

Mar 23, 2018

Matloff: This is part three of an oral history interview with
Department of Defense
OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW

Mr. Andrew W. Marshall, held in the Pentagon, on June 29, 1992, at 10:30 a.m. The interview is being recorded on tape and a copy of the transcript will be sent to Mr. Marshall for his review. Representing the OSD Historical Office are Drs. Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff.

Mr. Marshall, at our meeting on June 15 we discussed the Schlesinger and Rumsfeld eras in Defense and were talking about Secretary Brown's administration. This morning we would like to wind up the discussion of the Brown period and move on to subsequent administrations and the role of your office and your contributions in them.

Were you and your office consulted or involved in any way in connection with Brown's decisions on weaponry? He had such problems as the B-1, stealth technology, whether to upgrade the B-52--were you or your office involved in any of those decisions?

Marshall: No, not directly. I can't remember cases where we were brought in. I would say no. What we were doing was production of assessments that went to him. Early in the administration there were about four of them that were produced and sent over to Brzezinski and Carter. We also got involved in one part of the PRM-10 activity. There were two parts, one run by Huntington and Odom, out of the NSC staff,

17-S-2376

and my office was the principal contributor from Defense because they were trying to replicate at another level a broad assessment of the world situation and major trends.

Matloff: How about in connection with foreign area problems and crises in the Carter administration--for example, did your office play any role in connection with Carter's initiative to normalize relations with China, pressing Japan for larger defense efforts, or the Camp David accords in September of 1978?

Marshall: Your question reminds me of two things that we got involved in in a slight way; one was a matter of the decision on the Korean withdrawals. We had underway an assessment of the balance on the Korean Peninsula and when this issue was raised, what we already had was fed into the internal processes here and I was also drawn into the work of a group chaired by Armacost. The stuff that we had done was fairly effective in making people aware of the state of the balance then, which was not as good as it should have been. The North had undertaken a major effort to build up and intelligence people had only recently understood what was going on.

Matloff: Did this have any effect on the administration's desires to withdraw troops?

Marshall: It pushed on the side of being perhaps dangerous to do that then and tended to support the view that we oughtn't

to withdraw anything like the number of forces that had been proposed. I gather that Carter had read a Brookings' or some other study that indicated that you should withdraw a large part of the forces. Then, we finished that up and took it over to both Korea and to Japan. I did write something to Harold about what seemed to me the longer term prospects of the Japanese and the fact that we might profit by encouraging them to spend a little bit more on defense. In that limited sense we got involved.

Matloff: How about in connection with the fall of the Shah in January 1979 and the hostage crisis from November '79 to January '81--were you drawn in on the lessons learned from that?

Marshall: No. We had not been doing that much on the region as a whole. As I mentioned to you, during the Brown period we were conducting discussions with the Israelis and the only thing I remember about the Iranian situation was conveying to Brown an offer that the Israelis made to facilitate the shipment of parts, etc.

Matloff: From your perspective, what do you consider the major achievements of the Brown administration in Defense?

Marshall: I think that Brown, in particular, and perhaps others, deserve a lot of credit, given the overall stance of the Carter administration, in making an effective case for

Defense. Also, I think that he and Perry did lay down programs, particularly in the black area, that have had significant payoff.

Matloff: And the principal contributions of your office in this period?

Marshall: The PD-59 study, which Slocombe and I ran; and the assessment that I mentioned to you--I queried the Navy about it a couple of years ago, when Wolfowitz wanted to circulate it more widely and I was urged not to do that--had a good effect on decisions that Brown made about our policy in the naval area toward the Soviets, particularly in the ASW area.

Matloff: To turn to the Weinberger period, January 1981 to November 1987, how well had you known him before his appointment?

Marshall: I had met him a couple of times during the Nixon period when he was the head of OMB.

Matloff: Did he ask for a briefing when he came over to Defense?

Marshall: No. We prepared transition materials, and presumably he read them or glanced at them. The people in the secretary's own office had him come down and visit our offices. I gather that it was the only place that he ever got around to visiting. That's about it.

Goldberg: He wasn't in the building long enough to visit many offices.

Matloff: Did he give any instructions or directives when he took over?

Marshall: No.

Matloff: From your perspective, what was his conception of the role of Secretary of Defense?

Marshall: It's more a matter of inferring, but my sense was that his principal view was that there were two or three major things that he wanted to do, things that Reagan wanted to happen, which were (1) a significant budget increase to make up for the period of under-funding; (2) getting along with our allies, particularly in Europe. Somehow being effective at these was the main thing.

Matloff: How much contact did you actually have with him during his fairly long period as Secretary of Defense?

Marshall: Not very much.

Matloff: How about with the deputies?

Marshall: With Carlucci I had more contact. Shortly after they had entered the building, around March or April 1981, Carlucci called me and I went down to see him. Already they were being somewhat criticized for not having a strategy. He wanted to talk about developing a strategy and what it would mean. I wrote him two long memos with various attachments

from things that had been produced in my office in the past. One thing I forgot about the Brown period, I did present to him a piece that Jim Roche and I had actually written in middle '76 for Rumsfeld because he was so interested in the issue of strategic thinking. We tried to say what strategic planning in Defense might look like, how it might be structured, and why it was important. Rumsfeld had been responsive to it, but nothing much had happened. We sent it to Brown, and he was very interested in it. One of the things we did for Brown was to run several experiments in strategic planning, one on bombers and another on the surface part of the Navy.

Matloff: What sort of experiments?

Marshall: By creating small task forces, although the naval one was a much bigger enterprise and having some people try to develop a kind of strategic plan and approach to thinking about where you wanted to go with bombers, etc..

Goldberg: When you say task forces, you mean people, groups?

Marshall: Yes. So when Carlucci raised this issue, I wrote him two memos. One was on what it would mean to have a strategy, and what it would look like, and gave him several alternative ways he could go about developing strategic planning.

Matloff: Was this involved with the Defense Guidance, which came out in early 1982?

Marshall: No, that was separate. Then we wrote him another memo with some other attachments about how this kind of thing should be organized. We had some meetings with Carlucci about that. After a lot of to-ing and fro-ing, what came out of it was the creation of a group at NDC, but not with much chance of succeeding. Weinberger decided to piggyback on something that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that time was planning to institute over at NDU. So he added another group that was to do some strategic planning and recruited Phil Karber to run it. I ended up having more frequent contact with Carlucci than with Weinberger.

Matloff: How about with Paul Thayer and then Taft?

Marshall: A little with Taft, and some with Thayer, although he was here only a brief time. The interesting thing about Thayer relates to the first defense guidance that was put out under Weinberger. Iklé was in charge of drafting a good deal of it and he had sent it to me and asked me for anything else that should go in the guidance. I told him he might put in some guidance that would urge people to take a somewhat longer term perspective, and for programs they were proposing they should show how they exploited Soviet weaknesses, fears, and concerns. They should include in their justification of

programs an estimate of the costs imposed on the Soviets. He thought that was a good idea and so I wrote a few pages which were successively watered down in later years as the bureaucracy took control of the subsequent DPG's. The interesting thing was that when Thayer came into the building, he read some of these defense guidance documents, and he said, "That's a terrific idea, what has happened to that?" He called and I talked to him and said, "Not a lot." He then sent out a memo to the services asking them for the responses they had made to that part of the guidance. He got back memos from the Air Force and the Navy, and I think the Army never did respond. The services claimed many of their programs satisfied those requirements, but most were not, in fact, really responsive to this part of the guidance.

Matloff: What use did Weinberger make of your office?

Marshall: Very little after the first couple of years, when we did send him some assessments. Two interesting things happened. In the Brown administration Stan Turner, as DCI, had tried to get the intelligence community into the net assessment business and he had been strongly opposed by the people in this building, especially the military, and so had ceased and desisted the last year or two. At the very beginning of the Reagan administration Weinberger and Casey got together and agreed to a two-part deal. First, rather

than their going off to do these things alone, which caused so much trouble, there would be a program of joint assessments, which would be jointly issued by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.

Goldberg: What trouble had occurred as a result of their doing net assessment? Just resentment on the part of the military?

Marshall: One of Brown's points of view was "You make these projections, but you are prejudging what American force posture is going to be and that's not a business that you ought to be in." The military point of view was that the wrong people were sitting at the table, no matter how much involvement the DIA and the service military intelligence chiefs had in it; those were not the people in those organizations that should make these kinds of decisions. It should be the operators and the other parts of the services. They felt that this whole thing was not appropriate.

Goldberg: Typical military reaction.

Marshall: Yes. But, I must say that I thought that the assessments they did were not very good. I did not have a strong reaction. In fact, I wrote to Turner a couple of times saying, "If you people really want to get into the net assessment business, there is a big important role you can play and thus far, despite urgings, the intelligence community

has been a complete flop at it. Why don't you fix that? Why don't you get them to give us really good assessments of how, in fact, the Soviets make assessments, what their likely view of the balance is? This is very important because one of our principal goals is not to win wars, but to deter their happening. Central to that is the issue of what assessment the other side is making. Why don't you get on with that?" We never got any response out of him; the intelligence community never did anything on it. To the extent that anything serious was done on it it was done by contractors, by people in my office. Odom was very interested in it. He was in Army intelligence. But it was something that either they didn't think they could do, or were not interested in doing, and made no serious efforts.

Matloff: How about in connection with the big military buildup in the Weinberger period, did your office get drawn in in any way in that connection?

Marshall: In the sense that one of the assessments that we had started back in the Brown period was what we called the military investment balance, where we looked at the budgets, the resources flowing in on the Soviet side, our side, and including allies in both cases. That was a story which was very useful in defending the budget, etc. In fact, Brown had found it so. So the stuff that we did was useful in that way,

but we were not, and never have been, directly involved in deciding which programs to push, with a few exceptions.

Matloff: With the budgets going up in the earlier years of the Weinberger administration, did that affect the budget of your office?

Marshall: No.

Matloff: How much contact did you have with people like Iklé, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy?

Marshall: I had a lot of contact with Iklé; I had some contact with Perle. I had known Perle for some time and used to see him occasionally. He operated very independently, so he wasn't drawn into other things, but I saw him occasionally. I saw a lot of Iklé.

Matloff: Did the appointment of Iklé affect your office's functions, operations, and studies? Did he have a particular interest that he wanted to push?

Marshall: It did to some extent. It affected me, particularly early on. Iklé was chosen rather late and, in fact, there was some delay, as I remember, in the whole manning. He was here in the building but hadn't been confirmed yet and there were several things on which he had me represent him. For example, there was an early set of task

forces that were organized to decide what to do about the missile program, the bomber program, and so on. Because he had known me for a long time, there was a period early on of that sort. I told him what we were doing and he had no quarrel with that, so we more or less went along. We did start this program of joint assessments, that I mentioned, with the people at Langley picking as the first one the strategic balance. Harry Rowen became the main point of contact there and I was the person here at Defense. That was a very successful collaboration. Very few joint assessments were done after that, maybe just one other, because they were so time consuming that people didn't have resources to devote to these things, given all the other stuff they were doing. I forgot to mention the other part of the deal with Weinberger and Casey, which was to increase the flow of information on U.S. forces to the people in the intelligence community.

Goldberg: If there had been more demand for those joint assessments, presumably you would have done them? If somebody up the line like Weinberger or Carlucci had pushed it?

Marshall: Yes. The first one was very successful. People read it and thought that it was very good. But there wasn't a lot of active demand. The pace was left more or less up to Harry and me, and in the end we didn't produce very many because we were too busy on other things.

Goldberg: There are so many of these studies of all kinds-- what you do, and all the other places in CIA and everybody else. How much of that ever filters up to the top and has any kind of effect? That's something I have pondered for many years, and you have also, no doubt.

Marshall: I think it depends a great deal on who the top people are, what use they make of them. Brown actually made a lot of use of them. I think that I mentioned his comments; but also, after the things had been finished and he had read them, he would request a series of tasking memos and would sign off on them. That's rare.

Goldberg: So it's only a small percentage of this that percolates up--and presumably affects thinking and, possibly, decisions?

Marshall: I think some of it may well, in a general way, affect the thinking, but it is hard to track in terms of specific kinds of decisions. My view has come to be that the U.S. government is kind of a no-decision-making place on the whole, because no one is in a position to make any decisions. It is designed to be that way, with the separation of powers, and so on. All inputs, even into things that look like decisions, have to be seen as really moves in a very long, slow, social, cultural, political process, so it is very hard to trace the effect of any one particular input.

Goldberg: It is an inertial guidance system.

Matloff: I take it that the appointment of Perle did not affect your office in its functions ?

Marshall: No.

Matloff: How about your relationship with John Lehman? Did his pushing his line of thought have any effect on what your office was doing?

Marshall: It had a little bit of effect. For one thing, there had been created in the Navy a net assessment office. In fact, of all of the services, it was the only one that created a net assessment office. Zumwalt did that. When I first came into the building, one of the tasks I had was to try to encourage more net assessment-like analyses in the services, and there were different responses. The Army did some studies for me and designated a particular person as a point of contact. The Air Force did several special studies that I thought were very well done. One of the things that Lehman did was to drop this office because he didn't feel, I guess, that he wanted some other place issuing overall views of what the state of the naval balance was. I had known Lehman; we had been on the NSC together, and I got along pretty well with him. Another way in which we interacted was when the Falklands war came along, as in some prior cases, I was designated as the person to conduct the overall lessons

learned activity. We funded IDA and found a good marine three-star who had been the J-3 to run the whole thing. Lehman, meanwhile, rushed through the Navy a "lessons learned" report. It was the only other service that had a competing set of lessons learned, and we were somewhat at variance with some of their conclusions.

Matloff: Did you go along with his forward strategy to defeat the Soviet fleet?

Marshall: I think the basic answer is yes, but it was not clear that you could close with the carriers in the way that he had proposed. In some ways the business of this naval strategy, which was enunciated under him, was already underway in a different way as a result of things the Navy was doing, which were reinforced by the assessment I mentioned earlier that Brown had acted on in the ASW world.

Matloff: There were a number of management and organizational changes either proposed or introduced in the Weinberger period. There was the establishment of the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization was created; the Packard Commission, 1985-86; the Goldwater-Nichols Act of '86--was your office consulted or drawn in in any way in connection with task forces or studies relating to these changes?

Marshall: Yes, we were certainly called upon and testified to the Packard Commission people. And one of the things that came out of the Packard Commission and then was picked up by Goldwater-Nichols was the notion of net assessments and the role of the JCS in them. We were much involved in that.

Matloff: Did any of the changes that were introduced, particularly as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, have any effect on the way your office was doing business or the kinds of activities that your office engaged in?

Marshall: Those particular things did not, at least immediately, during the Weinberger period. They have had some effect. In response to the Packard Commission and in anticipation of the Goldwater-Nichols, some people on the NSC drafted a directive and sent a memo to Defense on the net assessment area. There was some consultation between myself, Iklé, and the head of the Joint Staff about the response to that, because it called for the JCS to get into the net assessment business. It also called for the inclusion of people from the DCI in the process and some decisions were made early on not to comply with the latter. It was agreed that there would be set up what has now had a more formal function, a net assessment coordinating committee, to exchange views on what my office and the JCS were going to do. We also turned over a lot of materials to them to show them the kind

of assessments we had done. There is an ironic story connected with this. The two people on the Packard Commission who pushed for this net assessment recommendation were Carlucci and Gen. Gorman. I had known Gorman for a long time and we had collaborated on some things when he was at CIA, where he was the NIO for the general purpose forces. Both Carlucci and Gorman thought a broad overall look, a net assessment, could, if done right, be of great value. But what they had in mind was nothing like what, in fact, happened. Their view was that net assessment should be the work of the Chairman and the CINCS. The Chairman would produce it and it would be a short piece, after consulting with the CINCS, and be an overall military judgment by the most senior people as to how adequate our forces were and, as we look forward, how adequate they would be in view of any problems that were rising. It was to occur early in the process of the budgeting and programming cycle, and it was to be presented to the president and the NSC and to be helpful in deciding on budget levels. What has happened is that the JCS, in response to the directive to get into the net assessment business, has taken an analysis they used to do at the end of the programming and budgeting process, where they look at the proposed forces (the budgets have been already set long before), look out four or five years, and make a judgment as to the risks associated

with the particular forces. What they have done is simply taken it over, fixed it a little bit, and it is now something produced down in the staffs, not by the Chairman himself.

Matloff: To come back to the strategy of the Reagan-Weinberger era, was there, in your view, an overall guiding strategy in that period?

Marshall: I think that there was in Reagan's mind, perhaps in Weinberger's, but certainly there was in the mind of someone like Iklé. In fact, he articulated a view of what the strategy was and should be to a group of labor people fairly early in the fall of the first year that I thought was the best statement of it I ever heard. He gave it at a meeting that took place in the Pentagon.

Goldberg: He was briefing in the White House on this, also, with Reagan and others. We supplied him with a good bit of information for those particular briefings, and he acknowledged it.

Marshall: So he certainly had a view of that. How much Weinberger shared that perspective, I don't know.

Matloff: You became particularly involved in two groups during this Weinberger period. One was the President's Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy in 1986-1988, and the other was the Nuclear Strategy Development Group of 1984-85. You became the Chairman of the Working Group of the

Nuclear Strategy group and Co-Chairman of what was called the Future Security Environment Working Group. Can you explain how you became the Chairman of both of these, who appointed you, and what work you did on them?

Marshall: What basically happened is that, after the first few years of the Weinberger period, it was clear that he himself was not very interested in the kind of studies that we did and so Iklé asked us to do other things. While we kept doing some assessments, we ended up diverting half or more of the resources to other things. The first one of them was the Nuclear Strategy Development Group. It had the following focus: in the early period of the Reagan administration there had been a master plan developed for the strategic forces, it ran out to '95. Iklé wanted to make an early start on looking at the period beyond '95--where we should go in the longer run? It was driven in particular by the fact that, first, the SDI program had started and there was the possibility that one of the directions we would want to go would be toward a defense-dominated strategy. The other thing that had become clear, as the result in part of PD-59, as the intelligence people began looking for the leadership targets, was that the Soviet Union had done a lot of deeply buried hardened construction for the leadership. So the number of hard targets was increasing substantially. It was also clear that

the Soviets were going to have some portion of their strategic force in mobile systems. So the question was, "If we take a longer term look and some of these trends play out, what should our whole strategy be in the strategic warfare area?" There were a series of panels and a working group that I chaired. One of the major things we did was to run a number of war games. I got the people at Booz-Allen to help us with the design of the gaming so that the games would allow us to put the players in a situation at the end of the century and say, "What if SDI exists; here is how effective it is; here's what's happened to the Soviet posture; here are your forces and his forces; you are the Joint Staff planner and have to develop a war plan and play out the scenarios." That turned out to be very interesting. We did fourteen of those and there was a report at the end of '85 or '86.

Matloff: How about the other one?

Marshall: I am not sure about how that started, I suppose out of discussions between Iklé and Wohlstetter. They had also at one point persuaded the people on the NSC to be sponsors. At the end of it the NSC people withdrew. There were four working groups and I was asked to lead the working group whose task was to describe the future security environment, over the next 20 years. Later they decided they wanted to include Charlie Wolf of Rand as co-chairman. We produced a series of

reports, including a final report that I think was quite effective, even though when we wrote it, we were asked to tailor it in a way that didn't quite correspond to Charlie Wolf's and my beliefs. One, we didn't believe in the CIA estimate of Soviet GNP, which we thought was a central issue, and thought the actual GNP was much lower; but nonetheless we treated the CIA estimate as the base case. We were also asked to tone down the discussion of Aids in its long-term impact on things.

Matloff: Is there any way of knowing if these reports got up to the level of the President?

Marshall: What came out was a slim report of the Commission itself and four working group reports which were all much thicker. My guess is that the report itself probably got read fairly highly up.

Matloff: Do you think Weinberger read it?

Marshall: I would suppose that he probably looked at it.

Matloff: The Reagan administration came to office predicting the dire dangers of a strategic window of vulnerability with the Soviets in the mid-1980s. Did you and your colleagues within your office and OSD believe in that?

Marshall: We did a strategic assessment--the balance assessment--that started in the first year and finished in the second. What came out of that was that we thought that there

was adequate deterrence and indeed, after it came out, I requested a session to talk with Weinberger because there were three things which couldn't be included in the assessment because of the security surrounding them, all of which were in our favor. I wanted to tell him to remember that some of the programs were not reflected--the Stealth bomber, the ASW situation, and another program. So, I would say no. We thought the situation wasn't as good as it ought to be, but we didn't have a sense of urgency.

Matloff: Any way of knowing whether Weinberger and his assistants, by the end of his tenure, felt that the gap had been closed and the window of vulnerability had been ended?

Marshall: My guess is that they did, or should have.

Matloff: Let me give you this quote from Mary McConnell, Weinberger's former speech writer, writing in the Chicago Tribune on November 13, 1987, that bears on a prior point you raised: "Conventional wisdom holds that Weinberger threw money at the military without offering a strategy to guide this spending. In fact, strategic thinking has undergone a major revitalization during the Weinberger years. Most notably, the hoary--and discredited--strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction has been replaced by one that holds that a defense against nuclear weapons is a more credible deterrent

than a (presumably) mutual suicide pact." Do you go along with that?

Marshall: I think it is certainly true that these people didn't believe in mutual assured destruction and tried to move away from that. Of course, Brown and company didn't either. I think it's true to a limited extent in the sense that there was the attempt to seriously explore the effect of defenses. The work that was done, particularly one of the interesting things coming out of the war games, was that defenses, contrary to a lot of stuff one heard, were stabilizing. People felt more secure and, if defenses were available on both sides, both sides felt more secure. Later in the Weinberger period there was an effort at development of competitive strategies, which was an attempt to implement the ideas in the early guidance of the DPG.

Matloff: Did you feel that a nuclear war was fightable and winnable? Did studies in your shop support such a conclusion?

Marshall: No. I think the concern was that the Soviets might, to some extent, think so. They certainly, more than we, had done a lot to move in that direction--for example, all of their effort at the survival of large parts of the Soviet Nomenklatura and the amount of hardening that they had done of various kinds of communication links, and so on. They had worked harder at some dimensions of it than we had, and some

of the things that they said suggested that they might think so.

Matloff: From where you were sitting, did the philosophy of nuclear war fighting really change in the Reagan administration from that of the Carter era?

Marshall: I don't really believe that it did so in a very significant way. In the Reagan period you had some things that were initiated. There's one still highly compartmented program which was kept to move somewhat in that direction.

Matloff: Weinberger, you remember, had called the late '70s "the decade of neglect." Did the Reagan-Weinberger defense program differ in substantial ways from the Carter-Brown program that it inherited, or did it just for the most part speed up or expand the Carter-Brown program?

Marshall: There clearly were some differences. They did push ahead with the B-1, moved forward on MX, and SDI. It's true that, while the budgets were coming up somewhat under the Carter administration, still there had been a long period of basic under-funding of things.

Goldberg: What things, particularly--strategic forces?

Marshall: The pace of modernization of strategic forces; but it probably shows up more in the numbers of things like the level of ammunition stocks and repair and maintenance. I think that during the Reagan period, in addition to the new

programs that went forward, there was a general phenomenon going on of fixing up all kinds of things, and certainly the buying of stocks of ammunition went up significantly.

Goldberg: So you would agree with the notion that we did have hollow forces during the mid- and late '70s?

Marshall: Yes, I would.

Goldberg: You don't think there was any particular hyperbole on the part of the military forces in fostering this notion?

Marshall: No. I think that some of the hollowness had begun to be corrected--some of it had to do with training, stability of units, and so on. No, I think there was a real qualitative kind of thing.

Goldberg: And part of that would have been the result of the kinds of choices that the services made in using their funds?

Marshall: Yes.

Matloff: I'll assume that your office was not drawn into controversies over weaponry from what you indicated before. To your knowledge, were Weinberger and OSD involved in the decision of Reagan to go ahead with Star Wars--remember that speech of March 23, 1983? Had he consulted Weinberger or anyone in OSD, as far as you know?

Marshall: I know that he consulted or talked with the Chiefs, because Watkins told me about that. In some ways I think it was less of a surprise to them. I have no idea of the extent

to which he talked with Weinberger, but it certainly, more broadly, was a big surprise.

Matloff: What was your reaction? How did you view the technical feasibility or the strategic wisdom of SDI?

Marshall: I thought the strategic wisdom was very great, because my view had been that it was a business in which we ought to be. It had been very unwise to go out of the business of actively defending the territory of the United States to the extent that we had done.

Goldberg: Is that still your perspective?

Marshall: Yes, absolutely. I thought it was strategically very wise. I had no view as to the feasibility, but it didn't seem to me infeasible, provided you harnessed people in the way that Reagan more or less talked about as kind of a Manhattan Project type of thing. I was basically for it, but didn't know anything about it ahead of time.

Matloff: Did your office get drawn in on any studies relating to the antiballistic missile program?

Marshall: Yes, because of the thing that I have already mentioned, and the SDI people then picked up these games that we had devised and began using them for their own purposes.

Matloff: Were you drawn in in connection with foreign affairs and crises of the Reagan-Weinberger period--e.g., landings in Lebanon?

Marshall: I got involved in the Lebanon affair. I was again asked to take over the lessons learned thing. But that aborted and didn't work out this time. It was partly the fault of the Israelis. We wanted information from them. They wanted a complicated agreement before they would give us the information. I went over to negotiate that.

Matloff: After the operation?

Marshall: Yes, to negotiate, to get an arrangement with them whereby they would give us information and allow access to interview people, and so on. I brought back a draft, which Weinberger did not like, and there was a last minute problem with Sharon, then the Minister of Defense. I thought Sharon was an absolute bastard. We had negotiated this thing and I told them it would have to be agreed to by the people back here. Sharon used the meeting to get TV coverage of our meeting with him in order to exploit it for internal Israeli affairs. In addition, at the very opening of the meeting, I told him that we had this document, but I wanted to alert him to the fact that there were several things in the the agreement to which I did not think the people in Washington would agree. One thing had to do with the name of the operation. They insisted that this document contain their name for the war. I knew that our people would never agree to it. That sent Sharon off into a tirade about how dare we

raise such a thing, that they didn't tell us what to name our wars. He ended up asking me to convey to Weinberger how urgently they needed some money that was still to be released. When I got back, Weinberger and the people at State were not happy. I was unhappy. So we dropped that. Then it was decided that each of the services would try to do their own lessons learned efforts. But the services came to us and got most of the phrasing for the agreements they made with their counterparts, because they had the same problem with the Israelis. But we had most of the wording OK. One other thing in connection with these separate discussions with the Israelis that I have mentioned to you, they had begun under Rumsfeld and continued under Brown--toward the end of the Brown period, McGiffert and company couldn't stand it any longer and persuaded Brown that they should be put in charge. The Israelis were unhappy and the discussions ceased. When the Reagan administration came in, Perle and Iklé wanted to start things up again on the same basis, so I was sent over to try to come to some agreement with them to do that.

Goldberg: That wasn't part of Perle's area, was it? But he involved himself anyhow.

Marshall: Yes. I got there, but just as I left, the Israelis took out the Iraqi reactor, and Weinberger, who wasn't

probably too keen on it anyway, said we were not going to go forward with it, anyway.

Matloff: How about the invasion of Grenada, in 1983? Did you get involved in the lessons learned in that?

Marshall: No, because there were no lessons learned in that. I have noticed that if it is somebody else's war and we think we can learn something from them, we organize lessons learned activity. If we are involved, there is no lessons learned activity.

Matloff: How about the British operation in the Falklands?

Marshall: Yes, we did that, and there is a whole set of volumes of reports on that war.

Matloff: Anything on the Libya raid in 1986?

Marshall: No.

Goldberg: With reference to your previous remark, we have been doing a lot on the Persian Gulf business. There is a great effort there to learn something.

Marshall: That's right.

Matloff: Were there any other foreign area problems or crises during the Weinberger era into which your office was drawn in any way?

Marshall: I don't believe so.

Matloff: How about on arms control?

Marshall: We got drawn in occasionally on arms control matters. Largely, people would request access to data bases or analyses that had been done for us, and that was particularly true when Rowny was here. We did a number of things with him.

Matloff: Who in OSD, from your observation, was particularly influential in the area of arms control during the Weinberger administration?

Marshall: Richard Perle.

Matloff: He's sometimes been charged with being a hard-liner. It's also charged that the Pentagon became the redoubt of the hard-liners on arms control. Perle is cited as the example, vis-a-vis the State Department, which, presumably, was a little more maleable. Does that seem like a fair charge?

Marshall: I am prejudicial to arms control, I guess.

Matloff: Do you still feel that way?

Marshall: Yes.

Matloff: Did you sense a deliberate and conscious link from the beginning of the Reagan administration between the policy of military buildup with an eventual arms control agreement with the Soviet Union?

Marshall: I was not conscious of that. I think there was a general sense of "if we build up, then the agreement we get will be better and we will not be under any pressure to come

to disadvantageous agreements." I didn't have a sense of that, but there may have been such a view.

Matloff: In the writings now coming out about the administration, that connection is being pushed, at least in certain quarters. For historians looking back on it, the question is whether the evidence bears it out.

Marshall: I don't think so; but it does remind me of another aspect of the period of the Reagan administration. I have mentioned the investment balance that we had done for some time, and beginning in the early '80s, largely because of some Soviet emigrés, it became increasingly clear to me that the CIA estimates of the size of the Soviet GNP were probably wrong and also that the Soviet Union was in very significant economic difficulty. That didn't mean that they weren't spending a lot of money and a lot of their military forces were not very capable. The evidence continued to grow that that was really the case. We did a special paper for Iklé on the growing sense of the growing weakness of the Soviet Union, what this would mean in terms of the impact of some of our programs, and the fact that the Soviets could not continue to compete and put the kind of resources that they were putting into the military forever. We produced an analysis of this matter and Iklé then had us brief Weinberger on it. This was probably in 1984 or '85. It was clear at the briefing that

Weinberger didn't really understand some of the argument and also had his own view of how the Soviets could afford their large military effort. It centered around the low pay to the soldiers and low wages in the armaments plants; his view was that there wasn't any economic strain, that doing this was inexpensive for them. Our efforts to convince him that the drain on their economy was substantial and that they might not be able to sustain this over the long term led me to talk to Dennis Ross, who was on the NSC, about making lists of what we wanted in our negotiations, not planning on the concessions we would make if we had to. The Russians were in a weak position and we shouldn't be concerned if the talks stretched out, because the longer time went on the worse their position would be. I also wrote to Carlucci, when he came in, to alert him, as the evidence kept piling up, that he should begin considering how he was going to defend the defense budget, when it became clear that the Soviets were in grave economic difficulty and wouldn't be able to continue.

Goldberg: Looking back, what was your reaction to the Team B report in 1976?

Marshall: I thought that was very good.

Goldberg: You agreed with its conclusions, then?

Marshall: Yes.

Matloff: Were the views in Defense intelligence closer to your views of the estimates, in the Weinberger period?

Marshall: By that time there wasn't that big a difference between the DIA and the CIA views, just occasionally on some things.

Matloff: Did you get drawn in on controversies between the Defense intelligence agencies and the CIA on the question of GNP estimates?

Marshall: The Defense intelligence people did not really make an estimate of GNP, except maybe Bill Lee, who had his own view.

Goldberg: And getting attention.

Marshall: The main thing was the issue of the level of the defense expenditures. There, I had the view that was closer to the DIA view--that the CIA estimates of the Soviet defense expenditures were low and their estimate of Soviet GNP was high.

Matloff: What do you regard as Weinberger's major achievements during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, and how do you view his strengths and weaknesses?

Marshall: In terms of what I thought he was trying to do, on the whole he was quite successful. He got the budget up; he was good at defending it. He did not have the impact on the

programmatic side that someone like Brown had. I think that he is to be seen as a fairly successful Secretary.

Matloff: More so in the first term of the Reagan administration than in the second?--from about '85 on he had trouble with Congress on the budget.

Marshall: Yes, but nonetheless he was probably as successful as anyone was going to be at keeping the budget up.

Goldberg: Did you ever get any whiffs of anything in connection with Iran-Contra?

Marshall: No.

Goldberg: Particularly with reference to supplying arms to Iran?

Marshall: No.

Goldberg: Nobody asked for an assessment? They should have asked for a political net assessment.

Matloff: We asked the same question when Weinberger had just come from a hearing and he said he didn't want to talk about it.

Goldberg: He kept his eyes closed much of the time that he was talking with us, and just let the words flow.