

The Department of Defense 1947–1997

Organization and Leaders

Roger R. Trask
Alfred Goldberg



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FOREWORD

The past half century has been an age of historic events and forces that have reshaped the world. This constantly changing, unstable world, full of accidents, violence, and the unexpected, at the same time is more interconnected and interdependent than ever before. The United States must be constantly alert, for any change in one part of the world may be viewed as a potential threat to the whole. In such a world, high priority for the nation's security is paramount.

During this same half century the evolution of the Department of Defense has been shaped by its response to the volatile dynamics of the domestic and international scenes. Guided by the policies and decisions of

our civilian and military leaders, the four military services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—and the unified combatant commands that have the ultimate fighting responsibility are the principal guarantors of our security. On this fiftieth anniversary of the Department of Defense it is fitting that we recognize our vital military establishment and the men and women of the armed forces who have served us so well and are so deserving of the respect and gratitude of the nation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "William S. Cohen". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized initial "W".

PREFACE

The Department of Defense is the largest U.S. governmental institution and the ultimate protector of the nation's survival. In its first 50 years it has engaged in wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf area. It has protected U.S. interests in a host of political and military crises—Berlin, Taiwan, Lebanon, Cuba, Grenada, Panama. It has participated in peacekeeping in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and other areas. It has rendered humanitarian assistance to nations and peoples around the globe, including the United States. Most important of all, it carried through the U.S. policy of containment successfully during the Cold War, preserving peaceful coexistence with the Soviet bloc through nuclear and conventional military power and thus helping to bring the Cold War to an end. The Department of Defense has been a “can do” institution that has always responded to the varied challenges of its complex mission.

The Department of Defense dates from 17 September 1947 when the first secretary of defense, James V. Forrestal, was sworn into office. For the first two years of existence after its creation by the National Security Act of 1947, it was known as the National Military Establishment. The act created a new overall U.S. national security structure, with the National Security Council at the apex and including the National Military Establishment, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board. The National Military Establishment, headed by the secretary of defense, included three military departments—Army, Navy, and Air Force—as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other elements. It is clear that the military establishment received special and detailed attention in this legislation because of its important role in making and executing national security policy. The changes in military organization prescribed

in the act were intended to bring about unification of the armed forces through more centralized direction, stronger cohesion, and greater joint effort and mutual support. Amendments to the act in 1949 changed the name to Department of Defense, thereby establishing it as an executive department. After 50 years this national security structure remains essentially intact.

This volume examines the establishment and development of the higher organization of the Department of Defense from 1947 to 1997 and the role of the men who exercised top leadership—the secretaries of defense. Many of the inherent problems of the department over the years had to do with organizational relationships that had to be altered by executive or legislative action. This involved particularly the relationship between the secretary of defense and the military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Major trends included the increase in centralization of power in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the deployment of all operational forces to the strengthened unified combatant commands, the enlarged role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the growth in the number of Defense agencies, and some diminution of power and influence of the military services. A constant throughout the years has been the competition between the services for money, weapons, people, and missions. All of these trends and, indeed, the overall functioning of the department, have been greatly affected by the official and personal interplay between the leaders. It is often said that people, not structure, are the determinant of an organization's success or failure. The experience of the Department of Defense indicates that both able people and sound organizational structure are essential to the effective functioning of an institution.

The 20 secretaries of defense between 1947 and 1997, serving as “principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense,” molded events and shaped policies of great national and international consequence. Their records are diverse owing to differences of personality, philosophy, and circumstance, but they have in all instances occupied a position of crucial importance to U.S. national security.

Documentation of the two parts of this volume differs. Part I has reference notes that appear at the end of the volume. Part II is supported by a bibliography which lists all of the main sources, notably the *Public Statements of the Secretary of Defense* for the period 1947-1996.

This study has benefited greatly from the thorough and cogent critiques of successive drafts by Stuart Rochester, Ronald Landa, and John Glennon. They performed an invaluable service with generous patience and forbearance and at full speed. Ronald Landa over-

saw the preparation for publication of all aspects of the work with his usual skill, initiative, and concentration. Ruth Sharma who typed and helped edit the manuscript contributed her accustomed high-quality effort and work to the final product. Alice Cole helped prepare the appendixes and Carolyn Thorne typed them in final form. Walter Poole of the Joint Staff Historical Office reviewed the section on Unified Combatant Commands and suggested needed changes. Kathleen Brassell of the OSD Graphics and Presentation Division advised on the concept of the design of the book and provided assistance in preparation of graphics. For photographs we are indebted to the following: U.S. Senate Historical Office (Pictorial Services), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Joint Staff Historical Office, Naval Historical Center, and Director of Marine Corps History and Museums. Many pictures came from the collection of the OSD Historical Office.

Roger R. Trask
Alfred Goldberg

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I ORGANIZATION

ORGANIZATION

When President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 on 26 July 1947, it signified the nation's awareness that it would have to meet the challenge of a world greatly altered by World War II and its far-reaching consequences. The act not only reorganized the military establishment; it also created a large, more coherent politico-military framework for the direction and execution of U.S. national security policy. This structure has endured for half a century, evolving in response to changing domestic and international circumstances. Despite adjustments in both form and substance, the military establishment has retained the essential features of the original 1947 structure.

After almost every war the U.S. government has found the wartime military arrangements defective and carried out reforms. Changes following the Spanish-American War and World War I tended toward centralization that seemed to be characteristic of the experience of most of the great institutions of American society. And always, resistance to this trend from many quarters caused proposed reforms to be compromised and modified. The 1947 legislation was not the first attempt to reshape the military. Between 1921 and 1945 some 50 bills had been offered in Congress for reorganizing the two military departments—War and Navy. Only one of these bills, in 1932, reached the floor of the House of Representatives, where it was defeated.¹

It required the prolonged, intense, and all-embracing national experience in World War II to give new impetus and coherence to the movement for reorganizing the nation's military establishment. The war demonstrated that even though the United States had prevailed, its organization for national security was seriously flawed. Critical issues between the Army and Navy arose over allocation of resources, strategic priorities, and command arrangements, sometimes affecting the responsibility for, and the timing and conduct of military operations. To coordinate the war effort, a vast temporary array of some 75 interservice agencies and

interdepartmental committees came into being. The ad hoc arrangements for directing the conflict worked, but only because the nation's resources were so abundant that they could compensate for the mistakes and internal divisions. Waging war on a global scale attested powerfully to the greatly increased complexity of mobilizing and employing the nation's material and human resources.²

The disputes between the Army and Navy over command and control of forces in the theaters of operations reinforced the conviction of many close observers that teamwork was the key to victory. The prewar system of voluntary interservice "cooperation" of the sort symbolized by the Pearl Harbor disaster had to give way to centralized control of strategy and operations. Commanders in the field exercised operational control over joint forces—land, sea, and air—in the great campaigns of the war. The joint efforts of unified commands in some areas, particularly Europe, were more impressive than in others—the Pacific—but by the end of the war there was little doubt that unified field commands were integral to an effective military establishment.

The problems and deficiencies revealed were of sufficient magnitude to lead to a broad consensus (the Navy Department was a conspicuous exception) on the need for more integration of foreign, military, and domestic policies at the center of power in Washington. The key lessons of the war were that the American response to the exigencies of a radically different postwar world would require coordination of policy, intelligence, resource allocation, and military operations on an unprecedented scale, and that military preparedness in peacetime was indispensable. These perceptions infused the three years of planning and debate that culminated in the National Security Act of 1947. The theme of unification became increasingly dominant in the demands for changes in the organization of the armed forces from 1944 on. What unification meant remained to be defined in practice.

Having entered two world wars in a quarter of a century unprepared, the nation's leaders recognized before the end of World War II that the United States would have to maintain a peacetime establishment of unprecedented size and cost to carry out the responsibilities of the world leadership role that had been thrust upon it. It could not afford to be unprepared in the event of another major conflict.

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

The National Security Act of 1947 came into being only after almost three years of sometimes bitter controversy over whether and how to establish unified direction, authority, and control over the armed forces. Serious discussion about reorganization began in Congress and the military departments in 1944 and aroused much public interest. In April and May the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy held hearings on a "Proposal to Establish a Single Department of the Armed Forces." War Department officials urged the establishment of a Department of the Armed Forces and submitted a chart outlining its possible organization. Navy representatives urged further study. The committee called for study of the problem by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who had already established their own committee to look into the advantages and disadvantages of different organizational approaches. In April 1945 the JCS group, with only Admiral J. O. Richardson dissenting, recommended the establishment of a single department of the armed forces. The JCS took no formal action on the recommendation and forwarded the report to the president on 16 October 1945.³

With the end of the war and the beginning of an enormous demobilization that would reduce the military services to little more than one-tenth of their peak wartime strengths, the Army and Navy both gave the most serious attention to the future of the military establishment, each pursuing its own preferred concept. The strongest impetus for radical change continued to come from the Army, which consistently supported the establishment of a single department under a secretary of defense, with a chief of staff or military commander, a military high command, and unified service branches for ground, sea, and air warfare.

The Navy countered with its own proposals in the Eberstadt* Report, submitted to Congress on 18 October 1945. This report opposed a single department, accepted the creation of a separate Air Force,

and proposed a larger structure including a national security council and a national security resources board, supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as special agencies for intelligence and research and a munitions board.⁴

Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs between 17 October and 17 December 1945 revealed the extent of the differences between the Army and Navy. Spokesmen for the Navy rejected the Army proposal of a single department with three services—Army, Navy, and Air—and supported the Eberstadt plan for organizing national security.⁵

The requirement for a separate Air Force seemed generally acceptable to the services, Congress, and the public. The Army Air Forces (AAF), granted a high degree of autonomy by the Army,[†] had played an impressive and highly visible role in all theaters of operations during the war. It had organized itself in anticipation of and in preparation for independence after the war. Its peak personnel strength of 2.4 million in 1945 was 31 percent of the U.S. Army, three-quarters the strength of the Navy, and five times that of the Marine Corps.⁶

Still, the prospect of an independent and dynamic Air Force, supported by powerful political, industrial, and public constituencies, engendered fear and dismay in the Navy and Marine Corps. Army Air Forces leaders, flush with high expectations, questioned the need for Navy and Marine Corps aviation, the loss of all or a portion of which could reduce the Navy and Marine Corps to appendages of the Army and the Air Force. Moreover, the Army had made clear its position that the Marine Corps should not be permitted to become a second land army, that it should be restricted to duties with the fleet, and have only lightly armed units for shore operations. The Navy and Marine Corps, imbued with great pride in their long histories and their wartime exploits, could not tolerate what they viewed as subordination to the Army and a new Air Force. They mounted and conducted a campaign in which they eventually succeeded in protecting their functions and the composition of their forces. They were not successful in their opposition to a single national military establishment, but the Navy preserved its position as an equal of the other services within the new structure.


To secure the major objective of a unified military establishment under a secretary of defense, the Army and the Army Air Forces had to yield on the naval aviation and Marine Corps issues. Strong congressional and public support for the Navy dictated compromise on roles and missions. Thus, as it turned out, the changes

* Ferdinand Eberstadt was a close associate of Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal.

† The commanding general of the AAF was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chart 1 SINGLE DEPARTMENT OF ARMED FORCES PROPOSED BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF JCS (RICHARDSON COMMITTEE)

23 March 1945





President Harry S. Truman

that occurred on the civil side of the reorganization proved to be more radical and meaningful than those that occurred on the military side.

On 19 December 1945 President Truman sent a message to Congress recommending a single department of national defense with three coordinate branches—land, sea, and air. He emphasized the need to provide “the strongest means for civilian control of the military” and proposed that there should be a single chief of staff of the department, the position to be rotated among the services. The president became a driving force behind the campaign for reorganization of the national defense. His experience as chairman of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program during the war convinced him that the “antiquated defense setup” had to be changed. He spoke of “bureaucratic waste” and “overlapping jurisdictions.”⁷

On 9 April 1946 three members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee introduced a bill that followed many of Truman’s recommendations and included a number of the Eberstadt proposals for civil-military coordination. Shortly after, the Naval Affairs Committees of the Senate and the House, which strongly espoused the Navy position on change, countered this proposal. In a letter to the secretary of the Navy, the committees objected that the proposed bill concentrated “too much power in the hands of too few

men,” reduced civilian and congressional control over the military, and would empower the executive branch to abolish or emasculate the Marine Corps and transfer vital naval aviation functions to the Army Air Forces. The letter thus spelled out plainly the fears of the Navy and the Marine Corps that in a single department they would be dominated by the Army and a new and dynamic Air Force.⁸

Underlying the debate over unification was anticipation of the revolutionary impact on weapons, strategic plans, and national security policies of new military technologies—jet aircraft, missiles, radar, other electronic devices, and especially the atomic bomb. The Army had overseen the development of the bomb and the Army Air Forces had dropped it on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Navy participated in the atomic tests at Bikini in 1946. All of the services desired to share in the control and use of nuclear weapons, which promised to have a powerful role in shaping their future, if not immediately, certainly during the next decade. The critical and revolutionary effect of nuclear weapons clearly indicated that control and policymaking must come from the highest government authority.

The impasse in Congress between the oversight committees caused President Truman, on 13 May 1946, to ask the secretaries of the War and Navy Departments to seek agreement on a plan for the reorganization of the armed forces. In their reply of 31 May, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal reported that they agreed on 8 of 12 major points. The points still in dispute were, of course, the nub of the matter—a single military department, three coordinate services or three departments, control of aviation, and the functions of the Marine Corps.⁹

Truman’s response to the report on 15 June once again called for a single military department with three coordinate services under it, diminished naval aviation forces, and the status quo for Marine Corps functions. This represented a compromise of sorts, but not to the liking of the Navy. The president sent the correspondence to the chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Military Affairs and Naval Affairs with a request that Congress pass legislation based on the 12 principles he presented. Concurring in part with recommendations of the Navy’s Eberstadt report, he endorsed the creation of a council of national defense, a central intelligence agency, a national security resources board, a research and development agency, an organization for military procurement and supply, and a military education and training agency.¹⁰

Opposition to the president’s proposal persisted in the Navy and Marine Corps and in Congress. At



Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson

Forrestal's instigation, the Army and Navy agreed in November 1946 to work together to seek recommendations that would break the impasse. After two months of intense negotiations, Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad and Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman produced a compromise agreement that Patterson and Forrestal submitted to the White House on 16 January 1947. At the same time, the president prepared a proposed executive order clarifying the roles and missions of the services.¹¹

The Patterson-Forrestal agreement that the president sent to Congress represented a real compromise, thanks chiefly to concessions by the Army. The accord provided for an organization under a secretary of defense to establish "common policies and common programs for the integrated operation" of the armed forces—this instead of a single department. It called for separately administered departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the Marine Corps), and the Air Force, and continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assisted by a joint staff. The agreement called also for the creation of a war council headed by the secretary of national defense to consider "matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces." Beyond the defense structure, it asked for a council of national defense, a central intelligence agency, and a national security resources board.¹²

Consideration of the proposed legislation by Congress lasted six months, during which its provisions underwent substantial changes. The House of Representatives, influenced by arguments of the Navy and Marine Corps, enacted a bill further limiting the authority of the secretary of defense and elevating the status of the military departments. This compromise of diverse viewpoints represented a lowest common denominator. The legislation went to Truman on 26 July; he signed it immediately.¹³

The preamble of the National Security Act of 1947 spoke to the law's general objectives:

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States, to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authori-



Admiral Forrest P. Sherman



Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad

tative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.¹⁴

This expressed the essence of the compromise that had been struck—a structure that fell somewhere between a centralized system and a loose confederation of military services. It preserved much of the autonomy of the services at the expense of the secretary of defense. Moreover it suited the political interests of Congress. As one observer noted, “Congressmen have traditionally seen their ability to influence defense policy enhanced under a decentralized structure and have feared loss of influence under a more centralized one America’s defense establishment has reflected the pluralistic and decentralized nature of America’s national governmental system.”¹⁵

The National Security Act, then, represented a compromise not only between the military services but also between Congress and the president: Congress accepted the principle of unification but with what it considered safeguards. It sought to limit the powers

of the executive branch, particularly the secretary of defense, over the new National Military Establishment (NME), and to maintain its own constitutional powers over organization and appropriations for defense. By creating the National Military Establishment instead of an executive department, and by placing three executive departments—Army, Navy, and Air Force—under the secretary of defense, it effectively compromised the latter’s position and power. The secretaries of the military departments retained all of their powers and prerogatives subject only to the authority of the secretary of defense to exercise “general direction, authority, and control.” This deliberately imprecise language reflected the reluctance of Congress to place wide powers in the hands of the secretary of defense and his staff and plagued the first secretary of defense, James Forrestal,* throughout his incumbency, causing him to request changes that became the 1949 amendments to the act.

Title I of the act established the machinery for coordinating national security. This included the National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the president and including the secretaries of state, defense, and the three military departments, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), which was to oversee industrial and civilian mobili-



General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1944-47, strong opponent of unification

* President Truman first offered the position of secretary of defense to Secretary of War Patterson, who refused it.

zation. The NSC was to “advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.” The Central Intelligence Agency, successor to the Office of Strategic Services and the Central Intelligence Group, under the NSC would provide national security intelligence and coordinate the intelligence activities of government agencies; all existing intelligence agencies would continue as before.

Title II dealt with the National Military Establishment. It defined the secretary of defense as “the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security.” His specific responsibilities included establishing “general policies and programs” for the NME; exercising “general direction, authority, and control” over the military departments; eliminating “unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research”; and supervising and coordinating the preparation and implementation of annual defense budgets. The act provided legislative sanction for the preparation and submission of a budget for the whole U.S. military establishment. This proved to be the most significant power accorded the secretary of defense in his efforts to bring about greater integration and more efficient operation of the military services.

The act established the new Department of the Air Force and the U.S. Air Force under it, and changed the name of the War Department to Department of the Army. The three military departments retained the status of “individual executive departments” and were still largely autonomous with considerable control of their internal affairs. The act named the service secretaries members of the NSC and authorized them to present directly to the president and to the director of the budget any report or recommendation they deemed appropriate, after informing the secretary of defense. The provision reserving to the service secretaries all powers and duties not specifically conferred on the secretary of defense paralleled the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which reserves to the states or to the people all powers not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states.

The law placed limitations on the secretary’s support staff, permitting him to appoint only three special assistants “to advise and assist him” and prohibiting him from establishing a military staff. Although he could hire

civilian employees and draw on the military services for staff assistance, the limitations appeared to be—and indeed became—obstacles to the effective control of the new organization. The limitations seemed to be the result of concessions to still the fears of congressmen and others that a “super secretary” might impose a “Prussian-style general staff” on the nation. They also served to mollify opponents of unification in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Congress.

Title II also created a War Council and three other agencies within the NME. The Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board (RDB) were the statutory successors to existing boards. Responsible to the secretary of defense, each had a civilian chairman and military department representatives appointed by the service secretaries. The third agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been in existence since 1942 but now received statutory sanction as the “principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.” Composed of the chiefs of the military services and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief* “if there be one,” the JCS remained a committee of equals. There was no provision for a chairman of the JCS, but the act did create a Joint Staff of 100 officers under a military director.

The law required that the Joint Chiefs establish “unified” commands. Such commands had been in existence since 14 December 1946 when President Truman authorized the creation of seven unified commands under the Unified Command Plan (UCP).† The UCP accorded the Joint Chiefs strategic direction over all elements of the armed forces in each command, and each chief served as “executive agent” with operational command and control over the forces in one or more unified areas. The National Security Act thus provided a statutory basis for the creation of unified commands.

The carefully and cautiously crafted overall organizational arrangement reflected the success of the Navy and the Marine Corps and their congressional supporters in limiting civilian control that they feared might operate to their detriment. The opponents of unification also succeeded in eliminating any provision for a single chief of staff or commander and a general staff.

Title III was a miscellany. The secretary of defense replaced the secretary of war in the line of presidential succession and the secretary of the Navy was eliminated from succession. It prescribed the salary scale for senior officials and authorized the appropriation of money to further the provisions of the act.¹⁶

The National Security Act left many loose ends that were bound to affect the operation of the NME, but it probably represented the best arrangement that could be obtained at the time. It gave the military services

* Admiral William D. Leahy held this position until 1948, after which it lapsed.

† For a discussion of the unified commands, see pp. 49-50.

a higher statutory position in the overall government policymaking hierarchy in recognition of the vital role they played in the development of national policy. It provided them greater entree in peacetime to the highest levels of government and lent substance to the term "politico-military." The act provided for direct civilian oversight of the military services at a higher level than the military departments but left unclear the extent to which the secretary of defense could exercise effective control over the military. The statute confirmed the principle of unification by cooperation and mutual consent, thus placing a high premium on the persuasiveness and force of personality of the secretary of defense.

The legislation establishing the National Military Establishment could not of course do more than provide an overall framework of a national security organization. It could prescribe functions, but it could not provide the means of ensuring that they would be carried out as intended. This could come only through actual experience and operation, which would reveal what further changes would be needed to achieve more efficient and effective operation of the military machine.

When Forrestal became the first secretary of defense on 17 September 1947, he faced the formidable task of attempting to create a viable military structure out of the diverse elements specified in the National Security Act. The military services still harbored much of the traditional parochialism and distrust of each other so strongly manifested during the unification debate. Moreover, they had strong differences over the division of appropriated funds, kinds of military forces needed, roles and missions, and how the new NME should operate. As secretary of the Navy from 1944 to September 1947, Forrestal had initially opposed unification and then helped shape the compromise legislation that he considered the best that he could do for the Navy. Shortly before taking office, Forrestal remarked to his friend Robert Sherwood that "this office will probably be the greatest cemetery for dead cats in history!" Despite this expressed apprehension, he could not have been fully aware of the minefield of resistance and complex problems on which he was entering.¹⁷

The institution that Forrestal now headed had an operating budget of more than \$10 billion, about a third of the total U.S. budget, and 2.3 million military and civilian personnel. It was by far the largest and costliest government agency. It had worldwide responsibilities and powerful political and economic impact on the domestic scene. As one historian of this period commented,

Nothing like it [NME] had ever before existed. As an 'establishment' rather than an executive department, it was a unique and somewhat nebulous entity.

Existing law, tradition, and usage could provide only partial guidance for how the Secretary of Defense should perform his duties. To the extent that this would allow him to develop his own precedents and customs, it afforded him greater freedom of action than he might otherwise have enjoyed. But at the same time, deep-rooted traditions, customs, and interests of the services could just as easily handicap him and thwart his best intentions and endeavors.¹⁸

The creation of the position of secretary of defense was one of the most innovative and significant changes in the history of the U.S. military establishment and, indeed, of the U.S. government. The secretary of defense eventually became, in effect, the deputy commander in chief, with powers over the military establishment second only to those of the president. With the assistance of his staff and a number of Defense-wide agencies, the secretary came to exercise power over a vast global establishment that the president would otherwise have had to exercise himself with the help of a greatly enlarged White House staff. Gaining control over the array of proud and sovereign military services in the face of their resistance to centralization of power presented an immediate challenge to the first secretary of defense and remained a never-ending problem for his successors.

Forrestal's NME consisted of the three military departments and the three statutory agencies—the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board. He had to fashion a structure, develop procedures, and create a staff to assist him. This became the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which was an extension of the secretary himself as the civilian authority in the Department of Defense. It differed from the military services in its broader and more comprehensive responsibilities and authority—chiefly political, budgetary, and international. OSD did not secure statutory sanction until 1986, with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Forrestal viewed himself more as policymaker than administrator. In describing his plan for OSD, he said that his own personal desire was "to keep it as small as possible, not only for reasons of economy, but because my own concept of this office is that it will be a coordinating, a planning, and an integrating rather than an operating office." He intended to use the three statutory agencies as staff in their separate spheres. Another statutory body, the War Council, consisting of the secretary of defense, the three service secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs, provided a forum for discussion of policy issues. Forrestal created another advisory body known as the Committee of Four—himself and the



Forrestal and his three special assistants

three service secretaries—which met biweekly to discuss matters more freely without the presence of the military advisers.¹⁹

During the 18 months of his incumbency, Forrestal built a supporting staff around his three special assistants—Wilfred J. McNeil, Marx Leva, and John H. Ohly—men of exceptionally high ability. One description of these early days reported that Forrestal “had no office, no staff, no organization chart, no manual of procedures, no funds, and no detailed plans.” By the time he left office, all of these had come to be.²⁰

OSD grew rapidly, increasing from the 45 people Forrestal brought with him from the Navy in September 1947 to 173 by the end of January 1948, and to 347 by the beginning of 1949. Until the coming of the Korean War, the number in the immediate office ranged between 350 and 400 employees, of whom 15 to 20 percent were military “on loan.” To this number should be added some 1,200 civilians and military assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the two statutory boards, and other elements, making a total of about 1,600 within the secretary’s ambit at the end of 1949. OSD grew as it responded

to substantive problems and issues that were clearly related to policymaking.²¹

It became apparent to Forrestal and his assistants that OSD could not remain the small policymaking office he had envisaged, and that they could not rely on the military services for a high degree of voluntary cooperation and coordination. All the military services tended to resist or evade OSD control over their activities; their self-interest demanded as much autonomy and freedom of action as possible. Moreover, the continuing interservice rivalry had been compounded by the creation of the Air Force, making it even more difficult for Forrestal to get the services to pull together as a team. Effective direction of the NME required an OSD that could deal with these issues.


In his 18 months in office Forrestal could achieve only a few of the organizational changes that he came to see as necessary. He established in 1948 an Office of Civil Defense Planning that lasted little more than a year.²² The Office of Public Information (OPI), on the other hand, became a permanent fixture.

Public relations presented Forrestal with a vexing

Chart 3

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

15 September 1948



problem. The “press war” between the services, which flared up every time a major issue arose, and which had been waged loudly, vehemently, and persistently since the end of the war, finally led him to undertake a step that he had hoped to avoid. Upset by the harmful and embarrassing publicity about the services and angered by security leaks, Forrestal decided on 17 March 1949, only days before his departure, to establish an Office of Public Information in OSD. It was to assume responsibility for security review and clearance of manuscripts; moreover, “no information of any kind whatsoever relating to performance or capabilities of new weapons or new equipment of any type . . . [would] be released to the public without specific clearance from . . . [OPI].” The military services retained their public information offices, but on a reduced scale. This did not prevent them from waging their press wars through other staff offices, as soon became apparent.²³

At the same time he signed the National Security Act in July 1947, President Truman issued Executive Order 9877, which assigned roles and missions to the services. This had been drafted by the Army and Navy and approved by the secretaries of the services. But it soon became evident that the Navy and the Marine Corps had strong objections to language in the order that seemed to impose limitations on their functions, particularly naval aviation and land operations by the Marines. Since assignment of roles and missions obviously could shape the future of all of the services, and particularly the Navy and Marine Corps, by affecting their budgets and the size and composition of forces, the issue brought interservice controversy to a flash point.²⁴

In January 1948 Forrestal sought to have the services, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approve a revised executive order prepared in OSD. The chiefs failed to reach agreement on the order or any revision thereof and notified the secretary that their “fundamental disagreements” could “only be resolved by higher authority.”²⁵

The need for action on the matter (it was receiving wide public attention as the services, particularly the Air Force and the Navy, sought to enlist support) impelled Forrestal to meet with the Chiefs at Key West, Florida, from 11 to 14 March 1948. He provided guidance for a draft statement of roles and missions by the Chiefs entitled “Functions of the Armed Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” After further changes, Forrestal submitted the paper to President Truman, who revoked E.O. 9877 on 21 April, thus permitting Forrestal to issue the Functions paper the same day.

The Functions paper delineated both primary and secondary responsibilities of each service, thus giving recognition to the possibilities of collateral or joint efforts.

The primary responsibilities listed simply reaffirmed the basic and mutually acceptable responsibilities of the services. The secondary or collateral missions involved naval aviation and the size and role of the Marine Corps. The Navy disavowed any intention to create a strategic bombing force and was permitted to have a capability to attack inland targets in pursuit of its primary mission. The Marine Corps would not be allowed to grow into a second land army, and its maximum strength was limited to four divisions.²⁶

The Key West Agreement did not really settle the issues between the Air Force and the Navy; mutual suspicion and distrust persisted. The issues of strategic bombardment, strategic targeting, and control of atomic weapons continued to precipitate strong disagreements between the two services. Forrestal’s efforts to promote a compromise acceptable to both parties met with little success, and he convened the JCS again for further talks.

At Newport, Rhode Island, from 20 to 22 August, the Chiefs added a supplement to the Functions paper that clarified the term “primary mission” so that the Navy would not be excluded from a role in strategic air operations. The Chiefs also agreed in principle to Forrestal’s proposal to establish the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) to provide technical advice and analysis of new weapons. Impartial technical evaluations of weapons by an independent agency within NME might help reduce partisan strife over roles and missions. Forrestal chartered WSEG in December 1948, after studies by the RDB and the JCS.²⁷

1949 AMENDMENTS AND AFTER

Within a year of taking office Forrestal had become convinced that his original conception of the role of the secretary as coordinator and policymaker had resulted in failure. His inability to exercise effective control over the feuding military services and to resolve the disputes over budgets, weapons, strategic plans, and roles and missions could lead only to the conclusion that the National Security Act would have to be amended to enhance the secretary’s authority. He so testified before the Eberstadt Task Force of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) in the fall of 1948 and reiterated this conclusion in his First Report at the end of 1948. In February 1949 the Hoover Commission recommended that the secretary of defense be granted full authority and accountability for his department, that he have an under secretary and three assistant secretaries, and that he be empowered to appoint a chairman to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁸

The administration reviewed proposals for changes

in the NME during the winter of 1948-49. President Truman sent his recommendations to Congress in a message of 5 March 1949. He asked that the NME be converted into an executive department to be known as the Department of Defense, that the secretary of defense be given "appropriate responsibility and authority," and that he be the sole representative of the department on the NSC. Other changes looked to reinforce the authority of the secretary of defense over the military departments, the JCS, the Munitions Board, and the RDB.²⁹

Congress responded first to the Hoover Commission's recommendations for an under secretary of defense, and the president signed the measure on 2 April, shortly after Louis A. Johnson succeeded Forrestal as secretary of defense. The president named Stephen T. Early to the newly-created position.³⁰

After several months of hearings and discussions, the two houses of Congress reached agreement on amendments to the National Security Act, and the president signed the legislation on 10 August 1949. It was too much to expect that Congress would accept all the recommendations of the president or the Hoover Commission. But the changes did increase the powers of the secretary and diminish those of the military departments. The legislation created the executive Department of Defense (DoD) in place of the NME and authorized the secretary to exercise "direction, authority, and control"—not qualified by the adjective "general"—over the department of defense. It reduced the three subordinate departments from executive or cabinet to military departments and redesignated the under secretary of defense as deputy secretary and the three special assistants as assistant secretaries. The law did not transfer the statutory functions of the JCS and the two boards to the secretary, as had been recommended. The amendments provided for a chairman to preside over the Joint Chiefs, but gave him no vote. The JCS collectively were designated principal military advisers to the president, NSC, and secretary of defense. The amendments prohibited the secretary from establishing a single chief of staff to command the armed forces and from creating a military staff of his own apart from the JCS. The secretaries of the military departments lost their membership in the NSC, but they retained the initiative to present recommendations to Congress after informing the secretary of defense. The military departments were to be "separately administered," and combatant functions were not to be reassigned, transferred, consolidated, or abolished.

A major feature of the amendments was the attention paid to the budget function by the addition of Title IV to the National Security Act. This conferred the title of comptroller on one of the three assistant secretaries of defense and provided for uniform budgetary and

accounting procedures for the military departments. Title IV further reinforced the secretary's power over the military budget and gave him control of apportionment of appropriated funds within the department. This permitted him to regulate rates of obligation and expenditure by the services. Wilfred J. McNeil, special assistant to Forrestal since 1947, became comptroller and served until 1959. He played a major role in bringing about the enactment of Title IV and in implementing its provisions.³¹


It should be borne in mind that Congress is an integral part of the national security structure and exercises great powers over the defense establishment. During these postwar years Congress made significant modifications in its own structure that were certainly influenced by the fundamental change in the national military establishment and the overall organization for national security. No doubt committees also saw a need to provide more and better oversight of the armed forces, particularly of the appropriation process, if they were to carry out their constitutional responsibility.

The power of the purse has always resided in Congress; it represents its ultimate weapon in dealing with the executive branch. The enormous and urgent requirements of the war, however, had created great pressures on the legislative branch and caused it to virtually suspend its use of the power. This acute wartime experience, on top of the dramatic expansion of government during the New Deal years in the 1930s, provided the motivation Congress needed to carry out self-reform that had long been advocated or contemplated. Not least among the spurs to action was the recognition that the greatly enlarged and more powerful executive branch presented a challenge that the legislative branch would have to face if it hoped to fulfill its proper constitutional role.

After more than a year deliberating changes, Congress passed the Legislative Reorganization Act in August 1946. The act was "clearly intended to improve the lawmaking function of Congress by consolidating and centralizing legislative powers," thus permitting "party leaders . . . to exercise a tighter control and more efficiently bring forth a cohesive legislative program." It reduced the number of standing committees from 33 to 15 in the Senate and from 48 to 19 in the House. The Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees of both chambers merged into Armed Services Committees—a significant change because it meant that a single committee in each chamber would have jurisdiction over all legislative measures pertaining to the common defense and the armed forces. This change anticipated the National Security Act of 1947 and the submission of a unitary budget for the whole defense establishment.

Chart 4 ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AS AMENDED

10 August 1949



The Appropriations Committees in the House and Senate did not merge their separate subcommittees for the Army and Navy until 1949, in time for the subcommittees to consider the first unitary budget—for fiscal year 1950—submitted by Defense, which included the Air Force as a separate service. The change completed a congressional structure that complemented the Armed Services Committees and the Department of Defense, thus providing Congress with an overall review of the total defense budget for the first time.³²

The Key West and Newport Agreements had not really settled the issue over strategic bombardment and control of nuclear weapons. The wrangling came into sharper focus as the competition for diminishing funds became more intense. After 1947, therefore, competition for the defense dollar was one of the major facts of military life in Washington.

At the heart of the differences between the Air Force and the Navy still lay the issue of strategic air power. The Air Force, having retreated from its effort to secure control of all military aviation, saw the Navy's acquisition of large carrier task forces as an attempt to share the strategic air mission and thereby diminish the Air Force role. Moreover, it did not consider the carriers capable of accomplishing long-range missions. Navy strategists challenged the capabilities of the long-range bomber, particularly the new B-36, and, on occasion, the very concept of strategic bombing itself and even the effectiveness of the atomic bomb. The real competition was for money to purchase and employ expensive weapons, which had to be justified in terms of missions. Secretary Louis Johnson acknowledged that it was "primarily over the apportionment of funds that disagreements among the services arise."

The aggressive campaign for a large Air Force and the necessary funds, led by Secretary W. Stuart Symington, created a near-siege mentality in the Navy, anxious to find weapons and missions that would permit it to remain on equal terms with the Army and Air Force. The Air Force and the Navy each sought to make its case by attacking the other.

The fight between the two services became more acute and more open after the peremptory cancellation by Secretary Johnson on 23 April 1949 of the Navy's supercarrier, the *United States*. A majority of the Joint Chiefs had recommended cancellation; Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis Denfeld had, of course, dissented. Construction of this ship carried with it some of the Navy's highest hopes for its future. Navy Secretary John Sullivan resigned in protest, and Navy partisans intensified their attacks on the Air Force's new B-36 bomber. Anonymous documents circulating in the press in the following months alleged that corruption



Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan

had been involved in the selection of the bomber and that it did not have the performance characteristics claimed by the Air Force. The House Committee on Armed Services investigated the B-36 corruption charges in August and after extensive hearings dismissed them as utterly without credence.

Further hearings by the committee in October 1949 examined the merits of the B-36 and strategic air operations. Uniformed Navy leaders, in airing their frustrations and fears, presented what was essentially an indictment of strategic bombing as serving no useful purpose and being morally wrong. The B-36 was a mistake, they argued, and the supercarrier was a necessary and vital weapon for the future. It was also the Navy's hope for maintenance of a large aviation capability. Within the Navy, aviators headed by Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford asserted leadership and dominated the strategy in the battle against the Air Force that came to be known as the "Revolt of the Admirals."

The Air Force case in refutation of the Navy criticisms convinced the majority of the committee. JCS Chairman General Omar N. Bradley pointed out that in spite of its criticism of the effectiveness of both strategic air power and the atomic bomb, the Navy had been arguing right along that it "should be permitted to use the atomic bomb, both strategically and tactically." Bradley offered his opinion that the real issue was a


refusal by the Navy “in spirit as well as deed” to accept unification. An immediate outcome of the hearings was the dismissal of Admiral Denfeld, who had taken a position in direct opposition to the testimony of Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews, thereby losing the confidence of the president as well.

The final committee report, which appeared on 1 March 1950, criticized all parties to the controversy but did not address the substantive issues. It did not recommend reinstatement of the supercarrier, but it deplored “the manner of cancellation.” Many members of the committee condemned Denfeld’s dismissal as a reprisal for his testimony. The report had little to say on the matter of roles and missions and reached no decision on the relative merits of the supercarrier and the B-36. The hearings permitted a public airing of interservice differences and perhaps thereby provided an outlet for frustration, particularly for the Navy, that might otherwise have had more explosive effects.³³

Between 1947 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Secretaries Forrestal and Johnson sought to provide themselves with a staff organization that could meet their increasing responsibilities. The statutory boards had prescribed functions. For other matters the secretaries resorted to the establishment of non-statutory agencies—a personnel policies board, a civilian components policy board, and an office of medical services. The Military Liaison Committee (MLC) was a statutory body, created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 as part of the military rather than as an agency of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The committee served as the AEC’s principal adviser on the military application of atomic energy. It came under the secretary of defense, who replaced the military chairman with a civilian in 1948.³⁴

Although an OSD staff agency and the main connection between the secretary of defense and the military services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in practice advisers to the president, NSC, State Department, and Congress on a wide range of national security matters. The National Security Act gave them responsibility for strategic direction of the armed forces, preparation of strategic and joint logistic plans, formulation of joint training policies for the armed forces, review of major requirements, and establishment of unified commands. The 1949 amendments increased the Joint Staff from 100 officers to 210, drawn in approximately equal number from each service. From September 1947 to November 1949 the JCS had nine different members.³⁵

General Bradley became chairman of the JCS in August 1949. He had limited powers in the JCS organization, but he had responsibilities to the president and the secretary, and the influence he might exercise would




General Omar N. Bradley

depend on his relationship with his superiors and with his peers in the JCS.³⁶

Both Forrestal and Johnson wanted a close relationship with the JCS, but the conflicting outlooks—the secretaries seeking to further unification and broker interservice differences, and the services resisting the growth of secretarial power and disagreeing among themselves—impaired the relationship and served to diminish the power and influence of the JCS. Still, the Chiefs were an indispensable part of the national security structure because, by providing the professional military judgment, they lent greater credibility to the whole process. The dual role of the Chiefs as members of the JCS and as heads of their services placed them in an inherently awkward position when considering issues; generally, allegiance to service prevailed. A later Army chief of staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, described the dilemma faced by chiefs in reporting to Congress:

The hearings on the defense budget are usually the most difficult for the Chiefs, as they raise inevitably the issue of their divided responsibility toward the Executive and Legislative branches of the government . . . Very shortly a Chief of Staff will find himself in the position either of appearing to oppose his civilian superiors or of withholding facts from the

Chart 5 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 15 October 1952



Congress. Personally, I have found no way of coping with the situation other than by replying frankly to questions and letting the chips fall where they may.³⁷

As part of the national security structure, the Defense Department functioned within a larger framework. Forrestal and Johnson had to play active, growing, and highly visible personal roles in these external relationships, particularly with the president, NSC, and State Department. These relationships at the highest levels of government helped determine how influential Defense could be in the making of national policy and in securing its requirements. The two secretaries participated actively in the work and deliberations of the NSC, but the council did not achieve the influence in policy-making that Forrestal had hoped for.³⁸

The role of the secretary of defense in foreign affairs visibly increased as changes on the international scene increasingly involved the Defense Department. The presence of U.S. military forces in most parts of the world, especially in Germany, Japan, and Korea, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, and the large-scale foreign military aid program moved Defense into the foreground of U.S. foreign affairs. Participation in international bodies such as NATO and direct talks with foreign governments on a variety of matters required that Defense maintain a close relationship with the State Department. The extensive range of business with State included such matters as overseas occupation duties; foreign military assistance; atomic energy issues; foreign economic affairs; export controls; regulation of armaments; and refueling, overflight, and base rights in foreign countries. All this required an elaborate network of associations between departments in this jointly-shared area of national security policy. OSD developed a staff office for international security affairs that eventually came to be referred to as the "Little State Department." The military services also had to create substantial staffs to handle these matters.³⁹

The National Security Resources Board, another major element of the national security structure, had the responsibility "to advise the president concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization in the event of war." The board never achieved the status of an independent operating agency and became little more than an advisory staff. The Munitions Board, an established operating agency within DoD, disputed the responsibilities of the NSRB in matters concerning Defense and contributed in some measure to the NSRB's decline. The lack of an explicit mission, the indifference of the president, and the absence of a full-time chairman during much of its existence contributed to the decline and eventual

demise of the board in 1953.⁴⁰

The National Security Act had recognized the importance of the intelligence function in national security by establishing the Central Intelligence Agency. That agency, too, had growing pains but survived to play the role intended for it as the central organization for collection, collation, and analysis of intelligence. This required a close, if sometimes adversarial, relationship between Defense and the CIA, for the military services had extensive intelligence organizations that constituted a major part of the intelligence community. At the OSD level, development of a capacity to oversee the intelligence functions of the military services proceeded slowly. For many years, the secretary and his staff were chiefly consumers rather than policymakers or directors of intelligence.⁴¹

The coming of the Korean War in 1950 greatly relieved budget pressures on the military services, thereby permitting them to fight the war rather than each other. In Washington the issues that had been raised by unification became muted, but controversies between the services did come to the surface in Korea, chiefly over the question of control and use of the various service air elements in the theater. It was now a matter of *four* services (the Marines were a service *de facto* by this time) contending for position, status, and recognition. The reluctance of the services to yield control of their own forces to a commander from another service has been a constant since World War II. Yielding command and control of U.S. forces to an international command headed by a non-American has encountered even greater opposition from both military and political partisans.

The pressures of the Korean War discouraged the initiation of any major changes in DoD organization, but OSD made modest progress toward integration of functions in some non-controversial areas. In July 1952 legislation established in OSD the director of installations with wide powers over facilities and construction activities. An early Defense agency prototype came into existence also in 1952 with the establishment of the Defense Supply Management Agency to develop and administer cataloging and standardization programs for DoD. Other functions integrated at the OSD level included technical information, parachute testing, and use of commercial transportation in the United States. Finally, of great significance for the intelligence community, President Truman established in 1952 the National Security Agency, under the direction of the secretary of defense, to coordinate communications intelligence and signals security.⁴²

In response to technological development rather than any war pressure, Secretary of Defense George C.

Marshall acted under his own authority to appoint in October 1950 the director of guided missiles to advise the secretary in directing and coordinating the research, development, and production of guided missiles. The new office succeeded in accelerating guided missile programs of the services, but it could not put an end to interservice disputes over the potential missions of this promising new weapon.⁴³

One other development during the war, in 1952, the result of congressional action, authorized the Commandant of the Marine Corps to sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they considered matters pertaining to the Corps. A milestone along the path to eventual acceptance of the Marine Corps as the fourth service and full membership of the commandant in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was a remarkable achievement, earned by the dogged persistence and unwavering belief of its leaders in the unique qualities and contributions of the Corps.⁴⁴

REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 6—1953⁴⁵

The Eisenhower administration came into office in January 1953, before the Korean War had ended, determined to bring about further changes in DoD. The new president had criticized DoD during the election campaign in 1952 and called for greater unification. He had strong and firmly-held views on the need for greater civilian control of the military establishment. Congressional critics had pointed particularly to flaws in the organization and management of supply. In a letter to President Truman, outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett offered pragmatic and thoughtful recommendations for dealing with what he considered a defective organization. He believed that the secretary's powers over the military services and the JCS should be made more explicit and that the secretary should have a military staff in OSD to help him. He also implied that the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board should be abolished and their functions transferred to the secretary. His thoughts about the JCS revealed his dissatisfaction with the existing organization, and he suggested a number of changes designed to give the secretary greater flexibility and authority in dealing with the chiefs.⁴⁶

President Eisenhower, who had been thinking along the same lines, reacted favorably to Lovett's proposals, as did the new secretary of defense, Charles E. Wilson. In February 1953 Wilson appointed a committee, of which Nelson A. Rockefeller was chairman and Lovett a member, to review DoD organization. The three major problems addressed by the committee were the same ones discussed in 1949: (1) the powers of the secretary; (2) the inflexible board structure; and (3) the functions


of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. A strong consensus emerged for clarifying the authority of the secretary of defense over all elements of DoD. As for the boards, their difficulties in functioning effectively made it a foregone conclusion that they would have to go. But the JCS problem was different; there was much dissatisfaction with their performance, but also recognition that opposition to radical adjustments would be strong. The major change placed the service secretaries in the chain of command to the unified commands in order to resolve the awkward situation by which the service secretary, who had administrative responsibilities, could be bypassed in such matters by his subordinate military chief in dealing with a unified command. Problems of this nature had arisen and revealed the ambiguity of the arrangement.⁴⁷

After receiving the committee's report, derived largely from the extensive testimony of former officials, civilian and military, Eisenhower acted promptly in submitting to Congress on 30 April a message on reorganization of DoD, along with Reorganization Plan No. 6. He had sounded out congressional sentiment and found that a reorganization plan would be the most expeditious way to bring about change and that the proposed plan would be acceptable.⁴⁸

Congress accepted Reorganization Plan No. 6, and it became effective on 30 June 1953. The plan abolished the Research and Development Board, Munitions Board, Defense Supply Management Agency, and Office of the Director of Installations and invested their functions in the secretary of defense. It provided for nine assistant secretaries of defense instead of three and made the OSD general counsel a statutory position. It gave the secretary authority to prescribe the functions of the new positions as well as those of any other Defense agency or employee. To reinforce the secretary's authority, the president notified Congress in his message that "no function in any part of the Department of Defense, or in any of its component agencies, should be performed independent of the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense." This was considered necessary because of challenges to the authority of the secretary of defense by service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs, who claimed to have statutory authority for some of their functions outside the secretary's jurisdiction. The plan conferred on the JCS chairman management of the Joint Staff and approval of selection of its members, but it still did not accord him a vote in the JCS. The secretary of defense received approval authority for appointment of the Joint Staff director, a key position.⁴⁹

Eisenhower notified Congress of his intention to make two additional significant changes. The Key West Agreement would be revised to designate military department secretaries rather than service chiefs as executive

Chart 6
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
22 September 1953



agents for unified commands, thus eliminating the authority of the Joint Chiefs to name one of their own number as an executive agent, and placing the service secretaries in the chain of command. The second change gave civilian officials responsibility for writing the efficiency reports of military assigned to OSD. These adjustments represented significant steps toward Eisenhower's goal of enhancing civil authority over the military, especially the concentration of more power in the secretary of defense.⁵⁰

1958 REORGANIZATION ACT

The 1953 reorganization represented only a small part of the change that Eisenhower wanted to make in DoD; it was a quick fix. In the years that followed, the president made clear his continuing dissatisfaction with Defense and his intention to seek further changes.⁵¹

Others also called for reorganization of the department. In 1955 the Hoover Commission recommended changes in DoD to improve economy and efficiency, but only a few adjustments followed, notably the merger of the assistant secretaries for research and development and for applications engineering and the establishment of the Defense Science Board. In 1956 Congress completed a task begun in 1948—codifying all laws relating to the military establishment under Titles 10 and 32, United States Code.

Eisenhower continued to express his desire for changes in DoD, and particularly in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who, he said, could not develop "corporate judgment" on major problems. In May 1956 he spoke of seeking a reorganization of Defense in the coming year, particularly to strengthen the positions of the secretary of defense and the JCS chairman. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, on the other hand, did not see a need for fundamental changes.

Friction between the services also irritated Eisenhower and confirmed his view of the need for more control over them. The rapid progress in guided missile development had created fierce competition between the services. Disputes between the Army and the Air Force intensified as competing missiles approached the testing and deployment stages. By agreement in 1954 the Army received responsibility for surface-to-air missiles with a range less than 50 miles; the Air Force, for such missiles with longer ranges. The Army could develop and use surface-to-surface missiles within the zone of Army combat operations. The Air Force had sole responsibility for those of intercontinental range—5,000 miles or more.

Surface-to-surface ballistic missiles for intermediate-range use (IRBMs) became a problem in 1955 when development of 1,500-mile-range missiles accelerated



President Dwight D. Eisenhower

greatly. In 1956 the Army and Air Force fought in public the usual battle over turf, and OSD, the service secretaries, and JCS engaged in the usual protracted discussions, negotiations, and studies. Secretary Wilson issued a memorandum on 26 November 1956 that addressed a number of roles and missions issues. Although current statements of roles and missions did not require changes, new weapons and strategic concepts created a need for "clarification and clearer interpretation." The memorandum announced decisions on missile development and use and on Army aviation.⁵²

Although Wilson intended that his memorandum dispose of the issues over missiles and aviation, sharp differences between the Army and the Air Force over their respective responsibilities for tactical air support of the Army persisted. On occasion in the past they had been able to reach agreement on the subject themselves, but this time it became necessary for Wilson to step in again. He issued on 18 March 1957 DoD Directive 5160.22, "Clarification of Roles and Missions of the Army and the Air Force Regarding Use of Aircraft," which superseded previous agreements and directives. Once again, it placed limitations on Army aviation.⁵³

The question of Defense organization became a major public issue in October 1957.⁵⁴ The Soviet Sputnik shocked the nation and ignited a firestorm of criticism and argument about technology, budgets, and DoD.

These developments presented the president with both the need and the opportunity to take action. On 11 October he asked his new secretary of defense, Neil H. McElroy, to examine the Defense structure with a view to making changes. In discussions with his civilian and military advisers, the president continued to press for reorganization of DoD. The Bureau of the Budget (BoB) offered proposals for reorganization as did the president's Security Resources Panel (Gaither* Committee) that was considering broader questions. The director of BoB and the chairman of the President's Committee on Government Organization, Nelson A. Rockefeller, urged the president in November to send a reorganization proposal to Congress early in 1958. McElroy accepted their suggestion to set up a study group to examine the subject.

The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee inquired into matters of organization in hearings held in November and December 1957. Testimony from DoD officials, including the Joint Chiefs, did not reveal any firm views except for opposition by Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates and Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh A. Burke to further centralization. The subcommittee's conclusions, released in January 1958, included a general recommendation for reorganization but offered no particulars.

Early in the congressional session in 1958 it became evident that much sentiment for Defense reorganization existed, particularly more centralized control at the top for military research and development. A number of bills to this end were introduced. McElroy had already taken steps in this direction, establishing the position of director of guided missiles[†] on 15 November 1957 and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) on 7 February 1958. ARPA was to handle selected space projects as well as other advanced projects assigned to the secretary. Most space projects passed to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), created later in the year.

In Congress members partial to the Navy opposed centralization. Admiral Burke in a public speech denounced "public pressures toward centralization and authoritarianism in defense" and defended the JCS. The battle of public opinion was waged in newspapers and journals through surrogates of the services, chiefly of the Navy and Air Force.

Eisenhower moved to the forefront of the battle in his State of the Union address on 9 January 1958 when he listed Defense reorganization as the first of a number of matters on which action was "imperative." He set forth the objectives to be accomplished: "real unity" in

military activities; clear subordination of the military to civilian authority; better integration of resources; simplification of scientific and industrial effort; and an end to interservice arguments.

Under pressure to follow the president's lead, McElroy announced the appointment on 21 January of an advisory group of civilians and military leaders to develop a reorganization plan. He appointed Charles A. Coolidge, a former assistant secretary of defense, as his special assistant to work with the panel. There followed a period of two months of intensive activity in which the president, members of the White House staff, McElroy and other DoD officials, and representatives of BoB participated in discussions with the advisory group. The group sought the views of some 60 outsiders in person or in writing. These included all former secretaries and deputy secretaries of defense, former JCS members, former service secretaries, former unified commanders, military "elder statesmen," prominent members of Congress, and business executives.

While the Coolidge panel worked, two committees in the House of Representatives held hearings in January and February that related to Defense organization. In both houses influential members introduced bills that would have diminished OSD while enhancing the status of the JCS. These were direct challenges to the administration's position. Both bills gave way eventually to the legislation proposed by the administration in April, by which time sentiment favorable to the president's views had emerged.

The Coolidge panel, very much in accord with Eisenhower's outlook, took strong positions on centralization in a series of drafts of the proposed legislation. McElroy agreed with them on the main lines of thought: increased power for the secretary of defense; a stronger JCS chairman with more control over the Joint Staff; elimination of executive agents from the chain of command; designation of the JCS as the secretary's military staff; and an enlarged and integrated Joint Staff. The panel opposed the creation of a single service. Although it favored downgrading the service secretaries to deputy or under secretaries of defense, it understood that such a move would arouse much resistance from the services and Congress. Research and development needed to be centralized to achieve maximum results from resources. The matter of appropriations—how to give the secretary more flexibility in handling funds—also had to be carefully presented to Congress, always jealous of its appropriations prerogatives. Something had to be done to make the JCS organization more responsive and effective, but it was difficult to make a choice among possible alternatives. Finally, there was no need for

* H. Rowan Gaither was chairman of the panel.

† The position of the same name established in 1951 went out of existence in 1953.

change in the unified commands except to ensure that the commanders had full operational control over all of their assigned forces.

Some of these issues the president intended to resolve through executive action as he had in 1953. He drafted a message to Congress that would set forth the objective of the proposed changes and methods of attaining them. Objections from the service secretaries brought about changes pertaining to the breadth of the legal authority of the secretary of defense and the authority to be given the assistant secretaries to issue instructions to the services. The revised draft that went back to the White House underwent a complete rewrite there without much change of substance. At a meeting between the president and legislative leaders on 1 April, McElroy and Coolidge described their proposals, which encountered no strong objections.

Eisenhower sent the message to Congress on 3 April 1958. In forceful language he affirmed the principles on which his recommendations rested.

First, separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief.

Additionally, Secretary of Defense authority, especially in respect to the development of new weapons, must be clear and direct, and flexible in the management of funds. Prompt decisions and elimination of wasteful activity must be primary goals.

He then put forward six broad objectives, with prescriptions for action on each one, as follows:

1. We must organize our fighting forces into operational commands that are truly unified, each assigned a mission in full accord with our over-all military objectives.

2. We must clear command channels so that orders will proceed directly to unified commands from the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of Defense.
3. We must strengthen the military staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to provide the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense with the professional assistance they need for strategic planning and for operational direction of the unified commands.
4. We must continue the three military departments as agencies within the Department of Defense to administer a wide range of functions.
5. We must reorganize the research and development function of the Department in order to make the best use of our scientific and technological resources.
6. We must remove all doubts as to the full authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Eisenhower's proposals for carrying out these aims all pointed toward greater centralization and control from the top. The unified commanders would have full authority over their commands; executive agents would be eliminated from command channels; the JCS would serve as the secretary's staff in exercising direction of the unified commands and would perform no duties independent of the secretary's direction; the Joint Staff would have to be larger and stronger; the chiefs of services should be authorized to delegate a "major portion" of their service responsibilities in order to spend more time on their JCS duties; the secretary of defense should have "complete and unchallengeable" control over research and development, with the assistance of a director of research and development; the secretary of defense should have "adequate authority and flexibility" in handling funds, and authority to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate functions of departments; the president would henceforth consider for nomination to the two highest ranks only those recommended by the JCS, and he proposed that the secretary have the authority to transfer officers between services.

Congressional reaction was mixed, much of it negative. Criticism centered on command arrangements, the status of the service secretaries, and how appropriations might be handled. Supporters of the services took predictable positions—Army and Air Force in favor and Navy and Marine Corps against. To allay Navy fears and make certain of their support, the president met with Navy Secretary Gates and Admiral Burke, who accepted most of the proposals but expressed their concern about

attitudes of others in the Navy, and particularly among the Marines, who were described as “emotional.”

After at least seven drafts, the president settled several points at issue and sent the bill to Congress on 16 April, accompanied by a letter to Speaker Sam Rayburn. Eisenhower pointed out that the bill did not mention changes in appropriations of funds; the flexibility he desired in use of the funds could be met by changes in the 1960 budget format.

At a press conference the same day Eisenhower spoke to the subject of military officers who did not publicly support the bill. He drew a distinction between public speeches and congressional testimony. In keeping with established procedures, officers had an “absolute duty” to express real convictions in congressional testimony, but they were not entitled to give public speeches that amounted to “propagandizing.” This was a matter of great concern to Eisenhower. He was infuriated, and would continue to be, by high-ranking officers who took or appeared to be taking issue with policy established by the president and the secretary of defense. Indeed, a year later he seriously contemplated dismissing a chief of staff and the commander of a specified command who took public positions of which he disapproved.* His commitment to civilian control over the military was consistently absolute during his presidency. He was fully aware, of course, that there would be a congressional and public debate over the proposed legislation and that Congress would undoubtedly make changes in it.

In Congress some members voiced the usual clichés in opposition to centralization of authority in Defense. Rep. Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, attacked the bill as tending toward a “Prussian-type supreme command” and called it an “open invitation to the concept of the man-on-horse-back.” Eisenhower joined the issue immediately, pointing out that there was general ignorance of what the “Prussian general staff” really had been. The White House and OSD orchestrated a campaign to enlist the support of veterans, business, and other influential groups.

Congressional consideration of the bill consumed more than three months. The issues that emerged during early committee hearings centered on how much power the secretary needed, the rights of the service secretaries, and the JCS and the chain of command. The specter of a “Prussian general staff” arose again and had to be exorcised, this time by JCS Chairman General Nathan F. Twining, who explained that it was more myth than fact. As was predictable, the members of the JCS failed to agree on the bill. Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell

D. Taylor and Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White supported the measure. Admiral Burke endorsed the objectives but had reservations about the language. Marine Corps Commandant General Randolph McC. Pate saw no need for some of the provisions and expressed fears for the future of the Corps if the secretary had power to transfer or abolish functions of the services.

After hearing testimony from OSD civilian officials, the House Armed Services Committee drafted legislation that made changes in the bill submitted by the administration. These were intended to place some limitation on the secretary’s powers in relation to the military departments and the functions of the services. The bill also retained the right of service secretaries and JCS members to appeal to Congress after first informing the secretary of defense. It limited the Joint Staff to 400 officers and forbade it to organize as an armed forces general staff or to exercise executive authority.

Eisenhower accepted the House bill with two crucial exceptions. He did not want the secretary of defense to have to exercise control through the departmental secretaries, and he opposed limitations on the authority to transfer functions. Moreover, he did not want the service heads to have the right of appeal to Congress. The House committee did not accept the president’s proposed amendments and reported out their bill on 22 May. It affirmed congressional responsibility for the armed forces stating that Congress would not “abdicate or renounce its constitutional responsibilities relating to the national security.”

Friends and opponents of the legislation lobbied vigorously with a wide array of constituencies. The Association of the United States Army and the Air Force Association supported the president, while the Navy League opposed, and retired Marine Corps Commandant General Clifton B. Cates urged a fight against the entire plan. The bill passed the House on 12 June by a vote of 402 to 1, after efforts to amend it as the president wished had failed. One significant amendment was added. This authorized the secretary of defense to establish common supply activities—the single-manager system.

In the Senate, as in the House, leading senators asserted forcefully the constitutional authority of Congress over defense matters. In the hearings that followed, McElroy and other OSD officials sought to have the House bill revised to accommodate the president’s concerns. After further testimony from witnesses on both sides of issues, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported a bill with some changes from the House bill. The most important gave either house of Congress a period of time to negate transfers in service functions proposed by the secretary of defense. Other changes

* Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White and SAC Commander General Thomas S. Power. A specified command was composed of forces from a single service only.



General Nathan F. Twining

gave the right of appeal to JCS members but not to service secretaries, and accorded the National Guard a statutory basis.

The House-Senate conference committee presented on 23 July a bill almost identical to the Senate bill except that it gave the service secretaries the right of appeal to Congress. The president announced his acceptance of the measure, and it passed both houses on 23 July without change. Eisenhower signed it on 6 August.⁵⁵

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 gave the president most of what he had asked for, moving further in the direction of centralization and unification. What emerged from the long process of executive and legislative deliberation and negotiation were the following provisions: strengthening the authority of the secretary of defense, including greater control over the service departments; elevating the status of JCS chairman and eliminating the prohibition on his having a vote in JCS decisions; almost doubling the size of the Joint Staff; prescribing the establishment of unified and specified commands by the president; stipulating the number of assistant secretaries; and creating the position of director of defense research and engineering. The president had lost on two matters on which he held strong feelings—the right of appeal by service secretaries and JCS members to Congress and the procedure for transferring military functions. It now remained to implement the terms of the act.

Even prior to the passage of the act Secretary McElroy had made many of the changes that the president had indicated in his message to Congress. He directed that promotion to general and lieutenant general be at the recommendation of the secretary of defense rather than the service secretaries and that completion of a tour of duty with a joint or interallied staff be required for promotions beyond the rank of colonel (or Navy captain). Changes within OSD focused on the abolition of departmental committees, a recurring exercise; eventually 199 of some 300 DoD committees were dissolved.

JCS internal organization changes began in April also, calling for restructuring the Joint Staff along conventional lines, with directorates—J-1 through J-6—replacing existing groups or committees. A new J-3 (operations) responded to new JCS responsibilities deriving from the abolition of the executive agent system. Admiral Burke and General Pate opposed this plan as converting the Joint Staff into the kind of supreme general staff they feared, but they came around after the new act provided for the Joint Staff to operate as a conventional staff. The Joint Chiefs approved the change and it went into effect on 15 August. Subsequently the JCS took over staff direction of the unified and specified commands from the departmental executive agents, leaving the departments to provide administrative and logistical support for the commands. The Unified Command Plan was rewritten to instruct the commander to communicate directly with the JCS on strategic and logistic planning matters, direction of forces, and conduct of combat operations.

The president had made it clear that he expected the service chiefs to delegate some of their service responsibilities to their deputies as authorized by the law. Burke led the way on 28 July, and Taylor and White followed suit soon after.

The act stipulated that commanders of unified and specified commands would have “full operational command” of forces assigned to them. The House committee included a definition of the term in its report but not in the legislation. In January 1959 McElroy asked the JCS to formulate a definition. The Chiefs submitted a definition close to the House report version: “Those functions of command over assigned forces involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, the over-all control of assigned resources, and the full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.” The president approved this definition on 30 January. Over the years this term—full operational command—as rendered by the JCS, grew by accretions that tended to refine the meaning, and eventually other terms, most recently “combatant command,” replaced it.

The new act made it necessary to revise the basic directives—5100.1 and 5158.1—that provided general guidance for the military establishment. Issued in 1953 and 1954, respectively, by Secretary Wilson, they set forth the functions of the armed forces and the JCS and prescribed modes of operation for the JCS and their relationship with OSD staff agencies. Bringing these directives into conformance with the 1958 Reorganization Act proved difficult and time-consuming because of the need for precise language that would gain consensus of the interested parties, particularly the JCS and the services, which sought to retain as much initiative as possible and to achieve as much freedom as possible from OSD authority.

Most of the matters at issue pertained to the relationship of the JCS to OSD, particularly whether the JCS was part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The JCS made clear that they did not see themselves as a staff element of OSD. Moreover, they wanted “directives and requests” to the JCS from OSD assistant secretaries to be approved by the secretary or deputy secretary of defense. They made clear to the president that they did not want to be under the direction of assistant secretaries of defense. Up to this time the JCS had been included in OSD, and the question then became whether they should be removed from OSD, which had no statutory existence at this time and was therefore only what the secretary said it was. It was understood that the secretary had the legal power to place the JCS within OSD. Although the president and OSD officials strongly favored retaining the JCS as a part of OSD, Eisenhower accepted a compromise offered by the Joint Chiefs. This scheme placed the JCS under the secretary of defense as a separate entity from OSD and affirmed their separate access to the president. Eisenhower insisted that the direct responsibility of the JCS to the secretary under this arrangement should be clear and that the need for close coordination between OSD and the JCS be distinctly recognized.

After receiving White House approval, McElroy issued the two implementing directives—5100.1 (functions) and 5158.1 (JCS organization and relationships)—on 31 December 1958. These directives established the broad structural framework in accordance with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and the president’s order. Directive 5100.1 stated explicitly that “the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though separately identified and organized, function in full coordination and cooperation in accordance with . . . [DoD Directive 5158.1].” Moreover, “the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, as a group, are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the functions assigned to them.” The military departments, “separately organized,” were to “function under the direction, authority, and control” of the secretary of defense. Orders to the military departments would come through the department secretaries from the secretary of defense or from authority delegated in writing by the secretary of defense. The chain of command was to run from the president to the secretary of defense and through the Joint Chiefs to the unified commanders. The commanders would have full operational command over the forces assigned to them.


The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff constituted the immediate military staff of the secretary of defense. The JCS were the principal military advisers to the president, the NSC, and the secretary of defense. Directive 5100.1 spelled out the functions of the JCS and of the military departments and the military services. Directive 5158.1 specified that “the duties of the chiefs of the military services as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall take precedence over all of their other duties” and that they should delegate service duties to their vice chiefs. It enjoined the JCS to maintain full and effective cooperation with OSD. The directive resolved the sticky question of issuing orders to the JCS by requiring that “responsible officers” of OSD have specifically delegated authority from the secretary of defense. The authority of the JCS chairman was marginally enhanced; he received responsibility for organizing and managing the Joint Staff and appointing the director of the Joint Staff with the approval of the secretary of defense.

Drafting of the charters, issued as DoD directives, of the seven assistant secretaries,* the director of defense research and engineering, and the general counsel, also occasioned differences between OSD and the JCS and the military departments. All parties, jealous of their prerogatives and anxious to obtain as much authority as possible, engaged in disputes over language in certain charters—particularly that for the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA). Such words as “establish,” “supervise,” “monitor,” “coordinate,” and “develop” became bones of contention between opposing parties. Mutually satisfactory language concerning the responsibilities of ISA and the JCS for the military assistance program came only after more than two months of debate.

A charter for the new Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) had to await the appointment of the new director, Herbert F. York, on 24 December 1958. DDR&E would supervise all research and engineering activities in DoD, including programs

* There were eight assistant secretaries when the 1958 act was passed.

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*When pertaining to Marine Corps matters.

to meet military requirements, assignment of responsibility for developing weapons, and centralized management of research activities as directed by the secretary of defense. Challenges to the charter by the services were minimal, and it was issued on 10 February 1959. It abolished the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Engineering and transferred its functions and personnel to DDR&E.

The reorganization required expansion of the combined personnel strength of OSD and JCS from 2,176 on 30 September 1957 to 2,773 as of 30 June 1959. The increase derived largely from the growth of the Joint Staff and its support personnel and the establishment of DDR&E on a larger scale than its predecessor organization.

President Eisenhower was clearly the driving force behind the 1958 reorganization. He achieved a substantial measure of success in getting much of the change that he had proposed. To his role as chief executive and commander in chief he added the most impressive credentials of military experience. He paid especially close attention to Defense problems and expressed his views vehemently. Still, Congress had the last say on the legislation and refused to give the president some of the important changes that he had asked for, especially by limiting the power of the secretary of defense to transfer functions and requiring the secretary to exercise control through the departmental secretaries. On these issues, Congress responded to the concerns of the services and their supporters and would not yield. It would be almost three decades before these and other reorganization matters would be revisited in Congress.

It fell to Thomas S. Gates, Jr., who succeeded McElroy as secretary of defense in December 1959, to take further constructive actions that affected DoD organization and operations. Gates thought the 1958 law had been beneficial, he saw no need for further statutory changes until the reorganization had been “thoroughly digested,” and he believed that “the Secretary of Defense has great power and the administrative ability to do a great many things.” Accordingly he used his authority to further implement the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Like Forrestal, his Navy-colored perspective on DoD changed strikingly once he became secretary of defense.⁵⁶

On the same day he took office, 2 December 1959, Gates directed that all line officers would have to serve a tour of duty with a joint, combined, or OSD staff before they could be considered for promotion to general or flag officer rank. Gates initiated the practice of sitting often with the Joint Chiefs in order to reach more timely decisions. This went beyond the practice of previous secretaries, who had attended JCS meetings only occasionally. Indeed, Gates or his deputy, James H. Douglas, did make final decisions on a number of important

issues at these meetings.⁵⁷

Two JCS “splits” were of particular importance and difficulty. They involved the related matters of control of the Polaris submarine forces and unified control of strategic targeting—the salient issues in the continuing struggle between the Air Force and Navy over strategic air operations. The Polaris missile submarine introduced a new dimension of strategic operations and gave the Navy promise of a major role in such operations. The Air Force viewed the new development as a threat to its primacy in planning, targeting, and directing strategic air operations. It pushed for centralized control of all strategic air assets, including the Polaris submarines.⁵⁸

Coordinating strategic targeting to permit the most efficient and effective use of nuclear weapons caused a running dispute between the services as the number of targets and the number of commands increased. Targeting was, of course, intimately related to the conflicting strategies adhered to by the services—the Air Force’s maximum deterrent force vs. the minimum deterrent advocated by the Army and Navy. The advent of the Navy’s Polaris as a strategic deterrent weapon in competition with strategic bombers intensified the debate over deterrent strategy. The Joint Chiefs split on the issue. The Air Force proposed a “Unified Strategic Command” with two components—Air Force land-based weapons and the Navy’s Polaris force. The Navy objected and wanted Polaris placed under unified commanders with naval forces.

The central questions were development of target lists, a single operational plan, and control of the striking forces. Burke opposed an overall strategic force command and a single operational plan, insisting that strategic targeting should be a JCS responsibility. The differences between the Chiefs during 1959–60 over whether targeting should emphasize urban/industrial or military targets delayed the preparation of the annual short-term and mid-term strategic plans.

Eisenhower and Gates agreed on the need to have a mixed force that could attack and destroy both military and urban/industrial targets. For two months, from May to July 1960, Gates met repeatedly with the Joint Chiefs in a vain effort to secure agreement on strategic targeting. In a meeting with the president on 6 July he proposed that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) have responsibility for strategic targeting and for preparation of a single operational plan, acting as the agent of JCS, and that its staff for this purpose be augmented by the other services. Eisenhower fully supported Gates’s recommendations. Fearing a leak, Gates held the decision closely and presented his draft directive to the JCS on 10 August. He later recalled that “the Navy wouldn’t agree on it. The others agreed.”

The directive established a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) to be prepared under the direction of the commander in chief of SAC, who, for this function, was designated director of strategic target planning (DSTP). Directly responsible to the JCS, he would have no command authority and would have a deputy from another service and a staff drawn from all the services.

At a meeting the next day with the president, attended by Gates, Douglas, and Twining, Burke expressed strenuous opposition to the directive. He accepted integrated target planning but adamantly disputed the desirability of a single operational plan. The president rejected Burke's arguments and approved Gates's recommendation.

Burke later told Gates that he did not agree "one damn bit" with the decision but that he would support it. Gates thought that the new procedure would permit the JCS to bring SAC, a specified command, more firmly under control. The deputy DSTP would, of course, come from the Navy. The secretary issued the implementing directive on 16 August, and the JCS approved the organization of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff with the commander in chief of SAC as the director.

Although the services and some of the unified commanders continued to voice disagreements over procedures and the substance of the target list and the SIOP, the JCS approved both in December 1960. This marked an important advance in the direction of centralized control over a crucial element of the military establishment. As Robert J. Watson has observed, "From a practical standpoint, the coalescence of separate plans into a single document, subject to periodic review by the secretary of defense, greatly simplified the secretary's task in directly influencing strategy, a fact that Gates's successors were to exploit to advantage."⁵⁹

The 1958 act prompted other moves toward consolidation of DoD-wide functions in the form of Defense agencies. The first of these, the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA), was the successor to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), which had been in existence since 1947 and responsible to the service chiefs. Its mission was to provide atomic weapon technical, logistical, and training services to the armed forces and to oversee DoD participation in AEC tests of nuclear weapons. The JCS wanted to retain control of the function, but Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles established DASA at the secretarial level on 1 May 1959 with a broad mission encompassing all of DoD. The existence of DASA may have lent weight to Gates's arguments in 1960 for greater coordination of strategic targeting and planning.⁶⁰

The high cost and the steadily growing size and



Admiral Arleigh A. Burke

number of communications networks invited attention to them as objects for consolidation. Pressures came from the White House and Congress. The JCS proposed to combine long-haul facilities under their control. The services could not agree on the management of a joint military communications network, and Gates decided on an agency directly responsible to the secretary of defense. He established the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) on 12 May 1960 to supervise and control the worldwide Defense Communications System. He assuaged the Joint Chiefs by prescribing that the DCA would report to him through the JCS.

The matter of better integration of intelligence functions received serious study during the last year of the Eisenhower administration. The JCS and an interagency group headed by a CIA representative prepared reports reviewing requirements and recommending changes, but they came too late in the day for the administration to act on them. It remained for the next secretary, Robert S. McNamara, to complete the work begun by Gates.⁶¹

THE MCNAMARA YEARS

National security and the performance of the Defense Department became major issues in the presidential election of 1960 between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon. During the campaign, on 14 September, Kennedy appointed a committee of six civilians headed by Sen.

W. Stuart Symington, who had been secretary of the Air Force under Truman, to study the administration and management of the Department of Defense and to make recommendations for change. The report, presented on 5 December, proposed a radical reorganization of the military establishment. It asserted that the Department of Defense was “still patterned primarily on a design conceived in the light of lessons learned in World War II, which are now largely obsolete.” The major recommendations of the committee entailed changes far greater than any given consideration before or after. In addition to centralizing full powers in OSD, it provided for all appropriations to be made to OSD rather than to the military services. It abolished the separate military departments but retained the military services with chiefs reporting directly to the secretary of defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be superseded by a military advisory council chosen from retired senior officers and presided over by a chairman of the joint military staff who would be the principal military adviser to the president and the secretary of defense. Military forces would be placed under four unified commands—strategic, tactical, continental defense, and reserve and civil defense. The committee also wanted to abolish all of the assistant secretaries of defense and concentrate OSD functions in two under secretary positions, for administration and for weapon systems. Perhaps in response to hopes for arms control raised during the Eisenhower administration, Symington added a special assistant to the secretary of defense for arms control, declaring hopefully that it might be “the most important job in government in the coming years with the exception of the presidency.”⁶²

Harsh criticism of and resistance to the plan was predictable. Too many powerful constituencies faced being abolished or diminished by the changes; they would not tolerate the notion. There was little support from Congress, which could not be expected to allow loosening of the purse strings on behalf of the secretary of defense. The president-elect said only that he would take the Symington committee recommendations under advisement and never moved beyond that neutral position.

The new secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, early decided that he had enough power under the 1958 act to make changes in DoD and moved quickly in the direction of further centralization of functions without reference to the Symington committee recommendations, other than to mention the need to study them more closely. He explained his approach some years later: “It seemed to me, when I took office . . . that the principal problem standing in the way of efficient management of the Department’s resources was not lack of management authority—the National Security Act provides the Secretary of Defense a full measure of power—but rather the

absence of the management tools needed to make sound decisions on the really crucial issues of national security.”⁶³

McNamara’s organizational and functional innovations began even before the Kennedy administration took office. At a meeting with his future team of top DoD officials, McNamara told them that he wanted to “integrate the Service Secretaries into the Defense operation as an arm of the Secretary of Defense rather than have the Service Secretaries function only as an advocate of their own military Department.”⁶⁴ The role of the service secretaries had become more ambiguous after the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act and the reorganizations of the 1950s further diminished their stature in the military establishment. McNamara’s desire to attach them more firmly to the secretary of defense placed them in an even more awkward position in relation to their military services than they already found themselves. It may not have been coincidental that no less than 10 service secretaries held office under McNamara. Some of them plainly felt that their freedom of action had been unduly curtailed and that their relationship with their military subordinates was being compromised. Still, much depended on the individual secretary’s force of character and personality; some fared better than others.

At the very beginning of his tenure McNamara directed his general counsel, Cyrus Vance, to review existing practices and plan necessary changes. On 8 March he asked Vance to “review the activities of the total military establishment and identify those operations which can be organized to serve all services,” and to “undertake a comprehensive study of alternative long-range organizational structures for DoD.”⁶⁵ The changes that resulted from the recommendations of these studies served notice of the continuing and accelerated drive towards greater centralization of the Department of Defense—an inherent tendency present from the beginning that generally encountered opposition from the military services.

In his search for consolidation or unification of functions, McNamara pursued a course already set by his predecessor, Thomas Gates—establishment of DoD agencies.⁶⁶ In August 1961 McNamara established the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which began functioning on 1 October. The groundwork for this agency had been prepared by Gates the previous year when he initiated studies looking toward consolidation of the DoD intelligence functions. No doubt the Bay of Pigs fiasco early in 1961 hastened the creation of DIA and enabled OSD to counter objections on the usual grounds by the services and Congress. Although McNamara’s order transferred most of the military service intelligence resources to the new agency, all of the services

retained intelligence organizations of considerable size, presumably to carry out missions peculiar to the individual service and more of a tactical than a strategic nature.

The supply function offered a natural target for consolidators seeking cost reductions and more efficient field operations. The common supply elements of the military services—petroleum, automotive, clothing textiles, and medical—together added up to a large percentage of DoD expenditures. McNamara established the Defense Supply Agency in August 1961; when it became operational on 1 January 1962, it also took over responsibility for the Armed Forces Supply Support Center, the Military Management Agency, and the Consolidated Surplus Sales Offices.

Still another agency, activated by McNamara in March 1961, the Defense Communications Agency (DCA), had been established by Secretary Gates the previous year.⁶⁷ McNamara in June 1965 established the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) with the mission of lowering operating costs for DoD and its contractors by providing consistent advice to contractors, instituting uniform procedures, and exercising close contract supervision. DCAA became the seventh Defense agency, joining the National Security Agency (1952), Advanced Research Projects Agency (1958), Defense Atomic Support Agency (1959), Defense Communications Agency, and the two other agencies established in 1961 by McNamara.⁶⁸

By the late 1950s military space research and development had become a bone of contention between the military services. They all had space-related systems under development and viewed space operations as integral to their future missions. Although the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1958 had circumscribed the military authority for space research, the military role remained a large and active one, and collaboration between the civilian and military space programs was imperative.

President Kennedy asked the secretary of defense to examine the military role in space and the military space budget. Acting speedily, McNamara issued DoD Directive 5160.32 on 6 March 1961, giving the Air Force, which already had 90 percent of all military space funding, responsibility for space development programs or projects. While the directive gave the Air Force a large measure of authority over the military space program, OSD would still retain overall control through the powers accorded the director of defense research and engineering. Quick to follow up on this directive, the Air Force reorganized its research and logistical organization, consolidating all research, development, and procurement of space and aircraft weapon systems under

a new command—the Air Force Systems Command.

McNamara's decision dismayed the other services, particularly the Army, which had a flourishing missile and space program. The Army feared the loss or reduction of its missile and space programs and found it difficult to accept the change in spite of Air Force efforts to reassure the other services that it would meet their requirements. Army and Navy officers spoke against the directive in hearings before the House Space Committee, but OSD prevailed.

A function unsought by McNamara and OSD and regarded with disinterest by the JCS was thrust upon them when President Kennedy ordered DoD to assume responsibility for civil defense in July 1961. Worsening relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, further affected by the growing ICBM threat and the crisis over Berlin, had revived governmental and public concern about civil defense. In September McNamara appointed an assistant secretary for the new function, and extensive plans and programs were developed. As the problems and costs of proposed programs underwent close scrutiny in Congress and elsewhere and public concern abated, the civil defense function diminished rapidly in scale and status. In 1964 the Office of Civil Defense was transferred to the Department of the Army where it existed on a much smaller scale and with much less visibility.⁶⁹

To accommodate the need to create the position of assistant secretary of defense for civil defense and to lend more stature to the position of deputy director of research and engineering by also designating him as an assistant secretary, OSD merged four assistant secretary positions into two in 1961. It combined the offices of the ASD (Manpower and Reserves) and the ASD (Health and Medical) into the ASD (Manpower); ASD (Supply and Logistics) and ASD (Properties and Installations) were merged into ASD (Installations and Logistics). In July 1964 when the civil defense function moved to the Army, McNamara established the new position of ASD (Administration). To elevate systems analysis to a higher level, the secretary abolished the position of assistant secretary for research and engineering and assigned the assistant secretary position to systems analysis in September 1965. Finally, because of congressional action to give reserve affairs statutory sanction in the OSD organization, ASD (Manpower) was redesignated ASD (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) in 1968.⁷⁰

McNamara's disposition to bring greater centralization to DoD extended to the military forces. In 1961 he placed the U.S. Army's Strategic Army Corps and the Air Force's Tactical Air Command under a new joint combat command created for the purpose—the U.S. Strike Command, with some 170,000 personnel. A year later, on

1 October 1962, the secretary established the National Military Command System (NMCS) consisting of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon, an underground alternate center, and the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP). This created a more coherent and centralized system than the three military service global systems that had existed before. It provided the president, the secretary of defense, and the JCS with information needed to exercise swifter and more effective strategic and operational direction of the fighting forces in the unified and specified commands. This development was the first step in the evolution of a World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) that gradually took shape during the 1960s.⁷¹

A major innovation by McNamara, the institution of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), had long-term effects on management and consequently on organization throughout DoD. The intent of PPBS, inaugurated in DoD in 1961 by Charles J. Hitch, the OSD comptroller, was to provide a more thorough, analytical, and systematic way for the administration to make critical independent national security decisions with particular reference to force structure, weapon systems, and costs. At the OSD level, as previously noted, McNamara eventually elevated the function to assistant secretary rank with the title Systems Analysis. The military services found themselves under tighter constraints and more searching examination of the financial implications of alternative programs than they had yet experienced, and they reacted ambivalently. Resentful of what they considered intrusion on their traditional prerogatives, they also recognized the need to adapt to the new initiative. Accordingly, they took steps to acquire their own capability to perform the PPBS functions, educating a whole generation of officers in the necessary disciplines. As a result, OSD and the military services attained a high level of sophisticated analysis and skill in dealing with the important issues of Defense management.⁷²

McNamara's organizational innovations occurred during his first two years in office. Much of the change he wanted, such as PPBS, could be effected without statutory reorganizations. Like his predecessors, he made organizational adjustments as functions rose or fell in importance or as new functions mandated by Congress or initiated by him had to be accommodated at high staff level. He greatly enlarged the civilian staff of OSD to meet the demands on the department.

One other development of the McNamara period also had long-term consequences—the growing participation of the secretary in international affairs. By the 1960s the scale and incidence of DoD participation

in international matters had become so visible that the Pentagon was universally recognizable as a symbol and the center of the U.S. military establishment. In all the great international concerns of the 1960s—Berlin, Cuba, NATO, nuclear strategy, arms control, military assistance, and, above all, Vietnam—McNamara and DoD played a prominent and highly conspicuous role in the making of national security policy. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA), headed by a succession of able men beginning with Paul Nitze, grew in size and stature during the 1960s and came to be regarded as a policymaking rival to the State Department. ISA provided the secretary with the expertise he needed to support his positions on policy. Although secretaries who succeeded McNamara may not have exercised as great influence over foreign policy as he did, they have always had a role to play through their influence with the president, in the NSC, or with the State Department. The policy function in OSD has grown in stature within the national security establishment. The extent of its influence depends on the assertiveness and leadership of the secretary of defense.⁷³

1968-1981

The pace of change that had occurred in the early years of McNamara's tenure slowed markedly under his successors. His immediate successor, Clark Clifford, during his brief time in office, less than 11 months, was too preoccupied with the Vietnam War to pay attention to the department's organization.

As previous administrations had done at the outset of their terms or even before taking office—Eisenhower in 1953 and Kennedy in 1960—the Nixon administration commissioned a study of Defense organization. In July 1969 President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, both supporters of a strong defense, appointed a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 16 business and professional leaders to study the organization and functioning of the Department of Defense.

After almost a year of study the panel presented a 237-page report on 1 July 1970 that contained 113 recommendations, of which 15 pertained to organization. The recommended changes were almost as radical as those of the Symington committee a decade earlier and similar in some respects. Their effect was to further extend the direct control of the secretary of defense over the military establishment and diminish the stature of the JCS and the military services, but not the service secretaries and the military departments. The major recommendation affecting OSD organization grouped the functions of DoD into three categories headed by

deputy secretaries of defense—military operations (including operational command, intelligence, and communications); management of personnel and material resources; and evaluation functions (including financial controls, testing of weapons, analysis of costs, and effectiveness of force structures). For each of the major functions in the three new deputy secretariats there would be an assistant secretary. The report called for an operational staff in OSD under a senior military officer in place of the JCS military staff and the military operations staffs of the services. It also called for concentration of all military forces into three unified commands—Strategic Command, Tactical Command, and Logistics Command—under the full control of their commanders and with component commanders serving as deputies. Other proposals required extensive changes in the organization of OSD, JCS, and the military departments. Observing that all of the military headquarters staffs in Washington were excessive, the panel recommended a limitation of 2,000 on the combined departmental and military headquarters staffs; it recommended the same limitation for OSD.⁷⁴

The organizational recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel fared little better than had those of the Symington committee. Not a single major recommendation was adopted. Since the National Security Act of 1947, change in the defense establishment had been incremental. Even the 1958 reorganization had incorporated only limited requirements for organizational changes thanks to resistance by Congress, JCS, and the military departments. The panel's proposals encountered similar opposition from the same quarters and developed no strong support in either the White House or OSD. Neither Nixon nor Laird evinced the strong commitment to reform that had impelled Eisenhower to push so hard for the 1958 Defense reorganization.

A final report issued by DoD in February 1975 revealed that only three of the lesser recommendations for reorganization had come to pass. Another 9 of the total of 15 were listed as "recommendations on which the Department's actions were consistent with the panel's objectives, but which might differ on details and procedures." This spared the embarrassment of using the term "rejected" as was done with the remaining recommendations.⁷⁵

The three proposals accepted provided for an enhanced role for public affairs, a joint map service, and a net assessment office to develop net assessments of current and projected United States and foreign military capabilities. The chief outcome was the establishment of the Defense Mapping Agency in January 1972. The net assessment office, established by directive in December 1971, did not come into existence until Secretary James Schlesinger appointed a director in 1973. There

does not seem to have been any appreciable change in the public affairs function. Laird and his immediate successors did not accept the most important of the panel's recommendations—those pertaining to the realignment of DoD functions under three deputy secretaries and the changes in the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The indisposition during these years to make large changes, even those originally solicited by the secretary of defense, no doubt resulted from political obstacles in Congress and the military services during a time of Vietnam exigencies and declining budgets.⁷⁶


A few further changes did emerge, perhaps as a consequence of the Blue Ribbon Panel report. Laird established additional Defense agencies in 1971-72: the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (transferred from the Department of the Army), and the Defense Investigative Service. At Laird's request Congress authorized a second deputy secretary of defense in 1972, but the secretary did not fill the position.⁷⁷

OSD instituted a number of changes at its own initiative. In May 1969 Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard established the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), which has since existed under a number of other names. The DSARC advised the secretary of defense on the defense acquisition process from the beginning of contract definition by the military services through full scale development and finally to production. The council initially consisted of the director of defense research and engineering and the assistant secretaries of defense for installations and logistics, systems analysis, and comptroller.⁷⁸

By congressional authorization, the number of assistant secretaries of defense was increased to eight in November 1969 and to nine in December 1971. These changes permitted the appointment of assistant secretaries for health and environment and for telecommunications. In addition, Laird appointed an assistant secretary for intelligence, replacing the assistant secretary for administration, who was redesignated deputy assistant secretary and placed under the ASD/Comptroller.⁷⁹ Frequent changes in the assistant secretary positions became a normal occurrence as the status of particular functions rose or fell as circumstances and the wishes of the secretaries dictated.

The three secretaries who followed Laird—Elliot L. Richardson, James R. Schlesinger, and Donald H. Rumsfeld—during the four years 1973-77 seemed to have little time or inclination for organizational change. In 1976 Rumsfeld disestablished the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, which had been performing critical evaluations for OSD and the JCS since 1948. He also transferred control of the Defense Intelligence Agency from the JCS to OSD. A number of other lesser adjustments

Chart 8 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE November 1969



*When pertaining to Marine Corps matters.



President Nixon and the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel

occurred, the chief one in the status of systems analysis, which had its name changed to program analysis and evaluation, as it rode up and down the organizational ladder three times in three years. In December 1975, Rumsfeld filled the second deputy secretary of defense position, which had remained vacant since its creation in 1972. The incumbent confined his function to coordinating intelligence activities in DoD. The position was abolished in October 1977.⁸⁰

When Secretary Harold Brown came into office in January 1977, he had behind him almost eight years of experience in DoD—as director of defense research and engineering and as secretary of the Air Force. He brought with him ideas for streamlining the organization of the department. He felt that the secretary, with 29 major DoD offices and 8 unified and specified commands reporting to him, had to exercise too broad a span of control to manage effectively. Both OSD and the military department headquarters were too large and engaged in many activities that could be handled at lesser levels of organization. The weapon system acquisition process

and research and engineering needed closer integration. And top management needed to pay more attention to NATO, a chief cornerstone of U.S. containment policy.⁸¹

In search of consolidation of functions and better coordination in his staff, Brown early initiated a series of major changes. In March 1977 he eliminated the positions of assistant secretary for intelligence and director of telecommunications and command and control systems and merged the function into the assistant secretary for communications, command, control, and intelligence—known as C³I. In another important merger of functions he combined the office of the assistant secretary for manpower and reserve affairs and the office of the assistant secretary for installations and logistics.* This created the very large office of the assistant secretary for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics (MRA&L). In a change affecting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, legislation initiated in the House of Representatives and approved by President Carter in October 1978 made the commandant of the Marine Corps a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; since 1952 he had sat with the Joint Chiefs only for consideration of Marine Corps matters. This marked the end of a long campaign by the Marine Corps to

* The weapons systems and related procurement policy function of installations and logistics were transferred to the director of research and engineering.

achieve recognition as a fourth armed service.⁸²

After receiving congressional approval of a Defense Reorganization Order that had the effect of reducing the number of assistant secretary positions from nine to seven, in April 1977 Brown asked for legislation to eliminate the second deputy secretary and create two under secretaries—one for research and engineering and one for policy. When the law, PL 95-140, came into effect in October 1977, Brown described the reorganization as intended to “eliminate confusion regarding the distribution of authority immediately below the Secretarial level. It will also clarify the role of the remaining Deputy Secretary as the single principal assistant and alter ego to the Secretary in all areas of Defense management.”⁸³

These changes obviously derived from Brown’s desire to group functions so that he could deal with fewer than the 37 entities that he encountered on taking office. Thus the under secretary for research and engineering—USD(R&E)—had under him the ASD(C³I), the assistant to the secretary for atomic energy, and four Defense agencies. The under secretary for policy, who had the ASD(ISA) and the director of net assessment assigned to him, had responsibility for political-military affairs, arms limitation negotiations, and integration of DoD plans and policies with overall national security policies. Brown further reduced the number of officials reporting to him by assigning supervisory responsibility for the Defense agencies to under secretaries and assistant secretaries. (See chart 9) The secretary did make an important further change that added to his staff. Acting on his strong belief in the importance of NATO, in 1977 he appointed an adviser for NATO affairs who reported directly to him.⁸⁴

Whether these organizational adjustments secured the advantages for Brown and the department that he hoped for is not certain. He still had to deal, either directly or on paper, with assistant secretaries and other officials who did not report to the two under secretaries. And even subordinates of the under secretaries would sometimes go directly to the secretary, on occasion bypassing their immediate superiors. Nevertheless, on balance, Brown probably believed that he had come out ahead.

To reduce OSD numbers and to consolidate administrative and operating support, essentially housekeeping and other services for OSD, Brown created the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) in October 1977, transferring hundreds of people from OSD into WHS. This field activity, as it was categorized, had responsibility for large-scale administrative and operational support to a sizable number of DoD activities in the National Capitol Region.⁸⁵

From his previous experience in DoD, Brown had acquired an understanding and appreciation of the role of the PPBS process initiated under McNamara, but he wanted to make changes in it. He felt that the various

OSD offices that issued guidance documents needed better coordination and correlation of the documents with each other and with the JCS strategic plans, that there were too many repetitive reviews, and that too many changes occurring late in the budgeting cycle affected the programming and budgeting phases adversely.


Brown introduced a number of new features into the system to help achieve his objectives. The president and the secretary of defense would enter into the PPBS process early and remain involved in it. The services and JCS would expand their roles to provide information early and to participate in decisionmaking throughout. A consolidated guidance would replace the several guidance papers extant. The JCS would prepare a strategic planning document considering the views of the unified commanders and prepare still other documents to assist in OSD reviews. Although Brown declared that he intended the changes to enhance the role of the JCS and the military departments, there were those who did not believe that this would be the result. Among them was Graham Claytor, secretary of the Navy from 1977 to 1979 and deputy secretary of defense from 1979 to 1981. Claytor, from a broader perspective than the PPBS alone, offered the opinion on leaving office that OSD exercised too much centralized control and that it should yield more powers to the military departments and services.⁸⁶

At the instigation of the White House, which manifested a keen interest in departmental organization and administration, Brown initiated in November 1977 a study of Defense organization that eventually produced five reports that examined and made recommendations for change in the major elements of DoD. The last of the five studies was not completed until 1980, and no final consolidated report making proposals for change was prepared. Brown attempted no significant adjustments on the basis of these reports.

The main conclusions of the reports had a sharp critical tone. The JCS performance, still inadequate in most respects, had to be improved. The unified commands were weak and the component commands too strong. Too much layering of management and too much centralizing of authority in OSD needed to be corrected. Imprecise lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability and submergence of differences of opinion deprived the secretary of defense and the president of the full knowledge needed for informed decisionmaking. Moreover, the Defense agencies received inadequate supervision and responded insufficiently to the needs of the operating forces. And the combat training was defective and too much compartmented by the services.⁸⁷

This extensive litany of criticism echoed the findings of examinations of Defense organization and operations during previous decades. Lovett, Eisenhower,

Chart 9 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE June 1978



McElroy, and McNamara had all expressed discontent with the performance of the Joint Chiefs in many aspects of their proceedings. Only Eisenhower had been able to take some ameliorative measures, and these had required congressional approval. At best, it seemed that studies of DoD even by high-level panels resulted in only minor organizational and operational changes. Once again, it would require congressional action to bring about changes that would have a significant impact on the department.

THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, while presiding over a large buildup of the armed forces beginning in 1981, held to the belief that the organization of DoD was sound and required little or no change. Such changes as he himself made during his tenure were chiefly in OSD. Other and much more important changes resulted from action by Congress at its own initiative.

Weinberger described his organizational approach as “a proper balance between centralized policy formulation and decentralized program execution.” He brought the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff increasingly into consultations on policy and strengthened the role of the service secretaries by making them members of the Defense Review Board (DRB), a key decisionmaking body established by his predecessor, Harold Brown, in 1979. Under the chairmanship of the deputy secretary of defense the board played a major role in preparing the DoD budget submission and in directing the OSD review of the Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) and budget requests. Weinberger maintained close relations with the JCS chairman and the other JCS members, holding frequent meetings with them.⁸⁸

Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci undertook the active day-to-day management of the department while Weinberger engaged in the many external activities—relations with the White House, especially the president, and with Congress, the public, international bodies such as NATO, and foreign countries. Carlucci brought about changes intended to improve the PPBS process and acquisition procedures.⁸⁹

Congress displayed continuing concern about oversight in DoD and took steps to create offices for the purpose. Early on, in April 1981, Weinberger had established the office of the assistant to the secretary of defense for review and oversight “to provide a single official charged with oversight of ongoing efforts to detect waste, fraud, and abuse of DoD operations.” This move did not accord with congressional notions of independent oversight, since the new office was directly responsible to the secretary. In September 1982, therefore, Congress, against the wishes of the secretary,

enacted legislation creating the position of inspector general in the Department of Defense as an independent and objective official to supervise and initiate audits, investigations, and inspections of DoD programs and operations. The inspector general was to be responsible for keeping Congress and the secretary of defense fully informed on all matters relating to problems and deficiencies in Defense and the need for corrective action.⁹⁰

In the same vein, and again contrary to the department's preference, Congress established the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation with responsibility for field testing weapons and evaluating the results. The department had sought to make the case that the under secretary for research and engineering was already carrying out this function satisfactorily and that no separate office was needed, but Congress imposed its will in September 1983. Unhappy at the result and taking his time to respond, Weinberger did not establish the office until February 1984 and did not appoint a director until early 1985.⁹¹

Weinberger made a number of changes in the OSD organizational structure, particularly the addition of four assistant secretaries and a reshuffling of functions between some of the assistant secretaries. One significant change, to accommodate a new appointee, Richard N. Perle, transferred responsibility for handling European, NATO, and Soviet Union matters from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) to the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ISP). Congress enacted explicit statutory authority for two existing positions—the assistant secretary for reserve affairs and the assistant secretary for command, control, communications, and intelligence. With congressional sanction other assistant secretary positions were created, raising the total number of assistant secretaries from 7 to 11. The net result of these changes was a great widening of Weinberger's span of control. By September 1985 as many as 42 officials, including the individual members of the JCS, might report to the secretary.⁹²


A strong impulse for reorganization and reform had been intensifying in Congress and elsewhere for a number of years before 1985. Dissatisfaction with the performance of DoD surfaced from many sources and for a host of reasons—some legitimate, some driven by politics or bureaucratic infighting; persistent, the criticisms could not be ignored.

After the Vietnam War, as had occurred after previous wars, the armed forces reduced their strength to the point where it was alleged that they were “hollow” forces, lacking in weapons, equipment, and readiness. President Carter and Secretary Brown began to reverse this downward trend in the last year or two of their

administration, but it remained for President Reagan and Weinberger, beginning in 1981, to carry through the rebuilding process. Huge increases in Defense spending for weapons and supplies focused attention on procurement practices and deficiencies and led to demands for reform of the procurement system and subsequently of other elements of the DoD organization. The rapidly mounting cost of defense as part of the overall budget and the soaring deficit created strong interest in and increasing demand for greater efficiency in DoD. "Horror stories" about excessive expenditures for weapons and equipment embarrassed the department and fueled the demands for reform from Congress, which placed the whole Defense structure under scrutiny. The House of Representatives, in 1982 and for several years following, passed a JCS reform bill on which the Senate took no action. The absence of any serious efforts at Defense reform in the Senate was generally ascribed to the unwillingness of the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. John Tower, regarded as a strong Navy adherent, to take any steps toward change. But the momentum for reform gained steadily.⁹³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained a major target of complaint. Dissatisfaction with the JCS had existed from the beginning in 1947. Secretaries of defense and other officials and outside critics had often pointed to the ineffectiveness of the JCS organization in making decisions and providing support to the secretary of defense. In the 1980s the impetus for reform came from a number of converging circumstances. Criticism of the command structure, particularly the JCS and the unified commands, intensified and came from military leaders as well as others. In 1981-82 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General David C. Jones severely criticized the JCS as inadequate and ineffective in discharging their functions. Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer proposed far-reaching changes to overcome JCS deficiencies. Other JCS members, the Navy and Marine Corps chiefs, defended the existing organization. Analyses and criticism multiplied rapidly as the shortcomings that characterized such recent military operations as Desert One (Iran), Lebanon, and Grenada became public knowledge.⁹⁴

An especially telling critique in February 1985 came from a study sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Entitled *Toward A More Effective Defense*, it had the endorsement of six former secretaries of defense—McNamara, Clifford, Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger, and Brown. They pointed particularly to the need to strengthen joint military institutions and to improve the quality of military advice. These were familiar refrains, but with the passage of the years the need for improvement seemed to have become more urgent.



General David C. Jones

The main recommendations of the CSIS study centered on defense planning and military advice, program execution, resource allocation, and congressional oversight. The chairman of the JCS should be the principal adviser to the president, NSC, and secretary of defense, and the under secretary for policy should have a broader role. The budget should be on a biennial basis, the PPBS process streamlined, and the unified commanders should have greater authority. The study recommended creation of a third under secretary of defense position to oversee programs for readiness and sustainability of forces in the field. Finally, it called for reductions in the size of OSD, the civilian and military staffs of the military departments, and the staffs of the relevant congressional committees and agencies. The CSIS study echoed many of the themes of previous studies of DoD organization. It succeeded in clearly posing basic questions and issues pertaining to Defense organization and operations and making balanced suggestions for change. The study gained the attention of Congress, DoD, and the informed public.⁹⁵

As early as June 1983 the Senate Armed Services Committee had asked its staff to prepare a comprehensive study of the organization and functioning of the Department of Defense. The study received little encouragement and support until the departure of chairman John Tower at the end of 1984. His successor, Sen. Barry Goldwater, a strong advocate of DoD reform, ordered a

full-scale effort on the study under the direction of staff assistant James R. Locher III. The ranking minority member of the committee, Sen. Sam Nunn, worked closely with Goldwater throughout the legislative process leading to the passage of a bill in 1986, adding considerable political weight to the bipartisan pro-reform forces. When completed in October 1985, the 600-page study, entitled *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, offered a comprehensive assessment, addressing issues of civilian control of the military, OSD, JCS, unified and specified commands, military departments, PPBS, acquisition, and congressional review and oversight. It announced in the first sentence of the Executive Summary that it was “critical of the current organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense (DoD) and of the Congress.” The report made 91 specific recommendations, many of them sweeping, such as replacing the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a Joint Military Advisory Council composed of four-star officers, other than chiefs of staff, on their last tour of duty.

The study contained a large menu of possible changes and therefore provided only “a starting point for inquiry by the Committee on Armed Services.” It recommended establishing three under secretary positions in OSD; giving a variety of powers to the chairman of the Joint Military Advisory Council, especially that of principal adviser to the secretary of defense on operational matters; removing the service component commanders from the operational chain of command; and creating the position of assistant secretary of defense for strategic planning. Finally, it recommended fully integrating the secretariats and the military headquarters staffs in the Departments of the Army and Air Force and partially integrating the secretariat and military headquarters in the Department of the Navy. The Department of the Navy was treated differently because of its dual-service structure.⁹⁶

This study, although prepared for a congressional committee by its own staff, did not fare much better than its many predecessor studies that examined DoD organization. It received much attention but only a few of its recommendations, dealing chiefly with personnel management and the chain of command, survived the congressional debates the next year and were enacted in law in some modified form.

Before Congress could act, the widespread concern about the management of the department caused President Reagan in 1985 to establish a commission “to study defense management policies and procedures, including the budget process, the procurement system, legislative oversight, and the organizational and operational arrangements, both formal and informal, among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command



Senator Barry M. Goldwater

system, the Military Departments, and the Congress.” The president and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger established the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management reluctantly. The chairman of the commission was David Packard, a former deputy secretary of defense.⁹⁷

A rising tide of congressional and public inquiry into and criticism of DoD had played no small part in impelling the administration to establish the Packard Commission. While the commission did its work, Congress moved to effect reforms also. Secretary Weinberger, who did not consider the commission necessary, believed that he could meet the requirement for reforms by executive action and did not request Congress to make changes. This time, in a departure from previous practice, the initiative and the demand for further changes came from the legislative branch rather than the executive.⁹⁸

President Reagan, taking an increasingly favorable attitude toward the commission, moved quickly to respond to its recommendations. He issued Executive Order 12526 in April 1986 implementing a number of the proposals made in the commission’s interim report in February. These included changes in national security planning and budgeting, improvements in communication between the secretary of defense and the JCS chairman and the combatant commanders, increases in the authority of the combatant commanders, and most of the changes pertaining to acquisition organization and

procedures that could be made by executive action. Other changes would require statutory sanction. Following up with a special message to Congress on 24 April, Reagan enunciated general principles of Defense organization, defined special relationships between the president and the secretary of defense and the JCS chairman, and asked for congressional support for Defense reform. He asked also for two-year Defense budgets and multi-year procurement.⁹⁹

The commission issued an interim report on 28 February 1986 followed in June by the final report that included little more than a page on military organization and command but made significant recommendations. It called for designating the JCS chairman as the "principal uniformed military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense," placing the Joint Staff under his exclusive direction and removing the statutory limit on the number of officers on the staff. It recommended establishment of a vice chairman who would be a sixth member of the JCS. The report proposed strengthening the powers of the unified commanders and revising the Unified Command Plan to permit greater flexibility in delineating the command areas. It recommended creation of a single unified command for land, sea, and air transportation.¹⁰⁰

On the procurement or acquisition side of DoD, its other major concern, the commission recommended statutory creation of an under secretary of defense for acquisition at a level equivalent to that of the deputy secretary. He would "set overall policy for procurement, and research and development (R&D), [and] supervise the performance of the entire acquisition system" To complement the under secretary, the military departments should each establish a comparable senior position to be occupied by a top-level civilian presidential appointee. Other recommended changes were intended to streamline the acquisition process and cut through red tape.¹⁰¹

Following up on the recommendations of the Packard Commission, Congress completed action to reform procurement and related functions. In the Military Reform Act of 1 July 1986, it created the position of under secretary for acquisition at the same pay grade as the deputy secretary of defense and gave him authority over the departmental secretaries in acquisition matters. This created another potentially powerful centralizing executive in OSD. The act also created an acquisition executive for each of the military departments and program executives for each major weapon program.¹⁰²

Before the end of 1985 it became apparent that committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate would introduce legislation on reform of DoD in the coming 1986 session. Secretary Weinberger, still



Senator Sam Nunn

opposed to congressionally-mandated changes, notified Goldwater that he was prepared to accept a number of the changes being considered, notably some pertaining to the JCS chairman. Consistent with their positions since 1945, the Navy and the Marine Corps worked to prevent passage of the legislation or to dilute it. Opponents of reform, chiefly the Department of the Navy and its secretary, John Lehman, through sympathetic members of the Senate committee, offered 87 amendments intended to water down the thrust of the bill, but these had little success. In May 1986 the Senate approved the bill by a vote of 95 to 0. Concurrently the recommendations of the Packard Commission embodied in the Military Reform Act of 1 July 1986 were moving through Congress and the two bills no doubt interacted to influence members of Congress to favor reform of DoD. Moreover, the support of the White House for reform undercut the efforts of OSD and Navy opponents. The House passed its bill on reform in August by a vote of 382 to 17, and in the ensuing House-Senate conference to resolve differences between the two bills, the House had little trouble prevailing on provisions that tended to strengthen the reforms. Both houses passed the Goldwater-Nichols bill in September.¹⁰³

Thus, the Goldwater-Nichols* Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433, 1 October 1986)


* After Sen. Barry Goldwater (Arizona) and Rep. Bill Nichols (Alabama).

represented the culmination of the preceding several years of debate, hearings, and public discussions on the management of the Defense establishment. Like every prior legislative or executive reorganization of the Defense Department it was the product of compromise—between the Senate and the House, which had different versions of the legislation, between DoD and Congress, and between the services. It was a greatly modified statute that emerged from the legislative mill—one that discarded most of the more radical ideas originally considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee—but it clearly reflected the strong sentiment in Congress for change. It also endorsed the main organizational recommendations of the Packard Commission.¹⁰⁴

The act reiterated the intent of Congress to strengthen civilian authority in DoD, to improve military advice to higher authority, to increase the stature and authority of unified commanders, and to improve joint officer management policies. It prescribed structural changes intended to help institutionalize functional and operational adjustments.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense had been in existence since 1947 but had never been established by statute. It had been an extension of the secretary himself, deriving legislative sanction only for the principal officials down to assistant secretaries. Now, in 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act formally established the Office of the Secretary of Defense and prescribed its composition. Its function was to assist the secretary in discharging his duties and responsibilities. As in previous organizational legislation, the act forbade the establishment of a military staff in OSD although it permitted the assignment of military officers to OSD.¹⁰⁵

The emphasis on change centered on the military command structure. The act provided for a stronger and more active JCS chairman who would be the principal adviser to the president, NSC, and secretary of defense. It increased his powers in relation to the JCS, gave him full authority over a strengthened Joint Staff, and control over development of joint doctrine. Although designated the highest-ranking officer, the chairman could not exercise military command over the JCS or the armed forces. The law required that not less than once every three years the chairman submit to the president or the secretary of defense “a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the armed forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces.” To assist the chairman and act in his place when necessary, the act created the position of vice chairman of the JCS with rank second only to the chairman’s. This increased the membership to six, but the vice chairman had a vote only when acting as chair-



Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr.

man. As the manager of the Joint Staff, the chairman could select its director and officers and prescribe its duties. Once again Congress manifested its opposition to a general staff by specifying that the “Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority.” The act limited the size of the staff to its then 1,627 military and civilian personnel.¹⁰⁶

The Goldwater-Nichols Act clarified the chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders. The commanders in chief of the unified commands came directly under the secretary—the chairman and the JCS were not in the command chain. The act authorized the secretary to use the chairman as his channel of communication to the unified commanders, and this has generally been the practice. The emphasis on the primacy of the secretary of defense in the military establishment reiterated a major theme of all major Defense Department organizational legislation since 1949 and clearly reflected the intent of Congress.¹⁰⁷

Goldwater-Nichols significantly increased the authority, responsibilities, and powers of the combatant (unified) commander in giving direction to subordinate commands, prescribing the chain of command, employing forces within his command, assigning command functions, and coordinating and approving administration and support to carry out missions. Congress stipulated that “the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that a commander of a

combatant command has sufficient authority, direction, and control over the commands and forces assigned to the command to exercise effective command.” Moreover, separate budget proposals for such activities of the combatant commanders, as might be determined by the secretary of defense after consultation with the chairman, should be included in the annual DoD budget.¹⁰⁸

In 1996, civilian and military leaders, including a combatant commander, believed that the legislation had facilitated greater jointness in the unified commands, including jointness in training and operations. They also felt that the CINCs had acquired more direct input to planning and programming in Washington. At the same time the CINCs dealt directly with service chiefs when they thought necessary and appropriate. Thus there continued between the DoD entities a complex interaction whose extent and nature depended often on personal outlooks and relationships among the principals.¹⁰⁹

In its pursuit of greater jointness in the military establishment, to emphasize the importance of duty on joint staffs and to ensure the assignment of highly capable officers to joint staffs, the act gave extensive treatment to joint officer personnel policy—Title IV. This established management policies for joint specialty officers, promotion policy objectives and procedures, education prescriptions, length of joint duty assignments, and joint duty assignments as prerequisites for promotion to general or flag officer rank. To some, perhaps many, of the military leaders of the services and commanders this appeared to be excessive micro-management by Congress, imposing burdensome procedures on them. They would have preferred more general prescriptions and procedures.¹¹⁰

In Title III, the act increased OSD oversight of the Defense agencies and Defense field activities. It specified that the secretary of defense should assign responsibility for the overall supervision of each Defense agency and each DoD field activity to a civilian officer in OSD or to the chairman of the JCS. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency were excepted from this provision.¹¹¹

The statute prescribed uniformity in the responsibilities of the service secretaries to the secretary of defense and also directed that in each of the services the secretaries and chiefs would have the same basic responsibilities and reporting relationships. Title V delineated in detail the responsibilities and functions of the chiefs and their staffs. It also enumerated the responsibilities of the secretaries and assigned them “sole responsibility” for certain functions. By giving the secretaries authority to make changes in organizational arrangements between their own secretariat staffs and the military staffs, including transfer of functions and


personnel from the military staff to the secretariat, it was expected that duplication between the two staffs would be reduced. The major change seemed to be the consolidation of the acquisition and financial functions under the secretaries, both within their departments and in relation to the secretary of defense. Although the organizational changes that ensued did not occur without some friction, they did seem to have the effect of enhancing the stature of the service secretaries. In 1995 the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces concluded that the existence of two or more staffs in each department did not make for efficiency and recommended a single integrated staff of civilians and military. Resistance to such a merger of staffs was strong, especially on the part of the military staffs. Moreover, it would require statutory authorization to bring it about.¹¹²

The Goldwater-Nichols act clearly intended to clarify command lines and the division of responsibilities among the armed services by transferring more authority from the services to the JCS chairman, the combatant commanders, and the departmental secretaries. The law repeatedly enjoined the secretary of defense to see to it that the various provisions were carried out.

The armed services were perceived as the central core of the military establishment and as the chief opponents of changes in organizational and command arrangements, which they generally viewed as threats to their roles and authority in DoD. Their presence at the seat of power in Washington and the strong staff resources they had at their disposal enabled them to exercise influence in Congress, OSD, and the Joint Staff. The unified commanders, by contrast, most of them far removed from Washington, dependent on staffs supplied by and with strong ties to the services, could not hope to compete with the services for power without strong support from the secretary of defense and, after Goldwater-Nichols, from the JCS chairman. With the increased powers accorded him under the act, the chairman could become a major control center in DoD and help to effect the desired changes. The relationship between the secretary and the chairman also took on an added dimension of importance with the increased authority of the latter. Still, the chairman's closest military colleagues were the other members of the JCS, and he could not help but be influenced by them and have to take into account their positions on issues. Although more than the first among equals in the JCS, a pragmatic chairman had to remain aware that both as a corporate body and individually the chiefs were, after him, still the highest ranking and most influential military leaders.

Legislation mandating change cannot foresee contingencies that might delay or obstruct implementation of its provisions. The printed document is not immedi-

Chart 10 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE August 1989



ately self-fulfilling; it is a blueprint rather than a detailed prescription, dependent on the will and the competence of those charged with making it work. In an institution as gigantic as the Department of Defense change cannot come swiftly, except in time of war. Thus, the various changes required by Goldwater-Nichols and related legislation proceeded at an uneven pace, most of them slowly, carefully, and generally thoughtfully. The creation of an under secretary of defense for acquisition and counterparts in the military departments proceeded quickly but not without difficulties. The reform that would take the longest to have the desired result would no doubt be the creation of joint staffs in the JCS and unified commands that would be able to transcend military service bias.

The accretion and exercise of his new powers by the chairman of the JCS proceeded cautiously under Admiral William J. Crowe, chairman until October 1989, and more expeditiously and vigorously under General Colin L. Powell, who served until October 1993. Augmenting the role of the unified commanders required adjustments that often proved difficult or took time to implement. The commanders themselves, who were, after all, members of one service or another, may sometimes have found themselves in ambivalent situations. The secretaries of defense, especially Secretary Weinberger, were cautious in effecting changes in the command structure. Secretary Richard B. Cheney generally agreed with the changes recommended by General Powell. The unified commanders had been given an opportunity to participate in the budget process since the early 1980s, but it remained difficult to determine to what extent their requirements should be accommodated as against those of the services.

As always, while the changes in organization and functions were significant in themselves and brought about adjustments, the extent, speed, and effectiveness of change depended on the people charged with its implementation. They, in turn, had to contend with the realities of shifting relations between huge institutions of long-standing tradition, jealous of their prerogatives and fearful of the consequences of change. This is not uncommon in large bureaucratic institutions, but the Department of Defense was unique in its great size, its diverse and powerful components, and the complex civil-military relationship.

The changes set in motion by Goldwater-Nichols gradually achieved many of the effects intended by Congress for the JCS. The pace quickened greatly under General Powell, who exercised his powers with much assurance and forcefulness. He established beyond doubt the role of the chairman as the ranking officer of the armed forces. The Gulf War afforded him the opportunity

to employ powers that gave him some of the appearance, if not the responsibility, of exercising overall command, a function that he did not possess in law. His organizational achievements had to do principally with the unified commands and the creation of a Joint Staff that emphasized jointness—the concept that informed much of his thinking and actions. The Joint Staff, subject to the chairman as never before, and much less subject to the pull of service interest, is regarded as having reached a level of joint thinking and behavior that generally transcends service loyalties. Because it is looking more like a general staff, it may encounter more criticism and opposition in the future. In spite of the support this trend toward joint behavior has enjoyed, the possibility of a reaction by those fearful of militarism and a more unitary military establishment is always present.

The creation of the position of vice chairman of the JCS was also a significant development that pointed to further adjustments in relationships among the top echelon of the military. As the second-ranking member of the Joint Chiefs, the vice chairman constitutes another power center in the JCS for control and change and further diminishes the role of the service chiefs.¹¹³

The vice chairman's role took on increased stature from his chairmanship of the Joint Resources Oversight Council (JROC), whose membership included the vice chiefs of staff of the four military services and the director



Admiral William J. Crowe



General Colin L. Powell

of the Joint Staff. In an effort to transcend service interests and achieve a DoD-wide outlook, the JROC undertook the formidable and highly sensitive task of determining future weapon priorities for the services, thus providing the JCS chairman and the secretary of defense with a better informed basis for making decisions. As with other major innovations in Defense, the success of the JROC will depend on a continued evolution toward genuine jointness in making decisions. This may well be a painful and prolonged process for the military services, all of which have strong preferences for weapon systems that are designed to maintain and further advance their roles and missions.¹¹⁴

Changes in OSD organization occurred in 1993-94 under Secretaries Les Aspin and William J. Perry. Strongly influenced by his perception of a vastly changed international scene, Aspin focused his attention on the policy function and established six assistant secretary positions subordinate to the under secretary for policy. He did not see this reorganization through before his departure in February 1994; the number of assistant secretaries in USD/Policy was thereafter reduced to four. The creation in 1994 of two more under secretaries—personnel and readiness, and comptroller and chief financial officer—added to the layering effect. This was further compounded by the elevation to statutory rank of the principal deputy under secretary for policy and the principal deputy under secretary for acquisition and technology.¹¹⁵

The Goldwater-Nichols Act had not addressed the perennial and contentious question of service roles and missions. Continuing congressional unease about redundancy and overlapping of functions between the services and the search for savings in the cost of the Department of Defense led to calls for further changes. In November 1993 Congress mandated the establishment of the Commission on Roles and Missions in the Armed Forces to examine service responsibilities and make recommendations “to improve military effectiveness and eliminate needless duplication.” Secretary Perry announced in March 1994 the appointment of a commission to be chaired by John P. White, a former assistant secretary of defense then at Harvard University, and including among other members former Secretary of Defense Aspin.¹¹⁶

The commission was to conduct a one-year study and submit its recommendations to the secretary of defense and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. The long-standing disagreements among the services on roles and missions soon emerged with the usual manifestations of service interest and complicated the work of the commission. Inevitably the services sought to maintain and strengthen their roles within the establishment, sometimes at each other's expense. The Air Force, in particular, proposed changes designed to enhance its role at the expense of the other services, which responded to the Air Force's initiatives by arguing that they should not only retain their present missions but add some new assignments.

When the commission made its final report in May 1995 it offered more than 100 specific recommendations, but it did not suggest any radical changes. It focused chiefly on the capability of the unified combatant commands' forces to engage in joint operations and on DoD support operations. It recommended no departures from the traditional roles and missions of the services. Recommendations called for more joint education and training; more joint planning for combined operations; reform of the budget process and consideration of a two-year budget cycle; reduction in service bureaucracies; and increased use of the commercial marketplace for non-combat functions and services. A particularly controversial recommendation that seemed unlikely to come about called for combining the departmental secretariats and the military staffs and reducing the number of political appointees in the service secretariats.¹¹⁷

The Department of Defense accepted approximately two-thirds of the commission's proposals, most of them non-controversial, and rejected only a few. The secretary created the Roles and Missions Senior Advisory Group, chaired by the deputy secretary of defense, to oversee

implementation of key commission recommendations and further consideration of other recommendations. Since important changes in large institutions do not come quickly, the full effects of the commission's work will not be seen for some time.¹¹⁸

UNIFIED COMMANDS

Of particular significance among the changes wrought by Goldwater-Nichols was the expanded responsibilities and authority accorded the unified commands.¹¹⁹ The Unified Command Plan (UCP) approved by President Truman in December 1946 established seven unified commands and a "specified" command—the Strategic Air Command. The National Security Act of 1947 required that the Joint Chiefs of Staff create "unified commands," and the Reorganization Act of 1958 confirmed in law the concept of "unified or specified combatant commands." The number of commands varied over the years, but in the early 1980s there were 10 unified and specified commands.

Between 1983 and 1987 three new unified commands were formed from existing ones and additional component forces. The U.S. Space Command came into existence on 23 September 1985 after more than two years of study and debate. Much of the driving force for its creation came from the strong support that President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger gave the Strategic Defense Initiative,* a space-oriented missile defense concept. The new command replaced the Air Force's Aerospace Defense Command.

The initiative for the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) came from Congress, which overrode JCS opposition and passed legislation in November 1986 mandating creation of a unified combatant command for special operations by 15 April 1987, as well as appointment of an assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict. The establishment of the new command set off a chain reaction that affected most of the other unified commands. The Readiness Command was disestablished and its units distributed among other commands. SOCOM took over all active and reserve special operations forces; its responsibilities included training, special exercises, planning, and commanding special missions, including low-intensity conflicts and non-traditional threats. It stood unique among unified commands because of special statutory authority it possessed over some personnel functions and the development and procurement of weapons and equipment.

The need for an effective unified transportation command had been apparent for many years but sporadic

efforts to bring it about had usually foundered on the inability of the military services to agree. The Packard Blue Ribbon Commission recommended creation of a unified command integrating land, sea, and air transportation, and President Reagan on 1 April 1986 directed that it be done. After more than a year of disagreement between the services, Secretary Weinberger ordered activation of a unified U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM); it came into being on 1 July 1987. The Military Airlift Command became a component command of USTRANSCOM. The new command gathered into its hands the reins of authority over functions performed by its service component commands. Only in February 1992, thanks to the persistent efforts of JCS Chairman Powell, did USTRANSCOM receive single manager control of DoD transportation in place of the service secretaries. This represented a considerable move toward centralization. It also provided another lesson in the difficulties almost always encountered in efforts to promote greater centralization of functions at what the military services and their secretaries might regard as their expense. Consolidation or integration of functions in strengthened and enlarged unified commands tended to diminish the authority, responsibilities, and stature of the services. The Navy and the Marine Corps remained the most inveterate in opposing this accelerating trend toward what became known as jointness. But more radical changes were yet to come.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War inevitably brought about wholesale changes in the U.S. military establishment. Large force reductions would require major adjustments throughout the services, and particularly in the unified commands. The requirement in the Goldwater-Nichols Act that the JCS conduct a biennial review of the Unified Command Plan meant that the combatant commands endured virtually continual review. The conjunction of political, economic, and strategic circumstances in the 1990s made further change inevitable.

Proposals within the Joint Staff envisaged consolidation of commands and reduction in their number. These may have been driven in part by the fear that Congress might take its own initiative in revising the UCP. The most important and, as it turned out, the most feasible changes involved the strategic forces and the forces based in the continental United States.

The notion of a unified strategic command had been considered and rejected throughout the 1980s. In 1991 all of the Joint Chiefs affirmed support for a unified Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Chairman Powell recommended and President Bush approved the

* The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was placed under OSD.

establishment of the new command, and it began functioning on 1 June 1992, when the Strategic Air Command ceased to exist. The component elements included ICBMs, bombers, battle management, ballistic missile submarines, and a strategic communications wing. These came from the new Air Combat Command and the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. In 1993, reflecting a continued shift in focus from the former Soviet nuclear threat to potential regional conflicts, the bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft were reassigned to the new U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) in recognition of their conventional capabilities.

The other significant change in the command structure involved satisfying the need for joint training and packaging of the combat forces stationed in the continental United States. This proposal to bring Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine component commands under a single headquarters set off two years of studies and arguments that Secretary Les Aspin resolved in April 1993 by his decision to assign additional functional responsibilities to a much-expanded U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The enlarged combatant command, which now included major components from all four services—Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Air Combat Command, Atlantic Fleet, and Marine Forces Atlantic—would have responsibility for joint training, force packaging, and deployment of assigned forces. FORSCOM, the last of the specified commands, became a component command under USACOM. The changes became effective on 1 October 1993.

In 1997 there still remained nine unified combatant commands, designated as either geographic or functional commands. The geographic commands included EUCOM, Pacific Command, USACOM, Southern Command (responsible for most of Latin America), and Central Command (CENTCOM) (responsible for the Southwest Asia area). The functional commands were Space Command, SOCOM, TRANSCOM, and STRATCOM. Given the volatility and pressures of the domestic and international scenes, further changes in the UCP might be expected in the next several years.

Creation of the functional commands had come only after much controversy, for the services saw these commands as powerful rivals to their own positions in the military establishment. The functional commands incorporated forces that had previously been specified commands or had been major elements of the military services. And in the geographic commands also, the unified combatant commanders acquired increased powers over the service component commands as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

In bringing about the changes in the UCP between 1991 and 1993, JCS Chairman Powell provided much of

the initiative and the driving force. He resolved important differences between the services, achieved agreement through persuasion to the extent possible, and made key decisions that brought the changes into effect. Powell crusaded tirelessly to bring about a higher degree of jointness in key elements of the military establishment—the combatant commands, operations, training, and the Joint Staff. The momentum toward jointness carried over into the term of Powell's successor as chairman, General John M. D. Shalikashvili.

CONCLUSION

Change in the Department of Defense over a period of half a century has proceeded slowly. The department is a huge institution with many diverse and often contending elements, some of which have been continually or intermittently resistant to reforms, most of which they viewed as affecting them adversely. Still, change has occurred and it has moved in the direction of centralization of authority, chiefly in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Throughout most of the history of the Department of Defense the military services have been the core around which other elements of the department have revolved. The services received and spent almost all of the money, commanded most of the people, and had responsibility for carrying out the basic functions of the establishment—most weighty and ultimately most controlling of all, the conduct of military operations. Through their membership in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the uniformed heads of the services were the chief military advisers to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. Their instinct, born out of both service loyalty and their interpretation of the national interest, was to protect and advance the interests of their services.

Under a system that necessarily imposed ceilings on funds and manpower, there inevitably occurred interservice competition for these vital resources, its intensity varying with the monies made available to DoD. The competition for money was directly reflected in the factors that determined the division of funds among the services. Thus the services differed in their estimates of the threat to the United States, each finding the threat in its own sphere high, if not paramount. Their approaches to strategy, deriving in large part from their view of the threat, also followed service interest, so that the strategic plans developed by the JCS often represented an effort at consensus to satisfy the interests of all of the services. Development of weapons became a major arena of competition because of the revolutionary impact of advanced weapons on combat missions. To own and deploy these weapons could make a great deal of difference in the stature and role of a service. To own

a share of the unified commands could help ensure the participation in combat operations that gave a service high public visibility and provided evidence of its essential role.

Because the functions assigned to a service could profoundly affect its relative status among the armed forces, the roles and missions battles remained the most intense between the services. Battles over money, weapon systems, strategic plans, and the threat all related to roles and missions. Missiles, bombers, aircraft carriers, Army and Marine divisions were the stuff of which military services were made, and their numbers were crucial to the size and status of each service. Interservice battles ranged over the whole spectrum of weapons and functions: Air Force bombers vs. Navy aircraft carriers; development, control, and deployment of nuclear weapons; development and control of ballistic missiles; command of strategic forces; Air Force vs. Army aviation; command of tactical air in theaters of operations (Korea and Vietnam); control of air transport; responsibility for air defense; military space responsibilities. What a service did would determine what it got, and what it got would determine how much it could do. The link between money and missions dominated all else.

These long-established, well-entrenched military services presented a formidable challenge to secretaries of defense seeking to bring about unification or closer integration of the services. Supported by powerful congressional, industrial, and public constituencies, each service could bring to bear strong pressures on the president and the secretary of defense. To contend with these independent-minded baronies, the secretaries of defense had to develop their own organization—the Office of the Secretary of Defense—and to seek support in Congress as well as from the White House.

Congress exercised its constitutional role in providing for the common defense primarily through its control of the purse, but it also had statutory authority over the organization and functions of the Department of Defense. Until the 1980s, most initiatives in seeking changes in DoD organizational functions came from the executive—the president and the secretaries of defense. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, in particular, from strong conviction worked persistently to bring about reforms in the defense establishment. Still, it is clear that the most effective and far-reaching changes have come about as the result of congressional action, whether at the instance of the president or Congress. Thus the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953, the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 brought about real changes because they had legislative authority. The Blue Ribbon Panel of 1970, the

organization studies under Secretary Brown in the late 1970s, and the Packard Commission had limited effect because the president and the secretary of defense were free to accept or reject their recommendations. In the 1980s Congress, alarmed by the costliness and apparent waste in DoD and the command and operational failures in recent military actions such as Desert One and Grenada, seized the initiative and wrought major changes.

Congress consistently exercised its powers over money and organization in a major issue that engaged its attention throughout the years after World War II—the role of the National Guard (Army and Air Force) and the organized reserves of the four services, which have constituted a significant element in DoD. The size, composition, cost, readiness, and very existence of these components have been matters repeatedly debated and manipulated by the contending parties, with Congress using its legislative powers to make the decisions. Cost and readiness are the nub of the differences between DoD and the reserve elements.

The military services, which bear more than 90 percent of the National Guard costs and all of the costs of the organized reserves, are especially prone to seek cuts in the reserves in times of declining budgets—typically after a war or, more recently, the Cold War. The services have a natural preference for regular units over reserve units, pointing to the former's higher state of readiness for quick deployment in times of emergency. President Eisenhower, a former Army officer of great eminence, in spite of repeated efforts failed to persuade Congress to make cuts of any size in the reserve forces. These components, especially the National Guard, appealing to the tradition of the citizen-soldier and the local economic benefits derived from dispersion of reserve units throughout the country, gained and kept strong backing in Congress, whose members readily appreciated the political benefits of support from this constituency. The legislators manifested their support through statutes that established assistant secretaries for reserve forces in OSD and the three military departments and through other frequent legislation affecting most features of the reserves. Thus, reserve forces have remained an important political factor in the defense equation, affecting budgets, organizations, and functions.

If the military services often had to yield on such issues as the reserve forces, their tenacity in seeking to hold on to the levers of power within DoD should not be underestimated. They understood the effect that centralization of functions at higher levels or in organizations separate from them would have on their individuality as services and their ability to influence operations of the Department of Defense. The military have had a culture that transcended the obligation placed on their members

by service in OSD, on the Joint Staff, or on the unified combatant command staffs. The allegiance of officers was to their services, and those on joint staffs who were perceived not to be serving the interests of their services paid a career penalty—sometimes severe. A major element of this culture was conviction of the essentiality and even primacy of the combat missions assigned to the service. Therefore the services almost instinctively resisted encroachment on or abridgment of their functions from any direction. Over the years, this culture worked as a brake on efforts to integrate or unify functions and forces and attenuated the notion of jointness. The changes set in motion by Goldwater-Nichols, however, promoted a culture of jointness that may have a profound effect on some aspects of the traditional service culture.

The imposition of a civilian-dominated OSD on top of the departmental secretaries, the services, and the JCS had a strong effect on civil-military relationships. The American military, with a few notable exceptions over the years, has accepted and supported the constitutional principle of civil control of the military establishment. But at the same time, they have sought to retain as much authority and responsibility for their own services as they can get for themselves from Congress and the executive branch. The injection of the secretary of defense into the chain of command as a deputy commander in chief supported by a large staff tended to raise the level of friction that normally existed between the civil and military authority.

As the secretary's powers grew, the services had to give way on budget, manpower, and weapon system decisions—to render unto Caesar the things that were Caesar's. But on matters that they considered the province of the professional military, they contested the authority of the secretary. How to organize, equip, train, and deploy their forces, the weapons, strategy, and tactics for employment in combat—these they regarded as their responsibility and beyond the capacity of civilians to determine. Where to draw the line between civil and military authority has been a constant issue and an underlying factor in many of the problems that have had to be resolved. The civilian-military relationship has always carried within it the seeds of dispute over demarcation of lines of authority and responsibility. The high turnover rate of statutory civilian officials in OSD further aggravated the military perception of them as lacking in military experience or knowledge. Where the line was drawn depended on circumstances and the officials involved.

The continual trend toward centralization of authority in OSD received incremental reinforcement from statutory law over the years, sometimes reluctantly by Congress, which generally had reservations about the

extent to which centralization was desirable and consequently tended to moderate proposals for far-reaching reform looking toward much greater centralization. Still, through the exercise and extension of his powers, practice that varied with the individual secretary of defense and his perception of the role he should play, a secretary could make a difference in advancing centralization. Major international crises and conflicts of the past half century have afforded the secretaries opportunities for highly visible displays of their capacity for command of the military establishment, and thereby enhanced the stature of the office. Most recently, Secretaries Cheney and Perry had conspicuous roles in dealing with military operations in Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Bosnia. They participated as top-rank principals in making the most important policy and strategic decisions.

Movement toward centralization proceeded not only through the gathering of more decisionmaking power in OSD but through the establishment of Defense agencies which came directly under the secretary of defense (reporting to under or assistant secretaries of defense). Beginning with the National Security Agency in 1952, the number of such agencies performing department-wide functions increased steadily, and numbered 15 in 1997. OSD itself created nine field activities that augmented the staff. Defense agencies accounted for a substantial percentage of the DoD budget and personnel. The military services continued to exercise influence in the agencies, most of which had military as well as civilian personnel; more than half of them had military directors.

On the civilian side of DoD centralization progressed more rapidly and more thoroughly than on the military side. The two most important institutions on the military side that eventually promoted centralization were the JCS and the unified combatant commands. The JCS, operating in a collegial mode and with a service-dominated Joint Staff, could not play the effective role desired by most secretaries of defense. Criticisms of their performance by secretaries of defense over several decades centered on their inability to agree on many of the most important issues presented to them, leaving it to the secretary and the president to resolve them. These most important issues involved roles and missions, force structure, weapons development and employment, strategic plans, and organization and functions of the unified commands. Agreements in the JCS often represented accommodations that would be acceptable to all services—a formula for lowest-common-denominator action.

The Goldwater-Nichols act permitted an acceleration of the centralization trend in the JCS that gave it greater vitality and influence than it had possessed before. This was largely because of the increased powers of the chairman and the development of a greater sense of

jointness in the Joint Staff. The JCS chairman, in spite of the limitations placed on him by law, had always exercised influence because of his relationship to the president and the secretary of defense, to whom he often offered advice and on occasion took positions on issues contrary to the position or positions taken by his colleagues. To this important consultant function, Goldwater-Nichols added decision powers that gave the chairman authority to take actions on his own and to use the Joint Staff to support him. The result in recent years has been a shift on many important issues away from corporate decisionmaking and a noticeable decline in the capability of the services to avoid acting on important issues that they thought might affect them adversely. The shift in power from the service chiefs to the chairman, vice chairman, and the Joint Staff has eroded in some degree the capacity of the services to exercise influence.

The rise of the JCS chairman and the Joint Staff has been accompanied by a rise in the power of the unified combatant commanders. For decades the services dominated the unified commands as they did the Joint Staff. The Goldwater-Nichols act permitted an expansion of the combatant commander's responsibilities and his authority over the single-service component commands. JCS Chairman Powell encouraged and facilitated the growth of power in the unified commands in the name of jointness—understood as a means of achieving greater efficiency, effectiveness, and economy in the employment of the armed forces. Accordingly, the unified commanders began to assume a more visible role in Washington in matters of concern to them—budget, force structure, training.

The centripetal forces set in motion during World War II, given statutory reinforcement by the National Security Act of 1947 and additional legislative approval over the years—in 1949, 1953, and 1958—culminating most recently in the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986—provided periodic impetus toward what was termed unification and integration. Unification in the sense of a merger of the services into a single service received consideration only for a brief period in the late 1950s. The most appropriate terms for the basic trend in organization are now centralization and jointness. The gathering of the reins of power over the armed forces into fewer and more authoritative elements—OSD and the joint military structure (Joint Staff and combatant commands) led by the JCS chairman—is the inevitable

result of this trend. The reverse side of the coin is that it has meant a decline in the influence of the armed services. What role should the military departments have in this changing environment? How far can jointness be carried before diminishing returns may be reached? Change has occurred gradually because of the checks and balances that have always existed in the Department of Defense and because of the oversight and managerial role exercised by Congress. The invigorated joint military structure has emerged as a military power center with which the secretary of defense must deal. The jointness being fostered in this arena will have to extend to the relations between OSD and the military power center.

As always, the civil-military relationship is crucial to the common defense. The principle of civilian supremacy remains intact even though the armed forces in the years since 1940 have been so much more visible within American society and have exercised so much influence in national security policy. The civilian authority remains preeminent, not merely because of military deference to the letter, the spirit, and the intent of the Constitution, nor even because the administrative hierarchy of the Department of Defense imposes a layer of civilian superiors above the services, but fundamentally because the military themselves accept completely, as a matter of long-standing and self-perpetuating tradition, the doctrine of civilian supremacy, and the public expects the tradition to be honored and vigorously upheld. It is eternally to the credit of our military leaders, most notably George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that they observed this tradition wholeheartedly, thus affirming their dedication to the Constitution they had sworn to uphold.

Historian Richard H. Kohn has paid fitting tribute to the devotion of the American military to the tradition:

No military force in the United States has ever risen up to . . . challenge constitutional procedures or the Constitution itself, nor has any political leader, so far as is known, ever attempted to use military force against the Constitution. The unbroken record of subordination and loyalty by the American armed forces, under the Constitution of the United States, has been a blessing of the American political system, and the envy of nations the world over.¹²⁰

II

LEADERS

LEADERS

JAMES V. FORRESTAL (1947-1949)

Confronted immediately at its creation with complex global problems made more urgent by the Cold War, the new national security system had to begin functioning without delay. Indeed, when James Forrestal became the first secretary of defense on 17 September 1947 his swearing-in took place, at President Truman's order, several days earlier than originally scheduled. Concerned that the Communist government of Yugoslavia might attempt to seize the Adriatic city of Trieste, still occupied by U.S. and British troops, Truman decided that Forrestal should assume office at once.

Fortunately, the first secretary of defense was well-qualified to guide the National Military Establishment's (NME) participation in the new national security structure. Forrestal was born on 15 February 1892 in Matteawan (now Beacon), New York. His father, who emigrated from Ireland to the United States in 1857, headed a construction company. After graduation from high school in 1908, Forrestal worked for three years on local newspapers in New York State and then entered Dartmouth College as a freshman in 1911. The following year he transferred to Princeton University, which he left in 1915 a few credits short of his degree, apparently because of academic and financial difficulties.

In 1916 Forrestal joined an investment banking house, William A. Read and Company of New York (later Dillon, Read and Company), as a bond salesman. Except for a period in the Navy during World War I, during which he took flight training, Forrestal remained with Dillon, Read until 1940. He rose rapidly in the company, becoming a partner in 1923, vice president in 1926, and president in 1938. His government service began in June 1940 as a special assistant to President Roosevelt. In August 1940 the president nominated Forrestal to fill the new position of under secretary of the Navy. Assigned by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to handle contracts, tax and legal affairs, and liaison with several other government agencies, Forrestal built his office into



an efficient organization. Most importantly, he ran very effectively the Navy's machinery for industrial mobilization and procurement. By 19 May 1944 when he became secretary of the Navy, succeeding Knox who had died of a heart attack, he had become well-known in Washington as a highly capable administrator and manager. He guided the Navy through the last year of the war and the two difficult years of demobilization after the Japanese surrender.

Forrestal participated prominently in development of the National Security Act of 1947, even though he had opposed unification. Under pressure from President Truman and others, Forrestal made use of the 1945 Eberstadt report and negotiations with Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to play a prime role in shaping

the initial form of the NME. Although Patterson was President Truman's first choice as secretary of defense, he preferred to return to private life. The president's subsequent selection of Forrestal, however ironic it might have appeared given the secretary of the Navy's resistance to unification, was deserved and logical considering his long experience in the Defense establishment and dedication to effective government administration.

Forrestal brought to his new office a deep distrust of the Soviet Union and a determination to make the new national security structure workable. He recognized the magnitude of the job; he wrote to a friend shortly after announcement of his appointment confiding his serious apprehensions about the future of the new organization. He soon discovered that perhaps the chief obstacle to accomplishing his objectives for the NME was the inherent weakness in the secretary of defense's powers as defined in the National Security Act. Another problem was the existence of virtually autonomous heads for the military departments. These organizational difficulties, combined with a steady escalation of Cold War tensions, ensured 18 months of frustration for Forrestal.

In February 1948 the Soviet Union completed its network of satellite nations in Eastern Europe, as Communists supported by Moscow seized control in Czechoslovakia. In June 1948 the Soviets blockaded land routes from the western zones of Germany to Berlin, forcing the United States and its allies to initiate an airlift which supplied Berlin until Moscow relaxed the blockade more than 10 months later. In the meantime, war broke out in Palestine between Arab and Israeli armies immediately after the proclamation of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948. As these events occurred, Congress approved the Marshall Plan, providing economic aid for 16 European nations, and in June 1948 the Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution, encouraging the administration to enter into collective defense arrangements. The United States and the United Kingdom led in developing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formally established when 12 nations signed the constituting treaty in April 1949. On the other side of the world in China, the Communists made significant headway against the Nationalists, leading in 1949 to final victory and the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

The NME played an important role in the development of U.S. policies and programs to meet these Cold War challenges. Forrestal believed strongly in the need for close coordination of defense and foreign policy and saw the National Security Council (NSC) as a major instrument for accomplishing this coordination. Although President Truman deemed the NSC a subordinate advisory body—he met infrequently with it before the

Korean conflict began in June 1950—Forrestal thought it should originate policy proposals and provide firm guidance for strategic planning. He labored hard, for the most part unsuccessfully, to increase its influence.

The NME budget became a source of tension between Forrestal and Truman. Because of public pressures to limit defense expenditures and his predilection for a balanced budget, Truman would not agree to budget levels proposed by Forrestal or the even larger amounts desired by the military services. Disagreements between the services over roles and missions complicated the matter. Because the budget limits Truman imposed intensified the competition for scarce funds, the services developed elaborate rationales justifying their views of roles and missions and the funds to support them. The Air Force argued that strategic air power—the long-range bomber carrying nuclear weapons—could be the key factor in any future major conflict. It wanted funds to support 70 combat groups as well as exclusive use of atomic weapons. On the other hand, the Navy wanted to build large flush-deck carriers from which it could launch naval aircraft carrying atomic weapons. These and other differences among the services surfaced especially during annual NME consideration of the budget.

By the time Forrestal became secretary of defense most of the advance work on the FY 1949 budget had been completed. Truman submitted it to Congress in January 1948, requesting about \$10 billion plus additional funds for universal military training and equipment stockpiling. The events in Czechoslovakia, Germany, and elsewhere in the early months of 1948 influenced Truman to consider a supplemental appropriation for FY 1949—actually an increase in the recommended budget. While Truman had in mind an additional \$3 billion, the services wanted \$9 billion. The bulk of the supplemental would go to the Air Force if the recommendation of an Air Policy Commission that it needed 70 groups to do its job prevailed.

Hoping to facilitate agreement among the services over the budget and other matters, Forrestal met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at Key West, Florida, 11-14 March 1948. Out of this meeting and subsequent discussions came a paper entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff" that Forrestal issued on 21 April 1948. Among JCS duties, the paper delineated preparation of strategic plans and provision for strategic direction of the armed forces, establishment of unified commands, and designation of executive agents for certain activities. The Navy received authorization "to conduct air operations as necessary for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign," and the Air Force retained responsibility for

strategic air warfare. The Key West document remained in force until the Eisenhower administration issued a revised version in 1954.

Although the Key West Agreement smoothed over some service differences, it had limited long-range effect. As for the FY 1949 budget, the JCS agreed on a \$3.5 billion supplemental, enough when added to the original budget to fund 66 Air Force groups; the president reduced it to \$3.1 billion. Congress eventually approved total obligational authority (TOA) for FY 1949 of \$13.2 billion—\$4.2 billion for the Air Force (including more than \$820 million above what the administration recommended) to fund a 70-group program, \$4.7 billion for the Navy, \$4.03 billion for the Army, and \$270 million for other defense purposes. Truman refused to allow the Air Force to spend the extra funds, limiting it to 59 groups. In 1997 constant dollars, FY 1949 TOA amounted to \$127.7 billion.*

Persistent differences among the services over roles and missions and Truman's determination to keep defense costs down made Forrestal's task in developing the FY 1950 budget extremely difficult. For example, the Navy and the Air Force continued to disagree over the issue of delivery of atomic weapons. Forrestal discussed this and other matters with the service secretaries and the JCS at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, on 20-22 August 1948. The conferees decided that the Air Force would have interim operational control of atomic weapons, but that "each service, in the fields of its primary missions, must have exclusive responsibility for planning and programming and the necessary authority." For the Air Force-Navy dispute over atomic weapons the Newport agreement meant that the Air Force should utilize any strategic bombing ability developed by the Navy. This and other decisions reached at Newport helped calm interservice dissension, making it easier to achieve agreement within the NME on the FY 1950 budget.

Although President Truman set a ceiling of \$14.4 billion for FY 1950, the services initially proposed \$29 billion, later reduced to \$23.6 billion. Forrestal asked the JCS to prepare both a \$14.4 billion plan and an alternate budget of \$17.5 to \$18 billion, hoping that the president might accept the latter. Eventually Forrestal

presented two budgets: one for \$14.2 billion (a new ceiling set by the Bureau of the Budget) and the other for \$16.9 billion. Truman summarily rejected the higher version and sent the \$14.2 billion proposal to Congress in January 1949. Congress eventually agreed to about \$14.3 billion, including an extra \$737 million to support 58 Air Force groups rather than the 48 prescribed in Truman's budget proposal. Again Truman made clear that the Air Force would not spend the unsought funds. In developing the 1949 and 1950 budgets Forrestal faced the reality that they did not depend on the military's expressed requirements alone but also on competing domestic needs, political considerations, and the president's own views, and that the National Security Act had done little to lessen interservice rivalry.

For all the problems, Forrestal could list 15 "solid accomplishments in the process of unification" in his first report as secretary of defense in December 1948. These included the formulation of long-range and short-range strategic plans, the development of an integrated NME budget for FY 1950, the definition of service roles and missions, the coordination of service procurement efforts, and the establishment of additional overseas unified commands. Forrestal observed in this report that "the mere passage of the National Security Act did not mean the accomplishment of its objectives overnight. The most difficult part of the task of unification is to bring conflicting ideas into harmony. . . . How fast we complete the process of resolution will depend on the speed with which we achieve the harmony of thought which is inherent in true unification. I am confident that we shall reach that accord."

Although he still felt the National Security Act provided "a sound basis for substantial progress in the unification of the armed forces," Forrestal recommended several amendments reflecting his personal experience after 15 months as secretary of defense: establishment of the position of under secretary of defense; major strengthening of the secretary of defense's authority by giving him specific rather than "general" responsibility for exercising "direction, authority, and control" over the NME; removal of the chief of staff to the commander in chief as a member of the JCS; designation of a JCS chairman; increasing the size of the JCS Joint Staff; clarification of the secretary's role in personnel matters; and dropping the service secretaries from NSC membership, leaving the secretary of defense as the only NME member. President Truman followed up the Forrestal proposals with a message to Congress on 5 March 1949 recommending specific changes in the National Security Act, most importantly converting the NME into an executive

* Total Obligational Authority (TOA) represents the value of the direct defense program for each year, regardless of the method of financing, which could include balances available from prior years or resources available from sales of items from inventory. TOA figures and FY 1997 constant dollar amounts come from a table prepared in April 1996 by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The constant dollar figure translates each fiscal year's budget into projected FY 1997 values; they are useful for comparison purposes. See TOA-constant dollar table in Appendix IV.

department—the Department of Defense—and providing the secretary of defense “with appropriate responsibility and authority, and with civilian and military assistance adequate to fulfill his enlarged responsibility.”

These proposals reflected Forrestal’s experiences as secretary of defense. He had left the ranks of those favoring merely coordination and had joined the advocates of a more genuine and thoroughgoing unification. His commitment to making effective the national security structure outlined in the 1947 law increased in urgency as he became more and more concerned about the Soviet military threat. The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act stand as testimony to Forrestal’s determination to improve the Defense structure.

The amendments, in Public Law 216, 10 August 1949, included these major provisions: The service secretaries were no longer NSC members; an executive department, the Department of Defense, replaced the NME, and the departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force became *military* departments; the secretary of defense received “direction, authority, and control” (eliminating the modifying word “general”) over the Department of Defense, and the military departments were to be “separately administered by their respective Secretaries under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense”; the offices of deputy secre-

tary and three assistant secretaries of defense were created (the deputy secretary replaced the under secretary, a position established in April 1949, and the assistant secretaries replaced the three “special assistants” authorized in the 1947 legislation); the JCS acquired a non-voting chairman; the JCS Joint Staff was increased to 210 officers; and the office of comptroller of the Department of Defense, to be filled by one of the assistant secretaries, became statutory.

The 1949 amendments began the legislative process of clarifying and expanding the powers of the secretary of defense. In fact, centralization of authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense became a constant objective under Forrestal and many of his successors. Unfortunately, Forrestal was no longer in the Pentagon when Congress approved these amendments. He left office on 28 March 1949 and died tragically less than two months later. Not only the first but one of the most notable secretaries of defense, his contributions have been commemorated by a bronze bust at the Pentagon’s Mall Entrance and by the designation of a major federal office building in downtown Washington as the Forrestal Building. Some months after he left office, the House Armed Services Committee, with which he had worked closely over the years, described his administration as secretary of defense as “able, sensitive, restrained, and far-sighted.”

LOUIS A. JOHNSON (1949-1950)

Forrestal's successor, Louis A. Johnson, born in Roanoke, Virginia, on 10 January 1891, earned a law degree from the University of Virginia. After graduation he practiced law in Clarksburg, West Virginia; his firm, Steptoe and Johnson, eventually opened offices in Charleston, West Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Elected to the West Virginia House of Delegates in 1916, he served as majority floor leader and chairman of the Judiciary Committee. During World War I, Johnson saw action as an Army officer in France. After the war he resumed his law practice and was active in veterans' affairs, helping to found the American Legion and serving as its national commander in 1932-33. As assistant secretary of war between 1937 and 1940, Johnson advocated universal military training, rearmament, and expansion of military aviation. He practiced law from 1940 to 1949, except for several months in 1942 when he served as the president's personal representative in India.

During 1948 Johnson acted as chief fund-raiser for President Truman's election campaign. After Truman chose him to succeed Forrestal early in 1949, there were allegations that his appointment was a political payoff, but his experience in veterans' affairs and as assistant secretary of war strengthened his credentials. Johnson entered office sharing the president's commitment to achieve further military unification and to control costs while maintaining adequate defense forces. These commitments insured Johnson, an outspoken and forceful leader, a stormy term in the Pentagon. At a press conference the day after he took office, Johnson promised a drastic cut in the number of NME boards, committees, and commissions, and added, "To the limit the present law allows, I promise you there will be unification as rapidly as the efficiency of the service permits it." Later, in one of his frequent speeches on unification, Johnson stated that "this nation can no longer tolerate the autonomous conduct of any single service A waste of the resources of America in spendthrift defense is an invitation to disaster for America."

Johnson welcomed the passage of the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, telling an American Legion convention that he was "happy to report . . . that 80 percent of the problems that beset unification immediately disappeared when the President signed the bill increasing the authority and the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense." Believing that the amendments would help him promote economy, he estimated that one year after their passage the Defense Department would be achieving savings at the rate of \$1 billion per year, and he later claimed that he had attained this goal.



One of his slogans was that the taxpayer was going to get "a dollar's worth of defense for every dollar spent" by the Pentagon, an approach that Truman approved. For FY 1951, Johnson supported Truman's recommendation of \$13.3 billion, but a month after the fighting in Korea started, the secretary proposed a supplemental appropriation of \$10.5 billion, bringing the total requested to \$23.8 billion. Johnson told a House subcommittee when recommending the supplemental that "in the light of the actual fighting that is now in progress, we have reached the point where the military considerations clearly outweigh the fiscal considerations."

It took a war to divert Johnson from his economy drive, which began on 23 April 1949, when he announced cancellation of the 65,000-ton flush-deck aircraft carrier USS *United States*. The Navy had been planning this ship for several years and construction had already begun. Johnson, supported by a majority of the JCS and by President Truman, stressed the need to cut costs. At least by implication, Johnson had scuttled the Navy's hope to participate in strategic air operations through use of the carrier. Abruptly resigning, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan expressed concern about the future of the Marine Corps and naval aviation and about Johnson's unprecedented and arbitrary action so drastically affecting the Navy's operational plans without consulting it.

The cancellation of the supercarrier precipitated a

bitter controversy between the Navy and the Air Force, the so-called “Revolt of the Admirals.” The Navy reacted to Johnson’s action by questioning, in congressional hearings and other public arenas, the effectiveness of the Air Force’s latest strategic bomber, the B-36. The Air Force countered with data supporting the B-36 and minimized the importance of a naval role in future major wars.

In June 1949 the House Committee on Armed Services launched an investigation into charges, emanating unofficially from Navy sources, of malfeasance in office against Secretary Johnson and Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington. The hearings also looked into the capability of the B-36, the cancellation of the supercarrier, and JCS procedures on weapon development, and ultimately examined the whole course of unification. Besides disparaging the B-36, Navy representatives questioned the current U.S. military plan for immediate use of atomic weapons against large urban areas when a war started. The Navy argued that such an approach would not harm military targets, and that tactical air power, ground troops, and sea power were the elements necessary to defend the United States and Europe against attack. The Air Force countered that atomic weapons and long-range strategic bombers would deter war, but that if war nevertheless broke out, an immediate atomic offensive against the enemy would contribute to the success of surface actions and reduce U.S. casualties. Strategic bombing, the Air Force contended, provided the major counterbalance to the Soviet Union’s vastly superior ground forces.

In its final report, the House Armed Services Committee found no substance to the charges relating to Johnson’s and Symington’s roles in aircraft procurement. It held that evaluation of the B-36’s worth was the responsibility of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, and that the services jointly should not pass judgment on weapons proposed by one service. On cancellation of the supercarrier, the committee questioned the qualifications of the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff, who had testified in support of Johnson’s decision, to determine vessels appropriate for the Navy. The committee, disapproving of Johnson’s “summary manner” of terminating the carrier and failure to consult congressional committees before acting, stated that “national defense is not strictly an executive department undertaking; it involves not only the Congress but the American people as a whole speaking through their Congress. The committee can in no way condone this manner of deciding public questions.”

The committee expressed solid support for effective unification, but stated that “there is such a thing as seeking too much unification too fast” and observed that “there has been a Navy reluctance in the interservice marriage, an over-ardent Army, a somewhat exuberant Air Force It may well be stated that the committee finds no unification Puritans in the Pentagon.”

Finally, the committee condemned the dismissal of Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, the chief of naval operations, who accepted cancellation of the supercarrier but testified critically on defense planning and administration of unification. Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews fired Denfeld on 27 October 1949, explaining that he and Denfeld disagreed widely on strategic policy and unification. The House Armed Services Committee concluded that Denfeld’s removal was a reprisal because of his testimony and a challenge to effective representative government.

Although Johnson emerged from the Revolt of the Admirals with his reputation intact, the controversy weakened his position with the services and probably with the president. Notwithstanding Johnson’s emphasis on unification, it was debatable how far it had really progressed, given the bitter recriminations exchanged by the Air Force and the Navy during the controversy, which went far beyond the initial question of the supercarrier to more fundamental issues—strategic doctrine, service roles and missions, and the authority of the secretary of defense.

Momentous international events that demanded difficult national security decisions also marked Johnson’s term. The Berlin crisis ended in May 1949, when the Russians lifted the blockade. Johnson pointed to the airlift as a technological triumph important to the future of air cargo transportation and as an example of the fruits of unification. A week after Johnson took office, the United States and 11 other nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty, creating a regional organization that became the heart of a comprehensive collective security system. After initial reservations, Johnson supported the new alliance and the program of military assistance for NATO and other U.S. allies instituted by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 6 October 1949.

In August 1949, earlier than U.S. intelligence analysts had anticipated, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic device. This event and the almost concurrent collapse of the Chinese Nationalists hastened debate within the administration as to whether the United States should develop a fusion, or hydrogen, bomb. Con-

ceiving the bomb as a deterrent rather than an offensive weapon, Truman decided on 31 January 1950 to proceed; Johnson supported the president's decision. Truman at the same time directed the secretaries of state and defense to review and reassess U.S. national security policy in the light of the Soviet atomic explosion, the Communist victory in China, and the hydrogen bomb decision. Johnson went about this task reluctantly, presumably because the State Department took the lead and heavily influenced the contents of the resultant report—NSC 68. Although Truman took no immediate formal action on the large rearmament effort proposed in NSC 68, the report became more pertinent when the North Koreans attacked South Korea on 25 June 1950. Johnson's obstinate attitude toward the State Department role in the preparation of this paper adversely affected his relations with both Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Truman. Although he publicly professed belief that "the advance guard in the campaign for peace that America wages today must be the State Department," his disagreements with Acheson and his restrictions on DoD contacts with the State Department persisted until the exigencies of the Korean War moderated them.

Although he had followed faithfully President Truman's lead in imposing economy measures on the armed forces, Johnson received much of the blame for the initial setbacks in Korea. U.S. involvement in the war and the continued priority accorded to European

security necessitated rapid, substantive changes in defense policy—including a long-term expansion of the armed forces and more emphasis on the military buildup of U.S. allies. Truman decided that these tasks required new leadership in the Department of Defense. When Johnson resigned at Truman's request on 19 September 1950, the president replaced him with General George C. Marshall.

Johnson was a controversial secretary of defense. Considered a purely political appointee by some, and trying to follow in the footsteps of a highly respected predecessor, Johnson became embroiled in controversy almost immediately. Once he had weathered the super-carrier storm, other problems bore down on him—continued interservice quarreling, differences with Acheson, and above all the Korean War. At the time of his appointment Johnson met the president's needs; by September 1950, with the Korean conflict in full swing, he had become a liability. He returned to his law practice, which he pursued until his death in Washington at the age of 75 on 24 April 1966. In his last speech as secretary of defense the day before he left office, Johnson observed: "When the hurly burly's done and the battle is won I trust the historian will find my record of performance creditable, my services honest and faithful commensurate with the trust that was placed in me and in the best interests of peace and our national defense."

GEORGE C. MARSHALL (1950-1951)

Given the controversy surrounding Johnson's performance, and especially the military situation in Korea, President Truman recognized the need to choose a person of great national prestige to head the Department of Defense. His selection of General Marshall eminently met this requirement. The son of a coal merchant, Marshall was born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, on 31 December 1880. He entered the Virginia Military Institute in 1897, graduated in 1901, and took a commission as second lieutenant in the United States Army in 1902.

By 1917 he had served in the Philippines and at several stations in the United States, including two service schools. Marshall had extensive combat experience in Europe during World War I, and between 1919 and 1924 he was aide-de-camp to General John J. Pershing. After three years in China (1924-27), he served for the next dozen years at posts in the United States, beginning with more than four years as assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, where many of the future Army leaders of World War II were on his faculty and staff. He became a brigadier general in 1936.

In 1939 just as World War II began in Europe, President Roosevelt appointed Marshall Army chief of staff. In that position and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff beginning in 1942, Marshall labored unceasingly to build up U.S. defenses and to prepare the Army for action. President Truman later described him as the "architect of victory" in World War II.

Within weeks after Marshall retired from the Army in November 1945 Truman sent him to China in an unsuccessful attempt to mediate the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists and to establish a coalition government. He returned to the United States in January 1947 to become secretary of state for a momentous two years, marked by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and negotiation of the NATO pact. After he left the State Department he achieved further distinction as president of the American Red Cross.

Marshall's appointment as secretary of defense required a special congressional waiver because the National Security Act prohibited a commissioned military officer on active duty within the previous 10 years from holding the post. Although the Senate approved quickly, questions did surface about a military leader holding a position clearly intended for a civilian. With the Johnson-Acheson competition in mind, some senators queried Marshall about his views on State-Defense relationships and service unification. Marshall noted that he had "suffered from the lack of unification



throughout the war" and also that he had initiated several Army unification studies during the war period.

Marshall had to pay close attention to the conduct of the Korean War. Believing that the Communist attack proved that the Soviets and their satellites were willing to risk a general war and that U.S. military weakness encouraged the aggression in Korea, Marshall promoted a rapid expansion of the armed forces. Between July 1950 and June 1951, U.S. military strength increased from 1,460,000 to 3,250,000, with the final goal for July 1952 set at 3,600,000. Although Korea was an immediate concern, Marshall wanted "an enduring system of national defense." During the "great debate" over U.S. national security policy in the spring of 1951, he vigorously backed the administration's controversial proposal, which Congress finally approved, to increase U.S. ground forces supporting NATO in Europe from two to six divisions.

Because he saw the necessity for long-term preparedness, Marshall argued strenuously for universal military training (UMT), formally proposed by President Truman in March 1948. He described the Military Training and Service Act of 1951, although less than he wanted, as a historic step. This legislation revised the Selective Service Act of 1948 by lowering the draft age from 19 to 18 1/2, increasing the period of service from 21 to 24 months, and setting the total service obligation (active

and reserve) at 8 years. It also approved UMT in principle, based on induction of youths for six months' service in a "National Security Training Corps." Although Marshall expressed confidence that Congress would pass legislation implementing UMT, it never did, thus eliminating what he considered the act's most important feature.

Confirming the crucial importance of manpower matters, Marshall established the new position of assistant secretary of defense for manpower and personnel and recruited for the post Anna M. Rosenberg, a dynamic labor and public relations specialist with previous service in the federal government. Responsible for industrial and service manpower, universal military training, and selective service, Rosenberg served under both Marshall and his successor, Robert A. Lovett. She was the first woman to hold such a high-level DoD position, and Marshall was justly proud of her selection and performance. Marshall also established the Defense Advisory

Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), which first met in September 1951 and continues to function effectively today.

The action in Korea and the military buildup necessitated large increases in the DoD budget, a process begun before Marshall entered office. Total obligational authority in FY 1951, roughly coinciding with Marshall's tenure, totaled more than \$45.1 billion, compared with just over \$14 billion the previous year. For FY 1952, beginning on 1 July 1951, TOA skyrocketed to more than \$57 billion, larger than any fiscal year since 1945.

The heaviest fighting during the Korean War took place while Marshall was secretary of defense. The dramatic landing of General Douglas MacArthur's forces at Inchon on 15 September 1950 initiated a period of military success for UN forces, which drove deep into North Korea in succeeding weeks until "volunteers" from the People's Republic of China intervened in massive



President Truman and General Douglas A. MacArthur

numbers in October and November. The Communists then inflicted heavy losses on UN troops and forced them back into the southern part of the peninsula. Although lines became more or less stabilized by the spring of 1951, generally along the 38th parallel, the fighting continued for another two years. Marshall backed the U.S.-UN limited war objectives to return Korean boundaries to prewar lines, achieve an armistice, and then work for a diplomatic solution.

This approach precipitated the most serious controversy during Marshall's year in the Pentagon. General MacArthur, UN Supreme Commander in Korea, advocated a ground offensive all the way to the Chinese-North Korean border at the Yalu River and the bombing of bridges and supply routes between China and North Korea. Rejecting the concept of limited war, MacArthur believed in fighting for complete victory, even if it meant a major conflict with China and perhaps the Soviet Union. In spite of presidential and DoD directives to refrain, General MacArthur persisted in expressing personal views contradicting official policy. In a 20 March 1951 letter to Joseph W. Martin, House Republican minority leader, MacArthur directly challenged the president's policy, and a few days later, undercutting a UN plan for an armistice and negotiations, he publicly offered to confer personally with the enemy commander to discuss surrender terms.

On 10 April 1951 President Truman relieved MacArthur of his commands in the Far East. Marshall and the JCS, with whom Truman conferred, agreed with the president's decision. In congressional hearings during May 1951 Marshall testified for seven days. MacArthur's removal, he stated, stemmed from "the wholly unprecedented position of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement with the foreign and military policy of the United States." Some MacArthur supporters and Truman political opponents bitterly criticized Marshall for his role in these events. In June 1951 Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, who had earlier accused the Truman administration of harboring Communists, spoke for three hours in the Senate; he released a 60,000-word document

reviewing Marshall's career since 1939 and charging him with leading a conspiracy to sacrifice the United States to the intrigues of the Soviet Union.

In fact, of course, Marshall devoted himself to improving the defenses of the United States and its allies. He placed great emphasis on collective security, particularly strengthening NATO by deploying more U.S. military forces to Europe. He testified at length in favor of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which consolidated existing foreign aid programs within the framework of one law. This law gave the Department of Defense responsibility for the administration of military assistance to NATO and other nations under the umbrella of the Mutual Security Agency. In Marshall's last month as secretary of defense, the United States concluded three important security treaties: with the Philippines on 30 August 1951, with Australia and New Zealand on 1 September 1951 (the ANZUS Pact), and with Japan on 8 September 1951. This last pact coincided with the signing of a peace treaty between Japan and 48 other nations, marking the official end of the Pacific phase of World War II. In playing a role in the formulation of these treaties, Marshall added to his pioneer work in promoting collective security during his term as secretary of state between 1947 and 1949.

General Marshall informed President Truman when he became secretary of defense that he probably would serve only one year. He accepted the position because of the Korean emergency and the need to restore prestige to the office. Leaving the Pentagon on 12 September 1951, he retired to his country home in Leesburg, Virginia. In December 1953 he received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the development of the Marshall Plan and his other contributions to international peace and understanding. General Marshall died at Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington on 16 October 1959, and was interred in Arlington National Cemetery. Although sometimes controversial and subject to political attack in the later years of his public service, Marshall has been recognized as an effective and influential secretary of defense and indeed as one of the most distinguished leaders of the United States in the twentieth century.

ROBERT A. LOVETT (1951-1953)

Because Robert A. Lovett served as deputy secretary of defense under Marshall, he was thoroughly familiar with the duties and responsibilities of his new office when President Truman selected him to be secretary of defense. The son of a judge, Lovett was born in Huntsville, Texas, on 14 September 1895. He graduated from Yale University in 1918 and took postgraduate courses in law and business administration at Harvard University between 1919 and 1921. As a naval ensign during World War I, Lovett flew for a time with the British Naval Air Service on patrol and combat missions and then commanded a U.S. naval air squadron, rising to the rank of lieutenant commander.

Lovett began his business career as a clerk at the National Bank of Commerce in New York and later moved to Brown Brothers Harriman and Company, where he eventually became a partner and a prominent member of the New York business community. He remained interested in aeronautics, especially in European commercial and military aviation. In December 1940 Lovett accepted appointment as special assistant to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and four months later became assistant secretary of war for air. He served with distinction, overseeing the massive expansion of the Army Air Forces and the procurement of huge numbers of aircraft during the war. In awarding Lovett the Distinguished Service Medal in September 1945, President Truman wrote: "He has truly been the eyes, ears and hands of the Secretary of War in respect to the growth of that enormous American airpower which has astonished the world and played such a large part in bringing the war to a speedy and successful conclusion."

After leaving the War Department in December 1945 Lovett returned to Brown Brothers Harriman, only to be called back to Washington a little more than a year later to serve with General Marshall as under secretary of state. Lovett went back to his investment business in January 1949, but Marshall insisted that he join him again when he took over at the Pentagon in September 1950. As deputy secretary of defense, Lovett played a critical role in the management of the department; his appointment as secretary, made on Marshall's recommendation, received wide praise.

When Lovett became secretary of defense, the end of the Korean War was not yet in sight. Thus the long-range rearmament program continued to be one of his main concerns. Like Marshall, Lovett believed that the United States erred seriously at the end of World War II: "We did not just demobilize . . . we just disintegrated." As secretary of defense he designed a rearmament pro-



gram intended both to meet the demands of the Korean conflict and to serve as a deterrent and mobilization base in future military emergencies. As Lovett put it, "Heretofore this country has only had two throttle settings—one, wide-open for war, and the other, tight-shut for peace. What we are really trying to do is to find a cruising speed."

Lovett therefore argued for budgets large enough to carry on the Korean conflict and to improve U.S. defensive strength. In his main budget effort during his 16 months in office he sought to secure adequate funds for FY 1953. Lovett eventually reduced initial service requests of about \$71 billion to \$49 billion, which the president and the Bureau of the Budget cut further to \$48.6 billion, the amount requested of Congress. Lovett argued strenuously against additional congressional cuts, emphasizing the need to expand Army, Navy, and Marine Corps forces and to work toward a goal of 143 Air Force wings (as compared with 95 then authorized). Lovett did not get all that he wanted. Actual TOA for FY 1953 came to about \$44.2 billion, almost \$13 billion less than the previous year.

Lovett's efforts to meet rearmament and preparedness goals suffered in 1952 from a major dispute between the federal government and the steel industry. Truman tried to avert a threatened strike, caused mainly by a wage dispute, by taking over the steel mills in April 1952.

The strike occurred after the Supreme Court overruled Truman's seizure order. Lovett supported the president's action as essential to maintaining defense production and expressed serious concern about the strike's effects on the nation's military capabilities. Even so, he noted that "the last six months of 1952 saw the most significant increases in the military effectiveness of the United States since the beginning of partial mobilization." By the end of the Truman administration, the Defense Department had met successfully the challenges of the Korean War mobilization and embarked on a long-term preparedness effort.

Besides the preparedness issue, Lovett inherited a number of other matters that were still unresolved in the early 1950s, including the proper military role of nuclear weapons. In 1951 Sen. Brien McMahon of Connecticut led the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in endorsing a resolution urging DoD to expand the atomic weapons program. Lovett noted that the department accorded such weapons a prominent place in its planning and budget requests. His proposal for increased funds for the Air Force, in fact, recognized that aircraft represented the most efficient delivery method for atomic weapons. But he warned against premature reliance on them: "There is no new, inexpensive, or magic way to win wars in the near future. We must be able to defend ourselves and to win battles with tested, available armaments. . . . Any premature adoption of the most modern but untried weapons and devices could lead to possible disaster."

Lovett's stands on the nuclear weapons question and other major military issues generally followed those of his predecessors. He strongly supported universal military training, regarding it as the only viable long-term approach to building a reserve force, and thus making possible a smaller regular military establishment. A firm proponent of NATO, he played an important role when the NATO Council in February 1952 adopted force goals totaling 50 divisions and 4,000 aircraft to be achieved at the end of 1952. Lovett endorsed enthusiastically the council's decision to admit Turkey and Greece as new NATO members. He supported the Mutual Security Program, viewing it as an important and integral part of the

U.S. defense effort and as vital to future NATO effectiveness. Reliance on unilateral security rather than mutual security would require a tremendous commitment in manpower and funds without guaranteeing the nation's safety.

Despite a relatively smooth administration, Lovett felt a growing dissatisfaction with the existing defense organization. Although he recognized that real unification could result only from an evolutionary process and not legislative edict, as the end of his term approached he discerned the need for changes in the National Security Act beyond those made in 1949. Commenting about unification at a press conference a week before he left office, Lovett observed that the Department of Defense would have to be reorganized substantially if the United States became involved in a major conflict. He put forward his recommendations in a long letter to President Truman on 18 November 1952, proposing clarification of the secretary of defense's relationship to the president, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military departments; redefinition of JCS functions; reorganization of the military departments; and reorganization and redefinition of the functions of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board.

Lovett meant his recommendations for practical consideration by his successor, and they indeed played an important role in the formulation of a reorganization plan during the early months of the Eisenhower administration. Concerned about the need for an orderly post-election changeover in the Department of Defense, Lovett met several times during the transition period with the incoming secretary, Charles E. Wilson, and made sure that he was thoroughly briefed on current issues.

After Lovett left office on 20 January 1953, he returned again to Brown Brothers Harriman, where he remained active as a general partner for many years. Robert Lovett has been recognized as one of the most capable administrators to hold the office of secretary of defense and as a perceptive critic of defense organization. His work in completing the Korean War mobilization and in planning and implementing the long-range rearmament program, as well as his proposals to restructure the Department of Defense, were among his major contributions. He died in Locust Valley, New York, on 7 May 1986.

CHARLES E. WILSON (1953-1957)

The election of 1952 brought to the White House Dwight D. Eisenhower, one of the nation's best known and most respected military leaders. His choice for secretary of defense, Charles E. Wilson, had achieved notable success as a business executive. As Eisenhower was superbly equipped, and inclined, to give close personal attention to national security affairs, the new secretary was expected to concentrate on defense management rather than formulation of basic national security policy.

Wilson was born on 18 July 1890 in Minerva, Ohio. After earning a degree in electrical engineering from the Carnegie Institute of Technology in 1909, he joined the Westinghouse Electric Company in Pittsburgh, where eventually he supervised the engineering of automobile electrical equipment, and during World War I, the development of dynamotors and radio generators for the Army and Navy. In 1919 Wilson moved to Remy Electric, a General Motors subsidiary, as chief engineer and sales manager. By January 1941 he was the president of General Motors. During World War II, Wilson directed the company's huge defense production effort, which earned him a U.S. Medal of Merit in 1946. He was still head of General Motors when President Eisenhower selected him as secretary of defense in January 1953.

Wilson's nomination sparked a major controversy during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, specifically over his large stockholdings in General Motors. Reluctant to sell the stock, valued at more than \$2.5 million, Wilson agreed to do so under committee pressure. During the hearings, when asked if as secretary of defense he could make a decision adverse to the interests of General Motors, Wilson answered affirmatively but added that he could not conceive of such a situation "because for years I thought what was good for the country was good for General Motors and vice versa." Later this statement was often garbled when quoted, suggesting that Wilson had said simply, "What's good for General Motors is good for the country." Although finally approved by a Senate vote of 77 to 6, Wilson began his duties in the Pentagon with his standing somewhat diminished by the confirmation debate.

Both Wilson and Eisenhower entered office committed to reorganizing the Department of Defense. They succeeded in securing from Congress approval in June 1953 of Reorganization Plan No. 6, which made changes in OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the chain of command.* Wilson welcomed the reorganization plan, which became effective on 30 June 1953, as facilitating more efficient management of the Department of Defense.



He looked on the assistant secretaries as his "vice presidents" and tried to run the Pentagon like an industrial corporation. Wilson took advantage of the reorganization to decentralize administration, giving the service secretaries more responsibility and importance. In his first annual report, he noted that the service secretaries were his principal assistants; decentralizing operational responsibility to them would make for effective exercise of civilian authority throughout DoD. In July 1954, to complement the 1953 reorganization, Wilson issued a directive to the JCS, the most important provision of which stated that "the Joint Staff work of each of the Chiefs of Staff shall take priority over all other duties"—namely their tasks as chiefs of individual services. The directive also clarified the role of the JCS chairman and his authority over the Joint Staff while making clear that assignment of major tasks to the Joint Staff was the prerogative of the full JCS.

Internal reorganization was only one of several major changes during Wilson's tenure, foremost among them the "New Look" defense concept. Eisenhower had criticized the Truman policies during the 1952 campaign, arguing that they were reactive rather than positive and that they forced the United States to compete with the Soviet Union on terms laid down by the Russians. The

* See pp. 21-23.

president entered office with strong convictions about the need to reorient the nation's security policy, convictions reflecting his interest in maintaining a staunch defense while cutting government expenditures and balancing the budget.

The president inaugurated planning for the New Look in July 1953 by asking the incoming members of the JCS—Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman; General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army chief of staff; General Nathan F. Twining, Air Force chief of staff; and Admiral Robert B. Carney, chief of naval operations—to prepare a paper on overall defense policy. Although the JCS paper did not recommend any fundamental changes, the National Security Council in October 1953 adopted a key tenet of the New Look—that a large-scale limited war or a general war would likely be fought with nuclear weapons. Eisenhower formally presented the New Look in his State of the Union message in January 1954 and Secretary Wilson helped to explain it. More defense for less money was possible, he said. With new weapons and techniques and ready reserves of troops and materiel, the United States could support capable military forces within budget allocations that Congress was willing to provide.

The major features of the New Look included (1) greater reliance on nuclear weapons, utilizing the advantage the United States had over the Soviet Union

in such weapons; (2) elevation of strategic air power, the major means to deliver nuclear weapons, to a more important position (not an expansion in the number of Air Force wings but rather development and production of better equipment); (3) cuts in conventional ground forces, based both on reliance on strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and the expectation that U.S. allies would provide ground troops for their own defense; (4) an expanded program of continental defense, which, along with strategic air power, would serve as a principal ingredient of the New Look's deterrence program; and (5) modernization and enlargement of reserve forces, enhancing the military manpower base while reducing active duty forces.

Although the Eisenhower administration generally adhered to the New Look throughout Wilson's term, the policy remained controversial. Some critics maintained that it made impossible the fighting of a limited non-nuclear war. The Army and Navy felt that the increased emphasis on air power and nuclear weapons represented a departure from the concept of "balanced forces," where individual service programs were balanced against overall requirements. Implicit in the policy was rejection of the idea that a year of crisis with the Soviet Union was imminent (to occur when the Soviets achieved offensive nuclear capability against the United States) or that a general war was just around the corner. Wilson pointed out frequently that defense policy should be long-term and not based on short-range projections of Soviet-American relations. "Military expenditures," he observed, "must be adequate, but not so great that they will become an intolerable burden which will harm the social and economic fabric of our country. True security cannot be founded on arms and arms alone."

Wilson worked hard to reduce the defense budget. This meant some immediate cutbacks in FY 1953 funds and a concerted effort to economize in subsequent years. Total obligational authority approved by Congress during Wilson's tenure decreased significantly at first and then began to creep back up, but remained lower than the Truman administration's last budgets (that were of course inflated because of the Korean conflict). The TOA for FY 1953, Truman's final Defense budget, was \$44.2 billion. TOA in subsequent fiscal years was: 1954, \$30.4 billion; 1955, \$33.7 billion; 1956, \$33.06 billion; 1957, \$39.7 billion; and 1958, \$41.1 billion. Especially after 1954, when the Democrats regained control of Congress, the Wilson-Eisenhower effort to curb defense expenditures provoked growing criticism. The Air Force, even though the New Look enhanced its role, opposed the decision to cut back from the Truman goal of 143 wings, and its congressional supporters tried repeatedly, sometimes successfully, to appropriate more money for air power



Admiral Arthur W. Radford

than the administration wanted. The other services, especially the Army, objected to force reductions ordained by the New Look. Both General Ridgway, who retired as Army chief of staff in June 1955, and his successor, General Maxwell D. Taylor, believed that the Army was receiving too small a share of the military budget.

Its standing threatened by the New Look, the Army questioned the wisdom of reliance on “massive retaliation” and strategic air power to the neglect of other force elements. Secretary Wilson reportedly observed that the United States “can’t afford to fight limited wars. We can only afford to fight a big war, and if there is one, that is the kind it will be.” But by 1955 the Army, and later in the decade the Navy, departed from their emphasis on preparation for total war by urging the need to prepare for limited war—non-global conflicts restricted in geographical area, force size, and weapons (although tactical nuclear weapons were not ruled out). Generals Ridgway and Taylor stressed the need to have a variety of forces available and equipped to fight different kinds of war—from a local non-nuclear war to a global strategic nuclear conflict. They rejected the notion that limited wars would occur only in less developed areas and argued that such conflicts might occur in the NATO region as well.

The Army received indirect support from such critics of massive retaliation as Bernard Brodie, William W. Kaufmann, and Henry A. Kissinger, who noted that the

United States and the Soviet Union had or were acquiring the power to destroy each other with strategic nuclear weapons, thus precluding their rational use in response to a limited attack. Taylor, concluding that the Soviet Union and the United States had achieved mutual nuclear deterrence, believed that limited-war forces would play an active role in future conflicts and that atomic retaliatory forces would play a passive role. The Army did move into missile and space programs in an effort to preserve for itself a part in planning for and fighting a nuclear war, but in the late 1950s it continued to push for adoption of a new national security policy acknowledging the primacy of limited war. While the Eisenhower administration did not adopt the Army’s position, by the time Wilson left office it did accept both the need to prepare for limited war and the idea that deterrence of a direct attack on U.S. interests required “sufficient” rather than “superior” retaliatory capability.

Increased competition among the services resulting from the New Look compelled Wilson to deal with the perennially troublesome question of service roles and missions, complicated by the introduction of new weapons, especially missiles. He noted in his semi-annual report at the end of FY 1956 that the services, which had eight categories of guided missiles available for various tasks, could not agree on their respective roles and missions in relation to these and other planned missile systems. Also at issue were aircraft types for the individual services and Air Force tactical support for the Army. To address these and other nagging questions, Wilson issued two important documents. The first, a memorandum to members of the Armed Forces Policy Council on 26 November 1956, dealt with five points of contention. First, Wilson limited the Army to small aircraft with specifically defined functions within combat zones. On the matter of airlift adequacy, which the Army questioned, the secretary declared current Air Force practices acceptable. As to air defense, the Army received responsibility for point defense—of specified geographical areas, vital installations, and cities; the Air Force became responsible for area defense—the interception of enemy attacks away from individual vital installations; and the Navy could maintain ship-based air defense weapon systems. Wilson assigned to the Air Force primary responsibility for tactical support for the Army, although the Army could use surface-to-surface missiles for close support of its field operations. Finally, the secretary gave the Air Force sole authority to operate land-based intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) systems and the Navy the same responsibility for ship-based IRBMs. He enjoined the Army from planning operational employment of missiles with ranges beyond 200 miles.



General Maxwell D. Taylor

On 18 March 1957 Wilson issued a directive to clarify his earlier decisions on the Army-Air Force use of aircraft for tactical purposes. He made no major changes from the previous division of responsibility; rather, he provided a more detailed and specific listing of those functional areas for which the Army could procure its own aircraft and those for which it would rely on the Air Force.

Although Wilson found it necessary to clarify service roles and missions, he did not press for extensive further unification of the armed forces. He established in February 1956 an office of special assistant to the secretary of defense for guided missiles but made few other changes after implementation of Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953. When asked in 1957 about persistent demands for further unification, Wilson responded: "It's an oversimplification in the false hope that you could thus wash out the problems if you put the people all in the same uniform and that then they wouldn't disagree over what should be done. Of course, they would."

Wilson, a folksy, honest, and outspoken man, sometimes got into trouble because of casual remarks. In January 1957, for example, he referred to enlistees in

the National Guard during the Korean War as "draft dodgers." This caused a storm of protest and even brought a rebuke from the president, who said he thought Wilson had made "a very . . . unwise statement, without stopping to think what it meant." On another occasion, Wilson jokingly referred to the White House as a "dung hill," generating further controversy. These episodes should not detract from recognition of Wilson's determined efforts to run the Department of Defense efficiently and to maintain the nation's security forces within reasonable budget guidelines.

Wilson indicated his intention to retire from office shortly after the start of the second Eisenhower term and left on 8 October 1957. Eisenhower noted when Wilson stepped down that under him "the strength of our security forces has not only been maintained but has been significantly increased" and that he had managed the Defense Department "in a manner consistent with the requirements of a strong, healthy national economy." After he left the Pentagon, Wilson returned to Michigan, where he devoted his time to business and family affairs. He died at the age of 71 on 26 September 1961.

NEIL H. MCELROY (1957-1959)

On 4 October 1957, just four days before Wilson left office, the Soviet Union launched into orbit the world's first satellite (Sputnik I), suggesting that the Soviets were ahead of the United States in missile development. This event, which raised important questions about the U.S. defense program, served as a backdrop to the swearing in, on 9 October 1957, of Neil H. McElroy as secretary of defense.

Born in Berea, Ohio, on 30 October 1904, of school-teacher parents, McElroy grew up in the Cincinnati area. After receiving a bachelor's degree in economics from Harvard in 1925, he returned to Cincinnati to work in the advertising department of the Procter and Gamble Company. He advanced rapidly up the managerial ladder and became company president in 1948. Although a well-known businessman, McElroy's only experience in the federal government prior to 1957 had been as chairman of the White House Conference on Education in 1955-56. Given his background in industry, and given President Eisenhower's predominance in defense matters, McElroy's appointment was not unusual. He spelled out his mandate the day he assumed office: "I conceive the role of the Secretary of Defense to be that of captain of President Eisenhower's defense team."


The launching of Sputnik I and a second Soviet satellite a month later prevented McElroy from easing into his duties at a deliberate pace. To meet the concern generated by the sputniks, McElroy attempted both to clarify the relative positions of the United States and the Soviet Union in missile development and to speed up the U.S. effort. Placing considerable emphasis on the intermediate-range ballistic missiles the United States then had under development, McElroy argued that with proper deployment in overseas locations they would serve as effectively as Soviet intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Without waiting for completion of final tests and evaluations, McElroy ordered the Air Force Thor and Army Jupiter IRBMs into production and planned to begin their deployment in the United Kingdom before the end of 1958 and on the European continent shortly thereafter. McElroy also ordered accelerated development of the Navy solid-fuel Polaris IRBM and the Air Force liquid-fuel Atlas and Titan ICBMs. In February 1958 he authorized the Air Force to begin development of the Minuteman, a solid-fuel ICBM to be deployed in hardened underground silos, with operational status expected in the early 1960s.

McElroy did not believe that the Sputnik success represented a major change in the world's military balance, but he acknowledged that it had a significant impact on



world public opinion. The launching of the Sputniks indicated that "the Soviet Union is farther advanced scientifically than many had realized" and that "the weapons of the future may be a great deal closer upon us than we had thought, and therefore the ultimate survival of the Nation depends more than ever before on the speed and skill with which we can pursue the development of advanced weapons." McElroy had to spend much time explaining the missile programs and trying to allay congressional anxiety about a so-called "missile gap" between the United States and the Soviet Union.

McElroy shared some responsibility for the missile gap controversy. When asked whether the United States was behind the Russians in the satellite and missile fields, he responded affirmatively. Later he qualified his statement by noting that while the Soviet Union was ahead in satellites, it was not necessarily ahead in missiles, and he repeatedly pointed out that U.S. IRBMs deployed overseas were just as much a threat to the Soviet Union as Soviet ICBMs deployed in Russia were to the United States. But charges of a missile gap persisted. When he left office in December 1959 McElroy stated that the two nations had about the same number of ICBMs, but that if the USSR built missiles up to its capacity and the United States built those it planned to build, the Soviet Union would probably have more missiles than the United States during the 1961-63 period. The missile gap debate lasted



Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles

throughout the rest of Eisenhower's term and became a prominent issue in the presidential campaign of 1960.

In some measure the Soviet sputniks may have hastened the landmark Defense reorganization of 1958. Although President Eisenhower provided strong leadership in achieving the necessary legislation, McElroy was instrumental in seeing it through. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 significantly influenced the evolution of DoD organization and the role of the secretary. McElroy considered the most important aspects of the 1958 reorganization to be the replacement of service executive agents by the JCS in directing the unified commands and the creation of a strong director of defense research and engineering.*

As always, the budget greatly influenced the shaping of Department of Defense plans and programs.

Although the Eisenhower administration maintained a determined interest in controlling expenditures and balancing the budget, McElroy did not place economy above preparedness. A strong supporter of military assistance, he argued effectively for continued congressional and public support for the program. "Military Assistance," he said, "is to the defense of our Country as fire prevention is to fire fighting. You can have the best, most modern sprinkling system in your factory but it will be useless if you don't take steps to prevent fires from getting out of control before they reach your plant." Nonetheless, he presided over a budget that remained stringent. In spite of public concern about preparedness in the wake of the Russian Sputnik and pressures from Democratic critics to spend more money, the Eisenhower administration did not panic. While it shifted some expenditure priorities, especially toward missile development, production, and deployment, it did not support a drastic increase in the defense budget. The president and Secretary McElroy contended that the budget was adequate to insure the nation's security. For the McElroy period, the Defense Department's total obligational authority by fiscal year was as follows: 1958, \$41.1 billion; 1959, \$42.1 billion; and 1960, \$40.2 billion.

When McElroy acceded to Eisenhower's request in 1957 that he become secretary of defense, he limited his availability to about two years. Although there was criticism that the secretary was leaving just as he had learned the job, McElroy confirmed early in 1959 that he would resign before the end of the year. Speculation that Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles would succeed him ended with Quarles's death in May 1959. Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates, Jr., succeeded Quarles, and when McElroy's resignation became effective on 1 December 1959, Gates replaced him. Actually, McElroy served longer as secretary of defense than any of his predecessors except Wilson. When he left the Pentagon, he became chairman of the board of Procter and Gamble. He died on 30 November 1972 in Cincinnati.

* See pp. 23-31.

THOMAS S. GATES, JR. (1959-1961)

Gates was sworn in as secretary of defense on an interim appointment on 2 December 1959 and confirmed by the Senate on 26 January 1960. He was born in Germantown, Pennsylvania, on 10 April 1906, the son of an investment banker who served at one time as president of the University of Pennsylvania. Gates graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1928, then joined the investment banking firm of Drexel and Company in Philadelphia and became a partner in 1940. During World War II he served in the Navy, rose to the rank of lieutenant commander, and participated in campaigns in the Pacific and Mediterranean areas. He was released from active duty in October 1945.

President Eisenhower appointed Gates under secretary of the Navy in October 1953 and secretary on 1 April 1957, positions in which he earned the president's approval. It was a foregone conclusion when Gates became McElroy's deputy on 8 June 1959 that he would succeed him. He entered office with an impressive background of active military experience and more than six years in the Department of Defense.

As a top-level DoD official since 1953, Gates was familiar with the 1953 and 1958 changes in Defense organization. Believing that the secretary of defense had all the authority he needed and that time should be allowed for evaluation of the long-range effects of the 1958 amendments, he discouraged efforts to further revamp the department. As a former secretary of the Navy who had observed the gradual downgrading of service secretary positions, he felt that the service secretaries should play a more important role, and he encouraged them to do so.

Gates cultivated a good working relationship with the JCS. Less than a month after becoming secretary, he reminded the chiefs of their responsibility to apprise him of disputes and proposed to meet with them in order to expedite settlement or bring the issue to the president's attention for final resolution. Soon Gates and the JCS met on a regular basis, not just in instances when the Chiefs disagreed. Congressional and other sources applauded Gates for taking the initiative in improving both the JCS organization and the secretary's relations with it.

Another important Gates initiative was the creation in August 1960 of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). Previously, inadequate coordination of targeting plans between the Strategic Air Command and the Navy led to redundancy and disputed priorities. These differences became especially significant with the advent of the Navy's sea-based Polaris ballistic missiles.



Acting on a proposal by SAC Commander in Chief General Thomas S. Power that SAC control strategic weapons targeting, Gates set up the JSTPS. The SAC commander, supported by an integrated joint staff, assumed separate duties as director of strategic target planning, to be, as Gates indicated, "the planning agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing and keeping up to date the detailed plans which are necessary." When Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke objected to the new arrangement, Gates encouraged him to argue his case with President Eisenhower, who ultimately upheld Gates's decision. Thereafter Burke supported the JSTPS and assigned to it highly qualified naval officers. By December 1960 the JSTPS had prepared the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which specified for various attack options the timing, weapons, delivery systems, and targets to be used by U.S. strategic forces.*

Gates devoted more time than Wilson and McElroy to the development of basic defense policy, a sphere in which the president remained dominant. While he instituted no radical departure from the New Look approach, the changing nature of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the related assumed need for continental defense systems, and the pressing question of how to respond to local or "limited" wars, dictated a gradual

* See p. 31.

shift in defense policy. As Gates pointed out at a congressional hearing in January 1960, the two principal U.S. defense objectives were “to deter the outbreak of general war by maintaining and improving our present capability to retaliate with devastating effectiveness in case of a major attack upon us or our allies” and “to maintain, together with our allies, a capability to apply to local situations the degree of force necessary to deter local wars, or to win or contain them promptly if they do break out.” Gates saw no clear distinction between general war and limited war forces. As he put it, “All forces are a deterrent to and would be employed in a general war. Most of our forces could be employed in a limited war, if required.” He noted as an example that aircraft carriers “are probably the country’s best limited war capability initially because they are deployed in the world’s trouble zones and they have on-the-spot ability to react”; yet, he added, they could contribute to the strategic offensive forces during general war.

During Gates’s tenure two missile elements—the ICBM and the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—joined the manned bomber to form a “triad” of strategic nuclear delivery systems. Also during this period, there occurred movement toward greater emphasis on counterforce—targeting a potential enemy’s military installations and forces. Not only was the United States developing or beginning to deploy a variety of missile systems during this period—Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Polaris—but so was the Soviet Union. The USSR’s emphasis on the land-based ICBM rather than the manned bomber as its primary strategic delivery system presaged a threat of such magnitude to the United States that, together with the Sputnik shock, it forced an acceleration in the pace of U.S. missile development.

Gates, like McElroy, had to contend with the “missile gap” controversy. He regarded it as a false issue, based on the failure of missile gap believers to distinguish between space and military programs. When the U.S. long-range ballistic missile program began in the early 1950s, Gates observed, the development of small, lightweight nuclear warheads by American scientists made it possible for smaller ballistic missiles to carry them. The Russians, on the other hand, concentrated on very large boosters that they used to launch space satellites earlier than the United States. Gates told a House committee, “We are not behind the Russians in our military effort overall It is one thing to admit you are behind in the ability to put big payloads in space for which we have at the moment no military requirement, and another thing to admit that we are behind in our total military posture.” Gates conceded that the Soviets might have more strategic missiles than the

United States for a few years, perhaps peaking in 1962, but he denied that there was a real missile or deterrent gap; the Soviets would not “gain a strategic posture which might tempt them to initiate a surprise attack.” Gates based his thinking in part on a debatable approach to intelligence estimates, which took account of Soviet intentions as well as capabilities, leading to the conclusion that the disparity between the number of Soviet and U.S. missiles by 1962 or 1963 would not be as great as estimated during the McElroy period.

Like all of his predecessors, Gates supported U.S. participation in collective security pacts and military assistance programs. He identified NATO as the nucleus of the U.S. “forward strategy.” As he put it, “Should we ever abandon our forward strategy in favor of the so-called ‘Fortress America’ concept, we would retreat forever.” He urged Congress to continue adequate funding for military assistance, which had brought very high returns for the money spent.

Perhaps the most spectacular event of Gates’s administration occurred on 1 May 1960 when the Soviet Union shot down over its territory a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers. When Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced the incident four days later and accused the United States of spying, the Eisenhower administration initially suggested that the plane might have strayed into Soviet airspace. On the recommendation of representatives from State and Defense, including Gates, President Eisenhower later admitted that the U-2 was on an intelligence-gathering mission (actually under CIA control) and assumed responsibility for the flight. In mid-May Gates accompanied Eisenhower to Paris for a summit meeting that had been scheduled prior to the U-2 affair. There Khrushchev demanded termination of all U.S. flights over the Soviet Union, an apology, and punishment of those responsible. Eisenhower indicated that the flights would not be resumed but rejected the other demands, whereupon Khrushchev refused to proceed with the summit meeting. Gates suggested later that the Russian leader used the U-2 crisis to abort a meeting that he had determined in advance would not result in gains for the Soviet Union.

On the eve of the summit conference, Gates ordered a worldwide alert of U.S. military communications facilities—a decision criticized by some as provocative. Stoutly defending his action, Gates later explained that he decided, with the concurrence of Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, to call the alert when he became aware of the belligerent position Khrushchev intended to take when the summit convened the next day. “Under the circumstances,” Gates said, “it seemed most prudent to me to increase the

awareness of our unified commanders. Moreover, since the command and individuals concerned in the decision process, including the President, the Secretary of State, and myself, were overseas, it was important to check out our military communications.”

Although Gates adhered to the usual budget posture and strategy of the Eisenhower administration, there was 8.2 percent real growth in DoD's FY 1961 budget after Congress completed its work. Total obligational authority amounted to \$44.6 billion, almost \$4.4 billion over the previous year. The bulk of the increase went to the Navy and the Air Force. Gates pressed for an appropriation of \$2 billion for military assistance, most of which Congress provided. To criticism of the Eisenhower administration's continuing efforts to hold down the DoD budget, Gates replied that the department was spending enough money to meet the nation's vital security needs.

In a lengthy statement entitled “Department of Defense, 1953-1960,” prepared at the close of Gates's tenure, the Department of Defense summarized its accomplishments during the Eisenhower years, concluding that “today our armed forces have the greatest striking power in our history—many times greater than in 1953.” Among other accomplishments, it cited development of medium- and long-range bombers (including the B-52s put into service during the 1950s) and ICBMs; installation of a continental defense system—the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), and Nike surface-to-air missile systems; production of several

nuclear submarines, beginning with the *Nautilus* in 1954, and *Forrestal*-type carriers; and creation of the Defense Communications Agency.

Gates retired from office on 20 January 1961. There were those who regarded him as the first of a new breed of secretaries of defense who would take a more active management approach—evidenced by his regular meetings with the JCS and establishment of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. Gates, of course, had the advantages of long prior service in DoD and the expanded authority of the office resulting from the 1953 and 1958 reorganizations. Although President Eisenhower continued to be, as during the Wilson and McElroy periods, the chief author of defense policy and the ultimate decision-maker, Gates appeared to operate with more authority and independence than his immediate predecessors, especially in areas such as strategic policy and planning. It is notable that after John F. Kennedy's election to the presidency in 1960 the press speculated that he might include a Republican in his cabinet and that if so, Gates would be high on the list of possible appointees.

After he left the Pentagon, Gates joined Morgan and Company in New York, later the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, becoming president in 1962 and chairman and chief executive officer in 1965. President Richard M. Nixon appointed him chairman of the Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, which presented its influential report in November 1969. In 1976-77 he served, with the rank of ambassador, as chief of the United States Liaison Office in the People's Republic of China. He died in Philadelphia at age 76 on 25 March 1983.

ROBERT S. MCNAMARA (1961-1968)

Defense issues, including the missile gap, played a prominent role in the campaign of 1960. President-elect Kennedy, very much concerned with defense matters although lacking Eisenhower's mastery of the issues, first offered the post of secretary of defense to former secretary Robert A. Lovett. When Lovett declined, Kennedy chose Robert S. McNamara on Lovett's recommendation.

McNamara was born on 9 June 1916 in San Francisco, where his father was sales manager of a wholesale shoe firm. He graduated in 1937 from the University of California (Berkeley) with a degree in economics and philosophy, earned a master's degree from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in 1939, worked a year for the accounting firm of Price, Waterhouse in San Francisco, and then in August 1940 returned to Harvard to teach in the business school. He entered the Army Air Forces as a captain in early 1943 and left active duty three years later with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

In 1946 McNamara joined Ford Motor Company as manager of planning and financial analysis. He advanced rapidly through a series of top-level management positions to the presidency of Ford on 9 November 1960—one day after Kennedy's election. The first company head selected outside the Ford family, McNamara received substantial credit for Ford's expansion and success in the postwar period. Less than five weeks after becoming president at Ford, he accepted Kennedy's invitation to join his cabinet.

Although not especially knowledgeable about defense matters, McNamara immersed himself in the subject, learned quickly, and soon began to apply an "active role" management philosophy, in his own words "providing aggressive leadership—questioning, suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives and stimulating progress." He rejected radical organizational changes, such as those proposed by a group Kennedy appointed, headed by Sen. W. Stuart Symington, which would have abolished the military departments, replaced the JCS with a single chief of staff, and established three functional unified commands. McNamara accepted the need for separate services but argued that "at the end we must have one defense policy, not three conflicting defense policies. And it is the job of the Secretary and his staff to make sure that this is the case."

Initially the basic policies outlined by President Kennedy in a message to Congress on 28 March 1961 guided McNamara in the reorientation of the defense program. Kennedy rejected the concept of first-strike attack and emphasized the need for adequate strategic arms and defense to deter nuclear attack on the United



States and its allies. U.S. arms, he maintained, must constantly be under civilian command and control, and the nation's defense posture had to be "designed to reduce the danger of irrational or unpremeditated general war." The primary mission of U.S. overseas forces, in cooperation with allies, was "to prevent the steady erosion of the Free World through limited wars." Kennedy and McNamara rejected massive retaliation for a posture of flexible response. The United States wanted choices in an emergency other than "inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation," as the president put it. Out of a major review of the military challenges confronting the United States initiated by McNamara in 1961 came a decision to increase the nation's limited warfare capabilities.

The Kennedy administration placed particular emphasis on improving ability to counter Communist "wars of national liberation," in which the enemy avoided head-on military confrontation and resorted to political subversion and guerrilla tactics. As McNamara said in his 1962 annual report, "The military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. The political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination." In practical terms, this meant training and equipping U.S. military personnel, as well as such allies as South Vietnam, for counterinsurgency operations. Later in the decade, U.S. forces applied these counterinsurgency techniques with mixed success in Vietnam.

Increased attention to conventional strength complemented these special forces preparations. The Berlin crisis in 1961 demonstrated to McNamara the need for more troops. In this instance he called up reserves and also proceeded to expand the regular armed forces. Whereas active duty strength had declined from approximately 3,555,000 to 2,483,000 between 1953 (the end of the Korean conflict) and 1961, it increased to nearly 2,808,000 by 30 June 1962. Then the forces leveled off at around 2,700,000 until the Vietnam military buildup began in 1965, reaching a peak of nearly 3,550,000 by mid-1968, just after McNamara left office.

McNamara played a much larger role in the formulation of nuclear strategy than his predecessors. In part this reflected both the increasing sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and Soviet progress toward nuclear parity with the United States. Central in McNamara's thinking on nuclear policy stood the NATO alliance and the U.S. commitment to defend its members from aggression. In a widely-noticed speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in June 1962, McNamara repeated much of what he had told a NATO ministers' meeting in Athens several weeks earlier, especially about the importance of NATO to U.S. security and the proper response to a surprise Soviet nuclear attack on the Western allies. Basic NATO strategy in such an unlikely event, McNamara argued, should follow the "no-cities" concept. "General nuclear war," he stated, "should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population."

With his principal goal deterrence—to convince Moscow that a nuclear attack against the Western allies would trigger U.S. retaliation against Soviet forces, perhaps eliminating their ability to continue military action—McNamara also wanted to provide the Russians with an incentive to refrain from attacking cities. "The very strength and nature of the Alliance forces," he said in the Ann Arbor speech, "make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to it."

McNamara soon deemphasized the no-cities approach, for several reasons: public fear that planning to use nuclear weapons in limited ways would make nuclear war seem more feasible; increased Air Force requirements, after identifying additional targets under the no-cities strategy, for more nuclear weapons; the assumption that such a policy would require major

air and missile defense, necessitating a vastly expanded budget; and negative reactions from the Soviets and NATO allies. McNamara turned to "assured destruction," which he characterized as the capability "to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, even after absorbing a surprise first strike." As defined by McNamara, assured destruction meant that the United States would be able to destroy in retaliation 20 to 25 percent of the Soviet Union's population and 50 percent of its industrial capacity. Later the term "mutual assured destruction" meant the capacity of each side to inflict sufficient damage on the other to constitute an effective deterrent. In conjunction with assured destruction McNamara stressed the importance of damage limitation—the use of strategic forces to limit damage to the nation's population and industrial capacity by attacking and diminishing the enemy's strategic offensive forces.

To make this strategy credible, McNamara speeded up the modernization and expansion of weapon and delivery systems. He accelerated production and deployment of the solid-fuel Minuteman ICBM and Polaris SLBM missiles and by FY 1966 had removed from operational status all of the older liquid-fuel Atlas and Titan I missiles. By the end of McNamara's tenure, the United States had deployed 54 Titan II and 1,000 Minuteman missiles on land, and 656 Polaris missiles on 41 nuclear submarines. The size of this long-range strategic missile force remained stable until the 1980s, although the number of warheads increased significantly as the MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) system emerged in the late 1960s and the 1970s.

McNamara took other steps to improve U.S. deterrence posture and military capabilities. He raised the portion of SAC strategic bombers on 15-minute ground alert from 25 percent to 50 percent, thus lessening their vulnerability to missile attack. In December 1961 he established the Strike Command (STRICOM). Authorized to draw forces when needed from the Strategic Army Corps, the Tactical Air Command, and the airlift units of the Military Air Transport Service and the military services, Strike Command had the mission "to respond swiftly and with whatever force necessary to threats against the peace in any part of the world, reinforcing unified commands or . . . carrying out separate contingency operations." McNamara also increased long-range airlift and sealift capabilities and funds for space research and development. After reviewing the separate and often uncoordinated service efforts in intelligence and communications, McNamara in 1961 consolidated

these functions in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Communications Agency (the latter originally established by Secretary Gates in 1960), having both report to the secretary of defense through the JCS. In the same year, he set up the Defense Supply Agency to work toward unified supply procurement, distribution, and inventory management.*

McNamara's institution of systems analysis as a basis for making key decisions on force requirements, weapon systems, and other matters occasioned much debate. Two of its main practitioners during the McNamara era, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, described the concept as follows: "First, the word 'systems' indicates that every decision should be considered in as broad a context as necessary The word 'analysis' emphasizes the need to reduce a complex problem to its component parts for better understanding. Systems analysis takes a complex problem and sorts out the tangle of significant factors so that each can be studied by the method most appropriate to it." Enthoven and Smith said they used mainly civilians as systems analysts because they could apply independent points of view to force planning. McNamara's tendency to take military advice into account less than had previous secretaries contributed to his unpopularity with service leaders.

The most notable example of systems analysis was the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) instituted by DoD Comptroller Charles J. Hitch. McNamara directed Hitch to analyze defense requirements systematically and produce a long-term, program-oriented Defense budget. PPBS evolved to become the heart of the McNamara management program. According to Enthoven and Smith, the basic ideas of PPBS were: "the attempt to put defense program issues into a broader context and to search for explicit measures of national need and adequacy"; "consideration of military needs and costs together"; "explicit consideration of alternatives at the top decision level"; "the active use of an analytical staff at the top policymaking levels"; "a plan combining both forces and costs which projected into the future the foreseeable implications of current decisions"; and "open and explicit analysis, that is, each analysis should be made available to all interested parties, so that they can examine the calculations, data, and assumptions and retrace the steps leading to the conclusions."

Among the management tools developed to implement PPBS were the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), the Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM), the Readiness, Information and Control Tables, and the Development

Concept Paper (DCP). The annual FYDP was a series of tables projecting forces for eight years and costs and manpower for five years in mission-oriented, rather than individual service, programs. By 1968, the FYDP covered 10 military areas: strategic forces, general purpose forces, intelligence and communications, airlift and sealift, guard and reserve forces, research and development, central supply and maintenance, training and medical services, administration and related activities, and support of other nations.

The DPM, intended for the White House and usually prepared by the systems analysis office, was a method to study and analyze major Defense issues. Sixteen DPMs appeared between 1961 and 1968 on such topics as strategic offensive and defensive forces, NATO strategy and force structure, military assistance, and tactical air forces. OSD sent the DPMs to the services and the JCS for comment; in making decisions, McNamara included in the DPM a statement of alternative approaches, force levels, and other factors. The DPM in its final form became a decision document.

The *Development Concept Paper* examined performance, schedule, cost estimates, and technical risks to provide a basis for determining whether to begin or continue a research and development program. The Readiness, Information, and Control Tables provided data on specific projects, more detailed than in the FYDP, such as the tables for the Southeast Asia Deployment Plan, which recorded by month and quarter the schedule for deployment, consumption rates, and future projections of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.

PPBS was suspect in some quarters, especially among the military, because it was civilian-controlled and seemed to rely heavily on impersonal quantitative analysis. As Enthoven and Smith observed, "Much of the controversy over PPBS, particularly the use of systems analysis, is really an attack on the increased use of the legal authority of the Secretary of Defense and an expression of a view about his proper role." In spite of the criticism, the system persisted in modified form long after McNamara had left the Pentagon.

McNamara relied heavily on systems analysis to reach several controversial weapon decisions. He canceled the B-70 bomber, begun during the Eisenhower years as a replacement for the B-52, stating that it was neither cost-effective nor needed, and later he vetoed its proposed successor, the RS-70. McNamara expressed publicly his belief that the manned bomber as a strategic weapon had no long-run future; the intercontinental ballistic missile was faster, less vulnerable, and less costly.

* See pp. 32-33.

Similarly, McNamara terminated the Skybolt project late in 1962. Begun in 1959, Skybolt was conceived as a ballistic missile with a 1,000-nautical mile range, designed for launching from B-52 bombers as a defense suppression weapon to clear the way for bombers to penetrate to targets. McNamara decided that Skybolt was too expensive, not accurate enough, and would exceed its planned development time. He asserted that other systems, including the Hound Dog missile, could do the job at less cost. Toward the end of his term McNamara also opposed an antiballistic missile (ABM) system proposed for installation in the United States, arguing that it would be too expensive (at least \$40 billion) and ultimately ineffective, because the Soviets would increase their offensive capability to offset the defensive advantage of the United States. Under pressure to proceed with the ABM program after it became clear that the Soviets had begun a similar project, McNamara finally agreed to a "thin" system, but he never believed it wise for the United States to move in that direction.

Despite serious problems, McNamara initiated and continued the TFX (later F-111) aircraft. He believed that Navy and Air Force requirements for a new tactical fighter could best be met by development of a common aircraft. After extensive study of the recommendations of a joint Air Force-Navy evaluation board, McNamara awarded the TFX contract to General Dynamics. The decision, based on cost-effectiveness and efficiency considerations, irritated the chief of naval operations and the Air Force chief of staff, both of whom preferred separate new fighters for their services and Boeing as the contractor. Because of high cost overruns, trouble in meeting performance objectives, flight test crashes, and difficulties in adapting the plane to Navy use, the TFX's future became more and more uncertain. The Navy dropped its version in 1968. Some of McNamara's critics in the services and Congress labeled the TFX a failure, but versions of the F-111 remained in Air Force service two decades after McNamara decided to produce them.

McNamara's staff stressed systems analysis as an aid in decisionmaking on weapon development and many other budget issues. The secretary believed that the United States could afford any amount needed for national security, but that "this ability does not excuse us from applying strict standards of effectiveness and efficiency to the way we spend our defense dollars You have to make a judgment on how much is enough." Acting on these principles, McNamara instituted a much-publicized cost reduction program, which, he reported, saved \$14 billion in the five-year period beginning in 1961. Although he had to withstand a storm of criticism from senators and representatives from affected congressional

districts, he closed many military bases and installations that he judged unnecessary to national security. He was equally determined about other cost-saving measures.

Nonetheless, mainly because of the Vietnam War buildup, total obligational authority increased greatly during the McNamara years. Fiscal year TOA increased from \$48.4 billion in 1962 to \$49.5 billion in 1965 (before the major Vietnam increases) to \$74.9 billion in 1968, McNamara's last year in office. Not until FY 1984 did DoD's total obligational authority surpass that of FY 1968 in constant dollars.

In the broad arena of national security affairs, McNamara played a principal part under both Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, especially during international crises. The first of these occurred in April 1961, when a Cuban exile group with some support from the United States attempted to overthrow the Castro regime. The disastrous failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, carried through by the Kennedy administration based on planning begun under Eisenhower, proved a great embarrassment. When McNamara left office in 1968, he told reporters that his principal regret was his recommendation to Kennedy to proceed with the Bay of Pigs operation, something that "could have been recognized as an error at the time."

More successful from McNamara's point of view was his participation in the Executive Committee, a small group of advisers who counseled Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. McNamara supported the president's decision to quarantine Cuba to prevent Soviet ships from bringing in more offensive weapons. During the crisis the Pentagon placed U.S. military forces on alert, ready to back up the administration's demand that the Soviet Union withdraw its offensive missiles from Cuba. McNamara believed that the outcome of the missile crisis "demonstrated the readiness of our armed forces to meet a sudden emergency" and "highlighted the importance of maintaining a properly balanced Defense establishment." Similarly, McNamara regarded the use of nearly 24,000 U.S. troops and several dozen naval vessels to stabilize a revolutionary situation in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 as another successful test of the "readiness and capabilities of the U.S. defense establishment to support our foreign policy."

The Vietnam conflict came to claim most of McNamara's time and energy. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations had committed the United States to support the French and native anti-Communist forces in Vietnam in resisting efforts by the Communists in the North to control the country. The U.S. role, including financial support and military advice, expanded after 1954 when the French withdrew. During the Kennedy


administration, the U.S. military advisory group in South Vietnam steadily increased, with McNamara's concurrence, from just a few hundred to about 17,000. U.S. involvement escalated after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 when North Vietnamese naval vessels reportedly fired on two U.S. destroyers. President Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes on North Vietnamese naval bases and Congress approved almost unanimously the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the president "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression."

In 1965, in response to stepped up military activity by the Communist Viet Cong in South Vietnam and their North Vietnamese allies, the United States began bombing North Vietnam, deployed large military forces, and entered into combat in South Vietnam. Requests from top U.S. military commanders in Vietnam led to the commitment of 485,000 troops by the end of 1967 and almost 535,000 by 30 June 1968. The casualty lists

mounted as the number of troops and the intensity of fighting escalated.

Although he loyally supported administration policy, McNamara gradually became skeptical about whether the war could be won by deploying more troops to South Vietnam and intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam. He traveled to Vietnam many times to study the situation firsthand. He became increasingly reluctant to approve the large force increments requested by the military commanders. The Tet offensive of early 1968, although a military defeat for the enemy, clearly indicated that the road ahead for both the United States and the South Vietnamese government was still long and hard. By this time McNamara had already submitted his resignation, chiefly because of his disillusionment with the war.

As McNamara grew more and more controversial after 1966 and his differences with the president and the JCS over Vietnam policy became the subject of public speculation, frequent rumors surfaced that he would leave office. Yet there was great surprise when



President John F. Kennedy at the Pentagon



President Lyndon B. Johnson

President Johnson announced on 29 November 1967 that McNamara would resign to become president of the World Bank. The increasing intensity of the antiwar movement in the United States and the approaching presidential campaign, in which Johnson was expected to seek reelection, figured heavily in explanations of McNamara's departure. So also did McNamara's alleged differences with the JCS over the bombing of North Vietnam, the number of U.S. troops to be assigned to the ground war, and construction along the 17th parallel separating South and North Vietnam of an anti-infiltration ground barrier, which McNamara favored and the JCS opposed. McNamara's resistance to deployment of a major ABM system also upset the military chiefs. The president's announcement of McNamara's move to the World Bank stressed his stated interest in the job and that he deserved a change after seven years as secretary of defense, much longer than any of his predecessors.

McNamara left office on 29 February 1968; for his dedicated efforts, the president awarded him both the

Medal of Freedom and the Distinguished Service Medal. He served as head of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981. Shortly after he departed the Pentagon, he published *The Essence of Security*, discussing various aspects of his tenure and his position on basic national security issues. He did not speak out again on defense issues until after he left the World Bank. In 1982 McNamara joined several other former national security officials in urging that the United States pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in Europe in the event of hostilities; subsequently he proposed the elimination of nuclear weapons as an element of NATO's defense posture. His book, *In Retrospect*, published in 1995, presented an account and analysis of the Vietnam War that dwelt heavily on the mistakes to which he was a prime party and conveyed his strong sense of guilt and regret.

Evaluations of McNamara's long career as secretary of defense vary from glowing to negative and sometimes scathing. One journalist reported criticism of McNamara as a "human IBM machine" who cares more for computerized statistical logic than for human judgments." On the other hand, a congressman who had helped shape the National Security Act in 1947 stated when McNamara left the Pentagon that he "has come nearer [than anyone else] to being exactly what we planned a Secretary of Defense to be when we first wrote the Unification Act." Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote, "Except for General Marshall I do not know of any department head who, during the half century I have observed government in Washington, has so profoundly enhanced the position, power and security of the United States as Mr. McNamara." Journalist Hanson W. Baldwin cited an impressive list of McNamara accomplishments: containment of the more damaging aspects of service rivalry; significant curtailment of duplication and waste in weapon development; institution of systems analysis and the PPBS; application of computer technology; elimination of obsolescent military posts and facilities; and introduction of a flexible strategy, which among other things improved U.S. capacity to wage conventional and limited wars. Although McNamara had many differences with military leaders and members of Congress, few could deny that he had had a powerful impact on the Defense Department, and that much of what he had done would be a lasting legacy.


CLARK M. CLIFFORD (1968-1969)

On 19 January 1968 President Johnson announced his selection of Clark M. Clifford as McNamara's successor. Clifford was born in Fort Scott, Kansas, on 25 December 1906, took both bachelor and law degrees at Washington University, and practiced law in St. Louis between 1928 and 1943. He served as an officer with the Navy from 1944 to 1946, including assignment as assistant naval aide and naval aide to the president. After separation from the Navy, he held the position of special counsel to the president from 1946 to 1950. During this period he participated extensively in the legislative efforts that resulted in the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendments.

After leaving the government in 1950 Clifford practiced law in Washington, but continued to advise the White House occasionally. In 1960 he was a member of President-elect Kennedy's Committee on the Defense Establishment, headed by Stuart Symington. In May 1961 Kennedy appointed him to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which he chaired beginning in April 1963. After President Johnson entered office, Clifford served frequently as an unofficial counselor and sometimes undertook short-term official duties, including a trip with General Maxwell Taylor in 1967 to Vietnam and other countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Clifford estimated that in the year prior to his appointment as secretary of defense he had spent about half of his time advising the president and the other half with his law firm.

Widely known and respected in Washington and knowledgeable on defense matters when he became secretary of defense on 1 March 1968, Clifford was generally hailed as a worthy successor to McNamara. Many regarded the new secretary as more of a hawk on Vietnam than McNamara and thought his selection might presage an escalation of the U.S. military effort there. Clifford attempted to allay such fears when, responding to a query on whether he was a hawk or dove, he remarked, "I am not conscious of falling under any of those ornithological divisions."

Vietnam occupied most of Clifford's time and attention during his less than 11 months in office. He did not change the management system McNamara installed at the Pentagon, and for the most part assigned internal administration to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze. Clifford made no effort to depart from McNamara's policies and programs on such matters as nuclear strategy, NATO, and military assistance, but he favored the Sentinel ABM system McNamara gave only lukewarm backing. He wanted to deploy the system and supported



congressional appropriations for it. One important effect of Sentinel construction, he thought, would be to encourage the Soviet Union to enter arms control talks with the United States. Indeed, before Clifford left office, the Johnson administration made arrangements for negotiations that eventually led to the ABM limitation treaty in 1972.

Clifford continued McNamara's highly publicized Cost Reduction Program, announcing that over \$1.2 billion had been saved in FY 1968 as a result of the effort. Faced with a congressionally mandated reduction of expenditures in FY 1969, Clifford suspended the planned activation of an infantry division and deactivated 50 small ships, 9 naval air squadrons, and 23 Nike-Hercules launch sites.

By the time Clifford became secretary, DoD work on the FY 1969 budget was complete. It amounted in total obligational authority to \$77.7 billion, almost \$3 billion more than in FY 1968. The final FY 1970 budget, which Clifford and his staff worked on before they left office, amounted to \$75.5 billion TOA.

Clifford took office committed to continuing the president's Vietnam policies. At his nomination hearing, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the limited objective of the United States was to guarantee to the South Vietnamese people the right of self-determination. He opposed ending the U.S. bombing of North

Vietnam but acknowledged that the situation could change. In fact, on 31 March 1968, just a month after Clifford arrived at the Pentagon, President Johnson, in an effort to get peace talks started, ordered the cessation of bombing north of the 20th parallel, an area comprising almost 80 percent of North Vietnam's land area and 90 percent of its population. In the same address, Johnson announced that he would not be a candidate for reelection in 1968. Soon the North Vietnamese agreed to negotiations, which began in Paris in mid-May 1968. Later, on 31 October 1968, to encourage the successful outcome of these talks, the president, with Clifford's strong support, ordered an end to all bombing in North Vietnam.

Clifford, like McNamara, had to deal with frequent requests for additional troops from military commanders in Vietnam. When he became secretary, the authorized force in Vietnam was 525,000. At the end of March 1968 the president agreed to send 24,500 more troops on an emergency basis, raising authorized strength to 549,500, a figure never reached. Even as he oversaw a continued buildup, Clifford preferred to emphasize the points President Johnson had made in his 31 March address: that the South Vietnamese army could take over a greater share of the fighting, that the administration would place an absolute limit on the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam, and that it would take steps, including the bombing restrictions, to reduce the combat level.

Eventually Clifford moved very close, with the president's tacit support, to the position McNamara held on Vietnam just before he left office—no further increases

in U.S. troop levels, support for the bombing halt, and gradual disengagement from the conflict. By this time Clifford clearly disagreed with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who believed, according to the *Washington Post*, "that the war was being won by the allies" and that it "would be won if America had the will to win it." After he left office, Clifford, in the July 1969 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, made his views crystal clear: "Nothing we might do could be so beneficial . . . as to begin to withdraw our combat troops. Moreover . . . we cannot realistically expect to achieve anything more through our military force, and the time has come to begin to disengage. That was my final conclusion as I left the Pentagon on January 20, 1969."

Although the Johnson administration ended under the cloud of the Vietnam War, Clifford concluded his short term as secretary of defense with his reputation probably enhanced. He got along well with Congress, and this helped him to secure approval of at least some of his program. Besides settling in to his duties quickly and efficiently, Clifford capably managed the initial de-escalation of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict; indeed, he apparently strongly influenced the president in favor of the de-escalation strategy. As he left office to return to his law practice in Washington, Clifford expressed the hope and expectation that international tension would abate, citing the shift in the Vietnam confrontation from the battlefield to the conference table and the evident willingness of the Soviet Union to discuss limitations on strategic nuclear weapons.


MELVIN R. LAIRD (1969-1973)

Chosen by President-elect Richard M. Nixon as secretary of defense, Melvin R. Laird was the first member of Congress to occupy the position. Laird was born in Omaha, Nebraska, on 1 September 1922. In 1942 he graduated from Carleton College in Minnesota, then entered the United States Navy as an enlisted man. He received an ensign's commission in April 1944 and served on a destroyer in the Pacific. The recipient of the Purple Heart and several other decorations, Laird left the Navy in April 1946.

About the same time, at age 23, Laird entered the Wisconsin State Senate, succeeding his recently deceased father. He remained there until his election in November 1952 to the United States House of Representatives. Subsequently reelected eight consecutive times, he was chairman of the House Republican Conference when Nixon selected him for the cabinet. A very active congressman, Laird became known for his work on both domestic and defense issues, including his service on the Defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. He left Congress reluctantly, making it clear when he became secretary on 22 January 1969 that he intended to serve no more than four years.

As a congressman Laird had supported a strong defense posture and had sometimes been critical of Secretary McNamara. In September 1966, characterizing himself as a member of the loyal opposition, he publicly charged the Johnson administration with deception about Vietnam war costs and for delaying decisions to escalate the ground war until after the 1966 congressional elections. Laird also criticized McNamara's management and decisionmaking practices. After he became secretary of defense, Laird and President Nixon appointed a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel that made more than 100 recommendations on DoD's organization and functions in a lengthy report of 1 July 1970. The department implemented a number of the panel's proposals while Laird served in the Pentagon.*

Laird did not depart abruptly from the McNamara-Clifford management system, but rather instituted gradual changes. He pursued what he called "participatory management," an approach calculated to gain the cooperation of the military leadership in reducing the Defense budget and the size of the military establishment. While retaining decisionmaking functions for himself and the deputy secretary of defense, Laird somewhat decentralized policymaking and operations. He accorded the service secretaries and the JCS a more



influential role in the development of budgets and force levels. He revised the PPBS, including a return to the use of service budget ceilings and service programming of forces within these ceilings. The previously powerful systems analysis office could no longer initiate planning, only evaluate and review service proposals.

As Laird noted in his FY 1971 report, "Except for the major policy decisions, I am striving to decentralize decision-making as much as possible So, we are placing primary responsibility for detailed force planning on the Joint Chiefs and the Services, and we are delegating to the Military Departments more responsibility to manage development and procurement programs." The military leadership was enthusiastic about Laird's methods. As the *Washington Post* reported after his selection as secretary of defense, "Around the military-industrial complex these days they're singing 'Praise the Laird and pass the transformation.'"

Laird did not shrink from centralized management where he found it useful or warranted. His tenure saw the establishment of the Defense Investigative Service, the Defense Mapping Agency, the Office of Net Assessment, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (to administer all DoD military assistance programs). In October 1972 Congress passed legislation creating a

* See pp. 34-35.

second deputy secretary of defense position, a proposal Laird strongly supported, even though he never filled the position. Laird paid special attention to two important interdepartmental bodies: the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), composed of senior Defense, State, and CIA officials, which gathered information necessary for presidential decisions on the crisis use of U.S. military forces; and the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC), which brought together representatives from many agencies, including DoD, State, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Office of Management and Budget, to analyze defense budget issues as a basis for advising the president, placing, as Laird commented, "national security needs in proper relationship to non-defense requirements."

Laird succeeded in improving DoD's standing with Congress. As a highly respected congressional veteran, Laird had a head start in his efforts to gain more legislative support for Defense programs. He maintained close contact with old congressional friends, and he spent many hours testifying before Senate and House committees. Recognizing the congressional determination, with wide public support, to cut defense costs (including winding down the Vietnam War), Laird worked hard to prune budgetary requests before they went to Congress, and acceded to additional cuts when they could be absorbed without serious harm to national security. One approach, which made it possible to proceed with such new strategic weapon systems as the B-1 bomber, the Trident nuclear submarine, and cruise missiles, was agreement to a substantial cut in conventional forces. As a result, total military personnel declined from some 3.5 million in FY 1969 to 2.3 million by the time Laird left office in January 1973.

Other initiatives, including troop withdrawals from Vietnam, phasing out old weapon systems, base closures, and improved procurement practices, enabled the Pentagon to hold the line on spending, even at a time when high inflation affected both weapon and personnel costs. In Laird's years, total obligational authority by fiscal year was as follows: 1969, \$77.7 billion; 1970, \$75.5 billion; 1971, \$72.8 billion; 1972, \$76.4 billion; and 1973, \$78.9 billion.

Vietnam preoccupied Laird as it had McNamara and Clifford. In 1968 Nixon campaigned on a platform critical of the Johnson administration's handling of the war and promised to achieve "peace with honor." Although not receptive to demands for immediate withdrawal, Laird acknowledged the necessity to disengage U.S. combat forces gradually. Thus he developed and strongly supported "Vietnamization," a program intended to expand, equip, and train South Vietnam's forces and assign to

them an ever-increasing combat role, at the same time steadily reducing the number of U.S. combat troops. During 1969 the new administration cut authorized U.S. troop strength in Vietnam from 549,500 to 484,000, and by 1 May 1972 the number stood at 69,000. During this same period, from January 1969 to May 1972, U.S. combat deaths declined 95 percent from the 1968 peak, and war expenditures fell by about two-thirds. Laird publicized Vietnamization widely; in his final report as secretary of defense in early 1973, he stated: "Vietnamization . . . today is virtually completed. As a consequence of the success of the military aspects of Vietnamization, the South Vietnamese people today, in my view, are fully capable of providing for their own in-country security against the North Vietnamese."

In this same report Laird noted that the war had commanded more of his attention than any other concern during his four-year term. Upon becoming secretary he set up a special advisory group of DoD officials, known as the Vietnam Task Force, and he met with them almost every morning he was in the Pentagon. He also visited Vietnam several times for on-the-scene evaluations. Although his program of Vietnamization could be termed a success, if one considers the progress of troop withdrawals, U.S. involvement in the conflict became perhaps even more disruptive at home during Nixon's presidency than during Johnson's. The U.S. incursion into Cambodia in May 1970 to eliminate North Vietnamese sanctuaries, the renewed bombing of North Vietnam and the mining of its harbors in the spring of 1972 in response to a North Vietnamese offensive, and another bombing campaign against the North in December 1972 brought widespread protest. Nixon's Vietnam policy, as well as that of previous administrations, suffered further criticism when, in June 1971, the *Pentagon Papers*, a highly classified narrative and documentary history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967, prepared at Secretary McNamara's order, was leaked and published in part in several major newspapers.

While publicly supporting Nixon's Vietnam course, Laird privately opposed the Cambodian invasion and the 1972 spring bombing and mining operations. He counted on the success of Vietnamization, peace talks that had begun in 1968 in Paris, and the secret negotiations in Paris between Henry Kissinger, the president's assistant for national security affairs, and North Vietnamese representatives to end the conflict. On 27 January 1973, two days before Laird left office, the negotiators signed a Vietnam settlement in Paris. They agreed to an in-place cease-fire to begin on 28 January 1973, complete withdrawal of U.S. forces within 60 days, the concurrent phased release of U.S. prisoners of war in North



Secretary Laird and Presidential Assistant Henry A. Kissinger at the Pentagon

Vietnam, and establishment of an international control commission to handle disagreements among the signatories. Although, as time was to demonstrate, South Vietnam was not really capable of defending its independence, Laird retired from office satisfied that he had accomplished his major objective, the disengagement of United States combat forces from Vietnam.

Vietnam preoccupied Laird, but not to the exclusion of other pressing matters. Although not intimately involved in the development of strategic nuclear policy as McNamara had been, Laird subscribed to the Nixon administration's program of "Strategic Sufficiency"—that the United States should have the capability to deter nuclear attacks against its home territory and that of its allies by convincing a potential aggressor that he would suffer an unacceptable level of retaliatory damage; it should also have enough nuclear forces to eliminate possible coercion of its allies. The policy, not much different from McNamara's except in name and phrasing, embraced the need both to avoid mass destruction of civilians and to seek mechanisms to prevent escalation of a nuclear conflict. The administration further refined its strategic ideas in July 1969 when the president issued a statement that came to be known as the "Nixon Doctrine," stressing

"pursuit of peace through partnership with our allies." Instead of the previous administration's "2 ½ war" concept—readiness to fight simultaneous wars on two major fronts and one minor front—the Nixon Doctrine cut back to the "1 ½ war" level. Through military aid and credit-assisted sales of military equipment abroad, the United States would prepare its allies to take up a greater share of the defense burden, especially manpower needs, in case of war. U.S. military forces would be "smaller, more mobile, and more efficient general purpose forces that . . . [would] neither cast the United States in the role of world policeman nor force the nation into a new isolationism."

Laird supported the strategic arms talks leading to the SALT I agreements with the Soviet Union in 1972: a five-year moratorium against expansion of strategic nuclear delivery systems, and an antiballistic missile treaty limiting each side to two sites (later cut to one) for deployed ABM systems. As Laird put it, "In terms of United States strategic objectives, SALT I improved our deterrent posture, braked the rapid build-up of Soviet strategic forces, and permitted us to continue those programs which are essential to maintaining the sufficiency of our long-term strategic nuclear deterrent."

Other important Laird goals were ending the draft by 30 June 1973 and the creation of an All Volunteer Force (AVF). Strong opposition to selective service mounted during the Vietnam War and draft calls declined progressively during Laird's years at the Pentagon—from 300,000 in his first year, to 200,000 in the second, 100,000 in the third, and 50,000 in the fourth. On 27 January 1973, after the signing of the Vietnam agreement in Paris, Laird suspended the draft, five months ahead of schedule.

Laird completed his term of office as secretary of defense on 29 January 1973. Because he had stated repeatedly that he would serve only four years (only Wilson and McNamara among his predecessors served longer), it came as no surprise when President Nixon on 28 November 1972 nominated Elliot L. Richardson to succeed him. In his final report in January 1973 Laird listed what he considered to be the major accomplishments of his tenure: Vietnamization; achieving the goal of strategic sufficiency; effective burden-sharing between the United States and its friends and allies; adequate security assistance; maintenance of U.S. technological superiority through development of systems such as the B-1, Trident, and cruise missiles; improved procurement; "People Programs" such as ending the draft and

creating the AVF; improved National Guard and Reserve forces; enhanced operational readiness; and participatory management. One of Laird's most active initiatives was his persistent effort to secure the release of the American captives held by the enemy in Vietnam.

In spite of the Vietnam quagmire and the unfolding Watergate affair, which threatened to discredit the entire Nixon administration, Laird retired with his reputation intact. Although not a close confidant of the president and not the dominant presence that McNamara was, Laird had been an influential secretary. He achieved a smooth association with the military leadership by restoring some of the responsibilities they had lost during the 1960s. His excellent relations with Congress enabled him to gain approval for many of his programs and budget requests.

After a brief absence Laird returned to the Nixon administration in June 1973 as counselor to the president for domestic affairs, concerning himself mainly with legislative issues. In February 1974, as the Watergate crisis in the White House deepened, Laird resigned to become senior counselor for national and international affairs for *Reader's Digest*. Since 1974 he has written widely, in *Reader's Digest* and other publications, on national and international topics.

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON (JANUARY-MAY 1973)

Laird's successor, Elliot L. Richardson, sworn into office on 30 January 1973, served less than four months and thus had limited impact on the affairs of the department. Born in Boston on 20 July 1920, Richardson graduated from Harvard College in 1941 and from the Harvard Law School in 1947. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1942 as a private, subsequently received a commission, and left the service as a first lieutenant in 1945, after participating in the D-Day invasion of Normandy and receiving several decorations, including the Purple Heart.

Richardson served as a law clerk to Justice Learned Hand of the U.S. Court of Appeals and then to Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1949 he joined a Boston law firm, with which he was associated between service in a series of appointive and elective positions: assistant to Sen. Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts (1953-54); assistant secretary in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1957-59); U.S. attorney for Massachusetts (1959-61); special assistant to the U.S. attorney general (1961); lieutenant governor (1965-67) and attorney general (1967-69) of Massachusetts; under secretary of state (1969-70); and secretary of health, education, and welfare (1970-73).

When President Nixon selected Richardson as secretary of defense, the press described him as an excellent manager and administrator, perhaps the best in the cabinet. In his confirmation hearing, Richardson expressed agreement with Nixon's policies on such issues as the adequacy of U.S. strategic forces, NATO and relationships with other allies, and Vietnam. Although he promised to examine the DoD budget carefully to identify areas for savings, and in fact later ordered the closing of some military installations, he cautioned against precipitate cuts. As he told a Senate committee, "Significant cuts in the Defense Budget now would seriously weaken the U.S. position in international negotiations—in which U.S. military capabilities, in both real and symbolic terms, are an important factor." Similarly, he strongly supported continued military assistance at current levels. During his short tenure, Richardson spent much time testifying before congressional committees on the



proposed FY 1974 budget and other Defense matters.

On 30 April President Nixon announced that he would nominate Secretary Richardson to be attorney general. It was understood that Richardson would guide the administration's handling of the Watergate investigation, which had reached a critical stage. Richardson continued as secretary of defense until 24 May, the day before he became attorney general. His tenure in that position was short also; he resigned abruptly in October 1973 after declining to support the president's decision to fire a Watergate special prosecutor Richardson had appointed. Subsequently, Richardson served President Gerald Ford as ambassador to Great Britain and secretary of commerce, and President Jimmy Carter as ambassador at large and special representative for the Law of the Sea Conference (1977-80). Thereafter, he practiced law and remained publicly active, speaking and writing widely on national security and other issues.

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER (1973-1975)


To replace Richardson, President Nixon chose James R. Schlesinger, who was born on 15 February 1929 in New York City and educated at Harvard University, where he earned a B.A. (1950), M.A. (1952), and Ph.D. (1956) in economics. Between 1955 and 1963 he taught economics at the University of Virginia and in 1960 published *The Political Economy of National Security*. In 1963 he moved to the Rand Corporation, where he worked until 1969, in the later years as director of strategic studies.

In 1969 Schlesinger joined the Nixon administration as assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, devoting most of his time to Defense matters. In 1971 President Nixon appointed Schlesinger a member of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and designated him as chairman. Serving in this position for about a year and a half, Schlesinger instituted extensive organizational and management changes in an effort to improve the AEC's regulatory performance. In February 1973 he became director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Although his CIA service was short, he again undertook comprehensive organizational and personnel changes. By this time he had a reputation as a tough, forthright, and outspoken administrator.

Nominated by Nixon on 10 May 1973, Schlesinger became secretary of defense on 2 July at age 44. Despite his relative youth, given his academic and government credentials he appeared exceptionally well-qualified for the post. As a university professor, researcher at Rand, and government official in three agencies, he had acquired an impressive background in national security affairs.

Shortly after assuming office, Schlesinger outlined the basic objectives that would guide his administration: maintain a "strong defense establishment"; "assure the military balance so necessary to deterrence and a more enduring peace"; obtain for members of the military "the respect, dignity and support that are their due"; assume "an . . . obligation to use our citizens' resources wisely"; and "become increasingly competitive with potential adversaries . . . We must not be forced out of the market—on land, at sea, or in the air. Eli Whitney belongs to us, not to our competitors." In particular, Schlesinger saw a need in the post-Vietnam era to restore the morale and prestige of the military services; modernize strategic doctrine and programs; step up research and development; and shore up a DoD budget that had been declining since 1968.

Analyzing strategy, Schlesinger maintained that the theory and practice of the 1950s and 1960s had been overtaken by events, particularly the rise of the Soviet Union to virtual nuclear parity with the United States



and the effect this development had on the concept of deterrence. Schlesinger believed that "deterrence is not a substitute for defense; defense capabilities, representing the potential for effective counteraction, are the essential condition of deterrence." He had grave doubts about the assured destruction strategy, which relied on massive nuclear attacks against an enemy's urban-industrial areas. Credible strategic nuclear deterrence, the secretary felt, depended on fulfilling several conditions: maintaining essential equivalence with the Soviet Union in force effectiveness; maintaining a highly survivable force that could be withheld or targeted against an enemy's economic base in order to deter coercive or desperation attacks against U.S. population or economic targets; establishing a fast-response force that could act to deter additional enemy attacks; and establishing a range of capabilities sufficient to convince all nations that the United States was equal to its strongest competitors.

To meet these needs, Schlesinger built on existing ideas in developing a flexible response nuclear strategy, which, with the president's approval, he made public by early 1974. The United States, Schlesinger said, needed the ability, in the event of a nuclear attack, to respond so as to "limit the chances of uncontrolled escalation" and "hit meaningful targets" without causing widespread collateral damage. The nation's assured destruction force would be withheld in the hope that the enemy would

not attack U.S. cities. In rejecting assured destruction, Schlesinger quoted President Nixon: "Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?"

With this approach Schlesinger moved to a partial counterforce policy, emphasizing Soviet military targets such as ICBM missile installations, avoiding initial attacks on population centers, and minimizing unintended collateral damage. He explicitly disavowed any intention to acquire a destabilizing first-strike capability against the USSR. But he wanted "an offensive capability of such size and composition that all will perceive it as in overall balance with the strategic forces of any potential opponent."

Because he regarded conventional forces as an equally essential element in the deterrence posture of the United States, Schlesinger wanted to reverse what he perceived as a gradual downward trend in conventional force strength. He pointed out that because Soviet nuclear capabilities had reached approximate parity with the United States, the relative contribution to deterrence made by U.S. strategic forces had inevitably declined. One of the missions of conventional forces, he noted, was to deter or defeat limited threats.

In this vein Schlesinger devoted much attention to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, citing the need to strengthen its conventional capabilities. He rejected the old assumption that NATO did not need a direct counter to Warsaw Pact conventional forces because it could rely on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, noting that the approximate nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviets in the 1970s made this stand inappropriate. He also rejected the argument that NATO could not afford a conventional counterweight to Warsaw Pact forces. In his discussions with NATO leaders, Schlesinger promoted the concept of burden-sharing, stressing the troubles that the United States faced in the mid-1970s because of an unfavorable balance of international payments. He urged qualitative improvements in NATO forces, including equipment standardization, and an increase in defense spending by NATO governments of up to five percent of their gross national product.

Schlesinger had an abiding interest in strategic theory, but he also had to deal with a succession of immediate crises that tested his administrative and political skills. In October 1973, three months after he took office, Egypt and Syria launched the Yom Kippur War with a sudden attack on Israel. A few days after the war started, with Israel not faring well militarily and the Soviets resupplying the Arab belligerents, the United States began airlifting supplies to Israel. As Schlesinger explained, the initial

U.S. policy to avoid direct involvement rested on the assumption that Israel would win quickly. But when it became clear that the Israelis faced formidable military forces and could not make their own resupply arrangements, the United States took up the burden. Schlesinger rejected charges that the Defense Department delayed the resupply effort to avoid irritating the Arab states and that he had had a serious disagreement over this matter with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Eventually the combatants agreed to a cease-fire, but not before the Soviet Union threatened to intervene on the Arab side and the United States declared a worldwide alert of its forces. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur conflict, partly because of U.S. assistance to the Israelis, the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut off oil shipments to the United States for several months.

Another crisis flared in July 1974 when Turkish forces, concerned about the safety of the Turkish minority community, invaded Cyprus after the Cypriot National Guard, supported by the government of Greece, overthrew President Archbishop Makarios. When the fighting stopped, the Turks held the northern section of the island, about 40 percent of the total area. Turkey's military action caused controversy in the United States, because of protests by supporters of the Greek Cypriots and because Turkish forces used some U.S.-supplied military equipment intended solely for NATO purposes. Schlesinger felt the Turks had overstepped the bounds of legitimate interests in Cyprus and suggested that the United States might have to reexamine its military aid program to Turkey. During this time President Nixon resigned and Gerald R. Ford succeeded him; eventually Ford and Secretary Kissinger made it clear that they favored continued military assistance to Turkey as a valued NATO ally, but Congress in December 1974 prohibited such aid, instituting an embargo that lasted five years.

The last phase of the Indochina conflict occurred during Schlesinger's tenure. Although all U.S. combat forces had left South Vietnam in the spring of 1973, the United States continued to maintain a military presence in other areas of Southeast Asia. Some senators criticized Schlesinger and questioned him sharply during his confirmation hearings in June 1973 after he stated that he would recommend resumption of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam and Laos if North Vietnam launched a major offensive against South Vietnam. However, when the North Vietnamese did begin an offensive early in 1975, the United States could do little to help the South Vietnamese, who collapsed completely as the North Vietnamese entered Saigon in late April. Schlesinger announced early in the morning of 29 April 1975 the evacuation

from Saigon by helicopter of the last U.S. diplomatic, military, and civilian personnel.

Only one other notable event remained in the Indochina drama. In May 1975 forces of the Communist Cambodian government boarded and captured the crew of the *Mayaguez*, an unarmed U.S.-registered freighter. The United States bombarded military and fuel installations on the Cambodian mainland and launched an amphibious invasion of an offshore island to rescue the crew. The 39 captives were retrieved, but the attack cost the lives of 41 U.S. military personnel. Nevertheless, the majority of the American people seemed to approve of the administration's decisive action.

Unsurprisingly, given his determination to build up U.S. strategic and conventional forces, Schlesinger devoted much time and effort to the Defense budget. Even before becoming secretary, in a speech in San Francisco in September 1972, he warned that it was time "to call a halt to the self-defeating game of cutting defense outlays—this process, that seems to have become addicting, of chopping away year after year." Shortly after he took office, he complained about "the post-war follies" of Defense budget-cutting. Later he outlined the facts about the DoD budget: In real terms it had been reduced by one-third since FY 1968; it was one-eighth below the pre-Vietnam War FY 1964 budget; purchases of equipment, consumables, and R&D were down 45 percent from the wartime peak and about \$10 billion in constant dollars below the prewar level; Defense now absorbed about 6 percent of the gross national product, the lowest percentage since before the Korean War; military manpower was at the lowest point since before the Korean War; and Defense spending amounted to about 17 percent of total national expenditures, the lowest since before the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. Armed with these statistics, and alarmed by continuing Soviet weapon advances, Schlesinger became a vigorous advocate of larger DoD budgets. But he had little success. For FY 1975, Congress provided TOA of \$86.1 billion, compared with \$81.6 billion in FY 1974; for FY 1976, the amount was \$95.6 billion, an increase of 3.4 percent, but in real terms slightly less than it had been in FY 1955.

Schlesinger's insistence on higher defense budgets, his disagreements within the administration and with Congress on this issue, and his differences with Secretary

of State Kissinger all contributed to his dismissal from office by President Ford in November 1975. Kissinger strongly supported the SALT process, while Schlesinger wanted assurances that arms control agreements would not put the United States in a strategic position inferior to the Soviet Union. The secretary's harsh criticism of some congressional leaders dismayed President Ford, who was more willing than Schlesinger to compromise on the Defense budget. On 2 November 1975 the president dismissed Schlesinger and made other important personnel changes. Kissinger lost his position as special assistant to the president for national security affairs but remained as secretary of state. Schlesinger left office on 19 November 1975, explaining his departure in terms of his budgetary differences with the White House.

In spite of the controversy surrounding both his tenure and dismissal, Schlesinger was by most accounts an able secretary of defense. A serious and perceptive thinker on nuclear strategy, he was determined that the United States not fall seriously behind the Soviet Union in conventional and nuclear forces and devoted himself to modernization of defense policies and programs. He got along well with the military leadership because he proposed to give them more resources, consulted with them regularly, and shared many of their views. Because he could be blunt in his opinions and did not enjoy the personal rapport with legislators that Laird had, his relations with Congress were often strained. A majority of its members may have approved Schlesinger's strategic plans, but they kept a tight rein on the money for his programs. As for the Pentagon bureaucracy, Schlesinger generally left its management to Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements.

After leaving the Pentagon, Schlesinger wrote and spoke forcefully about national security issues, especially the Soviet threat and the need for the United States to maintain adequate defenses. When Jimmy Carter became president in January 1977 he appointed Schlesinger, a Republican, as his special adviser on energy and subsequently as the first head of the new Department of Energy in October 1977. Schlesinger held this position until July 1979 when Carter replaced him. Thereafter he resumed his writing and speaking career and was employed as a senior adviser to Lehman Brothers, Kuhn Loeb Inc., of New York City.

DONALD H. RUMSFELD (1975-1977)

To replace Schlesinger, President Ford chose Donald H. Rumsfeld. Born on 9 July 1932 in Chicago, Rumsfeld graduated from Princeton University in 1954 and then spent three years in the U.S. Navy as an aviator and flight instructor. Following naval service, Rumsfeld worked in Washington as an assistant to two different congressmen and then, between 1960 and 1962, at a Chicago investment banking firm. Elected to the House of Representatives in 1962, he was reelected for three more terms. In 1969 he resigned from Congress to join the Nixon administration as an assistant to the president and director of the Office Of Economic Opportunity; later he served as counselor to the president and director of the Cost of Living Council. In February 1973 he became U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, returning to Washington in August 1974 to head Gerald Ford's transition team and then became assistant to the president, directing the White House Office of Operations and serving as coordinator of the White House Staff. At the time of his designation as secretary of defense, Rumsfeld was one of President Ford's closest associates and advisers.

Sworn in on 20 November 1975, at age 43 the youngest secretary of defense to date, Rumsfeld served exactly 14 months in the office. Although he instituted some organizational changes at the Pentagon, including appointment of a second deputy secretary of defense (a position created in 1972 but never previously filled) and consolidation of several offices in OSD, Rumsfeld concentrated more on the political aspects of his job. More than any of his predecessors, he served as a roving ambassador for the Defense Department, traveling widely in the United States and abroad and discussing defense issues through numerous speeches, press conferences, and interviews.

Although he supported the Ford administration's efforts at detente, Rumsfeld, like Schlesinger, sought to reverse the gradual decline in the Defense budget and to build up U.S. strategic and conventional forces. He made clear his agreement with Schlesinger's strategic and budget initiatives and that he would press forward with them. He pointed out in his FY 1977 annual report that "U.S. strategic forces retain a substantial credible capability to deter an all-out nuclear attack," but he indicated three areas of concern: (1) U.S. submarine and bomber forces were aging while Soviet capabilities in antisubmarine warfare and bomber defense were improving; (2) because of Soviet progress in offensive and defensive programs there was danger that Soviet strategic capability would be perceived as superior to



that of the United States; and (3) "a continuation of current Soviet strategic programs . . . could threaten the survivability of the Minuteman force within a decade." Rumsfeld used the phrase "rough equivalence" to compare the current military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. He noted that trends in comparative U.S.-Soviet military strength had not favored the United States for 15 to 20 years, and that if continued they "would have the effect of injecting a fundamental instability in the world."

To maintain strategic parity with the Soviet Union, Rumsfeld moved ahead with several proposed weapon systems—the B-1 manned bomber to replace the B-52, the Trident nuclear submarine program, and the MX ICBM to succeed the Minuteman in the 1980s. He personally piloted a test version of the B-1 bomber and authorized the Air Force to execute the initial contracts for its production. Rumsfeld paid close attention to NATO, regularly attending meetings of its Nuclear Planning Group and its Defense Planning Committee and stressing the alliance's importance in the deterrence of the Soviet Union. While supporting the current SALT negotiations, he did not consider the proposed SALT II settlement a final solution to Soviet-American rivalry and emphasized the need to maintain military equivalence.

Given these views and initiatives, increasing the DoD budget became an imperative for Rumsfeld. He spent his first few weeks in office completing the proposed FY 1977 budget. In spite of his previous differences with Schlesinger over budget matters, President Ford agreed with Rumsfeld's arguments that U.S. force levels and Defense expenditures had been decreasing in real terms for several years and that building real growth into the FY 1977 budget was essential to the nation's security. Congress generally cooperated, although it cut some funds Rumsfeld wanted, including those proposed for shipbuilding. Ultimately, total obligational authority in the FY 1977 budget was set at \$107.5 billion. Still, in constant dollars the FY 1977 budget was \$5 billion less than it had been in FY 1956.

Rumsfeld continued his efforts to augment funding in preparing the FY 1978 Defense budget. When Ford presented his new budget to Congress just before leaving office, he proposed another increase for DoD. However, during the 1976 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter had criticized Ford administration Defense spending and urged a substantial decrease. Thus

the final FY 1978 TOA for the Department of Defense amounted to \$116.1 billion, an increase in the current dollar amount but a slight decrease in constant dollars. While Rumsfeld maintained the momentum begun by Schlesinger to halt the decline in Defense spending, his brief term and the change in administration limited his success.


An active secretary of defense, Rumsfeld remained very close to the president and very much in the public eye. Had Ford been reelected in 1976 it is likely that he would have retained Rumsfeld, who left office with the president on 20 January 1977. After briefly teaching at Northwestern University, Rumsfeld became president and chief executive officer (1977-85) of G. D. Searle and Company, a health care concern based in Illinois. He continued to write and speak about defense issues, stressing the need for adequate spending in order to maintain equivalence with the Soviet Union. Rumsfeld opposed the 1979 SALT II treaty, believing that it was not advantageous to the United States. Between November 1983 and May 1984 Rumsfeld served President Ronald Reagan as special ambassador to the Middle East. After leaving Searle in 1985 Rumsfeld held executive positions with a number of corporations.

HAROLD BROWN (1977-1981)

President Carter's choice as secretary of defense, Harold Brown, came to office with imposing academic credentials and a wealth of experience in national security affairs. Born in New York City on 19 September 1927, Brown took three degrees at Columbia University, including, at age 21 in 1949, a Ph.D. in physics. After a short period of teaching and postdoctoral research, Brown became a research scientist at the University of California Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. In 1952 he joined the staff of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, and became its director in 1960. During the 1950s he served as a member of or consultant to several federal scientific bodies and as senior science adviser at the 1958-59 Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests. Brown worked under Robert McNamara as director of defense research and engineering from 1961 to 1965, and then as secretary of the Air Force from October 1965 to February 1969. Between 1969 and 1977 he was president of the California Institute of Technology. With almost eight years of prior service in the Pentagon, Brown was the first scientist to become secretary of defense.

Brown involved himself in practically all areas of departmental activity. Consistent with the Carter administration's objective to reorganize the federal government, Brown launched a comprehensive review of defense organization that eventually brought significant change.* But he understood the limits to effective reform. In one of his first speeches after leaving office, "Managing' the Defense Department—Why It Can't Be Done," at the University of Michigan in March 1981, he observed:

. . . I want to note again the basic limitation of any attempt to manage the Defense Department in an idealized textbook fashion. The pull of the need to be able to fight a war, if necessary, will always limit the peacetime efficiency of the defense establishment The pull of conflicting domestic interests represents democratic government To manage defense efficiently and at the lowest possible cost along presumed business lines of management and organization is a useful standard. But there are prices we cannot afford to pay for meeting it exactly. One is the abandonment of democratic control. Another is the loss of a war. Defense cannot be "managed" like a business. But it can be *led* so as



to preserve most effectively our national security interests.

With regard to strategic planning, Brown shared much the same concerns as his Republican predecessors—the need to upgrade U.S. military forces and improve collective security arrangements—but with a stronger commitment to arms control. Brown adhered to the principle of "essential equivalence" in the nuclear competition with the Soviet Union. This meant that "Soviet strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage; nuclear stability, especially in a crisis, is maintained; any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by U.S. advantages in other characteristics; and the U.S. posture is not in fact, and is not seen as, inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union."

Brown considered it essential to maintain the triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers; some of the administration's most important decisions on weapon systems reflected this commitment. Although he decided not to produce the B-1 bomber, he did recommend upgrading existing B-52s and equipping them with air-launched cruise missiles, and gave the go-ahead for development of a "stealth" technology, fostered by

* See pp. 37-38.

William J. Perry, under secretary of defense for research and engineering, that would make it possible to produce planes (bombers as well as other aircraft) with very low radar profiles, presumably able to elude enemy defenses and deliver weapons on targets. The administration backed development of the MX missile, intended to replace in the 1980s the increasingly vulnerable Minuteman and Titan intercontinental missiles. To insure MX survivability, Brown recommended deploying the missiles in “multiple protective shelters”; 200 MX missiles would be placed in Utah and Nevada, with each missile to be shuttled among 23 different shelters of its own located along roadways—meaning a total of 4,600 such shelters. Although this plan was expensive and environmentally controversial, Brown argued that it was the most viable scheme to protect the missiles from enemy attack. For the sea leg of the triad, Brown accelerated development of the larger Trident nuclear submarine and carried forward the conversion of Poseidon submarines to a fully MRVed missile capability.

By early 1979 Brown and his staff had developed a “countervailing strategy,” an approach to nuclear targeting that both McNamara and Schlesinger earlier had found attractive but never formally codified. As Brown put it, “we must have forces and plans for the use of our strategic nuclear forces such that in considering aggression against our interests, our adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a success—on any rational definition of success. The prospect of such a failure would then deter an adversary’s attack on the United States or our vital interests.” Although Brown did not rule out the assured destruction approach, which stressed attacks on urban and industrial targets, he believed that “such destruction must not be automatic, our only choice, or independent of any enemy’s attack. Indeed, it is at least conceivable that the mission of assured destruction would not have to be executed at all in the event that deterrence failed.”

Official adoption of the countervailing strategy came with President Carter’s approval of Presidential Directive 59 (PD 59) on 25 July 1980. In explaining PD 59 Brown argued that it was not a new strategic doctrine, but rather a refinement, a codification of previous explanations of our strategic policy. The heart of PD 59, as Brown described it, was as follows:

It is our policy—and we have increasingly the means and the detailed plans to carry out this policy—to ensure that the Soviet leadership knows that if they chose some intermediate level of aggression, we could, by selective, large (but still less than maximum) nuclear attacks, exact an unacceptably high price in the things

the Soviet leaders appear to value most—political and military control, military force both nuclear and conventional, and the industrial capability to sustain a war. In our planning we have not ignored the problem of ending the war, nor would we ignore it in the event of a war. And, of course, we have, and we will keep, a survivable and enduring capability to attack the full range of targets, including the Soviet economic base, if that is the appropriate response to a Soviet strike.

Because the almost simultaneous disclosures of PD 59 and the stealth technology came in the midst of the 1980 presidential campaign, some critics asserted that the Carter administration leaked them to counter charges of weakness and boost its reelection chances. Others charged that PD 59 made it more likely that the United States would initiate a nuclear conflict, based on the assumption that a nuclear war could somehow be limited. Brown insisted that the countervailing strategy was not a first-strike strategy. As he put it, “Nothing in the policy contemplates that nuclear war can be a deliberate instrument of achieving our national security goals But we cannot afford the risk that the Soviet leadership might entertain the illusion that nuclear war could be an option—or its threat a means of coercion—for *them*.”

Brown regarded the strengthening of NATO as a key national security objective and worked hard to invigorate the alliance. With the assistance of Robert W. Komer, at first his special adviser on NATO affairs and subsequently under secretary of defense for policy, Brown launched a series of NATO initiatives shortly after taking office. In May 1978 the NATO heads of government endorsed a Long Term Defense Program that included 10 priority categories: enhanced readiness; rapid reinforcement; stronger European reserve forces; improvements in maritime capabilities; integrated air defenses; effective command, control, and communications; electronic warfare; rationalized procedures for armaments collaboration; logistics coordination and increased war reserves; and theater nuclear modernization. To implement the last item, NATO defense and foreign ministers decided in December 1979 to respond to the Soviet deployment of new theater nuclear weapons—the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber—by placing 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in several Western European countries beginning in December 1983. The NATO leaders indicated that the new missile deployment would be scaled down if satisfactory progress occurred in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

At Brown’s urging, NATO members pledged in 1977 to increase their individual defense spending



Presidential Assistant Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (center) with Secretary Brown

three per-cent per year in real terms for the 1979-86 period. The objective, Brown explained, was to ensure that alliance resources and capabilities—both conventional and nuclear—would balance those of the Soviet bloc. Although some NATO members hesitated to confirm the agreement to accept new missiles and did not always attain the three percent target, Brown was pleased with NATO's progress. Midway in his term he told an interviewer that he thought his most important achievement thus far had been the revitalization of NATO.

Brown also tried to strengthen the defense contributions of U.S. allies outside of NATO, particularly Japan and Korea. He repeatedly urged the Japanese government to increase its defense budget so that it could shoulder a larger share of the Western allies' Pacific security burden. Although the Carter administration decided in 1977 on a phased withdrawal of United States ground forces from the Republic of Korea, it pledged to continue military and other assistance to that country. Later, because of a substantial buildup of North Korean military forces and opposition to the troop withdrawal in the United States, the president shelved the plan, leaving approximately 40,000 U.S.

troops in Korea. In establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 January 1979, the United States formally recognized the PRC almost 30 years after its establishment. A year later Brown visited the PRC, talked with its political and military leaders, and helped lay the groundwork for limited collaboration on security issues.

Arms control formed an integral part of Brown's national security policy. He staunchly supported the June 1979 SALT II treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and was the administration's leading spokesman in urging the Senate to approve it. SALT II limited both sides to 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles), including a sublimit of 1,200 launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles, of which only 820 could be launchers of MIRVed ICBMs. It also placed restrictions on the number of warheads on each missile and on deployment of new land-based ballistic missile systems, except for one new type of light ICBM for each side. There was also a provision for verification by each side using its own national technical means.

Brown explained that SALT II would reduce the Soviet Union's strategic forces, bring enhanced predict-

ability and stability to Soviet-U.S. nuclear relationships, reduce the cost of maintaining a strategic balance, help the United States to monitor Soviet forces, and reduce the risk of nuclear war. He rebutted charges by SALT II critics that the United States had underestimated the Soviet military buildup, that the treaty would weaken the Western alliance, that the Soviet Union could not be trusted to obey the treaty, and that its terms could not really be verified. Partly to placate Senate opponents of the treaty, the Carter administration agreed in the fall of 1979 to support higher increases in the defense budget. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ensured that the Senate would not accept the treaty at that time, forcing the president to withdraw it from consideration. When his term ended in 1981, Brown said that failure to secure ratification of SALT II was his greatest regret.

Besides broad national security policy matters, Brown had to deal with several more immediate questions, among them the Panama Canal issue. Control of the canal zone had been a source of contention ever since Panama achieved its independence from Colombia in 1903 and granted the United States a concession "in perpetuity." In the mid-1960s, after serious disturbances in the zone, the United States and Panama began negotiations that went on intermittently until 7 September 1977, when the countries signed two treaties, one providing for full Panamanian control of the canal by the year 2000 and the other guaranteeing the canal's neutrality. The Defense Department played a major role in the Panama negotiations. Brown championed the treaties through a difficult fight to gain Senate approval (secured in March and April 1978), insisting that they were both advantageous to the United States and essential to the canal's future operation and security.

In Middle East affairs, Brown supported President Carter's efforts as an intermediary in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords of September 1978 and the signing by the two nations of a peace treaty in March 1979. Elsewhere, the fall of the Shah from power in Iran in January 1979 eliminated a major U.S. ally and triggered a chain of events that played havoc with American policy in the region. In November 1979, Iranian revolutionaries occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took more than 50 hostages. Brown participated closely in planning for a rescue operation that ended in failure and the loss of eight U.S. servicemen on 24-25 April 1980. Not until the last day of his administration, on 20 January 1981, could President Carter make final arrangements for the release of the hostages.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to bolster a pro-Soviet Communist government further complicated the role of the United States in the

Middle East and Southwest Asia. In response to the events in Iran and Afghanistan and in anticipation of others, Brown activated the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida on 1 March 1980. Although normally a planning headquarters without operational units, the RDJTF could obtain such forces from the several services and command them in crisis situations. Brown explained that the RDJTF was responsible for developing plans for contingency operations, particularly in Southwest Asia, and maintaining adequate capabilities and readiness for such missions.

As with all of his predecessors, budget matters occupied a major portion of Brown's time. During the 1976 campaign, Carter criticized Defense spending levels of the Ford administration and promised cuts in the range of \$5 billion to \$7 billion. Shortly after he became secretary, Brown suggested a series of amendments to Ford's proposed FY 1978 budget, having the effect of cutting it by almost \$3 billion, but still allowing a TOA increase of more than \$8 billion over the FY 1977 budget. Subsequent budgets under Brown moved generally upward, reflecting high prevailing rates of inflation, the need to strengthen and modernize conventional forces neglected somewhat since the end of the Vietnam conflict, and serious challenges in the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

The Brown Defense budgets by fiscal year, in TOA, were as follows: 1978, \$116.1 billion; 1979, \$124.7 billion; 1980, \$141.9 billion; and 1981, \$175.5 billion. In terms of real growth, there were slight negative percentages in 1978 and 1979, and increases in 1980 and 1981. It should be noted that part of the increase for FY 1981 resulted from supplemental appropriations obtained by the Reagan administration, but nevertheless the Carter administration by this time had departed substantially from its early emphasis on curtailing the DoD budget. Its proposals for FY 1982, submitted in January 1981, called for significant real growth over the TOA for FY 1981.

Brown left office on 20 January 1981 following President Carter's unsuccessful bid for reelection. During the 1980 campaign Brown actively defended the Carter administration's policies, speaking frequently on national issues in public. After leaving the Pentagon, he remained in Washington, joining the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies as a visiting professor and later the university's Foreign Policy Institute as chairman. He continued to speak and write widely on national security issues, and in 1983 published *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*. In later years, Brown was affiliated with research organizations and served on the boards of a number of corporations.

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER (1981-1987)

Caspar W. Weinberger, President Ronald Reagan's choice to be the fifteenth secretary of defense, was born in San Francisco on 18 August 1917, the son of a lawyer. He received an A.B. degree (1938) and a law degree (1941), both from Harvard. He entered the U.S. Army as a private in 1941, was commissioned, and served in the Pacific theater. At the end of the war he was a captain on General Douglas MacArthur's intelligence staff. Early in life he developed an interest in politics and history, and, during the war years, a special admiration for Winston Churchill, whom he would later cite as an important influence.

Between 1945 and 1947 Weinberger worked as a law clerk for a federal judge and then joined a San Francisco law firm. He won election to the California State Assembly in 1952 and reelection in 1954 and 1956. Although unsuccessful in his campaign in 1958 for California attorney general, Weinberger continued active in politics, becoming chairman of the California Republican Party in 1962. Governor Ronald Reagan named him chairman of the Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy in 1967 and appointed him State director of finance early in 1968. He moved to Washington in January 1970 to become chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, subsequently serving as deputy director (1970-72) and director (1972-73) of the Office of Management and Budget and as secretary of health, education, and welfare (1973-75). For the next five years, Weinberger was vice president and general counsel of the Bechtel Group of Companies in California.

Although not widely experienced in defense matters, Weinberger had a reputation in Washington as an able administrator; his powers as a cost cutter earned him the sobriquet "Cap the Knife." He shared the president's conviction that the Soviet Union posed a serious threat and that the defense establishment needed to be modernized and strengthened. Belying his nickname, at the Pentagon Weinberger became a vigorous advocate of Reagan's plan to increase the DoD budget. Readiness, sustainability, and modernization became the watchwords of the defense program.

Modernization and the perceived need to make up for past funding deficiencies required significant budget increases, for which Weinberger fought successfully in the first half of his tenure. Initially he sought a supplemental Defense appropriation of nearly \$7 billion for the FY 1981 budget and an increase of almost \$26 billion over President Carter's proposed FY 1982 budget. Congress proved agreeable, providing \$175.5 billion (TOA) for FY 1981 and \$210.6 billion for FY 1982, the latter



amount representing 11.4 percent real growth. For the next three fiscal years positive real growth continued, with increases of \$20 billion or more in each successive year. In the last three fiscal years of Weinberger's tenure, 1986 to 1988, the increases were very modest in current dollars, and showed negative real growth (-1.8 percent for FY 1986 and FY 1988, -1.5 percent for FY 1987). In current dollars, the DoD budget increased from \$175.5 billion in FY 1981 to \$287.8 billion in FY 1988.

Although Weinberger obtained large increases between 1981 and 1985, Congress consistently provided less than requested and became less willing to go along with those requests. Weinberger resisted congressional reductions, contending that he prepared budget submissions carefully according to real needs. In a book on his years in the Pentagon, he wrote of having "acquired a reputation of being stubborn, uncompromising, immoderate and unpragmatic."

The new secretary quickly established a good working relationship with the leaders of the military services, making manifest in words and actions his respect for them and his firm intention to get for them the funds needed for the buildup that the administration thought necessary. The military reciprocated this attitude, which was no doubt furthered by Weinberger's success in securing large appropriations for Defense. Indeed, Weinberger gave the services their head to a greater extent than they had enjoyed for a long time.

With regard to the Joint Chiefs, the secretary stressed their responsibility to do more comprehensive planning of military strategy, objectives, and policies, and urged them to assume a more integral role in budget planning. Although he had not supported it, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (1986) strengthened the powers of the JCS chairman and made other changes designed to improve the organization and operation of the Joint Chiefs.

Although he functioned more as the outside representative of the Department of Defense and left day-to-day internal management to the deputy secretary (Frank C. Carlucci, 1981-83; Paul Thayer, 1983-84; and William H. Taft IV, 1984-89), Weinberger instituted important management and organizational changes to achieve "a proper balance between centralized policy formulation and decentralized program execution." He strengthened the role of the service secretaries, including seating them on the Defense Resources Board, an advisory group that consulted on major resource decisions. He aimed to ensure that those responsible for development and execution of service programs had authority to manage their program resources. But, according to Weinberger, "there was never any suggestion that *policy* decisions should be delegated to the service secretaries (or to anyone else), nor that they should have any organization or strategic responsibilities."


High on Weinberger's agenda to revitalize the armed forces stood the men and women of the services. He felt that the all-volunteer force, adopted in 1973 to replace the draft, was not working. The enlistment and reenlistment rates were too low, only 60 percent of incoming personnel were high school graduates, and the officer and non-commissioned officer attrition rates were too high. Rather than reinstating the draft, a step both he and Reagan rejected, Weinberger placed high priority on increasing the compensation and support of service members. His initiatives brought about the improvements he sought.

A perceived decline in U.S. strategic capabilities relative to Soviet forces and a fear that U.S. strategic deterrent forces could be vulnerable to an enemy surprise attack in the mid-1980s created great concern in the new administration. Weinberger played a key role in developing a plan to revitalize the strategic deterrent, announced by Reagan in the fall of 1981. The plan included deployment of E-4B aircraft (airborne command posts) to serve the National Command Authorities in wartime; production of 100 B-1B strategic bombers, with initial operational capability in 1986; development of a stealth aircraft, with deployment at the end of the 1980s; development of the Trident II (D-5) missile, a larger and more accurate submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), to be

deployed in 1989; production of 100 MX ("Peacekeeper") missiles, about one-third to be deployed in extra-hardened Titan or Minuteman III silos, and studies of other deployment schemes; and enhanced air surveillance with improved radar, deployment of F-15 aircraft (as interceptors) and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes, and development of an anti-satellite system.

Some aspects of this strategic modernization plan proved controversial, particularly the proposed deployment of the MX missile, for which several modes were proposed. After much debate, in January 1983 Reagan appointed the Commission on Strategic Forces, headed by retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, to review the purpose, nature, and composition of U.S. strategic forces. The commission recommended placing 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos and designing a new, smaller single-warhead mobile missile, the Midgetman (15 tons compared to the nearly 100-ton MX) that could be ready for deployment in 1987. Weinberger opposed this recommendation as a "typical compromise." However, Reagan endorsed the commission's proposals, and Congress appropriated funds for flight testing and the initial production of the MX. To blunt congressional criticism, the administration promised to pursue arms controls negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The emergence of the Strategic Defense Initiative



President Ronald W. Reagan

(nicknamed “Star Wars” by its critics) created the possibility of a profound change in the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and in arms control negotiations between them. Much taken by the prospect of a space-based antimissile system that would provide a comprehensive defense against enemy missiles, President Reagan embraced it with enthusiasm. Weinberger saw SDI as an alternative to the mutual assured destruction (MAD) approach that both the United States and the Soviet Union had accepted since the 1960s. He set up the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) in the Pentagon to develop and manage the system, but immediately it faced budgetary and other problems. The formidable research and development task for SDI caused Weinberger to seek large annual appropriations for the program, even as many experts were doubting its technical feasibility. For fiscal years 1985 through 1989 Weinberger requested \$20.5 billion for SDI; Congress cut each annual request and ultimately appropriated \$14.68 billion.

Weinberger also had to meet the argument of some critics, including arms control advocates, that testing and deploying the projected defensive system would violate the ABM Treaty, which limited the United States and the Soviet Union to one antiballistic missile defense system for their capitals and one ICBM launch site each. The United States never built a defense system for Washington. Weinberger and Richard N. Perle, the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, favored a broad interpretation of the treaty, allowing space-based SDI testing. Weinberger also thought that the ABM Treaty would have to be changed or disregarded at the time of deployment. In a March 1987 statement six former secretaries of defense—McNamara, Clifford, Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger, and Brown—urged Reagan to adhere to the traditional interpretation of the treaty. The Senate Armed Services Committee voted in May to prohibit tests that would violate the treaty. An opinion by the State Department legal adviser that month held that the treaty negotiating records allowed for more testing activity than would be permitted by a strict construction, but the Reagan administration did not proceed with the controversial testing plans, leaving the issue open for later negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Although he did not regard arms control as a high priority when he took office in 1981, it increasingly claimed Weinberger’s attention, especially after SDI entered the picture. Moreover, Reagan’s decision to pursue arms negotiations with the Soviet Union could not help but put the subject higher on Weinberger’s agenda. Richard Perle, Weinberger’s key assistant in arms control matters, had long had a reputation as an outspoken opponent of arms control but was not unwilling to

negotiate. Both Weinberger and Perle approached the subject cautiously, intent on ensuring that the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) talks in Geneva during the 1980s resulted in agreements clearly in the national interest of the United States. At issue early in the Reagan administration was the 1979 NATO “dual track” decision to begin deploying Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe in 1983 while seeking arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

In 1981, both Weinberger and Reagan embraced the “zero option” approach: If the Soviets would withdraw their SS-20 missiles (a mobile IRBM with three warheads, first deployed in 1977), as well as their SS-4, SS-5, and SS-23 missiles, NATO would not deploy the Pershing IIs and GLCMs. After initially rejecting the proposal, the Soviets later said they would withdraw some SS-20s if the United States would not deploy the Pershing IIs. Both Weinberger and the president opposed this plan. When the United States began to deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs in November 1983, the Soviets walked out of the INF negotiations. Meeting in a summit at Geneva in November 1985, Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to pursue an INF treaty. At the Reykjavik summit a year later, Gorbachev offered to eliminate all nuclear weapons. The United States put forward a plan to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles within 10 years, coupled with a pledge to respect the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) (1972) for the same period. Gorbachev insisted that the United States limit SDI testing to the laboratory, a proposal Reagan rejected. After further negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on an INF treaty, which Reagan and Gorbachev signed in Washington in December 1987. By this time both Weinberger and Perle had left the Pentagon.

International problems engaged much of Weinberger’s time and attention, involving him in necessarily close relationships with other agencies that did not always go smoothly. Differences in policy on some issues between Defense and other organizations, especially State, sometimes led to friction and personality clashes. Weinberger did not get along well with the secretaries of state during his term—Alexander M. Haig (1981-82) and George Shultz (1982-89)—and he objected to the influence exercised by some National Security Council officials, including NSC adviser Robert McFarlane. His relationship with Reagan was close and cordial; the president usually took his advice. Occasionally, however, the president had to mediate disagreements between State and Defense.

When Weinberger took office, he had as one of his principal international goals improvement of relations with Japan and China. He hoped that Japan, which traditionally limited its annual expenditure on defense to

one percent of its budget, would increase its investment. Although the State Department resisted Defense involvement, Weinberger suggested to Japan's ambassador that his country assume responsibility for defense of its home territory, the surrounding air space, and the sea lanes of the North Pacific. In May 1981, Japan accepted these proposals and agreed to work toward easing the U.S. cost of maintaining forces in Japan. Japan's defense budget increased annually in subsequent years; in 1987 the Japanese cabinet formally discarded the one percent limitation. Weinberger's effort to persuade Japan to buy a fighter aircraft rather than build its own paid off when Japan announced in September 1987 that it would buy the U.S.-built F-16 Falcon and agreed to provide the United States with technology derived from U.S. data on modifying the F-16 to meet Japan's needs.

Efforts by the Carter administration to improve relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) did not have a military side. The Reagan administration, and Weinberger himself, favored developing military contacts. The Taiwan Relations Act (1974) required the United States to continue arms sales to Taiwan. Reagan, in a joint communiqué with the PRC in August 1982, stated that the United States would continue to provide defensive weapons to Taiwan but would not upgrade U.S. arms sales to that nation, thus helping smooth the path to improved military relations with the People's Republic. On Weinberger's visit to China in September 1983 he made arrangements for China's premier and defense minister to visit the United States and for Reagan to travel to China, which he did in June 1984. Weinberger and the Chinese defense minister in 1984 signed a military technology cooperation agreement, and Reagan declared China eligible for Foreign Military Sales cash purchases.

Elsewhere in the world Weinberger paid close attention to crises that might require the use of U.S. military forces. While the number of active duty military personnel increased during the 1980s, and weapon systems were upgraded and new ones brought on line, Weinberger urged the exercise of much caution in committing troops to military action. In a notable speech in November 1984, entitled "The Uses of Military Power," he listed six major tests that ought to be applied when the United States considered the use of combat forces abroad:

(1) . . . The United States should not commit forces to *combat* overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . . . (2) . . . If we decide it is necessary to put *combat* troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of

winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. . . . (3) . . . If we *do* decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. . . . (4) . . . The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. . . . (5) . . . Before the U.S. commits forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. . . . (6) . . . The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

NSDD 238, a basic national security decision directive in 1986, adopted the last of these principles.

When Great Britain and Argentina clashed over the Falkland Islands, off the southern coast of Argentina, Weinberger early on involved himself strongly on the British side. Great Britain had seized the Falklands, or Malvinas Islands as the Argentines knew them, in the 1830s, and the two nations had been at odds over them ever since. On 2 April 1982 Argentine forces invaded and occupied the Falklands. The British had no military units there to resist, but Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government decided to retake the islands. Weinberger supported Thatcher's decision—he saw Argentina as the aggressor, and Great Britain as a principal U.S. ally. He privately criticized Secretary of State Haig for his use of shuttle diplomacy between England and Argentina in an effort to settle the controversy peacefully. Reagan agreed with Weinberger on the need to assist Britain; the United States provided missiles, aircraft fuel, military equipment, and intelligence information to the British government. In a little over two months, British forces defeated the Argentines, who surrendered on 14 June 1982. A new Argentine government, not hostile to the United States, came to power. Proud of U.S. aid to Great Britain in this crisis, Weinberger felt it brought beneficial results.

In the Middle East, a crisis developed in 1982 when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), strongly entrenched in Lebanon, became involved in fighting with Israeli forces on the Lebanon-Israel border. Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982, fought the PLO, and tried to establish a friendly government in the country. In July the United States, Italy, and France contributed troops to a Multinational Force (MNF) to supervise the PLO's departure from Beirut and help stabilize internal politics

in Lebanon. Weinberger had not favored U.S. participation, consistent with his view that troops should be committed only when vital to U.S. interests and with clearly defined objectives, but he acknowledged that it had been a success when the force withdrew in September.

As soon as the MNF left, the situation deteriorated. Lebanon's president-elect was assassinated, Israeli forces returned to Beirut, and Lebanese Christian Phalangists massacred Palestinians in Israeli-run refugee camps in West Beirut. Reagan agreed to U.S. participation in a second MNF that entered Lebanon in late September 1982. The U.S. contingent took up position at the Beirut airport to keep the facility open. In the meantime, Christian and Muslim factions clashed, the Israelis and Syrians did not withdraw, and the Lebanese factions began attacking the MNF. On 18 April 1983 a bomb wrecked the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 17 U.S. citizens. In the following months the U.S. force at the Beirut airport endured frequent shelling. Weinberger urged withdrawal of the MNF, but Reagan, with the support of the State Department and the NSC staff, left it in place. On 23 October 1983, terrorists blew up the barracks housing U.S. Marines at the Beirut airport, killing 241 of them. In December, an investigating commission appointed by Weinberger issued a report that criticized the laxity of the second MNF, its operational chain of command, and its poor training. After attacks against U.S. aircraft in Lebanon by Syria, Reagan decided to withdraw the U.S. MNF contingent, which departed late in February 1984.

In 1983, turmoil broke out on the Caribbean island of Grenada, caused by opposition to a government that had come to power in 1979 and had invited greater Cuban and Soviet influence and presence. A large new airport, suspected of being for purposes other than tourism, was under construction. After urgings from some of Grenada's neighboring nations, the United States decided to intervene following the overthrow of the Grenadian government by a still more radical group that appeared to threaten nearly 600 U.S. medical students on the island. Weinberger took a leading part in the extensive military planning preceding the invasion. At its peak the U.S. force, which took several days to accomplish its mission, numbered 6,000. Although they encountered logistical problems and unexpected armed opposition from 700 Cuban engineers on the island, the U.S. forces prevailed.

Weinberger also had to deal with the challenge to U.S. interests by Libya. In 1981 Moammar al-Qadhafi, the Libyan ruler, claimed that the entire Gulf of Sidra, in the Mediterranean off Libya's north central coast, belonged to his country. He warned that he would attack U.S. aircraft and naval units that came south of 32°30' in the Gulf. The United States decided to follow through with

its plans for naval maneuvers and aircraft operations in the Gulf in spite of Qadhafi's warning. On 18 August 1981, two U.S. Navy planes shot down two Libyan fighters that had threatened them south of 32°30'.

Relations between Libya and the United States remained tense in the ensuing years. In March 1986 Qadhafi again declared closed the Gulf of Sidra, which he named the "Zone of Death." President Reagan decided that U.S. military exercises, including those south of the 32°30' line, should proceed as planned. In late March the Libyans fired missiles at U.S. planes in the Gulf but missed. Then, on 5 April, a terrorist bomb exploded in a discotheque in West Berlin, killing two persons, including a U.S. serviceman, and injuring 230 others, among them 50 U.S. military personnel. The United States blamed Qadhafi for the incident and decided to take action. Weinberger and his staff joined in the detailed planning for an air attack on Libyan terrorist training installations, command and control headquarters, airfields, and aircraft on the ground. On 15 April, U.S. F-111s flying from bases in England hit pre-selected targets successfully.

In the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, both combatants offered threats to U.S. interests in southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf area. In seeking to block access through the Gulf to each other's ports, the two countries threatened U.S. activities in the area as well. Iran seized several U.S. hostages, and Iraq in May 1987 launched a missile attack against the destroyer USS *Stark*, killing 37 Americans. Iraq labeled the attack an accident and apologized, but the incident sharpened criticism of the Reagan administration's Gulf policy.

In January 1987 Kuwait had asked the United States to protect its oil tankers in the Persian Gulf from Iranian attacks by convoying them. Weinberger favored a positive response to this request, both to ensure that the Soviet Union could not take advantage of the situation by stepping in to assist Kuwait and to guarantee the free movement of Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf. Reagan agreed with Weinberger; the convoying and reflagging of the tankers to the U.S. flag began in the summer of 1987.

During the 1980s the Reagan administration became involved in activities that led to disclosure late in 1986 of the Iran/Contra affair. During this decade, the administration supported the Contras in Nicaragua in their efforts to unseat the leftist Sandinistas, who in 1979 had driven out a long-standing dictatorship that the United States had supported. The reformist Sandinistas accepted aid and advisers from Cuba and the Soviet Union, contributing to Reagan's determination to give military assistance to the Contras. Reagan held to his policy even after 1984, when Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega became president

of Nicaragua in a fair election. In the same year, Congress officially cut off U.S. military aid to the Contras.

In 1985, persuaded by NSC officials including Robert McFarlane and Lt. Col. Oliver North, Reagan secretly agreed to send antitank missiles and other military equipment to Iran in the hope of securing the release of the U.S. hostages held there. When these activities became public knowledge in November 1986, together with the disclosure that money obtained from the arms sales to Iran had been sent to the Contras in Nicaragua, the Iran/Contra affair exploded.

Weinberger and his counterpart, Secretary of State Shultz, had opposed providing military equipment to Iran. Weinberger, according to his own account, did not know that proceeds from the Iranian arms sales were going to the Contras. He played an unwilling role in the arms transfer to Iran by agreeing to a sale by DoD to the CIA of 4,000 TOW missiles, which the CIA transferred to Iran through Israel. Weinberger later stated that at the time he had warned the administration that the direct transfer of arms from DoD to Iran would be a violation of the Arms Control Export Act. Some years after, in spite of the extenuating circumstances, Weinberger was indicted on the

recommendation of a special counsel for the Iran/Contra affair. President George Bush pardoned him in December 1992.

By 1987, the disclosure of the Iran/Contra venture and increasing difficulties with Defense budgets weighed on Weinberger. When he resigned on 23 November 1987, Weinberger cited his wife's declining health as the reason, but the press speculated that he was unhappy with the prospect of a successful conclusion of a U.S.-Soviet INF arms control agreement. He specifically denied that he was opposed to the INF treaty, scheduled to be signed in Washington in December 1987. In fact, he took credit for proposing the substance of the treaty early in his term at the Pentagon.

Weinberger had been secretary of defense for six years and ten months, longer than any of his predecessors but Robert McNamara. After he left the Pentagon, he became publisher and chairman of *Forbes* magazine, where over the next decade he wrote frequently on defense and national security issues. In 1990 he wrote *Fighting for Peace*, an account of his Pentagon years; in 1996, Weinberger co-authored a book entitled *The Next War*, which raised questions about the adequacy of U.S. military capabilities following the end of the Cold War.

FRANK C. CARLUCCI III (1987-1989)

Frank C. Carlucci, who had served as Caspar Weinberger's deputy secretary between 1981 and 1983, succeeded him as secretary of defense. Carlucci was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania, on 18 October 1930. After graduation from Princeton University in 1952, he served two years as a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy. In 1956 after study at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration and a short stint in private business, Carlucci joined the Department of State as a foreign service officer.

His State Department assignments took him to South Africa, the Congo, Zanzibar, and Brazil between 1957 and 1969. He left the State Department in 1969 to join the Office of Economic Opportunity as assistant director, and moved up to director late in 1970. He then became associate director and deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget (1971-72) and under secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1972-74). At both places he worked under Caspar Weinberger.

In 1975 Carlucci returned to the State Department to serve as ambassador to Portugal until 1978, when he went to the Central Intelligence Agency as deputy director, staying until January 1981. The next month he joined Weinberger at the Department of Defense as deputy secretary. Strongly supported by Weinberger, Carlucci was selected for the post even though some of President Reagan's advisers opposed him because he had served in the Carter administration. As deputy secretary he worked closely with Weinberger, assuming responsibility for the day-to-day management of the Pentagon and overseeing the defense budget and procurement. He created the Defense Resources Board and proposed the "Carlucci initiatives" to bring more stability and order into the defense procurement process.

Carlucci left the Pentagon in January 1983 to become president and later chairman and chief executive officer of Sears World Trade, Inc., in Washington. He stayed with Sears until 1986, when he moved to the White House as assistant to the president for national security affairs. In 1985-86, while still with Sears, he served on the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, chaired by David Packard. Carlucci worked particularly on the issues of long-range planning and the budgeting and programming process.

Given his extensive experience in national security affairs, Carlucci was a natural choice to succeed Weinberger; he took office on 23 November 1987. Although a long-time associate of Weinberger and a strong advocate of the Reagan defense policy, Carlucci did things his own way in the Pentagon. During his short 14 months as



defense secretary he was in no sense a caretaker. His initiatives on management, his relationships with Congress, his views on major defense issues, such as the budget, procurement, weapon systems, and the downsizing of the military—all contained his own stamp.

Carlucci did not undertake extensive organizational changes in DoD, probably because he entered office toward the end of the Reagan administration. He retained William H. Taft IV, who had been deputy secretary since 1984, and established close relationships with Chairman Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He and Taft met weekly with the service secretaries. Although he had earlier been skeptical about the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act giving the JCS chairman more power, he concluded eventually that the changes had worked out well.

Carlucci's tactful but clear-spoken approach brought about significant improvement in DoD relations with Congress and the State Department, areas where Weinberger had encountered difficulty. He testified frequently before congressional committees, and while often critical of legislative handling of defense affairs, he was less resistant than Weinberger had been and generally got along well with Congress. He maintained a good relationship with Secretary of State George Shultz, who also met frequently with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Carlucci did much to promote foreign and military policies on his many visits abroad. During his 14 months

as secretary of defense, he made 13 trips overseas, devoting about 25 percent of his time to visiting Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The first incumbent secretary of defense to visit the Soviet Union, he went there twice: from 29 May to 1 June 1988 to attend a Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting, and again early in August 1988 for meetings with his counterpart, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov. In an earlier meeting in March 1988 in Berne, Switzerland, Carlucci and Yazov discussed the Soviet minister's contention that the Soviet Union was changing its military doctrine, putting more emphasis on defense. The two leaders covered the same subject at their Moscow meetings. Carlucci established what he termed a "bridge of communications" with Yazov, but he saw no evidence to support the Soviet claim that they had adopted a defensive strategy. Carlucci concluded that the United States should continue to strengthen its own military capacity and that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He visited NATO headquarters at Brussels four times during his term to discuss the future of NATO within the context of the shrinking U.S. defense budget, arms control advances, and the changes taking place in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev's leadership.

In visits to China and Japan, Carlucci pursued much the same agenda that had occupied Weinberger. He urged Japan to continue to move forward with its defense programs and to increase support for U.S. forces stationed there. In China he asked the government not to sell missiles to Middle Eastern countries; previously China had sold Silkworm missiles to Iran and intermediate-range missiles capable of reaching Israel to Saudi Arabia. Talks followed on U.S. transfers of technology to the Chinese armed forces.

The Defense budget confronted Carlucci with his most important domestic issue. As soon as he took office in November 1987, he had to deal with the DoD budget request for fiscal year 1989, beginning on 1 October 1988. Shortly after the stock market crash in October 1987, the administration and Congress agreed on limiting the FY 1989 DoD budget to about \$299 billion, some \$33 billion less than President Reagan had requested earlier. Carlucci established priorities for allocating the reduced funds among the military services and other units of the Defense Department. He chose to reduce personnel levels in order to protect a proposed military pay increase, and to reduce the force structure rather than cut training and support. In addition he terminated uneconomical or marginal programs and deferred or delayed others.

Working closely with Deputy Secretary Taft, Carlucci provided guidelines to the military departments on cutting the proposed FY 1989 budget and expected them to follow through, but he encountered trouble. The Army,

for example, proposed to slow production of some systems even after Carlucci made it clear that he would not accept that approach; he wanted the elimination rather than the stretching out of certain weapon programs. The Navy objected to Carlucci's order that it retire 16 frigates, since it meant the abandonment of the 600-ship Navy goal. Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb, Jr., resigned over this issue, accusing Carlucci of failing to lead, a charge that did not seem valid.

When DoD presented its revised \$299.5 billion budget proposal to Congress in February 1988, it projected a reduction of 36,000 from the current personnel strength of 2,174,000. The services would have to cut certain planned weapon systems and retire existing systems. The Navy would retire 16 frigates and one Poseidon-class submarine; the Army would lose 620 Vietnam-vintage helicopters; and the Air Force would phase out its fleet of SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft and deactivate a tactical fighter wing. The budget request included funds for various weapon systems for each of the services, as well as \$4.6 billion for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and \$200 million for the Midgetman missile. Carlucci opposed the Midgetman, but support for it in Congress resulted in an allocation designed to keep the program alive, leaving to the next administration a final decision about it. Carlucci anticipated that over the next five years DoD spending would decrease \$300 billion from previous projections.

After Congress completed work on the Defense budget in the summer of 1988, President Reagan vetoed the bill, even though Carlucci and the national security adviser, Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell, recommended approval. Reagan found unacceptable the reduced levels of SDI spending imposed by Congress and restrictions on the amount of money the Pentagon could spend on development of space-based antimissile interceptors, part of the SDI program. Eventually Carlucci and congressional leaders agreed to retain the \$4.1 billion spending level for SDI in the vetoed bill but to drop the restrictions on antimissile interceptor funding. Carlucci accepted a \$299 billion DoD spending ceiling late in 1987; he thought it not really adequate, but understood that it was the best he could get.

To help accommodate to the tighter budget Carlucci wanted to close wasteful and unneeded military bases in the United States. Disposing of these bases was difficult, in large part because individual members of Congress resisted shutting down military installations in their own districts and states. To circumvent the usual congressional obstacles, Carlucci proposed the creation of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. The commission, established in 1988 with a bipartisan membership selected by the secretary, submitted a list of nearly 90 bases

to be eliminated. Carlucci endorsed the entire list, and Congress subsequently accepted it. Carlucci actually thought the matter ought to be exclusively in the hands of the secretary of defense, but he proposed the commission approach as a politically viable way to achieve the result.

Carlucci also had to deal with the damaging “Ill Wind” procurement fraud, involving billions of dollars in contracts, disclosed in the summer of 1988. As deputy secretary in the early 1980s and later as a member of the Packard Commission, Carlucci had worked to improve procurement. Thus he found especially troubling the 1988 fraud disclosures—payment of bribes for inside information on competitive bids, use of contract specifications to favor one contractor over others, and collusive bidding by contractors. One of the principal figures involved was a former assistant secretary of the Navy, who had resigned in March 1987 to become a private defense consultant. Eventually the courts prosecuted and convicted some of the major figures involved in the Ill Wind fraud. The whole episode, however, raised questions anew about the procurement process and damaged the Pentagon’s reputation.

Carlucci worried about proposals in Congress to provide quick fixes in the procurement area—including establishment of an independent procurement control agency, a special inspector general to investigate reports of Pentagon corruption, and strengthening the “revolving door” laws involving the Pentagon and military contractors. He set new guidelines for procurement emphasizing multiyear buying, adoption of a total quality management program for procurement, fewer auditors, and strengthening of the position of under secretary for acquisition, established in 1986. In an important speech in September 1988 Carlucci proposed a five-point program to streamline the procurement process, urging Congress to (1) combine the authorization and appropriations processes; (2) reduce the number of committees and subcommittees having overlapping oversight of DoD budgeting; (3) revise procedures to make it impossible for individual members to introduce amendments to the budget bill forcing the president to buy items not in his budget request; (4) shift to a biennial Defense budget; and (5) adopt reforms to further stabilize the procurement process, including funding more programs on a multiyear basis.

Many existing and proposed weapon systems, especially ballistic missiles, posed difficult problems for Carlucci. A long-standing issue related to the 50 MX intercontinental ballistic missiles placed in hardened underground silos in the mid-1980s. Carlucci considered these missiles vulnerable to Soviet attack and advocated putting all of them, including a second 50 MXs, on moving railroad cars. Congressional opposition

prevented Carlucci from proceeding with the rail basing plan. Complicating this issue was congressional and other support for the proposed Midgetman missile, a 15-ton single-warhead mobile missile first proposed in 1983. Carlucci felt that the Midgetman would not be cost effective and would compete for funds with the MX in a tight Pentagon budget, but he proposed a modest allocation in the FY 1988 budget to keep the Midgetman alive. Neither the MX rail-based mode nor the Midgetman proposal ever went forward; the end of the Cold War in the years immediately following Carlucci’s term made these proposals less urgent.

As a firm supporter of SDI, Carlucci opposed negotiations on arms control that might limit U.S. choices in developing, testing, and deploying SDI systems. State Department arms control negotiator Paul H. Nitze and Admiral Crowe, among others, thought that it might be possible, in the interests of securing a new arms control agreement, to negotiate with the Soviet Union some limits on SDI testing without compromising the SDI program. Carlucci consistently opposed any such agreement.

After signature of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, the State Department hoped to move rapidly on a strategic arms reduction treaty (START). Carlucci again argued against negotiating limitations on SDI research and development, and Reagan made it clear that he would not trade SDI for a START agreement. Carlucci publicly defended SDI technological progress, observing that the major obstacle to securing the system was likely to be political rather than technical. He acknowledged the unlikelihood of achieving a perfect antimissile defense system, but argued that SDI would strengthen the U.S. deterrent at a time when the nation had no real defense against incoming missiles. He also portrayed SDI as a defense against rogue countries, such as Libya, that might be able to obtain nuclear-armed missiles capable of reaching the United States. Although he did not get as much money as he wanted for SDI in the FY 1989 budget, he secured enough to keep research and development work underway.

His stand on SDI did not detract from Carlucci’s support of the efforts of the Reagan administration to negotiate arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Some arms control advocates saw his appointment as secretary of defense to succeed Weinberger in 1987 as a sign that the Pentagon would soften its hard-line approach on the issue. Carlucci testified strongly in favor of the INF Treaty, which he saw as enhancing NATO security in several ways. The treaty would reduce the Soviet military threat to Western Europe by removing an entire class of missile systems from the area and demonstrate to the USSR that NATO nations had the political will to make and support decisions necessary to ensure their

security. He also emphasized that the INF Treaty included stringent verification provisions. To implement the verification process of the INF Treaty, Carlucci created the On-Site Inspection Agency on 15 January 1988.


The long war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s threatened the interests of the United States and its friends in the Persian Gulf region and confronted Carlucci with a major crisis. The United States began to convoy Kuwaiti tankers, carrying the U.S. flag, in the summer of 1987, shortly before Carlucci arrived at the Pentagon. He had played a central role in the development and implementation of the reflagging and convoy policy as Reagan's national security adviser before he became secretary of defense. On one of his first trips abroad as secretary in January 1988 he visited Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and U.S. ships in the Gulf. Three months later U.S. relations with Iran reached another flash point when U.S. Navy ships destroyed two Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for damage done by an Iranian mine to the USS *Samuel B. Roberts* in the Gulf. In the southern half of the Gulf, U.S. ships clashed with Iranian forces, crippling or sinking six of their ships. Subsequently President Reagan ordered the U.S. Navy to expand its duties in the Gulf to include the protection of neutral, non-Communist merchant ships that requested help when attacked. Carlucci monitored these developments closely; he visited the Gulf area again in December 1988.

Another serious incident in the Persian Gulf occurred on 3 July 1988, when the USS *Vincennes* mistakenly shot down a civilian Iranian airliner over Gulf waters, killing 290 persons. Carlucci set up a commission of inquiry to look into the matter, and the United States apologized to Iran and paid compensation to the victims' families. In August 1988 Iran and Iraq agreed to an armistice, ending their eight-year conflict, but Carlucci kept U.S. forces at full strength in the Persian Gulf, pending a formal settlement between the two countries.

Carlucci left office on 20 January 1989 with the advent of the Bush administration. In an interview with

reporters shortly before his departure, Carlucci said he was most proud of three accomplishments: persuading Congress to agree to streamline base closing procedures, the conduct of the successful tanker escort operation in the Persian Gulf, and the development of a new, positive relationship with Soviet military authorities. Other achievements included setting funding priorities and guiding the process for cutting the FY 1989 Pentagon budget; developing a calm, measured approach to the Pentagon procurement fraud investigation; impressing on world leaders the dangers of long-range missile proliferation; and persuading Congress to drop the idea of using military forces to seal U.S. borders in the fight against drugs. Carlucci said his biggest disappointment was that the Pentagon had "not been able to preserve the defense consensus" in Congress and in the nation at a time when developments in the Communist world showed that "negotiating from strength works." In an article published soon after his retirement, he listed what he considered the central challenges policymakers would face in the 1990s: the emergence of new and dangerous threats to U.S. security from all over the world, the persistence of the Soviet threat, and the probability that the Western countries would face a growing tendency toward conflict arising from economic competition.

After he left the Pentagon, Carlucci joined the Carlyle Group, a Washington investment partnership, as vice president and managing director; he later became chairman. In the ensuing years, he wrote, spoke, and testified frequently on defense issues. He addressed again the problem of congressional micromanagement of DoD, continued to advocate rail deployment of the MX, and supported the new B-2 bomber as necessary in the nuclear deterrent triad. In 1993 he joined with several other former secretaries of defense who voiced strong reservations about deploying U.S. troops in foreign trouble spots. Carlucci and his colleagues rejected the idea of sending troops to ensure stability in the former Soviet Union, and they also opposed sending troops to Bosnia.



The Pentagon Building — Headquarters of the Department of Defense

RICHARD B. CHENEY (1989-1993)

President George Bush initially chose former Texas Sen. John G. Tower to be his secretary of defense. When the Senate in March 1989 rejected his nomination, Bush selected Rep. Richard B. (Dick) Cheney of Wyoming. Cheney, born in Lincoln, Nebraska, on 30 January 1941, attended Yale University, Casper College, and the University of Wyoming, where he earned B.A. (1965) and M.A. (1966) degrees. He went on to further graduate study in political science at the University of Wisconsin, and moved to Washington as a congressional fellow for the 1968-69 year.

Cheney entered federal service in 1969 as a special assistant to the director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. In 1971 he became a White House staff assistant, and soon moved on to become assistant director of the Cost of Living Council, where he stayed until 1973. After a year in private business, he returned to the White House to become deputy assistant to President Gerald Ford (1974-75) and then White House chief of staff (1975-77).

In November 1978 Cheney, a Republican, won election as Wyoming's representative at large in the House of Representatives. Re-elected for five additional terms, he served several years on the House Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Budget Subcommittee. In December 1988 House Republicans chose him to serve as whip in the incoming 101st Congress. Less than a week after Bush nominated him, the Senate confirmed Cheney as secretary of defense; he entered office on 21 March 1989.

Cheney generally focused on external matters and delegated most internal Pentagon management details to Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald J. Atwood, Jr. He worked closely with Louis A. (Pete) Williams, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, and Paul Wolfowitz, under secretary of defense for policy. For chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he selected General Colin L. Powell, who assumed the post on 1 October 1989. Many of Cheney's major decisions resulted from the almost daily meetings he had in the Pentagon with Powell and Atwood.

Cheney met regularly with Bush and other top-level members of the administration, including Secretary of State James Baker, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, and General Powell. Occasionally Bush consulted with Cheney on matters unrelated to defense, such as White House organization and management. When not at the White House, Cheney was often on Capitol Hill. He understood how Congress, and more particularly the legislative process, operated, and he used this knowledge and experience to avoid the kind of difficulties Caspar Weinberger had encountered with Congress.



In general Cheney got along well with Congress and with DoD's main oversight committees in the House and the Senate, though he suffered disappointments and frustrations.

Although some of the usual turf battles between the State and Defense Departments continued during his term, Cheney and Secretary of State Baker were old friends and avoided the acrimony that sometimes occurred between the two departments during the Weinberger period. On the important problem of arms control, Cheney and General Powell tried to reach consensus on DoD's position in order to deal more effectively with the State Department. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Cheney worried about the dangers of nuclear proliferation and effective control of nuclear weapons from the Soviet nuclear arsenal that had come under the control of newly independent republics—Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—as well as in Russia itself. Cheney warned about the possibility that other nations, such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, would acquire nuclear components after the Soviet collapse. He supported the initiatives that President Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin took in 1991 and 1992 to cut back the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and to move toward new arms control agreements.

The end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact obliged the

Bush administration to reevaluate NATO's purpose and makeup. How to restructure the alliance and modify its strategy to reflect changes in the military situation posed major questions for Cheney. He believed that NATO had to remain the foundation of European security relationships and that it would continue to be important to the United States in the long term. At the last NATO meeting he attended, in Brussels in December 1992, Cheney said that the alliance needed to lend more assistance to the new democracies in Eastern Europe and eventually offer them membership in NATO. Central and Eastern Europe, he told his NATO colleagues, presented the most threatening potential security problems in the years ahead. The current problem, rather than East versus West, was East and West versus instability.

Cheney's views on NATO reflected his skepticism about prospects for peaceful evolution in the former Soviet areas. He saw high potential for uncertainty and instability, and he felt that the Bush administration was too optimistic in supporting Mikhail Gorbachev and his successor, Boris Yeltsin. Cheney believed that as the United States downsized its military forces, reduced its troops in Europe, and moved forward with arms control, it needed to keep a watchful eye on Russia and other successor states of the Soviet Union.

The DoD budget faced Cheney with his most immediate and pressing problem when he came to the Pentagon. President Bush had already said publicly that the proposed FY 1990 Defense budget of more than \$300 billion had to be cut immediately by \$6.3 billion, and soon after Cheney began work the president increased the amount to \$10 billion. Cheney recognized the necessity of cutting the budget and downsizing the military establishment, but he favored a cautious approach. In making decisions on the FY 1990 budget, the secretary had to confront the wish list of each of the services. The Air Force wanted to buy 312 B-2 stealth bombers at over \$500 million each; the Marine Corps wanted 12 V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor helicopters, \$136 million each; the Army wanted some \$240 million in FY 1990 to move toward production of the LHX, a new reconnaissance and attack helicopter, to cost \$33 billion eventually; and the Navy wanted 5 Aegis guided-missile destroyers, at a cost of \$3.6 billion. What direction to go with ballistic missiles also posed difficult choices. One option was to build 50 more MX missiles to join the 50 already on hand, at a cost of about \$10 billion. A decision had to be made on how to base the MX—whether on railroad cars or in some other mode. Another option was to build 500 single-warhead Midgetman missiles, still in the development stage, at an estimated cost of \$24 billion.

The MX-Midgetman issue led to a misunderstanding between Cheney and General Larry D. Welch, the Air

Force chief of staff, just three days after Cheney entered office. The *Washington Post* reported on 24 March 1989 that Welch had been canvassing members of Congress on their opinions on a plan to deploy the existing 50 MX missiles and build and deploy 300 Midgetman missiles. At a news conference the same day, Cheney indicated that no decision had been made on the MX-Midgetman question, and that Welch was not speaking for the Defense Department. Cheney made his views known to Welch in a meeting shortly after the news conference. They resolved their differences when Welch informed Cheney that he had, indeed, cleared his actions with OSD. Nevertheless, Cheney had plainly carried out his intention of making a statement about the respective roles of the civilian and military leadership in the Pentagon.

In April Cheney recommended to Bush that the United States move ahead to deploy the 50 MXs and discontinue the Midgetman project. While not unalterably opposed to the Midgetman, Cheney questioned how to pay for it in a time of shrinking defense budgets. Cheney's plan encountered opposition both inside the administration and in Congress. Bush decided not to take Cheney's advice; he said he would seek funding to put the MXs on railroad cars by the mid-1990s and to develop the Midgetman, with a goal of 250 to 500.

In making broad budget decisions, Cheney held to two overriding priorities—protecting people programs (including training, pay, housing allowances, and medical care), and using proven hardware rather than rushing into complicated new technologies. Like Carlucci he thought it better, if cuts had to be made, to have a smaller but highly trained and equipped force rather than maintain previous levels of strength without sufficient readiness. Cheney preferred to cut some conventional weapon systems rather than strategic systems.

When Cheney's FY 1990 budget came before Congress in the summer of 1989, the Senate Armed Services Committee made only minor amendments, but the House Armed Services Committee cut the strategic accounts and favored the V-22, F-14D, and other projects not high on Cheney's list. The House and Senate in November 1989 finally settled on a budget somewhere between the preferences of the administration and the House committee. Congress avoided a final decision on the MX-Midgetman issue by authorizing a \$1 billion missile modernization account to be apportioned as the president saw fit. Funding for the F-14D was to continue for another year, providing 18 more aircraft in the program. Congress authorized only research funds for the V-22 and cut SDI funding more than \$1 billion, much to the displeasure of President Bush.

In subsequent years under Cheney the budgets proposed and the final outcomes followed patterns similar

to the FY 1990 budget experience. Early in 1991 the secretary unveiled a plan to reduce military strength by the mid-1990s to 1.6 million, compared to 2.2 million when he entered office. In his budget proposal for FY 1993, his last one, Cheney asked for termination of the B-2 program at 20 aircraft, cancellation of the Midgetman, and limitations on advanced cruise missile purchases to those already authorized. When introducing this budget, Cheney complained that Congress had directed Defense to buy weapons it did not want, including the V-22, M-1 tanks, and F-14 and F-16 aircraft, and required it to maintain some unneeded reserve forces. His plan outlined about \$50 billion less in budget authority over the next 5 years than the Bush administration had proposed in 1991. Sen. Sam Nunn of the Senate Armed Services Committee said that the 5-year cuts ought to be \$85 billion, and Rep. Les Aspin of the House Armed Services Committee put the figure at \$91 billion.

Over Cheney's four years as secretary of defense, encompassing budgets for fiscal years 1990-93, DoD's total obligational authority in current dollars declined from \$291.3 billion to \$269.9 billion. Except for FY

1991, when the TOA budget increased by 1.7 percent, the Cheney budgets showed negative real growth: -2.9 percent in 1990, -9.8 percent in 1992, and -8.1 percent in 1993. During this same period total military personnel declined by 19.4 percent, from 2.202 million in FY 1989 to 1.776 million in FY 1993. The Army took the largest cut, from 770,000 to 572,000—25.8 percent of its strength. The Air Force declined by 22.3 percent, the Navy by 14 percent, and the Marines by 9.7 percent.

The V-22 question caused friction between Cheney and Congress throughout his tenure. DoD spent some of the money Congress appropriated to develop the aircraft, but congressional sources accused Cheney, who continued to oppose the Osprey, of violating the law by not moving ahead as Congress had directed. Cheney argued that building and testing the prototype Osprey would cost more than the amount appropriated. In the spring of 1992 several congressional supporters of the V-22 threatened to take Cheney to court over the issue. A little later, in the face of suggestions from congressional Republicans that Cheney's opposition to the Osprey was hurting President Bush's reelection campaign, especially



Office of the secretary of defense

in Texas and Pennsylvania where the aircraft would be built, Cheney relented and suggested spending \$1.5 billion in fiscal years 1992 and 1993 to develop it. He made clear that he personally still opposed the Osprey and favored a less costly alternative.

Although budget and downsizing issues occupied much of Cheney's time and attention, international crises could make overriding demands on him. When some elements of the military in the Philippines attempted a coup against the government of President Corazon Aquino and strafed and bombed the presidential palace in November 1989, Aquino asked for assistance from the United States. Bush and Cheney approved the use of U.S. jets stationed at Clark Air Base on Luzon to buzz the rebel planes at their base, fire in front of them if any attempted to take off, and shoot them down if they did. The buzzing by U.S. planes soon caused the coup to collapse.

Panama, controlled by General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the head of the country's military, against whom a U.S. grand jury had entered an indictment for drug trafficking in February 1988, held Cheney's attention almost from the time he took office. Using economic sanctions and political pressure, the United States mounted a campaign to drive Noriega from power. In May 1989 after Guillermo Endara had been duly elected president of Panama, Noriega nullified the election outcome, incurring intensified U.S. pressure on him. In October Noriega succeeded in quelling a military coup, but in December, after his defense forces shot a U.S. serviceman, 24,000 U.S. troops invaded Panama. Within a few days they achieved control and Endara assumed the presidency. U.S. forces arrested Noriega and flew him to Miami where he was held until his trial, which led to his conviction and imprisonment on racketeering and drug trafficking charges in April 1992.

Cheney took a strong stand against use of U.S. ground troops in the vicious civil war in Bosnia between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims that began in April 1992. After the collapse of a collective presidency in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the country split into several independent republics, including the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which declared its independence in March 1992. Whether and how to intervene in Bosnia evoked an emotional debate in the United States, but Cheney left office before any firm decisions were made, and his successors inherited the knotty issue.

In Somalia also, a savage civil war that began in 1991 claimed the world's attention. In August 1992 the United States began to provide humanitarian assistance, primarily food, through a military airlift. In December, only a month before he left office, at President Bush's direction Cheney dispatched the first of 26,000 U.S. troops

to Somalia as part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), designed to provide security and food relief. Cheney's successors as secretary of defense, Les Aspin and William J. Perry, had to contend with both the Bosnian and Somalian issues.

Cheney's biggest challenge came in the Persian Gulf. On 1 August 1990 President Saddam Hussein of Iraq sent invading forces into neighboring Kuwait, a small oil-rich country long claimed by Iraq. An estimated 140,000 Iraqi troops quickly took control of Kuwait City and moved on to the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait border. Although taken by surprise, President Bush soon decided that the aggression could not stand. Cheney regarded Iraq's intrusion into Kuwait as a grave threat to U.S. interests. Fortunately, the United States had already begun to develop contingency plans for defense of Saudi Arabia by the U.S. Central Command, headed by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf.

Shortly after the Iraqi invasion Cheney made the first of several visits to Saudi Arabia and secured King Fahd's permission to bring U.S. troops into his country. The United Nations took action, passing a series of resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and eventually demanded that Iraq withdraw its forces by 15 January 1991. By then, the United States had a force of about 500,000 stationed in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Other nations, including Great Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Syria, and Egypt, contributed troops, and other allies, most notably Germany and Japan, agreed to provide financial support for the coalition effort, named Operation Desert Shield.

In the meantime a congressional and public debate developed in the United States about whether to rely on economic sanctions against Iraq or to use military force. Bush in October 1990 settled on military action if Iraq's troops had not left Kuwait by the 15 January 1991 deadline. In November 1990 UN Resolution 678 authorized "all necessary means" to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The debate ended on 12 January 1991, when both houses of Congress agreed to a joint resolution stating that the president was to satisfy Congress that he had exhausted all means to secure Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions on Kuwait before he initiated hostilities. Cheney signed an order, not publicly released at the time, stating that the president would make the determination required by the joint resolution and that offensive operations against Iraq would begin on 17 January.

As the military buildup in Saudi Arabia (Desert Shield) proceeded in the fall of 1990 and as the UN coalition moved toward military action, Cheney worked closely with General Powell in directing the movement of U.S. personnel, equipment, and supplies to Saudi Arabia. He

participated intently with Powell, Schwartzkopf, and others in overseeing planning for the operation. Cheney, according to Powell, “had become a glutton for information, with an appetite we could barely satisfy. He spent hours in the National Military Command Center peppering my staff with questions.” When hostilities began in January 1991, Cheney turned most other DoD matters over to Deputy Secretary Atwood. Cheney spent many hours briefing Congress during the air and ground phases of the war.

In an incident in September 1990 involving General Michael J. Dugan, who had replaced General Welch as Air Force chief of staff, Cheney again demonstrated the primacy of civilian authority over the military. On a return flight from Saudi Arabia, in discussions with reporters about the Kuwait situation, Dugan was guilty of indiscretions that became public and could not help but invite Cheney’s attention. Powell’s later recollection of this episode summed up the problem: “Dugan had made the Iraqis look like a pushover; suggested that American commanders were taking their cue from Israel, a perception fatal to the Arab alliance we were trying to forge; suggested political assassination . . . ; claimed that air power was the only option; and said . . . that the American people would not support any other administration strategy.” Cheney quickly decided to fire Dugan, who had been Air Force chief of staff for less than three months.

The first phase of Operation Desert Storm, begun on 17 January 1991, was an air offensive to secure air superiority and attack Iraq’s forces in Kuwait and Iraq proper. Targets included key Iraqi command and control centers, including Baghdad and Basra. Iraq retaliated by firing Scud missiles against locations in Saudi Arabia and Israel. The United States used Patriot missiles to defend against the Scuds, which were old and unsophisticated, and diverted some aircraft to seek out and bomb the missile sites. The Israeli government wanted to use its own air power to hunt down and destroy Scud launch sites in western Iraq, but U.S. officials, concerned about the effect on the Arab members of the coalition, succeeded in persuading Israel not to intervene.

After an air offensive of more than five weeks, the UN coalition launched the ground war, with the first forces thrusting into Kuwait from Saudi Arabia early in the morning of 24 February. Within four days Iraqi forces had been routed from Kuwait and pushed into the interior of Iraq after suffering heavy losses. Although easily defeated, Iraq’s army did considerable damage while retreating, including setting fire to many oil wells. By 27 February General Schwartzkopf reported that the basic objective—expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait—had been met. After consultation with Cheney, Powell,

and other members of his national security team, Bush declared a suspension of hostilities effective at midnight on 27 February, Washington time. A total of 147 U.S. military personnel died in combat, and another 236 died as a result of accidents or other causes. Iraq agreed to a formal truce on 3 March, and a permanent cease-fire on 6 April.

Subsequently there was debate about whether the UN coalition should have driven all the way to Baghdad to oust Saddam Hussein from power. Bush and his advisers agreed unanimously on the decision to end the ground war when they did. The UN resolutions on the war limited military action to expelling Iraq from Kuwait. Cheney thought that if the campaign continued, the invading force probably would get bogged down and suffer many casualties. The debate persisted for years after the war as Saddam Hussein remained in power, rebuilt his military forces, resisted full implementation of the cease-fire terms, and periodically threatened Kuwait.

Looking to the future, Cheney regarded the Gulf War as the first example of the kind of regional problem the United States was likely to face in the aftermath of the Cold War. He thought the successful campaign validated the broad strategy developed under his direction. A draft Defense Planning Guidance issued early in 1992 envisioned several scenarios in which the United States might have to fight two large regional wars at one time—for example, against Iraq again, against North Korea, or in Europe against a resurgent, expansionist Russia. The Pentagon later modified this document, but it gave some indication of what the Defense Department saw as future threats to the United States.

Just before he left office, Cheney released a paper dealing with defense strategy for the 1990s in which he elaborated his strategic views, underscoring the importance of strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, and crisis response. He added “science and technology” and “infrastructure and overhead” to the traditional pillars of military capability—readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure.

Increasingly, toward the end of his tenure, Cheney had to consider social issues affecting the military forces, particularly the status of homosexuals in the military and the role of women in combat. In the face of pressure from some members of Congress and the public at large, Cheney reviewed standing DoD policy on these matters. He decided that the existing policies—a ban on homosexuals serving in the military and the exclusion of women from combat positions—were correct and did not need to be changed. During the campaign of 1992 Democratic candidate Bill Clinton said he favored a change in official policy

on homosexuals in the military services, keeping the issue alive and leaving it to Cheney's successor to handle.

On 20 January 1993 when the Clinton administration took office, Cheney left the Pentagon and joined the American Enterprise Institute in Washington as a senior fellow. He maintained his interest in national security affairs, speaking and writing occasionally on the subject. Cheney regarded the successful planning and implementation of Desert Shield and Desert Storm as his most important achievement as secretary of defense. The failure to make significant reforms in procurement was his biggest disappointment. Acting Secretary of the Navy

Sean O'Keefe, in an October 1992 speech, pointed to Cheney's capacity for independent judgment as one of his strongest assets as a government leader. Cheney, according to O'Keefe, had redefined national objectives, force size, and other elements of national security in terms of what the future involvement of the military establishment might be.


Cheney contemplated becoming a candidate for the 1996 Republican nomination for president but decided against it in 1995. In October of that year he became president and chief executive officer of the Halliburton Company in Dallas, Texas.

LESLIE ASPIN (1993-1994)

President-elect Bill Clinton's choice for secretary of defense, Leslie (Les) Aspin, had represented Wisconsin's First Congressional District in the House of Representatives since 1971. Aspin was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on 21 July 1938 and attended public schools there. His academic credentials included a B.A. from Yale University (1960), an M.A. from Oxford University (1962), where (like the new president) he was a Rhodes Scholar, and a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1965). As an officer in the U.S. Army from 1966 to 1968, he served as a systems analyst in the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Before his election as a Democrat to Congress in 1970, Aspin had been active in Wisconsin politics and had taught economics at Marquette University.

Aspin began his career in Congress as an outsider but soon developed a special interest and expertise in defense matters. Before and during his tenure in the House, he had opposed the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. In his early years in Congress he often issued press releases critical of shortcomings he detected in the armed forces. By 1985, when he became chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, he was recognized as a leading defense authority. His chairmanship caused controversy among some House Democrats, particularly because he supported the Reagan administration's policies on the MX missile and aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. Although temporarily removed from his committee chair by his Democratic colleagues in 1987, Aspin weathered the crisis and resumed the post. He again broke with many Democrats in January 1991 when he issued a paper supporting the Bush administration's intention to use military force to drive the Iraqis from Kuwait. The accuracy of his prediction that the United States could win a quick military victory with light casualties added to his reputation as a military expert.

Aspin served as an adviser to Clinton on defense matters during the 1992 presidential campaign. Given Clinton's lack of military experience and avoidance of service during the Vietnam War, appointment of a prominent and respected defense expert to head the Pentagon seemed desirable. Because of his leadership position in the House, Aspin's views on defense issues were well known. He was skeptical about the Strategic Defense Initiative, and favored a smaller Navy, a cut in U.S. troops in Europe, and further reduction of military personnel strength. These positions, along with the assumption that Aspin would work toward a substantial cut in the Defense budget, worried the military. Defense industry leaders applauded Aspin's selection because he favored



maintaining a viable defense industrial base. Although questioned extensively, Aspin won easy confirmation in the Senate.

Shortly after he took office, Aspin discussed dangers that had emerged with the end of the Cold War: the uncertainty that reform could succeed in the former Soviet Union; the enhanced possibility that terrorists or terrorist states could acquire nuclear weapons; the likely proliferation of regional conflicts; and the failure to take adequate account of the impact of the state of the domestic economy on U.S. national security interests. Given these conditions and the end of the Cold War, it seemed clear that the Pentagon was entering a period of potentially profound change. Aspin looked like a sound choice to manage this change.

At it turned out, Aspin faced difficulties from the beginning. A serious heart ailment put him in the hospital for several days in February 1993, after barely a month in office. A month later he was back in the hospital for implantation of a heart pacemaker. Even so, he had to deal immediately with the highly-charged question of homosexuals in the military, a controversy left over from Cheney's tenure. That had become an issue in the 1992 campaign, when Clinton had promised to end discrimination against homosexuals. During his confirmation hearings Aspin indicated that he would take action quickly, and on entering office he presented

a plan to the president to discuss the matter with Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and presented a timetable leading to an order dealing with the matter. This plan provoked widespread protest from all sides on the issue.

The fallout from the controversy wounded both Clinton and Aspin politically and dragged on until December 1993, when, after many months of equivocation, confusion, and more controversy, Aspin released new regulations on homosexual conduct in the armed forces: Applicants for the services would not be asked about their sexual orientation, and homosexual orientation would not disqualify anyone from service “unless manifested by homosexual conduct”; military personnel would be judged on suitability for service, not sexual orientation; separation from the service would be based on homosexual acts, same sex marriage, or statements by an individual that he or she was bisexual or homosexual, with the person accorded the opportunity to rebut the presumption of homosexual acts; DoD criminal investigation or law enforcement organizations would not investigate solely to determine a service member’s sexual orientation, and sexual orientation questions would not be included in personnel security questionnaires; finally, service members would be informed of DoD policy on sexual conduct during their training. This compromise policy, sometimes termed “don’t ask, don’t tell,” issued after an agonizing and divisive public debate, did not completely satisfy any of the concerned parties.

Also on the social side, Aspin had to deal with the volatile question of servicewomen in combat. In April 1993 he announced a revised policy on the assignment of women in the armed forces: The services were to allow women to compete for assignments in combat aircraft; the Navy was to open additional ships to women and draft a proposal for Congress to remove existing legislative barriers to the assignment of women to combat vessels; and the Army and Marine Corps were to look for opportunities for women to serve in such components as field artillery and air defense. Meanwhile, Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall became the first woman service secretary.

Development of the Defense budget for FY 1994, beginning on 1 October 1993, remained Aspin’s biggest task. The budget process proved more complicated than usual, owing to Clinton’s campaign pledge to reduce DoD funding and to a “bottom-up review” of the military structure ordered by Aspin shortly after he took office. The end of the Cold War and the consequent opportunity to cut military costs clearly called for the kind of reevaluation of ends and means that the bottom-up review might contribute. A Pentagon steering group



Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall

chaired by Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) John M. Deutch and including representatives from various OSD offices, the Joint Staff, and the services conducted the review.

Because of the growing threat of regional conflicts, Aspin wanted to have a strong capability to carry out limited military operations, including peacekeeping, and to maintain “a strong peacetime presence of U.S. forces around the world.” The bottom-up review report, which Aspin released in September 1993, took into account strategy formulation, force structure, weapon systems modernization, and Defense infrastructure. The report projected a reduced force structure still capable of fighting and winning two simultaneous major regional conflicts. Forces would include 10 active Army divisions; 11 carrier battle groups, 45 to 55 attack submarines, and about 345 ships; 5 active Marine brigades; and 13 active and 7 reserve Air Force fighter wings. The report also called for additional prepositioned equipment and airlift/sealift capacity, improved anti-armor and precision-guided munitions, and enhanced Army National Guard combat brigade readiness.

The conclusions of the bottom-up review influenced the development of the FY 1994 Defense budget, although detailed work on the budget had begun as soon as Aspin took office. In March 1993 Aspin introduced a FY 1994

budget proposal costing \$263.4 billion, about \$12 billion below current levels, and reflecting cuts in the military services similar to those later included in the bottom-up review. To some critics of high military spending, Aspin's budget plan differed little from that of the Bush administration.

In the fall of 1993 Aspin began to tell the White House that the five-year Defense budget, reflecting the results of the bottom-up review, would exceed the more than \$1 trillion projected by the Clinton administration. In December 1993 he put the anticipated shortfall at no less than \$50 billion, the consequence of inaccurate inflation estimates, a military pay raise, and failure to account for other Pentagon costs, including peacekeeping operations. The size of the force needed to meet the two regional wars scenario contributed to the projected budget shortfall. Furthermore, Aspin was on record as favoring the use of U.S. troops in regional conflicts, as opposed to other decisionmakers, including General Powell, chairman of the JCS. Aspin's departure from office early in 1994 left further decisions on the Defense budget to his successor. The final FY 1994 budget amounted to a little under \$252 billion in total obligational authority.

Like his predecessors Carlucci and Cheney, Aspin faced the perennial issue of base closures, which could also affect the Defense budget. In March 1993 he released a plan to close an additional 31 large military installations and to shrink or consolidate 134 other sites, projecting a savings of over \$3 billion a year beginning in 2000. A new Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved the proposal, which went into effect when Congress accepted it as a package.

The SDI program also held important budget implications. In May 1993 Aspin announced "the end of the Star Wars era," explaining that the collapse of the Soviet Union had determined the fate of SDI. He renamed the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and established its priorities as theater and national missile defense and useful follow-on technologies. Aspin's assignment of responsibility for BMDO to the under secretary of defense (acquisition and technology) signified the downgrading of the program.

While seeking solutions to the complex budget and force structure issues, Aspin found himself beset with difficult regional problems and conflicts that demanded decisions and action. In NATO he pushed the U.S.-sponsored "Partnership for Peace" program to bring together NATO members and nonmembers for military activities, including training maneuvers, equipment sharing, search and rescue, antiterrorist efforts, environ-

mental cleanup, and peacekeeping operations. At a meeting in Brussels in December 1993 the NATO defense ministers agreed to consider for future alliance membership those non-NATO nations that participated in the program. Russian President Boris Yeltsin warned that attempts to bring Eastern European nations into NATO would threaten his country's strategic interests and endanger hopes for the former Soviet bloc's reconciliation with the West. Yeltsin argued that enlarging NATO would reawaken old Russian concerns about encirclement and possibly weaken the cause of democratic reform.

The unstable situation in Haiti, where elected president Jean Bertrande Aristide had been ousted from office by the military in September 1991, presented another regional problem. The United States pressured the military government to restore Aristide. In July 1993, the Haitian military regime agreed to reinstate Aristide by 30 October 1993, but then refused to step down. In October, in an effort Clinton approved even though Aspin opposed it, the United States sent the USS *Harlan County* carrying 200 troops to Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital. Met by a hostile mob of armed Haitians, the ship turned away without attempting to undertake its mission, which the Pentagon described as an effort to professionalize the Haitian military and undertake civil assistance projects. Some observers attacked Aspin for not taking a harder stand in the administration against an action he opposed and then aborting the effort in the face of local opposition.

During Aspin's term the U.S. concern that Communist North Korea might have underway a nuclear weapon development program gave way to alarm when that country refused to allow full inspection of nuclear sites. In November 1993 North Korea demanded that the United States and South Korea cancel a planned joint training exercise as a precondition to discussions on the nuclear issue. Aspin rejected this demand and announced that the United States would suspend plans to withdraw its troops gradually from the peninsula.

In the Persian Gulf area, Iraq remained a problem. In June 1993 two U.S. Navy ships fired Tomahawk missiles against the headquarters building of Iraq's intelligence service in Baghdad in response to evidence of a plot to assassinate former President Bush during a visit to Kuwait. Aspin described the attack as a "wake up call" for Saddam Hussein. Two months later Aspin received a report on the U.S. military performance during the 1991 Gulf War, the result of a study undertaken by the House Armed Services Committee when he chaired it. The report concluded that the U.S. Central Command had greatly exaggerated damage done to Iraqi military equipment, such as tanks and naval vessels, by air strikes.

Aspin also had to consider the question of health problems of U.S. service personnel who participated in the action against Iraq. He announced that a preliminary review disclosed no connection between chemical weapon agents and the reported health problems. Nevertheless, he formed a panel of outside experts to examine the issue further.

The worsening crisis in Bosnia commanded attention and demanded some kind of U.S. response. Aspin did not favor using ground forces to intervene in the civil war involving the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, but thought that using high technology weapons such as cruise missiles might be a feasible option. Eventually the administration decided on an airdrop of humanitarian aid, even though Aspin did not favor the plan.

Somalia turned out to be Aspin's biggest headache. A civil war involving various clans had engulfed the country since 1991. Direct U.S. involvement, begun in August 1992, provided food through a military airlift and other means to the people of Somalia. In December 1992, shortly before Aspin became secretary of defense, the United States joined a new Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to provide security as well as food relief. The United States sent 26,000 troops to Somalia to join about 13,000 others from more than 20 nations. UNITAF, operating until May 1993, restored order in Somalia and distributed food widely.

In May 1993 Operation Somalia-2 (UNOSOM-2) began in an effort to create conditions to enable the Somalis to rebuild the country. The United States cut its troops in Somalia to some 4,000 and then added 400 Army Rangers in August 1993. At that time, confronting criticism at home that the United States was getting more deeply involved in the factional violence in Somalia without a clear rationale, Aspin explained that U.S. troops would remain until order had been restored in Mogadishu, Somalia's capital, progress had been made in disarming rival clans, and effective police forces were operating in the country's major cities. At the same time the United States increased its military efforts against a leading Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed.

In September General Powell asked Aspin to approve the request of the U.S. commander in Somalia for tanks and armored vehicles for his forces. Aspin turned down

the request. Shortly thereafter Aideed's forces in Mogadishu killed 18 U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 75 in attacks that also resulted in the shooting down of three U.S. helicopters and the capture of one pilot. In the face of severe congressional criticism, Aspin admitted that in view of what had happened he had made a mistake, but stated that the request for armored equipment had been made within the context of delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia rather than protecting troops. In an appearance before a congressional committee to answer questions about the Somalia disaster, Aspin made an unfavorable impression and appeared weak in response to the detailed probing and criticism of his performance. The president publicly defended Aspin but made clear that the White House was not involved in the decision not to send armor reinforcements to Somalia. Several members of Congress called on Clinton to ask for Aspin's resignation.

On 15 December 1993 President Clinton announced Aspin's resignation, for personal reasons. Given the problems that Aspin encountered during his short term, most obviously the losses in Mogadishu, observers assumed that the president had asked him to step down. Speculation in the media centered on the Somalia embarrassment and on Aspin's differences with the Office of Management and Budget over how much the Defense budget should be cut. The secretary's health problems, of course, may well have also been a factor. One news magazine stated that Aspin's major handicap was "neither his famously unmilitary bearing nor his inability to discipline himself or the enormous Pentagon bureaucracy—it is his politician's instinct for the middle ground on defense issues."

Aspin continued to serve as secretary of defense until 3 February 1994, when William J. Perry took office. He then joined the faculty of Marquette University's international affairs program in Washington. In March he became a member of the Commission on Roles and Missions, and in May Clinton chose him to be chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In March 1995 he began work as chairman of still another study group, this on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community. Shortly thereafter, on 21 May 1995, he died in Washington after a stroke.

WILLIAM J. PERRY (1994-1997)

In December 1993 President Clinton selected retired Vice Adm. Bobby R. Inman to replace Les Aspin as secretary of defense. Inman, a career naval officer, had served previously as director of naval intelligence (1974-76), director of the National Security Agency (1977-81), and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (1981-82). When Inman decided a few weeks after his nomination that he did not want to be secretary of defense after all, Clinton chose William J. Perry, deputy secretary of defense under Aspin, for the position.

Perry was born on 11 October 1927 in Vandergrift, Pennsylvania. He received B.S. (1949) and M.A. (1950) degrees from Stanford University, and a Ph.D. in mathematics from Pennsylvania State University in 1957. He was director of the Electronic Defense Laboratories of Sylvania/GTE in California from 1954 to 1964, and from 1964 to 1977 president of ESL, Inc., an electronics firm that he helped found. From 1977 to 1981 Perry served as under secretary of defense for research and engineering, where he had responsibility for weapon systems procurement and research and development. Among other achievements, he was instrumental in the development of stealth aircraft technology.

On leaving the Pentagon in 1981 Perry became managing director until 1985 of Hambrecht and Quist, a San Francisco investment banking firm that specialized in high technology companies. Later in the 1980s and up to 1993, before returning to the Pentagon as deputy secretary of defense, he held positions as chairman of Technology Strategies Alliances, professor in the School of Engineering at Stanford University, and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Perry's selection was well received in the Pentagon, Congress, and the defense industry, and the Senate quickly confirmed his nomination; he was sworn in on 3 February 1994. At his confirmation hearing he listed six broad responsibilities of the secretary of defense: to oversee the direction of military operations; to ensure readiness of the forces; to be a key member of the president's national security team; to be responsible for military strategy; to prepare annual defense budgets; and to manage defense resources. Shortly after taking office Perry outlined three specific reasons why he agreed to be secretary of defense: to work to end the nuclear threat to the United States, while avoiding a return to the Cold War; to advise the president how and when to use military force or to reject its use; and to manage the reduction of forces in the post-Cold War era.

Clearly, Perry entered office with broad national security experience, both in industry and government, and with an understanding of the challenges that he



faced. A hands-on manager, he paid attention both to internal operations in the Pentagon and to international security issues. He worked closely with his deputy secretaries (John M. Deutch, 1994-95, and John P. White, 1995-97), and he met regularly with the service secretaries, keeping them informed and seeking their advice on issues. He described his style as "management by walking around."

Perry adopted "preventive defense" as his guide to national security policy in the post-Cold War world. During the Cold War the United States had relied on deterrence rather than prevention as the central principle of its security strategy. Perry outlined three basic tenets of a preventive strategy: keep threats from emerging; deter those that actually emerged; and if prevention and deterrence failed, defeat the threat with military force. In practical terms this strategy relied on threat reduction programs (reducing the nuclear complex of the former Soviet Union), counter-proliferation efforts, the NATO Partnership for Peace and expansion of the alliance, and the maintenance of military forces and weapon systems ready to fight if necessary. To carry out this strategy, Perry thought it absolutely necessary to maintain a modern, ready military force, capable of fighting two major regional wars at the same time.

As always with secretaries of defense, the formulation of the Defense budget and shepherding it through Congress was one of Perry's most important duties. The

problem of how to deal with a large projected Defense budget shortfall for the period 1995-2000, an issue that weakened Aspin and contributed to his resignation, persisted when Perry took office. Immediately on presenting his 1995 budget request, which he termed "a post-Cold War budget," Perry stated that Defense required a few more years of downsizing and that its infrastructure needed streamlining as well. The proposal, he said, maintained a ready-to-fight force, redirected a modernization program (including a strong research and development program), initiated a program to do business differently (acquisition reform), and reinvested defense dollars in the economy.

Perry asked for \$252.2 billion for FY 1995, including funds for numerous weapon systems, such as a new aircraft carrier, three Aegis cruisers, and six C-17 cargo aircraft. The budget projected a further cut of 85,500 in active duty military personnel, leaving a force of 1.52 million. Ultimately Congress provided \$253.9 billion TOA, about \$2 billion more than in FY 1994, but actually a 1.2 percent cut in real growth.

In February 1995 Perry asked for \$246 billion for DoD for FY 1996. This proposal became entangled in the controversy during 1995 over the House Republicans' Contract for America, their efforts to spend more on defense than the administration wanted, and the continuing need for deficit reduction. Perry cautioned Congress in September of the possibility that President Clinton would veto the FY 1996 Defense budget bill because Congress had added \$7 billion in overall spending, mainly for weapon systems that the Defense Department did not want, and because of restrictions on contingency operations Congress had put in the bill. Three months later he recommended that the president veto the bill. When Congress and the administration finally settled on a budget compromise midway through FY 1996, DoD received \$254.4 billion TOA, slightly more than in FY 1995, but in terms of real growth a 2 percent cut.

The question of a national missile defense system figured prominently in the budget struggles Perry experienced. Aspin, Perry's predecessor, had declared an end to the Strategic Defense Initiative program, but long-standing supporters both inside and outside of Congress called for its resurrection, especially when the Defense budget came up. Perry rejected calls for revival of SDI, arguing that the money would be better spent on battlefield antimissile defenses and force modernization, that the United States at the moment did not face a real threat, and that if the system were built and deployed it would endanger the strategic arms limitation treaties with the Russians. The secretary was willing to continue funding development work on a national system, so that if a need emerged the United States could build and deploy

it in three years. President Clinton signed the FY 1996 Defense bill early in 1996 only after Congress agreed to delete funding for a national missile defense system.

Shortly before he introduced his FY 1997 budget request in March 1996, Perry warned that the United States might have to give up the strategy of preparing for two major regional conflicts if the armed forces suffered further reductions. The Five-Year Modernization Plan Perry introduced in March 1996 reflected his basic assumptions that the Defense budget would not decline in FY 1997 and would grow thereafter; that DoD would realize significant savings from infrastructure cuts, most importantly base closings; and that other savings would come by contracting out many support activities and reforming the defense acquisition system.

For FY 1997 the Clinton administration requested a DoD appropriation of \$242.6 billion, about 6 percent less in inflation-adjusted dollars than the FY 1996 budget. The budget proposal delayed modernization for another year, even though the administration earlier had said it would recommend increased funding for new weapons and equipment for FY 1997. The proposal included advance funding for contingency military operations, which had been financed in previous years through supplemental appropriations. Modest real growth in the Defense budget would not begin until FY 2000 under DoD's six-year projections. The procurement budget would increase during the period from \$38.9 billion (FY 1997) to \$60.1 billion (FY 2001). For FY 1997 Congress eventually provided \$244 billion TOA, including funds for some weapon systems not wanted by the Clinton administration.

Although he had not thought so earlier, by the end of his tenure in early 1997 Perry believed it possible to modernize the U.S. armed forces within a balanced federal budget. Perry argued for the current force level of just under 1.5 million as the minimum needed by the United States to maintain its global role. Further reductions in the Defense budget after 1997 would require cuts in the force structure and make it impossible for the United States to remain a global power.

Perry devoted much time to restructuring defense acquisition policy and procedure, pursuing measures on acquisition reform begun when he was deputy secretary. Six days after he became secretary Perry released a document that laid out a variety of proposed acquisition procedure changes, including simplification of purchases under \$100,000; maximum reliance on existing commercial products; conforming military contracts, bidding, accounting, and other business procedures to commercial practices when possible; eliminating outdated regulations that delayed purchases; and announcing military purchase requirements on data interchanges

normally used by private business to increase vendor competition. In June 1994 the secretary signed a directive ordering the armed forces to buy products and components to the extent possible from commercial sources rather than from defense contractors, signaling a major departure from the traditional “milspec”—over 30,000 military specifications and standards that actually inflated the cost of military items.

In March 1996 Perry approved a new DoD comprehensive acquisition policy that emphasized commercial practices and products. Program managers and other acquisition officials would have the power to use their professional judgment in purchasing. The plan canceled more than 30 separate acquisition policy memoranda and report formats and replaced existing policy documents with new ones that were about 90 percent shorter. Perry considered these reforms one of his most important accomplishments, and saw savings generated by the new practices as part of the key to adequate funding of the military in an era of continuing tight budgets.

In a further effort to save money Perry resorted to base closures and realignments. In May 1994 he and General John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that Defense would go forward, as required by law, with a 1995 round of base closings. In doing so Defense would consider the economic impact on the affected communities and the capacity to manage the reuse of closed facilities. In March 1995 Perry released DoD's 1995 base realignment and closure (BRAC) plan, recommending 146 actions. He estimated that implementing BRAC 95 would bring one-time costs of \$3.8 billion and net savings of \$4 billion within a six-year period.

At the time of his appointment it was not expected that Perry would involve himself aggressively in foreign policy. He quickly belied this impression. Within days of taking office he left Washington on his first trip abroad to confer with European defense ministers. In April 1994 the *Economist*, in an article entitled “Perrypatetic,” observed: “The man who has started to sound like a secretary of state is in fact the defense secretary, William Perry. . . . He is popping up in public all over the place and moving into the strategy business in a big way.” In fact, Perry traveled abroad in his three-year tenure more than any previous secretary. Unlike most of his predecessors, Perry paid attention to the other nations in the Americas, hosting the first Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas at Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1995 and attending the second conference in 1996 in Argentina. His extensive travel matched his direct style. In his travels, he emphasized personal contact with rank and file members of the armed forces. His frequent trips also reflected the demands of the large number of foreign crises that occurred during his term, including several

requiring the deployment of U.S. forces.

Perry strongly supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He made major efforts to promote its Partnership for Peace Program, which the Clinton administration saw as a way to link NATO with the new Eastern European democracies, including Russia, and as a compromise between the wishes of many of the Eastern European countries to become full NATO members and Russia's determined opposition. Individual nations could join the Partnership for Peace under separate agreements with NATO, and many did so, enabling them to participate in NATO joint training and military exercises without becoming formal members of the alliance. Perry conferred several times with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in an effort to allay Russia's worries about and secure its membership in the Partnership for Peace. The issue remained outstanding when Perry left office in early 1997, by which time NATO had developed tentative plans to admit a few former Warsaw Pact members during the summer of 1997.

Although he recognized that the reform movement in Russia might not succeed, Perry did everything he could to improve relations with Moscow. He stressed the need for continuing military cooperation with and aid to the states of the former Soviet Union to facilitate destruction of their nuclear weapons. He used the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1992 (the Nunn-Lugar program), which provided funds for the dismantling of nuclear weapons in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, to diminish the nuclear threat. He urged Congress to continue the threat reduction program, defending it against claims that in reality it provided foreign aid to Russia's military. By June 1996 when Perry traveled to Ukraine to observe the completion of that country's transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia, the only former Soviet missiles still outside of Russia were in Belarus. Perry testified in favor of U.S. ratification of the START II treaty, completed in 1996; in October 1996 he spoke to a session of the Russian Duma in Moscow, urging its members to ratify the treaty.

In Asia, like Weinberger a decade earlier, Perry endeavored to improve relations with both China and Japan. He was the first secretary of defense to visit China after the 1989 events at Tiananmen Square, when Chinese authorities forcibly crushed a dissident movement. While not ignoring long-standing problems such as China's weapons sales abroad and its human rights abuses, he believed that the United States and China should cooperate militarily. He made some progress, although when China threatened Taiwan just before the latter's presidential election in March 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carrier task forces to the area to counter the Chinese.

In Japan in 1995 the rape of a young girl by three U.S. servicemen stationed on Okinawa led to demands that the United States diminish its military presence on the island. Late in 1996 the United States agreed to vacate 20 percent of the land it used on Okinawa and to close some military facilities, including Futenma Marine Corps Air Station. The Japanese agreed that the 28,000 U.S. troops stationed on Okinawa could remain.

The most serious ongoing international crisis was in Bosnia. When Perry took over in February 1994, the Bosnian Serbs were besieging Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, but the Serbs were forced to draw back in face of a UN ultimatum and warning of air strikes. Shortly thereafter the Serbs threatened to overrun the Muslim city of Gorazde in eastern Bosnia. Perry at first ruled out U.S. military action, but in April 1994 U.S. fighter planes participated in UN air strikes at Gorazde, causing the Bosnian Serbs to retreat.

In a major statement on Bosnia in June 1994 Perry attempted to clarify U.S. policy there, declaring that the conflict did involve U.S. national interests, humanitarian and otherwise, but not "supreme" interests. To limit the spread of violence in Bosnia, the United States had committed air power under NATO to stop bombardment of Bosnian cities, provide air support for UN troops, and carry out humanitarian missions. Perry and the White House resisted congressional pressures to lift an arms embargo imposed earlier by the United Nations on all sides in the Bosnian conflict. During 1994-95 some senators, including Republican leader Robert Dole, wanted the embargo against the Bosnian Muslims lifted to enable them to resist the Serbs more effectively. Perry thought this might provoke Serb attacks and perhaps force the commitment of U.S. ground troops. In August 1995 Clinton vetoed legislation to lift the arms embargo. (In fact, the Bosnian Muslims had been receiving arms from outside sources.) Meanwhile, although it had stated consistently that it would not send U.S. ground forces to Bosnia, in December 1994 the Clinton administration expressed willingness to commit troops to help rescue UN peacekeepers in Bosnia if they were withdrawn. In May 1995, after the Bosnian Serbs had taken about 3,000 peacekeepers hostage, the United States, France, Germany, and Russia resolved to provide a larger and better-equipped UN force.

Applying strong pressure, in November 1995 the United States persuaded the presidents of Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia to attend a conference in Dayton, Ohio, that after much contention produced a peace agreement, formally signed in Paris in mid-December. It provided for cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of the combatants to specified lines, creation of a separation zone, and the

stationing in Bosnia of a Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). The North Atlantic Council, with Perry participating, had decided in September 1995 to develop a NATO-led force to implement any peace agreement for Bosnia, setting the force size at 60,000 troops, including 20,000 from the United States. In congressional testimony in November Perry explained why U.S. troops should go to Bosnia: The war threatened vital U.S. political, economic, and security interests in Europe; there was a real opportunity to stop the bloodshed; the United States was the only nation that could lead a NATO force to implement the peace; and the risks to the United States of allowing the war to continue were greater than the risks of the planned military operation.

The first U.S. troops moved into Bosnia in early December 1995, and by late January 1996 the full complement of 20,000 had been deployed. Although Perry had said earlier that they would leave Bosnia within a year, in June 1996 he hinted at a longer stay if NATO decided the peace in Bosnia would not hold without them. The secretary agreed to a study proposed in September 1996 by NATO defense ministers for a follow-on force to replace IFOR. Finally in November 1996, after the presidential election, Clinton announced, with Perry's support, that the United States would provide 8,500 troops to a NATO follow-on force. The U.S. force would be gradually reduced in 1997 and 1998 and completely withdrawn by June 1998.

Perry also inherited from Aspin the problem of what to do about Haiti, where a military junta continued to refuse to reinstate the deposed president, Jean Bertrande Aristide. In the spring of 1994 debate persisted in the United States on whether to intervene militarily to oust Raoul Cedras, the military leader, and restore Aristide to power. President Clinton said that the United States would not rule out the use of military force and also suggested that military teams to train local security and police forces might be sent to Haiti. In the meantime large numbers of refugees fled from Haiti in boats, hoping to gain admittance to the United States. U.S. vessels intercepted most of them at sea and took them to the Navy base at Guantanamo, Cuba.

In spite of continuing pressure and obvious preparations in the United States for an invasion of Haiti, the junta refused to yield. On 19 September 1994, just after former President Jimmy Carter negotiated an agreement, the United States sent in military forces with UN approval. Haiti's de facto leaders, including Cedras, agreed to step down by 15 October so that Aristide could return to the presidency. By the end of September, 19,600 U.S. troops were in Haiti. At the end of March 1995 a UN commander took over, and the United States provided

2,400 of the 6,000-man UN force that would remain in Haiti until February 1996. Given the opposition to the mission when it began, the primary U.S. concern was to do its limited job and avoid casualties among its forces. With the final withdrawal of U.S. troops, and Aristide's duly elected successor installed in office in February 1996, the Pentagon and the Clinton administration could label the Haitian operation a success up to that point.

North Korea posed another serious problem for Perry, who backed the administration's policy of pressuring the Communist regime to allow monitoring of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Between February and October 1994 the United States increased its pressures on North Korea. Perry warned in March that the United States would not permit the development of an arsenal of nuclear weapons. War was not imminent, he said, but he indicated that he had ordered military preparations for a possible conflict. Soon thereafter Perry stated that the United States would propose UN economic sanctions if North Korea did not allow international inspection of its planned withdrawal of spent fuel from a nuclear reactor—fuel containing sufficient plutonium to produce four or five nuclear weapons. North Korea began removing the nuclear fuel in May 1994 without granting the IAEA inspection privileges, and later said it would leave the IAEA.

On 21 October 1994 the United States and North Korea signed an agreement after lengthy negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, assisted again by former President Carter. The United States, Japan, South Korea, and other regional allies promised to provide North Korea with two light-water nuclear reactors, at an eventual cost of \$4 billion, to replace existing or partially constructed facilities that could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. North Korea then agreed to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection, and the United States pledged to lift trade restrictions and provide fuel oil for electric power generation. Perry considered this agreement better than risking a war in Korea and a continuation of North Korea's nuclear program. He promised that he would ask Congress for money to build up U.S. forces in South Korea if the agreement broke down. Again a critical situation had moderated, but implementing the agreement proved difficult. By the end of Perry's term some issues remained outstanding, and tension between the two Koreas flared up from time to time.

In the Persian Gulf area Iraq continued to make trouble, with periodic provocative moves by Saddam Hussein triggering U.S. military action. After the 1991 Gulf War, acting in accord with a UN resolution, the United States organized a coalition to enforce no-fly

zones in Iraq, north of 36° and south of 32°. In a tragic accident in April 1994 two U.S. Air Force F-15 aircraft, operating in the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq, shot down two U.S. Army helicopters after misidentifying them as Iraqi. This incident, with its high death toll, highlighted dramatically the complexities in dealing with Iraq in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Further, in October 1994, when several elite Iraqi divisions began to move toward Kuwait's border, the United States mobilized ground, air, and naval forces in the area to counter the threat. Perry warned Iraq that the U.S. forces would take action if it did not move its Republican Guard units north of the 32nd parallel. Subsequently the UN Security Council passed a resolution requiring Iraq to pull its troops back at least 150 miles from the Kuwait border.

Iran, too, behaved aggressively, placing at least 6,000 troops in March 1995 on three islands at the mouth of the Persian Gulf claimed by both Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Perry stated that the Iranian moves threatened shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway on which moved a significant part of the world's oil production. The United States worked with its allies in the Persian Gulf area to bolster their capacity to defend themselves and to use their collective strength through the Gulf Cooperation Council. Most important, in Perry's judgment, was the determination of the United States to maintain a strong regional defense capability—with aircraft and naval ships in the area, prepositioned equipment, standing operational plans, and access agreements with the Gulf partners.

Provocative moves again by Iraq forced the United States to take strong action. When Saddam Hussein intervened in September 1996 by sending some 40,000 troops to assist one side in a dispute between two Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, he demonstrated that he was not deterred by a U.S. warning against using military force. Perry made clear that while no significant U.S. interests were involved in the factional conflict, maintaining stability in the region as a whole was vital to U.S. security and there would be a U.S. reaction. On both 2 and 3 September U.S. aircraft attacked Iraqi fixed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and air defense control facilities in the south, because, Perry explained, the United States saw the principal threat from Iraq to be against Kuwait.

Another tragic incident on 25 June 1996 revealed the continuing tension in the Middle East and the dangers involved in the U.S. military presence. Terrorists exploded a truck bomb at the Khobar Towers apartment complex housing U.S. military personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 and wounding 500. In September 1996 an

investigative panel set up by Perry recommended vigorous measures to deter, prevent, or mitigate the effects of future terrorist acts against U.S. personnel overseas, and further, that a single DoD element have responsibility for force protection. The panel found that the unit attacked at Dhahran had not taken every precaution it might have to protect the forces at Khobar Towers. Eventually the Defense Department moved units from Dhahran to more remote areas in Saudi Arabia to provide better protection.

U.S. involvement in Somalia, a problem during Aspin's tenure, ended in 1994. Under the protection of U.S. Marines on ships offshore, the last U.S. forces left Somalia before the end of March, meeting a deadline set earlier by President Clinton. Later, in February 1995, more than 7,000 U.S. troops assisted in removing the remaining UN peacekeepers and weapons from Somalia in a markedly successful operation. In another mission in Africa in 1994, the United States became involved in humanitarian efforts in Rwanda. A civil war between two rival ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsi, resulted in widespread death and destruction and the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Rwanda into neighboring countries, including Zaire. Although not part of the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, the United States provided humanitarian aid in the form of purified water, medicine, site sanitation, and other means. In July the Pentagon sent in aircraft and about 3,000 troops, most of them to Zaire. The U.S. forces also took control of and rebuilt the airport at Kigali, Rwanda's capital, to aid in distribution of food, medicine, and other supplies.

Clearly Perry bore a heavy load during his term as secretary of defense between 1994 and 1997. Fine-tuning the budget, downsizing the military, and conducting humanitarian, peacekeeping, and military operations provided him with a full agenda. Yet it had been an exhilarating three years. In January 1996 he talked about experiences over the past year in which he never thought a secretary of defense would be involved. At the top of the list was witnessing participation of a Russian brigade in a U.S. division in the Bosnian peacekeeping operation. The others: Dayton, Ohio, becoming synonymous with peace in the Balkans; helping the Russian defense minister blow up a Minuteman missile silo in Missouri; watching United States and Russian troops training together in Kansas; welcoming former Warsaw Pact troops in Louisiana; operating a school at Garmisch, Germany, to teach former Soviet and East European military officers about democracy, budgeting, and testifying to a parliament; worrying about day care for chil-

dren; dismantling the military specifications system for acquisition; cutting the ear off a pig in Kazakhstan; and eating rendered Manchurian toad fat in China. These things, Perry said, demonstrate "just how much the world has changed, just how much our security has changed, just how much the Department of Defense has changed, and just how much my job has changed."

Shortly after President Clinton's reelection in November 1996, Perry made known his decision to step down as secretary. He spoke of his growing frustration over working with a Congress so partisan that it was harming the military establishment, and said that he did not think the results of the 1996 congressional election would decrease the partisanship. He later explained that his decision to retire was "largely due to the constant strain of sending U.S. military personnel on life-threatening missions."

As he left the Pentagon Perry listed what he thought were his most important accomplishments: establishing effective working relationships with U.S. military leaders; improving the lot of the military, especially enlisted men and women; managing the military drawdown; instituting important acquisition reforms; developing close relationships with many foreign defense ministers; effectively employing military strength and resources in Bosnia, Haiti, Korea, and the Persian Gulf area; dramatically reducing the nuclear legacy of the Cold War; and promoting the Partnership for Peace within NATO. His disappointments included failure to obtain Russian ratification of the START II treaty; slowness in securing increases in the budget for weapon systems modernization; and the faulty perceptions of the Gulf War illness syndrome held by some of the media and much of the public. At a ceremony for Perry in January 1997 General Shalikashvili noted the departing secretary's relationship with the troops. "Surely," Shalikashvili said, "Bill Perry has been the GI's secretary of defense. When asked his greatest accomplishment as secretary, Bill Perry didn't name an operation or a weapons system. He said that his greatest accomplishment was his very strong bond with our men and women in uniform."

Perry's successful career in the Department of Defense actually spanned eight years of profound changes—four years as under secretary for research and engineering in 1977–81, a year as deputy secretary from 1993 to 1994, and three years as secretary. After he left the Pentagon Perry returned to San Francisco to join the board of Hambrecht and Quist as a senior adviser. He also rejoined the faculty at Stanford University.


WILLIAM S. COHEN (1997-)

On 5 December 1996 President Clinton announced his selection of William S. Cohen as secretary of defense. Cohen, a Republican about to retire from the United States Senate, was the “right person,” Clinton said, to build on Secretary Perry’s achievements, “to secure the bipartisan support America’s armed forces must have and clearly deserve.” In responding to his nomination, Cohen said that during his congressional career he had supported a nonpartisan national security policy and commended the president for appointing a Republican to his cabinet.

Cohen was born in Bangor, Maine, on 28 August 1940. He received a B.A. in Latin from Bowdoin College (1962) and a law degree from Boston University Law School (1965). While practicing law, he served on the Bangor City Council beginning in 1969, and was mayor of Bangor, 1971-1972. Elected to Congress in 1972, he served three terms in the House of Representatives and won election to the Senate in 1978, and reelection in 1984 and 1990. A moderate Republican, he served on both the Senate Armed Services and Governmental Affairs Committees from 1979 to 1997 and was a member of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, 1983-91 and 1995-97. He participated in the drafting of several important laws related to defense matters, including the Competition in Contracting Act (1984), the GI Bill (1984), the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (1986), the Intelligence Oversight Reform Act (1991), and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (1996). During his years in Congress, he found time to write or co-author eight books—three non-fiction works, three novels, and two books of poetry.

During his confirmation hearings, Cohen said he thought on occasion he might differ with Clinton on specific national security issues. He implicitly criticized the Clinton administration for lacking a clear strategy for leaving Bosnia and stated that he thought U.S. troops should definitely be out by mid-1998. He also asserted that he would resist further budget cuts, retain the two regional conflicts strategy, and support spending increases for advanced weapons, even if it necessitated further cuts in military personnel. Cohen questioned whether savings from base closings and acquisition reform could provide enough money for procurement of new weapons and equipment that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought necessary in the next few years. He supported the expansion of NATO and looked on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the most serious problem the United States faced.

After confirmation by a unanimous Senate vote, Cohen was sworn in as the twentieth secretary of defense on 24 January 1997. He then settled into a schedule



much fuller than he had followed in the Senate. Routinely he arrived at the Pentagon before 7:00 a.m., received an intelligence briefing, and then met with the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The rest of the day he devoted to policy and budget briefings, visits with foreign and other dignitaries, and to what he termed “ABC” meetings at the White House with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and national security adviser Samuel Berger. He also traveled abroad several times during his first months in office.

One of Cohen’s first major duties was to present to Congress the FY 1998 Defense budget, which actually had been prepared under Secretary Perry’s leadership. Cohen requested a budget of \$250.7 billion, which represented 3 percent of the nation’s estimated gross domestic product for FY 1998. He stressed three top budget priorities—people, readiness, and modernization. To preserve U.S. military superiority DoD needed to recruit and retain high quality people. This required regular military pay raises, new construction or modernization of barracks, and programs for child care, family support, morale, welfare, and recreation. To enable the U.S. military to respond to crises, the budget would have to provide strong support for force readiness, training, exercises, maintenance, supplies, and other essential needs. As for modernization, Cohen stressed the need to develop and upgrade weapon and supporting systems to guarantee the combat superiority of U.S.

forces. This meant increasing the funds available for procurement of new systems, with the target set at \$60 billion by FY 2001.

When he presented the FY 1998 budget, Cohen noted that he would involve himself with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which would focus on the challenges to U.S. security and the nation's military needs over the next decade or more. When the QDR became public in May 1997, it did not fundamentally alter the budget, structure, and doctrine of the military. Some defense experts thought it gave insufficient attention to new forms of warfare, such as terrorist attacks, electronic sabotage, and the use of chemical and biological agents. In commenting on the QDR, Cohen stated that the Pentagon would retain the two regional wars scenario adopted after the end of the Cold War. He decided to scale back purchases of jet fighters, including the Air Force's F-22 and the Navy's F/A-18E/F, as well as Navy surface ships. The review included cutting another 61,700 active duty service members—15,000 in the Army, 26,900 in the Air Force, 18,000 in the Navy, and 1,800 in the Marine Corps, as well as 54,000 reserve forces, mainly in the Army National Guard, and some 80,000 civilians department-wide. Cohen also decided to recommend two more rounds of base closings—in 1999 and 2001. The Pentagon hoped to save \$15 billion annually over the next few years to make possible the purchase of new equipment and weapon systems without a substantial budget increase above the current level of \$250 billion.

As he settled into office, Cohen knew that unforeseen problems would undoubtedly arise and that he would have to face several that had occupied his immediate predecessors in the Pentagon, among them the question of the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which he supported, and its relationship to Russia. At a summit meeting between President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin in Helsinki, Finland, in March 1997, Yeltsin acknowledged the inevitability of broader NATO membership. Two months later he agreed, after negotiations with NATO officials, to sign an accord providing for a new permanent council, to include Russia, the NATO secretary general, and a representative of the other NATO nations, to function as a forum in which Russia could air a wide range of security issues that concerned that country. Formal signing of this agreement would pave the way for a July 1997 invitation from NATO to several nations, probably including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, to join the organization.

The proposed U.S. missile defense system received attention at the Helsinki summit, where Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to an interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty allowing the United States to proceed with a limited

missile defense system currently under development. Specifically, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to distinguish between a *national* missile defense system, aimed against strategic weapons, not allowed by the ABM Treaty, and a *theater* missile defense system to guard against shorter range missile attacks. Some critics thought that any agreement of this kind would place undesirable limits on the development of both theater and strategic missile defenses. The Helsinki meeting also saw progress in arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia, a matter high on Cohen's agenda. Yeltsin and Clinton agreed on the need for early Russian ratification of the START II Treaty and negotiation of a START III Treaty to make further significant cuts in the strategic nuclear arsenals of both nations.

The continuation, at least until mid-1998, of the existing peacekeeping mission involving U.S. forces in Bosnia and the possibility that other such missions would arise worried Cohen, who earlier had expressed reservations about such operations. Humanitarian efforts that did not involve peacekeeping, such as in Rwanda in the recent past, also seemed likely. Other persistent national security problems, including tension with Iraq in the Persian Gulf area, Libya in North Africa, and North Korea in East Asia, could flare up again, as could conflict in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians.

In preparing future budgets, the challenge would be to find the right mix between money for operation and maintenance accounts on the one hand and modernization procurement funds on the other, while facing the prospect of a flat DoD budget of about \$250 billion annually for the next decade or so. A relatively new problem that could affect the DoD budget was "vertical integration" in the defense industry. It occurred on a large scale in the 1990s as mergers of major defense contractors created a few huge dominant companies, particularly in the aerospace industry. They were called vertical because they incorporated most of the elements of the production process, including parts and subcomponents. Cohen and other Pentagon leaders began to worry that vertical integration could reduce competition and in the long run increase the costs of what the Department of Defense had to buy.

Finally, Cohen would have to address social issues that engaged the widest public interest. The status and treatment of homosexuals in the military, the role of women in combat as well as in other jobs in the services, racism, and sexual harassment were serious problems, inevitably requiring strong leadership from Cohen and other top civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense.

CONCLUSION

Between 1947 and 1997, 20 men served as secretary of defense. Ten had prior national security experience—seven in the Department of Defense or its predecessor agencies (the War and Navy Departments); one in Defense, State, and as national security adviser to the president; and two in related agencies (AEC, CIA, and State). Their professional backgrounds varied, including four lawyers, three investment bankers, three industrialists, five politicians who had been elected to national office, one economist, one mathematician, one scientist, one career executive branch official, and one career military officer. The average term of the first 19 secretaries was slightly over 31 months, although one served less than 4 months and another more than 7 years.

The secretary of defense presides over a vast confederation of agencies that today employ about 2.2 million military and civilian personnel and consume 15 percent of the annual federal budget. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the immediate staff of the secretary, has evolved from a mere handful of employees and limited functions when it was established in 1947 to an authorized strength of more than 2,000 civilian and military positions in 1997 and duties which require a deputy secretary, 4 under secretaries, 10 assistant secretaries, and 6 other statutory officials concerned with a huge range of functions. Over the years, OSD has borne the main burden of implementing a central mandate of the National Security Act—to provide for “authoritative coordination and unified direction [of the military services] under civilian control” and for “effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.” While some secretaries have been more successful than others in accomplishing these goals, all have encountered difficulty overseeing the services, whose historic competition for resources and missions has invariably complicated the secretary’s job.

Legislative and institutional changes greatly facilitated the trend toward centralization of authority in OSD after 1947, but the outlook, temperament, and energy of the individual secretaries, as well as the disposition of their chiefs in the White House, significantly affected the exercise of power. Louis Johnson, dedicated to a tight budget and not afraid to take summary executive action, did not hesitate to cancel construction of an aircraft carrier coveted by the Navy. Robert McNamara took bold initiatives and exerted personal influence in a wide range of Pentagon concerns—the sweep of his office was perhaps wider than any other secretary’s. McNamara had

support in his management of the Pentagon from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and this was a critical factor. Had he served under President Eisenhower, it is unlikely that he would have had the opportunity to conduct the department’s affairs in the same manner. Les Aspin, an influential defense expert while in the House of Representatives, found that running the Defense Department was quite different from being a member of Congress. Under pressure from the White House, he decided to resign before the end of his first year in office.

Quite clearly, whatever the respective philosophies and approaches of the individual secretaries, each enhanced or influenced the office in some way, although in some instances brief tenure prevented major accomplishments. James Forrestal, a hesitant innovator who was compelled early in his trailblazing tenure to arbitrate the quarrels of the military services, set standards and instituted practices that still influence his successors. George Marshall, a career military officer, contributed much to strengthening the principle of civilian control of the defense establishment. Robert Lovett’s suggestions about reform contributed significantly to the major reorganization plan implemented in 1953. Thomas Gates, in an effort to improve relationships between OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, initiated important and lasting procedures for consultation. Robert McNamara instituted organizational and management changes that consolidated power in OSD, and he devoted more time to developing strategic policy than any of his predecessors. Among his successors, Melvin Laird is recognized for his efforts to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War and to bring an end to the draft. James Schlesinger and Harold Brown in particular gave much attention to strategic policy. Caspar Weinberger demonstrated tenacity in efforts to secure increased budgets from Congress. Richard Cheney played a prominent role in developing strategy and directing the forces during the Gulf War of 1991, in close collaboration with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell. William Perry presided over much of the post-Cold War drawdown of the military services and traveled abroad more than any of his predecessors, to meet with foreign officials and visit U.S. service men and women stationed all over the world.

Presidents have had varying objectives in choosing their secretaries of defense. Truman’s selection of Johnson in 1949 may have had more than the usual political motivation for such appointments, but the next year, when he replaced him with Marshall, he moved to enhance the prestige of the office and gain

effective military direction of the Korean War. Eisenhower picked Charles Wilson because he wanted an efficient manager rather than a strategist; Nixon chose Melvin Laird in part because of his excellent congressional ties; and Carter nominated Brown because of his scientific and technical expertise and experience in defense matters that made him well suited to manage the Pentagon at a time of critical decisions on weapons and strategy. Three recent secretaries of defense—Richard Cheney, Les Aspin, and William Cohen—came directly from seats in Congress to head the Department of Defense, reflecting the increasing role of Congress in military affairs and the need for both presidents and secretaries of defense to pay more attention to congressional relations. Thus, each president applies criteria that derive from his personal predilections and contemporary political circumstances. Perhaps most important are the president's views on defense policy and how he conceives of the role of the secretary of defense.

In sum, the factors that affect a secretary's performance are myriad: variables of circumstance and personality, the capacity to work with the president, the secretary of state, and other high national security officials; prior experience in the national security field; understanding of the federal bureaucracy, especially

the military services; understanding of the budget process and experience in congressional relations; skill in crisis management; understanding of nuclear strategy; technical-scientific knowledge; expertise in managing a large organization; diplomatic skills (especially as the relationship between foreign policy and defense matters has become increasingly close in recent years); and perhaps past military service. The history of the secretaries of defense suggests the usefulness of these qualifications, but no secretary has possessed them all, and there is no guarantee that an incumbent who did would be successful.

From the beginning, the Office of the Secretary of Defense faced formidable tasks that grew in number and complexity, reflecting persistent tensions around the world, especially with the Soviet Union up to 1991, and the increasingly complicated technology of modern weapon systems. The secretaries of defense have differed considerably, sometimes markedly, in their response to these demands and have achieved varying degrees of success in meeting them. Whatever their special strengths and objectives, as leaders of a department that has become one of the great centers of power and decision in the U.S. government, they have been prominent and influential principals on the world stage.

APPENDIXES

Appendix I

**THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
OF 1947 – 26 JULY 1947**
(PUBLIC LAW 253 – 80TH CONGRESS)
(CHAPTER 343 – 1ST SESSION)
(S. 758)

AN ACT

To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED,

SHORT TITLE

That this Act may be cited as the “National Security Act of 1947”.

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DECLARATION OF POLICY

Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

TITLE I – COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

National Security Council

Sec. 101. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: PROVIDED, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

The Council shall be composed of the President; the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, appointed under section 202; the Secretary of the Army, referred to in section 205; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force, appointed under section 207; the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, appointed under section 103; and such of the following named officers as the President may designate from time to time: The Secretaries of the executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board appointed under section 213, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board appointed under section 214; but no such additional member shall be designated until the advice and consent of the Senate has been given to his appointment to the office the holding of which authorizes his designation as a member of the Council.

(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council—

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

(c) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year. The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is hereby authorized, subject to the civil service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.

(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.

Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the commissioned officers of the armed services or from among individuals in civilian life. The Director shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.

(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director then—

(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof; and

(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which \$14,000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: *Provided*, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: *Provided further*, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: *And, provided further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: *Provided, however*, That upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office—

(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and

(2) the personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by the Agency.

National Security Resources Board

Sec. 103. (a) There is hereby established a National Security Resources Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board") to be composed of the Chairman of the Board and such heads or representatives of the various executive departments and independent agencies as may from time to time be designated by the President to be members of the Board. The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.

(b) The Chairman of the Board, subject to the direction of the President, is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Board in carrying out its functions.

(c) It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including—

(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war;

(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and conditions;

(3) policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products;

(4) the relationship between potential supplies of, and potential requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war;

(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical material, and for the conservation of these reserves;

(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security.

(d) In performing its functions, the Board shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.

TITLE II – THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Establishment of the National Military Establishment

Sec. 201. (a) There is hereby established the National Military Establishment, and the Secretary of Defense shall be the head thereof.

(b) The National Military Establishment shall consist of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created under title II of this Act.

Secretary of Defense

Sec. 202 (a) There shall be a Secretary of Defense, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate: *Provided*, That a person who has within ten years been on active duty as a commissioned officer in a Regular component of the armed services shall not be eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security. Under the direction of the President and subject to the provisions of this Act he shall perform the following duties:

(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all of the departments and agencies therein;

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies;

(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research;

(4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies under the applicable appropriation Act:

Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force from presenting to the President or to the Director of the Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary: *And provided further*, That the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force shall be administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all

powers and duties relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall submit annual written reports to the President and the Congress covering expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the National Military Establishment, together with such recommendations as he shall deem appropriate.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a seal of office to be made for the National Military Establishment, of such design as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

Military Assistants to the Secretary

Sec. 203. Officers of the armed services may be detailed to duty as assistants and personal aides to the Secretary of Defense, but he shall not establish a military staff.

Civilian Personnel

Sec. 204. (a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to appoint from civilian life not to exceed three special assistants to advise and assist him in the performance of his duties. Each such special assistant shall receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year.

(b) The Secretary of Defense is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such other civilian personnel as may be necessary for the performance of the functions of the National Military Establishment other than those of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Department of the Army

Sec. 205. (a) The Department of War shall hereafter be designated the Department of the Army, and the title of the Secretary of War shall be changed to Secretary of the Army. Changes shall be made in the titles of other officers and activities of the Department of the Army as the Secretary of the Army may determine.

(b) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions relating to the Department of War or to any officer or activity whose title is changed under this section shall, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to relate to the Department of the Army within the National Military Establishment or to such officer or activity designated by his or its new title.

(c) The term "Department of the Army" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision

of the Department of the Army.

(d) The Secretary of the Army shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Army, of such design as the President may approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

(e) In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It shall be responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

Department of the Navy

Sec. 206. (a) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.

(b) In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall include naval combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It shall be responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall consist of combat and service and training forces, and shall include land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval combat

and service elements; matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: *Provided*, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

Department of the Air Force

Sec. 207. (a) Within the National Military Establishment there is hereby established an executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force, and a Secretary of the Air Force, who shall be the head thereof. The Secretary of the Air Force shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(b) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes is amended to include the Department of the Air Force and the provisions of so much of title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended as is not inconsistent with this Act shall be applicable to the Department of the Air Force.

(c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Air Force.

(d) There shall be in the Department of the Air Force an Under Secretary of the Air Force and two Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(e) The several officers of the Department of the Air

Force shall perform such functions as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe.

(f) So much of the functions of the Secretary of the Army and of the Department of the Army, including those of any officer of such Department, as are assigned to or under the control of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, or as are deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary or desirable for the operations of the Department of the Air Force or the United States Air Force, shall be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force: *Provided*, That the National Guard Bureau shall, in addition to the functions and duties performed by it for the Department of the Army, be charged with similar functions and duties for the Department of the Air Force, and shall be the channel of communication between the Department of the Air Force and the several States on all matters pertaining to the Air National Guard: *And provided further*, That, in order to permit an orderly transfer, the Secretary of Defense may, during the transfer period hereinafter prescribed, direct that the Department of the Army shall continue for appropriate periods to exercise any of such functions, insofar as they relate to the Department of the Air Force, or the United States Air Force or their property and personnel. Such of the property, personnel, and records of the Department of the Army used in the exercise of functions transferred under this subsection as the Secretary of Defense shall determine shall be transferred or assigned to the Department of the Air Force.

(g) The Secretary of the Air Force shall cause a seal of office to be made for the Department of the Air Force, of such device as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

United States Air Force

Sec. 208. (a) The United States Air Force is hereby established under the Department of the Air Force. The Army Air Forces, the Air Corps, United States Army, and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), shall be transferred to the United States Air Force.

(b) There shall be a Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years from among the officers of general rank who are assigned to or commissioned in the United States Air Force. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall exercise command over the United States Air Force and shall be charged with the duty of carrying into execution all lawful orders and directions which may be transmitted to him. The functions of the Commanding General,

General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), and of the Chief of the Air Corps and of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be transferred to the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. When such transfer becomes effective, the offices of the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, and Assistants to the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, provided for by the Act of June 4, 1920, as amended (41 Stat. 768), and Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force, provided for by section 5 of the Act of June 16, 1936 (49 Stat. 1525), shall cease to exist. While holding office as Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, the incumbent shall hold a grade and receive allowances equivalent to those prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall take rank among themselves according to their relative dates of appointment as such, and shall each take rank above all other officers on the active list of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: *Provided*, That nothing in this Act shall have the effect of changing the relative rank of the present Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the present Chief of Naval Operations.

(c) All commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, commissioned, holding warrants, or enlisted, in the Air Corps, United States Army, or the Army Air Forces, shall be transferred in branch to the United States Air Force. All other commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, who are commissioned, hold warrants, or are enlisted, in any component of the Army of the United States and who are under the authority or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued under the authority or command of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Air Force. Personnel whose status is affected by this subsection shall retain their existing commissions, warrants, or enlisted status in existing components of the armed forces unless otherwise altered or terminated in accordance with existing law; and they shall not be deemed to have been appointed to a new or different office or grade, or to have vacated their permanent or temporary appointments in an existing component of the armed forces, solely by virtue of any change in status under this subsection. No such change in status shall alter or prejudice the status of any individual so assigned, so as to deprive him of any right, benefit, or privilege to which he may be entitled under existing law.

(d) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, all property, records, installations, agencies, activities, projects, and civilian personnel under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command

of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued to the same extent under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command, respectively, of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, in the Department of the Air Force.

(e) For a period of two years from the date of enactment of this Act, personnel (both military and civilian), property, records, installations, agencies, activities, and projects may be transferred between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force by direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(f) In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

Effective Date of Transfers

Sec. 209. Each transfer, assignment, or change in status under section 207 or section 208 shall take effect upon such date or dates as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

War Council

Sec. 210. There shall be within the National Military Establishment a War Council composed of the Secretary of Defense, as Chairman, who shall have power of decision; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The War Council shall advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces, and shall consider and report on such other matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Sec. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the National Military Establishment the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one.

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;

- (2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;
- (3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;
- (4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;
- (5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;
- (6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and
- (7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense and shall perform such other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law.

Joint Staff

Sec. 212. There shall be, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Joint Staff to consist of not to exceed one hundred officers and to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall perform such duties as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director shall be an officer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Munitions Board

Sec. 213. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military Establishment a Munitions Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board").

(b) The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head thereof, and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from each of the three military departments, to be designated in each case by the Secretaries of their respective departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year.

(c) It shall be the duty of the Board under the direction of the Secretary of Defense and in support of strategic and logistic plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

- (1) to coordinate the appropriate activities within the National Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters, including the procurement, production, and distribution plans of the depart-

ments and agencies comprising the Establishment;

- (2) to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization;

- (3) to recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among the several military services and to plan for standardization of specifications and for the greatest practicable allocation of purchase authority of technical equipment and common use items on the basis of single procurement;

- (4) to prepare estimates of potential production, procurement, and personnel for use in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations;

- (5) to determine relative priorities of the various segments of the military procurement programs;

- (6) to supervise such subordinate agencies as are or may be created to consider the subjects falling within the scope of the Board's responsibilities;

- (7) to make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement, production, and distribution in such manner as to promote efficiency and economy;

- (8) to maintain liaison with other departments and agencies for the proper correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy, particularly in regard to the procurement or disposition of strategic and critical material and the maintenance of adequate reserves of such material, and to make recommendations as to policies in connection therewith;

- (9) to assemble and review material and personnel requirements presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those presented by the production, procurement, and distribution agencies assigned to meet military needs, and to make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Defense; and

- (10) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

(d) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Munitions Board.

(e) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

Research and Development Board

Sec. 214. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military Establishment a Research and Development Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board"). The Board shall be composed of a Chairman who shall be the head thereof, and two representatives from each of the Departments of the Army, Navy,

and Air Force, to be designated by the Secretaries of their respective Departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year. The purpose of the Board shall be to advise the Secretary of Defense as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in assuring adequate provision for research and development on scientific problems relating to the national security.

(b) It shall be the duty of the Board, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense—

- (1) to prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes;
- (2) to advise with regard to trends in scientific research relating to national security and the measures necessary to assure continued and increasing progress;
- (3) to recommend measures of coordination of research and development among the military departments, and allocation among them of responsibilities for specific programs of joint interest;
- (4) to formulate policy for the National Military Establishment in connection with research and development matters involving agencies outside the National Military Establishment;
- (5) to consider the interaction of research and development and strategy, and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith; and
- (6) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

(c) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office the Joint Research and Development Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Research and Development Board.

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

TITLE III – MISCELLANEOUS

Compensation of Secretaries

Sec. 301. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.

(b) The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force shall each receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.

Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries

Sec. 302. The Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force shall each

receive compensation at the rate of \$10,000 a year and shall perform such duties as the Secretaries of their respective departments may prescribe.

Advisory Committees and Personnel

Sec. 303. (a) The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and to employ, consistent with other provisions of this Act, such part-time advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States for which they receive compensation while serving as members of such committees shall receive no additional compensation for such service. Other members of such committees and other part-time advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed \$35 for each day of service, as determined by the appointing authority.

(b) Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory committee, or in any other part-time capacity for a department or agency hereunder, shall not be considered as service bringing such individual within the provisions of section 109 or 113 of the Criminal Code (U.S.C., 1940 edition, title 18, secs. 198 and 203), or section 19 (e) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, unless the act of such individual, which by such section is made unlawful when performed by an individual referred to in such section, is with respect to any particular matter which directly involves a department or agency which such person is advising or in which such department or agency is directly interested.

Status of Transferred Civilian Personnel

Sec. 304. All transfers of civilian personnel under this Act shall be without change in classification or compensation, but the head of any department or agency to which such a transfer is made is authorized to make such changes in the titles and designations and prescribe such changes in the duties of such personnel commensurate with their classification as he may deem necessary and appropriate.

Saving Provisions

Sec. 305. (a) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions applicable with respect to any function, activity, personnel, property, records, or other thing transferred under this Act, or with respect to any officer, department, or agency, from which such transfer is made, shall, except to the extent rescinded, modified, superseded, terminated, or made inapplicable by or under authority of law, have

the same effect as if such transfer had not been made; but, after any such transfer, any such law, order, regulation, or other action which vested functions in or otherwise related to any officer, department, or agency from which such transfer was made shall, insofar as applicable with respect to the function, activity, personnel, property, records or other thing transferred and to the extent not inconsistent with other provisions of this Act, be deemed to have vested such function in or relate to the officer, department, or agency to which the transfer was made.

(b) No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or against the head of any department or agency or other officer of the United States, in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties, shall abate by reason of the taking effect of any transfer or change in title under the provisions of this Act; and, in the case of any such transfer, such suit, action, or other proceeding may be maintained by or against the successor of such head or other officer under the transfer, but only if the court shall allow the same to be maintained on motion or supplemental petition filed within twelve months after such transfer takes effect, showing a necessity for the survival of such suit, action, or other proceeding to obtain settlement of the questions involved.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the second paragraph of section 5 of title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, the existing organization of the War Department under the provisions of Executive Order Numbered 9082 of February 28, 1942, as modified by Executive Order Numbered 9722 of May 13, 1946, and the existing organization of the Department of the Navy under the provisions of Executive Order Numbered 9635 of September 29, 1945, including the assignment of functions to organizational units within the War and Navy Departments, may, to the extent determined by the Secretary of Defense, continue in force for two years following the date of enactment of this Act except to the extent modified by the provisions of this Act or under the authority of law.

Transfer of Funds

Sec. 306. All unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by or on behalf of the Army Air Forces or officers thereof, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Such other unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by the Department of War or the Department of the Army in exercise of functions transferred to the Department of the Air Force under this Act, as the Secretary of Defense shall determine, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for use

in connection with the exercise of its functions. Unexpended balances transferred under this section may be used for the purposes for which the appropriations, allocations, or other funds were originally made available, or for new expenditures occasioned by the enactment of this Act. The transfers herein authorized may be made with or without warrant action as may be appropriate from time to time from any appropriation covered by this section to any other such appropriation or to such new accounts established on the books of the Treasury as may be determined to be necessary to carry into effect provisions of this Act.

Authorization for Appropriations

Sec. 307. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions and purpose of this Act.

Definitions

Sec. 308. (a) As used in this Act, the term "function" includes functions, powers, and duties.

(b) As used in this Act, the term "budget program" refers to recommendations as to the apportionment, to the allocation and to the review of allotments of appropriated funds.

Separability

Sec. 309. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and of the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Effective Date

Sec. 310. (a) The first sentence of section 202 (a) and sections 1, 2, 307, 308, 309, and 310 shall take effect immediately upon the enactment of this Act.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of this Act shall take effect on whichever of the following days is the earlier: The day after the day upon which the Secretary of Defense first appointed takes office, or the sixtieth day after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Succession to the Presidency

Sec. 311. Paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of section 1 of the Act entitled "An Act to provide for the performance of the duties of the office of President in case of the removal, resignation, death, or inability both of the President and Vice President", approved July 18, 1947, is amended by striking out "Secretary of War" and inserting in lieu thereof "Secretary of Defense", and by striking out "Secretary of the Navy,".

Approved July 26, 1947.

Appendix II

SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE AND OTHER KEY OFFICIALS 1947–1997

SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE, 1947–1997

Secretary	Dates of Service	Length of Service (in months)
James V. Forrestal	17 September 1947 – 28 March 1949	18
Louis A. Johnson	28 March 1949 – 19 September 1950	18
George C. Marshall	21 September 1950 – 12 September 1951	12
Robert A. Lovett	17 September 1951 – 20 January 1953	16
Charles E. Wilson	28 January 1953 – 8 October 1957	56
Neil H. McElroy	9 October 1957 – 1 December 1959	26
Thomas S. Gates, Jr.	2 December 1959 – 20 January 1961	14
Robert S. McNamara	21 January 1961 – 29 February 1968	85
Clark M. Clifford	1 March 1968 – 20 January 1969	11
Melvin R. Laird	22 January 1969 – 29 January 1973	48
Elliot L. Richardson	30 January 1973 – 24 May 1973	4
James R. Schlesinger	2 July 1973 – 19 November 1975	29
Donald H. Rumsfeld	20 November 1975 – 20 January 1977	14
Harold Brown	21 January 1977 – 20 January 1981	48
Caspar W. Weinberger	21 January 1981 – 23 November 1987	82
Frank C. Carlucci III	23 November 1987 – 20 January 1989	14
Richard B. Cheney	21 March 1989 – 20 January 1993	46
Leslie Aspin	20 January 1993 – 3 February 1994	13
William J. Perry	3 February 1994 – 24 January 1997	36
William S. Cohen	24 January 1997 –	

DEPUTY SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE, 1949–1997

Deputy Secretary	Dates of Service
Stephen T. Early	10 August 1949 – 30 September 1950
Robert A. Lovett	4 October 1950 – 16 September 1951
William C. Foster	24 September 1951 – 20 January 1953
Roger M. Kyes	4 February 1953 – 1 May 1954
Robert B. Anderson	3 May 1954 – 4 August 1955
Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.	5 August 1955 – 25 April 1957
Donald A. Quarles	1 May 1957 – 8 May 1959
Thomas S. Gates, Jr.	8 June 1959 – 1 December 1959
James H. Douglas, Jr.	11 December 1959 – 24 January 1961
Roswell L. Gilpatric	24 January 1961 – 20 January 1964
Cyrus R. Vance	28 January 1964 – 30 June 1967
Paul H. Nitze	1 July 1967 – 20 January 1969
David Packard	24 January 1969 – 13 December 1971
Kenneth Rush	23 February 1972 – 29 January 1973
William P. Clements, Jr.	30 January 1973 – 20 January 1977
Robert F. Ellsworth	23 December 1975 – 10 January 1977
(Second Deputy Secretary of Defense position)	
Charles W. Duncan, Jr.	31 January 1977 – 26 July 1979
W. Graham Clayton, Jr.	24 August 1979 – 16 January 1981
Frank C. Carlucci	4 February 1981 – 31 December 1982
Paul W. Thayer	12 January 1983 – 4 January 1984
William H. Taft IV	3 February 1984 – 22 April 1989
Donald J. Atwood, Jr.	24 April 1989 – 20 January 1993
William J. Perry	5 March 1993 – 3 February 1994
John Deutch	11 March 1994 – 10 May 1995
John P. White	22 June 1995 – 15 July 1997

SECRETARIES OF THE ARMY, 1947–1997

Secretary	Dates of Service
Kenneth C. Royall	18 September 1947 – 27 April 1949
Gordon Gray	20 June 1949 – 12 April 1950
Frank Pace, Jr.	12 April 1950 – 20 January 1953
Robert T. Stevens	4 February 1953 – 20 July 1955
Wilber M. Brucker	21 July 1955 – 20 January 1961
Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.	24 January 1961 – 30 June 1962
Cyrus R. Vance	5 July 1962 – 27 January 1964
Stephen Ailes	28 January 1964 – 1 July 1965
Stanley R. Resor	5 July 1965 – 30 June 1971
Robert F. Froehlke	1 July 1971 – 14 May 1973
Howard H. Callaway	15 May 1973 – 3 July 1975
Martin R. Hoffmann	5 August 1975 – 13 February 1977
Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.	14 February 1977 – 20 January 1981
John O. Marsh, Jr.	29 January 1981 – 13 August 1989
Michael P. W. Stone	14 August 1989 – 20 January 1993
Togo D. West, Jr.	22 November 1993 –

SECRETARIES OF THE NAVY, 1947–1997

Secretary	Dates of Service
John L. Sullivan	18 September 1947 – 24 May 1949
Francis P. Matthews	25 May 1949 – 30 July 1951
Dan A. Kimball	31 July 1951 – 3 February 1953
Robert B. Anderson	4 February 1953 – 2 May 1954
Charles S. Thomas	3 May 1954 – 31 March 1957
Thomas S. Gates, Jr.	1 April 1957 – 7 June 1959
William B. Franke	8 June 1959 – 20 January 1961
John B. Connally	25 January 1961 – 20 December 1961
Fred H. Korth	4 January 1962 – 1 November 1963
Paul H. Nitze	29 November 1963 – 30 June 1967
Paul R. Ignatius	1 September 1967 – 24 January 1969
John H. Chafee	31 January 1969 – 4 May 1972
John W. Warner	4 May 1972 – 8 April 1974
J. William Middendorf II	10 June 1974 – 20 January 1977
W. Graham Claytor, Jr.	14 February 1977 – 26 July 1979
Edward Hidalgo	27 July 1979 – 29 January 1981
John F. Lehman, Jr.	5 February 1981 – 10 April 1987
James H. Webb, Jr.	10 April 1987 – 23 February 1988
William L. Ball III	24 March 1988 – 15 May 1989
H. Lawrence Garrett III	15 May 1989 – 26 June 1992
Sean O'Keefe (Acting)	7 July 1992 – 20 January 1993
John H. Dalton	22 July 1993 –

SECRETARIES OF THE AIR FORCE, 1947–1997

Secretary	Dates of Service
W. Stuart Symington	18 September 1947 – 24 April 1950
Thomas K. Finletter	24 April 1950 – 20 January 1953
Harold E. Talbott	4 February 1953 – 13 August 1955
Donald A. Quarles	15 August 1955 – 30 April 1957
James H. Douglas, Jr.	1 May 1957 – 11 December 1959
Dudley C. Sharp	11 December 1959 – 20 January 1961
Eugene M. Zuckert	24 January 1961 – 30 September 1965
Harold Brown	1 October 1965 – 15 February 1969
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.	15 February 1969 – 14 May 1973
John L. McLucas	19 July 1973 – 12 November 1975
Thomas C. Reed	2 January 1976 – 6 April 1977
John C. Stetson	6 April 1977 – 18 May 1979
Hans M. Mark	26 July 1979 – 9 February 1981
Verne Orr	9 February 1981 – 30 November 1985
Russell A. Rourke	8 December 1985 – 7 April 1986
Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.	9 June 1986 – 15 December 1988
Donald B. Rice	22 May 1989 – 20 January 1993
Sheila E. Widnall	6 August 1993 –

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 1949–1997

Chairmen	Dates of Service
Position created by 1949 Amendments to National Security Act of 1949, approved 10 August 1949.	
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, USA	16 August 1949 – 15 August 1953
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN	15 August 1953 – 15 August 1957
General Nathan F. Twining, USAF	15 August 1957 – 30 September 1960
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA	1 October 1960 – 30 September 1962
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA	1 October 1962 – 1 July 1964
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA	3 July 1964 – 2 July 1970
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN	2 July 1970 – 1 July 1974
General George S. Brown, USAF	1 July 1974 – 20 June 1978
General David C. Jones, USAF	21 June 1978 – 18 June 1982
General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA	18 June 1982 – 30 September 1985
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN	1 October 1985 – 30 September 1989
General Colin L. Powell, USA	1 October 1989 – 30 September 1993
Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN (Acting)	1 October 1993 – 24 October 1993
General John M. D. Shalikashvili, USA	25 October 1993 –

Vice Chairmen	Dates of Service
Position created by Goldwater–Nichols Reorganization (PL 99–433), 1 October 1986. Serves as chairman in event of absence or disability of chairman. Full member of JCS, PL 102–484, October 1992.	
General Robert T. Herres, USAF	6 February 1987 – 28 February 1990
Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN	1 March 1990 – 28 February 1994
Admiral William A. Owens, USN	1 March 1994 – 29 February 1996
General Joseph W. Ralston, USAF	1 March 1996 –

CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY, 1947–1997

Chiefs of Staff	Dates of Service
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower	19 November 1945 – 7 February 1948
General Omar N. Bradley	7 February 1948 – 16 August 1949
General J. Lawton Collins	16 August 1949 – 15 August 1953
General Matthew B. Ridgway	15 August 1953 – 30 June 1955
General Maxwell D. Taylor	30 June 1955 – 1 July 1959
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer	1 July 1959 – 30 September 1960
General George H. Decker	1 October 1960 – 30 September 1962
General Earle G. Wheeler	1 October 1962 – 2 July 1964
General Harold K. Johnson	3 July 1964 – 2 July 1968
General William C. Westmoreland	3 July 1968 – 30 June 1972
General Bruce Palmer, Jr. (Acting)	1 July 1972 – 11 October 1972
General Creighton W. Abrams	12 October 1972 – 4 September 1974
General Fred C. Weyand	3 October 1974 – 1 October 1976
(Acting, 4 September 1974–2 October 1974)	
General Bernard W. Rogers	1 October 1976 – 21 June 1979
General Edward C. Meyer	22 June 1979 – 22 June 1983
General John A. Wickham, Jr.	23 June 1983 – 22 June 1987
General Carl E. Vuono	23 June 1987 – 21 June 1991
General Gordon R. Sullivan	21 June 1991 – 19 June 1995
General Dennis J. Reimer	20 June 1995 –

CHIEFS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 1947–1997

Chiefs of Naval Operations	Dates of Service
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz	15 December 1945 – 15 December 1947
Admiral Louis Denfeld	15 December 1947 – 2 November 1949
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman	2 November 1949 – 22 July 1951
Admiral William M. Fechteler	16 August 1951 – 16 August 1953
Admiral Robert B. Carney	17 August 1953 – 17 August 1955
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke	17 August 1955 – 1 August 1961
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.	1 August 1961 – 1 August 1963
Admiral David L. McDonald	1 August 1963 – 1 August 1967
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer	1 August 1967 – 1 July 1970
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.	1 July 1970 – 1 July 1974
Admiral James L. Holloway III	1 July 1974 – 1 July 1978
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward	1 July 1978 – 1 July 1982
Admiral James D. Watkins	1 July 1982 – 1 July 1986
Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost	1 July 1986 – 30 June 1990
Admiral Frank B. Kelso II	1 July 1990 – 23 April 1994
Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda	23 April 1994 – 16 May 1996
Admiral Jay L. Johnson	2 September 1996 –
(Acting, 16 May–2 September 1996)	

CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE, 1947–1997

Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Air Force	Dates of Service
Position created by the National Security Act of 1947.	
General Carl A. Spaatz	26 September 1947 – 30 April 1948
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg	30 April 1948 – 30 June 1953
General Nathan F. Twining	30 June 1953 – 30 June 1957
General Thomas D. White	1 July 1957 – 30 June 1961
General Curtis E. LeMay	30 June 1961 – 31 January 1965
General John P. McConnell	1 February 1965 – 1 August 1969
General John D. Ryan	1 August 1969 – 31 July 1973
General George S. Brown	1 August 1973 – 30 June 1974
General David C. Jones	1 July 1974 – 20 June 1978
General Lew Allen, Jr.	1 July 1978 – 30 June 1982
General Charles A. Gabriel	1 July 1982 – 30 June 1986
General Larry D. Welch	1 July 1986 – 30 June 1990
General Michael J. Dugan	1 July 1990 – 17 September 1990
General John M. Loh (Acting)	17 September 1990 – 27 October 1990
General Merrill A. McPeak	27 October 1990 – 25 October 1994
General Ronald Fogleman	26 October 1994 –

COMMANDANTS OF THE MARINE CORPS, 1947–1997

PL 485, 95th Congress, amending Sec. 141 of Title 10, US Code, 20 October 1978, approved full membership for Commandant of Marine Corps in the JCS, providing full equal status with other services.

Commandants of the Marine Corps	Dates of Service
General Alexander A. Vandegrift	1 January 1944 – 31 December 1947
General Clifton B. Cates	1 January 1948 – 31 December 1951
General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.	1 January 1952 – 31 December 1955
General Randolph McC. Pate	1 January 1956 – 31 December 1959
General David M. Shoup	1 January 1960 – 31 December 1963
General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.	1 January 1964 – 31 December 1967
General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.	1 January 1968 – 31 December 1971
General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.	1 January 1972 – 30 June 1975
General Louis H. Wilson	1 July 1975 – 30 June 1979
General Robert H. Barrow	1 July 1979 – 30 June 1983
General Paul X. Kelley	1 July 1983 – 30 June 1987
General Alfred M. Gray, Jr.	1 July 1987 – 1 July 1991
General Carl E. Mundy, Jr.	1 July 1991 – 30 June 1995
General Charles C. Krulak	1 July 1995 –

COMMANDERS IN CHIEF, 1947–1997
(Unified and Combatant Commands)

Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM)

Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) until 28 October 1983, when redesignated Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT). Also served as Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) until 4 October 1985. Redesignated CINCUSACOM, with responsibility for continental U.S.-based Army and Air Force combat units, on 1 October 1993.

Adm. William H. P. Blandy, USN	1 December 1947
Adm. William M. Fechteler, USN	1 February 1950
Adm. Lynde D. McCormick, USN	15 August 1951
Adm. Jerauld Wright, USN	12 April 1954
Adm. Robert L. Dennison, USN	29 February 1960
Adm. Harold P. Smith, USN	30 April 1963
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN	30 April 1965
Adm. Ephraim P. Holmes, USN	17 June 1967
Adm. Charles K. Duncan, USN	30 September 1970
Adm. Ralph W. Cousins, USN	31 October 1972
Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, USN	30 May 1975
Adm. Harry D. Train II, USN	19 September 1978
Adm. Wesley L. McDonald, USN	1 October 1982
Adm. Lee Baggett, Jr., USN	27 November 1985
Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, USN	22 November 1988
Adm. Leon A. Edney, USN	18 May 1990
Adm. Paul D. Miller, USN	13 July 1992
Gen. John J. Sheehan, USMC	17 October 1994

Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT)

Lt. Gen. Robert C. Kingston, USA (Gen., 6 November 1984)	1 January 1983
Gen. George B. Crist, Jr., USMC	27 November 1985
Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA	23 November 1988
Gen. Joseph P. Hoar, USMC	9 August 1991
Gen. J. H. Binford Peay III, USA	5 August 1994

Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR)

(Unified command, but largely Army)

Gen. Lucius D. Clay, USA	15 March 1947
Gen. Thomas T. Handy, USA	23 August 1949

Commander in Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR)

(Unified command)

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, USA	1 August 1952
Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, USA	11 July 1953
Gen. Lauris Norstad, USAF	20 November 1956
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA	1 November 1962
Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA	5 May 1969
Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA	1 November 1974
Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, USA	1 July 1979
Gen. John R. Galvin, USA	26 June 1987
Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA	23 June 1992
Gen. George A. Joulwan, USA	21 October 1993

Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (USCINCPAC)

Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) until 28 October 1983.

Also served as CINCPACFLT until 14 January 1958.

Adm. John H. Towers, USN	1 January 1947
Adm. Louis E. Denfeld, USN	28 February 1947
Adm. DeWitt C. Ramsey, USN	12 January 1948
Adm. Arthur W. Radford, USN	30 April 1949
Adm. Felix B. Stump, USN	10 July 1953
Adm. Harry D. Felt, USN	31 July 1958
Adm. Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN	30 June 1964
Adm. John S. McCain, Jr., USN	31 July 1968
Adm. Noel Gayler, USN	1 September 1972
Adm. Maurice F. Weisner, USN	30 August 1976
Adm. Robert L. J. Long, USN	31 October 1979
Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., USN	1 July 1983
Adm. Ronald J. Hays, USN	18 September 1985
Adm. Huntington Hardisty, USN	30 September 1988
Adm. Charles R. Larson, USN	1 March 1991
Adm. Richard C. Macke, USN	25 July 1994
Adm. Joseph Prueher, USN	13 February 1996

Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO)

Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB) until 6 June 1963.

Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger, USA	1 November 1947
Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, USA	28 June 1948
Lt. Gen. William H. H. Morris, Jr., USA	1 October 1949
Lt. Gen. Horace L. McBride, USA	1 April 1952
Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., USA	15 June 1954
Lt. Gen. Robert M. Montague, USA	5 January 1957
Maj. Gen. Truman H. Landon, USAF	20 February 1958
Lt. Gen. Ridgely Gaither, USA	1 April 1958
Lt. Gen. Robert F. Link, USA	15 July 1960
Gen. Andrew P. O'Meara, USA	1 February 1961
Gen. Robert W. Porter, Jr., USA	22 February 1965
Gen. George R. Mather, USA	18 February 1969
Gen. George V. Underwood, Jr., USA	20 September 1971
Gen. William B. Rosson, USA	17 January 1973
Lt. Gen. Dennis P. McAuliffe, USA	1 August 1975
Lt. Gen. Wallace H. Nutting, USA	1 October 1979
Gen. Paul F. Gorman, USA	24 May 1983
Gen. John R. Galvin, USA	1 March 1985
Gen. Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., USA,	6 June 1987
Gen. Maxwell R. Thurman, USA	1 October 1989
Gen. George A. Joulwan, USA	21 November 1990
Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, USA	17 February 1994
Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA	26 June 1996

Commander in Chief, US Space Command (USCINCSpace)

Gen. Robert T. Herres, USAF	23 September 1985
Gen. John L. Piotrowski, USAF	6 February 1987
Gen. Donald J. Kutyna, USAF	30 March 1990
Gen. Charles A. Horner, USAF	30 June 1992
Gen. Joseph W. Ashy, USAF	13 September 1994
Gen. Howell M. Estes III, USAF	29 August 1996

Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC)

Gen. James J. Lindsay, USA	16 April 1987
Gen. Carl L. Stiner, USA	27 June 1990
Gen. Wayne A. Downing, USA	20 May 1993
Gen. Henry H. Shelton, USA	29 February 1996

Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command (USCINCSSTRAT)

Gen. George L. Butler, USAF	1 June 1992
Adm. Henry G. Chiles, Jr., USN	14 February 1994
Gen. Eugene E. Habiger, USAF	21 February 1996

Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTrans)

Gen. Duane H. Cassidy, USAF	1 July 1987
Gen. Hansford T. Johnson, USAF	22 September 1989
Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF	25 August 1992
Gen. Robert L. Rutherford, USAF	18 October 1994
Gen. Walter M. Kross, USAF	15 July 1996

DISESTABLISHED COMMANDS, 1947–1997

Commander in Chief, Aerospace Defense Command (CINCAD)

Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD) until 30 June 1975.
Aerospace Defense Command established as a specified comand 1 July 1975; disestablished
19 December 1986.

Gen. Benjamin W. Chidlaw, USAF	1 September 1954
Gen. Earle E. Partridge, USAF	1 July 1955
Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, USAF	1 August 1959
Gen. John K. Gerhart, USAF	1 August 1960
Gen. Dean C. Strother, USAF	1 April 1965
Gen. Raymond J. Reeves, USAF	1 August 1966
Gen. Seth J. McKee, USAF	1 August 1969
Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Jr., USAF	1 October 1973
Gen. Daniel James, Jr., USAF	1 September 1975
Gen. James E. Hill, USAF	6 December 1977
Lt. Gen. James V. Hartinger, USAF (Gen., 1 October 1981)	1 January 1980
Gen. Robert T. Herres, USAF	1 August 1984

Commander in Chief, Alaska (CINCAL)

Alaskan Command disestablished 1 July 1975.

Maj. Gen Howard A. Craig, USAF	1 January 1947
Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, USAF	17 October 1947
Lt. Gen. William E. Kepner, USAF	1 July 1950
Lt. Gen. Joseph A. Atkinson, USAF	1 March 1953
Lt. Gen. Frank A. Armstrong, Jr., USAF	1 October 1956
Lt. Gen. George W. Mundy, USAF	1 August 1961
Lt. Gen. Raymond J. Reeves, USAF	1 August 1963
Lt. Gen. Glenn R. Birchard, USAF	28 July 1966
Lt. Gen. Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF	29 June 1967
Lt. Gen Robert G. Ruegg, USAF	1 August 1969
Lt. Gen. James C. Sherrill, USAF	1 August 1972
Lt. Gen. James E. Hill, USAF	1 September 1974

Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE)

Far East Command disestablished 1 July 1957.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA	1 January 1947
Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, USA	11 April 1951
Gen. Mark W. Clark, USA	9 May 1952
Gen. John E. Hull, USA	5 October 1953
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA	1 April 1955
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA	5 June 1955

Commander in Chief, Forces Command (CINCFOR)

Designated a specified command 1 July 1987. Terminated as a specified command on 1 October 1993.

Gen. Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., USA	1 July 1987
Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA	4 April 1989
Gen. Edwin H. Burba, Jr., USA	27 September 1989
Gen. Dennis J. Reimer, USA	2 April 1993

Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC)

Designated a specified command 1 February 1977. Terminated as a specified command on 1 October 1988.

Gen. Paul K. Carlton, USAF	1 February 1977
Gen. William G. Moore, Jr., USAF	1 April 1977
Gen. Robert E. Huyser, USAF	1 July 1979
Gen. James R. Allen, USAF	26 June 1981
Gen. Thomas M. Ryan, Jr., USAF	30 June 1983
Gen. Duane H. Cassidy, USAF	20 September 1985

Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM)

US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, disestablished 1 December 1963.

Adm. Richard L. Conolly, USN	1 November 1947
Adm. Robert B. Carney, USN	1 November 1950
Adm. Jerauld Wright, USN	14 June 1952
Adm. John H. Cassady, USN	19 March 1954
Adm. Walter F. Boone, USN	1 May 1956
Adm. James L. Holloway, Jr., USN	21 February 1958
Adm. Robert L. Dennison, USN	1 April 1959
Adm. Harold P. Smith, USN	18 February 1960
Adm. David L. McDonald, USN	9 April 1963
Adm. Charles D. Griffin, USN	26 June 1963

Commander in Chief, Northeast Command (CINCNE)

Northeast Command disestablished 1 September 1956.

Maj. Gen. Lyman P. Whitten, USAF	1 October 1950
Lt. Gen. Charles T. Myers, USAF	20 March 1952
Lt. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus, USAF	26 July 1954

Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command (USCINCREC)

Commander in Chief, US Strike Command (USCINCSRIKE) until 30 December 1971. Assumed additional responsibilities as USCINCMCAFSA, 1 December 1963, coincident with disestablishment of US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM). Added responsibilities and MEAFSA title terminated 31 December 1971. US Readiness Command disestablished 30 September 1987.

Gen. Paul D. Adams, USA	9 October 1961
Gen. Theodore J. Conway, USA	1 November 1966
Gen. John L. Throckmorton, USA	1 August 1969
Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA	1 February 1973
Gen. John J. Hennessey, USA	9 December 1974
Gen. Volney F. Warner, USA	1 August 1979
Gen. Donn A. Starry, USA	1 August 1981
Gen. Wallace H. Nutting, USA	22 June 1983
Gen. Fred K. Mahaffey, USA	28 June 1985
Lt. Gen. Harry A. Goodall, USAF (Acting)	30 September 1986
Gen. James J. Lindsay, USA	10 October 1986

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC)


Specified Strategic Air Command disestablished on 1 June 1992. Its joint strategic functions transferred to the new unified US Strategic Command. Strictly Air Force functions transferred to the USAF Air Mobility and Air Combat Commands.

Gen. George C. Kenney, USAF	14 December 1946
Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, USAF	19 October 1948
Gen. Thomas S. Power, USAF	1 July 1957
Gen. John D. Ryan, USAF	1 December 1964
Gen. Joseph J. Nazarro, USAF	1 February 1967
Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, USAF	1 August 1968
Gen. John C. Meyer, USAF	1 May 1972
Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, USAF	1 August 1974
Gen. Richard H. Ellis, USAF	1 August 1977
Gen. Bennie L. Davis, USAF	1 August 1981
Gen. Larry D. Welch, USAF	1 August 1985
Gen. John T. Chain, USAF	1 July 1986
Gen. George L. Butler, USAF	25 January 1991

Appendix III
ORGANIZATION CHARTS, 1996–1997


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

December 1996




OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

January 1997




MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

February 1997




JOINT CHIEFS OF STATE

May 1996




UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDS

May 1996



DEFENSE AGENCIES


April 1997



*Combat Support Agency

DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES

December 1996



Appendix IV

FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER DATA

FEDERAL OUTLAYS, FISCAL YEARS 1947-1997 (\$ Millions)

Fiscal Year	Federal Unified Budget					Undist. Offsetting Receipts	Grand Total
	National Defense	Veterans Space International	Net Interest	Social & Economic	Agency Total		
1947	12,808	12,135	4,204	6,901	36,048	-1,552	34,496
1948	9,105	11,023	4,341	6,938	31,407	-1,643	29,764
1949	13,150	12,651	4,523	10,290	40,614	-1,779	38,835
1950	13,724	13,507	4,812	12,336	44,379	-1,817	42,562
1951	23,566	9,173	4,665	10,442	47,846	-2,332	45,514
1952	46,089	8,032	4,701	12,241	71,063	-3,377	67,686
1953	52,802	6,638	5,156	15,076	79,672	-3,571	76,101
1954	49,266	6,209	4,811	13,966	74,252	-3,397	70,855
1955	42,729	6,898	4,850	17,460	71,937	-3,493	68,444
1956	42,523	7,355	5,079	19,272	74,229	-3,589	70,640
1957	45,430	8,207	5,354	21,733	80,724	-4,146	76,578
1958	46,815	8,791	5,604	25,580	86,790	-4,385	82,405
1959	49,015	8,849	5,762	33,085	96,711	-4,613	92,098
1960	48,130	8,798	6,947	33,136	97,011	-4,820	92,191
1961	49,601	9,666	6,716	36,547	102,530	-4,807	97,723
1962	52,345	12,484	6,889	40,377	112,095	-5,274	106,821
1963	53,400	13,338	7,740	42,635	117,113	-5,797	111,316
1964	54,757	14,751	8,199	46,529	124,236	-5,708	118,528
1965	50,620	16,023	8,591	48,902	124,136	-5,908	118,228
1966	58,111	17,354	9,386	56,223	141,074	-6,542	134,532
1967	71,417	17,637	10,268	65,436	164,758	-7,294	157,464
1968	81,926	16,927	11,090	76,236	186,179	-8,045	178,134
1969	82,497	16,313	12,699	80,117	191,626	-7,986	183,640
1970	81,692	16,563	14,380	91,646	204,281	-8,632	195,649
1971	78,872	17,009	14,841	109,557	220,279	-10,107	210,172
1972	79,174	18,697	15,478	126,915	240,264	-9,583	230,681
1973	76,681	19,223	17,349	145,863	259,116	-13,409	245,707

FEDERAL OUTLAYS, FISCAL YEARS 1947-1997 (CONTINUED)
(\$ Millions)

Fiscal Year	Federal Unified Budget					Undist. Offsetting Receipts	Grand Total
	National Defense	Veterans Space International	Net Interest	Social & Economic	Agency Total		
1974	79,347	22,047	21,449	163,265	286,108	-16,749	269,359
1975	86,509	26,634	23,244	209,547	345,934	-13,602	332,332
1976	89,619	28,190	26,727	241,642	386,178	-14,386	371,792
1977	97,241	28,032	29,901	268,923	424,097	-14,879	409,218
1978	104,495	30,209	35,458	304,304	474,466	-15,720	458,746
1979	116,342	31,310	42,636	331,220	521,508	-17,476	504,032
1980	133,995	38,334	52,538	386,022	610,889	-19,942	590,947
1981	157,513	41,069	68,774	438,934	706,290	-28,041	678,249
1982	185,309	41,831	85,044	459,670	771,854	-26,099	745,755
1983	209,903	42,962	89,828	499,663	842,356	-33,976	808,380
1984	227,413	47,933	111,123	497,376	883,845	-31,957	851,888
1985	252,748	49,045	129,504	547,900	979,197	-32,698	946,499
1986	273,375	47,235	136,047	566,855	1,023,512	-33,007	990,505
1987	281,999	45,356	138,652	574,612	1,040,619	-36,455	1,004,164
1988	290,361	48,270	151,838	610,987	1,101,456	-36,967	1,064,489
1989	303,559	49,800	169,266	658,258	1,180,883	-37,212	1,143,671
1990	299,331	54,431	184,221	751,795	1,289,778	-36,615	1,253,163
1991	273,292	60,113	194,541	835,810	1,363,756	-39,356	1,324,400
1992	298,350	63,009	199,421	860,181	1,420,961	-39,280	1,381,681
1993	291,086	66,011	198,811	890,892	1,446,800	-37,386	1,409,414
1994	281,642	67,031	202,957	947,873	1,499,503	-37,772	1,461,731
1995	272,066	66,917	232,169	989,032	1,560,184	-44,455	1,515,729
1996	265,748	63,174	241,090	1,027,938	1,597,950	-37,620	1,560,330
1997	267,176	66,820	247,382	1,096,125	1,677,503	-46,487	1,631,016

Source: Adapted from Table 7-1 in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1998*, March 1997, 160-61.

U.S. PUBLIC SPENDING—FEDERAL, STATE, & LOCAL, FISCAL YEARS 1947-1997
(\$ Millions)

Fiscal Year	Total Federal Budget	State & Local Governments	Less Grants in-aid	Net Total U.S. Public Spending
1947	34,496	14,000	-1,603	46,893
1948	29,764	17,684	-1,612	45,836
1949	38,835	20,200	-1,876	57,159
1950	42,562	22,787	-2,253	63,096
1951	45,514	24,400	-2,287	67,627
1952	67,686	26,098	-2,433	91,351
1953	76,101	27,910	-2,835	101,176
1954	70,855	30,701	-3,056	98,500
1955	68,444	33,724	-3,207	98,961
1956	70,640	36,711	-3,561	103,790
1957	76,578	40,375	-3,974	112,979
1958	82,405	44,851	-4,905	122,351
1959	92,098	48,887	-6,463	134,522
1960	92,191	51,876	-7,019	137,048
1961	97,723	56,201	-7,126	146,798
1962	106,821	60,206	-7,926	159,101
1963	111,316	64,816	-8,602	167,530
1964	118,528	69,302	-10,164	177,666
1965	118,228	74,678	-10,910	181,996
1966	134,532	82,843	-12,887	204,488
1967	157,464	93,350	-15,233	235,581
1968	178,134	102,411	-18,551	261,994
1969	183,640	116,728	-20,164	280,204
1970	195,649	131,332	-24,065	302,916
1971	210,172	150,674	-28,099	332,747
1972	230,681	168,549	-34,375	364,855
1973	245,707	181,357	-41,847	385,217

U.S. PUBLIC SPENDING—FEDERAL, STATE, & LOCAL, FISCAL YEARS 1947-1997 (CONTINUED)
(\$ Millions)

Fiscal Year	Total Federal Budget	State & Local Governments	Less Grants in-aid	Net Total U.S. Public Spending
1974	269,359	198,959	-43,357	424,961
1975	332,332	230,722	-49,791	513,263
1976	371,792	256,731	-59,094	569,429
1977	409,218	274,215	-68,415	615,018
1978	458,746	296,984	-77,889	677,841
1979	504,032	327,517	-83,351	748,198
1980	590,947	369,086	-91,385	868,648
1981	678,249	407,449	-94,704	990,994
1982	745,755	436,733	-88,134	1,094,354
1983	808,380	466,516	-92,448	1,182,448
1984	851,888	505,008	-97,553	1,259,343
1985	946,499	553,899	-105,852	1,394,546
1986	990,505	605,623	-112,331	1,483,797
1987	1,004,164	657,134	-108,400	1,552,898
1988	1,064,489	704,921	-115,342	1,654,06
1989	1,143,671	762,360	-121,928	1,784,103
1990	1,253,163	834,818	-135,325	1,952,656
1991	1,324,400	908,108	-154,519	2,077,989
1992	1,381,681	981,253	-178,065	2,184,869
1993	1,409,414	1,027,488	-193,612	2,243,290
1994	1,461,731	1,075,902	-210,596	2,327,037
1995	1,515,729	1,126,596	-224,991	2,417,334
1996	1,560,330	1,179,680	-227,811	2,512,199
1997	1,631,016	1,235,264	-244,794	2,621,486

Source: Adapted from Table 7-3 in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1998*, March 1997, 164-65.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY (TOA), 1948-1997
(\$ Millions)

Fiscal Year	Current \$	Constant \$ (1998)	% Real Growth
1948	11,903	119,553	-20.6
1949	13,204	127,723	6.8
1950	14,337	128,731	0.8
1951	48,173	326,792	153.9
1952	57,188	426,363	30.5
1953	44,283	340,130	-20.2
1954	30,429	246,932	-27.4
1955	33,790	255,477	3.5
1956	38,065	269,899	5.6
1957	39,724	273,632	1.4
1958	41,124	272,163	-0.5
1959	42,193	269,132	-1.1
1960	40,257	254,320	-5.5
1961	44,643	275,200	8.2
1962	48,434	295,954	7.6
1963	49,420	296,416	0.2
1964	49,547	286,806	-3.2
1965	49,560	278,370	-2.9
1966	64,531	335,389	20.5
1967	71,590	358,762	7.0
1968	74,965	360,436	0.5
1969	77,752	356,939	-1.0
1970	75,512	324,255	-9.2
1971	72,846	294,302	-9.2
1972	76,467	282,969	-3.9
1973	78,925	269,298	-4.8
1974	81,693	256,144	-4.9
1975	86,132	246,760	-3.7
1976	95,658	255,244	3.4
1977	107,567	264,228	3.5
1978	116,128	263,702	-0.2
1979	124,721	261,087	-1.0
1980	141,983	266,259	2.0
1981	175,549	296,986	11.5
1982	210,667	330,940	11.4
1983	235,493	356,109	7.6
1984	255,271	374,187	5.1
1985	276,173	389,877	4.2
1986	278,140	382,907	-1.8
1987	282,718	377,377	-1.5
1988	287,806	370,539	-1.8
1989	291,540	361,211	-2.5
1990	291,344	350,703	-2.9

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY (TOA), 1948-1997 (CONTINUED)
(\$ Millions)

Fiscal Year	Current \$	Constant \$ (1998)	% Real Growth
1991	310,638	356,802	1.7
1992	285,350	321,796	-9.8
1993	269,993	295,652	-8.1
1994	251,953	269,478	-8.9
1995	253,954	266,319	-1.2
1996	254,474	260,887	-2.0
1997	244,016	244,016	-6.5

Source: Adapted from Table 6-3 in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1997*, April 1996, 66-69.

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL, 1940-1997

(Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Full Time Gd&Res	Total Military
1940	218	161	28	51	-	458
1941	1,310	284	54	152	-	1,801
1942	2,311	641	143	764	-	3,859
1943	4,797	1,742	309	2,197	-	9,045
1944	5,622	2,981	476	2,372	-	11,452
1945	5,984	3,320	470	2,282	-	12,056
1946	1,435	978	156	456	-	3,025
1947	685	498	93	306	-	1,582
1948	554	418	85	388	-	1,444
1949	660	448	86	419	-	1,614
1950	593	381	74	411	-	1,459
1951	1,532	737	193	788	-	3,249
1952	1,596	824	232	983	-	3,636
1953	1,534	794	249	978	-	3,555
1954	1,405	726	224	948	-	3,302
1955	1,109	661	205	960	-	2,935
1956	1,026	670	201	910	-	2,806
1957	998	676	201	920	-	2,795
1958	899	640	189	871	-	2,600
1959	862	626	176	840	-	2,504
1960	873	617	171	815	-	2,475
1961	859	626	177	821	-	2,483
1962	1,066	666	191	885	*	2,808
1963	976	665	189	870	*	2,700
1964	973	668	189	857	*	2,688
1965	969	672	190	825	*	2,656
1966	1,200	745	261	887	*	3,094
1967	1,442	751	285	897	*	3,377
1968	1,570	765	307	905	*	3,548
1969	1,512	776	310	862	*	3,460
1970	1,322	692	260	791	1	3,066
1971	1,123	623	212	755	1	2,715
1972	811	588	198	726	1	2,323
1973	801	564	196	691	1	2,253
1974	783	546	189	644	1	2,162
1975	784	535	196	613	1	2,128
1976	779	524	192	585	1	2,082
1977	782	530	192	570	1	2,074
1978	771	530	191	569	1	2,062
1979	758	522	185	559	7	2,031

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL, 1940-1997 (CONTINUED)
(Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Full Time Gd&Res	Total Military
1980	777	527	188	558	13	2,063
1981	781	540	191	570	19	2,101
1982	780	553	192	583	22	2,130
1983	780	558	194	592	39	2,162
1984	780	565	196	597	46	2,184
1985	781	571	198	602	55	2,206
1986	781	581	199	608	64	2,233
1987	781	587	200	607	69	2,243
1988	772	593	197	576	71	2,209
1989	770	593	197	571	72	2,202
1990	751	583	197	539	74	2,143
1991	725	571	195	511	75	2,077
1992	611	542	185	470	72	1,880
1993	572	510	178	444	71	1,776
1994	541	469	174	426	68	1,678
1995	509	435	174	400	65	1,583
1996	491	417	175	389	66	1,537
1997	495	402	174	381	65	1,517

* Indicates fewer than 500 Full-Time National Guardsmen and Reservists. Data prior to 1962 not available.

Note: Navy reserve personnel on active duty for Training and Administration of Reserves (TARS) are included in the active Navy prior to FY 1980 and in the Full-Time Guard and Reserve thereafter. Active Duty Military includes the activation of 25,652 National Guard and Reservists in FY 1990 pursuant to sections 673b, Title 10 U.S.C., 17,059 National Guard and Reservists in FY 1991, and 954 National Guard and Reservists in FY 1992 pursuant to sections 672 and 673, Title 10 U.S.C., to support Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Source: Adapted from Table 7-5 in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1998*, March 1997, 168-69.

DEFENSE CIVILIAN WORK FORCE, 1940-1997
(Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Army	Navy including Marines	Air Force	Defense Agencies & Other Civilians	Total
1940	137	119	-	-	256
1941	329	227	-	-	556
1942	852	432	-	-	1,284
1943	1,545	648	-	-	2,193
1944	1,503	736	-	-	2,239
1945	1,881	747	-	-	2,628
1946	927	489	-	-	1,416
1947	503	356	-	-	859
1948	303	347	152	1	804
1949	310	343	166	2	821
1950	261	293	154	2	710
1951	487	452	261	2	1,201
1952	515	481	310	2	1,308
1953	884	470	382	2	1,738
1954	720	433	371	2	1,527
1955	651	433	397	2	1,483
1956	592	416	333	2	1,443
1957	571	411	417	2	1,400
1958	530	381	373	2	1,286
1959	497	375	364	2	1,238
1960	473	365	355	2	1,195
1961	472	363	346	2	1,183
1962	476	365	349	20	1,210
1963	459	360	337	32	1,188
1964	430	347	322	38	1,137
1965	414	343	317	42	1,116
1966	450	367	336	69	1,222
1967	516	416	349	76	1,357
1968	510	429	339	75	1,352
1969	531	438	349	72	1,390
1970	480	388	328	68	1,264
1971	452	362	313	63	1,189
1972	446	353	300	60	1,159
1973	406	334	288	72	1,099
1974	409	335	289	75	1,108
1975	401	326	278	73	1,078
1976	390	321	262	72	1,045
1977	372	318	255	77	1,022
1978	371	317	251	77	1,016
1979	359	310	245	77	991

DEFENSE CIVILIAN WORK FORCE, 1940-1997 (CONTINUED)
(Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Army	Navy including Marines	Air Force	Defense Agencies & Other Civilians	Total
1980	361	309	244	77	990
1981	372	321	246	80	1,019
1982	378	319	248	82	1,028
1983	391	339	251	83	1,064
1984	403	342	253	87	1,085
1985	420	353	264	92	1,129
1986	413	342	263	94	1,112
1987	418	353	264	98	1,133
1988	393	348	253	96	1,090
1989	403	354	261	99	1,117
1990	380	341	249	103	1,073
1991	365	329	233	117	1,045
1992	334	309	214	149	1,006
1993	294	285	202	156	937
1994	280	269	196	156	901
1995	267	249	186	147	849
1996	259	240	183	138	819
1997	256	225	181	137	799

Note: Air Force civil service employment is included in the Army prior to 1948 and identified separately thereafter. Beginning in 1953, the civilian work force figures include both U.S. and foreign national direct hires and the foreign national indirect hire employees that support U.S. forces overseas. Beginning with FY 1996, all the federal civilian work force are measured in Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) in this table.

Source: Adapted from Table 7-5 in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1998*, March 1997, 168-69.

TOTAL DEFENSE RELATED MANPOWER, 1940-1997
(Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Total DoD Manpower	Defense Related Employment in Industry	Total Defense Related Manpower
1940	714	314	1,028
1941	2,357	2,500	4,857
1942	5,143	10,000	15,143
1943	11,238	13,361	24,599
1944	13,691	12,600	26,291
1945	14,684	11,000	25,684
1946	4,441	1,168	5,609
1947	2,441	786	3,227
1948	2,248	958	3,206
1949	2,434	732	3,166
1950	2,170	713	2,883
1951	4,551	2,400	6,851
1952	4,944	3,600	8,544
1953	5,293	4,118	9,411
1954	4,829	2,975	7,804
1955	4,419	2,500	6,919
1956	4,249	2,500	6,749
1957	4,195	2,850	7,045
1958	3,885	2,800	6,685
1959	3,741	2,700	6,441
1960	3,671	2,460	6,131
1961	3,665	2,600	6,265
1962	4,018	2,725	6,743
1963	3,888	2,550	6,438
1964	3,825	2,280	6,105
1965	3,771	2,125	5,896
1966	4,316	2,640	6,956
1967	4,733	3,100	7,833
1968	4,900	3,174	8,074
1969	4,849	2,916	7,765
1970	4,330	2,399	6,729
1971	3,904	2,031	5,935
1972	3,482	1,985	5,467
1973	3,352	1,850	5,202
1974	3,270	1,860	5,130
1975	3,206	1,800	5,006
1976	3,127	1,690	4,817
1977	3,096	1,730	4,826
1978	3,078	1,765	4,843
1979	3,022	1,860	4,882

TOTAL DEFENSE RELATED MANPOWER, 1940-1997 (CONTINUED)
(Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Total DoD Manpower	Defense Related Employment in Industry	Total Defense Related Manpower
1980	3,053	1,990	5,043
1981	3,121	2,085	5,206
1982	3,158	2,290	5,448
1983	3,226	2,415	5,641
1984	3,270	2,735	6,005
1985	3,335	2,980	6,315
1986	3,345	3,315	6,660
1987	3,376	3,665	7,041
1988	3,299	3,450	6,749
1989	3,319	3,295	6,614
1990	3,216	3,150	6,366
1991	3,122	3,075	6,197
1992	2,886	2,875	5,761
1993	2,713	2,650	5,363
1994	2,579	2,490	5,069
1995	2,432	2,350	4,782
1996	2,356	2,260	4,616
1997	2,316	2,180	4,496

Source: Adapted from Table 7-5 in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1998*, March 1997, 168-69.

Appendix V

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SEAL

In accordance with the provisions of Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by Section 5 of Public Law 216, 81st Congress, August 10, 1949, and with the approval of the President, the seal of the National Military Establishment is hereby redesignated as the seal for the Department of Defense with the change of designation. The design is redescribed as follows:

An American eagle is displayed facing to the right. Wings are horizontal. The eagle grasps three crossed arrows and bears on its breast a shield whose lower two-thirds carries alternating white and red stripes and whose upper third is blue. Above the eagle is an arc of thirteen stars with alternating rays. Below the eagle is a wreath of laurel extending to the eagle's right and wreath of olive extending to the eagle's left. On an encircling band is the inscription "Department of Defense" and "United States of America."

When the seal is displayed in color, the background is to be of medium blue with the eagle and wreath in natural colors and the arrows, stars, and rays of gold. The encircling band is to be dark blue with gold edges and letters in white.



The American bald eagle, long associated with symbolism representing the United States of America and its military establishment, has been selected as an emblem of strength. In facing to the right, the field of honor is indicated. The eagle is defending the United States, represented by the Shield of thirteen pieces. The thirteen pieces are joined together by the blue chief, representing the Congress. The rays and stars above the eagle signify glory, while the three arrows are collectively symbolic of the three component parts of the Department of Defense. The laurel stands for honors received in combat defending the peace represented by the olive branch.

August 15, 1949

LOUIS JOHNSON
Secretary of Defense

NOTES

1. *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 16 Oct 85, 49.
2. Steven L. Rearden, *The Formative Years, 1947-1950*, vol I in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, D.C., 1984), 17.
3. Alice C. Cole et al, eds, *Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978* (Washington, D.C., 1978), 3.
4. *Ibid*, 6; Rearden, 19-20.
5. Cole, 6-7.
6. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds, *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago, 1955), VI:32; Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C., 1975), pt 2, 1141.
7. Cole, 7-17; Rearden, 20-23.
8. Cole, 17-21.
9. *Ibid*, 22-26.
10. *Ibid*, 26-31.
11. Rearden, 22.
12. *Ibid*, 27; Cole 31-33.
13. Rearden, 22-23; Cole, 33.
14. Cole, 36.
15. Robert J. Art et al, eds, *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace* (Elmsford, NY, 1985), xiv.
16. Cole, 35-50; Rearden, 23-27.
17. Rearden, 29-32 (quote, 32).
18. *Ibid*, 32.
19. *Ibid*, 33-35 (quote, 32).
20. *Ibid*, 60-61 (quote, 58).
21. Center for Naval Analyses, *Defense Manpower Data Base—OSD Staff*, 11 Jun 87; *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 260.
22. Rearden, 83-86.
23. *Ibid*, 77-82 (quote, 81).
24. *Ibid*, 392-93; Cole, 267-70.
25. Cole, 270-75; Rearden, 393-95.
26. Cole, 275-89; Rearden, 395-97.
27. Rearden, 397-402; Cole, 289-93. For WSEG, see John Ponturo, *Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The WSEG Experience, 1948-1976*, (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1979).
28. Cole, 63-67, 75-77.
29. *Ibid*, 77-80.
30. *Ibid*, 81-82; Rearden, 67-68.
31. Cole, 82-106.
32. Rearden, 73-74.
33. A full account of the controversy is in Rearden, 410-22.
34. *Ibid*, 111-15.
35. *Ibid*, 132-34; OSD Historical Office, *Department of Defense Key Officials, 1947-1995*, 1995, 60-61.
36. Rearden, 138.
37. *Ibid*, 138-41 (quote, 140).
38. *Ibid*, 118-23.
39. *Ibid*, 123-29.
40. *Ibid*, 129-32.
41. *Ibid*, 141-46.
42. Cole, 115; Doris M. Condit, *The Test of War: 1950-1953*, vol II in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, D.C., 1988), 506-15.
43. Cole, 473-75.
44. Cole, 114.
45. Except where otherwise noted, this section is derived from Richard M. Leighton, ch II, "Department of Defense Reorganization of 1953," vol III (mss), *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*.
46. Cole, 115-26.
47. *Ibid*, 126-43; Condit, 530-31.
48. Cole, 149-58.
49. *Ibid*, 151-58 (quote, 151).
50. *Ibid*, 151-52, 154.
51. *Ibid*, 164-70; Robert J. Watson, *Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960*, vol IV in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, D.C., 1997), 245-46.
52. Watson, 159-64, 244-46; Cole, 306-12.
53. Cole, 312-15.
54. Except where otherwise noted, the ensuing account is based on Watson, ch IX.
55. For the text of the act, see Cole, 188-230.
56. Watson, 735.
57. *Ibid*, 735-37.
58. *Ibid*, 471-79.
59. Watson, 479-95 (quotes, 486, 495).
60. *Ibid*, 446.
61. *Ibid*, 738-40.
62. Except where otherwise noted, this section is derived from Lawrence S. Kaplan, ch II, "Defense Reorganization," vol V (mss), *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*. See also *Report to Senator Kennedy on Reorganization of DoD, Congressional Record*, Senate, 87 Cong, 1 sess, vol 107, pt 2:1928-31.
63. Kaplan, 9-10 (quote).
64. *Ibid*, 11 (quote).
65. *Ibid*, 12 (quote).
66. *Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1966*, 58-59, 37.

67. *Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1962*, 28-29; Watson, 738-40.
68. *Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1965*, 39.
69. Kaplan, ch II, 52-70; Cole, 241-44.
70. Cole, 239-40, 246.
71. *Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1962*, 6-7; *ibid*, *Fiscal Year 1963*, 12; Cole, 239-40, 246.
72. Kaplan, ch III, "Toward a New National Security Policy" (mss). See also *Defense Organization: The Need for Change* (cited in n 1), 483-528; Adm. Robert P. Hilton, "The Role of Joint Military Institutions in Defense Resource Planning," in James A. Blackwell, Jr., and Barry M. Blechman, eds, *Making Defense Reform Work* (Washington, D.C., 1990), 173-78; Philip Odeen, "A Critique of the PPB System," in Robert J. Art et al, eds (cited in n 15), 375-80.
73. Steven Rearden, ch V, "McNamara and Kennedy" and ch VI, "McNamara, Clifford, and the Limits of Power," *The Secretary of Defense and Foreign Affairs* (mss), OSD Hist.
74. *Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel*, 1 Jul 70; Cole, 249-54.
75. Cole, 258-59.
76. *Ibid*, 240, 256-58; DoD Dir 5105.39, 6 Dec 71.
77. Cole, 240, 256-58.
78. For a detailed account of defense acquisition policy including the evolution of the DSARC, see Joe Ferrara, "DoD's 5000 Documents: Evolution and Change in Defense Acquisition Policy," *Acquisition Review Quarterly* (Fall 1996), 109-30. Memo, DepSecDef Packard to Defense officials, 30 May 69, OSD Hist.
79. Cole, 240, 248, 256.
80. *Ibid*, 240; *Annual Defense Department Report FY 1978*, 304.
81. *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979*, 349-50.
82. *Ibid*, 351-52, 354; Cole, 240, 263-64.
83. Cole, 259-64; DoD Press Release No. 491-77, 21 Oct 77 (quote, 2).
84. *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979*, 352-54.
85. *Missions and Functions Guidebook for the Office of the Director of Administration and Management (OSD) and Washington Headquarters Services*, December 1995, 6.
86. *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979*, 348, 372-74; *ibid*, *Fiscal Year 1980*, 302-04; interv with Graham Claytor by Alfred Goldberg and Roger R. Trask, 8 Jan 81, 6-7, 15, OSD Hist.
87. *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1980*, 308-10; *ibid*, *Fiscal Year 1981*, 282; *ibid*, *Fiscal Year 1982*, 297-98; Archie D. Barrett, *Reappraising Defense Organization: An Analysis Based on the Defense Organization Study of 1977-80* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), 9-11, 66-75, 82-85.
88. Roger R. Trask, "A Brief Account of Department of Defense Organizational Changes Since 1960," 30-31, Oct 85, OSD Hist.
89. *Annual Report to the Congress. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1983*, III-197-201; DoD Press Release No. 172-81, 30 Apr 81.
90. Trask, 31; *Annual Report to the Congress, Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1983*, III-203-04; PL 97-252, Sec 1117 (8 Sep 82).
91. FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act; DoD Dir 5141.2, 2 Apr 1984; *Department of Defense Key Officials, 1947-1995*, 47.
92. Trask, 33-35; *Annual Report to the Congress, Caspar W. Weinberger, Fiscal Year 1983*, III-205-07; *ibid*, *Fiscal Year 1985*, 107.
93. Thomas L. McNaugher, *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: A Case History*, National Academy of Public Administration, (Washington, D.C., 1991), 13-14, 18-20, 24, 26, 31.
94. US Cong, House, Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services: *Hearings: Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 97 Cong, 2 sess (1982), 3-42, 46-97; William J. Lynn, "The Wars Within: The Joint Military Structure and its Critics," in Robert J. Art, et al, eds (cited in n 15), 168-69, 185-87, 192-93; David Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs Must Change," *Armed Forces Journal International* (Mar 82), 62, 64-68, 72; Edward C. Meyer, "The JCS—How Much Reform is Needed," *ibid* (Apr 82), 82-90.
95. *Toward a More Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), v-vi, 1-4, 8-9.
96. *Defense Organization* (cited in n 1), iii-v; McNaugher, 27-29.
97. *A Quest for Excellence: Final Report by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management* (hereafter cited as *Final Report*), Jun 86, 27-28; McNaugher, 32-33.
98. McNaugher, 18-19, 26-30.
99. *Final Report*, 27-28, 43-50.
100. *Ibid*, 11-12.
101. *Ibid*, 13-21.
102. PL 99-348 (1 Jul 86); PL 99-661 (14 Nov 86).
103. McNaugher, 27-30, 34-37.
104. *Ibid*, 36-37.
105. PL 99-433 (1 Oct 86), Title 1, Sec 104.
106. *Ibid*, Titles I and II (quotes, Title II, Sec 153(b), Sec 155(e)).
107. *Ibid*, Title II, Sec 162(b), Sec 163(a).
108. *Ibid*, Sec 164 (quote, (c)(2A)).
109. "An Interview with Colin L. Powell," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 96), 29-32; John P. White, "Defense Organization," *ibid*, 1-4; Joseph W. Prueher, "War Fighting CINCs in a New Era," *ibid*, 48-51.
110. PL 99-433, Title IV; Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, "Emergence of the Joint Officer," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 96, 53-57.
111. PL 99-433, Title III.
112. *Ibid*, Title V; Michael B. Donley, "Prospects for the Military Departments," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 96), 58-62; Commission on Roles and Missions, *Directions for Defense*, 1995, 4-23, 25.

113. For discussion of the effects of Goldwater-Nichols, see James A. Blackwell, Jr., and Barry M. Blechman, eds, *Making Defense Reform Work* (cited in n 72), 15-17; Paul Y. Hammond, "Fulfilling the Promise of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in Operational Planning and Command," *ibid*, 127-32; Hilton, "The Role of Joint Military Institutions in Defense Resource Planning," *ibid*, 157-72; Walter Poole, Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman, JCS, *The Unified Command Plan, 1983-1993*, Oct 94. A particularly informed and critical view is offered by James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 96), 10-16.
114. General John M. Shalikashvili, "A Word from the Chairman," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 96), 5; William A. Owens and James R. Blaker, "Overseeing Cross Service Trade Offs," *ibid*, 37-40.
115. DoD Dirs 5111.4, 5111.5, 5111.6, 5111.7, 5111.8, all 6 Jul 93; PL 99-661 (14 Nov 86); PL 102-190 (5 Dec 92); PL 103-160, Sec 901 (30 Nov 93); PL 103-337, Sec 903 (5 Oct 94); memo Dep U/S Def(Policy) for DepSecDef, 14 Mar 94; memo D.O. Cooke, D/Admin & Mgt, for DepSecDef, 13 Jun 94; memo John Deutch, DepSecDef, for SecsMilDepts et al, 7 Jul 94.
116. PL 103-60, 30 Nov 93.
117. Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense*, 1995.
118. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Mar 96, 47-51.
119. The chief source for the section on Unified Commands is Walter Poole, *The Unified Command Plan, 1983-1993* (cited in n 113). See also John J. Sheehan, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 96, 41-47; Prueher, "War Fighting: CINCs in a New Era," *ibid*, 48-52.
120. Richard H. Kohn, ed, *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989* (New York, 1991), 87.

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