Matloff: This is part two of an oral history interview with Mr. Andrew W. Marshall, held in the Pentagon on June 15, 1992. Representing the OSD Historical Office are Drs. Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff. This interview is being recorded on tape, and a copy of the transcript will be sent to Mr. Marshall for his review.

Mr. Marshall, at our meeting on 1 June we discussed some of your background experiences before assuming the post of Director, Net Assessment, in October 1973, your appointment during the Schlesinger era, and the foundations that you laid for the office during that period. We had begun to talk about Schlesinger's role as Secretary of Defense from your perspective. This morning we would like to finish that discussion and go on to subsequent administrations in DoD and the contributions of your office. In connection with the Schlesinger administration, on what did he and you base the estimate of the threat?

Marshall: We tried to get as much information as we could out of the intelligence people and then make our own judgments about how threatening it was and how far we, in fact, believed the intelligence, or additional factors or dimensions on which we had some views that tended, in fact, not to be incorporated into the intelligence.
Matloff: When and how did Schlesinger obtain advice and analysis? Did he have a small trusted group of advisors? Where was he getting it from?

Marshall: Yes. It depended upon the topic area. For example, there was a man at Rand whose views he trusted on the estimates of Soviet CEP, which was one of the big issues. On economics, he had other people that he knew. A large part of it was based on his own prior experience and people he knew in particular areas whose judgment and views he had come to respect.

Matloff: Was William Kaufmann one of those people?

Marshall: Not in that same sense. Bill was useful in writing up material, but on more substantive matters it was much more a matter of people whom he had known and had a good view of their past record and ability to think about the problem and have balanced judgments.

Matloff: Did he consult with you on matters outside the field of net assessment? Can you give some examples of what kinds of things?

Marshall: Yes. We talked a lot about people. He would ask my judgments of particular people that he was thinking of appointing or doing something with. One time we went down to a Marine base in North Carolina to watch a landing exercise and later we talked about the real future prospects for those
kinds of operations; what the Marines as an organization should focus on in the future.

Matloff: What use did he make of your office?

Marshall: We were just starting up. His initial interest was to get studies on the strategic nuclear balance, on the worldwide maritime situation, and on the balance in the European theater. So we went ahead and produced assessments on all three of those areas. In some ways the office was just getting started, so in many respects, other than talking with me or getting my advice on certain things, we hadn't been in business long enough to produce a lot for him. But we did produce several assessments back in that period.

Goldberg: You got a lot of things started that took years to do.

Marshall: Right.

Matloff: Most of the studies that were being done, then, were by his mandate rather than being initiated from within?

Marshall: He and I had a talk about what areas to work in, and we started off in those three.

Matloff: Did he put the studies to use?

Marshall: It's hard to judge whether studies are put to use. He did read them and made comments. We talked about them, and I think they were helpful in assembling information and changing his views a bit. Another thing that the office was
used for was much like the kind of thing I had been doing for Kissinger; for example, there were several special efforts that he wanted out of the intelligence community, and so I became an intermediary to the intelligence community, explaining what was wanted. The one that I remember most had to do with the Russian air base in Somalia, where it was discovered that on the air base were some buildings that were thought to have missiles in them, and there were some Soviet ships of supply and repair anchored nearby. The issue was to try to understand more about the whole story of how that had happened. They had been discovered, but there was a period when the intelligence people decided something funny was going on that was really been going on for some time. It was also a period when it looked as though the Soviets were going to go into the business of intervening in the Third World in a major way. There had been some writing in the Soviet military journals which suggested that. They were talking about the mission of the Soviet forces in a different way. So one of the questions was, "How are they going about this?"--because it was very different then from the way we would go about it. We would have negotiations, get base rights, and so on, and theirs was far more incremental. It was the difference between a kind of seduction and a marriage proposal.
Matloff: The representations to the Defense community, was this out of Defense, as well as in Defense?

Marshall: In particular, it was out of Defense, to CIA.

Matloff: How about the question of the bearing of the studies in your office on extending the counterforce concept across the strategic arsenal? Do you recall studies along that line? Studies leaning to the development of new technology that your studies might have supported?

Marshall: Schlesinger and I certainly talked about that, and things like that, for many years, but I don't think our particular studies had much to do with that.

Matloff: You weren't drawn in on those controversial questions dealing with the B-1 bomber, cruise missiles, low-cost surface ships?

Marshall: Not at a detailed level, though he might have asked my view on them. Another thing on this intelligence side was the business of the CIA estimates of the Soviet military budget, which both Schlesinger and I thought were way off. He had tried when he was at CIA to get them to take another look at it and when he got down here, he had a couple of top CIA managers come down and asked for a special kind of review of that.

Goldberg: Did he pay attention to Bill Lee on this?

Marshall: No.
Matloff: The feeling being that their estimates were too low?
Marshall: Far too low; especially their estimate as a percentage of GNP was low. In fact, my records show that they then wrote something about reviewing it and said their estimate of around 6 percent was right, and that the most it could be off was 10 percent.
Goldberg: Ten percent of six percent.
Marshall: Yes. I wrote a commentary for Schlesinger. He then had me review their argument and draft a memorandum to be sent to the Agency on why we didn't believe their estimates. They came back and said they believed in them. Then a year or so later they doubled the number up to 12-13 percent.
Goldberg: That was before Team B.
Marshall: Yes, it was.
Matloff: You can read in the CIA argument that CIA thought that Defense was estimating too highly, and that they tried to offer a counterpoint to this. Did Schlesinger and you advocate nuclear parity, superiority, sufficiency, or what, vis-a-vis the Russians?
Marshall: I forget the buzzword, but yes. Another thing I worked on for Schlesinger--he was very interested in what you might think of as the political-psychological impact of military forces. He and I talked about this for several years, and it was part of our discussion of why you could only
give "two and one-half cheers" for systems analysis--it was too narrow an evaluation of the complex consequences of acquiring some new systems. I undertook to get studies done on this whole area of the political-psychological impact on others and on their calculations, etc. Herb Goldhamer at Rand started to work in this area and he did several studies. We held a conference about "perceptions" and brought in a wide variety of people. He and I had long been interested in the work of ethologists, like Robert Ardrey and others--the notion that you might be able, through looking at the behavior of other animals, particularly the primates, to understand some of these dimensions of how threats and other displays actually function and impact on others. We launched a whole series of studies.

Goldberg: Did you find that useful?

Marshall: Yes. We got the CIA to undertake to write some papers on what it was about our forces that most impressed the Soviet military. Schlesinger was much focused on how we could use our exercises to shape their assessments. Another thing I got into for him was the deception business--how can you make them believe things that aren't necessarily true, but to your benefit to have them believe?

Goldberg: We could have learned that from them, couldn't we?
Marshall: Right. But then to go back to your point. The question came up about the nuclear forces, and certainly one of the things that he argued for was that, even if in some narrow kind of military sense you might think some increase, or excess numbers they had might not make a difference, for these other reasons these might have an impact. Therefore there were several dimensions on which you would want to have parity and equality.

Matloff: I take it that you both believed in the balanced nuclear strategic triad?

Marshall: Yes.

Matloff: Did you detect significant differences in the strategic ideas of Schlesinger and Kissinger?

Marshall: We talked about it. Do you mean with respect to the strategic forces?

Matloff: In general.

Marshall: Schlesinger started from the view that one didn't have to be as pessimistic as Henry was at that time, and that we could and should compete with them. We had lots of advantages which we could make use of. That led him, I think, to have a different strategic view.

Matloff: Why did he feel that the national strategic weapons doctrine had to be reoriented?
Marshall: For several reasons. First, he had worked at Rand, from the middle '60s on, on the area of limited strategic options. As a consequence of the growth of the size of the Soviet forces, you might find yourself in a position of striking in some limited way. Particularly, it would come about if the Soviets invaded Iran or something of that sort. If you were going to use nuclear weapons, you might want to use them in a more limited way and try to get the Soviets to desist or get a limited response from them. While this wasn't a terrific option, it was the least bad option. Also, there had been work in the first Nixon term, largely done here by people like Johnny Foster, Jasper Welch, and others, taking a look at the targeting doctrine more generally and suggesting changes that, basically, he very much agreed with.

Matloff: How revolutionary was this flexible response strategy of his for the use of nuclear weapons?

Marshall: It was revolutionary mainly in the importance given to limited options and the push for a fairly substantial range of options to be thought through. There had gradually been evolving a very limited set of these smaller options. Going back to the beginning of the Nixon administration, when Kissinger first became aware of how few these options were, he made a big fuss about it and complained about how constrained
a president would be in a wide variety of crises, if he wanted to make some use of nuclear weapons.

Goldberg: Limited if he didn't have these options to use.

Marshall: Limited by the planning and preparation existing—the SIOP. There always were some smaller cases that people had planned for, but they were going to be more or less extemporized, and what was wanted was serious planning for these kinds of options.

Matloff: Kissinger makes a great point about this in his memoirs, that when he came in office with Nixon he felt the options had to be increased.

Marshall: That had been evolving from the early mid-60s, but it had not been pushed home. Even after it had been adopted as a policy, there was obvious resistance. I remember going on a trip to SAC with Schlesinger, the whole point of which was to follow up on the official signing off to try to move them along.

Goldberg: McNamara had the same experience in 1961, didn't he, when he went to Omaha and found what the initial plans were at the time before SIOP?

Marshall: Yes. There was an effort under Enthoven and others to get multiple options, and so there was some evolution.

Goldberg: Except that it isn't multiple options when it's in the direction of conventional warfare or limited strategic.
Matloff: It's a progression that you see right up through the Brown era. How successful was he in obtaining administration approval for his strategic ideas?

Marshall: In the nuclear weapons area, quite. There really wasn't any resistance at the top levels. It's something the people in the White House and others had wanted for some time.

Matloff: How lasting, from your perspective, has Schlesinger's strategic imprint in the Pentagon been? Have there been any major changes in official U.S. strategic doctrine since the adoption of his selective targeting strategy, at least down to the breakup of the Soviet Union?

Marshall: I think not. There was the early '70's target review, and his effort to push it and get it implemented; further review under Brown, which largely continued in the same mold with some changes, particularly on the SIOP side, to take account of some problems. There really hasn't been anything since then. Now there will be some changes.

Matloff: Did you or your office play any part in connection with the foreign area problems or crises in the Schlesinger era?—for example, such things as NATO, the Mayaguez, the Yom Kippur war of October 1973, the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus?

Marshall: The office really wasn't here at the time of the '73 war, but I came here shortly after that, and was put in
charge of the first lessons learned effort. Actually, this office has been used a number of times to look at lessons learned from crises, smaller wars. When these crises were going on, like the Mayaguez, no. I would occasionally be asked a question, but the office wasn't involved.

**Matloff:** Were you and your colleagues in OSD aware of his policy differences with Kissinger and with the growing strains with President Ford?

**Marshall:** I certainly was.

**Matloff:** Did you ever discuss them with him?

**Marshall:** Yes. We used to talk about Henry, and his views. With Ford, he didn't raise it, but I talked to him about it. A few weeks before he was fired, I brought it up with him because Bill Cockle, who was on the NSC at the time, had talked to me about it. He thought things were getting tense. Schlesinger said that he was aware, but it didn't make any impact on his behavior.

**Matloff:** You were not totally surprised at the news of his dismissal in November 1975?

**Marshall:** I guess I was surprised at the suddenness of it in some sense, but these were very tense times.

**Goldberg:** What was your understanding of the sources of the tension?
Marshall: My understanding was that it was Schlesinger's resistance to demands with respect to the Defense budget that Ford wanted. Based on the discussion I'd had with Cockle, there was another element of it which was that Jim was felt, by some of the people over there and maybe by Ford personally, to have overstepped in the way he spoke to Ford.

Matloff: In Ford's memoirs he gives a series of reasons. One was the Mayaguez incident, in which he felt that his instructions were not carried out by Defense. The evacuation of Americans from Saigon was another issue, in April 1975; and in connection with Turkey's incursion into Cyprus Schlesinger wanted restrictions put on the military aid to Turkey, and Ford did not. These, plus Schlesinger's differences with Kissinger, give a multiplicity of reasons. When we interviewed Ford, he said that maybe he was wrong.

Goldberg: Ford said that maybe he was wrong; Schlesinger didn't admit that maybe he was wrong.

Marshall: Right. When I talked to him, it was based on the other discussion—that maybe he ought to cool it a little.

Goldberg: These composites on the same issues and problems give us a broader and deeper perspective than we can get from one person. We get a full round of views of a particular matter and see it in a way that no one of the individuals could.
Matloff: What were your reactions and those of other people in OSD to the news of the dismissal?

Marshall: I was sorry that it happened. It wasn't entirely unexpected, but I think that the abruptness of it shocked me a bit. Other people here in this office were very sorry that it had happened. I had the sense that it had been done in a way that it needn't have been done.

Matloff: From your perspective, how effective was Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense?

Marshall: I think that he was effective within the building. Given all the problems, that went pretty well. Clearly, the conflict with Kissinger and dealing with the White House were a problem.

Matloff: How about with Congress?

Marshall: Mixed; I thought he did pretty well, not as well as some others.

Goldberg: Do you think that some of the congressmen may have had a hand in influencing Ford? Mahon, for instance, was reputed to be very much put out with Schlesinger, and he was an old friend of Ford's.

Marshall: That is possible, but I don't have any information about that.
Matloff: Schlesinger makes the point that he did cultivate relations with members of congress, and worked assiduously at it.

Marshall: Yes, he tried hard.

Matloff: What would you say were his major achievements as Secretary of Defense?

Marshall: I think that it was keeping the general morale in the Department as high as it could be, during a bad period; his optimistic view, the revivalist aspect of things that he did; and he worked quite well with several of the heads of the services, particularly the Army. The services were going through a bad period.

Matloff: In what ways did this era, in which the foundations were really laid for your office, set the pattern for your office and the administrations that followed?

Marshall: The office probably never would have had the character that it had unless it had been started and perpetuated the way it was. The office was fortunate--first the Schlesinger period, when the basic role and mission were set, and then sustained very well under both Rumsfeld and Brown.

Matloff: We can now move on to the Rumsfeld administration, from November 1975 to January 1977. How well had you known Mr. Rumsfeld before he became Secretary of Defense?
Marshall: Not at all.

Matloff: Did you get a chance to brief him after his appointment? Did he seek a briefing?

Marshall: With the turnover there was a request for a brief set of papers on the nature of the office and what was going on. Some of the people Rumsfeld brought with him, like Alan Woods, came by and talked with me. Then Rumsfeld asked to see me and we talked, and he asked me to stay. After the first few weeks we did a lot of things for him and got along very well with him. I was very impressed with Rumsfeld.

Matloff: Did he give you any specific instructions about what he wanted your office to be doing?

Marshall: Not at the initial meeting. We went ahead with the program that we had started. He, more than any other secretary, would send down requests for our views on certain things. One was about the Soviet missile program, the so-called period of vulnerability. He was very interested in taking a strategic view of things and asked for ideas of how one should think about the Navy we ought to be building for the future.

Matloff: How did he conceive his role as Secretary of Defense, from your perspective? Was it different from Schlesinger's?
Marshall: In some ways it was very close to Schlesinger's. Partly because of his past connections to people in the White House and with Ford, he was much better positioned, in some sense, than Schlesinger, so he had potential for being a terrific secretary of defense. It was a pity in some sense that his period was so short.

Matloff: Did his philosophy of management differ from that of Schlesinger?

Marshall: It didn't in the sense that he had a group of people he trusted and from whom he sought advice. It was wider than the group with which Schlesinger consulted. I thought one of his best attributes was his ability to use people. In my case, I had not known him, but I presume that he found what we did useful. He was easy to work for and with. I thought that he was very good. I don't know whether he spent as much time as Schlesinger trying to talk with, and deal with, the chiefs of the services. Schlesinger spent a lot of time talking personally with the heads of the services. I don't know of any other other secretary who has done that kind of thing.

Goldberg: Did both Schlesinger and Rumsfeld leave the administration of the Department pretty much to Clements, as far as you know?

Marshall: In a way, both did that.
Goldberg: Many secretaries have done that.

Marshall: I guess that's right.

Goldberg: In that regard, McNamara was probably the exception, rather than the rule, as secretary.

Marshall: Yes.

Matloff: Rumsfeld introduced a number of changes in organization and management. One was that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was given the additional title of Director. He also introduced the second deputy secretary of defense, Robert Ellsworth.

Marshall: Yes. In fact, I was put under Ellsworth.

Matloff: Did any of these changes affect the operations of your office?

Marshall: That one did, to some extent. While we continued to do the basic things we were doing, Ellsworth had a daily staff meeting in the morning which I attended. And even though prior to that I had been working with Schlesinger, he didn't have a morning staff meeting, except with Wickham and a few others, but not the same sort of thing. Out of Ellsworth's meeting grew certain tasks; for example, the Israelis had been approaching Defense as early as six months after the '73 war to set up a direct channel for discussions between the Israeli Ministry of Defense and DoD. Schlesinger, after consulting with Kissinger, had rejected that. I knew
about it because I had run a study of lessons learned from the '73 war, beginning shortly after I got here. Some of the people I had sent over to Israel to get data came back delivering this message. It was turned down twice. Soon after Rumsfeld came in an Israeli, Sadya Amiel, a physicist, came and asked about this. He talked to Ellsworth and it was finally decided that it would be done. In order to have it done quietly and not have it become another channel for them to lobby for things they wanted, my office was asked to conduct this set of discussions. Carried out under the cover of our branching out and doing an assessment in the Middle East region, it really was a discussion twice a year with a group of the strategic planners in the Israeli Ministry of Defense. That went on for five or six years and was kept to few people, because there was concern about letting it be known that this was going on.

Goldberg: You know, earlier than that, in 1971, '72, and possibly '73, the Israelis sent groups of their top intelligence people here to Rand in Washington and held discussions. Do you remember that? At least twice they did that, and these were headed usually by the Deputy Director of Intelligence. They were a cocky group before the Yom Kippur War.
Marshall: This group was headed by the Deputy Minister of Defense. That's another way the work changed.

Matloff: Your office was being used in ways that it had not been used in the Schlesinger administration.

Marshall: That's right. It was also used because one of Ellsworth's tasks as the second deputy was the reorganization of the intelligence activities within Defense. He got me involved in that because of my other prior experience working for Kissinger on a similar set of issues.

Matloff: Did you detect any differences in the strategic ideas of Rumsfeld and Schlesinger?--the buildup, for example, of strategic as well as conventional forces in those areas?

Marshall: I don't think so.

Matloff: Were you drawn in on any of the controversies over the weaponry, some of which was a legacy from the previous administration--such things like advocating the B-1 bomber to replace the B-52; the Trident program?

Marshall: Relatively little. Not into the controversy. However, Jim Roche and I wrote a paper for Ellsworth. He was to chair the final meeting where the decision on the B-1 was announced. We wrote a piece for him that provided a strategic rationale for the bomber and was very much in the direction of broadening the consideration of the consequences of choice of
a program and going ahead with a program that went far beyond just looking at how many targets it was going to destroy.

Matloff: Did you get into the cruise missile question at all?
Marshall: No, not particularly.

Matloff: Rumsfeld had an interest in this question. In fact, he wanted a joint program of the Air Force and the Navy to develop a new long-range stand-off cruise missile.

Marshall: Yes.

Matloff: Did you or your office get involved in any way in supporting the Ford-Kissinger efforts vis-a-vis Red China, directly or indirectly?

Marshall: No, I don't believe so.

Matloff: Was there a question of whether there should be a tilt toward China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, to play the so-called China card?

Marshall: I don't remember, but that went all the way back to the Nixon-Kissinger efforts.

Matloff: Were you drawn in on the question of Japanese rearmament?

Marshall: No. It was a little later, with Brown, for that.

Matloff: Any involvement in other foreign area problems; for example, the widening civil war in Angola, the Soviet backing of the Cuban troops?
Marshall: We had added this area of power projection—that is, looking at U.S.-Soviet capabilities to intervene in third world areas—and actively pursuing that question produced our first study of that during Rumsfeld's period here.

Matloff: Looking at Rumsfeld's position on arms control, it is obvious that he was opposed to the SALT II treaty as it was being evolved. In fact, when he got out of office he wrote, "To people who talk of the arms race, one must ask whether there really has been an 'arms race'. A more appropriate characterization might be that the Soviets have been running and the U.S. has been walking." This was in a 1980 article in Comparative Strategy. He went on to object to a doctrine of "minimum deterrence" and called for the United States to adopt an approach of "extended deterrence". To what extent did this reflect views in OSD? Was this a typical view, or were you in agreement with these sentiments?

Marshall: If you looked at things in the middle '70s, particularly in the strategic area, there were a whole series of Soviet missile programs that went through R&D and were deployed and the U.S. deployed nothing. We hadn't deployed any new missile systems for a long time, with the exception of the naval area. The Soviets were moving into some increase in their bomber programs, and so on. So reflecting that, perhaps, and the view he took away from his time in the
Pentagon, which in the middle '70s was very much that picture, I think.

Matloff: Was your office drawn in on studies of arms control in this period?

Marshall: Not directly. The studies we did had some bearing on arms control, in the sense of providing a broad picture of the military balance in the strategic nuclear forces, but no, we didn't get directly involved in the more immediate negotiatory process.

Matloff: From what you said before, you had a favorable view of his administration and himself as secretary of defense. In retrospect, what do you regard as his major achievements as secretary of defense?

Marshall: I don't think his direct impact on the building was that substantial, but his policies were a continuation of the things that had been going on. He certainly was very much in the line, certainly on Schlesinger's side, on any Schlesinger-Kissinger difference. He had the same kind of views. There was no reason for us to be second or downhearted; we just needed to get on with it.

Matloff: As you look back on it, was your office in the Rumsfeld period initiating more studies than in the Schlesinger era, or was the proportion of mandated studies from above about the same as in the previous administration?
Marshall: In terms of the studies, we had started with the three that I mentioned, added the power projection balance, and also during that period we had had a request that came down from Clements to do an assessment of command and control. The Congress, in effect, demanded one. Their argument was that we had been asking them to spend money on command and control systems, and various kinds of fixes, but they had no overview of how necessary they were or the state of our command and control relative to the Soviets. We did two or three assessments of that. The other thing about the Rumsfeld period was that he was very interested in a strategic planning perspective on major areas of defense. He had requested a paper on the Navy--where should it be going, what was the real strategic long-term view. Jim Roche and I wrote that for him. Roche was a commander when he came to me, and had the background of a Ph.D at the Harvard Business School. When Rumsfeld showed interest in this kind of strategic planning, we wrote a paper and sent it to him about what we felt was a lack in the management structure of defense and that there wasn't anything comparable to the strategic planning that at least some companies attempt. Success is very mixed in business, but it was also an area in which Roche and I were interested. It went back to some work I had done at Rand at the end of my period there and had led in some respects to the
competitive strategies set of ideas. But it was so late in the year when Rumsfeld got around to reading the paper so it didn't have much impact. We resubmitted it to Brown and went on from there. That's another thing we spent a fair amount of time on.

Matloff: Since you mention Brown, let's move on to his era--January 1977 to January 1981. How well had you known him before he became Secretary of Defense?

Marshall: I had known him quite well; I knew him from his visiting Rand when he was associated with Livermore. He had asked me to come to work for him when he was DDR&E in McNamara's time. I wasn't a close personal friend, but I had known him quite a long time. When he came on board, I was asked to stay and in some ways the period under Brown was probably the time when the office had the biggest kind of payoff.

Matloff: Did you have any dealings with him when he was Secretary of the Air Force, in the late '60s?

Marshall: Not particularly--it was mainly when he was DDR&E.

Matloff: Did you brief him after his appointment? Did he ask for a briefing?

Marshall: No. Again, we sent up in the transition a packet of things. I did have a short meeting with him and we proposed a program of things we should do. He more or less
accepted that and we went ahead. During the Brown administration we did a couple of special assessments of the ASW problem as part of the broad naval situation; and Asia; and, in particular, we did a Korean balance, but we had a broader look at Asia.

Goldberg: Were these studies done in your office by your people?

Marshall: Yes, with inputs from the intelligence people, inputs from various study contracts. All of the actual final assessments have been done here.

Goldberg: I was thinking in terms of the all-over study program. The supporting study program has been very substantial over the years.

Marshall: Right.

Matloff: How did Brown conceive his role as Secretary of Defense, from where you were sitting?

Marshall: The Carter administration was very split, I think, and there were people like Brown and others that had been brought on, on the one hand, and on the other hand you had people, especially people at State, who had a very different view of how the U.S. ought to posture itself in the world.

Goldberg: Not to mention Brzezinski in the White House.
Marshall: That's right. But the main thing was the set of people who thought that if we only showed ourselves to be more friendly or more peaceful, the world would calm down.

Goldberg: That wouldn't be Brzezinski, then.

Marshall: No, not at all. Also, you had a very different kind of president. I don't know how Brown envisaged it when he came in, but one of the things he found himself doing was spending a lot of time dealing with very detailed requests for information by Jimmy Carter, who was a micromanager in a way that no U.S. president has ever been. I had one insight into that when Harold Brown sent me, as an interested party, a piece that he had written to Carter on the issue of the airborne alert aircraft and how many we should have, etc. It was a very long piece, and it was obvious from that that Carter's questions were at a very detailed level.

Matloff: Soon after Brown got into office, he launched a comprehensive review of Defense organization and management.

Marshall: Yes, he did. Gene Fubini was very much involved in that.

Matloff: Such things as resource management, and the national command structure; he eliminated the second deputy secretary of defense and created two under secretaries of defense, one for policy and one for research and engineering.
Marshall: And he moved this office under the Under Secretary for Policy.

Matloff: And also brought in a new special assistant for NATO affairs, a special advisor.

Marshall: Right.

Matloff: Were you or your office consulted on any of these changes?

Marshall: I think we were asked to provide initial inputs. I don't know whether you could say we were consulted. Gene Fubini, whom I also knew, came by and we talked about what he was planning to recommend. In that sense, I would say yes.

Goldberg: Did you get a chance to say much when you were talking with Fubini?

Marshall: Yes.

Matloff: The introduction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy--did this change your working relations with the Secretary of Defense and other agencies or top officials in OSD?

Marshall: No. Indeed, a special provision was made for direct reporting to the Secretary.

Matloff: Did you have to clear with the Under Secretary?

Marshall: No. It evolved and now that's the way it happens, but originally, no.
Goldberg: That wasn't the case with other offices under the Under Secretary, was it? The Assistant Secretaries had to go through the Under Secretary, theoretically.

Marshall: Theoretically, but it never worked until Wolfowitz got here.

Goldberg: Komer tried to make it work. He said that he tried by staying late enough that the assistant secretaries couldn't go to Brown directly as long as he was on hand.

Marshall: Right.

Matloff: How often did you see the Secretary of Defense and these under secretaries of Policy, Resor and Komer?

Marshall: I saw Resor a few times. Frankly, I was happy to see the establishment of the position; I thought it was a good move. Resor made a couple of requests, which we filled, but on the whole we were left alone. I saw more of Komer. He is an old friend of mine from the late '50s when he was at CIA, where I first met him. And, of course, he had also been at Rand. I had known him a long time and had been very friendly with him, so I did see and talk with him sometimes. I didn't actually see Brown very much. He is not a person who really wants to see people. On the other hand, he has trained himself to be the most prodigious and efficient reader I have ever met. We did not send him lots of things, but we sent more to him than to any other secretary, partly because by the
time he came we were really up to speed. He also had increased the size of the office; it had reached its largest size.

Goldberg: That was his initiative?

Marshall: Yes. But we would send him a package that we had been working on for perhaps up to two years that might be 150 pages or so, with a four-page memo on top which had the most important or sensitive points, and within two or three days it would come back and there would be lots of marginalia on almost every page and directions on what he wanted done with it, follow up actions to be taken, and memos to be prepared. It was absolutely amazing.

Matloff: How about the under secretaries, did they have any major interests that they wanted worked on?

Marshall: No, not even Komer. I wrote other things for him, that I thought needed to be done, and he would respond. And there was this continuation of the meetings with the Israelis. I had informed Brown of their existence, that they had started, and asked whether they should be continued. He said that he consulted with the people in the NSC, Brzezinski, and Vance, and it was agreed that we would go on, but they would be kept very close because it was very sensitive that we were having these kinds of discussions with the Israelis. Indeed, one of the things that eventually came along was that
McGiffert and his people couldn't stand not being part of this, and toward the end trouble developed over that.

Matloff: During the Brown administration?

Marshall: At the very end.

Goldberg: Komer had his troubles with McGiffert, too.

Marshall: Right.

Goldberg: Komer did tell us that 90% of his business with Brown was conducted by writing, and less than 10% in person.

Marshall: I would put mine at 95% or so.

Matloff: Did Brown ever discuss his perception of the threat with you?

Marshall: No, but it would be in the marginalia. There would be comments such as, "I don't think it's quite this bad," to give us some sense of it, but no discussions.

Matloff: From your perspective, what contributions did Brown make as Secretary of Defense in connection with strategic policy and planning?

Marshall: Brown was criticized by somewhat harder line people. My view had been that both Brown and the chairman at that time will look a lot better in the history books than they did at the time, when people understand what they were up against. There was micromanagement by Carter at one level and other pressures in the administration that weren't favorable to increasing Defense budgets. Brown succeeded, in spite of
all that, in getting the Defense budgets turned around. I think the other thing that happened during that time period was that because of him and Bill Perry a kind of strategic view was able to be implemented about R&D and a number of the black programs. One thing I found was that both he and Perry were very receptive to the sorts of things that I mentioned earlier, the set of ideas that Jim Roche and I had written for Rumsfeld. I remember in talking with Perry and reflecting Brown's view that we should increase the threat to the Soviet large ICBMs in the silos either to force them out of the silos into mobile systems, in which case they would have to reduce the payloads, or that they would negotiate them away. So they had a strategic view of things, and, similarly, the backing of the stealth programs, and so on. I think it was very personal to him and Perry and did not survive for those reasons. Similarly, probably the most immediately effective assessment that we ever prepared was done for Brown. We had been asked to do assessments of the ASW situation and we did do one for Ford, and another one in the early part of the Carter administration. By that time it had become very clear that the Soviets, because of their concern about the vulnerabilities of their ballistic missile submarines, had withdrawn them into bastions areas near the Soviet Union. Roche and I became convinced and had put together some good
evidence that their whole plan during the early stages of the 
war was not only that these ballistic missile submarines were 
to be kept back near the Soviet Union, but that the rest of 
the Soviet navy was going to be destroyed in their defense, 
including all the submarines, and a good deal of the defense 
was going to be pushed out over the sea areas. We wrote this 
assessment, which put the whole picture together, and then 
made the point to Brown that these concerns that they had 
about our submarines coming after their SSBNs, even though 
they were in the bastions, had this beneficial effect, because 
most of the work that people were doing assumed that the 
attack submarines were going to come out into the North 
Atlantic, and we were going to have to convoy across, and 
therefore we had to devote all our efforts to putting up 
barriers so they couldn't get through.

Goldberg: G-I-UK Gap. etc.

Marshall: That's right. So we made the point to him that we 
should reinforce the Soviet concerns, that it was of such 
strategic advantage to us. Actually only two people read it, 
Brown and his deputy. We suggested that Brown meet with the 
CNO and the Vice CNO to talk about this and that was arranged. 
The meeting took place, and the Navy at that point was unclear 
as to how much they should prosecute this because U.S. policy
was ambiguous as to what they should do. [Here follows a
portion that remains classified SECRET.]
Matloff: This raises an interesting point. Schlesinger was a secretary of defense who was raised in the strategic field, had spent long years in Rand, and brought a lot of capital with him to the job; and in the case of Brown we have a secretary with a fine technical and scientific background. How was he getting his strategic ideas? Was he learning on the job?

Goldberg: He had been Secretary of the Air Force for almost four years.

Marshall: And he had been DDR&E.

Matloff: When we interviewed him, he said that McNamara had told him there was a gap in his education on the political side, and he recognized it. Surely he had contact with people at Rand . . .

Marshall: But his earlier contacts at Rand were mainly with the physicists.

Matloff: Was he getting it from people like yourself? Was he getting it from self-study, from the documents being sent to him?

Marshall: My guess is that he probably got it through self-study or from involving himself in other kinds of things. He had obviously been much involved in arms
Matloff: Was his emphasis in the strategic field any different than that of his Republican predecessors? Did he have a stronger commitment to arms control?

Marshall: I think he was somewhat more committed to arms control than either Schlesinger or Rumsfeld. Schlesinger probably thought it was largely folly. My view is that historically it will look like the south sea bubble. How could people believe what they said then? I think he was very tough-minded in terms of the position he thought we ought to have, relative to the Soviets. And certainly the view that he and DDR&E had about the use of our own programs to drive them one way or the other--he was very much focused on that and this whole ASW thing.

Matloff: While we are still in the strategic field, he is associated with the notion of countervailing strategy. He was also talking about essential equivalents in nuclear competition with the Soviet Union. The two key documents in this period were PD-18 and PD-59. Do you recall, in connection with PD-18, what was the significance of it? This was the one that Carter approved in August 1977.

Marshall: As I remember it, it said that we would continue the targeting policies that were in force but that there was
to be a review of the targeting policies. I was much involved in that, because he asked Slocombe and me to direct that.

Matloff: This is with PD-18?

Marshall: No, the thing that led to PD-59. The tasking came out of PD-18. Slocombe and I wrote out the issues that needed to be covered and developed the plan for the whole thing and recruited Leon Sloss to direct the studies and panels.

Matloff: You were handling this in task forces?

Marshall: We gave it to Sloss and then under him there was a series of task forces.

Matloff: Carter approved this in July 1980.

Marshall: Yes, there was a big delay. It was finished about a year before. Slocombe wrote the speech that Brown gave at the Naval War College that first used the phrase "countervailing strategy". At the end of the study that Slocombe and I managed, there were some meetings in Brown's office of Slocombe, myself, Brown, and Dave Jones. The issue was posed to Harold as several options he had as to the degree to which one pursued counterforce capability.

Matloff: Back to the strategic options again.

Marshall: Yes, but the key issue was the degree to which, in the targeting, one was pursuing counterforce options. Brown chose one that basically was characterized by pursuing counterforce to a sufficient extent to make clear to the
Soviets that one was going to be attacking those things which one felt they placed high value on—which included their forces, command structure, and so on.

Matloff: What do you regard as the significance of PD-59? Why did Brown feel that he needed this kind of strategy?

Marshall: I think the reason he felt he needed it was that it was increasingly believed, and I think correctly so at that time, that the top Soviet leadership—in particular the military leadership—themselves were very much focused on counterforce and therefore they looked at us with that perspective. The fundamental objective was to deter them, but in order to do that, you had to think in their terms and to make the consequences and the outcome sufficiently negative in their way of thinking about things, and that required you to get into the counterforce business for deterrent purposes. My guess as to what happened with PD-59 is that it was sent over to Carter and the NSC in the early part of '79. Then there was a long hiatus when nothing was happening. Someone you want to talk to about that is Bill Odom, because he actually wrote PD-59, and that is one of the reasons it is so elaborate. One of the distinctive things about the Carter period is the character of the presidential decisions, memoranda, and so on. They are far more detailed; they go probably with his own penchant for micromanagement, but they
are more directive. Actually, I think that's a plus. The problem with most presidential directives is that they are so general that they do not really give much guidance. On the other hand, people down below in the bureaucracy like that, because it gives them all kinds of leeway. But in a well-run government, there would be the general document and an intermediate document that spelled out policy and strategy in some meaningful way. But there is a tendency for there to be a big gap between the stated guidance and the nuts and bolts programs. There is no existing guidance in between.

Goldberg: The military services usually criticize these policy and guidance documents in NSC, because they are so general. In reality, they like them, especially if they can get their own language into them, which they have tried to do from the '50s on.

Marshall: That's right. At any rate, there was a long hiatus, and then PD-59 came out and a draft was sent over and there were meetings, with the same group responding to them. I think Slocombe ended up being the main drafter of the positions going back.

Matloff: On July 25, 1980, Carter approved it. There seems to be a difference of views between Brown and Brzezinski on what PD-59 represented. Brown's statement called it, "not a new strategic doctrine; not a radical departure"; that the
United States could counter "some intermediate level of Soviet aggression by selective, large, (but still less than maximum) nuclear attacks." In his memoirs, Brzezinski says PD-59 was "an important new step" in American strategic thought, with its concern for a long conflict rather than the assumption of "a brief, spasmodic and apocalyptic conflict, hitherto postulated in American war planning." What would be your thoughts on those judgments?

Marshall: I would agree more with Brown. It did represent some kind of further evolution along the line that people had been taking, at least on that issue for some time.

Goldberg: A refinement.

Marshall: Yes. There were obviously some changes in the emphasis in the targeting because one of the things that happened in response to the one done either just prior to Schlesinger, or with Schlesinger doing the final signing off on it, was that there were to be increased attacks on the economy and the number of targets began to escalate considerably. The objective was said to be that we should attack their economy in such a way that after the war we would recover faster than they would. I pointed out to Brown that one of the problems was that nobody knew how to make those calculations. So that was dropped.

Goldberg: It wasn't all that comforting a thought, anyway.
**Marshall:** To change the targeting of industry to make it focus on things having more immediate impact on the war rather than long-term recovery.

**Matloff:** Did he rule out the assured destruction approach on urban and industrial targets?

**Marshall:** One of the interesting things when we did this was the whole issue of casualties. There's always been the position that we weren't trying just to kill people; however, Brown did have me do a separate calculation of how many Russians would be killed. There were people around who wanted to know, even though it wasn't an objective. There were other things done that Brzezinski was interested in. One question was getting into the issue of what they cared about. One of the things that we had done separately after some of the main analysis was completed was to look at how many ethnic Russians would be killed, even though you weren't targeting for that. If they did the calculations and then wondered about what would happen, presumably the Soviet leadership cared more about whether the dead were Russians or whether they were Azerbaydzhanis, or something like that. We did have some work done on that, and Brzezinski was very interested in that. Later, when the Reagan people got in, and I mentioned some of these calculations to Pipes or someone else, they didn't want to hear about it. There was no interest in it.
Matloff: Do you see this as an evolution from the thinking of McNamara and Schlesinger on nuclear targeting? They had never really formally codified it.

Marshall: Yes, I think it was an evolution from that, with some changes, some shifts in the targeting for a variety of reasons. It certainly refocused significant effort, again from this point of view of going after what Soviet leadership itself cares about. It had a very interesting effect in that when these things became targets—bunkers, protection for the Soviet leadership—they began to find hundreds of these places which they had never understood were there before. It also led, in a way, to the discoveries of the large underground command centers.

Matloff: There were some charges by critics of the Carter administration that the almost simultaneous disclosures of PD-59 and stealth technology, which came in the middle of the 1980 presidential campaign, were deliberately leaked to counter charges of weakness and boost the reelection chances. Do you recall your reaction to such charges? Was your office drawn in on that in any way?

Marshall: No. It's always possible. I welcomed the targeting thing and thought it should have happened earlier because we wanted to get the message out to the Soviet leadership. But the stealth thing I did wonder a bit about;
why it came out exactly then. I have no idea whether the program by that time was getting so substantial that there was some problem about it or what had an impact on the particular choice of timing.

**Matloff:** To what extent had the Rand philosophy on strategic nuclear policy become official U.S. policy by the time Carter and Brown left office—in terms of the counterforce concept being endorsed? Is that going too far, or would you go along with that?

**Marshall:** I don't know whether it was associated with Rand, whether Rand had that much of a formulated counterforce perspective. I think it is true that by the time they left office several ideas that had been growing for some time had had a firmer effect. That is, the notion that it makes a difference whom you are trying to deter and that you need to, in effect, threaten to do those things which cause the most pain to the people who make the decisions on the other side. That had kind of won out, because one of the problems with some of the earlier stuff had been to treat the matter too crudely. McNamara's stuff, about 40% of this and 50% of that, was deterring, and this represented a move toward saying, "This is what the Soviets, including the military leadership, care about, not just affection, but in terms of importance in determining the outcome and aftermath of the war, and those
are the things that you threaten. Also, at another level, something that Schlesinger had been interested in—that in part you design exercises to send a message to the other side and have deception programs that assist in having the right message get there—such notions were developed and became still more firmly implanted during that period.

**Goldberg:** When you talk about the Rand philosophy on strategic nuclear policy, you must remember that Rand itself had considerable differences on all of these matters.

**Matloff:** I meant the counterforce notion, which goes back to the 1950s, in the development of this concept through various administrations.

**Goldberg:** But the concept did not originate with Rand in the 1950s; Rand picked it up but there were others who had formulated it.

**Marshall:** If you take Rand as a whole, it was on the whole rather counter-counterforce until later, and the kind of thing that Kaufmann developed based in part on the stuff that Loftus and I had been telling him about the feasibility of counterforce.

**Matloff:** We have reached the two-hour mark. We can pick this up at a later date.