Matloff: How about your experience in the Bureau of the Budget? You were there before appointment to the Defense Department.

Morris: Yes, I was there a little less than a year. During that year I worked mainly in the civilian agencies. I didn’t have very much to do with Defense, per se.

Matloff: What were the circumstances of your appointment to the Defense Department as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for I&L?

Morris: They were strictly a surprise to me. I got a call late one afternoon over in the Budget Bureau from my boss, Elmer Staats, who was then Deputy in the Budget Bureau, saying that McNamara had contacted him about talking with me. I knew nothing up to that point, not even that he knew my name. But I did meet him that evening. He was the kind of man who moved quickly. We chatted for a while, about 30 minutes or so, as I recall. He told me of his aspirations to move in quickly and take the leadership in better management in the Pentagon and completely persuaded me that I ought to give up my Budget Bureau career post and move over with him. It was a total surprise.

Goldberg: This was before he took office?

Morris: Yes. He began work in late November, as I recall and as others have undoubtedly told you. He actually had an office in the Pentagon. He got one for me in early December. Most of us were already at work well before January. I recall our first staff meeting in early January, when he got Zuckert, Stahr, and many of us around the table and began giving us assignments, things to which he expected us to give the first priority. He recruited his own team. Kennedy had given him that privilege, which made,
I think, a tremendous difference in the esprit de corps and motivation of that group as a team. He gave me the same authority, I might say, to choose my own deputies, which I did, and to help choose my associates in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Matloff: Had you known President Kennedy before this?

Morris: No, I did not know him at all. In fact, I had never dealt personally with him. I had met him on several occasions, but in formal circumstances.

Matloff: How about some of the other members of the team at the top that were coming in: people like Gilpatric, Hitch, and others?

Morris: As a matter of fact, I had not known any of them, except by reputation, and except in the logistics area itself, where the people on duty in key jobs in OSD at the time I arrived were people I had worked with or known in the past. I did recruit Paul Ignatius. That was one of the things I was very proud of accomplishing. The other Assistant Secretaries had already been chosen before I got there, or before I had a chance to meet them, but I was given a chance to interview them and decide whether we were going to be a good team.

Matloff: What instructions or directives were given to you, and by whom?

Morris: The most important aspect of the McNamara style, from my personal point of view, was that the first week we were all officially in office he set a firm time when he was going to meet with us one-on-one, each week. Mine was 8:00 on Friday morning, and over the many years I worked with him he missed that date maybe once or twice. It was a very sacred date. I prepared for that date by doing literally hours of work with my staff and taking to him
notes, plans, and suggestions. He went through them very rapidly, but with
great care, made decisions, and gave me instructions as to what he wanted to
accomplish. So mine was essentially a week by week communication with the
boss. Of course, we had our regular directives, which had long been on the
books, as to our general authorities, but they really didn't mean a heck of a
lot.

Matloff: Mr. Ignatius remarked that you used to take him, on occasion,
to these Friday morning meetings, when he was in the Army counterpart post.

Morris: That's correct.

Goldberg: McNamara must have missed some of those when he was away on trips,
didn't he?

Morris: He probably did, but it is my recollection that I missed only one or
two over all the years. The only one I recall definitely that he canceled on
me, when he was there, was after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. He was so upset
that he said, "Let's just not try to meet today."

Matloff: What was your initial conception of your role?

Morris: I had a pretty good idea. First, I had served as McGuire's deputy
for a little less than two years in the late 50s, so I knew the office, and I
knew its mission and functions. Secondly, I had had the Hoover Commission
experience, where we tried to spell out some objectives for what the Hoover
Commission recommended as an office of Installations and Logistics. There
were two Assistant Secretaries in the old days, one for Installations and
one for Supply and Logistics. McNamara put them together, but two were
recommended. The other thing that Hoover recommended was the creation of
something like a DSA, a defense supply agency. He called it Defense Supply and Services Agency. I had been through that argument and debate in great detail, so I knew there were priorities of that type that we had to address. The staff, I might say, was superb. I had seven deputies, every one of whom was a long-standing careerist in the Pentagon. I don’t think that I had a single political appointee on my staff in those days; even my Deputy was a careerist.

**Matloff**: Did you set your own priorities, or were they set for you?

**Morris**: I had these weekly communication sessions, and I would take my proposed priorities to McNamara, who would accept or revise them. He usually supplemented them, added to, and embellished them. I’d say that about 80 percent of the time I was selecting the targets that I was going to work on. He expected me to.

**Matloff**: What was the state of Defense installations and logistics when you took over?

**Morris**: It was in a very interesting era, as you probably know better than I. After the Unification Act there were certain people on the Hill who became extremely interested in policing progress in unification and particularly in the business side of the Department. Senator Douglas, for example, was one of those. So the pressure was on us from the very beginning to do something like form the Defense Supply Agency, to get rid of overlap and duplication, as they saw it, in the common commercial item side of procurement and inventory control. Further, there had been lots of pressure in areas such as transportation and communications, to get more concerted effort among the services and get rid of the stovepipe kind of organization. Those were the key pressures with which we were confronted from the very beginning. I was just looking in my
scrapbook, which is very well kept. Senator Douglas sent a letter to McNamara, of which I have a copy, dated 23 January, 1961, the first week he was in office, giving him a charter as to what he wanted to see accomplished. McNamara took that letter very seriously; in fact, he invited the Senator over to talk with us about plans of action. He invited the Comptroller General to attend that meeting. He also invited counterparts from the House to attend that meeting. That showed the way in which he reacted to priorities of that type.

Matloff: Could you tell us something about how you selected your deputies, and how you organized your staff?

Morris: We had seven deputies. We decided that we wanted each of the major functions in the I&L area to be headed by a deputy, that I would not have a day-to-day line deputy overall, but I would designate one of the seven as my principal one, so to speak, and when I was away he would take charge. The key functions of that overall deputy, a gentleman named Glen Gibson, were, number one, requirements. Gibson was an expert in the defense budget process. He had been in the Navy in World War II and stayed with McNeil, who came over as the first Comptroller under Forrestal. Gibson knew that process better than anyone. Number two was procurement in its totality. I had a gentleman named Bannerman, whom I had had the pleasure of bringing into OSD from the Navy in 1958 as my deputy for the procurement policy side of things. I had a third one in production, a fourth in installations, and one in supply and maintenance, who had been a career man in the Army. Each of my deputies was a career person. There was not one that hadn't had many years in the field to which he was assigned.
Goldberg: Was Nate Brodsky one of your deputies?

Morris: Nate was one of my key associates. He was not a deputy. He worked for Glen Gibson, who was my overall deputy. I had known Nate in the '50s and when he came out here to American University. I knew him for many years. He's a very brilliant man.

Matloff: How large a staff was it, how much civilian, and how much military?

Morris: It's a little hard to be precise in remembering numbers, but my recollection would be on the order of 300 members on the total staff, larger than it is today, partly because they have moved some of the functions today out into what they call field activities. About 95 percent was civilian, as is true of most OSD offices, but I had some extraordinarily able military people assigned to the office. General Joe DeLuca, for example, who was one of the great logicians of our time.

Goldberg: I had him as a student at one time.

Morris: Joe was a tremendous person. He was the original leader of the cataloging program.

Goldberg: He took his degree on a part-time basis at the University of Maryland.

Morris: He's a fantastic individual. We were constantly seeking, in those days, top military people with an interest, and I found their skills, capabilities, and flexibility to be absolutely superior and often much better than the civilians'.

Goldberg: By the way, the course in which I taught DeLuca was entitled "Military Logistics."

Morris: He must have been a good associate professor.

Goldberg: He got an "A."
Matloff: Did you make much use of consultants from the outside, from industry, think tanks, or other sectors?

Morris: I might mention two things. Very early in our regime we took an action which established what is now known as LMI, the Logistics Management Institute. This was an idea that Ignatius and I had and McNamara quickly bought. The idea was to have our own dedicated consulting team. Both Ignatius and I had come out of the management consulting business, so we knew what we were up to, and so did McNamara. That was our principal use of the consulting. But we also made extensive use of outside experts of all kinds who had an interest in working with us—people like Sterling Livingston of Harvard and Ronald Fox, now a professor at Harvard—that would frequently make themselves available and were friends of McNamara in the past. We were particularly interested in working with people from industry who had ideas that they wanted to see considered—things like the value engineering program, the gold-plating problems. A lot of the ideas for those came out of industry.

Matloff: I'd like to discuss the whole matter of working relationships, starting at the top level with OSD, the Secretary of Defense and his top deputies. You mentioned those weekly meetings with SecDef McNamara. Did you see him besides that, in any other capacities? How often did you meet with him aside from those weekly meetings?

Morris: He had his own weekly staff meetings on Monday mornings at 8:00. They never ran more than an hour (that was his first law, he would get up and leave at the end of an hour), and where all of us met with him. That was a communication session, essentially, on a group basis. I seldom saw him during
the week, but all of his key Assistants had a hotline and he would frequently call on spot problems—on letters he was reading or calls he had just received. He didn’t hesitate to buzz that hot line and ask questions.

Matloff: Could you walk in on him if you had something that was pressing?

Morris: I could call his secretary and slip in to see him if I really had an urgent matter. I would more likely go to his deputy, Gilpatric, because he was more accessible and under less pressure than McNamara. Communication was never a problem.

Matloff: How about people like Comptroller Hitch? How close were you with him?

Morris: We had good daily working relationships with all of the Assistant Secretaries or counterparts at the OSD level. We were not close in an intimate way, with regular sessions, but we had no hesitancy in dealing with each other whenever our paths crossed. I’m sure you’ve heard about the famous issue papers that drove the budget process, of which Charlie Hitch was in charge. We were contributors to development of those issue papers and frequently talked with him or his staff. Glen Gibson had come out of McNeil’s office, so he knew that place thoroughly. We didn’t hesitate to go to any level of the staff in any of the offices in OSD for discussions as needed.

Matloff: What were McNamara’s policies in connection with installations and logistics? Do he have any strong feelings or motivations in this field?

Morris: He had tremendous feelings and motivations apparently in every field. But he had been a businessman, himself, and the I&L shop in our day was primarily the business side of the Department of Defense. The most famous thing that we did was to create what was called the Defense Cost Reduction
Program, which was highly formalized and which McNamara personally, with me and few others, designed. I mean designed in terms of his 27 separate initiatives. We reported to him quarterly on that program, drawing on service reports to us. We held at least annual sessions with the press, giving them our scorecard. We had the President over at least once a year to brief him and to have him make presentations to some of the key players. Our very first assignment, which we’ll never forget, was to come to him within 60 days with a list of bases and installations that needed to be reduced or closed. Kennedy personally got involved in that effort as well. Every year thereafter we came up with the annual list of base closures, that became a McNamara ritual. We had a dedicated staff that worked on it. He literally had an interest in every aspect of installations and logistics. One simple example is family housing, which became very important in the early 60s, because our inventory was not good enough. He instructed me, and my seventh deputy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Family Housing, a gentleman named John Reed, who came out of the Navy where he had been handling that program. McNamara wanted to be the key witness at the first major hearing on the Hill on family housing. I had the job of having to brief him and get him ready for that hearing. He never wanted support witnesses. He went up by himself, and didn’t want anyone else to have a voice getting mixed up with his in answering questions. He was usually quite right about that.

Matloff: By family housing, you are referring to housing on the bases?

Morris: Yes, around the world. That’s a big program.

Matloff: Both for enlisted men and officers, and all services?

Morris: That is correct.
Matloff: How about the relations of your office to the counterpart programs of the services in this area? What contact did you have with them and with their service secretaries?

Morris: I think the most important difference in the environment in the Pentagon that we knew in the 60s and the environment that I perceive from where I sit today is an answer to that question. We had a weekly breakfast session, to which came Paul Ignatius, the Assistant Secretaries of the services, and their chiefs of military logistics, the so-called DCSLOGs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, plus my seven deputies. We sat around for several hours reviewing what we had done in the past week and what our mutual plans were for the coming week. We shared fully with each other what our problems and objectives were, and we frequently began our joint planning. The cost reduction program quickly became a joint service-OSD program; it was not a unilateral program. In addition to that, the Assistant Secretaries frequently got together as a team, in my office as a rule, particularly when there was a hearing coming up that was going to involve all of us. On more than one occasion we went up to the Hill as a foursome and had four witnesses by plan. The military relationships were always excellent, and I felt free to go to my Deputy Chief of Staff in the Army around Ignatius at any time. If I had a problem and Ignatius wasn’t there, he was comfortable with our working that way.

Matloff: Did you have much contact with the secretaries of the services—Stahr, Vance, Ailes?

Morris: Rather little, except these Monday morning staff meetings of McNamara’s. But again, if we had a reason, we never had a problem of getting in to see
them. I remember that early in our tour there in 1961, I called on each of the service secretaries and explained that my office was a support office, not only for McNamara, but, in our judgment, for them as well. We had the board responsibility, and interfacing of the services was an area that was our responsibility. We wanted them to look on us as people they could call on, and they did in various ways.

Goldberg: I take it that the resentment of the military against McNamara, which became greater over the years, did not extend to much of the staff—to some of the staff, but not to other parts—is that correct? That is, they'd resent systems analysis, Enthoven. particularly, that was the focal point of their feelings? But not so much against other elements.

Morris: I think that is correct, and certainly I can say that from my experience both in installations and logistics and in manpower. We were always welcome and we got along well. We made it our business to.

Matloff: How about your relationships with the members of the JCS and the Chairman, did you many dealings with them?

Morris: That was a much more distant relationship. The old J-4 was our principal point of contact, and the J-4 himself came to the weekly breakfast meetings that I mentioned. We saw to it, and we kept him informed. But in the 60s I would say that the JCS and the Joint Staff had less interest in what we were doing than they probably have today. They left the business side of the house pretty much to the civilian team, and they worked on their military problems. There was no bad blood. I could talk to the Chairman any time I needed to, but there wasn't that close rapport.
Matloff: You had three in this case, Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler. How about your dealings with Congress? You mentioned in that first hearing that McNamara insisted on going himself. How about after that?

Morris: He always let us pick up the ball at that point. We worked very well on the Hill, particularly with the staff chiefs, the counsels to the committees or the staff directors, and made it a point to visit with them with some frequency, always on an arms length basis. We learned early on that you didn't want to surprise them. One, I recall well, was the problem we had with open housing on and around military bases in the Vietnam period. This is getting out of I&L, but McNamara and Johnson were just convinced that we had to solve that problem. Our chairman in the House was then Mendel Rivers, from South Carolina, and we were scared to death what Mendel was going to say when we adopted a policy of open housing, meaning that landlords who would not rent would be off limits. I had to go over and work with Mendel's staff director on the problem, and we together went to Mendel and worked out the strategy that we finally were able to announce, and it worked.

Matloff: Did you find in general that the congressional committees were sympathetic toward Defense programs and policies in this area?

Morris: Yes. The committees in those days had been for years preaching the need for economies and unification in the business side of the house, and that was where I spent 90 percent of my time. So when they saw the response they were getting, starting in 1961, from McNamara and his team, which was relevant to what they had been pushing for, they welcomed and praised it. Our scrapbooks are full of nice words on the floor. I recall no hostility in my I&L days.
Matloff: How about on problems of base closings, any feathers ruffled there?
Morris: I'm glad you raised that. That was one of our most difficult problems. We quickly understood the fact that no Congressman could do anything but stand up and fight back; that was his first requirement. We did several things, and McNamara took an extraordinarily heavy-handed lead in this area. One was that we began communicating well in advance of announcements. We tried to avoid, again, any surprises to people. But the most important thing we did was to create a full-time staff that continues to exist today, called the Office of Economic Adjustment. That staff was created to devote its full energies to helping communities, which were to be impacted by base reductions and closures, plan ahead, get a title to the properties if they wished them, and plan on attracting industry or other activities into those communities. There have been some beautiful publications on their success. That was a McNamara idea. More and more people on the Hill began to see that frequently these closures could be a blessing and not a curse. The first success story was Presque Isle, Maine, where Senator Muskie personally went with us to tell the community about the closure. We were back within a year to compliment them on the fact that they had more employment in light industry in that area than they ever had had when the base was active. Two other things McNamara did that were extraordinarily important: one was to create a central data base for the vacancies throughout the Department of Defense, and I think it still exists out in Dayton. He required that any employee dislocated by virtue of a base closure had to be given an opportunity for a job in that data base. Frequently it wasn't possible, because the job opportunities were not in the same location, and so on, but on the whole it worked well. The
third thing he did was to space out base reduction and closure programs over a period of years, the biggest ones over five years, so that there was time to plan and to soften the blow and help the employees. That was a skillfully managed effort. Of course, events overtook us, and Congress finally stepped in and passed laws that today make it very difficult to close anything.

Matloff: Was it 1964 when the Brooklyn Navy Yard was closed? Did that cause any problems for you, testifying on the Hill, and dealing with the Congress?

Morris: It was the last thing I did in my first tour. I resigned and went back into private life for a year at the end of 1964, and my very last project was the closure of the Brooklyn Navy Yard. McNamara and I and Vance or Nitze flew to New York. We had to meet with Gov. Rockefeller, Bobby Kennedy, and one or two others to tell them about this coming problem. They were very unhappy, of course, but they understood after the facts were laid out, and we went ahead with that closure.

Matloff: Did you have complete leeway in testifying on the Hill from the Secretary of Defense, or did you have to clear with him before you went up?

Morris: I never cleared with him unless I wanted guidance, which I would get out of these weekly one-on-one meetings. There was a regular reading of testimony, I assume, wherein Henry Glass, or some of the top staff folks could catch any policy boo-boos, but I never went to the boss.

Goldberg: How did you see Henry’s role over the years that you were there?

Morris: He was a spectacular individual who was able to absorb the complexities of that place and put them into the annual posture statement. We all marveled at his breadth of comprehension. It was far beyond that which any of us
possessed. But he was not in a role of any authority or command influence, and was no threat to any of us.

Goldberg: But he had full access to McNamara, and did other things than the posture statements?

Morris: Yes, that was my understanding. The posture statement was the most visible product that Henry turned out.

Matloff: Did you have any dealings with the press in connection with the base closings or any other factors involved in installations and logistics?

Morris: Yes, we had constant relationships with the press. These old scrapbooks reveal interviews with people from the Post, The Evening Star of the day, and out of town newspapers and magazines. The press showed a lot of interest in the '60s in the McNamara management improvement program, partly because of the Hill interest, I suspect. We had an extraordinarily favorable press, although occasionally not. Local community reports on base closures, of course, were always very cantankerous and upset. But otherwise our press was quite good and we had excellent relations with the Assistant Secretary of the Public Affairs Office. They had a gentleman named Dan Henkin, who worked for Ignatius at ATA, who was our liaison, our adviser, and we always worked carefully with him before we talked to the press. We did not seek publicity or interviews, but we didn't refuse any that we were asked to have.

Matloff: How seriously did you view the state of Soviet logistics as a threat, when you came into this office? Did that problem arise for you at all?

Morris: Not really. Glen Gibson, who was my principal deputy and my requirements deputy, kept in close touch with international logistics through the
ISA office, which Paul Nitze then headed. He went to our NATO conferences. We had regular meetings with our counterparts in Canada, in charge of the Canadian production and sharing program. I frankly did not get into that area very much; I left it to Mr. Gibson. I concentrated on our domestic business management problems, which were McNamara’s interests.

Matloff: How about interaction between strategy and logistics, did you have any consultation on those matters? Did the Joint Chiefs, for example, ever ask what the implications for logistics might be?

Morris: They did not tend to come to my office. This would happen, understandably in those days, through the services. That is, the Chief of Staff of the Army would go to Paul Ignatius or the Deputy Chief of Staff of Logistics of the Army. If problems arose that would involve McNamara, and which he might expect us to know about, then we would get into them, more or less on a case basis. The one exception was in the late ’60s and during the Vietnam period, which was largely the Ignatius period. When I came back into that office, I found that McNamara got daily briefings on the state of air munitions, production, and inventory supply as the basis for determining the sortie raids out in Vietnam. He and the President, you know, set those raids. He always had the facts at his fingertips, which he used our office to get for him.

Goldberg: To what extent did Systems Analysis become involved in the business of your office and others and in some ways almost preempt you?

Morris: Systems Analysis was new and growing from ’61 on, and feeling its way. Its power built over the years. It started out more modestly, as a component of Hitch’s office, and then became its own Assistant Secretaryship.
I would say that we were always alert and sensitive to what their people were up to, and my deputies were keeping in touch with them. Frankly, we had no problems that we couldn't straighten out. I was somewhat shocked, particularly in the later years, at the extent to which Systems Analysis finally got its hands into practically everything, and particularly in the military strategy side of the Pentagon, which, it seemed to me, was beyond its members' ken.

But they didn't think so.

**Goldberg:** Why did you think it was beyond their ken?

**Morris:** Let me relate an anecdote. When I came back into logistics at the end of the 60s, I recall a meeting at which McNamara had myself, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Alain Enthoven, and himself. We sat for an hour while Enthoven interrogated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs about some of the planning in a way that was McNamara's province. But I felt that it was very unbecoming an assistant secretary, because he was really challenging the judgment and military acumen of the Chairman, it seemed to me.

**Goldberg:** He must have had McNamara's sanction for it, obviously.

**Morris:** Of course, in those later years McNamara became a different person, in the sense that he was tired; he shouldn't have been expected to stay that long, and the problems had become overwhelming. He trusted Alain, as he should have. Alain was a brilliant man, and a person I later worked with in private life, but I thought he let the "whiz kids" go too far in assuming almost a command interest in some of the things that were going on.

**Goldberg:** It certainly created some of the problems with the military services for him. The Systems Analysis people were out front, and often did things that were then attributed to McNamara.
Morris: True, no question about that. Our office was fortunate, one would say, in not being a threat to the services. By and large we were there to work together to get a more business-like job done, and we all enjoyed doing it.

Matloff: How serious a problem was interservice rivalry for you in this capacity?

Morris: It was, very candidly, no problem at all. These weekly meetings that we had and that applied both to installations and to manpower, the full communications that we took it on ourselves to be sure occurred and which was reciprocated by the folks in the services, and the fact that we were more often helping than fighting each other, created a very team-like working relationship. The current lack of communication has been the biggest change in the Pentagon in my area, I think, in the past 20 years.

Goldberg: This is really reversion to the pre-McNamara period, in a sense, then? There existed lots of interservice rivalry in the late 1940s and '50s, throughout that period.

Morris: Yes. The people in the '50s, to their credit, had done quite a job in the logistics side and in the DSA-type of logistics in beginning to build a foundation for overcoming interservice rivalry, to such an extent that when McNamara came in, the Defense Supply Agency was created within about 3 months after he arrived. Some resistance existed, but not a lot.

Goldberg: The groundwork had been laid. Do you think McNamara realized this?

Morris: We told him this. People like myself realized it. My deputies knew it very well indeed.
Goldberg: When we spoke with him, he gave the very distinct impression that he didn’t pay much attention to what had happened before he came into office.

Morris: In fact, I’m sure he was being truthful, except that he loaded the staff responsibility on us to come up with the plans, which we did. We paid a lot of attention to what had gone on, but we didn’t need to bother him with a lot of that. And he’s probably right; it would not have swayed him. He would still have made the decision that he thought was right. But we had the strategy development for him.

Goldberg: From the broader standpoint, a great deal of what was done in the early years of the Kennedy-McNamara period was already pre-figured in what had been going on before under their predecessors.

Morris: No question. It’s so important to make that point. In procurement, for example, Jim Bannerman had been the leader, almost as an individual, in what has now been called the FAR, the Armed Services Procurement Regulation. He created it, he attributed great substance to it. Paul Riley the same way in the supply and maintenance side; Glen Gibson in the requirements side. We had real pros—Nate Brodsky was an example. They were ready, and accepted my leadership readily to come up with plans that the Secretary of Defense could get behind. The preparation had been going on for years.

Marloff: How much input did you have as Assistant Secretary in the formulation and allocation of the Defense budget for these areas of interest?

Morris: We were a secondary player in the budget process. We always contributed to these issue papers whenever there was a logistical factor involved. The one area where we had the major leadership was the military construction
budget—installations—where we were the key witness on the Hill for that budget each year, and where my office actually scrubbed the service requests for Mr. Hitch's office. We really did the work on that budget. Otherwise we were a support role-type outfit. We were not in on the approval, or final decision-making, of major new weapon systems; that was not our business. We looked on ourselves as executors. Once the decisions were made, we were there to see that they got carried out logistically in the most efficient way.

Matloff: Do you recall what percentage of the Defense budget was actually allocated to installations and logistics in this period?

Morris: There are always casual ways of answering that. When it came to administering the actual expenditure programs of buying and maintaining bases and installations and weapons, we frequently said that we impacted 60 to 70 percent of the total dollars, which is correct. When it came to the decision-making, however, behind the requirements for weapon systems and things like that, that was the main job of other people. We had, in the execution phase, a very substantial responsibility in the budget process, but in the decision-making phase, a secondary one.

Goldberg: When you say impacted 60-70 percent, presumably you are also including manpower costs?

Morris: Yes. The money spent on procurement alone was something like 40 to 50 percent of the Defense budget—the acquisition dollars. When you add maintenance, which involves the equivalent of about a million out of the 4 million people in the Defense Department, you quickly find that the logistical side, installations and logistics, is involved in about 60 to 70 percent of the expenditures.
Matloff: This period in the McNamara administration was also a period of controversy in weaponry, manpower, and the like. Were you drawn in on this in this first period of your tenure as Assistant Secretary for I&L?

Morris: Again, mainly in a secondary way. The TFX, for example—our office did not get involved in it. We were very aware of what was going on, but that was Alain Enthoven's problem. In lesser things, like the issue of program management, which was a new issue back in those days, we did get heavily involved. The Army, for example, had no program managers; the Navy and Air Force did have. McNamara used us to help get one set up for the rifle program, bringing a new rifle on line. So we became the leader in that kind of area, but by and large we were not involved in the heavy weapons system debates, such as Godwin would be today, for example.

Matloff: You didn't get in on the problem of the so-called missile gap, its rise and demise?

Morris: No.

Matloff: Did any of the international incidents or foreign area problems, such as Cuba, Berlin, NATO, or Indochina, have an impact on your office in connection with installations and logistics?

Morris: Vietnam, of course, was the biggie, after 1965, but in the early period we had very little direct impact from these matters. The one very regular and well-attended relationship was with Canada. We had what was then called the Canadian-US production sharing program. The Canadians and ourselves were both very interested in that and worked on it together constantly. That was the one I got involved with. I did have an office under Glen Gibson,
that kept in continuing touch with ISA and what was happening and was responsive to their needs, but it did not involve me very much.

Matloff: Your office was not consulted on the Cuban missile crisis?

Morris: No, and it was proper we shouldn't have been. That was up to the services, the operators, to take care of in an emergency, and we had no competence and capability.

Matloff: In connection with Vietnam in this period, 1961-64?

Morris: There was no awareness.

Matloff: How did the McNamara reforms in management affect your office?

Morris: Of course, the whole PPBS process affected all of us, and we were very much in the orbit of commenting on the issue papers and things like that. In terms of our major missions, which in those days were more efficient inventory management, maintenance, communications, procurement rules and regulations, and installation operations—those were our business activities, and that was 90 percent of our time from day to day.

Matloff: What do you regard as your major achievements during that first term as Assistant Secretary from 1961-64?

Morris: It was a period of tremendous activity. The first major achievement was the creation of the Defense Supply Agency, to which all of us devoted a lot of time in its origination and then in its administration. General McNamara, who became its first head, looked on us as his day-to-day conduit to the top and we saw him frequently. Today I would still rate that as probably the most outstanding single thing we got done in those first four years. The savings it achieved and its continuous existence over these years prove that, I believe.
Goldberg: Do you think that the services’ criticisms of that are unwarranted?

Morris: I have not seen any well- or systematically-organized criticisms, except I’ve heard about Secretary Lehman’s complaints, which struck me as being totally superficial. I know that General Poe, when he was head of AFLC in Air Force, was a vocal opponent. An interesting anecdote is that GAO, where I went later in my career, did a major year-and-a-half study of DLA about two years ago. They had a panel of advisors, made up of mainly ex-Defense executives, military and civilian. General Poe was one of about twelve. Eleven of us were strong supporters of DLA, but Gen Poe spoke out in opposition. As far as I can tell, he never had any particular logic, except that he preferred to be able to do his own thing, so to speak. He didn’t need outside help, and he ignored the economy aspect. The other great achievement of that first period was the cost reduction program, which was really just an organized management-by-objective approach to giving priority attention to the most important opportunities for economy and efficiency. That was the hallmark of our first four years. Base closures, of course, were a major part of that. We accomplished over 400 actions in those years that had permanent savings of a billion and a half or more dollars. It was quite an achievement. The Office of Economic Adjustment, which continues to exist, I rate as an important concept; the Logistics Management Institute, 25 years later, is going strong.

Goldberg: Why did you leave at that particular point in 1964?

Morris: That’s a good question. I think, frankly, that I was pretty much tired out at that point, and felt that both for myself and for Defense, fresh
thinking should be brought to bear. That was the key reason. I came back with equal glee, I might say, a year later, to work again in that environment.

Matloff: What were the circumstances that brought you back in the Manpower post?

Morris: Once you have lived in that kind of a job for four years and under such a dynamic leader, you never forget it, and you miss it quickly. I went back to New York and rejoined the consulting firm I had been with for twelve years before. I enjoyed that year, but it was nowhere near the challenge that I had had. When Vietnam began to heat up, I simply told Cy Vance, who told McNamara, that I would be glad to be asked back in any capacity at all.

Matloff: What instructions or directives were given to you and by whom?

Morris: This was a very different kind of job. The logistics position is a massive business management job where one wanted to create greater economy and efficiency. When I came into manpower, I found an office that had never been given very much stature, I guess it's fair to say, in the OSD hierarchy. It tended to be a secondary kind of job, more than logistics. The Secretary of Defense himself had not given it a great deal of attention, at least that was the indication.

Goldberg: It probably had its greatest attention under George Marshall and Lovett, when Anna Rosenberg had the job.

Morris: Yes, she was a great one, and I quickly amend what I said to acknowledge that. When I came into office, we were in the midst of the Vietnam buildup, so that very first issue was the draft, and how we would cope with our recruiting and our requirements for manpower. I spent over half my time that first year on various aspects of the draft, the many complaints
around the country about the favoritism being shown, and the advocacies of the lottery system to be more fair about it. We were constantly involved in that. The offshoot of that was the so-called "category mental group four problem," also involved with minority recruits, where we found that the Army was having to take 25 percent or more of its monthly draftee population out of the lowest mental group—the Navy to a lesser extent, and the Air Force almost not at all. The Marine Corps was like the Army. So the problem was posed as to whether this the best way to man and staff our force.

Goldberg: Exactly the same thing occurred during Korea, the same problem. The Secretary of Defense did the same thing.

Morris: I didn't know that. This became a matter of great interest to McNamara, as well as to all of us, and we worked out a project, which became one of our key objectives for the two years I was in office, called "Project 100,000." The objective was to take in at least that many category four recruits during the period, but to apportion them among the services in a wise way so that the Air Force got its fair share, which I believe was around 10 percent. The Army got a lesser share than it would otherwise have gotten. Instead of 25 to 30, it went down to 18 to 20. At the same time we worked on all the supporting requirements, such as boot training, to make sure that we had the capacity to accommodate that kind of intake. We didn't just order a program into effect; we kept working on how to make it effective. In my weekly meetings with McNamara, which continued in that new capacity, this was always number one on my agenda. He wanted to know where we stood, how many we had taken in, and what our success rate was turning out to be. We got into things like developing better reading training for the new recruits. It was
a fascinating period, and led to another project called "Project Transition." As the recruits began to finish their term of duty, we then were told by McNamara and the President, "We want to help these people get back into private life. We've given them a start here in the military, and even if they didn't pass the test too well, let's help them back into private life."

Those were very key objectives. There were all kinds of other interests that were taking place during that period in the manpower field. The reserve affairs area tended to be one; the interest on the Hill; pay and medical benefits; the interests of the women, who were then really coming into their own. We had to usher through the Congress the bill that created the first lady generals, Jean Holm and company. We took a lot of interest in problems of this type, but they were quite different from the business management problems of the logistical period.

Matloff: The manpower problems were primarily those involved with the Vietnam conflict, I take it.

Morris: Those whose priority was increased out of the Vietnam conflict. We would have had some of these other problems anyhow, but Vietnam certainly made them more pressing.

Matloff: In the Manpower post, how much of your staff was civilian, and how much military?

Morris: First, I ought to say that Systems Analysis had impacted the Manpower office, and did so upon the beginning of my tenure, by taking away from that office its former concern with requirements. We got out of the business of
defining requirements and into the business of execution again—the recruiting, training, assigning, compensating, housing, etc., of our forces. That was our major interest, both military and civilian—more like a personnel office would be in a major company. We were a much smaller office than logistics. The number that sticks in my head is on the order of 150, maybe that's a little bit high. As to the military, my first action was to get a three star general assigned to me as my deputy—Jim Lampert, whom I had worked with and was at West Point running the academy, a fantastically able gentleman. He was known to me and to Cy Vance, who was then Deputy. I had more military presence in the manpower office relative to its size than I had had in logistics, as a matter of fact. With an overall deputy, I had a staff under another general for military manpower policy, a staff under a civilian director for civilian manpower policy, and at that time I also had a deputy for medical affairs, who was a civilian. We had all of the medical side of things, as well as manpower. We had reserve affairs responsibilities, and I had a military man in charge of that. We were responsible for the JAG function and for the women in uniform function. We had everything concerned with manpower in the broad sense. It has been split into three assistant secretariats today, with manpower, reserve affairs, and medical.

Goldberg: For a while, you remember, they combined manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics. What did you think of that?

Morris: I'm sorry that you asked. Harold Brown asked me before he did it—I had known Harold quite well—whether it was feasible. I told him, having had both jobs and having run the two together for a short period, it could be
done. Harold went away and got it done, but he did it, I'm afraid, in the wrong way, and it was a tragedy. They are still suffering from it. The problem is that it is very difficult to choose an assistant secretary who has an equal interest and capability in both areas, so you end up giving undue attention to one and insufficient to another. That's what has happened, I'm afraid.

Matloff: Were your working relationships in this post different in any way from what they had been in the other capacity?

Morris: I brought the same style into manpower and immediately started the breakfast meetings with my counterparts in the services, both civilian and military. We frequently had retreats in places like Fort Ritchie, where we would go away for a weekend as a team and talk about the problems we were mutually wrestling with.

Matloff: How about your dealings with OSD? Were they any different in this capacity? for example, dealings with McNamara or Vance?

Morris: No, they were exactly the same, and I think I fared much better than my predecessor, Norm Paul, who has since passed away. Norm was a fine lawyer, but I'm afraid he had very small feel for the nuances of the manpower job.

He was a good generalist, but not well suited for that job.

Matloff: Any differences in your dealings with your counterparts in the services?

Morris: No, we had excellent relationships with all four, particularly with the Marine Corps.

Matloff: Any closer dealings with the JCS in this capacity than in the I&L post?

Morris: No. Again, the same kind of environment seemed to exist in those days. The JCS looked to the selective service system and the manpower side
of the house to get these jobs done for them. We had more dealings with people like Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp during the Vietnam period on their requirements and how we could best help them satisfy them.

Matloff: How about with Congress, were there any problems that arose in connection with manpower?

Morris: Congress had a terrific interest in the draft, so that relationship was very keen, particularly on the House side. They were always interested in things like military pay and benefits. The women in uniform issue was another interest. I would say that there was a lot of congressional interest, but it was less intense and more benign, more friendly and less critical. We got along very well indeed.

Matloff: I take it that you were not drawn in any more on problems of strategic planning in this position than in the previous one?

Morris: No, our job was to supply the trained troops on time, on schedule, and on request. We looked on ourselves again as the executers of the monthly draft requirements we got from the services. We were the conduit to the selective service system. It was up to us to be sure that boot camps were ready to accept them and then to work on any manpower-related problems in Vietnam. My very first little issue, I recall, coming into that office, was the black market problem with post exchange merchandise in Saigon. McNamara shot me over one weekend without any preparation to dig into that problem, which I did, with Westmoreland himself. I think that we overcame the problem pretty quickly; we just cleaned it up. It was a hell of a problem. It was that kind of response. Later in the Vietnam period we got into more
serious, longer-term efforts, such as the need for PURA, Pacific Utilization and Rehabilitation Agency, a sort of a war assets approach of taking out of Vietnam vehicles, motors, and equipments that still had useful life—instead of junking them in Vietnam, to pull them back where they could be repaired and refurbished and made available, either in-country or to others. That was the kind of problem that we worked on.

Goldberg: Is it your impression that the Vietnam War probably exercised a more corrupting influence—I mean financial—than either the Korean War or World War II on the people in Vietnam, military and civilian?

Morris: I would have no basis for making that judgment at all. I didn’t feel that corruption was a big problem. The black market thing was really a nuisance problem. What had happened, at least the problem that we were sent over to solve—we had no women in Vietnam, and that created problems like it has done today with the Marines in Moscow. The troops would go into the PXs and buy things like hair spray.

Goldberg: What do you mean by no women?

Morris: No American women in uniform at that time, and families were not sent out; they stayed at home. The troops were lonely. The thing that set McNamara off was that we found we had sold 75,000 cans of hair spray in one month in Saigon through the post exchange system and we had no females over there. I had to go over and find out how to get rid of it, and we quit sending hair spray.

Goldberg: I asked that question because of the extent of the corruption among the Vietnamese themselves at the time—the government, the military,
the civil populace—how could it not have affected the Americans? I know of American civilians who were greatly affected by it.

Morris: This is an area that I just have no feel for, I’m sorry.

Matloff: How about the impact of systems analysis on manpower problems? Was there anything more that you want to add on that score?

Morris: I don’t think that this created any problems for us. They didn’t get involved at all in our Project Hundred Thousand and our work on draft policy, and didn’t want any part of them. We were able to work with a gentleman named Bill Brehm, who now runs his own business and does a lot of work in the Pentagon. He was a systems analysis expert on manpower requirements and a splendid person to work with.

Goldberg: He came back later as Assistant Secretary for Manpower.

Morris: That’s correct.

Matloff: What role did you play in this capacity in connection with the Defense budget?

Morris: We had virtually no role in respect to the budget, since that requirement had been taken over by systems analysis. We did get into things like the medical benefits program; hospital construction was always high on our list of inputs to the annual budget. Military pay was a responsibility of our office. We conducted the first quadrennial review of military pay, which Congress required and headed up the task forces that did this work. But we really had little direct input to the budget.

Matloff: The McNamara period is always identified with the controversy over the plan for reorganizing the reserves and merging them with the National Guard. Were you drawn in on that question?
Morris: That controversy had occurred before my watch, fortunately. If it had come up on my watch, I think I would have had sense enough to fight against the simplistic notion that those two organizations might be combined, because their traditions and culture obviously meant that that was not the case. And it is not the case today, I think. On the other hand, there was the Reserve Forces Policy Board (that still exists today), a very active and esteemed group of people that met quarterly. We were always involved with them and always listened to things that concerned them and tried to assure communication with McNamara or his deputy. They had suffered from inadequate communication and there was a tension there that we worked on.

Matloff: In connection with Vietnam, was your office drawn into such questions as the impact of the draft on different sectors of American society, problems of deferment, race relations, and drug use and abuse within the military?

Morris: Yes. The primary involvement was this category 4 project One Hundred Thousand Project. This was of direct impact on the Army and the Marine Corps, where they were having to take the dregs of those who took the Armed Forces Qualification Test, because the category 1, 2, and 3 folks were more prone to go on a volunteer basis to the Air Force and to a great extent to the Navy, leaving the Army and Marine Corps to take what was left, so to speak. Project 100,000 was designed to equalize the distribution of the mental groups among all the services and also to improve our capability to utilize all levels of intellect and culture, so to speak, and to avoid the overdoing of the race relations problem. The other very interesting problem was open housing, where we began to have all kinds of difficulties around our bases, particularly
in the south, with landlords who didn't rent to black tenants. This was unsatisfactory to Johnson and to McNamara, and they decided to declare landlords who acted like that off limits. They turned over to me the problem of working out the strategy of getting it done, which was mainly a congressional strategy; no one else was going to object. We did it.

**Goldberg:** In the earlier years, didn't Adam Yarmolinsky work on those problems also?

**Morris:** Yes, he was always involved in areas like this. He was one of the very effective quiet men around McNamara on any sticky issue.

**Matloff:** On the fact that the reserves were not called up, did McNamara ever discuss this question with you?

**Morris:** He had a very simple philosophy, at least when it was expressed, and that was that if we called up the reserves, the law said they could only be called for a maximum of two years. McNamara's view was: if we call them, we spend them, and we don't have reserves left unless we get the law changed, so it's much better that we keep the reserves in reserve. This was the philosophy that he and Johnson kept espousing. I had no basis for challenging that; it sounded logical. But the reserves themselves were very resentful of this and felt that they were not being used for the purpose for which they existed. With hindsight, if we had another problem today, I think we would give serious thought to different approaches. We should make better use of the reserves. I'm not sure if we should call them up en masse, but their skill, motivation, and dedication needed more application than it got.

**Goldberg:** We would have to call them up. We don't really have a draft.
Morris: That is the other aspect of the issue. My personal view is that you would have to go back to the draft.

Goldberg: That would take some time, though.

Morris: If it's being kept in standby, as it should be, it could be reactivated in a matter of a few months, I would think. In the Vietnam period we would have draft calls that would range from a low of a few thousand in a month up to fifty thousand. You just can't possibly do that through normal recruiting mechanisms.

Matloff: In connection with NATO, was your office drawn into any of the problems of manpower in that respect?

Morris: Not really.

Matloff: How about in the Dominican Operation, 1965-66, was your office consulted at all?

Morris: No. Cy Vance tended to be the action person, as I recall, on those problems.

Matloff: Were you drawn in on the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967?

Morris: No.

Matloff: How would you compare your service in this post with that in I&L—any similarities or differences, as you look back on it?

Morris: In the overall, in the sense of how I performed as a member of a management team, it would be pretty much the same. The problems were quite different, and the type of staff I had tended to be quite different—not quite as professional in the sense of being experts in the subject areas. And it was a war period, which made it more exciting, under a great deal more
pressure. On balance, I think the effectiveness of the contribution of the first four years was far greater because of the atmosphere, the opportunity, McNamara was able to give us such great support, and with such favorable press and congressional support.

Matloff: What would you regard as the major achievements of your term as Assistant Secretary for Manpower?

Morris: I think getting the services working together again and resolving the problems that we were faced with in terms of draft, the use of minorities, and so on, and the successful completion of the Women in Uniform legislation, which triggered off the progress since that time. We got the CHAMPUS program accepted on the Hill and rolling. I enjoyed the medical relationship. The Surgeons General were a great team, incidentally. I would have them together as a group with frequency. They would go to Vietnam as a group with my Deputy, Dr. Fisk. They were wonderful people to work with.

Matloff: After having served four years as Assistant Secretary of Defense for I&L and then a stint in the Manpower post, you returned to the post of Assistant Secretary (I&L) from '67-'69. What led to this appointment?

Morris: The gentleman who had been selected to become Secretary of the Navy was killed in an air crash, and Mr. McNamara chose Paul Ignatius, who had succeeded me in the I&L post in '64, to become Secretary of the Navy in that last year of his term of office. He decided to put me back in logistics since I knew the game, and Vietnam was so important. Obviously, I did what he wanted. I did suggest to him one day, and he turned me down, that he let me have both jobs for that last year, but he felt that was unwise.
Matloff: How did that second term differ from the first, in terms of role and problems you faced?

Morris: It was less a period of innovation. The first had been a period of new initiatives, the cost reduction program and its many objectives, with a lot of enthusiasm for that kind of achievement. In that last year we still had the cost reduction program but it was then a very mature program and it was reaching a point where it was time to phase it down and out, as it has been. I was more, I would guess, in a troubleshooting kind of capacity in that last year. We had a change of Secretaries, with Clifford coming in and turning the whole attitude toward Vietnam around, as he did so skillfully. It was more of a job of maintenance during the crisis period.

Matloff: Any great changes in the staff that you had?

Morris: Fortunately, I had the same organization, which Ignatius had kept, and the same key players. Some later left for higher jobs. It was a joy to work with that kind of experienced crew.

Matloff: Did your dealings with Clark Clifford, who was only in from March 1968 to January 1969, differ in any way from those with McNamara?

Morris: First, in terms of access and communication, they were the same. Clark was a wonderful man to work with. His interests were totally different. He was there to work on the Vietnamization problem, and we helped him do that. I did see him on the same weekly basis, or his deputy—he more frequently would have Paul Nitze see me than himself. He had much less interest in the business side of the house, but I think that he was just the right man at the right time.

Matloff: Does that mean that you were dealing more with Nitze than you had with the predecessor Deputy Secretaries?
Morris: It's hard to make a comparison, because they were all such great people, and Nitze was there throughout the entire period—the first McNamara term in ISA, then into the Deputy role when Vance left, and Secretary of the Navy in between. The three deputies I worked with were different kinds of people. Vance was a real generalist, an excellent lawyer, and he knew this town. He and McNamara were a great team. Nitze is a tremendous intellect. He understands international relations better than anyone. Gilpatric was a good generalist, an attorney who had prior background in the Air Force. He tended to have a lesser impact on the logistic side of the equation than any of the three, and less interest in it, perhaps. But a wonderful person in all other respects.

Matloff: Did you run into any new problems relating to manpower, weaponry, or logistics in general, in this capacity?

Morris: I think not.

Matloff: How about in the area of foreign problems and crises? Aside from Vietnam, were you consulted in connection with any others? This was the period of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Pueblo incident, in 1968?

Morris: No, we really were pretty much in the same role we had been throughout the '60s. The Canadian program was of interest to us. Gibson and his folks attended the NATO meetings, but we were not involved in any decision-making way in these emergencies and incidents.

Matloff: How about the role of the French in NATO, one foot in, one foot out, on the military integration side, particularly the impact on logistics in the alliance? Did this have any repercussions on the activities of your office?
Morris: Not that I recall. If there were any, it would have been in Gibson's area, and they were not surfacing to the Secretary through me.

Matloff: About Vietnam—this was a period when American sentiment against the war was rising and disillusionment with it was growing. Were you aware of any disillusionment with it by Mr. McNamara or other OSD officials?

Morris: It would be unfair for me to do much speculating. It was apparent that McNamara was getting tired. He had been under such extraordinary pressures. I guess there has been lots of writing about how he was counseling the President and others in those days. I thought that Clifford was able to cast more light and more common sense on the real nature of the problem, when he came aboard at that point, than we had had in quite a while. There was pending, when he arrived, another request from Westmoreland for 275,000 additional troops, and that was a matter of great contention and concern to all of us as to whether it was the right thing to do, and we certainly lacked the policy expertise to have much voice. Clifford got the facts together and turned the whole thing around.

Matloff: Were you drawn in on that issue?

Morris: Not really.

Goldberg: What was your feeling about it at the time?

Morris: I think that I was delighted with the decision that Clifford got, if we weren't willing to go in all-out and clean the matter up. Poor Westmoreland was kept in a very untenable position. I thought that Abrams was a good successor to him. It would be great if you could interview Westmoreland.

Matloff: Had your own views undergone any transition toward the war in Vietnam?
Morris: I have no real mature views that are worth expressing. I thought the way in which the logistical support aspects were handled, including construction out there, and in the manpower training that we did good work. I was proud of that record. I don’t think that it has been well documented, or that we’ve learned good lessons from it.

Goldberg: It’s been alleged that the success of McNamara and his people, including you, laid the groundwork for a real global logistics system that made it possible to wage war in Vietnam over such long supply lines, and logistically, at any rate, so successfully. What’s your view on that?

Morris: I think, looking back, I would want to agree with that, and I would hope people like Paul Ignatius would give you their views. The Vietnam challenge was a tremendous one from a logistics point of view, and I think it was quite well executed. Is the name General Joe Heiser familiar to you? He was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Logistics and then he went out at one point as Westmoreland’s deputy for logistics in-country. He’s still very active around town. I think the capability and the responsiveness, in terms of the right supplies at the right places at the right time, were superior. We were able, through DSA’s good offices, to respond to the needs for good clothing, subsistence, fuel, and such supplies. DSA made its contribution to that event. General McNamara could give you some good assessments of this.

On the construction side, where we put a coalition of civilian construction firms together, with my office or Ignatius’s office having quite a heavy hand, that was very successful. In terms of those measures, I think we were better prepared.
Goldberg: Do you think that the response could have been as successful and immediate if it had to take place on 20 January 1961 instead of in June 1965?
Morris: I feel there's no question but what we were far better prepared in 1965. We had the services working together, among other things, and that was an extremely important fact.

Goldberg: The corollary of all of this is, of course, if there are people who say if we had not been so well prepared to do it in June 1965, we might not have done it.
Morris: That could be another way to look at it.

Matloff: A general question about the job of Assistant Secretary as you found it—how would you describe a typical day, or week? How many hours did you have to spend on this job, and what pressures did it introduce for you?
Morris: This is going to vary with individual styles and with the bosses that happened to exist from time to time. We worked extraordinarily hard, a good 70-80 hours a week on the job in the Pentagon. McNamara never demanded that we do this, but he set such high goals, tight deadlines, and great challenges, and was so able to provide the incentive of appreciation when we did good work and did it timely, that it was a joy to respond that way.

Goldberg: How did he show his appreciation?
Morris: In all kinds of little but important ways. When I left the office in 1964, he gave me a little silver cigarette tray, with an inscription on it, "To my most important assistant," or something like that, "in my first four years." Something totally unexpected. He didn't have a ceremony with a roomful of people. He just called me into his office and said, "I want you to have
this." I knew he had bought it at Tiffany’s, because when we went up to see Rockefeller and Kennedy on closing the Brooklyn Navy Yard just a few days before, he had gone into Tiffany’s and bought something. He was that kind of a person. He would buzz you on the hot line once or twice a year and say something complimentary. His acceptance of our ideas, which we took to him weekly, and his support of the things we were trying to do; the way he would do his homework on our cost reduction exhibits. We put together press conferences with 50 exhibits, big boards, before and after competition, gold plating, and so on. He would literally get up personally and explain these examples, which Ignatius and I had put together for him. That kind of leadership was an inspiration. He involved the Presidents—Kennedy, Johnson—in the very beginning in all of these things, and got their interest and support.

Matloff: For purposes of symmetry and balance, in your second term as Assistant Secretary (I&I), what did you regard as your major achievements?

Morris: I think just keeping the office intact and supportive of the change of the Secretary and the change in the course of events in Vietnam, and meeting the challenges that all that brought to bear. I mentioned the air munitions control, for example, which was indicative of the office in those latter years.

Matloff: Were you brought into the problems of military aid to foreign countries? Were you ever consulted on issues involved in that?

Morris: That was an ISA problem. My staff through Gibson worked with ISA as needed.

Matloff: Nothing on arms control or disarmament?

Morris: No.
Matloff: We've come to the last major area, the perspectives that you have on OSD management and organization. I know that it's a matter that is very close to your heart. Do you see the need for further changes in the structure or working relations at the top levels, say the role of the SecDef, JCS, between the services and OSD, or the roles of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense?

Morris: After the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols bill and the four studies that are now in process of OSD, and the five studies of the joint agencies—I think there are far too many studies going on. I personally feel that you could replicate the McNamara kind of environment, culture, and leadership with current statutes whenever you can bring the right team together. The things that made him so successful, as I've tried to say in that little article I sent along, was choosing his team, getting that team to work on a group of new initiatives from day one, with tight deadlines, good feedback and communication, and heavy involvement of OSD with the services in getting things done. The problem with OSD in the '50s, and, I'm afraid, in the '80s, has been that it likes to issue directives; it likes to lay out new initiatives and just assume everybody is going to figure out how to make them come true. The thing we learned in the '60s was that you've got to work as a team. You've got to share ideas and experiment together, and make the most successful things go. OSD isn't all-wise, to sit there and dictate solutions to problems.

Goldberg: But the military, during the 1960s, thought that they were being dictated to by McNamara, didn't they?

Morris: The requirements people did. I think that if you went to the logistics folks, like Joe Heiser, they would feel just the opposite—that they were part
of a team effort that was highly successful. And the manpower folks, I hope, would tell you the same thing.

Goldberg: The requirements people were the ones who carried the real weight and power in the main in the services. Hasn't that generally been so?

Morris: Properly, the requirements people are most close to the real military capabilities in the sense of weaponry, but logistics is always a support function. It's there to help get the supplies, maintenance, communication, and transportation jobs done to assist the military leadership. We did not look on ourselves as leaders of the military leadership. The systems analysis folks did, and that was what was resented. And I understand why.

Netloff: This is a good point at which to ask you some of your impressions of top officials with whom you worked. On McNamara, the charge is made in some quarters that he sacrificed morale and personal relations for efficiency and swift decision-making; that he brusquely shrugged off military tradition and advice. Would you buy that? Is that a fair charge?

Morris: I think that it's probably only partly true, and undoubtedly it happened from time to time. McNamara is a person of extraordinarily high standards, both in respect to what he personally does and to what he expects of others. He is not content with superficial responses and self-serving. To give you an example, I had to go out to look at an old facility in Cleveland, Ohio, the first year I was in office. Elvis Stahr was Secretary of the Army. He was undoubtedly a great university president and a great scholar and leader, but he and McNamara were totally non-communicative. McNamara didn't trust Elvis, I must tell you. Elvis looked on himself as a proponent for the Army, more like Lehman has in recent times for the Navy. I came
back from Cleveland and reported to Mr. Stahr what we had seen out there. He sat down and scribbled a note to McNamara and said, "Go give this to your boss. I think we ought to keep that facility open." I took the note to McNamara and he looked at it and threw it in the wastebasket with complete disdain. McNamara didn't feel that Stahr had weighed the facts, nor that he was giving him [McNamara] more important facts to weigh. McNamara was a person who didn't have much patience with people that he didn't think were doing their work properly. But from my point of view and that of the people I worked with, he showed nothing but courtesy, help, and supportiveness that made our work delightful.

Goldberg: How about his relationship with Connally?

Morris: John wasn't there very long. From where I sat and what I observed, it was OK. John was one of the political appointees that had been brought in by Johnson. I found him a very intelligent man. He went on with important work as Secretary of the Treasury. He wasn't quite as businesslike and devoted as McNamara was, but it was a far better relationship than that with Stahr. Zuckert, I thought, was excellent. Of course, he brought a background of previous service in Defense; it made him sophisticated.

Goldberg: He wasn't entirely happy with the job. He always got caught between the Air Force people and McNamara.

Matloff: I read your piece on McNamara with great interest. It raised a question in my mind which apparently has crossed your mind, too. It is the question of why didn't the reforms of management introduced in Defense work as well in the wartime period as in the peacetime period?
Morris: I'm not sure to what extent the reforms didn't work. I think the initiatives toward reform had to be laid aside, so to speak, in the war period. That happened in World War II. I was in the Navy Headquarters during that period, and observed the same thing happening there. Congress even outlawed the use of formal advertising in World War II.

Matloff: Perhaps I should rephrase that. Why didn't they have as effective an impact on the problems of the war as they had in the first three years of the McNamara administration?

Morris: A good point. Let me give you a sort of philosophy. I think that in time of war and real emergency, the military has got to be dominant, responsive to the President and the Secretary. But the civilian element, as it was in World War II in the Navy where I sat, was in there to support the military. They were there to do the business side of the job. We invented two terms in the Navy, one was "consumer logistics," the other was "producer logistics." Admiral King was responsible for consumer logistics. He stated the requirements. The rest of us worked on producing and meeting those needs. I think that is right, and any system of management that doesn't recognize the superiority of the military mind in background and training in wartime is wrong. You can't bring in civilians and expect them to do an adequate job.

Matloff: How permanent a legacy do you think McNamara left in the Defense Department's organization and management?

Morris: It's hard to know, but I think the PPBS system is one thing that, at least in good part, has survived and been an important contribution. I think that we made a lot of strides in refining logistics in terms of the DLA-type effort, better maintenance practices, and more productivity of our maintenance
forces—management refinement, so to speak. What seems to have been lost, with no legacy left, is creating and sustaining that teamwork and interface between OSD and the services, particularly in the logistical and manpower areas, to make them work as a team and not as commander and subordinate. That is not the way that place functions effectively, in my opinion.

Matloff: Would you like to add any more comments on other Secretaries of Defense with whom you served—Clifford, or anybody before?

Morris: I can't do so with real knowledge. I thought that Laird was a very effective person. I almost went to work for him, and am sorry that I didn't. He brought that great knowledge of the Hill, good common sense, and an ability to choose good people, apparently. For example, he brought in Barry Shillito. Clifford, I thought, was a masterful interpreter and student of the problem, with that tremendous skill of communicating to the person he was advising, and getting results. I knew Tom Gates a little bit, and thought he was, on the whole, a good person. Don Quarles and Wilson, whom I knew a little bit, I thought were weak in their top roles. Reuben Robertson as Deputy was good, but he didn't stay long enough.

Matloff: Any other deputies—Gilpatric, Vance, and Nitze?

Morris: Nitze, Vance, and Gilpatric—I would give gold stars to all. They were wonderful people and would fit into any team environment at the Deputy level. I would love to see Vance as Secretary of Defense. I think that he has that breadth and skill.

Matloff: How about the Comptrollers—Hitch, Anthony, Moot?

Morris: I knew them all well. Hitch did a masterful job of introducing PPBS and will go down in history as perhaps one of the great creators. Bob Anthony
was a good successor and effective, but not nearly the substantive person in Defense matters that Hitch had been. I have known Bob Moot since the '50s, when he came out of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. He was brought into OSD and I thought that he did a top flight job as Comptroller. He could go back any day and do the same.

Goldberg: What about McNeil?

Morris: I had an interesting relationship with W.J. McNeil. He was a lieutenant commander over in the old Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Disbursing Division. Forrestal sent us over one day to survey the backlog of unpaid bills in the Navy, and we were told to meet with McNeil. We fell in love with the fellow. He was so imaginative and persuasive. We went back and told Forrestal and within two years McNeil had become an admiral and was financial director of the Navy. I think that he was just one of the world's unusual people. He wasn't perfect at all; he got along well on the Hill, and was very skillful politically. I don't think that I would like to have worked for McNeil in the Pentagon. My impression is that he was kind of a wheeler and dealer. I knew him for a long time.

Goldberg: The people who worked for him liked and respected him. I think what came out was that he was not a wheeler-dealer on the Hill. He followed the same business of being open with the Congress. He apparently was a wheeler-dealer within OSD and DoD.

Morris: That might be a better way to put it. Glen Gibson, whom I admire so greatly, had been with McNeil for a decade. So he would agree with you. I'm sure, and Henry Glass would. But, as I say, I was an admirer of his from the day I first met him. He and Forrestal got along well, and Struve Hensel, another member, and Marx Leva were all a good, small, close-knit group.
Goldberg: John Ohly?

Morris: I didn’t know him as well.

Goldberg: He may have been the best of the lot.

Morris: Could be.

Matloff: Any other Assistant Secretaries—Enthoven, William Bundy, McNaughton, Warnke?

Morris: All fine people. That whole group in the ’60s. There were some that were just fair, like, as I said, Norm Paul, whom I liked very much.

Matloff: Did you deal much with Solis Morwitz, an official in Defense Administration?

Morris: Yes.

Matloff: Any in Defense Research and Engineering—York, Brown, Foster?

Morris: I knew Brown and Pubini quite well, and John Foster. Enthoven and I went to Litton Industries when we left Defense. I stayed the shortest period. They were all fine people. Harold Brown, I think, is an unusual citizen of this country. While he was not the best manager, he was perhaps the best student of the whole problem that they have ever had in that job.

Goldberg: If he had had Laird’s skill, he would have been a remarkable man in that job. Put the two of them together, you would have something.

Morris: That’s exactly right.

Matloff: Did any other officials either in or out of DoD who dealt with national security particularly impress you?

Morris: No names snap to mind. I thought we had on the Hill in those years some very interesting personalities, like Mendel Rivers and Carl Vinson.
"Good old Uncle Carl," as they called him, was just a tremendous statesman. You haven't seen his equal in a long time.

**Goldberg:** What about George Mahon?

**Morris:** Outstanding. Senator Russell—outstanding. Jackson—a tremendous statesman. Their staffs took after them. Russ Blandford, for example, in the House, whom I worked with so much. Frank Sanders, who then came to Defense and became Under Secretary of the Navy. He is still very active—I see him occasionally—a great statesman. I guess it's true that as you get older, you don't quite see the equal of those Chairmen and those staff people in today's scene. You see people without the substance and motivation.

**Goldberg:** They have spent 30-40 years of their lives at it.

**Morris:** I know.

**Matloff:** Are there any other questions dealing with Defense organization and management that we should have asked and haven't?

**Morris:** No, you've done a beautiful job, and I appreciate the opportunity. The one sadness I continue to have is the loss of the spirited communication and partnership or team relationships that existed in the McNamara period, which he supported and aided, although he didn't demand it. Unless that can be returned, I don't think we'll have the effectiveness. Quick in andouters, like Mr. Godwin, Mr. Hicks, and Dr. Costello, all of whom I'm sure are very good people, can't get hold of that place in two years, particularly if you don't have counterpart organizations you can work with in the services.

**Goldberg:** What about relations with the JCS under McNamara? His relations with them, and their attitudes toward him?

**Morris:** I wasn't close to the JCS. He met with them with frequency. I was never privy to how he got along with them. The impression those of us around
the third floor had was that they communicated pretty well. They didn't like some of his decisions. But he worked at the problem; he wasn't at arms length. I don't know if you've looked at this [notebook] or not, but I'll offer it, if you wish. When I did that article on McNamara that was published, it was done as a lecture at a symposium of the Academy of Management. There were a number of us who made talks and were told that we were primarily to analyze why our subject was a great manager and leader. Mine was McNamara. I wrote to 38 people and got replies from most. About 75 percent of them are highly favorable, about 25 percent vary on down to being very unfavorable. Westmoreland refused to answer my letter. Admiral Sharp was not kind at all. One of the Chiefs, Taylor, was not friendly. George Brown, on the other hand, who had been Chairman of the Chiefs and had worked for McNamara, wrote one of the letters with the most lavish praise that I've got in the whole book, bless his heart. Admiral Zumwalt gave me a letter which is very unusually appreciative. Eddie Hebert gave me one that is highly critical of many things, but also expresses great admiration.

Goldberg: We would like to borrow this and make copies, may we?

Morris: I gave it to Deborah Shapley for her book. McNamara knows I did that, and he has seen the letters, even the unfavorable ones.

Goldberg: Was it the feeling in Defense that OSD could get what it wanted from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services in the way of information? That you really could get anything you needed from them? Not just simply for logistics and manpower, but all of OSD?

Morris: I could speak mainly of my areas. I don't know the others that well. In the logistics area I thought that I got superb response from the services.
We got less from the Chiefs, but I didn't feel they were prepared to give us much more or that we needed to impose much more on them. That has changed over time. Bill Brehm has had quite a hand in that; he has talked to me from time to time. In manpower I felt the same way. I would not be at all surprised that you would find the systems analysis counterparts feeling quite differently about this.

Goldberg: That's what I had in mind. And, at the top level, McNamara and Gilpatric. And it's been true since, too, where the Joint Chiefs did not and would not make information available.

Morris: These are things that didn't have much impact on me as I went about my duties. I know Bill Brehm feels that it is terribly important, as the Goldwater bill does, to get those relationships much closer, and I would agree with the importance of that. I think our shops should have had a closer interface with the military planners and more understanding of military plans.

Goldberg: The most reluctant dragons have always been the Navy and the Marines, haven't they, even before the beginning?

Morris: Yes. But the thing that worries me about this bad press we occasionally have been getting these last few years is the lack of public understanding of the greatness of the resources of that Department, particularly its human resources in uniform.

Matloff: Thank you for sharing your insights and recollections with us. We have fulfilled the injunction of many of the people we have interviewed who have said, "Talk to Tom Morris."