Interview with Major William Stout  
Final  
June 23, 2006

Putney: This is an oral history interview with Major William Stout of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency. It is June 23, 2006, and we are in 1777 North Kent Street, the OSD Historical Office. The interviewer is Diane Putney.

Putney: Major Stout, on September 11, 2001, what was your rank and what was your job with the Defense Protective Service?

Stout: I was a lieutenant, and I was assigned to the Anti-terrorism Force Protection Division of the DPS. I was stationed at the Federal Office Building (FOB) 2, the Navy Annex.

Putney: As I understand it, you weren’t at FOB 2 when the plane hit, but you arrived at the Pentagon Reservation very soon after that. Would you describe how you got to the Pentagon, what you saw and heard, and what you did for the first few hours?

Stout: I ended up riding my bicycle in. I was actually supposed to be at work that day but took it off. It was gridlocked around the Pentagon area, they had several roads blocked off all the way up past Glebe Road at Columbia Pike; Washington Boulevard was closed. They were being manned by Arlington police officers and basically you couldn’t get a car through there. I was in Falls Church, and I rode in on my bicycle due to the gridlock and all the cars still in the parking lot of the Pentagon. A lot of folks had abandoned their vehicles; they had gotten to a certain point, got out of their car, and just started walking away from the area. The roads were blocked. When I got to the Pentagon and changed into my uniform, I checked for our marked police Ford Explorer with four-wheel drive—good, for driving over the curbs—and jumped in and drove down the hill to the Pentagon. We had set up a substantial perimeter with our officers. All roads leading to the Pentagon had been closed off, and we were assisting emergency vehicles to get in.
It was real smoky and there was a lot of ash flying around. There was a triage set up underneath the Washington Boulevard overpass at the bottom of Columbia Pike. We had to be careful because we had emergency traffic going through there, but they were still using the lanes closest on the outside underneath the overpass as the triage area. Basically when I had checked in—went “10-41,” which means “in service”—I started assisting our Communications Center trying to help the building get their basic services back on line—phones, and any type of infrastructure issues they were having. I was going out, meeting crews coming in from everywhere—Washington Gas, the phone company, infrastructure services—and getting them in there. We were in Force Condition Delta, meaning nobody was moving around in there unless they were authorized to be there, so I would have to go out and meet them, get a canine to sweep their vehicles, and take them where they needed to go to service the building. The fire was still being fought at that time.

Putney: Did you meet with any of the fire officials? I know they operate under an incident command system. Were you aware of that system and that one of them would be the incident commander and how that would all play out?

Stout: Yes. I ended that day very late and didn’t get home until 3:00 a.m. The next day Mr. [John] Jester, the director of DPS [Defense Protective Service] at the time, assigned me and my boss as the incident commanders. I was the site commander, and my boss Randall Harper, deputy chief of the Pentagon police right now, was the incident commander. As the site commander I was in charge of all law enforcement activities that happened on the crash site itself, and I worked within that incident command structure for Chief [James] Schwartz. He was the operations chief of the Arlington County Fire Department. He worked for Chief [Edward]
Plaugher, who was technically incident commander. It was still in the realm of the fire
department at that time because it was still a firefighting operation.

Putney: What was Randall Harper’s rank at the time?

Stout: He was a captain at the time.

Putney: Chief Jester made him the DPS incident commander and you were the site commander.
Your command system mirrored the firefighter’s incident system but was different. It had a chain
of command.

Stout: When you have multiple agencies working together it turns into a unified command
system; you have a representative of your agency who is part of the unified command and is
helping the unified commander make whatever decisions or do whatever he needs done. In this
case, since it as a firefighting operation, and Arlington County was the primary fire department
down there, it fell under Chief Plaugher and the incident commander he had designated, Chief
Schwartz, who is now the fire chief for Arlington County.

Putney: When Schwartz would have the unified command meetings, who would be there from
DPS? Whenever he had a regularly scheduled unified command meeting would someone from
DPS always be there?

Stout: Yes, and that was me.

Putney: How often did you meet, and was there some key issue that came out of those meetings?

Stout: When Chief Schwartz had his meetings, they more or less dealt with strategy for taking
care of the fire issues, initially, and then it progressed to the search and rescue of the victims.
His meetings were structured around guiding the fire department where it needed to go. We
were there in case he had had any issues with getting things done. As the resident police force
that dealt with the Pentagon, if he needed something or needed help doing something we would
give him guidance or recommendations. If he needed to get his firefighters to a certain point in
the building, they didn’t know the building that well; we would get them there; things of that
nature. He would have a meeting geared toward that; then there were other regularly scheduled
meetings held by the FBI, dealing with the security aspects. The security aspect was that we
needed to be sure that the site was secure, with no additional threats coming on to the site.
Around the clock, we were sweeping all vehicles coming onto the site, making sure that
everyone coming into the site was authorized to be there. We had checkpoints that operated 24
hours a day. There were two perimeters to that site, an outer and inner. The outer was the
perimeter of the old Heliport itself, basically along Route 27, a crescent-shaped area.

Putney: Was there a fence there, too? Plaugher had ordered a fence.

Stout: Yes, we put a fence up, we coordinated that through PenRen. The inner perimeter was to
protect what we could of the crime scene and to make sure that folks going into the inner
perimeter had definite authorization and were given instructions as to what they could and could
not do.

Putney: Were those the people for shoring, people actually going into the impact zone?

Stout: Yes, there were shoring operations, and once the fire was out there were people going in
for search and rescue and remains. There was a time period of about a day and a half where a lot
of congressional folks and senators all wanted to come over and see the site. They wanted to go
close and went right up by the major pile of rubble where the building collapse occurred. At the
security meeting the Bureau talked with us and told us to keep people out of there because it was
a sensitive area and a crime scene. We established that inner perimeter then and put guidelines
in place. Instead of bringing them down on the site we put a flatbed truck up on Rte. 27, on high
ground, and made that the viewing area.
Putney: Was that the same thing done for the family members?

Stout: Yes; legislative affairs actually helped put that in place.

Putney: Who was your main point of contact with the FBI? We talked with Combs.

Stout: He was one of the primary agents;

Putney: And Eberhart—

Stout: Art Eberhart ultimately took over from Schwartz as incident commander once the search and rescue operation transferred to a crime scene.

Putney: Because it was an investigation of a crime, did you have a detective component of DPS that does investigations with the FBI?

Stout: Yes. They work with the FBI as well as OSI, the Air Force investigation people. The FBI has jurisdiction over this type of terrorist event, so they just assisted where they were needed.

Putney: Would they have actually been in on the searching for the evidence within the building?

Stout: I believe they were, but I don't know to what extent. I can give you names of persons who could tell you: Agent David Mann, or Agent Frederick Shull.

Putney: These are DPS personnel?

Stout: Yes, they are criminal investigators.

Putney: For looking for evidence, DPS would have relied on them to interface with the FBI for that? You are more at the command and control level, working with Harper, correct?

Stout: Correct.

Putney: Would Harper go to those meetings with you?

Stout: Occasionally he would.
Putney: But you were always there, and you would report to him about what needed to be done, coming from that meeting.

Stout: Yes.

Putney: To control access, I know there was a badging system and prior to that some effort to wristband, can you explain how that was set up and how that worked?

Stout: It was interesting. This was all new territory to us, obviously. An event of such magnitude and a huge firefighting operation and the building still on fire and Mr. Rumsfeld saying we were not closing down our operation—we had people coming to work in a burning building. That was an interesting dynamic. When you have a situation like that you just have to try to get a handle on it and start tightening down your security in steps, from the perimeter on in. We got to our perimeter, the crescent-shaped Heliport area, and at one time we had about 3,000 people out there, doing one thing or another—search and rescue people standing by, firefighters—and basically the rule of thumb was that if they had firefighter equipment on they just came right in. As we started tightening down we had second thoughts and needed to be sure everyone out there was who they said they were. We were at a crossroads. We had to clear the site, so to get everybody off quick we said we had a bomb threat and needed to clear the site. We didn’t actually have one. We cleared everybody off the site, manned up all our entrance points, and started bringing everybody back in. We had representatives that we knew were legitimate—Arlington fire, military personnel that worked for the clinic, OSI, FBI—and at our checkpoints we put a band on them. We had a color code system, red for firefighter, blue for law enforcement, maybe green or yellow for the military, etc., because everyone had on different clothing, things of that nature, and weren’t readily identifiable.

Putney: This was your first attempt at badging, or credentialing?
Stout: Yes, the very first attempt. It worked out well, because we did find a few people who didn’t belong there. Basically, they were citizens who just wanted to help. I appreciated the gesture.

Putney: Would they have had something on that made it look like they belonged, a fireman’s outfit, etc?

Stout: As a matter of fact, later on we found a couple of folks who had brought their own equipment. One man brought a big ATV, a six-wheeler, with lights on it, emergency equipment all over it. You would think he certainly would be working for somebody. But it was his personal stuff, he didn’t work for anybody. He had a lot of firefighting equipment and was just in there helping.

Putney: So initially these people you found were not misrepresenting themselves, but they just wanted to help.

Stout: Correct. They just came onto the site. And this man obviously got by because he had a six-wheel ATV with all that equipment. But when you start to tighten down you find these things out. Next, we had our badge people switch the bands to a badge that said “Heliport site” on it. Our problem was we didn’t have the technology or staff at that time to generate these things fast enough. Art Eberhardt and the FBI said they would bring the Secret Service in to do the badging operation. We had two types of badges, a white badge for the outer perimeter, on the site itself—

Putney: Bounded by Rte 27.

Stout: Correct. Through the security checkpoints. There was a red badge to get into the inner perimeter.
Putney: That would be right on the Heliport by the collapsed portion and actually into the building.

Stout: Right, the crime scene itself.

Putney: Did the bands not last because there were not enough of them?

Stout: They were just plastic bands and didn’t provide a photo ID.

Putney: So it wasn’t that there weren’t enough of them.

Stout: We did run out initially, but we were able to get some additional ones.

Putney: So you went to the badging system because it was a better ID system.

Stout: Correct. A photo ID helped us check each person’s identity; a band would not serve that purpose.

Putney: When did you start the banding?

Stout: The banding was done on the morning of the 12th.

Putney: You asked everybody to leave on the 12th? There had been other bomb threats.

Stout: There was a lot of stuff going on. We had a report that at Fort Myer some pick-up truck drove up and people in the back jumped up and started shooting machine guns. It never happened; I don’t know where that came from. There was an explosion downtown at one of the DoD warehouses or something, some batteries blew up, and everyone initially thought it was an attack. There were a lot of wild reports coming in. The fire was still going on and we needed to clear the site out and get it back, but we had to do something because we didn’t know if the enemy was in there with us. We decided to call a bomb threat to get everyone out.

Putney: What time was that on the 12th?

Stout: Probably around 9:00 or 10:00 a.m.

Putney: You coordinated this with Eberhardt, Harper, and Chief Jester?
Stout: Yes. I did a lot of coordinating the security piece with Agent Bob Blecksmith. He was the assistant agent in charge under Eberhardt.

Putney: You didn’t pull the firefighters from the building, did you?

Stout: No, we knew they were OK, because they were under the command and control of Chief Schwartz. We were concerned about the folks standing around on the site, not really doing anything. The firefighters engaged with the fire never came off, but we needed to find out who the folks out here were.

Putney: Did you intend to have the two different color badges from the beginning, or did you issue them and then realize you still wanted to have more control?

Stout: That progressed from the Heliport one, and they couldn’t make them fast enough. We just kept on with that system until the Secret Service came and set up their operation. We initially made the white badges. Did you ever get one of those? I can get you one.

Putney: I’d like to send it to one of the museums; the service historians collected things like that. The Army’s building a big museum, the Navy has a museum, and they were looking for stuff like that.

Stout: I have some other stuff, too.

Putney: Do you have an extra band?

Stout: Yes, I can give you one of those, too. When the Secret Service got there and set up their operation we started with the white bands and realized we needed to set up an inner perimeter to protect the crime scene. That’s when Blecksmith and Eberhardt said we needed a separate badge for that because the officers protecting that perimeter needed to have some very distinguishable ID; they made it a red one. I’ll bring in a red and white one.
Putney: That's separate, then, from Tent City. Can you describe what that was and when it sprang up and security considerations regarding that whole phenomenon?

Stout: Tent City went up pretty quickly. We put the fence around 27 and got the outer perimeter secured. Then basically all entities in the units coming in for support, like the search and rescue people, the [New] Mexico, the Tennessee, Montgomery County, etc., would come to me and we would ask them what they had and how big an area they needed, and we would coordinate getting all their vehicles swept by the dogs to make sure they were safe before they came in and they would come in and set up all their stuff. Tent City was basically all the supporting elements assisting in whatever facet needed. We had tents for evidence recovery teams from the FBI bringing out airplane parts and whatever they considered evidence.

Putney: Tent City wasn't a part of the credentialing system, so someone working, let's say, for the Outback Steak House, wouldn't get a wristband or a badge, but to get into South Parking they would show some kind of ID?

Stout: If they were out in the parking lot they would show ID but not get a wrist band or badge. We made sure that everybody coming in to set up part of that operation was legit.

Putney: The soldiers doing evidence and remains recovery said that [having Tent City] was a morale booster. But I could see that from a security viewpoint you had all those extra people coming in. Was there a second fence placed close to the building for the red badge people?

Stout: No, we lined it with police tape. They had equipment moving in and out of there all the time so a fence would get in the way. We identified them at the entry points, the officers stationed around that area would stop anyone who approached.

Putney: If someone is at Route 27 trying to get through the outer perimeter, how many entry points did you set up?
Stout: There were 5 gates (entry points), 2 near the building that were not used except for the main recovery folks. The primary entrances were at 2, 3, and 4. Gate 3 and gate 2 were the primary vehicle entrances.

Putney: I have a map here. This is the outer perimeter.

Stout: Right. The Outback, the Baptist gentlemen from Louisiana, etc., were all back here. This was called Camp Unity.

Putney: This inner perimeter red badge area—

Stout: Was right here. The gates were here, here, there, and here, and gate 5 was here. These two were the primary vehicle entrances; 3 was where the gators,* work trucks, would come in; 2 was the primary construction entrance and exit for hauling out rubble and sifting through it, they would go out into North Parking here.

Putney: So they were actually on Rte. 27 to go over to North Parking?

Stout: Yes. There was two-way traffic from North Parking.

Putney: Anything coming there was screened by canines?

Stout: Yes.

Putney: On September 12th in the morning when people were coming back were there still a lot of employee cars on the lot?

Stout: Yes, all of them.

Putney: People couldn’t pull them out.

Stout: I think I have some old maps depicting the gates.

Putney: That would be helpful. Graphics came up with some charts to help people figure out who was located where, because somebody coming on base needed to know to whom to report. On that morning there was a report of an unidentified plane coming, and the people at the JOC

* Gator Utility Vehicle, a cross between a pickup truck and all-terrain vehicle.
tried to get the word out that it was friendly, but there was a breakdown in communication. Do you remember that incident? Did people have to evacuate?

**Stout:** There were a few of those. We didn’t evacuate. There were some questions back and forth between unified command and the JOC about that, but we did not evacuate.

**Putney:** You spent most of your time outdoors, then?

**Stout:** Yes.

**Putney:** Did you have a command post set up somewhere?

**Stout:** Yes, right here, inside gate 3.

**Putney:** Did you get a tent?

**Stout:** Yes, the next day. The tent went up pretty quickly, I’m not sure who supplied it. Lt. Jason Bauer could tell you that—he was the logistics guy. It worked out OK, except we couldn’t run laptops, dust got into them and phffttttsh. We eventually rented a Winnebago; that worked out better.

**Putney:** Did that become routine? The main issue there was getting control, and once you had the credentialing down did you feel better? It took a few days.

**Stout:** Yes. Getting the gates open and operating like we wanted them to took a week or so, because before we could get vehicles in there we had to get gravel laid, access roads built. PenRen came in and did all that, in order to be able to handle the heavy equipment coming in there.

**Putney:** The state police—they had a role that first day, closing roads, etc. Who was your point of contact with the Virginia police? Did you have much interaction with them and on what kinds of issues?
Stout: Yes. My primary contact at the time was 1st Sgt. Rick Keevill. He is now our chief of police.* He was our primary contact I had with the Virginia State Police.

Putney: Why did you need to coordinate with them? What kinds of issues did you need their assistance with?

Stout: They were helping us with the outer perimeter, as far as roads, roadways, and things of that nature. If they were at a checkpoint, obviously there were people that needed to get to the building. A Virginia trooper from Tidewater, Culpeper or such wouldn’t know who those people were or what the IDs were for. We would normally put an officer out with a trooper to help screen these folks.

Putney: Would that be similar to your coordination with Arlington County?

Stout: Yes.

Putney: Who would be your point of contact?

Stout: I worked with several folks from Arlington County [Police Department]—Bruce Hackert, a lieutenant, retired now; Lt. Terry Murray [now Captain], he’s still there in their OEM section; Rich Alt, a captain.

Putney: We interviewed Alt. Was there a Lieutenant [Robert] Medairos?

Stout: Yes, he was an intel guy for them.

Putney: Their report said he was their first on-scene commander, and he talked with a DPS officer, and they agreed that the Arlington police would deal with the beginnings of the outer perimeter, and naturally DPS would deal with the grounds of the building. I haven’t been able to identify who that DPS person might be. They don’t identify him either. Do you know who it might be?

* Richard Keevill, currently Chief of the Pentagon Police Directorate.
Stout: Chief Harper could probably answer that. Have you interviewed him? He didn’t work in operations, but he worked up at FOB 2. He was there early and was a captain, so he would have been in a position to do that kind of thing.

Putney: That’s logical, because the Arlington police don’t usually come onto the Pentagon property, and they can do the roads and things like that. Were you there 7:00-10:00 p.m. at night—what were you doing at that point the first night, when it was getting dark? What was happening late at night?

Stout: That first night we were getting lights set up, getting light towers in there.

Putney: So immediately equipment began arriving and you had to coordinate it and check it out.

Stout: Making sure it gets where it needs to go.

Putney: DPS has its own canines. Did you rely on others from around the region?

Stout: At the time, we did, because we didn’t have enough. The state police helped us out tremendously. We had dogs over from the Capitol Police, the Airport Authority.

Putney: They were not just checking out bomb threats, but they were doing the routine work of checking anything coming into that inner area.

Stout: Yes. Any vehicle coming into the perimeter would be swept by canines.

Putney: The RDF [Remote Delivery Facility] was unavailable because it was a temporary morgue, but the people coming back to work needed the ordinary deliveries. Were you aware of what was happening there, too? If they are not using RDF and a regular delivery came, were they allowed to come in, and how was that treated?

Stout: They were using a certain area of the RDF, they had refrigeration trucks back in there, but we were still using part of it.

Putney: So it was never completely closed down.
Stout: No.

Putney: And ordinarily you did check out things, x-rayed them, etc. That continued.

Stout: Yes.

Putney: You just had the new responsibility of the canines and coordinating everything, starting early in the afternoon.

Stout: Yes, that was part of the initial security procedures that we set up as soon as the initial event occurred, and the people exiting the building; the canine sweep started when we started getting the perimeter set up. Obviously, when the first fire trucks got there, there was no sweep of the trucks. But once the perimeter was set up, we swept everything from then on. It’s relatively quick.

Putney: The next day the Maryland National Guard showed up. Who was the point of contact you worked with there? Did you have close cooperation with them?

Stout: Yes.

Putney: Could you describe what kinds of things you and they did together?

Stout: They fell under my command and control, as a site commander. They assisted us in securing the site. We didn’t have enough police officers. We went to two shifts, 6 to 6 and 6 to 6, on 12-hour shifts, but we didn’t have enough police officers to man everything we needed—inside the building as well as outside. We had the site outside as well as all the floors and corridors that needed to be closed on the inside.

Putney: As well as all the workers doing the construction that was going on.

Stout: Right. We had to make sure they didn’t wander into an area they shouldn’t be in. We had to post up all those areas. They assisted us at quite a lot of posts we were manning. We had a staff on the inside that had access from the Center Court area as well. I worked with their
leadership in making sure that if we didn’t get it someone would. It was a team effort, and they worked out great.

Putney: You had the temporary morgue, and the trucks coming and going to Fort Belvoir to the airfield to get the remains up to Dover. Then you had North Parking. Did your span of control include security for North Parking?

Stout: Yes.

Putney: That’s an exposed area, and from Rte. 27 down to Rte. 10 cars go right down there. Did you have that patrolled, because citizens were curious and wanted to see what was going on.

Stout: We had Pen Ren put a fence around that area and put up the blinding so it could not be seen except from high ground or inside. You could not see them sifting through the rubble because they had all the gear on.

Putney: What was the blinding?

Stout: It’s a screen that goes inside the fence. It’s a green material.

Putney: You can see it around the memorial.

Stout: Yes, that’s the same stuff.

Putney: How tall was the fence?

Stout: That fence was 8 feet, I believe, down there.

Putney: If you were on Rte. 27 you could see over there. Was 27 opened up, then?

Stout: No. We didn’t allow any pedestrians up there. If you were on 27 at that time you were part of the operation.

Putney: How long did 27 stay closed?

Stout: A couple weeks, maybe more; it was a long time.

Putney: But there wouldn’t have been civilian traffic on 27 exiting to 110, anyway.
Stout: No, it's closed. The other side of the road was closed for about a week, and then they reopened that side.

Putney: North parking does fall under your purview.

Stout: Yes.

Putney: Later on the regular Army MPs arrived, in mid-September?

Stout: Yes, the unit out of Fort Bragg.

Putney: What kind of coordination did you have set up?

Stout: They came in and assisted us with manning not only the site itself but securing the entire reservation. The primary person I dealt with was Major Robert Byrd, and his boss was Colonel Dennis, out of Fort Bragg.

Putney: And to add to all your security concerns, on the 12th the President came over. That must have made it interesting, also.

Stout: Yes, it did.

Putney: It's just more secret service, kind of routine for the President, but an added security concern.

Stout: Yes.

Putney: Visitors—did they present a challenge?

Stout: We really didn't have any visitors, unless they were being escorted in by someone and needed to be there. They were vouched for if they were a law enforcement entity or construction worker. They were being vouched for by someone we knew that had authorization to be there. The visitors from Congress posed a challenge, because that first few days they wanted to walk out into the area and didn't even have hard hats on. They were walking into the crime scene, which should not happen.
Putney: Did the flatbed with a platform on it help out, for the families?

Putney: We did have a couple of family members come up there and want to go into it, and we had to hold them back. They were losing it; that was tough.

Putney: The families were housed in Crystal City?

Stout: Yes, I believe at the Marriott.

Putney: Was it Arlington County police that would handle the security for that, or were the DPS over there too?

Stout: We were over there with them, we had some representative officers over there to keep an eye on them. The surrounding roadways belong to the Arlington police.

Putney: The folks from out of town doing the shoring and search and rescue were billeted over there too? And the DPS were concerned about their safety, too?

Stout: Yes, at that time we only had around 172 officers, not a whole lot. Our primary focus was on the reservation itself, but if they called to request something we tried to accommodate them. Arlington would help us, too

Putney: DPS had a Swat team at the time. Did you make any recommendations on how it should be used, or how was it used, that day, evening, or the next few days?

Stout: They are part of our special operations, and they had their commanders looking at their deployment. They were doing countersurveillance, making sure nobody was watching us. They were supplemented pretty quickly by the Maryland National Guard. They had some folks that were SRT members for the National Guard, and a lot of those guys, when they were not with the National Guard, were with another police organization—the Maryland State Police, the Baltimore Police, or something like that. So they supplemented our ERT team as well.

Putney: Some of the FOB were up on the roof of the FOB 2?
Stout: Yes, up on the roofs, patrolling around. Early on we had in addition to the Maryland National Guard, some U.S. Marshals from the Special Operations folks, and they brought some ATVs. They were able to scoot around relatively quickly and intercept folks. There were a lot of curious people that walked down into the Pentagon area, and it's a big area to try to seal off. We would try to intercept them and tell them it was off limits and make sure they weren't there doing some kind of surveillance.

Putney: There was that makeshift memorial across from FOB 2. You wanted to allow that outlet for community support. Did you keep that under a watchful eye?

Stout: We patrolled that regularly. It was right here, basically.

Putney: It's as close as you can get just beyond the police line, and it had a great view of the damaged portion of the building.

Stout: People were leaving a lot of stuff up there, and at one point we had to sit on it a lot because people left a lot of money there and there were homeless people wandering around.

Putney: What happened with that, did you donate that to the families? The Vietnam Veterans wall gets all kinds of things left there, and the Park Service had to develop a policy.

Stout: We would occasionally go out and round up all the money and trinkets and turn them over to the Army.

Putney: They would figure out what to do with it. Were you involved with recovering classified documents?

Stout: I helped coordinate that. The primary entity that handles our classified is our security services division. The director at the time was John Pugrud. Mike Copeland was actually on the ground recovering the documents.
Putney: I have dealt with Mike Copeland on contract matters. Were you involved with escorting people into their offices to retrieve personal items and see how badly damaged their offices were?

Stout: My staff didn’t do that, but the guy assisting with that was Randall Peterson, I believe a sergeant at the time. He was on the inside of the building, and that was one of the things he was doing. Mike Nesbitt also assisted with that.

Putney: Were there any radio problems, communication problems, when you were at the site, communicating with Lt Nesbitt in the Comm Center or with your people on patrols?

Stout: No.

Putney: Did the radios work OK?

Stout: Yes.

Putney: Except for when the batteries died.

Stout: Yes.

Putney: Did you have to buy more radios, or did you have a system for recharging them?

Stout: We had charging banks deployed out there. We ultimately got more batteries, I believe, but what we did have to get for our people was cell phones. Sprint, or somebody, came out there and set up a phone tent where they had cell phones that we could sign out. They kept batteries for us, and it was a big help because our radios are good for short periods, but when you are trying to coordinate arrivals or clearances and things of that nature it is better to do it on a phone.

Putney: I believe it was Verizon that brought the phones, and I believe the Secret Service did also.

Stout: Yes, I think they coordinated it.
Putney: Looking back, were there certain lessons learned, recommendations for what to do if it happened again, from this?

Stout: I think the thing from our standpoint that we learned was that our relationships with our neighboring jurisdictions are priceless. Knowing the key players and what they do and the role and responsibility we each have enables us to jump into a unified command system and make it work well. I think the 9/11 Commission report indicated that, for the Pentagon situation. We didn’t have any issues. There were no jurisdictional issues, no infighting, we just all jumped on board and did it. I think that is the biggest light bulb moment I had out there was that the work we do on a daily basis pays off when we have a situation like this happen.

Putney: So the Marine Marathon, for example, teaches you a lot about coordination, and the Army 10 K, things like that?

Stout: Yes, and the Freedom Walk, it crosses multiple jurisdictions. In the Freedom Walk, for example, we walked from the Pentagon down to the Mall, so we had, besides us, the Arlington County Police, the Fire Department. For the medical piece, the U.S. Park Police, because they crossed Memorial Bridge, and the MPD [D.C. Metropolitan Police Department].

Putney: One thing the Arlington County After-Action Report recommended was to continue training exercises. There was Cloudy Office, a chemical exercise, and it mentioned “Abbottsville,” which I guess is a simulated town crisis. But you had not done this Abbottsville before 9/11, had you?

Stout: I don’t believe we did; we did Cloudy Office before 9/11.

Putney: I found quite a bit about Cloudy Office on the Internet; I introduce DPS [in my chapter] describing the DPS mission and that DPS had thought about terrorism.

Stout: Yes.
Putney: Having the blast proof windows installed during the renovation and things like that. DPS was an advocate of that.

Stout: Yes.

Putney: You must have done a lot of coordination with the PenRen people, with all the movement of trucks and things. Who was the main contact out there?

Stout: There was a couple that I worked with: Edwin Pickens, or the sub, who notified PenRen if we needed something right away. The sub works for Fachina the contractor.

Putney: Was Fitzharris on the scene a lot?

Stout: He was out there; he's with PenRen. He was a sub, and he would let me know if gravel, for instance, was available, how quick it could be there, if we needed to do anything. His name was (?)

Putney: It will come.

Stout: I have it written down, I have an after-action report I can send you

Putney: That would be great. There was no serious incident then, a follow-on attack that you thwarted, and nothing else happened, is that correct?

Stout: Nothing else happened.

Putney: We don't know why, maybe they had something else planned, and after they saw all the security there was no follow on attack of some sort. I guess we should ask this just for the record.

Stout: No. When we started tightening down and positively ID-ing everyone on site we did come across some folks who didn't need to be there, but there was no terrorism nexus drawn to that. They were interviewed by the FBI simply because they were on a site where we were dealing with classified material and there would possibly be classified information that they
would be exposed to. They were interviewed by the bureau and released. But that was the extent of it, we didn’t have anything additional.

Putney: Is there anything else that you would like to say, that comes to mind?

Stout: Nick was his name, I’ll get his last name for you. He was the foreman for Fachina, and they did all the shoring operation.

Putney: I’ll send you the transcript, and we will add it in.

Stout: That’s about it. I’m not sure of the hours that we worked, but we worked from 16 hours a day down to 12, and stayed on 12 for 6 or 7 months. The burnout rate was high, because we were only getting one day off. Then we got it up to two days, but nobody complained about it. Everybody wanted to be there.

Putney: That’s what I hear, too, the first responders wanted to be there, and that’s where you need a system to control it, for your own sake, to have accountability.

That should do it, and I will send you the transcript for you to edit. May I e-mail you if I need something clarified?

Stout: Yes.