on what issues Congress was sensitive?

Ignatius: I mentioned the nuclear frigates. There was a lot of sensitivity and interest on that. Also, the TFX.

Matloff: With whom in Congress were you mostly dealing?

Ignatius: With the Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Committees. In the Defense I&L job I dealt with a wider range of Congressional committees than in the Navy job. In the Navy job it tended more to be testimony in connection with the budget. We would go with posture statements to the authorizing committees, and then subsequently to the appropriations committees—but all around the cycle of the annual budget.
Matloff: Did you have complete leeway when you appeared on the Hill? No instructions or emphasis from anybody in OSD on what position was to be taken?

Ignatius: I responded earlier in connection with my other jobs in Defense. In the Navy, I don't think it was different. I perceived of my job, and of every job I held there, as being a member of a Defense team. I felt that I was bound to support the President's budget when it was finally decided, and I did so. If I were asked a personal opinion, I would answer directly and honestly, but I was there to defend the President's budget, and that portion of it for which the Defense Department was responsible, and not to fight old battles that had been decided. I would never try to go around a Defense decision by currying favor on the Hill for a Navy point of view that had not prevailed during the deliberations prior to submission of the President's budget.

Matloff: Did this lead to any embarrassment in connection with those controversial areas, like the TFX? With the OSD offices taking one position and the services involved in a struggle over another?

Ignatius: When I got into the TFX, the Grumman Corporation, which had been a subcontractor to General Dynamics, came in with an unsolicited bid for a new airplane that would be for the Navy itself. When I learned about this, I talked to McNamara and told him that I saw the strongest kind of opposition in the Navy to the TFX F-111 and they weren't going to buy it, and that there had been this new proposal from Grumman. I said, "If we were going to do anything here, it's got to be competitive. It doesn't make any sense suddenly to award a contract to Grumman. If
we're going to go for a new airplane, it ought to be offered competitively to any company interested in bidding on it." My recollection is that McNamara continued to believe that the Navy was wrong in this but was persuaded of the inevitability of what was happening. We went forward on that basis. We did a study (I think Bud Zumwalt was responsible for it, working for the CNO) of this new airplane that ultimately became known as the F-14. I insisted on a competitive procurement. As it turned out, Grumman did finally win it.

Matloff: Are you conscious of any change in your attitude toward the threat in this position?

Ignatius: I became more concerned with the problem of the Middle East, and I was worried about our preoccupation with Vietnam and our commitment of resources to that effort perhaps creating problems for us as time went on in areas such as the Middle East. I became quite interested in that and in the need to keep in mind that the fleet had to be strengthened and that the support for the fleet in torpedoes, weapons of war, and all the other things that were needed had to be funded at adequate levels because there had been a rather significant drain because of Vietnam. This related to manpower, also.

Matloff: How about in connection with strategic planning, what role did the Secretary of the Navy or his staff play in this connection during this period? How influential was the Navy in strategic planning under McNamara and Clifford?

Ignatius: The Navy was interested in war at sea scenarios. A lot of work was done by Admiral Zumwalt and by the Institute for Naval Analysis.
There was a lot of influence on that, and in the areas that were peculiarly Navy responsibilities—submarine warfare, antisubmarine efforts, etc. The Secretary's office was involved, often not in initiating these things, but in the discussion and decision-making.

Matloff: Any changes from one period to the other—from the McNamara to the Clifford era?

Ignatius: I mentioned the nuclear frigates. Having failed to get those approved in Defense under McNamara, they were approved during the Clifford period. We had a number of new programs started during the Clifford period, although their inception was earlier, during McNamara's. There was a new antisubmarine airplane that we got started; the F-14; the Los Angeles class of nuclear attack submarines, a major program. I was particularly interested in seeing us build more attack submarines.

It seemed to me that they were terribly important and that the rate was minimal when I came in. I talked with Paul Nitze about this issue. He had the background of this whole matter that was enormously important and helpful. We increased the rate considerably on construction of attack submarines and got the funding for it. It was a very productive period in launching new ships. I think we also got a big program going on the Marine general purpose ship—helicopter carriers that also contain a Marine battalion.

Matloff: Did interservice competition become a serious problem for you in this capacity?

Ignatius: There was competition and rivalry between naval aviation and the Air Force. That was always present, but it did not get out
of bounds, as it had in an earlier period of our history. But it was
there, and naval aviators had very strong views about the perpetuation
of naval aviation and the ways that they thought it could best be served.
There was also naval opposition to the fast deployment logistic ships.
I had encountered that particularly when I was ASD(I&L). I think that
the Navy regarded them as an OSD requirement, and that if they were
going to be bought, they should be bought out of OSD money, and not
come out of the Navy budget in competition with carriers, destroyers,
frigates, and submarines.
Matloff: There was no objection to the concept, just to the funding?
Ignatius: I don’t think there was objection to the concept, except on
the part of Senator Russell and others. Russell said, "If you are able
to intervene quickly, you are more likely to intervene quickly." That
opposition was fairly strong. The Navy opposition was more to the idea
that the funds would be at the expense of more cherished Navy programs.
Matloff: Was Mr. McNamara drawn into this question of the competition
between naval air and the air view on the same matter? Did he try to
mitigate the competition?
Ignatius: There must have been some effort, but I don’t recall any right
off. Trench warfare wasn’t going on. It was always present, though.
It came to a head, in one sense, in the number of carriers—that’s been
a long-standing question. Nobody ever thought that we should have no
aircraft carriers. The question was, how many? Should it be 12, or
15?
Matloff: How much is enough, the old Enthoven phrase, and the title of his book. What about in connection with the budget, the Navy aspects of the Defense budget, how did it all work out?

Ignatius: I thought it worked out very well. The Navy was pleased; Tom Moorer was very pleased. We were able to get a number of important programs initiated and funded.

Matloff: You felt that the Navy got its fair share?

Ignatius: Yes, and I think the uniformed Navy thought so.

Matloff: Did the approach of McNamara and the whiz kids to the Navy budget put you in an uncomfortable position vis-a-vis the CNO and the admirals?

Ignatius: I probably gave you some insight into that earlier. I must say that as the Secretary of the Navy I felt it was my job to do the best possible job I could of articulating and defending the Navy point of view. But I never felt in that job or any other job that advocacy should be blind, nor, as a Defense official, that all wisdom resided at the Defense level. I thought of the place as a single Department with certain elements within it, and in various jobs you did various things, but always as part of the Defense team. How the uniformed Navy regarded that initially, and with the background I had, I don't know, but as time went on we seemed to meet with some success, and I'm sure that helped to build some enthusiasm.

Matloff: Were there any other differences that you encountered with the OSD office? over the nuclear carrier perhaps? Did that become an issue during your period?
Ignatius: I recall less with the nuclear carrier; the controversies in the nuclear field involved the nuclear frigates. We had a lot of discussion, but finally obtained a decision in our favor with respect to starting a new class of submarines. We had a major controversy on a specialized submarine that Rickover wanted. It was one of a kind, and Johnny Foster was very much opposed. I spent a lot of time with Foster on it, and a fair amount of time with Admiral Rickover, although it was hard to get much out of him. What you mainly got out of Rickover was his own personal view, and if you had questions, he didn't have much interest in them. I finally found some salvation by some long and quite personal discussions with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, who was a submariner, Admiral Clary. Rivero had gone by then. He and I spent a good deal of time talking about that, and I became convinced, largely as a result of his comments to me, that I wanted to go to bat for this quiet submarine that Rickover wanted. Johnny Foster had some very tough questions about that submarine. I went to the mat and fought for it and I got it done. Clary was very pleased, and I suspect Rickover was. That was quite controversial.

Natloff: Did any problems of allocation of manpower to the Navy come up during this period?

Ignatius: Problems on manpower that I remember had to do with retention rates, particularly in key categories, such as nuclear qualified officers. I don't remember any battles involving overall numbers; there may have been some. I remember particularly the problem of the reenlistment of key people, and retention in officer categories, particularly nuclear
nuclear submarine people. The atomic power industry was beginning to
draw off some of those people and we had to find ways to try to stimulate
their retention.

Matloff: On area problems and crises, was there any involvement with
NATO in this capacity?

Ignatius: It was still more the Vietnam War that I recall, rather than
NATO involvement.

Matloff: How about the Pueblo incident, in January 1968?

Ignatius: I learned about that from Admiral Moorer around 2:00 in the
morning. My phone rang at my house and Tom told me that he had
just learned about it. That whole thing, of course, was in the opera-
tional chain for which the Service Secretaries, under law, had no respon-
sibility, but for which they had a great deal of interest and concern.
But I wasn't involved in the decision-making.

Matloff: When the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, did
that get down to your level at all?

Ignatius: No, except that in the scheme of things it was an event that
had a lot of significance. Wasn't this at the time of the Glassboro
conference when Johnson and McNamara were meeting with Kosygin on levels
of investment in weapons?

Trask: Glassboro was 1967, I think.

Ignatius: Wasn't it in that same general period? At any rate, I had
one reaction, just as an individual, of the terribly sad history of
that country, having been invaded by Hitler and all of those problems,
and then to have the Soviet Union come in. Czechoslovakia was a
country that in the past had always been very close in many ways to the United States. So far as the effect on our thinking here and what we did, it was another tragic event, like Hungary. It made it important that we have NATO, that we support NATO, that we have adequate forces and support for the allied effort in NATO.

Matloff: How about in connection with Vietnam? How much of your time was occupied with Vietnam?

Ignatius: Less than I spent as ASD(I&L), but nevertheless a great deal of time. There were concerns in the Navy; for example, with respect to the repetitive tours of naval aviators in Vietnam. We spent a lot of time talking about some of the implications of this. We brought into being during my period the battleship New Jersey, which was taken out of mothballs and made ready for sea for ship-to-shore bombardment. That was controversial in some respects. I went out on the New Jersey on a trip to Vietnam, and she was commanded by someone who had previously been in my office. There were problems about ammunition in the Navy. The expenditure rates were enormous. This was a matter of some concern. When you expend ammunition, you wear out gun tubes, so you had gun tube problems, and there were a lot of discussions with Moorer and others about all of this. There was one interesting anecdote. We had to get a new commander of the naval forces in Vietnam. I liked the idea of sending Bud Zumwalt out there because he had never had very much duty with the troops. He had been around the State Department corridors and the E ring of the Defense Department, but if you were going to get anywhere in the Navy, you had to know how to drive a ship. He was a
bright fellow, and I told Moorer that I thought we should consider him. We jumped him over quite a few people to send him out as a Vice Admiral to Vietnam. Once we had made that decision, I wrote a personal letter—one of very few times I ever did this—to Creighton Abrams, who had replaced Westmoreland as overall commander in Vietnam. Abe was a good personal friend from the old Army days, and an outstanding soldier. I told him that we were sending Zumwalt out there, that he was bright and objective, and that he would work well with Abrams and could be counted upon. But Abrams at that point had not been notified officially by the Chiefs that Zumwalt was the nominee for the naval command. According to custom, the overall commander has to give approval. Abe’s nose was really out of joint because he heard it from me before he heard officially about it. He told me later, when I saw him, that if it had not been for his affection for me and his trust in my judgment, he was about to tell the Chiefs to shove it; he was not going to have something decided without his involvement. As it turned out, Zumwalt did a terrific job in Vietnam and Abe couldn’t praise him enough.

Matloff: Were your views on the conduct or ending of the war consulted? Ignatius: I got involved to some extent in that, particularly in my discussions with Zumwalt before he went over there, saying that we ought to do everything we could to turn it over to the Vietnamese. Everything that possibly could be done should be done. That later became a formal program, the Vietnamization program. Bud was very instrumental in that because the Navy had a lot of small craft within the country and it was easier to turn that size ship over to the Vietnamese than some of the
larger aspects of the war. Then Bud emphasized the English language. That had to be taught to the Vietnamese in order to speed the process.

Matloff: How about higher up, from the OSD level, were your views consulted on how to end the war?

Ignatius: No, I don't think they were, particularly. I remember walking out with McNamara from the SecDef's staff meeting, following the Tet offensive. I was sitting as the Service Secretary then. I remember two things being said simultaneously: 1) we won a major victory, and 2) we need 180,000 more troops for Westmoreland. I said to Bob, "You've got to work on this, but it seems to me that we've got to look into this with the greatest of care because there were some reports of a collapse of the RVN. If that's true, you're going to need a lot more than 180,000; and if it's the great victory that we've said it is, why do we need 180,000? The American people aren't going to support this. We need better intelligence on what happened before we act." He looked at me as though I was telling him things that he knew better than I. I may have that number wrong, but it was an enormous number.

Matloff: That is fascinating, because he said that he was not happy with intelligence dealing with Vietnam, and that he wanted the CIA to set up a special group as a result of that.

Ignatius: I think they did and he felt that their information to him was very accurate. McNamara got into trouble with the Congress when he testified about the bombing program against North Vietnam. He said that
claims that we went after the North Vietnam steel industry were incorrect. There was no steel industry; there were iron foundries. He said, "I had more iron foundry capacity under my control as president of the Ford Motor Co. than the entire North Vietnamese have under their control in their country." He talked very candidly about what bombing did and didn't accomplish, and it offended many people on the Hill and elsewhere.

Matloff: Were you aware in this period of any disillusionment with the war by McNamara or other OSD officials?

Ignatius: He kept that pretty well to himself. He was intensely loyal to President Kennedy, and after that to President Johnson. He would never say, "I don't think this is a good idea, but the White House does." That was foreign to him. So he maintained this loyalty and support. At the same time, as we know from subsequent events, he had grave doubts about the efficacy of a lot of what we were doing.

Matloff: Would it be fair to ask whether you felt any change in your own attitude toward the war? You mentioned the Tet offensive, Westmoreland's bid for more ground troops, McNamara's bid for a bombing halt. Did any of these factors change your thinking about the war itself? about whether we should stay in or get out?

Ignatius: I thought that we had to resolve it in an honorable way. We had made a major commitment and we owed it to the people of the United States who had been called on to serve and in some cases to give their lives. That to me was the most important aspect. Whatever
we did, we had to do it in an honorable way. But it became increasingly evident that it was necessary to extricate ourselves in some appropriate fashion from this war. We had given the blood of our youth, the treasury of our country, and a major commitment to the cause of freedom, if you will. There were many aspects of this that redounded to our favor. Indonesia, for example, avoided Communist takeover at a time when that might have happened, and it may well have been that our stand in Vietnam was instrumental in what finally happened.

Trask: Clifford came in at about this point. He had gotten a reputation of being kind of a hawk and had been an advisor of Johnson on this long before he became Secretary of Defense, but he rather quickly shifted. Did you perceive that at the time, and what was the response?

Ignatius: Yes. Clifford was appalled at the extent to which Vietnam was claiming the resources of the United States and the time of the President of the United States. Johnson was so preoccupied with this war. Clifford, with his perspective going back to Harry Truman, was appalled at this because of the many other things that were necessary to do and which required presidential involvement, not least of which was a program of long-term significance that Johnson had initiated, the war on poverty—the final culmination of efforts to grant full status to minority groups in the country.

Matloff: We always ask this question about Vietnam in retrospect: Did the United States fail in Vietnam? If so, was it a failure of American national policy, military policy, or what?
Ignatius: I wouldn't say that we failed. I think that we went into Vietnam for many reasons I mentioned earlier: the domestic political aspects of it as related to the so-called loss of China; the decision not to go into Laos; the belief that we could conduct a viable operation in Vietnam and had in Diem a leader who would give leadership and stability; and the concern that the conflict with communism had changed from wars with battle lines to wars that were less clear cut. Korea was a turning point. You had in that war one army crossing the line of another. In these other conflicts involving guerrilla warfare, it was murky. If the United States was going to play a role, it would have to contend with this new kind of threat. All of this came to a head in Vietnam. As time went on, it became apparent that some of the assumptions made at the time we went in were proving not to be as valid as we thought. The North Vietnamese fought harder and longer with greater morale than we had anticipated; we had problems in the south; television brought the horrors of war directly to the American people; there was competition for resources in the United States; problems about the length and nature of the war. It was a political war as well as a war in the old fashioned sense. For these reasons politicians began to have doubts; the American people began to have doubts; the military had to adapt their old ways of doing things to the new demands of this war; and eventually it became obvious that we needed in some honorable way to bring it to an end. We did what seemed to be necessary to do as a leading world power for reasons that seemed valid at the time, and as time went on it was equally clear that we needed to resolve this thing.
Matloff: How about the impact of the war 1) on the domino theory, and
2) on the U.S. Navy? What do you think the legacy of that war was?

Ignatius: The dominoes didn’t fall in quite the manner that proponents
of the theory seemed to suggest. I think that to some extent a direct
reading of the theory was discredited, although some aspects of it
probably came to pass. On the legacy in the Navy—the Navy had exhausted
a lot of its resources in the war and needed to be reconstituted, both
with respect to ships and with respect to supporting equipment. In
large part, I think, that has been accomplished in the years since
Vietnam. Another legacy is that we are using the Navy more today because
it avoids landing troops on the shore and we have made excellent use of
our carrier task forces in tense situations around the world. Maybe
that’s another legacy of Vietnam, avoiding the direct commitment of
American troops if we can, but still not abdicating responsibility. We
have been able to do that with the presence of the Navy.

Matloff: On the question of arms control and disarmament, were you drawn
in on any discussions along those lines?

Ignatius: The quick answer is no. The only thing I remember was that
Bob Frosch, who was my R&D secretary, was also an expert on underwater
matters. I believe that he was involved, and through him, my office,
in some of the discussions about arms control conventions with respect
to weapons implanted on the ocean floor. Some of that was beginning.
Senator Pell had a major interest in that, and there was an ongoing
effort that Frosch oversaw.
Matloff: We talked about the role of the Service Secretary. Secretary Zuckert is quoted as having said, "Today the Service Secretary is a group vice president." Would you have agreed with that?

Ignatius: By and large, I would. And that would conform to my view about being part of an overall organization and a Defense team. But I think that the Service Secretary, and I think Gene would agree, is more than a group vice president, because he is a proponent and public spokesman, whereas the group vice president sometimes isn't. I don't believe McNamara had a sufficient understanding or appreciation of the role of the Service Secretary. That official is a useful person to have, and McNamara didn't fully understand the job of the service secretary. He is a group vice president in one sense, but also the public spokesman for his service, and there are a lot of things that he can handle better than Defense can. For example, if there were a cheating scandal at West Point or Annapolis, we would be a lot better off letting the service and its secretary handle it than getting the Secretary of Defense involved.

Matloff: So you still see need for the position?

Ignatius: I would keep the position.

Matloff: The Symington Report was one that would have eliminated it.

Ignatius: The way we're set up, I think it makes sense to have Service Secretaries.

Matloff: What do you regard as your major achievements as Secretary of the Navy?
Ignatius: Getting some important Navy programs articulated, funded, and underway. I mentioned frigates, submarines, F-14 airplanes, the new ASW airplane—there were a number of accomplishments during that period that had some lasting effect.

Matloff: Any major disappointments?

Ignatius: There must be some. I can't think of any right now.

Matloff: Some general questions on the Cold War. Did you believe in the 1960s that containment was a realistic policy, that its assumptions were valid?

Ignatius: Yes, I thought it was. I thought that the foreign policy of the United States in the period under Truman, Marshall, Acheson, et al.—NATO, the Truman Plan, the Marshall Plan, came into being—was creative, constructive, and worthwhile. I was rereading last night the Marshall Plan speech that the general gave at Harvard. I happened to be there that day in 1947, because I was graduating from the Harvard Business School, and Marshall was the graduation speaker and gave the Marshall Plan speech. Incidentally, I was delighted to read in this article that President Conant failed to see the full implications of Gen. Marshall's speech, because I had not seen them either, and I was glad that someone as knowledgeable and brilliant as President Conant had not seen its full implications either. The containment policy, I thought, was a wise policy.

Matloff: How about détente? Was it a realistic policy?
Ignatius: I hope that, in the long run, by being strong and maintaining the posture that we have, we can somehow reach a point where we can live in one world together. I find the Soviet system abhorrent; so do the Soviet people. There are some signs maybe of the beginning of some change taking place. But a war, such as a large-scale conventional war in Europe, which we've seen twice in this century, is devastating. Nuclear war, as we've seen from the one or two bombs that have been dropped, is an appalling thing. So we owe it to mankind, if you will, to see if we can't find ways to live amicably while disagreeing fundamentally on political and social values. Detente, or whatever you call it, I believe, should be viewed in positive terms in the sense that it is something towards which we should work.

Matloff: How effective, in your view, was military aid as a tool for political leverage in the cold war?

Ignatius: I think that it was, generally speaking, quite effective. There was a feeling on the part of some people, particularly in OSD, that in Latin America and Africa, to name two places, some of the military aid programs ended up with the forces having very sophisticated weapons that were not the kind of weapons that they really ought to have; that we were essentially giving senior military officers some goodies that they wanted, as opposed to what the country really needed to deal with the insurgencies that directly or indirectly were taking place. Generally, I thought the military aid programs were important to fund and to support.
Matloff: How about alliances as an effective way of meshing American and foreign military power?

Ignatius: Certainly in the case of NATO it has been long-lasting, effective, with a lot of accomplishment. Less successful in some other instances, but NATO has proven over time to be extremely valuable and important.

Matloff: As a result of your experience in DoD, and your reflection on this, do you see the need for further change in the structure and working relations, such as between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS and its Chairman; between OSD and the services?

Ignatius: I did a study during President Carter's administration on Defense organization, which Doc Cook has probably got on file. President Carter wanted an examination of the organization of every Cabinet department, including Defense. These studies were done by OMB people. In the case of the Defense Department, Harold Brown asked to do it instead of OMB. He asked me to do this particular one, and a companion one was done on the JCS. One of the issues the Carter people raised was whether we should have a service secretary; they really wanted to abolish that. I differed with that, and told Harold so. He had the same view I did. I thought that he was wrong in merging manpower and logistics, and said so in that report. I thought that each job was important and that the logistic side wasn't getting a fair shake. They have since changed that and now have a senior official in Defense who is solely responsible for logistics. I think that you can improve management of the Department by avoiding some of the layering that goes on. I don't see why you
need to have a civilian office of R&D in the Secretary of the Navy's office and a military office of R&D under the Chief of Naval Operations. There aren't that many good R&D people, and there's no need to have two offices. Graham Claytor, who was at that time the Navy Secretary, said he was willing to do something like that. I felt also that the Secretary of Defense often was not getting enough good military input into decision-making because the papers that came out of the JCS often were brokered among the services with something for everybody or an avoidance of some of the hard questions, which caused the Secretary to turn to his civilian assistants for advice on what tended to be military matters. In this study I devoted a fair amount of attention to this question and a new position in the Department, Under Secretary for Policy, as the focal point to mesh the military input and the civilian input to the Secretary of Defense. In short, I thought that there could be a real improvement in overall defense planning by improving the means for bringing forward the military views. In general, I think I would support the kind of reforms that have been instituted within the last couple of years, beginning with General Jones's efforts to bring about some changes in the role of the JCS and then the Goldwater legislation that was passed. I don't buy everything that's in there, but, generally speaking, it seemed to me that these were worthwhile reforms.

Matloff: How would you characterize the styles, personalities, and effectiveness of the SecDef and other top officials in OSD with whom you served, beginning with Mr. McNamara?
Ignatius: First, a general comment. I have never been involved with a group of people anywhere in my life of the caliber of those who were in the Defense Department over that eight year period. They were absolutely outstanding and it was a privilege to be part of it. Secondly, I was enormously impressed with the ability of the key civilian career people with whom I worked to respond to all of these changes and requests for effort. I was greatly impressed with that as an outsider coming in. Coming down to individuals during the McNamara period, I really loved working for Bob. He was a demanding person with enormously high standards. You almost never got a compliment, but you didn’t need to. When you did something that was accepted and approved, that was really all that was needed. He was able to get things done. There were other people there who had tremendous intelligence and ability who, I do not believe, could have gotten things done in the way that McNamara did. He was a thinker, as well as one who got people to accomplish things on very tough time schedules. The place was just full of talent at that time. It has been remarked by others. It was like the Franklin Roosevelt period. Because of President Kennedy, I think, a lot of people responded to the call and there were many first rate people, both Republicans and Democrats. One of the things about it, as I look back on it, that is difficult, is the question that is often raised: If we were all that smart, how did we get involved in the Vietnam War? That’s a tough one, and I have given you some comments in response to that. That causes me, and I’m sure, others who were there, to think long and hard about all of this. But so far as the caliber of the
people, their commitment to the United States, and their desire to do an outstanding job, there is no question about it. McNamara was surrounded by talent. His three deputies—Gilpatric, Vance, Nitze—were outstanding. You just can’t do better than that. Harold Brown, Johnny Foster, the R&D people; Paul Nitze, John McNaughton, Paul Warnke, in the ISA job—all were first-rate. There was no more dedicated person in the government in the last decades than Tom Morris; he is a legendary figure.

Matloff: The charge has sometimes been made that McNamara sacrificed morale and personal relations for efficiency and swift decision-making and brusquely shrugged off military advice and tradition. Would you go along with that?

Ignatius: I don’t think he brushed off military advice as much as he refused to accept unsubstantiated or unsupported views. He wanted to know the reasons why, and not just be told what ought to be done. In a time of change, some people got upset. I was absolutely convinced at the Army level that we had to do something about the technical services. So was Bob McNamara. You don’t bring about a change like that without some people getting pretty upset in the process. In this case the Chief of Army Ordnance, Gen. Hinrichs, retired. If you go back in history, to Elihu Root’s time, when he brought the general staff concept into the Army, very senior officials of the Department of the Army quit, because they felt that this change was going to ruin the Army, that we had to go forward the way we always had with each bureau in the Army independently presenting its own budget. Elihu Root said that this was crazy, that we needed a general staff to give an overview for all
of this. McNamara got things done and, generally speaking, got them done pretty well. Some of the controversies have persisted. His opposition to nuclear power in the carrier Kennedy has always been a sore spot in the Navy. The conflict over the TFX probably still persists. He got things done, and by and large they were tough and important things to do, and a lot of those have had lasting effects.

Matloff: What do you think his permanent legacy will be?

Ignatius: If we ever reach a large scale, meaningful arms reduction accord, a comprehensive accord, then McNamara will get a lot of credit. He was one of the instigators, beginning with Glassboro, of the whole concept of why it makes sense to try to limit our level of investment in these things, and he has continued his efforts in that since leaving the World Bank. In a managerial sense, the long-range planning, the five-year force structure and financial plan, are part of an important legacy which has gone well beyond the Defense Department into the thinking of the government as a whole, and I believe that strategic planning in industry has benefited also. The notion that we should provide whatever is needed for defense, irrespective of any budget limitations, but no more than that, and not for frivolous reasons, was a cardinal part of the McNamara period. To some extent I think we've gone away from that, and I think undesirably so. You hear people saying that if we don't buy a particular weapon, there will be unemployment. That makes it sound as if the purpose of the Defense Department is like that of the WPA during the depression years. There may be jobs associated with building weapons, but they are a consequence of building weapons, not the
reason for building them. McNamara believed in that strongly, and it permeated a lot of what we did—the base closure program, for example. He said we were going to keep open every base that meets a Defense need, but not the bases that don’t meet a Defense need. He set in motion programs to accomplish that. Those are some of the things.

He should have spent more time than he did at the personal level, particularly at the military schools, looking toward the next generation. He should have spent more time with people, other than the immediate people with whom he dealt, because he was very effective when he did it. But he never felt there was enough time. Sometimes his decisions were rather quick. If you weren’t ready to have a decision made, you were probably better off not raising the question with Bob, because you would get a decision, and maybe not the one you wanted in the long run.

There was a tendency sometimes to act rather quickly. But, overall, I think he was an extremely important figure, and on a personal level was a major influence in my life and a person for whom I have great respect and affection.

Natloff: Any comments on Clark Clifford or any other Secretary of Defense with whom you have had contact?

Ignatius: I had a lot of contact with Clark Clifford, and he was different from McNamara in many respects, but he was an outstanding person and I also count it a privilege to have worked with him. I have seen him in the intervening years. He is a very wise man and one of the last now to go back so far and have such perspective. I knew Harold Brown very well. I have worked with him as a colleague and have seen
him a good deal since. His mind works faster than just about anybody's.

McNamara said once, jocularly, that there were only two people smarter
than he; one was Harold Brown; and the other was Jack McLean, a professor
at Harvard Business School at the same time Bob was and who later became
president of the Continental Oil Co. Harold was very bright but you
had to have people like Jack Stempler around to tell Harold not to
answer the question before it was fully asked and occasionally to smile
at some of those congressmen. And you had to have people like Jack
Stempler around to tell McNamara to remember that those congressmen
think they, too, have something to do with all this.

Matloff: That concludes my questions. We want to thank you for your
cooperation and for sharing your recollections and insights with us. You
have been very kind and very gracious.

Ignatius: Thank you very much. I have enjoyed it.