

Harold Brown

Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge

—————1977–1981—————

# Documentary Supplement

Edited by  
Edward C. Keefer



SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE HISTORICAL SERIES  
Erin R. Mahan, GENERAL EDITOR

SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE HISTORICAL SERIES

Volume IX

# Harold Brown

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Historical Office  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
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## Preface

This collection of documents complements the official history of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown by making available a selection of the documents cited in the notes of *Harold Brown: Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge, 1977–1981*. The author selected documents based on their historical significance, with a preference for material created by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and those not included in *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes for the Jimmy Carter administration.

The documents are arranged by chapter and may be accessed by clicking on the document title in the table of contents. Readers will find that some of the documents bear sourcing notations by the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that were not present at the time of the document's creation. While every effort has been made to remove such notations, those instances where this proved impracticable are noted. All of the documents are either unclassified or have been properly declassified. The views presented in the documents included in this collection do not necessarily represent those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Erin R. Mahan

Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON D. C. 20301

February 14, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As I have told Ham Jordan, I am proposing for nomination as Director of Defense Research and Engineering Dr. William Perry of California. Bill Perry, a Democrat, is in my view the best possible person for this job. He is a technologist who knows development, production, and business, having built the electronics company he founded, ESL, Inc., to \$45 million sales annually. I have spoken with Alan Cranston, who agrees with the appointment.

Perry's company is not a large defense contractor like Lockheed or General Dynamics. However, virtually all of the business it does is with the Defense Department (intelligence-collection systems). Perry's assets are in the stock of his company, which is thinly traded; were he to try to sell it at the same time he leaves the company, the price drop would be devastating for the other shareholders, most of whom are employees of the company.

I have asked Perry to place his stock in trust and to forgo any gain (with an allowance for inflation) which might occur during his tenure in DoD; he has agreed to do so. I hope that this version of the "Packard arrangement" will be acceptable to the Stennis committee. If it is, I would want to approve an exception to your guidelines to permit this arrangement.

Almost all the other persons whom I considered for this position would be from large defense contractors, and would raise even greater seeming conflicts of interest in the public eye than would Perry. I believe that an agreement along the lines described above, to enable a relatively small and independent businessman to serve in this position, is consistent with the spirit of your guidelines. It also will fill the job with the person who I believe is by far the most able.

*Harold Brown*

Date	2-15-77
Info	Jack Watson
Action	H. Jordan

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0017, Box 18, Folder 110.01 (Jan) 1977.

JAN 21 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, PLANNING AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: FY 1978 Budget Revisions

The President has directed me to review the FY 1978 Defense budget now before the Congress and make those changes I believe necessary to:

(1) ensure that the U.S. military posture is fully adequate to meet our national security needs, and (2) eliminate those programs that contribute marginally to our security, or (3) defer them where a question exists as to how much value they have. In light of the pressure of the schedule for consideration of the budget by the Congress, this review will of necessity be brief.

Many of the fundamental issues affecting our national security requirements cannot be addressed in this time frame. President Carter is planning to direct a series of comprehensive reviews of our basic national security policies and strategy, and the programs needed to sustain them. These reviews will continue over the next several months. I also plan to ask you to look in depth at several areas where I believe costs can be reduced with little effect on our strength, freeing funds for higher priority Defense needs. I wish, in particular, to take a careful look at the support structure, headquarters, and other overhead operations, manpower and manpower costs, and our base structure in the United States and abroad. President Carter has repeatedly emphasized the importance of taking all necessary actions to ensure our military forces are fully adequate to their tasks, but at the same time, are lean and efficient. I will need your ideas and support in this critical endeavor, the results of which will be reflected in possible future adjustments to the FY 1978 budget and in the FY 1979-1983 program.

In carrying out the review of the FY 1978 budget and program, there are four criteria I plan to use in evaluating the current program and proposed changes:

1. Greater emphasis on combat readiness, of manpower and material, to ensure our forces are prepared should they be needed.
2. Continue essential modernization of our forces, while scheduling such actions to ensure that we receive full measure of increased effectiveness for the costs of the new equipment.

OSD, 330-80-0017, box 18, 110.01 (4) 1977



3. Identify and eliminate support and overhead programs that contribute marginally to real military effectiveness, to ensure that our forces grow in efficiency as well as effectiveness.

4. Ensure that reductions do not affect the morale or well-being of our military personnel and their dependents or the civilian work force.

During the past weeks, the Defense Transition staff, working with OMB Director Lance and his staff, reviewed the proposed FY 1978 budget. Based on this review, and in accordance with guidance from OMB, I have developed a proposed set of budget changes which I believe are consistent with the foregoing criteria. These tentative revisions will be provided to you by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). However, you will be given full opportunity to review these tentative decisions and recommend other changes as appropriate.

The President has asked me to submit my recommendations to OMB on January 31. To meet this schedule, I plan the following review process:

1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will issue PBDs reflecting my tentative budget decisions today.

2. The Service Secretaries should submit their positions with respect to these tentative decisions by close of business, Wednesday, January 26. I will consider these alternatives in making my final decisions.

3. On January 28 and 29, Deputy Secretary Duncan and I will meet with each Service Secretary and Chief of Staff to discuss any unresolved issues.

4. On January 31, I will submit my recommendations to the President and provide you with my final decisions at that time.

I regret the limited time available for this review and recognize the strain it imposes on you and your staffs. However, final decisions of the President are expected in time to permit a revised budget submission to Congress by mid-February.

*Harold Brown*

cc: CJCS

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

26 JAN 77 26 JAN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: FY 1978 Budget Revisions

In accordance with your directions I am currently reviewing the FY 1978 Defense budget now before the Congress. Upon completion of this review I will be recommending specific changes which I consider appropriate to (1) ensure that the U.S. military posture is fully adequate to meet our national security needs, and (2) eliminate those programs that contribute marginally to our security, or (3) defer them where a question exists as to how much value they have. Attachment A is a paper which describes the basis for my review and summarizes the major changes resulting from tentative decisions I have made. I will transmit my final recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget shortly after February 1, 1977, following my consideration of the positions of the military departments and my discussions with each service secretary and military chief and the Chairman, JCS.

Attachment B contains a summary of all of the proposed budget revisions. The budget would be reduced immediately by \$2.578 billion for FY 1978 and \$.399 billion for FY 1977 and prior - a total of \$2.977 billion. Extension of my tentative decisions through FY 1979 - FY 1982 indicates the potential for further reductions of \$6.127 billion during that period.

Many of the fundamental issues affecting our national security requirements cannot be addressed in the timeframe established for this initial budget revision. Therefore, I plan to initiate a number of studies of strategy, force levels, and support requirements which are likely to result in further changes to the FY 1978 budget and Five Year program. Examples are contained in Attachment A.

Key force structure, readiness, and procurement issues appropriate for a brief NSC meeting, in my view, are:

- a. B-1/MX/Cruise missiles.
- b. F-15.
- c. NATO Readiness and Mobility Forces.
- d. Ship construction program.

*Harold Brown*

OSD, 330-80-0017, box 18, 110-01 (Q-1) 1977  
Attachments

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SUMMARY OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO FY 78 DEFENSE BUDGET

Changes have been based on the following criteria:

- Greater emphasis on combat readiness, of manpower and materiel, to ensure our forces are prepared should they be needed.
- Continue essential modernization of our forces, while scheduling such actions to ensure that we receive full measure of increased effectiveness for the costs of the new equipment.
- Identify and eliminate support and overhead programs that contribute marginally to real military effectiveness.
- Ensure that reductions do not affect the morale or well-being of our military personnel and their dependents or the civilian work force.

Strategic Forces

The pace of modernization of some of the U.S. strategic programs has been slowed somewhat pending a review of the objectives of the strategic force and the progress of SALT. Specifically, the FY 78 costs of strategic forces have been reduced through the following actions:

- Reduction in the pace of production of the B-1 in FY 78 from 8 aircraft to 5.
- Deferral of the start of engineering development on the M-X ICBM, thus delaying initial operating capability until the mid-1980s.
- Cancellation of production of the Minuteman III missile in FY 77.
- Deferral of overhauls for two Polaris submarines, initial funding for a follow-on aircraft to the F-106 air defense interceptor, and restart of the SRAM production.
- Deferral of the anti-ship version of the TOMAHAWK missile in favor of effort on ground launched TOMAHAWK for the Theater Nuclear role.
- Reduction in AWACS procurement from 6 aircraft to 4 pending review of force structure requirements and NATO interest.

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Ground, Tactical Air and Mobility Forces

Changes to the General Purpose Forces emphasize readiness, especially NATO readiness, at the expense of reductions or deferrals of certain programs that can be delayed with acceptable risks. Specifically, the FY 78 funding for General Purpose Forces has been adjusted through the following actions:

o Land Forces

-- Substitution of two Reserve Component brigades for two late deploying active Army brigades.

-- Cancellation of Non-Nuclear Lance procurement in FY 77 and FY 78 and Hawk battery sets.

-- Reductions in marginal Army equipment procurement.

-- Delay CH-53E helicopter procurement.

-- Delaying the Advance Attack Helicopter (AAH) development.

o Tactical Air Forces

-- Slowing F-15 production to permit evaluation of the high-low fighter mix and potential alternatives.

-- Termination of A-7E production.

-- Reduction in the number of fighter/attack aircraft in the three Marine Corps wings.

o NATO Readiness

-- Acceleration of aircraft shelter construction in NATO for U.S. aircraft.

-- Provision of additional storage facilities for increased prepositioned combat equipment and materiel in NATO.

o Mobility Forces

-- Increase the funding for Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to permit modification of eight aircraft in FY 1978 (vice 4).

Naval Forces

- Cancellation of plans to build the nuclear powered strike cruiser (CSGN).
- Deferral of the production of one attack submarine (SSNs) in FY 78.
- Deletion of funding for two patrol frigates (FFG-7s) in FY 78 in favor of long-lead item funding (thus retaining deployment schedule).
- Restructuring the Patrol Hydrofoil and Surface Effects Ship (SES) programs to technology-oriented efforts.
- Deferral of funding for additional nuclear reactor components from naval vessels.

Manpower

- Shifting 40,000 naval reservists in lower priority mobilization billets to the Individual Ready Reserve category.
- Deferral of a plan for retirement reform pending further study.

Investment

Changes have also been made to programs that cut across the Military Departments and combat missions of the forces. These include:

- Increased funding to step up the number of ship overhauls and the pace of equipment repair.
- Restoration of \$200 million of construction funds for certain selected projects.
- Deferral of lower priority communications and electronics programs.
- Deferral of certain equipment programs recognizing fact-of-life procurement delays or the need for further study where the risk of delay is acceptable.

Further Actions

The above actions are a result of a brief review of the FY 78 budget. Further revisions and adjustments to the FY 78 budget and Five Year Program are possible after more comprehensive study and analysis through the remaining year. Listed below are examples of those activities which could result in additional budgetary adjustments.



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- National Security Policy for Strategic and General Purpose Forces.
- Review of Mission for Guard/Reserve Forces.
- Requirements for Domestic Base Structure.
- AWACS Force Levels Requirements.
- Review of Manned Strategic Aircraft Modernization.

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Summary of Proposed Budget Revisions  
FY 1978

(\$ Millions)

Strategic Nuclear Forces

- |   |               |
|---|---------------|
| 1. <u>B-1 Bomber</u> : Stretch out production to reduce number requiring retrofit of avionics, procuring 5 rather than 8 with FY 1978 funds.                        | -340.0        |
| 2. <u>MX ICBM</u> : Defer full scale engineering development based on a fiscal year 1985 IOC.   | -160.0        |
| 3. <u>Follow-on Interceptor</u> : Defer until FY 1979 funds for the Air Force follow-on interceptor program, pending examination of CONUS Air Defense requirements. | -26.3         |
| 4. <u>AWACS</u> : Revise production schedules pending reevaluation of the program.  | -100.0        |
| 5. <u>Minuteman III Production</u> : Cancel FY 1977 Minuteman III production.   | (-101.7)      |
| 6. <u>Polaris Submarine Overhauls</u> : Defer 2 Polaris submarine overhauls and reduce operating tempo.   | -28.6         |
| 7. <u>SRAM-B</u> : Defer restart of SRAM-B production, indefinitely, pending evaluation of related programs. (FY 1977 - \$20M)                                      | -58.4         |
| 8. <u>Cruise Missiles</u> : Defers the anti-ship version of the TOMAHAWK missile in favor of effort on ground launched TOMAHAWK for the Theater Nuclear Role.       | -             |
| Subtotal  | <u>-713.3</u> |

Ground, Tactical Air and Mobility Forces

- |  |         |
|--|---------|
| 1. <u>Substitution of Reserve Component for Active Brigades</u> : Replace 2 Active with 2 Reserve component combat brigades. | -67.0   |
| 2. <u>Non-Nuclear Lance</u> : Eliminate Non-Nuclear Lance procurement.   | -77.7   |
| FY 1977  | (-64.6) |
| 3. <u>HAWK</u> : Cancel procurement of 6 HAWK battery sets.  | -35.3   |
| 4. <u>AAH</u> : Slow AAH airframe development.   | -100.0  |



(\$ Millions)

5.	<u>F-15</u> : Temporarily slow F-15 production to the requirements of a 5-wing F-15 force (72 aircraft funded in FY 1978) pending review of the tactical aircraft mix.	-460.0
6.	<u>A-7E</u> : Terminate production after FY 1977 funding. FY 1977 (\$9M)	-24.4
7.	<u>CH-53E</u> : Delay FY 1978 procurement, since delay in awarding FY 1977 initial buy provides for production until FY 1979 funds are available, and reduces concurrency.	-76.0
8.	<u>NATO Tactical Aircraft Shelters</u> : Accelerate program to provide shelters for NATO-deploying aircraft in 2 rather than 5 years.	+60.0
9.	<u>Marine Corps Fighter Attack Force</u> : Reduce force to 96 rather than 144 UE.	-12.0
10.	<u>Civil Reserve Air Fleet Modifications</u> : Finance 8 modifications in FY 1978 and 42 in FY 1979-82.	+15.0
11.	<u>Storage for Prepositioned Unit Stocks</u> : Provide storage for additional stocks and to better protect previously authorized material.	+50.0
Subtotal		-727.4

Naval Forces

1.	<u>CSGN</u> : Delete long-lead funding for FY 1979 ship and cancel construction plans on basis of excessive cost for capability.	-187.0
2.	<u>SSN</u> : Defer one boat based on production limitations which make FY 1978 financing unnecessary.	-230.0
3.	<u>Patrol Hydrofoil Program</u> : Delete support ship in FY 1978; restructure and reduce prior year program.	-43.0
4.	<u>Surface Effects Ship</u> : Reduce SES to a technology-only program.	-30.0

(\$ Millions)

5. Frigates: Defer 2 FFG's from FY 1978 in favor of long lead items, with no change in force objectives. -282.0
6. Reactor Components: Reduce FY 1978 on basis of more than adequate component levels funded through FY 1977. -149.9

Subtotal -921.9

Manpower

1. Naval Reserve: Reduce paid drill strength by 40,000 shifting lowest priorities to Individual Ready Reserve. (Two weeks annual training) -50.0
2. Retirement Reform: Do not submit current legislative proposals pending review in a broader context. -25.0

Subtotal -75.0

Investment

1. Equipment Readiness: Provide for most urgent of FY 1978 unfunded overhaul and repair of equipment. (Army \$115M--Navy \$120M--AF \$45M) +280.0
2. Communications and Electronics: Defer programs of low priority or high risk, or the requirements for which should be reexamined in the light of common service requirements, including TACFIRE. -168.0
3. Army Equipment: Reduce FY 1978 Army programs where inconsistent with efficient, economical production practice; where development is still incomplete; and where requirements and effectiveness should be reevaluated. -452.4
4. Construction: Restore projects deleted from FY 1978 pending review of base plans, but urgent in terms of operational, environmental and energy conservation, and unlikely to be affected by such a review. +200.0

Subtotal -140.4

Total -2,578.0

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(May-20 Jun) 1977.

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Date: JUL 13 2016

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 13 Jul 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 2.3 (b) (4), (g)  
MDR: 15 -M- 0210

5 U.S.C. 552

STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE MODERNIZATION

16 May 1977

~~Classified by: AF/RD  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE  
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 2263  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3  
DECLASSIFY ON 2004~~

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## Strategic Bomber Force Modernization

### A. Executive Summary

(U) The United States maintains a diversified force of land and sea launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and strategic bombers to provide a high confidence deterrent against nuclear attack or coercion. No single element of this deterrent force can satisfy all of the required strategic offensive tasks; rather, each provides unique capabilities which, in combination, insure our ability to respond effectively under all circumstances, including that of an enemy surprise attack.

(U) The strategic bomber is an integral element of the US deterrent posture and provides important contributions not available with our ballistic missile forces.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

JS 33(b)(4)(8)

(U) Current intelligence estimates for the post-1980 period identify Soviet offensive and defensive developments which could result in serious reductions in the ability of today's force to survive an attack on its bases and penetrate Soviet air defenses.

(U) Threats to bomber force launch survival from Soviet Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) forces can be offset by the B-1's faster escape speed, greater resistance to nuclear effects, and shorter take-off distance to permit dispersal to a larger number of airfields if required. The effectiveness of projected Soviet defenses will be seriously degraded by the B-1's high penetration speed at very low altitude and low radar cross section in combination with high quality



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electronic countermeasures. The superior B-1 launch survival and penetration characteristics combined with its improved accuracy and larger payload capacity, compared to the B-52, will provide a highly effective contribution to the future US strategic deterrent posture.

(U) Additionally, the B-1's design provides the operational flexibility and growth potential necessary to reduce its sensitivity to threat variations and continued evolution. The B-1, for example, possesses the electrical power, cooling capacity and space for additional offensive or defensive avionics which may be required during its long lifetime. Further, the B-1 will be capable of employing modified tactics, including high altitude supersonic flight, and improved weapons. In short, the B-1 has been designed with the necessary flexibility and adaptability (historically associated with the US strategic bomber force) to remain effective into the 21st century.

(U) The critical need and primary justification for committing substantial national resources to the deployment of the B-1 remains its role in deterring nuclear war. However, modernization with the B-1 also preserves and enhances an important capability to use strategic bombers in other roles. Unlike the other two components of our strategic deterrent -- ICBMs and SLBMs -- the manned bomber contributes to deterrence in a broader dimension due to its versatile capability for a variety of non-nuclear missions (e.g., conventional bombing, ocean surveillance, mine laying and anti-shipping).

(U) The B-1's performance characteristics will permit accurate delivery of large payloads to major areas of potential conflict while operating from US bases. Should forward deployment be required, the reduced ramp space, taxiway/runway width and load bearing requirements permit operation from bases unsuitable for the B-52. Further, the B-1's self sufficiency characteristics (APU, self test equipment, on-board oxygen generation equipment) reduce the requirement for in-place or deployed ground support equipment.

(U) The conventional potential of the B-1 will be a key element of its total capability, providing the combination of an advanced aircraft and new conventional weapon technology.

(U) In determining a prudent bomber modernization program, several strategic bomber alternatives, in addition to the B-1, have been studied extensively since the start of development in 1970. Alternatives to the B-1 including "stretched" FB-111s, updated B-52s, and stand-off wide body cruise missile carriers have been examined as well as various cruise missile employment concepts. The results of these studies support a concept employing a mix of penetrating bombers and cruise missiles.

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(U) When the cruise missile is employed as a complement to the penetrating bomber, the enemy is prevented from concentrating defenses to counter the cruise missile. This cruise missile employment concept, which allows launch before or following penetration of the GCI/SUAWACS line, provides additional operational flexibility and:

- o Complicates enemy air defenses
- o Reduces bomber threat exposure and increases bomber survivability
- o Widens and extends effective flight path of penetrating bomber
- o Reduces tanker requirements
- o Improves strategic Air-to-Surface missile hard target kill capability
- o Allows effective use of shorter range cruise missile
- o Decreases cruise missile exposure to area defenses
- o Permits cruise missile use against lightly defended/undefended targets

(U) The Joint Strategic Bomber Study conducted during the 1973-74 time frame examined the cost effectiveness of various US alternative bomber forces against a 1988 postulated threat. Results of this study were updated during November 1976 to reflect costs in FY 77 dollars for the period 1977-91. The conclusions remained basically unchanged, i.e., forces containing larger numbers of B-1s provide lower costs per weapon delivered than alternative forces, including an all stand-off cruise missile carrier force. The most cost effective force examined contained penetrating B-1s and B-52s employing cruise missiles. ✓

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(U) Considered in the context of the arms limitation environment, the B-1 represents a normal force modernization program and is complementary to our National objectives. The B-1 Program:

- o Would not violate provisions of current or foreseeable agreements.
- o Provides a highly visible step in modernizing the strategic force.
- o Reflects national resolve and determination.
- o Does not constitute disarming first strike capability.
- o Permits achievements of agreed force levels.
- o Keeps pressure on Soviets to continue negotiations.
- o Allows the US to retire older, less effective systems, if reduced levels are negotiated.

(U) The B-1 has had the benefit of more careful preproduction planning and exhaustive component and vehicle testing than any previous military or civilian aircraft at the same procurement decision milestone. The test program has confirmed the accuracy of analytical predictions of performance.

(U) The major structural components of the aircraft have been subject to static tests at loads which exceeded by 50% those which would be experienced in flight. Fatigue tests to several lifetimes of expected aircraft service have been accomplished. Fatigue testing on all major structural assemblies will be completed over two years before the first production B-1 is delivered. The successful static and fatigue testing already completed provides high confidence that the B-1 is structurally capable of performing its strategic mission.

(U) The flight test program has now accumulated over 562 hours and has successfully explored all mission requirements. The operational modes of the aircraft have been demonstrated, and extensive high speed, low altitude, automatic and manual

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terrain following activities have been reliably and safely executed, as well as supersonic flights to speeds above Mach 2.1. Routine refueling with KC-135 tankers has been accomplished on most flights.

(U) The Air Force Test and Evaluation Center has reported operational effectiveness and suitability are good and that all deficiencies that have been identified are correctable and being worked. Based on data obtained from the flight test program, the B-1 will provide the capability and operational flexibility necessary to effectively modernize the strategic bomber force.

(U) Current Air Force costs are based on procurement of 244 B-1s (four RDT&E and 240 production aircraft), of which 241 will be deployed for operational use. The planned B-1 force level is based on initial program estimates made in the late 1960s which indicated that about 244 B-1s were required to offset bomber force aging and to meet an increasingly sophisticated threat.

(U) At the time of the B-1 development decision (June 1970), the program cost estimate was \$9.9 billion in constant 1970 dollars. The estimate in then year dollars, which takes into account predicted inflation over the program period, was \$11.2 billion. The program estimate in constant 1970 dollars given to the Defense System Review Council (DSARC) III on 1 December 1976 increased from the original \$9.9 to \$11.1 billion. A number of program changes had occurred since 1970; however, there was no real cost growth since 1973. In then year dollars, the effects of actual inflation from 1970 to 1976 and predicted inflation from 1976 to end of the program in 1988 caused a much larger increase from the original estimate of \$11.2 billion to the DSARC III estimate of \$22.8 billion.

(U) Production rates either above or below four aircraft per month could be selected for the B-1 program. A rate higher than the currently planned four aircraft per month would require additional construction of facilities at the B-1 production plant and higher funding levels on a yearly basis. Lesser rates could be accommodated within the production facilities and would reduce yearly funding levels, but procurement at these rates would increase total program costs. If, for example, a rate of two aircraft per month were selected, no savings would result in FY 1978 but a reduction in funding of \$3 billion would occur over the next five years. However, with this option, the total program cost would increase \$3.3 billion above the current program.

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(U). A decision on a production rate above two aircraft per month is not required until December 1978 for the FY 80 budget. Total force levels can be evaluated on a year-by-year basis. This allows us to set the pace and level of the program based on a continuing assessment of the projected Soviet threat, strategic arms limitations agreements, and periodic review of national priorities and fiscal constraints.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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OFFICE OF THE  
JCSM-223-~~SECRETARY OF DEFENSE~~  
20 May 1977

Office of the Secretary of Defense/Historical Office, Subject File, Panama Canal Treaty, Documents re. Negotiations and Implementation, 1976-1980, Box 427, Folder Panama Canal Documents, 1977-1980.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

DEC 30 2014

Subject: Defense of the Panama Canal (S)

1. (S) It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a new treaty which modernizes the US-Panamanian relationship and provides a basis for development of a friendly relationship between the two countries is of significant importance in insuring that the Panama Canal will continue to be available to the United States when needed.

2. (S) After discussion and review of the US military interests in the Panama Canal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined that the primary military concern is in use of the canal, not ownership. Therefore, as a minimum, in order to provide reasonable assurance that access to and security of the Panama Canal are protected in time of war and peace, the United States and Panama should agree in the new treaty to the following provisions:

a. That the United States will operate and have primary responsibility for the defense of the canal through 1999.

b. That there be established in the treaty a permanent joint US-Panamanian guarantee that, upon termination of the new treaty, the canal will remain open to all world shipping at reasonable tolls, without discrimination, in accordance with specific rules of neutrality agreed to in the guarantee and that Panama would take no action that would hamper the efficient operation of the waterway.

c. That each country commits itself to protect and defend the canal after the termination of US operation.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1985

OSD Hist, box 427, Pan Can Treaty

Doc re Negotiations & Implementation 1976-80

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"Pan Can Docs 77-80"


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3. (S) It is critical to safeguarding US security interests that the universally recognized historical precedent that the neutral character of the Panama Canal is defined by treaty rules unique to the waterway be perpetuated.

4. (S) With these minimum acceptable provisions, US military interests should be adequately protected by US defense rights and military presence through 1999, a sufficiently lengthy period of time to assure the formation and institutionalization of the US-Panamanian partnership essential to the long-term US use of the canal. After 1999, legal and political arguments could be made to support a unilateral US intervention in the event any nation, including Panama, threatened the nondiscriminatory operation or security of the canal in time of war or peace.

5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the views stated above be conveyed to the US Negotiators by the Panama Canal Negotiations Working Group in a memorandum substantially like that contained in the Appendix.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

  
GEORGE S. BROWN  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

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Date: 29 March 2002  
Chief, Declass Br, Dir & Rec WHS

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-001,  
Box 77, Folder Panama, 821 (27 Sep-10 Nov) 1977.

29 AUG 13/7

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Military Utilization of the Panama Canal

This memorandum provides a brief description of the Department of Defense's past use of the Panama Canal and the canal's potential impact on defense planning for various conflict scenarios.

United States' military use of the Panama Canal has two broad strategic aspects:

- Interoceanic transfer of warships and their supporting auxiliaries.
- Logistical support (movement of supplies and equipment) for U.S. and allied forces in Europe and the Pacific.

A review of historical data shows that during a nine year period of the Vietnam conflict, 1964-1972, the canal averaged 123 warship and 645 military logistical transits (about four million tons of military cargo) per year. For the four year period between 1973-1976, the averages for warship and logistical transits were reduced approximately two-thirds to 42 and 219 (about one million tons of military cargo) respectively. During the peak 1967-1969 period, approximately 49 percent of all US Government cargo arriving in Vietnam passed through the canal. The highest this figure ever reached was in FY 1968 when 69% of this type of cargo passed through the canal. These figures represent all naval ship transfers between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. The largest naval transit was the 39,000 ton amphibious assault ship USS TARAWA in 1976. Tab A provides a detailed breakout of US Government ship passages from fiscal year 1964 to 1976.

Our planned wartime and contingency use of the canal (Tab B provides details and is classified SECRET) is based on a strategy which permits rapid augmentation of forces in the Atlantic or Pacific theaters. Canal use improves availability of surface escorts, amphibious shipping, and logistical support. Its use reduces transit times and this equates to increased defense force availability in the early period of a conflict. Current planning reflects programmed use of the canal; however, alternate routes and measures are part of military planning in the event the United States is denied its use. Attack carriers and their escorts already use routes such as those around Africa and South America although this adds an average of 15-21 days to their transit time.

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In a NATO conflict, significant numbers of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and a substantial portion of amphibious lift for Marine Corps forces would transit the canal. This would reduce the time to achieve availability by 15 to 21 days for the Atlantic-Mediterranean theaters when compared to ship transits which did not use the canal. The canal also assists in the movement of military cargo from West Coast ports and facilitates the assembly of shipping in the Atlantic. The use of the canal results in a net increase in cargo capacity of 30 percent during the first month of mobilization.

The escort requirements are not as significant in a Pacific only scenario. However, because of West Coast port limitations (safety and capacity), current plans require approximately 75 percent of certain critical cargo to be shipped from the East Coast during the first thirty days of a conflict in the Pacific. During the 60-day initial period, use of the canal facilitates assembly of shipping and improves delivery of critical cargo by 18-25 percent. The canal also reduces the time required to assemble amphibious shipping by approximately 30 percent. Tab B provides a classified examination of the effect of canal closure on operation plans.

The paper does not address long term alternatives which might be undertaken to compensate partially for the unavailability of the canal. In sum, assured ability to transit the canal remains of military importance, though rather less than in the past. Therefore, the principal military interest is to assure that ability. I agree with the JCS that the proposed canal treaties are the best way to do so.

*Harold Brown*

Attachments  
a/s



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Talking Paper for the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Policy Review Committee, 23 March 1977)

Subject: PRC Meeting on Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (PRM 17)

PURPOSE OF MEETING: To consider the response to Presidential Review Memorandum NSC-17, Review of United States Policy Toward Latin America.

ISSUES:

- Do the "didactic stark options" set forth in the Overview correspond to the real choices available to us in Latin America and are they consonant with the detailed presentation of the issues and options contained in the basic paper?
- Does a North-South, East-West focus provide a useful frame of reference for dealing with the problem of pluralism, e.g., the emergence of socialist and Marxist regimes and political change in the hemisphere?
- Has proper attention been given to the problem of providing the Latin Americans with the sense of security which is essential for their development and will permit a reduction of local tensions?
- Will severing or further diluting our military-to-military ties with Latin America contribute to our ability to advance U.S. national interests in the region? How do we manifest U.S. national resolve and reliability in light of actual and perceived withdrawal?
- Is there an alternative to the military governments of the region? What is the impact of likely successor regimes on our national interests?
- Regarding human rights, will military sanctions, such as an embargo on arms sales, be any more productive than similar efforts on other issues, for example, the embargo of Cuba?

RECOMMENDED POSITION:

- DoD believes that the Overview paper does not provide the perspective and balance necessary for presidential consideration of our full range of options towards the governments of Latin America.

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- The North-South, East-West focus obscures the principal issue, i.e., the degree of acceptable pluralism in political change in the hemisphere.

-- Everyone agrees that economic, political and social development is the key to stability in Latin America.

-- We further agree that pluralism is acceptable, and indeed exists at this time.

-- However, there are certain limits beyond which we perceive the Congress and the people are unwilling to go with regard to acceptance of pluralism (e.g., a communist Mexico, Panama, or Brazil or a uniformly and totally hostile Caribbean).

-- The real issue then is whether we are willing to accept the universal application of the principle of pluralism and pursue political, economic and social development without reference to ideological considerations, or whether we pursue such development but define the areas of U.S. self-interest where pluralism cannot be accepted. / ?

- Our military-to-military relationships should be preserved.

-- These have already declined to a point where the Latin Americans perceive us to be withdrawing from the hemisphere.

-- Until Latin American governments feel themselves to be secure they will continue to divert scarce resources from development to defense, thus undermining our efforts to promote stability and to reduce the possibility of local conflict.

-- Given this erosion in our influence with the Latin American military we have little leverage left to affect their behavior in desired directions.

- We should not, at this meeting, be forced into a position of "voting for" specific options, but should assure the stated purpose of the paper, "to elicit guidance from the PRC on general policy directions." (Should discussion of options become unavoidable, specific positions are set forth in the Enclosure to this Talker, page 5.) *Don't want*

#### BACKGROUND:

- Our relations with Latin America are at a low ebb.

- Factors contributing to this situation (covered in the basic paper) include:

-- The failure of our policy in Cuba and Vietnam and the upheavals of Watergate, CIA revelations, etc., raised doubts about our "will" and our capacity to lead;

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- Pursuit of detente with the Soviets, and the Latins' misunderstanding thereto, and questions about our commitment to hemispheric security confused threat perceptions and caused previously muted regional tensions to come to the fore;
- Our inability or unwillingness to provide either the favored economic treatment or the basic security implied in our rhetoric about the 'special relationship' existing between the U.S. and Latin America led our neighbors to reconsider the value of our association.
- Reports emanating both during and after the campaign stated that Latin America was to be an area of prime importance for President Carter.
- Despite this favorable outlook for the future of hemispheric relations, initial actions by the Administration have been interpreted by the Latin Americans as infringements on their sovereignty and intervention in their internal affairs:
  - Publicly expressed concerns about human rights conditions in several countries;
  - Reductions in FMS credits for Argentina and continuing prohibitions for Uruguay and Chile;
  - Talk of rapprochement with Cuba, a country still viewed as a significant threat by many Latin American nations;
  - Veto of the proposed sale of Israeli aircraft to Ecuador;
  - Efforts to modify the FRG's agreement to provide nuclear technology to Brazil, and the human rights statement that caused a unilateral Brazilian refusal of U.S. security assistance;
  - Allegations of CIA payments to President Perez of Venezuela and former President Echeverria of Mexico;
  - Criticism of Guatemala and El Salvador for human rights violations which led to their rejection of military assistance.

DISCUSSION:

- DoD believes that in stressing the political, economic and human rights issues, many of the alternatives addressed in the paper serve to erode our security interests and the paper itself does not give the President a full and balanced understanding of these interests, viz:
  - Prevent the introduction of hostile forces and influence;
  - Protect lines of communication;
  - Seek Latin American cooperation in defense matters;
  - Maintain necessary defense installations.

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- The paper has broad options within the "conceptual" (page 3) and "specific" issues sections (page 6) which are, in fact, baskets of options; some features of these conglomerations are acceptable, some not. This approach obscures some very valuable options in the basic paper, which were not brought forward in the Overview.

- The thrust of the paper appears to emphasize one U.S. interest-- increased respect for human rights--to the detriment of others which are no less important (protection of U.S. national defense interests; promotion of economic, political and social development; reduction of regional tensions which threaten stability; cultivation of support in global fora).


- Some of the discussion included in the paper and several of the directions suggested for future policy seem to reflect the same paternalistic and condescending approach we seek to eliminate in structuring a new wholesome, respectful and constructive relationship with the governments of the hemisphere.


- In seeking innovative and positive ways to deal with old adversaries such as Cuba, we must be sensitive to the need not to antagonize and dishearten old friends.

- The military in Latin America have played and will play a key role in the area's development for the foreseeable future; we need to focus our attention on creating the kind of relationships with this Institution which will influence its behavior in directions consonant with U.S. global objectives.

-- Discussion may arise regarding the value of our "military influence." State holds a strong view that it is minimal and that "even military governments take policy decisions out of . . . national interests rather than purely on the basis of military relationship to the U.S." The foregoing is not a balanced argument. Military governments give more weight to security when viewing their national interests. In dealing with these governments, the attainment of total U.S. military influence is not a practical goal or one we seek. The U.S. military is exerting a moderating and constructive role through our military-to-military relationships, and there are significant benefits accruing to U.S. interests well beyond the level of military representation we maintain in Latin America.

Approved by

  
Asst. Secretary of Defense (ISA)

  
Director, Joint Staff

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div  
Date: JAN 02 2015

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ENCLOSURE: JOINT TALKER, PRM-17

The following comments regarding the several "issues" addressed in the response to PRM-17 augment the Talker and are provided for information and use in the event a discussion of those issues is unavoidable. This does not alter the recommendation in the Talker that "voting for" specific options is to be avoided.

*Arguing  
Substantive  
Security Interests*

III. ISSUES FOR DECISION

A. CONCEPTUAL

1. Special Relationships (p.4)

- Direction A: Not preferred...calls for eventual withdrawal from all regional institutions notwithstanding their importance...a blow to collective security.
- Direction B: Preferred...permit President greater flexibility in developing new relationships, primarily economic, with Latin America.

2. North-South or East-West Approach? (p.5)

- Choices unacceptable: (See Talker)

B. SPECIFIC ISSUES

1. Intervention (p.8)

- Choices unacceptable...stress need for redrafting. Example of the conglomerate "basket options" which do not permit realistic choices. Direction A is less objectionable. (Additional comments in Talker).

2. Relations with Military Regimes (p.9)

- Direction A: Preferred although very vague..."types of programs" not defined.
- Direction B: Tilts against military regimes regardless of their behavior.

3. Arms Transfer (p.11)

- Direction A: State Department position...would continue to reduce arms sales regardless of effect on U.S. interests.

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- Direction B: Preferable...provides President needed flexibility to be able to influence Latin American governments in positive ways and defuse regional tensions.

4. Human Rights (p.12)

- Both directions are paternalistic. Direction B is the better of the two. Another example of conglomerate options obscuring the basic issue.
- Recent actions reveal that Latin American governments are particularly sensitive on this score...they perceive this as intervention in their internal affairs.

5. Private Investment (p.14)

NOT primary concern to DoD...Direction B probably preferable in terms of long-range U.S. interests.

6. Development Assistance (p.16)

- NOT primary concern to DoD, but...
- Direction A: Status quo which is not working.
- Direction B: Probably be more effective in attacking problem of social development--the real cause of instability in the region.

7. Cultural Exchanges (p.17)

- NOT primary concern to DoD. We believe exchanges are useful...promote mutual understanding. Support expansion of such programs.

8. Style and Attention (p.18)

- Direction B: Preferred...Greater high level attention is needed to counter the negative atmosphere created by Latin reaction to the recent U.S. hemispheric policy.

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JAN 02 2015

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 2 Jan 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15-M-0426

543.6.582

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING

Wednesday, March 24, 1977

Time and Place: 3:30 - 5:00 p.m., White House Situation RoomSubject: Latin AmericaParticipants:StateWarren Christopher  
Terence Todman  
William LuersTreasuryAnthony Solomon  
Edward BittnerArms Control and Disarmament Agency

Leon Sloss

DefenseCharles Duncan  
Major Gen. Richard E. CavazosCommerce

Frank Weil

Joint Chiefs of StaffGeneral George S. Brown  
Lt. General William SmithNSCDr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
Thomas Thornton  
Robert A. PastorCIADeputy Director Enno Knoche  
[REDACTED]Overall Approach: Should the U.S. Move Away From the Special Relationship?

Deputy Secretary Christopher opened the meeting by saying that the new Administration had been dealing with many specific Latin American problems -- for example, Panama, Cuba, and Mexico -- but we had not had an opportunity to develop an overall approach, particularly with respect to those economic issues which were of greatest concern to the Latin Americans.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

 PER 9/18/98 NSC H-RE NLC-97-126  
 BY [signature] NARS DATE 2/12/99

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He suggested that the best overall policy may be a non-policy. To follow the remarks in the President's United Nations speech, the U.S. should treat Latin America in a global context, rather than think about a regional policy. The President's Pan American Day speech on April 14 provides the natural culmination of this process and the opportunity to suggest this approach.

He then initiated a discussion of whether the U.S. had a special relationship with Latin America or not.

Assistant Secretary Todman suggested that we drop the rhetoric about a special relationship and deal with Latin America on bilateral, regional, or global levels depending on the issues. In the major economic areas, it is necessary to deal on a global basis and develop a single policy, and this is also the case on nuclear proliferation and immigration. But because of the geographical proximity, Latin America impinges on us more directly than other areas. For example, we share a border with Mexico and that requires special policies. We have certain regional institutions, and they require special policies.

Under Secretary Anthony Solomon agreed that we had special problems with respect to Mexico and Brazil, but the question of the special relationship relates to the region rather than to individual countries. He suggested that we would need special policies to these two countries. He said that the arguments against an overall special relationship to the region are very powerful.

Enno Knoche said that the possible consequences of ending the special relationship would be that it would tend to encourage Latin America to form blocs against the U.S., but he added that since this would not be in Latin America's long-term interest, he felt such blocs would not endure.

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan said the U.S. has had a special relationship with Latin America, and it still does. General Brown agreed, but he said that our special military relationships are eroding, and that we are going to miss them when they are gone. He said that this relationship -- for example, the training assistance program for foreign air force personnel -- provides an opportunity for us to influence these governments on human rights and other matters.

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Intervention

Todman said that this issue aroused the greatest interest and controversy in Latin America where the U.S. has had a long history of intervention -- most recently in the Dominican Republic and Chile. Now, we are being accused of intervention on behalf of human rights. The question is: to what extent do we need to intervene?

Duncan said that we first needed to define our interests in the hemisphere, and said such a definition would be necessary to decide on the need for a "special relationship." Then, he prefers the option of "limited intervention."

Brzezinski returned to the question of whether we should have a special policy to Latin America. He said that the notion of a special policy is ahistorical. In the past, it has done nothing more than lock us into a cycle of creating unrealistic expectations and then having to live with the subsequent disappointments. The Monroe Doctrine which underlines this approach is no longer valid. It represents an imperialistic legacy which has embittered our relationships.

He recommended that if our relationships are to become healthier, then we need to put them on a more normal footing. He said that we can do this by stressing our bilateral relations and in seeing the region's problems in a global context, as the President said in his UN speech. And we should use this as a point of departure in the Pan American Day speech. What was needed was a normalization of our relations with Latin America. We did not want another Alliance for Progress.

Christopher said that he agreed with Brzezinski's assessment.

General Brown agreed and said that we should put the statement in the context that we have recognized that Latin America had reached adulthood. Brzezinski warned, however, that such an approach was also patronizing. Instead, he said that we should encourage Latin America to diversify its relationships with other countries and regions, and that we, in turn, should differentiate our approach to different governments.

Duncan agreed that a bilateral approach makes sense, but he said the relevant question on intervention is how should we react to the Soviets in this hemisphere.

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Brzezinski said that we should not react reflexively; rather we should judge our response in terms of the likely consequences if the U.S. did not intervene. Nevertheless, he does not see a great likelihood of the U.S. intervening in Latin America in response to Soviet probes. He said that individual governments have a good sense of their own independence and therefore our reactions should be contingent on the way the other Latin Americans respond. But we cannot accept a blanket policy for all cases. Later, he said, and Solomon agreed, that a statement on nonintervention might be misinterpreted.

Leon Sloss of ACDA said that he agreed with Brzezinski's emphasis on a global and a bilateral approach, but he said that we should not discourage some regional institutions which have potential to contribute to the solution of certain problems -- for example in arms control areas.

Brzezinski agreed that we should not discourage regional institutions, but he suggested that the healthiest approach would be a hands-off one, where the Latin Americans would approach us -- instead of we, them -- to pay attention to the regional institutions.

Solomon and Brzezinski agreed that the President should redefine our relationship rather than renounce it. Solomon said that the only viable regional economic institution was the Inter-American Development Bank, and a sign of its relative importance is the fact that Secretary Blumenthal will attend its annual ministerial meeting whereas he would not attend the one at the Asian Development Bank. Even the IDB has diversified its relationships -- bringing on donors from Europe and Japan -- although we are still the biggest contributor. But in trade or aid, it is hard to see a special relationship.

David Aaron pressed the issue of the special relationship a couple of steps further. One implication of a change in strategy would involve a shift in the distribution of U.S. resources abroad. Secondly, he noted that there was, in fact, a collective consciousness in Latin America.

Brzezinski said that we should not deceive ourselves. The consciousness is only collective when it is negative and in opposition to the U.S. Constructive relations demand greater specificity.

-- In ideology, we want to show an affinity for democratic states.

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- Security considerations demand that we recognize the geopolitical importance of Brazil and perhaps the special importance of the Caribbean to the United States.
- Economically, we need a more diversified strategy.

However, Brzezinski said we should not try to package these clusters of interests into a single policy.

Weil from Commerce agreed.

#### Relationships With Military Regimes

Christopher applied the approach suggested by Brzezinski to this next issue. He suggested that we adjust our relations so as to differentiate according to the kind of regime: warm relations with civilian and democratic governments, normal relations with nonrepressive military regimes, and cool but correct relations with repressive governments.

Brzezinski agreed, noting that Brazil was not so repressive as is commonly thought. Duncan and General Brown also agreed with Christopher and repeated the need to distinguish between kinds of military governments.

David Aaron suggested joining the two agreed approaches -- the movement toward globalism and establishing a closer affinity with democracies -- by a Presidential trip to selected democracies, say in Latin America as well as in Africa or Asia.

Aaron also said that if we are going to be sincere about moving toward a global approach, we must make clear that our policies with respect to democracies or repressive regimes must be the same in Latin America as in Africa or Asia. Given the special constituencies in the U.S., that would not be easy. We will have to go out of our way to do that.

#### Human Rights

Christopher said that it was very important for us to stay committed on our policy on human rights, but at the same time, we must explore affirmative ways to express our policy.

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Solomon said that we should work with Congress to make clear why they should not be thinking about a Latin American policy on human rights. He and Christopher agreed on the need to obtain more discretionary authority and make more relevant distinctions in the application of our policy. If we define gross violations as torture or degrading treatment, instead of denial of due process, then we only single out seven-ten countries rather than 60 - 80. Then, we can have some impact.

Todman said that we should look at aid as a way to improve human rights conditions in very poor countries. For example in countries like Haiti, violations of human rights occur often because of impoverished conditions, and it does not make much sense for us to cut off aid in these circumstances.

#### Arms Transfers

Christopher asked whether the United States, as a declining source of arms to Latin America, is justified in adopting a special policy on arms transfers to Latin America.

General Brown reminded everyone that in the early Kennedy years we tried to get Latin American governments to shift defense expenditures to nation-building, but as sovereign states, they just turned to other sources to buy arms. As long as they are going to buy, he preferred that they buy from us rather than the Russians.

Sloss from ACDA said that we must approach this problem globally at both ends. Discuss it with the Soviets and with other suppliers, and at the same time urge restraint by purchasers. If this does not work, he is inclined to agree with George Brown.

#### Organization of American States

Christopher asked whether the OAS was part of the special relationship.

Todman thought the OAS was useful, but that it wasted a lot of time because it is not well-focused. He said he would like to see it strengthened.

Christopher suggested that we alter our relationship to the OAS to the way we relate to other regional organizations, like CENTO or ASEAN.

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Solomon asked Todman how he would strengthen the OAS, and Todman answered that he would eliminate the Permanent Council and reduce the U.S. contribution, but we should do so after consulting with the Latin Americans.

Solomon said that in his experience in State and in ARA, every Administration had tried to strengthen the OAS and tried to make it more efficient, by cutting personnel and reorganization. The trouble is that the Latin Americans are very sensitive to their "perks," and they perceived every effort to strengthen the OAS as an attempt to weaken it. He concluded that the OAS was useless, and there was nothing that could be done.

David Aaron said that if we want to follow the global approach to its logical conclusion, then our involvement in the OAS, which once played the role of a mini-UN, should be phased out. We really do not need it any longer. We should say we want to deal with Latin America like other regions.

Solomon acknowledged that that would indeed be perceived as the end to the special relationship, but noted that before doing that, we should look at the political ramifications and the domestic reaction, which he predicted would be negative. In conversations he has had with Latin American leaders, they all acknowledged privately that it was a worthless organization, but at the same time, they were horrified at the prospect of its being abolished. But he did not see anything we could do.

In fact, Latin Americans use the global North-South forum more and even take the SELA more seriously than they do the OAS.

Christopher said that the OAS was one of those institutions which would not die a natural death. Whenever it looks like it will, somebody turns the oxygen back on, and it has another life.

Aaron said that rather than try to leave it, abolish it, or resuscitate it with new ideas, the U.S. should just ask the OAS to justify itself.

William Luers from State said that we should be careful in formulating our policy to the OAS and more generally to the hemisphere, least our new policy be perceived as a massive rejection of Latin America.

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### Cultural and Educational Exchanges

Todman said that the value of individual contacts is very important to increase mutual understanding.

Christopher asked whether we should return to a more enlightened and generous policy with respect to cultural and educational exchanges with Latin America. Todman nodded yes.

### Technical Assistance

Christopher asked whether we should put more money into technical assistance to Latin America.

Weil from Commerce said that question brought the discussion back to the beginning: What are our interests? If they are not special, then we should not give special assistance.

### Summary and Miscellaneous

Christopher noted that Todman will be meeting with the Cubans in New York, that the Canal Treaty negotiations will be continuing, and that we should be increasingly sensitive to Brazil. Any overall statement needs to take into account our concern for special problems. He noted that the discussion was a little more philosophical than usual, but that we were probing for a relationship which adapted to the new realities.

The next step is the speech at the Organization of American States.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Doc #235

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-81-0202, Box 52, Folder Argentina, 1978.

17 MAR 1978

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 02 2015

Dear Cy,

I am concerned that continuing our present policy on arms sales to Argentina may not be contributing to our human rights objectives, and about the adverse effects it may be having on our overall long-term interests. Ambassador Castro has stated that the effect of U.S. sanctions policy to date has helped to sensitize Argentine leaders to international concern for human rights, but has not significantly ameliorated specific wrongs. He also points out that the sanctions approach is influencing adversely our other major bilateral objectives -- non-proliferation, good security relationships, and cooperation on multilateral economic and political issues. I think we need to reexamine carefully how we are proceeding.

Although Public Law 95-92 requires a total embargo on security assistance to Argentina after September 30, 1978, our policy over the past year has been an early embargo on all forms of security assistance. I think it is clear that the intent of the Congress in establishing a delayed effective date for termination of security assistance to Argentina was to give the Administration some flexibility in working with the Government of Argentina to encourage significant improvement in human rights practices in that country. I suggest that we now use the remaining maneuvering room made available to us by the statute.

What I propose is that we appeal to the military's interest in maintaining their force capabilities by selectively approving some requests, with a specific appeal to the military leaders that our ability and willingness to approve additional requests will be conditioned entirely by their near term performance in the human rights area. We would also indicate that we hope, if they move meaningfully in the right direction, to take measures to change the embargo legislation. After the initial demarche we would be prepared to complement the State Department by dispatching senior U.S. military men to make our position crystal clear.

In specific terms, I urge that you approve, at a minimum, release of the training which Argentina has requested to purchase, as well as all pending requests for spare parts for U.S. origin equipment. As you know, Ambassador Castro has strongly been urging approval of the training requested.

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SUBJECT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 1 Dec 86

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336-81-0202, box 52, Argentina, 1978

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Such an initiative should not be difficult to explain to the Congress, especially in light of our restrictive policy over the past year. We would be making use of remaining available time and flexibility granted to us by the Congress and of the most immediate and likely channel of influence on members of the Argentine leadership, the military. We would make a limited contribution to the Administration goal of limiting conventional arms transfers by the provision of spare parts for U.S. origin equipment--thus delaying the need for new acquisitions. Approval of the sale of spare parts and training would have a very minimal impact on the ceiling.

October is soon upon us--I believe we should give this approach a try while the law permits. We have the authority. We have credibility from past actions, and we have plausibility for these actions. Most importantly, we have the possibility for some measure of success.

*Harold*

Office of the Secretary of Defense *645.6 552*  
Chief, RDD, TSD, WHS  
Date: *2 Jan 2015* Authority: EO 13526  
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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 02 2015

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Washington National Records Center,  
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54, Folder Brazil 092, 1978.

25 APR 1978

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 31 2014

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Cy,

As you know, during his recent visit to Brazil the President and President Geisel agreed on the desirability of improvement of bilateral military cooperation.

I believe we should move promptly to follow up on this agreement, capitalizing on the very productive atmosphere created by the President's trip. Specifically, I think our Departments should jointly consider and formulate proposals which our new Ambassador can be authorized to discuss with the appropriate Brazilian authorities shortly after his arrival in country.

The Brazilians are interested in cooperating in areas involving reciprocal benefit, a proposition in which we totally concur. In thinking about such areas, a few possibilities come readily to mind:

- Intensification of personnel exchange programs covering all Services and a wide range of professional skills and specialties;
- Institution of a high level Brazil-US Lecture Exchange Series (senior Service and War College level);
- Encouragement of visits to the US by top level Brazilian military authorities under JCS and Military Department annual VIP programs (we would, of course, be prepared to reciprocate if invited);
- Consideration of the execution of memoranda of understanding between counterpart Services (and agencies like the Defense Mapping Agency) which would facilitate exchanges of ideas and information and participation in training, education, joint exercises and activities in both countries;
- Consultation at the JCS/Brazilian Armed Forces General Staff level on matters relating to hemispheric security interests.

Brazil 092

2519-175

Classified by Director, IA (ISA) OASD  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 12-31-84

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1-0202, box 54

Brazil 092

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Additionally, I think we should begin to consider an appropriate organizational framework completely different from the past. Within this framework our cooperative efforts could be discussed, and joint programs formulated and coordinated. Again, several possibilities involving senior military and diplomatic officials suggest themselves:

- An arrangement similar to that we have with Canada, i.e., a binational Defense Board consisting of diplomatic, political and military representatives to meet periodically for study and discussion of common security problems, with a subordinate Military Cooperation Committee composed of military officers responsible for planning.

- A more loosely structured relationship, perhaps folded in under the 1976 Memorandum of Understanding, which would involve periodic high level consultations on defense matters.

At this point in time I do not believe that we should regard any of these approaches as definitive or all-inclusive. Moreover, since greater equality is one of Brazil's principal aims in putting her military relationship with us on a new footing, I believe we should be as receptive and responsive as we can to any suggestions the Brazilians may have to offer.

As an opening move, I suggest we act promptly to approve the commercial exports of those items on the Munitions List which have been pending for some time now. Delay only adds an unnecessary irritant into our relationship at this juncture and tends to undercut the President's successful Brazilian visit.

Sincerely,



Office of the Secretary of Defense **S.U.S.C. 552**  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 31 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
 Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
 MDR: 15 -M- 0433

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 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: **DEC 31 2014**

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON - D.C. 20301

22 AUG 1978

Doc # 243

Honorable Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Cy:

As a follow-up to the August 17 discussion between you, Zbig, and me concerning our deteriorating relations with Argentina, I would like to recommend some positive steps which I believe should be taken on an urgent basis to reverse the recent sharp downturn in those relations.

I believe there was general agreement between us that our relations with Argentina have very seriously deteriorated. I believe the recent Argentine Navy decision to withdraw from UNITAS may represent just the first of negative steps which the GOA will feel forced to take unless we moderate our approach. While our human rights policy is very important, we need also to take into account that Argentina is a key nation with respect to our non-proliferation policy and that a go-it-alone Argentina -- whether that might mean formation of destabilizing ties with Peru, a more provocative stand on the Beagle Channel issue, withdrawal from the Rio pact, or enhanced relations with Soviet bloc countries -- is not in our interest. Further, it may well be at this point that some modification of our approach, if properly explained, will actually help on the human rights issues.

I welcome Secretary Vaky's proposed September visit. But in addition, concrete actions are needed. On the military side, I recommend we moderate our position by approving before September 30 all the pending Argentine spare parts requests, including but not limited to those which are safety related, offering this as a gesture of U.S. good faith at a time when what Ambassador Castro characterizes as "outraged nationalism" seems to be the governing factor in Argentine politics. Also, to the extent our law allows, I believe we should approve the pending requests to purchase DoD training courses.

There have been several developments since a hold was put on these transactions. Argentine public reaction to the denial of the \$270 million EXIM Bank loan for the hydroelectric project and to the public testimony by Pat Derian before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs has been, as we understand it, very negative.

~~Classified by Director IA(ISA)OASD  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 1986~~

330-81-0202, box 52, Argentina, 1978

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X-2480

15-m-0445 R-1

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 31 2014

The terrorist bombing of Admiral Lambruschini's residence, resulting in the death of his teenage daughter, has also served to strengthen the argument of minority hard-line elements of the Argentine military that reforms are premature. The alleged Tyson statement reflecting USG support for the Montonero terrorists, even though totally false, has done further serious harm to our efforts to promote democratization. The GOA has, in fact, taken some positive steps to meet the conditions laid down during Dave Newsom's visit by initiating an invitation to the IAHRC, by agreeing to a majority of conditions necessary for such a visit, and by continuing to consider the remainder. Finally, in view of the new junta-president power relationship established August 4, power plays between the president and junta, and within the junta itself, will probably continue for the near term, delaying the resolution of key policy issues.

Unlike the EXIM Bank decision, our decision to withhold training and spare parts has not been made public here or in Argentina. For this reason, I think we could safely modify our current position without seeming to vacillate. We need to do this immediately -- or at the latest by the time of the Vaky visit because of the administrative lead-time prior to the legislated embargo date of September 30 which would be needed to implement any go-ahead decision. In connection with such a decision we could inform the GOA privately that: (1) we recognize the internal political difficulties which have recently developed, (2) we are offering these approvals as concrete evidence of our good faith and determination to work together toward mutual objectives, and (3) we hope and expect they will see fit to develop and implement a set of substantial human rights initiatives soon.

Sincerely,

*Harold*

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 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: DEC 31 2014

Office of the Secretary of Defense *SV.S.C. 552*  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: *31 Dec 2014* Authority: EO 13526  
 Declassify: *X* Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
 MDR: *IS* -M- *0445*

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Doc # 247

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0205, Box 7, Folder Chile, 1979.

OCT 24 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Retaliatory Actions Against Chile as the Result of the Letelier Decision

I strongly disagree with implementing the military related actions proposed by Cy Vance in the Chile case, which would amount to severing our military-to-military relations. (The Defense Attache Office, which is proposed to be kept, is correctly regarded as principally an intelligence activity.)

I recognize the fact, and agree, that we must show some displeasure with the Chilean Supreme Court decision. However, I believe that our response must be carefully measured and not contrary to national security interests. To overreact, in terms of military relations with a government whose leaders are military men, would in my judgment be contrary to our best interests.

Recognizing that military related actions are simple to initiate--and, perhaps, politically agreeable domestically--I am convinced that any military-related countermeasures are not desirable for the following reasons:

- Chile's geographic location is strategically important to us and is becoming increasingly so.
- Since the Chilean government is a military government, we would be inflicting both a political and a military wound. Political wounds take years to heal, are not easily remedied, and will end up making us work through third parties to achieve objectives.
- Any military sanctions which force disassociation will result in long-term Chilean decisions and commitments. Logistics, materiel, training and funding commitments will be irreversible in the short to midterm.
- Acts of withdrawal/disengagement equate to long-term loss of influence and control.

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Date: DEC 31 2014

23 Oct 79

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OSD FS 212 Other Agency Equity TBD  
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- Denying spare parts for Chile's current weapons systems would force them to acquire new and more sophisticated systems, creating an unwanted arms race in the region.
- We can ill afford creating additional vacuums in the hemisphere for the Soviets or other third parties to fill.
- We can ill afford signaling further disengagements in the hemisphere.

For the reasons stated above, and in keeping with the policies you outlined to the nation and the world in your 1 October speech, I strongly recommend that military-related actions not be included in any short-term retaliation directed toward Chile. Specifically, we should not terminate the FMS pipeline on the Mil Group, or deny validated licenses for exports to the Chilean armed forces. The long-term security interests of the United States are paramount and override the short-term option of using military disassociation as a sanction.

*Harold Brown*

cc: Secretary Vance

Office of the Secretary of Defense *5 U.S.C. 552*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *31 Dec 2014* Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: *X* Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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OCT 27 1980

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Brzezinski Collection (Donated Material),  
Subject File, Box 34, Folder Mtgs Muskies, Brown, Brzezinski, 10/80-1/81.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Argentina (U)

(S) In July, the PRC recommended improving our relations with Argentina, and your reaction was that you were "inclined to move faster" than the PRC had recommended. Secretary Muskies has now proposed cutting back on our initiatives because of the Argentine support for the coup in Bolivia and the lack of Argentine cooperation on grains export restrictions to the Soviet Union. This approach strikes me as counter-productive.

(S) We have long known that the Argentines did not support the grain embargo. Indeed, one of the factual predicates for the PRC recommendation was our inability to influence the Argentines to join in the embargo. That lack of influence demonstrated the need to improve relations. The Argentine support for the Bolivian coup is regrettable, to say the least, but again we are not likely to improve our ability to influence their actions by limiting our opportunities to talk to them.

(S) Such limitations, however, are, in effect, what the State Department memorandum proposes. Leaving aside the signature of the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement, which is outside the national security area, the other proposed actions are

- to avoid talks on security and hemispheric policy issues,
  - not to extend invitations to Argentine military officers,
- and
- not to send a high level U.S. military delegation on a visit to Argentina.

(S) General Goodpaster's earlier visit demonstrated the important positive effects which can be achieved by high level personal contact between U.S. military officers and the Argentine government. The Argentines have a military government. If we

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are to bring Argentina closer to our views, the best chance rests in talking to that government and using military to military channels as appropriate conduits for our messages and views.

(C) I therefore strongly oppose the proposed postponements of military-related initiatives recommended by Secretary Muskie.

*W. Graham Claytor, Jr.*

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Copy to:  
Secretary of State

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0203, Box 9, Folder Cuba (Jan-Aug) 1979.

22 JUN 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In my memorandum of May 14, 1979, I recommended an SCC meeting to review our policy toward Cuba in connection with the Summit. Even though such a meeting was not held before the Summit, I continue to believe we need to review our Cuba policies, particularly in light of Cuba's buildup of its conventional military forces and its increasing adventurism in Central America and the Caribbean.

There has now been distributed on an interagency basis the DOD background paper, which I referred in my memorandum of May 14, as well as a subsequent paper prepared by the Department of State. I recommend a mid-July SCC, based on these papers updated as appropriate.

*Harold Brown*

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5456.552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 27 Jan 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15-M-0452

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Date:

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BACKGROUND PAPER

REAPPRAISAL OF U.S./CUBA RELATIONS

Summary and Conclusions

Recent Cuban arms modernization, including MIG 23s, naval base construction and the acquisition of submarines, together with Cuban activities in the Caribbean and in Africa all pose serious security policy questions for the U.S.

- The rapid buildup of Soviet-furnished conventional offensive weapons since early 1976 and the increased Soviet navy presence in the Caribbean increase Soviet-Cuban military capabilities in this hemisphere. The acquisition of MIG-23/Flogger aircraft, the Foxtrot and Whiskey submarines and the development of the naval facility in Cienfuegos exemplify this trend, which could be taking place without violation of existing agreements with the USSR.

- Based on the potential capacity of the new naval facilities and submarine/minelayer capability, Cuba could establish within 1½ to 2 years a capability to interdict our non-Arab petroleum supplies (Nigeria, Venezuela, potentially Mexico), our bauxite supplies (Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana) and ocean-to-ocean transit (Panama Canal).

- Therefore, in the event of contingencies in a NATO scenario, CINCLANT would be obligated to provide forces to protect our southern flank against Cuba. Both CINCLANT and the Joint Staff have indicated that the U.S. forces required to neutralize an increasingly modernized hostile Cuba could cause an important reduction in U.S. forces available to NATO.

- Cuba has been an influential communist regime and in some cases directly supported Soviet objectives by providing troops and direct aid to revolutionary movements elsewhere. Cuba's revolutionary small country mystique gives it entree into liberation struggles more easily than the USSR.

- The successes of these efforts and Cuba's continuing role in Africa encourage those antagonistic to us even in countries where Cuba has not actually sent troops. Recent developments in Central America and the Eastern Caribbean (Grenada, Jamaica, Guyana) are providing Cuba with new targets of opportunity in the Western Hemisphere which she has demonstrated a willingness to pursue.

- In sum, Cuba provides the USSR a cheap proxy to carry out Soviet policy objectives with little direct Soviet commitment.

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In the face of these problems our policy is drifting. We have neither developed carrots nor sticks with which to deal with Castro. The embargo is an irritant to Cuba but has not brought them to revise their policies, and it does reinforce their dependence on the Soviets. Our efforts toward normalization of relations and other partial efforts to solve our problems have not paid off. Cuban initiatives in Angola and Ethiopia have not evoked a forceful response from the U.S. nor have they deterred the establishment of a new Cuban presence in South Yemen, and Mozambique. We have mounted a political challenge in the NAM through friends but this has not really undercut the Cubans and our efforts are flagging. We have not conveyed clear signals regarding the Cuban activities in Africa, the Cuban military buildup, or on Central American or Caribbean issues.

In short, the Cubans have many irons in the fire and may believe they are free to expand their activities at will. Therefore, a reappraisal of our relations with both Cuba and the USSR is in order and we need to redefine the agreement or "understanding" under which the placement of nuclear and/or offensive weapons in Cuba is precluded.

Obviously actions we take vis-a-vis Cuba will have a Soviet dimension and could impinge adversely on U.S./USSR relations. The purpose of this paper is to stimulate discussion of the joint Cuban-USSR strategy as we see it, to describe comprehensively the pattern of Cuban action, and to catalog possible U.S. responses.

#### Disturbing Trends in Cuban Actions

- Continued buildup of Cuban military, civilian advisory and training personnel abroad in unprecedented numbers. (Some 39,000 military personnel and 11,000 civilian advisors in 20 countries.) Notable deployments include:

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian Advisory</u>
-- Angola	20,000	7000-9000
-- Ethiopia	13,000	600
-- Mozambique	600	300
-- Iraq	UNK	400
-- S. Yemen	500	200-300
-- Vietnam	UNK	200-300
-- Laos	UNK	50-150
-- Grenada	70	200 (anticipated shortly)

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Note: The trends have been upward in each of the countries cited above in recent years. Increases in civilian advisory personnel are anticipated in each of these countries and a presence in Afghanistan may be expected this year.

- Continued acquisition of sophisticated offensive military weapons systems which represent an increase of potential threat to the U.S. (MIG-23s, Foxtrot submarine and Whiskey trainer, with Cienfuegos base construction, and possibility of additional submarines and missile patrol boats are examples.)

- Increased military capability has increased Cuban options for possible military action against the U.S., especially in a global U.S.-USSR conflict or in support of destabilizing the Caribbean as a surrogate force for the Soviets. These actions generally support Soviet foreign policies, but could also support independent Cuban objectives -- a fact that suggests that we may need to deal with Cuba as well as the Soviet Union in forestalling problems.

- Strenuous efforts to control the NAM Summit and establish firmly Castro's leadership. (In 1970 Cuba had diplomatic relations with 7 African nations, in 1979 with 36. It now has relations with 66 of the 88 NAM nations.)

- Conclusion recently of long term economic arrangements with the USSR, keeping Cuba in the Soviet camp for years to come.

Note: Though Moscow is trying to reduce the burden in 1981-1986, they will find it difficult to hold aid to Cuba below \$3 billion per year. With such a subsidy constituting 20-30% of Cuban GNP, intensification of Cuban-Soviet planning for 1981-86 period cannot but have an effect on Cuban policy. The largest subsidies are paid by the Soviets on sugar, nickel and petroleum.

- A record of unbroken success has given Cuban leaders greater confidence in overseas expeditionary forces as evidenced by their increased presence in the Middle East (S. Yemen), Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos), potentially in Afghanistan and now in the Eastern Caribbean (Grenada).

- More sophisticated ability to influence events by indirect methods -- infiltration, organization and training in Cuba, advice, and funds -- rather than direct intervention with personnel and arms. (Witness their behind the scenes approach in Central America. Also their sophisticated marshalling of support for radical movements in Puerto Rico and attempts to make Puerto Rican independence a major U.N. issue.)

- Continued revolutionary and terrorism training in Cuba and in some cases (Jamaican trainees) encouraging them to immigrate to the U.S. to foment revolution.

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### Cuban Objectives

From the record of Cuban actions over the past few years, we interpret their objectives to be these:

- Establish Cuba as a major leader in the Third World, the NAM, and North-South fora through an extensive network of political, military and economic ties.
- Demonstrate Cuba as a Communist success story and example for the Third World, especially Latin America.
- Remove U.S. trade embargo and force U.S. withdrawal from Guantanamo without appearing to capitulate to U.S. pressures for quid pro quo.
- Expand their influence in various Third World conflicts through process of "revolutionary support," while neutralizing Western or Chinese reactions by branding them as "illegal," "imperialist," "interference," in other countries' internal affairs, and relying on Soviet strategic power as a deterrent against retaliatory actions directed against Cuba.
- Maintain domestic support for various foreign "crusades" while minimizing domestic repercussions, e.g. heavy combat losses, or steady attrition of forces, find employment for returning veterans, etc. Secure Soviet aid to finance ventures.

### U.S. Policy Dilemma

Basic U.S. response: We have attempted to make clear we are not fundamentally hostile, are prepared to work toward accommodation, and as an indication of our intent, established interest sections as a signal of our willingness to normalize eventually. In addition we took a number of practical steps such as concluding fishing agreements, easing travel barriers, obtaining the release of some political prisoners, reuniting families and other moves. However, these steps were taken against the backdrop of actions and objectives cited above which run directly counter to U.S. global interests -- doubtless causing the Cubans some confusion as to our intent. Indeed, we have shown no success in containing Cuban military assistance to revolutionary governments in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Our policies have vacillated, as in Africa. First we intended to ignore the Cuban presence, then claimed their role was helpful, later tried to join their side until there were serious conflicts and finally came down hard on their intervention. We have made withdrawal from Africa a pre-condition for forward movement and this has led us to an impasse in our relations. We have indicated that we will withhold lifting the trade embargo and that diplomatic relations will not be reestablished until:

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(1) There is a dramatic improvement in their African/Middle East posture and

(2) We reach agreement on compensation for expropriated U.S. properties.

It is clear, however, that these policies have not proved effective. They do not appear to place a high priority on normalization. The Cubans continue to expand their military capabilities and overseas ventures, are linked more solidly than ever with Soviet economic aid, and continue to enhance their position with the Third World. Under these circumstances, what should be our policy objectives and strategy?

#### Desirable U.S. Policy Objectives

- Reduce and ultimately remove Cuban military forces from Africa and the Middle East and halt the introduction of these forces elsewhere.
- Undercut the Cuban drive for leadership in the Third World, cooperating with our Western Allies, the Chinese and moderate NAM members to identify Cuba for what it often is -- a proxy for the Soviets.
- Halt the introduction of new and sophisticated offensive weapons into Cuba from Soviet sources and the construction of new bases capable of supporting them.
- Increase Cuba's economic difficulties at present through concerted economic measures while holding out prospect of cooperation in event their policies change.
- Meanwhile, actively seek a more meaningful dialogue with Cuba aimed at genuine normalization of relations.

#### Actions to Achieve Our Policy Objectives

If we accept that Cuban actions are a cause for concern, that their apparent objectives are inimical to our basic security interests, that we have desirable contrary objectives, then there are several different contexts in which we can take political, military or economic actions to achieve our objectives. For discussion purposes we have grouped some examples of the types of actions we might take to achieve our objectives either on the spot, in areas of intervention, with the Soviets, through the NAM, in the economic field or as longer term measures.

#### Actions to Neutralize Cuban Activities on the Spot

- Expand our intelligence capabilities to detect subversive activities in support of revolutionary regimes in Third Countries and furnish convincing evidence thereof. (Example, Grenada)

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- Exchange this information promptly with our allies and opponents of Cuba. Indeed, share it with existing leftist but nationalistic governments which Cubans may be subverting.

- Mount an information campaign to publicize Cuban subversive efforts as soon as they occur, making them pay in world opinion for every action. (Caution should be exercised so as not to generate sympathy for the under-dog being "bullied" by a super power.)

- Increase military exercises and intelligence gathering activities in Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean area, with an emphasis on demonstrating appropriate counters to Cuban military capabilities.

- Recall the head of our Interest Section in Havana and fully brief him on our efforts. Instruct him to make a demarche to the Cubans pointing out our concerns over the trend of Cuban actions and our intent to take remedial steps.

- Approach all countries with some leverage on Cuba. Point out political, economic and other measures, both positive and negative, we might be prepared to take to obtain a reduction of Cuban presence.

#### Actions To Take With The Soviets

Approach the Soviets at the highest level and review the entire situation of the influx of offensive weapons to Cuba and the joint Cuban/Soviet involvement overseas.

- We should be prepared to tie the approach to major U.S./USSR issues, including economic steps as well as political and military moves.

- Redefine the agreements and understandings which precluded the introduction of nuclear and offensive weapons into Cuba.

- Point out where the use of Cuban forces overseas are contributing to deterioration of our relations and outline steps we feel might alleviate the situation and steps we may be forced to take to counter such actions if they continue.

#### Actions To Take Regarding the NAM

- Orchestrate a diplomatic offensive against Cuba, through all posts, and particularly through the U.N., OAS, OAU and moderate NAM members. Encourage the Yugoslavs and Chinese to take the lead in criticizing Cuba. Attempt to discredit in every way Cuba's non-aligned status and Castro's right to lead the NAM, especially as the Havana Summit approaches. Characterize the Cubans as a Soviet proxy whenever possible. Raise the specter of Soviet manipulation of the Cubans so as to expose their effort to establish a "natural alliance" of the NAM and the socialist bloc. Isolate Cuba in the NAM.

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- Weaken the Arab/Cuban connection. Use moderate Arabs such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan to educate more radical states on the dangers of Cuban revolutionary influence in Islamic states.

- Carefully solicit Chinese initiatives with third countries to neutralize Cuban and Soviet actions. The Chinese can be very effective persuaders to a broad spectrum of NAM nations.

#### Economic Actions

- Approach Cuba's major trading partners, especially Japan, seeking their reassessment of trading policies with Cuba and those countries which have Cuban troops present.

- Play on Cuba's shortage of hard currency. Urge cancellation of credit links; make them a bad lending risk. Work with major Western creditors, i.e., British, Canadians and Japanese. Make the Soviets bail Cuba out.

- Prevent Cuban membership in the Caribbean Development Bank.

- Urge inactivation, postponement, or cancellation of all Western economic and technical cooperation agreements with Cuba by those nations who agree that steps must be taken to halt Cuban overseas ventures.

- Maintain our own strict embargo -- urge others to reconsider. Set up a special restrictive COCOM category for Cubans (this will do little economically but will isolate them more politically).

- Revive the black list of third country ships trading with Cuba.

- Attempt to keep world sugar and nickel prices at current low level, recognizing that we are also sugar producers.

#### Longer Term Actions

- Take on the Cubans directly in the U.N. on the Puerto Rico issue. Start early, take the initiative from the Cubans and remove issue from U.N. agenda. Refuse to give an inch.

- Form "groupings" with Western Allies and moderates of concerned nations to counter Cuban/Soviet influence and take actions, exerting political, economic, and, when necessary, military force in different geographic areas. (For example, in Africa utilize the French, Portuguese, Belgians, West Germans, British and Italians and coordinate with Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Nigeria and Zaire. Another example: Seek to tie European support for projects in African nations hosting Cuban's project to reducing Cuban military presence there.) These efforts should include some contingency planning by participants for allocation of resources and activation in the event of intervention by the Cubans.

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- Analyze the potential ideological differences between (1) Cuban and emerging revolutionary groups (example, Central American) and (2) Cuban and Soviet objectives and attempt to exploit them in order to create friction in the international party apparatus.

#### Why These Courses of Action?

We believe that our current efforts toward normalization with Cuba, while achieving limited domestic benefits, have damaged our long term strategic interests. If our intelligence is correct, the Cubans now do not expect significant improvement in U.S./Cuban relations over the next few years. Therefore, they feel they have much to gain and nothing to lose by continuing their present course on issues of concern to the U.S. In order to make them moderate their actions, this perception must be reversed. Strong, across-the-board but progressively measured actions as outlined above will lay the groundwork for the United States to respond to disturbances in the Third World fomented by the Cubans and Soviets. Keeping the Cubans and Soviets "honest," even at a short term cost to normalization, would be preferable to the unopposed activism of the Cubans and Soviets. It might well advance us more toward normalization with Cuba in the long term. It would increase U.S. prestige and credibility worldwide. And it would, most importantly, force reconsideration of what appears to be a joint Cuban/Russian attempt to project force in this hemisphere, i.e., introduction of offensive weapons, construction of bases.

#### Implications for U.S.-USSR Relations

If we depart from the premise that Cuba's actions are motivated both by Castro's "revolutionary" zeal and the level of support received from the USSR, then we need to either decrease the level of USSR support or increase the cost perceived by the USSR, since we have no ready way of counter-acting Castro's mind-set. That is the purpose of the possible actions listed above, all of which in turn have a cost to us in terms of our relationships with the USSR. The point is that the Cuba-USSR joint program which we now consider poses serious policy considerations for the U.S., will not be moderated unless we find a way to exacerbate subtle ideological differences between the USSR and Cuba, or increase the cost to the USSR compared to the benefit of using Cuba as its surrogate, as has been so comprehensively described in both DIA and CIA studies (SNIE 85-79 and TCS 2315-79/1). Just as Cuban actions can only be viewed in a Cuban/USSR context, U.S. counter-action must also be viewed in a U.S./USSR context.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Washington, D.C. 20301  
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Washington National Records Center,  
SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0203, Box 9,  
Folder Cuba (Jan-Aug), 1979.

1 AUG 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

Subject: Ways to Enhance US Military Presence in the  
Caribbean

X-  
Cuba

A Special Coordination Committee (SCC) convened on July 20, 1979, to consider various courses of action in response to the Cuban military buildup and increasing interventionism in the Third World. From that meeting, DoD was tasked to develop, and submit to the NSC, proposals on ways the US can enhance its military presence in the Caribbean in order to promote regional stability and demonstrate US interest in the region.

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The current military presence in the Caribbean is as follows:

- a. Major Bases: US military bases are at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the Canal Zone. No operational fleet units are permanently based at these locations; however, there are virtually continuous US Navy training missions in the Caribbean and occasional large exercises conducted in the region. Port calls throughout the Caribbean by US Navy ships are limited by operational/training considerations.
- b. US Naval Facilities: The US has maintained naval facilities in Antigua, Barbados (closed March 31, 1979), Turks and Caicos and the Bahamas. These facilities provide sound surveillance intelligence data on Soviet submarine operations in the Western Atlantic. However, as a result of improved technological developments, these facilities will no longer be required. Closure of the facilities at Turks and Caicos and the Bahamas is programmed for 1980. The Antigua closure is programmed for 1984. The US Navy Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) at Andros Island in the

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Date Sept 13 2005 Sec 3.3 (b) (5)  
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REVIEW ON JULY 31, 1999  
EXTENDED BY: DIRECTOR, IA(OSD/ISA)  
REASON: 5200.1R, Par 2-301c5

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Bahamas, which conducts acoustic research and weapons development, will be retained for the indefinite future.

c. Air Force Sites: The Air Force Eastern Test Range sites are located at Antigua, Grand Bahama Island and Grand Turk. These sites are involved in supporting ballistic missile test programs. They will be maintained for the foreseeable future.

The options below detail ways in which US military presence and operational readiness can be enhanced in the Caribbean, particularly in the eastern region. These options are feasible for implementation within the Atlantic Command and can be conducted within the constraints of operational tempo, fuel allocation, budgetary considerations and other deployment commitments; e.g., DPQ submitted to NATO.

a. Shift the centroid of fleet exercises from the Atlantic seaboard southward to the Caribbean. Short training periods in home waters can be combined into fewer but longer duration periods of coordinated exercises in the Caribbean. Exercise units can be scheduled for increased visits throughout the Caribbean.

b. Deploy amphibious shipping, with a landing force embarked, to conduct additional amphibious training in the Caribbean. This will provide an opportunity for increased port visits both before and after the exercises.

c. Conduct bilateral maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) operations with Netherlands patrol aircraft stationed in the Caribbean.

d. Renew efforts to encourage Latin American and NATO navies with interests in the hemisphere to expand their participation in the annual readiness exercise (READEX) in the Caribbean. This is a follow-on exercise to the previous SPRINGBOARD exercises in which various countries from Latin America, the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands participated. Participation has decreased in recent years because of a variety of factors, but it is believed this can be reversed.

e. Obtain staging rights for periodic surveillance missions of US maritime patrol aircraft out of Barbados and Brazil. Present staging is out of Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. Staging rights in the eastern region/South Atlantic will increase surveillance area coverage and

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provide wider US presence in the hemisphere. DoD is proceeding to approach State with a proposal on patrol aircraft staging in this hemisphere as well as other areas.

f. Increase of mid-training break period for ships undergoing training at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base to permit expansion of port visitation program.

g. Provide military support for civic action programs after natural disasters. Funding for operations of this nature would be required from non-DoD sources.

h. The possibility exists for the establishment of a naval reserve unit in Puerto Rico. However, there are a number of factors that need to be addressed before proceeding with this endeavor.

In addition to the above options, DoD is now studying the most effective use for the basing assets of the US naval complex at Key West, Florida (which supports Navy and Air Force TACAIR).

An option on the diplomatic side would be to pursue the establishment of a regional Defense Attache (DATT) accredited to the eastern Caribbean islands. The DATT could be stationed in either Barbados or Trinidad and Tobago.

My own view is that we should proceed with the majority of the above options, selecting them on the basis of their expected diplomatic and perceptual benefits and possible disadvantages.

As related information, US Navy/US Coast Guard Caribbean deployment port calls since 1976 are listed in Appendix I. This summary shows that the greatest US military presence has been in US territories. Elsewhere, particularly the eastern Caribbean, the US military profile is quite low. Major fleet exercise activity in the region is summarized in Appendix 2. This list does not include the almost continuous exercise/training activity that is conducted at Guantanamo throughout the year.

*Harold Brown*

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APPENDIX I

US NAVY PORT CALLS/EXERCISES IN THE  
CARIBBEAN, 1976-July 1979

PORT CALLS - CARIBBEAN

Numbers denote total annual inport days of one or more  
USN, USNS and USCG ships.

<u>Country</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u> (to July)
Anguilla	3.3	9.2		
Antigua	10.2	7.6	20.4	46.0
Barbados	8.9	1.0	3.1	9.0
Dominican Republic		36.4		
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	828.7	476.4	764.3	199.8
Haiti	76.8	47.2	33.6	24.7
Jamaica	90.5	5.7	41.4	1.4
Martinique		3.6		3.6
Netherlands Antilles	46.5	167.3	195.8	95.1
Puerto Rico	762.3	629.4	573.8	394.2
St. Croix	253.0	569.2	685.3	199.0
St. Lucia				3.0
St. Thomas, VI	50.9	63.8	76.8	46.0
St. Vincent	31.9	2.0		
Trinidad & Tobago	49.6	3.4	19.0	18.6
TOTAL	<u>2,213.2</u>	<u>2,012.2</u>	<u>2,413.5</u>	<u>1,040.4</u>

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 31 2015

APPENDIX 2  
SUMMARY OF NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE CARIBBEAN


<u>YEAR</u>	<u>EXERCISE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>TYPE OF EXERCISE</u>
1976	CARIBEX	Caribbean	22Jan-5Mar	Combined*
	Safe Pass	Caribbean	9-19May	Combined
	Solid Shield	Caribbean/US	12-27May	Joint **
	UNITAS XVII	Caribbean (portion)	7-15Aug	Combined
			20-30Nov	
	COMPTUEX 1-77	Caribbean/ Jacksonville Area	12-22Oct	US Navy
1977	Springboard	Caribbean	17Jan-4Mar	Combined
	CARIBEX 1-77	Caribbean	10Jun-7Feb	Combined
	Solid Shield	West Atlantic/ Caribbean	9-27 May	Joint
	CARIB Ops	Caribbean	20Jun-20Jul	US Navy
	South America	Caribbean	9Jun-18Jul	US Navy
	CTVG Ops	South Atlantic		
	UNITAS XVIII	Caribbean (portion)	7-15Aug	Combined
	COMPTUEX 5-77	Caribbean	12-26Aug	US Navy
	COMPTUEX 1-78	Caribbean/Western Atlantic	21Oct-15Nov	US Navy
1978	READEX 1-78	Caribbean	1Feb-1Mar	Combined
	ASWEX 1-78	Caribbean/Western Atlantic	6-16Mar	Combined
	COMPTUEX 2-78	Caribbean/Western Atlantic	10-20Apr	US Navy
	COMPTUEX 3-78	Caribbean/Western Atlantic	6-23May	US Navy
	UNITAS XIX	Caribbean (portion)	22Jul-2Aug	Combined
	Solid Shield	Caribbean/Western Atlantic	19-30Jun	US Navy
	COMPTUEX 4-78	Caribbean/Western Atlantic	31Jul-18Aug	US Navy
	COMPTUEX 1-79	Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico	14Nov-3Dec	Combined
1979	READEX 1-79	Caribbean/Western Atlantic	15Jan-13Feb	Combined
	COMPTUEX 2-79	Caribbean/Western Atlantic	2-13Apr	US Navy
	Solid Shield	Caribbean/Western Atlantic	9-25May	Joint
	UNITAS XX	Caribbean (portion)	20-25Jul	Combined
	READEX 2-79	Caribbean/Western Atlantic	12-23Jul	US Navy

\* Combined: Between two or more allies

\*\* Joint: Elements of more than one Service of the same  
nation participating

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Date: FEB 17 2017

CUBA

30 OCT 79

- A permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force was established at Key West, Florida, on October 9. The JTF will be responsible for planning, exercising, and operating forces in the Caribbean.

- Three US Navy ships, now in the Mediterranean and returning to the US approximately November 12, will be sent through the Caribbean, and may conduct a port visit. In addition, the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group and embarked landing force, leaving for the Sixth Fleet in January, will be routed through the Caribbean and conduct a port visit. Subsequent Ready Groups will also pass through the region.

JS 3.3 (b) (b)

15-m-045-8

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Date: FEB 17 2017

JS 3.3(b)(6)

- The Commander in Chief, Atlantic is planning a more diversified ship port call program to include the less frequently visited islands commencing next January. Planning for 1980 also includes shifting the centroid of fleet exercises from the Atlantic seaboard southward to the Caribbean. Exercise units can then be scheduled for increased visits throughout the Caribbean.

- US military personnel (both active and reserve) and equipment have been utilized for civic action programs after natural disasters in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Dominica.



- We plan to encourage Latin American and NATO navies with interests in the hemisphere to expand their participation in the annual readiness exercise in the Caribbean.

In further reviewing options for bolstering US objectives in the region, several additional initiatives have been developed to supplement those previously submitted. On the diplomatic side, we should pursue the establishment of a regional defense attache accredited to the eastern Caribbean islands. This action needs to be addressed through diplomatic channels. The US Reserve and National Guard units in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, because of their language and cultural affinity with nations in the region, seem well suited to play a useful role in enhancing the US military presence in the area. (Recently, for example, elements of the Puerto Rican National Guard were federalized for a period of approximately three weeks and provided helicopter support for the disaster relief effort in the aftermath of Hurricane David.) Through continued face-to-face cooperation, they may be used to provide the Caribbean nations with further positive signs of US interest and resolve. Talks with authorities at appropriate levels should be undertaken as initiatives are further developed.

Initiatives involving Puerto Rican/Virgin Island reserve component forces are as follows:

- Improve the readiness of US Army Reserve and National Guard in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in order to provide a signal of US resolve in the region (this action also will provide a more technically proficient force to work with Caribbean nations) and hold US joint exercises in the Caribbean, which include these reserve component forces.

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- Develop personnel and small unit exchange programs between reserve component forces and the armed forces of selected Caribbean countries, to increase cooperation and interoperability. Through these exchange programs, the US reserve component forces would help upgrade indigenous capabilities. (On a broader plane, we should consider the use of both active and reserve military components to conduct small scale, combined military exercises with friendly forces in the region.)

Naturally, the extent to which the above initiatives are carried out within current national security policy priorities, is contingent upon present and future DoD resource limitations.

With respect to the ex gratia payment to Barbados, the payment has been funded, a check has been drawn and is awaiting payment pending the receipt of an appropriate release from the Government of Barbados. The following are responses to the remaining queries in the August memo:

- The preliminary draft of an ongoing environmental impact statement study, conducted for the Commander in Chief, Atlantic has concluded that Vieques is the preferred site for amphibious training exercises. The evaluation included operational requirements, environmental impact and cost. Other areas covered in the study, which were considered less preferable in overall suitability, are the islands of Culebra (PR), Mona (PR), Isla Saona (DomRep), and Anegada (UK). Aside from suitability problems, the initial costs to purchase land and set up facilities at those alternative locations would have a significant adverse budgetary impact.

- Concerning the reexamination of the proposals to phase out and close the several US Navy sound surveillance facilities in the Caribbean, it is not practical to keep these facilities open because there is no longer any military requirement for their use. Because of improved technology these facilities are no longer needed.

*Harold Brown*

Copy to: Secretary of State

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: FEB 17 2017

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 17 Feb 2017 Authority: EO 13526 +  
Declassify: Deny in Full: 5 USC 552  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(6)  
MDR: 15 -M- 0458

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

*Doc #265*

AUG 1 1980

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-00217, Box 6, Folder Cuba (Aug) 1980.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Return of Cuban Undesirables - Military Options (8)

(8) The attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff presents military options to return approximately 1500 undesirable Cuban refugees from the United States to Cuba.

(8) None of the options offers a good prospect of success and several involve a significant potential for the need to use military force. I concur in the JCS' initial assessment of the attached military options that indicates it would be very difficult to penetrate Cuban waters or airspace and accomplish the mission undetected; if detected, risks are high, appropriate reaction difficult, and the propaganda value to Cuba would be significant.

(8) Accordingly, at this time I recommend against going forward with any of these options.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

Office of the Secretary of Defense *54.5.6.530*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *28 Jan 2015* Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: *x* Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: *15-M-0467*

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: *JAN 28 2015*

*330-82-00217, box 6, Cuba (Aug) 1980*

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Declassify on *Aug 1, 1986*

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~~NOFORN~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

30 JUL 1980

1 AUG 1980  
SECDEF HAS SEEN

In reply refer to:  
I-23828/80



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Return of Cuban Undesirables - Military Options (8) -- ACTION  
MEMORANDUM

(9) During the deliberations considering possible actions to be taken to prevent the flow of Cuban refugees aboard third country vessels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were tasked by the NSC Staff to provide military options to return approximately 1500 undesirable Cuban refugees. The attached options paper has been forwarded to you in response to that request.

(8) After a review of the attached paper, we agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that none of the options deserve recommendation. The risks and escalation factors inherent in such operations are very high for the ends to be achieved. The Coast Guard option is interesting, but unlikely to work (i.e., the Cubans need not let the vessel land, thereby demonstrating US impotence) and could even pose the risk of another hostage situation (which although unlikely could be escalatory).

(6) Attached is a memorandum from you to Dr. Brzezinski.

Franklin D. Kramor

Attachments  
a/s

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense  
International Security Affairs

cc: USDP

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 28 2015

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Declassify on 25 July 1986~~

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X-09804





~~SECRET~~ ~~NOT FORN~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 July 1980  
CM-676-80

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Military Options (✓)

1. (§) This memorandum responds to a request for military options to return approximately 1500 undesirable Cuban refugees now detained in the United States to Cuba.
2. (§) Four military options and one non-military alternative have been reviewed. Of the military options, two are based on the use of sealift to return the aliens, while the other two rely on airlift. The fifth, a non-military alternative, was suggested by the Coast Guard. u/c

OPTION 1 - Major clandestine return via sealift

This option envisions anchoring a seized refugee boat or MSC vessel in Cuban waters with the aliens on board. Specifically, the detainees would be staged at a base such as NAS Pensacola, where they would be loaded aboard ship for movement to Cuban waters. The vessel could be one such as the recently seized BLUE FIRE (capacity only about 500), or preferably, a larger MSC "expendable" ship like the TOWLE (currently awaiting turn-in for scrapping), capable of carrying all 1500. Both vessels are operable and would proceed under their own power.

A SEAL detachment would be responsible for security while a USCG team would be responsible for movement of the vessel. Once loaded, BLUE FIRE or TOWLE would proceed to Cuban waters with the final portion of the voyage under cover of darkness. Upon arrival inside Cuban waters, the ship would be anchored and its steering and propulsion systems disabled. The SEALs and USCG team would then depart via small boats to a USN ship in international waters. The aliens would be released from below-deck detention by timed lock devices set for release subsequent to departure of the security force.

Forces required:

- 1 MSC ship or seized vessel
- 1 Escort ship (DD/FF)
- USCG ship control team and USN SEAL detachment 11

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 28 2015

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The principal advantage of this option is minimal use of direct military force. Its major disadvantages are the difficulty in masking intentions, the potential for charges that the US had violated customary international humanitarian law and the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, and the ease with which the Cuban Government could thwart the entire operation by towing the ship outside Cuban waters.

OPTION 2 - Smaller, multiple vessel clandestine sealift

This option envisions the return of small groups of Cuban undesirables via boats previously seized by the USCG. The concept would be essentially the same as that for the larger sealift option, requiring smaller crews and security elements.

In addition to the advantage of minimal use of direct military force, this small boat option would be more difficult to thwart and would probably result in less adverse international reaction. The small boat option would, however, only be useful in moving a limited number of aliens.

OPTION 3 - Small scale clandestine insertion by airlift

This option would use C-130 aircraft for movement of about 50 aliens from a base, such as Eglin AFB, to an airfield or suitable landing area in Cuba. Specifically, 2 C-130s would depart Eglin AFB at night, ostensibly destined for Howard AFB, Panama. Once south of Cuba, the C-130 with the aliens aboard would turn north and land at a predetermined site in Cuba, while the other C-130 continued to Panama. After landing, the C-130 would discharge its passengers and depart under cover of darkness. If the C-130 entering Cuban airspace were detected, Cuban air defense radars would be jammed by carrier-based EA-6Bs, while TACAIR support would be available from an on-station carrier. An airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS) would provide warning and control to the C-130 and carrier aircraft in the event of a Cuban military reaction.

Force required:

- 2 C-130 aircraft
- 1 Aircraft carrier within 100 miles of Cuba
- 1 E-3A (AWACS)
- Security force aboard the C-130

The principal advantage to this option would be speed and minimum warning it allows for Cuban reaction. The major problems are maintaining security on the C-130, avoiding detection and subsequent Cuban reaction, and the likelihood of casualties and general escalation if detected and engaged.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 28 2015

OPTION 4 - Major clandestine insertion by air

This option envisions sequencing approximately 18 C-130s with all of the aliens, a ground security force, and a combat control team into a suitable Cuban landing site. This operation would be accomplished under cover of darkness and would require the back-up forces mentioned in Option 3. The likelihood of detection and probability of escalation resulted in elimination of this option from further consideration.

Non-Military Alternative - Coast Guard overt return via ship

The Coast Guard suggested an overt alternative with prior notice to the Government of Cuba. It assumes, however, that court challenges to the return of the aliens have been successfully answered.

The aliens would be gathered at a convenient southern port and loaded aboard an unarmed US vessel with a Coast Guard crew. Security would be provided by Coast Guard personnel or US Marshalls. The vessel would be considered expendable, such as USNS TOWLE mentioned above. It would sail directly for Havana utilizing an appropriate escort as far as Cuban waters.

This alternative carries minimum risk of military opposition, but it would run the risk of the US crew being held by the Cubans. The major advantage of this alternative is its overt character, demonstrating publicly but non-offensively firm US resolve not to accept excludable aliens.

3. (P) The initial assessment of these military options indicates that it would be very difficult to penetrate Cuban waters or air-space and accomplish the mission undetected. If detected, risks are high, appropriate reaction difficult, and the propaganda value to Cuba would be significant. DIA has been tasked to provide a more detailed assessment of the military risks and no option is recommended in this paper.

4. (U) Moreover, there are complex legal implications and obvious humanitarian issues which present additional serious problems. If these military options are to be pursued further, an Interdepartmental Task Force should be formed to address these critical issues.



LEW ALLEN, JR.  
General, USAF  
Acting Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff



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~~ALPHA CHANNEL~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JUN 25 1979

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0204, Box 38, Folder 337  
WH (Aug-Dec) 1979.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Limiting the Consequences of a Sandinista Victory

As you are aware, there are a variety of steps being taken to deal with the situation in Nicaragua. However, we ought to consider the consequences if we are unable to achieve a satisfactory solution. It therefore seems to me desirable that we begin immediately to examine what we might do to prevent the destabilization of neighboring countries, especially El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Should the Sandinistas prevail in Nicaragua, and especially if the resulting government goes Marxist-Leninist, we are likely to see two types of general effects. The leftist oppositions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras will be encouraged in their efforts; Nicaragua likely will be available to them as a base of operations, possible safe haven, and source of, or conduit for, materiel support. The right in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras will likely react sharply to protect their positions; they (including especially the military) will want to take measures to ensure that "it can't happen here." In sum, a Sandinista victory will strengthen the leftist insurgents and increase the likelihood of left-right confrontations in these other countries.

It would be useful specifically to take account of these possibilities in our policies toward El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The recent PRC on Central America made specific recommendations concerning these countries (Tab A), but, at that time, a near-term Sandinista victory seemed less likely than currently is the case. The situations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras actually differ substantially, making different strategies appropriate:

- In El Salvador, the current president, Romero, is one of the very few El Salvadoran military leaders who would be receptive to United States' suggestions for internal political liberalization. He faces a very significant (and recently quite successful) leftist opposition -- the take-overs of the Venezuelan, French, and Costa Rican embassies are only the most

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Review on 23 June 1985

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SEC DEF JCNR NO. 2

82-0204, Box 38, 337 WH (Aug-Dec) 1979

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

JAN 28 2015

recent manifestations of the very substantial internal terrorist threat -- who almost certainly will be emboldened by the Sandinista (and their own) successes. Concurrently, his military will want to crack down hard on this opposition and will want to replace him if he does not respond.

- The US cannot reasonably expect a better government in El Salvador than President Romero represents and our near term efforts should be directed toward maintaining Romero in power. El Salvador is, however, a tinderbox and helping Romero may require both providing him assistance (beyond the aid loan recommended by the PRC) to demonstrate that his "dialogue" with the US Embassy pays dividends and looking the other way somewhat if, to offset the terrorists, he takes steps that also violate rights in country. This would require our adopting (especially in forums like Deputy Secretary Christopher's committee which reviews our many non-military assistance programs) a policy toward El Salvador designed toward encouraging stability by giving more weight to actions that would buttress Romero and less weight to actions which would squeeze him because of human rights violations.
- In Guatemala, the military and ruling elite are sufficiently strong and the opposition sufficiently weak that a Sandinista takeover likely will have only long-range, rather than immediate, significant effects. Given the substantial involvement of the government in assassination of potential moderate leaders, we probably do not want to do more than the PRC recommended (\$6 million rural enterprise loan, helicopter for President). Indeed, long-range United States strategy may best be served by selecting moderate military leaders and seeking to protect them from government attack.
- In Honduras, as in Guatemala, there is no significant leftist threat. Indeed, the advent of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua could remove them from their safe havens in Honduras and thereby eliminate one of the significant problems the country now faces. The other significant problems (apart

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Date: JAN 28 2015



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from Honduras' general politico-socio-economic plight) are the influx of refugees from Nicaragua and the Honduras-El Salvador border dispute. Neither of these will be much affected by a Sandinista victory in Nicaragua.

Our strategy in Honduras, therefore, should be directed to ensuring that the military do not (in reaction to the Nicaraguan situation) refuse to go through with its plan shortly to hold elections. One useful thing the United States could do would be quickly to implement the PRC strategy to "try" to increase economic aid, FMS, and IMET levels. This would be a demonstration of US support at a time when the Honduran military might most appreciate it.

In sum, the strategy laid out by the PRC and approved by you is sound so far as it goes, but it should be expanded as outlined above.

*Harold Brown*

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: JAN 28 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 28 Jan 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0486



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT DATE:  
02-24-2015

Washington National Records Center,  
SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0000217, Box 7,  
Folder El Salvador, 1980.

DEC 30 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Security Assistance to El Salvador (U)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 11 2016

(C) Secretary Muskie's recent memorandum to you concerning assistance to El Salvador focused heavily on the economic situation in that country. Your approval of continued economic aid, non-lethal FML pipeline military equipment and continued training of Salvadoran officers in Panama and the U.S. will be helpful. There is, however, a further military dimension which also deserves consideration.

(S) El Salvador's national security establishment consists of some 17,000 personnel divided between the military (12,000), national guard (2,000), the security police (2,000), and the treasury police (500). These forces have limited training and are extremely short on equipment and materiel (for example, many soldiers lack boots, and the entire force has only three small operational helicopters); the officer corps is very thin, and central control over the forces has been limited. The objective of these forces is to eliminate or neutralize a guerrilla insurgent force which has grown in the last year from 2,000 to 5,000 and which has been able to increase the size of its operations from attacks involving a few people to operations involving one or two hundred. The guerrillas have received training in Cuba, Nicaragua, and by the PLO, and are receiving arms from Cuba, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Viet Nam and Eastern Bloc countries, either flown in from neighboring countries or brought in by sea.

(S) The military situation is precarious. Government forces are not able to prevent the guerrillas from conducting significant operations throughout the country, although the guerrillas themselves are not yet strong enough to prevail in open battles with government forces. An increase in strength by either side could make a significant difference and, as indicated above, the guerrilla forces have been growing in strength and we anticipate this will continue. They are reportedly organized for attacks designed to disrupt this year's harvest, and are seeking to topple the present government within the next several weeks. Thus, there are both long-term and immediate reasons counseling military assistance which had not earlier existed.

(S) A special United States' military planning team was recently in El Salvador and developed with the Salvadoran military a plan to protect the crucial present harvests. Protection of the harvests

~~Classified by Sec Def~~  
~~Declassify on 19 December 86~~

0-82-0217, box 7, El Salvador

1980

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and generation of foreign exchange from them are essential to keep El Salvador from economic chaos. The critical elements of the plan are centralized control of the military, national guard, treasury and security police; division of the entire country into five military zones with single commanders responsible for all operations in the zone; and use of increased mobility, especially helicopters, by the Salvadoran forces to let them quickly bring forces to bear against guerrilla operations. Effective implementation of the plan would require United States advisers for central headquarters and each of the zonal commanders (about five per headquarters, 30 total) and release of programmed materiel assistance and the helicopters.

(S) Such a plan is judged by the JCS to allow the security forces to conduct effective military operation against the guerrillas. There is also a political dimension to such action which needs addressing. Our entire strategy in El Salvador is premised on supporting the Christian Democrat/military coalition. It was the military itself which, in overthrowing the Romero government some 14 months ago, brought civilians into government. Since then, there has been continued pressure by some elements of the military and other security forces to eliminate civilian participation. Twice before, we have averted right-wing military coups--with significant help from senior military leaders in the high command. Again, in the last two weeks, the announcement that we had suspended aid produced significant pressure for a right-wing takeover of the government. The leader of our planning team for harvest protection was working full time with the high command, and his personal observation is that such a coup was averted only by the intervention of Colonel Garcia, the Minister of Defense; Colonel Carranza, the Sub Minister, and Colonel Castillo, Chief of Staff.

(S) The conditions we have laid down for the resumption of military aid, however, demand the removal of some or all of these persons from positions of responsibility. We should recognize that, were that to happen, there likely would be no one to restrain the pressure for a right-wing coup.

(S) Our Ambassador in El Salvador has eloquently argued that government participation in or condonation of right-wing violence must cease if the government is to win the support of the people. I wholeheartedly agree. He has also argued that withholding of military aid can be used as a stick to cause the military and security forces to bring about the necessary reforms. Here, I disagree. The military needs greater control from the center to police itself and assistance in mechanisms to make that central control effective. Insistence by us on elimination of the few officers capable of controlling the entire military/security force establishment will exacerbate, not solve, the problem. Moreover, the withholding of United States military assistance strengthens the right-wing by providing substance to its argument to the officer corps that there is little benefit in cooperating with the United States.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 11 2016

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(S) In sum, I would advise that we resume military aid to El Salvador because

- there is an immediate military necessity for such aid, and
- politically, the resumption of such aid is more likely to avoid a right-wing coup than its withholding.

(S) The SCC had earlier recommended that we resume our military assistance to El Salvador if the Christian Democrats were satisfied with the arrangements that they had made with the military. I propose that:

- We inform the Christian Democrats that we are willing immediately to renew security assistance if they desire. If they accept our offer, we inform them that the following measures will take place in the next few weeks:
  - The FY81 FMS loan agreement will be released next week and shipment of needed individual clothing and equipment will begin 1 January 1981.
  - In order to assist in improving the control of all security forces, we will redeploy a five-man operations and planning team to work with the Ministry of Defense by 1 January, and dispatch similar teams to each of the five operational zones as quickly as possible, certainly by late January.
  - The two-man advance party for the helicopter training team will deploy at once with the helicopters, and associated training personnel, to deploy as soon as possible thereafter.

*Harold Brown*

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 11 2016

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 5 U.S.C. 552  
Date: 11 JUL 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
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Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M-0494

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

29 December 1980

Memo For Dave

SUBJECT: El Salvador Military Assistance Pipeline

Your information from Dave Newsome is incorrect. The President, on Saturday, not only specifically approved continuing delivery of the pipeline from FY 80 FMS assistance but also the training of El Salvador officers and men in Panama and the U.S. scheduled to begin in Jan 81. This was achieved by a message to Dr. Brzezinski in response to a memo sent to the President with our cooperation. Bob Pastor informed me of this this morning and was about to telephone Bill Bowdler. Pastor had been in touch with Tarnoff in State yesterday and apparently Sec Muskie's concern was about lethal equipment. Pastor assured Tarnoff that no lethal equipment was in the pipeline and this satisfied Tarnoff, who said that Sec Muskie would probably also be satisfied.

The President insisted that if any announcement were made about the training, that the limits on U.S. military assistance to El Salvador should be made clear, i.e., that there is no lethal equipment being delivered and that there is a freeze on the

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Memo For \_\_\_\_\_

FY 81 FMS program, including the helicopters. Pastor and I see no reason why there should be any announcement, although the caveats must be stressed if there is any leak. Frank Kramer will be informed as soon as he comes in.

*FLC*  
Fred

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Date: JUL 11 2016

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEMO FOR \_\_\_\_\_

Warren -

The situation in  
El Salvador is getting critical.  
I hope you can reconsider  
your position on the  
enclosed, which is being  
sent to the President.  
I would also hope that  
State will promptly approve  
our going forward with Panama  
and JC IMET programs,  
as the President has already  
approved.

Graham

30 Dec

"Warren,

The situation in El Salvador is getting critical. I hope you can reconsider your position on the enclosed, which is being sent to the President. I would also hope that State will promptly approve our going forward with Panama and US IMET programs, as the President has already approved.

Graham

30 Dec 80"

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 11 2016

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

1 JUN 1977

CIA

EO 13526 3.5(c)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

SUBJECT : PRM/NSC-11, Task 2 Report

1. Submitted herewith is the subject report as directed by the President. I believe it provides an instructive overview of the functions, powers, and problems of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), particularly in his role as leader of the Intelligence Community.

2. On the basis of my past experience and all I have learned since becoming DCI, I have formed some strong views on what is needed in the way of improvements to Community structure and to DCI authority to make the Community more effective and efficient, and to assure that its activities are demonstrably proper. I have expressed such views in this report.

3. Not surprisingly, there are those who differ sharply with some of my views. Representatives of the Department of Defense, in particular, take exception to some of them in the attached report. Secretary Brown and I have had an extensive and constructive exchange on these matters. I believe the time has come to submit them to the test of review and debate in the Special Coordinating Committee.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS STANSFIELD TURNER  
Date: MAY 10 2017

SIGNED

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Date: MAY 10 2017

FOREWORD

In PRM/NSC-11, the President directed a comprehensive review of the missions and structure of United States intelligence entities with a view to identifying needed changes. As part of this review, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was directed to chair an interagency subcommittee of the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the National Security Council (NSC) to analyze his own role, responsibilities, and authorities.

This subcommittee was comprised of representatives of the DCI (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Officers, and Intelligence Community Staff), the Defense Department (Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff), the Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), and the NSC Staff.

Specifically, the PRM/NSC-11, Task 2, called for a report that reviews "the responsibilities and powers of the DCI in his role as Foreign Intelligence Advisor to the President, central authority for the production of national intelligence and manager of the national foreign intelligence program and budget. This examination should include an analysis of the mechanisms for:

- planning, evaluating, and improving the Intelligence Community performance;
- identifying intelligence requirements and tasking all sources;
- processing, analyzing, producing and distributing intelligence for anticipated activities, warning, crisis support, current and estimative intelligence and net assessments;
- evaluating intelligence production performance."

Because this report is devoted, as tasked, to the roles of the DCI, who is but one of several senior authorities responsible for the activities of the Intelligence Community, it cannot completely treat the roles of other such authorities.

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Representatives of the Department of Defense (DOD) believe this is particularly the case regarding the roles of the Secretary of Defense, who manages nearly 80 percent of the financial resources of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, who is executive agent for several major intelligence programs of great importance to national as well as to DOD's intelligence concerns, and whose principal functions require intimate involvement in national intelligence affairs.

DOD wishes, further, to state the following: It should finally be noted that the text was changed in many respects at the direction of the DCI after the last Subcommittee meeting. In DOD's view, these changes serve to make this report principally a vehicle for the expression of the DCI's views on the changes he believes are appropriate in the Intelligence Community structure. DOD also believes that the Executive Summary does not represent a balanced presentation of the main text.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\*

Intelligence is a diversity of collection and production organizations serving a variety of customers with varying needs from the President down to military commanders and diplomats in the field.

-- The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the position of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) were created to afford a degree of unity amid this organizational diversity.

-- The roles of the DCI and of the other officials with whom he interacts in this federated community of organizations evolved, and the size and diversity of US intelligence have grown over thirty years.

-- The Department of Defense (DOD) retains a very large role in US national intelligence affairs, with management custody of some 80 percent of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget, including major national technical collection programs; and DOD has major specialized intelligence needs in the areas of force and weapons development and tactical operations.

In recent years, largely as a result of the Community's size and diversity, questions have arisen about the adequacy of the organization and management of the Intelligence Community and of the role which the DCI plays within it. The key structural questions are:

-- Whether the responsibilities of the DCI are clear and sound, particularly as they relate to intelligence entities within DOD.

-- Whether the authorities and powers of the DCI are commensurate with his responsibilities.

Of the DCI's many roles, the most important are:

-- Principal advisor to the President and the National Security Council on foreign intelligence matters;

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\* DOD does not concur in this Executive Summary. Note especially Page iv (FOREWORD) and Pages 58, 60, and 69.

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- Producer of national intelligence;
  - Leader of the Intelligence Community;
  - Head of the CIA.

The first of these roles has important implications for Community structure.

-- To the extent that there is a perceived need for someone to organize and manage the intelligence affairs of the US Government as a whole, there is a tendency to look to the DCI.

-- In one view, held by the DOD, this tendency can lead to an unwise deepening of the DCI's involvement in the management of other agencies' intelligence affairs, and an unhealthy dilution of the DCI's primary substantive role.

-- The DCI believes, however, that this tendency is both natural and legitimate. The resulting expansion of DCI responsibility can be appropriately handled through delegation of duties to subordinates.

The DCI's substantive role as producer of national intelligence originates with the duty given the CIA in the National Security Act of 1947 to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security."

-- Although there are weaknesses in this area, the DCI has significant power to remedy or alleviate problems; improvements are frequently more a matter of judgment and management attention than of authority.

-- However, the DCI has little power over the departmental contributors on which the analysis and production of national intelligence so heavily relies.

The DCI's resource management responsibilities in the Intelligence Community have two time dimensions: the use of existing collection and processing resources to meet current and near-term intelligence needs; and the development of new resources to meet future intelligence needs.

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-- Centralized mechanisms for the guidance of major current collection activities exist at the national level, under the DCI, in the case of technical collection assets. DCI powers are strong and prescriptive in the area of imagery; somewhat less strong in the case of SIGINT. Many argue that difficulties here arise not so much from lack of DCI authority or from failings of Community structure, although the fragmented structure of the Community has helped to instill in each collection discipline a disposition to want to manage its own affairs with only general guidance. Frequently, difficulties are in defining problems and designing workable improvement mechanisms -- for example, managing collection tasking during the transition from peace to war and assuring reliable cooperation between the Community and overt human source collectors outside of intelligence (e.g., in the Foreign Service).

-- A greater challenge for US intelligence management is to develop the best overall mix of future capabilities needed to perform effectively at reasonable cost. A fundamental problem is one that is common to other functional programs in government: the absence of a set of measures for assessing the value of outputs and the relative contribution of inputs in terms that find general acceptance and lead to confident decisions.

In his role as head of the CIA, the DCI has strong management powers, but the augmentation of the DCI's role as Community leader has been perceived, in recent years, to cause increasing tension between the two roles.

-- Some in the Community see the DCI as bound to favor CIA in any Community deliberation on production, requirements, or resources in which CIA has an interest, and therefore argue for some degree of DCI separation from CIA.

-- Others contend that part of the problem stems from the imbalance between the DCI's broad responsibilities and his more limited decisionmaking powers in the Community arena; this forces him into a position where he must appear to neglect the CIA to be effective as a negotiator in the Community. Those of this view tend to favor enhancing DCI authority over other Community elements.

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Most of the DCI's other roles are subsidiary to these four primary ones and have fewer implications for Community structure.

-- To help protect the security of intelligence sources and methods, past DCIs have sought new legislation to punish damaging disclosures of sources and methods information; other initiatives -- such as reinvigoration of the classification system within the Community -- are also needed.

-- The DCI is a participant in US foreign counter-intelligence policies and activities; there is a clear need for a national level policymaking and coordinating structure in this area.

-- As an officer responsible for the propriety of US foreign intelligence activities, the DCI has an Inspector General and the normal mechanisms for discovery and investigation of impropriety within CIA. Although charged under Executive Order 11905 to ensure effective Inspectors General in other agencies, he has little power to act on this charge and is generally not equipped to assure propriety in the behavior of agencies other than CIA.

-- Occasional confusion about the DCI's responsibilities as coordinator of liaison with foreign intelligence services would appear to require some clarification in pertinent regulations.

-- With respect to his role as principal spokesman to the Congress on national foreign intelligence, one of the foremost problems for the future may be to find a way in which the DCI can respond to the proper demands of Congress without jeopardizing Presidential prerogatives and DCI relations with the Executive.

-- Regardless of the organizational configuration of the Intelligence Community, the DCI almost certainly will be expected to continue the trend toward greater openness and to accept a continuing role as public spokesman on national foreign intelligence.

Three basic criteria, especially pertinent to the roles of the DCI, can be used in assessing the adequacy of management and authority structures within the Community: propriety, effectiveness, and efficiency.

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-- In the view of DOD, these criteria, as discussed in this paper, do not fully address other criteria important to the roles of the Secretary of Defense, especially the need for adequate integration and interoperability of intelligence with military command and control.

Assuring the propriety of intelligence activities is not solely -- or, in the view of some, primarily -- a matter of Community structure or authority. It is a matter of political or constitutional standards, law and regulations, oversight, and professional ethics. The DCI cannot, at present, be held directly responsible for the actions of agencies which he does not directly command.

-- Although legal responsibility for the propriety of intelligence operations runs from the President down through the line managers of the several intelligence agencies, the DCI believes that the President, the Congress, and the public expect him to act as virtual guarantor of the propriety of all United States national foreign intelligence activities below the President. In the DCI's view, his authorities to satisfy these expectations are now less than adequate, except in the case of CIA.

Improving the overall effectiveness of national intelligence production does not rest mainly on structural change or redistribution of management authority. Improvement requires problem recognition and steady management effort at all levels and in all producing agencies. But efforts to improve intelligence production do have implications for Community structure, and changes in structure sought for other reasons could affect the quality of intelligence production. Effective service to consumers requires a diversified set of producing organizations, some of which are directly subordinate to consumer entities, all of which are able to act in concert when required. The Intelligence Community today affords such a structure.

-- The DCI believes that the diversified structure of the national intelligence production Community existing today is generally sound. In his view, however, more effective national intelligence production requires enhancing the DCI's authority to:

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a.. Task Community production elements outside CIA for national intelligence production;

b. Task national collection assets that lie outside CIA but support national intelligence production;

c. Control the program management of the major NFIP elements.

-- DOD disagrees with this view. It believes, moreover, that such enhancements of DCI authority could materially degrade the responsiveness of DOD collection and production elements to DOD needs.

Achieving the most efficient allocation of resources is mainly a matter of managing collection and processing resources, because that is where most of the money and manpower are. The challenge is to provide the necessary coverage of target problems and adequate service to consumers, while avoiding unnecessary effort and undesirable duplication.

-- With regard to the management of current collection requirements, priorities, and tasking, the DCI believes that, notwithstanding his central role respecting technical systems today, enhanced DCI direct tasking or line authority over major national collection entities is essential to improve their responsiveness to all consumers and to eliminate the high degree of competitive overlap that presently exists.

-- DOD disagrees with this view. It maintains that such enhanced DCI authority would probably work to reduce the responsiveness to DOD needs of those major collection entities within DOD.

Historically, programming and budgeting aspects of US intelligence resource management, as well as line control, have been largely decentralized, both in the Community as a whole and in DOD, where most of the resources reside. But pressures to centralize the process of managing those resources labeled "national" have been increasing for several years, culminating last year in Executive Order 11905.

-- The programming and budgeting decision system initiated by Executive Order 11905 is essentially collegial (in the PRC[I]) and rests on the cooperative

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interaction of the DCI, departmental authorities, their staffs, and intelligence program managers. To a large extent, it places the initiative in the hands of program managers and outside critics. As a by-product, it places some strain on the dual roles of the DCI as a Community leader and as head of CIA. It also, as a practical matter, requires that departmental authority over departmental intelligence elements in the NFIP be compromised; the Executive Order does not eliminate the statutory responsibilities of the department Secretaries over their intelligence activities.

-- Refinement of the programming and budget process created by that order is one way of enhancing the integrity of national intelligence resource management in the future; it has the significant virtue of an evolutionary approach that builds on existing organizations and accumulated experience. Better definition of goals and rules is desirable to make the process of persuasion inherent in the collegial approach more constructive.

In deciding whether significantly to change this regime, several issues are relevant, such as:

-- How much emphasis should be placed on efficiency as compared with other goals;

-- What intelligence activities should be involved;

-- How much and what kind of centralized authority is desirable?

The last question involves at least four conceptually distinguishable management activities: definition of requirements and priorities, and issuance of guidance; reviewing and vetoing Community programs; controlling programming and budget decisions; and exercise of line management. Each activity could, in theory, be centralized or decentralized, could be unilateral or collegial, could be mandatory or advisory. The relevant options and responses are addressed in other parts of the PRM/NSC-11 response.

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The DCI believes, however, that present arrangements give him responsibilities in intelligence resource management that are beyond his management authority to fulfill. Although formal responsibility for the contents of the NFIP rests with a collegial body, the PRC(I), as Chairman and as DCI he is expected by the President and the Congress to develop and take responsibility for an NFIP that is rigorously efficient and displays a close relationship between resource inputs and intelligence product outputs. In the DCI's view, achieving the goals of efficient national intelligence resource management requires his having stronger central authority over national intelligence programming and budgeting decisions, and, in the case of key national programs, line authority as well.

DOD disagrees with this view. It maintains that the degree of centralization under the DCI implied above would be unwise and would severely prejudice the ability of major collection programs in DOD to meet important Defense needs in peace, crisis, or wartime.

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MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE

June 15, 1977

Time and Place: 4:30-6:30 p.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: PRM/NSC-11 -- Intelligence Structure and Mission

Participants:

The Vice President  
A. Denis Clift  
Fritz Schwarz

OMB  
James McIntyre  
Edward R. Jayne

State  
Warren Christopher  
Harold Saunders  
Herbert Hansell

Justice  
Attorney General Bell  
Frederick Baron  
John Harmon

Defense  
Secretary Brown  
Charles W. Duncan  
David E. McGiffert  
Deanne Seimer  
Lt. General William Y. Smith

NSC  
Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
Samuel M. Hoskinson  
Robert A. Rosenberg

CIA  
Admiral Stansfield Turner  
James Taylor

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The first meeting of the full SCC on PRM/NSC-11, Intelligence Structure and Mission, focused on the Part III Study, and in particular, on Section III of the report "Structural Options."

Both Harold Brown and the Attorney General's Subcommittee (Part I) had recommended an early start in our inter-relationship with the Congress, first with those pieces of charter legislation concerned with safeguards against abuse. The SCC consensus was that the Administration's own thinking was most advanced in this area and this was a proper course of action. The Vice President added that his own discussions with Senator Inouye were along the same lines; that his committee is most concerned with first addressing safeguard legislation.

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The SCC then approved the establishment of a senior working-level Coordinating Committee chaired by David Aaron to bring to the point of decision the work done on non-structural problems such as:

- The overseas counterpart of the domestic foreign intelligence electronic surveillance bill
- Foreign intelligence physical search legislation
- Restrictions on covert action and clandestine collection
- Oversight mechanisms
- Counterintelligence activities.

There was substantial deliberation over the eight structural options, focused on resource management, line authority, consumer requirements, tasking, production and accountability.

The debate resulted in a consensus that there are really somewhere between two to four realistic options to pursue in a follow-on meeting.

- Harold Brown favors an option that essentially modifies E.O. 11905 by enhancing PRC(I) and DCI resource management authority by removing ambiguities.
- Stan Turner supports a complete restructure of the intelligence community (except departmental analysis) under line, resource management and tasking authority of a "Director of Foreign Intelligence."
- Warren Christopher agreed with Stan Turner's approach generally except that he proposed establishment of a "Board of Directors" to which Stan Turner reports for review, guidance, and approval.
- The consideration of a "Consumers Union," chaired by the National Security Advisor, that would establish intelligence collection and production requirements and priorities was proposed. This would provide a means to assure that consumers, rather than the intelligence community, set the needs from intelligence.

It was agreed that these options should be further developed for consideration by the SCC during the week of 20 June prior to presentation to the President.

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It was also agreed to develop a third option which, in addition to incorporating some of the above features, would be based upon concern for improving the quality of intelligence--in particular, political intelligence--as well as one which would focus on strict control of the clandestine service.

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Notes on SCC June 28 Meeting on PRM-11

(N.B. The discussion often outran your scribe's pencil, so these notes are not complete)

Zbig: (1) identified last time six issues - wants to continue discussion around those issues - resource management, line authority, tasking, accountability, requirements, output:

(2) wants areas of agreement and disagreement to present to President.

(3) Asks for Brown and Turner to summarize their proposals.

Brown: (1) What we put together was in response to Zbig's thought that there should be an option which starts with present structure and tries to improve it. May be other ways to do this.

(2) PRM-11 mentioned many problems of which 2 solvable by organizational change.

(a) On budget issue, DCI needs data access - that's what Option A proposes. Option A also has a fenced budget and DCI monitoring. Turner's paper of last week to program managers on zero based budgeting was an example of effective resource control under present system.

(b) Requirements setting - most in need of improvement to get consumer input. Describes Option A consumers committee. Question is how far to extend this consumer concept into the tasking. Senior people can't task. Option A provides for tasking committees into DCI as chairman, with user consultation, plus appeals to consumer committee.

(3) To assure data access, we should try to remove excessive need-to-know barriers.

(4) Abuses - describes Option A.

(5) Military responsiveness - I have specific responsibilities - intelligence systems can't help but be both tactical and national - no such distinction in collection systems - only in how material is used - this makes it all the more important to accommodate DCI and SecDef. Have to have close linkages all the way down the line - not just principals in Washington. Some of systems that collect missile information

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are also critical for indications and warning. Unnecessary and possibly dangerous to change line authority. In SIGINT, bad to split NSA from service SIGINT operations - would create duplication NRO is increasingly efficient.

(6) Response to DCI tasking exists now. Describes his visits to NSA, NRO - clear that they are responding to DCI - what is not happening is responsiveness to technical change. This will come naturally with technological advance.

(7) Monolithic department of intelligence will not solve problems; will create others which will be bad.

Bell: What is tasking? Change it? Five people over DCI?

Brown: Priorities setting differs from tasking. DCI has tasking authority now. NRO responds to DCI.

Turner: Raises question re NRO response

Zbig: What if SecDef says no.

Brown: SecDef would have right to appeal under Option A - this is new. Refusal of DCI tasking has never happened.

Turner: We are close to agreement on what problems are - consumer committee, centralized tasking, data access, budget - but disagree on how to do it.

Option A relies on "restatement" of access. DCI's right of access already stated in National Security Act and 11905, i.e. for 30 years we've been entitled to data which we still don't have. Almost as vulnerable today as in 1941. More words won't work. DCI must have clout.

Thought he could work out compromise. But don't have "community". Information being withheld, Congress is taking advantage of divisiveness. Centralization needed for accountability. Present system goes back 30 years. Same arguments have been made time and again over 30 years. Intelligence hasn't improved. Now is not the moment for partial biting of bullets. Middle ground is a quick-sand, not an improvement.

Zbig: Sees major movement on resources; DoD option allows more centralization.

Turner: No - has to have data and line authority is required for this.

Zbig: Appears to be agreement re setting of requirements

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Saunders: (State) - Vance would agree with proposals on setting priorities. In present system, although recognizing tactical needs, present system collegiality leads to too much material collected, etc. Need more centralization of resource management and line authority.

Zbig: What's your (Saunders') view?

Saunders: Little exposure personally; Vance speaking from DoD experience.

George Brown: Three points: (1) If go to centralization, easier to downplay dissent - this is bad. (2) tactical user needs (3) readiness for war.

Lance: If centralize, will have to face how to keep military from recreating transferred reorganizations

Jayne: - not convinced one year trial enough. Would centralize budget and tasking, but no line authority. Describes OMB option.

Zbig: describes NSC option, including emphasis on not loading DCI with management authority.

Aaron: NSC option is designed to avoid national/tactical problem operationally; same division re budget

Jayne: We don't disagree with consolidating technical collection by taking from CIA its technical collection functions

Turner: Great disservice to suggest that technical collection is primarily military.

Aaron: Outstanding characteristics of collection programs are high dollars and need for trade-offs, therefore it is sensible to consolidate. May be some loss in not bringing in HUMINT too - but no option is perfect.

Bell: Agreement on priorities board, - except perhaps shouldn't be run out of White House. Redefine tasking to include some line authority - but NSA, NRO would still be operated by military - but NSA head ought to report to DCI - but NSA would still be a military organization.

Brown: can we see other options spelled out.

Zbig: let's look in detail at priorities board; also we agree on DCI tasking - except how to do it. budget authority - relatively minor differences.

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DCI ANALYSIS FOR THE PRESIDENT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REORGANIZATION

1. In considering the alternatives for reorganization of the Intelligence Community, I support placing the present Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), [REDACTED] under the line control of the Director of Central Intelligence. In addition, I believe some functional integration of major collection systems operated by these entities is desirable. For reasons well developed in the basic PRM 11 itself, departmental analysis units (Defense Intelligence Agency) and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)) should remain basically independent of DCI control. These centers provide dissenting views and independent intelligence judgments. The analytic process is strengthened by such competition, and there is no serious argument to consolidate departmental analysis units with those under my authority today. Further, I do not believe the DCI should control those intelligence collection activities now under the control of DoD that are primarily tactical in nature. My reasoning in support of these positions is set forth below.

2. From outside, the Intelligence Community looks more cohesive and manageable than it does to those more familiar with its actual operation. Before taking this job, I had not realized that the ability of the DCI to weld together diverse agencies and functional collection systems is so closely linked to a collegial, "management by committee," process and the corresponding requirement for broad Community consensus. It is not that the Intelligence Community functions so poorly, but rather that it does not work as well as it might. I reached this conclusion shortly after I began to match my present authorities against my responsibilities. I believe my job includes responsibilities in these areas:

- Advisor to you and the NSC.
- Executive direction of the Central Intelligence Agency.
- Production of national intelligence for civilian and military needs, including crisis reporting.
- The conduct of covert action when directed.

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CIA 3.3(b)(1)

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- Coordination of clandestine and counterintelligence activities outside the US.
- Control of intelligence-related liaison with foreign governments.

3. By virtue of my line control over CIA, I can meet these responsibilities and carry out my primary duty to you as your foreign intelligence advisor. I do not have the same confidence in my ability to carry out these additional responsibilities which I also hold:

- Protecting intelligence sources and methods.
- Ensuring that intelligence activities are conducted in a manner compatible with our democratic system and policy objectives.
- Reviewing Intelligence Community programs and budgets and evaluating the effectiveness of those programs.
- Acting as the principal spokesman of the Intelligence Community before Congress.
- Ensuring responsiveness of Community collection systems.

4. The reasons I estimate that I lack adequate authority in these six areas are:

a. In protecting intelligence sources and methods, my authority is limited to CIA, and the authority is itself weak.

b. In ensuring that intelligence activities are conducted in a manner compatible with policy directives and our democratic system, my authority is effective only over CIA. At present the DCI has authority only to be assured that Inspectors General of the non-CIA elements of the Intelligence Community are doing their work. He does not even have access to their reports.

c. Executive Order 11905 and the establishment of the Policy Review Committee gave the DCI added budgetary influence in another collegial forum over elements of the Community not under his line control. But these improvements still fell short, in my view, of providing the authority that is essential to meet the responsibilities of the office. Budgetary authority has limitations as a management tool, particularly if line command authority is retained by another whose unit has a different primary mission. Beyond this, in overall evaluation of the effort

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of the non-CIA elements of the Community, the DCI simply cannot gain adequate access to data to permit a reasonable evaluation.

d. As long as the principal management of major portions of the National Foreign Intelligence Budget is lodged with the Secretary of Defense, there is no possibility that the DCI can speak effectively for the Community before Congress.

e. In directing Community collection assets, I have the authority to "task" but can guarantee only that CIA will respond. Elsewhere in the Community, responsiveness to tasking is directly related to the existence of consensus regarding the collection "trade-offs" required in most targeting of national systems. My direction to DoD collection assets must, at least tacitly, have DoD concurrence. For example, if I should decide that the needs of national intelligence require more economic reporting and less military reporting from NSA, I can issue collection guidance or requirements to "task" collection systems to increase their economic reporting. No one will question my right to issue collection guidance. In the last analysis, if the Director, NSA, and the Secretary of Defense agree with me, the necessary adjustments will be made. If they do not agree, the collection ratio between military and economic coverage might remain unchanged. At this point, I might appeal to you to ask Defense to honor my request to collect more economic intelligence. Since such a question is not likely to be brought to you for decision, I would then have to try to use my present limited budget powers over the Community. It is, however, difficult to find an effective place within NSA to use that budget power to cause a shift from military to economic reporting. The same collection and processing systems serve both reporting categories. There is nothing to veto, no unit to deprive of funds. The choice often is to cripple NSA's ability to collect intelligence at all or to accept the practice of selectively responding to my collection guidance. All the tools available to me today can prove ineffective in bringing collection activities into line with national intelligence needs.

5. In considering fundamental changes in the existing Community structure, we must have clearly in mind what we hope to improve by making such changes. PRM 11 sets forth the important criteria:

—The Community must be structured and managed so as to provide responsive intelligence support to numerous consumers at many levels.

- US intelligence must be timely and responsive. It must meet today's needs, and it must be responsive to needs not yet fully appreciated by consumers.
- US intelligence must be candid, accurate, and analytically penetrating and unbiased by policy preference.
- Intelligence, particularly expensive intelligence collection and processing programs, must be cost effective.
- Our intelligence system must be able to share data and judgment, and, on major issues, to collaborate in disciplined agreement or disagreement.
- US intelligence must be able to support the conduct of war with minimum disruption.
- US intelligence must be organized to minimize any potential of subverting constitutional principles and basic individual rights. Its activities must be demonstrably consistent with US legal and political standards.

These criteria constitute benchmarks which we can use to measure the soundness of arguments for changes in the present structure. I believe my proposed changes satisfy these benchmarks.

6. There have been several recent reviews of the management structure of the Intelligence Community. Prior efforts, and the present PRM 11, have all identified four basic sets of possible changes:

First, we could abandon the effort to develop a capability for central management of the Intelligence Community, based on an assessment that there is no acceptable way to give one individual authority to manage the bulk of the Intelligence Community. Thus a sensible approach would be to return to the arrangements which applied before an effort was made to give the DCI a budget role in the Intelligence Community. This would be an admission that only Congress can cope with the managerial and budgetary issues which arise within the Community. I believe this approach is inconsistent with your public position to seek improvements in the operation of our programs through reorganization where desirable.

Second, we can consider improvements which do not alter present lines of authority, i.e., minor adjustments in the existing

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Executive Order 11905. PRM 11 identifies possible improvements of this type, and Secretary Brown supports this basic approach. This might smooth somewhat the existing unsatisfactory arrangement, but as explained above, I believe this will only marginally, if at all, improve the performance and responsiveness of the intelligence process.

Third, we could consider giving statutory authority over the Community budget or a large part of it to the DCI. This is a position which has been advanced by OMB staff. However, giving the DCI statutory authority over budgets outside CIA without also giving him line authority would mean that the Directors of the NSA, the NRO, [REDACTED] would have two bosses: one to whom they reported on management and policy issues, and one to whom they responded on budget matters. We should recall that President Johnson tried this mechanism in the early 1960s with the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) program. The concept was that funds would be appropriated to OEO but that responsibility for program operations would generally remain with other existing departments. In fact OEO was only rarely able to get those departments to focus on the programs OEO thought most important. More importantly, this approach cannot give me the tools I believe are necessary to solve two important problems: the need to develop a unified tasking mechanism to give coherence and priority to our expensive collection programs, and the need to resolve pervasive and long-standing strife within the Community over access by analytical elements to timely and complete data from collectors.

The fourth basic choice, which I support, involves consideration of whether line authority should be given to one individual for management of the bulk of the Intelligence Community. Line authority is sometimes an elusive concept. Fundamentally, however, it includes the ability to give direction and ensure that it is carried out; to control the management of personnel and funds; and to have access to any information available within the organization. The principal argument against this solution, if the DCI is given line authority, is that the vital interests of DoD in intelligence might be neglected. The presumption behind this concern, that a DCI would naturally favor other consumers to the detriment of DoD, is not bound to be the case. In fact, the DoD might find greater responsiveness from national intelligence assets under such conditions. Today the DCI's mechanisms instinctively assume that the Secretary of Defense's line authority over NSA, NRP, [REDACTED] will protect his equities.

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CIA 3.3(b)(1)

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Placing clear responsibility upon the DCI for fulfilling the Secretary of Defense's requirements, I believe, would result in closer attention to DoD requirements than occurs in the present competitive atmosphere.

7. If we should place national intelligence collection components within a unified organization, five other steps would require our immediate attention:

a. A National Intelligence Tasking Center jointly manned by civilian and military personnel should be provided to task all national intelligence collection systems. It would also be responsible for ensuring that the resulting intelligence flow would be routed immediately to relevant components and commands. The Tasking Center would normally be under my direct authority. However, suitable arrangements could be worked out under which the Secretary of Defense could assume this responsibility in time of crisis or war if you so directed. Thus a smooth transition from peace to war would be ensured since the mechanism would not change, just the direction of it.

b. A high-level consumer committee is needed to identify priority national intelligence needs, subject to your approval. I recommend that a policy level group including the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Treasury, the Attorney General, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the DCI be established for this purpose. There is agreement within the NSC on the desirability, in principle, of this step.

c. While I have argued above against the present "management by committee" of the budget process, it is essential that the principal users of the intelligence product have an opportunity to compare proposed programs with their needs. Representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Advisor, and others as appropriate, should participate in a formal review of the intelligence budget. This review should be structured to allow full debate and discussion.

d. An immediate effort should be undertaken to review issues relating to the flow of information within the Intelligence Community, especially between producers and consumers, to ensure that present problems are eliminated, consistent with sound security practices, and that related new problems do not develop.

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e. Finally, we would need to establish a strong Inspector General corps, responsible for policing all intelligence activities under DCI authority, with unrestricted access to all parts of the new organization.

8. Perhaps the essence of the debate is whether centralizing authority under the DCI would jeopardize the legitimate needs of DoD, especially military commanders, for intelligence. There are two additional types of safeguards against such a possibility:

a. Tactical intelligence collection assets would remain under DoD control. The integration of national assets with them would, in all probability be more effectively achieved under a clearly defined responsibility than under the present divided and competitive situation.

b. There are numerous institutional hedges against neglect of DoD interests: the Secretary of Defense is a Cabinet Officer; the DoD has strong support in the Congress; all long-term budgetary decisions are subject to intense and varied scrutiny in our system of government; and short-term, crisis type decisions concerning military matters will continue to receive obvious and natural priority.

9. Implementation of my proposals could be accomplished largely under the Reorganization Act and by Executive Order. The reorganization plan would transfer NSA, NRO, [REDACTED] to the Director of Central Intelligence. The existing Executive Order 11905 would be rewritten to be consistent with the plan. Integration of like functions within the consolidated organization would be addressed in a measured way to reduce disruption to continuing important activities. Legislation on abuses and charters which we do not believe can be addressed by Congress this year would be considered in the context of the new organization.

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CIA 3.3(b)(1)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

July 7, 1977.

Dear Mr. President,

In your consideration of the complex issue of intelligence organization, I urge that you further discuss the matter with Stan Turner and myself before you reach a decision. However you proceed, there is one specific point about which I want to convey my strong personal conviction. This has to do with the effect on our military capability of various options for intelligence organization.

I consider myself to be charged by law and held responsible by you for the combat readiness and capability of our military forces. Those characteristics depend crucially on the ability of the military to have adequate tactical as well as strategic warning, and on having continuous information on opposing force capabilities, equipment, and disposition - in place and in war.

In my judgment, the option for intelligence organization ("Option A") proposed by the Department of Defense will provide for those military needs adequately for me to meet my responsibilities. With some modest changes, I consider that the OMB option could also be acceptable from that point of view. I do not see how the organization proposed by the DCI can meet this test.

Respectfully,  
Harold Brown

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON D C 20301

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[5 July 1977]

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: PRM-10 Force Posture Study (C)

The PRM/NSC Force Posture Study has served a useful purpose in focusing attention on the value of developing a strategy to guide the evolution of our military forces for the next decade and in raising a number of key military strategy issues. I do not think the study provides the basis for a selection of an overall integrated military strategy at this time. None of the notional AIMS is completely satisfactory. Instead, I see the study as the first step in a process of refining our strategy choices and of eliciting initial Presidential policy guidance on key military strategy issues.

The President's guidance needs to insure our flexibility pending the definition of an overall US national strategy. The importance of the choices ahead of us, the size of the investments involved, and the possible consequences of misjudging the Soviets all warrant that we do nothing now to foreclose our ability largely to determine the nature of our long-term competition with the USSR, rather than to react to their initiatives in a context set by them.

The PRM-10 study and the Presidential guidance which follows will provide a framework for my review within DoD of specific program and budget issues. Establishment of guidance on military strategy issues will also provide one of the bases for the conduct of our foreign policy, our arms control negotiations, and priorities for our intelligence efforts. This study does not provide a sufficient basis for specific decisions on US military force structures or force planning.

With this in mind, I attach an Agenda defining "Issues for Discussion" for the two PRC meetings on the Force Posture Study.

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I would like the first meeting on 8 July to cover the first four sections of the Agenda, i.e., the AIMS and general purpose forces issues. The second meeting on 13 July will address the AIMS and strategic forces issues.

I attach as TAB A of the Final Report an analysis prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the "Military Implications of the AIMS." This analysis evaluates the AIMS on the basis of the objectives spelled out in the Defense Guidance.

*Harold Brown*

Enclosure

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AGENDA

PRC MEETINGS ON PRM/NSC-10

MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE REVIEW

Issues for Discussion

- I. US Military Strategy for Europe (Key Questions 1 and 2, Section IV of the Final Report)
  - How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression? In particular, what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense?
    - What should be US military strategy in Europe to (1) deter a Warsaw Pact attack (or intimidation) and (2) to terminate conflict successfully if deterrence fails?
    - For deterrence, is it necessary to plan military capability to restore the original borders or only to blunt an initial Warsaw Pact conventional attack?
    - Is it necessary to have a military sustaining capability greater than that of the Warsaw Pact?
    - If deterrence fails, what conventional military capability is required? To what extent should the US rely on the early first use of nuclear weapons?
  - To what extent should the US for political or military purposes state objectives for security in Europe which are inconsistent with the interpretation or implementation of NATO strategy by other members of the Alliance? Specifically, does it make sense for the US to plan military capabilities in excess of those of our NATO Allies?
- II. US Military Strategy Outside Europe In Relation to US-European Military Strategy (Key Questions 1 and 3)

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- To what extent should the US acquire military capabilities, above those required for the European theater, to undertake military operations (either offensive or defensive) against the Soviets in a US-USSR war?

- What should be US military strategy toward China?

III. US Military Strategy for Crisis Management and Potential Local Wars (Key Question 4)

- What should be the planned extent of US military forces (and supplies) available for crisis management or intervention in local wars?
  - To what extent should these forces (or supplies) be available without drawing from those required for a major US-USSR war?
  - In what individual regions of the world should the US plan for the use of US military forces in crises and potential local wars (Middle East, Korea)? Are there any regions where the US should plan for the use of land combat forces?

IV. US Military Strategy for East Asia (Key Question 5)

- What should be the US military strategy in East Asia? Should the US maintain the current military presence or include additional adjustments in US forces in Korea and the Philippines?

V. US Military Strategy for Strategic Forces (Key Question 6)

- To what extent should the US procure nuclear forces, above and beyond those required to achieve other US objectives, in order to respond to US-Soviet force asymmetries? What serious options should the President consider? What should be the trend in US strategic forces: (a) to stay ahead or equal in major indices of strategic power or (b) to deemphasize the importance of advantages in the major indices of strategic power?
- What kind and level of retaliatory capability is necessary for deterrence of Soviet conventional and nuclear aggression?
- To what extent should the US acquire an efficient hard-target-kill capability and for what purposes?

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- Should the US acquire forces for a Strategic Reserve Force, i.e., forces in excess of other requirements or for protracted withholding in a strategic nuclear war.
- What should be the relationship between the choice of a Strategic Force substrategy and the other components of an overall US military strategy. What difference does it make for a US nuclear strategy whether the US chooses a limit-loss strategy in Europe or something else; chooses a strategy requiring an increase or reduction in forces outside Europe, etc.?

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MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE REVIEW

FINAL REPORT

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MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE REVIEW

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose. The purpose of the PRM-10 Force Postures Study is to elicit policy guidance from the President on key issues pertaining to national military strategy. The scope of this study is intentionally broad. It partakes of all, but exhausts none, of the numerous topics and factors which enter into the determination of national military strategy. It is designed to provide a solid basis for further detailed work on defense force structure and program issues, using either the interagency process or the normal PPBS decision process, as appropriate.

Approach. In order to develop alternative integrated military strategies (AIMS), Substrategy building blocks were constructed to identify a range of options in each of five analytical areas:

1. NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe (including the NATO Flanks and the North Atlantic).
2. Operations outside Europe during a NATO-WP war.
3. East Asia.
4. Peacekeeping activities and potential local wars.
5. US-USSR nuclear conflict.

The major issues in each analytical area, or conflict category, were isolated. Then, using this building block technique, the substrategies shown below were developed to focus on what the US should achieve as well as the threats to that achievement.

### Summary of Substrategies

<u>NATO-WP IN EUROPE</u>	<u>NON-EUROPEAN OPERATIONS DURING A NATO-WP WAR</u>	<u>EAST ASIA</u>	<u>PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND POTENTIAL LOCAL WARS</u>	<u>US-USSR NUCLEAR CONFLICT</u>
COUNTEROFFENSIVE				
OFFSETTING ATTACKS				
DIRECT DEFENSE	INITIATIVES	INCREASED PRESENCE	HEAVY INTERVENTION	CLEAR SUPERIORITY
LIMIT LOSS	LIMITED ACTION	CURRENT PRESENCE	LIGHT INTERVENTION	RETAIN US FORCE ADVANTAGES
ELASTIC TRIPWIRE	MINIMAL EFFORT	REDUCED PRESENCE	LIMITED ACTION	MAINTAIN OVERALL FORCE BALANCE
TRIPWIRE		MODIFIED WITHDRAWAL	PROXY RELIANCE	ASSURED RETALIATION ONLY
		WITHDRAWAL		

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Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS) were formulated from the analytical area substrategies by excluding unworkable combinations of substrategies. Eight final AIMS were selected for detailed evaluation in terms of their military, economic, political (both in technical and domestic) and arms control implications. Each AIMS addresses in a different way the major military issues facing the United States. The range of AIMS is intentionally broad so that they will provide a comprehensive analytical framework for evaluation of the major elements of defense policy.

The composition of the eight final AIMS in terms of their analytical area substrategies is shown in the table below:

ALTERNATIVE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRATEGIES (AIMS)

AIMS	NATO/WP Conflict in Europe	Operations Division Europe in US-USSR war	East Asia	Peacekeeping and Patent's Local Wars	US-USSR Nuclear Conflict
E	Limit Loss Hold 86-92 division threat at West-Loch w/90-day sustainability	Limited Action	Reduced Presence	Limited Action	Maintain Overall Force Balance
F		Limited Action	Current Presence	Light Intervention	Retain US Force Advantages
G		Initiatives	Current Presence	Heavy Intervention	Maintain Overall Force Balance
F(Variant)	Limit Loss. Hold 130 division threat at West-Loch w/90-day sustainability	Limited Action	Current Presence	Light Intervention	Retain US Force Advantages
H	Direct Defense Restore previous time against 130 division threat w/90-day sustainability	Limited Action	Reduced Presence	Limited Action	Maintain Overall Force Balance
I		Limited Action	Current Presence	Light Intervention	Retain US Force Advantages
J	Direct Defense: w/indefinite sustainability	Initiatives	Current Presence	Heavy Intervention	Assured Retali- ation only
K	Offsetting Attacks Plans attack on East while holding in central region against 130- division threat w/indefinite sustainability	Initiatives	Increased Presence	Heavy Intervention	Clear Superiority

Each of these strategies has a specific rationale for linking building blocks into coherent AIMS, as summarized below.

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AIMS E - This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be achieved with somewhat reduced reliance on military force, but the US still would retain the capability to wage a major conventional war of short duration with the USSR. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently. In conjunction with NATO Allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days. (A defense which stabilizes along the Weser-Lech line yields to Pact forces about a quarter to a third of the FRG territory east of the Rhine River). In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS F - This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be met through a strategy achievable by approximately the current US military forces, but with a capability for sustained combat comparable to that of our NATO Allies. US nuclear capabilities would be somewhat enhanced; all present US advantages in strategic nuclear force balance indices would be retained, with the expectation of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently. As in AIMS E, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. In contrast to AIMS E, the current programmed military deployments in East Asia, less land forces in Korea, would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS F Variant - This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be met by a modest increase in US military capability and a substantial increase in sustainability by our NATO Allies. This strategy is identical to AIMS F except that in a European war, sustainability is commensurate with that currently programmed for US forces, with a requisite increase in sustainability by our NATO Allies. In conjunction with the NATO Allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 90 days, still involving loss of NATO territory. Both sides are assumed to have the capability to employ additional forces in Central Europe beyond the first month of conflict, so this AIMS requires more forces than AIMS F. AIMS F Variant requires forces at least comparable to those in the current US Five Year Defense Program, but in excess of those currently programmed by the NATO Allies.

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AIMS G - This AIMS is based on the premise that achievement of US objectives both inside and outside Europe would be enhanced by a stronger conventional military capability outside Europe. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold in Europe, however, might be raised because of the enhanced conventional capabilities outside Europe. As in AIMS E and F, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. Contrary to previous AIMS, however, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside of Europe against the USSR. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments--less land forces in Korea--would be retained. Other global interests would be secured by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.

AIMS H - This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while reduced reliance on military force is possible elsewhere. This raised threshold is assumed to permit a slight reduction of US nuclear capabilities; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. In Europe, and in conjunction with NATO Allies, the US would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS I - This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while maintaining approximately current capabilities outside Europe. The raised nuclear threshold would be accompanied by a slight increase in the current strategic nuclear levels. All present US strategic advantages would be retained, with assurance of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. As in AIMS H, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. (Two excursions, to size US war reserve stocks for 180 days and for an

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indefinite time, but without change to combat forces during those periods, were evaluated.) In addition, the US would maintain a limited air and naval capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. In contrast to AIMS H, essentially the current programmed military deployments in East Asia--less land forces in Korea--would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS J - This AIMS is based on the premise that decreased levels of strategic nuclear forces are desirable. A significant and sustainable conventional military capability permits such decreased nuclear dependence. Thus, US nuclear capabilities would be reduced to the level of assured retaliation only--the capability to substantially destroy Soviet economic and leadership resources--and minimal counter-military capability would be provided, with no attempt made to match or offset strategic force asymmetries in the Soviets' favor. As in AIMS H and I, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. US war reserve stocks, however, would be sized to provide for indefinite combat to avoid NATO's having to resort to nuclear weapons should the Pact be able to sustain the conflict beyond 90 days. Contrary to AIMS H and I, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside Europe against the USSR which would further enhance deterrence in Europe. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments--less land forces in Korea--would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.

AIMS M - This AIMS is based on the premise that significant, sustainable conventional power capable of responding to any Soviet conventional attack combined with clear US nuclear superiority is required to support achievement of US objectives. US nuclear capabilities and threshold would be raised to near maximum levels; US strategic capabilities would exceed that of the Soviets in all significant indices--forces, modernization, and options for major active defenses. Such a nuclear posture would be designed to deter Soviet first use and provide political leverage. Should Warsaw Pact aggression occur in Europe, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would defend in Central Europe while the US would initiate an attack against less heavily defended Warsaw Pact territory on the flanks to secure negotiating leverage. Major conventional capability is also maintained elsewhere to assure fulfillment of US global interests with a high probability of success. This would call for an increased military presence in East Asia and a major intervention capability in other regions.

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The range of general purpose forces estimated to accomplish each AIMS is shown in the table below:

## ESTIMATED FORCES FOR AIMS

AIMS	Army Divisions	Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings	Marine Amphibious Forces	Navy	
				Aircraft Carriers	Surface Combatants
E	21-22	31-37	2-4 1/3	6-18	42-310
F	21-23	33-39	3-4 1/3	8-18	100-310
F (Variant)	25-27	36-42	3-4 1/3	10-18	204-310
G	26-27	51-57	4-4 2/3	12-21	121-366
H	33-42	36-42	3-4 1/3	9-23	190-366
I	33-42	38-44	4-4 1/3	12-23	211-365
J	35-48	53-62	4 2/3-5	14-25	245-407
M	39-57	63-74	5 2/3-6	24-28	374-454
End-FY78 Program	24	36	4	13	195

The range of estimated five year costs (total obligational authority) for each AIMS is shown in the chart below. The high end of the range is influenced both by the high range for force estimates but also by the rate at which the forces are procured. These cost estimates do not show the total cost to achieve a force posture, only that portion of the cost which would be obligated in the first five years. Nevertheless, these costs give an idea of the expense incurred by adoption of an AIMS.

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
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Assumptions. The study is based on six fundamental assumptions as to US policy and the international environment. If these assumptions are not valid, a reappraisal of these AIMS would be required. The major assumptions are:

1. The Soviet Union will continue to pose the primary threat to the physical security of the United States and to US interests worldwide.
2. The United States will continue to view the security of Europe as a vital interest and will continue to participate actively in the defense of NATO, which is threatened by the Warsaw Pact.
3. The United States will continue to regard aggression against Japan as a threat to vital interests.
4. The PRC and the Soviets will not effect a rapprochement sufficient to allow significant reduction in forces oriented towards each other.
5. So long as Sino-Soviet hostility persists, the US will not need to procure specific conventional forces to counter a PRC military threat.
6. In an interdependent environment, the US will continue to have major global interests.

Limitations. The study has several limitations, some intentional, others due to constraints on time or information.

--It is not based on overall US national objectives because no agreed set of national objectives exists.

--It does not evaluate the Soviet threat; best available national intelligence on the threat was used in estimating force postures and evaluating the alternative strategies.

--It does not study manpower or industrial mobilization preparedness.

--It does not address specifically theater nuclear forces issues.

Current Capabilities. An analysis of the capability of the FY1978 force structure was accomplished for a worldwide war with the Soviet Union and also for some lower level contingencies.

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--In Central Europe, the chance of NATO stopping a Warsaw Pact attack with minimal loss of territory and then achieving its full objective of recovering that land which had been lost appears remote at the present time. It is also considered unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would achieve its full objective of defeating NATO forces in Central Europe and reaching the French border and North Sea Coast.

--If NATO could stabilize a defensive line in Central Europe the flanks could probably be defended, though not without some loss of territory. The establishment of a full NATO air and ASW barrier in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap would probably result in significant attrition over time of Soviet forces attempting to interdict the North Atlantic SLOC. The naval campaign on the Southern Flank would depend initially on the ability of the Allied forces to absorb the initial Pact attack, but it is judged eventually to result in Allied control of the Mediterranean.

--The overall ability of US and Allied forces to prevail against Soviet forces outside of Europe is uncertain.

--The results of a major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union are that both nations would suffer very high levels of damage and neither could conceivably be described as a "winner." Further, there is no decisive advantage to either side in terms of residual resources. Today, this is true regardless of who strikes first, or whether the attack is a surprise or occurs after a period of warning. With some slight variations, it is true regardless of the targeting policy adopted by either side. In the three cases examined in the analysis, the US suffers at least 140 million fatalities, and the Soviet Union suffers at least 113 million fatalities. Both the US and the USSR would incur over 70% destruction to economic recovery resources.

Examination of three lower level contingencies reveals the following:

--The US would likely prevail against the Soviets if the two powers fought one-on-one in the Middle East.

--The US would have substantial advantage over the Soviet Union in the deployment of combat forces to sub-Saharan Africa.

--If the North Koreans were to obtain tactical surprise in a major attack on South Korea, it is possible that they could at least temporarily attain their most likely major objective--the capture of Seoul. However, the North Koreans would probably not be able to gain and sustain major breakthroughs or wear down the ROK in sustained combat. With US contributions in tactical air and materiel support, the US and ROK would prevail against North Korea in the longer term.

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Key Questions for Presidential Consideration. Six key questions for Presidential consideration are discussed in the context of the AIMS. The intent is to illuminate the various aspects of each question, rather than provide a single "right" answer. The questions are interrelated and should be addressed completely before final judgments are rendered on any of them.

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~~SECRET~~QUESTION ONE.

Question. How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression? In particular, what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense? If deterrence fails, to what extent should the US rely on the early use of nuclear weapons?

Discussion. The major threat to US interests and security is posed by Soviet power worldwide. A US national military strategy must address the need to deter a US-USSR war and the ability to wage war in such a way as to terminate conflict on conditions acceptable to the US. Europe, because it is where the US and USSR have substantial interests and confront each other militarily, is the area of principal military concern.\* Thus, while any US strategy to deal with the threat of Soviet aggression must be worldwide in scope, it is appropriate to focus the military elements of the US national strategy on Europe.

For illustrative purposes, it is analytically useful to group the AIMS described in Section III into three broad categories.

AIMS E, F, G

In AIMS E, F, G (Group One), deterrence is based on both conventional and nuclear forces which are designed to make the costs of military aggression outweigh potential gains.

NATO conventional forces to resist a Soviet attack are planned to deny the Soviets the prospects of a quick, inexpensive, low risk victory. They are not planned to deny the Soviets territorial gain. While Warsaw Pact sustainability and short term mobilization capabilities may exceed NATO's,\*\* in conventional conflict with NATO destruction of a significant element of Soviet military power would occur. The conventional forces, through their ability to engage in high intensity combat, would also increase the credibility of a US/NATO nuclear response. While the Soviets might hope that the mutual hostage effect of the US-USSR strategic systems would make an American use of nuclear weapons in Europe unlikely, they could not be certain. Moreover, Soviet planners would have to consider British and French nuclear systems. Finally, deterrence is enhanced by the fact that the Soviets must consider their relationship with the Chinese and divide their finite military resources between widely separated military regions.

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- \* Continuing Sino-Soviet hostility both requires the Soviets to allocate their military resources between Europe and Asia and limits the Soviet ability to directly threaten US interests in Asia. This Sino-Soviet hostility permits greater relative American concentration on Europe.

- \*\* Warsaw Pact logistical doctrine calls for each front to maintain enough supplies for 30 days combat, prescribes strategy of 2 to 3 months supply for a theater, and calls for national reserves of war materiel. If ammunition and POL storage capacity are used as an index, the Pact could have available 2 to 3 months of POL and more than two months ammunition, including that stored in the western USSR. Great uncertainty attaches to such estimates of Pact sustainability, however, as they assume optimal stockage

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If, in spite of the considerations outlined above, conflict should occur, this group of strategies does not provide, at a high level of confidence, the capability to defeat a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack. Whether the Soviet objective of a victory within several weeks could be achieved is uncertain. The Soviets may be able to sustain combat for longer than the 30 days for which these AIMS provide.\* If the Soviets can persist in their attack, a US/NATO conventional defeat in Central Europe is likely.\*\* In that event the US could be forced to:

- Negotiate an end of the conflict.
- Resort to first use of nuclear weapons.
- Fall back from Central Europe and continue the war conventionally elsewhere.

The probability of NATO obtaining a satisfactory negotiated settlement to European hostilities is slim, since the Soviets would be winning militarily.

If NATO's first use of nuclear weapons, rather than terminating hostilities, provoked a Soviet nuclear response, the consequences are not clear, but it is doubtful that US/NATO would thereby obtain a military advantage and be able to reverse the losing situation. If war escalated to strategic nuclear exchange, major destruction would result without any foreseeable US advantage.

Finally, the US would find it exceedingly difficult to continue the war by conventional means, since its forces would have been sized and sustained only for the initial battle in Central Europe and not for a protracted worldwide conventional struggle.

#### AIMS H, I, J

In AIMS H, I, and J (Group Two), deterrence rests on the US/Allied capability to repel a Soviet conventional attack without resort to nuclear weapons. The objective of NATO forces is to deter a Soviet attack through a clear conventional capability to defeat it rather than to make a conventional "victory" too costly for the Soviets.

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- \* The OMB representative believes that because of the large uncertainty in Pact sustaining capability, it cannot be confidently predicted that the Pact could conduct an offensive operation longer than NATO could sustain a less militarily demanding defense. The uncertain reliability of non-Soviet Pact forces (which contribute over one third of the total Pact forces) contributes to this judgment. The OMB representative also believes that AIMS E, F, and G significantly upgrade NATO early combat capabilities.
  - \*\* If NATO forces succeeded in containing a Soviet attack and establishing a stable defensive line, the eventual outcome is not clear.

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If conflict should occur, the US would have planned the capability to defeat a Soviet attack without resort to nuclear weapons. In Central Europe these strategies are designed to allow the US/NATO to move back to the original borders after first blunting and stopping the Soviet/Pact attack.

Having achieved their war objectives, the US/NATO could then initiate negotiations for conflict termination. Although the Soviets would not have achieved their war objectives, they might choose to limit their own losses and terminate the conflict. If not, the US/NATO would still have conventional and nuclear forces which could be used to threaten the Soviets. If a period of prolonged stalemate ensued, the superior economic power of the US, NATO, and Japan, could be brought to bear.

#### AIMS M

In Group Three strategies (AIMS M), deterrence rests on the threat of offsetting a Soviet attack in Central Europe with a capability to seize other territory, supported by superior US strategic forces. The threatened response to Soviet aggression in Europe is not confined to that theater; rather, Soviet aggression would be countered by US military initiatives against the Soviet Union itself. Should conflict occur, the probability of Soviet success is remote. Unlike the options available in Group Two, AIMS M provides sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to obtain a military advantage over the Soviet Union. US/NATO, possibly in cooperation with China, could either threaten or actually use these capabilities to force a termination of hostilities.

#### Policy Tensions

The basic policy tension is that, on the one hand, Group One strategies, which can be supported within current defense expenditures and are consistent with the capabilities of our NATO Allies, promote deterrence; but, if conflict occurs, probably would not provide satisfactory options for conflict termination. On the other hand, Group Two strategies, which offer more satisfactory options for conflict termination and lessen the probability of nuclear war, would require large increases in US and Allied defense spending and may provoke adverse Soviet and Allied reactions.

Affordability of military forces depends on the perceptions of the US/NATO as to the urgency of the situation. If it were perceived that a major Soviet/Pact conventional attack were intended, great expenditures for defense would be acceptable to the NATO governments. At present, such a perception does not exist. It is not that the US and its Allies cannot "afford" greatly increased defense expenditures but rather that the perceptions of the Soviet threat do not justify radical increases. Furthermore, while the US and NATO possess the necessary resources, there is intense domestic competition for these resources in non-defense sectors.

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The Allies desire an American commitment to a restoration of the status quo ante but, unlike the US, show little inclination to provide conventional forces to accomplish such a goal. (The NATO Allies currently provide no more than 30 days of ammunition and supplies.) For them, deterrence appears assured by US military involvement in European security affairs and the potential escalation of any conventional conflict to strategic nuclear war. Given such views, dramatic increases in conventional forces and sustainability, such as in Groups Two and Three, would probably be viewed as either inconsistent with the Soviet threat or undermining deterrence.

However, if Group One AIMS were interpreted as reducing the US commitment to Europe, this would probably provoke serious Allied concern, especially in the FRG. Significantly increased German perceptions of vulnerability can only jeopardize the US ability to influence FRG defense policies, including German nuclear decisions. Moreover, the flank allies, perceiving a reduction in US support for the defense of their territorial integrity, may seek security assurance outside of NATO. Groups Two and Three strategies avoid these difficulties through the US commitment to restoration of the status quo ante. However, US/NATO movement to acquire and deploy forces capable of first absorbing and then defeating a Soviet attack might provoke a similar Soviet counter-buildup. Thus, while Group Two and Three strategies might provide the basis for stable deterrence if the capabilities described in the strategies existed, movement from current capabilities towards the increased force levels might actually be destabilizing.

#### Elements of a Solution

A number of ways exist to try to reconcile the policy tensions posed by the different AIMS. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; in fact, the US currently pursues portions of a number of them. In seeking resolution:

-- The US could have as its declared strategy a restoration of the status quo but acquire forces for a more modest strategy. A public NATO commitment to forward defense and restoration of the status quo ante would ease anxieties in the FRG even without full US or Allied funding for the necessary forces. US reassurance of European allies concerning US nuclear reliability forces the Soviets to consider the consequences both of a failure to achieve their objective in a timely fashion and NATO nuclear response to a conventional attack. (See Question Two.)

-- The US could acquire conventional forces to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities outside the European theater. AIMS G, for example, provides forces specifically to undertake non-European initiatives against the USSR. Because this AIMS also plans for heavy intervention in local wars, additional forces could be available for initiatives. (These same forces, if employed in Europe, could provide a limited enhancement of the conventional capability NATO possesses in Group One strategies.) (See Question Three.)

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-- The US could, individually or in cooperation with NATO, expand the conventional sustainability of Group One forces to delay or avoid reaching a nuclear decision point. AIMS F(v), for example, provides the US/NATO with 90 days of sustainability. This would not permit restoration of the status quo ante; but, if also attained by the Allies, it might avert a conventional defeat. Increased US sustainability above that provided by the Allies may be useful as an example for them and to provide the US additional non-nuclear options should conflict occur.

-- The US could enhance its nuclear capabilities to increase the deterrent value of the various groups of strategies. AIMS F, F(v) and I include strategic forces which maintain US advantages in certain indices. AIMS M seeks clear superiority in strategic forces. (See Question Six.)

-- The US could undertake political, economic, and arms control initiatives to promote Soviet-American cooperation and thereby decrease the likelihood that war would break out in Europe. Or the US could undertake foreign policy initiatives which seek to undermine the reliability of the military contribution of the Eastern European countries to Warsaw Pact strength. For example, the US/NATO might adopt a public TNF targeting practice which excludes either non-Soviet Pact forces not participating in attack on NATO; all East European targets except Soviet military formations, installations and logistic support; or both.

-- The US could actively seek closer security links with the PRC to force the Soviets to devote additional resources against China. Such a US China policy might include military sales, intelligence sharing, or other Sino-American security ties.

-- The US, in conjunction with its NATO Allies, could plan to maintain in peacetime the forces and sustaining capability needed to stabilize a defense line in Europe and plan to create in wartime the additional forces needed to counterattack to restore the original borders. This would require manpower and industrial base mobilization plans and capabilities sufficiently responsive to generate new forces on a timely basis. At present we do not have such capabilities; neither our manpower mobilization capability nor our industrial base have been planned on this basis. To estimate the cost of such a capability would require study of (1) Warsaw Pact capability to sustain its existing forces in protracted combat while simultaneously creating new forces and (2) the cost to the US and NATO of maintaining in peacetime the capability to create forces on various schedules. Insufficient work has been done on such total mobilization planning in recent years to permit even gross estimates of the costs involved.

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QUESTION TWO.

Question. To what extent should the US, for political or military purposes, state objectives or fund programs for security in Europe which are inconsistent with the interpretation or implementation of NATO strategy by other members of the Alliance?

Discussion. NATO's official strategy, expressed in MC-14/3\*, calls for preserving peace and providing for the security of the NATO area by maintaining a credible deterrent effected by forces which would cause the Warsaw Pact to conclude that, if they were to launch an attack, the chances of a favorable outcome would be too small to be acceptable, and fatal risks could be involved. Should aggression occur, NATO's objective would be to preserve or restore the integrity of the NATO area by employing such forces as might be necessary within the concept of forward defense. NATO's response to aggression could take the form of:

-- Direct defense--a response in kind to deny the attacker his objective;

-- Deliberate escalation--raising the scope and intensity of combat to raise the cost and risk, not solely to defeat the enemy, but also to weaken his will; or,

-- General nuclear response.

While direct defense would be NATO's first response to any aggression short of full nuclear attack, NATO should always be prepared to escalate; and the main deterrent to aggression is the threat of escalation. As a result, the strategy calls for conventional forces to be designed to deter and counter a limited non-nuclear attack and to deter any larger non-nuclear attack by presenting the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities at a scale that could involve grave risk of escalation to nuclear war.

Within the ambiguities of this statement, the US has been able to urge improvements in NATO's conventional capabilities and the Allies have been able to rely heavily on the nuclear deterrent. None of the AIMS considered in this study is completely consistent with a strict

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\* This paragraph paraphrases portions of MC-14/3 relevant to the issue at hand.

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reading of the NATO strategy, although the force capabilities of all but AIMS M could be interpreted as adequate to execute the strategy.\* However, certain AIMS require a level of conventional capabilities which considerably exceed those presently planned by our NATO Allies, and it might be difficult to persuade the Allies to procure the capabilities needed without raising questions about strategy.

In AIMS E, F, or G, the US would, in essence, be adjusting its planning for conflict in the European theater to correspond more closely to that of the Allies. Consequently, there would be no need to challenge the current acquisition policy of our NATO Allies. The small decreases in total US forces that might result in AIMS E and F could, if desired, be explained as a way to obtain funds for increases in capability to reinforce Europe rapidly in the early days of a war. NATO's conventional capabilities would continue to be inadequate to implement the wartime objective of preserving or restoring territorial integrity against a large scale attack, and first use of nuclear weapons would be unlikely to provide a satisfactory solution. Many of the adverse political implications of adoption of these AIMS probably could be avoided if the US continued to publicly support MC-14/3, particularly with reference to forward defense and restoration of the status quo ante. The fact that the Warsaw Pact is aware of NATO's formal strategy may be an additional reason for the strategy to espouse goals and intentions other than those which would actually govern NATO force planning in AIMS E, F, or G.\*\*

\* One divergence between formal NATO strategy and all the AIMS considered in this study is the concept of accepting, either temporarily or permanently, a significant loss of NATO territory. The amount of loss of NATO territory contemplated in all AIMS is likely to be viewed by the Allies as inconsistent with the concept of forward defense. Consequently, regardless of the AIMS proposed, there will be the question of whether to continue to subscribe to the concept of forward defense in our declaratory policy or whether to reconcile declaratory policy and capability. As we presently model land warfare, implementation of a defense at the West German border would require significant increases in NATO's peacetime deployed forces and in their day-to-day readiness posture. Such changes are unlikely to be politically acceptable given the current assessment of the likelihood of an attack. In addition they might appear threatening to the Pact and thus be counterproductive. Failure to address with our Allies the problem of reconciling strategy and capabilities makes war planning difficult. Yet it cannot be addressed without also raising the question of the circumstances under which the US would be willing to initiate nuclear warfare.

\*\* The JCS representative believes that adoption of any of these AIMS contains the high risk of the loss of Western Europe or early initiation of a nuclear response, should deterrence fail.

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On the other hand, implementation of AIMS H, I, or J, which call for the development of conventional forces adequate to restore lost NATO territory, would require major increases in Allied as well as US capabilities.\* It is uncertain as to whether the Allies could be persuaded to make such increases (given current public perceptions of the threat) without opening up the issue of strategy. If a strategy debate should develop, it might be divisive and might guarantee that the US would not be able to persuade the Allies to make further force improvements.

AIMS F(v) falls between these two categories. The Allied forces required are not much larger than those currently planned, and the principal difficulty would be obtaining the necessary sustaining capability for the Allies. We might succeed in persuading the Allies to make the necessary improvements in their capabilities if we did not question NATO strategy but continued to urge improvements in the conventional leg of NATO's TRIAD in reaction to Pact activities. Mechanisms such as a common NATO war reserve stockpile have been suggested recently. If the Allies could not be persuaded to develop the needed capability, the US could consider planning to supply them in wartime from its own stocks, recognizing the problems associated with commonality. Congressional appropriations for a policy of stockpiling for the NATO Allies is, however, doubtful.

If neither of these solutions is achievable in the near term, the question arises as to the extent to which the US is willing to fund sustaining capability in excess of that of the Allies. Some greater capability might serve as an inducement to greater Allied effort and would be available for use in other, perhaps more likely, contingencies. In addition, no contingency considered in this study other than sustained conflict in Europe generates significant stockpile and industrial base requirements. If such a contingency is not to be planned for, it must be decided how much (or how little) sustaining capability is enough--a question somewhat analogous to the political sufficiency question for strategic forces.

#### Summary

In summary, the US could implement AIMS E, F, or G without questioning formal NATO strategy, because the Allied capabilities required correspond roughly to those currently planned. Full implementation of AIMS F(v) or H would require Allied cooperation, but such cooperation might best be obtained by working within current NATO strategy. Implementation of AIMS H, I, or J requires Allied cooperation in making major increases in capabilities. There is doubt about whether such Allied cooperation could be obtained without raising the issue of strategy. Thus, choice of a strategy which requires a major increase in Allied capabilities would require a decision on whether to raise the issue of strategy within NATO.

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\* The JCS representative believes that a variant of AIMS I which relaxed the criteria for early restoration of pre-war borders and provided for D-day to P-day sustainability, vice 90 days, would not require the major increases in active NATO peacetime forces.

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QUESTION THREE.

Question. To what extent should the US acquire military capabilities, above those required for the European theater, to undertake military operations (either offensive or defensive) against the Soviets in a US-USSR war?

Discussion. Recent strategic planning has necessarily focused on Europe and there has been little analysis of the conduct of the non-European aspects of a worldwide war. However, the steadily growing ability of the USSR to employ military force worldwide makes it prudent for the US to assess the need to confront them on that basis and determine whether the US should provide more forces either to counter Soviet initiatives or to take its own initiatives.

A major purpose of operations outside Europe would be to promote US objectives in a European war. At a minimum, the US would undertake operations to insure that the war in Europe could be prosecuted effectively. Additional forces might permit the US to put off the decision to use theater nuclear forces or could provide hedges to reduce the risk inherent in any European strategy. If the NATO defense in Europe were unsuccessful or a stalemate were achieved, operations outside Europe might improve the US negotiating position.

The AIMS as presented all require "Limited Action" or "Initiatives" as the options for outside Europe operations. Essentially the two categories represent the limits of a range of defensive and offensive capabilities. AIMS E and F are basically deterrence strategies and provide a limited military capability to counter Soviet initiatives outside Europe.

AIMS H and I, which also have "Limited Action" as the outside Europe option, are less dependent on nuclear deterrence and provide a more formidable conventional warfighting capability for a longer period of time. In these two AIMS, "Limited Action" is designed to allow the US to focus on Europe but prevents the Soviets from concentrating on Europe by confronting them worldwide.

The other three AIMS, G, J, and M, have "Initiatives" as the outside Europe option. In the case of AIMS G, also basically a deterrence strategy, "Initiatives" raise the nuclear threshold and provide a hedge against failure in Europe.

In AIMS J and M, "Initiatives" and increased presence outside Europe coupled with a strong conventional defense in Europe provide the US with a credible conventional deterrence. Additionally, AIMS M provides a substantial capability to wage war and defeat the Soviets worldwide.

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Representative forces envisioned for operations outside Europe are shown below.\*

TABLE IV-1

<u>Forces (Representative)</u>	<u>Limited Action**</u>	<u>Initiatives***</u>
Army Divisions	2****	2 ****
Tactical Fighter Wings	4	20
Navy Carriers	6	9
Marine Amphibious Forces	3/9	1 3/9

As earlier indicated, all of the AIMS contain some air and naval forces for operations outside Europe in the context of worldwide conflict. However, AIMS G, J and M, which have initiatives outside Europe, also have heavy intervention for potential local wars. Some of the forces perform a dual role and are not completely additive.

US-Soviet Advantages/Disadvantages

It is useful to note the relative advantages that each major power enjoys when considering options to pursue in a worldwide war. Essentially the USSR has near term energy self-sufficiency, and the US and its allies are increasingly dependent of foreign sources of energy. The USSR has either internal or short length SLOC's and LOC's to the potential area of conflict while the opposite is true for the US.

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- \* The JCS representative believes that given the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used in preparing the illustrative force postures and costs, they are not appropriate to use in discussion of notional military strategies.
- \*\* Limited Action forces were sized to accomplish the following tasks: protection of oil SLOC's; limited conventional attacks against Soviet facilities and deployed air and naval forces; extensive mining to deny Soviets free use of the seas; assistance to allies in maintaining Pacific SLOC; and assistance in the defense of South Korea with forward deployed forces.
- \*\*\* Initiatives forces were sized to do the Limited Action tasks and, in addition: increased attacks on Soviet facilities, as well as air and naval forces, and attacks on Soviet fishing fleet. Marine forces are employed in support of naval campaigns.
- \*\*\*\* Army force structure provides two divisions as part of the NATO requirement, which are planned only for employment in the Mid-East.

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On the other hand, the US has greater open access to the seas than do the Soviets. (Soviet limited access to the sea may be a disadvantage on the offensive but an advantage on the defensive, since the sea avenues of approach are also limited.) As opposed to the Soviets, the US is free from hostile neighbors and has relatively reliable allies; has greater industrial, economic, technological and agricultural strength; greater power projection capability; and does not need to withhold considerable military power to defend national borders or control internal situations.

#### Soviet Initiatives

The Soviet Union has a capability to take initiatives against US interests outside Europe. The problem for the US would be compounded if the Soviets undertook a variety of different initiatives simultaneously. Potential Soviet initiatives include:

- Attack US nuclear capabilities (carrier, submarine, air forces and support bases) in the Pacific to limit damage from US attack.
- Attack Japan's sea lanes of communication and air and naval bases in order to tie down US forces in the Pacific, as well as limit Japan's war supporting potential.
- Support a North Korean attack on South Korea.
- Threaten Persian Gulf oil by attacking oil SLOC's or conducting land/air attacks on these oil sources.
- Attack US SLOC's to Hawaii and Alaska, attack US bases, and conduct raids on US territory.

#### US Initiatives

The US has limited forces available, after European requirements are met, to do what current strategy\* calls for:

- Defending SLOC's to Hawaii and Alaska.
- Attacking deployed Soviet naval and air forces.

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\* Present planning also requires that some US forces deployed worldwide "swing" to reinforce the European war. The concept of "swinging" forces is more credible if a US-USSR war starts in Europe or if the swing is started as soon as Pact mobilization is detected. However, if conflict is initiated by crises in other areas and expands subsequently to a NATO-Pact war in Europe and worldwide US-USSR conflict, then considerable portions of the swing forces may already be engaged and not readily available to move to the North Atlantic/European theater. Also, in the case of a short war (less than 30 days), naval swing forces may not be able to reach the European theater in sufficient time to accomplish designated tasks. On the other hand, if the war is extended, then these forces become critical.

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-- Conducting limited attacks against Soviet facilities when beneficial to do so.

-- Assisting allies in defending Pacific and Indian Ocean SLOC's.

At issue is whether additional forces should be acquired to take initiatives against the Soviet Union to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities and for better defense against Soviet initiatives. The US could consider a number of different initiatives:

-- Attack Soviet air and naval facilities. Considerable advantage accrues to the power that can attack first in areas outside Europe, as the other must adopt a defensive posture, thereby immobilizing a large portion of his forces. The ability to deny the Soviets free use of the seas or the ability to conduct air attacks against US forces would be enhanced by destroying forces before they deploy. Preemptive strikes or actions such as mining passages prior to Pact D-day, however, might not be desirable politically. More forces will be required, and more US losses taken in attacks on Soviet bases after D-day, but it may be prudent to determine Soviet intentions before attacking.

-- Defend Persian Gulf oil SLOC's and oil fields. The continued flow of Persian Gulf and North African oil is crucial to the war capability of the NATO Alliance. Consequently neither the Soviets nor ourselves could ignore the importance of these resources, and US forces could be called on to counter Soviet attempts to interdict oil SLOC's or take over the oil fields themselves.

-- Deny seas to Soviet merchant and fishing fleet. Attacks on the Soviet merchant fleet would limit critical logistic support to the northeast Soviet provinces. The Soviets also rely heavily on food from the sea, and attacks on the fishing fleet would create problems in terms of a long war. The northeastern provinces are particularly vulnerable and denial of economic and military reinforcement by sea renders the maritime provinces susceptible to possible PRC initiatives.

-- Power projection into Soviet littorals. The principal goal would be a diversion of Soviet resources disproportionate to our own. Therefore, limited objective operations with the purpose of tying down Soviet defensive forces and possibly encouraging support from other powers would be more appropriate than a unilateral attempt to open a second front. In this regard, Petropavlovsk and the Kuriles are prospective objectives.

[REDACTED] In addition to actual combat operations, the mere threat of such operations and unconventional warfare operations can tie down Soviet defending forces.

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-- Deep interdiction of Soviet territory. If reinforcement and supply by sea of the maritime provinces has been disrupted, the only alternative transportation from the Soviet Union's western economic and industrial heartland is the Trans-Siberian railway which can be interdicted by the US or PRC. Attacks of this nature against Soviet territory would provide military, political, and psychological benefits. However, in this context, as in all major US-USSR conflicts, there is a corresponding risk to US territory.

Summary

The US currently has the capability to perform limited operations, both offensive and defensive, outside of Europe during a worldwide war with the Soviet Union. A greater capability could be retained by delaying the "swing" of PACOM forces to NATO with an attendant risk for the European war.

The USSR has the capability to conduct a range of initiatives against the US to which the US should be able to respond with those actions necessary to protect vital interests. There are increased initiatives that the US can consider based on the objectives desired and the relative costs/benefits derived.

The key issue is whether the US should plan for only those actions to protect vital interests or should the US plan for specific actions (which will require additive forces and incur increased costs) outside of Europe in an overall strategy for worldwide war against the Soviets.

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QUESTION FOUR.

Question. To what extent should the US plan to have military forces (or supplies) available for crisis management or intervention in local wars? To what extent should these forces (or supplies) be available without drawing from those required for a major US-USSR war?

Discussion. The focus of previous questions has been on deterring or waging a major war with the Soviet Union. While consideration of this critical dimension remains central to US national security planning, other militarily significant events are more likely. International crises and local wars, variously affecting US interests, have punctuated the years since the last war between great powers. The probability is high that during the next decade similar conflicts will occur which, while not directly threatening the territory of any major power, may warrant the use of US military power.

Potential US actions in these circumstances range from crisis management or peacekeeping activities--where military presence provides a complement to diplomacy--to armed intervention in order to protect US interests. The utility of military action, as well as the degree of involvement which is appropriate, is a function of many variables. Physical proximity to the US is a dimension, as is the extent of US commitment, whether via formal treaty or perceived obligation. The significance of interests in some regions, such as the Middle East, may justify a degree of military involvement under any circumstances, while other areas may assume sufficient importance only in a great power context. Thus, an insurgency in Rhodesia might not warrant US military presence unless the USSR introduced forces there. This dimension, which could produce a direct confrontation between US and Soviet units, continues to gain importance as Russian involvement in the Third World grows and their capability to project military power beyond their borders increases.

The Importance of Planning

A de facto capability to deal with crises and local wars would exist even if forces were acquired only to deal with a major US-USSR war. However, in the absence of an independent decision establishing planning guidance for local wars, drawing on these sizable forces might not provide a satisfactory capability for crisis management or intervention. For example, to make sure that these major war forces were in Europe when needed, significant portions of the force and its equipment might be forward deployed with the remainder tied to strict, time-phased mobilization and deployment schedules. If it were subsequently decided to employ these forces in a crisis or local war, the capability to make initial, forcible entry, such as that possessed by airborne and amphibious forces, might be lacking. Appropriate basing and rights of passage might be unavailable. Additionally, the strategic lift available might be inappropriate to deploy these "European" forces and equipment in a timely manner. Their training

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and equipment might be unsuitable for a non-European environment, and they might have inadequate logistic support to accomplish the local war mission. Such potential shortcomings might be consciously accepted as the result of a planning decision. They should not come as "surprises" based on the assumption that large forces acquired for one purpose are automatically employable for other missions.

#### Planning Levels

A planning decision on peacekeeping and local wars can be made by establishing a level of effort which forces and supplies in the structure must be capable of supporting. Implicit in this approach is the possibility of employing other available forces to support higher levels of effort should US interests warrant, but the capability to do so would not be programmed.

A set of representational levels of effort were defined in the study and are outlined below. They describe three points on the capability planning continuum and provide the components of global flexibility (strategic mobility, initial entry capability, environmental suitability and sustainability) in varying amounts. These levels and the resultant forces reflect approximately the three general groupings which emerged from the analysis of several local war force posturing scenarios, postulated in the 1985 timeframe. (Amounts of sustainability, though rather arbitrarily assigned, are consistent with the options described and provided a basis for costing.) The levels of effort for planning are:

-- Limited Action - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support\* and limited naval and tactical air forces to support US interests anywhere in the world for 90 days. The commitment of US land combat forces would not be planned. (AIMS E and H incorporate this planning concept.)

-- Light Intervention - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support and moderate naval and tactical air forces, but only limited land combat forces anywhere in the world. Supplies to sustain US and host nation forces for 180 days would be planned. (AIMS F, F(v), and I incorporate this planning concept.)

-- Heavy Intervention - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support and considerable land, naval and air power anywhere in the world. Supplies to sustain US and host nation forces for 360 days would be planned. (AIMS G, J, and M incorporate this planning concept.)

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\* Supplies would be planned to sustain both US and host nation forces. Currently, except for certain nations, the acquisition of such war reserve stocks for use by non-US forces is prohibited by law.

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The chart below depicts representative forces associated with the three planning options.\*

TABLE IV-2

<u>Forces (representative)</u>	<u>Limited Action</u>	<u>Light Intervention</u>	<u>Heavy Intervention</u>
Army Divisions	0	1-2	3-8
Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings	1	4	9
Marine Amphibious Forces	0-1/9	1-3/9	3-1
Aircraft Carriers	1	2	4
Wide-bodied Aircraft	24	130	260

Additional Forces versus Drawing Down

Once a planning level of effort has been specified, the forces and supplies required to support it need not increase the total structure. In many cases, the capability required may already be present in the forces provided for other purposes. Where there are deficiencies, e.g., in strategic lift or sustainability, the shortfall would constitute, at a minimum, the additive requirement to achieve that particular level of planned effort. Beyond this, it may be desirable to acquire further additive capability at additional cost to reduce the need to draw on other assets in order to cope with crises and local wars. Such decisions must span the considerable range of choice from completely inclusive forces for "limited action" to completely additive forces for "heavy intervention."

The balance struck between drawing down and acquiring additive capabilities depends on the significance attached to several inter-related factors. These include force redeployability, sequence of events, available sustainability, relative force sizes, source of forces, and the desirability of flexibility/hedging.

Force redeployability, or the ability of forces to disengage and redeploy rapidly, can best be appreciated by posing two conditionals. If the US does not want to draw down major war capabilities for crisis management and local wars:

-- Land combat forces and associated support must be additive, since they can only be disengaged and redeployed slowly, if at all.

\* The JCS representative believes that, given the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used in preparing the illustrative force postures and costs, they are not appropriate to use in discussion of notional military strategies.

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-- Some tactical air forces must be additive. While such units are easily redeployable, complete withdrawal would leave land forces without air support. In addition, attrition of aircraft in local wars must be considered.

-- Naval forces and strategic mobility forces need not be additive, since they can be disengaged and redeployed relatively quickly and easily.

-- Airborne and amphibious forces may or may not be additive depending on whether the US plans to commit such forces to sustained combat or use them for initial entry only.

If the US is willing to draw down:

-- The requirements for local wars may affect the mix of forces, e.g., numbers of heavy and light divisions.

-- Local war planning may influence the deployments of forces acquired primarily for other purposes. For example, the requirement to structure a single force for both local and major wars may lead to a different mix of POMCUS and airlift for Europe than would be optimum if Europe were the only contingency.

-- As noted above, local wars may still generate the largest requirements for certain types of forces, e.g., airborne and amphibious forces. The increment between local war and other requirements would have to be additive.

Differences in redeployability are the operative factor in considering the possible sequence of events between a local and a worldwide war with the USSR. If US intervention in a local war occurred prior to the outbreak of a war with the USSR, some intervention forces would not be available rapidly for employment against the Soviets in Europe or elsewhere. If the intervention forces are additive, no adverse impact would occur in the US-USSR war. If the intervention forces are inclusive, there would be a reduction in US forces available for the US-USSR war. The effect might be to limit US capability in the critical early days of the major war.\* On the other hand, if the US-USSR war started before the local war, the US would have already committed inclusive forces to the US-USSR conflict and presumably would not want to undertake an intervention. In this situation, any additive intervention forces would be available as a central reserve to be employed in Europe or elsewhere to influence the war outcome.

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\* This problem might be offset at least partially by mobilizing reserve forces in numbers corresponding to those active forces committed to a local war. In this way, readiness for the initial phases of a major war could be maintained, possibly providing sufficient time for local war forces to redeploy in the event of a major US-USSR war. There could, however, be significant political ramifications of such a reserve call-up.

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Another factor is the amount of available sustainability. In most cases, even though forces may exist elsewhere which can be drawn down to wage a local war, adequate logistic support will not be available. Major draw downs of stocks for a protracted local war may prove disastrous if a major war occurs. Thus, even if intervention forces are even partially inclusive, attention must be paid to the possibly additive sustainability needs, both for US and host nation forces.

The degree of risk associated with relying on inclusive intervention forces, if a major war follows a local war, is a function of relative force sizes and resultant margins for error. Thus drawing down on a limit loss defense in Europe (AIMS E, F, F(v), and G) to completely satisfy the requirement for a heavy intervention would invite disaster. The diversion of forces from a European direct defense (AIMS H, I, J, and M), especially if the intervention forces were taken from CONUS reinforcements, (perhaps with compensating activation of reserve units), would not be as significant.

If the forces for initiatives against the Soviet Union in the event of a worldwide war are acquired (AIMS G, J, and M), a source of forces for certain aspects of crisis management and local wars has already been created.\* If these initiative forces are to be used for intervention, some delay in commencement of actions against the Soviet Union would have to be acceptable. It should also be noted that in several instances, a local war requiring significant US participation might already involve a direct confrontation with the USSR. In such situations, the question of relative leverage (who is tying down whom) must also be considered.

Ultimately, the degree of draw down which is acceptable represents an assessment of the probability and impact of military involvement in crises and local wars, with appropriate hedging against uncertainty. The desire for sufficient flexibility to provide the optimum response to any military contingency must be balanced against such constraints as political and fiscal feasibility. Any resultant risk of inadequate military response must be acceptable.

#### Summary

Planning for peacekeeping and local wars represents an important dimension in developing a US military strategy. Establishment of a level of effort for planning is essential. Beyond this, it is necessary to decide to what extent the capability to support this level will be additive or drawn from forces planned for a major US-USSR war.

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\* It should be noted that the reverse is also true--the acquisition of additive intervention forces creates a source of some initiative forces. This potential for partial interchangeability becomes particularly useful at "Heavy Intervention" levels.

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QUESTION FIVE.

Question. What should be the US military strategy in East Asia? Should the US maintain the current military presence or include additional adjustments in US forces in Korea and the Philippines?

Discussion. In the years following the Korean War the US maintained strong sea and land based forces forward deployed in the Western Pacific to combat Sino-Soviet inspired and supported aggression against a weakened Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and throughout Southeast Asia. The situation today is quite different. As Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated from alliance to military confrontation, a similarity of Sino-American security interests vis-a-vis the Soviets has evolved. The threat of a Taiwan invasion has moderated because of Chinese hostility toward the USSR, preoccupation with internal economic problems, and the advent of a less radical Chinese leadership. Japan has become the third largest economic and industrial power in the world. The Republic of Korea has developed its economic and military capabilities to the point where it is less reliant upon the US for its security needs.

As the circumstances in East Asia have changed, the primary US objective in that region has become a stabilization of the current, relatively favorable balance among the great powers as opposed to containment of a Sino-Soviet threat. Defense links with US Asian allies enhance the stability of this East Asian great power balance. The US strategy in the Pacific should, in addition to supporting US political interests, provide for military requirements such as protection of the approaches to the continental United States and LOCs to deployed US forces.

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The Soviet Union is perhaps less sensitive to changes in US deployments. Although they are as concerned as the US about the security of the sea approaches to their homeland, they are particularly concerned about China.

Of the major powers, the PRC is perhaps least sensitive to changes in US force deployments in East Asia but has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to US global military posture vis-a-vis the USSR. Chinese security needs are dominated by their Soviet requirements. Inasmuch as the PRC does not appear, at this time, to constitute a threat to US interests, it would appear to be advantageous for the US to avoid a threatening posture relative to China.

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In this political environment, the PRC can play an important role in a US worldwide strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. The nature of the Soviet security problem, which confronts them with powerful adversaries in both Europe and Asia, is an important American advantage. Perhaps paradoxically, US military policy and actions in Europe may have a more important effect on the Chinese ability or inclination to remain hostile to the USSR than US military presence in Asia. A strong US/NATO position in Europe forces the Soviets to allocate substantial forces to that theater. But increases in US air and naval forces in East Asia could prompt Soviet buildups in the Far East which China would not view as desirable. Substantial increases in US forces deployed to East Asia could result in a conflict of interest between the US and PRC at the expense of the mutual interest of deterring aggressive Soviet behavior.

US interests in East Asia are defined in terms of both great power and regional considerations. The exact causal relationship between the level of US peacetime military presence and degree to which US regional interests in East Asia are secured is not known. However, five basic reasons for peacetime forward deployments are to:

- Accomplish initial wartime tasks against the Soviet Union
- Protect US interests.
- Promote regional stability.
- Discourage nuclear proliferation.
- Enhance US influence.

The presence of US military forces in East Asia demonstrates tangible US military power and provides a sense of security to our friends. The visible evidence, provided by US presence, and active US involvement in regional security affairs inhibits aggression, provocation and coercion by local or outside powers and discourages nuclear proliferation. While US influence is not measured solely by our military presence, it does contribute to our influence.

The visibility of involvement is greater in those AIMS with current or increased East Asian presence



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The East Asia forces generated for all AIMS were developed primarily to satisfy wartime requirements against the Soviet Union and, secondarily, to provide air and naval combat support during Korean hostilities or other local wars for the appropriate AIMS (AIMS F, F(v), G, I, J, M). The minimum military mission requirements against the Soviet Union in East Asia are the same in Reduced and Current East Asian Presence substrategies.

Increased forces for use against the Soviets as in AIMS G, F and M are the result of planned initiatives during hostilities. Forces were not generated to satisfy peacetime presence requirements in support of US political interests in East Asia over and above those needed to satisfy military requirements, except in the case of AIMS E and H in which the low range of carrier forces was based in part on maintaining a peacetime presence in Asia.

As can be seen in the table below, the forces provided in all AIMS insure that the US would retain significant anti-Soviet military capabilities in the Western Pacific.

TABLE IV-3  
Forces Deployed in the Pacific

	Reduced Presence		Current Presence (Without wartime initiatives)		Current Presence (With wartime initiatives)		Increased Presence
	E	H	F/F(v)	I	G	J	M
Army Div	0-1	1	1	1	1	1	1-4
TFW	3	3	4	4	3	5	5
MAF Ashore	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
MAF Afloat	1/9-2/9	1/9-2/9	2/9-3/9	3/9	2/9-3/9	3/9	3/9-6/9
CTGs	1-2	1-2	2	2	2-3	2-3	3-4
Maritime Patrol Sqdr	2-4	2-4	4	4	4	4	6-8

What may be of considerably greater significance than the actual combat power of US forces deployed to the Western Pacific is East Asian perceptions of the nature and extent of US participation in regional security affairs that US force levels convey. In the altered East Asian political environment, the forces allocated to East Asia have declined steadily from the pre-Vietnam posture. Vietnam aside, the US has already withdrawn one division from Korea and announced plans to remove all remaining ground combat forces; the airborne brigade has been withdrawn from Okinawa;

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deployed carrier task groups have been reduced from three to two; US forces have been removed from Thailand and significantly reduced in Japan; US military presence in Taiwan has been significantly reduced; the level of military assistance to East Asian nations has declined; and the US is publicly committed to consideration of proposals which would limit US military presence in the Indian Ocean.

Both US allies and potential adversaries are keenly aware of these trends and it may be difficult to persuade Asian nations of a continuing US involvement in regional security affairs. The exact point at which further reductions may harm US interests is not known. The question is whether further reductions in either US deployed forces or retrenchment in the US base line can be made without risk to US regional interests.

There are differing views whether reductions in US forces and/or retrenchment in the US base line (AIMS E and H) could be conducted in a manner which would continue to provide for major US security interests vis-a-vis the Soviets without upsetting regional stability or discouraging Chinese hostility towards the Soviets. Further, such reductions might encourage Japan to do more in its own defense and assume a greater regional military role. There is no question but that Japan could contribute a much greater share of its national effort to its own defense. This may be desirable and could, ultimately, permit further reductions in wartime requirements for US air and naval forces in East Asia.



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The current situation is relatively favorable to the US. The US is moving towards an offshore military posture which avoids automatic involvement in regional hostilities but is capable of combat operations throughout East Asia; the Soviets are in check; China persists in its anti-Soviet attitude and military orientation while showing little inclination towards aggressive action against Taiwan; nuclear proliferation incentives in Japan, Korea and Taiwan are not pervasive; North Korea must take into account powerful US air and naval assets in any decision to attack the South; Japanese-American relations are close and cooperative; and ASEAN cooperation is both relatively high and hostile to DRV expansion.

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QUESTION SIX.

Question. What constitutes an adequate strategic force posture?

Discussion. Assessments of alternative strategic force structure should begin by specifying objectives: What is it the United States expects to accomplish with these forces? Clearly, satisfying our strategic objectives depends on many factors; declaratory policy is no doubt fundamental,\* as are operational factors (i.e., where the weapons are deployed and their operational readiness).

Specific objectives for US strategic nuclear forces are:

-- Deter nuclear attack on the US, our forces, our allies, and others whose security is important to the US.

-- In conjunction with general purpose and theater nuclear forces, enhance deterrence on non-nuclear aggression, particularly against NATO and our Asian allies.

-- Should deterrence fail and nuclear conflict occur, control escalation, limit damage to the degree possible, and terminate the conflict quickly on acceptable terms. If escalation cannot be controlled, obtain the best possible outcome for the US and its allies.

-- Insure that the US, our allies, and others whose security is important to the US can act without intimidation stemming from perceptions that the strategic balance favored or was increasingly favoring the USSR.

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\* Five distinct but interrelated elements of nuclear policy can be identified.

-- Declaratory statements on policy: how we describe our nuclear policy to the public, allies, and adversaries.

-- Acquisition policy: the planning criteria for both developing and procuring nuclear weapon systems for the future.

-- Employment policy: how available weapons are targeted and planned for use in the event of nuclear conflict (addressed by NSDM 242).

-- Deployment policy: how we deploy nuclear forces.

-- Arms control policy: how we seek to maintain a stable force balance and, if possible, reduce force levels through negotiations.

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Alternative force structures were derived by selecting a combination of criteria, one for each objective. All told, there are more than one thousand possibilities. The Interagency Working Group has illustrated these possibilities by grouping combinations of criteria into "substrategies," each representing a logical combination. Substrategy 1, for example, utilizes the least demanding criteria for each objective. Substrategy 4 utilizes the most demanding. The other two substrategies lie between these two extremes and illustrate the high and low side of the range of capabilities that could be derived from current US policy and plans.

Even with agreement on the criteria appropriate for each substrategy the derivation of force structures which could satisfy it requires that a number of additional assumptions be made, e.g., as to the capabilities of Soviet forces, the desired diversity/redundancy in US forces, and the alert status of US and Soviet forces. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of Soviet capabilities for the mid-1980's was applied in all cases; the sensitivity of results to these assumptions was not tested. The target data base was derived from the 1977 National Target Base revised to reflect projected changes in the number and hardness of Soviet silos and related facilities for the 1986 time period. Growth rates of other types of targets were ignored. The consequences of maintaining various forms of diversity in US forces, in terms of the resulting costs and size, were demonstrated by configuring alternative forces\* for each substrategy based on differing combinations of existing or planned strategic force components.

Current policy is to maintain a TRIAD of strategic forces--ICBM's, SLBM's and manned bombers. This TRIAD provides mutually reinforcing and partially overlapping capabilities which give high confidence that the US can achieve current US objectives.

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- \* The JCS representative notes that the planning factors used in developing forces to test the notional strategic substrategies fail to take into account significant current nuclear tasking requirements. The current nuclear tasking criteria which are ignored are the requirement to achieve 90% damage against Soviet military recovery resources and the requirement to allocate some alert weapons against the nuclear threat and conventional military forces of the Warsaw Pact and PRC. Additionally, the modeling used to generate forces does not recognize real world considerations such as: MIRV footprint constraints, target base growth (no growth or hardening of industrial sites was considered), cross targeting or timing considerations, operational bomber loadings, availability of strategic nuclear material, and sensitivities of the planning factors to uncertainties in the Soviet threat. Given these factors, the JCS representative believes the force postures and costs that are displayed are not appropriate for use in discussion of notional strategic forces.

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The TRIAD also poses major problems to a Soviet planner contemplating a first strike. Because Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's would have different flight times to their targets, one or the other would provide enough warning time for the US to launch one of its two land-based components while still maintaining the options to employ sea-launched missiles. For example, if Soviet SLBM's and ICBM's were launched simultaneously, the SLBM's would detonate first--probably on US bomber bases and command/control--thereby creating the option for the President to launch the US ICBM's in the 15-20 minutes prior to arrival of the Soviet ICBM attack. Alternatively, if the Soviet ICBM's were launched first, there would be additional warning to US bombers on alert to enhance their escape from their bases.

The central acquisition issue related to force diversity is whether or not the US needs a TRIAD with relatively equal legs. The major alternative would be a force with the required retaliatory capability primarily residing in two legs with equal capabilities. This issue has arisen because of the projected vulnerability of fixed silo ICBM's. The US choice is whether (a) to modernize our land-based missile forces with a mobile ICBM (M-X) to maintain a fully hedged TRIAD, or (b) to permit the present ICBM force to become less survivable and to rely to a greater degree on SLBM's and bombers, or (c) rely on a launch-on-warning policy for the present ICBM force.

#### Objectives

-- Assured Destruction and Counter-Recovery Criteria. The US approach to achieving deterrence is, and has been for some time, to maintain forces which could sustain a massive Soviet first strike and survive with sufficient capability to inflict retaliatory damage which would be regarded as unacceptable by Soviet leaders. There is, however, no universally agreed set of criteria for "unacceptable" damage. Possible criteria would include the destruction of 50% of the enemy's economic and political resources critical to recovery, or the destruction of 70% of the economic, political, and military resources critical to recovery.

Various other criteria have been cited publicly by US officials in the past. In 1965, then Secretary of Defense McNamara stated that he believed an aggressor would be effectively deterred by knowledge that an adversary had the capability to destroy one fourth to one third of his population and two thirds of his industrial capacity. These criteria were modified in 1968 to one fifth to one fourth of the population and one half of the industrial capacity. Even so, the actual employment policy, set forth at one point in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP), was materially different. It contained no specific criterion with respect to population, but set a damage expectancy of 70% of the war-supporting economic base and 90% damage expectancy against nuclear threat targets as goals, recognizing that damage levels would vary (no single US delivery system at that time could achieve a 90% damage expectancy against a hardened Soviet silo).

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US policy today is oriented on maximizing US post-war power and influence relative to the Soviet Union.\* Thus, while there have been differences in views of deterrence criteria, these apparent differences are not as important as are the similarities; namely, that retaliatory forces are planned to be adequate to inflict some specified level of damage to Soviet society.\*\*

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- \* Current US policy (as defined in NSDM 242 for the employment of US nuclear forces and in the Secretary of Defense Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP)) defines the targets in terms which emphasize the objective of reducing to the minimum the strategic power and influence of a potential enemy in the post-war era and to prolong post-war recovery. To this end, the targeting is defined under four criteria:

- a. Damage 70% of the war-supporting economic base.
- b. At least one weapon on an industrial facility in the top 250 urban areas of the Soviet Union.
- c. At least one weapon on major centers of government.
- d. Neutralize other targets, including military targets, critical to post attack recovery not covered above.

In this light, the levels of damage to resources critical to post-war recovery have been further defined as:

- a. Inflict that damage to the industrial sector of the economy critical to post-war recovery which will reduce the assessed value of the national output by approximately 70% of the USSR.
- b. Place special emphasis on targets, the loss of which would cause economic bottlenecks and extend recovery time.
- c. Damage approximately 90% of the military resources critical to postwar recovery in the USSR.
- d. Damage other targets critical to post-war recovery not covered above.

These levels were chosen to maximize US post-war power and influence related to the Soviet Union.

- \*\* An alternative way, not examined in the PRM-10 Study, of defining deterrence criteria could emphasize the relative post-war balance of usable power (which is suggested by Soviet writings on warfighting) as opposed to absolute measures.

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-- Limited Attacks. A second US objective is to deter smaller nuclear attacks. Forces acquired for this purpose are additional to those obtained to deter massive attacks, so that the latter can be held in reserve to deter escalation to a massive exchange. The general rule adopted in the study is that the US should have some capability to respond to limited Soviet attacks. The substrategies differ as to whether the US should acquire forces capable of matching or offsetting any limited Soviet attack, i.e., to be able to respond with a comparable number of weapons against a comparable set of targets. The most demanding requirement would be to match Soviet capabilities to destroy hardened targets, especially missile silos and associated launch facilities. The criteria utilized range from an ability to deliver up to 200 weapons against relatively soft targets, to an ability to deliver up to 4,000 weapons--including a capability to destroy up to 90% of the 1,300 Soviet ICBM silos and 400 associated launch control centers.

-- Deterring Attacks on Our Allies. The next objective, the use of strategic forces to contribute to the deterrence of an attack on our allies, proves to be relatively less important for force sizing. Strategic forces are maintained to enhance the deterrence of conventional or nuclear attacks against US allies in Europe and East Asia by threatening nuclear strikes, primarily against the East European members of the Warsaw Pact and China. Insofar as these strikes are envisioned only following the outbreak of large scale conventional crisis or war, it was assumed that, for the purpose of evaluating force requirements to meet these objectives, US strategic forces would have been placed on a generated alert.\*

Given this assumption, no additional strategic forces were found to be necessary to satisfy this objective. Some of the demand was already met by forces acquired to deter limited Soviet attacks; in most cases, the same strategic forces which could satisfy the other objectives when in a day-to-day alert posture, could also satisfy the rest of the demand when placed on generated alert. Thus, US objectives in Europe and Asia resulted in no significant additional demands for strategic weapons. This result is currently being tested in greater detail.

-- Damage Limiting. Fulfillment of the objective of limiting damage to the US should deterrence fail was addressed by a range of possible R&D programs and deployments. The capabilities directly applicable to damage limiting range from a modest civil defense program, to the deployment of ABM systems, to the acquisition of offensive counterforce capabilities. Limitation of damage via passive defensive programs, i.e., civil defense and industrial hardening, provides an approach which is controversial and would involve uncertain costs and effectiveness. The civil defense approach requires sufficient warning time (about one week) for implementing protection measures. Passive ABM defense programs which do not rely on such warning

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\* Today, the US covers targets in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact and China using day-to-day alert planning factors.

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times, and so hedge against surprise attacks, are costly and would likely be politically unacceptable in the US unless the nature of US-Soviet relations changed.

-- Political Sufficiency. The keystone in US strategic policy is deterrence. In addition, the US and its allies need to be free from any intimidation which could occur as a result of perceptions of an eroding strategic balance. This requires the perception by ourselves, our allies, and the Soviets of an undiminished US ability and willingness to counter Soviet actions against US interests. A necessary element of this is a retaliatory capability that we perceive as adequate. But is this politically sufficient?

There is general agreement that US strategic forces should be postured to provide freedom from intimidation, but what is at issue is whether major asymmetries in US-Soviet force levels, or perceived offensive and defensive capabilities, have political utility (e.g., for intimidation) and, if so, how should the US deal with such major asymmetries.

Current US declaratory policy states that the US maintains at least rough equivalence with the Soviet Union in aggregate force measures. Alternatives to this policy go from an active declaratory policy deemphasizing the significance of static measures or programmatic imbalances favoring the Soviets to an acquisition policy seeking clear superiority in strategic power. Even if a policy of rough equivalence were continued, a collateral force issue still arises: should the US simply respond to Soviet programs in kind, or take initiatives (e.g., development and/or deployment of improved cruise missile technology) to offset major asymmetries and place the Soviet Union in a responsive position? A case of particular interest involves hard target capabilities. A significant hard target asymmetry favoring the Soviets might lead to a perception on their part that they possess an important edge in warfighting capability and thus to a perceived imbalance.

The study utilizes several alternative sufficiency criteria, including both indices that are static (i.e., indices of strategic power prior to a nuclear exchange) and dynamic (i.e., measures of strategic power after a one-sided exchange). The resulting forces are affected in various ways by the application of sufficiency criteria. In most cases, especially those involving DYAD forces and substrategies with relatively low military requirements, the impact of sufficiency criteria was to add substantially to the size of the total force. The impact was considerably less for balanced TRIAD and augmented DYAD forces, particularly as military requirements increased.

-- Strategic Reserve Forces. Current US employment policy directs that survivable strategic forces be taken from forces generated by other requirements and be held back for trans and post attack protection. An alternative approach would be to buy additional forces with the desired characteristics and maintain them as the strategic reserve force.

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The SRF is a hedge against wartime uncertainties--previously unknown Soviet threats, unexpected failures in US forces--as well as a force to cope with post-war contingencies (e.g., attempted intimidation by other powers after a US-USSR exchange). Knowledge by the National Command Authority that a survivable, capable SRF if available could, in some circumstances of less than massive attack, provide additional decision time thereby aiding in the control of escalation.

The most important characteristics of an SRF would be survivability, responsiveness to political control, flexibility for operating in varying environments, versatility made possible by availability of a range of yield and accuracy in both aircraft and missiles, and the availability of both MIRV and non-MIRV systems.

#### Alternative Substrategies

Four substrategies were defined for strategic forces. Substrategy 1 would meet the least demanding set of criteria; substrategy 4 the most demanding. Not surprisingly, the four substrategies are similarly ranked in terms of the pace and scope of modernization programs necessary to provide the forces for which they call.

-- Substrategy 1 would provide an assured retaliation capability against Soviet political and economic recovery resources. No early strategic force modernization is required. Force levels could be reduced by retirement of the older B-52D's, Tital II's and Polaris SSBN's. Defensive capabilities remain at current levels or are slightly reduced. The ability to respond flexibly is limited, and little countermilitary or damage limiting capabilities are provided. This substrategy assumes that domestic and foreign perceptions would not be seriously affected as a consequence of large disparities in US-Soviet force postures, even if no SALT agreement were reached which would constrain Soviet force modernization and growth to the US force levels associated with this posture. Consequently, there is no attention to forces for political sufficiency.

-- Substrategy 2 would provide a capability against Soviet political, economic, and military recovery resources; a more extensive flexible response capability; and the appearance of US-Soviet strategic balance essentially by maintaining force levels at SALT limits and some countermilitary capability (including retaining some of the current counter silo potential). Some strategic force modernization is necessary to provide the required retaliatory capability (e.g., one or more of ALCM, B-1 and M-X). Defensive levels remain at current levels or are modestly increased. The most distinctive feature of this substrategy, which lies at roughly the low to middle side

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of current US policy, is its decision not to pursue a highly effective hard-target-kill capability against Soviet silos and associated launch control facilities. Forces to maintain equivalence depend upon agreed SALT limits and Soviet deployments. Expected Soviet deployments within the Vladivostok limits would require additional new systems. Overall sufficiency requirements are to retain the US lead or equality in total warheads (RV's + bomber weapons) while maintaining forces at or near SALT limits.

-- Substrategy 3--which combines an assured retaliation capability against Soviet political, economic, and military recovery resources with a full range of flexible response options--would enable the US to respond directly to the potential Soviet hard-target-kill threat with an efficient hard target capability of our own, while at the same time actively pursuing maintenance of some current areas of US advantage in the strategic balance. Early strategic force modernization is necessary to provide the required retaliatory capability (e.g., M-X and/or D-5 for a time-urgent, efficient hard target capability, plus B-1 and/or ALCM). Defensive capabilities are maintained at about current levels with perhaps some modest increase. The most important strategic judgment associated with this alternative, which lies roughly at the high side of current policy, is that a matching US response to the Soviet hard target threat is important for deterrence and that the Soviets would not act as if it were an unacceptable threat to their strategic forces. Political sufficiency options are to retain a US lead or equality in static measures (RV's + bomber weapons, MIRV'd launchers, and hard target kill) or status plus dynamic measures (surviving RV's and bomber weapons, surviving missile throw-weight and bomber payload). Retention of current force balances alone could require substantial deployments of new systems, although requirements for equivalence depend upon Soviet deployments.

-- Substrategy 4--which combines an assured retaliation capability against Soviet political, economic, and military recovery resources, with a full range of flexible response options--would enable the US to respond directly to the potential Soviet hard-target-kill threat with an efficient hard target capability of our own. Early strategic force modernization is necessary to provide the required retaliatory capability (e.g., M-X and/or D-5 for a time urgent efficient hard target capability, plus B-1 and ALCM). Defensive capabilities would remain at current or substantially increased levels. This substrategy represents initiatives on our part to restore clear US superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear forces. Political sufficiency objectives are to maintain or acquire US superiority in all indices, both static and dynamic. Acquisition of associated forces would require substantial deployments of our new systems.

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#### Alternative Forces

Alternative illustrative forces are summarized in Section F of Annex D. For each, numbers and types of delivery vehicles are given.

Variations in costs within substrategies will depend on whether it is required to maintain three relatively equal components of strategic offensive forces (ICBM's, SLBM's, and bombers), or if the diversity provided by maintaining two components of equal capability is considered sufficient. Variation in costs also will be strongly related to the scope and pace of modernization. The greatest variation in costs, however, will occur in relation to which criterion of political sufficiency is selected. In this study, the measure of sufficiency is based on a variety of publicly discussed indicators of both the quantity and quality of forces. Each of these indices can be faulted as being biased or misleading. We know that these indices can affect (and have affected) the perceptions of different audiences in different ways, but we do not know how these perceptions are formed or how consequential they are. Although they are only representative, the indices for offensive force appear to bound the problem sufficiently for this analysis. The decision to meet requirements for political sufficiency (if these indices or ones like them are used) can, in some instances, result in strategic nuclear forces significantly larger than those that analysis shows are needed to meet the target destruction goals established in this study. As noted earlier, such increases occur primarily in cases involving DYAD forces in sub-strategies having relatively low military requirements. The impact is considerably less pronounced for TRIAD and augmented DYAD forces, particularly as the military requirements increase. Nevertheless, differences in force requirements caused by the application of political sufficiency criteria justify the most careful and rigorous assessment of the relative importance of this objective of US strategic forces.

#### US Declaratory Policy, Military Strategy and Acquisition Policy

A continuing problem with US policy for strategic forces has been the degree of consistency and conscious coordination among the three major elements that constitute US strategic policy: our declaratory policy (what we say about our strategic force objectives, plans, and capabilities); our military strategy (actual plans for employing US strategic forces); and acquisition policy (the guidance for procuring strategic forces).

There exists today, for example, some discrepancy between US declaratory policy and US military strategy with regard to what we will do in the event of a massive Soviet nuclear attack. Our declaratory policy is that we do not target people per se; we target recovery resources. Yet there are large numbers of people living in close vicinity to many if not most of the Soviet "recovery resources" targeted. Consequently, US assertions that we do not target people simply are not credible to the Soviets (or Americans). More importantly, we do not tell the Soviets exactly what would be entailed in the destruction of the political (leadership), economic, and selected military resources critical to the recovery of their post-war power, influence, and economy.

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At issue is how specific should US officials be in defining US strategic policy objectives? There are occasions when ambiguity in declaratory policy may make sense (e.g., as to exactly what the US response would be to a limited nuclear attack on the US), but is there any case for being less than fully explicit about the kind and extent of the destruction that the US plans and has the capability to produce in the Soviet Union in response to a massive attack on the US? Once we have determined these plans and capabilities, some argue that deterrence would be improved if the Soviets knew precisely what our targeting plans were and were told in painful clarity the total amount of death and destruction the US would have the capability to produce. Others argue that providing details of US targeting plans could trigger unwanted Soviet responses; e.g., accelerated defensive measures, industrial hardening, etc. They suggest it would be better to leave the Soviets with uncertainties, relying on the conservatism of Soviet planner to "worst case" their own estimates of our capabilities.

There also exists today an imperfect fit between US strategy and US acquisition policy as they relate to the objective of deterring a massive Soviet attack on the US. In response to Presidential guidance, our current military strategy is defined in terms of the kind of targets (recovery resources) to be destroyed and the level of destruction (70%) to be achieved. But the President did not, at that time, decide that this strategy could be used as guidance for acquisition policy. Indeed, the last Presidential guidance on acquisition policy was NSDM 16 in 1969, which was concerned with a different military strategy (the requirement, inter alia, that the US would not incur more deaths and industrial damage than the USSR).

There is at present, then, no Presidential guidance on acquisition policy that matches our military strategy. As a result, the number and kind of US forces needed to execute this strategy are open to interpretation. This point is not without some consequence, since our present military strategy is aimed at a "moving target"; i.e., Soviet recovery resources are continually increasing in number and varying in kind.

#### Summary

To define what constitutes an adequate US military strategy and acquisition policy for strategic forces, the following specific questions need to be answered:

- What kind and level of retaliatory capability is necessary for deterrence of Soviet conventional and nuclear aggression?
- To what extent should the US acquire an efficient hard-target-kill capability and for what purposes?

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against Soviet forces in the Far East after planned redeployments of US air and naval forces to the European theater upon NATO mobilization. It assumes that conflict does not break out between North and South Korea. The ability of NATO to protect the flow of Middle Eastern oil is not considered on the assumption that, in the event of oil SLOC interdiction, NATO would depend upon existing POL stockpiles until forces could be freed from other theaters to counter this additional threat.

While the war in Central Europe is, of course, the conflict of greatest importance, the outcome of the worldwide conflict influences foreign support (resources and bases) necessary for US prosecution of the war, the stance adopted by the PRC, and negotiations to terminate hostilities. The overall ability of US and Allied forces to prevail against Soviet forces outside of Europe is uncertain. US advantages are based primarily upon control of critical maritime choke points, access to bases in Japan (including the Ryukyus) and South Korea, and the ability to threaten the territory of the USSR itself through naval and air attack. These advantages are offset by the difficulty of establishing effective anti-air and anti-submarine barriers in the face of intense Soviet opposition. Although essential military shipping to Japan could probably be maintained, the possibility exists that the USSR could cut the economic and resupply LOC's to Japan, endangering Japan's continued support of US military operations. This would make the US task in the Pacific considerably more difficult.

There is always a possibility that the PRC, North Korea, Vietnam, or other nations might take aggressive actions during or in the aftermath of a conventional war between the US and the USSR. Both sides, however, have multiple deterrents to such actions, ranging from threats (on the low end) to using nuclear weapons (on the high end). It would appear that these measures are adequate in FY 1978 to discourage any such peripheral activities.

The major problems for the US are the need to disengage forces under the current "swing" strategy (which requires redeployment of significant US naval and some air forces from the Pacific to the European/Atlantic theater upon mobilization), the limited Japanese defense capabilities, and the strong Soviet forces available in the Far East. Soviet problems include the need to maintain substantial forces opposite the PRC, the difficulty of sustaining extended naval operations in the Pacific and the vulnerability of isolated areas to US air and naval attack. Major uncertainties for both sides are the nature and impact of Soviet measures to deny Persian Gulf oil to the West, Soviet naval deployments prior to hostilities, Japanese strength and determination, and the actions of third parties during the conflict, primarily the PRC, but including North Korea and Vietnam.

#### US-USSR Nuclear Conflict

The results of a major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union are that both nations would suffer very high levels of damage and neither could conceivably be described as a "winner." Further,

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there is no decisive advantage to either side in terms of residual resources. Today, this is true regardless of who strikes first, or whether the attack is a surprise or occurs after a period of warning. With some slight variations, it is true regardless of the targeting policy adopted by either side. In the three cases examined in the analysis, the US suffers at least 140 million fatalities, and the Soviet Union suffers at least 113 million fatalities. Both the US and the USSR would incur over 70% destruction to economic recovery resources.

The results of several limited nuclear attacks on individual force components of both sides reveal the following outcomes:

-- Whichever side initiates a limited nuclear attack against the ICBM forces of the other side will not find itself better off in terms of the residual number of ICBMs, ICBM RVs, and throwweight.

-- In SLBM attacks on bomber bases, the US would not lose a significant number of its bombers on alert.

The limited nuclear attacks have been executed in isolation with the objective of maximizing damage on the particular delivery systems involved without regard for other targeting requirements. An attack on any single force component would result in the alerting of the remaining two force components; thus the results of the one-to-one exchanges should not be aggregated since they may not be achievable in combination. In fact, the targeting in an all-out exchange might well differ significantly from that in these limited attack scenarios.

#### C. OTHER CONTINGENCIES

##### Middle East

The contingency scenario used for the evaluation postulates a conflict in the Middle East between

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The scenario investigated here is considered illustrative and not a probable course of events. Given the opportunity to mobilize fully, the

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This Mideast scenario does permit a comparison of



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#### Sub-Saharan Africa

This contingency examines the ability of the US and Soviet Union to introduce and sustain moderate levels of combat forces in sub-Saharan Africa and to prevail in a limited conflict there. It examines a notional scenario involving US assistance to Zaïre in combating an Angolan attack which is supported by Soviet and Cuban forces. Neither the US nor the Soviets mobilize or employ air or ground forces deployed in Europe.

In the past, the Soviet Union has avoided direct military confrontation with US forces in non-contiguous regions, and would probably attempt to use "covert" assistance, shipments of military equipment, and surrogate forces to further their interests. It is considered unlikely that the USSR would attempt to match a US force buildup in sub-Saharan Africa if the US committed its forces first, and the possibility of escalation to direct conflict between Soviet and American units were present. The reverse may not be true for the US. Although the US has been cautious in those contingencies with significant escalatory potential, it has in the past risked direct confrontation with Soviet forces -- e.g., Cuba in 1962, Haiphong mining in 1972, and the worldwide alert during the 1973 Mideast War. The ability of the US to project forces over great distances and to establish and protect its reinforcement/resupply routes is well known and

- \* The following notional US combat forces were committed to this contingency:  
3 carrier task groups, 1 Marine Amphibious Force(MAF), 3 Army divisions  
and 12 Air Force fighter squadrons.

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gives the US the flexibility to support its national policies essentially where it wishes. Thus, even if the Soviets were given a headstart in the buildup of military forces in Angola, the US would probably be able to match and surpass the Soviet efforts.\*

If both superpowers were to commence deployment of combat forces to sub-Saharan Africa, either from a standing start or after a period of tension, the US would have a substantial advantage owing to: (1) its more direct, less encumbered LOCs; (2) more mobile, projection-ready forces backed by extensive strategic and tactical lift assets; (3) better expeditionary equipment and experience; and (4) amphibious assault capability. If conflict were to occur during or after the deployments, the US would likely prevail: we would be able to interdict Soviet sustaining air and sea LOCs, while at the same time protecting our own reinforcement/resupply lines.

Despite its overall advantages, the US would experience problems initially in maintaining POL stocks for its forces deployed by air and in rapidly clearing any Soviet mining effort in Zairian coastal waters. Soviet problems are much more extensive. Their ability to rapidly air-lift forces is highly sensitive to overflight and landing rights, their projection forces (airborne and naval infantry) are not structured to "fight their way" into a hostile area, and they would be unable to either maintain their own sustaining LOCs or impose an effective blockade of US deployed forces.

#### Korea

This contingency examines a surprise North Korean attack on South Korea. The US provides initial air and naval support at D-day. In-place US ground forces initially take action only in self-defense but are fully committed by D+7. The USSR and PRC provide only logistic support to North Korea.

If the North Koreans were to achieve tactical surprise, it is possible that they could at least temporarily attain their most likely major objective--the capture of Seoul. However, the North Koreans would probably not be able to gain and sustain major breakthroughs or wear down the ROK in sustained combat. The ability of the US to project military power into Northeast Asia is the critical factor in this assessment. If the North Korean reserves could be prevented from arriving at the DMZ, the US/ROK

\* The following notional US combat force "packages" were examined for possible commitment in this contingency: 1-2 carrier task groups, 1 Marine Amphibious Brigade (3/9 MAF), 1 Army division, and 2 Air Force fighter squadrons.

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defense could probably stall the initial North Korean attack north of Seoul. With the US contributions of land and carrier-based tactical air assets and materiel support, it would appear that the US and ROK would prevail against North Korea in the longer term.\*

The level of forces which could be brought to bear at the front on D-day would generally favor North Korea over the ROK in all categories. The North Koreans would have the additional benefits of the initiative, an unconventional warfare capability, pre-established LOCs with both the PRC and USSR, and peacetime deployments which are conducive to tactical surprise. The ROK has widely spread infantry forces with limited mobility and vulnerable stocks of war reserve materiel. Major uncertainties associated with this contingency are the actions of the USSR and PRC, and the efficiency and maintainability of Soviet and PRC LOCs into North Korea. ROK forces, supplemented by US assistance, have the lead in number of tactical aircraft and in overall payload capability after about one week of conflict. In addition, the US/ROK naval forces (practically all US) are generally superior. Other US/ROK advantages are the availability of Japan as a staging area, prepared defensive positions, stronger manpower reserves and economic/mobilization base, more capable all-weather aircraft, precision-guided munitions, the availability of the US Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), and a good capability for long-term sustainability. It should be emphasized that despite South Korea's ongoing progress in strengthening its forces, certain forms of US military support still are required for a successful defense effort. The ROK Army appears capable of self-defense without large-scale support from US ground combat forces. However, the ROK still requires US tactical air, air defense, naval, logistic, command and control, intelligence and communications support.

\* The following notional US combat forces were committed to this contingency: 5 carrier task groups, 2 Marine Amphibious Forces, 1 Army division, and 24 Air Force fighter squadrons.

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TABLE III-1  
Summary of Substrategies

<u>NATO-WP IN EUROPE</u>	<u>NON-EUROPEAN OPERATIONS DURING A NATO-WP WAR</u>	<u>EAST ASIA</u>	<u>PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND POTENTIAL LOCAL WARS</u>	<u>US-USSR HOMELANDS NUCLEAR CONFLICT</u>
COUNTEROFFENSIVE				
OFFSETTING ATTACKS				
DIRECT DEFENSE	INITIATIVES	INCREASED PRESENCE	HEAVY INTERVENTION	CLEAR SUPERIORITY
LIMIT LOSS	LIMITED ACTION	CURRENT PRESENCE	LIGHT INTERVENTION	RETAIN US FORCE ADVANTAGES
ELASTIC TRIPWIRE	MINIMAL EFFORT	REDUCED PRESENCE	LIMITED ACTION	MAINTAIN OVERALL FORCE BALANCE
TRIPWIRE		MODIFIED WITHDRAWAL	PROXY RELIANCE	ASSURED RETALIATION ONLY
		WITHDRAWAL		

To formulate composite AIMS, substrategies were combined in a style that took one from the first column, one from the second, and so forth. A process of elimination led to the eight AIMS analyzed in this report. Out of the 216 possible AIMS variations, these eight were chosen as the set best encompassing a broad range while addressing in different ways the major military issues facing the US.

C. CONTENT OF AIMS. The final eight AIMS and their component substrategies are shown in Table III-2, below. The dotted line represents a rough approximation of current US capability in the terms of the substrategy elements listed. The sustainability dimension--which refers to the nominal length of time the US or NATO is prepared to support a conventional conflict from stocks plus initial production--is not apparent from this table (see footnotes), but it is the key variable between AIMS F (providing for 30 days) and F Variant (providing for 90 days). Of the eight AIMS, F Variant calls for forces closest to the goals established in the present US Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).

Each of these strategies has a specific rationale for linking building blocks into coherent AIMS as summarized below. Detailed descriptions and implications of AIMS are in Annex C. Strategic nuclear forces and related issues are discussed in detail in Annex D.

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## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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July 6, 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: JAMES THOMSON <sup>JAT</sup>  
VICTOR UTGOFF <sup>VU</sup>

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting on PRM 10 -- Friday,  
July 8, 1977, at 10:00 A.M.

Introduction

This is the first of two PRC meetings scheduled to discuss the PRM-10 Military Strategy and Force Posture report (Tab B). In this meeting, Harold Brown wants to cover the first five of the six key questions discussed in Section IV of the report -- those related chiefly to our general purpose forces posture. His memorandum and agenda paper are at Tab A. The second meeting, scheduled for Wednesday, July 13, will cover the last key question, which is related chiefly to strategic forces. The key questions are part of the agenda paper at Tab A.

This memo discusses our tentative views on each of the five key questions. In the process, we build an AIMS (less the strategic nuclear component) that we feel would be an appropriate goal for future defense policy. Acceptance of this goal does not imply acceptance of the associated forces and costs for two reasons: (1) the study has not precisely defined forces and costs; and (2) it is possible to get goals, while providing only enough funds to partially achieve them. Our recommendation, which is displayed on the attached chart, calls for:

-- More emphasis on NATO's conventional deterrent with goals of minimum territorial loss and a capability to sustain conventional conflict longer than the Warsaw Pact.

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Classified by Zbigniew Brzezinski

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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-- Largely foregoing plans to take initiatives against Soviet territory outside of Europe during a NATO/Warsaw Pact war, while trying to prevent Soviet initiatives against US interests.

-- A minimal capability to intervene in local wars, providing only some specialized capability for forcible entry and relying on diversion of US forces oriented toward Europe.

-- Maintenance of current US force levels in East Asia following the withdrawals from Korea, at least for the near term.

In addition to presenting a detailed exposition of the arguments leading to this goal, this memo also:

-- Describes a potential DOD attempt to scuttle the AIMS and to discuss the key questions without reference to the AIMS (we do not feel this should be permitted since the AIMS are needed to understand the implications of answering the questions);

-- Discusses the problems associated with the forces and costs estimated for the AIMS; and

-- Suggests additional reading that would be useful preparation for the meeting.

We believe it would be useful to discuss this memorandum with you before the meeting, and have scheduled a half hour for this purpose at 6:30 p.m., Thursday, July 7.

#### The AIMS Analysis

The Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS) are alternative answers to the key questions; and the study's analysis of the AIMS describes the consequences of implementing the AIMS. These potential consequences, in terms of forces and costs and of impact on foreign policy, arms control, and Soviet attitudes, limit any strategy choice. This analysis is summarized in Section III of the main report.

The study analyzed eight AIMS (actually seven plus one variant that was created to answer a criticism you made at the May 19 meeting with the President). The AIMS are displayed schematically on page III-3 of the

report, in terms of their substrategy components. The substrategies were discussed in Harold Brown's earlier memorandum to the President (Tab C). Beginning with AIMS E, the AIMS become increasingly demanding until they reach AIMS M.

There is strong pressure within DOD to abandon the AIMS analysis totally and to carry on an academic discussion of the key questions, hoping to lead only to the broadest (and vaguest) Presidential guidance on military strategy. There is some substance behind this move: Many are concerned that the AIMS are not suitable for Presidential choice of a strategy or force posture. The latter is certainly true because the study failed to resolve disputes in the Pentagon and left each AIMS with a wide range of estimated force postures; thus, the President cannot at this stage choose a precisely defined force posture. Also, because the AIMS cover such a broad range (as required by the PRM), the choices among the AIMS are stark and the President will probably not be able to find his strategy in one of the AIMS. But this is not a fatal flaw, because a strategy can be found by combining AIMS.

The pressure to abandon the AIMS is mainly bureaucratically motivated. First, there is an attitude of "not invented here" among many officials who came into DOD well after the study was launched and beyond their control. Also, the broad range of AIMS, together with the force posturing exercise, stung the services -- especially the Navy -- by opening up such controversial issues as the allocation of roles and missions among the services and among branches within the services. Finally, there is a standard DOD concern, accentuated by the "not invented here" problem, that the President will provide detailed guidance to DOD and constrain DOD's freedom-of-action; the AIMS were designed for such guidance.

We believe you should oppose any attempt to surpress Presidential decisions. The first sign of such an attempt may be either an argument -- probably from Defense -- that the AIMS are inappropriate for decision or, more simply, an attempt to discuss the key questions without reference to the problems of implementation -- i. e., without reference to the AIMS.

#### Forces and Costs

A quick inspection of the forces and costs in the report reveals that the range of forces and costs estimated for each AIMS is large, especially for the less demanding AIMS and especially for the Navy. Mainly, the



high estimates were made by the individual military services and the low estimates by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The reasons for these differences (see pages III-7 through III-12) reveal a need for further work on force posturing assumptions by both the DOD and the intelligence community; for example:

-- Army forces are influenced by assumptions about: (1) the allocation of Warsaw Pact forces against Central Europe; (2) the ability of those forces to sustain themselves in combat; and (3) the time available for NATO to prepare for combat. Agreed national intelligence on these questions does not currently exist.

-- Naval forces are strongly affected by assumptions about the role of the Navy in short European wars (AIMS E, F, G) and about the capability of Allied forces, and by differing views on the ability of land-based aircraft and submarines to substitute for sea-based aircraft.

Also influencing the force and cost estimates is the question of "risk" (or uncertainty); i. e., the degree of confidence that a given set of forces can successfully execute the military strategy. All estimators were ostensibly guided by the same "risk" -- prudent risk, as opposed to the more conservative minimum risk criterion. But one man's minimum risk is another's prudent risk. And "risk" explains why it is (and has been) possible to state one strategy, but only be able to execute a less demanding strategy with high confidence. Thus, the President can choose a demanding strategy, but not provide a level of funding adequate to achieve "prudent" risk.

With the exception of the naval roles and missions questions, the forces are based on current military employment doctrine. The costs do not include any estimate of the effect of efficiency actions. As a consequence, both forces and costs could be lower than shown if novel employment doctrine or increased efficiency were considered.

The ranges of forces and costs for each AIMS are unfortunate, since the costs of supporting a military strategy is a major constraint on the strategy choice. Without rehearsing all the arguments, we believe that you can safely use the low estimates as a guide for comparing the relative costs of implementing an AIMS, if not for the absolute numbers. The high estimates are patently absurd: as shown by the cost chart on page III-19, the high estimates imply that the defense budget is independent of strategy choice and must be about 25% higher than today's for any strategy. This absurdity is mainly driven by the high naval force estimates made by the

Navy. Basically, the Navy is arguing that even for AIMS E (a strategy considerably less demanding than today's), it must have about 50% more forces than it has today. This conflicts directly with the CNO's statement to Congress earlier this year that current forces are capable, albeit marginally, of carrying out their current missions.

Questions 1 and 2 (Page IV-2 - IV-9)

The questions focus mainly on the defense of Europe: the degree of reliance on the threat of early nuclear first-use for deterrence and the ability of the US to convince the Allies to emulate our approach to deterrence. Here, the strategy choice falls between two groups of AIMS:

-- In AIMS E, F, and G, NATO would hope to deter conflict by having the capability to make Warsaw Pact conventional aggression costly, backed up by the threat of nuclear first-use to enhance deterrence of conventional attack and deter Soviet first-use. In the event deterrence fails, NATO would attempt to absorb a conventional attack, fall back, and stabilize a defensive line. NATO would be able to sustain the conventional conflict for about a month (consistent with current Allied planning). NATO would always have the option to use nuclear weapons if the conflict went worse than anticipated or if it appeared that the Pact could simply outlast NATO (current estimates of Pact capability to sustain conflict are quite uncertain, but it is believed that the Pact could sustain conflict for greater than a month). Defense of the Flanks is left to the Allies.

-- In AIMS H, I, and J, NATO would hope to deter conflict by having the capability to throw back a Warsaw Pact conventional attack. In the event deterrence fails, NATO would attempt to absorb a conventional attack, stabilize a defensive line, and counterattack to push Pact forces out of West Germany in a campaign lasting less than three months.

Nuclear weapons would assume a lesser role, existing mainly to deter Soviet first-use, to provide another option if conventional defense fails, and to help deter conventional attacks.\*

\* Beyond general statements of the relationship of theater nuclear forces (TNF) to deterrence, this study did not review the purposes and structure of TNF. Such a review should be a high priority follow-on to this study and will be the subject of an initiative that we will provide you.

In an attempt to bridge the chasm between these two alternatives, AIMS F (variant), which purports to be close to the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP), was proposed. This AIMS is almost identical to F but provides a capability to sustain conflict for three months.

The study thus presents a dilemma:

-- Almost all agree that increased NATO conventional capability is needed to enhance deterrence and provide better war termination options. But the AIMS offered by the paper are too expensive (AIMS H, I, and J cost about \$30 B per year more than E, F, and G); would cost the Allies more as well (and they would almost certainly refuse to bear the cost — they are currently only willing to stock 30 days of supplies); and would raise Allied fears that we are planning to confine conventional conflict to European soil (which is exactly what we would be doing).

-- On the other hand, lower cost strategies (E, F, and G) that we and our Allies could more readily support financially, rely heavily on the threat of nuclear first-use for deterrence and, if deterrence fails, would cede territory and permit the Warsaw Pact to outlast NATO in a conventional war. But, the Allies could not support these strategies politically because they contemplate territorial loss.

But, US strategy for Europe is not really such a dilemma:

-- This study did not discover the problem; it has existed for years. Within the ambiguities of NATO's declaratory strategy of forward defense and flexible response, all have been able to live with the low confidence in NATO's ability to prevent territorial loss in a conventional conflict; the US has been able to argue for increased emphasis on conventional defense and to pull NATO slowly in that direction; and the Allies have been able to resist providing a high confidence conventional defense, while relying on the threat of nuclear first-use for deterrence.

-- The cost differential may be overstated. It results in part from the requirement to restore NATO's territorial integrity within 90 days. The force sizing analysis assumed, moreover, that -- according to current NATO operational planning -- NATO would give up territory before stabilizing a defensive line and would have to go on the offensive to regain territory. Regaining territory -- according to the study's methodology -- would require achieving a significant force superiority over 130 Pact divisions within 90 days. But, the methodology is shaky; alternative defense concepts, such as establishment of a forward defensive line

armed with precision-guided munitions, might require fewer forces; and a search for greater efficiencies might lower the cost.

-- Since NATO only needs to outlast the Pact and we do not know how long the Pact can sustain conflict, it may not be necessary to plan to sustain conflict for three months. The intelligence community needs to apply additional resources -- both collection and analysis -- in order to give an explicit answer to this key intelligence question.

To some extent, the President has already set US strategy for Europe: His statements at the NATO Summit and at the May 19 meeting on PRM 10 have described our goals; these include:

-- A reaffirmation of NATO strategy of flexible response and forward defense;

-- A recognition of the need for continued improvement in the conventional deterrent;

-- A stated goal of maintaining the territorial integrity of the NATO area if deterrence fails; and

-- A stated goal of sustaining conventional conflict for 90 days if deterrence fails, together with a statement to our Allies that while the US supports this goal, it will only go as far toward achieving it as the Allies will.

According to the study, the forces and costs associated with the latter two goals are beyond both our Allies and our own ability to support and would mean reinstitution of the draft, but the paper's forces and costs need not be the result. First, the goals can be viewed as long-term objectives. Second, more work is needed to determine the programmatic implications of implementing the goals. However, it must be recognized that these goals imply somewhat more US military capability oriented toward Europe than at present, which in turn means less (or at least no more) capability will be specifically available for other purposes if we are fiscally constrained.

As you will see in our discussion of later questions, including the strategic forces question, we believe it is possible to emphasize conventional capability for Europe more than at present, particularly since forces oriented toward Europe can be employed elsewhere if needed. Moreover, we believe this reorientation of priorities to be consistent with



our strategic interests: Except for the protection of the US homeland, Europe remains the area of our greatest interest, but the contingency assessment showed that of all military contingencies, Europe is the area where we are least confident of securing our objectives.

In short, the strategy goals we describe would be consistent with a combination of AIMS H and I.

Question 3 (Page IV-10)

This question concerns the extent to which we should plan separate military capabilities to undertake military operations against the USSR outside Europe during a NATO/Warsaw Pact war. The paper presents two basic options:

- AIMS E, F, H, and I, which provide for "limited action" ; and
- AIMS G, J, and M, which provide for "initiatives."

We are not convinced that planning to take initiatives against the USSR in a NATO/Pact war has any strategic merit worthy of the costs.

-- The USSR is confined to the Eurasian land mass, while US interests stretch far from its shores. The US would have enough on its hands coping with Soviet initiatives against those interests and for that reason, has an interest in preventing a NATO/Pact conflict from spreading worldwide. Taking initiatives against the USSR would only increase the probability of such spread.

-- Initiatives would be valuable if they could hurt the USSR enough to cause the diversion of significant resources away from Europe or to bring the USSR to sue for peace. Only initiatives against Soviet territory could have a such an effect. But even here, our options are not great. Land attacks that are not prohibitively costly would at the same time not gain Soviet territory that would be of great consequence to the Soviets in the context of a war for Europe -- the Kuriles are often suggested. Conventional air attacks against Soviet military bases on the Soviet perimeter might be of some psychological value, but only limited military value unless the Soviets were caught by surprise -- that is, by preemptive attack.

-- The Soviets do not have a conventional capability to take action against US territory in response to US attacks against Soviet territory. This "capabilities gap" might force the USSR to consider using nuclear weapons against the US homeland.



In consequence, we feel that US strategy should concentrate on defending its vital interests outside Europe and preventing the worldwide spread of a NATO/Pact conflict, if possible. According to the contingency assessment, we have the capability to defend our interests now, given Soviet inability to sustain its own initiatives against deployed US and Allied forces and US interests. In the language of the PRM-10 report, the "limited action" capability provided by AIMS E, F, H, and I is roughly equivalent to our current capability.

Question 4 (Page IV-15)

This question concerns planning for crisis management and intervention in local wars. It asks to what extent we should plan on these contingencies and, if we do, whether we should have an independent intervention capability or instead rely on forces that have been procured for other purposes (e.g., Europe). The question addresses the one-half war component of previous two and one-half and one and one-half war US military strategies.

Given the Vietnam experience, a military strategy calling explicitly for some intervention capability must be approached with caution. Yet, the US is more likely to see a need to employ forces outside the NATO/Pact context than in it. The most obvious possibility is the Middle East: US interests there continue to grow as Western access to oil becomes more important; the possibility of conflict, potentially involving the USSR, remains higher there than in other parts of the world. The contingency assessment revealed that US capability to project power considerably exceeds that of the USSR in most areas of the world, including the Middle East, but that the US would face the greatest difficulty projecting power into the Middle East.

The US cannot avoid the potential need to intervene, if not in the Middle East, then perhaps elsewhere. But the question remains: To what extent? Intervention capability comes by the yard: Unlike capability for Europe, which is estimated on the basis of a specific mission in a specific place, intervention capability is planned to sustain a given level of effort anywhere in the world. The study selects three illustrative purchases (see table on page IV-17).

-- AIMS E and H provide for "limited action": materiel support to participants in local wars, together with a small amount of US naval and air forces, but no land forces.

-- AIMS F and I provide "light intervention": materiel support plus moderate amounts of naval and air forces as well as some land forces (2 divisions).

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-- AIMS G, J, and M provide for "heavy intervention": a healthy independent capability including eight Army divisions.

This question is closely coupled to the others, for a military capability planned for Europe can be used for military operations elsewhere if need be. For example, if, as we suggest, the US continues to increase conventional capability oriented to Europe, there is a reduced need to plan an independent capability for intervention. Still, there are limits to which this so called "drawdown" planning can be carried:

-- Forces designed for Europe may not provide capabilities needed for intervention -- particularly forces needed for forcible entry -- airborne or amphibious units.

-- Drawdown may not be possible if the European conflict precedes the intervention conflict. Or, once an intervention conflict begins, US capability oriented toward Europe but diverted to the contingency would be less available. This latter problem, which occurred during Vietnam, is more important for land forces than for air and naval forces, which are more easily redeployed.

Given the contingency assessment's judgment that current capability (roughly "limited action") is adequate for most contingencies and given that we have argued earlier for increased capabilities for Europe, we feel that the US can plan for a capability roughly between "limited action" and "light intervention"; that is, between AIMS H and I, so long as the US maintains an independent land-force capability for forcible entry.

Question 5 (Page IV - 20)

This question concerns US military strategy in East Asia following the withdrawal of ground forces from Korea. The only real issue is whether the US should draw down peacetime presence further, should retain the status quo, or should increase peacetime presence.

Question 5 almost disappeared from the key question list numerous times, but it was retained because Secretary Brown and others want to use the PRM-10 paper to argue for no further reductions of US military presence in the Western Pacific. It was almost dropped because considerations of peacetime presence in East Asia did not influence the forces required for the AIMS: Forces required for the missions associated with Questions 3 and 4 could support the East Asian peacetime presence associated with the AIMS; additional forces would not be required to support peacetime presence.

-- AIMS E and H would draw down US presence by withdrawing all forces in the Philippines and Korea.

-- AIMS F, I, G, and J would maintain current presence.

-- AIMS M would add deployed forces -- tactical aircraft, carriers, embarked marines and maritime patrol aircraft -- and would seek some form of security ties with China.

Excluding the transitory US presence brought about by Vietnam, US military presence in East Asia has steadily declined over the last two decades. The question at hand is whether further reductions can be accomplished without upsetting regional stability, causing the Chinese to reassess relations with the USSR, or encouraging a major Japanese rearmament, perhaps including nuclear weapons.

Proponents of further reductions argue that the small reductions contemplated would not unduly harm stability. They argue that a carefully managed trend toward some Japanese rearmament would be a positive step, since the Japanese are able to lift some of the burden from the US and provide for their own defense. Finally, they feel that an East Asian drawdown would be consistent with a Europe-first US strategy, but would not impair US ability to carry out wartime missions.

While we are attracted to these notions, we feel that with plans for US withdrawal from Korea now underway, this is not an appropriate time to consider further withdrawals. After the effects of the withdrawals from Korea have settled, the US can take another look.

#### Additional Reading

In addition to this memo, we suggest that you also:

-- Read or at least scan Harold Brown's memo at Tab A and the Executive Summary -- this will be the common reading of all participants;

-- Become familiar with the AIMS as displayed on the chart on page III-3;

-- Become familiar with the general purpose forces and costs estimated for the AIMS (see the forces chart on page III-9 and the table on page III-8 as well as the cost charts on pages III-19-21);

-- Scan, beginning on page III-7, the causes for the ranges of estimated forces for each AIMS; and

-- Scan the comparative AIMS analysis between pages III-27 and III-45.

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SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

April 4, 1979

Time and Place: 1:45-3:00 p.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Strategic Forces Employment Policy (U)

Participants:

State

Cyrus Vance  
Secretary

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron

Defense

Harold Brown  
Secretary

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny  
Deputy Director

NSC

Victor Utgoff

JCS

General David Jones  
Chairman

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Chairman opened the meeting by noting that this meeting is the first of several to discuss strategic forces employment policy and related issues. He stated that the series would probably lead to an NSC meeting in which the SCC's recommendations would be presented to the President, and ultimately to a new or updated PD on strategic forces policy. (S)

DOD gave an overview of their study of strategic forces targeting policy done in response to PD-18. The main points were:

- that while we don't know exactly what deters the Soviets, some Soviet strategists appear to believe that nuclear war is in some sense winnable;

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Classified by Z. Brzezinski  
Review April 5, 1985

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Per 3/5/10 NSC e-mail  
NSC-18-046  
BY [signature] DATE 12/3/10



- that deterrence should be strengthened by improving our capability to defeat possible Soviet objectives in nuclear war; and
- that major changes in our targeting policy are not required to achieve such a strengthening. (TS)

DOD also stated that the study does not argue that nuclear war can be controlled or that the Soviets are correct in thinking nuclear war is winnable, and it does not propose that we shift from a deterrence to a warfighting posture or that we shift from targeting urban/industrial targets to targeting military forces. (TS)

State and ACDA questioned DOD's interpretation of the study -- arguing that it seems to call for a shift away from urban/industrial targets and toward placing more emphasis on targeting military forces. DOD did not agree. (TS)

DOD summarized a number of follow-on efforts it has underway. These efforts include: (1) studies on alternative criteria for targeting several general classes of targets; (2) work to improve the flexibility of the SIOP by structuring it in terms of building blocks that are finer grained than the current SIOP options; (3) construction of some SAOs for targeting conventional forces in Eastern Europe; (4) development of a launch-under-attack option; (5) development of options for damaging and disrupting Soviet forces on the Chinese border; (6) development of plans for targeting China by means of regional nuclear forces rather than SIOP forces; (7) a program to improve the crisis management process by involving senior officials in exercises that would include planning of non-SIOP nuclear options; (8) development of plans to improve our C<sup>3</sup>, and (9) efforts to improve the target data base. (TS)

The Chairman noted the large number of issues to be discussed and suggested that the discussion be framed in terms of three general questions: What are the requirements of (1) stable deterrence at all levels; (2) crisis bargaining; and (3) effective war management? (S)

After some discussion it was agreed that the following specific issues should be discussed in terms of the above framework:

- (1) removing China from the SIOP; (2) potential asymmetries in population fatalities; targeting leadership and the

control apparatus; targeting to regionalize the Soviet Union; (3) economic targeting to prolong Soviet recovery vs. targeting war supporting industry and the broad industrial base upon which Soviet post-war power might depend; (4) the requirements for time-urgent and non-time-urgent hard-target kill capability; (5) launch under attack; (6) the impact of our targeting policy upon our European Allies; (7) implications of any changes in employment policy on declaratory policy; (8) implications of employment policy changes for acquisition policy. (TS)

The Chairman noted the group's apparent agreement that increased flexibility and endurance for our strategic forces are desirable. It was also noted that the specific purposes of increased flexibility will be discussed in the next meetings. (TS)

The Chairman asked DOD to prepare issue papers on each of the above eight topics. These papers will be the basis for the next meetings and, given their sensitivity, will be handled in such a way as to insure the minimum possible distribution. (S)

Finally, DOD suggested that the group receive briefings on four topics: (1) the SIOP, (2) the RISOP, (3) C<sup>3</sup> connectivity, and (4) the M-X. (C)

23.

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 5, 1979

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: VIC UTGOFF *Vu*  
SUBJECT: SCC on Strategic Forces Employment  
Policy (U)

In preparing the attached material I noted that two issues were not explicitly identified for discussion in the next SCC meetings on this general topic:

- Targeting moving general purpose Soviet forces (which is the most important flexibility issue); and
- Secure reserve force/C<sup>3</sup>I requirements (which is probably the most important endurance issue and could have some significant implications for acquisition policy). (TS)

The PD that is written at the end of this process should include guidance on both these issues. In light of this I have added a paragraph to the memo at Tab B suggesting that Harold start thinking about preparing background papers on these issues as well. At Tab C are my detailed notes on the meeting. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A. (U)

That you sign and forward the memo at Tab B. (U)

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Classified by Z. Brzezinski  
Review April 5, 1985

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*EX-08-046*  
BY *GJ* NARA, DATE *2/3/10*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Strategic Forces Employment Policy  
and Related Issues (U)

In Wednesday's SCC on strategic forces employment policy, we agreed that the next meetings on this general topic should be based on issue papers on the following specific topics: (1) removing China from the SIOP, (2) potential asymmetries in population fatalities; targeting leadership and the control apparatus; targeting to regionalize the Soviet Union; (3) economic targeting to prolong Soviet recovery vs. targeting war supporting industry and the broad industrial base upon which Soviet post-war power would depend; (4) the requirements for time-urgent and non-time-urgent hard-target kill capabilities; (5) launch under attack; (6) the impact of our targeting policy upon our European Allies; (7) implications of any changes in employment policy on declaratory policy; and (8) implications of employment policy changes for acquisition policy. (TS)

I suggest that we plan on discussing the first three of these topics in the next meeting and time permitting, begin discussion of the fourth. (U)

You might also begin thinking about developing two additional papers for SCC discussion -- one on targeting moving Soviet forces, and one on the requirements for a secure reserve force and its supporting C<sup>3</sup>I. (TS)

Finally, while it is clearly appropriate for DOD to draft these papers, I would like our staffs to cooperate in their preparation, particularly with respect to framing the questions that should be discussed under each of the above topics. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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Review April 5, 1985

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BY: J NARA DATE 12/3/10

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15 April 1980

Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb390/>, Accessed 19 Dec 2013.

PD on Nuclear Force Employment

Proposed Revision

In PD-18, I directed a follow-on study of our targeting policy for nuclear forces. I have reviewed the results and considered their implications for maintaining deterrence in the present decade, particularly in light of the growing Soviet strategic weapons arsenal and its capabilities.

The most fundamental objective of our strategic policy remains nuclear deterrence. I reaffirm the directive of PD-18 to that effect. The purpose of this directive is to outline policies and actions in the nuclear force employment field to secure that continuing objective.

Our strategic nuclear forces must be able to deter nuclear attacks not only on our own country but also on our forces overseas, as well as on our friends and allies, and to contribute to deterrence of non-nuclear attacks. To continue to deter in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, it is necessary to have nuclear (as well as conventional) forces such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory on any plausible definition of victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical, if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack.



The employment of nuclear forces must be effectively related to operations of our general purpose forces. Our doctrines for the use of forces in nuclear conflict must insure that we can pursue specific policy objectives selected by the National Command Authorities at that time from general guidelines established in advance.

Entire contents TSS.

SANITIZED

MR. MCJG-08-092

FOR 2/2/09 JOD LETTER

BY [Signature] NARA DATE 8/21/09


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These requirements form the broad outline of our evolving countervailing strategy. To meet these requirements, improvements should be made to our forces, their supporting C3 and intelligence, and their employment plans and planning apparatus, to achieve a high degree of flexibility, enduring survivability, and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions. The following principles and goals should guide your efforts in making these improvements.

Pre-planned options. The Single Integrated Operational Plan will provide pre-planned targeting for strikes against the Soviet Union, its allies and its forces. It should provide for retaliatory strikes that will be effective, even if the Soviets attack first, without warning, and in a manner designed to reduce our capability as much as possible. It will be developed with flexible sub-options that will permit, to the extent that survival of C3 allows,



Flexibility. In addition to pre-planned options we need an ability to design nuclear employment plans on short notice in response to the latest and changing circumstances. This capability must be comprehensive enough to allow rapid construction of plans that integrate strategic force employment with theater nuclear force employment and general purpose force employment for achieving theater campaign objectives and other national objectives (when pre-planned response options are not judged suitable in the circumstances.)

To assure that we can design such plans, our goal should be to have the following capabilities on a continuing basis in peacetime, during crises, and during protracted conflict:

- Staff capabilities to develop operational plans on short notice and based on the latest intelligence existing within all unified and specified commands which have nuclear forces.
- Staff capabilities at the seat of Government to support the NCA for coordinating and integrating the nuclear force employment for all commands.
- Intelligence and target development capabilities which permit damage assessment and acquisition of a broad range of targets, fixed and mobile, on a timely basis for military operations.

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 17, 1980

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: WILLIAM ODOM *WDO*  
JASPER WELCH *W*  
SUBJECT: Draft PD on Nuclear Employment Policy (TS)

1  
Give me a  
game-plan after  
7- discussion  
with Slocombe

29  
(4/18/80)

We have completed our initial review of Harold's memorandum commenting on our draft PD and enclosing his proposed revision. We would make the following general points:

- (1) He did respond, and in a constructive manner. (TS)
- (2) He characterized our draft as "sound an approach and consistent with" current thinking in the Pentagon and ongoing implementation. (TS)
- (3) His proposed revision retains the structure of our draft and most of the language. (TS)
- (4) His proposed revision does include a fair number of modifications to the concepts in our draft as well as some additions. (TS)

OK | We find some of the changes helpful, some of them confusing, and some of them, in our judgment, counterproductive. Walt Slocombe has offered to explain their rationale behind the changes, and we intend to take him up on that offer today if possible. After we confer with Walt we will be in a better position to advise you as to which of Harold's changes you should object, which to modify, and which to accept. (TS)

On balance, we expect that a mutually agreeable draft can be achieved without a major struggle. There is the possibility, however, that our conference with Slocombe could uncover underlying differences of view, not clearly evident in the language of the proposed revision, which would require resolution. (TS)

We have attached a copy of Harold's memo and his revision in which important points and changes are highlighted. (U)

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Review on April 17, 2000  
Extended by Z. Brzezinski  
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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Per 2/16/11 NSC email  
NDC-DR-021  
NARA DATE 2/17/14

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1. This paragraph should be omitted. It introduces a number of points which are at odds with the overall thrust of the PD:
  - It puts the emphasis "first of all" on "industry and cities." We retain this city-busting option in the pre-planned options section. No need for it up front.
  - "Controlling escalation" is used here in its traditional sense of exchanging LNOs for psycho-political effects, precisely the kind of thing which is wholly incredible. (S)
2. Specific reference to Cuba, SRV, North Korea, and the PRC is added to provide a basis for targeting these states. Our draft excluded them because they can be treated in the implementation section under review of pre-planned options. We can accept this or we would replace it with: "All countries now targeted with pre-planned options shall remain so, subject to annual review as prescribed in the implementation section below." (S) *better*
3. This is the "launch from under attack" section. Brown seems committed to it. You have heard my protestations. It is operationally a very dangerous thing. And it is an eventual excuse for not deploying MX. This PD is probably not the place to debate this issue. (S)
4. Brown added this clause about pre-planned options. It is vintage Brown, hedging against a clear commitment to flexibility of the sort in this section. Not a critical point to debate. (S)
5. "At the seat of government" is Brown's language designed to prevent this staff role from accruing to the NSC staff. My original reference mentioned the JCS. Accept Brown's language. We want a better staff in the Pentagon, not at the White House. (S)
6. We said pre-planned options should be "without use of weapons designated for the reserve forces." Brown's language allows the use of some but "leaving a substantial force in the secure reserve." At issue is the size of the reserve. You would seek a larger one sooner. The last sentence about "most survivable" is an addition. We can accept it. (S)

Brown has omitted our sentence about a significant increase in the next two years. (S)

Debate this one with him. His own concept of a countervailing strategy seems to require a larger and coercive reserve. It can be notionally targeted, but in principle it should be held

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for "flexible" use to "countervail" against any surprising enemy operations as a conflict unfolds. We can accept this language but you need to insist on some schedule for increasing the reserve. Brown can take the weapons from the "urban-industrial" targets, i.e., city-busting/economic recovery, which we are trying to move away from. (S)

7. and 8. "Categories" versus "priorities." Brown wants to avoid a ranking of priorities, and he wants to re-insert the city-busting category. Again, vintage Brown, on the fence, looking first to one side and then the other. (S)

We should seek a compromise by accepting "category" in exchange for deletion of the clause, "While preserving a major force capability for either early use or urban-industrial targets . . ." Brown gets the effect of this clause in the later paragraph beginning, "In addition, pre-planned options . . . on general industrial capacity." (S)

9. "In the near term, . . ." has been added. This puts the emphasis on "fixed" instead of "mobile" targets. We can ask Brown to drop this and leave it for his internal DOD implementation guidance. He is mixing implementation in the wrong place. This PD should be more brief and general, not loaded with implementing detail. (S)
10. Brown omits our statement, "This consideration should not be allowed to prevent effective attacks against targets that would not otherwise be struck under our countervailing strategy." Discussion with Slocombe revealed that Brown may have misunderstood this. His substitute, "In order to permit the NCA . . . methods of estimating collateral damage . . . should be improved" does not perform the function of our sentence, a function sorely needed: it tells the planner that when he has a problem of limiting collateral damage in striking key military targets, the President would generally prefer to destroy the military target anyway. These trade-offs are so frequent that planners can't refer them all to Brown. Thus, a general criterion, like our statement, is an important clue for the planner. Brown will probably accept a revised version. (S)
11. Brown added the underlined, "commensurate with those of the forces themselves . . ." This is gratuitous, another implementing concept better left to DOD internal guidance. He might be willing to drop it. (S)
12. Brown left out "and general purpose forces" and added the underlined phrase, "needed . . ." He believes it asked for too much to tie nuclear employment policy to acquisition policy of tanks, ships, and airplanes. We can let him have this point, but the tie is important, e.g., "EMP-hardening" of aircraft, anti-radiation characteristics of tanks and ships. Failure to make the tie let us buy NEACP without EMP-hardening. Now we are paying for that modification. (S)
13. The changed wording in two implementing procedures is of no great consequence. We can accept it. (S)





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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON D C 20301

24 OCT 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES  
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE UNIFIED  
AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

SUBJECT: Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear  
Weapons (NUWEP)

To enhance deterrence and thereby reduce the dangers of nuclear war -- which is at once a military, a political, and a moral objective -- we must continue to pursue an integrated policy of force modernization, equitable and verifiable agreements on arms limitations, and more credible doctrine and plans for the employment of nuclear weapons. To insure achievement of the latter, the attached Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP) sets forth in accordance with national guidance (PD-59) policy for the employment of nuclear weapons.

NUWEP has important elements of continuity with past guidance, but it is intended to yield improvements in employment flexibility, provide the basis for strengthening endurance of forces and supporting C<sup>3</sup>I, and produce better interaction between policymakers and military planners. We should seek through plans we develop, the forces and C<sup>3</sup>I systems we procure, the exercises that we conduct, and the operational practices we employ to convince our adversaries that they could not and would not "win" a nuclear war in any meaningful sense, however they may define winning. To this end each of you should fully understand and carefully take into account the attached policy guidance in future actions.

*Howard Bunker*

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

**POLICY GUIDANCE  
FOR  
THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS (NUWEP) (U)**

OCTOBER 1980

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Reason 2301C 5, 6 & 7, DoD 5200.1-R

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OFFICE OF  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NUMEP) (U)

Classified by: USD(P)  
Review on: Oct 2000  
Extended by: USD(P)  
Reason: 2-301C 5, 6 & 7, DoD 5200.1-R

24 October 1980

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## I. INTRODUCTION

~~(TS)~~ This document establishes guidance for the planning for employment of nuclear weapons and provides planning guidelines consistent with national policy. It reflects current realities of power relationships among the United States and its allies, the Soviet Union and its allies, and China. This guidance is intended to strengthen the defense posture of the United States through the development of greater flexibility and endurance in our forces and supporting C3I systems, and in the plans for their employment. It sets forth the principles for the planning needed to implement a ~~(b)(1)~~ strategy--an ability to deter by a manifest capability to carry out a broad range of nuclear attacks such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory by any plausible definition of victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical, if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack. This capability must be maintained even after absorbing an initial Soviet surprise attack optimized to reduce U.S. retaliatory capability and even through a prolonged series of exchanges.

## II. BACKGROUND

~~(TS)~~ National policy for the employment of nuclear weapons is set forth in PD/NSC-59 which directs that US targeting plans provide flexible sub-options in ways that will enable us, to the extent that survival of C3I allows, to employ nuclear weapons consonant with our objectives and the course of the conflict. ~~(b)(1)~~

~~(TS)~~ The Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR) recommendations which were approved have also been incorporated in the development of this policy guidance document. ~~(b)(1)~~

(U) The guidance herein is to be used by the OSD staff as appropriate and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the preparation of capabilities plans for the employment of nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will insure that this guidance is reflected in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and in all other plans for the employment of nuclear weapons.

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III. OBJECTIVES

A. Deterrence


(U) The most fundamental objective of our policy for the employment of nuclear capable forces is the deterrence of nuclear attack against the U.S., its forces, and its allies and friends; and, in conjunction with conventional forces, deterring non-nuclear aggression as well. PD/NSC-59 reaffirms the directive of PD/NSC-18 in that respect. Also, our nuclear capable forces must support NATO strategy as expressed in MC-14-3. We must continue to make the prospect of nuclear war even more remote by remaining capable, in all plausible scenarios, of fighting successfully so that the adversary would perceive that he could not achieve his war aims, and should he initiate an attack, he would suffer losses that were unacceptable or, in any event, greater than his expected gains. We seek to make a Soviet victory, as seen through Soviet eyes and measured by Soviet standards, so improbable over the broadest plausible range of scenarios that the Soviets will be deterred.

B. Crisis Stability

(U) In a crisis, we must ensure that the USSR has no incentive to initiate a nuclear attack and that the U.S. is not under pressure to do so. We must minimize vulnerabilities in our forces and supporting C<sup>3</sup>I systems, improve our ability to detect and assess a Soviet attack (or preparations for an attack) and enhance our ability to respond appropriately. The latter must include effective options to reach and maintain higher levels of force readiness, launch under attack if directed, and conduct a prolonged and controlled nuclear exchange.

C. War Objectives

(S) If conflict occurs, the most critical military employment objective of the United States is to defeat Soviet attempts to achieve their politico-military objectives or impose higher costs on them than the value they might expect to gain from their actions. (b)(1)



D. Protection and Coercion

(S) (b)(1)



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#### IV. STRATEGY FOR EMPLOYMENT

##### A. Flexibility

(U) The U.S. must have the capability to respond appropriately and effectively to any level of Soviet aggression, over the continuum of nuclear weapon employment options, ranging from use of a small number of strategic and/or theater nuclear capable weapon systems in a contingency operation, to a war employing all elements of our nuclear forces in attacks against a broad spectrum of enemy targets. The ability to respond with selectivity to less than an all-out Soviet attack in keeping with the needs of the situation is required in order to provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with suitable alternatives, strengthen deterrence, and enhance the prospects of limiting escalation of the conflict. In addition to pre-planned options we need an ability to design employment plans on short notice in response to the latest and changing circumstances. To advance the goal of flexibility, planning will provide an objective-oriented series of building block options for the employment of nuclear weapons in ways that will enable us to employ them consonant with our objectives and the course of the conflict.

(S) As it evolves, the building block approach should provide plans which satisfy a hierarchy of targeting objectives and which will provide the NCA an improved capability to employ nuclear weapons effectively in as measured and controlled a manner as feasible in case of a limited conflict. It should provide complementary elements which can be combined in an integrated and discrete manner to provide larger and more comprehensive plans for achieving politico-military objectives in specific situations. The building block approach places emphasis on the individual elements, their objective utility, and our ability to employ them separately or in total. However, this does not imply that the total plan be finely divisible--practical realities cannot be ignored. The desire for enhanced flexibility in employment must be balanced by practical consideration of the increased complexity incurred in planning and operations, the need to avoid compromising the effectiveness and workability of the larger options, and the need to maintain a responsive decisionmaking and force execution process.

##### B. Endurance

(S) Endurance of forces and supporting C<sup>3</sup>I can strengthen the US defense posture by: (1) ensuring that the U.S. is not placed in a "use or lose" situation that might result in an unwarranted escalation of the conflict; (2) providing a hedge that allows us to adapt the employment of our forces across the spectrum of nuclear war; and (3) (b)(1)

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(b)(1)

C. Escalation Control

(U) U.S. nuclear weapon employment plans should provide the NCA with the ability to conduct military operations at various levels of conflict in ways that will be militarily effective and will maximize the chance of controlling escalation. Plans for the controlled use of nuclear weapons should seek in conjunction with other political and military actions to: (1) provide the U.S. and its allies with leverage for a negotiated termination of fighting; (2) reverse or stalemate an unfavorable military situation, at least temporarily; (3) diminish the enemy's expectations of success both by the direct military effect of the attacks and by evidencing U.S. willingness to respond as appropriate, while indicating clearly the limited character of the U.S. response executed to that point; (4) convince an enemy that previously calculated risks and costs were in error and that early termination of the conflict or a reconsideration of his course of action is the most attractive alternative; and (5) leave the enemy with sufficient remaining political, military and economic resources clearly still at risk so that he has a strong incentive to seek conflict termination.

D. Targeting Objectives

~~(S)~~ Planning for SIOP attack options will be in accordance with the overall objectives set forth below. (For relative priorities for allocation of weapons against these objectives, see page 13). These objectives are consistent with PD/NSC-18, PD/NSC-59 and NTPR initiatives as subsequently approved by the President and contained in the SecDef 29 January 1979 Implementation Instructions.

~~(S)~~ Structured plans other than the SIOP will be guided by the political and military situation for which they are being prepared, in keeping with guidance provided to military commanders-in-chief (CINCs) by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (b)(1)

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff will propose measures to insure that SIOP and non-SIOP plans complement each other to the maximum feasible degree.

~~(S)~~ It is recognized that the ability to achieve many of the individual objectives will require the suppression of selected enemy defenses not a part of the objective itself.

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(U) Details of specific near term objectives for providing increased flexibility in current employment plans against the USSR and its allies and China are contained in Section V.

~~(TS)~~ General target objectives are:

1. USSR and Allies


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
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(c) ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)



(d) ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)




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
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(3) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)



(e) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)



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2. (b)(1)

(S) (b)(1)

(a) (S) (b)(1)

(b) (S) (b)(1)

(c) (S) (b)(1)

; and

(d) (S) (b)(1)

(S) (b)(1)

(a) (S) (b)(1)

(b) (S) (b)(1)

(c) (S) (b)(1)

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F. Exercises

(U) To ensure continuing assessments of nuclear employment plans, evaluations in regular exercises must be pursued. To this end, periodic exercises shall be conducted to test the suitability of implementing preplanned and ad hoc nuclear weapons plans; to familiarize senior civilian officials with the overall objectives of the plans; and to test future concepts of weapons employment to include the use of mobile command centers and simulated stress environments. Exercises for nuclear employment operations shall include interaction between the Department of Defense and other federal agencies, as appropriate. At least two exercises involving the National Command Authorities should be conducted each year to evaluate our capabilities and our employment doctrine.

V. PLANNING CONCEPTS

A. Pre-planning and Review

(U) It is essential to pre-plan nuclear employment options to the extent practicable for important reasons: (1) to permit consideration and balanced treatment of the key factors involved; (2) to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process and the forces used; (3) to provide for rapid and effective communications of NCA execution orders; and (4) to develop a more comprehensive ability for estimating the consequences of execution given specific scenarios.

(S) Structured plans, and especially the SIOP, will be pre-planned for use in circumstances where vital national interests clearly would be imperiled. Overall targeting planning appropriate to implement a (b)(1) strategy will result in a capability to choose to put the major weight of the initial response on (b)(1). To the extent appropriate for individual plans, and specifically for the SIOP, each will comprise an integrated set of options for attacking coherent sets of objective-related targets. Ideally, the number of attack options to be developed to provide the NCA with a range of alternatives should be limited only by consideration of the associated complexities. In planning and execution, the constraints imposed by operational characteristics of US weapon systems, and the capabilities and limitations of U.S. and Soviet warning, attack characterization and CI systems.

(U) Where only general plans can be prepared in advance, appropriate organizations and procedures should be established by all nuclear CINCs and exercised to improve the capability for the rapid development, assessment and execution of specifically tailored options. This capability must be comprehensive enough to allow rapid construction of plans that integrate strategic force employment with theater nuclear force and general purpose force employment for achieving theater campaign objectives and other national objectives when pre-planned response options are not judged suitable in the circumstances.

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(U) Periodic review by the NCA and senior defense advisors of the potential risks, limitations and effectiveness of nuclear employment options in meeting national policy should be undertaken to promote understanding and facilitate reaching timely and appropriate decisions in crisis and conflict situations.

B. Force Planning Postures

~~(S)~~ The U.S. must maintain the capability to increase and maintain force readiness levels so as to react promptly to warning and force employment directives. Minimally provocative force and C<sup>3</sup>I readiness alternatives should be available which provide the NCA with the ability to: (1) signal increased military readiness and national resolve; (2) enhance capability and flexibility to respond to attack; and (3) support the timely re-establishment of lower force readiness postures after relaxation of tension. Plans for the latter situation should not prejudice our ability to increase force readiness again in the near-term should subsequent developments require such actions. In general, force readiness levels shall be geared to the perceived threat and the need for survivable and enduring forces (and C<sup>3</sup>I) capable of reacting in a timely manner, taking into account the ability to support and maintain specific force readiness postures.

~~(S)~~ Plans for the employment of nuclear forces should be structured so as to take advantage of the flexibility and capability of the specific forces assumed to be available at the time of execution. (b)(1)



~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)



C. Attack Option Structure

(U) Attack options shall be structured to take advantage of the inherent flexibility and capability of U.S. forces, so as to permit the U.S. to respond appropriately to any level of Soviet/Warsaw Pact or Chinese aggression. The attack option structure should provide plans for a number of objective-oriented attacks that satisfy a hierarchy of political/military objectives and consist of:

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(S) (b)(1)

[Redacted]

(S) (b)(1)

[Redacted]

(S) (b)(1)

[Redacted]

(S) (b)(1)

[Redacted]

1. (S) (b)(1) and

2. (S) (b)(1)

[Redacted]

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D. Targeting Constraints.

~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

1. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

2. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

3. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

4. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

5. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

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(b)(1)

E. Weapon Allocation Planning

~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

1. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

2. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

3. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

(U) More detailed guidance for the weapon allocation process will be issued separately.

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F. Planning Actions

~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

1. (U) Revisions of Employment Plans for the Near Term

(U) The following near-term changes and improvements will be made to the existing plans.

a. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

b. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

c. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

d. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

e. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

f. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1)

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g. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

2. (U) Revision of Employment Plans for the Long-Term

(U) Much of the employment flexibility which is the major objective of this guidance will require improvements in endurance and capability of forces and C<sup>3</sup>I (in accordance with PD/NSC-53 as applicable), as well as additional research leading to the improvements of target data bases and targeting concepts. These actions are necessary to support further development of building block options for the SIOP and other nuclear plans, as appropriate, and should be developed in parallel.

~~(S)~~ The following efforts should proceed at a deliberate pace to provide the following specific improvements, with full recognition of the practical limitations involved and the need to maintain the ability to execute effectively the full range of options:

a. (U) further development of the building block planning approach and structure;

b. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

c. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

d. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

e. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

f. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

g. (U) more effective utilization in the employment plans of improvements in the endurance of U.S. nuclear capable forces and supporting C<sup>3</sup>I;

h. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

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1. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

VI. RELATION TO OTHER POLICY

~~(S)~~ The fundamental nuclear weapons employment policy concepts and targeting objectives detailed herein have implications for acquisition, declaratory, deployment and arms control policy.

A. Acquisition Policy

~~(S)~~ Our ability to support our strategic objectives is ultimately determined by how well we coordinate acquisition and employment policies. Accordingly, objectives for nuclear weapon employment and the required flexibility, survivability, endurance, and target destruction capability needed to support (b)(1)

and their supporting C<sup>3</sup>I, as set forth in the Defense Policy Guidance, the Consolidated Guidance, and related long-range planning documents. Every effort should be made to strengthen the synergistic effect of acquisition and employment efforts through stronger analysis of how well our nuclear capable forces, both current and future, measure up to the task of achieving the employment objectives, and offer additional flexibility for potential future changes in employment policy. OSD, the Service Secretaries, and directors of the relevant defense agencies will insure that the employment concepts described herein are fully considered when planning for research, development, and acquisition of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, related C<sup>3</sup>I, and associated support systems.

B. Declaratory Policy

~~(S)~~ Declaratory policy consists in part of the numerous statements and public reports by U.S. officials which describe the objectives and capabilities of our nuclear forces. Since declaratory policy, de facto, also includes the inferences drawn from our exercises and operational and training practices, their impact on perceptions of our capabilities and determination should be accounted for in planning. A major objective of declaratory policy is to enhance deterrence in the eyes of our enemies and our allies alike by conveying U.S. determination and capability to deny an adversary, particularly the Soviet Union, the prospect of successful military adventurism.

~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

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(b)(1)

Public statements related to objectives and capabilities of our nuclear forces should conform to the declaratory policy set forth in those documents and other authoritative public statements on the subject.

C. Deployment

(S) In implementing the employment objectives, nuclear weapon deployments or adjustments to deployment postures will be consistent with national guidance contained in PD/HSC-60 (or as subsequently changed) and the Secretary of Defense's Annual Weapons Deployment Plan, as approved.

D. Arms Control

(U) In order to meet our own national security needs, force planning and force posture decisions should accommodate equitable arms control agreements, provide the U.S. effective responses to potential Soviet violations and be able to continue to meet our national security objectives in the absence of such agreements. In turn, arms control and limitation proposals, which are evaluated on the basis of their contribution to our defense posture (PD/NSC-50), should take into account their impact on the employment objectives contained in this guidance, or their attainability.

VII. CONTINUING POLICY REVIEW

(S) Past experience shows that whenever changes occur to nuclear employment policy, questions and issues arise from planners regarding points of interpretation, technical issues, adequacy of nuclear forces to meet guidance objectives, and testing and exercising of plans developed during implementation. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will have overall staff responsibility for actively monitoring the implementation and continuing review of this policy and supporting employment plans to ensure an orderly progress. His responsibility will include, but not be limited to, coordination of supporting studies and analyses, the review and comment on planning reports and the annual assessment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recommendations on revisions to the employment policy, as appropriate.

(S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit to the Secretary of Defense for approval a proposal for each SIOP development cycle. Data should include, but not be limited to: (1) planning assumptions (postures and damage criteria for planning); (2) changes in size, composition or tasking (b)(1) (3) new or revised options; (4) recommendations to adjust the number of weapons targeted against (b)(1) to accommodate changes in threat; and (5) changes, if any, to priorities and objectives for weapon allocation or for fatalities/collateral damage constraints.

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(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall also provide an annual assessment to the Secretary of Defense on the status and progress of the development of nuclear employment plans including, but not limited to, (b)(1) (b)(1) the degree of employment flexibility available, limiting factors in achieving flexibility, and the status of programs to provide improvements. An integral part of the assessment will be a statement on the expected capability of deployed forces and supporting C<sub>3</sub>I to accomplish the objectives stated in this guidance. The JCS assessment will include: (1) an evaluation of the results of exercises and tests of the plans developed in support of this policy; (2) an evaluation of the ability of current plans to achieve the objectives specified and the fatality estimates (both prompt and delayed) associated with each option; (3) intelligence data base gaps; (4) progress made toward implementing an objective-oriented building block approach; (5) deficiencies in force employment that may exist; (6) the ability to constrain collateral damage and fatalities and the impact on achieving the stated objectives; (7) measures that should be taken to correct any force employment deficiencies; (8) questions of interpretation and potential application of this and other guidance; and (9) recommendations on any suggested revisions to this policy.



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~~TOP SECRET~~  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

22 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ALCMs on Aircraft other than Heavy Bombers

EXEMPTED FROM EO 12958, Sec 3.4(b)(9)  
OSD F.S. 212 Date 15 March 2003  
Review/Declassify On 31 Dec 2028  
Other Agency Equity TBD

Having given further thought to this issue, I now suggest that any new proposal not include a provision barring ALCMs of range greater than 600km from aircraft other than heavy bombers.

Using the 2500km range across the board as a line of demarcation between strategic and other applications of cruise missiles makes sense from a military point of view and gives our position an important simplicity in presentation and negotiation. Moreover, a single limit, though not solving the verification problems with cruise missiles (different ranges with different payloads, nature of payload) at least does not make them more difficult.

The other-than-heavy bomber provision introduces a potentially controversial complexity, the rationale for which appears largely historical. In a sense, the provision is a survivor of the period when the idea was to have as many 600km-like categories as possible and to treat longer ranges as specially justified exceptions.

As I have indicated earlier, a 600km limit could be advantageous to the US with respect to the Backfire problem, by barring an easy means of range extension and penetration of a modest US air defense. However, Soviet adherence to a 600km limit would be practically unverifiable. The same limitation might be obtained through a more specific collateral constraint, applicable only to Backfire.

On the other hand, the 600km limitation would have considerable potential adverse impact on US and Allied use of cruise missiles:

-- First, if applied to "armed" CMs, it would bar employment of Tomahawk-style cruise missiles from aircraft in conventional roles (e.g., anti-ship). Though anti-ship use at ranges of 2500km are at present greatly limited by targeting capability, this will not always be the case. To avoid such a prohibition, substitution of "nuclear armed" for "armed" would be required in defining cruise missiles.

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-- Second, even for theater nuclear roles, other-than-heavy bomber aircraft offers mobility, flexibility, and easy dispersal without the range requirements of sea-basing or the "public interface"

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problems of GLCMs. At present we know very little about how, if at all, we would use CMs for theater nuclear roles: That counsels against foreclosing a platform option except for very good reason. At the very least, the backdoor restriction on FBS will be of some concern to the Allies.

In short, the case for the 600km provision seems weak, it poses some substantive military and Alliance problems, and it could create difficulties both for negotiation and for ratification.

I have come to these views despite the nonsensical charges in a column earlier this week about the treatment of this issue at the Moscow meetings.

*Harold Brown*

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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21 September 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0016, Box 4,

Folder

USSR 388.3

(Aug-Oct 1977).

Subject: BACKFIRE (U)

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that BACKFIRE should count in the SALT strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV) aggregate. BACKFIRE has range/payload capabilities equal to or greater than other heavy bombers the Soviets agree should count. Under all intelligence assessments of range, BACKFIRE can reach significant portions of the United States on high-altitude, unrefueled missions when operating from certain Arctic bases and recovering in third countries. Further, within present technology, BACKFIRE could be given unverifiable improvements which would increase its range capabilities by 20 percent. Projected Soviet production of 425 BACKFIRES could account for a 30- to 40-percent increase in Soviet megatonnage (or a 20- to 25-percent increase in equivalent megatonnage) in 1985 if all BACKFIRES were used for strikes against the United States.

2. (S) The United States has sought to mitigate the potential impact of BACKFIRE's strategic capability by proposing temporary production limits and collateral constraints and assurances that BACKFIRE would not be used as a strategic weapon. In spite of the assertions made by the Soviets concerning the intended mission of BACKFIRE, they have not been forthcoming on even these minimal limitations which are directed at constraining strategic employment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that Soviet refusal to accept such limits is sufficient justification to reconsider the US position reflected in the March and May proposals not to count BACKFIRE in the aggregate.

3. (S) It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the BACKFIRE should be counted in the SNDV aggregate. If, for other than military reasons, a decision is made not to count BACKFIRE in the SNDV aggregate in future proposals, then a

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I can forward,  
but not endorse, these  
views. Backfire belongs in  
a gray area, along  
with some other weapons. It  
is probably therefore best  
treated in the protocol, while  
we try to  
include it  
SS-20,  
Germans  
in a new  
comprehensive  
package.

US 388.3

This is  
not a  
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RJ




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restrictive production limit, not to exceed 100, can be supported militarily. The US May 1977 proposition, that BACKFIRE not be counted in the SNDV aggregate during the period of the Protocol but instead be subjected to a 250 production limit during that period, posed no production constraints on the Soviets. Since that overall package was not accepted by the Soviets and the JCS view to count all BACKFIRES was not adopted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, as a fallback position, the number of BACKFIRE deployed in excess of 100 should count in the aggregate both during the period of the Protocol and the Treaty. While collateral constraints and high-level assurances would not negate BACKFIRE's intercontinental capability against the United States in time of war, they are a desirable supplement to a production limitation.

4. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you endorse these views and forward them to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

  
GEORGE S. BROWN  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
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DIA Reviewed this document and has no objection to its declassification. Our review subject to results of concurrent reviews of JS and State//wcj//29 Sep 2015.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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Date: OCT 08 2015

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Office of the Secretary of Defense **SUSC. § 552**  
Chief, RDD, FSD, WHS  
Date: 08 OCT 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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MDR: 15 -M- 1648

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: SALT

The attached memo states the views of the JCS on current SALT issues. As General Brown's cover memo notes, their positions on these and other issues were known to you when you made your decisions in the course of the September talks.

As I advised you in my 6 October memo, it is my personal view that their substantive concerns have been adequately reflected in your positions, though not always in the precise ways the JCS (or I, for that matter) would have preferred, had the U.S. been able to dictate, rather than negotiate the terms of the agreement. The present JCS statement first states their view on the degree to which their concerns have been accommodated. It goes on to review the critical outstanding issues on which acceptance of Soviet positions would be strongly adverse to our interests.

General concerns.

1. Overall Levels. The JCS stress that (because of the greater proportions of MIRV systems in US forces and programs, and the lack of a new US non-MIRV, non-ALCM system) the 1200/2160 combination will require that the US depart somewhat from current programs to reach the 2160 level. This is an important problem and I believe it has been recognized consistently in our deliberations. We can maintain the 2160 level by retaining older forces (Titan II, Polaris) -- though at considerable cost and with relatively low marginal benefit. As we consider our strategic policy under an agreement, we will need to decide whether on military and/or on political/perception/leverage grounds we need a new non-MIRV system or systems to fill out the permitted SNDV aggregate. In making that decision, the technical possibilities, their costs and military utilities -- which the JCS advise they have under study -- will be an important consideration.

2. ALCM Range. The JCS stress their view that an increased ALCM range will be required in the post-Protocol period, even without "dramatic" Soviet air defense improvements. Different opinions on

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DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 2007

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the effect of establishing our definition of cruise missile range, the likely pace of Soviet air defense improvements, and the prospects of significant air defense limits in SALT III obviously influence this issue. However, the basic principle -- that we need to be free to have longer ranges in the future -- is protected by our position, under which the 2500 km range limits on ALCM are for the period of the Protocol only. I fully agree that in this context as in others, as the JCS stress, a provision which is tolerable in the Protocol would pose very serious questions if regarded as a precedent for later agreements.

3. ALCM Flexibility. The JCS note that increasing the ALCM heavy bomber (AHB) force beyond the "set aside" would require difficult choices between additional AHBs and full adherence to our current MIRV expansion programs, and they state their view that imposition of the 820 limit on MIRVed ICBMs (MICBMs) does not "adequately counterbalance" the proposed treatment of AHB. Clearly these are issues of judgment. In my own view, the AHB position gives us adequate flexibility. (And I would not agree that reducing MM III or Poseidon to increase numbers of ALCM-carrying aircraft, whether B-52s or other aircraft, would be appropriately described as "phasing out of newer US strategic systems while older systems are retained in the force.") Moreover, in my view the MICBM limit adds a significant new category of sublimit, holds the Soviet MICBM force below estimated levels, and substitutes an agreed limit for an intelligence prediction of the size of this most threatening element of the Soviet force. Therefore, I believe, the MICBM sublimit helps attain US arms control objectives in ways that cannot be ignored in measuring the acceptability of the limits on US forces, including AHBs.

4. Cruise Missiles (GL/SLCMs). The JCS underscore the serious problems for US and Alliance interests in theater nuclear forces of any impression that the Protocol's severe limits on GL/SLCM limits would permanently limit Allied options for improvement of TNF. I fully agree with these observations, but I would add that the apparent Soviet acceptance of our position on testing gives us the options we need. I would also add that we must, with our Allies, vigorously pursue political, military, and arms control decisions on this matter. By so doing we can take advantage of these opportunities which we have held open, either to deploy an appropriate Allied medium range force or to constrain by agreement the corresponding Soviet forces.

5. ICBM Vulnerability and Mobile ICBMs. With respect to the Protocol ban on mobile ICBMs, the JCS again express their concern at possible precedential effects. I share their view that we should continue to keep the mobile ICBM option open. I would note that the agreement terms we are now seeking to work out would be fully consistent with this position because they would explicitly recognize that mobiles would be permitted once the Protocol expires, unless the parties affirmatively decide otherwise.

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6. Backfire. The JCS reaffirm their consistent view that "the Backfire should be counted in the SNDV aggregate," and state that "none of the 'assurances' under consideration in the current approach would be adequate to insure that Backfire could not be used against the United States in time of war." As in prior statements on the subject, they call attention to the potential of the aircraft to increase substantially the Soviet megatonnage available against the US, if the Backfire were employed entirely for CONUS missions. They also observe that the Backfire's potential assumes still greater significance at the lower SNDV level we hope to achieve in the future.

I agree that the Backfire is a matter of serious concern and that the preferable result would be to count it in the aggregate -- which remains our formal JDT position. Any future judgment that this preferred result is not essential will rest, of course, on the specificity and character of the assurances the Soviets offer. As I have stated earlier, on balance, I believe a firm production rate limit and other assurances will meet the basic concern that Backfire not "run free," but the points the JCS make underscore the importance of the issue.

Outstanding Issues.

Turning to the current negotiations, the JCS, despite these concerns, state that they "believe -- as communicated earlier to [the Secretary of Defense] and to the President -- that the agreements reached with Gromyko in September provide the basis for concluding a workable SALT II agreement." They stress, however, the importance of avoiding erosion of critical US stands or agreement to unacceptable positions the Soviets have taken on a number of outstanding issues. Broadly, I agree with their positions on these issues. In that connection, they identify:

a. Proposals to adopt a "type rule" rather than an aircraft-by-aircraft rule for defining AHBs: As you know, the SCC has directed the preparation of language designed to meet both our verification concerns that units not distinguishable from each other be similarly counted and our concern that the equipping of limited numbers of B-52s (or other aircraft selected for the purpose) not result in counting large numbers of related but non-ALCM equipped aircraft as AHBs.

b. Soviet proposal to ban "development" of cruise missiles capable of ranges in excess of 2,500 km. I agree that it is essential that our development work on longer-range cruise missiles not be inhibited in significant ways, given our potential long-term need for longer stand-off distances. Maintaining our definition of "range" is of great importance in this context.

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c. Soviet insistence that they be allowed to deploy the SS-NX-17, SS-NX-18, and Typhoon SLBM in exchange for the US right to deploy Trident I. I share the view that it would be unacceptable to permit Typhoon -- an untested missile -- in return for only the Trident I. The recent instructions to the Delegation on this point are fully consistent with the JCS view -- which I believe is shared by all the SCC members.

d. Soviet attempts to ban transport aircraft as nuclear delivery vehicles, thus eliminating the US option for a wide-body ALCM carrier (CMC). Again I note that there appears to be no dissent among your senior advisors from the proposition that the CMC option must be protected.

e. Continued Soviet resistance to a MIRV ICBM launcher "type" rule. For the future viability of the agreement, it seems to me very important that we adhere strictly to the position that units which cannot meaningfully be distinguished count the same. I would not, in this context, exclude the US offering cooperative measures going beyond NTM to resolve any alleged Soviet doubts about U.S. systems, to avoid the alternative of locking ourselves into inflexible counting rules for CMCs.

f. Soviet intransigence on the bomber variants issue: I believe this issue is of importance also in connection with the bomber and AHB counting issues, and that, however the current variants are treated, we must adequately block such possibilities or incentives for the Soviets to design future "variants" that would not count in the aggregate but could be quickly converted to bomber configuration.

g. Soviet insistence that limitations apply to all armed air-to-surface cruise missiles for the full period of the treaty. Some US and European observers of the NATO scene have also stressed this issue, because of their belief in the longer-term potential of conventional cruise missiles in the European theater.

In sum, the JCS statement underscores the importance of achieving our objectives in the issues they list, as well as meeting their general concerns. Their "outstanding issues" are a subset of the list considered by the SCC; meeting their "general concerns" is a matter of the overall U.S. - USSR strategic balance and our unilateral force structure decisions within SALT restrictions, as well as a matter of the specific provisions of SALT agreements.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

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Date: OCT-08-2015



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON D C 20301

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Date: OCT 05 2015

March 27, 1978

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 05 OCT 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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MDR: 15 -M- 1651

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: SALT II: Strategy for Completing the Process

The memo Cy Vance and Paul Warnke have sent (Tab A) outlines a strategy to resolve the remaining SALT issues within the pattern of meetings we now foresee: continued negotiations at Geneva, a Vance trip to Moscow, a Gromyko visit to the US at the time of the SSOD, and a subsequent Summit. The scenario assumes we can achieve a satisfactory resolution of the various issues at the indicated level. Of course if we cannot handle them at the levels indicated, they will have to be discussed, and if possible resolved, at a higher level.

In addition, the strategy outlined makes some implicit assumptions about what is a satisfactory outcome for a number of the issues--and there are no doubt some interagency differences on that.

The JCS have also recently completed a memo (Tab B) stating their views on SALT generally. Looking through this will provide useful background in thinking about the issues that must be decided as we prepare for the final stages.

Substance

I would divide the outstanding issues as follows: Broadly, these relate to the levels proposed to handle them but the correspondence is not identical.

Those issues that are vital militarily, in the sense that a significant departure from our position would prevent our achievement of programs, either forces or of options, that we consider necessary to our strategic posture:

- o heavy bomber definition, treatment of bomber variants, ALCM-equipped B-52s, and CMCs (cruise missile carriers). This requires that there be no over-counting of B-52s with ALCMs, that CMC flexibility be assured, and that we have adequate confidence that current and future Soviet "variants" actually have a non-bomber role.

USSR 388-3

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330-81-0212, Box 5, USSR 388.3 (Feb-Mar) 1978

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Chief, Declassification Division, WHS



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o cruise missile range. This requires an effective launch to target range in operational terms of 2500 km for ALCMs and 600 kms for GL/SLCMs during the Protocol, with subsequent needs to be determined.

o the 120 "gap" before ALCM-carrying heavy bombers count as MIRVs.

On these issues, projected for resolution before the Summit, we must prevail if we are to carry out our critical ALCM program.

Those issues that are vital with our Allies, in the sense that success on them is essential to our efforts to persuade the Allies that we are not sacrificing their interests:

o non-circumvention: acceptance of our "fall-back" formula without any restrictive interpretation inconsistent with what we have told the Allies, thus not allowing the Soviets to split the Allies from us. (Vance in Moscow). Going beyond our "fall-back" on non-circumvention would violate our repeated assurance to the Allies.

o "cruise missile definition," which means confirming there are to be no limits on conventionally armed ALCMs on non-heavy bombers after the Protocol expires. (Summit). In my view, inclusion of limits on conventional CMs after the Protocol expires would seriously undermine our argument that the Protocol holds open cruise missile options and does not set unacceptable precedents. (This is an area of clear inter-agency dispute.)

Those whose resolution, in addition to important military and/or Alliance effect, has a particular impact on ratification, i.e., those that are symbols of who "wins" the negotiations:

o Backfire: The precision and effectiveness of the Soviet obligations in this area--not properly described as merely a "letter"--will strongly affect perceptions of how well we have negotiated. (Summit)

o Remaining verification questions: Clarifications that the MIRV launcher type rule means that, in the future, launchers for single RV missiles must be externally distinguishable from those for MIRVed missiles; stronger assurance against telemetry encryption; and verifiable standards of what modernization of ballistic missiles is banned. Success on these issues will greatly strengthen our ability to demonstrate that the agreement is adequately verifiable. (This issue is not explicitly addressed in the Vance/Warke memo.)

o Reductions completed before Protocol expires: We cannot afford to lay ourselves open to the argument that the Soviets will try to force extension of the Protocol by being able to delay their reductions to or even past its end. (Summit)

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Date: OCT 05 2015

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o The single-RV exception? The question-mark is meant to indicate that while this is another area in which simply agreeing to the Soviet position would appear to be an improper concession, there may be entirely different formulations that could be acceptable. (Vance in Moscow, if possible; if not, Summit).

Finally, those where some splitting of the difference is likely to be acceptable on both substantive and ratification grounds. These include the SNDV aggregate, the Joint Statement, and probably some elements of the "new types" package.

### Process

The Vance/Warnke memo outlines a method of working through these issues. It is also, implicitly, an assessment of the difficulty of the issues (e.g., CM range definition would be resolvable at Geneva; the aggregates probably must await a Summit). Obviously, only events will show how we can go from issue to issue. We should do what we can at lower levels but if we cannot resolve a "lower level" issue, it will have to be escalated.

To start to implement the overall plan, we should:

o On the Geneva issues, decide on and pass to Paul Warnke the instructions necessary to nail some of these down before Cy Vance goes to Moscow. This requires decisions on cruise missile range definition and on definition of modernization barred by the new types ban. New instructions on bomber definition reflecting your latest guidance have been sent recently.

o For Moscow, decide on the position Cy Vance is to carry on the "new types" and Statement of Principles issues. The others (non-circumvention, timing, Backfire, cruise missile definitions, and aggregates) are covered by instructions that there is no need to reassess.

o Finally, as to a spring Summit, we should recognize that we will have to be ready to modify our game plan if things go worse than we hope. It is important that a Summit dealing with SALT occur only if we are quite sure beforehand that at it we can get an agreement that meets our requirements on equivalence and on ratifiability. If we're not that far this spring, late summer or after the election are alternate targets. This implies we should avoid any public commitment to a SALT-oriented Summit until we have that confidence, i.e., any announcement should be made only after the Vance trip.

I have these specific comments on the scenario:

o I generally agree with the plan to deal at Geneva with the more technical issues (the bomber issues, CM range, and new types-modernization definition). But these include items that are vital militarily; if we can't resolve them there, they will have to go higher.

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o Backfire is projected to be "pre-cooked" in Moscow--i.e., sharpened for decision at the Summit. That is realistic as far as a guess as to where we will reach the final settlement, but I am concerned about the implied suggestion that we will make no progress on this until the Summit. The issue is technically complex as well as politically sensitive, and it is important that we gradually move toward a settlement in a way that will build support as we go. We should not plan to accept a process that will leave this issue where it is now until a Summit.

o The "cruise missile definition" issue, i.e., limits on conventional ALCMs, is shown as a Summit issue. That may reflect an estimate that the Soviets won't yield short of the Summit. But we should try hard to get them to do so, and should be under no illusions that a compromise on our part is possible at any level without severely adverse effects on the Allies and on ratification prospects.

#### Other Issues

In addition to planning for completion of the negotiations we need to be thinking before signature about an issue that I have raised with you and that the JCS identify in the attached paper--the kind of commitment to strategic programs we will want to make as a means to assure the Senate, the nation, our Allies, and indeed the Soviets, that we will take advantage of the flexibility the agreement will offer. A major ratification issue will be the charge that the Protocol will become permanent. A commitment to particular programs may be important to lend conviction to our position that the Protocol is only an interim measure, that it will not be converted or extended automatically, and that restrictive longer term limits on some of the issues it addresses (e.g., mobiles and cruise missiles) would require limits on the Soviets that go well beyond the limitations placed on them by the Protocol. Such commitments may be important on other issues as well. For example, a relatively modest increase in our air defense force structure could significantly reduce the potential of Backfire both militarily and in terms of ratification.

I raise this issue not to recommend now what the commitments ought to be, but only to call attention to the probability that we will want to make them at about the time the agreement is signed--and to the need to consider what we would say.

I will plan to talk about the substantive SALT issues with the Chiefs later this week, so that their views can be considered in your decisions following your return. It is important to keep the Chiefs involved, particularly as we approach the final decisions that will have to be defended in the ratification process.

*Harold Brown*

Attachments



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D C 20301

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Date: MAY 01 2017

May 27, 1978

Washington National Records  
Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-81-0212, Box 5,  
Folder USSR 388.3 (Apr-May)  
1978.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: SALT Implications of Multiple-Aim-Point ICBM Systems

This memorandum outlines:

- the reasons for a program to rebase our ICBM force in a multiple-aim-point/mobile system mode; and
- the relationship of such an approach to SALT.

The Need

It is now generally agreed that there are no plausible programmatic or arms control measures which can assure the ability through the mid-1980's of the Minuteman force, in its present deployment mode, to ride out a Soviet preemptive attack. Indeed, with the recent tests of Soviet SS-18's and SS-19's demonstrating improved accuracy, there is probably no hope of significantly delaying the development of the threat to Minuteman beyond the 1983-85 period, with or without SALT II. Vulnerability of Minuteman is not, of course, synonymous with the vulnerability of the United States nor with the loss of our capability for deterrence of general nuclear war. It is, however, a serious problem both in military terms and in terms of perceptions of the balance. This points to two needs. One is to ensure that SALT does not--in fact or in perception--preclude us from a deployment mode that would solve this problem (assuming that we have or can find a technically and economically feasible solution). The other is to move ahead at a deliberate pace with the development of a program to assure preservation of a survivable, land-based, ballistic missile leg of the Triad.

A Technical Solution--The Multiple-Aim-Point/Mobile ICBM System



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able

See Def.

31 Dec 2009

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
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Our basing studies have included various missile options. These include the Minuteman III, a modernized Minuteman III, a common ICBM/Trident II missile, and the largest U.S. missile consistent with SALT agreements--an object the size of the Soviet SS-19. Total system costs are rather indifferent to the choice of missile (for a specified residual capability after absorbing a Soviet attack); ten percent variations seem to be the bound, with a large missile being favored because of economy-of-large-scale effects.

It is important to keep in mind that the decision to rebase our ICBM's does not necessarily include the decision to deploy new, larger or more accurate missiles. We could, for example, use existing Minuteman III missiles and add more shelters. The basing and missile decisions can be kept separate, in both the policy and programmatic aspects.

Our technical analysis is still not fully complete, and it would be premature to offer in this memo the judgments on the important and difficult policy, programmatic and budget issues involved in developing and deploying a MAP mobile ICBM system. But I believe it important to avoid a situation where SALT bans such an option. There is a big difference between being uncertain whether we would choose to deploy a MAP mobile system and conceding that SALT prevents us from doing so. In this regard, I would like to note two additional favorable features of MAP systems. First, MAP systems allow us, not the Soviets, to determine the survivability level of our strategic forces.

To me  
it seems  
obvious



MAP and SALT

The U.S. has taken the position in SALT TWO--and the Soviets have agreed--that "after the date on which the Protocol expires, mobile ICBM launchers should be subject to the relevant provisions of the Treaty which are applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers should not be deployed after that date."

JS 3.3(b)(5)

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We have repeatedly assured Congress that we have protected the ICBM rebasing option in SALT TWO (Treaty and Protocol) and that we have thereby offset the unwillingness of the Soviets to accept limits on their ICBM's that are drastic enough to preserve Minuteman survivability.

There are, as we have long acknowledged, problems in fitting mobile MAP ICBM systems within the current and traditional procedures and lexicon of SALT: The problem involves two elements:

- The rules for MAP mobile ICBM's, i.e., how they are limited, and what elements are counted against the applicable limits.
- The means of verifying compliance with those limits, including counting rules, cooperative measures, and the like.

#### SALT Accommodation

There is agreement that mobiles would be permitted after the Protocol expires, unless the Parties agree to a different result. But certain elements of the current SALT Joint Draft Text (JDT) create questions for any MAP mobile system. The issue is, in a sense, whether those provisions would permit that apparent option to be exercised.

The principal questions about MAP mobile systems under the JDT are:

- The limits on fixed ICBM's (as with SLBM's and bombers) are on launchers, and not missiles,\* and the JDT contemplates permitting and counting "mobile ICBM launchers." For a fixed ICBM system, the launcher is in the silo (or, for soft systems, on the pad). For a MAP mobile system it is less clear what is the launcher. Is it the vehicle that moves the missile from point to point? (This is assumed to be so for trucked systems like the SS-20 or Pershing.) Is it each place from which a missile, having been moved, could be launched after returning? Does it make a difference how much equipment is at the place and how much moves with the missile? If launcher means any spot from which a missile can be launched, most land-mobile systems (which usually use pre-surveyed launch points) and MAP systems (which have multiple shelters for each missile) are effectively banned. However, if launcher means the transporter and the whole set of equipments, including the shelters associated with a missile, MAP systems are permitted. They are also permitted if the launcher is considered to be the canister and associated launch equipment that would be moved from shelter to shelter. Either of these would be reasonable ways to count for SALT purposes. I propose we pursue these interpretations. (In the past it has been assumed that the transporter for a mobile would be the counted item.)

\* The limits on air-to-surface ballistic missiles are on missiles, not launchers, so it is within the SALT context for us to consider limiting mobile-missiles rather than launchers for mobile ICBM's.

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No new fixed launchers can be built, nor can existing ones be re-located or expanded by more than 32% in volume. If each shelter or pre-surveyed launch point is considered a fixed launcher, no mobile or MAP system can be built. This would be equally true of a tunnel or of the garages for an SS-20 (or mobile SS-16) type system. However, if a MAP mobile system is not a fixed ICBM system at all, the provision does not apply. The definition and counting rule proposed in the preceding paragraph could solve this problem.

*This seems to be the crucial issue to me*

- Deliberate concealment practices are barred. If this means a ban on efforts to make it hard to locate a system once it is deployed, all MAP and mobile systems are banned. But it is not a violation to submerge SSBN's, so the deliberate concealment ban should not be read so restrictively. It would be consistent with this and with the foregoing proposed definition of a launcher for us to adopt the position that concealment means such things as the deployment of a missile outside of the shelters normally associated with the missile or in other facilities, or interference with measures necessary to count the number of missiles and launchers systems constructed and deployed.

In short, the problems in squaring the limits in the current JDT with a MAP systems become insoluble only if the system is treated like a fixed ICBM, and if the political agreement that mobiles are permitted and counted is ignored. The answer to these questions is, I think, not semantic analysis of what a launcher is but recognition that, for MAP mobile systems, the limits will have to be applied to the equipment (including the missile) that is moved from shelter to shelter (and perhaps the whole set of shelters associated with one such missile and equipment unit), and that MAP mobile systems do not involve deliberate concealment so long as the numbers deployed can be counted adequately in other ways.

### Verification

The problem of the SALT accommodation of MAP/mobile ICBMs is quite distinct from verification problems, i.e., the very important need to confirm that the limits--whatever they are-- are not being violated. If we wish to have such a system we need to have an arrangement that would satisfy us that an analogous Soviet system is adequately verifiable. As with the legality issues, the problem of verifying MAP mobile systems in SALT must begin by recognizing that MAP mobile systems are not fixed-silo ICBM's and therefore cannot necessarily be verified in the same way. Clearly there would be verification problems, perhaps serious ones, but I believe they are soluble.

The issue of verifying MAP/mobiles is usually formulated in the following way: If ICBM's are made mobile or moved among shelters to gain

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survivability through position uncertainty, won't it be impossible to count the numbers deployed? This formulation is defective because it assumes that mobile ICBM's must be counted in the same way that fixed ICBM's are counted, i.e., by seeing them after they have been deployed in the field. That won't work for an effective MAP mobile system. By definition, once it is deployed, if it is successful, one cannot tell (without some cooperation) exactly where the missile is. With fixed silo ICBM's, we do count the launchers in the field. Present mobile systems, however, are not counted in this way: SLBM submarines are counted as they come out of their construction halls and begin sea trials. An analogous provision intended to apply to mobile ICBM's is included in the JDT.\* Heavy bombers are counted as they are deployed to their operational bases where they sit in the open and carry out training missions. SLBM's and heavy bombers would be more difficult to count (perhaps impossible) in the ocean and in the air. Therefore, this issue of counting systems that cannot be monitored continuously after deployment is not unique to mobile ICBM's, but is shared by all mobile systems. Mobile ICBM's, however, are the most recent system to be considered for deployment and we do not yet have set procedures on how they will be assembled, deployed and based.

Of course, there are differences between MAP mobile ICBM's and present mobiles or truck-mobile ICBM's: SSBN's are very large compared even to ICBM transporters. Bombers are parked in the open. The pre-surveyed launch positions for SS-20 type mobiles cannot hide a missile. We have relatively low confidence in our estimate of the number of strategic missiles produced, as distinct from the number deployed. But we do have considerable confidence in our overall counts of many types of military equipment not continuously subject to observation which are relatively much smaller than would be the combinations of missile transporter and canister for a MAP mobile system.

One approach to resolving the verification problem for MAP mobile ICBM's is to call for the special cooperative measures required to count the missiles in the field, i.e., duplicating the silo verification model if possible while preserving the survivability of the system. A concept along these lines is that on demand we would agree to open the group of shelters associated with a single MAP-based missile, thereby showing to an observer (satellite or on-site) that all but one are empty. Measures like this should be carefully considered. We should recognize that it may be hard to get Soviet agreement to schemes to count in the field since the schemes require some level of cooperation involving exposure

*They've never agreed to this procedure*

\* Article VI, paragraph 2(c) is intended to apply to heavy bombers and mobile ICBM's and reads, "... other strategic offensive arms which are finally assembled in a shop, plant, or other facility after they have been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where their final assembly has been performed."

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of operational systems. However, no more exposure than we currently experience with both sides having satellite photography is involved here, so we should not be unduly pessimistic regarding cooperative measures.

A second, alternative or supplemental, approach to verification may be more promising. It uses the analogies of SLBMs and bombers. We may be able to deliberately design features into a MAP mobile ICBM system to allow it to be more easily counted at other stages--perhaps as the missiles are assembled or through cooperative measures as they are being deployed. These are the stages at which we now count SLBMs and bombers.

Verification aimed at production or movement to the field could also be supplemented by cooperative measures that fall short of on-site inspection or displaying operational systems, e.g., identifying assembly plants, requiring exposure of missile/transporters at production facilities and in the process of transporting them to deployment areas. Cooperative measures to support production and/or deployment monitoring need not be less negotiable or effective than those presently conceived for counting in the field. Present means of intelligence and collection and more frequent observation would help this approach, especially at the production site.

#### Summary

In summary, this is a difficult problem, but it need not be an impossible one. Moreover, I do not think that it can be simply ignored in SALT II; we must find a way to address it. If an option for a MAP system is not adequately preserved, we will face serious problems in military terms, in perceptual balance-of-power terms and, more immediately, in gaining congressional approval for SALT.

I believe the JDT preserves the option--both in the legal sense, and more importantly in the political sense that the Soviets have agreed that "mobile ICBM launchers" are permitted within the limits after the Protocol expires. However, since one could argue the contrary on a purely legalistic basis, some clarification of our position that the option for a MAP mobile system is preserved seems in order. To that end, neither detailed negotiation of MAP systems nor any change in the JDT is needed. We should, however, state unequivocally and at a high level to the Soviets that our interpretation of the matter is that MAP systems are entirely compatible with the JDT under general definitions of launchers suggested in preceding paragraphs, and that any necessary details to support verification can be worked out during the Protocol period as a part of the SALT III effort. Furthermore, we should state that we will decide, on the basis of our assessment of threat and need as we see it, whether to move ahead during the Protocol period with full-scale development of a MAP system, and that there are no SALT constraints on our decision. These statements would be made to the Soviets, the Congress,

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to the members of the defense community, and to the public, as appropriate. It is this approach that lies behind the draft statement proposed for Cy Vance to make to Gromyko (attached).

I should add that while I am not making any recommendations now, I believe we need to follow up with program actions the statements preserving this option in SALT, in order to have high confidence in Congressional support for SALT approval. It may be that we will want to go to full-scale development and deployment of M-X in Minuteman silos while continuing work on developing a MAP deployment mode. A decision on whether to enter full-scale development of a MAP system probably will be appropriate late this year, militarily and politically. By then the technical and economic feasibility should be clear.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 01 MAY 2017 Authority: EO 13526  
 Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify in Part: X  
 Reason: 3.3(b)(5)  
 MDR: 15 -M- 1652

5 U.S.C. § 552

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Washington National  
Records Center, SecDef  
Files, Acc 330-82-0270,  
Box 2, Folder USSR,  
388.3, 1979.

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: OCT 05 2015

March 17, 1979

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50-5-056  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 05 OCT 2015 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: X Deny in Full:       

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Reason:       

MDR: 15 -M- 1659

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: JCS Assessment of SALT

The JCS have conducted an assessment of the emerging SALT II agreement, the conclusions of which are stated in the attached JCS Memorandum and its Annex.

In summary, the Joint Chiefs' assessment is that -- assuming certain specific issues (discussed below) are dealt with favorably -- "SALT II (is) a modest but useful framework which gives the United States flexibility to regain ultimate strategic parity, but it is by no means a risk-free panacea nor a substitute for modernization programs." They note their preference for "more extensive mutual reductions and constraints than SALT II will impose," and their concern at the failure of SALT II to reduce Soviet heavy ICBMs or include Backfire within the SNDV aggregate. They warn that Soviet programs will continue even with SALT and that "primarily as a consequence of actions and inactions extending back at least a decade, essential equivalence will be lost in the early 1980's, with or without the emerging SALT agreement." They call for "longer-term resolve to avoid the mistakes of previous years, ... which have brought the nation to the certain prospect of strategic inferiority," and for "prompt and resolute action to arrest, and ultimately reverse, the steady erosion of our relative strategic posture" as "an objective of the highest national priority."

They raise the possibility of "restructuring the treaty" but recognize that this is not a feasible course. They also note the calls by some for disapproving it so that "the American public can be 'shocked' out of ... complacency and induced to support the necessary measures to restore parity." The JCS reject this approach, concluding instead that "the more appropriate course" is regarding SALT "in a balanced and realistic perspective" as a "modest but useful framework" that gives us the necessary flexibility to carry out the programs to restore the balance.

My own assessment parallels that of the JCS in most respects, though I do not believe the US faces the prospect of certain

330-82-0270 Box 2, USSR 388.3, 1979

EXEMPT PER EO 12958 as amended  
Date Oct 14 2003 See 3.3 (b)  
GSD P.3-212 Other Agency Equivalency TBD  
Review/Declassify On 31 Dec 2030

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strategic inferiority. In particular, I strongly share the view that the US must recognize that the prospective SALT II agreement is not a basis for complacency, but rather an occasion for resolve to do what is needed to meet the challenges we face. We must not risk falling into the trap of believing that SALT II will relieve us of the unpleasant necessity to expand our strategic programs to maintain parity with the USSR in strategic forces -- even if the Soviets merely carry out the programs they now have underway. I believe the principal benefits of the Treaty lie: in its prevention of still greater problems resulting from Soviet buildup that would go further than its present programs in numbers and in new types; in the Treaty's contribution (through the RV limitations) to the feasibility of more survivable basing for our ICBMs; and in maintaining the process by which we can seek more significant future limits. Thus, I believe that the SALT II treaty will provide a moderately better military situation for the US than no treaty, if we do take the appropriate steps, which SALT II permits, to build up our strategic forces.

In my own assessment, I would also add a factor not explicitly addressed by the JCS: A refusal to sign (assuming outstanding issues, especially related to verification, can be resolved) or a Senate rejection would, I think, critically damage the international standing of the US, in addition to its negative effects on US-Soviet relations.

I fully agree that we must, in our efforts to gain support for the Treaty, avoid exaggerating its benefits, or minimizing the problems we will face even with it, and that we must match our efforts to secure support for SALT with resolution to carry out necessary programs to correct the problems it will not solve.

I also share -- and welcome -- the implicit JCS judgment that "restructuring" the agreement on major issues is not feasible, however desirable such action might be, and that resort to the alleged energizing shock effect of rejection is inappropriate -- and, I would add, very dangerous.

Verification. The Annex includes a detailed discussion of the JCS' views on verification of the agreement. They note that the prohibitions on interference and deliberate concealment mean that "the United States is better able to monitor Soviet military activities, particularly those relating to strategic systems," and they call attention to the utility of the data base's provision of indicators of strategic force levels. They conclude that "We have reasonable confidence in our ability to monitor certain important areas where Soviet cheating may take

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place," but they warn of the uncertainties in monitoring covert deployment of MIRVed SLBMs in Delta- I and II SSBNs, mobile ICBMs, SS-16 production, and cruise missile characteristics and internal ALCM deployment.

The JCS do not make an overall assessment of the significance of these uncertainties or their acceptability. I agree of course that any Soviet cheating would be a matter of the gravest concern, whatever its direct military significance, but I believe that an assessment of the acceptability of the monitoring uncertainties listed must take into account the significance of cheating in these areas for the military balance, the desirability of US flexibility in certain of the areas involved (including notably mobile ICBMs and cruise missiles), and the potential of US programs (including R&D hedges) for response to violations on a scale large enough to affect the balance. Measured by that standard, which I consider the appropriate one, I believe the agreement is adequately verifiable. That is, undetected cheating could not be on a large or broad enough scale to affect our security.

My conclusion depends heavily, of course, on the assumption that we will maintain present monitoring capability, restore as soon as possible the collection capacity lost with the closure of the Iranian sites, and maintain the vigorous procurement, development and research programs needed to have adequate responses to detected violations; adequate measures to provide readiness to respond to detected Soviet cheating or breakout are a separate matter from the programs needed to maintain strategic equivalence in the face of overt Soviet efforts. My conclusion also depends on the proposition that the US will be prompt to protest Soviet actions that give rise to uncertainty; we need not be able to prove Soviet violation beyond a reasonable doubt within the US Government to be justified in raising an issue with the Soviets.

All these factors are also identified by the JCS. The JCS annex stresses the importance of adequate monitoring capability to verification -- and to the overall problem of monitoring Soviet military developments not limited by SALT. They also call for US efforts to gain Soviet agreement to an increased role for cooperative measures for SALT verification. (Their position with respect to the still-unresolved issue of telemetry encryption is described below.)

Modernization Programs. Contrary to widespread charges, the JCS do not condition their attitude toward SALT II on a commitment by you to MX or any other specific program. They do, however, particularly in the annex, make clear that both the strategic

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balance and future arms control are related to our programs. They note that "the existence of SALT aggregate limits and sublimits reduces the level of uncertainty in projecting the future Soviet force structure, allowing the United States to better formulate the necessary modernizations." The Five Year Defense Program for 1980-84 -- which includes full pre-deployment work on MX (including initial procurement funds) and Trident II -- contains, they conclude, "programs which, if followed through, would ameliorate the adverse trends in the strategic balance" but they warn that "deletions or slippages" would pose serious risks to our national security. They call for "modernization programs across the full spectrum of military capability," including "deployment of MX in a survivable basing mode, improvements in SSBNs and SLBMs, modernization of the air-breathing leg of the Triad beyond the deployment of B-52 ALCM carriers, and aggressive R&D programs" as well as modernized C<sup>3</sup>. They point out that our leverage in SALT III will be determined in large part by our programs.

The JCS stress that an adequate and increased US strategic forces program will be necessary with or without SALT II. However, I do not regard the JCS statements on the importance of, and the need for, the modernization programs discussed as conditioning their attitude toward SALT II on an express commitment by you to MX, Trident II, a new bomber, or any other particular program. However, I fully agree with the stress they place on the need to increase our efforts in strategic forces even with a SALT agreement, if we are to maintain (the JCS would say "reestablish") essential equivalence. My view is that the increase necessary would be even greater in the absence of SALT II.

Specific Issues. In addition to these overall judgments, the JCS address a number of specific points.

First, they list a number of "ambiguities" which "unless ... favorably resolved before the treaty is signed" will mean "SALT II cannot be considered to serve the national security interest." These are:

-- Explicit Soviet acknowledgement that the maximum number of RVs tested on Soviet MIRVed ICBMs is for the SS-17 -- 4, for the SS-18 -- 10, and for the SS-19 -- 6. I agree that such acknowledgement is desirable, and, indeed, I believe we may need additional clarity to deal with the uncertainty recently created with respect to the maximum capacity of the SS-18 Mod 4.

-- Access to unencrypted telemetry that is essential for verification. Recent Soviet statements on this subject incline me to the belief that we will need to secure additional Soviet

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agreement in the area of telemetry. I am still considering this issue and will make my specific recommendations at the forthcoming SCC meeting.

-- Protocol not precedential. Recognizing the impracticality at this stage of dropping the Protocol entirely, the JCS warn that "extending Protocol limitations on SLCM and GLCM without suitable Soviet concessions would be very harmful to Western security," and call for a Presidential declaration that "no restrictions in the Protocol will be precedential." I agree with both the assessment of the dangers of extending the Protocol and the utility, both in the US and with our allies, of a statement by you -- repeating the position taken by our negotiators -- that its provisions are not precedential.

-- Non-circumvention. Urging that the non-circumvention clause must not "interfere with our options to share with our NATO allies the technology required to counter the Soviet long-range theater nuclear threat," the JCS call for a Presidential declaration of our policy. The US has already agreed to present to the Senate and to NATO an authoritative statement of our interpretation of the non-circumvention clause. I think it appropriate that that statement be endorsed by you in the document transmitting the Treaty to the Senate for its consideration.

-- MX basing. The JCS call for a Presidential declaration embodying the US interpretation that SALT II will not bar deployment of MX "in an appropriate multiple protective structure (MPS) mode." While I am not yet ready to make a recommendation on the basing mode issue, I agree that it must be the position of the US that SALT II does not foreclose the MPS option, subject of course to the requirement that any new system, US or Soviet, must be so designed as to be adequately verifiable. It would, I believe, be useful for you explicitly to repeat that interpretation, either in your transmittal document or, as suggested in the Annex, before signature.

-- Outstanding issues. The Annex to the JCS paper stresses the need to resolve all the outstanding issues, but the JCS identify the following three issues as those of "greatest concern" to them:

- "The armed definition of ALCM (should) not be allowed to be applied to GLCMs and SLCMs, except as the United States has specified in the Protocol." After the Protocol expires, the Treaty provides no limits on GLCMs and ALCMs. The US has made explicit in the negotiations that our agreement to the "armed" definition for ALCMs for the entire treaty period does

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not constitute a precedent for possible future limits on GLCMs and SLCMs. Our formulation of the definitions would re-enforce our position. I fully endorse the JCS position, but I believe no further action is required provided the Soviets accept our formulations.

- "UPVs should not be included in SALT." I understand from Secretary Vance that Amb. Dobrynin has indicated Soviet agreement with the US position on UPVs. This should promptly be confirmed through the Delegations in Geneva.

- "ICBM new type limits should be constrained so there truly would be only one new type." We must, I agree, insure that the Soviets are not permitted both a modern successor to the SS-11 non-MIRVed system in the guise of a modification of an existing missile and a new 10-RV MIRVed successor to the SS-17 and SS-19. This issue is still under negotiation and we should be appropriately cautious in any relaxation of our position that reductions (as well as increases) in characteristics be limited to 5%. We should also recognize that Soviet objections to including additional parameters in the limited category, in combination with their insistence on greater than 5% "downside" flexibility, may well relate to seeking to avoid having to choose between a modernized single-RV missile and a 10-RV light ICBM.

Finally, the JCS request an opportunity to meet with you and me to discuss these issues before final action is taken on consummation of a SALT agreement. I strongly endorse that request, and I hope we can meet with the Chiefs during the coming week, before you make final decisions on the outstanding issues.

*Harold Brown*

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~Declassified to Secret~~  
Date: ~~1-27-05~~  
Chief, Declassification Unit, WHS

~~ALPHA CHANNEL~~

April 19, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

EXEMPT PER EO 12958 as amended  
Date Sep 3, 2005 Sec 3.3 (b) (2)  
OSD F.S. 212 Agency Equiv: 1B  
Review/Declassify On: 31 Dec 2030

SUBJECT: Two Remaining Issues

(2)  
~~(S)~~ This memorandum outlines two actions I believe should be taken between now and the signature of an agreement:  
(1) Inclusion in your forthcoming SALT speech of a statement of the US position that the Treaty will permit mobile systems of the various kinds we have been considering, if they are designed so as to be verifiable by NTM; informing the Soviets that you will raise the telemetry issue with Pres. Brezhnev at the Summit; (3) making it clear that on one or two issues, precise wording of the agreement, and understandings about the meaning of that wording, must be reached before signature.

1. ~~(S)~~ SALT Impact on MX Decision. In Congressional discussion of SALT, the issue frequently arises whether various mobile options are really permissible under SALT II, or whether we would accede to Soviet objections (such as they have made in the negotiations) purporting to be based on SALT consideration. Whatever decision you ultimately make on MX, it is important to maintain the principle that the mobile ICBM systems of the kinds we are considering--including multiple shelters, ground mobile, trench, air-mobile--are permissible under SALT II (after the Protocol expires), with the important proviso that they be designed so as to be subject to verification by national technical means. Last summer, in speaking to the American Legion, I made a statement to that effect, in terms approved by the SCC as the position of the Administration. As you recall, the JCS, in their recent summary assessment of the agreement, proposed that, prior to the signature of the agreement, you should underscore that position in a public statement. I believe it would be useful, both in terms of ratification and of emphasizing to the Soviets the seriousness with which we view the problem, for you to make such a statement. Your forthcoming speech on SALT would be an ideal opportunity.

2. ~~(S)~~ Telemetry. Your March 27 letter to Brezhnev was "designed to express the agreement that we believe exists" on telemetry. Instead of agreeing, the most recent Soviet

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note on SALT says that "taking into account the (U.S.) President's letter of March 27 and L. I. Brezhnev's letter of March 11 the Soviet side considers the question of telemetric information closed." The most recent Soviet communication can therefore be considered, in substance, a reaffirmation of the positions taken in Brezhnev's March 11 letter.

(~~SS~~) I agree with Cy Vance that nothing more can usefully be done in diplomatic channels. But I also believe that we must return to the issue at the Summit, to seek Soviet agreement to the points made in your letter, and I think the Soviets should know in advance that you will be returning to the issue for that purpose.

(~~SS~~) Telemetry will be a major issue in the debate over the verifiability of the Treaty. The Senate will, quite reasonably, want to know what, if anything, we have agreed with the Soviets, beyond the Common Understanding that will appear in the Agreement itself. The current situation, where we have to rely on a series of letters is unsatisfactory from that point of view. We would have to inform the Senate not just of your March 27 letter (and the accompanying oral note) but of Brezhnev's March 11 letter as well--and possibly the earlier exchanges as well.

(~~SS~~) I believe there would be a highly unfavorable reaction to both the tone and the content of Brezhnev's letter. Indeed, it is cast in such terms that the less one knows about the subject, the worse it sounds. Even in its precise statements, however, there are problems: For example, he claims a "right" to encrypt "information about those parameters which are not regulated by the agreement"--even though information "about" non-regulated parameters like acceleration may be important to monitoring regulated matters like throw-weight. (Your letter said the protection extends to "telemetry that provides information concerning" compliance.) Similarly, he describes the obligation as not to encrypt information that "could become necessary" to verification--not whose denial could "impede" verification, which is the standard to which both sides have in the past agreed.

(~~SS~~) The Senate, after considering these exchanges and focusing on the problems with the Soviet formulation, would be very likely to insist on amendments which would be hard to resist on the Hill, but which would probably be impossible to sell to the Soviets.

(~~SS~~) To forestall this ratification problem--and strengthen the verifiability of the Treaty--I urge that you plan, at the Summit, to raise the telemetry issue with

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Brezhnev, and seek his assent to the basic propositions of the U.S. March 27 communications:

-- certain telemetric information is relevant to verification because it provides information concerning compliance, and denial of such information is prohibited;

-- other telemetric information is not relevant to verification and its denial is not prohibited;

-- some of the encryption on the [REDACTED] tests would, in the case of a new or modified missile, impede verification of specific characteristics limited by the agreement;

-- the above propositions are agreed by the sides and in connection with the agreed Common Understanding.

(S) Ideally, the Summit discussion would result in a joint statement embodying these points that would operate as an authoritative interpretation of the Common Understanding, and wipe the slate clean of the conflicting positions contained in the various earlier negotiations.

(S) Since I believe it is important that we do this at the Summit, I also believe it is important not to give the Soviets a false impression that we are satisfied with the negotiating record as it stands. The more justifiably the Soviets can maintain that we assented (by silence) to the statement (in their last note) that they consider the matter closed, the more you will be placed in the role of creating new obstacles at the Summit. Therefore, I believe we should pass the word through Amb. Dobrynin that you plan to discuss this, along with other verification issues, at the Summit, to forestall any Soviet misimpression that we consider the issue definitively closed on the basis of their latest communication.

3. (S) Language Issues. For similar reasons, I believe that when a Summit is announced, and when you make your SALT speech, it should be made clear that exact SALT language and understandings (both of which are important) still need to be reached.

NSA 3.3(b)(3)+5 USC § 552(b)(3); 50 USC § 3605  
OSD 3.3(b)(3)+5 USC § 552(b)(3); 50 USC § 3605

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 06 Sep 2016 Authority: EO 13526 +  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(3)+5 USC § 552(b)(3);  
MDR: 15-M-11058 50 USC § 3605

*Harold Brown*

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 06 2016

cc:  
Secretary of State  
Asst to the President  
for National Security  
Affairs

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WNS

Date: MAR 06 2017

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON D C. 20301

JUN 12 1978

Washington National Records  
Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-82-00205, Box 25,  
Folder USSR 388.3  
(11 Jun-35 Jun) 1978.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: JCS Judgment on SALT II

In the attached memorandum, the JCS support the agreement you are about to sign as a "modest but useful contribution to our national interests." They do so with some reservations and concerns. Two of the Chiefs do not agree with the summary judgment of "modest but useful" and support the agreement only on broader, essentially non-military grounds:

- The Commandant of the Marine Corps (Gen. Wilson) believes "that the agreement as negotiated does not contribute to our national military interests. However, he accepts why the broader national interests of the United States may be served by the treaty and supports it in this context."

- The Chief of Staff of the Army (Gen. Rogers) "agrees with (the JCS) judgment concerning our broader national interests, (but) believes that the agreement contributes only marginally to our military interests."

All the Chiefs join in calling attention to concerns about future US actions and the resolution of outstanding issues and ambiguities concerning the Treaty itself:

As to US actions: They warn that "the limits ... in SALT II are sufficiently permissive that the current and projected momentum of Soviet strategic nuclear programs will shift the strategic balance in favor of the Soviets in the early 1980's." They emphasize that "a continuing commitment by the national leadership to the programs to regain a strategic balance in the 1980's is vital" and that the lack of such programs would lead to "increasing instability in crises and an unfavorable negotiating position for SALT III."

They do not refer to any specific program. They do, however, call for "resolve to provide adequate capabilities to maintain strategic equivalence," and they warn against "a perpetuation of public complacency" from SALT II. I share these views.

380-82-0205, box 25, USSR 388.3 (11 Jun - 25 Jun) 1978

JCS

12 Jun 1999

Para 2-301.e.5&7

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USSR 388.3

12 Jun 1978

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As to outstanding SALT II issues:

1. On verification generally, they state their belief that "before the agreement is signed, it must be made clear to the Soviets in unequivocal terms that the issue is of the utmost importance and that the agreement cannot survive if we determine that our monitoring efforts are being impeded." I believe this is absolutely true and I recommend that you include a statement to that effect in your general remarks about SALT which you will make prior to signature.
2. On telemetry, they state that in their judgment, "the US Government must receive an unambiguous commitment from the Soviets that both sides will have access to unencrypted telemetry that is necessary for verification." The need to obtain from Brezhnev explicit confirmation of Soviet agreement with the US position, as stated in your letter to him of March 24, was agreed to by all the members of the SCC, and I fully share that view. Again this can be done in connection with your meeting with Brezhnev prior to signature. The JCS also observe that it is "critical for the Soviets to understand that encryption such as that practiced in July 1978, December 1978, and April 1979 would impede verification if extended to new or modified ICBMs." However, they do not call for express Soviet agreement to this proposition. In my view the statements of the US, most recently in our oral note of April 25, amply make clear the US position in this matter.
3. On the Protocol, the JCS call for "statement by you at the Summit "reaffirming the nonprecedential nature of the Protocol," and for the public reiteration of that view. The JCS does not view this as mandatory ("should" not "must"), and I believe the US view that the Protocol is non-precedential is entirely clear to the Soviets. Nonetheless, I agree that it would be useful for you to repeat the point at the Summit -- and to include it also in the transmittal documents.
4. On cruise missile definition, they state that they "strongly support" the current US position. I agree that this issue is important as a symbol of the proposition that the "armed" definition agreed to in the specific context of this agreement (for ALCMs for the Treaty period, and for GLCMs and SLCMs only for the Protocol period) does not predetermine the definition that might be applied in future agreements, if any, affecting those systems. I join in urging that we hold firm to our current formulation. (From the latest Soviet offer, it appears

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that the Soviets will accept our formulation.)

As to SALT III, the Chiefs urge that SALT II be regarded as "only another step in a long-range process." They note their regret that the SALT II agreement will not result in lower SNDV, MIRV ICBM and heavy ICBM levels than those agreed, and note the importance of effective US programs to SALT III negotiating position. They call for, in addition to adequate programs, "vigorous efforts to achieve further substantial reductions" in future talks. I support those views, although I believe we should not limit our SALT III goals to reductions alone.

The Chiefs' statement has somewhat reduced the urgency of a meeting with you prior to your departure for Vienna, but I believe such a meeting would still be useful. If it takes place, I recommend that you concentrate on your plans for resolution at the Summit of the important issues and concerns addressed in the Chiefs' statement, as listed above, and your thoughts on SALT III.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

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Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +  
Date: 06 MAR 2017 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 1615

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Library of Congress, Harold Brown  
Papers, Box 11, Folder Alpha  
Channel File, 12/78-7/79.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 23 2015

1 AUG 1979

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RELEASE OF THIS  
DOCUMENT DATE:  
29-Sep-2015

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

It has become evident that we have won the debate on SALT II in the Senate hearings and with the media (and probably the public). But we have not yet won the Senate vote. There will be difficult bargaining, in the process of achieving a two-thirds vote of approval in the Senate, over the issue of defense programs and budgets. Sam Nunn speaks for a group without whose votes we probably can't get Senate approval of SALT. He clearly believes that the present five-year defense program is inadequate, and that the financial plan won't fund even the present five-year program. He will demand a commitment, whose exact nature he can't yet specify, to an annual growth in the defense budget of at least three percent (perhaps more) after actual inflation. At the same time, others such as George McGovern could well be brought to vote against SALT II by such a commitment. And whether the Congress would actually be willing to put money where some of its members' mouths are is questionable. John Stennis wants to support SALT II and is for a stronger defense program, but is more influenced than Nunn by fiscal conservatism; his views may provide a good vehicle for compromise.

My present thought is that one way to meet the Nunn position may be to revise the fiscal guidance for the Five Year Defense Plan (1981-5) to assure a genuine after-inflation annual budget growth rate of three percent. The Congress has those figures, and it is on the basis of the claimed growth rate and assumed inflation rates contained in it, along with the past effects of underestimated inflation rates, that Nunn has taken his position. Another (and they are not mutually exclusive) way would be to submit a FY 1980 supplemental. This could cover the amount of Congressional cuts (which I anticipate could well be 1B\$ or more -- the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee will recommend a 2B\$ cut) and/or the unprogrammed increases in fuel costs (which will amount to 0.9B\$ for FY 1980).

In this situation, I believe it would be useful for you to consider the findings of a DOD examination of the military balance, specifically the military investment balance. I

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Signer

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described these findings at the June 4 NSC meeting which updated the Comprehensive Net Assessment made in PRM-10 and reflected in PD-18. I have had the principal conclusions of that DOD study boiled down to a few pages; they are attached.

My judgment is that those conclusions are essentially correct. In some ways they may be too pessimistic. In particular, I think that if we exert the efforts necessary to put some of our advanced technological concepts into operational hardware, we can make the trend of the balance somewhat less adverse -- but I also believe the Soviets are likely in the next five years to confront us with some technological surprises of their own. In any event, I believe the highly probable dangers of the prospective military balance fully justify an annual growth in the defense program, after inflation, of at least three percent annually through 1985. Moreover, I believe that the Congress as a whole would support that growth if such a program is put forward vigorously by the Administration. I recognize the major problem posed by House Republicans voting in the Budget Resolution process to increase defense, and then voting against the Resolution. But I do not believe that a defense budget set at the level of the median view of the Democratic Party will satisfy either the defense needs of the country or the demands of the electorate. Your leadership can, in my view, produce Congressional support for the necessary program. We should be reticent in responding with compromise to what Sam Nunn (and Kissinger) are saying about the defense program. That should be saved for the end game. But I believe that program and process can be elaborated during the next month or two, and that they will need to be reflected in some joint Presidential-Congressional statements and actions before Congress adjourns this year, if SALT II is to be ratified. 11

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 23 2015

50.S.C. 552  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 23 NOV 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 1660

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## THE MILITARY INVESTMENT BALANCE

We have recently assessed the US-USSR Military Investment Balance. Some military expenditures contribute only to current capability, others -- in varying degrees -- to future as well as present military capability, and ought to be considered as investments. The assessment concentrated on future-oriented activities such as RDT&E, procurement of long-lived weapon systems, and the construction of military facilities. It examined those current investment flows, and the accumulated stock of past investments, which contribute to future military capability. The assessment, thus, is an indicator of the future military balance.

The main message of this balance is that continuing current trends in and differences between US and Soviet military efforts for 5-10 years will place the US in a clearly inferior military position. Focusing on investment makes this clearer, providing a picture less favorable to the US than does comparing overall efforts.

The assessment is based on CIA-produced dollar estimates of Soviet military programs. Those show that:

- Soviet military efforts measured in dollars have exceeded ours by a steadily widening margin since 1969 and are now almost 45% greater.

- The Soviets have out-invested us for 10 years and, for the last few years, their investment effort has been about 75% larger than ours.

- Projecting current Soviet trends and US plans into the future shows only a slow reduction in the gap in the rate of investment, and even that reduction is uncertain.

The Soviet advantage is growing even more rapidly than is revealed by the respective rates of current investment flow, since:

- Soviet investment stock value is now about 25% more than ours.

- That differential is expected to increase to 40-60% by the mid 80's, depending on assumptions about the depreciation profile.

- The stream of Soviet investment dividends can be expected to exceed those of the US for many years.

The analysis also examined several possible, but not very convincing, arguments as to why these investment trends need not be cause for concern.

- Adding allies' defense efforts to both sides changes the comparison, but much less in the investment area than when

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Date: NOV 23 2015

total defense efforts are compared. In either case we think there is more unproductive duplication among NATO than among Warsaw Pact programs, which are centrally directed.

-- US technological leads are being eroded by massive, broad-based continuing Soviet R&D programs, increasingly in high-risk, high-cost, potentially high-payoff areas. However, as I have indicated earlier, we ourselves have two or three efforts underway that I consider of major potential effect.

-- The fundamentally stronger underlying US economy is offset somewhat by Soviet design and manufacturing processes which facilitate military surge production. Further, the relevance of industrial mobilization is questionable in many cases.

Trying to assess the balance from the Soviet perspective suggests they probably measure their efforts against those of the US, the NATO Allies, and at least Japan and China. Therefore they may:

-- Believe they face total defense efforts greater than their own.

-- And see reasons to sustain or even increase the rate of growth in their defense efforts in the recent reversal of the downward trend in the US defense efforts, the NATO commitment to real defense growth and the US-PRC rapprochement.

The assessment also notes our uncertainty about how Soviet defense efforts will be constrained by demographic, energy and economic problems. This is a possible future bright spot for the US and is a critical area for further study.

However, Soviet gains in the military balance are likely to be even greater in the future because:

-- Soviet investment flows have continued to grow while ours, in general, are lower than in the 50's and 60's.

-- The fruits of the Soviet differential in military investments have yet to be realized due to the long lead times between large investments in R&D and visible, deployed weapons.

Finally, the assessment addresses the consequences if current trends persist. The following three scenarios outline some possibilities:

-- Continuation of current US and Soviet military trends into the mid-eighties, followed by slackening in the Soviet military buildup because of economic, demographic and other problems.

-- Continuation of current trends throughout the 80's to a situation of clear US military inferiority with respect to the Soviets. This is unlikely to be a stable situation, however.



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-- A major confrontation a few years hence triggered by the Soviets aggressively pushing their advantage somewhere. Depending on the nature and severity of the crisis and the political reaction in the US to the crisis or to consequent US losses, a major increase in US defense expenditures and a more competitive US-Soviet relationship may result. (In the past four decades, 40-200% increases have occurred three times -- each following a crisis involving combat.)

The assessment concludes that the consequences of any of these scenarios are enormous. They will likely impact directly on our ability to defend our interests and our allies. Also, since the US has been the core around which western alliances have formed, allied perceptions of US inferiority are likely to lead to severe stresses -- at the very least -- in these alliances. They could break, others could be formed, and there could be hedging and increased compliance with Soviet desires on the part of former allies. The US has had such a central role in organizing the western world that repercussions would likely be felt throughout the world.

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I found this assessment, focused on expenditures and investment, to be particularly useful. The adverse overall trends indicated are generally confirmed by the changes we see in more detailed assessments of various military balances:

-- We see deterioration in the strategic nuclear balance by all the common indicators, static and dynamic which will very probably continue until we deploy the ALCM and, later, the MX.

-- NATO's ASW forces have probably improved relative to the Soviet submarine force, and the Central Region ground force balance has been roughly static, but the balance has deteriorated in theater nuclear forces, tactical air forces, and forces on the flanks (particularly the Southern Flank).

-- (The perceived balances in the Persian Gulf and Korea have also deteriorated, but these have resulted from revolution in one case and new intelligence in the other rather than from differences in US and Soviet military investments.)

In the context of policy, all this implies that we have not and will not maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other at least as favorable as that existing in early 1977, the central requirement laid down in PD-18.

We have yet to achieve a 3% annual real growth in defense spending. The FY75-79 average is less than 0.3%. No year reached even 1%. If we continue that trend because of insufficient provision for inflation, competing demands for national resources, or any other cause, the military balance will become perilous over the next five years.

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On the other hand if we and our NATO allies achieve a 3% real growth rate, the military balance likely will roughly stabilize after a few years. Even then it would still not meet the PD-18 criteria.

-- We would have essential equivalence in strategic nuclear forces, but the general purpose forces situation would be far less satisfactory, in (small) part because of the diversion of resources to the higher priority strategic force investments.

-- The conventional force balance would give us only a questionable ability to stop a Warsaw Pact attack and practically no confidence in our ability to restore prewar boundaries.

-- Our ability to cope with some plausible crises involving local and Soviet forces in the Middle East, Persian Gulf or Korea would still be severely limited, depending both on generous warning times and on freedom from crises elsewhere, particularly in Europe.

To redress the balance and meet the criteria of PD-18 by 1990 will require an average annual real growth in the US defense program well in excess of the 3% we have discussed; it would also require increased allied efforts.

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Washington National  
Records Center,  
SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-81-0212,  
Box 1, Folder 320.2  
Strategic, 1978.



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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

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Administrative and Criminal Penalties

15 MAR 1978

OSD 3.3(b)(5)(8) + section 6.2(a)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Strategic Deterrence

Department of Energy Declassification Review	
1 <sup>st</sup> Review Date: 7/28/2002	Determination: (Circle Number(s))
ALL-DO	1. Classification Retained
Authority: David Morris	2. Classification Changed To: <u>EO</u>
Authority: <u>DO</u> <input type="checkbox"/> <u>DD</u> <input type="checkbox"/>	3. Contains No DOE Classified Info
Derived From:	4. Coordinate With:
Declassify On:	5. Declassified
2 <sup>nd</sup> Review Date: 9/29/15	6. Classified Info Bracketed
ALL-DO	7. Other (Specify) <u>DOE info</u>
Authority: T. Rice	1 <sup>st</sup> SRO

This is a brief status report on an ongoing analysis we are conducting on  
alternative ways of maintaining our strategic deterrence in the face of  
the growing Soviet counterforce capability.



I am exploring a number of R&D and acquisition alternatives that will pro-  
vide a timely solution to this problem. Accelerating the M-X is the major  
alternative but one in which I still have serious concerns because of the  
technical problems I see and the cost problems I expect to see. We will

330-81-0212, Box 1, 320.2 Strategic, 1978

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: FEB 28 2017

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continue an intensive effort (DRE, AF, and DSB) to develop a technically acceptable MX program. In the meantime, we are pursuing at a conceptual level alternatives to MX. These concepts, if pursued, would entail the following programatic actions:

1. Expedite the TRIDENT II program.
  - a. The TRIDENT II missile would be accelerated to allow an IOC of 1984.
  - b. The advanced development phase could be run as a design competition between the TRIDENT contractors and the MX missile contractor(s).
2. Redirect the MX missile program.
  - a. The MX missile would be a TRIDENT II missile plus an additional stage (an extra stage would be inserted between TRIDENT's first and second stage). It would also have a 1984 IOC.
  - b. [REDACTED]
  - c. [REDACTED]
3. Redirect the MX missile basing program.
  - a. [REDACTED]
  - b. [REDACTED]
4. Consider deployment of a "thin" ABM system.
  - a. Complete development of the new light-weight non-nuclear interceptor.
  - b. Install this system for a thin defense of one MM wing (Grand Forks) with an IOC of 1984. System would include PARS already there plus 100 interceptors (to be compatible with SALT).
  - c. The deployed system could stop (at most) 100 RVs, but provides a base from which an effective ABM system could be ~~quickly~~ made operational in a year or two from design.

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- d. Accelerate R&D in non-conventional (Garwinian) "bloody-nose" defenses of individual silos as a backup to ABM deployment.

5. MM II

- a. Left-over MM III missiles could be deployed in MM II silos (compatible with SALT restrictions) during the gap period between POSEIDON phase-out and TRIDENT phase-in. This option may be particularly important if our TRIDENT ship construction problems worsen.
- b. Develop a more effective use of our SALT quota of SNDVs than the present MM II.

Some combinations of the programs just outlined would lead to a reduction of ICBM vulnerability by 1984 with high confidence because the technical risks are not high (with the exception of the ABM, which does not seem difficult but involves more unknowns). These programs in aggregate would be less expensive than the MX alternative. The cost of the ABM development is more than offset by the R&D savings effected by a single missile development. The cost of deep silo deployment is more than offset by avoiding the cost of deploying the MX trenches. Also this approach is compatible with present SALT agreements and gives us a good negotiating position for future agreements.

However the concept has a major weakness to the extent it depends upon ABM, as long as we are limited to 100 interceptors. Therefore our major objective continues to be finding a technically sound approach to MX basing. The trench looks less and less attractive and a number of other alternatives are being seriously examined by the Air Force and DSB. I will give you a status report on this effort in a week or two.

*William J. Perry*

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC §  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 552 +  
Date: 28 Feb 2017 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(3)(B), 6.2(a)  
MDR: 15 -M- 1661

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Date: FEB 28 2017

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 19 2016

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

31 MAR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT DATE: 11-30-2015 ALT

SUBJECT: MX and Alternatives

The land based ICBM force currently plays a unique role in the U.S. Triad of strategic forces. It is not potentially vulnerable to Soviet ASW breakthroughs, and it does not currently depend on launch-on-warning for survival as our bombers do. Moreover, [REDACTED]

As the Soviets continue to deploy their new generation of ICBMs with improved accuracy and large numbers of [REDACTED]

It is clear that SALT can do little to slow this decline. Even with a SALT agreement, I judge that there is a 50% chance that the number of Minuteman survivors in 1980 would be below [REDACTED] and, by 1985, at least an even chance that this number could be reduced below [REDACTED]

There are a number of options available to us to respond to this increasing vulnerability. These options are all under study in our follow-on efforts to PD-18. The Triad study, the primary focus for this effort, is scheduled for completion in mid-September. Further, we should know considerably more about MX basing options by the end of the summer. It would be premature, therefore, to draw any final conclusions now. However, I would not exclude the possibility of deciding before then to accelerate the missile development while leaving open which basing systems it will be deployed in. All of the options require a new missile, and we could decide on one basing system without foreclosing others.

Before going into the list of alternatives we are currently considering, I want to emphasize that we face no immediate crisis. Our strategic offensive forces are highly survivable today. By any reasonable reckoning they are, overall, fully the equal of those of the Soviet Union. In addition, the modernization of the bomber force with large numbers of air-launched cruise missiles and the SLBM force with Trident I missiles and the new Trident submarine (albeit at a somewhat slower pace than anticipated) will significantly increase the overall effectiveness of the Triad even in the face of some decrease in the survivability in the ICBM leg. We have time to study our options and determine the best course of action. The Soviets will in any event have to reckon with the possibility of ICBM launch under attack. This preserves ICBM deterrent capability to some extent for some time, though I think we should seek to reduce their vulnerability.

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In addition to a more survivable ICBM in mobile basing (MX), which is the focus of our current study efforts, the following options are under consideration in the PD-18 follow-on studies. They are listed here in two categories: options available within a SALT TWO agreement, and options assuming a breakdown or major alteration in SALT.

Options Within SALT TWO

1. Accelerate the Trident II (D-5) missile.
  - potential 1983-1984 IOC (current IOC is 1988);
  - accuracy for hard target kill may not be available until later.
2. Deploy MX in silos until alternative basing concept is proven.
  - potential 1983-1984 IOC (current IOC is 1986);
  - puts more capable missiles in vulnerable silos.
3. Develop a smaller and cheaper SSBN than Trident.
  - could make up for reduced launcher levels projected in late 1980s/early 1990s due to Trident slowdown and Poseidon phase out;
  - potential 1990 IOC.

[REDACTED]

- probably of only short-term value;
- SALT status also needs study.

Options Assuming a Breakdown in SALT

1. [REDACTED]

- mid-1980s IOC.

JS 3.3(b)(2)(5)(8)

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Date: DEC 19 2016

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- late 1980s IOC;
  - probably cheap but needs much study.
4. Defend the ICBM force with ABMs.
- late 1980s IOC and very expensive;
  - cost-effectiveness probably favors the attacker.

The choice between these various alternatives will be difficult, involving many complex factors of cost, technical feasibility and performance. We should not make that choice before these factors have been adequately studied.

*Harold Brown*

JS 3.3(b)(2)(5)(8)

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Date: DEC 19 2016

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 19 Dec 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
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Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(2)(5)(8)  
MDR: 15 -M- 1663

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301  
6 SEP 1978

CIA

Washington National  
Records Center,  
SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-81-0212,  
Box 4, Folder USSR  
388.3 (Aug-Sep) 1978.

EO 13526 3.5(c)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Memorandum for the President on Numbers  
and Capabilities of Soviet Strategic Warheads

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on your draft memorandum to the President. Although I have a number of comments, I believe there are few, if any, disagreements between us. First, let me point out that my paper dealt with the fractionation issue, but not with Minuteman survivability. I am concerned that although we seem to be counting very heavily on an RV lead to offset perceptions about such matters as the Soviet threat to Minuteman survivability, the throw weight balance, etc., that RV lead could be largely eliminated by the Soviets within a relatively short time. Our projections of Soviet fractionations (even "high estimates") are by no means upper bounds -- they may indeed be good estimates of what will happen, but they could also be optimistic

Your draft memorandum gives the impression that it would be difficult for the Soviets to eliminate our RV lead, and mentions availability of special nuclear materials, the Soviet need to consider a range of military objectives, etc. I believe these difficulties are real but should not be exaggerated. Far from representing "maximum" fractionations, the illustrative future payloads I mentioned in my letter were well within the current state of the art --

[REDACTED]

Although producing large numbers of extra RVs and new buses would surely take time

I would emphasize that the Soviets could profit in the meantime by merely testing highly fractionated payloads --

[REDACTED]

Classified by DUSD/P 330-81-0212, box 4, USSR 800-2 (Aug-Sep) 1978  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED  
TWO YEAR INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED ON 31Dec88

15-m-1655

Classified by 08 APR 2011  
Declassify on: OADR

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In summary, I am concerned that the Soviets may decide to seek strategic advantage in the only major index in which we currently lead. Militarily, that might mean very little, but in the world of politics and perceptions it could be very damaging.

Turning briefly to your discussion of MM survivability, let me first say that, as I suggested in our discussions, I believe it appropriate for you to go on record in this way now that your staff has completed their review. Although there have been a number of alarms rung already (including the SALT Interagency study dated 30 April), they have been cautious not to over-state how certain the near-term threat is.

My staff have a few further comments on the MM portion of your memo. These do not affect the overall judgment. First, the Severe Damage criterion that you continue to use is appropriate for a Soviet planner. For moderately US-conservative planning -- we should also note the results of using the Light Damage criterion [REDACTED]

Second, your August 10 draft memo may give a bit too much prominence to the modeling issues. Although your new model is indeed consistent with DOD models, and presumably more accurate than the original model which was developed a decade ago, the uncertainties due to differences in models are not as significant as uncertainties in future Soviet CEP, future Soviet yields, US silo hardness, etc. Finally, I believe it would probably be useful to give the President some further feeling of how good the overall calculations are, assuming that our estimates are not wholly wrong because of some catastrophic reliability problems, etc. The 30 April SALT paper (to which your staff contributed greatly) provided a mechanism for doing this.

I hope some of these comments will be useful. I believe they are consistent with what we have told the President.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WNS  
Date: OCT 28 2016

*Harold Brown*

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50.44352  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WNS  
Date: 28 OCT 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3 (b)(1) + 3.5 (c)  
MDR: 15 M-1655

JS 3.3(b)(2)(4)(5)(8)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

February 26, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Governors List and Matheson

This is the follow-on MX paper I promised you in the memorandum I sent you on Saturday about the Senator Garn letter.

Your meeting with Governors List and Matheson is timely in that support for MX needs to be expressed now from the highest level. The MX system faces serious obstacles in Congress and also in Nevada and Utah. These obstacles can be overcome, but only if strong support is given now, the Administration's previous commitment is reaffirmed by you, and continuing active support is offered at high levels over the months ahead. The meeting with Governors List and Matheson provides an ideal opportunity for such reaffirmation. (In this connection, I believe it would be helpful for you to issue a statement to the press in support of MX following your meeting with the Governors, or provide the press a summary of your meeting.)

Attached is a paper on several issues of concern to the Governors, and a draft statement for your use with the Governors or with the press.

Here is my personal assessment of where we stand. In the Congress, members who are normally advocates of strong national security conclude that something like MX is needed, but think the MX system is too complicated and too expensive. The Senators from Nevada and Utah mistakenly see (or claim to see) the MX basing mode as arising from SALT considerations. To the extent that opposition to MX can be used politically to question the Administration's competence in strategic matters, it will be so used. Congressional "liberals" question the need for the system altogether. They view it as posing a first strike threat and, therefore, as destabilizing. They agree, erroneously, with many who previously endorsed the system, that in a no-SALT context MX may not be survivable. They also are most concerned about the disruption of the environment.

Should we actually get into real difficulties in the land withdrawal process or in the environmental area, and face much longer delays, I think it probably would be possible

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WPM  
Date: Sep 16 2015

fol - missiles, 10/79 - 3/80, bx 43, Self File, Brz Mat, NSA, JC

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to obtain special legislative relief, particularly if our relationship with the Russians stays on its current course. There is good precedent for such an outcome in the Alaska pipeline case, where legislative relief from the National Environmental Policy Act was finally obtained as the oil supply situation in the country worsened. But it is desirable to avoid having to take that route if we can solve the problems under the present rules.

We are designing the missile so that it can be deployed in Minuteman silos--"silo stuffing"--as a hedge against the kind of delays we may encounter in the environmental assessment and land withdrawal processes. We are also working to improve our strategic indications and warning systems to enhance the credibility of this option.

Engineering studies continue on the basing mode, as required by the Stevens Amendment and in line with our own desires to improve the design. We have evolved a variation of the horizontal shelter system which allows the transporter to be separated from the erector-launcher, thereby reducing complexity and cost (perhaps by as much as several billion dollars). However, we do not intend to make a major issue out of this variation, because it could be misconstrued as another "change of mind."

In Nevada and Utah, the Governors and members of Congress, with one exception, have raised objections to MX deployment. (The exception is Congressman McKay who has supported the system, and who deserves recognition.) I believe the opposition of these "national level" leaders is not fundamental; they are testing the wind. However, they are trying to create a situation where the federal government will guarantee that any adverse environmental, social and economic impacts of deploying MX will be appropriately alleviated with generous doses of federal funds.

Local leaders--mayors, county commissioners, state legislators and business groups--are far more supportive of MX. These officials see the economic benefits, and can evaluate possible environmental impacts realistically. What concerns them most is possible changes in their life style that will be caused by an influx of large numbers of people from out of state to construct and operate a system of this magnitude. With them too, federal assurances that the strain on public facilities will be mitigated by federal assistance will go far towards easing their concerns.

*Harold Brown*

Attachments

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Date: SEP 16 2015

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DIA Reviewed and Determined we have No Objection  
to Declassification. Our review Decision is subject to  
the results of the Concurrent reviews of DOE, Air  
Force and Joint Staff/wcj//01 March 2016.

1 June 1978

CIA

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a copy of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
on (PD)/NSC-38, announcing your decisions as to the U.S. negotiating  
position on CTB. They have asked that I forward it to you, as an  
expression of their strongly held views. I believe that the JCS  
memorandum accurately identifies the technical and military factors  
involved. I agree with some, but not every one, of their evaluations.

A CTB involves some level of military risk. However, I believe that  
the probability that a CTB would adversely affect the reliability of the  
warheads for our important strategic systems is low enough during a three-  
year (or, less clearly, even a five-year) period so that for such a  
period the military risk in itself is acceptable. Of some weight also  
is the fact that we would become aware by continued stockpile inspection  
if a question of such reliability arises and, in principle, could in-  
voke the supreme-national-interest withdrawal clause.

I emphasize that there would be a serious question of continued  
stockpile reliability on the U.S. side if there were an indefinite CTB.  
The greatest risk, therefore, follows from the tendency of a limited-  
term agreement to be extended. The statement of intention to resume  
tests at the end of a limited-term in order to assure stockpile re-  
liability can somewhat ameliorate that problem. But the pressure at  
the time of expiration to renew (and also pressure not to do so) will  
probably be very great despite anything we say now. Such a concern  
about extension is likely to be expressed by opponents during the  
ratification process. This aspect, in my judgment, makes the prospects  
for approval of a CTB substantially less favorable than those for SALT,  
and also less favorable the earlier a CTB is concluded.

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Date: JUN 30 2016

A-400.112 Test Ban

OSD 3.3(b)(1) CIA 3.3(b)(1)

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386 81-0202, box 52,

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A 400.12 Test Ban (Apr - 57)

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-1670 78



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- 2 -

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I believe that the JCS paper understates the potential advantages from a CTB for non-proliferation (which many of us see as its main benefit). However, those advantages have yet to be articulated sufficiently. In my view it would be useful for the State Department and ACDA to set forth the criteria by which they believe we would be able to judge after a five-year period whether proliferation had indeed been inhibited by the CTB, and therefore whether there would be reasons supporting renewal to counter the military and technical needs for reliability tests.

A great concern of mine is the possible irretrievable dissipation of our nuclear scientific and technological talent if a CTB is perceived by them as being of long or indefinite duration. To be able to test for stockpile reliability after a previously set time period of some years, and to correct deficiencies, the capabilities of the nuclear design laboratories have to be maintained. From this point of view there are two matters that particularly trouble me. (1) The decision to limit experiments to a few pounds of high explosive equivalent -- rather than, for example, a few hundred tons -- limits sharply the degree of interest of such experiments to the scientists and technologists on whose continued skills and continued professional dedication to nuclear weapons design we would depend when tests are resumed. (2) Second, the five-year period of the treaty instead of a three-year period that had alternatively been proposed also reduces the chances of keeping viable nuclear laboratories together. The laboratory directors have told the JCS that, given a commitment to resume testing, they can maintain relevant laboratory effectiveness for three years, but probably not for five. I therefore urge that these two issues be reexamined as part of the development of the safeguards program you requested by June 30.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

OSD 83(b)(1)  
CIA 3.3(b)(1)

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Date: JUN 30 2016

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DIA Reviewed and Determined we have No Objection to Declassification. Our review Decision is subject to the results of the Concurrent reviews of DOE, Air Force and Joint Staff//wcj//01 March 2016.

5/30  
HJB  
JCSM-188-78

30 MAY 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Presidential Decision on Comprehensive Test Ban (U)

1. (S) Presidential Decision (PD)/NSC 38 announced that in view of the importance of maintaining confidence in safety and reliability of US stockpiled nuclear weapons, the President has decided that the United States should propose a fixed-duration Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) treaty of 5 years, with provision for nuclear weapon experiments of a few pounds yield. In forwarding the treaty to the Senate for ratification, the President would state that the United States intends to resume testing at the expiration of the treaty, for safety and reliability purposes only, unless testing is shown not to be necessary. Any further agreement on testing limitations after the 5-year treaty would be presented to the Senate for ratification.

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the test ban, as outlined, would involve significant military risks. In a memorandum\* which you forwarded to the President on 22 April 1978, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated they believe that a test ban must allow continued testing at a level sufficient to:

a. Maintain high confidence in the reliability of US nuclear weapons and hence confidence in the US nuclear deterrent.

b. Avoid undesirable asymmetries which are otherwise likely to result due to the inability of the United States to verify compliance with the test ban.

3. (S) Recent discussions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have held with Department of Energy officials and their laboratory directors, upon whom the United States must rely for technical judgments concerning the reliability of US nuclear weapons, have further underscored the requirement for continued testing to maintain stockpile reliability. These experts have stated that, under a CTB with zero testing over an extended period, stockpile reliability will be degraded. They have taken the

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~~SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION~~  
~~SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652~~  
~~AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO~~  
~~YEAR INTERVALS~~  
~~DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1986~~

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position that the most current nuclear warheads and bombs in the US stockpile cannot be maintained without nuclear testing. Their current best estimate is that the required nuclear yield for that purpose is at least 3-5 kilotons. With nuclear testing permitted at 3-5 kilotons, it is likely that the current nuclear weapon stockpile could be maintained in a safe and reliable condition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have found these assessments persuasive.

4. ~~(S)~~ Based on available information, Soviet reliability problems may not be as severe, since the Soviets' typically heavier weapons and larger payloads have allowed them to use coarser design criteria which are not as susceptible to problems as the high-technology US designs. This is likely to cause an asymmetric degradation of the stockpiles. Assuming that the Soviets recognize this, they may eventually perceive a strategic advantage, and the asymmetry therefore would become destabilizing.

5. ~~(S)~~ The announced intention to restrict resumption of testing to that necessary for weapons safety and reliability appears to preempt decisions concerning weapons development which are better made in the context of other arms control agreements. The United States may be unilaterally restricting development of new strategic weapons, without any similar restraint upon the Soviets if a SAL agreement or other agreements reached do not restrict new strategic weapons development. Moreover, such an unfavorable asymmetry may also be imposed on the development of new theater/tactical nuclear weapons, at least until an arms control agreement with reciprocal restraints might be achieved.

6. ~~(S)~~



Thus, the United States will face a situation wherein the Soviets could test without detection and the United States will not test--a situation that could lead to asymmetries detrimental to the credibility of the US deterrent.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)  
CIA 3.3(b)(1)

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7. ~~(S)~~ Experience with the nuclear stockpile has demonstrated that serious problems can arise during a 5-year ban on nuclear testing. The decision in PD/NSC 38 does not provide for testing to address stockpile reliability problems which may arise during the period of the treaty. In the event that a serious problem arises, the United States would either have to exercise the "supreme national interest" withdrawal clause or depend on a less reliable deterrent force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, rather than accept the prospect of placing the United States in this undesirable situation, the United States should initially seek to negotiate a treaty which lowers the testing threshold to the level of verification capability. Such a lowered threshold could provide an opportunity to learn how to deal more confidently with stockpile reliability problems in an environment of restricted testing, while at the same time observing Soviet performance under the treaty and upgrading US monitoring capabilities.
8. ~~(S)~~ JCS discussions with the nuclear laboratory directors also have confirmed the belief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that retention of skilled scientists and engineers at the US nuclear weapons laboratories is essential to maintain the stockpile and retain a nuclear weapons design capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the judgment of the laboratory directors that it is unlikely that the necessary number of skilled scientists and engineers can be retained throughout a 5-year test suspension, even under the incentives of a strong safeguards program.
9. ~~(S)~~ In addition to the military and technical considerations expressed above, there are also politico-military implications which should be given consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that it is in the US national interest to stop nuclear proliferation. However, they are not at all certain the balance of considerations with respect to a test ban, as outlined, would contribute substantially to nonproliferation. Further, if US allies were to lose confidence in the ability of the United States to maintain a credible and reliable stockpile and, hence, in the deterrent quality of US nuclear guarantees, they could be disposed to develop or increase nuclear stocks.
10. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff judge the military risks to national security to be serious. The issue is considered to be the adequacy of the US nuclear deterrent forces--both perceived and actual--and the equivalence of those forces to those of the Soviet Union. The magnitude of the risks and the potential consequences compel the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that the negotiating position could result in a treaty which would adversely affect the national security interests of the United States.

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Date: JUN 30 2016



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11. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you forward this memorandum to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*David C Jones*

DAVID C. JONES, General, USAF  
Acting Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:

\* JCSM-119-78, 18 April 1978, "Comprehensive Test Ban (U)"

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 30 Jun 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3 (b) (1)  
MDR: 15 -M- 0550

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUN 30 2016

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Space Operations for Military Purposes

Dear Harold:

On September 19, 1977, you received a letter from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concerning the cost effectiveness and the planned military uses for the new Space Transportation System (STS) or the Space Shuttle. In our response to this inquiry, Charles Duncan indicated that a further study would be performed of the military uses that might be possible with the new Space Transportation System. He also directed that a Steering Committee, with myself as Chairman, be established to provide broad policy guidance for the planned study effort. The study group was headed by Lieutenant General Thomas P. Stafford and it included several former astronauts who brought their space flight experience to bear on the study effort. Four mission oriented panels were established to study the requirements, capabilities and utility of possible missions that could be conducted using the Space Shuttle. The final report resulting from these efforts is attached herewith for your consideration.

In contrast to prior studies which concentrated on asking whether there was a need for man in space, the current study started with the assumption that man would be there in any event. The most important new feature of the Space Transportation System is that people will be present on every flight. Thus, the question now is not to justify the need for "man in space," but to determine what should be done of military value once he is there. In reviewing the situation which we are likely to face in the 1980s, the members of the Steering Committee and the Study Group concluded that there would indeed be military value to having men in space and that human judgment applied to the situations we are likely to face would eventually be of great value.

The Committee also concluded that operations in space performed by this nation would be of increasing importance in the next decade. In an era of "essential equivalence" of strategic forces between ourselves and the Soviet Union, surveillance from space becomes much more important than it was at a time when we had overwhelming strategic superiority. In addition, one of the important elements of strategic stability in this era of "essential equivalence" will be Arms Control Treaties that very probably will contain provisions dealing with verification and monitoring using space-based sensing devices.

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date:

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Declassify on

Review on

*5 April 1999*

JAN 27 2015

*15m-0592 RI*

*330-82-0204, Box 48, 471.96 (Jan-Jul) 1977*

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Date: *82 DEC 25 19*  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

*X. 3092/78*  
*X-02304*

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Another factor that will become more important in the next decade is that our land-based nuclear deterrent force is likely to become more vulnerable to a first strike before a new land-based system is built. In your speech before the Commonwealth Club of California last June, you indicated that in the coming years, the Soviets would have to consider the possibility that our strategic missiles would no longer be in their silos when theirs arrive. In order to make the Soviets believe that we may actually adopt such a doctrine, a warning and attack assessment system is required which is very much more capable than the one we have at the present time. This warning and attack assessment system will depend on significantly upgraded sensing systems placed in earth orbit. In addition, the new Space Transportation System will give us the possibility of introducing man into the assessment at an earlier phase and thus to apply the crucial factor of human judgment in space rather than on the ground. I should add that in no sense do we regard the creation of a better warning and attack assessment system as a substitute for a land-based strategic deterrent force that is invulnerable to a Soviet first strike. We look upon an upgraded warning system as a stopgap measure until a new, less vulnerable land-based strategic deterrent is fielded.

Consequently, it is our view that space operations for military purposes will indeed be increasing substantially during the next decade. It is fortunate indeed for the United States that the new Space Transportation System will become available in this time period since it will give the United States the unique advantage over the Soviets in space operations. It is quite possible in our view that the advantage provided by the Shuttle for the development of space observation platforms will give us a strong hand in leading the search for new Arms Control Agreements and in developing strategic warning systems that may be necessary should a "breakout" of Soviet strategic forces occur.

The operation of the Space Shuttle system that will become commonplace in the mid-1980s will be dominated by the presence of man. The use of people in space to perform military missions and the proper blend of manned and unmanned systems were the central issues on which this study was focused. In each case the military importance of the missions was also considered. The findings and recommendations of the study are based on two principles that were inherent in the Presidential Directive Number 37 (PD-37) that has recently been issued:

1. The Defense Department or any other government agency that has a requirement to go into space should be able to do so using the new transportation system. This means that any agency with a mission requiring space operations should be free to establish its own requirements and should develop an organizational structure that will permit it to use the new Space Transportation System to its best advantage.

2. The technology employed by the public and private organizations that operate in space must have the highest degree of commonalty while maintaining each organization's ability to independently develop mission peculiar requirements and independently perform mission operations.

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 27 Jan 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15-M-0592

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
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The findings and recommended actions of the study developed specific requirements for organizations within the Department of Defense to carry out the national military effort in space. The first study finding was concerned with the need for the development of new doctrines for space operations by the Department of Defense with the attendant organizational and programmatic decisions required to implement them. The second study finding determined that the Department of Defense will require military man in space to provide improved operational capability and positive Department of Defense command and control of military space missions.

The actions recommended by the study follow from these two findings. The commitment for the Department of Defense to undertake the development of its own doctrines for space operations is derived from the first finding. More importantly, however, is the need for the Department of Defense to establish an organizational focus for space operations at the unified or specified command level. If the study is approved as written, it states that the Department of Defense will designate an operational command to implement military space policy. In addition, the study states that the Department of Defense will designate flight crews and establish a centralized training facility for all Department of Defense Space Shuttle payload operations specialists for near term missions. Finally, as a result of the first finding, one of the most important recommended actions commits the Department of Defense to establishing a secure, dedicated mission control facility for command and control of Defense Department missions which use the new Space Transportation System. As long as the Space Shuttle is in its experimental stage or is used only as a launch vehicle, then the "Controlled Mode" operation at the Johnson Space Center can probably provide adequate support. However, once the Space Shuttle becomes a mission platform, as it will, in which the interface between the payload and the vehicle is highly complex and in which men go aloft to perform military missions, then a separate mission control capability is absolutely essential. Specific missions that will require such a facility include the inspection of hostile satellites, reconnaissance and some missions dealing with military research and development.

Based on the second finding of the study, the Department of Defense should designate the following missions as essential and critical:

a. Launch and recovery of military payloads, using the Space Transportation System which is more cost effective and efficient than current limited launch vehicles.

b. Terrestrial reconnaissance missions, allowing flight crew on-scene optimization of target selection and data simplification.

c. Satellite inspection missions, which will provide early identification of foreign satellite functions, missions and capabilities.

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d. Repair and servicing of military payloads, will incorporate man-on-the-scene for more efficient utilization of existing and evolving military space resources.

e. Military research and development programs, including for example, Surveillance and Warning RDT&E, in which investigation of the use of multi-sensors in a man-augmented role is most promising.

The study also designated those missions which are viewed as highly desired:

a. Achieving a space-based ASAT capability unless an agreement is reached with the Soviet Union to control ASAT activities.

b. Deployment and support of large structures in space intended for military purposes.

c. The support of space-based non-nuclear weapons.

Finally, the Department of Defense will develop its requirements for mid and far-term space systems while also determining the adequacy of the follow-on or growth versions of the new Space Transportation System to support mid and far-term missions. It is especially vital for representatives of the Department of Defense to be heavily involved in the development of future versions of Space Shuttle technology and of the launch vehicles that might be based on that technology.

These are matters which we draw to your attention in this study so that you can bring them to the attention of people at the appropriate level within the Department of Defense and other places in the Administration. The actions recommended in the study report will permit the Department of Defense to take maximum advantage of the operational opportunities and the resource efficiencies offered by the Space Shuttle. We believe that the implementation of these actions will give us, through the use of the Space Shuttle, the ability to conduct those independent military operations in space required for the national defense. I would very much like to have the opportunity to meet with you personally and to discuss the contents of the study with you in more detail.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

*Haus*

Hans Mark

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: JAN 27 2015

2 NOV 1977

Honorable James T. McIntyre, Jr.  
Acting Director  
Office of Management and Budget  
Washington, D. C. 20503

Dear Mr. McIntyre:

This is in response to Mr. Lance's letter of September 19, 1977, concerning the cost-effectiveness and utility of the Space Shuttle for military space missions. I believe these are important issues, and am pleased that Mr. Lance posed the question not only in terms of cost-effectiveness but also in relation to the value of new capabilities inherent in the Shuttle.

Enclosure 1 provides our current perspective regarding the cost of Shuttle operations. The conclusion to be drawn is that the cost-effectiveness of the Shuttle depends on the traffic model assumed. Our experience, both with major weapon systems and space launch vehicles, reflects lifetimes in excess of the ten year model used. If an increase in traffic is projected, and the period of use is extended, I am confident the Shuttle will prove to be significantly more economical and effective than current systems.

The unique capabilities of the Shuttle derive from its nature as a highly reliable, manned system capable of revisiting payloads on orbit and returning payloads to earth, either for planned operations or in mission abort situations. Further, the Shuttle provides greater throw weight and volume capabilities. The expected utility of applying these and other capabilities to potential defense missions is discussed in Enclosure 2.

I believe that the unique capabilities offered by the Shuttle are the major justification for the program and will provide us with an entirely new way of doing business in space. During the nineteen-sixties, a number of studies were conducted to evaluate

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See F. E. O. 1 Pr. X-2983

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OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
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the employment of man in space. Eventually it was concluded that whatever military and reconnaissance missions had to be conducted could be done more effectively with automated spacecraft. It is now a decade later and the time has come to re-examine this question. We have sent men into space for non-military reasons and now have experience that demonstrates the value of man in space.

Most of the people who have been in space are trained military officers. It is important, in my opinion, to bring the experience and the judgment of these people to bear and to consider again the military value of man in space. I am creating a committee having experienced astronauts among its members. This group will be asked to make the judgment of the military value of man in space and to provide a report to me in approximately three months.

A decision establishing an adequate Shuttle fleet size will allow us to proceed with planning for its more ambitious use. The DoD fully supports the acquisition by NASA of a five Orbiter fleet operating from both eastern and western launch and landing sites to accommodate total national space transportation needs. ✓

Sincerely,

*W. D. Burns*

2 Enclosures

1. Shuttle Cost

Effectiveness Chart (A)

2. Shuttle Applications (A)

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JAN 27 2015

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RESEARCH AND  
ENGINEERING

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

10/11  
HRS

10 NOV 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: OMB Options for Space Shuttle

Attached is a paper which you requested discussing Space Shuttle options which OMB is considering and may submit to the President for decision. These options have a major impact on DoD planning for Shuttle use.

We understand that OMB and NASA will be meeting with the President on November 15, 1977 to discuss the Shuttle budget. You may wish to attend this meeting to express DoD's point of view.

Admiral Turner has supported the Shuttle program and we understand that the NSC staff has recommended proceeding with five orbiters and two launch sites. You may wish to consult with Admiral Turner and either Dr. Brzezinski or Mr. Aaron prior to the November 15 meeting.

Attachment

*Gerald P. Dunnein*

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 27 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
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15-M-0559



## SPACE SHUTTLE

### Reasons for DoD Interest

DoD's interest in the Space Shuttle continues to increase as the NASA Shuttle development program proceeds on schedule toward a 1980 IOC at Kennedy Space Center. The Space Shuttle can support the launch of all projected DoD space systems in the foreseeable future. The Shuttle provides significant new technological opportunities which can lead to more effective and flexible military space operations. Compared to our largest current space booster, the Shuttle can deliver twice the payload weight and three times the payload volume to orbit. We can use this increased capability to incorporate redundancy in critical subsystems, thereby improving the life of our spacecraft on orbit. We can also improve the capability of our spacecraft by prudently adding sensors and communications links. We can improve the survivability of our space systems, in a natural or hostile space environment, by selecting from a number of Shuttle-related options. These survivability options include placing spare spacecraft on orbit, carrying additional on-board propellants for spacecraft maneuvering, or perhaps placing on orbit more spacecraft of a simpler, lower cost design. The Shuttle capabilities offer the opportunity to achieve greater spacecraft modularization and standardization of subsystems while avoiding costly weight reduction programs.

The reliability of placing a satellite in its desired orbit projected for the Shuttle (.995) is higher than we are experiencing today on our current expendable boosters (.88 to .98). The benefits of this improved reliability include greater mission success and timely replenishment of priority DoD space systems. We anticipate that the Shuttle can be used routinely as a development test bed for various sensors and subsystems thereby reducing the development time for new space systems and enhancing our capability to respond rapidly to changing needs.

Initially, we will use the Shuttle as we would a larger replacement launch vehicle. However, should the Shuttle arrive on-orbit with a payload that did not check out properly, most payloads could be returned to earth for adjustment or modification. In the future, we can design our payloads so that the Shuttle can retrieve them from low orbit when the mission is complete and return them to earth for refurbishment and reuse, diagnostic purposes, or technological update. Another option which might be equally attractive in the Shuttle era is on-orbit servicing of payloads. Spacecraft designed for automated subsystem replacement could be serviced while in low orbit depending on mission requirements.

In the long term, the Shuttle will open the way for many new technical advances in the military use of space.

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date:

JAN 27 2015

### DoD Shuttle Program

Present plans are to transition all DoD payloads from launch on current expendable space boosters to Shuttle launch after the Shuttle becomes operational in 1980. The Air Force is developing an Interim Upper Stage which will be operational by mid-1980 for use on both the Shuttle and the Titan III booster during the transition period. The Air Force is also developing the Shuttle launch and landing capability at Vandenberg AFB, which will be operational in June 1983. Some Titan III boosters will be procured as a backup for our critical launches in the event that the Shuttle encounters delays during development or early operational use. When the Shuttle is fully operational, expendable boosters will be phased out of the inventory. Current DoD planning is predicated on the timely availability of an adequate orbiter fleet, assumed to be 5 orbiters based on NASA's national traffic projections for Shuttle use. DoD funding for Shuttle use through FY 1983 totals \$2.3 billion including \$429 million for payload transition, \$161 million for Interim Upper Stage, \$853 million for Vandenberg, and \$358 million for backup boosters.

### Shuttle Cost Effectiveness

NASA, with significant Air Force inputs, conducted a study on the cost effectiveness of the Shuttle and the need for additional orbiters. The study was based on projected national traffic of 487 flights by 1992, including a DoD portion of 111 flights. While there is some uncertainty in the national traffic estimates, the NASA analysis shows that the Shuttle remains cost effective, when compared to expendable vehicles, even if the national traffic estimate is reduced to 300 flights by 1992. The NASA study concludes that five orbiters and two launch sites (East and West coast) provide the most cost effective system to support future national needs.

### OMB Position

OMB apparently has considerable concern that the national Shuttle traffic projected by NASA (487 flights by 1992) is inflated. OMB also questions the validity of the NASA cost analysis.

Two Shuttle program options are apparently being considered by OMB for Presidential decision.

Option 1. Do not build the Shuttle launch and landing facility at Vandenberg AFB. Operate the Shuttle out of Kennedy Space Center with only 3 orbiters.

Option 2. Provide for two site operations but provide only 4 instead of 5 orbiters in the Shuttle fleet.

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### The DoD Position

The principal DoD interest in the Shuttle is motivated not by cost-effectiveness arguments, but by the significant new opportunities provided by the Shuttle. Our analysis shows that DoD investment is not quite offset by the Shuttle cost savings obtained with 111 DoD launches by 1992. However, additional launches or an extended traffic model period would provide the offset. Thus, Shuttle cost-effectiveness does not appear to be a major driver for the DoD.

The significant new capabilities offered by Shuttle include: increased payload capability, which can provide increased performance with greater on-orbit reliability and survivability; improved launch reliability, providing greater mission success and timely replenishment of priority DoD space systems; flexibility, allowing for responsive development tests of new subsystems and the ability to recover payloads; and the opportunity for fundamental advances in the military use of space.

#### OMB Option 1 - Eliminate Vandenberg AFB, and eliminate orbiters 4 and 5.

- DoD requires a Vandenberg launch site for its polar orbiting heavy payloads. DoD would need to maintain current boosters at Vandenberg while using the Shuttle at Kennedy. Current boosters would require substantial upgrading as payload weights grow. Maintaining this dual capability would be inefficient. Current boosters could not be phased out, and DoD operating costs would increase as other users moved to Shuttle launch.
- Exploitation of space would be severely limited. Assuming the loss of one orbiter would reduce the fleet to two. Two orbiters could not effectively support launch operations, and the Shuttle would be reduced to an R&D program. Neither DoD nor NASA would be able to exploit space to its full potential.

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OBM Option 2 - Provide for two site operations with only four orbiters.

- The size of the orbiter fleet must be based on total national traffic. For the traffic projected by NASA, procurement of a 5 orbiter fleet appears prudent. A 5 orbiter fleet would allow for appropriate orbiter maintenance, turn around times, acceptable scheduling, and potential loss of an orbiter.
- With only 4 orbiters, DoD would probably maintain more backup boosters for a longer period of time, and would be concerned that one orbiter would be lost. The risk and cost to DoD in using the Shuttle would increase.
- If OMB determines that national traffic requires only 4 orbiters, it would be prudent to provide long lead materials for a fifth orbiter in the event of loss of one orbiter. Two site operations may not be effectively sustained with 3 orbiters.

An additional issue which might be raised concerns DoD funding of orbiter 4 and 5. This does not appear to be a reasonable approach for the following reasons:

- There is no practical way to place funds for additional orbiters "over ceiling" in the Defense budget. Further, DoD must fully fund -- \$1.2 billion in a single year for two orbiters.
- Orbiters must be justified in terms of total national Shuttle traffic. Orbiters are not unique to DoD, but are used for foreign, civil, and DoD payloads. DoD alone cannot justify additional orbiters to Congress.
- The "fair share" argument makes no sense since the more NASA costs increase in bringing the Shuttle into operation and the more national Shuttle traffic drops, the greater DoD's "fair share" would become. Other U.S. government and civil users do not plan to invest in the Shuttle. DoD has never planned to invest in orbiters.

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JAN 27 2015





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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D C 20301

Washington National Records  
Center, SecDef Files, Acc Folder  
388.3, 1978, Box 1,  
SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-81-0442.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: JAN 27 2015

February 28, 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: U.S. Position Regarding ASAT Policy (U)

(8) This memorandum is in reply to your correspondence of February 25, 1978, requesting my views regarding the deletion of space test restrictions from the existing Presidential Directive on Arms Control for ASAT Systems.

(18) For the reasons which you have cited, I agree that it would be wise to modify the Presidential Directive along the lines that you have suggested. Our program, as currently planned, does not require a change in Presidential guidance until 1980; however, it is necessary that the Congress support our budget requests if we are to maintain our option for flight tests in 1981. Although I think that it is unlikely that the FY 1979 budget requests will not be fully approved as a consequence of the testing restrictions, the removal of these restrictions would eliminate any such possibility. Removal of the testing restrictions also has the advantage of enhancing the likelihood of Soviet acceptance of U.S. proposals by indicating our firm intent to achieve a high-performance ASAT capability as quickly as possible.

(9) If we are to achieve an ASAT interceptor capability of which we are confident, we must test against targets in space. Therefore, I view space testing as essential to the test and evaluation process and a necessary phase in the weapon development cycle. It would be preferable, then, that any authorization to test not contain a restrictive clause that limits tests to demonstration purposes, as may have been suggested in your memorandum. My concern is that development flight tests might be deemed not to be allowed.

(1) If desired, as a means for impressing upon the Soviets our resolve and ability to develop an ASAT weapon, we could conduct an ASAT flight test demonstration (using MINUTEMAN, as I mentioned to you and the President) within about 12 months for about \$50 M. This effort would be quite different from the program we are now pursuing. The interceptor would be assembled from available components, would lack the performance, and would be more costly than the approach we are now taking. While a

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Date: 03 Dec 2014  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

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single-shot demonstration may provide an incentive to the Soviets to accept our proposals, however, it may also divert resources away from our present program that could provide an effective system, if needed. I therefore do not recommend it.

*Harold Brown*

Office of the Secretary of Defense *545.6.552*  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: *27 Jan 2015* Authority: EO 13526  
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Washington National  
Records Center, SecDef  
Files, Acc 330-80-0017,  
Box 45, Folder 370.64 CBR  
(Aug-Dec) 1977.

22 NOV 1977

The Honorable Cyrus Vance  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declassification  
Date: NOV 04 2015

Dear Cy:

I have read your letter of October 23, 1977, regarding chemical munitions with great interest and share your concerns in the critical area of chemical warfare (CW). As you know, I have issued policy guidance to implement PD-15, which supports the current CW negotiations while preserving our potential ability to produce our own binary chemical weapons if negotiations fail to show progress.

First, let me assure you that there are no funds included in either the FY 1978 or FY 1979 defense budget for facilities for production or pre-production of binary chemical weapons. We have included some limited research and development funding for binary weapons. The only plans that we are developing for production are contingency plans of the sort we have for any conceptual weapons system, not firm plans.

To place our CW program in perspective, I want to emphasize that the major effort of our present programs is to provide improvements in our protective posture, both in research and development of new items and procurement of standard equipment. These programs have been fully supported by Congress and I plan to continue them. We would be pleased to provide you and your staff a complete briefing on the programs and the DOD assessment of the CW threat at your convenience.

Even while we are negotiating a treaty to ban chemical warfare, the threat of the use of chemical warfare against our forces remains great. Several of our Unified Command commanders have recently communicated to me personally their concern about the minimal nature of our protective posture and about the need for improving our CW posture in line with the threat facing US forces and our Allies. Nevertheless, we have already demonstrated considerable restraint in our own offensive capability. I hope this will provide a favorable climate for negotiations. Since 1973, we have unilaterally demilitarized more than 7,000 tons of chemical agents and a large number of munitions. This stockpile reduction, coupled with the fact that no chemical weapons have been produced since 1969, should have already achieved the psychological advantage you mentioned. Perhaps it will elicit a Soviet response to the US initiative. However, our combined intelligence analysis has continued to show no abatement of the rather significantly expanded Soviet activity in the chemical warfare field.

OSD, 330, 80-0017, Box 45, 370.64 CBR (Aug-Dec) 1977

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I do not feel it would be prudent to forego the necessary long-lead planning required for the research, development, and pilot production of binary munitions. We do plan to follow the guidance provided in PD-15, supporting to the fullest the on-going negotiations, and preparing for a review and reassessment at the beginning of the FY 1980 budget cycle unless significant progress is made in Geneva prior to that time.

Sincerely,

*Harold*

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 04 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50 U.S.C. § 552  
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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~~WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS~~

14 OCT 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Binary Chemical Munitions Facility

My memorandum of May 24, 1979 pointed out the concern felt by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself regarding the need to maintain effective means of monitoring compliance with any agreement which is reached with the Soviets to ban chemical weapons. It also requested review of the 1978 decision to defer funding for the binary munitions facility. Your response suggested we examine this decision in connection with the FY 1981 budget review process.

We have been participating in the bilateral negotiations with the Soviets since 1976 and see little or no movement on their part to resolve critical differences. In view of the continuing degradation of our deterrent stockpile and the serious asymmetry of capabilities in this area, I directed that the binary chemical munitions facility be included in the Department of the Army basic budget submission in the amount of \$19 million. I believe this action will provide the Soviets a clear indication of our dissatisfaction with the negotiations, and will signal the increasing difficulty of exercising restraint in our own chemical warfare capabilities while negotiations toward a comprehensive ban continue without progress.

Please inform the other concerned agencies of this action and solicit their views. If any agency forwards a nonconcurrence, then the SCC should resolve the issue in time to insure a decision prior to forwarding the FY 1981 budget to the President.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 25 2016

*Harold Brown*

330-82-0204, box 42, 370.64 (Oct-Dec) 1977

Enclosures

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Review on 24 May 1989

Extended by \_\_\_\_\_

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Date: Sept 13 2005 Doc 330-80-0017  
GSD-F.O. 212 Chief Agency Registry: TDD  
Review Declassify On: 31 Dec 2050

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

66

MAY 24 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Chemical Weapons Negotiations

I enclose for your consideration and for transmittal to the President a copy of a March 14, 1979 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning U.S.-Soviet chemical weapons negotiations.

The memorandum underscores the Joint Chiefs of Staff concern that the U.S. maintain effective means for monitoring compliance with any agreement which is reached in our negotiations with the Soviets to ban chemical weapons. The Chiefs also ask for SCC review, prior to this fall, of the decisions to maintain U.S. chemical warfare forces without force improvement, and not to seek funds for the binary munitions facility.

I support these views of the JCS.

*Harold Brown*

Enclosure 1  
Cy of JCSM-57-79  
14 March 1979

cc: CJCS

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 25 2016

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Review on 24 May 1989

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Reason 5200.1R, Para 2-301c5

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JCSM-57-79

14 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: US Chemical Weapons Negotiating Position (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ Review of the US negotiating position summary developed by the Chemical Weapons Backstopping Committee indicates that an agreement fully incorporating all elements in this position would meet the objective of a chemical weapons prohibition set forth in Presidential Directive/NSC-15. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the current and projected asymmetries in chemical warfare capability favoring the USSR provide no incentives for the Soviets to agree to any meaningful prohibitions on chemical weapons.
2. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the chemical weapons negotiations, in seeking to eliminate an entire means of warfare, constitute a disarmament--as opposed to an arms control--undertaking. Therefore, it is vital to national security that strong, effective provisions be made for monitoring compliance with any agreement resulting from such an undertaking.
3. ~~(S)~~ There are serious military risks inherent in this disarmament effort.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 25 2016


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4. (S) While the position summary includes the essential US element requiring onsite international access for adequate verification, the Soviets have indicated this approach to chemical weapons verification is unacceptable. In view of this real and critical difference and of the absence of any compelling reasons for the Soviets to resolve this difference, it will be important for the US Delegation to remain resolute in its negotiating effort. Further, it is essential that the Special Coordination Committee review again, prior to the fall of 1979, the decision to maintain US chemical warfare forces without force improvement and the decision not to seek funds for the binary munitions facility.

5. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you support their views and that you also convey these views to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



JAMES E. DALTON  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 25 2016

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Washington National Records  
Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-80-0016, Box 10, Folder  
091.3 (May-Jul) 1977.

3 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Presidential Directive on Arms Transfer Policy

(9) On further reviewing the draft Presidential Directive on Arms Transfer Policy, it seems to me that it may, in two cases, inadvertently fail to express what I understand to be the decisions made.

(8) First it should be worded so as to make clear that it does not include more restrictive controls than intended on the transfer of newly-developed weapons to NATO and our other allies and friends. In particular, I recommend that NATO countries, Australia and New Zealand, and Japan be excluded from all three controls relating to newly-developed advanced weapons systems. If applied in the past, such controls would have precluded the F-16 arrangements with NATO.

(8) I further suggest that the controls with regard to newly-developed weapons systems include, as do several others, a clause permitting a Presidential waiver.

(9) Further, the language of paragraph 2.b. on page 2 raises some potential problems. Commitments to foreign military governments to sell weapons are often made well ahead of the time these weapons are scheduled to arrive in the US inventory to insure an orderly production schedule and to lower the unit costs of the weapons systems. I am not clear whether the draft language really reflects the intended decisions. If the decision is to delay the transfer of new weapons until they have entered the US inventory, then I suggest the following change:

"Commitment for sale, cooperative research and development, or coproduction of newly-developed advanced weapons systems is prohibited where such a commitment would result in delivery prior to the time the systems are operationally deployed with US forces."

If the decision is to put off any commitment for sale until after the weapon enters the US inventory, then there should be explicit reference to a Presidential waiver, for this will be required in certain cases, such as Iranian AWACs.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED  
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Date: JAN 26 2015

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336-80-0016, box 10, 0913, (May-Jul) 1977

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(U) As a final point, you will recall that last week I offered a wording change (substituting "approval for transfer" or "commitments for transfer" for "transfers") for the first control dealing with dollar volume. I assume this kind of change will be incorporated in the final directive.

*Harold Brown*

cc: Secretary of State

Office of the Secretary of Defense *543.6 552*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *26 Jan 2015* Authority: EO 13526  
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INTERNATIONAL  
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Date:

JAN 26 2015

In reply refer to:  
I-21964/77  
30 APR 1977

2 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Directive on Arms Transfer Policy --  
ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S) After reviewing the draft PD (TAB B) on Arms Transfer Policy, I think we may have inadvertently failed to express clearly the decisions which have been taken, particularly with regard to the transfer of newly developed advanced weapons systems.

(S) If implemented, the policy controls suggested for the transfer of newly developed advanced weapons systems would preclude F-16-type arrangements with NATO or the transfer of such systems to other allies and friends, such as Israel.

(S) In addition, it is not clear what the draft language regarding the "Commitment to sale. . ." of newly developed weapons systems (paragraph 2.b. on page 2) really means. If the decision is to prohibit the transfer of weapons until after they have entered the US inventory, then I propose some new language. If the decision is to prohibit the sale, then I strongly recommend including a reference to a Presidential waiver.

(U) Recommend you sign the memorandum at TAB A. You may wish to also send a copy to Mr. Vance.

*David E. McGiffert*

David E. McGiffert

Attachments  
a/s

HB - This may come too late, but I hope not. Dzm.

Classified by ~~Assistant Secretary of Defense~~  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 85



~~SECRET~~

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-

1316

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D C 20301

21 SEP 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report on Government Procedures Which May Promote  
the Sale of Arms

(S) You asked that I review government procedures which may promote the sale of arms and report the results of my review. This memorandum responds to that request.

(U) As a first step, I asked the heads of the various components of the Defense Department to review and comment on the procedures of this Department. I also asked the heads of other government departments and agencies to review and comment on their procedures. The attached report summarizes the results of those reviews and lists thirteen proposals.

(S) Two proposals affect procedures within the Department of Defense and I am directing their implementation, including the preparation of legislation to give effect to the first:

- (1) - Deposit in the Treasury's Miscellaneous Receipts Account all sums received by Defense Department agencies as reimbursement for nonrecurring research, development and production costs.
- (2) - Exercise tight control over bailment of USG-owned military equipment to US defense contractors for sales promotion purposes.

Classified by Dep Sec Def  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31Dec85

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: JAN 26 2015

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-2-

(8) Seven proposals affect procedures of the Department of Defense and the Department of State, and we will jointly work out arrangements for their implementation:

- (3) - Eliminate USG support for Munitions List items in international air shows, including the bailment of military equipment, granting export licenses for demonstration purposes, and attendance by high-level US military and civilian Defense officials.
- (4) - Require foreign countries — aside from NATO, Australia, Japan and New Zealand — to use diplomatic channels in forwarding requests for purchases of major defense equipment.
- (5) - Require the Departments of State and Defense to review all proposed sales of items on the Munitions List for foreign forces to determine whether the proposed sales should go through government-to-government channels (FMS) or should be direct sales by contractors. (NATO, Australia, Japan and New Zealand would be excepted from this procedure; State and Defense could agree on categories of items also to be excepted.)
- (6) - Speed up the interagency review process of all significant arms requests, acting immediately upon receipt of a significant request — with notification to the President within 30 days.
- (7) - Designate specific points of contact in the Departments of State and Defense to work with industry on arms sales matters.
- (8) - Require prior USG approval before US contractors may engage in any activities designed to promote significant sales of combat equipment.
- (9) - Curtail USG involvement — except for NATO, Australia, Japan and New Zealand — in offset arrangements under which given levels of procurement in a foreign country by the US or its contractors would partially compensate for a foreign government's purchases from the United States.

(9) Four proposals would require action by other Agency Heads or inter-agency resolution:

- (10) - Extend the Defense Department "Standards of Conduct" to govern relations between all USG personnel involved with arms sales and industry.

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Date: JAN 26 2015

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- (11)- Permit the use of USG credit or credit guarantees to finance repairs and other items needed to support existing inventories of the lesser developed countries, in lieu of financing purchases of new major items of armaments.
- (12)- Provide credit only as a substitute for grant aid, but continue to provide such credit at the interest rates currently being charged by the Federal Financing Bank, which are less than the rates charged by commercial banking institutions.
- (13)- Eliminate US arms exports from the program of tax benefits (DISC) designed to encourage overall US exports.

(U) I recommend that the latter four proposals be referred to an inter-agency review, under the auspices of the NSC, for the preparation of appropriate implementing determinations and directives.

(C) Each of the foregoing proposals should serve to inhibit incentives, within Government and on the part of contractors, to press unwarranted foreign military sales. The attached report also notes procedures, such as the inter-agency review process, designed to guard against unwarranted sales. Nonetheless, an underlying problem remains. Foreign military sales are most often driven by genuine foreign policy objectives. This prime incentive will continue unless we can find a substitute in meeting foreign policy objectives now served by foreign military sales. The task will not be easy — given the importance that other countries attach to meeting their military needs — particularly in those cases where the countries do not have their own production capabilities or an acceptable alternate source of supply. Until we do so, however, the reduction in sales is likely to be quite marginal.

*CW Dwyer*

Attachment

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 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date:

JAN 26 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 26 Jan 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
 Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
 MDR: 15 -M- 0541

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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Authority: EO-13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

November 23, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR JAN 26 2015

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Report on Government Procedures Which  
May Promote the Sale of Arms

Your report on government procedures which may promote the sale of arms and formal agency comments which were prepared on it have been reviewed. With reference to your memo at Tab A, you should proceed with the following steps:

1. Implement recommendations 1 and 2.
2. In coordination with the Department of State, implement recommendation 3, modified to read:  
  
"Closely review requests for USG support for Munitions List items in international air shows, supporting only those in the national interest."
3. Coordinate with the Department of State to implement recommendations 4, 7 and 9.
4. Continue to monitor recommendation 8 which has already been implemented by a change in the ITAR.
5. Implement recommendations 10 and 13 through the Arms Export Control Board.

Given the overwhelming negative comments received concerning recommendation 5, it would appear unproductive to continue its discussion. The remaining recommendations (6, 11 and 12) will be forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the Arms Export Control Board for further review and action.

David Aaron

Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

65-m-0540

R1

330-81-0202, box 9, 0913

CC: Members of the

(1-25 9-1978)

D-25303/17

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 27 2015

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 14, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. Arms Transfer Policy

We have recently assessed our experience of the past two years with the arms transfer restraint policy established by PD-13. On the whole, we believe the policy has supported U.S. interests in restraint without denying us the capability to meet our foreign policy requirements and the defense needs of our allies and friends.

There has been considerable criticism of the policy from several quarters. Some allies and friends perceive the policy as being artificially restrictive to the point of denying legitimate access to U.S. military equipment. U.S. industries complain that it disadvantages them in international markets vis-a-vis other exporters. Most significantly, however, members of Congress continue to be skeptical of the policy. Some believe its only achievement has been creative bookkeeping; others feel that arms transfers are no longer being used as an effective instrument of foreign policy. We believe that all these criticisms have been overstated, but we nevertheless expect them to emerge once more as Congressional studies currently under way are completed and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee moves to hearings at the end of the year.

Our own principal conclusions are:

-- The policy has required the creation of a planning system that allows us to look at the flow of U.S. arms transfers over a multi-year period and to establish priorities.

-- The machinery created to implement the policy ensures that the Executive Branch takes a wide range of factors -- political, security, arms control, economic, and human rights -- into account in all major arms transfer cases.

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- 2 -

-- The policy has imposed measurable restraint on US arms transfers.

-- Even though we have sold less than we could have, there has not been a subsequent reduction in the total volume of the world's arms trade.

(U) In the course of this policy reassessment, we have identified the following issues that will require attention in the near future.

#### Qualitative Controls

(S) The qualitative controls of PD-13 have been generally effective. Nevertheless, there are a couple of questions that may require decisions over the coming months.

(S) 1. We are currently considering whether to authorize the development of an intermediate fighter aircraft solely for export. (The F-5E currently fills this role.) If we decide that this is a good idea for policy reasons, we shall then have to decide whether it requires an exception to PD-13.

(S) 2. Several countries are expressing interest in the F-18L, a land-based version of the Navy aircraft modified solely for export. In 1977 an Iranian request for the F-18L was denied because the aircraft was not operationally deployed with US forces. It is necessary that we review our position on this at an early date because of renewed interest in the aircraft.

(S) Another area of concern is co-production. We have chosen to make exceptions to this guideline in a number of instances. This is a basic dilemma for US policy. As our non-NATO friends and allies continue to expand their own production capabilities, the long-term task of arms control becomes more difficult; on the other hand, co-production provides us a measure of control that would be lost if other suppliers sold the concerned equipment. An interagency study, chaired by ACDA, is currently under way to examine the trends in Third-World arms production capability.

(S) A related problem has been the reluctance on the part of some NATO countries to enter into RSI co-production arrangements because of our control over third-party sales outside of NATO. These controls have their foundation

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Date: JAN 27 2015

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in our statutes as well as in the arms policy. We are trying to work out these problems on a case-by-case basis.

#### Quantitative Control (The Ceiling)

(P) The ceiling on sales to non-exempt countries has been the most controversial aspect of PD-13. Its positive features include its visibility as a symbol of the US commitment to arms transfer restraint and the managerial reforms associated with it. While it has not led to the rejection of any specific arms transfer requests, it did achieve its purpose of reducing sales in FY 78 compared to FY 77. In FY 79, because of cancellations by Iran, total sales could drop significantly and come in well under the ceiling. This could lead to pressure to lower the base for calculating the FY 80 ceiling. Such pressure should be resisted because in FY 80 important sales to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia could largely fill the gap left by Iran in FY 79.

(P) In any case, we believe that no further reductions in the ceiling should be made unless there is evidence of progress in our multilateral restraint effort. After four rounds of negotiations with the Soviets we have no tangible evidence of Soviet restraint, and our European allies have made future restraint on their part (they have not shown any in the past) contingent on our ability to get restraint from the Soviets. We will be submitting our formal recommendation to you later this summer in the context of our FY 80 plan.

#### Multilateral Cooperation

(P) PD-13 recognized that achievement of the objective of a worldwide reduction in arms transfers required the cooperation of other suppliers and recipients. We have not yet made concrete progress toward such cooperation although our efforts will continue. Nevertheless, we believe that the qualitative controls in PD-13 support US national interests regardless of such cooperation. The substantive and procedural benefits of the qualitative controls, as distinct from the FY 80 ceiling level noted above, are not vitiated by the lack of multilateral progress. We shall be assessing the results of the multilateral restraint effort and commenting on its implications in a report due to the Congress by December 31, 1979.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 27 2015

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- 4 -

### Conclusions

(S) We believe that PD-13 continues to support our national objectives in arms restraint and that the policy should be maintained with no further reductions under the ceiling. As noted above, our experience suggests that certain aspects of the policy will raise questions of interpretation as circumstances change. We will continue to review PD-13 to ensure that it remains in consonance with our basic foreign policy needs and arms control objectives. We will also continue to tailor carefully rhetoric about the policy and specific policy decisions in order that it reflect realistically the objectives and achievements of PD-13.

(U) The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concur in this memorandum.

*G. Vance*

*Harold Brown*

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 27 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense 54.56.552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 27 Jan 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0545

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0216, Box 10,  
Folder 100.54 (20-30 Jul 1980).

JUL 22 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: FY 82 Security Assistance Program (U)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & DeClass Div, WHS

Date: JAN 27 2015

(P) The increased challenge to our national security has led us to increase significantly the defense budget. We will need to pursue that path further, recognizing that it will intensify budget problems at a time of fiscal stringency. But our military capability, central as it is to our security, represents only part of our national security effort. Another critical element is our security assistance program which in recent years has been diminishing in real terms. I recommend that this too be substantially increased. Specifically, I think we should seriously consider the following, recognizing that until we can examine the budgetary implications we cannot make final judgments.

- Not phasing out MAP, but instead increasing it by \$100M over FY 81 levels.
- FMS Credits
  - Concessionary Credits: Instituting a \$1B program of direct loans at low interest rates.
  - Total FMS Credits: Increasing total FMS credits to approximately \$4B in FY 82 (from \$2.8B in FY 81).
- IMET be effectively doubled over FY 81 levels.

(P) MAP and Concessionary Credits. For some years now, we have been considering whether to phase out MAP. Circumstances have significantly changed since the tentative decision was taken in that direction, and last year the President agreed to keep open the possibility of MAP for some countries. Now, we should consider retaining and increasing MAP, along with the addition of a program of concessionary credits, in the FY 82 budget for a number of countries. As prime examples, neither the Turkish nor the Portuguese economies can support the military modifications so critical to improving their NATO posture with ordinary credits alone. Thus, Turkey in FY 1980 is scheduled to receive \$200M in FMS guaranteed loans but its interest and principal repayments to the U.S. from previous loans are \$125.1M so that the net cash flow to

330-82-0216, box 10, 100.54 (20-30 Jul) 1980

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Turkey on security-related loans is less than \$75M. For countries like Turkey and Portugal and certain economically strapped LDCs, the rejuvenation of MAP or MAP-equivalent programs is the only meaningful way of having a military assistance relationship and thereby contributing to our political objectives. Where the countries in question host U.S. bases of importance to our strategic posture, there is even more reason to make sure we have great flexibility in the military assistance we can offer.

(Q) FMS Credits. The high inflation rates of recent years have not been adequately reflected in our annual security assistance budget. Since 1978, total FMS credits have actually decreased slightly (if one puts aside the unique requirements of Egypt and Israel), while inflation over the same period has been significant. As a result, numerous countries have, with some justification, complained that our support to them has been dropping in real terms at the same time that they face increased security risks. World-wide we face an increasingly aggressive Soviet challenge, and while FMS credits are not the only way to respond, they are an important element of any credible response. We should not shrink from providing the credits necessary to meet the security challenge.

(Q) IMET. The small but vital IMET program has high payoff. We anticipate that pending legislation, which will alter IMET accounting rules, will increase the amount of training we are able to provide by approximately 40-50% with no increase in funding. We should go further and double the program. Every report that I get shows that, for a rather small amount of money, IMET forges solid "people-to-people" relationships of great long-term value to our defense and foreign policy interests. Something on the order of \$48M would be justified in FY 82.

(Q) I have listed some of the countries for which I believe significant increase in assistance is warranted in the attachment to this memorandum. My staff will provide more complete detail to State, NSC, and OMB staffs. We should discuss the matter and, together with economic assistance, raise it with the President.

*Shirley Bunker*

Attachment

cc: Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Director, Office of Management  
and Budget

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 27 Jan 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0546

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 27 2015

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EXAMPLES OF COUNTRIES REQUIRING ADDITIONAL

FY 82 FMS CREDITS

- Portugal. Portugal is critical for our access to Southwest Asia. Yet we have had recent difficulties with the Portuguese on this issue. In substantial part, this difficulty arises from a Portuguese perception that we are not being fully receptive to their needs. A significantly increased security assistance program will be an important element in shaping Portuguese attitudes. The money can and will be well spent. For example, with assistance from its NATO allies, the Portuguese Navy plans to modernize its outdated ASW frigates at a cost of over \$400M. The responsibility for providing assistance in procuring these ships rests primarily with our European allies. In meetings with the NATO ministers, I have indicated that U.S. willingness to make a significant contribution to this effort is contingent upon full participation by the Europeans. Nonetheless, a significant U.S. contribution for the frigates would be very well received by the Portuguese.

- Egypt. Egypt has been critical to our Mid-East strategy and would be equally critical to any Southwest Asia contingency. We have promised to provide \$800M in FMS credits to the Egyptians in FY 82 to support their efforts to modernize their armed forces. This represents an increase of \$250M over the FY 81 level. These credits will be used to purchase systems such as F-16 aircraft and M60A3 tanks to replace rapidly deteriorating and unsupportable Soviet-provided equipment.

- Turkey. The Turkish economy is in a shambles. A significant increase in FMS credits, at concessionary rates, is necessary if the Turkish government is to meet its modest force modernization goals during the 1980's. Without such modernization, the Turkish armed forces will remain unable to carry out their NATO mission on the important Southeastern flank.

- Thailand. In an effort to deter or raise the cost of future Vietnamese aggression, the Thai government is attempting to restructure and strengthen its small, counterinsurgency-oriented armed forces as rapidly as its limited resources will permit. A significant increase in FMS credits for Thailand is essential to help the Thais meet the heavy financial burdens associated with major new military equipment procurement programs.

- Tunisia. In the wake of the Gafsa incident, Tunisia has asked the U.S., France and Saudi Arabia for increased assistance to help with its armed forces modernization program. So long as Qaddafi remains in power in Libya, the threat is real and warrants our increasing FMS credits in FY 82.

~~All paragraphs in this attachment  
are classified CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Date: 22 March 2006  
Chief, Declass Br, Dir. & Rec. WHS

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 27 2015

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

31 OCT 1977  
SEC DEF HAS SEEN

25 OCT 1977

SEC DEF HAS SEEN

10/25  
For discussion  
with the President  
on Oct 31.

CM 1676-77  
25 October 1977

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WNS  
Date: SEP 14 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Military Forces Counter-Terrorism Capability (U)

1. (U) This memorandum provides for your information, and for possible discussions with the President, a report on our current capabilities to cope with terrorist actions using military forces and our plans for the improvement of these capabilities.
2. (S) We currently possess a capability to plan and conduct certain counter-terrorist operations. The designated primary ground force is built around the two Ranger battalions augmented by Special Forces and other specialists. One of the Ranger battalions is constantly on alert status. It must be recognized that the Rangers are not organized solely for counter-terrorist operations. Therefore, non-standard exotic type devices and highly qualified experts necessary for the more sophisticated operations must be provided in time to permit force training prior to employment.
3. (S) The US Air Force Special Operations and Military Airlift Command Units have trained personnel and specialized equipment to support such operations to include all-weather low-level approach and darkened airdrop and airlanding capabilities.
4. (S) Command and control will be provided by a well-trained Joint Task Force Headquarters provided by the Readiness Command. A deployable air mobile communications package (Jackpot) is available but is limited in deployability in that it is capable of installation only in a slow C-130 aircraft at this time. A C-141 capability is necessary.
5. (S) Over the past 15 months, counter-terrorists exercises have been conducted by Readiness Command on the average of every two months covering a variety of terrorist situations to include hi-jackings. These exercises are all no-notice in nature and have included specialist augmentation such as nuclear and demolition experts, translators, interrogation, and medical specialists. At Enclosure is a summary of these exercises.

Classified by CJCS

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS

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25 OCT 77


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6. (S) While these exercises have demonstrated a credible capability, the availability of special items of equipment, specially skilled personnel from other agencies, and time to conduct effective final integrated training of the force remain a matter of concern. To improve further our capability, the Army is developing a specially trained small force (172 personnel) of experienced and mature personnel with a wartime special operations mission and a capability for the prompt and successful execution of those counter-terrorist missions for which no other DOD force is specifically trained or structured to execute. In the near term, the Army will continue to train and exercise augmentation personnel with their Ranger battalions. *5-9 months*

7. (U) As a related matter, Mr. Brezinski has requested a briefing on our current capabilities and future plans. This presentation will be available later this week.

  
GEORGE S. BROWN, General, USAF  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment  
a/s

Office of the Secretary of Defense *SUSC55a*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS *+*  
Date: 14 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0569

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 14 2015

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~~SECRET - CLOSE HOLD~~

COUNTER TERRORISM EXERCISES

DATE	NAME	UNIT	REMOTE MARSHALL- ING BASE (REMAB)	EXERCISE AREA	SCENARIO	SUPPORTING FORCES
Nov 76	CRUSADER	2/75 Ranger Bn (Bn size)	Fairchild AFB	Ft Lewis	Rescue victim/ nuclear	MAC FORSCOM (XVIII Corps)
Dec 76	GOBLIN SENTRY	1/75 Ranger Bn (Bn size)	Ft Bragg		Hijacked acft/ rescue/nuclear	MAC FORSCOM (XVIII Corps)
Apr 77	CELTIC MURPHY	2/75 Ranger Bn (Bn size)	Holloman AFB NM	Ft Bliss	Mission recovery/ rescue	MAC FORSCOM (XVIII Corps-9 Inf) TAC/REDCOM
Jul 77	BLACK LIGHTNING	2/75 Ranger Bn (Co size)	Fairchild AFB	Ft Richardson	Rescue	MAC 9 Inf/TAC/AAC
Sep 77	RAPID RETRIEVER	1/75 Ranger Bn (Co size)	Hunter AAF	Indian Springs, NV	Hijacked airliner	MAC/FORSCOM

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 14 2015

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CIA

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WORKING PAPER  
(Destroy when no longer needed)

*Chase*

J-3 TP-3-78  
11 January 1978  
JAN 12 1978

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, on an item to ~~DEF SEC HAS BEEN~~  
at a meeting of the NSC SCC on 13 January 1978

SUBJECT: Status of US Military Capabilities to Conduct  
Counter-Terrorist Operations (U)

PURPOSE: To provide the Chairman, JCS, with the status of  
US military capabilities to conduct counter-terrorist oper-  
ations for discussion with the NSC SCC.

CONCEPT PLAN

- A JCS concept plan published on 15 March 1977 provides the concept for US military operations to counter terrorist activities overseas.
- CONPLAN was developed by the Joint Staff and covers a wide spectrum of possible terrorist activities.
- CONPLAN provides National Command Authorities with mili- tary options to counter terrorist acts against US citizens and property overseas.
- Unified commands have been tasked to develop supporting plans for conducting counter-terrorist operations.
- JCS has reviewed and approved the plans of USCINCRD, CINCLANT, CINCPAC and USCINCSOUTH, subject to incor- poration of certain directed changes.
- USCINCEUR CONPLAN is in final draft form and will be provided JCS for review on 30 Jan 78.
- Pending JCS approval of EUCOM supporting CONPLAN, USCINCEUR will continue to use the counter-terrorist plan prepared by Support Operations Task Force, Europe. (SOTFE CONPLAN 4305)

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Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 12 Apr 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)  
MDR: 15 -M- 0570

~~Classified by Director, J-3~~  
~~EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION~~  
~~SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652~~  
~~EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON 31 DECEMBER 2008~~

*Jan 75*

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date APR 12 2016

*Mr. Dungan has 8984*

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- There are a number of terrorist acts that might trigger a US military response. Possible military missions range from the rescue of hostages from a hijacked US aircraft to recovery/neutralization/destruction of stolen nuclear weapons. (See TAB A for possible missions.)
- Each terrorist incident involving the US overseas must be analyzed to determine if a military response would be effective.

#### COMMAND AND CONTROL

- Command and control elements exist on national and unified command level, and have been exercised.
  - On the national level, a terrorist action team has been formed within the Joint Staff to monitor terrorist incidents and to implement NCA decisions for deployment of military counter-terrorist forces.
  - Unified commands have established compartmentalized cells within their crisis action system to respond to terrorist activities.
  - A joint task force (JTF) will be formed by the unified command to conduct counter-terrorist operations.
  - Readiness Command has a small joint operations and intelligence staff, devoted to support of the joint task force. This staff may augment counter-terrorist joint task forces under unified commands.
  - During the execution phase of counter-terrorist operations, Commander, Joint Task Force will be under operational command of a unified command or report directly to NCA through JCS.
- Secure communications links have been established and exercised for control of counter-terrorist operations through the World-wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).
- A deployable airmobile communications package is available to provide direct communications from NCA to deployed counter-terrorist force.
- Special intelligence data files and procedures have been established by DIA on airfields, civilian and military aircraft, key overseas installations, maps, and terrorist activities.

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### CAPABILITIES

- CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, USCINCRD, and CINCSO, in coordination with CINCAD, CINCMAC, and CINCSAC, are tasked by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 78 (JSCP) to plan, develop, and maintain a capability to conduct counter-terrorist operations outside the United States.
  - Overseas unified commanders have trained and equipped forces to conduct counter-terrorist operations as a secondary mission. (See TAB B for USCINCEUR C-T forces).
- Time permitting, counter-terrorist operations overseas which exceed the capability of the CINC's forces will be conducted by CONUS forces.
  - Selected US military units maintain advance alert status and can be employed in a counter-terrorist role. (See TAB C for specific forces).
    - The two US Army Ranger battalions provide the commando type muscle for counter-terrorist operations.
    - US Forces with specialized training, such as Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Marine Reconnaissance Teams, may be used.
    - US Air Force Special Operations Forces and Military Airlift Command units have trained personnel and specialized equipment to support counter-terrorist operations, to include all-weather, low-level approach and darkened airdrop and air-landing capabilities. (See TAB D for specialized equipment)
- Depending on the nature of the mission, the size of US military forces may range from a small element to a larger task force.
- Over the past 16 months, counter-terrorist exercises have been conducted by USCINCRD on the average of one every two months. (See TAB E for a list of major exercises.)
  - Units were moved to remote sites to prepare for their mission and to protect the secrecy of their operation.

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- All missions required surprise insertion, rapid execution and extraction prior to compromise in the objective area.
- While our exercises have demonstrated a credible capability, the availability of special items of equipment, specially-skilled personnel from other agencies, and final integrated training of the force remain a matter of concern.
- USCINCEUR designated counter-terrorist force (38 Special Action personnel, Berlin Detachment Alpha Special Forces) has concentrated on developing special skills and techniques for conducting such operations.
- All personnel have completed a special demolitions school [REDACTED]
- 4 individuals have completed 7 days of exchange training on counter-terrorism by UK Special Air Service (SAS).
- Cross training on individual specialist skills has been provided FRG Border Group 9 by the Berlin Detachment.
- Hostage rescue training is regularly conducted by the unit on a US Boeing 707 aircraft. An effort is being made to expand the training to include other US aircraft types, including joint training with FRG Border Group 9.
- 20 personnel have attended a two week course conducted by FRG Border Group 9 on counter-terrorist tactics and techniques. 10 additional personnel will complete the training in January.

#### CURRENT ACTIONS

- For several months, the US military capability to respond to terrorist incidents has been under review. Hijacking of the Lufthansa aircraft highlighted the continuing threat of terrorism throughout the world.
- An American interagency team visited Bonn on 7-8 December 77 and The Hague on 9 December 77 to discuss counter-terrorist operations with FRG and Dutch officials. Valuable lessons were learned from the German operations in Mogadiscio and the Dutch operations against Moluccan terrorists.
- To further improve our counter-terrorist capability, the Army is developing a specially trained, small force (172 personnel) of mature and experienced personnel, dedicated to counter-terrorist operations. (See TAB F for details)

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CIA 3.3(b)(1)

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- Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta (SFOD-DELTA) will offer a high degree of assurance for the prompt and successful execution of those missions for which no other DOD force is specifically trained or structured to execute. ✓
- SFOD-DELTA will have an interim capability on 15 July 78 when two teams of 20 men each complete training. The Army Ranger battalions will provide backup for SFOD-DELTA when a larger force with more muscle is required.

RAWED - Pending SFOD-DELTA becoming operational, a dedicated force of 75 men from the 5th Special Forces Group at Ft Bragg, NC, ~~has been assigned a primary mission~~ <sup>IS BEING</sup> to conduct precision counter-terrorist operations. When SFOD-DELTA becomes fully operational, this unit will resume its normal mission.

APPROVED BY

*[Signature]*

Director, J-3

*[Signature]*

Director, Joint Staff

Prepared by: COL. J. L. COOPER, USMC  
Joint Operations Division, J-3  
Ext 52994/10 Jan 78

*see command below*

ATTACHMENTS

- TAB A - Possible US Military Counter-Terrorist Missions
- TAB B - USCINCEUR Counter-Terrorist Forces
- TAB C - US Military Forces with Counter-Terrorist Capabilities
- TAB D - USAF Specialized Equipment
- TAB E - Major US Counter-Terrorism Exercises
- TAB F - Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta

\* I am, perhaps, not as confident in our ability as one might read into this point paper. Our exercises have demonstrated good ability to move and insert forces - but not yet have we become ~~for~~ proficient at recovering hostages. Recommend we don't give an oversell on our capability - though it is improving all the time.

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V. R.

*[Signature]*



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Washington National Records  
Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-82-0216, Box 29,  
Folder 320.2 (Jun) 1980.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 11 2015

JCSM 166-80  
7 June 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Establishment of a Joint Task Force (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ At the time of the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a concept plan which provided options to the National Command Authorities (NCA) for a military response to terrorist incidents. In addition, the unified commands had supporting plans for response to terrorist incidents in their assigned areas.
2. ~~(S)~~ A special task force was formed for the hostage rescue mission within the context of the existing plan. This task force, consisting of personnel and equipment from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, was responsible for the planning, training, and conduct of the mission.
3. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the organization established for the rescue of the hostages in Iran and have concluded that a permanently established force is necessary to achieve an effective response to future terrorist incidents.
4. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you approve the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) with the following mission:  
  
Conduct military operations to counter terrorist acts directed against US interests, citizens, and/or property when directed by the NCA, either unilaterally or in support of a unified command~~(S)~~.
5. ~~(S)~~ The JTF will be under the direction of the NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanded by an Army general officer. Headquarters for the JTF will be at Fort Bragg, NC. The headquarters will be manned by assigned personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The headquarters will perform joint administrative intelligence, operations, training, logistics, planning, and communications functions for the force.

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~~DECLASSIFY ON: 6 JUNE 1986~~

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6. ~~(S)~~ Pending determination of security aspects, the planning for the establishment of this JTF is being done on a strict need-to-know basis within the Services and the Joint Staff. It is requested that the distribution of information on the JTF be similarly limited within your office.

7. ~~(S)~~ The operating components of the force will consist of specially organized, equipped, and trained forces under the operational control of the Commander, Joint Task Force. Additional forces will be available for assignment to the force if required. Dedicated communications and administrative air transportation support will also be provided for the force.

8. ~~(S)~~ The operational functions of the JTF will be performed by Service components. These components will be:

~~(S)~~ Army. 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta.

~~(S)~~ Navy. SEAL command organized from Navy assets.

~~(S)~~ Air Force. A composite command of fixed and rotary wing aircraft organized from Air Force assets.


9. ~~(S)~~ The JTF established for the hostage rescue mission has been retained. Its mission and worldwide counterterrorism operations will be assumed by the JTF described above when it is operational. MFI  
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10. ~~(S)~~ The impact of the establishment of a JTF on presently authorized appropriations and manpower has not yet been determined. Should fiscal initiatives or billets be required, they will be coordinated with the Services and subsequently submitted to you.

11. ~~(S)~~ The establishment of the proposed JTF is a matter of high priority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 11 2015

  
LEW ALLEN, JR., General, USAF  
Chief of Staff



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR POLICY

6/10

MEMO FOR

*SecDef*

*HB*

As I noted before, the issue is whether the forces assigned and the VTF HQ will be dedicated, or composed primarily of earmarked forces which also have other missions. If the latter, fine. If the former, here's another "special mission" VTF being set up (probably out of our own hide) at the expense of something else.

Therefore, I believe your approval should be either (1) "in principle, subject to specifics on funding and people"; or (2) "as long as the people and units involved are earmarked from existing assets."

*RWK*

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 11 2015

7 JUN 1980

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6/7

Memo For

This should be shown to

C Smith — Looks OK; should have a name. Co 6/9

P. Hamilton ~~POB~~

R. Komer

W. G. Clayton

I plan to approve, based on  
my discussions with Dave Jones,  
after they above have a chance  
to comment.

HB

No comments, — I think this  
is a good idea and should be  
implemented w/ 6/9

DOCUMENT IS JCSM. 166-80

Page determined to be Unclassified

Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS

IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5

Date: DEC 11 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 11 Dec 2015 Authority: EO 13526

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 02 2015

NOV 7 1979

Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 02 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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Dear Mr. Brzezinski:

As you know, the Department of Defense has been concerned for some time with the continuing erosion of high seas freedoms through unilateral claims by coastal states. These claims, if embedded into law and international practice, pose a real threat to the unimpeded movement of U.S. forces on, under and over the oceans of the world. We are hopeful, of course, that the UN Law of the Sea Conference will produce a comprehensive treaty which will serve as a widely accepted legal basis for the protection of essential high seas rights. Even if an acceptable treaty is concluded eventually, however, it probably will be three or four years before it becomes effective. In the meantime, a new body of customary international law claims could become so widespread and forceful as to clearly be incompatible with basic U.S. security interests. Indeed, some countries now take the position that expanded territorial sea claims already have become valid as a matter of customary law. It therefore is now imperative that the U.S. actively assert its position on high seas rights lest they erode by default.

The Navigation and Overflight Policy paper which you approved on 20 March 1979 provides clear guidance on this matter with regard to diplomatic protests and the assertion of rights. Accordingly, and in response to your memoranda of both 20 March and 2 July 1979, DOD has embarked upon a comprehensive plan of action which will bolster our general posture and legal position by dispelling any impression that we have in practice acquiesced in excessive and illegal claims. To the best of my knowledge, however, with the exception of delivery of a long-pending note to France, there have been no diplomatic protests issued since the Navigation and Overflight Policy Paper was approved on 20 March of this year.

336-82-0205, Box 5, 801.2 (May-Dec)

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I am convinced that effective implementation of this important policy will require a more vigorous program of authoritative diplomatic initiatives. Informal consultation with other states typically results in no more than pro-forma consideration of U.S. Law of the Sea concerns and does little to resolve basic problems. Further delay of formal protests, or diplomatic action of equivalent and immediate effectiveness, means that the effect of coordinated DOD action vis-a-vis a given state to strengthen our general posture against these excessive claims will be weakened.


In keeping with the spirit and intent of the Navigation and Overflight Policy Paper and using the criteria outlined in that paper, DOD has compiled a list of coastal states whose claims are illegal and unquestionably excessive and which pose a significant challenge to U.S. security interests. I have attached this list for the earliest possible consideration by the Law of the Sea Contingency Planning Group on Navigation and Overflight in the hope that the claims involved will become the subjects of formal diplomatic protests, or diplomatic action of equivalent and immediate effectiveness, in the near future.

It is recognized, of course, that in a certain few instances there may be compelling reasons for delaying action. For the most part, however, I would envision that this initiative reasonably could be completed with regard to most of the countries listed over a period of the next twelve months. Moreover, consideration could be given to the use of a circular note as appropriate which sets forth maritime claims which the United States recognizes and which reserves our rights and those of our nationals in the premises.

I cannot over-emphasize the importance which DOD places upon timely implementation of our Navigation and Overflight Policy. You have assurance of our full support in this regard.

Sincerely,

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 02 2015

  
W. Graham Clayton, Jr.

Enclosure

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### Territorial Sea Limits Greater than 12 Nautical Miles

Angola - 20 miles	Gabon - 100 miles
Nigeria - 30 miles	Senegal - 150 miles
Togo - 30 miles	Benin - 200 miles
Cameroon - 50 miles	Congo - 200 miles
The Gambia - 50 miles	Ghana - 200 miles
Madagascar - 50 miles	Guinea - 200 miles
Tanzania - 50 miles	Peru - 200 miles
Mauritania - 70 miles	Somalia - 200 miles

### Archipelago Claims

Cape Verde	Philippines
Fiji	Mauritius
Indonesia	Solomon Islands
Sao Tome & Principe	

### Baseline, Historic and Internal Waters Claims

Burma (222 mile line closes Gulf of Martaban)  
Libya (300 mile line closes Gulf of Sidra)  
Guinea (120 mile single baseline)  
Panama (Gulf of Panama claimed as historic bay and  
its waters internal)  
Madagascar (123 mile baseline)  
Argentina/Uruguay (closing line across mouth of Rio  
de la Plata)

### States Requiring Prior Permission or Notification for Warships to Enter their Territorial Seas

Algeria	Indonesia
Bangladesh	Maldives
Barbados	Mauritius
Brazil	Mauritania
Bulgaria	Pakistan
Burma	Somalia
China (PRC)	Soviet Union
Ecuador	Sri Lanka
German Dem. Rep.	Sudan
India	Yemen (Aden)

Attachment

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date SEP 02 2015



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350  
11 November 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: Draft Issue Paper on Naval Forces - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

I am most appreciative of your consideration in affording me the opportunity to review and comment on OMB's issue paper. As you suggested, I am working with Russ on the response, and more detailed comments than contained herein have been passed to him. The attachment is a talking paper on the subject that I think you will find useful.

My initial reaction to the paper was to question its purpose. My impression is that OMB is concerned with the budget at hand, whereas the paper concerns itself more with outyear programming issues, principally those relating to carriers. The FY 79 budget is even now undergoing review, and the Decision Package Sets are being processed in full coordination with OMB. If the paper's purpose is to address carriers in the context of the FY 79 budget, the DPS process would seem to me to be a more appropriate vehicle. It is one thing to trim a budget; it is another to restructure the Navy after exhaustive OSD review. There is, however, little money in the FY 79 budget for carriers. The total consists of \$75M for long lead materials and \$32M for the carrier service life extension program. The issue then is related more to outyear force structure than budget year review.

If the purpose of the issue paper is to affect consideration of the FY 80 budget, I question its timing. The paper correctly notes that the Navy has undertaken two significant efforts, both of which will contribute to the understanding of the carrier issue. One, the Assessment of Sea Based Air Platforms, is being conducted at the request of the Congress, and will array relative costs and effectiveness of a variety of air capable platforms. Contrary to the assertion in the paper, the Navy fully expects to meet the Congressional deadline of 1 February. The other, the Naval Force Planning Study, will incorporate and expand on the

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Date: NOV 17 2015

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results of the Sea Based Air Assessment, and should have preliminary results available in January, not May as stated in the issue paper. Thus, the President will have ample opportunity--and information--to address the carrier issue well in time to affect the FY 80 budget should he choose to do so.

If the purpose of the issue paper is to illuminate the carrier issue, then I have serious reservations as to its thesis and conclusions. The paper's thrust is that certain roles and missions performed by carriers can be assumed by a combination of land-based aircraft and reduced numbers of carriers, at lower costs, and with no attendant diminution in the security of the United States or its allies. I consider that unilaterally and arbitrarily reducing the number of carriers to eight has dangerous political and foreign policy implications. Little need be said concerning the critical reaction that would follow a decision to reduce capability, under the guise of cost savings, when faced with a formidable threat in an increasingly unsettled world. My reservations extend beyond that, however, in that such a decision stemming from the issue paper would be based on an imperfect understanding of the issue. Let me comment on some of the assertions made. (OMB assertions underlined.)

- The carrier is vulnerable. The issue paper assumes that the carrier (and by implication all surface vessels) is becoming relatively more vulnerable to conventional weapons with each passing year. This is a popular theory not supported by facts. Given the sciences and skills upon which naval combat depends, there is no technological determinism which favors the Soviet offense over the U.S. defense. If anything, the opposite is true, particularly since the defense of our carrier task force is, in tactical terms, entirely offensive. In this regard, the presence of a carrier would be critical to the survival of other naval forces operating in its proximity.
- Alternative ship types could substitute for carriers in the presence role. This is a rather cavalier treatment of a sensitive variable. Much of a ship's usefulness in a peacetime presence role depends on the credibility of its combat capability. LHAs, LPHs and the like simply do not compare with the strike potential of the modern carrier. Further,

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there is no consideration given to the disposition of the embarked Marine units and the primary mission for which the ships were designed. The foreign policy implications of having not four but two CVs forward deployed deserves more serious treatment.

- Force sizing criterion. The issue paper is couched in terms of a NATO war of 30 days duration. I am uncomfortable with this criterion as the basis for naval force planning. A ninety day war is the current approved criterion, and while OSD has initiated a Sustainability Study to address this issue, no prudent planner can accept an arbitrary cut off point--he must take a long war into consideration.
- Bases required to support land-based air will be available. The overseas bases necessary to support land-based aircraft are becoming expensive, both economically and politically. Political instability (Portugal, Spain) or conflicting national interests (Iceland) may cause the U.S. to lose a degree of control over the size and employment of forces based in foreign countries. Excessive reliance on aircraft based on foreign soil should be avoided when possible.
- Land air bases are militarily defensible. Long range aviation, cruise missiles and precision guided munitions all combine to make fixed bases increasingly vulnerable to attack. Accordingly, the continued effectiveness of land-based aircraft depends on an uncertain ability to defend their bases successfully from a sophisticated threat.
- Land-based air alternatives will provide cost savings over carrier air. The substitution of significant numbers of new design, land-based aircraft for carriers will be a costly and time consuming initiative. No cost data whatsoever are offered to indicate that such a program would provide savings.
- Soviets will allow a permissive air environment for employment of U.S. land-based air. Long range, land-based aircraft of the sort required to perform sea control are inherently vulnerable to attack by missiles and fighters. Thus, the survival of U.S. land-based air in an expanded sea control role is contingent upon the questionable availability of a permissive environment within which to operate.

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With these considerations as prologue, suppose we did only protect a SLOC in Europe by reducing carrier levels and basing more aircraft in Iceland? When the war concluded, however that might happen, the Soviet fleet might be relatively intact. Would that be a satisfactory conclusion? Despite the paper's assertions about surface ship vulnerability, the Soviets have good reason to be concerned about the offensive capabilities of our carrier strike groups and SSBNs. The loss of their navy, and perhaps more, is a price they might very well have to pay for aggression in Europe. The paper also acknowledges that with one third fewer carriers the sea lines to Japan would be severed. Where does that leave Japan, our foremost Asian ally with the world's third largest GNP, at war's end? Let me put forward one very interesting perspective not even a part of the paper's framework. Our intelligence community is in basic agreement that the Soviets will pursue in the future a more global and opportunistic foreign policy. Outside the Eurasian land mass--most of the world--where U.S. and Soviet interests conflict, our naval forces will be deployed in future crises. The Soviets are building towards 8-12 VSTOL carriers. The Navy is investigating region by region future U.S./Soviet surge deployments in a crisis to analyze which side would have clear force superiority. They are doing this under two parameters--superiority at sea, and superiority if land-based air is employed by both sides. The latter variant is considered as an escalatory step, since both sides would prefer not to have to involve use of their homelands or an ally's permission in order to gain superiority. We wish to determine if there are scenarios in which the President would be foreclosed from preferred options or forced to escalate due to a lack of confidence in U.S. military capabilities. Such crises are not beyond the pale, as the Sixth Fleet Commander's experience in the Mid East War of 1973 attests.

Our preliminary analyses indicate that, depending upon the severity of the Soviet naval buildup and the proximity and numbers of Soviet naval air (especially the Backfire), three and perhaps four carrier task forces would have to be surged to assure us of regional superiority. The issue paper acknowledges that such crises, especially in the Mid East, are possible and that we might use land-based air in Israel or Iran; or that, with only a few carriers available to surge from an eight carrier base, we might have to admit such operations are "risky." Well, given the

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overall volatility of the international environment over the next quarter century, the pressures OPEC might exert over our allies in a crisis, and the threat the Soviets would pose to the nation from which our land-based air was to fly, I do not believe we can assume away the issue of Soviet/U.S. naval interaction as a lesser included case of NATO SLOC protection. In terms of the types of forces most useful and the nature of their employment, SLOC protection and crisis management are not generically the same.

But to get back to some specifics outside the context of the carrier issue, I am uncertain as to the impetus for inclusion in the issue paper of the CGN 42, the cable layer, and two destroyer tenders. Even though the last three are non combatants which the paper purports to address, their deletion from the FY 79 budget is proposed in an offhand manner with little by way of supporting rationale. Again, I would expect an issue of this sort to be treated as part of the budget process, such as with the current Program Decision Sets.

In summary, three questions were asked in the forwarding memo. In reply:

- The analysis is neither accurate nor adequate.
- The options are not appropriate, and
- The President should be afforded the opportunity to review the findings of the Naval Force Planning Study.

While acknowledging that the carrier force structure is a policy issue that should be discussed with the President, I recommend doing so in February or March, at which time the results of our analysis will be available.

*Graham Claytor*

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.  
Secretary of the Navy

Attachment

50 USC § 552  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 17 Nov 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-80-0017, Folder 1110.01 (14-21 Dec) 1977.

December 2, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The U.S. Defense Budget

The attached set of charts (in constant FY 79 dollars) is worth your consideration in approaching the FY 1979 U.S. Defense budget. It shows the following:

- The Congress has (Fig. 1) cut substantially the Defense budgets submitted by the President every year for the past ten years. The enacted budget is what our Allies and adversaries look at as the financial index and, for many observers, the index of our military posture.
- Under any projection shown (Fig. 2), your budget would meet or better the criterion of being lower (in 1979 dollars) by \$5 to \$7 billion than the FY 79 Defense budget figure submitted by former President Ford with his FY 78 budget.
- A FY 79 budget recommendation at the lowest figure proposed would be less than your FY 78 amended budget request, with obvious SALT, NATO, and domestic political consequences.
- In this connection, the historical comparison of defense-related outlays with those of the U.S.S.R. is instructive. I mentioned it to you late last month, and it is shown in Fig. 3. Outlays both lag in time and smooth out the changes in budget TOAs. A comparison of investment outlays (procurement, RDT and E, construction) is even more unfavorable to us. The numbers are not exactly comparable with those of Fig. 1, but it is the trends that are important.

We have emphasized in the formulation of the FY 79 U.S. Defense budget the strengthening of the forces immediately assigned to NATO, and I believe the composition of the budget I will propose reflects this emphasis. However, an attempt to segregate costs for this purpose would be of very limited meaning. In the event of conflict, all available forces -- including our strategic forces and even our Pacific fleet --

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Date: SEP 14 2015

would be utilized to achieve NATO objectives. In dealing with our NATO Allies, any attempt to focus on only some fraction of the U.S. Defense budget as meeting our commitment "to raise the level of defense spending by approximately three percent per year in real terms along with our Allies" (PD-18) would, in my judgment, negate our efforts to put them on that road.

*Harold Brown*

Attachments

*P.S. I am continuing to examine the budget on a ZBB, item-by-item basis. The above considerations should appropriately be applied when we consider the defense budget as a whole.*

*HB*

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Reviewed Chief, RDB, WNS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 2.5  
Date: SEP 14 2015



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 Reviewed On: 07/02/2015  
 EAW EO 13526, Section 1.5  
 Date: SEP 14 2015




FIGURE 1

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Reviewed Chief RDD, WMS  
JAW EO 13526, SECTION 3.1  
Date: SEP 14 2015





FIGURE 2

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 Date: SEP 14 2015







THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

Washington National Records  
Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-81-0202, Box 48,  
Folder 560.1 (17 Feb) 1978.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 16 2015

17 FEB 1978

The Honorable Warren G. Magnuson  
Chairman, Appropriations Committee  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Office of the Secretary of Defense 508552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 16 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 1605

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The 1978 Defense Authorization Act directed me to undertake the conduct of comprehensive evaluation studies of the costs and combat effectiveness of Sea-based Aircraft Platforms for both the short and long term needs of the Navy. Specifically, the studies of at least four sea-based air platforms, the CVN, CVV, VSS and the air capable DD 963(H), were to be sufficiently advanced to provide Congress information necessary to the authorization of any one of the ships in fiscal year 1979. These studies have been completed, and I am pleased to forward our report to you. Identical reports have been sent to the Chairman of the other Defense Committees. An executive summary is contained in the section immediately following this letter. Formal transmittal of the reports will be made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

I believe you will find the report responsive. Every effort was made to provide the best possible cost estimate of each of the platforms deemed technically feasible by our Navy design teams. All of the designs will be sufficiently advanced by the time you complete your budget deliberations this summer so that any one of the platforms could be authorized, though not necessarily contracted for, in fiscal year 1979.

The combat effectiveness studies examined one or more of each platform type in specific combat scenarios designed to test a range of capabilities of each platform and its embarked aircraft. Although your tasking did not specifically mention aircraft, I believe the evaluation of the ship and airwing as a weapon system was implicit in your directive. As an example of the insight gained by this approach, the costing revealed that in a typical force mix, aircraft life cycle costs exceeded those of ship platforms by a two-to-one ratio.

Limitations

The study is not presented as providing the definitive answers to all questions as to which sea-based air platform is "best." It deals conceptually with ships and aircraft in a setting more than 15 years in the future. Uncertainties exist, and the number of variables is myriad. Given these limitations, I consider that the study provides a sound basis for the selection of additional sea-based air platforms for the immediate future.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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330-81-0202, box 48, 560.1 17 Feb 1978

15-m-1605 R-1



It should be recognized that cost and performance estimates associated with CVNs and CVVs are of considerably higher confidence than are those for future VSTOL platforms, such as VSSs or air capable DD 963(H)s. Additionally, the cost and performance estimates of future ships are considered to be far more accurate than the estimates for future aircraft. This is so because the ship designs are firmer and the technologies involved are better in hand.

As is typical of studies of this scope, a great many assumptions were required, some primarily to limit the total effort to reasonably manageable proportions. For example, the equal-cost forces that were compared for effectiveness were single-platform forces (i.e., all CVN, CVV, or VSS) rather than mixed forces such as CVN/CVV/DDV or CVN/CVV/VSS. In actuality, any future direction in aviation ship design other than indefinitely continuing construction of large deck CVs or CVNs alone (together with conventional takeoff and landing aircraft) implies a mix of platform aircraft types for a quarter century or more. The comparison of single platform types in various scenarios was made for two reasons: first, to make the problem tractable in the time allowed, and second, to isolate and highlight the capabilities of each ship design in a variety of applications. We believe that information now available is sufficient to form a basis for decisions concerning aviation ships in the immediate future. Further, we will have ample opportunity to examine and refine interim force mixes and ultimate force compositions during the extended period of transition.

Additional assumptions were applied to achieve a perspective on the relative worldwide utility of the alternative types of platforms and aircraft, the equal-cost forces were distributed to theaters of operation around the world, and the alternative forces in each theater were engaged by a defined common threat to assess their effectiveness. Thus, although we can thereby gain some insight as to the advantages of strategic dispersion, this issue was not treated in any rigorous quantitative fashion in this study. Within each theater, however, the advantages and disadvantages of tactical dispersion were taken into account. Also, there was simply not time to analyze all the cases possible, including more types of engagements in each theater. Thus air defense capabilities, and limitation, were assessed in one scenario, while vulnerability to torpedo attack was the focus in another. On the whole, I think this was a reasonable approach, but consequently it is important to avoid becoming diverted by such questions as "why that force and that threat at that place used in that way?" or the fundamental lessons can be lost. In reviewing the study I found it helpful to isolate strategic dispersion considerations and to review the combat effectiveness arguments independent of geography.

Finally, the study looked only at non-nuclear conflicts. Tactical nuclear warfare at sea poses a complex analytical task; this question is now being assessed in other studies. The advantages of dispersed aviation platforms (and of submarine forces) may well be significant in such a case.

While no study can answer all the questions about the relative potential contributions of the different ship designs, this study does, in my view, provide a variety of useful insights and a wealth of quantitative data on those features that are quantifiable. The study also has examined a number of candidate platforms that have been proposed from time to time and rejected those that proved unpromising.

## Discussion

### CVN

The CVN possesses, ship for ship, both the greatest unit capability and survivability of the ship types examined. This study thus confirms many previous findings in that regard. Further, a variety of CVN designs, from present configuration through one with maximum passive (structural) protection, were examined. The increased protection was found to offer a high payoff in survivability against all threats relative to its additional cost. Another interesting point is that the CVN makes quite an effective VSTOL platform when its inherent survivability is combined with VSTOL freedom from cyclic operations and the ability of VSTOL aircraft to operate from slowed or damaged platforms. The predictable shortcomings of the CVN were its high unit cost and correspondingly smaller numbers, which constrain both strategic and tactical dispersion.

### CVV

The CVV, although below the CVN in both unit capability and survivability, offers a variety of offsetting advantages. It is, by any account, a highly capable weapon system and, at a ratio of 3CVVs to 2CVNs, it significantly enhances simultaneous deployment options and strategic dispersion. It is specifically sized for operation of both conventional and vertical takeoff aircraft, so that, however the CTOL/VSTOL transition develops, continued high CVV utility is assured. The CVV, in our cost-effectiveness analyses, did not surpass but was generally comparable to the CVN, and it must be considered as an attractive alternative because of its overall sea control and projection contribution and its ability to support both the near term CTOL force and a long term VSTOL force. It should be understood, of course, that more CVVs will be needed than CVNs for equal capability.

### VSS

The VSS represents the end of the spectrum opposite the CVN in most respects. It is less capable and survivable on a ship-for-ship basis, but is much more affordable at 3.5 to 1 ratio, and lends itself well to a much greater degree of strategic and tactical dispersion. The long-term value of the VSS, of course, rests on the successful development of at least some mission-capable VSTOL aircraft. Given such success in VSTOL, the VSS would provide unique flexibility to the development and employment of sea-based aviation. I found it most interesting and revealing that the VSS fared exceptionally well in the projection role, as well as in war at sea.

As in the case of the CVN, a modified VSS design was developed during the course of the study with significantly more passive protection than the baseline configuration. Again, as in the improved CVN design, the increased protection proved highly effective for the additional cost.

#### Surface Combatants

Surface combatants, such as SPRUANCE class destroyer derivatives with VSTOL capability, are not fully comparable with major aviation ships, and therefore are not compared to them in all roles. They were highly effective, however, in selected sea control scenarios and demonstrated well the large benefit from improved air capability in the surface combatant force. Advantages were shown both for occasional tactical dispersal of aircraft from major aviation ships and for increased use of aircraft in executing the surface combatants' primary missions.

#### Conclusions

I believe that the findings of the capable people who worked so hard on this set of studies are the best conclusion I can offer you. For your convenience I am attaching to this letter portions of classified executive summaries of the three parts of the assessment.


You will see that there is no single or dominant answer to the question of how best to utilize aviation at sea in the future. This outcome was not completely unexpected. The sea-based aviation forces which we are comparing will support a large number of missions against a large number of threats, none of which are predictable with confidence, into the 21st century. There is no single key or driving consideration to this highly demanding set of tasks, whether nuclear power, VSTOL, or any other. Had there been such an accessible answer to the sea-based air question, the impetus for this study would have been considerably reduced. But we must not give up in our efforts to plan for such a distant future merely because it is hard to do. We should avoid making the easy assumption that our children and grandchildren will be called upon in the 21st century to re-fight the wars of the recent past, such as the WWII battle of the Atlantic, Vietnam, or any other.

We are all faced with the difficult job of deciding today what platforms and aircraft to design and build for this dimly perceived future, and I feel that you deserve my best personal assessment in making that decision. I believe that the keynote must be flexibility and ability to adapt to uncertainty. This is the source of my own interest in VSTOL aircraft and my predilection for a more numerous force of smaller carriers than we will be able to have if we decide now to remain perpetually with large-deck carriers and CTOL aircraft. This study provides a beginning in assessing the costs and benefits of such flexibility. If we are able to effect a gradual transition to VSTOL there will be a very lengthy period during which mixed CTOL and VSTOL aircraft will operate, with both large

and small ships to carry them. This mixed force may well have many strengths. We should thus not neglect to build other needed CTOL-capable carriers merely because of the promise of VSTOL and more numerous smaller ships in the future.

I realize that the question of whether any additional such carrier should be a CVN or a CVV is one of great importance, but in my view it is of less importance than getting some kind of CTOL-capable carrier built in the reasonably near term. This debate -- CVN or CVV -- has, with minor variations, been going on for twenty years or so. Our study found, with certain variations and updated data, what most previous ones have found: ship for ship, the CVN is the more survivable and effective platform, but it is also the more expensive, by a ratio of about 3 to 2. The two ships are relatively comparable in equal-cost mixes. Given the budgetary constraints we will continue to face and our need for more rather than fewer ships, my own preference continues to be for the CVV.

Respectfully,



W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WMS  
Date: SEP 16 2015





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 05 2015

August 16, 1978

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Defense Authorization Bill

Office of the Secretary of Defense **5 U.S.C. § 552**  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +  
Date: 05 OCT 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 1607

I have given further thought to the question whether the defense authorization bill should be signed or vetoed. In terms of its effect on our defense posture, directly and through the reductions it forces in funds for procurement, readiness, sustainability, and research and development, the bill has a debilitating effect on our defense posture as compared with the budget that you submitted for Fiscal Year 1979.

In particular, addition of a nuclear carrier in the bill has two very serious effects. First, it caused the Appropriations Committees, in order to stay within the Congressionally approved budget limits for defense, to displace a number of more important and urgent needs mentioned above. Second, it continues the trend toward larger and more expensive ships -- which inevitably means fewer ships -- in the Navy; this is true both of the CVN itself and of the (nuclear) escorts for it that the Congress will presumably feel impelled to insert into future budgets. Thus, on substance, a veto is in order.

If we are to sustain the coherence of the defense program in support of the Administration's priorities and the defense needs of our country, the Congress must be encouraged to produce a better final outcome than now looms in its defense authorization and appropriation. A veto offers some chance of that, depending on how well we are able to articulate our objections. It does not offer a certainty, and there is a real possibility that the result will be worse. There is also the likelihood of inflaming our relations with the Congress; one must set against this the need to restrain the Congress from even more erosion of defense needs to meet their own more immediate political pressures. There is also the question of how confident we are that a veto can be sustained. Major adverse consequences to our ability to manage the defense program will follow if a veto is overridden.

330-81-0202, box 15, folder 110.01 (1-16 Aug) 1978

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✓ Signer +2 for subma  
✓ file (3)

15-m-1607

R-1

A serious concern is that a veto could be seen as an Administration move toward a weaker defense posture. Our public statements, and particularly your veto message, would be a key in countering such a misapprehension. I believe that we probably can show that a veto is not intended to weaken defense, by including in the veto message a number of points, including all of the following:

a. concentrating on the nuclear carrier, about whose wastefulness we have laid a substantial predicate over a period of six months;

b. making it clear that we urgently want to restore the more important items that were deleted in the Congressional authorization and appropriation process to make room for the CVN within the budget;

c. including in our proposed restoral Navy ships -- some deleted by the Congress and some that we had anticipated funding in future years -- to show that we can indeed get more ships if we avoid spending too much on a few ships.

d. making it clear that we want the Congress to appropriate funds in the full amount of \$126 billion, which was your budget proposal.

We would all, of course, work hard to persuade the Congress to return to the \$126 billion level through the bill which would replace one vetoed. But if the Congress did not, a supplemental request would be essential, and the intention of seeking one in the event the \$126 billion level is not reached in the basic bill would be a necessary part of a veto strategy. It is also important that this not be the only authorization or appropriation bill vetoed.

A clear Congressional, media and public understanding of our reasons for a veto would be absolutely essential. The public and the Congress would need to understand that you are firmly committed to a \$126 billion level for defense for FY 79. The nature of the veto message is an essential element in establishing such a position. I believe that with the message whose text is attached, a veto would be appropriate.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 05 2015



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

August 31, 1978

Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.  
Speaker of the House  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I have received questions from several Members of Congress concerning the President's veto of the Defense Authorization Bill, and the effect of the veto on other legislation now pending before the Congress. The attached information sheet provides brief answers to some of the most frequent queries.

There are, in my judgment, four essential points:

- The President vetoed the Defense Authorization Bill because it was causing the elimination during the on-going appropriation process of \$2 billion of high priority defense items in order to provide for a \$2 billion nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
- The President plans to request a conventionally-powered aircraft carrier for Fiscal Year 1980. That ship is estimated to cost \$1 billion less than the nuclear-powered carrier authorized in the Defense Authorization Bill.
- The President does not seek any deletions in the remainder of the Defense Authorization Bill passed by the Congress. All he is requesting is deletion of the authorization for the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and restoration of the higher priority procurement, readiness and research and development defense programs which its inclusion in the Defense budget would eliminate.
- We must stop the trend of the past ten years toward a Navy of fewer and fewer, more-and-more-expensive ships. To allocate defense dollars to build the most costly ship in history is not the way toward the future Navy our country needs.

Next week the House will consider the President's veto. I firmly believe a vote to sustain the veto will help preserve a balanced defense program that will significantly improve our defense posture in Fiscal Year 1979.

Sincerely,

Attachment

Harold Brown

○  
Information on  
Veto of the Defense Appropriation Authorization Bill

1. Why did the President not wait, sign the Authorization Bill, and later veto the Defense Appropriation Bill instead?

The Congress had not completed action on an appropriation bill. The appropriation bill had passed the House, but was not expected to receive final Senate action and completion of a conference for several weeks. The authorization bill was the only bill before the President. It contained a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier that the President has often and consistently said is unneeded and an inappropriate expenditure of defense funds.

The inclusion of the carrier displaced \$457 million in needed programs in the authorization bill alone--programs that could not have been restored if the President had failed to veto the authorization bill. In addition, it was clearly displacing another \$1.6 billion in programs in the defense appropriation bill that passed the House and was under consideration by the Senate Appropriations Committee. The President had to act on the authorization bill to preserve a well-balanced defense program. By doing so he also gave the Congress the maximum time available to pass an authorization bill deleting the carrier and making possible restoration of more urgently needed Defense programs.

If one works with a Defense budget fixed at a total of approximately \$126 billion--approximately the level set by the Congressional budget committees--it is clear that a \$2 billion increase for one item as was contained in the Defense authorization bill inevitably forces a \$2 billion decrease in others (some of which require authorization and some of which do not).

The President's veto of the authorization bill gives the Congress the opportunity to reconsider the effect of its defense allocations before it finishes work on the Defense appropriation bill, and it gives the Congress the opportunity to do what the President urged in his veto message: to take out the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and restore to the defense program higher priority readiness, procurement and research and development funds.

2. Is the President's veto based only upon objection to the inclusion of the nuclear carrier in the Defense Authorization Bill?

Yes. His position is that the carrier should not be funded and that the higher priority defense programs the carrier replaced should be restored. Although he does not agree with all the other changes, the President does not seek by the veto to revise or call into question at this time the rest of the authorization bill, including other changes made in the programs he requested.



3. Does the President support continuation of a twelve-active-carrier Navy?

Yes. Inclusion of a conventionally-powered aircraft carrier in the FY 1980 budget, as scheduled in the Navy shipbuilding program, will provide for a twelve-active-carrier force through the end of the century.

4. What are the estimated costs for the nuclear and the conventional carriers?

In FY 1979 dollars, it is estimated that a nuclear-powered carrier (CVN) would cost \$2,453,000,000 and that a conventionally-powered carrier (CVV) would cost \$1,480,000,000--a difference of \$973 million. In FY 1980 dollars, the nuclear carrier is estimated to cost \$2,611,000,000, while the conventional carrier is estimated to cost \$1,575,000,000--a difference of \$1,036,000,000. The difference, in other words, is about \$1 billion.

5. How do you respond to claims that the conventionally-powered carrier proposed by the President for FY 1980 will cost about the same as a nuclear carrier?

Such claims are inaccurate. The conventionally-powered carrier will cost \$1 billion less to build. Moreover, besides costing about \$1 billion more to build than a conventional carrier, the nuclear-powered carrier also costs more to operate over its life cycle.

Construction Costs. H.R. 10929 authorized \$1.93 billion for construction of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, a figure which is \$450 million in excess of the estimated cost of \$1.48 billion for a conventionally-powered design. In addition, \$268 million of FY 1977 procurement funds already obligated for nuclear-carrier parts would have to be used. Those FY 1977 funds are not a sunk cost that can properly be credited and used to reduce the price advantage of the conventional carrier. The parts built with those funds will be needed for existing nuclear carriers, and should be replaced if used for building a fifth nuclear-powered carrier. The Chief of Naval Operations testified that it would be prudent to maintain this level of key spare nuclear components for the existing Nimitz-class carriers. The Administration's earlier rescission request stated that this \$268 million would purchase spares for the Nimitz-class carriers.

The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier contained in H.R. 10929 also does not have the added protection features which the Navy's Sea-Based Air Platform Study showed are needed in order to provide the nuclear-powered carrier with vulnerability-reducing features roughly equivalent to those in the conventionally-powered design. These added protection features would add another approximately \$200 million to the funds needed for the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier above the \$1.9 billion authorized in H.R. 10929.

The above two adjustments alone, when added to the \$450 million differential and consistently priced in FY 1980 dollars, account for a total direct difference in procurement costs of about \$1 billion.

Fuel and Other Operating Costs. It has been suggested that a 13-year fuel supply should be added to the price of a conventional carrier since the useful life of the nuclear core of a nuclear-powered carrier is thirteen years. It has been further suggested that a 13-year supply of fuel for a conventional carrier (in FY 79 dollars) would be \$355 million. Neither suggestion is sound.

It is correct that the oil equivalent of a 13-year core fuel supply for the nuclear-powered carrier is 11 million barrels of oil--which at today's prices would cost about \$360 million to buy, store, and deliver to a conventionally-powered carrier. That, however, is enough oil to run a conventionally-powered CVV carrier for nearly 30 years at peacetime operating rates. To run the conventionally-powered carrier for 13 years at peacetime rates would cost \$150 million or less.

Moreover, fuel costs are but one element in a ship's operating costs. In spite of the cost of fuel oil, the initial cost difference between the nuclear-powered and conventionally-powered CVV carrier grows with time. The Navy's Sea-Based Air Platform Assessment estimated that, using conventional aircraft, the 30-year cost difference between the former and the latter is about \$6 billion (including air wing and underway replenishment group factor). If only the cost of the ship, its direct operations and underway replenishment costs for 30 years are considered, the difference in cost would be \$1.4 billion, according to the Navy study.

6. Isn't a nuclear-powered carrier more capable than a conventionally-powered aircraft carrier?

A nuclear carrier has some operational advantages over a conventional carrier in some situations. The issue is whether these advantages are worth the great added costs.

As part of the planned twelve-active-carrier force, the Navy already has three operating nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and a fourth is under construction. The Navy has enough nuclear-powered carriers to meet the narrow range of military situations in which they have an advantage--situations calling for traveling a very long distance in a very short time to fight for a short period. After such an engagement, the nuclear-powered carrier must be resupplied with aircraft fuel and--even more critically--with ammunition, just as a conventionally-powered carrier must. There is no reason to spend \$1 billion extra in construction costs alone (the cost difference between a nuclear and conventional carrier) to duplicate a capability that we already possess in sufficient quantity--particularly when, as noted above, the likely life-cycle costs of equipping and operating that nuclear carrier can be expected to exceed conventional carrier costs by billions more.

7. If we need another carrier, why delay its authorization until FY 1980?

There are more pressing short-term defense needs in the areas of readiness, procurement, and research and development demanding attention in the FY 1979 budget. In any event, even if a new conventional carrier were funded in FY 1979, it would not be completed earlier than if funded in

FY 1980. Thus, to fund a carrier in FY 1980 will not result in a delay in its entering the force. In fact, a conventionally-powered carrier funded in FY 1980 would be delivered to the fleet sooner than a nuclear-powered carrier authorized in FY 1979.

8. Is the rest of the naval ship construction program in the defense authorization bill affected by the veto?

No. As noted earlier, the only ship construction item--indeed, the only Defense program--to which the veto was directed was the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

9. Have reductions occurred in Air Force procurement programs for weapons and equipment as a result of adding the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to H.R. 10929?

Yes. The House Appropriations Committee has recommended a reduction of \$221 million in Air Force procurement programs other than aircraft and missiles. Those are programs not requiring specific authorization, but which were reduced in the appropriations process to make room for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier within the Defense budget ceiling.

10. What reductions has the addition of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier caused in Army procurement of weapons and equipment?

The addition of a nuclear carrier within the DoD budget total of \$126.0 billion has caused drastic reductions to the programs for procurement of Army weapons and equipment, including:

- Loss of 28 needed helicopters
- Deletion of 360 armored personnel carriers
- Reduction of 70 M60 main battle tanks
- Reduction of 80 U.S. ROLAND missiles
- Reduction of \$230 million in ammunition stocks
- Reduction of \$142 million of Army tactical vehicles, engineering, electronic and medical support equipment

Loss of these items will seriously degrade the Army's combat readiness and weaken NATO preparedness.

11. How does H.R. 10929 affect research and development funds?

The President requested a \$12.5 billion budget for research and development. The Authorization Bill passed by Congress included \$12.3 billion for research and development, a net reduction of \$200 million. It eliminated \$611 million of research and development programs requested by the President.

The action taken <sup>C</sup>is the Senate Appropriations subcommittee indicates that it has reduced research and development funds to \$12.0 billion by further deletions of more than \$300 million.

Therefore, unless corrective action is taken by the House and Senate during the remaining review of the defense budget, there is a strong probability that research and development will be funded at about \$12 billion--a decline in real program value when compared to FY 1978, and far from the three percent increase which the President requested.

12. Could approximately \$1 billion of funds for the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier be provided from funds programmed for the delayed Trident submarine program?

No. All funds which might be available from the Trident delay--\$912 million--were more than used up by other changes which H.R. 10929 added to the President's budget request. H.R. 10929 added a total of approximately \$1.4 billion to the President's defense budget request for items in addition to the \$2 billion inserted for the nuclear carrier--items such as additional aircraft.

Those additions are not challenged by the veto, but their cost more than exceeded the amount of funds requested for the Trident in fiscal year 1979.

13. Could approximately \$600 million in pay "savings" be used to absorb part of the cost of the nuclear carrier?

No. The \$600 million estimate of civilian and military pay raise savings results from holding pay increases to 5.5 percent and then absorbing in unspecified program reductions a portion of the total amount required. The congressional budget committees have already used this as a basis to reduce the budget target for national defense within the congressional budget resolution. This action by the Congress removed that amount from the total defense budget. There are no "savings" to apply to the nuclear-powered carrier or any other program.

14. Are \$500 million of the cuts caused by H.R. 10929 in other defense programs offset by allocation of part of the Defense budget to a currency reevaluation fund?

No. The Appropriation Bill would designate \$500 million of the Defense budget for a currency reevaluation fund. That fund, if established, would deal only with fluctuations in the exchange rate of the dollar relative to foreign currencies. It does not make one penny more of funds available for defense programs, and does not in any way offset the \$500 million or more of very real readiness cuts to which the President referred.



15. Does the President support the substitution of a conventionally-powered carrier for the nuclear-powered carrier in the FY 1979 budget?

No. At one point during the consideration of H.R. 10929 in committee the Administration expressed the preference that if a carrier were to be added by the Congress in FY 1979, that carrier should be of the conventionally-powered rather than the nuclear-powered design, because of the \$1 billion cost differential. That was at a time early in the congressional budget process and before it had become apparent what other defense programs would be cut, through the interrelated authorization and appropriation process, to make room within the Defense budget ceiling for a carrier. Now, several months later, it is clear that the programs which would be cut are of higher priority than the funding of a conventionally-powered carrier in FY 1979. That conventionally-powered carrier was and is in the Navy shipbuilding program for FY 1980. To fund it in FY 1980, as previously noted, will not delay its delivery to the fleet. But to cut or eliminate other Defense programs in order to fund it in FY 1979 would cause more time-critical Defense needs to go unmet.

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Washington National Records Center,  
SecDef Files; Acc 330-81-0202,  
Box 57, Folder Israeli 233.3, 1978.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 06 2017

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

27 OCT 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Preliminary Cost Estimates for Replicating Israeli Military Installations in the Sinai

Set out below are our preliminary estimates for replicating Israel's military installations in the Sinai. Considerably higher costs have been mentioned both within DOD and by the Israelis, but these have, I believe, been based on assumptions going beyond replication; we have been careful to make clear both in the Pentagon and to the Israelis that no commitment has been made except with respect to the airbases and then only on a replication basis at most.

	(\$ million)
Etam and Etzion airbases	\$1,220
Ground force installations	120
Naval facility at Sharm-el-Sheikh	95
	<u>\$1,435</u>

In addition, the Israelis will probably want and need a military road, with laterals to bases, paralleling the Negev-Sinai border. Our estimate for this is \$345 million, based on 400 km of road which Israel says it needs - a requirement which may well be overstated. Some portion of these funds would need to be expended as a precursor to construction of the facilities.

The estimates assume replication of current operational capability and support facilities, as best as these can be determined from aerial photography and other data sources. The estimate for the ground force installations could be lower if based on the tentative Israeli plan to transfer one of the two Sinai regular divisions to the reserves; it also could be reduced by taking advantage of the fact that many of the structures are relocatable. The other Sinai airbases, all small, are not costed since no aircraft are permanently deployed there and the bases probably will not be replicated; costs for any possible replication of the

Israel 233.3

27 Oct 78

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J-1 early warning station have not been estimated. Costs of providing water and power are included but are especially uncertain.

The estimates take into account geographic location, inflation (at US rates), time compression (three year design and construction period), and other factors; but the uncertainties are necessarily large. In particular, if the construction time was shortened from three to two years, costs might rise by as much as 50%. Also some degree of in-country procurement of material and labor is inevitable and, given Israel's high inflation rate, this will drive costs up.

I can provide further details on these estimates if you wish.

*Harold Brown*

*We will continue to be both  
very tight-fisted on these costs and  
very non-committal toward Israeli requests.*

*HJB*

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## COSTING APPROACH

These cost estimates were derived by adjusting what it would cost to replicate the Sinai facilities in the United States by factors for 1) geographic location, 2) cost growth, 3) data reliability, 4) contingencies and administration, and 5) special conditions.

Normally, these factors are based on experience in similar locations and circumstances. In this case, we have no direct experience of this sort in Israel; therefore the above factors are preliminary only. The location factor used is an estimate based primarily on experience in Saudi Arabia, and adjusted for expected cost and productivity differences between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Likewise, special condition factors are estimates of adjustments needed for unique site characteristics (remoteness, etc.), time compression, and for availability of skilled labor. All of these estimated factors will be refined following our assessment team's visit during the next several week.

The cost growth factor underlying this estimate assumes an annual inflation rate of 6.5 percent, which is significantly less than Israel's inflation rate of about 42 percent. In view of the overheated nature of the Israeli economy, and at least the Israelis' belief that the Sinai withdrawal will exacerbate this condition, the final costs of the project will be very sensitive to how much of the resources will be provided from within Israel, and how much will be available from external sources. If the US were to provide all resources, then the cost growth factor of 6.5 percent might be reasonable and the location factor could be reduced. If, on the other hand, a significant portion of the resources are to come from the Israeli economy, the estimates are probably low.

Finally, the estimates assume a three year design-construction period. Costs might well be as much as 50% higher if this period were compressed to two years.

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Date: MAR 06 2017

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 16, 1978

ISRAEL 323.3

Washington National Records Center,  
SecDef Files, Acc 330-81-0202, Box 57,  
Folder 233.3, 1978.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Relocating Israeli Airbases from the Sinai to the Negev

At Camp David you indicated that, subject to Congressional approval of the necessary funds, that the United States would help in the relocation to the Negev of Israel's two Sinai airbases at Eitam and Etzion. In pursuance of this agreement, on September 28, 1978, I sent a letter to Israel's defense minister proposing that our two governments consult on the scope and costs of the two new airbases. In November 1978, I sent a survey team to Israel to begin these consultations. A summary of the team's report is attached.

Eitam and Etzion presently accommodate up to four aircraft squadrons (120 planes). Israeli plans had called for expansion to five squadrons in 1979 with subsequent further expansion to an eventual 8 squadrons. Israel is asking for U.S. assistance in building airbases to accommodate 5 squadrons within three years. This would require constructing three bases, given the available land in the Negev. The cost would be about \$1.5 billion.

I recommend we confine any assistance on our part to no more than the basing of the 4 squadrons now at Eitam and Etzion, and leave to Israel the full expense of any expansion. This would entail construction at two sites in the Negev (Ovda and Matred) rather than three. The cost for construction of the two bases, accommodating two squadrons each, would be \$988 million for operational facilities and \$57 million for necessary (family housing and recreational facilities for example) but non-mission essential facilities, for a total of \$1.045 billion. This does not include costs for off-base infrastructure and related expenses such as road construction and maintenance, utilities, port and terminal expenses, and the like, which we have assumed Israel would bear. One way we could reduce the U.S. contribution (alternative forms of which are discussed later in this memo) below \$1 billion would be by agreeing to fund only the operationally essential facilities (\$988 million). These costs include inflation based on the assumption of construction over the three year period CY 1979-81.

(16 Dec 78)

If the two new airbases are to be operationally ready in three years it will be necessary for DoD to undertake overall management responsibility and to use accelerated construction techniques; Israel lacks the management experience to complete the task in three years. Also, a non-Israeli construction firm will be required to do the work because Israeli firms lack both experience and capacity. Almost all the essential ingredients -- management, equipment, manpower, materials -- will have to be imported. If a U.S. contractor is awarded the contract, the bulk of the money will be spent in the United States.

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330-81-0202, box 57

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The requirement to have operationally-ready bases in three years is a substantial task having important budget and legislative implications. If a treaty were signed in December 1978, funds would be required as follows: \$5 million immediately for site investigation and planning; 49.5% of total U.S. costs (roughly \$500 million) by March 1979; 39.5% in FY 1980; and the remaining 10.5% in FY 1981. Thus, money for the first year must be from FY 1979 funds and available in March 1979, if the peace treaty is signed this month. A delay in signing obviously would allow a corresponding delay in funding.

There are, of course, various ways of reducing the cost to the United States either by cutting back on the scope of the assistance or by the method of financing. The former is connected with broad political questions. As to the latter, there are at least three ways the costs could be funded:

1. Direct grant for the full amount. This is the simplest and most convenient way to assure the construction is funded adequately and on time, and therefore holds open the best prospect that the work would be completed on schedule.

2. FMS Credits (50% "forgiven"). Israel now gets \$1 billion annually. This could be increased (or perhaps in part reprogrammed) for FY 1979-1981 to cover the U.S. share of the airbase costs, i.e., of the total U.S. share of about \$1 billion, Israel would receive \$500 million as grant and the remainder as a long term loan on current FMS terms (no payment on principal for 10 years, payback over the next 20 years, prevailing interest rates).

3. Long term loan for the full amount. The terms might correspond with the FMS loan arrangements, or be separately negotiated.

The extent and method of assistance are matters that will require your decision, and you may want to reexamine them in the light of recent events. I am undertaking on a close-hold basis the necessary preparatory work so that we are ready when you decide, and when a peace treaty is in hand, to complete negotiations with Israel and to prepare and support legislation before the Congress. DoD personnel have been instructed to make no commitments to the Israelis on amount, or nature of assistance, and I believe they have observed those instructions.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment:

Survey Team Report. (draft) (\$)

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: MAR 06 2017

Office of the Secretary of Defense<sup>\*</sup>  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: MAR 06 2017

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2/9/79

To Harold Brown

The immediate purpose of your trip is to restore and reinforce confidence in the United States among our friends in the region. In doing so, you should begin to lay the basis for security collaboration among the U.S. and key states in the region -- Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Consistent with our strategy in the peace negotiations, we should be aiming for a situation in which Egypt and Israel are not isolated from the rest of the region.

To that end, you should place very high emphasis on the need for the rapid conclusion of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as the first step in a wider process of Israeli-Arab accommodation. You should make it clear that our ability to develop regional cooperation will be severely handicapped, and perhaps even negated, by continued Israeli-Arab hostility. That hostility intensifies internal strains in the Arab countries, contributes to growing radicalization, and opens doors to the reentry of the Soviet Union. You should, therefore, indicate that the United States expects a forthcoming attitude from our friends on this issue in order to facilitate greater regional cooperation on wider strategic matters.

With the foregoing as a key point of departure, you should forcefully express our recognition of the strategic importance of the region, its strategic location, its vital resources, and its crucial role in establishing healthy patterns of internal development and North-South relations. Make it clear that we see the region to be under serious threat from Soviet power which is systematically exploiting internal instability as well as regional conflicts.

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~~Review on February 8, 1985~~

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With or without a grand plan, determined Soviet efforts, as evidenced in the Horn of Africa, the PDRY, and Afghanistan, now abetted by turmoil in Iran, could lead to general disorder or the imposition of dominant Soviet influence, which the U.S. and its friends cannot tolerate.

To counter these threats, the United States sees the need for an integrated strategy for regional security to which it is prepared to make a strong political and military contribution. This strategy should be comprised of several elements:

-- Rapid progress in bringing peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors, first and foremost between Israel and Egypt, but in a manner which progressively draws support from Arab moderates for subsequent peace negotiations.

-- New forms of bilateral and multilateral collaboration in security management, including military assistance, intelligence cooperation, and contingency planning.

-- Increased U.S. military presence in the region, possibly including increased naval presence and new collaboration on basing arrangements. You should explore reactions to possible forms of enhanced U.S. presence, without making any specific commitment at this point. Upon your return, I expect a full report on steps that can be taken to strengthen our position in the area.

-- Concerted measures to counter radical forces that now provide a base for the intrusion of Soviet influence.

-- Cooperation in oil matters that builds on the common interest of the U.S., its allies, and the region's moderate states in security and economic development.

You should emphasize our conviction that a new strategy for peace and security in the region will require new policies on the part of the U.S. and the governments of the region, demanding the resolve to effect them at home and internationally.

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We will do our part, but will expect in return enhanced cooperation from each of the states that you will be visiting.

#### Saudi Arabia

In addition to a review of regional security along the lines indicated above, you should discuss with the Saudis the nature of the "special" relationship they say they desire. You should seek their views on specific security concerns. At their initiative, this could include discussion of oil field security. You should agree to more systematic security consultations, including the possibility of some joint contingency planning directed at threats from Soviet surrogates in the region.

In conversations with Saudi leaders it should be emphasized that it is vital that American policy have the support of the Congress and the American people. You should note that it is a reality of our political system that the success of our cooperation with them on security issues is dependent in considerable measure on U.S.-Saudi cooperation in the peace process and on economic issues.

With regard to specific arms transfer issues, you should indicate that a decision on air munitions will be made by me after my conversations with Fahd. You might also indicate to the Saudis that, subject to my final approval after the Fahd visit, we expect to continue with the modernization program for two Army brigades and four National Guard battalions. Following the discussions with Fahd, I will review also the issue of nominal FMS credits for third country military assistance.

#### Egypt

President Sadat believes that Egypt can play a constructive regional role in support of moderate states and in limiting Soviet influence, provided a peace treaty with Israel can be achieved and Egypt receives American support. Egyptian leaders should be encouraged to think realistically in these terms, consistent with their objective of alleviating Egypt's economic problems, and to focus on specific

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situations, such as Sudan, Oman, the Emirates, and Yemen where an Egyptian contribution to security may be possible. We should seek to initiate the development of a close U.S.-Egyptian security relationship for the post-treaty environment. It is particularly important that the Egyptians understand that our ability to sustain a long-term security relationship with Egypt depends upon peace with Israel.

With regard to specific arms transfer issues, you can offer to send a survey team to survey Egyptian air defense requirements; indicate to the Egyptians that the United States will review the question of FMS in the light of regional developments; and that I am prepared to consider favorably the sale of 800 APCs for Egypt in the context of progress on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. You should make the Egyptians understand the congressional sensitivity on this point, and reiterate again the connection between regional security and Israeli-Arab accommodation.

#### Israel

In your meetings with Israeli leaders, you should provide assurance that the U.S. commitment to Israel's security remains firm. You should seek to gain understanding of Israeli perspectives of their security problems, especially those that would arise from a reduced military presence in the West Bank and Gaza. You should also encourage Israeli leaders to develop a regional approach to security matters, building on the common interests of Israel and the moderate Arab states in limiting hostile Soviet and radical influences within the area. The critical relationship between the Arab-Israeli peace process and regional security should be emphasized.

On specific bilateral issues, you should:

1. Convey the conclusions of the survey for the relocation of two Israeli air bases from the Sinai, but without commitment as to the extent or terms of U.S. financial assistance;
2. Agree in principle to provide equipment and technical assistance in overcoming the loss of intelligence and early warning stemming from Sinai withdrawal,

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the details to be developed in the course of ongoing security consultations.

3. The air base relocation aside, avoid any commitment in regard to Israeli requests for FY 1980 financial assistance in excess of the \$1 billion in FMS and \$785 million in security supporting assistance.

4. You can indicate to the Israelis that I am prepared to consider favorably the sale of 960 APCs and 200 Howitzers in the context of progress on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. You should make the Israelis understand the congressional sensitivity on this point, and reiterate again the connection between regional security and Israeli-Arab accommodation.

#### Jordan

King Hussein will be seeking both general assurance of American support and specific commitments to supply arms of greater sophistication. You should encourage him to adopt a supportive role toward the peace negotiations, particularly as they turn to the West Bank/Gaza issues. You should also open the prospect of greater U.S. assistance in meeting his legitimate security needs in the future as Jordan becomes more actively involved in the peace process. You should specifically:

1. Discuss Jordan's security requirements now and during a period of protracted negotiations about the future of the West Bank, reaffirming our commitment to continue with military modernization programs which have already been agreed.
2. Agree to consider Jordan's additional defense needs, but without commitment to a favorable outcome.
3. Agree to continue detailed defense consultations through the existing Joint Military Commission in the spring with regard to Jordan's future security requirements.


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Date: MAR 06 2017

Sincerely,



The Honorable Harold Brown  
The Secretary of Defense  
Washington

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Office of the Secretary of Defense +  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

*Good report*  
*J*

February 19, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Middle East Trip Report

You know from my personal messages about the highlights of my meetings with Sadat, Begin, Dayan, Weizman, Hussein and the Saudi Princes. I will therefore confine this report to a general assessment and some suggestions for future action.

Conclusions

My overall conclusions are these. First, we must press forward as quickly as possible to an Israeli-Egyptian accord. Time is probably running against success. To make this step by Sadat digestible to the other moderate Arabs, we need to do three things besides portraying the treaty as part of a process designed to achieve a comprehensive peace: be forthcoming on regional economic development; be forthcoming on arms supplies, although not nearly to the extent of the announced demands; and find some form of US military presence which will provide reassurance without carrying the political burdens of a presence so intrusive as a US military base.

These actions will also lay a basis for a greater degree of regional security cooperation, with US support. That cooperation will come, if at all, on an evolutionary basis unless the perception of the threat intensifies. All the countries were concerned about the events in Iran; but there was no panic and, indeed, less anxiety than I had expected. None of the leaders thought we should do more than "wait and see" on Iran for the moment.

My second conclusion is that the most likely threats lie in internal violence supported from across borders or from internal political, economic, and social instability. The first will hardly, and the second not at all, be cured by major military hardware, which can however inhibit direct aggression across borders. We need to promote regional security cooperation, particularly where there is a threat from a Soviet surrogate as in North Yemen, and perhaps Oman, from the PDRY. And we need to continue forcefully to assert

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our willingness and ability to oppose direct Soviet aggression in the area. But most important of all, we need to do our best to forestall development of internal instability. Our influence is necessarily limited on this score, but the steps outlined above may help to enhance it. In particular, assistance in sensible economic development is needed. Several leaders stressed in private that this took priority over arms, though this wisdom did not extend to moderating their own long lists of arms requests.

My trip had four main objectives. Pursuant to your instructions, the first was to restore confidence among the moderate states that the United States understands the dangers to the region and intends to act to protect its interests. This was achieved. But there will be backsliding unless we now follow through on the commitment to play a more active role in the Middle East -- in frustrating Soviet interference, in displaying some modest presence of our own, and in cooperating more actively with the moderate states in security terms.

The second objective was to stimulate the development of a general strategy for the region. I outlined the major elements: close cooperation between the United States and the individual states, concerted actions among moderate states, bilateral politico-military consultations about hypothetical contingencies, a potentially greater US military presence, cooperation on economic issues (oil) and economic assistance, and, above all, rapid progress on Arab-Israeli peace.

In response, the countries' leaders acknowledged a commonality of interest. However, not surprisingly, the Arabs do not see Israel as having a regional security role, and tend also to criticize each other's efforts. Several urged a US military presence in other countries "which are weak and need it" but see it as a lightning rod in their own (the exception was Israel, which would welcome such a presence for reasons both plain and, to us, unattractive). It is quite obvious as well that each country views US interest in promoting regional security as a lever to obtain more US arms for itself. This presents opportunities for the United States as well as problems, for we may be able over time to establish some degree of implicit linkage between bilateral arms supply relations and regional cooperation.

The third objective was to emphasize the peace process, and its importance for regional strategy. I did this at each stop. I pressed hard the argument that sustained progress toward peace would make an essential contribution to the security of the region. While all professed dedication to

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peace, recognized the threat to stability posed by its absence, and wished to exclude the Soviets from the negotiations, reactions to the Camp David Agreements were along predictable lines.

Sadat and the Israelis are wedded to the Camp David process, but holding to their positions that progress be on their terms. Each is seeking maximum reward in US security support as an incentive for moving forward. Hussein and the Saudis are convinced that the Camp David process carries more immediate danger than eventual safety. They appear to have no constructive, practical alternatives and have difficulty focusing on the threat that stalemate in the peace process poses to their security. Neither wants to close the door completely -- their desire for our support in security matters precludes this -- but they both seem to be hoping somehow that the moment of decision will go away. I believe concentration on Gaza with respect to the autonomy issue would be a good tactic.

The final objective was to strengthen bilateral relationships. Overall, I sought to convey the idea that a comprehensive peace settlement and other forms of defense cooperation are far more important to regional security and well-being than additional arms. I made very few commitments, handling most requests by undertaking to consider them on my return to Washington or to arrange for US teams to survey requirements or make staff visits in order to arrange for US teams to survey requirements or make staff visits in order to examine the need in greater depth. In some cases, I was frank in warning them not to expect approval.

In the main, however, offers of consultations and joint planning and intelligence exchange were welcomed but were not enough. We were judged in this functional area by how favorably we responded to arms requests. My approach was all right as a stop gap but will not work for more than a few months. No one was satisfied. Everyone had his list. Saudi Arabia renewed earlier requests for advanced systems, such as the XM1 tank, without addressing quantities or timing. Jordan presented a \$2 billion plan for filling shortfalls and for force modernization, including F-16 aircraft and ROLAND missiles. Israel scrapped MATMON C, substituting a new eight-year force development plan for equipment which could cost \$6-8 billion. The new plan does cut back significantly on MATMON C's planned force expansion and is said to be 20-25% less expensive, but most of the savings appear to be in the later years. Egypt listed equipment which would total \$15-20 billion, in effect an "Americanization" of Egyptian forces.

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I'm sure none of these nations expected us to respond fully to their requests. We cannot ignore them, however. I believe we should now approve military hardware items at a somewhat faster rate (without increasing dollar levels where credit is involved) than we have in the recent past for Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. I believe we need to plan for a sharply increased arms supply to Egypt, including FMS credits, although not to anything like the extent of Egypt's full request. The Egyptians have a genuine self-defense need to reverse the continuing decay of their military forces flowing from loss of Soviet support. And, with Iran gone, Egypt's role in regional security becomes more important; no other country in the region can play a comparable role. The expanded relationship must, of course, be paced by the peace talks; our survey teams will tide us over until May-June. Also, we will face a difficult task in adjusting Egyptian appetites downward to fit the threat and competing economic development needs.

You also asked that I report on the view of the regional states toward a greater US military presence. Israel favors a US presence, preferably one in Israel, but even one in the Arab states would be all right with them. Dayan and Weizman raised the possibility of our taking over the Sinai air bases. Weizman distinguished between a naval base at Haifa, which he said would not be antagonistic in an Arab-Israeli context, and other kinds of ground or air bases which would be.

Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia wants a base on its soil, although they might acquiesce in a US base in some other Arab country. Sadat thinks a US base would be a sign of Egyptian weakness and showed no interest in a US presence in the Sinai. The Saudis did not think direct Soviet military action sufficiently likely to warrant the political risks to them that, in their view, would follow from a major US military presence. Some Saudis thought a US presence somewhere else in the Gulf was worth considering, but it is by no means clear this represents a consensus.

It may be that, on reflection, one or more of the Arab countries may be interested in a form of US presence less intrusive than a military base, such as periodic aircraft deployments, joint exercises, and the like. It may be that we can develop arrangements for use of facilities in a crisis, perhaps with some pre-positioning of critical items. This would give us some of the military advantages of a base with fewer of its political burdens. We will learn more about this as our security consultations progress.

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There remain two other "presence" questions. First, the possibility of base facilities in another country, such as Oman. In 1977 Oman agreed in principle to our use of Masirah, the former British base, but at a very high cost. I did not get a clear view of Saudi Arabia's or Egypt's attitude on such a base, although I understand Crown Prince Fahd had expressed reservation about the idea in late 1976. We should examine this further within our government and perhaps with Saudi Arabia, to see whether the question should now be re-opened with Oman. More importantly, I believe we ought to promote assistance from moderate Arab states to Oman to replace the capability withdrawn by Iran. The sooner this is done, the more South Yemen will be discouraged from seriously considering renewed efforts against Oman.

Second is the question of increasing US military presence off-shore. I believe we should carefully consider augmenting the Middle East Force (which now consists of 3 ships) and expanding the facilities on Diego Garcia. This is not for purposes of reassuring the moderate Middle East states, who showed little interest. Rather, its justification would rest on broader geo-political grounds or on improvement in our rapid deployment capability. I will send you a separate memorandum on this.

My impressions of the military capabilities of these countries can be only very sketchy ones, but I'll give them anyway.

Israel's forces are very capable, very tough, and very ready. In a short war with Egypt and Jordan, they should have no trouble winning, but could take casualties substantial for their small population. I have no way to judge their expressed strong concern about Syrian and Iraqi capability (the latter is touted in many of the countries of the region as the coming military power) but I hypothesize that during the next few years this would not change the outcome.

Egypt's forces have rather good morale, are quite large, and claim to be ready. I doubt the last, and their denials of equipment unreadiness are undercut by their expressed concerns about spare parts. They are competent technically and professionally. I think they'd do well against anyone in the area except the Israelis, if we help them solve their equipment problems.

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The Jordanians show spit and polish, are probably well trained (I saw only the honor guard!) but their forces are both small and very modestly equipped. They probably have considerable defensive capability, but would be wise to stay out of offensive operations. They can make a useful military advisory contribution in the Peninsula (there are said to be about 1500 Jordanian military personnel seconded to various countries in the Gulf and North Yemen).

The Saudis, though they are moving ahead toward a professional air force, seem to me a military zero at this time.

### Recommendations

Our assurances of greater US interest and involvement are perishable. We need to follow through:

1. By means of the follow-on security consultations with the four countries to which I have agreed, we should:

(a) Further explore forms of US presence -- short of permanent bases -- which would be politically acceptable to host nations and militarily useful to the United States in deterring Soviet adventurism or enhancing our capability for rapid deployment of US forces in a crisis.

(b) Lay the basis for multinational regional security cooperation. We should concentrate on situations where stability is threatened by Soviet surrogates, in particular North Yemen and potentially Oman.

2. We should modestly step up the pace of our arms supply approvals within present dollar levels with Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In the case of Egypt, we should substantially increase our program, post-treaty, both quantitatively and by extending significant FMS credits. We should not, however, lend our assistance to force structure expansion in any of the four countries, and we should in particular encourage post-treaty force structure reduction in Egypt in exchange for our help in modernizing its forces. In Saudi Arabia we should encourage the development over time of a more professional army, not based solely on heavy and sophisticated equipment, but equipped and tailored to the environment and the Saudi capabilities to absorb. We should recognize that, at least in the case of the Army, the prospects for real military capability are very limited.

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3. We should not encourage at this stage build-up of arms in the Gulf states. This issue needs further analysis.

4. The most serious threat to security is likely to be internal instability. We should review in depth our assessment of the political, economic and social conditions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf states to make sure our policies are best designed to minimize the development of internal instability in those countries. This is particularly important in the case of Saudi Arabia, for reasons that are self-evident. It is also true in Egypt, where former MOD Gamasy told me privately he is worried about the effects on Army morale and attitudes of an eroding economic position military personnel experience in their personal lives. Where we have to make a choice we should give priority to economic assistance designed to promote internal stability over arms transfers.

5. We should plan further speeches and statements -- by you and others -- built around the themes of my visit. This declaratory policy will help maintain momentum and credibility. In doing this, we should recognize that declaratory policy is no substitute for action and, indeed, can be counterproductive if not matched with concrete implementing steps.

*Harold Brown*

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 06 2017

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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February 21, 1979

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22 FEB 1979

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show to DEM, &

ask him to

follow up with a

proposal decision

document for  
the President.

Done

2/22

- Due

1/31/79

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT:

Your Middle East Trip Report

Attached is a copy of your Middle East trip report to the President. I thought you would want to see his comment.

BS.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

EXEMPT FROM EO 12958 (12958) (b)(1)  
Date: 06/15/2017  
Sec 3.3 (b)(1) (c)  
EO 12958, 211 Other Agency Review: 100  
Review/Declassify On: 31 Dec 2020

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 06 2017

Office of the Secretary of Defense \*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 06 Mar 2017 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 17 -M-0940

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330-82-0205, box 15, Middle East

(Feb 1-23) 1979

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 06 2017

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

March 14, 1979

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-83-0205, Box 12, Folder Israel (Jan-Jun) 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Supply of Arms to Egypt and Israel in Connection with the  
Peace Treaty

During our trip I discussed the supply of arms and other facilities and services and their funding with Egyptian Minister of Defense Kamal Ali and with Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman. With the Egyptians, I described an implied release, after a peace treaty was concluded, of a number of equipment items (Tab A), with USG financing of \$1.0 to \$1.5 billion over three years. The funding would be part cash, part FMS credits, the mix and terms to be determined. With the Israelis, I indicated that, in the case of a peace treaty, we would make certain equipment items available (Tab B) and would assist in the relocation of air bases from the Sinai to the Negev. The total funds would (in addition to the current annual \$1.785 billion) be \$2.0 to \$2.5 billion over three years. Again, the mix of grants, credits, and sales was to be determined. With both, I stressed that the U.S. Government was prepared to make these commitments in the context of the Peace Treaty and subject to consultation with and approval of Congress. (Weizman will be in Washington Friday for discussions on this subject.)

Financing will be critical to accomplishment of these commitments. The options for financing as I see them now are as follows:

	OPTIONS		
	A	B	C
Egypt (\$1.5 billion)			
Terms: credits	40% (\$0.6B)	50% (\$0.75B)	60% (\$0.9B)
cash	60% (\$0.9B)	50% (\$0.75B)	40% (\$0.6B)
Israel (\$2.5 billion)			
Terms: grants	none	\$1.0B	
FMS credits	\$2.0B	\$1.5B	
Other loans	\$0.5B	none	

330-83-0205, Box 12, Folder Israel (Jan-Jun) 1979  
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Page 2-30/c (1)(7)

17-M-0940

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We should begin negotiations on a conservative level of U.S. commitment, but be prepared to move to a level you now decide on. For Israel, I would strongly recommend that you decide now that we will be prepared to seek grant aid for the airbase relocation, in the amount of \$1.0 billion. Since the U.S. intends to perform all the work on the contract, much of this amount would be spent in the United States and not adversely impact on balance of payments. The rest, \$1.5 billion, would be FMS credits (of which half is customarily forgiven). This extra \$1.5 billion could be spent, in a mix to be determined by the Israelis, among equipment, extras for the relocated airbases, and other Sinai relocation costs. For Egypt, I recommend a 50-50 credit-cash split. The cash for sales would have to be found by them, presumably from Saudi Arabia, though this is chancy given likely violent Arab League reactions to the Peace Treaty. We could also seek grants from other western countries and from Japan. If Egypt obtains such a Saudi or other grant, then their terms would be equivalent to the terms we extend Israel for FMS credits, i.e., half forgiven. Alternatively, we might extend Egypt the FMS terms (half forgiven, the rest paid over 20 years beginning 10 years later, at commercial interest terms) that we customarily provide Israel.

The total package shown amounts to \$4.0 billion over the three year period, although the amounts required to be appropriated would be much less. The first year costs and their financing will have to be determined based on how quickly we can get programs going. We can envisage, for instance, that an Egyptian program, front-loaded, might require \$300 million in FMS financing in the first year. The airbase relocation will require as much as \$500 million in the first year, in order to insure completion within the three year limit. These would require an FY 1979 supplemental to get going, while other initial costs might be accomplished by a change in the FY 1980 budget proposal.

The U.S. Government will also need to consider economic aid for Egypt. Egypt's economy is not in good shape, and such aid might be very important to Sadat's political survival. He may well have difficulty in obtaining continued assistance from other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, which in the past has amounted to around \$500 million a year in non-military aid.

Recommendation: That you authorize me to negotiate financial arrangements (covering a three year period) with Israel and Egypt up to, but not exceeding the following:

- a. Israel: \$1.0 grant assistance for airbase construction (Israel would pay all costs above this amount), and \$1.5 billion FMS (half forgiven) credit.
- b. Egypt: \$750 million (none forgiven) FMS credit, and \$750 million in cash sales to be financed by others.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 06 2017

*Harold Brown*

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TAB A

EGYPT: EQUIPMENT

\$ Million

INDICATED AS LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE (but requiring choices among them by the Egyptians to stay within 1.5B\$)

One cruiser (the ALBANY)	34.5
Up to four Gearing Class Destroyers (two for active service; two for cannibalization if necessary).	34.7
Reasonable quantities of Armored Personnel Carriers (e.g., 1000) cut to 800	125.0
Twelve I-Hawk missile batteries	500.0
Additional F-5 aircraft (50)	500.0
Additional C-130 aircraft (20)	230.0
CH-47 "Chinook" helicopters (40)	350.0
Pressure test of Egyptian Soviet-built submarine hulls	12.0
Technical Data Package for retrofitting current Egyptian tanks	300.0

TO BE CONSIDERED:

F-4 aircraft in moderate numbers (35)

One or two diesel submarines (Guppy type or Tang class)

TURNED DOWN:

F-15 or F-16 aircraft

Attack helicopters

M60 tanks

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: MAR 06 2017

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TAB B

ISRAEL: EQUIPMENT

INDICATED AS LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE

Acceleration of 55 F-16 aircraft, but keeping the same original total of 75, with deliveries to begin in January 1980 instead of April 1981.

600 AGM-65B (MAVERICK) Precision-guided bombs	24.0
600 AIM-9L air-to-air missiles	56.0
200 M60A3 Tanks	231.0
800 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers	108.0
200 M109 Armored Self-Propelled Howitzers	33.2
14 Phalanx Close-in-Weapon Systems	65.0
4 Encapsulated Harpoon Fire Control Systems	15.0
Intelligence and Early Warning Equipment	Indef.

TO BE CONSIDERED:

Adding to the 75 an additional number of F-16 aircraft up to 55 for a total up to 130.	500.0
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5 U.S.C. 552

Office of the Secretary of Defense<sup>+</sup>  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 06 Mar 2017 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 17 -M- 0940

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

MAR 06 2017

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON D C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc  
330-82-0205, Box 9, Folder Egypt (Jan-Jul) 1979.

23 MAR 1979

His Excellency  
General Kamal Hassan Ali  
Minister of Defense and War Production  
General Commander of the Armed Forces  
Arab Republic of Egypt

Office of the Secretary of Defense \*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 06 Mar 2017 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 17 -M- 0940

Dear Mr. Minister:

In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of at least a portion of those sales, subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required.

With respect to financing, the President is prepared to recommend to Congress that the United States provide military equipment and services during the next three years of a value of \$1.5 billion, with up to \$500 million annually in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits. The credits will be made available on the following terms: current interest rates, a ten-year deferment of payments on principal, and twenty years to repay the loan thereafter.

The United States is prepared in general to supply the items of equipment we discussed and which are listed in a classified attachment to this letter. In this connection, the United States agrees to dispatch teams to Egypt in the very near future to survey and discuss Egyptian needs for naval forces, air defenses, and ground force armored and other vehicles. The United States is also pleased to receive an Egyptian team in Washington in the near future to discuss the needs of the Egyptian Air Force.

Sincerely,

*Harold Brown*

~~Classification - Authority EO 12958, as amended~~  
Date: 11/08/17  
~~Declassify on: 10/1/2028~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 06 2017

Attachment (8)

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~~WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS~~

17-M-0940

Doc 6 RI

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The United States is prepared to approve the sale of the following equipment and services to Egypt:

- Jet Training Aircraft (e.g., of the T-38 type)
- 10 Additional C-130 aircraft.
- 16 CH-53 Helicopters.
- Aircraft ECM Pods.
- 12 Improved Hawk Batteries.
- 4 TPS-59 Three-Dimensional Radars.
- 4 Destroyers of the US Gearing Class, henceforth to be referred to as "frigates."
- Harpoon and Phalanx Weapons Systems for installation on Frigates, number to be determined.
- Pressure testing of diesel submarine hulls.
- 800 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers.
- Technical Data Package to Upgrade T-54 and T-55 Tanks.
- Lorries and Tractors, number to be determined.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 06 2017

The United States is willing to consider favorably the following items of equipment, subject to further discussion and definition:

- F-4 Phantom Aircraft
- Radars for detecting low-flying aircraft, of a type to be determined by the Air Defense Survey.
- Diesel Submarines of the Guppy Type, following evaluation of the program for pressure testing existing Egyptian submarine hulls.
- Auxiliary Equipment (e.g., Ground Radars, Communication Equipment, Forward and Side Looking Camera, Equipment for Frogmen).
- Patrol Boats

The United States also maintains its offers of the following equipment:

- Cruiser (USS Albany)
- CH-47 Helicopters
- Additional F-5E Aircraft

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

COPIES TO:  
RF/hjb

July 19, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Assistance for Egypt

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 06 2017

You asked about the possibilities for enhanced military assistance for Egypt. We conclude that it is important for the United States to move beyond the immediate program of assistance agreed during the Treaty negotiations.

As you know, during Mubarak's June visit we undertook to develop a longer term (five year) military assistance plan with Egypt. We are now preparing for the first round of talks in Cairo on this plan, with the aim of completing the plan by October 1st. In the planning process we will be reviewing Egypt's force structure and missions as well as equipment requirements. It will be our aim to encourage Egypt to make reductions in its force structure and to limit equipment requirements to those needed for replacement and modernization of obsolete or unsupportable Soviet equipment. We will severely discourage force expansion.

Moreover, wherever possible, we will encourage Egypt to make the most of the Soviet equipment it has now, and will offer technical assistance for this purpose. We are looking at ways to help Egypt's defense industries adapt and maintain, and otherwise keep operating, Soviet equipment now in the Egyptian inventory. A DOD team has already visited Egypt for this purpose. We expect to have specific proposals by October 1st.

Nevertheless, some new equipment will be a continuing requirement, and we should be prepared to continue our financial and material help. In this regard we will be considering further FMS credits at about the \$500 million per year level, beginning with the FY 1982 budget. This is the financial guide we propose to use in our long-term planning for Egypt. Such an approach would begin a program of regular military funding aid for Egypt outside the peace package. This aid would be similar, to but less than, the annual aid to Israel.

330-82-0205, Box 9, Egypt

~~Classified by~~ SECDEF

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~~Review on~~ 18 July 1985

*drafted in State*

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We may have a problem with the public and Congress regarding an enhanced program. If we should propose to provide \$500 million a year in further FMS credits beginning in FY 82, critics may argue that our one-time package was authorized for the period through FY 82. In addition, Israel might argue that our total economic and military assistance programs for Egypt would be approaching parity with Israel's and, therefore, might seek new increments for itself. We believe these are manageable problems.

We have also considered the terms on which FMS credits are offered. At present we have agreed to finance military purchases over a 30 year period, with an initial ten year grace period on principal, but we believe that debt service will be a growing problem, depending on how quickly, if at all, the economy prospers. It is preferable that military equipment be given second priority after Egypt's economic development needs.

So far as equipment releases are concerned, Egyptian requests for modern tanks, antitank helicopters, and advanced fighter aircraft could run into regional balance or arms control problems on the Hill. While our sale of such articles to Egypt may not be advisable now, we may have to consider them in the longer term. The Egyptians would see any joint planning which omits such equipment as a serious indication that the U.S. will not support Egyptian force modernization. The consultations we plan will give us an opportunity to channel Egyptian desires in directions we can politically manage.

Our longer-term planning will take place within our previously stated policy that the U.S. is prepared to provide a substantial amount of Egypt's military equipment needs, but not all. Egypt should be encouraged to develop perhaps smaller but nevertheless significant supply programs with Europeans and others to complement our own activities.

In carrying out this policy, we need to begin conditioning both Congress and the public to the fact that Egypt has legitimate defense requirements in addition to needs for support in its economic development program and that both of these aspects of our effort serve U.S. national interests and are closely intertwined.

In our judgment, U.S.-Egyptian defense relationships are developing in productive ways, although the supply of equipment is naturally not as extensive, as inexpensive, or as fast as Egypt desires.

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 Date: MAR 06 2017

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-- We will deliver before October 6 the first of the F-4 aircraft, plus other equipment and, if Egypt makes a firm decision, a Gearing Class destroyer. These first deliveries are a high priority for Sadat and we have made every effort to make them available in time for this politically important date.

-- We are exchanging a number of expert military teams on Egypt's high priority items, such as air defense.

-- We have defined with Egypt the equipment priorities and delivery schedules for the full \$1.5 billion already agreed.

-- We are starting work on the longer term plan decided above. While this will not initially provide commitments for financing and delivery, it will continue the military dialogue and help to cement defense relationships between our two countries.

In addition we earlier promised Sadat and Kamal Ali that we would welcome the opportunity for close defense consultations. To that end we would expect to have annual meetings at the Defense Minister level and periodic staff consultations during the year.

We believe we are well started on the road to enhanced defense relationships with Egypt. We will have to consult closely with Congressional leaders as we go along.

*Harold Brown*

*Gene Vance*

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Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 06 Mar 2017 Authority: EO 13526

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DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Egypt (Aug-Dec) 1979.  
Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: MAR 06 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Egypt: Long Term Security Assistance Program

At your request we sent you a memo on October 25 on long-term security relations with Egypt. The first step in this long-term relationship, going beyond the initial \$1.5 billion peace treaty package, will be incorporated in your decision on the sum to be included for Egypt in the FMS budget for FY 1981. You indicated that you wanted this issue to be considered in the context of the overall FY 1981 FMS budget and that is being done.

Other decisions on the program for Egypt fall outside the FY 1981 budget framework, but must be taken before we proceed in planning with Egypt. These were posed in our earlier memorandum and include the issues of release of F-16 aircraft and M-60 tanks, the limited use of cash flow financing to facilitate earlier deliveries, and the levels of financing for FY 1982 and thereafter.

The F-16 and M-60 programs would take the greater part of the financing we plan. These programs are responsive to the priority needs of Egyptian armed forces. We have singled out F-16 and M-60 because they represent first-line although not top of the line equipment we have for sale. The F-16 seems to be the most practical alternative if we are to deliver any aircraft in the near future. Egypt feels strongly that F-5s are not adequate against the threats they face. A putative successor to the F-5 would take too long to develop and result in a politically unacceptable delivery gap. We cannot prudently strip more F-4s from the U.S. Air Force. We do not believe for political and arms control reasons that we should sell more sophisticated aircraft like F-15 or F-18 to Egypt.

As for the M-60, we need to begin a program soon - by spring, 1980 - if a production line break is to be avoided. Some 900 of Egypt's force of 2100 tanks are obsolescent (T-34s and T-54s), and our willingness to sell M-60s would begin to fill this gap. We also plan to work with the Egyptians to upgrade their T-55 tanks.

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330-82-0205, box 7, Egypt (Aug-Dec) 1979

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Selected use of cash flow financing in FY 1980 and FY 1981 would permit us to make an early start, adequately finance, and deliver in timely fashion M-60s and F-16s if you approve our sale of these items. We would use funds from the \$1.5 billion peace package which we would repay from financing appropriated in subsequent years.

Finally, we seek your decision on funding for FY 1982 and the four years subsequent to that. We have recommended a level of \$800 million a year, based on our analysis of priority Egyptian needs. It would be difficult for us to plan a coherent program without your support for this annual level of financing. While we would not make a multi-year commitment to the Egyptians, it is essential to use notional levels in planning discussions with the Egyptians in order to keep their expectations within reasonable bounds and to permit rational planning. (Note that the F-16 and M-60 programs could take up to \$3 billion of the \$4.35 billion planned.)

Since your letter of June 7, 1979, to President Sadat indicating willingness to enter into a longer term security assistance relationship, the Egyptians have been waiting patiently for us to make definitive planning proposals. We had a meeting with them (in August) to obtain a better understanding of their needs. This was followed by Vice President Mubarak's visit here in September. We urge you to make your decisions now so that we can meet our commitment to continue planning discussions with the Egyptians.

*James Baker*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
SECRETARY OF STATE

12/8/79

*William P. Clark*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3 DEC 1979

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 06 2017

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Long-Term Military Relationship with Egypt

Issue for Decision

You asked for a decision paper examining the implications of a long term military assistance program for Egypt along the lines proposed by the PRC, and alternatives. In this paper, we have taken into account the budget impacts of continuing security assistance for Egypt, as you requested.

BACKGROUND

Following Vice President Mubarak's visit last June, you wrote to President Sadat suggesting that our two governments work closely to plan a longer-term military supply relationship, in order that Egypt could satisfy a greater proportion of its military equipment needs over the next several years. You also indicated at that time the hope that Egypt would assign highest priority to economic development rather than to military programs. DOD began the planning process with Egypt in August. Based on its report of the results of this first exchange, the PRC met on September 20 to consider the issues and make some recommendations.

The DOD report validated Egypt's priority military needs for the defense of its homeland. The analysis showed that whatever assistance we could provide within feasible financial assistance levels would not meet all their needs and would not create a significant threat to Israel; Egyptian force structure would in fact be less than that in the 1973-79 period. It is also clear that, with the cessation of Soviet assistance earlier and Arab assistance at the time of the Peace Treaty, the US is seen by Egypt as not only chief supplier of military equipment but practically the only source of substantial credit assistance. In view of present political circumstances and Egypt's economic situation, the US is likely to remain in this position for a while to come.

17 Oct 79

380-82-0205, box 9, Egypt (Aug-Dec) 1979

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 06 2017

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~~Permit on 17 Oct 1985~~

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Our decisions on the scope of a longer term arms supply relationship thus have significant political content. This is true not only of the size of the program, but also its pace. The deliveries in the current "three-year" program are front-loaded. Therefore, if we simply phase in a five-year program after "the three-year program," we will have a severe interim "delivery gap" of 2-3 years which will put a serious strain on our overall relationship.

The PRC recommended a multi-year security assistance program for Egypt, involving \$350 million in FMS credits in FY 1981 and \$800 million annually for the five years thereafter, FY 1982-86, borrowing from the unspent portion of the \$1.5 billion peace package to assist earlier starts of selected new programs in order to minimize the gap in deliveries of equipment, and relying on future appropriations to ensure full funding of approved programs. The PRC also recommended that we agree to sell F-16 aircraft and M60A3 tanks to Egypt, as well as a few more F-4Es (i.e., about 15) if necessary.

There are several issues that require your decision:

- The multi-year nature of the US commitment;
- Annual funding levels;
- Whether to begin additional funding in FY 1981;
- Use of "cash-flow" financing;
- Sale of F-16 aircraft and M60 tanks.

#### The Nature of the US Commitment

With the Peace Treaty, the \$1.5 billion FMS program, and your decision to enter into joint planning, we are already well on the road toward a long term security assistance relationship with Egypt. To move the planning process beyond this point, we need to indicate to Egypt what level of credits we might provide in future years.

Given extensive and pressing Egyptian modernization needs, and the high costs of the programs involved (e.g., 80 F-16s for \$1.8 billion or 900 M60s for \$1.2 billion), we would not be able to fully fund the most important programs with a single year's credits, nor delay the start of programs till the requisite credits had been accumulated. This means we must start selected major programs with available credits, e.g., drawing upon the unspent portion of the \$1.5 billion

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program, taking the risk that Congress will appropriate in subsequent years the credits necessary to continue those programs (this is called the "cash-flow" approach). Nevertheless, we do not propose a formal multi-year budget commitment. Rather we recommend that we continue the planning process with Egypt, indicating the specific level of FMS financing we intend to seek from Congress in FY 1981 and FY 1982. We would make clear that financing is subject to annual Congressional authorization and appropriation. We would point out that we do not have a formal multi-year commitment with Israel. We would indicate that we intend to request substantial levels for the out-years, suggesting we use the FY 82 figure (and by implication its extension in future years) for planning purposes only. As programs are planned by the US and Egypt together under these sums, the US would carefully control the flow of letters of offer to them in order to avoid overcommitment.

#### FY 82 Funding Levels

We have studied Egypt's military needs and priority equipment requests in great detail. We examined alternative annual funding levels to see what militarily justified types and quantities of equipment could be bought by Egypt with our credit assistance. Illustrative alternatives are as follows:

- \$500 million a year would permit purchase over five years of some 50 F-16s, 300 M60s, 4 patrol gunboats, but a severely cut-down list of vehicles and other equipment, and no additional air defense. This is well under the quantities Egypt has said have priority and which we believe are justified from a military point of view.

- \$650 million a year would allow us either to add somewhat to the numbers of aircraft or tanks Egypt could buy or to offer a more substantial amount of the smaller equipment items the Egyptian services would like so much to have and we believe they urgently need.

- \$800 million a year would permit purchase of the full quantity of priority F-16s (80), but still only 300 M60s, plus other equipment, but no more aircraft and no more air defense weapons. This amount would neatly replace Arab military aid, which was \$800 million a year.

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Date: MAR 06 2017

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- \$1 billion a year - President Sadat's request and the same as Israel now receives - would permit the purchase by Egypt of 80 F-16s, the full priority complement of 900 tanks, additional air defenses, but no additional aircraft or frigate-type ships.

The PRC recommended \$800 million a year.

None of these alternatives meet all of Egypt's needs or priority requests. They would, however, provide some of Egypt's requirements for advanced weapons (which we support) over the next six years. Nonetheless, the lower alternatives shown above would result in considerable delays in the delivery of equipment, because of the slow pace of programs required. While we are also embarking on a program of limited production assistance to Egypt, it will have minimal impact in satisfying Egyptian requirements for the foreseeable future.

The budgetary impact differential among these annual funding levels is not great, assuming no "forgiveness" (grant aid) is involved. For FMS credits extended by the Federal Financing Bank, the annual appropriation must cover only the guarantee fees, which equal 10% of the loans. Thus, the budget appropriation would range from \$50 million to \$100 million a year. OMB already assumes, in its budget projections for FY 1982, credit funding at the \$500 million a year level. (The possibility of FY 1981 funding is discussed below).

We are sensitive to the "proportionality" of the annual funding level to that of Israel. As it approaches Israel's \$1 billion, Israel will undoubtedly feel the case for additional security assistance it has submitted is even more justified. They have asked for an additional \$800 million a year, but we do not believe the accelerated pace of military equipment deliveries which this would imply is necessary, and we have not encouraged them to think they will get it or even a portion of it. An increase for Israel, assuming that it contained the usual 50% forgiveness, would add greatly to the budget impact; e.g., an additional \$800 million a year for Israel would require an additional budget appropriation of \$440 million. If this initiative with Egypt did result in our also increasing assistance for Israel, we would want to strongly resist extending any forgiveness in that increase.

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We do not recommend forgiveness for Egypt. Egypt's external financing deficit appears just about balanced by the external assistance they receive. Egypt should be able to manage the interest and subsequently the principal repayments if we offer the same terms provided for under Peace Treaty package--10 year grace period and 20-year repayment of principal thereafter. By the same token, however, we do not recommend that Egypt directly fund a major portion of approved purchases from their own resources. It would merely divert resources from priority economic development. In our judgment, these recommendations would not lead to a requirement for an increase in currently projected U.S. economic aid levels to Egypt.

#### FY 1981 Funding

The original \$1.5 billion treaty package was supposed to cover a three-year period, but it is already committed and it satisfied only a small portion of Egypt's priority needs. If we do not begin the new assistance program until FY 1982, we would face a politically difficult two-year gap before we can even announce a new sale to Egypt, and a three or four-year gap between completion of major deliveries from the \$1.5 billion program and the start of new deliveries. In the meantime, Egypt's Soviet equipment will be seriously deteriorating, with attendant decline in Egyptian military morale.

There will be unspent credits remaining from the \$1.5 billion package--either \$520 million in FY 1980 or \$320 million in FY 1981 and we could draw upon those to start new programs for Egypt ("cash flow"). However, we would have to pay them back out of subsequent years' appropriations.

Therefore, the PRC has recommended some new funds be made available in FY 1981 to permit a transition to be made to the new longer-term program. The PRC specifically suggested \$350 million for this purpose.

Additional credits for Egypt in FY 1981 could have serious implications for the overall FMS credit program. State and Defense have requested a global level of \$2.304 billion for FY 1981 (the present OMB mark is \$1.98 billion). \$1 billion of this is for Israel, \$175 million is for treaty

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commitments to Spain, Philippines, and Panama; \$250 million is for Turkey, leaving only \$879 million for Greece, Jordan, Thailand, and numerous smaller but crucial programs around the world. A program for Egypt cannot be undertaken with the security assistance financing levels cited above. A decision to begin a regular program of FMS financing for Egypt means the level will have to be raised by the amount earmarked for Egypt, for FY 1981 and beyond.

Alternatives for FY 1981 funding are as follows:

- No new credits in FY 1981. We could make some minor new program starts by borrowing from the unspent portion of the \$1.5 billion, but this alternative would probably be insufficient to start any major program, like F-16. Egypt would see cash flow financing alone as simply an accounting sleight of hand. Some new U.S. resources need to be committed to meet our foreign policy objectives.

- \$225 million in new credits in FY 1981. This would make available a total of \$545 million in credits in FY 1981, permitting some new program starts. However, at the pace these amounts would permit, the delivery gap could be reduced in perhaps only one major program. The budget impact would be only \$22.5 million (10%) additional.

- \$350 million in new credits in FY 1981. This would make available up to \$670 million, and would allow substantial new starts and acceleration of deliveries to close the delivery gap. It would impose less of a "cash flow" payback burden in FY 1982 and thereafter. The budget impact would be only \$35 million (10%) additional. The PRC recommended this alternative.

#### Use of Cash Flow Financing

The foregoing alternatives for FY 1981 funding have assumed the use of cash flow financing to minimize the deliveries gap. Objections to cash flow financing, which we utilize in the Israeli program, have been raised because of the financial risk to the US involved unless a long-term FMS financing program at substantial levels were established. Because of this risk we do not recommend cash flow financing across the board; rather we propose this method of financial implementation only on a selected basis to begin important programs in FY 80 and 81 and only drawing on committed but

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not yet spent funds from the original \$1.5 billion program. We believe that limiting the use of cash flow financing in this manner meets previous objections and limits our financial exposure to an acceptable level. Cash flow financing (up to \$320 million available) in combination with new FY 81 funds (e.g. \$225-350 million) would make available up to \$545-670 million to begin new programs in FY 1981. This will help bridge the gap until a more substantial program can begin in FY 82.

### Equipment

Only F-16 aircraft and M60 tanks pose policy issues. Their release poses no serious arms control or arms transfer issues given the quantities under consideration and the quality of equipment in neighboring countries. We have sold identical or superior equipment to other friendly nations in the area. Tactically, Israel could object in hopes we will provide it more equipment and we will need to conduct extensive consultations with Congress before any formal proposal is made. Because of production line problems the tank sale may have to be notified to Congress relatively soon. F-16s might wait, although we need a decision in principle to permit us to continue our discussions with the Egyptians.

We have looked at less capable equipment such as F-4s and M48A5s from the U.S. inventory, but have concluded we cannot strip U.S. forces without adversely affecting U.S. combat capability. We might be able to provide up to 15 F-4s and some M48A5s if we can buy back M48s from Jordan. This may change over time and we will keep the situation under review.

### Congressional and Israeli Implications

A substantial continuing FMS program for Egypt will come as no surprise to either Israel or to the Congress. Israel will probably not object as long as the program does not threaten its security -- which any feasible programs do not -- but it will certainly bring pressure to increase its own security assistance level. Congress has been supportive of our security assistance to Egypt. We will have to guard against Congressional attempts to wedge the Egyptian program in under the overall level or to cut crucial programs in other countries. Once we have your decisions, we plan to consult closely with key members and committees about the emerging program.

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Recommendations:

1. That we continue our five-year planning discussions with Egypt, without seeking a multi-year appropriation from Congress, on the basis of anticipated annual FMS credit amounts of up to:

- \$1 billion (equal to Israel) \_\_\_\_\_
- \$800 million (recommended by PRC) \_\_\_\_\_
- \$650 million \_\_\_\_\_
- \$500 million \_\_\_\_\_

2. That we begin new FMS financing in FY 1981 at:

- \$350 million (budget impact \$35 million)  
(PRC recommendation) \_\_\_\_\_
- \$225 million (budget impact \$22.5 million) \_\_\_\_\_

Other \_\_\_\_\_

3. That the amount of financing for Egypt in FY 1981 and in subsequent years be added to the projected FMS financing level.

- Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

4. That the "cash flow" approach be used in FY 1980 and FY 1981 to facilitate selected new program starts and sustain the momentum of programs.

- Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

5. That you approve in principle the sale of F-16 aircraft and M60 tanks.

- Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
SECRETARY OF STATE

23 OCT 1979

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OCT 17 1979

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Date: MAR 06 2017

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## MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5439X

~~SECRET~~POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING  
September 20, 1979Time and Place: White House Situation Room  
1630-1800 hours

Subject: Egyptian Military Supply Relationship (U)

## Participants:

State

David Newsom (chairman)

Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Lucy Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science  
and TechnologyHarold Saunders, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern  
and South Asian AffairsOSD

Secretary Harold Brown

Graham Claytor, Deputy Secretary

David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs

Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern African,  
and South Asian AffairsJCS

Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

OMB

John White, Deputy Director

Bowman Cutter, Executive Associate Director for the Budget

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director

Barry Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and  
Control BureauWhite House

David Aaron

NSC

Robert Hunter

Gary Sick

Robert Kimmitt

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Review on September 20, 1985

SANITIZED

E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER 12/18/88 NLC Hc RE NLC-97-118  
BY 0 NARS. DATE 2/8/99

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#### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

The PRC recommended (with OMB to comment separately) that a U.S. delegation resume talks with the Egyptians in early November. This delegation should be authorized to discuss a five-year U.S.-Egyptian military supply relationship based on a proposed level of U.S. support as follows:

1. \$350 million of additional credits in FY 81.
2. Cash flow financing of the Egyptian program.
3. \$800 million in credits per year for five years (FY 82-FY 86).
4. Approval in principle to sell F-16 aircraft and M60A3 tanks. (S)

#### Discussion

Secretary Brown reported to the PRC on the results of the high-level delegation which visited Egypt in mid-August for discussions with the Egyptian military leadership, and on subsequent discussions he had conducted with Vice President Mubarak in Washington. It was his judgment that Egypt has very substantial legitimate security needs. Given the withdrawal of Arab financial support from Egypt, the fact that Sadat has in effect burned his bridges by turning to us, and our own political commitment to Egypt as part of the on-going peace process, he saw no alternative to the United States accepting a major program of support for Egypt for some time to come. This analysis was endorsed fully by the Department of State, the JCS, and the NSC. Admiral Turner added that, without substantial U.S. support, Sadat might be in trouble domestically. (S)

Secretary Brown noted that Egypt was previously reported to be receiving \$800 million per year from Arab sources. That funding was assumed to be available when we proposed the \$1.5 billion, three-year "Peace Package" for Egypt. Although Egypt has requested at least \$8 Billion of military equipment, our own analysis of Egypt's security needs indicates that it requires a military program of about \$4 Billion through FY 86. He proposed that the United States consider a program of FMS credits over a five-year period (FY 82 through FY 86) of \$800 million per year. He also noted that some additional assistance would be required before FY 82 in order to permit Egypt to begin working out its military priorities and to begin placing orders. Otherwise, there would be no tangible

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progress on the Egyptian program during the next two critical years. He proposed that this be accomplished in two ways:

-- That we agree to finance the Egyptian program on a "cash flow" basis. This procedure, which is now used with Israel and Jordan, permits available credits to be used to cover actual expenses in a year, with the implicit understanding that additional credits will be available in future years. (The Egyptian program is now handled on a "full funding" basis in which credits are set aside from the start to cover the entire cost of a program.) By shifting to the cash flow basis, some of Egypt's credits under the \$1.5 billion "Peace Package" would be freed to cover start-up costs on additional programs.

-- That an additional \$350 million in credits be added to the FY 81 budget. This additional increment, plus cash flow funding, would smooth out the two-year gap until additional funds became available in FY 82. If this course of action were adopted, we would have to explain to Congress that the withdrawal of Arab support from Egypt required us to request additional funds before the end of the three-year period previously anticipated for the "Peace Package." It would also provide leverage for Israel to request an increase in its own funding level. (S)

All agencies except OMB agreed that this level of funding was consistent with Egypt's needs. OMB representatives stated that they would want to take a much closer look at the concept of cash flow funding. OMB indicated that they would submit their comments on this and the budgetary implications of this very large proposal to the President separately since they had not had time to study it sufficiently. (S)

OMB questioned the need to seek a decision on this issue now, rather than during the regular budget review process in December. Secretary Brown noted that we had promised General Ali to resume talks in early November. At that time we would have to be able to provide some indication of the size of the program we were prepared to offer. It was also noted that the proposed sums--although very large--required an appropriation of only ten percent of the total amount as a credit guarantee. (S)

The PRC reviewed the list of items which Egypt has requested. All agreed that we could not support its request to purchase F-15 aircraft at this time. However, all agencies, including

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ACDA, supported the OSD/JCS proposal that we indicate our willingness in principle to sell F-16 aircraft and M60A3 tanks to Egypt. Other items on the list, e.g. APCs, air defense, ships, etc., did not pose a significant problem in terms of arms transfer policy. The exact number, mix, and timing of any purchases would have to be worked out with Egypt. This program would not permit Egypt to purchase as much as they had requested, and further negotiations would be required to permit them to work out their own priorities. (S)

All agreed that consultations should be undertaken with the Congress as soon as possible after the President had had the opportunity to review the PRC recommendation and take a decision. We would probably wish to inform President Sadat personally of the President's decision at approximately the time we begin consultations on the Hill, but we should avoid leaks coming from Egypt before the Hill had been informed. (S)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



28 JAN 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Expedited Deliveries of Equipment to Egypt (§)

As we discussed at breakfast on January 25, Defense has analyzed the options for expediting delivery of F-16 aircraft and M60 tanks to Egypt (see attached paper and tables). The options are illustrative and designed to show a range of possibilities from which the Egyptians would be invited to choose when a US team visits Egypt the latter half of February. The object then would be to reach agreement on the sales which would constitute the initial increment of an Egyptian long-term defense program. The precise components of the program should be left to the Egyptians. A preview of the options could be presented to Ambassador Ghorbal and Defense Attache Abou Ghazala at the end of January.

The options show that:

(1) At the approved FMS credit levels the Egyptians could expedite aircraft deliveries if they are willing to limit themselves to a small number of M60 tanks and forgo other new programs until FY 1982. The more they accelerate aircraft deliveries, the fewer tanks they can buy. If they insist on F-16 deliveries beginning in December 1980, they could buy only 40 M60 tanks, and they would not be able to order more later because the production line will have shut down.

(2) With an additional \$200 million in FY 1981 credits the Egyptians could expedite an 80 F-16 aircraft program somewhat (beginning in December 1982) and still buy 700 tanks and have some \$70 million a year in FY 1980 and 81 to begin other new programs. Greater acceleration or insistence on F-15 aircraft would severely limit the total number of aircraft, tanks in some instances, and other new programs even with an additional \$200 million in FY 1981.

(3) The approved \$1.5 billion limit on cash flow financing does not affect our ability to expedite aircraft deliveries, but it does prevent us from offering initially more than a

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small fraction of the 120 F-16 aircraft and 900 M60 tanks requested by Egypt. If this limit were raised to \$2.7 billion and the Egyptians opted for F-16 deliveries beginning in 1982, we could sign Letters of Offer and Acceptance in 1980 for 80 F-16's and 700 tanks.

In a working level meeting during Vice President Mubarak's visit we gave the Egyptians tables of aircraft and tank delivery options assuming the approved FMS financing and normal production leadtimes. As the meeting progressed, the Egyptians appeared to gain a better appreciation of the way in which financing constraints and production leadtimes limit our ability to expedite deliveries. We think this understanding could be further improved by the discussions which Dave McGiffert will lead in Cairo in February, though the political importance attached by Sadat and Mubarak to early F-16 deliveries and/or F-15 sales is unlikely to change as shown by Ambassador Atherton's cables of January 26.

The following changes from the constraints already given the Egyptians would be improvements resulting from the Mubarak visit which, along with our willingness to accelerate F-16 and M60 deliveries, would give the US team a good basis for achieving agreement on the initial sales package for the long-term program:

(1) \$550 million of FMS credits in FY 1981 instead of \$350 million. This adjustment could be made during the foreign assistance hearings or submitted in a later supplemental (\$20 million extra in obligational authority, \$0 in outlays, covers the extra \$200 million in FMS credits).

Approve           ✓           Disapprove                                 

(2) \$2.7 billion limit on cash flow financing instead of \$1.5 billion.

Approve                                  Disapprove                                 

(3) Willingness to discuss options for providing F-15 aircraft, subject to your final approval. Given the late delivery (second half of 1983), high cost (\$1450 million for 19 aircraft), and potential for disapproval by you or Congress, the Egyptians may decide against going ahead with F-15's at this time, though my guess would be that they'll then press for early (and many) F-16's and the F-15's later.

Approve                                  Disapprove                                 

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(4) Diversion of equipment in production for US forces instead of normal production leadtime assumed in discussions to date with Egyptians. (Secretary of Defense will approve.)

*Harold Brown*

Attachments  
a/s

cc: Sec State  
Dir, OMB

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Date: MAR 06 2017

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TABLE I

OPTIONS WITHIN APPROVED FY 1980-81 FINANCING (\$550 MILLION TOTAL)  
(\$ in Millions)

Item	Total Price	First Delivery	Last Delivery	PAYMENTS							
				FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87
Option 1											
19 F-16 Aircraft	532	Dec 81	Nov 83	43	128	192	160	9			
280 M60A3 Tanks	443	Dec 80	Aug 82	114	263	66					
Other New Programs				2	0	392	590	791	800	800	800
Available Credits 1/				1591/	3911/	6502/	7503/	800	800	800	800
Option 2											
19 F-16 Aircraft	1,9234/	Dec 82	Jun 87		49	162	385	532	407	277	111
550 M60A3 Tanks	8644/	Dec 80	Feb 83	123	378	271	92				
Other New Programs				0	0	217	273	268	393	523	689
Option 3											
19 F-16 Aircraft	498	Dec 80	May 81	121	377						
40 M60A3 Tanks	61	Dec 80	Jun 81	16	36	9					
Other New Programs				0	0	641	750	800	800	800	800
Option 4											
19 F-15 Aircraft	1,4505/	Dec 83	Sep 84		116	421	653	260			
370 M60A3 Tanks	5865/	Dec 80	Oct 82	123	307	126	30				
Other New Programs				4	0	103	67	540	800	800	800

- NOTES: 1/ Sum of FY 80 and 81 financing limited to \$550M (\$200M unspent from \$1.5B Peace Package credits and \$350M new credits in FY 81 Budget). Except for distribution of \$550M between FY 80 and 81, available credits are the same for all four options.
- 2/ Net of \$800M new credits in FY 82 minus \$150M payback of borrowed Peace Package credits.
- 3/ Net of \$800M new credits in FY 83 minus \$50M payback of borrowed Peace Package credits.
- 4/ Ordering both aircraft and tanks in 1980 requires raising limit on cash flow financing from \$1.5B to \$2.5B.
- 5/ Ordering both aircraft and tanks in 1980 requires raising limit on cash flow financing from \$1.5B to \$1.7B.

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Date: MAR 06 2017

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
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 Date: 06 Mar 2017 Authority: EO 13526  
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 Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
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TABLE II

OPTIONS WITH ADDITIONAL \$200 MILLION IN FY 1981 (\$750M TOTAL IN FY 1980-81)  
 (\$ in Millions)

Item	Total Price	First Delivery	Last Delivery	PAYMENTS							
				FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87
<u>Option 1</u>											
19 F-16 Aircraft	532	Dec 81	Nov 83	43	128	192	160	9			
700 M60A3 Tanks	1,097	Dec 80	Jul 83	123	436	390	148				
Other New Programs				20	0	68	442	791	800	800	800
Available Credits				186 <sup>1/</sup>	564 <sup>1/</sup>	650 <sup>2/</sup>	750 <sup>3/</sup>	800	800	800	800
<u>Option 2</u>											
80 F-16 Aircraft	1,923 <sup>4/</sup>	Dec 82	Jun 87		49	162	385	532	407	277	111
700 M60A3 Tanks	1,097 <sup>4/</sup>	Dec 80	Jul 83	123	436	390	148				
Other New Programs				77	65	98	217	268	393	523	689
<u>Option 3</u>											
19 F-16 Aircraft	498	Dec 80	May 81	121	377						
185 M60A3 Tanks	259	Dec 80	May 82	79	173	42					
Other New Programs						608	750	800	800	800	800
<u>Option 4</u>											
19 F-15 Aircraft	1,450 <sup>5/</sup>	Dec 83	Sep 84		116	421	653	260			
610 M60A3 Tanks	960 <sup>5/</sup>	Dec 80	Apr 83	123	412	320	115				
Other New Programs				0	0	0	0	540			

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- NOTES: 1/ Sum of FY 80 and FY 81 financing limited to \$750M (\$200M unspent from \$1.5B Peace Package credits and \$550M new credits in FY 81 budget). Except for distribution of \$750M between FY 80 and FY 81, available credits are the same for all four options.
- 2/ Net of \$800M new credits in FY 82 minus \$150M payback of borrowed Peace Package credits.
- 3/ Net of \$800M new credits in FY 83 minus \$50M payback of borrowed Peace Package credits.
- 4/ Ordering both aircraft and tanks in 1980 requires raising limit on cash flow financing from \$1.5B to \$2.7B.
- 5/ Ordering both aircraft and tanks in 1980 requires raising limit on cash flow financing from \$1.5B to \$1.9B.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 JUN 1980

VIA ALPHA CHANNEL

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-82-0217, Box 17, Folder Saudi Arabia (May-  
Jun) 1980.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia -  
Approval to Offer AIM-9L and PATRIOT (S)

(S) A critical aspect of my meeting with Prince Sultan on June 26 in Geneva will be the response I am able to give to Saudi equipment requests. In addition to the answer we give on the Saudi request for F-15 accessories and an aerial refueling capability, I would like your agreement to offer the AIM-9L SIDEWINDER air-to-air missile for use on Saudi F-15s to Prince Sultan. Further, in the mutual interest of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, I would like your agreement to raise the US Army PATRIOT missile system with the Saudis as one we would at some future time (when available) be prepared to consider for sale.

THE PATRIOT:

(S) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and continued political turmoil in Iran have significantly increased the threat to the Kingdom from the East. I am concerned that the Saudi military modernization program must provide for the continuing development of a unilateral Saudi capability to counter this changing regional threat, especially in the vital eastern province oil installations. This system would not only help protect our oil access but be quite valuable in defending forward bases that would be needed by US forces in a Persian Gulf contingency involving the USSR. As a sophisticated modern system, it will also show the Saudis that we are prepared to sell them advanced hardware, yet as a defensive system it should ease (though not avoid) the problem of Israeli political reaction.

(S) The HAWK missile and F-15 aircraft programs were undertaken by the Saudis based on recommendations contained in our 1974 DoD surveys of Saudi defense needs. At the time those recommendations were made, a lesser threat existed to the Kingdom than we perceive today. I plan to use this rationale, coupled with a statement of our long-term confidence in U.S. - Saudi cooperation, as a basis for offering to consider the PATRIOT air defense missile system, which offers greater range and target engagement capability than their I-HAWKS, for sale when available.

Classified by: Sec Def  
Review: 18 June 2000  
Reason: 2-301 c.7.

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Authority: EO12958 as amended  
Date: 28 April 2006  
Chief, Declass Br, Dir & Rec. WHS

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SIGNER'S COPY

330-82-0217, box 17, Saudi Arabia (May-Jun) 1980

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(S) While final production schedules are not yet firm for the PATRIOT, this system could be available for delivery to Saudi Arabia by as early as 1985 if production proceeds according to current planning. I would conclude with an offer for US and Saudi experts to begin examining now appropriate plans for the eventual introduction of this system into the Kingdom. On the issue of PATRIOT, Ed Muskie has not had a chance to comment; by copy of this memo I am asking him to do so.

CONCUR: \_\_\_\_\_

NON-CONCUR: \_\_\_\_\_

THE AIM-9L:


(S) The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is manpower constrained, has a vast territory over which to provide protection, and will have only 60 F-15 aircraft. It is essential that maximum effectiveness be gained by depending upon quality of equipment rather than quantity. The AIM-9L version of the SIDEWINDER represents an increase in capability over the AIM-9P3, which is currently in production for use on the Saudi F-15s, because of its all-aspect capability. The improved seeker and improved warhead of the AIM-9L would enable the RSAF to attack and destroy attacking fighter aircraft in the forward hemisphere (head-on), thus lessening the vulnerability of the Saudi F-15s. The improved probability of kill for the AIM-9L over the AIM-9P3 would actually reduce F-15 SIDEWINDER War Reserve Munitions requirements by just over 20 percent.

(S) Delivery of AIM-9L would probably not occur until 1984 (given production lead-time) if Congressional approval were obtained in 1981. The AIM-9L has already been released to Israel, and is being co-produced by the EPG (European Production Group). We will be selling it also to the Egyptians. The Saudis have expressed interest in acquiring it and we expect to receive their formal request momentarily. I recommend that we inform Prince Sultan of our willingness to move forward during 1981 on the sale of AIM-9L for the RSAF's F-15s, subject to the results of consultations with Congress and the conclusion of a General Security of Information Agreement of the kind we have with other countries. I have a note from Ed Muskie concurring on AIM-9L.

CONCUR: \_\_\_\_\_

NON-CONCUR: \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Secretary of State



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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JUN 18 1980

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc  
330-82-0217, Box 17, Folder Saudi Arabia (May-Jun) 1980.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: F-15 Items for Saudi Arabia

(S) You will remember that at a Friday breakfast late in May, you approved my telling Prince Sultan at our meeting in Geneva next week that we are willing to move forward next year on the sale of both conformal pods and an aerial refueling capability for the F-15s subject to the results from consultations with Congress which would be undertaken at the end of the year. You also agreed that I should tell the Prince that the question of providing multiple ejection racks (MERs) would be considered after the question of providing conformal pods and aerial refueling had been resolved.

(S) I continue to believe that this is the best approach and have incorporated it in the attached expanded talking points. (The talking points also provide for a forthcoming position on the AIM-9L which I have covered in a separate memorandum to you.) I have discussed these talking points with Zbig and Ed Muskie. They agree with the approach with one exception. Ed believes that we should not tell Sultan we will consult the Congress with respect to refueling capability of any kind; he thinks that to do so would carry us too far from my earlier assurances to the Congress and create severe Congressional problems which could impact on the peace process. I recognize the problem -- indeed I feel it strongly since I will be the one who has to tell the Congress that changed conditions have caused me to recommend changing the restrictions I assured them about in April of 1978. But I do not share Ed's conclusion. I believe that, were we to reject both the refueling and MERs requests there would be a very substantial adverse effect on our relations with Saudi Arabia. Both items will be attacked domestically, but in my judgment the refueling capability will be less controversial than MERs, which are associated with an air-to-ground capability rather than an air-defense capability. As you will note from the talking points, I propose to limit my affirmative response on aerial refueling to KC-130 tankers which have relatively limited fuel-carrying capability. If the Saudis ask for more than that I will respond that we would have to consider the matter further.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority EO12958 as amended  
Date 28 April 2006  
Chief, Declass Br, Dir & Rec WHS

Classified by: Sec Def  
Review: 18 June 2000  
Reason: 2-301c.7.

VIA ALPHA CHANNEL

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
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330-82-0217, box 17 Saudi Arabia (May-Jun) 1980

VIA ALPHA CHANNEL

(S) The forthcoming attitude I would express to the Saudis on conformal pods, aerial refueling, and AIM-9L would in all cases be explicitly conditioned on the results of consultations with Congress. In that sense, no commitments are involved. Further, I propose that we make no public announcement at this time but simply say in response to the inevitable inquiries that the Saudi desire to obtain various F-15 accessories is longstanding and well known, that the matter has been discussed with the Saudis periodically over a long period of time, that no sale commitments have been made, and that Congress will certainly be consulted before any are made.

(S) I would appreciate your reaffirmation of your earlier decision to handle the Saudi requests along the lines indicated above and in the attached talking points.



Attachment

cc: Secretary of State

TALKING POINTS

1. A clear commitment was made by Saudi Arabia to the President and Sec Def to accept the F-15s without the additional items. SecDef made an explicit commitment to the Congress on this subject. Without that commitment, there would have been no F-15 sale. Obviously, we cannot depart from that commitment without further Congressional consultation.
2. It is true that the situation has changed in the region, given the collapse of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
3. Although the largest military threat to the area is the Soviet threat -- a threat only the US can handle -- there would be military utility for Saudi Arabia in certain of the additional F-15 items requested.
4. We also appreciate the deep Saudi desire to purchase those items.
5. Accordingly, we are willing to move forward next year on the sale of conformal pods and an aerial refueling capability for the F-15s, subject to the results from consultations with Congress. The outcome of these consultations will affect the timing of any sale.
6. With the same understanding on Congressional consultations, we are also willing to move forward next year on the AIM-9L for the F-15s should you request it, subject to conclusion of a security of information agreement of the kind we have with other countries.
7. Specifically as to aerial refueling,
  - the capability we are prepared to consult Congress about would be to provide Saudi C-130s with boom refueling capability for the F-15s (this could be done with existing or new Saudi C-130s; if existing C-130s were modified, the probe and drogue capability for refueling F-5s would be retained on the same aircraft).
  - although we are prepared to go forward on this item as indicated, we believe we should jointly consider the potential impact on the regional military balance. We have consistently refused to provide such capability to states in the region such as Israel, because we have felt that the long-range strike capability involved would be destabilizing and we did not want to give the Soviet Union reason to provide to its client states in the region such refueling capability as it may develop.
8. It will be a difficult task to gain the necessary consensus during the Congressional consultations, given the previous commitments not to pursue these items (except AIM-9L). But because of the changed circumstances, we believe a good case can be made, and we are prepared to carry out those consultations at the end of this year.
9. After the question of conformal pods and aerial refueling capability has been resolved, we can look at the question of providing MERs which poses much more difficult problems. We have doubts about the wisdom of MERs from a military point of view; perhaps we should engage in a joint study of this issue.



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: 05 MAR 2016

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Your Meetings with the Shah of Iran (U) -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

TIME AND PLACE: Tuesday, 15 November 1977, Working Luncheon, James  
Madison Room, (8th Floor, State Building) 1300-1430  
(discussion could last to 1500) and 1530-1630  
(+ 30 minutes buffer) at Blair House.

(FYI. Issues are likely to be raised by the Shah at either or both of the  
following meetings with you. End FYI)

WORKING LUNCHEON PARTICIPANTS: See Tab B.

BLAIR HOUSE PARTICIPANTS:

US

Secretary of Defense + Mr. *Hansen*  
ASD/ISA McGiffert  
Ambassador Sullivan  
LTG Fish  
DASS/NESA Sober  
DASD Janka -- notetaker  
RADM Hanson

IRAN

Shahanshah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi  
PHONETIC: Pah-la-VEE  
ADDRESSED: Your Imperial Majesty  
Ambassador Zahedi

5 U.S.C. § 552

CHECKLIST:

- Nuclear Energy (raised by State)
- Human Rights (raised by State)
- Indian Ocean (raised by State)
- Purchase of 140 additional F-16s (raised by President in AM)
- Replacement aircraft for F-4s and F-5s (raised by President in AM)
- Release of electronic warfare items (DoD if raised by Shah)
- Coproduction of surface-to-surface missiles (DoD if raised by Shah)
- Command, control and communications (recommend DoD raise)

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 03 Feb 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)  
MDR: 15-M-0292

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330-80-0017, Box 69, Iran 091.112, 1977

EXEMPT PER EO 12958, Sec 3.4 (U) X  
OSD E.S. 212 Date 4 March 2002  
Review/Declassify On: 31 Dec 2027  
Other Agency Equival: TBD

15-M-0292  
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~~(S)~~ SETTING

The Shah's last visit to Washington was in May 1975 at which time he requested the AWACS and participated in a flight of the E-3A. This trip follows the more than two year review process which culminated in the October 1977 signing of the AWACS LOA by the Government of Iran. Fresh on the Shah's mind, therefore, will be the Administration's struggle with the Congress over the Iranian AWACS and what impact that struggle will have on future arms transfer policy regarding Iran.

This visit comes at a time when the mood in Congress clearly calls for restraints in arms sales by the USG in general and to Iran in particular. It can be expected that behind the Shah's requests for particular defense related items will be his search for a signal of reaffirmation of the continuity of USG resolve to continue to serve Iran's military needs -- as perceived by the Shah. Our challenge is to assuage both the Shah and the Congress.

It is expected that the President will personally discuss with the Shah the arms transfer policy in general as it relates to Iran, his decision on the 140 additional F-16s and the replacement aircraft issue. All other defense related issues probably will be deferred to you for discussion at the working luncheon, immediately thereafter with Secretary Vance and Mr. Brzezinski or by you at the Blair House meeting.

BACKGROUND/ANALYSIS

~~(S)~~ Personal Notes and Observations: A stock biography of the Shah is at Tab A. Not included in the biography is that the Shah is a very persuasive individual. This is a key point in that past Administrations have found it extremely difficult to say "no" to the Shah unless it could be clearly shown that the turndown (1) was in the best interests of Iran; (2) was not released to any foreign government; and (3) would be reviewed again in the future. He is also an impatient man who desires to see the results of his White Revolution (discussed later) in his lifetime. He is on a force building timetable that cannot necessarily be reconciled by traditional USG threat analysis. It has been said that the Shah is driven by a great need to prove his worthiness as heir to a long-family tradition of fighting men. The Shah is a self-proclaimed divinely ordained man with a mission, who easily perceives denial as a serious challenge to his self-esteem.

Therefore, in negotiating with the Shah, it may be assumed that any statement or action which might be construed as a personal affront will be so construed by him. Denials must be couched very carefully so as to avoid the implication that the USG does not fully agree with his perceptions of Iran's destiny.

~~(C)~~ The Role of the Iranian Military: The Shah's stated goal is to create by the mid-1980s an Iran comparable to any one of the major nations of Western Europe of the mid-1970s. His White Revolution (as

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opposed to a Red Revolution which suggests blood letting) encompasses land reform, economic development, literacy and public health. The role of his military is multifaceted and related to the White Revolution. He sees modernization of his military first and foremost for defense against any potential enemy. The rapid military modernization is also looked upon as complementing economic development, improving the nation's literacy and improving public health. A large modern military (Tab D) -- encouraged in part by the USG's Guam Doctrine -- is also to provide a symbol of Iran's sovereignty and independence. The Shah's emphasis on his military tends to put a strain on Iran's limited supply of technically trained military manpower. The heavy demand of private industry for trained personnel at higher wages makes it difficult for the armed forces to keep those who are skilled in modern technologies. The Shah is aware of our concerns in these matters and yet has stepped up his military recruiting programs. He sees his military training programs as a major tool in nation building because in many cases the once illiterate and unskilled conscripts are returned to the civilian sector after two years of military duty as more useful citizens.

The backbone of the military is the career noncommissioned and regular officers -- augmented by the "homafar" (a long-term, contracted technical warrant officer type). The officers typically come from the provinces and have a civilian high school education, followed by training at a military academy, one or more service schools and in many cases training in this country (Tab F).

The officer corps as a whole is conservative and by the time one reaches flag rank he has been exposed to the Western culture -- specifically, American. The military is apolitical and strongly loyal to the Shah. The chain of command, to hinder a military coup by an emerging strong military leader, is intentionally diffuse. The Shah personally is "Chief of Staff" of each of the Services with a joint-like Supreme Commanders Staff maintaining only coordination authority with the Services.

As far as military equipment is concerned, the Shah buys only the most modern equipment available (Tab G). He also purchases military equipment from several countries to further his own foreign policy. He purchases vehicles and automatic weapons from the Soviet Union, missiles and tanks from the UK, helicopters from Italy, small arms from Israel and the Swiss, and ships from France. The preponderance of equipment, however, especially aircraft comes from the U.S. Although he prefers American equipment, he has gone and will go elsewhere if necessary.

Despite much discussion on the subject, it is believed the USG has little leverage over Iran when it comes to the Shah's plans for modernizing its military.

~~(S)~~ Iran's Foreign Relations:

The Shah, although pro-Western, maintains a balanced approach in international affairs -- as indicated in part by his third country arms

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purchases discussed above. Additionally, he has sought and consummated economic agreements with Iran's historical "enemies." Nonetheless, he worries about the Soviet Union and its influence in Iraq's radical regime and Soviet influence in Afghanistan. He is particularly concerned with the current problem of leadership in Pakistan, fearing that a collapse there will invite Soviet intervention.

While we in the USG strain to articulate specific Iranian threats in order to determine the validity of Iranian military hardware requests, the Shah is looking as far as 30 years into the future to develop capabilities of meeting any threat -- which we cannot begin to define now. Therefore, given the Shah's other reasons for acquiring a modern military and the impossibility of conjuring future threats to Iran, attempting to justify his purchases on threat analysis alone could be a futile exercise. Nonetheless, discussion of the U.S. perception of Iran's current threat is at Tab E.

One of the other reasons, alluded to above, for acquiring a modern military is related to the Shah's objective of becoming the dominant power and arbiter in the Persian Gulf. He sees this as an economic necessity in that he believes that only Iran can defend the vital oil routes through the Strait of Hormuz -- through which pass most of the oil for the Western world and Japan. Moreover, recent Soviet and Cuban incursions into Africa have alarmed the Shah, causing him to expand his scope of interest along those oil routes well into the Indian Ocean. We are unaware of any U.S. official discouragement of the Shah's recent utterances on this subject. Our silence in this matter, especially in view of our discussions with the Soviets regarding superpower demilitarization of the Indian Ocean (Tab I), could form the basis for undeclared U.S. support for the Shah's "new" Indian Ocean philosophy.

Close relations with the U.S. remain the cornerstone to the Shah's foreign policy. His perceptions formed on this visit could very well influence our relationships with Iran over the near term. If he is led to believe that the President's arms transfer policy and the mood in Congress have caused a swing in our historic and traditional relationship, we may find him very difficult to deal with in regards to present and future desired U.S. rights, authorizations and facilities arrangements in Iran. We have been unsuccessful generally in convincing the Congress that U.S./Iranian relationships have increased in importance following the Turkey/Greece conflict, vis-a-vis, potential USG objectives in Iran. We must begin to articulate exactly what our national security objectives are relative to Iran. A suggested starting point is to reconcile differing U.S./Iranian understandings of the 1959 Bilateral Agreement (Tab J) between the USG and GOI. The Shah views this agreement as a USG commitment to meet Iran's defense needs, while the USG believes that it merely provided the USG a vehicle to become involved with the Central Treaty Organization of the UK, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan (CENTO). Identical agreements were signed with Turkey and Pakistan. Additional politico-military prognosis information is at Tab K.

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(U) COURTESY POINT

If you have not had the opportunity to listen to the Shah's viewpoints on the politico-military situation in his region, you may want to begin with a request for his evaluation of the situation in his area of interest. (The Shah received his annual DIA regional balance briefing from LTG Tighe mid-Oct 77)

~~(S)~~ ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

1. Purchase of 140 Additional F-16s

Three years ago the Shah first expressed interest in acquiring 300 F-16 aircraft to augment his Air Force. In early 1976 he divided this request into two segments as a result of financial pressures owing to a temporary oil lifting shortfall. The initial purchase was to be limited to 160 aircraft of which we notified the Congress that year. Shortly after we made the notification, he added the remaining 140 planes to his request. We advised Congress of the request for 300 F-16s, but did not increase the sale proposal to include the additional aircraft. The Shah plans that 160 F-16s will provide a two-for-one ratio with his 80 expensive F-14s (in accord with the U.S. concept of high-low mix). The 140 F-16s at a cost of about \$2 billion would be deployed mainly at the new bases Iran is constructing in the south and the east.

USG Position

(FYI. No Presidential decision was made at the time of this writing. Also the President's "going in" position could be modified during his personal meeting with the Shah. End FYI)

It is anticipated that we will agree in principal to supply 140 additional F-16s at the rate of four per month as a continuation of the delivery of Iran's first order for 160 aircraft. Therefore the second increment would start about mid-1983. We would however choose the timing of sending the formal notification to Congress between now and 1980.

Your Talking Points

-Your Imperial Majesty, I believe the President informed you of our willingness to agree in principle in providing the additional 140 F-16s.

--but would retain flexibility in our formal notification of Congress between now and 1980

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- This would allow us to measure the pulse of Congress and better manage a perceived balanced world-wide arms sale reduction.
- Even if we had to wait until 1980 for the notification this would not impact on a smooth F-16 delivery schedule for Iran.
- Because of production limitations and other commitments we could not support more than four F-16s per month for foreign military sales.
- This would allow the second F-16 increment to follow in tandem with the first 160 F-16 increment -- which ends about mid 1983.

#### Alternative USG Position

No commitment for 140 additional F-16s now. We will study the request later.

#### Your Talking Points

- Your Imperial Majesty, I believe the President informed you of his decision to restudy your request for 140 additional F-16s.
- I assure you that this decision, which I support, does not signal a USG change in our policy toward Iran.
- The President indicated continuity of US/Iranian relationships when despite his vowed pledge to reduce arms worldwide, he vigorously supported Iran's request for seven AWACS.
- But it is exactly that reason, why we must show restraint now.
- To submit another major arms request to Congress at this time would be counterproductive.
  - Congress may disapprove the request.
  - It would dilute the President's credibility in his attempt to reduce arms worldwide, thereby reducing the importance of any future requests pertaining to Iran.
- I note that the approved 160 F-16s will continue to arrive in Iran until mid-1983.
- Therefore, we have until mid-1980 to decide.

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## 2. Replacement Aircraft for F-4s and F-5s

Although Iran is still taking delivery of 209 F-4s and 169 F-5s, the Shah desires to replace both aircraft in the mid-1980s. Candidates are F-16s for the F-5s and the F-18A, F-16, F-15, Europe's multirole combat aircraft (MRCA or TORNADO) and the MIRAGE 2000 for the F-4s. The USG previously had denied 250 F-18Ls as a replacement for the F-4 on PD-13 grounds. The Shah appears to favor the F-18A.

### USG Position

(FYI. No Presidential decision was made at the time of this writing. Also the President's "going in" position could be modified during his personal meeting with the Shah. End FYI)

With the exception of 28 F-4Ds, both the F-4s and F-5s have useful lives until the early 1990s. We would prefer that the Shah keep these capable aircraft at least until the late 1980s for absorptive capacity reasons. Nonetheless, it would still be premature to make specific commitments on types of replacement aircraft for the mid-1980's. Moreover, it would be a PD-13 exception to commit the F-18A until it became operational in our own forces -- about 1982.

### Your Talking Points (agreement in principle)

- Let me assure His Imperial Majesty, that the Department of Defense agrees with long range planning for modernization of military forces.
- And we agree in principle to replace Iran's American aircraft with follow-on American aircraft.
- I would like to point out that our long range plans call for employing the F-4s, a very capable aircraft, into the 1990s and we will be logistically supporting other nations' F-4s into the 1990s.
- We would hope that Iran would therefore keep this capable aircraft with growth potential until the early 1990s.
- The F-18A may not be operational until about 1982, therefore, I cannot make any commitment for that aircraft until we are certain where we are going with it.
- We are prepared, however, to indicate our willingness to discuss specific types, amounts and delivery schedules when we get within three to four years of initial delivery.

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~~SECRET~~Alternative Talking Points (no agreement in principle)

- Let me assure His Imperial Majesty, that the Department of Defense agrees with long range planning for modernization of military forces.
- I would like to point out that our long range plans call for employing the F-4s, a very capable aircraft, into the 1990s and we will be logistically supporting other nations' F-4s into the 1990s.
- We would hope that Iran would therefore keep this capable aircraft with growth potential until the early 1990s.
- The F-18A may not be operational until about 1982, therefore, I cannot make any commitment for that aircraft until we are certain where we are going with it.
- I share the President's view that the USG should be sympathetic to Iran's need to replace its aging force with American aircraft when necessary -- but that it is just too soon to address the specifics.

3. Electronic Warfare (ALQ 131 and PAVESPIKE) and COMSEC Releasability:

The Government of Iran has repeatedly sought a more liberal, blanket policy concerning the release of advanced electronic warfare equipment and training. DoD periodically has re-evaluated our position and reaffirmed a policy of case-by-case review. Nonetheless, the Shah is expected to press for a liberal overall policy and the latest in technology and training in order to establish credible capabilities in ECCM and Signal intelligence (SIGINT). He may also press for the latest communications security (COMSEC) equipment.

USG Position ~~(NOFORN)~~

The areas of electronic warfare (EW) and COMSEC encompass the most sensitive equipment and procedures in the USG arsenal. Despite this, we have been very liberal on a case-by-case basis, on what we have released already to GOI. The joint EW program recommended by the MAAG and cleared by our own Joint Electronic Warfare Coordinating Group and the recent decision on COMSEC by the interagency US/COMSEC Board (U.S. commercial only) represent programs suitable to Iran's needs. We must preserve a policy of case-by-case review to protect USG interests.

Your Talking Points

- With regard to COMSEC, we have just formed a joint US Army, Navy and Air Force team that will work with US industry to

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develop commercial equipment that is compatible with SPRUANCE, AWACS, TSQ-73 Missile Minder (command and control for I HAWK), and other weapons systems, and suitable to prevent compromise of your tactics and our systems' capabilities.

--My appropriate agencies will certify that the selected equipment does provide sufficient protection from compromise and will allow interoperability of weapons systems before we recommend specific purchases to Iran.

-Also, I believe, the joint EW program developed by the MAAG in cooperation with the Iranian Services is a good program.

-We will continue to evaluate each Iranian request and will look favorably on approving those items which are releasable to our friends.

(FYI: Should the Shah press for reconsideration of PAVE SPIKE (TAB N) and the ECM Pod, ALQ 131 previously denied, use the following Talking Points. The Shah believes -- erroneously -- that Israel has approval for the ALQ 131. End FYI)

-We have re-evaluated the previous denials on PAVE SPRIKE and LATAR and we may be prepared to release price and availability on them (TAB N).

--approval of the sale, however, may require Congressional notification.

-The ALQ 131 pod has yet to be fully integrated into our own forces. Therefore, we have not released it to any foreign government.

#### 4. Coproduction (TAB P)

The GOI currently has USG approval to coproduce Bell 214 helicopters, TOW missiles and launchers, MAVERICK (AGM 65A) missiles and to repair F-4 components. Under review are coproduction arrangements for 2.75 in. rockets and an M-47 Tank modernization program. We have, despite repeated requests, denied coproduction arrangements and sale of the AGM 65B. HARPOON, REDEYE and STINGER missile coproduction arrangements also have been denied. (Moreover, REDEYE and STINGER and encapsulated HARPOON have not been released to Iran.) The Shah desires to enhance his defense industry by seeking other coproduction arrangements. He is currently negotiating with Israel (TAB P) and is expected to seek an arrangement with the U.S. on a surface-to-surface missile.

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USG Position

PD-13 prohibits coproduction arrangements with non-exempt countries on all but high usage spare parts and minor assembly of subcomponents. Because of absorptive capacity considerations and possible economic disadvantages for the U.S., no new coproduction arrangement commitments with Iran should be made now.

Your Talking Points:

-The President's arms transfer policy which he has committed his Administration to implement, allows coproduction arrangements only for high usage spare parts and assembly of subcomponents where "significant weapons, equipment, or major components" are concerned.

-My research and engineering organization is presently examining possible coproduction arrangements within the scope of the President's arms transfer policy.

(FYI. If raised by the Shah, acknowledge that this examination includes a review of Iranian request for coproduction of 2.75 inch rockets and on M-47 tank modernization programs. End FYI).

-I note that in the past we have approved coproduction arrangements on Bell 214 helicopters, MAVERICK AGM 65A missiles and TOW missiles and launchers -- as well as approving Iranian repair of F-4 components.

-But until our review is complete, and the limits of the new policy more clearly defined, I do not believe we can make any specific additional comments.

5. WILD WEASEL/SHRIKE

WILD WEASEL (TAB T) is a specially modified ECCM aircraft for seeking and destroying surface-to-air missile (SAM)/radar complexes. We expect the Shah may request this system now because impending F-4 production line closing requires a foreign government's decision to buy F-4s by December 1977. We do not know what specific number of aircraft he has in mind, but estimate that the number would be enough to equip at least one American size squadron (18 aircraft). This would be enough to form two Iranian squadrons of F-4 WILD WEASEL aircraft.

USG Position:

WILD WEASEL can be considered an offensive weapon system which would be difficult under normal circumstances to sell under the security assistance program. Moreover much of its EW equipment and associated tactics are unreleasable.

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Your Talking Points:

- The WILD WEASEL is a specially modified aircraft with systems considered by many as offensive in that the aircraft is designed to cross borders to seek out and destroy fixed missile complexes.
- Specially designed aircraft for offensive missions are not available for sale.
- There is a valid need, however, for a nation to be able to counter mobile SAM emplacements that penetrate borders.
- Therefore, there are some models of an anti-radiation missile (ARM) that we may be prepared to consider (SHRIKE).
  - These missiles can be loaded on your present aircraft and would provide you a capability against mobile SAM sites.
  - This, of course, may also be subject to a review by our Congress.

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6. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C<sup>3</sup>)

(FYI. If the situation presents itself this subject should be raised by you. End FYI).

OSD  
3.3(b)(1)

General Azhari, Commander of the Iranian SCS -- Supreme Commanders Staff (a JCS-like coordinating staff but without command authority), in 1975 requested a command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) team to assist Iran to develop a national C<sup>2</sup> capability. On the eve of departure of the OSD level team, Ambassador Helms cancelled the team, reportedly at the request of General Toufanian, Iranian Vice Minister of War. The request has periodically been raised since then -- most recently this past summer. This time, however, Ambassador Sullivan and General Toufanian are in agreement that help is required to establish a C<sup>2</sup> program which will net or electronically link [REDACTED] the commercial Bell International satellite communications system, AWACS, ground radars, I HAWK missiles, UK RAPIER Missiles, data link and non-data link fighters and Naval systems such as SPRUANCE. This request is fraught with danger of enmeshing us in Iranian parochialisms. Do we net these systems under the Imperial Iranian Air Force which its commander desires, or under the Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) for maritime operations which the IIN commander may desire, or under the SCS Commander who has no command authority, or under a non-existent joint command? Seasoned Iranian watchers believe that the Shah intentionally wants the Services to be separately commanded by him -- to diminish the likelihood of a coup. If this is indeed fact, then a logical joint integration of systems into a well planned C<sup>2</sup> or C<sup>3</sup> (plus communications) architecture is indeed a very difficult if not an unresolvable problem.

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USG Position

Before C<sup>3</sup> interfaces are addressed, doctrinal issues must be resolved. Logical joint integration of systems would suggest establishment of joint battle commands under a well defined National Command Authority (NCA). Only the Shah can decide these doctrinal issues which are basic and preliminary to designing C<sup>3</sup> architecture.

Your Talking Points:

(FYI. This is a delicate subject. We believe an organizational structure must be designed first which will have command and control over combined land, sea, and air forces before the weapon systems purchased by Iran can be effectively netted. However, it is not for the USG to recommend foreign military organizational structures. End FYI.)

-Your Imperial Majesty, we have an Iranian request for assistance in integrating all your data link and voice systems into a command and control system with appropriate communications security.

--Our DoD jargon refers to this as C<sup>3</sup> for command, control and communications.

-C<sup>3</sup> is a function of a command structure beginning with what we call the National Command Authority.

-In our case, the National Command Authority is exercised by the President or me directly to the joint or unified commands and finally down to the combat unit commander.

--JCS are the agents.

--Our combat unit commander is under command and control of his unified or joint commander, not his military service.

-As I understand the Iranian command structure in Iran, the National Command Authority begins with the Shahanshah and goes directly to each of the Services -- and there are no joint commands. However,

--to effectively use weapons systems requires integration which would suggest joint battle staffs. At any rate, the answer to this organizational question determines the systems architecture.

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- This poses a problem which we believe only the Shahanshah can solve.
- Although we have asked our JCS to recommend options for C<sup>3</sup> there still remains the doctrinal issue of command structure which must first be addressed at the highest level.
- It is not for the U.S. Government to recommend the establishment of joint commands.
- It would also be difficult for us to recommend integration of systems -- for example, netting AWACS/SPRUANCE/FIGHTERS for maritime operations without first knowing what organization will have command authority over maritime operations involving aircraft -- or for that matter ground operations involving aircraft.
- We seek your advise in this matter.

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*D.E.M.*

David E. McGiffert  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
International Security Affairs

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Washington National Records  
Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-89-0017, Box 69,  
Folder Iran 091.112, 1977.

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INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: DEC 24 2014

SUBJECT: The Shah of Iran Meeting with Secretary of Defense Brown

TIME & PLACE: 1530 to 1635 hours, 15 November 1977, Blair House

Attendees

United States

The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
ASD/ISA McGiffert  
Ambassador Sullivan  
LTG Fish  
DASS/NESA Sober  
DASD/NEASA Janka -- notetaker  
RADM Hanson

Iran

Shahanshah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi  
Ambassador Zahedi  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 24 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: ☒ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0243

The Shah began by stating that our two countries have an extensive relationship together which he explained in some detail to the President and Secretary Vance this morning. He also repeated why Iran cannot take any chances with its security. There is no time to mobilize forces and there are enemies on all sides who want to destroy Iran. However, Iran is very important to the Western World because of its dependence upon the energy it produces. He also said that the Strait of Hormuz will be very important to the flow of the world's oil. Five-to-ten years from now Iran will be a nation of fifty million people with lots of oil, natural gas, steel, and petroleum chemical industries. If plans work out, Iran will be a pillar in Western Asia and can help create a zone of peace and stability. Iran would be contributing its strength to the Northern tier of the Indian Ocean and the Western tier of Asia. Looking beyond that region, Iran hopes that South Africa will get itself disentangled from the awkward position in which they have put themselves. The Shah indicated this morning that he was discussing SALT II with Secretary Vance, and had a question he could not answer. Why are the Soviets being cooperative on SALT now? Is it for economic reasons? Is it part of a desire to reach strategic parity which will give them great conventional superiority? The Shah would answer this challenge by looking for unity in Western Europe along with the improvement of the European economies, the defeat of terrorism and most im-

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
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DECLASSIFY ON undetermined

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EXEMPT PER EO 12958, Sec 3.4 (b) (1)  
OSD F&E 212 Date 4 March 2002  
Review/Declassify On: 31 Dec 2027  
Other Agency Equity: TBD



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portantly, to have the Europeans show their will to defend the continent. Turkey must be brought back into the Western Alliance so that we can couple it with Iran's strength. Looking to the East, the Shah believes that China will always be nationalistic and will act on its own interests against the Soviet Union.

As for Iran's concerns, the Shah said that Iran has a legitimate defense need. The Shah said that he understood, and even sympathized with our Administration's announced policy of reducing global arms sales. But this understanding does not solve his legitimate needs for a strong defense for Iran. Therefore, we need to see what can be done to meet these needs. How much can the U.S. supply? The Shah said that he preferred to have American supplies and especially preferred American equipment for the Air Force which is very oriented toward America. As a demonstration of this American orientation he plans to send his son to a United States Air Force school this summer as part of his military training. After that, he will also be initiated into the activities of the other Services. If we agree, that is his plan.

Secretary Brown indicated that this can be arranged.

The Shah then referred to his discussion at lunch. There are 7,000 kilometers of land borders. He asked what then are Iran's calculations for the defense of its airspace and how many aircraft will be necessary, both day and night, to defend those extensive borders? He said that it is a 24-hour job. He went on to say that some of Iran's potential enemies have weapons that Iran does not have, such as surface-to-surface missiles and extensive surface-to-air missile defense systems. He said he recognizes that if there is an unprovoked attack from the other side they will have some initial success and that the only way Iran can strike back quickly is to neutralize their strike capabilities, to hit their facilities for launching attacks, and to defend Iran's skys against their intrusions. He said that some of Iran's enemies have MIG-23s and may even be getting MIG-25s and knows that the Soviets have huge quantities of other weapons--tanks, planes--they will be anxious to sell for cash. These weapons will be moving into the forces of Iran's enemies. He said that Iran must attach great importance to, given the huge distances in Iran, airlift capability since it takes one month for a division to cross Iran. There must be some standing army forces everywhere in Iran and also capability to beef up those forces by rapid airlift if needed. But, the Shah went on to say, this airlift activity requires tight air defenses, so for at least the next five years or more Iran must ask if we will be willing to provide even the bare minimum for Iran's air defense forces and striking back capability. Iran's current air defenses are based upon the F-16 and the F-14s armed with the PHOENIX missile. In this connection, the Shah said that he heard the Germans are working on an improved SPARROW missile for the F-16.

Secretary Brown replied that something like that will be needed to give the F-16 an all-weather capability, but not for all Iran's forces. It must be realized that most of the attacking forces are equipped for daylight fighting only.

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The Shah then went on to say that to defend the tremendous airspace even with AWACS and air-refueling capability, Iran must worry about seven times as much air space as Germany.

Secretary Brown said that he realized there is some need to worry about attacks from all quarters, but that threat is only in the future. For example, there is no present danger from air attacks along the Eastern border.

The Shah said that the minimum numbers of aircraft decided upon is 300 F-16s along with 80 F-14s and 188 F-5s, but that these F-5s should be replaced. He understands that the F-4 aircraft will be good until the 1990s. He said that if we are going to build the F-14 with the new engine, that he would forget about replacing the F-5s and instead to add enough additional F-14s to yield a ratio of one-to-two F-14s to F-16s. He would then need an additional 70 F-14s for the air defense forces. He would wait until after 1985 to discuss how to replace the F-4s, but that he will need something to replace the 28 F-4Ds which are being diverted for use as laser designator aircraft.

The Shah said that he will also need ECM equipment and the WILD WEASEL aircraft with the HARM missile to go after the enemy SAMs and their SCUDs.

Secretary Brown stated that the Shah meant going after the enemy SCUDs before they are launched and going through the enemy's air defenses. The Secretary stated that we have not even decided ourselves whether to buy the HARM missile yet. He reminded the Shah that the WILD WEASEL is designed to go after fixed missile sites and therefore it raises questions of offensive capability. He went on to say that HARM is still in the early stages of development and these two items represent a whole different category of weaponry than have been discussed so far.

With respect to ECM equipment, Secretary Brown said that we have been very careful not to put our most advanced equipment into the field where we run the risk of compromising it. He said that Iran already has the 119 equipment and the 131 POD is not yet in our own forces, therefore, the Shah could see that it is a question of timing in most of these cases. We are ourselves using the SHRIKE missile until we made a decision with regard to HARM.

The Shah said that the SHRIKE has a problem with short range.

Secretary Brown said that nevertheless, it is all that we have operable right now. He added that we have not decided ourselves on the question of developing the F-14B because we are having difficulty deciding on the F-18, the A-7, or the A-18 versus a new F-14 with up-graded engines. He said that if we go with the F-18 and A-18, we probably won't upgrade the F-14 engines. The problems with the TF-30 engine have been resolved and it now works quite well but still does not have enough thrust to make the F-14 a fighter, which of course, it was not designed to be. Secretary Brown said the question of a new engine will not be decided until well into next year.

Secretary Brown then deferred the matter of additional aircraft to the Shah's talks with the President later.

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Secretary Brown then went on to indicate our desire to reduce arms sales but said that we realize that there are countries where we have real security interests in building up their defenses. He pointed to problems with our Congress and referred to the beating we took on the AWACS sale. He said we therefore have to be very cautious with regard to new sales and they will have to be spread out over a longer period of time and to discuss this with the President. Secretary Brown said that after mid-1983 we will have the capability to produce F-16s beyond the 160 request. Therefore, we have lots of time to make a decision. D2W.

Secretary Brown said that we will certainly want to study carefully the Shah's idea of letting the F-5s go out of inventory in advance of acquiring more F-14s supported by the F-16. He pointed out that the F-5s have lots of life left in them and that the MIG-25 is used more for surveillance.

The Shah then agreed that there is time to pursue these matters and we should stay in close contact. He then stated that he intended to go with whatever we decide on the YC-14 or YC-15 for air transport.

Secretary Brown replied that we may in fact go for a new C-130 because it is so much cheaper, and in that case, Iran may want to think about prepositioning large equipment. He said we may make a decision on new transport aircraft in the 1979 budget within six weeks, or could decide to delay any buy for another year. Both agreed that even though the C-130 is about five inches too narrow that they are cheap. The Shah indicated that if the C-130 was chosen that he would need many more of them than the YC-14 or YC-15.

The Shah then went on to request help in establishing arms industries in Iran and asked if there was any possibility of allowing Iran to coproduce the DRAGON, in addition to the already approved TOW and MAVERICK. Secretary Brown said that we have not looked into coproduction of the DRAGON but we do have a policy that strongly discourages coproduction agreements. He said we looked on these requests on a case-by-case basis and we will take a hard look at the DRAGON issue.

The Shah then pointed to the coproduction contract with Bell on the 214 helicopter, and said that Iran needs permission for coproduction of a newer model of helicopter, the 214-B, for higher altitude operation. Secretary Brown said that in all of these matters we have to look at the question of technology transfer, and we have to look at each issue on a case-by-case basis.

The Shah responded that if Iran can get these kinds of things from the U.S. that he is not going to start an aircraft industry in Iran. However, he does want to develop extensive maintenance facilities if he can get the aircraft that he needs from the U.S. He does want to manufacture helicopters, however.

With regard to the Navy, the Shah said that Iran is waiting for the SPRUANCES and is also looking for the best Escort Destroyer to go with them. In the Indian Ocean Iran can provide air cover, especially with its refueling capability. He said he may need a few more tankers and additional 707s to help with logistics problems, but they cannot take the place of the YC-14 or YC-15.

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The Shah said that the ability of the Iranian fleet to move deep into the Indian Ocean will contribute to stability in that region.

Secretary Brown pointed to the discussions with the Soviet Union on Indian Ocean arms limitations looking towards a reduction of our fleets. The Shah said with less of our presence there is more of a requirement for Iran to be there with strength. He then said that the training on the SPRUANCES and the submarines is going quite well and is on schedule. The Shah said that Iran is buying some 1300 ton submarines from the Germans which are small but quite good and that no fleet can do without submarines.

Secretary Brown agreed that a fleet needs good air defenses and ASW capability.

The Shah said that Iran can pretty well control the Persian Gulf with existing aircraft and patrol boats and helicopters even though Iraq may have the super French Frelon helicopters armed with EXOCET missiles.

The Shah said that he is awaiting new British engines for his tanks and that the new 1200 horsepower engine is quite good, but now there is a problem with the transmission. He said that he recognizes that the future is with turbine engines and has asked the U.S. for one. He said that if the sale is agreeable to us that the engine change can be worked at the same time as Iran works with the British to solve the transmission problem.

Secretary Brown responded that the fit is probably alright, but the power train is a question and that we have not yet looked at that problem.

The Shah then spoke about the Soviets bringing into their inventory and on to Iran's borders the T-72 which he said is a very good tank. He said Iran is planning to adapt to Iran's tanks the very accurate 120mm British gun, which is accurate up to 3,000 meters versus 1500 for the Soviet gun. The Shah said that he did not plan to attack tanks only with other tanks but to attack from the air and with infantry armed with TOWs and DRAGONS. Secretary Brown said that we have much the same concept and we are also looking into minelaying by artillery in order to lay down mine fields in front of attacking tanks.

The Shah then said that Iran will have to augment the number of guns in its artillery forces because the Russians put great emphasis on huge numbers of artillery in their forces. He pointed out that against the Finns, they had one gun for every meter. Iran is asking for more self-propelled 155s and will also need the extended range gun we are working on. He said that he informed us that Iran is working with the Israelis to develop some kind of missiles but is stopping short of developing some of the longer range missiles they would like to build. He said Iran is reluctant to get involved because of their policy toward Middle East peace settlement. He said that instead Iran is staying within the range of the simple rockets, about 70 kilometers, a range they already have. Secretary Brown agreed that long range missiles would create real problems in the Middle East context and political problems in the United States. The Shah said, moreover, Israel already has the LANCE missile.

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The Shah went on to say that he is buying some Soviet equipment and APCs in particular are excellent. He said a newly acquired one has the 73mm smooth-bore gun, and a 3,000 meter wire-guided missile. The Shah said that he is now thinking of developing a supersonic laser-guided antitank missile. The Shah said when he visited Czechoslovakia recently they showed him their Soviet supplied equipment. On the basis of that visit the Shah thinks Iran's land armies could face any non-nuclear forces in the region. He said he would never surrender, would face any threatening forces and that everyone in the region knows this.

Secretary Brown then raised the issue of command, control and communication. He said that we have been asked to help design a C<sup>3</sup> system for Iran to integrate forces with voice and data transmission systems. He pointed out that this is a very challenging task which every military organization faces and we have found that in designing such a system we need to know first how the command and control itself will work in operation. Secretary Brown said that in this country we have the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with unified and specified commands, which include some regional commands. Secretary Brown said that as he understands that there is nothing comparable in Iran to integrate commands. He said our people are excited about building such a plan for Iran but we would need to know Iran's organization. The Shah replied that in Iran the Commander-in-Chief is also the Head of State, and as such, he issues orders through his Chief of General Staff, who in turn, issues orders to the three services. He pointed out that the Shah and Crown Prince are professional soldiers.

Secretary Brown said that in the United States orders do not go to the Services-- Instead they go to the Joint Commands.

The Shah said that he is going to set up four army commands in the Central, East, West and South regions. The orders will go directly from the Shah through the General Staff to each army, but separate orders will also go to the Air Force.

Secretary Brown responded by saying that our concern is how the land armies will communicate with the Air Force. If a command and control system is not set up from the beginning one could have problems where forces in the field can only communicate by going back up to headquarters. However, we cannot tell your country how to organize its forces. The Shah said that Iran could create special task forces or authorize the units to communicate with each other. Secretary Brown agreed, but said that Iran must first design that system. The Shah replied that that is why we should ask USAF/ESD to do it. He then added that he planned to set up headquarters in the north and in the south.

Ambassador Sullivan said that there are two different teams with two different tasks to carry out. The ESD team is for developing security for the air defense system. He said there will be a second team for command and control but that we needed to know more about Iran's needs on the latter subject.

The Shah then said that he can sum it up by pointing out that direct orders flow from the Shah to the General Staff to the land forces and armies, but for joint operations a task force will be formed to get orders direct; otherwise Iran would need our advice on communicating among the services.

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Secretary Brown responded that he raised this only to alert the Shah to the problem and that only he can answer it. The Shah repeated that this was his answer and that he will await our recommendations now.

Secretary Brown concluded that it is very useful to know Iran's overall needs since we need this to present to our Congress. He said that it is useful to lay them all out comprehensively for us to decide what we can do to meet Iran's needs. We need to work out a comprehensive picture over a period of years and that the Shah can be assured that we in the United States Government fully understand how important our two countries are to each other's security.

The Shah closed by saying thank you, and that he enjoyed the meeting.

The meeting ended at 1635 hours.

Approved:


  
The Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA

Date: 11/22/77

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Prepared by:

  
Leslie A. Janka  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Near Eastern, African, and  
South Asian Affairs, ISA

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~~SECRET SPECAT SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 10383~~~~EXDIS~~~~MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE~~~~E.O. 11652: GDS~~

TAGS: PGOV PINS ELAB IR

SUBJ: AUDIENCE WITH SHAH, OCT 24

1. WHEN I TOOK DEPSEC DEFENSE DUNCAN TO CALL ON SHAH MORNING OCT 24, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE IMPERIAL ATTENTION WAS SERIOUSLY DISTRACTED FROM ANY DISCUSSION OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT MATTERS. SHAH LET TOUFANIAN DO MOST OF THE TALKING AND THEN BROUGHT AUDIENCE TO AN END IN LESS THAN THIRTY MINUTES. HOWEVER, HE ASKED ME TO STAY BEHIND.

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2. TO MY SURPRISE, WE WERE THEN JOINED BY BRITISH AMBASSADOR (WHO LATER TOLD ME HE HAD BEEN SUMMONED QUITE UNEXPECTEDLY). SHAH SAID HE WISHED REVIEW CURRENT SITUATION WITH THE TWO OF US AND WOULD VALUE OUR CANDID ADVICE.

3. WE THEN WENT THROUGH A TWO HOUR SESSION WHICH LOOKED AT ALL THE MAJOR PROBLEMS CURRENTLY FACING IRAN AND EXAMINED SEVERAL OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THEM. THE ONLY INTERRUPTIONS WERE THREE TELEPHONE CALLS TO THE SHAH REPORTING INCIDENTS IN QOM AND AHWAZ.

4. IT SEEMS THAT THE PRIMARY STIMULUS FOR THIS UNUSUAL MEETING WAS THE CONTINUING STRIKE AT NIOC PRODUCTION AND REFINING FACILITIES IN AHWAZ AND ABADAN. SHAH SAID THAT HUSHANG ANSARY, WHO WAS STILL IN AHWAZ, HAD BEEN "IMPRISONED" NIGHT OF OCT 23 BY CLERICAL STAFF OF OSCO AND HAD "ESCAPED" ONLY BY RUNNING OUT A BACK DOOR WHEN HE HAD GONE TO TAKE A TELEPHONE CALL. HE SAID TECHNICIANS AND LABORERS WERE PREPARED TO RETURN TO WORK, BUT CLERICAL STAFF WAS PROLONGING THE STRIKE BY INSISTING ON "POLITICAL" RATHER THAN ECONOMIC DEMANDS. HE SAID STRIKE LEADERS WERE YOUNG, JUNIOR "CLERKS" WHO HAD ARROGATED CONTROL OF THE ACTION TO THEMSELVES. HE CLAIMED THERE WAS ALREADY A 600,000 BARREL LOSS OF NIOC PRODUCTION OCTOBER 23.

5. BEYOND THIS SITUATION, HE SAID HE WAS CONCERNED BY RIOTS IN HAMADAN, UNREST AT THE UNIVERSITIES, AND THE CONSTANT STREET DEMONSTRATIONS BY SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS. THE REPORTS FROM QOM WHICH CAME IN WHILE WE TALKED TOLD OF "SNIPER FIRE" FROM THE TOPS OF BUILDINGS WHICH HAD ALREADY WOUNDED THREE OR FOUR SOLDIERS.

6. FACED WITH ALL THIS, SHAH SAID HE WAS REVIEWING SEVERAL OPTIONS. ONE WAS TO INSTALL A MILITARY GOVT. HE PERSONALLY FELT THIS WAS A NON-STARTER. THE MILITARY COULD NOT EVEN BEGIN TO RUN THE OIL INDUSTRY. IF THEY TRIED, EVERYTHING ELSE WOULD SHUT DOWN AND THEY WOULD HAVE TO TRY TO RUN THE WHOLE NATION. AT BEST, A "MILITARY SOLUTION" WOULD BE A VERY SHORT-TERM FIX.

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7. ANOTHER OPTION, HE SAID, WOULD BE TO TRY A COALITION GOVT. HE HAD NO RPT NO CONFIDENCE SUCH A MEASURE WOULD SUCCEED. FIRST, HE DID NOT KNOW HOW "LOYAL" SUCH A COALITION WOULD BE. SECOND, HE HAD NO ASSURANCES ABOUT THEIR COMPETENCE. BUT, SUCH A MOVE MIGHT HAVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS WHICH WOULD CALM DOWN THE CURRENT "FRENZY." HE ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS.

8. BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND I, IN MUTUALLY REINFORCING STATEMENTS, SAID THE FOLLOWING:

(A) WE DID NOT RPT NOT SEE THE SITUATION QUITE AS DARKLY AS THE SHAH. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE DISRUPTIONS, LIFE WAS GOING ON MORE OR LESS NORMALLY IN MOST OF THE COUNTRY. PEOPLE WERE AT WORK, SERVICES CONTINUED, SHOPS WERE OPEN, ETC. WE ADMITTED THAT THE NIOC STRIKE AND THE INDISCIPLINE AMONG SCHOOL CHILDREN WERE TROUBLING, BUT NOT NECESSARILY FATAL.

(B) WE AGREED THAT A "MILITARY SOLUTION" IS A NON-STARTER. IT WOULD MERELY CREATE WORSE PRESSURES, WHICH  
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MILITARY ~~HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE~~

MIGHT LEAD TO A REAL EXPLOSION.

(C) WE HAD VERY LITTLE BASIS ON WHICH TO JUDGE THE COMPETENCE OR LOYALTY OF THOSE WHO MIGHT ENTER A "COALITION" GOVT. WE NOTED SOME POLITICIANS WERE CONSULTING IN PARIS WITH KHOMEINI. HOWEVER, LATTER SEEMED TO BE ADAMANTLY ANTI-SHAH. WHILE IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO BRING SOME OPPOSITION MEMBERS INTO CURRENT GOVT IF THEY WOULD AGREE, WE THOUGHT THAT DISMISSAL OF GOVT AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE FURTHER DESTABILIZING.

PAGE 1 ~~SPECAT~~

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: MAY 24, 2016



# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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PAGE 2 ~~SPECAT~~

~~SECRET~~

27613

(D) WHAT SEEMED MOST NECESSARY AT CURRENT STAGE WAS APPEARANCE OF POSITIVE, PROGRAMMED ACTION BY GOVT. PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF GOVT CURRENTLY WAS ONE OF DRIFT AND PASSIVITY. GOVT NEEDED TO PROPOSE AND ANNOUNCE SOME SOUND AND POSITIVE STEPS SO THAT IT COULD LEAD RATHER THAN FOLLOW.

(E) AS FAR AS NIOC STRIKE WAS CONCERNED, WE DOUBTED GOVT WOULD BE WISE TO CAPITULATE ON "POLITICAL" DEMANDS (PRIMARY DEMAND IS LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW NATIONWIDE). IF A STRIKE DID FORCE OIL INDUSTRY TO SHUT DOWN FOR AWHILE, IT NEED NOT BE FATAL. IN FACT, IT MIGHT BRING SOME PEOPLE TO THEIR SENSES BY FORCING THE REALIZATION THAT ALL THESE DISRUPTIONS COULD REALLY BEGIN TO HURT THOSE WHO WERE CARRYING THEM OUT.

9. SHAH, WHO WAS SOBER, BUT NOT DEPRESSED, THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION, THANKED US FOR OUR VIEWS AND FOR OUR REACTION TO HIS VIEWS. HE SAID HE WOULD WORK WITH HIS PEOPLE TO SOLVE THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES AND HOPED HE COULD CALL US IN AGAIN "WITHIN A FEW DAYS" FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

10. COMMENT: IT WOULD SEEM, FROM THIS MEETING, THAT SHAH REALLY FEELS HIMSELF WITHOUT ANY CLEAR PLAN FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IT WOULD ALSO APPEAR THAT HE FEELS HIMSELF WITHOUT RELIABLE IRANIAN ADVISERS FROM WHOM HE CAN GET OBJECTIVE REACTIONS. I BELIEVE THE MILITARY, WHO WOULD LIKE TO TAKE OVER IN THEIR OWN WAY, ARE DELIBERATELY FEEDING HIM THE DARKEST POSSIBLE VIEWS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. HIS FEAR OF AN NIOC SHUTDOWN REFLECTS HIS "CONSPIRACY" VIEW OF COMMUNIST INTENTIONS. I HAVE ASKED THE OSCO REPRESENTATIVE TO GET AN OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL OF THE STRIKE SITUATION IN AHWAZ AND GIVE ME A BRIEFING OCTOBER 25. I WILL REPORT THE RESULTS OF THAT CONVERSATION IMMEDIATELY.

SULLIVAN

BT

#0383

ANNOTES

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: MAY 24, 2016

5 U.S.C. 552

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 24 May 2016 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: ☒ Deny in Full: ☐

Declassify in Part: ☐

Reason: ☐

MDR: 15-M-0301



POLICY

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

~~WHEN WITH ATTACHMENT~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Washington National  
Records Center, SecDef  
Files, Acd 830-81-0212,  
Box 3, Folder Iran 092,  
1978.

21 DEC 1978

SECDEF HAS SEEN

21 DEC 1978

DIA

Minimal DIA-equity information noted. No  
DIA objection to declassification subject to  
the results of concurrent Joint Staff and CIA  
review. JDC 18 Jan 15

S.R.R. - We  
ought explore  
further the  
options I have  
checked, when  
then direct military  
action.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Sensitive U.S. Military Equipment in Iran

SECDEF HTS

Attached is a paper from the Joint Chiefs of Staff together with a cover  
memo from Dan Murphy on the sensitive U.S. military equipment in Iran.

You will note from the JCS paper that EUCOM is identifying the precise  
location of all sensitive items and that ISA and R&E may add to the list  
of sensitive equipment.

Wednesday night, December 20th, Ike Pappas of CBS news reported that  
"sources say the United States is prepared to take what they called  
appropriate action, possibly removing the F-14's and Phoenix missiles,  
or destroying them on the ground if it appeared they might fall into  
hostile hands in Iran." Tom Ross has no idea where this story came  
from.

Iran 092

Stanley R. Resor

CFA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT. DATE: 02-18-2015

ORIGINAL PERIOD DECLASSIFIED  
Revised: EO 12958, recommended: 02-18-2015  
Declassify On: 02-18-2015  
Date: 02-18-2015

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 12 2016

21 DEC 1978

330-81-0212, box 3, Iran 092, 1978

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RB

15-m-0305

02/138

Declassified by SecDef  
Date: 02-18-2015  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

COPY NO. 1B

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X-00424



POLICY

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

21 DEC 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)

SUBJECT: Sensitive U.S. Military Equipment in Iran

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 12 2016

Attached is an expanded Joint Staff paper on sensitive equipment. We have been working closely with them in its development. I believe the paper addresses the questions raised as a result of your previous review, but I want also to provide you with the following amplifying remarks as background:

153.3(b)(5), (6)

- "High sensitivity" items in the paper were so identified to safeguard our advanced technology. In non-technical terms, loss of those sensitive items associated with the F-14 aircraft and Phoenix missile would assist the Soviets in developing equipment or methods to counter the tactical advantage the systems give us. Compromise of the AN/AWG-9 fire control system on the F-14, for example, would reveal the technology that permits us simultaneously to track and shoot down multiple targets with a single interceptor. This is an area in which we now have an estimated 6-10 year lead over the USSR. Compromise of the electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment on the F-14 would reveal to the Soviets the degree to which we have exploited their radar systems and the degree to which we are able to react to their defensive threats. Such a loss would increase the vulnerability of all our aircraft (not merely the F-14) in combat to a degree that cannot be quantified, but would most likely be grievous.

- Items identified as having "medium sensitivity" are those which an enemy can exploit through examination to develop similar types for his own use (a process known as "reverse engineering"). The HARPOON and HAWK missiles fall into this category.

Review on 20 Dec 1998  
Reason 2-301(C) (6&7)

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

2

More guidance is required on which of these options, if any, need to be developed further. It is also important to remember that time for detailed planning will be required before any operation could be initiated.

*Sam*

Daniel J. Murphy  
Admiral, USN (Ret.)  
Deputy

Attachment 1  
a/s

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 12 2016

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~



~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

13M 8599 19/0  
13 DEC 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR POLICY

Subject: Sensitive Equipment, Iran ~~(S)~~

JS 3.3(b)(5), (6)

1. ~~(TS)~~ Pursuant to your request, the following information on possible disposition of sensitive US manufactured military equipment presently in the Iranian inventory is provided.

3. ~~(TS)~~ The attached preliminary point paper, which addresses the recovery of certain sensitive US military equipment under Iranian control, is provided for information.

4. ~~(TS)~~ The attached military options do not appear attractive. It is evident if this matter is to be pursued further detailed study would be required.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 12 2016

*Philip D. Shutler*  
PHILIP D. SHUTLER  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
Director for Operations

Attachments  
a/s

CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3  
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION  
OR (X) REVIEW  
TS: 1 Dec 1998  
EXTENDED BY:  
REASON:

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

POINT PAPER

- I. SUBJECT: Sensitive US Military Equipment in Iran ~~(TS)~~
- II. PURPOSE: To address recovery of certain sensitive US manufactured military equipment currently under Iranian control.
- III. MAJOR POINTS:

A. Classification of Sensitivity

- Based on three discreet effects if item is compromised:
  - High Sensitivity: Ability of USSR to identify and exploit capabilities of new systems (before US could modify or replace).
  - Medium Sensitivity: "Reverse engineer" equipment to compromise a US technological advance.
  - Low Sensitivity: Employment of equipment in a means antithetical to US interests.
- Assume the items identified as High and Medium sensitivity will remain so but other equipment not yet identified will be placed on list.
- EUCOM is presently identifying the precise location of all known High, Medium, and Low sensitivity items.
- ISA and DDR&E are expanding the list of sensitive equipment. It is not complete at this time.

B. Security

- US - Iran General Security and Information Agreement, June 1974, prohibits disclosure of information to a third country without prior consent of the government which furnished the information.
  - Agrees to material security inspection of furnished equipment and information.
  - Latest Iranian inspection, August 1978, covered AWACS support. Security was considered adequate.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 12 2016

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~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- Next DSAA inspection of TAFT - Iran is scheduled for mid-January 1979.
- US technicians assist in maintaining the F-14A and Phoenix missile and have access to most components and associated publications.

C. Sensitive Equipment (see Attachment)

- The F-14A Interceptor and associated Phoenix (AIM-54) missile are considered highly sensitive in Iranian hands. Sensitive component sub-systems include:
  - AN/AWG-9 FCS.
  - AN/AWM-23 test set.
  - AN/ALR-45 (V) ECM set.
  - AN/ALR-50 (V) ECM set.
  - AN/ALQ-100 ECM set.
  - DSM-130 test set (Phoenix Missile).
- The HARPOON surface/air to surface missile (RGM-84A) and the improved HAWK missile with the AN/TSG-73 missile minder are of a medium degree of sensitivity.

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D. Political Considerations

- [REDACTED]
- Equipment is under the sovereignty of Iran even though of US origin.
  - The only legal action is re-purchasing the equipment from the existing Iranian Government.

E. Conditions under which action may be taken

- Iranian military remains loyal to the Shah (no action required).
- Neutralist government with potential compromise of US equipment.
  - Negotiation for return of equipment by re-purchasing.

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~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

JS33(b)(5), (6)


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

- Request sanitizing equipment.
- Marxist government with likely compromise of US equipment to USSR.
- Some Iranian military remains friendly to US.

JS 3.3(b)(5), (6)



3

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Date: APR 12 2016

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Date: APR 12 2016


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~~SENSITIVE~~


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~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

3533(b)(5)(6)



APPROVED BY Philip D. Shuttler Director, J-3

Prepared by: MAJ [REDACTED]  
Special Operations Division  
Ext [REDACTED]

JS 5 U.S.C § 552 (b)(6 )

OSD 5 U.S.C § 552 (b)(6 )

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Date: APR 12 2016

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~SENSITIVE~~~~EYES ONLY~~SENSITIVE US MILITARY EQUIPMENT OWNED BY IRAN

## High Sensitivity

<u>System</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Location</u>
F-14A	77	Isfahan**/Shiraz
AN/AWG-9 FCS	107	"
AN/AWM-23 Test Set	6	"
AN/ALR-45 (V) ECM set	86	"
AN/ALR-50 (V) ECM set	85	"
AN/ALG-100 ECM set	93	"
AIM-54A Phoenix Missile	274*	Isfahan/Shiraz
DSM-130 Test set	2	"

## Medium Sensitivity

<u>System</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Location</u>
I-HAWK Btry	36	Bushemr/Vadati
I-HAWK Missiles	1448	Semnan/Kharg Island
AN-TSQ-73 Missile minder	4	"
HARPOON Missile (RGM-84A)	13	Bandar Abbas
SM-1 Missile	130	Bandar Abbas

\* 340 additional PHOENIX are to be delivered over next three years.

\*\* Some operations and technical manuals are located at IIAF headquarters, Tehran.

5 U.S.C. 552

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: APR 12 2016Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 12 Apr 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6)  
MDR: 15 -M- 0305~~TOP SECRET~~~~SENSITIVE~~~~EYES ONLY~~





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Jimmy Carter Presidential  
Library, National Security  
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Meetings File, Box 87,  
Folder Iran, Reports from  
Huyser, 1/79, For the  
President and Brzezinski  
Only.

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 13 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526

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Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_

Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

MDR: 15-M-0309

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 10, 1979

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: DEC 23 2014

SUBJECT: Conversation with General Huyser

After this morning's meeting, I called General Huyser on the secure phone and asked his views on a number of questions that had been raised at the meeting with you.

He said that he had just finished an emergency meeting with the senior military people in a group. They had told him that their conclusion was that a civilian government is the only way to go. They are not prepared to conduct a coup at this time. They believe that the military, under the direction of the Bakhtiar government, need to link up with Khomeini. They want the U.S. to support them in doing so.

Huyser urged that we do all we can to get Khomeini to support such an effort, in order to avoid bloodshed.

I asked his view of whether the Shah was planning to undercut the formation of a Bakhtiar government so as to create the conditions for a military coup. He said that there is some possible evidence that the Shah has such a hope, but that such a course is not supported by the Iranian military. He believes that the military have now been persuaded to substitute for, or at least add to, their loyalty to the Shah a loyalty to the nation.

I asked whether the Bakhtiar government could succeed if the Shah remained in the country. General Huyser said for Bakhtiar to succeed the Shah would have to leave. Moreover, Khomeini, if he does not support Bakhtiar, must at least be silent if the Bakhtiar government is to have a reasonable chance. Under those circumstances, Huyser believes that the military would probably be able to provide enough security in the oil fields, for example, so that a civilian government would have a good chance of reviving production.

He reiterated that it is important for the religious faction and the military to get together. (This is more or less what Ambassador Sullivan said to Cy this morning. I continue to regard as unrealistic the Iranian military view, apparently shared by Sullivan and Huyser, that

JC, NSA, State, Nat, Office, For Pres or Brz Only File, Iran, Repts from Huyser,  
Classified by \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify on \_\_\_\_\_  
Review on 9 Jan 2009

Extended by \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason Para 2-301.c.1

1/79, box 87

Downgraded to Secret  
Date: 17 Dec 2014  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

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15-M-0309  
R-1

SEC DEF CONTR NO. X00592



Khomeini can be brought around to supporting Bakhtiar and cooperating closely with the military, but they are on the scene and may be correct.)

I asked whether it was possible to separate the religious faction from Khomeini. He said that as a result of all the emotion that has been generated, with pictures of Khomeini everywhere, he did not think this was feasible. I asked whether the Shah's departure would make it more so. He said that even for a considerable time after the Shah leaves it will not be possible to separate the religious faction from Khomeini's influence.

Huyser volunteered that for the first time in his long relationship with the Iranian military he sees absolute unity among the service leaders and the Supreme Commander's Staff. He believes that is something we can build on as a positive factor.

*I hope  
he's right*

With respect to a Regency Council, I asked whether it should include a military member. General Huyser said it should and that probably the best person would be General Gharabaghi, the recently named Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff. He is very able and highly respected by all the others among the military. I asked whether under these circumstances General Djam might reconsider his refusal to serve as War Minister. Huyser said that he believes that General Djam has left Iran, probably to return to London. A substitute is being named from the active duty ranks. General Huyser said that he does not know who it is, but that the individual is junior to the present Minister of War, General Toufanian. Toufanian had planned in consequence to resign but Huyser believes he has persuaded Toufanian to stay.

Huyser will discuss with Sullivan the idea that they should be together at the meetings (to convey U.S. Government positions) with the Shah, the individual political leaders (Bakhtiar, perhaps Sanjabi and others), and the military leadership. Sullivan has an appointment with the Shah at 11:15 tomorrow morning.

Huyser repeated the importance of contact with Khomeini by the U.S. I told him you were calling Giscard to arrange to have the French see Khomeini on our behalf. Huyser believes that it would be a good idea to have a U.S. contact made directly. I told him this might be done after we got a readout from the French. He reiterated the urgency of a Khomeini contact.

In a subsequent conversation with Dave Jones, Huyser said the Iranian military are much more concerned about possible Soviet military intervention than we are, and would be greatly heartened by an American statement that we will react in kind if that happened. The Iranian military is greatly concerned by what they regard as the false and pro-radical content of the BBC broadcasts in Farsi. They also believe that the religious elements in the population need to be separated from the radical political groups and brought closer to the military.

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date DEC 23 2014

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Review on 9Jan2009  
Extended by \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason Para 2-301.c.1

*Harold Brown*

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Date: DEC 24 2014

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Meetings File, Box 87,  
Folder Iran, Reports from  
Huyser, 1/79, For the  
President and Brzezinski  
Only.

January 13, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Secretary Brown  
SUBJECT: Conversation with General Huyser

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 24062014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15-M-0312

General Huyser called me at 2:00 PM Washington time today to report on his activities of today and his assessment of the current situation. He said that he met this morning for three hours with General Rabi (Air Force Chief) who had been designated for this meeting as a spokesman for the group of five senior military leaders. Rabi urged that the military take over when the Shah left, saying that the military could come apart rapidly otherwise. Huyser held firmly to the line that the military must give Bakhtiar a chance to form an effective government and to try to get the country in order again. Rabi finally reluctantly indicated that they would follow this course.

During the conversation, the Shah called telling Rabi to have his aircraft promptly readied because he intends to leave earlier than he had previously indicated. Rabi attempted to dissuade the Shah from doing so on the basis that country clearance for the aircraft had not been arranged, but the Shah said he could if necessary fly out via Saudi Arabia. Huyser believes that the Shah wants to make sure his aircraft is fully ready and is putting pressure on Rabi by telling him that he intends to leave before the Wednesday date. In any event, the Iranian military now think the Shah will leave on Monday.

Following the Shah's call, there was extensive discussion of the military working more closely with some of the religious leadership, with Huyser pressing it and Rabi not inclined to do so.

Huyser met again in the afternoon with the military group, Toufanian leading it in the absence of Gharabaghi, who was working with the Shah on the presentation of the Regency Council.

Today there was a meeting of the military with Bakhtiar in a National Security Council session. They went over the problems expected when the Shah leaves, in the way of disorders. Bakhtiar said he would go on television and take the responsibility for restoring order. He was prepared

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Reason: Para 2-301.c.1

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Date: 17Jan2014  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

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15-M-0312 R-1

to do this through crowd control measures -- rubber bullets and tear gas. The military pressed him as to what he would do if that did not work. He said he was not prepared to go farther than that today, as regards for example the use of lethal force, but will meet with the military again tomorrow to reach a conclusion on this question. Huyser concludes that it is a good sign that Bakhtiar met with the military to discuss the issue of maintenance of order, but a bad sign that he had not thought through how far he was prepared to go.

The military believe that Khomeini's return on the Shah's departure would be the worst thing that could happen, greatly increasing the chances of chaos. They want to know whether we can do anything to stop it. Huyser also urges that we stop that return if we can and has sent a wire (~~not~~ <sup>ASSIGNED</sup> ~~yet received~~) to that effect. I told him that I would see that the matter was considered by you, although my own judgment was that even if we approached the French they would not be willing to stop his return. I then asked why, if Khomeini's return would be such a disaster, the military wanted us to approach Khomeini to urge some sort of cooperative relationship between him and the military. Huyser said that though Khomeini's return would be a very disruptive event, he (Huyser) is trying to get the military to work with the more moderate religious leaders in country. Huyser will meet with Gharabaghi at 8:30 tomorrow morning Tehran time to try to get him to meet with such religious leaders. Ambassador Sullivan's agents are meeting with those religious leaders to the same end.

The rest of the afternoon meeting with the military group was to go over various options for the future to show that there exist options other than a military coup. Huyser told them that there could be other civilian governments if the Bakhtiar government lasts a few months and manages to improve the situation somewhat.

I then said to General Huyser that it remained very important that we not imply to the military that there would never be a basis for strong military action, or that any civilian government, whatever its composition, would be better than a military coup. I repeated that he needed to walk a narrow line to prevent a military coup against the Bakhtiar government but not to encourage the military to stand idly by if the situation deteriorated continuously. He said he understood those to be his instructions, that he agreed with them, and that the immediate problem is to get the military to support rather than to overthrow the Bakhtiar government. I then said that he does need to keep the military psychologically and physically ready to do what is necessary if the government falters, and asked how that stood. He replied that he has them planning for possible military action. But he is telling them that they must measure their preparations, and decide on their future actions, in terms of the degree of the success of the Bakhtiar government; in the meantime they must give it full support. The military plans, with his agreement, to go to a higher level of readiness in preparation for the Shah's departure.

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date:

DEC 24 2004

I asked General Huyser what leadership pattern is emerging in the military. He said that the group of five which is speaking for the senior military consists of Gharabaghi, Toufanian, and the three service chiefs. They are working closely together. He regards it as a collective leadership, arriving at collective opinions. By law the leadership falls to Gharabaghi, but Toufanian is looked to by the others as the oldest and most senior in grade. The new Defense Minister is not in the group, and Huyser believes there is some hard feeling between him and Gharabaghi. In any event, he has not been brought in; Huyser thinks it is not a problem now, but if it comes to be he will take action.

I asked about reactions of the military at lower levels. He says that the Navy seems to be in complete accord on the course of action that the group has laid out, and the Army in at least some aspects of it. The lower levels are not fully read in yet. Huyser thinks that the more junior military levels (down to major) will support the Bakhtiar government. Below that, the officers are more subject to emotional reactions than to a carefully considered position. They are more affected than their seniors by their daily contacts with the religious and political elements outside of the military.

I asked whether it would be useful to contact Oveissi, now in this country. Huyser, who knows him well, said that it may be useful to get his views of the military people in Iran. However, Oveissi probably has little future potential in Iran because the military leadership has ruled him out on the grounds of him having left the country in times of its peril.

I asked him whether he knew the whereabouts of General Djam. Huyser believes he is back in the UK. The Shah says that Djam's capabilities were overrated. But all the other military with whom Huyser has contact respect Djam, and Huyser thinks he could be a potential player when the Shah leaves. He cautions that he does not know Djam, and is repeating what others tell him.

There was discussion (with General Jones on the line) of the Shah's itinerary. Huyser says that the Shah wants his arrival in the U.S. to be as low-key as possible -- no honors, low visibility. Under these circumstances, the three of us agree that the landing points in the U.S. would be first Loring (with Plattsburg or some other northeast base as an alternate), and Twentynine Palms or another base near Palm Springs, with helicopter to Palm Springs. This information should be held very closely as long as possible. In Iran, only the Shah, Huyser, and Rabii will be informed.

General Jones asked General Huyser to get a feel for Iranian attitudes on the various elements of our FMS program. I said he should tell the Iranian military that we are prepared to continue FMS. We want to proceed

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

DEC 24 2014



- 4 -

on the basis of what the new Iranian government and the military think they need in the light of their judgment of economic and military circumstances. Huyser indicated that he could get a feeling for this, without asking specific questions, over the next two or three days. All statements from the Pentagon on future deliveries will be transmitted by my office of International Security Affairs, not from the services.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment: Cable just rec'd  
from Gen. Huyser

cc: Secretary Vance (~~EYES ONLY~~)

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 24 2014



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

January 17, 1979

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: E.O. 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 24 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Conversation with General Huyser on January 17, 1979

1. General Huyser called at 1:30 EST today to report on the current situation. He said that he had spent considerable time today with the military leaders. Their attitude is one of sorrow at the Shah's departure, but morale and discipline at this point is good. The meeting between the military and the religious leadership is set for tomorrow.

2. He said he is proceeding with actions to assure distribution of diesel and mogas fuel in country if we can get it to the ports. On a related matter, the military found that there were 8,000 trucks held up near the Turkish border with food supplies and had concluded that this was too big a problem to try to handle. Huyser urged them to take the matter up with Bakhtiar, who said he would join with them to get the supplies moved. There are also wheat ships in the Persian Gulf that need to be unloaded to bring food to the Iranian people. When the military put it that way to Bakhtiar, he agreed to have them unloaded under military supervision. There was discussion of the efforts to get fuel to the ports. Huyser believes that Bakhtiar will give his agreement to having a U.S. auxiliary ship come in with fuel for the Iranian military vehicles. All these proceedings suggest that Bakhtiar and the military are working increasingly closely together.

3. Huyser and Sullivan have agreed on what answers they would recommend to Yazdi's questions, and have wired their views to the State Department.

4. Huyser said that the military continued to be most worried about the possible return of Khomeini. However, they have been conditioned to the idea that after there is some progress on ending the strikes, and as Bakhtiar moves ahead to consolidate the authority of the government, the military could then accept a return by Khomeini. Moreover, Huyser believes that they could then accept further changes in the government. This would be along the outlines of the Option B\* he mentioned in the wire describing his understanding of the alternatives.

\*From Huyser's wire of 13 Jan: "I'm not the expert in this field but so you will know how my mind is functioning, here are my thoughts on the types of government desired. List from best under current circumstances to worst. A - Successful Bakhtiar government. B - Bakhtiar operates with some success for a period of time (months) but fails. Another civilian government appointed (Shah is out of country) that is more acceptable to Khomeini and the religious faction. This alternative could repeat itself under certain circumstances. C - A military coup. D - A Khomeini government - Islamic Republic. E - A Communist government."

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Date: 11/18/2014  
Chief, Classification Division, WHS

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JC, NSA, Staff Office, For Brz Only File, Inc. Repts from  
Huyser, 1/79 box 87

5. At this point I raised the issue of Option C. I asked whether he thought we might not fall into a situation of a gradually worsening complexion in a series of changed governments, while at the same time the Iranian military lost cohesion, and the ability to take over. He said he was aware that could well happen.

6. I then asked what circumstances he envisaged as necessitating a coup by the military. When would they have to act or else lose the chance to act? His response was that in the present circumstances, Option C becomes viable and necessary if Khomeini returns next weekend or in the near future. If Khomeini does not return in the next two or three weeks and the Bakhtiar government makes progress in consolidating its authority and in ending strikes, Option C becomes both less feasible and, in his opinion, less necessary. There could nevertheless then occur a sudden surge toward communist power or toward unilateral rule by Khomeini; Option C could then become necessary again, and, in his opinion, would then also become more feasible. I asked whether we could know in advance that such a shift was about to occur. He agreed that it would be difficult to know; if Khomeini were to come back suddenly, even at a later time, with the intention of taking power, a decision on the part of the Iranian military and ourselves would probably have to be made before or immediately upon his landing.

7. I asked how much lead time we would need to have in reaching a decision for Option C. He said that if Khomeini were to return soon, we would have very short time. If we proceed along the lines of Option B, we gain lead time with respect to a decision on a coup, but it would be less likely that we would need to use that lead time. He reiterated that, though he prefers Option B from his limited perspective, he recognized (in response to my query) that it could be a slippery slope and the military could lose the ability to affect the course of events.

8. I asked whether the military are ready psychologically, physically, and in terms of planning if they had to go to Option C and, if not, when they would be.

9. He said that the military are gaining in planning and physical capability. In a week they will be much readier than they are now. At the moment, they are relying on Huyser to tell them whether or not to exercise Option C. He has them psychologically prepared to act if it appears that the constitutional government is slipping away. They would then act preferably under the direction of the Bakhtiar government. But if they cannot get instructions from Bakhtiar, they should be prepared to act themselves.

10. In response to my question of whether the Iranian military command structure is adequate, Huyser said that Gharabaghi is growing in authority and could probably lead. Huyser in his daily contacts with him presses him for decisions and is trying to transfer the habit of decision from himself to Gharabaghi. In response to a further question as to whether there is a coherent plan for a takeover, he said that it is not yet complete. However,

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Date: DEC 24 2014

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they are working on plans 24 hours a day, and will have a complete plan in two or three days. It would involve taking over the operations of various facilities so that the military could assure the population of what the latter needs -- food, fuel, power, transportation. Moreover, they are now working on annexes to the plan dealing with public affairs, finances, etc.

11. I asked whether he thought they could actually run the country if they had to, or get civilians to run it for them. He said that the answer was yes in Tehran; if protection were provided, people would go back to work. In the oil fields many foreigners who have left would have to come back to work; again the critical factor was providing protection, which he thought could be done. He did not address the issue of sabotage.

12. I asked whether a military coup would involve many casualties. He said there could be considerable casualties during the period until there was a clear assumption of power, with someone in charge.

13. I told General Huyser, in response to his telegraphed question, that I did not want him to even consider returning to Stuttgart until after Friday, which is a time of considerable danger. After that, we would discuss the matter again. He would have to condition them to his departure and it was my judgment that even if he did return to Stuttgart, he should probably plan to return to Tehran after about a week. I said that General Jones and I thought the psychology would be better if they knew he would be returning to Tehran and not abandoning them. He said that he was of course prepared to stay as long as we thought necessary. He agreed that Friday was a critical time, and he expected to be with the five senior military at the Army Headquarters all day. For that reason, he was not sure when he would be able to call on Friday, but he would call about the same time tomorrow.

*Harold Brown*

cc: Secretary Vance (Eyes Only)

Office of the Secretary of Defense **54.5.4.32**  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHIS  
Date: 24 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0313

Classified by SEC DEF  
Declassify on \_\_\_\_\_  
Review on 17 Jan 1999  
Intended by SEC DEF  
Reason 2-301 c.7

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 24 2014

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

January 22, 1979  
DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 23 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Conversation with General Huyser on January 21, 1979

Jimmy Carter  
Presidential  
Library,  
National  
Security  
Affairs, Staff  
Material,  
Meetings File,  
Box 87, Folder  
Iran, Reports  
from Huyser,  
1/79, For the  
President and  
Brzezinski  
Only File.

1. General Huyser called me at 1400 EST. He began by saying that though there were many negatives in Saturday's events, it ended in a better understanding between Bakhtiar and Gharabaghi. Gharabaghi called Huyser today to come and see him. Huyser had waited to hear from Gharabaghi rather than taking the initiative because he had had to be rather rough on Gharabaghi Saturday in helping to persuade him to stay on. When Huyser arrived today, Gharabaghi met him together with the service chiefs. Gharabaghi described his conversation last evening with Bakhtiar, for much of which Ambassador Sullivan was present, and which ended with Gharabaghi agreeing to stay on as Chief of the SCS. Gharabaghi had made several complaints to Bakhtiar about apparent misunderstandings, and indicated why he had felt that communications between Bakhtiar and the military had been inadequate. He mentioned several items: the fact that Gharabaghi had not been consulted on the press release Bakhtiar had made implying that the alternative to himself was a military coup; arrangements for newspaper publication; and the replacement of a provincial governor in the south of Iran, a military man, without consultation with Gharabaghi. Huyser said that he now thought that the air had been to some extent cleared between Bakhtiar and the senior military.

2. I asked Huyser whether he had thought further about the cohesion and steadfastness of the military. He replied that there were some questions in his mind about whether Gharabaghi would be prepared to carry out Option C, in view of some of the things Gharabaghi had said to him yesterday. On the other hand, he had no doubt about the willingness of the service chiefs and of Toufanian. If a decision were made that the time had come to exercise Option C, then there might have to be a change in the choice of the leader of the military group. Huyser will continue to watch this matter carefully. He had thought hard about possible replacements and wants to do more before making any recommendations. It will depend very markedly on the circumstances. Gharabaghi is probably the right person to take military actions under Bakhtiar, including the use of the military to operate vital functions. In less revolutionary times, Gharabaghi would be an excellent SCS Chief. None of the senior military so far have shown a very good understanding of the relationships between military and political factors. They tend to think in straight military terms, and not how military power and authority can be

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Review on 22 Jan 1999

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JCS, NSA, Staff Mtg. Office, For Pres & Brz Only File, Iran,  
Repls from Huyser, 1/79, Box 87

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used to advance the political goals of Iran. Huyser has passed to Sullivan and through him to Bakhtiar his views of Gharabaghi's actions yesterday and of what they say about Gharabaghi's own nature.

3. I asked what interactions were taking place among the military leaders, the religious groups, the Bakhtiar government, and the National Front. Huyser said the military-religious dialogue continues, and the military-Bakhtiar relation is now good. He doesn't know how much Bakhtiar is talking to the National Front.

4. In response to my concern that the military were proving a weaker support to western-oriented government and to stability than we had hoped, Huyser said that he still thinks they are rather reliably oriented toward Bakhtiar and toward the U.S. Ambassador Sullivan's opinion differs, but was formed largely on the basis of seeing Gharabaghi during 30 minutes when the latter was under extreme stress. The service chiefs had a different attitude from Gharabaghi on his attempt to resign. Moreover, the Ambassador reads agent reports pointing out trouble areas. Many of those are real, but Huyser also is informed about the commanders' follow-up actions to fix them. There is little indication of loss of loyalty, except for some loss of personnel. Shortages of fuel inhibit training, and therefore capability to some extent. Huyser sees them as still an organized and loyal force, and is working with them to clean up trouble spots. For the first time, the high command is putting out newspapers to inform the troops. The generals are learning that they must pay attention to the needs of their troops, and also to make sure that their orders are followed up.

5. A Security Council meeting was to take place late the evening of January 21, with the service chiefs present. They were to give a briefing on the status of forces in each service, as well as their planning for a situation in which the military could have to operate the essential functions. This would give Bakhtiar an idea of how he would be able to exert authority through the military.

6. The headlines all say "Khomeini will return on Friday." This has the military leaders very concerned; it gives them a sense that their goals could be completely defeated. Huyser told them Khomeini, as a religious leader, is entitled under the Constitution to return. It could happen and they should plan for it, on the basis of keeping troops on alert, as last Friday -- out of contact with street demonstrators, but protecting key installations. Bakhtiar has told the military that if Khomeini appointees try to take over government functions he will arrest them.

7. A Khomeini return provides many possibilities of disaster. Religious groups not devoted to him, the Communists, and others could all clash to produce chaos. Huyser will need to know as soon as we have clear indications of a time for Khomeini's return, so that the troops can go to alert. I note that we in Washington should try to keep him away, and simultaneously plan what we want to urge (and to do) if he returns.

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8. On January 22 Huyser will discuss with the military leadership whatever occurred at tonight's Iranian NSC meeting, and will force them to consider plans for Khomeini's return, even though they regard that return as unthinkable. Every day of delay helps.

9. Most ministers got into their offices today, and more people are working, with more cars on the streets. Some opposition strike leaders are working to put people back to work on domestic-only functions. The banks are transacting domestic-only business three days a week; the refineries are putting out more product for internal use. The troops did get paid, in an abnormal way (cash, instead of deposits by computer). Bakhtiar's "no work, no pay" rule also begins for government employees; it has yet to be seen whether it will be enforced.

10. I said some people are suggesting we make more military movements to the region, and going on alert in Europe, and asked his view. He said the present naval forces and the F-15 visit were enough for now. A large increase would be counterproductive; Bakhtiar does not want to appear a U.S. puppet. We should save our chips in Europe until there are signs of an external threat to Iran; we will need them if that happens.

11. I noted our concern about preserving our intelligence sites in Iran, which are both fragile and important, but indicated that they should not be raised if, or in a way that, jeopardizes the political situation. He said he and Sullivan have this problem in mind.

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Date: DEC 23 2014

Attachment

cc: Secretary Vance ~~(TEL-0000)~~

*Harold Brown*

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WIIS  
Date: 23 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
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OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON DC 20301

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief Records & Declassification  
Date: DEC 23 2014

2 February 1979

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, National  
Security Affairs, Staff Material, Meetings  
File, Box 87, Folder Iran, Reports from  
Huyser, 2/79, For the President and  
Brzezinski Only File.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I had a very frank discussion with General Huyser at 1630 our  
time today in which we concentrated on the question of whether or not  
he should leave Iran.

The two issues influencing the decision are the impact of Huyser's  
presence on the safety of Americans and on our continuing ability to  
influence the Iranian military leaders.

With regard to the first point, the Ambassador feels a very deep  
responsibility for the safety of the Americans and there is concern  
within the community that Huyser's presence may be jeopardizing their  
safety. I did not get the impression that the word "revolt" was  
appropriate but the concern is very real. In the past 4 or 5 days the  
presence of Huyser has been highlighted and he is the focus of much of  
the anti-American feeling. The opposition is giving Huyser the credit  
for the bloodshed in Tehran.

As to the second issue, a key concern is how one views the situation.  
Huyser believes the military retains a reasonable capability to implement  
Option C and that the threat of Option C is the only leverage Bakhtiar  
has with the opposition. Sullivan believes Option C is not viable and  
therefore an accommodation with Khomeini is almost inevitable. Both  
believe Bakhtiar is the preferable solution but Huyser has greater hope  
for success, especially if backed to the hilt by the military.

The military is holding together but there are differences of view  
with Gharabaghi and Admiral Habibollahi being reluctant to take strong  
action and Generals Rabi and Toufaniian urging stronger action. Huyser  
has been able to keep them unified by stressing the need to support a  
legal government (Bakhtiar) with as much might as needed and that the  
unity of the military - and their continuing ability to take strong  
action - is in the best interest of Iran. Strong action, when required,  
may well mean the saving of millions of Iranian lives in the long run.

Huyser also stated that their (Huyser and Gast) contacts with the  
military leaders is the only continuous, intimate tap into the Bakhtiar  
government. The military leaders are very open with Huyser and Gast.  
Furthermore, the military is very suspicious of the Ambassador, believing  
that he was a key factor in the Shah's leaving.

JC, NSA, Staff, 5/1, 2m, For Pres & Brz Only, Feb, 2/79

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Date: 12/22/04  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

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As to the question of continuing influence on the military if he should leave, Huyser says nothing is certain in Iran these days. Clearly he has their confidence and they remember that the Shah told them to listen to Huyser. On the other hand Gast has been a full participant in all discussions with the military and they and he have confidence in Gast. If Gast has the same access to Washington as he has had, Huyser believes Gast would do well. Huyser and Gast have the same view of the overall situation and Huyser is convinced he would present his views in an unfiltered way. Huyser recognizes that it is a close call on whether or not he should come out. The Ambassador's view should not be taken lightly - he may be right.

In view of Khomeini's press conference tomorrow morning and Huyser's meeting with Gharabaghi also in the morning, I suggested he make a call earlier tomorrow (0700) so that if a decision were made for him to leave, he could get out while the airport is open. He will not tip his hand in any way as to the possibility of leaving. If a decision is made shortly after the 0700 call, he should have time - although it will be close - to discuss his departure with the military leaders before he had to leave for the airport. He fully recognizes that he is to stay until a decision is made otherwise. The earlier call gives us an opportunity to address the issue before another day passes in Iran and for Huyser to take action as required on any Washington decision, whether it relates to his staying in Iran or to the fundamental issue of what is the next move for the military.

I have passed the word he is to call the situation room in the White House at 0700EST and should have Gast with him if possible.

*David C. Jones*

DAVID C. JONES, General, USAF  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 US 6 552  
Chief, RDB, RSD, WHS  
Date: 23/12/2014 Authority: EO 13526  
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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 23 2014

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

February 3, 1979

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 24 2014

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, National Security Affairs,  
Staff Material, Meetings File, Box 87, Folder Iran, Reports from  
Huyser, MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

2/79, For the President and Brzezinski Only File.

Secretaries Vance and Christopher, Dr. Brzezinski, General Jones and I had an extensive discussion with General Huyser at 0700 on Saturday, February 3. Major General Gast was with General Huyser but was not on the phone since they had but one instrument.

In response to my request for an update, Huyser reported that in a long serious discussion this morning, Gharabaghi (and Admiral Habibollahi who is the head of the Navy and acts as a translator when Gharabaghi uses Farsi) expressed positive views about Bakhtiar's strong behavior at the previous night's NSC meeting and about the unity of the military in support of the legal government. It is clear that the military leadership considers Khomeini to be a demagogue and that an Islamic republic would be a disaster. Under such a government, the armed forces capabilities would dwindle and there would be a 60% chance the country would go Communist and 40% that it would turn nationalistic (Huyser believes the likelihood of an Islamic republic eventually going Communist is even higher than 60%).

Gharabaghi and the other military leaders believe that Iran can best be served by having a Social Democratic government patterned after Sweden, Norway and Denmark - with a King who rides a bicycle. They are firm in resisting a Khomeini takeover. If Khomeini forms a government but its members stay out of the way, Bakhtiar is inclined to ignore it. However, if Khomeini's "government" tries to take over the Ministries, then Bakhtiar intends to take strong action, and the military support him in that intention.

Gharabaghi's view is that as long as Khomeini was in Paris he was a voice from afar and unified the opposition. Now that he is back in country, his influence may wane as a result of a power struggle within his camp and disagreements among the opposition groups. Gharabaghi is worried about the weapons stashed around the country and if Khomeini calls for armed conflict, there will be bloodshed. The Tudeh party will use the religious element to incite violence.

Huyser does not have a full translation of Khomeini's press conference this morning, but it is clear the rhetoric was much the same as in the past. Khomeini said the government was illegal, but also that he thought a peaceful solution was possible.

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Extended by Para 2-301.c.1

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SEC DEF CONTR No. 01003

Downgraded to Secret  
Date: 11 Nov 2014  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

I asked General Huyser the following questions:

1. Do the Iranian military leaders think you should leave or stay and how would they view your departure?

Answer: Gharabaghi (with Habibollahi present) raised this subject himself this morning. He said that Huyser has more information than Gharabaghi and should make the judgment, but in Gharabaghi's view, now was a good time for departure. Gharabaghi did state that General Huyser was very prominent in today's press and as a result he believed that Huyser's staying could become counterproductive. Gharabaghi and Habibollahi are supportive of his leaving but he has not had a chance to talk to the others today; however, Huyser believes they will understand and support his departure. They had previously accepted the thought of his leaving, though reluctantly. Now, however, having come through the traumas of the Shah's departure, the massive march of January 19, and Khomeini's return, they are more self-reliant and ready to carry on without Huyser. If Huyser goes and Gast takes on his role, the Iranians say it is especially important that Gast be able to talk daily to Huyser and Defense officials in Washington. The military leadership is now more self confident, determined, and capable and for the first time they are planning more than one day ahead.

2. Do you think you should leave?

Answer: His personal view was that now was the best time to transition to Gast. He is confident the military will work with Gast, who is locked in solidly with them and who shares Huyser's views.

3. How would your leaving impact on the ability to execute Option C (a military takeover, on Bakhtiar's behalf, or on their own)?

Answer: They could do it with Gast's help. We discussed the capability extensively and they are confident they can do what is necessary. Huyser does not believe his departure would have an impact on their capability to execute Option C.

4. What impact will your departure have on our ability to influence a decision by the Iranian military about Option C -- to hold it back or to encourage it?

Answer: Much the same as above. This is a judgment question but he believes that Gast would have much the same effectiveness as he would have.

5. Do the military leaders believe that C is a viable option?

Answer: Yes. If they lose Bakhtiar, they believe there is no way to have a legal government unless they are there to help in enforcement. Huyser said he would be less than honest if he indicated 100% confidence in the willingness of Gharabaghi and Habibollahi to use force.

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6. How does he see the current political-military situation?

Answer: Khomeini has been gaining in strength and what is important is for Bakhtiar to be able to compete on equal terms. The military hate Khomeini -- they call him "the devil." At this time Khomeini has the upper hand. Khomeini has religion, power over the economy (through strikes), and most of the media on his side, as well as support of the masses. Bakhtiar has the military. The key is to erode Khomeini's influence. There is hope that what the military call the "solid majority" will soon become more responsible and there are the first indications that the upper class is starting to help. Much of Khomeini's support is fragile. Many people recognize that the Mullahs have sapped the country and many are not ready to go back to the dark ages. The military believe that religious feeling in Iran, where the state predates Islam, is not as deep as in the Arab countries.

The hope rests on dividing the opposition and making small progressive steps in restoring normality. People are not suffering as much now as in earlier weeks. Heating oil and gasoline are available. A few more shops are open. There is a tendency for the people to settle down. A key action is a full reopening of customs. Bakhtiar intends to take a couple days more in negotiation, but if this is unsuccessful, to have the military take control. There are 1000 trucks backed up to the Turkish border and 60 ships waiting to be unloaded. Movement here could be very helpful.

7. Do the military leaders think they can hold together?

Answer: Yes, particularly if they can make some progress in restoring normality.

8. Is the ability of the Iranian military to execute Option C increasing, decreasing, or staying about the same?

Answer: Their plans have been formulated quite well and Huyser believes they can take over and restore law and order in a capable manner. He has continuing concern about the lack of sophistication of the military leaders in trying to run a government. There would be problems until they could get them sorted out. There have been isolated cases of disloyalty in the lower ranks, but Huyser believes that, for the most part, the military remain disciplined and loyal to their commanders. As long as major elements of the military are underemployed, there will be problems. He would rate the Imperial guard very high with well over 90% loyalty. The Infantry is good and their training continues. The Artillery is a question mark because many were trained by the Russians. The Air Force is solid down to a certain level and the fact that they flew 110 sorties the other day demonstrates they can still fly. There is the problem of keeping the technicians busy. He would rate 75-80% of the Air Force being loyal and disciplined. The Navy has given

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them very little trouble and when trouble has arisen, they have been able to isolate it. The overall situation is not changing much either way.

They have instituted the American system of "commanders calls" to counter the adverse propaganda. Gharabaghi is meeting today with the officers of the SCS to tell them what they can and cannot believe. Rabi has been doing likewise with homafars and found many of their concerns had some foundation.

9. Is there a single military leader among the 5 or 6 who is dominant and any more likely to lean towards Option C?

Answer: The answers to the two parts of the question are different individuals. There is no question that Gharabaghi has taken the leadership role and the other top military will follow him. Gharabaghi and Habibollahi are calculating and generally cautious. Baderi is a solid soldier who clearly understands the situation. He says little, but when he speaks it is meaningful; he is dedicated to the nation and to the soldiers. Rabi is a fighter pilot and a "ramrod." He is more extreme and outspoken than the rest. He might be a leader of an Option C. Toufanian is the senior officer and, for the first few days, ran the group. He is smart and thinks ahead. Without question, he would support Option C if that became necessary.

10. What about the attitudes of the Americans, especially the MAAG?

Answer: The Americans are apprehensive about Khomeini's statements on Americans. They are trying to get all but the essential personnel out and those staying are working hard. There is no problem of cohesion and discipline within the MAAG. Huyser has been using the senior officers in the MAAG to get feedback. Despite the apprehension, personnel are acting in a very responsible manner.

After answering the above questions, Huyser raised the subject of the FMS Memorandum of Understanding, stating that they may be able to achieve a breakthrough today. He has put on a full-court press with Gharabaghi. The military wanted to be assured of our continuing support despite the change in the MOU and Huyser gave them such an assurance. Gharabaghi told Toufanian to get on with the MOU. Although we are not assured of a signature, this is the first sign of optimism in a week.

Huyser reported that Ambassador Sullivan has been very helpful in providing him with support, and fully cooperative. Both of them want to be sure the press handling of Huyser's having left is handled carefully, taking into account the perceptions in Iran. We will work on this.

Secretary Vance, on behalf of all of us, thanked General Huyser for his outstanding performance under very difficult circumstances.

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General Huyser was asked to hold the line open while a decision was made as to his staying or leaving. A few minutes later he was instructed to depart either today or tomorrow morning. The option was his. Today would be OK if he could leave gracefully, to include making the necessary departure arrangements with the senior military. He was to proceed to Washington as soon as possible after departure from Iran. We have a report that he was airborne in a C-130 at 0935EST enroute to Incirlik, Turkey, whence he will proceed to Stuttgart, and then take a C-135 to Washington. The present estimate is for a 2000 departure (local time) from Stuttgart, arriving Andrews about midnight Sunday. Zbig is trying to arrange a meeting with you early Monday morning, February 5. Dave Jones is checking further on the schedule with General Gast and will pose to him the same questions we asked General Huyser.

*Harold Brown*

cc: Secretary of State (~~EYES ONLY~~)

*P.S. The MOU modifying the FMS  
arrangements has now been  
signed by the Iranians.*

*HCB*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**SUBJECT:** Meeting with the President on Iran

**PARTICIPANTS:** President Jimmy Carter  
Vice President Mondale  
Secretary of State Vance  
Secretary of Defense Brown  
Dr. Brzezinski, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
General David Jones, Chairman, Joint  
Chiefs of Staff  
Admiral Turner, Director of Central  
Intelligence  
Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary of  
Defense  
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary  
of State  
General Huyser, Deputy Commander in Chief,  
European Command  
Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the  
President  
Gary Sick, NSC (Notetaker)

**DATE, TIME** February 5, 1979; 4:20 - 5:15 p.m.  
**AND PLACE:** The Cabinet Room

The President met privately in the Oval Office with General Huyser from approximately 4:10 to 4:20 p.m. (U)

The President opened the meeting by expressing his thanks to General Huyser for the superb job that he had done during his time in Tehran. The mission he had performed was above and beyond the call of duty. He asked Dr. Brzezinski to prepare a letter of commendation for General Huyser. He had arrived in Tehran at a time of great disarray and uncertainty. As a result of the superb work that he had done with the Iranian military, the President had developed great respect for him for his commitment, his steadiness and the great contribution he had made to US policy. General Huyser had established

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in the Iranian generals elements of the kind of constructive patriotism that we have learned to associate with the United States military. When General Huyser arrived, the President had had a sense of relief, and he was never disappointed by his performance while there. He noted that they had just completed a private talk in which General Huyser had expressed his view that the Iranian military is capable of maintaining order in Iran, and that our current instructions to the Embassy were the proper instructions under the existing situation. He had described one concern of his, however, and the President asked him to repeat that concern for the group. (S)

General Huyser noted that the Embassy operated very well in Tehran and had been very supportive of him. He and Ambassador Sullivan had known each other for a long time. However, they had two basic differences. The first was a difference of opinion about Iranian military capability. He noted that this is perhaps something that could be expected between a political man as opposed to a military man; however, he could perhaps be pardoned for believing his own appreciation was better. General Huyser's largest concern was an evaluation of what objective would most favor the United States. He thought he clearly understood through conversations with Secretary Brown every night what the instructions were. Those were to support Prime Minister Bakhtiar and his government up to and including action by the Iranian military forces to see that he was successful. This was a view that Sullivan did not share. Ambassador Sullivan thought that it was probably better to get the military forces aside and let the political forces fight it out among themselves and settle the issue, and then accept whoever won. Sullivan believed that if Khomeini established an Islamic Republic, the drift was going to go toward democracy. General Huyser, however, thought that the drift would be toward communism. He had told the President that he thought his point should be made clear so there would be no misunderstanding. (S)

The President said this had somewhat disconcerted him; however, he was not amazed. There had been some early problems in getting instructions through to Sullivan. From his messages to the President and through a newsman, the President had wondered if Sullivan was taking these instructions. He was not doubting the integrity of Ambassador Sullivan; however, when he and Secretary Vance had jointly drafted instructions, he thought that there was no question about US policy. General Huyser's understanding of those instructions was exactly what he had wanted. For us to back away from Bakhtiar would be a breach of our commitment. We had backed the Shah, and then had backed

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Bakhtiar as his legitimate successor when the Shah left. The President wanted to make damn sure there was not a disparity of thought between Ambassador Sullivan and General Gast at the present time. General Huyser had assured him that General Gast had a good understanding of the situation. He also had the trust of the Iranian military. He had been involved in all of the conversations which General Huyser had held. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether General Gast shares General Huyser's views.

General Huyser said, yes. And he noted that with Ambassador Sullivan it was only a question of degree. He understood that our policy was to support Bakhtiar, and he supported Bakhtiar. However, where he differed was how far and how much force we would be willing to support in backing Bakhtiar's government. (S)

The President said that both of those differences that he had noted were profound differences. If Ambassador Sullivan thinks that Khomeini would lead Iran toward democracy, that was a very profound difference from our views. We support Bakhtiar, and we believe that the military should support Bakhtiar. There should be no equivocation in that position. He asked Mr. Christopher (Secretary Vance was delayed in arriving at the meeting) to ensure that this was the case. (S)

Mr. Christopher said that the State Department will make sure that there is no equivocation in the instructions to Ambassador Sullivan. (S)

The President said he remembered very well sitting with Secretary Vance on a couch at Camp David discussing the nature of the instructions.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered when the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State was going out to Iran.

Mr. Christopher said Mr. Twinam was going out in the immediate future. He had been the Ambassador in Bahrain and was going to accompany Secretary Brown on his trip to the Middle East, so he was being sent out a week early. This would give us a chance to hear another viewpoint from Iran. Ambassador Twinam had not been closely associated with the events in Iran, and perhaps that was an advantage under the present circumstances. (S)

General Huyser wondered whether we had heard this view before from Ambassador Sullivan.

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Mr. Christopher replied that we had never heard it as clearly as General Huyser had just stated it.

The President noted that in a recent New York Times report on Professor Falk's visit to Iran, there had been an interview with Sullivan in which he was quoted as referring to his "ill-advised superiors" in Washington and other such comments. So we were aware what General Huyser had described were indeed very profound differences. Any tangible evidence of US equivocation in our policy would endanger a cohesive approach to the problem in Iran, and the firmness on the part of the military and Bakhtiar was the best approach to prevent massive bloodshed. We should use our influence to get them to stand firm. We should encourage consultations and let Khomeini channel his ideas of an Islamic Republic into a shadow-government. (S)

At that point, 4:55, Secretary Vance arrived.

Secretary Vance apologized for being late, noting that he had been on the Hill, and that he had finally succeeded in getting rid of the Committee.

The President wondered how had gotten rid of them. The Secretary had gotten his hopes up (joking).

The President then briefly summarized the meeting up to that point, noting that General Huyser says that he thinks there are two profound differences in interpretation of instructions between himself and the Embassy. Ambassador Sullivan believes that it is best to permit Khomeini to become the Prime Minister, while the military stands aloof. General Huyser thinks the military can restore order while Sullivan does not. Sullivan thinks that a Khomeini takeover would lead to democracy, whereas General Huyser thinks it would lead to communism. The President said he wanted to make damn sure there was no remaining misunderstanding. He thought that Mr. Christopher had been taken somewhat aback by this report. (S)

General Huyser clarified his view as being that Ambassador Sullivan believes the Bakhtiar government is the best solution for the US Government at this point, but there was a question of how far we would go, specifically, would we be willing to condone the use of military force in support of him. (S)

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Secretary Vance wondered whether there was a lack of clarity in his understanding of his instructions, or whether these were simply his own views as opposed to his instructions.

General Huyser said that he cannot speak for the Ambassador, however, in his view the end objective of the process was not the same in the two cases. The General's understanding was that we would go to the wall to support Bakhtiar, including condoning the use of military force. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if Mr. Bakhtiar understands that position.

Secretary Brown said that he should understand it through the military. General Huyser had not met himself with Bakhtiar, but the message that he had relayed to the military should have gotten through to Bakhtiar in turn. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that if Bakhtiar gets a different view elsewhere, perhaps he would be less than clear on what our position was.

Secretary Brown said that he had told General Huyser to relay the view that our support included the use of force if necessary. (S)

General Huyser said that the military had in fact passed the message to Bakhtiar. General Jones had recently talked to General Gast in Tehran and said that General Gast had advised the Ambassador to underline the support and loyalty of the Military for Bakhtiar during his meetings with the Prime Minister. (S)

The President said he thought that when Bakhtiar closed the airports, he had shown resolve for the first time in a long time in Iran. The correct way was to show strength and force such as closing the airport, then to let Khomeini back in, in effect, with Bakhtiar's permission. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that for Bakhtiar to show resolve, he must feel that we and the military back him fully. (S)

Secretary Brown said that for that reason, letting the political elements fight it out among themselves with the military standing aside, would produce a foreordained conclusion. (S)

The President agreed, noting that the military was the only strong support which Bakhtiar had to rely on. (S)

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Admiral Turner wondered if Bakhtiar's card of sending the military into the streets was likely to be called soon.

General Huyser said he would not have put it in those terms. He had encouraged the military leaders never to call the troops out into the streets; rather, he had had advised them to prepare to protect key installations, and to reduce the chances of violent conflict as much as possible. They were not certain, however, how much a minority might be able to start a violent confrontation or who that minority was or where they might lie.

Admiral Turner noted that, if Bakhtiar should arrest Bazargan as he has threatened, and the opposition take to the streets with rioting, would it not be necessary to turn the military loose to restore order.

General Huyser said that his advice had been that, if the mob wants to burn and destroy Tehran, let them do it.

Secretary Brown noted that Bakhtiar had said to us recently that he did not intend to arrest Bazargan who was an old friend of his. However, if the opposition tried to take over the ministries, they will meet that with violence, if necessary.

The President asked if the key installations included the ministries, and did the Military understand that.

General Huyser said, yes.

Dr. Brzezinski asked, if all else fails and the military must go to "option C" as we have come to call it, what kind of resistance could they expect to encounter? What kind of planning had been done for actions to follow a takeover?

General Huyser said that he had helped them conduct planning on a different mode. When he had first arrived, the military was planning to hold a coup, if and when the Shah left. However, they had no plan at all. They did not even know where the key installations were located, including the key installations in the oil fields. He'd persuaded them to give up the idea of a coup and begin planning for taking over key facilities, which included banks, ministries and key installations in the oil fields, and to ensure that they would know how to make them work. There were indications that, if the army were able to provide protection, the workers, many workers, would come back to work.



At the present time, they were facing intimidation. He knew this for a fact. For instance, we had had two checks signed for military equipment. Within a few days, copies of those checks were circulating downtown, and the person who had signed them was being threatened. He felt that the military cannot run a sophisticated government like that. He did not know where, if any place, the military has the capability to run that kind of a government. However, the concept was to restore order at key points and to start from there to develop a functioning government.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered how long it would take to accomplish such a takeover.

General Huyser said that in the case of oil and power it would be almost instantaneous.

The President asked whether the military controlled those facilities now.

General Huyser said, no.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered whether some areas might have to be conceded.

General Huyser said he felt they could control most of the country. In an old plan that was drawn up 15 years ago, they had planned to go south, and then fight their way back to the north. He had discouraged this kind of thinking, but they still keep it in mind.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if they could seal off the north.

General Huyser said, they could.

Secretary Brown said that they presumably assume there will be no outside intervention or we would come to their help.

General Huyser said that he had counseled them to concentrate entirely on the internal developments and leave the Free World to take care of outside intervention.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered how much resistance they could expect to encounter.

General Huyser said that the resistance would not be purely religious. However, there was a third party underneath the religious element, and he did not know how large it was.

Secretary Brown said that this was the radicals, the Tudeh Party and the PLO.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if there had been any defections from the army.

General Huyser said there had been some.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if option C could be done quickly.

General Huyser said, yes. They could seize control quickly and then begin building.

The President wondered what was the highest defector to date.

Secretary Brown said that two names had been mentioned to date as not being entirely loyal to Bakhtiar, General Firuzi and Col. Azardarzin. He also noted that the retired Admiral Madani, whom Khomeini intended to appoint as his Minister of the Interior, was reported to have begged Bakhtiar not to arrest him. He saw no pattern in these events.

General Huyser agreed that he saw no pattern. He thought there may be a few defectors, and there may be some generals.

The President wondered if there were any generals that he was concerned about.

General Huyser said that at the beginning he had been very worried about General Gharbaghi and wondered whether he would in fact be willing to follow through if it should come to option C. He seemed to lack any determination. Recently we went through a threat by Gharbaghi to resign. He did not know whether this was simply a Persian way of ensuring that he had support.

The President recalled that Gharbaghi had threatened to resign after Bakhtiar had made a statement at his press conference regarding the military without first checking it with Gharbaghi.

General Huyser said that was correct, and said that Gharbaghi more recently had shown a willingness to take action if there was a takeover or an other than legal government.

Secretary Vance wondered if General Huyser knew anything about the parliament.

General Huyser said that he did not know much, that they were essentially inactive at the present time.

Secretary Brown noted that General Gast had reported concern that Khomeini might pressure enough members of the parliament to resign, that there would no longer be a quorum, thereby bringing down the government.

General Jones said that another concern was that, as Bakhtiar sent up various bills to the parliament, they might attempt to get a no confidence vote on Bakhtiar, and thereby bring down the government. General Gast did not seem too worried about this. He thought that the opposition would see the dangers of a military takeover and back away from that. Gast reports that Khomeini might take some "bold action", and this fact worried them. However, they were not able to define just what that bold action would be.

The President wondered how much conversation there had been between Khomeini and the military people before he came back.

General Huyser said there had been two contacts: the first had been General Mogadam with Behesti, in which the military had expressed solid support for the constitutional government. The second had been a meeting to prepare for Khomeini's return. There had been pressure for Bazargan and Behesti to meet with the military since that time. However, it had been suggested to Gharbaghi not to accept such meeting, except in the presence of the Prime Minister, and that had not happened thus far.

Dr. Brzezinski quoted from a cable in over the weekend which noted that General Toufanian was nervous and wished to leave the country. He thought that the senior generals shared his views, and that all wanted to leave on the same plane. He noted that they would say one thing to you and do something else, and thought they could not be trusted.

General Huyser said that report was based on one day's conversation with General Toufanian, whereas he had had 25 to 30 conversations with him. He had his ups and downs from one day to the next; however, he was still there. General Toufanian did not even have a passport, and he is one of those, he knows what will happen to him if someone else takes over. He has a rope around his neck because of charges of corruption.

General Huyser had spent a long time with Toufanian in his house, where he had discussed committing suicide and gave him a confession of his life, was very emotional. He thought the Iranian generals overall had been extremely emotional. He had met with them for seven hours straight after the Shah had left, and he thinks he understands them as well as an American can.

The President wondered whether they would be reliable in a crisis.

General Huyser said, yes. And General Toufanian would be in there with them. In fact, he might try to emerge as a leader of the group. That would be a sure way to save his neck.

Dr. Brzezinski said if all else fails and option C proves to be necessary, what are the command steps which are necessary for them to execute the plan.

General Huyser noted that the original plan was one that they started on one morning and planned to do on the next. The troops were already on alert and could move quickly. It does not take that many troops to seize the oil fields.

The President noted that there had been a threat of a coup when the Shah left. He wondered what other times there was a possible threat of a coup taking place.

General Huyser said that the generals had looked on the mass marches on the 19th of January as a national referendum, and they feared that this would represent the beginning of a new government on the basis of people marching in the street. They were tempted to preempt at that point. Also, at the time when Khomeini returned, they felt everything was going to collapse. They felt they would lose the soldiers to the religious faction. They could not see their way through that valley. In each case, they were tempted to try a coup.

Secretary Vance wondered what accounts for the different views held by Sullivan and General Huyser.

General Huyser said there was a very different view with regard to the stamina of the military forces. Ambassador Sullivan questioned whether the troops would actually respond to an order. The fact that they would respond to an order was proved when they were ordered to protect the Armory. However, Ambassador Sullivan thinks that they will go to Khomeini's side.

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General Huyser said that he had watched the soldiers on the various military bases that they have visited in other areas. They snap to, they salute, and there is a general sense of discipline. A good number of people disagreed with the idea of a show of force prior to Khomeini's return. But the military was extremely efficient and showed an effective capability to operate. General Huyser felt that there were two different opinions about the army. He felt that was perhaps good, and maybe the truth was somewhere in between.

Admiral Turner noted that General Huyser's view was considerably different from a number of analysts who are in town. Many analysts felt that the public was so overwhelming in its support of Khomeini that even if the military controls the key installations, the public will be able to defeat them, even if it's only a passive opposition.

Secretary Brown noted that that is indeed the way it is now.

General Huyser noted that, when he arrived in Tehran, the city was at a complete standstill. Although Tehran was noted for its massive traffic jams, when he arrived by airplane, he looked out at the city and could identify only ten cars moving in all of Tehran. Today, it is much improved. Some people thought it was crazy to plan pro-government demonstrations; however, by an honest count, they felt that between 250,000 and 300,000 people turned out to support the Bakhtiar government. This was without paying anyone, and only 48 hours notice. The reaction was extremely good. The opposition, by contrast, brought their people in by buses from outlying areas, and the figures of demonstrations were in fact exaggerated. On the 19th of January, the press reports indicated that one to three million people were demonstrating in Tehran. They observed the whole demonstration by helicopter, and using a very strict formula about how many people could be fit into a square meter, they determined that the crowds amounted to between 500,000 and 750,000. However, there was no denying that the demonstrations were well-planned and it was a very orderly crowd.

Admiral Turner noted that there may be very major differences of opinion .

General Huyser noted that the number of people who were anti-Shah was extremely high. But, now the Shah is gone.

Admiral Turner wondered if a military takeover would not revive the same feeling. People would look at a military takeover as a repeat of 1953.

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The President noted that talking of a military government is in our view talking of Bakhtiar with a military force under Bakhtiar's order. Our policy was not to throw Bakhtiar out. The first priority of all of our plans is to keep Bakhtiar strong. On his orders, the military might take over key installations, including the oil fields. But that is very different from a coup, very different from throwing out Bakhtiar, and very different than a military takeover as such.

Secretary Vance agreed that this was a very important point, and it was important to make that distinction. The word military coup was frequently used to describe an alternative to Bakhtiar.

The President noted that that was even stronger grounds for support of the Bakhtiar government.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered whether Bakhtiar's chances would not be increased and the military's ability to support him would not be maintained better if the Shah should resign in favor of his son.

General Huyser said that that was a very heavy question to be asking him. He felt that such a change would probably be acceptable to the military. In that respect, it was unbelievable how they progressed in their thinking since the Shah had left. They now refer to the Shah in has-been terms. The military accepts that there must be changes in the government. The King should be a constitutional monarch; they talk about him riding on a bicycle like the King of Sweden. There has to be some form of democracy. However, the effect of an abdication in favor of his son as far as the opposition is concerned would be zero. Khomeini is bent on destroying the entire Pahlavi dynasty, and a change in favor of his son would not change that.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered, if option C should be chosen, if there would not be less suspicion of the motives of the military's intentions if the Shah had in fact resigned. He posed this simply as a hypothetical case.

The President said that his own belief was that it would not. In his view, people had written off the Shah. He had asked General Huyser in the Oval Office what communication there had been with the Shah and whether he was still in touch with the military. The Shah had told Sadat, while he was in Egypt, that he had had no communications with the military since he had left as a result of what he felt was his commitment. It was never entirely clear what his commitment really was.

The Shah now appeared to be passive and not at all vigorous. For him to step down now in favor of a strong young fighter pilot could in fact raise fears that he would make a comeback. It could arouse hopes on the part of the military and fears on the part of the opposition that in fact the monarchy was in the process of making a comeback.

Dr. Brzezinski said that was a good point. The fact was now going to be bad. He wondered whether perhaps later it would be different.

The President said that a government under Bakhtiar would be best for us. His replacement with the Crown Prince would probably disturb the situation.

Secretary Vance said that General Waters had recently been in Morocco and had seen the Shah and had talked with him. He felt that the Shah had not been in touch with anyone.

Admiral Turner said that he would respectfully like to disagree with the President that the people generally assume the Shah was gone for good.

The President said this was only his opinion, but it was based on Admiral Turner's reports. (Laughter) He said that his impression was that the Shah was not a vigorous man today. He noted that General Huyser had said that the military now referred to him as a has-been. For a while after his departure he felt that the Shah considered going back, but that this was no longer true.

Admiral Turner said he would certainly agree that the Shah was gone for good. He would only disagree that most of the people in Iran believed that the Shah was gone for good.

General Jones said that replacing the Shah at this point with the Crown Prince would merely serve to raise the profile of the monarchy and draw attention to it.

The President said that it was all right for us at this point to talk about various options, but that it was important that the military support Bakhtiar whatever comes.

General Huyser said that the senior military now were even critical of the Shah about not doing what they felt was necessary prior to his departure.

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The President noted that in retrospect there are certainly things that the Shah could have done a hell of a lot better. The Shah had gone to pieces in early December or mid-December. He had turned into the shell of a man. However, despite that, he had never been diverted from his idea that he wished to avoid bloodshed. When the President had watched to CBS news report talking about the tape recording which they attributed to the Shah and in which the Shah called for civil war and asked the military to shed lots of blood, the President knew immediately that it was a forgery, quite apart from the experts. It was exactly opposite of what the Shah had in fact been urging entirely all the way through. Even to save his own ass, the Shah had not been willing to order massive bloodshed. CBS had really messed up on that report.

Mr. Jordan asked how long Khomeini would have to be back in order for him to be perceived as part of the problem.

General Huyser said that is already happening now. He recognized that he was an eternal optimist. He had been there in Iran working with a group of generals who were eternal pessimists, and he had to be success-oriented in order to do his job. However, Khomeini was going to have to show something was happening soon, or he would lose. At the present time, there was no structure, and it was merely up to whoever could grab the most. Friction was already beginning to develop between Bazargan and Khomeini. Bazargan understands the political equation in Iran. Things are improving daily. Each day while he was there in Tehran, General Huyser had noticed people were beginning to sweep the streets, pick up the garbage, even open up shops. Day by day, more shops were open. What was required now were some positive moves. He had recommended taking over the customs; there are currently a hundred trucks sitting in Turkey, waiting to get into Iran, and a hundred and sixty ships sitting and waiting in the harbor, which are carrying food and other items. The military could easily take over the customs. The only thing that Bakhtiar now controls is the airport, and he already showed that he could close that, if necessary. Opening the customs, however, would be a humanitarian thing, and he had urged Bakhtiar and the military to go for the humanitarian aspects. If the strikes were broken and people went back to work, a number of people would actually support the idea.

Secretary Brown wondered how long it would be before Khomeini would show a substantial drop in popularity; would it be days, weeks, months.

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Date:

JUL 25 2016



General Huyser said that he felt that it would be days.

Secretary Vance asked about Ayatollah Shariat-Madari. It seemed that he was flipping in his views. Previously, it was reported that he was keeping his distance from Khomeini. However, he is now reported saying that an Islamic Republic is not as bad as people think.

General Huyser said that, while he was there, Shariat-Madari seemed very moderate. He felt there was considerable difference between him and Khomeini's views. However, it is possible his view changed since General Huyser left.

General Jones noted that there was one small indicator over the weekend. They had released a tanker. They had decided that it was impossible to unload the Diesel oil from the tanker properly, and also decided that they had no need for it. Now they had suddenly asked for the tanker to turn around and come back. This may indicate a change. The ship was Norwegian and Defense went to State to ask the ship to turn around. This may indicate that the military is in fact planning to move. Also, there was a US Navy ship due in to deliver munitions to a naval port which did not receive a clearance to offload. However, this was a different situation, since the Navy was not ready to receive munitions. So this was a different situation than a denial of the National Iranian Oil Company to get permission for the Norwegian tanker to offload its products.

The President wondered if the Memorandum of Understanding had been signed.

General Huyser said, yes, it had been signed just before he left.

General Jones noted that the Iranians were not willing to do the same for the British.

Secretary Brown noted that the British may just have to cancel their military orders. This may be a reflection of the instructions which their new ambassador has just received, which told him not to opt for either government.

The President wondered what effect the BBC had had.

General Huyser noted the tremendous change that had taken place as far as the press was concerned. Previously, the Iranians had had no free press and no access to alternative sources of information. Suddenly they had an open press and also the BBC presenting them with a wide variety of information. They found

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this difficult to accept. For a long time, they had been critical of our own press for printing information that was not favorable to them. General Huyser specifically remembered the case of Ramsey Clark when he got back and saying that 99 percent of the people in Iran supported Khomeini. They found that very hard to take, and he found it quoted to him every place that he went. However now the senior military people are beginning to recognize that it was news and they are treating it accordingly. General Rabii went out to talk to the Homofars to try to convince them to change their point of view. It was a hopeful sign.

The President asked what were the Homofars exactly.

General Huyser said that they are the technicians. They are in for 12 years at a time.

The President wondered what was their function.

General Huyser said that they wear uniforms and they perform the technical support on aircraft. Although there are some of them in the army and the navy, the primary support is in the air force.

The President asked, if in case the military must take over in order to support Bakhtiar, would that include controlling the radio and television facilities?

General Huyser said, yes.

The President noted that General Jam in one of his conversations had noted that he had, when he was Chief of Staff, devised a plan to take over the key places, if necessary. He wondered if this was familiar to General Huyser.

General Huyser said that General Gharbaghi had referred to this plan on several occasions.

The President wondered how the senior generals viewed General Jam.

General Huyser said that they were somewhat disenchanted. When he came back to Tehran, he stayed with a retired general, who was not on the side of the government. Some viewed him as something of an opportunist.

The President said he felt the same. He wondered what General Huyser's plans were at this point.

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General Huyser said that he planned to return to Stuttgart, his post.

The President asked that a confirmation of Sullivan's instructions be sent to Tehran.

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 5U.S.C. § 552  
Date: 25 JUL 2016 Authority: EO 13526+  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

JUL 25 2016



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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28 JUL 1979 13 32

OFFICE OF THE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: FEB 03 2016

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
1 AUG 1979

28 JUL 1979

1-22887/79

*Pass copies of this with my  
comments to CV + ZB,  
be discussed at  
lunch on Friday.*  
8/ KB

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: What to do about Iran (U)

SUMMARY

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0204,  
Box 38, Folder 337 WH (Aug-Dec) 1979.

(S) A review of steps we might take in Iran reveals nothing new, nothing that will strengthen the Iranian government quickly or similarly improve our diplomatic and military relations with it. Nevertheless, we should frame a policy--and take some steps now--to improve our position in Iran over the longer term. This memorandum suggests four steps which we consider basic.

(S) The Policy Dilemma

In a memo we sent you six months ago we said the crucial question was whether the departure of the Shah was a change of government or a revolution. The latter, we said, would mean that new elites and new principles of rule had replaced old ones. It seems clear now--although only six months has elapsed--that the Iran of the future is going to be radically different from the Iran of the past two decades. Little will remain of the ideas or the old structure of economic and political order when the present movement is finished. The immediate prospect, however, is for another year or more of divided governmental authority, a weakening military, anti-Western religiosity as the principle of state, and growing radical leftist and separatist sympathies. TAB A describes conditions.

(S) The situation will get worse before it gets better. It could well come to a conflict between the religious right and the secular left. The large urban and lower class groups which overthrew the Shah in demonstrations and strikes will be the object of the conflict. This polarization is the core problem our policies in Iran must address, because the radical left could easily win. A government in Tehran like the one in Iraq and Afghanistan would alter the power balance in the Gulf ominously. Such a government would be worse than the other three outcomes. We see:

- More of the semi-chaos which exists now, perhaps even a further loss of control over the non-Persian minorities by the Persian speakers. At the worst, this could lead to the division of Iran into tribal, Turkish, Kurdish, Arab and Baluchi statelets, or

330-82-0204, box 38, 337 WH (Aug-Dec) 1979

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- A weak military regime, à la Pakistan, or
- A religious state like Saudi Arabia but with institution of rule provided by a stronger government rather than a royal family.

(S) The prospect of an invasion of Iran (from Iraq or the Soviet Union or a strengthened Afghanistan) seems remote. All these states could decide, however, to provide arms aid and political support to client groups inside Iran to promote a radical leftist take-over, or prevent a rightist one. All these states would probably hope, however, as we should, to see the restoration of Persian power wielded by a strong and friendly government. Bazargan and Khomeini's movement offers the best potential for such an outcome.

*I doubt that they would prefer, in order, a friendly strong, a weak one, an adversary strong one. But their own views of friendly & adversary are opposite.*

(S) Clearly the Bazargan and Khomeini camp is aiming at the religious state mentioned above. While their religious orientation is strong, Khomeini and company are on the way to framing a constitution, holding elections, re-directing and re-staffing the government and the economy to support their views of an Islamic commonwealth. Their perception of threat is still focused on the Shah's regime, not on the left, not on foreign foes (except as they are connected with the remnants of the Shah's government or military) and not on internal separatism. In this view of the world, the Komitehs are an essential device in dealing with a government and a military which they believe can't be trusted. In a restructured state, we can perhaps assume that, as Khomeini has said, the Komitehs would have a lesser role, the government a greater one.

(S) Given the options outlined above, the US Government should begin to put itself in position to help the evolution of the Khomeini state, accepting the collateral possibility of the emergence of a strong military man in time. The Islamic content of the state should not obstruct our policy, notwithstanding American hopes for the rights of women and distaste for the chador. Those are internal matters and we can hope in time to facilitate the cooperation of the Islamic movement with moderate secular leaders. This option is better than letting events slide toward a polarization which could produce a leftist government or a split-up of Iran.

(S) We see four areas--political, security, covert action and economic advice--in which specific actions could be taken now to put US policy on the right course.

#### (S) Political

The reasons that the government of Khomeini sees us as an important part of the opposition goes beyond their anti-Western biases to some hard perceptions of real politik. After the military collapsed, we showed more concern for the victims of Khomeini than for his government. We have never acknowledged any constructive aspects of Khomeini's revolution. We have never even sent an official emissary to Khomeini. We tarred ourselves with the image of

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Date: FEB 03 2016

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opposition in these efforts just as much as we did in supporting the Shah as long as we did. [redacted] --a friend--told Charge' Laingen in early July that the basic problem of the US is that Iranians think that while we have recognized the revolution, we have not accepted it. This should probably become the initial objective of a new policy.

(S) Now, six months after the Shah has departed, we should look to deal with the real power in Iran. This is still Khomeini and his movement. It should be possible to develop some areas of agreement and common concern, i.e.,

- Our steadfast policy of non-interference in Iran's internal affairs and, moreover, our explicit recognition of the idealism and the constructive elements of the revolution.

- Our interest in Iran's territorial integrity and economic welfare.

- Our apprehension over the aims of adjacent states.

- Our concern over the impaired ability of the Iranian army to defend the country and our willingness to cooperate in military matters with Iran through whatever procedures they choose.

- Our perception of a large and growing threat from leftists and separatists in Iran.

(S) This message should probably be delivered by a special emissary whose religious and political outlook allows him to be sympathetic to Khomeini's reformist and nationalist goals. The emissary's visit should follow a major speech in the US stating our support for the revolution. Bazargan and Yazdi can pave the way with the Ayatollah. Nevertheless, it should not be expected that Khomeini's personal reaction will be favorable. In fact, it will be unfriendly in the extreme. He is bitter and ignorant about the U.S. Still, we should take this step now in order to broaden the base of our contacts in Iran and establish a new credibility and relationship. Over time, with further steps, we can hope for reassessment among Khomeini advisors and perhaps eventually by the Ayatollah himself. Those actions would be useful as a prelude to the assignment of the new Ambassador, who should be charged with the new mandate of establishing a supportive and understanding relationship with the regimes in Qom and Tehran.

To be discussed w/ RB/CV

(S) Security

Despite the hostility and suspicion of Khomeini and others toward US contacts with the Iranian military, we should encourage the tentative steps that have been taken to reestablish logistic support arrangements. We should publicly and candidly describe our policy and procedures.

I agree with the suggested approach on these items.

5 U.S.C. § 552

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 03 Feb 2016 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify in Part: X

Reason: 3.3(b)(1)(A)

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: FEB 03 2016

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- In the long run the Army may yet prove to be a decisive factor. We should concentrate our advisory effort on establishing firm but quiet professional ties with the emerging leadership of the ground forces.

- By law, the USG can fund only six MAAG positions in Iran. Since it is unlikely that Iran will renew any personnel support cases by the end of this fiscal year (September 30) our advisory mission will consist of a maximum of six people. These officers should be carefully selected, Farsi-trained where time permits, and to emphasize our concern for the Iranian ground forces, headed by a US Army (not Air Force) O-6. (The Army in Iran--not the Air Force--is decisive politically.)

- Now that Congress has passed the FY 1979 Supplemental, we should proceed with our plans to offer emergency supply of repair parts provided Iran deposits funds in advance (\$5 million suggested) and to deliver unclassified repair parts and other minor items already paid for from the FMS trust fund and awaiting shipment.

- We should continue to keep the Iranian authorities informed of FMS trust fund status and to encourage them to send a team to the United States in order to resolve outstanding problems and establish a sound basis for resumption of normal FMS financial management (for example, quarterly billing and payment in advance to cover progress payments and termination liability). The target date for such a meeting, in either Washington or Tehran, should be no later than mid-September, when we will have completed our analysis of trust fund status following reimbursement from the U.S. Navy for the SPRUANCE-class ships and the Iranians will have completed their Ramadan religious break.

- We should respond positively to Iranian requests for technical assistance, including discreet requests for advice on improving operational effectiveness within a more constrained supply regime, providing the GOI can guarantee the safety of personnel and assure their ability to work in a non-hostile and constructive environment.

- We should be willing to discuss buy-back of US-supplied equipment in response to Iranian initiatives.

- As a general policy we should encourage government-to-government arrangements and discourage commercial arrangements as we resume our military supply relationship in order to foster government-to-government relations, to avoid a recurrence of the widespread abuses which resulted from previous commercial relations, and to assure the security and constructive nature of US activities in Iran.

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Date: FEB 03 2016

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
~~(S)~~ Economic

A World Bank team might be able to provide some encouragement and advice for the government in launching its new development program. The basic obstacles faced by this program lie in a lack of order and a lack of administrative machinery, but Iran does have a banking system which--while now under national control--could be used to provide loans for equipment and agricultural schemes in the countryside. The World Bank should be able to help with advice on food subsidies which do not undermine the position of the traditional farmer and on construction programs which soak up the excess and discontented labor of the cities. It might help establish wage and benefit guidelines which bring some more order and discipline to management-labor relations, which are presently chaotic. Although Iran does not need foreign exchange and has high and perhaps rising levels of national income, the IMF might advise on a stabilization program to deal with inflation on one hand and currency flight on the other. We should also consider offering US-only teams which could provide assistance in agriculture, road construction, and maintenance of power generation facilities.

~~(U)~~ Other Actions

See sensitive attachment.

~~(S)~~ I recommend you suggest to Cy and Zbig that we need a PRC meeting on Iran to consider specific steps we could take on Iran. State would chair, but we should offer to circulate a DOD paper to supplement State efforts. (You could also give them a copy of this memo if you wish.) The paper will spell out specific steps along the lines outlined above, to cover a three-to-six month period, and end our ad hoc approach to the problems in Iran. I have directed the Iran Task Force, which was established last November under Bob Murray, to oversee all DOD activities vis-a-vis Iran.



David E. McGiffert  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
International Security Affairs

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: FEB 03 2016



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ATTACHMENT

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~~(S)~~ Covert Action

We have so few such projects, and so little chance of mounting any that meet the tests of impact and deniability that it may be a waste of time to suggest opportunities here. However, we need to build some support around some ideas and some individuals. Specifically, we would like public comment on Soviet strategems against Iran and the anti-Islamic character of the Soviet regime, the need for a strong Army subordinate to a strong state, the mutuality of some US and Iranian interests in economic and security measures, the compatibility of Islam with economic progress and a parliamentary political life. We should look for a closer but very discreet tie to [REDACTED] other reformist clerics as well as emerging military leaders. The aim overall would be to create circumstances which would facilitate cooperation of the Islamic movement with moderate secularists--rather than force a polarization of the country between the right and the left.

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Date: FEB 03 2016

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

ALPHA CHANNEL

November 19, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Additional Military Forces Deployable  
into the Arabian Sea

As we think ahead to what may be a long crisis, we should contemplate additional military capabilities in the Arabian Sea and surrounding areas beyond what we have already discussed. The times required for some of them are considerable and therefore decisions involving them would have to be taken well before we wanted to assure their availability. Examples follow:

1. Additional aircraft carriers. The USS KITTY HAWK, now in port in Subic, can transit to the Arabian Sea in about 13 days from decision. The USS CORAL SEA, now in Hawaii, could be in the Arabian Sea in 20 days. The USS INDEPENDENCE (6th Fleet) now near Sardinia, can transit around the Cape of Good Hope to the Arabian Sea in about 27 days. The NIMITZ, near Naples, could reach the Arabian Sea in 19 days. The NIMITZ and the KITTY HAWK (which happen to be the two closest) carry F-14s; the INDEPENDENCE and CORAL SEA carry F-4s.

2. To deploy land based air to the region quickly probably the best option is to deploy some of the F-111Es and Fs, now in the UK, to whatever land base is available. My thought is that Egypt would be willing to provide such basing under these circumstances. We could have a squadron of F-111s (about 18 aircraft there within four days. They should be accompanied by two or three E-3s (AWACS) which could come from the United States or Western Pacific and could arrive in less than four days.

3. We have a squadron of B-52Ds on Guam. These have relatively short range. We could put the first B-52Hs there within 48 hours. These have much longer range and could reach the area of the Arabian Sea with fewer refuelings. B-52s cannot operate out of Diego Garcia in any event because of runway and parking apron limitations, but Diego Garcia could handle KC-135 tankers to refuel the B-52s in flight.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 23 2014

EXEMPT PER EO 12958, Sec 3.4 (b) (5)  
OSD P 5 212 Date: 28 March 2003  
Review Declassify on: 11 Dec 2028  
Other Agency Equity: FRO

Downgraded to Secret  
Date: 17 NOV 2014  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 23/01/2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: ☒ Deny in Full: ☐  
Declassify in Part: ☐  
Reasons:  
MDR: 15-NF-0325

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4. Amphibious forces. The nearest is the embarked Marine amphibious unit (MAU) in the Mediterranean (approximately battalion size). It could come through the Canal and reach the Gulf of Oman in about 12 days. There is also a MAU in the Western Pacific which could arrive in about 13 days.

5. We have four AC-130 gunships on Guam flying missions to Korea to exercise with US and ROK forces there. Three of these aircraft could deploy to Diego Garcia in about two days.

In my view, some of these actions should be begun now; others should not. There is also consideration of how they may affect actions in Tehran. I am prepared to be more specific verbally by secure telephone.

*Harold Brown*

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: DEC 23 2014



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

ALPHA CHANNEL

November 19, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Deploying Additional Forces

I believe that we should do the following now:

- Move the KITTY HAWK to the Arabian Sea. This will also allow us to move some large helicopters closer to the scene (with less risk of compromise than with other methods we've considered). The process would be rather complex. We disassemble six RH-53s at Norfolk (unfortunately they don't have the special navigation devices of the Air Force HH-53s which are not appropriate to use off carriers for other reasons), load them in C-5As, send them to Diego Garcia, reassemble and fly them to the KITTY HAWK as it passes near Diego Garcia. We might make another transfer from KITTY HAWK to MIDWAY, to save a day or two.
- Move the CORAL SEA to Subic Bay and defer for another week decision to move it on to the Arabian Sea. In the meantime we can examine options such as a port call to Singapore which may allow us to defer final decision longer.
- Deploy a contingent of three or four KC-135 tanker aircraft to Diego Garcia. This will improve our confidence that we can later carry out the AC-130 or B-52 options smoothly.

The CJCS believes that deploying B-52s to Guam should be a "medium" option, something we don't need to start today, but could well start in a couple of days.

We should defer decisions on the MAU, AC-130s and F-111s until, at least, late this week. In the meantime, Dave Jones and I will examine them in more detail to see if any of the response times can be reduced below what I have indicated here. I also recommend that Cy and I begin immediately to formulate a demarche seeking Egyptian cooperation in logistics support, Suez transit of a MAU, and F-111 basing.

Downgraded to Secret  
Date: 17 NOV 2014  
Chief, Declassification Division WHS

EXEMPT FROM E.O. 12958, Sec 3.4(b)(5)  
11 S. 27 Date: 20 March 2009  
as Declassified on 11 Dec 2028  
Reason: 25X

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Lib of Cong, Brown Papers, box 106, Alpha Channel File, 10/24/79-3/31/80

15-m-0326



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ALPHA CHANNEL

Finally, we should start thinking about what we will want to say to the Soviets about such reinforcements and about potential U.S. military actions, before or when (if) they happen.

*Harold Brown*

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WIS

Date: 23/12/2014 Authority: EO 13526

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MDR: 15 -M- 0326

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: DEC 23 2014

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 1, 1979

Jimmy Carter Presidential  
Library, Brzezinski  
Donated Materials,  
Geographic File, Box 11,  
Folder Iran (1/79-12/79).

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Dynamics of the Hostage Situation

Pursuing the diplomatic options and applying the pressure of world opinion to the Iranians is clearly the right approach over the next several days. The question of the Shah's departure from the U.S., the UNSC and ICJ proceedings, the religious fervor of Muharram, the Iranian vote on the new constitution, the continued international perception of the U.S. as the aggrieved party -- all argue that it is too soon to move to "other means."

But as time goes on, the Iranians, and the world -- though not the American people -- are likely to begin to see the holding of the U.S. hostages as the natural state of things, rather than as an abomination. There may then be more international pressure on the U.S. to "confess our sins of espionage," and to promise amnesty to Iran, than on the Iranians to release the hostages. At home, the general support for our policy (strong pressure with peaceful means, holding military action in reserve) will begin to fragment. On one side there will be calls for extreme military actions, on the other for meeting some or all Iranian demands.

Your press conference of Wednesday evening (the most effective of your Presidency thus far) has held the situation together for an extra week or so. Early in the week of Dec. 3, I believe it will be time to push our Allies and friends to adopt some of the strongest economic measures we can devise. Apparently action by the European and Japanese banks similar to our own -- blocking, defaults, etc. -- would soon have increasingly severe effects. But those countries correctly view such action as risky and painful to themselves. They will take it, if at all, only if they believe the alternative is military action by us that is even more risky to them in economic and political terms. We must be prepared to threaten such action.

If we cannot persuade them to take such economic and political action, or if it fails to secure release of the hostages, we will have to consider military options very seriously. Our approach should be to make it painful to Khomeini to hold the

JC, Brz Don Mat, Geo File, Iran [1/79-12/79) box 11

Review: 1 Dec 1999

Reason: 2-301c.7.

TOP SECRET EYES

per 8/22/02 Doc Hr.  
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B/AE NARA DATE 7/30/08

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hostages (so far it hasn't been painful -- world public opinion doesn't bother him much), and prospectively much more painful to him if they are harmed. Then he may be pushed toward a face-saving solution (e.g., expulsion with or without a quick trial). Though many suggest blockade, mining of harbors through which most Iranian imports flow is clearly, to my mind, less risky and less escalatory. With mining, we need not stop ships with our own ships; our forces are there to be shot at only briefly; and ships which might be sunk must themselves take the last move that has that result. Mining is the mildest military action I have found. We are seeking others, for example various acts to demonstrate how we could damage Iran, but I doubt that we will come up with any that are effective without being at the same time more escalatory.

Mining, like blockade, is an act of war -- though a bloodless act of war, like invading an embassy and taking hostages. There would be a real risk of upsetting our Allies, and a greater one of upsetting or even severely alienating other Muslim states in the Gulf region and elsewhere.

It could derail the negotiating process, such as it is, although it might also revive that process. And it would certainly increase the risk to the hostages -- probably severely, for a time, though not as likely fatally so as a rescue attempt would do. But it would show we are not to be trifled with and that we will not accept a status quo that has some of our people hostage without corresponding pain to those who hold them hostage. It would avoid a situation that might otherwise drag on, where the U.S. is hurting and Iran -- or at least the Iranian leadership -- is not. Mining would -- over a couple of months -- affect the Iranian economy significantly. It would, by the implicit threat of further escalation, get the attention of Iranian leaders; and convince them we are not bluffing, much faster than that.

The question on which your advisers will probably divide is "when?" That judgment will turn on: our estimates of the likely course and outcome -- both for the hostages and for perceived American standing in the region and elsewhere -- of diplomatic negotiations that last for months; whether the hostages are put on trial; the outcome of UNSC and ICJ proceedings; the willingness of others to join us in non-military actions and the effect thereof on the Iranians; how well we think we can make our case to the moderate Muslim countries.

My own judgment is that we can go for a period of ten to fifteen days along the diplomatic/economic route, if it appears to be moving in a promising way, and if there is not evidence

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~ THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

April 10, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
SUBJECT: Getting the Hostages Free

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 8 2015

The steps announced on Monday bought us some time and set a new process in motion. We need to think now about what we will do with the time we have gained and how we manage the coercive process. (S)

Having taken these initial steps, we must be prepared to back them up or else risk a further loss of credibility. Iran does not believe that we will use force. The measures announced Monday have raised some doubts in their mind, but those doubts will soon be put to rest unless followed by additional measures. (S)

Gradual escalation makes sense only if it is part of a strategy which has some promise of freeing the hostages. In my view there are two strategies available to us which could succeed:

1. A graduated application of force designed to persuade the Ayatollah and his followers that the continued holding of the hostages is self-defeating because it endangers Iran's wellbeing.
2. A rescue operation which deprives the Ayatollah of his bargaining leverage and punctures his aura of invincibility. (S)

Both strategies entail significant risks and both are clouded by uncertainties. The following is an effort to examine systematically the risks and prospects. (U)

Graduated Pressure

It is now clear that the diplomatic option is closed. The hostages are going to be held at least until the Majlis convenes in June, and the prospects that a new Parliament dominated by the clerics will vote to release them on terms even marginally acceptable to us are very remote. In short, unless something is done to change the nature of the game, we must resign ourselves to the continued imprisonment of the hostages through the summer or even later. (S)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~Review on April 10, 2000~~

~~Extended by Z. Brzezinski~~

~~Reason: NSC 1.13(f)~~

463

JC, NSC Staff Mat, Office, Pres & Brz only  
file, Iran hostage Mission, 11/79-7/80  
Ann 87. # ? 15-m-0328 R-1

0020166



Accordingly, a sharp increase in the pressures on Iran is one way of changing the environment. For example, we could undertake a deliberate program of increasingly severe steps every week or two weeks until the hostages are delivered. We might wish to inform the Iranians in advance of the schedule, or we could simply proceed step by step and let them draw their own conclusions. The following steps represent an illustrative program:

1. Sharply increased surveillance of shipping enroute to and from Iranian ports, combined with some overflights.
2. Declaration of a state of belligerency with Iran, coupled with a screening program of Iranian nationals in this country.
3. Technical interruption of power at a key point, e.g. the refinery complex in Abadan or cities such as Tehran or Qom.
4. Mining of harbors, leaving the Kharg Island facility untouched.
5. Closure of Kharg Island and/or occupation of the Tunbs and Aub Musa at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.
6. Selective air strikes on economic targets. ~~(TS)~~

The objective of undertaking such a program would be to free the hostages before the program had to be carried to its logical conclusion of outright hostilities. However, once embarked, we would have to be prepared to persevere or else be perceived as paper tigers. ~~(TS)~~

There are several difficulties with this strategy in terms of getting the hostages released. First, the deliberate progression of actions, even if fairly rapid in succession, will encourage the Iranians to seek some counterpressure to force us to stop. The recent threat by the militants to kill the hostages in the event of U.S. military action represents the kind of pressure tactics we can expect to encounter. ~~(TS)~~

The second problem is the uncertainty of the political reaction inside Iran. The Ayatollah would attempt to use this program to arouse public opinion and to unite the nation against the common enemy. He might succeed, at least initially, but over time, as it became clear that the Ayatollah was unable to prevent the disruption of the internal economy and as the citizens begin to bear increasingly heavy penalties because of his obstinacy, the mood might begin to shift from defiance of the U.S. to discontent with the irresponsibility of their own leaders. ~~(TS)~~

A third, very serious problem is the danger that our actions will inspire the tribal elements and other opposition forces to rise up against the clerical regime, with a complete breakdown of public order or even civil war. Not only would this situation endanger the hostages, but it would sorely tempt the Soviets to move across the border. The Soviets might cite our military actions as armed intervention, permitting them to invoke the 1921 Treaty. They might also be able to assemble a Tudeh-dominated government in Azerbaijan or even in Tehran in the name of protecting the Islamic Revolution. The Soviets have steadily been building their military capability near the Iranian border, and they have been accumulating political support by their support of Khomeini against the U.S. A small, disciplined group with outside resources can be very effective in conditions of anarchy and political collapse. (S)

Finally, even if we succeed in pressuring Khomeini to strike a deal, we will have a problem in extricating ourselves from the confrontation. In short, though superficially cautious and controlled, it is a high-risk strategy which sets in motion forces that are dangerous and beyond our power to control. (S)

#### Rescue Operation

The alternative is to force the issue to a resolution by unilaterally seizing the hostages away from the Iranians. From a political point of view, this course of action has enormous appeal. It is quick and almost totally under our control. A sudden strike with the sole objective of rescuing our people would be understood -- and perhaps applauded -- by regional states and allies alike. It would provide almost no opportunity or excuse for the Soviets to intervene. And it would embarrass the Ayatollah and show him and his regime to be inept. (S)

The difficulties of making a decision turn almost entirely on questions of capability and risk. Can we get in and out before the Iranians can react militarily? Can we get all the hostages? Do we believe that we could act swiftly enough to avoid having many of the hostages executed? Can we avoid losing many of our own military people? (S)

I am struck by the evaluation of some of those closest to the situation. My staff assistant, Gary Sick, who has been living with this issue day and night for the past five months, has personally and privately urged me in the strongest terms to adopt this course of action, and has proposed this memo. He has also informed me that the three best Persian-speaking officers in the Foreign Service have recently gone to Cy with the same recommendation. They all believe that the risks of continued incarceration or of military escalation are far greater than a surprise rescue

operation. They are convinced that true surprise is possible and that penetration of the Embassy is a realistic prospect. (TS)

I find this argument persuasive. There may never be a better moment to undertake such an operation than the next few weeks. The security at the Embassy must have settled into a routine by now, and the Iranians are almost contemptuous in their certainty that rescue is not a feasible option. Even the U.S. press has totally accepted our explanations that such an operation is impossible. The Iranian military is in nearly total disarray and preoccupied with the Iraqi threat. The chance of maintaining true surprise is good, and with true surprise, our chances of a successful operation grow. (TS)

We have no risk-free options. Even the risks of inaction are considerable. No other option offers as many potential benefits or gives us as many opportunities to keep the timing and control in our own hands. We could even build in a little protection for any hostages who might not be freed by "arresting" some of the militants and bringing them back under kidnapping and even murder charges. (TS)

In my view, a carefully planned and boldly executed rescue operation represents the only realistic prospect that the hostages -- any of them -- will be freed in the foreseeable future. Our policy of restraint has won us well-deserved understanding throughout the world, but it has run out. This is the painful conclusion we must now face. (TS)

I understand that your preference is not to undertake a rescue except as a reaction to the killing of our hostages. But that is really tantamount to dismissing the rescue option altogether. Please consider the following: the lead time on any rescue operation is a minimum of eight days. If a hostage is killed, there will be an immediate outcry for retaliation; there will be mass hysteria; there will also be a heightened state of alert in Tehran and perhaps even additional killings. I very much doubt that we could afford to wait for days to undertake a rescue operation, and could be thus forced to retaliate, which would then further reduce the element of surprise which is so crucial to a successful rescue. (TS)

#### Post-Rescue

It is essential that we be ready to react to any post-rescue consequences. These would include threats to the lives of any hostages left behind, or to any prisoners taken in the operation, or to any Americans available in Tehran. In addition, we have to consider the need to react to any large-scale failure that could occur, and which could maximize the foregoing complications.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Accordingly, in addition to the rescue operation, we should be prepared to initiate almost immediately large-scale retaliatory strikes against key Iranian facilities. Upon the completion of the rescue operation, the Iranian government should be informed, and we could also make it known publicly, that the U.S. will initiate large-scale retaliatory action if any reprisals follow the rescue. If the rescue operation itself fails, we might want to initiate such retaliation in any case in order to reduce the negative consequences of the aborted undertaking. I believe that the U.S. public will be with us whatever happens.

~~(TS)~~

#### Procedure

I would recommend that at some point soon you consult with your advisers on the above. If you decide to undertake the rescue, I would suggest that you inform your advisers that you have decided against it. Afterwards, a much smaller group could meet with you to initiate the actual plans and to monitor their execution through completion. I would think that such a small group would be confined to the Vice President, Vance, Brown, Jones, Turner, and myself, as well as perhaps Ham and Jody. At the very last minute, additional advisers could be brought in, but it would be essential to enforce iron discipline and minimum participation (on a need-to-know basis). ~~(TS)~~

#### Conclusion

The above recommendation is not easy to make. It is even more difficult for you to consider and accept. However, we have to think beyond the fate of the 50 Americans (and also some Iranians) and consider the deleterious effects of a protracted stalemate, growing public frustration, and international humiliation of the United States. ~~(S)~~

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 8 2015

5 U.S.C. § 552  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +  
Date: 08 Dec 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0328





POLICY

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3

25 AUG 1980 15 57

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I-24418/80

23 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DUSD/PR  
DUSD/PP  
DIRECTOR, J-5

OSD 3.3(b)(1) (b)  
CIA 3.3(b)(1)

Shouldn't we be working on plans to keep the Afghan resistance going on a long term basis--for years if necessary--to maintain a steady drain on Soviet resources? To me, the best way to do this over time, as the large popular resistance is gradually swallowed, is by skillful hit-and-run tactics (a la Vietnam) on a modest but still significant scale.

This would involve requires training small professional guerrilla teams of the type that could conduct small raiding and sabotage operations of a potentially quite visible type. There's plenty of excellent human material from which to recruit say a 1,000 and then 2,000 man force.

This sort of thing could keep the Soviets occupied for years. It could also provide key cadre for any eventual larger revolt.

What's your reaction? If this idea appeals,

*RW*

R. W. Komer

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

cc: SecDef  
DepSecDef  
CJCS

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 04 MAY 2017 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: ☒  
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)(76)  
MDR: 15 -M- 1673

Declassify: 33 Aug 2000  
Reason: 1 5816.6

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15-M-1673

Box 2,  
330-82-0217, Afghanistan (Mar-80)

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END DEB COMBAT W.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 30-82-0205, Box 20, Folder Pakistan, 1979.

25 OCT 1979

MEMO FOR SECDEF/DEPSECDEF

I emphatically endorse the hard-line ISA position for PRC on Pakistan Nuclear Problem and disagree with JCS position:

1. The non-proliferation issue is far larger than Pakistan alone, however regrettable that we must single out Pakistan pour decourager les autres.

2. The US military's romantic attachment to the stalwart Pakistani remains unshakable, despite the fact that they always used us more than we used them. The only real help we ever got from them was Peshawar and U-2, and when they finally kicked us out in '66 we should have reciprocated in kind. Ergo, if we ever want to get something more from the Paks (other than the few things going now) a hard-line will in my experienced judgment produce more than a soft one.

3. In any case a cool calculation of our strategic interest in the subcontinent shows that a billion Indians are far more important to our overall interest than 150 million Paks. Our consistent tilt toward Pakistan 1950-65 was a major factor driving India to reinsure with Soviets. Why do we want to keep pushing Delhi toward Moscow (especially when Beijing seems warming up toward Delhi), unless there is some larger gain in prospect than I can see now?

4. In fact I'd even argue for economic pressure on Pakistan through the Western aid consortium as the most powerful non-proliferation lever available. Why should DOD always have to carry the can?

C-ICS  
CC: ASD/ISA  
Bob Murray

RWK  
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50.SC.8552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 27 OCT 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 1676

EXEMPT FROM EO 13526 as amended  
Date Sept 15 2005 Ser 2.2 (b) (1) (C)  
OMB P.S. 212 Other Agency Equivalency TRD  
Review/Declassify On: 31 Dec 2030

15-m-1676

330-82-0205, box 20, 1979

DECLASSIFIED-IN-FILE  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 27 2015

Pakistan

25 OCT 79

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POLICY

~~SECRET~~

~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

14 FEB 1980 17 02

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 06 2015

In reply refer to:  
I-20224/80  
14 February 1980

2/15

Save for  
next sec def  
I attend.  
173

MEMORANDUM FOR SECDEF

15 FEB 1980  
SECDEF HAS SEEN

My reaction to Tuesday SCC meeting is that in light of Pak response to Brzezinski mission, we should lay off chasing the Pakistanis. Two broad alternative explanations of Pak conduct are: (1) they genuinely believe it better to rely on Islamic/PRC ties and not get too close to US; or (2) they are playing us to get more aid. Probably elements of both are involved. In either case, why not sit back a while and see if they come to us?

Though some reports (probably planted) talk about a third Pak option of "accommodation" with the USSR, I'd heavily discount this. The Paks have played this card before and found Moscow much more interested in 650 million Indians than in 75 million Paks (as in analogous Ethiopia/Somalia case). Moreover, Pak Army wouldn't stand for it, and Chinese would be affronted. So basically Paks have nowhere else to go but in our direction, since neither China nor Islamic world can offer them enough security against USSR plus India.

Nor do I see much early military threat to Pakistan. By reaffirming the 1959 "commitment" we have already clearly told the USSR that Pakistan is under our security umbrella. This will serve as a deterrent. In any case, a direct Soviet push into Pakistan seems unlikely (as opposed to hot pursuit across the border or subversion in Baluchistan and/or Pathan areas--don't forget Kabul's favorite "Push-toonistan" theme). Direct aggression (or even large scale military action on the borders) would further harden Islamic and other opinion against the USSR, confirm the US position about Soviet expansionism, and really worry India. Much better for Moscow to play a subtler game exploiting Pak minority problems, economic instability and Zia's fragile political base.

If above is broadly correct, then a lot of heavy military equipment should not be high on our priority list of what Paks need. A guaranteed supply of Islamic oil at discount prices would be more immediately desirable--and should

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~~Declassify 14 Feb 86~~

15-m-1679

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330-82-0207, box 14, Pakistan

~~ENTIRE TEXT~~ Sec Def Cont Nr. X-  
(1980-16 Apr) 1980



~~SECRET~~  
~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2

perhaps be made part of our economic aid consortium package).  
So too would be light internal security type equipment, not  
tanks and advanced aircraft.

*RWK*

R. W. Komer

cc: CJCS  
ASD/ISA  
Mr. Gaffney  
Dr. Wolfowitz

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 06 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50.S.C. § 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +  
Date: 06 OCT 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 1679

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~~ENTIRE TEXT~~



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 06 2015

29 SEP 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Sales to Pakistan

Office of the Secretary of Defense <sup>50 U.S.C. § 552</sup>  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 06 OCT 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 1689

As your meeting with President Zia-ul-Haq approaches, I believe it very important to our strategy interest in SW Asia that we keep open the door for renewal of close security ties with Pakistan. My concern is heightened by the Iraq/Iran conflict and the threats to stability which it poses.

We can and have indicated a willingness to sell to Pakistan certain military equipment for cash including M60 tanks. We have transferred two old destroyers, and have pursued the defense industrial cooperation program initiated last February. However, we cannot give them the security guarantees they desire and it is probably infeasible at this time to persuade Congress to remove the legislative barriers to grant aid and FMS credits, even if we renewed our earlier decision to turn a blind eye to their nuclear weapons program. In the absence of sales, we have had practically no strategic or military-to-military dialogue with them.

There is, nevertheless, one move we could make which would be taken by Pakistan as very positive evidence of our continued concern for Pak security and would thereby reinforce other cooperative programs. That move would be to agree to their long standing request that we sell advanced aircraft and, specifically, to offer to sell the F-16 for delivery in 1984 or 1985. Pakistan has also shown an interest in F-15.

In light of the threat to Pakistan, posed by the Soviets in Afghanistan, a good case can be made for Pakistan's acquisition of either the F-15 or F-16. Pakistan's air defense problem has been accentuated by the arrival of high performance Soviet Air Force aircraft in Afghanistan, as well as continued modernization of India's Air Force through recent receipt of Jaguars and reported plans to acquire the MIG-23 and MIG-25. With its strength comprised of obsolescent Chinese built F-6 (MIG-19) and a modest number of Mirage III and V aircraft, and with very limited surface-to-air missile capability, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is no match for its neighbors, and is practically unable to maintain sovereignty over its own air space.

-82-0217, box 14, P. 16-5-2 (17 Apr - Dec) 1980  
472

~~Classified by Sec Def~~

15-m-1689 R-1

~~SECRET~~

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Almost two years ago, we advised Pakistan that we were prepared to sell F-5E aircraft on a one-for-one basis to replace the PAF's Korean War-vintage F-86s. Subsequently, Pakistan has been cleared to receive presentations on the F-X but they have expressed no interest. Surplus F-4Es are unavailable and would be unsuitable against the threat. The F-16, which you considered but deferred last January, may be a practical option. Though the F-15 might be even more appropriate for the defense task Pakistan faces, it costs far more than the Arabs seem willing to furnish; I do not recommend it.

Expression of our willingness to sell advanced aircraft would have great symbolic value. It would help to dispel the Pakistani impression that we accord them second class status. Pakistan would still be required to come up with the cash for the transaction and the cost involved -- over \$1 billion for 40 F-16s. Normal production leadtime would preclude delivery of the F-16 or F-15 until mid-1984.

I recognize that India would react negatively to US agreement to sell Pakistan the F-16. However, we have also resumed selling arms to India and could demonstrate our South Asian evenhandedness by offering to release the F-16 to New Delhi as well, even though it is unlikely the Indians would be interested.

I urge you to consider offering to sell the F-16 to Pakistan.

*Harold Brown*

cc: The Secretary of State

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WNS  
Date: OCT 06 2015

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



OCT 1 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: F16s for Pakistan

I urge you to reconsider your decision not to offer to sell F16s to Pakistan. My reasons are contained in my memorandum to you of September 29 (attached). I want to reemphasize that -

- Pakistan has a well justified military case: all its neighbors have advanced aircraft, including most prominently the Soviets in Afghanistan.

- We are, quite properly, unwilling to broaden our security commitment or seek FMS credits at this time. This leaves agreement to sell advanced aircraft as the only politically significant step we can take on the security side of our relationship. It would be an important step: we need to encourage the Paks to resist increasing Soviet pressure for accommodation; we need to encourage regional states to believe in our commitment to oppose Soviet expansion.

- Our hopes that reluctance to sell Pakistan advanced weapons would help in bringing India to resist Soviet aggression more robustly have proved idle. In my judgment, continued reluctance won't stiffen the Indians and a sale of F16s (which we can also offer to India) won't push them into Soviet arms.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50 U.S.C. § 552

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 05 OCT 2015 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_

Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

MDR: 15 -M- 1691

*Harold Brown*

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: OCT 05 2015

330-82-0217, box 14, Pakistan (17 Apr-Dec) 1980

15-m-1691 R-1

Classified by: Sec Def

Review on: Oct 1, 1986 474

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

NOV 9 1978

*Charles J*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy in the Middle East

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 05 2015

I just returned from the Middle East and Africa, as you know, where I met with, among others, the heads of government and military chiefs of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Sudan. I found in each country a great appreciation for what the United States had done to contribute to the peace and security of the region, and a desire for a closer relationship with us.

I also found grave concern in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan about the threat from the Soviet Union. Each leader saw himself and his country on the front lines of opposition to Soviet encroachment and domination. Each had clearly in mind the scope and speed of Soviet arms supply demonstrated in Ethiopia, and the Soviet propensity for subversion and political intervention accomplished in Afghanistan. Each thought we seriously underestimated the weight of the Soviet threat to the region. Each, in one way or another, professed not to understand the objectives of the United States in the region. They argued that we are equivocal in declaring and pursuing our objectives and in supporting our friends.

I explained that American policy was indeed aimed at building up and supporting our friends. I said we were not indifferent to Soviet activities. I said you personally had taken a number of actions that made this clear--for example, in Zaire; in arms supply to Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Turkey; in the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia; and in your efforts to bring about a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict, which would do much to limit Soviet opportunities in the region. The leaders acknowledged these strong steps.

I recognize that most of what I heard is a familiar story to us. I recognize also that the nature of these governments, and their relatively small size and close proximity to the Soviet Union or to Soviet activities in neighboring states, makes them more fearful than we believe is warranted.

Nevertheless, I recommend we carefully weigh their message. The area of the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula is a fragile and potentially explosive one, as events in Iran suggest. The risks of instability are significant and Russian opportunities for meddling are substantial. My preliminary

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330-81-0202, box 61, folder Middle East 333

Classified by DSD  
EXEMPTED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 10/05/2015

15-m-1692 R1



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judgment is that, for a small additional investment of political and financial capital, we could constructively advance American purposes in this area. For example, we might make stronger and more frequent statements of American interest and policy, do more consulting with the governments, develop a more elaborate web of defense and other contacts (ship visits, military exercises and the like), and consider, for the poorer countries, additional financial assistance.

In view of the extreme importance of this area to U.S. and Allied national security interests, I recommend we undertake, on an inter-agency basis, a prompt review of U.S. policy toward the area, to see what measures we might take to strengthen our position there. I know Harold Brown shares my view and I believe he also recommended such a study.

*ok*

*C. W. Lawrence*

cc: Sec State  
Sec Def  
Asst to President  
for National Security  
Affairs

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 05 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50.S.C. § 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 05 Oct 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 1692

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~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

VIA ALPHA CHANNEL

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Office of the Secretary of Defense <sup>505C55a</sup>  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 10 DEC 1979  
Date: 16 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US Access to Facilities in Egypt (U)

(75) By your note on the report of the 30 November meeting between Ambassador Atherton and Egyptian Vice President Mubarak, and separately in a telephone conversation with me, you asked for a report on how the US could, and whether we should, help develop naval and air base facilities for Egypt on the Red Sea, usable by the US in future emergencies. This memorandum contains a preliminary analysis.

(75) Recent events reinforce my conviction that an expanded US military presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region is a strategic necessity. In the long term, the appropriate level of such presence will require access to a small number of selected air base and port facilities in the area. I will shortly submit my proposals on these broader measures to enhance our flexibility for rapid deployment and sustained operations in the area.

(78) In the shorter term, as you know, we are in the process of obtaining a very modest foothold in Egypt by virtue of the limited access to Wadi Kena Air Base extended by the Egyptian Government. We have proceeded quietly to insert a base warm-up team and necessary equipment to support operations by two E-3A AWACS aircraft. We will soon withdraw the personnel but leave behind under Egyptian Air Force caretaker status, the modest support infrastructure items now in place at this Egyptian field. Thus, we will be able to introduce E-3As into Wadi Kenna with supporting personnel with little notice and be able to conduct operations shortly after arrival.

(78) During our consultations with Vice President Mubarak regarding Wadi Kena, he repeated President Sadat's earlier suggestion of the desirability of having the US upgrade the Red Sea port/airfield complex at Ras Banas (Berenice). Preliminary information (see attachments) indicates that this

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EXEMPT PER EO 11759, Sec 2.1 (1) 15  
DER P-6 212 Date 28 March 2005  
Declassify On 31 Dec 2028  
Other Agency Query: FDI

VIA ALPHA CHANNEL

Para 2-301c(6)&(7)

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 16 2015

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Date: 09-08-01  
Authority: 505C55a

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complex is very austere and would require a substantial effort to develop a permanent base. Both the port and airfield lack a potable water source and a reliable fuel supply system. The harbor would require some dredging in order to berth destroyers and frigate-sized ships at the single dock. On the other hand, a collocated port and airfield (less than three miles apart) on the Red Sea would offer some attractive operational possibilities. Moreover, the remote location (140 miles from the nearest significant population concentration at Aswan) would serve both US and Egyptian political interests.

(7S) It would be premature to define a concept of operations for the use of Ras Banas at this time. We will have to weigh the costs versus the benefits of two options. One is a substantial investment of money for base development at this austere airdrome. The other is a more modest investment of funds to improve existing facilities at a less remote, but more developed air facility such as Wadi Kena. I will be able to give you a more definitive recommendation in this regard after we have analyzed the findings of the facilities survey team which I recently sent to Egypt with Vice President Mubarak's concurrence.

(7S) Further, we should recognize that there are likely to be significant political limits on our use of Egyptian bases which we will need to weigh against the costs of making those bases useful to us. My conversations earlier this year with President Sadat and Vice President Mubarak lead me to believe that they wish to avoid the permanent presence of US personnel. They have emphasized to me the political liabilities associated with foreign presence and their desire not to repeat the experience with the Soviets, who sent a large number of military personnel to Egypt. Their concept has been that the US would improve Ras Banas for Egyptian use in normal times and US use in an "emergency". We will need further to explore whether these limits to their political tolerance for our presence still apply.

(7S) In the near future, I will provide in cooperation with the Department of State a detailed proposal for how we should respond to the Egyptian suggestion.

*Harold Brown*

Attachments

cc: Secretary of State

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 16 2015

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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
February 28, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ✓  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Additional Item for Friday's SCC Meeting  
on Security Framework *let*

Attached is an OSD staff overview and synthesis of the needed security framework for Southwest Asia. Such a comprehensive action program would obviously have to be remanded for further analysis probably by an inter-agency working group. However, the Secretary of Defense would first like the preliminary reactions of the SCC principals as to whether a comprehensive document like this would be operationally useful. *let*

  
Christine Dodson  
Staff Secretary

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 02 2016

330-82-0217, box 15, Persian Gulf (Jan-Feb) 1980

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Derivatively classified  
from SEC. DEF. Control No. X06823  
Declassify 2/27/86

15-M-1699  
Doc#126

SEC DEF CENTER No. X06856



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R. W. Komer  
27 February 1981

Security Framework for Southwest Asia  
(A DoD Viewpoint)

Since our key objectives are not really at issue (access to oil, etc.), this analysis will focus on how best to achieve them. This is a much trickier proposition than in Europe or Northeast Asia, because we never built up a US presence in the region to compensate for the slow post-WW II British withdrawal.

Instead, largely because of the anti-colonial sensitivities of the newly independent states of the area, we relied on building up the security capabilities of the "northern tier" states--linking them together via CENTO, with its ambiguous US backing (we never became a full member). Later, under the Nixon Doctrine (and because Iran's escalating oil wealth fed the Shah's military monomania in any case) we tended to rely chiefly on Iran as the protector of the Gulf, because of our post-Vietnam inhibitions about assuming a more direct US role.

This policy worked for many years (at relatively low cost to the US). The reasons for its ultimate failure are instructive. To oversimplify: (1) all three northern tier regimes--Iraq pulled out in 1958--proved more or less internally unstable, so unable to build up adequate local power; (2) all three paid far less attention to the Soviet threat than to other external problems--Greece/Cyprus in the case of Turkey, India/Kashmir in the case of Pakistan; and the PG (chiefly Iraq) in the case of Iran; (3) the generous US arms subsidies designed to build up their capabilities declined sharply in the 1960s and 1970s for various reasons--US preoccupation with SEA, phasing out of grant MAP aid, various political reasons--till only Iran could afford to buy the arms needed; (4) the US focussed more in the 70s on access to oil and on its price than on protecting it; and (5) the overall shift in the East/West military balance 1965-80, especially the advent of nuclear equivalence, the decline of US maritime superiority, and the relative growth of Soviet force projection capabilities encouraged the USSR to adopt a more forward policy in the volatile and vulnerable PG/IO area.

When Sadat's expulsion of the Soviets and the Camp David breakthrough limited Soviet ability to exploit the Arab-Israeli problem against us, the USSR moved to compensate by wooing Ethiopia and PDRY, and giving yet more arms to Syria and Iraq.

In a sense the whole PG/IO problem sneaked up on us while our efforts were focussed elsewhere. We now have to

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make up for lost time. Let me take up various aspects of the problem sequentially.

I. Detering Direct Soviet Intervention. This is the most dangerous though least likely dimension of the problem. While overt Soviet invasion still seems unlikely (even after Afghanistan), the risk of Soviet intervention in a local confrontation or to counter perceived Western action is much higher. Iran is a good case in point.

Only the perceived risk of thereby precipitating a direct US response is likely to deter Moscow in such cases. Therefore, our problem is to create a credible US security umbrella over the region, which will serve the added functions of (1) reassuring edgy local states that they need not be so fearful of the USSR; and (2) enabling us to use this umbrella as leverage in getting what we want from area states.

II. What Sort of Security Umbrella? No revival of CENTO or even the RCD is feasible, even with strong US backing. Nor are the PG states likely to favor any defense coalition, even among themselves (as the Iraqis vaguely propose). The locals are too skittish about formal "treaty" relationships, and their interests too disparate. The only useful thing that might emerge over time could be a loose understanding among the lower Gulf states (Saudis, UAE, Qatar, Bahrein, Oman, probably not Kuwait) that an attack on one would lead all to respond--chiefly by allowing US access. Moreover, adding weakness to weakness won't deter anybody.

The same applies to Allied participation. Regardless of the fact that they are far more dependent on PG oil than we, our NATO Allies and Japan simply will not risk joining us in formal security guarantees (except maybe the UK). Nor do they have much capability to support us.

Thus the security umbrella will have to be an American one, fleshed out by understandings with threatened local states. The first step (American-style) must be a strong declaratory policy, as outlined by the President in his 1980 State of the Union Message. It is important that we not dilute this message by refining it too much. Artful ambiguity is needed on this score, rather than too much clarification of where we will and won't draw the line.

But what backs this up and makes it credible? Not too much at present, since (1) nuclear equivalence means we can't get too far with nuclear retaliatory threats; (2) as of now we have very limited presence in the PG/IO and only marginal rapid force projection capabilities against a Soviet attack.

Hence we must hint that: (1) it may not be possible to keep a confrontation localized, partly because

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we Americans may choose to retaliate elsewhere (e.g. naval blockade) where our capabilities are greater; (2) we will exact costs elsewhere, even if not militarily; and (3) if the Soviets appear to outgun us in a conventional confrontation escalation to use of nuclear weapons obviously cannot be precluded when such vital interests are at stake. Even hinting at such dire possibilities will find some resonance in Moscow. Besides, what other near-term options do we have?

III. Building a US Response Capability in the PG/IO. But the main task of lending credibility to our declaratory deterrent policy will have to rest on the buildup of US capability to respond. At present we lack a game plan, though all the things we are doing to date seem useful to the broader effort needed.

A. Obviously we need an enhanced "permanent presence" in the region. This is already in train, but let's be realistic. Most of it will have to be naval. It would be politically very difficult and economically very costly to build up a sizable peacetime US base structure in the region itself. The locals will be leery, and little usable real estate is available. A greatly expanded Diego Garcia is probably the limit of near-term options.

B. Hence we must rely primarily on a major force projection capability. This too is underway, but even current projections 1980-85 are insufficient. Naval power (with its flexibility) is indispensable, but we must hold ground too. Hence we must think in terms of ability to deploy--and sustain--forces on the scale of 2-3 division equivalents plus tacair within two weeks and 5-7 divisions within a month/six weeks if we are, for example, to be able to hold Southern Iran. These forces must be capable of defending against such Soviet (Iraqi?) armor as is deployable within such timeframes. To project forces on this scale does not require a larger US combat force structure; rather the problem is to get them there fast enough, with their equipment, and sustain them. The key desiderata here are (1) adequate access and transit rights; (2) more rapid air and sealift; and (3) prepositioning equipment in the area.

C. Prepositioning is the key. Our ability to project force to the PG/IO (just like our ability to reinforce NATO rapidly) will depend critically on having the heavy equipment already in the area. Because of the geographically widely separated contingencies to which we might have to respond, (Yemen-Somalia to Pakistan), together with local political inhibitions about onshore prepo, maritime prepo seems by far the best answer (with some exceptions-see below). It ensures flexibility, reduces political problems,



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and probably doesn't cost all that much more. Since it will take years to complete our fleet of new MPS ships, Defense is pushing ahead with interim quick fixes (e.g. RO-ROs) to give us some near term prepositioning. This must be pressed.

D. Immediate access to forward bases is imperative, though they need not fly the US flag. If we are to depend primarily on projection forces, quick access to facilities from which we can operate is vital. Indeed, if we can get in before the balloon goes up, we may even be able to deter hostile action. But we must make the necessary arrangements well in advance with area states, including their upgrade of facilities as we can operate from them immediately in a crisis (adequate runways, taxiways, POL, WRSK, shelters, air defense, etc.).

Given the sensitivities of local states, we should not seek to fly our flag over these facilities. Much better to leave them under local control (with perhaps a few US "advisors" around), since if they don't want to let us use the facilities in an emergency, we couldn't do so anyway.

E. Moreover, such a forward base structure already partly exists or is building. Most PG states are already building (largely with their own funds--a major advantage) quite a base structure we can use. The COB concept we use in NATO is relevant here. For example, the elaborate Saudi construction program (to accommodate forces mostly equipped with compatible US arms) could readily accommodate US forces too--especially if suitably overbuilt. Moreover, aside from major Saudi/Kuwait/Omani/Bahrain airports, there are six major airports built or building in the UAE alone which could take up to C-5s. Our task is to ensure discreetly that these facilities will be suitable--and available. Our arms sale program must be carefully dovetailed to our strategic needs for this purpose, but we must avoid publicizing this.

F. We need a major Rear Base area too. We cannot logistically support the forces needed for a major contingency from Subic, Rota, and Diego Garcia. They will be invaluable but are real estate-limited (especially Diego) and much too far away. What we need to have available if needed is a major "base" complex relatively near the area which can draw on substantial local infrastructure and skilled labor. Since forward bases in the PG area would be highly vulnerable to Soviet air attack, we would use this rear base for staging, repair and resupply (analogous to USAF's rear A-10 base in the UK with FOBs forward in the FRG). Such a rear base area ought to be on the shortest ALOC or SLOC from CONUS. Egypt fits all these requirements, Sadat is probably willing, and we might as well get more for



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all the money we're going to have to invest in Egypt anyway. Hence I see Egypt as our best future main base area for major PG contingencies. Indeed, we may be able to get Egyptian/Israeli agreement to let us use the two Sinai airbases instead of demilitarizing them. Turkey is the only logical alternative, but I just can't see Ankara agreeing (especially any government in which Ecevit and/or Erbakan participate).

G. Transit and refuelling rights are vital. No matter how much prepositioning we do, people airlift and substantial cargo airlift as well will be indispensable for flexibility and quick response. We should look at ways of using Allied and local airlift to complement our own. But adequate en route transit rights, pre-arranged to the maximum extent feasible are critical to quick and adequate response. We would have to use both the trans-Pacific and Atlantic/ Mediterranean ALOCs in a major contingency. Hence we should work on both, and hedge against risk by seeking alternative en route basing (e.g. Spain, Portugal, and maybe Morocco just in case one proves unavailable). This is already underway, but must be made more precise as our contingency plans develop.

H. Homeporting one or maybe two more carriers forward is very valuable. Since it would take us many years to build new carriers (and old carriers can't carry today's fighters), this is the best way to maintain forward deployments in three oceans instead of two. Rota, Augusta, Lisbon, Subic, and Sasebo look to be the best bets.

I. Frequent deployment and exercising in the area is essential. Only in this way can we acclimate our projection forces, acclimate the locals to operating with them, and signal the Soviets that we mean business.

IV. We Must Pay the Security Assistance Price. Current aid availabilities are flatly inadequate to sustain this strategy. Much greater aid to Turkey, Egypt, Yemen and maybe Pakistan is clearly indicated at a minimum (economic as well as military). Access and facility rights will require US subsidy in many cases (fortunately the oil-rich can and will prefer to pay their own bills).

We must also seek relief from the web of legislative and other restrictions which rob us of flexibility to respond. At present, we simply cannot meet the demands for quick delivery, subsidized prices, withdrawal from US stocks, cheap training and the like which are essential to make our PG/IO policy work.

The potential role of Turkey deserves special mention. At present Ankara is adamant against use of

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Turkish facilities for any but NATO contingencies. But Turkey's force structure and sheer geographic location make it a major threat to the flank of any Soviet march southward to the PG. Moreover, the Afghan crisis should reduce US domestic inhibitions to aiding Turkey. Maybe we can repair our relations with the Turks sufficiently to at least help create a threat in being to any Soviet LOC through Azerbaijan. Given our severe problems in generating effective PG/IO deterrence, we ought to make the try. But only if we're willing to face up, along with our Allies, to the enormous costs involved.

V. We Must Also Deal with Key Collateral Areas of Risk. It is easy to see how Soviet or surrogate use of PDRY bases could interfere with our plans. So could Libya. So could Ethiopia in the Red Sea or against Somalia. A major effort to woo Iraq or at least secure its neutrality is equally indicated. In a Pakistan contingency, the role of India will be critical. We need a damage-limiting counter or containment strategy in each case.

Unquestionably, our ability to secure the cooperation of Arab (and most Islamic) states is also partially hostage to our Arab-Israeli policy. Thus our ability to devise a viable security framework in SWA cannot ignore this factor, which also bears heavily on VI below.

VI. We Need an Oil Strategy to Complement our Deterrent Strategy. If the US is to defend the PG oil producers from outside attack (which will cost us plenty), can we afford not to link this massive effort to an assured flow of PG oil at reasonable price? At the least, we have nothing to lose by trying. We must get across to the PG states that OPEC price rises and production cutbacks can undermine our capability to defend them.

VII. The Role of Allies. Granting the political necessity of seeking European and Japanese help in our PG/IO efforts, realism dictates that the most we are likely to get is some economic and military aid, maybe token forces from the UK and France, and at best moral support. Therefore, the chief price we should exact from these Allies is more defense help in NATO and NE Asia, partly to enable us to do more in the PG/IO.

Since local states will feel directly threatened, they will probably do more. At the least we can get them to strengthen their own defense capabilities, and upgrade facilities for US use.

VIII. Last but not least, we need programs to deal with the threat of internal instability/subversion in

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vulnerable ME/PG/IO states. The consensus of DoD as well as other area experts is that the problem of internal breakdown (à la Iran), perhaps abetted by external subversion, is a far greater immediate risk to our area interests than overt Soviet or surrogate attack. Moreover, it could create ambiguous situations which, if we did not respond, could be exploited by the USSR to increase the threat to our hold on ME oil, etc. A breakup of Iran is an obvious case in point. Another would be growing internal instability in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. In short weak traditional regimes will be a constant problem for us over the next decade.

Above all, this requires a post-hostage program for rebuilding some kind of relationship with Iran, which is the best road to the Persian Gulf. No matter how we look at it, the integrity of Iran (so long as it remains independent) is preferable to a breakup exploitable by the USSR. So long as even a neutral Iran exists it bars direct Soviet access to the Gulf. But we must also be prepared to react to a collapse if it nonetheless occurs by retaining a buffer area in the south.

Clearly DoD programs can have only limited impact on local stability. Promoting this must be the primary responsibility of other agencies. Nonetheless, by developing a credible military presence and response capability, DoD can strongly discourage external military meddling in any such internal crises. We can also contribute to strengthening local military establishments as stabilizing elements and even to strengthening local security forces (though past experience suggests that this is not the strong suit of the US military). In any case the point is that any security framework for Southwest Asia must vigorously address internal as well as external threats to our security interests.

- - - - -

The above is merely an outline of a viable security framework for Southwest Asia. It alone is a tall order, but it still may not be enough. However all of its elements must necessarily be part of any even larger effort required. Since the stakes are so great in any case, it is the minimum we should aim at--as a matter of urgency--now.

#### IX. AN ACTION PROGRAM

In the light of the above, the following short and longer term actions should be laid in train:

##### State/Defense

1. Expand our high level strategic dialogue with key area states -- to explain the broad outline of this



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3.3(b)(1)

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security policy and seek their participation. At present there is confusion about our purposes, questioning about our resolution, and ignorance about where they fit in. We should take special pains with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, maybe Pakistan and India.

2. Develop lists of our short and longer term requirements -- in each key area state, and corollary lists of what we (and others) are willing to provide in return.

3. Further elaborate our declaratory deterrent policy -- in speeches, articles, and testimony. Tie this to the concrete measures we are taking to enhance its credibility.

4. Energetically pursue en route transit/refuelling rights in Atlantic/Mediterranean and Pacific. Push through Lajes upgrade package.

5. Immediately survey preferred homeporting facilities, for early costing and decision.

6. Explore possibilities for "facilities" access at Trincomalee (ex-Amb. Wriggins says this might just be politically feasible now.)

7. Prepare urgently (together with Allies) a separate military aid package for Turkey plus a corollary list of what we want in return from Turks.

8. Develop urgently a post-hostage program for repairing our relations with Iran, together with alternate politico-military contingency plans in case of breakup.

9. Prepare a next phase program vis-a-vis Pakistan, related appropriately to our aims vis-a-vis India.

10. Develop a proposal for an FY 80 security assistance supplemental to meet needs requiring immediate funding.

11. Explore ways of relating our energy needs and Arab-Israeli policy to our security needs in the PG.

12. Press our European and Japanese allies to participate appropriately in our game plan.

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Defense

1. Press ahead with interim IO maritime prepositioning.
2. Develop tailored RDF force packages for specified contingencies.
3. Press vigorously for the full FYDP package of MPS ships, airlift (including CX), and related measures. Examine ways of expediting IOCs.
4. Develop more detailed contingency-related facilities access plans for PG forward basing, as the basis for requests to local states.
5. Develop "rear base area" plans for Egypt/Sinai, sized to support a major effort to hold Southern Iran.
6. Develop plans for overbuilding the Saudi base structure and airfields, etc. in Bahrein, Qatar, UAE.
7. Develop programs for enhancing the local defense capabilities of appropriate area states in ways compatible with our own contingency needs.
8. Develop an expanded exercise/training program in the IO/PG area.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: **MAR 02 2016**

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +5 U.S.C. § 552  
Date: 02 MAR 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(2), (b)  
MDR: 15 -M- 1699

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 17 2015

JAN 26 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Rapid Deployment Forces (U)

Office of the Secretary of Defense SO&SS  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 17 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 1716

As you know, as part of our efforts to improve our capabilities to project forces in contingencies, I have directed the JCS to develop specific sets of Rapid Deployment Forces, and a controlling Joint Task Force headquarters. The purpose of this memorandum is to keep you abreast of the developments in this area, specifically RDJTF command arrangements. (U)

The JCS have developed a general structure for the RDJTF headquarters. It will be commanded by Major General (Lieutenant General selectee) Paul X. Kelley, USMC, and will be established at MacDill Air Force Base by March 1, 1980. It will also have a liaison staff here in Washington. The Commander of the RDJTF will have an exercise budget under his control. (S)

In peacetime, the RDJTF headquarters will be subordinate to the Readiness Command, but during contingencies it will transfer with its subordinate units to an appropriate Unified Commander (CINC) or will operate directly under the National Command Authorities, as appropriate. (S)

As an integral part of its function, the headquarters will assume planning, coordinating, and implementing responsibilities for military exercises in the Middle East, as well as planning and execution of combat operations in the region. This will help us determine the need for a separate unified command for this critical region. (S)

We have made considerable progress to date in our work on the RDJTF and we expect to meet our deadline of March 1 for the activation of the RDJTF headquarters. I will keep you informed. (S)

*Harold Brown*

330-82-0216 box 30, 320.2 RDF, 1980

~~Review: 26 Jan 1986~~

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15-M-1716

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: NOV 22 2016

12 FEB 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Near-Term Enhancement for Rapid Power Projection ~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I agree on the strategic necessity for major improvements in the US capability to project military power rapidly into the Middle East/Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea region.

~~(S)~~ Our airlift capability is significant, but it will probably be at least five years and possibly as long as eight years time before additional outsize-capability airlift to carry tanks and helicopters is available. In any case, airlift by itself can provide only a small part of the lift capability needed. People can be moved quickly and in large numbers, but there are limits on the amount of land forces fighting equipment, munitions, and other sustaining cargo that can be moved rapidly and cost-effectively by air, even with enhanced airlift. This category of materiel requires prepositioning to achieve a substantial early capability. It also requires the higher volume and capacity of ships to support sustained conflicts. During the period before regular sealift arrives it could be important to have additional materiel prepositioned. Similarly, land-based aircraft can be flown to the region very quickly. However, sustaining any meaningful tempo of air combat operations would require substantial quantities of munitions, fuel and other support; most of this materiel, in our current logistic posture, would have to come from the CONUS and would require nearly a month to assemble and ship to the region. These problems will be alleviated somewhat by the new Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Program in the FYDP, but the MPS will not begin to be available until 1983.

~~(S)~~ By combining Marine Corps amphibious units normally afloat in the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific, we could rapidly assemble and deploy a small Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). This would provide some limited near-term presence and combat capability ashore. We are looking at ways further to augment these forward deployed units from other locations. Additional amphibious forces could reinforce these units, but using current amphibious lift it would take up to 30 days (depending on use of warning time) to assemble and deploy to the Persian Gulf region a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) from existing assets in their present areas of deployment. Additional Marine sustaining supplies and equipment (Assault Follow-on Echelon (AFOE)) using merchant shipping would also begin arriving in about 30 days. Deployments above the MAB level could be sustained for only a few weeks without causing severe personnel rotation and equipment maintenance problems.

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~~(S)~~ Therefore, we badly need some near-term options until the new MPS become available (and to complement them thereafter). An attractive near-term option that would reduce deployment times is to accelerate the pre-positioning of combat materiel and initial resupply in a manner consistent with the MPS program. After reviewing a number of near-term alternatives, I strongly favor the following course of action (further details are at Enclosures A and B):

- Charter with option to purchase two "Maine" Class roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, built in 1976 and 1977, capable of handling the USMC armored vehicles, artillery, and other large items of rolling stock that place the largest demands on airlift.
- Establish a seven-ship pre-positioned force afloat in the vicinity of Diego Garcia, composed of these two newly available RO/RO ships along with three break-bulk ships, one fuel tanker and one fuel/water tanker from existing Government resources.

~~(S)~~ This force could provide an in-theater logistical presence with unit equipment, supplies, fuel, and water sufficient to support roughly a Marine Amphibious Brigade for two weeks. Ammunition to sustain several USAF fighter squadrons for 10 days would also be included. After being alerted at Diego Garcia, for example, this logistical force could sail to a designated Persian Gulf area port in about 5 days. There, it would be met by the combat troops who would have arrived by airlift. From this rendezvous point, they would draw their equipment and proceed to the objective area. The RO/RO ships could most conveniently and efficiently off-load alongside fixed piers or docks, but could be provided with portable crawler cranes that would enable them to be unloaded, like the breakbulk ships, onto floating causeways, lighters or Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) in any protected harbor. During a developing crisis, the illustrative closure time could be significantly shortened by early movement of this logistical force closer to the designated port. The specific USMC units and equipment sets to be deployed under this concept will be studied and decided in the immediate future; an illustrative list is included as Enclosure C. Use of USMC units entails less adverse impact on US capabilities in NATO than would diversion of Army equipment.

~~(S)~~ If we act now, the seven-ship pre-positioned force could be acquired and in place within at most several months. Estimated costs of this initiative (in constant FY 80 Dollars) are as follows:

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: NOV 22 2016

Department of the Navy
DON/AA DRMD
Date: <u>Nov 2015</u> Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: <u>x</u> Deny in Full: <u>      </u>
Declassify in Part: <u>      </u>
Reason: <u>      </u>
MDR <u>2015</u> -M-12998



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	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Operating Costs: <u>1/</u>	\$60.9M	\$87.0M	\$85.9M
RO/RO Acquisition (incl. spares):	-	\$56.0M <u>2/</u>	-

- 
- 1/ Current estimate (includes charter costs).  
2/ Cost quoted by owner; Maritime Administration states ships may be obtained at lower cost.

~~(S)~~ Given the urgent need to increase our power projection capability in the near-term, I propose, with your concurrence, immediately to commence negotiations for the acquisition, by charter and option to purchase, of the two RO/RO ships and to obtain Congressional reprogramming authority for approximately \$60 million in O&M funds to cover those costs to be incurred in FY 80. We will assemble USMC equipment for a brigade size unit to place aboard these ships as soon as the ships are ready to receive it, keeping to a minimum the impact on our capability to reinforce NATO.

~~(S)~~ We would contemplate restoring by an FY 1980 supplemental the O&M funds reprogrammed to cover the current charter and operating expenses listed above, and would propose an FY 1981 budget amendment to cover the acquisition and operating costs to be incurred in that fiscal year. However, the issue of source of funds should not hold up the decision to charter the two RO/RO ships with option to purchase.

~~(S)~~ In addition, we are actively exploring further means of substantially improving our near-term sealift surge capability through the acquisition by the Maritime Administration of eight comparatively new SL-7 Class container ships. These ships were built in the 1970's as high speed (33 knots), high capacity commercial ships. They have significant utility as container ships for rapid lift of reinforcements from CONUS. They are capable with minor alteration of carrying unit equipment, including tanks and APCs, when equipped with racks and portable crawler cranes. The cranes, and racks for wheeled vehicles including heavy trucks, are currently available. Special racks for tanks and APCs have been designed and could be obtained in quantity in a few months. These ships would have even greater flexibility if converted to RO/RO configuration; such conversion is clearly feasible, but would require about a year to accomplish at a cost preliminarily estimated at \$50 to \$60 million each. Studies are now in progress to determine more definitively the costs and time required for such conversion.

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(S) The SL-7 Class container ships have become unprofitable for their civilian owners because the rising costs of fuel have made their continuous operation prohibitively expensive. Accordingly, they may soon be either-phased out or converted to slow speed diesel power. As an alternative, their owners have made application to the Maritime Administration to trade in these ships for allowance for credit for new ship construction under the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, and we have urged the Secretary of Commerce to consider favorably their acquisition. The price quoted by the owner is \$285.0 million for all eight ships, including spares, but Maritime Administration believes they can make the acquisition under the Merchant Marine Act at lower cost. General Jones and I recommend that this acquisition be expedited so that these ships can be available as early as possible. They would be the fastest existing sealift to deliver from CONUS, or to sustain, forces in either Southwest Asia or Europe.

(S) Acquisition cost of these ships under the Merchant Marine Act would be in the Department of Commerce Budget; operating and conversion costs would be in DoD budget. On the assumption that ships could be acquired in the near future, and would be converted to RO/RO's in FY 1981 and FY 1982, operations and conversions would be funded by a DoD FY 1980 supplemental appropriation and a DoD FY 1981 budget amendment approximately as follows:

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
SL-7 Operating Costs	\$10.0M	\$20.0M	\$20.0M
SL-7 Interim Alteration Costs (Incl. \$.9M for loading exercise)	\$ 4.1M	\$23.6M	-
SL-7 Conversion	\$ 1.2M	\$240.0M	\$240.0M

(S) Also probably available for acquisition in FY 1981 are two additional "Maine" Class RO/RO ships and one SEABEE Class barge carrier. This latter is a versatile platform for moving large quantities of unit equipment, outsize items, ammunition, and supplies. It would give us the option of prepositioning up to 35,000 tons of supplies in humidity-controlled barges, and it is the only ship large enough to carry the Delong Pier, which would be useful in areas where port facilities were inadequate for normal unloading operations. The cost of acquiring the two additional Roll-On/Roll-Off ships is estimated at \$56.0 million, and the cost of the SEABEE, including barges, is estimated at \$56.5 million; if acquired, they would be funded by an FY 1981 budget amendment. No decision with respect to acquisition of these additional ships needs to be made

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Date: NOV 22 2016

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at this time, but I will continue to monitor our forward deployment and sealift requirements and will make a recommendation within the next several months with respect to acquisition or charter of these vessels.

(S) In summary, I recommend your approval to proceed as follows:

- Promptly establish a seven-ship pre-positioned force afloat in the Indian Ocean. I plan to lease the two RO/RO ships, with an option to buy them, right away, unless I hear otherwise from you this week. The question of replenishing the \$61M in reprogrammed FY 1980 operating funds can be settled soon thereafter.
- Direct the Department of Commerce to proceed with the acquisition of the eight SL-7 ships on an expedited basis.

(S) The extent to which this will improve our current surge capability is summarized in Enclosure D. In evaluating the major improvement provided in deployment capability, it should be noted that an armored division equivalent requires about 100,000 tons of lift to deploy with about 5 days of combat support.

*Harold Brown*

Enclosures

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 22 2016

cc Secretary Vance  
Dr. Brzezinski  
Mr. McIntyre

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ENCLOSURE A

SEALIFT ENHANCEMENT PROPOSAL (U)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

NOV 22 2016

~~(S)~~ Forward pre-positioning afloat

- Ship Mix: Two Maine Class Ro/Ro  
Three MSC Breakbulk  
Two MSC Tankers
- Cost <sup>1/</sup> FY-80 \$60.9M  
FY-81 \$143.0 (includes purchase of (2) Ro/Ros)  
Subsequent year operating cost \$85.9M
- Availability: Near term (ships could be readied for outload  
in several months if decision is made now).
- Principal Advantages:
  - Acquires two high capacity, relatively new, Ro/Ros  
for near-term gap-filler for Maritime Prepositioning  
Ships (and complement them thereafter).
  - Ro/Ros are in good material condition, require  
no modification, and can achieve controlled humidity  
with "on-the-shelf" units (not included in cost).
- Principal Disadvantages:
  - Requires MSC to time charter ships to replace  
two MSC tanker ships dedicated to the pre-  
positioning force, and to lease replacements  
for the break-bulk ships or accept a reduction  
in the current CONUS sealift surge capability.

1/ (U) Dollars in millions without escalation. All cost  
estimates include one-time acquisition/conversion if applicable,  
O&M costs and reimbursement to MSC for time charter differential.  
(See attached Enclosure B for summary of costs.)

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Date: NOV 22 2016

<u>FORWARD POSITIONING 1/</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 81-85</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Vessel Acquisition</u>								
2 RO/ROs (1 @ \$30; 1 @ \$25)	-	55.0	-	-	-	-	55.0	55.0
(Plus spares)	-	1.0	-	-	-	-	1.0	1.0
<u>Vessel Charter and Hire 2/</u>								
O&M reimbursement to MSC Industrial Fund for Time Charter differential cost for three C-4s & two tankers	10.0	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0	65.0	75.0
<u>Vessel Operations 3/</u>								
O&M reimbursement to MSC Industrial Fund for operation of seven vessel fleet								
2 RO/ROs - Time Charter from 1 March 1980-1 January 1981	17.3	7.4	-	-	-	-	7.4	24.7
2 RO/ROs - Civil Service operation	-	19.1	25.4	25.4	25.4	25.4	120.7	120.7
3 C-4s	17.4	25.8	25.8	25.8	25.8	25.8	129.0	146.4
1 POL Tanker	5.6	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	41.5	47.1
1 POL/Water Tanker	5.6	8.4	8.4	8.4	8.4	8.4	42.0	47.6
<u>Equipment Packaging, Handling, Storage, &amp; Transportation (PHS&amp;T) and Annual Maintenance 4/</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>30.0</u>
<u>TOTAL FORWARD POSITIONING</u>	<u>60.9</u>	<u>143.0</u>	<u>85.9</u>	<u>85.9</u>	<u>85.9</u>	<u>85.9</u>	<u>486.6</u>	<u>547.5</u>

- 1/ After initial positioning all seven forward positioned ships will be operated with full crews and at anchor 50% of the time.
- 2/ This reimbursement to MSC is required to allow the Industrial Fund to recover the additional unbudgeted cost it will incur due to the necessity of chartering five replacement ships (three C-4s; two tankers) for the day-to-day mission of the peacetime fleet. The C-4s and tankers were long-term chartered by MSC 8-10 years ago. The replacement ships will be chartered at today's rates; estimated to cost an additional \$13 million per full year in FY 80 dollars.
- 3/ Based on 31 Jan 80 fuel costs
- 4/ U.S. Marine Corps initial cost estimate between \$10-12M additive for preparation and loadout.

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1053

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2/20  
HB

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February 19, 1980

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 22 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT:

Near-Term Enhancement for  
Rapid Power Projection

I approve in principle your proposal to establish a seven ship prepositioned force in the Indian Ocean. Acquisition of the two Maine-Class RO/ROs should be accomplished in cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce, taking into account current ship market supply-demand circumstances. The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to begin discussions for the acquisition of eight SL-7 container ships at the lowest cost to the government. (S)

You should work closely with OMB and the Commerce Department to develop an appropriate strategy for the negotiation of acquisition of these ships. When the best prices have been determined from discussions with the ship owners and when the studies that are to more carefully define the time required and conversion costs of SL-7 program are completed, we can decide on the sources and amount of funds to be committed to near-term sealift enhancement. (S)

*Jimmy Carter*

cc: Director, Office of Management  
& Budget

5 U.S.C 552

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, FSD, WHS  
Date: 22 NOV 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: ☒ Deny in Full: ☐  
Declassify in Part: ☐  
Reason:   
MDR: 15 -M- 1705

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~~Review February 14, 1986~~

330-82-0216 Lx 340



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~NODIS~~

cc Harold  
J  
AUG 4 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

(S) Following additional JCS review of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) concept, I have just approved two further important steps toward streamlining the planning and command relationships involved. As you know, these issues have proved among the most controversial of all those involved in the development of a credible deterrence/defense posture in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean (PG/IO) area.

(S) Originally HQ RDJTF was charged with responsibility for planning and executing operations in several areas of the world. In practice, however, it has had to focus almost exclusively on the PG/IO because of the urgent nature of the potential demands on us in this vital area. Therefore, on JCS advice, I have approved narrowing the mission of HQ RDJTF to coping with the threat in the key area. For the foreseeable future, the range of threats in Southwest Asia seems likely to present the greatest challenges, and it appears prudent to dedicate HQ RDJTF exclusively to preparing to meet them.

(S) As foreshadowed in my March 6 memorandum to you, I have also approved the JCS recommendation to transfer responsibility for all Southwest Asia contingency planning to HQ RDJTF. This step will further clarify planning responsibilities, although close coordination will be maintained with EUCOM and PACOM planners, because both EUCOM and PACOM must for the foreseeable future be major supporting commands for any sizable contingency in that region.

(S) However, I agree with the JCS that HQ RDJTF should remain under the operational command of REDCOM, principally because REDCOM is in a better position to deal with other unified commands than HQ RDJTF, and because this ensures a close relationship with the REDCOM elements that would have to deploy to support HQ RDJTF in a contingency. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was the only dissenter from this JCS recommendation, preferring that HQ RDJTF report directly through the JCS. However, I agree with the Chairman and other three Chiefs that this would not be a viable course of action, unless the JCS organization were modified to provide the indispensable support to HQ RDJTF that REDCOM already can.

330-82-0216, box 30, RDF 1980

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~~Declassify on: 3 August 1986~~

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Sec Def Cont N--

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WMIS  
Date: SEP 15 2015

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Such a change in OJCS would require considerable and expensive duplicative staffing.

(8) I view the above measures as additional steps in the evolutionary process of developing the optimum command and control capability to meet new needs in the critical Southwest Asia Area -- a process which may eventually lead to certain changes in the Unified Command Plan. Ultimately it may become more feasible to establish a separate unified command somewhere in the region. For the time being no appropriate locale is available; establishing a new unified command without a land location would in my judgment both call attention to and exacerbate the political problems connected with too high a U.S. military profile. Moreover, so long as the great bulk of the ground and air forces earmarked for the RDJTF are located here in the United States, there are strong operational as well as training reasons for keeping HQ RDJTF here as well.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 505055a  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 15 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: ☒ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 1700

*Harold Brown*

*Harold - Oh, if you and the  
JCS insist, I still have the  
belief that in a real crisis  
we would have to initiate a  
different and simpler command  
structure.*

*J. C.*

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Date: SEP 15 2015



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~~EYES ONLY~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

13 Aug 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Defense Program--Request for Guidance

Office of the Secretary of Defense ~~SECRET~~  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 17 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15-M-1745

This is the memorandum promised you in my note of August 7. Its purposes are to report to you on progress to date on the formulation of the FY 80-84 Defense five-year program and, more importantly, to obtain your guidance as we move to the next step in this process which so vitally affects the security of our country.

As was explained in my note, I directed the preparation this year of balanced five-year defense programs at three different fiscal levels, to permit comparison of how much change in military forces (and, as a result, in military risk) each involves--the effect not only during 1980-84, but implications for subsequent years as well.

The three fiscal levels used are termed the basic, enhanced and decremented. The basic level was developed last November in coordination with OMB, by starting with the \$126 billion you requested for defense for FY 79, plus real growth of slightly under 3%, plus a 6% allowance for inflation based on the estimates then available. The resulting level in FY 79 is \$137.6 billion in FY 79 dollars (although it does not adequately allow for the inflation rate now forecast, as is noted more fully hereafter).

The enhanced level adds approximately 4%\* to the basic defense program for FY 1980, with slightly greater additions in each intervening year so that the enhanced level by FY 1984 is 6% greater than the basic. The decremented level is calculated in a converse manner--it is 4% less than the basic in FY 1980, 6% less by FY 1984. These three program levels (covering a range of some \$95 billion in total program through FY 1984) permit us to consider a reasonably wide range of defense programs, and to have a better understanding of the implications of different levels of the Defense program.

The next step is one of particular importance. The three are program benchmarks to define what capabilities would be added at the higher levels, or sacrificed at the lower. Recognizing the other claims on our national resources (though no other claim can match in importance that of protecting our physical security), I need your guidance as to what the level of the Defense program for the next five years, and the budget for the next year,

\*The enhancement was obtained by adding 5% for FY 1980 to the Service programs, which do not affect such other fixed DoD accounts as retirement pay, on up to 9% for FY 1984. Because these enhancements affected only part of the DoD budget, the divergence from the basic level DoD budget is only, as noted, 4%-6%.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 17 2015

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is to be. Your selection of a level now, followed by my staff's preparation of the balanced program corresponding to it, will lead to the final step in the process: preparation of the FY 80 budget for submission to the Congress next January.\*

I have prepared this memorandum in three parts. The first summarizes briefly the present military context in which your decision will be taken, and the trends which have led to that military posture.

Part II, the main portion, summarizes the conclusions from eight months of intense effort by me and many others in the Department, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the Military Departments. It describes the implications, mainly in hardware and force structure terms, of the choice of one or another level of five-year defense program--what really happens to our forces and defense capability, and in what particulars, if you decide to expand or contract the commitment to the country's defense.

Finally, in Part III I have appended my thoughts on the domestic and international considerations of a nature not entirely military which bear on the implementation and the effects of the defense decisions which you take.

## I. BACKGROUND FOR DECISION

### A. The Military Balance

Our military capabilities relative to the Soviets' are still in the zone of "essential equivalence" that you directed in PD-18\*\*, but the general trend of the military comparison is quite unambiguously against us, and is widely recognized as such both here and abroad.

This degradation is not due to any sudden surge on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been increasing its defense expenditures in real terms at a steady rate of 3% to 4% every year, compounded, for the past 20 years.

\*These programs of course represent only three specific points on a continuum of possibilities. Because of the large effort involved, I have not tried to build other properly balanced programs intermediate to these. By preserving these three as points of reference, we will be able to accommodate quickly to any intermediate level you might choose now, or adopt later.

\*\*"The United States will maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other hand at least as favorable as that that now exists."

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WMS  
Date: SEP 17 2019

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What we are seeing today is the cumulative payoff of those many years of steady effort on their part--an effort whose persistence is matched only by its breadth. In strategic offensive forces, the Soviets have deployed new ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned bombers, with a large and continuing R&D program for the future. In strategic defensive forces, they have a serious civil defense effort, are deploying new SAMs and interceptors, and continue R&D in the ABM field. Their theater nuclear forces now include camouflaged mobile SS-20s, able to strike all the capitals of Europe, deployed in the Soviet countryside. In land forces, they have deployed large numbers of new tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, and attack helicopters. Their tactical air forces used to be limited primarily to defense; but now they are being equipped with offensive aircraft more nearly like ours. The Soviet Navy, having moved well beyond coastal defense, now is taking tactical aircraft to sea, and developing modern ships and landing craft for amphibious assault. The pattern of growth seems to touch all areas of the Soviet armed forces, and though there may be doubt as to its purpose, there can be no doubt whatever as to its presence.

The Soviets now spend substantially more on defense than we do--this year 20% to 40% more, depending on how the calculation is made. In terms of that portion of defense spending that represents investment in military weapons and R&D, the Soviets are outstripping us even further. Much more of our Defense budget than of theirs, of course, goes simply for pay and retirement. Their investments in military forces, as measured by the hardware output, are about double ours. (See Figure 1, page 4.)

Overall spending is a crude measure, representing a combination of present capabilities (current accounts) and the piling up of future ones (investment accounts). But its very crudity makes it the simplest and most visible measure of military power. And we see the cumulative effects in many specific additions to Soviet military capability, as noted above. At the same time, over the same twenty-year period, our defense spending in real terms, after rising because of costs of the Vietnam War, has steadily declined. (See Figure 2, page 5.) It now is lower than it was when John Kennedy took office. Our Army has fewer personnel than it did before the Korean War. Our Navy has fewer ships than at any time since before World War II.

I do not wish to sound unduly pessimistic. I fully recognize that there are other factors--for example, the contributions of our allies and the fact that some Soviet forces are stationed on the PRC border--that tend to mitigate the trend toward imbalance. I am concerned, however, not just by the current balance but by the trends. They do, in my opinion, involve increasing military risk to the security of the United States. (See Figure 3, page 6.)


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 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WMS  
 Date: SEP 17 2015

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Figure 1



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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 17 2015


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Figure 3

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 17 2015

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~~EYES ONLY~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

August 14, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

Two errors crept into the copies of my memorandum to the President on the Defense Program which were distributed yesterday. I would appreciate your having them corrected.

Page 1, third paragraph, line 6: "FY79" should be changed to "FY80" at both places it appears in the line.

Page 19, last full paragraph on the page, line 6: "non-defense" (first word in the line) should be changed to "defense."

I regret any inconvenience, and request that you pass these corrections also to the President for his copy.

*Harold Brown*

cc: Secretary Vance

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 17 2015

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Authority: EO 13526  
Date: 28 February 2003  
Chief, Declass Div, WHS

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~~EYES ONLY~~

SEC DEF CONTR NO. X-22006

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D C 20301

5 MAY 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WDC  
Date: SEP 17 2015

A number of events this week suggest that public attitudes toward our defense situation, as well as our foreign policy, are changing. It also seems to me that these issues may play a larger part than usual in an off-year Congressional election, although I continue to believe that domestic economic issues, particularly inflation, will be the most important.

Three votes on the budget resolution in the House on Wednesday are worth considering. A proposal to shift \$4.8B from Defense to other purposes lost by more than 3 to 1 (313-98). A proposal to add \$2.4B to the budget, earmarked for Defense, lost by slightly under 2 to 1 (262-142). Most significant, Congresswoman Holt's proposal to cut all the budget except Defense by 2% came within 6 votes of carrying (202-197). These votes are consistent with my conclusion that (1) because of inflation there is an overriding concern in the House about the size of the budget deficit, and therefore a reluctance to add to the overall budget; (2) there is greater support than ever in recent years for shifting more expenditures within the budget total toward Defense.

I note also that Joe Kraft in his column yesterday said that although he has long supported detente, he now is deeply concerned about Soviet military and political gains. Such a change of position is consistent with the Congressional indications. Both suggest to me that while public sentiment will still support your decisions about the level of the Defense budget over a substantial range around our level, there is now much less leeway on the down side of that level than there was a year ago.

A group of Republican Senators, after an Easton, Maryland conference, has issued a lengthy "Declaration" critical of Administration national security and foreign policy. They announced that all thirty-eight of the Senate Republicans support it, though several have not yet signed it. This looks to me like an opening gun of a major campaign. I have said to Zbig that (whether we use it now or pieces of it later) he, Cy, and I need to put together for our use and yours a response to the major points raised.

330-81-0212, box 1, 100.54, 1978

R-1

15-m-1758

Classified by Sec Def  
Date of Review 31 Dec 84  
Declassification Authority CONFIDENTIAL  
Declassification Date 31 Dec 84

SEC 151 CONTIN No. X-1333

I also see a confluence of questioning and some loss of confidence among our allies which compounds and feeds back into the domestic concern about these issues.

I report these attitudes rather than analyzing their causes or suggesting detailed solutions at this point. We have had successes -- the Panama Canal Treaties, the B-1 decision, the beginning of programs to revitalize NATO -- and are likely to have more. I believe that most of our foreign policy and defense decisions, taken singly, have been correct and that all have been justifiable. Taken together, however, they have been distorted by some into signals of a weakening in our strength and resolve.

Part of the problem is, as we have all noted before, that the public and the Congress do not have a clear picture what we consider the relative proportions of the competitive and cooperative aspects of our relations with the Soviet Union, or of precisely where we propose to cooperate and where to compete. We should, and I will, place more emphasis on the new things we are doing in the defense area, to counter the charges that we merely kill programs. I urge that we try to present a uniform policy along the lines of your Wake Forest speech, and that our actions on foreign policy issues as well as on Defense program and budget issues be as consistent with that approach as we can make them. Visits by you to U.S. forces in Germany, and to Ft. Bragg or to Ft. Hood and Nellis Air Force Base, which I am proposing in detail in a separate memo, can reinforce this approach.

I believe it would be extremely useful for us to talk about these observations, which I take very seriously, along with Zbig, Cy, Ham Jordan, Frank Moore, or anyone else you think should be present.

*Harold Brown*

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**Authority: EO 13526**  
**Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS**  
**Date: SEP 17 2015**

Office of the Secretary of Defense **SUSC**  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS **SSA**  
Date: 17 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

November 30, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Fiscal Year 1980 Budget and Fiscal Year 1980-1984 Defense Program

The issue of the Fiscal Year 1980 Defense Budget, in the light of domestic program needs and of the need to hold the Fiscal '80 deficit to \$30 billion, has received considerable attention in the press during last week and this week. So far I have been able to ensure, as is evident from the articles, that this Department has not fueled the controversy. I will be sending you a detailed analysis this weekend of the defense program as it has emerged from the budget scrub, for discussion at Monday morning's meeting. However, I wanted you to know now how I have approached the budget and the program and what my views are on the current debate.

My own approach has been in terms of what programs are needed for our military security in a period during which the balance will continue to move in a direction not in our favor. It will always be a matter of judgment how much military capability we will really need five or ten years from now; it is difficult enough to judge what we need right now. Unfortunately, how much we have at that time will be determined by decisions that we make now. In any event, we need to procure, train, and ready those needed forces at the lowest possible cost.

My own judgment has been and remains that we need to do more in defense. I believe we have been improving our efficiency, but over the last two years we have not significantly increased our budgets in real terms. Even from a purely U.S. point of view, I believe that 3 percent annual growth in real terms represents, if anything, not enough in terms of urgent program needs. But there are two separate points that need to be made. One is that the commitment made by the Alliance members in 1977 and reiterated this year will fall apart if we are seen as backing away from it, because all the other members will consider that their economic and political circumstances are at least as difficult as those of the United States. Quite aside from the resulting loss of Alliance investment in defense, which I estimate at \$10 to \$20 billion over the next five years and which would come mostly out of hardware and combat capability, I believe that our efforts toward rationalization, standardization and interoperability would come to nothing and that political cohesion would suffer severely.

In domestic terms, I am sure a failure to meet the 3 percent commitment would affect SALT ratification adversely. How adversely, I cannot be sure, but I am convinced that it would strongly affect swing votes such as Senator

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Nunn, Senator Bentsen, and Senator Hollings. The same considerations apply to electoral politics in the areas represented by such moderate Senators. I recognize that important Democratic constituencies have strong feelings in the other direction.

In the end, I simply see no way around our national defense needs, and from that point of view the 3 percent real increase not only in Fiscal 1980 but in subsequent years is a necessity. But I want to reemphasize that my approach has been to look at programs, whose content you will be seeing. Charles and I have not added in order to reach such a figure, but have cut back as sharply as possible both by eliminating programs and scrubbing budgets, in order to try to stay within such a limit.

*Harold Brown*

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 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: NOV 02 2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
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## INFORMATION

February 9, 1977

ZBIGNIEW BRZDZINSKI

MIKE ARMACOST

# Intelligence Community Evaluation of the Military Balance in Korea

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-- The net assessment underestimates the extent to which deficiencies in both Korean capabilities are remediable. It is clear that the South has major weaknesses in its command and control, tactical intelligence, support, and logistics capabilities. There is a good reason for this. The US has provided for those functions in the past, and the ROK has been

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TO: 9/11/00 NSC NLC-99-123  
BY: 9 DATE: 5/2/01

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able to save money by leaving them to us. To the extent that we indicate a disposition to turn these functions over to the ROK, they will be forced, willy nilly, to devote resources to them. They are not intrinsic weaknesses; they reflect rather the past pattern of US-ROK burden sharing; they can be overcome -- and, I would submit, before 1982.

-- The CIA/DIA analysis too often relies upon "bean counts". That is, they compare North and South Korea simply in terms, for example, of the numbers of tanks or air defense systems they possess, concluding from these comparisons that the North maintains significant advantages. The more relevant question is how do South Korea's anti-tank defenses stack up against North Korea's capabilities for tank assaults across the DMZ. This kind of question -- which is illustrative -- has not been analyzed systematically.

-- The analysis focuses far too narrowly on military forces-in-being without sufficient reference to the underlying strength of the two economies. In the past, South Korea's defense policy has been comparable in many ways to Japan's. By relying heavily upon the U.S., the ROK has limited its investment in current military capabilities in order to develop a much stronger economic base -- thus military mobilization base. The result is that the ROK economy is now roughly 3 1/2 times the size of the North's; it is growing more rapidly; it enjoys preferred access to Western civilian and military technology; its credit worthiness is not in doubt; its industrial development programs have concentrated on those key industries such as steel, shipbuilding, electronics, and petrochemicals which represent the sinews of genuine military potential. The North, by contrast, has deep strains in its economy, faces acute debt problems, and has found both the Soviet Union and China niggardly when it comes to providing advanced military equipment. When one looks at these factors, a very different picture of relative North-South strength begins to emerge. From this point of view it would appear that in most measures of national power, the South enjoys absolute advantages which are growing in relative terms.

We will attempt in the PRM to develop a more balanced assessment of North-South military capabilities. At some point, however, we may wish to think of having someone from the outside -- e.g., Rand Corporation, IDA, or Brookings -- take a look at the CIA/DIA analysis and offer an independent critical assessment of its validity. Albert Wohlstetter has done quite a bit of work on this subject over the past two years, and might be a logical critic. I will be back to you on the subject in a few weeks when the PRM is farther along.

~~SECRET~~ - GDS





THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

16 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy in Korea

This memorandum responds to your request of May 5 for a detailed plan for the withdrawal from Korea of the first two brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division, a schedule for [REDACTED], and a proposal for military assistance to the ROK.

a. Ground Force Withdrawals

Our withdrawal plans are tentative and we may recommend some changes depending upon our own later evaluation and the results of our detailed consultations with the ROK. Within your guidance for withdrawals in 1978 and 1980, JCS has sought to preserve and maximize the combat power of the remaining ground forces. As a result the remaining combat brigade in 1980 is an effective fighting force capable of defending itself.

— Initial reduction of one brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division with appropriate support and programed FY 77/78 reductions/transfers (6,000 spaces) by 31 December 1978. (See TAB A for detail plan.)

— Beginning sometime next year we would withdraw a brigade headquarters, two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, [REDACTED] and their supporting elements (2,900 spaces).

— Selected nondivisional support activities (engineer, transportation, and maintenance units) would be reduced, turned over to the ROK, or returned to CONUS throughout the period (3,100 spaces).

-- Second withdrawal increment of another brigade plus additional reductions (9,000 spaces) by 30 June 1980. (See TAB B.)

— During the period January 1979 to July 1980 we would pull from the division an additional brigade headquarters, two infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, an air defense battalion, aviation battalion, and support units (6,300 spaces). This would leave in Korea the division headquarters and a separate brigade consisting of two armor battalions, a cavalry squadron, and two mechanized infantry battalions.

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supported by a composite artillery battalion and appropriate combat service support elements.

- An additional 2,700 spaces would be obtained from other non-divisional support forces.

The turnover of responsibilities and functions caused by these early withdrawals will not be easy. The ROK will have to revise its force structure and logistics plans, and will find it difficult to establish maintenance and supply systems to accommodate the equipment provided them from the 2nd Infantry Division and other sources in the period. The requirements for additional trained ROK manpower will be particularly difficult to meet. It is questionable whether or not the ROK will be able to achieve fully counterbalancing capabilities in this compressed timeframe.

b. [REDACTED]

On 30 April 1977, [REDACTED]

c. ROK Arms Requirements

Our analysis focused on ROK force requirements generated by the removal of U.S. ground combat forces. Because the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces not only means loss of firepower and support but also some reduction in deterrence, we examined further improvements in ROK ground force deficiencies. Options for funding of these requirements -- whether by the U.S. or the ROK -- are being proposed by the East Asian Interagency Group. This analysis assumes that the ROK Force Improvement Program (\$5-6 billion over five years) to help modernize its forces will be funded by the ROK with some U.S. credit assistance. (See TAB D for details.)

We believe ROK ground forces will need at a minimum the following amounts of ground force equipment over the next five years:

Eighth U.S. Army Assets	\$200-250 million
New Production from CONUS	200 million
Equipment Directed from	
Other Programs	100-150 million
	\$500-600 million

This funding will provide the following major items: 14 artillery battalions, 17 TOW anti-tank companies, two Hawk battalions, and 106 utility helicopters.

We consider these levels to be rock bottom needs to replace lost capabilities. Depending upon consultations with the ROK and further evaluation of technical constraints, we should also consider making available another \$200 million in equipment to further improve critical areas: artillery, anti-tank, air/ground tactical mobility, and ground air defense.

Estimates were arrived at by examining ROK ground vulnerabilities, programmed ROK equipment acquisitions, U.S. production capabilities, pros and cons of turning over certain equipment from our units, and the impact of diverting equipment to Korea from other FMS cases or U.S. Army programs. Also considered in determining the equipment to be left were the overall critical needs of the U.S. Army. Where for various reasons our assets in-country were not suitable to turn over, we recommended other equipment to provide similar capability.

Our ability to provide the proper training will be a major factor in ROK ability to effectively put to use the equipment we provide. Training is expensive and was not factored into the above costs. Training is also constrained by ROK ability to provide English-speaking students with the proper skills and our ability to provide enough quotas at high demand schools.

The JCS has recommended significant increases in war reserve material (WRM) in Korea. As in Europe, deficiencies exist including munitions. The departure of our ground forces will [REDACTED] shortfalls of WRM. I am studying the JCS recommendation. Increases in WRM need not necessarily be funded by the U.S. We also have to examine the problem of managing or turning over U.S. owned WRM in Korea when our forces depart.

I want to emphasize the preliminary nature of this analysis of Korean equipment needs. More work needs to be done, the Korean Force Improvements Program must be reexamined, and our thinking could be affected by consultations with the ROK. However, I believe the general magnitude of requirements set forth here is appropriate. We plan to present you final recommendations in early July.

Finally let me stress that:

-- Funding to maintain our force will be needed for Army equipment turned over cost-free to the ROK.

-- ROK defense needs must be accommodated within our efforts to limit arms sales abroad.

*Clifford*

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## MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR KOREA

The problem is to define what is required to replace the capabilities of the 2nd Infantry Division and the other combat support units in the Eighth Army as they are withdrawn from Korea's force structure. In addition, it is necessary to identify peculiar vulnerabilities in the ROK armed forces that will be more exposed when our forces are withdrawn. These vulnerabilities lie in the area of tanks, anti-tank capability, ability to transport forces rapidly, air defense, surveillance, secure communications and tactical early warning. Finally are there other upgrading measures needed to further reduce the loss in deterrence and ROK self confidence? The latter is obviously a highly judgmental matter. To assure that vulnerabilities were met with the proper balance of forces, we sought the advice of the Joint Chiefs on the overall prudent risk force level needed by 1982.

This analysis is preliminary. Many uncertainties still exist as to the required force improvements. We must also weigh ROK analysis of defense requirements. Our analysis assumes that the ROK's own Force Improvement Plan would continue to receive the necessary funding and support for completion on schedule. However, that plan also needs reconsideration in light of our removal of forces. Requirements are over and above currently planned improvements.

We estimate a minimal level of \$500-600 million in equipment is needed. Another \$200 million would be an important insurance factor.

The recommended means/costs involved in providing the equipment for the required ROK force upgrade are as follows:

- Transfer in the ROK of certain 2nd Infantry Division and Eighth US Army equipment. The US is taking the most powerful division out of the Korean defense structure. The ROK will demand its replacement and will almost certainly request the transfer of as much as possible of this equipment. In determining what might be turned over, our analysis balanced the critical need of the US Army for part of the equipment against the needs of the ROK. It was determined that most of the artillery (3 105 How Bns, 1 155 How Bn and 1/3 8in SP How Bn) all of the TOW anti-tank missiles (7 companies), 90 UH-1H helicopters, 16 CH-47 helicopters, six armored vehicle launch bridges (AVLB), miscellaneous surveillance, target acquisition and night observation items, and some related communications equipment should be transferred. The already programmed transfer of two of the three HAWK battalions satisfies the ROK requirement for air defense missiles of that type. The replacement value of this equipment is approximately \$300 million.

The M-60 tanks should be brought back with our forces since they are critically needed by the Army and would be unsupportable by the ROK unless a separate logistic system was developed. The withdrawal of the firepower of these tanks with their 105mm guns is most effectively compensated by an \$10 million (FY78 dollars) upgrade of 281 ROK M43 A1 tanks to the M60 comparable M43 A5, which we recommend. Also returning with our forces

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would be such major items as 170 armored personnel carriers (APC), 4 batteries of vulcan/chaparral air defense weapons, heavy engineer equipment, radios, and helicopters. These helicopters include 35 UH-1H (troop carrier) 17 CH-47 (heavy lift), 48 OH-58 (observation) and 27 AH-1Gs (attack). This equipment is either above recommended requirements, unsuitable for the ROK, or by the time our forces are prepared to turn over needed items, the ROK will have procured under the Force Improvement Program recommended levels of these or other more appropriate weapons and equipment. The ROK, however, is almost certain to insist upon the turnover of such items as APCs. We envision that sensitive critical capabilities [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] can be released to the ROK and personnel trained to fulfill these functions.

- Support acquisition of new unprogrammed equipment by the ROK from US production. Some ROK needs for equipment by 1982 can be satisfied routinely from US arms production capability not already committed to either firm FMS cases or US Army programs. Major equipment in this category includes 9 1/3 8-in. howitzer battalions, an armored vehicle launch bridge and 10 TOW anti-tank missile companies at a cost of about \$200 million. One problem to be dealt with here is prioritization for allocation of this production between ROK requirements and projected but not firm FMS cases for other countries. Further analysis will be required to determine the pressures we will face.

- Additional units/equipment. To achieve the necessary ROK force for 1982, some equipment can only be provided through accelerated delivery and diversion of assets from other FMS customers and/or Army programs. Our analysis has not progressed far enough to identify potentially affected FMS customers or assess the resulting pressures. Diversion from Army programs, however, will aggravate already critical shortages of these items. Major equipment items included in this category are two headquarters batteries for a field artillery group, six target acquisition batteries and one battery of short range air defense missiles. Relative to overall Army requirements, however, potential diversions are small and would have little negative impact.

- Support increases in war reserves. Whether or not US ground forces are in Korea, significant shortages exist in war reserve material stockpiles in Korea. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ammunition stockpiles may also need significant additions, though when the FY78 authorization for US-titled War Reserve Stocks for Allies is approved, a 30-day supply of ground force munitions will nearly be complete except for [REDACTED] some specific types of ammunition. The JCS recommends that [REDACTED] stockpile in all WRM categories be maintained. This provides a war fighting capability [REDACTED] while a logistic pipeline is established.

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Although our analysis clearly indicates some VRM deficiency, we have not yet been able to attach precise dollar figures. It seems likely that these reserves could be augmented to some level [REDACTED] by 1982 with continued efforts past that date. It may be that the bulk of the cost can be borne by the ROK through FMS case purchase or local manufacture. [REDACTED] about VRM and with the withdrawal of US ground combat forces. In any event, more analysis is required before we can provide precise recommendations.

- Support for ROK training. The key factor in the ability of the ROK to absorb new equipment into its armed forces is training. ROK personnel have already received a wide variety of US Army professional military education and resource management training. Our primary effort now must be to upgrade specific military and technical skills. The problem is that ROK and US schools are operating near capacity and the training establishment in the US either faces competing priorities or no longer offers required courses for older equipment, [REDACTED]. We need to beef up training capabilities here and in Korea. Both a plan for the physical improvements and considerations regarding funding require study. As a general principle, however, we believe that the training should be funded by a combination of the Military Education and Training Program and the ROK through FMS cases. Further analysis to identify costs is being initiated.

Attachment

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PROJECTED ROK MAJOR GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT  
ACQUISITION BY 1982

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<u>Equipment</u>	<u>ROK On Hand 1978</u>	<u>ROK Programmed Acquisitions</u>	<u>US Proposed Additional Acquisitions</u>	<u>EUSA/2d Div Equipment to be Withdrawn</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
<u>Armor</u>					
M48	420	421	0	0	All will be upgraded to M48A3 or M48A by 1982.
M47	421	0	0	0	
M60	2	0	0	116	
Recovery Vehicle M-88	3	15	0	11	
Combat Engineer Vehicle	0	5	0	3	
Armored Vehicle Launch Bridge	0	3	7	0	
Armored Personnel Carriers	30	344	0	170	ROK will produce APCs through co-production with
Mortar Carrier 107mm	0	0	0	22	

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PROJECTED ROK MAJOR GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT  
ACQUISITION BY 1982

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>ROK On Hand 1978</u>	<u>ROK Programmed Acquisitions</u>	<u>US Proposed Additional Acquisitions</u>	<u>EUSA/2d Div Equipment to be Withdrawn</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
<u>Artillery</u>					
105 Howitzer BN	82	6	3	0	
155 Howitzer BN	43	51	1	0	
155 Howitzer (GUN) BN	1	-1	0	0	
8-in Howitzer BN (SP)	9	0	9-2/3	0	
8-in Howitzer BN (towed)	6	0	0	0	
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175 Gun BN	1	-1	0	0	
Hq & Hq Battery for Field Artillery Group	2	4	2	0	
Target Acqn Battery	5	10	7	0	

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PROJECTED ROK MAJOR GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT  
ACQUISITION BY 1982

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>ROK On Hand 1978</u>	<u>ROK Programmed Acquisitions</u>	<u>US Proposed Additional Acquisitions</u>	<u>EUSA/2d Div Equipment to be Withdrawn</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
<u>Helicopters</u>					
UH-1H (each)	25	50	90	35	
AH-1J Co (W Tow)	2/3	1/3	0	0	
OH-AH (each)	48	60	0	0	In-country coproduction
CH-47 (each)	0	9	16	17	
OH-58 (each)	0	0	0	48	
AH-1G (each)	0	0	0	27	
<u>Air Defense</u>					
Vulcan Btry	34	30	0	2	In-country coproduction
Short Range SAM Btry (Improved Chaparral)	0	3	0	2	Not yet approved for release to ROK because of technical considerations.
HAWK Bn (transfer)	1	2	2	1	Already programmed transfer.

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D. C. 20520

May 28, 1977

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TO: The President

FROM: General George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint  
 Chiefs of Staff  
 Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary of State  
 for Political Affairs

SUBJECT: Troop Withdrawal from Korea

In compliance with your instructions, we held consultations in the Republic of Korea and in Japan on the Presidential decision to withdraw United States ground forces from Korea. Detailed reports of the discussions held have been filed with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. The following are our principal observations and conclusions.

KOREA

- President Park and his principal ministers now have a clear understanding of the Presidential directive concerning troop withdrawal from Korea. Although they would prefer no change in force levels, they understand specifically that the United States Second Division and supporting elements are to be withdrawn from Korea in a phased manner within a period of 4-5 years.
- While the United States program is accepted, there was clear concern for the risk of instability on the Korean Peninsula unless "compensatory actions" were taken in conjunction with the withdrawal so as to maintain an acceptable balance of military power during and following our ground force withdrawal.

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- "Compensatory actions" is a term used by the Koreans to include the transfer of additional U.S. military equipment and the expansion of Korean ability to produce arms and other military requirements. The specific items and quantities of equipment are yet to be defined but include such things as anti-tank weapons, artillery, communications equipment, air defense weapons, etc. We did not discuss quantities or the value of assistance to be provided. We stressed the necessity for Congressional approval and appropriation for any compensatory action.
- It will therefore be essential that Congressional support be secured for the programmed withdrawal of our forces. Specifically, Congressional agreement should be sought for those compensatory actions which should be agreed upon and defined in general terms at the forthcoming Ministerial Security Consultative Meeting which is due to be held in Seoul in July.
- In our discussion of Command arrangements, it was agreed to plan for a combined U.S./ROK Command. The character and functions of the Command will be the subject of consultations between General Vessey and Korean military authorities with the objective of agreeing on the new structure at the forthcoming Security Consultative Meeting. The Command will be formed and operating when the initial increment of U.S. ground forces is withdrawn from Korea before the end of calendar year 1978.
- It was generally accepted that a U.S. Officer would command the Combined Command so long as the bulk of the Second Division (defined as two Brigades plus the Headquarters), remains in Korea. Command arrangements beyond that

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
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point will require further discussion.

- In view of the Korean attitude toward Command arrangements and in response to President Park's specific request, it is recommended that when the second increment is withdrawn, no later than the end of June 1980, it should be so structured that the Second Division Headquarters and two Brigades remain. This will still allow for the projected 15,000 ground personnel to be withdrawn in the first two increments.



JAPAN

- The discussions in Japan with the Foreign Minister and Self Defense Agency were "pro forma" because of the number of people involved and the danger of leaks to the press. The discussion with Prime Minister Fukuda was substantive and informative.
- In general the Japanese also would prefer maintenance of the status quo. However, they seemed to accept our explanation of why U.S. ground forces were being withdrawn and our determination to maintain security on the Korean Peninsula.
- Prime Minister Fukuda emphasized the importance of reassuring all the friendly countries in East Asia of the continued presence and

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and commitment of the United States to the security of the region. We delivered to Fukuda the President's message concerning the importance of Japan's contribution to Korea's security. The Prime Minister understood and asked that the President be assured that Japan would contribute, as it could, to South Korea's economic and political strength through Japan's decisions on trade and investment and in the way in which Japan would publicly handle relations with North and South Korea respectively.

-- Both in Japan and Korea, in describing the proposed U.S. course of action, great stress was placed on the following points:

1. The United States would remain a Pacific power with substantial military capability in a forward position;
2. The United States commitment to the Mutual Security Treaty with the Republic of Korea remains firm;
3. The United States would withdraw ground forces in a phased manner so that the military balance would generally be maintained and instability would not result;
4. We were confident that the program could be carried out successfully based upon the economic strength of Korea, the Korean people's will to resist Communism and the deterrent capability of the Korean and U.S. forces remaining in the area.

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4559THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

12 JUL 1977

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: My Trip to Korea

I am going to Korea on July 22 for the annual Security Consultative Meeting of Defense Ministers, which will also continue the consultative process set in motion by Phil Habib and George Brown. This meeting is particularly important because it formally initiates a major change in our military presence in Korea. I will need to go over again with the Koreans the dimensions of our withdrawal of ground combat forces, assure them publicly of our commitment to their security, and assuage their concerns regarding the timing of our withdrawal and its impact on deterrence. The Koreans will also want some indication of the tangible measures we will take to help them improve their forces and better insure continued deterrence on the peninsula. It is imperative that this meeting demonstrate to Asia and to the world US/ROK agreement on carrying out our withdrawal program. I will also touch on -- and only with President Park -- the relationship between human rights in Korea and our ability to maintain support in Congress and in the public for our Korean efforts. I need your guidance on a number of issues. (Security assistance is being handled in a separate memorandum from the Secretary of State and myself.)

Decisions

1. Troop Withdrawal. On accepting our overall force withdrawal schedule, President Park stressed the need to keep two brigades in the 2d Infantry Division structure until the last withdrawal. Park believed this was of the highest psychological importance. He accepted that the two brigades would be below their authorized strength and that we would not change the present withdrawal numbers (6,000 in the first phase, 9,000 in the second). To make retention of a second brigade more attractive to us, Park indicated that as long as the bulk of the division remained (i.e., the division headquarters and two brigade headquarters), the US commander would maintain operational control (OPCON) over South Korean forces. You have approved in principle Park's request and to this end allowed for 7,000 combat spaces to be held for the final withdrawal. You asked that we withhold telling him that for the moment. I think my visit is a

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critical point for Park, and I believe it is essential that I be allowed to transmit to him in Seoul your agreement to his request. He expects an answer. Unless I communicate to him your favorable response, we will have major difficulties over the establishment of adequate command arrangements and the atmosphere for discussion of other thorny issues will be seriously damaged.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_


Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. Combined Command and OPCON. President Park's willingness to let the US keep OPCON over ROK forces as long as we maintain the 2d Division Headquarters and two brigades gives us what we want on command arrangements. Park also agreed to early negotiations at the military staff level on creating a new command structure -- a US-ROK combined staff -- which would come into existence by the time the first US ground forces are withdrawn in 1978. It was also agreed that this combined structure would be in addition to the present UN Command, which we would maintain until suitable arrangements are made to continue the Armistice Agreement or to replace it with mutually acceptable peacekeeping arrangements on the peninsula.

We have begun work on establishing the combined command with the Koreans and have reached some general conclusions on the structure. It would be commanded by an American with a Korean as deputy. The target date for its inception would be October 1, 1978. The major problem to work out is what US forces, if any, are to be assigned in peacetime to the combined command. We have to be careful on this score. I propose to review with the Koreans, concur in the terms of reference (TAB A), and encourage the Koreans to continue developing with us the details of the command's organization and functions. I will at this time make no commitments on inclusion of any US forces. We will also begin consultations with the Congress on this subject and the scope of the proposed bilateral agreement that will establish this combined command.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

4. Other Supplementary Measures to Shore Up Withdrawal. While primary Korean attention will be focused on the transfer of equipment from the 2d Division and sales of hardware under the Foreign Military Sales Program, I believe that some supplementary measures to demonstrate our commitment, and our capabilities to carry out our commitment, would be useful. These other measures, outlined briefly below, would be designed to serve as a warning to North Korea and provide reassurances to the South Koreans on our capability and willingness to employ military forces on their behalf. I propose to tell the ROK that we will be taking these measures over time.

- Improved Air Force Posture in Korea. The ROK has proposed that we double our tactical air presence to reinforce deterrence. I do not believe that is necessary. I propose rather to increase at an appropriate time the USAF tactical fighter strength in Korea from 60 to 72 aircraft (72 aircraft is equivalent to one full wing) with the planes to come from CONUS. The costs of this move would be modest -- some \$7 million. I will also propose to the Koreans that they undertake a program to upgrade facilities at those air bases designated to receive these and potential US augmentation forces.

I will also inform the Koreans that the E-3A AWACS aircraft, which will be deployed to Okinawa in 1980, will be available to respond quickly to any emergency in Korea and to exercise under the combined command.

- Exercises and Deployments. As a demonstration to both Korea and to Japan of US commitment to the security of South Korea, I propose to upgrade and increase our military exercises in the area. Temporary deployments of US ground, naval and air and mobility assets will be gradually increased in size, frequency and duration concomitant with US ground force withdrawals. Costs of these increased exercise deployments will require specific budgetary support from the Administration and the Congress for the service budgets. To gain the maximum impact from this increased exercise program, we propose to increase public affairs coverage of each military exercise in the Korean area. Carefully orchestrated publicity will help reassure our Northeast Asian allies while simultaneously contributing a measure of deterrence to North Korea. New training exercises will be coordinated with State and NSC.



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5. US Arms Transfer Policy. President Park and other senior ROKG officials are upset about Korea's exclusion from the list of close allies having a special relationship in terms of our arms transfer policy. President Park asked that his personal concern be conveyed to you on this.

I would not recommend attempting to include the ROKG in our overall arms transfer policy on the same terms as our NATO, Japan and ANZUS partners. I will reiterate to the ROK that we will sympathetically consider legitimate Korean defense needs. I believe, however, we have to come up with forthcoming language in my joint communique which indicates that under our existing policy ROK needs, with regard to procurement of military equipment, will be met. Given your wish to encourage development of appropriate ROK defense industries, including co-production, I would also include some favorable, although carefully couched, language on this score.

Cy Vance concurs with this memo.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Carter  
Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown  
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Michael Armacost, NSC Staff Member

DATE, TIME,  
& PLACE:

July 14, 1977; 2:00 - 2:30 p.m.  
Oval Office

SUBJECT:

Security Consultative Meeting in Korea


The President reached the following decisions concerning issues expected to arise at the US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting scheduled to take place in Seoul, Korea, on July 25-26:

1. Troop Withdrawal Schedule

Secretary Brown is authorized to inform President Park that two brigades and the Division Headquarters (but no more than 7,000 2nd Division personnel) will remain in South Korea until the third and final increment of our withdrawal.

2. Command Arrangements

Secretary Brown is authorized to negotiate with the Republic of Korea command arrangements along the lines of the attached terms of reference, and to include an appropriate reference to this in the SCM Communique.




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#### 4. Supplementary Measures to Shore Up Deterrence

The President indicated general approval for some future augmentation of U. S. Air Force tactical fighter strength (from 60 to 72 aircraft), the deployment of E-3A AWACS aircraft to Okinawa, and more frequent and visible military exercises, provided the implementation of these steps is coordinated closely with State and the NSC.

#### 5. Arms Transfer Policy

The President authorized Secretary Brown to express in the SCM Communique (subject to the President's approval of the language) a forthcoming attitude toward support for several Korean arms transfer requests, and U. S. support, with appropriate caveats, for the development of the ROK defense industry, including co-production.

#### 6. Military Assistance

The President indicated his desire to develop a comprehensive five-year program of military assistance for South Korea, noting that we stand a better chance of obtaining Congressional support for a substantial program now than later when the impact of current investigations may undermine support for Korea on the Hill. The President suggested that Secretary Brown undertake meetings with Congressional leaders in the coming week to develop a better sense of Congressional attitudes toward the mix between equipment transfers and FMS credits in the overall assistance package we present to the Koreans at the SCM. The President suggested that Secretary Brown candidly explain to the Koreans these Congressional reactions and our need to fashion a program which takes them adequately into account. In addition, he suggested that Brown remind the Koreans that their performance on the human rights front will have a direct and immediate bearing on our ability to secure Congressional approval for such concrete measures as we eventually propose.

The President indicated that if Frank Moore arranges a meeting next week between Secretary Brown and Congressional leaders in the Roosevelt Room, he would be glad to drop by.

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7. Future of the 2nd Division

Secretary Brown noted that it is not necessary to decide at this point the future of the 2nd Division, but stated his own belief that it should be returned to the U.S. and programmed against worldwide contingencies. Acknowledging that a decision need not be made at this time, the President agreed with the view -- shared by Zbig Brzezinski -- that Secretary Brown had just expressed.



MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

July 21, 1977

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Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File,  
Folder ROK 7-9/77.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *BS*  
SUBJECT: Congressional Reactions to our Korean Policy

The reaction of Congressional leaders to Harold Brown's Korean briefing this morning was very chilly. Not one Senator or Congressman spoke up in support of the troop withdrawal. Many expressed outright opposition or noted significant misgivings. It is clear that we face an uphill battle on this issue with Congress. Some are still uneasy with the manner in which the decision was made. Others are still waiting for a convincing rationale. There have been a variety of explanations why troop withdrawals are not a bad idea, but no compelling case has been presented as to why it is a good idea.

We heard some of the results this morning. Derwinsky, Tower, Glenn, and Stratton all expressed concerns about the impact of the withdrawals on our reputation as a great power. Case and Humphrey acknowledged misgivings that our withdrawal was not made conditional upon reciprocal moves by North Korea to stabilize the status quo. Don Fraser noted that the policy would save no money, yet would relinquish a source of leverage in relation to internal political reform inside South Korea. Lester Wolf, Clem Zablocki, and others echoed these concerns.

In short, sentiment in favor of troop withdrawal is at best lukewarm and passive. This is bad enough, but worse yet are the indications that it will be very difficult to secure the needed military assistance to upgrade ROK defenses as we withdraw. To withdraw without providing such assistance would be disastrous to our Asian policy and our reputation as a serious world power. Yet support for an aid package is going to be difficult to muster. George Mahon and Chuck Percy both suggested that there could be no less propitious moment to ask for additional aid for Korea. Some, like Fraser, will oppose on human rights grounds. Others because they are against military assistance per se. Still others because

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*1/24/96*  
NSA, Brz Mat, CF, <sup>ROK</sup> 7-9/77, box 43

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they oppose the withdrawal. And many Congressmen may vote against a request to prove to the folks back home that their vote has not been bought. Les Aspin is persuaded that these groups together constitute a majority of the House of Representatives.

One is forced by these considerations to several conclusions:

-- First, in talking to the Koreans next week, Harold Brown will have to pull his punches a bit. He will have to indicate our determination to supply substantial military assistance, but should leave flexible the mix of equipment transfers and FMS credits. (I believe we will have to emphasize the former, minimize the latter.) And he will need to avoid saying precisely when we will present a request for assistance to the Hill.

-- To secure support for aid, the Administration will have to mount a very major effort involving the expenditure of significant political capital without any certainty that such an effort can succeed on the Hill.

-- Congress considers the presence of U.S. troops essentially in terms of our defense interests, but assesses military assistance in terms of other factors. We say we cannot remove U.S. troops without augmenting ROK military capabilities. Congress buys the proposition, but would prefer to accommodate it by leaving troops there rather than by appropriating a large new assistance package.

-- Finally, all of the above as well as the Korean scandal in Congress, may warrant some adjustment in our withdrawal policy. Such an adjustment could come through a stretchout in the schedules or by making its implementation conditional upon steps by North Korea. We have preserved flexibility for such a contingency by avoiding a fixed date for the completion of withdrawals. We need not fall back now, but I wanted to alert you to the fact that we may have to face these tough choices when Harold Brown comes back from his discussions in Seoul.

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July 29, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~MR. KENNEDY~~ ~~MR. BUREAU~~ ~~MR. TINSKI~~

FROM: MICHAEL ARMACOST

SUBJECT: Addendum to Weekly Report

Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul

Harold Brown's meetings (July 25 and 26) with President Park and ROK Defense Minister Suh went rather smoothly. Korean anxieties about our troop withdrawals remain deep and pervasive. But the ROK Government, rather than challenging the premises of the withdrawal itself, chose to press hard for items it wanted -- particularly the completion of a compensatory package prior to the withdrawals. President Park welcomed your letter of reassurance, your decision to leave two brigades and the division headquarters until the last withdrawal phase, the prospect of some augmentation of our air units, and the promise of larger, more frequent, and more visible joint military exercises in the future. Agreement was reached on the terms of reference for a combined command to be created by October, 1978. Secretary Brown provided Suh with a list of items the U. S. plans to transfer to the ROK on a cost-free basis, subject to Congressional approval; the equipment on the list has a replacement value of roughly \$200 million. The South Koreans sought additional items, notably M-60 tanks and additional helicopters; and we agreed to produce by mid-October, on the basis of consultations with the ROK and Congress, a comprehensive list of ROK equipment needs, indicating whether specific items would be provided via cost-free transfers; FMS credits, or case sales. He noted that we would continue to seek FMS credits at roughly current levels to support the FIP. Brown indicated a generally forthcoming attitude toward helping the ROK develop its defense industries. (with caveats, however, toward development of export capabilities and efforts to acquire advanced weapons production capabilities.) He expressed willingness to sell the improved Chaparral for delivery in 1981; to provide F-16 data now and consider sale in 1981-1982; to contemplate coproduction of the Vulcan anti-aircraft

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system; and to consider sale of A-10 aircraft. He disclosed that we would not approve the sale of the Lance or Stinger systems to the ROK. Brown foreswore discussions of the Korean problem with the North in forums which exclude the ROK. (And he indicated our disposition to seek additional FMS credits for Korea while continuing to support the FIP with FMS credits at roughly current levels.) In a private session with Brown, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Harold will probably wish to discuss this ~~later~~ questions -- as well as Congressional discussions of our Korean policy -- with you on Tuesday.

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CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Park Chung Hee  
Mr. Choi Kwang-Soo, Chief of Protocol, Blue House  
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown  
Ambassador William H. Gleysteen, Jr.

DATE AND PLACE: November 7, 1978; Combined Forces Command Headquarters, Seoul, Korea

SUBJECT: Korea's Image in the United States/the Human Rights Problem

After the cake-cutting at the President's tea for the new Combined Forces Command, Secretary Brown had a brief private conversation with President Park. Picking up from his earlier comments about the need to broaden the base of public support in the United States for the US/ROK relationship, the Secretary suggested there was no substitute for direct observation if one were to appreciate fully Korea's tremendous economic progress and the way the benefits of this progress were distributed to various elements of the population. He was convinced that the American picture of Korea would benefit far more from the natural process of Americans coming to see Korea than by high pressure information campaigns mounted by the Korean Government in the United States. He went on to say that Korea's economic accomplishments were an important aspect of human rights which was often inadequately appreciated by Americans. He offered to be as helpful as he could in bringing this point home to Americans. In turn, President Park would appreciate, as Ambassador Gleysteen

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had recently explained to him, the concern of the American people and the Administration over human rights. He was sure the President was giving thought as to how progress could be made in this field.

President Park agreed that there was a problem in American appreciation of Korea caused by the recent scandals. Regardless of who was to blame for these regrettable events, they had caused serious difficulty. He agreed that travel to Korea by Americans generally had a very favorable impact and noted that Korea was making efforts to increase the exchange of scholars and scientists. Nevertheless, certain elements in America had unfairly tarnished Korea's image. Last night, for example, he had been reading sections of the Fraser Report and found a number of astoundingly inaccurate assertions about Korean Government activity. Secretary Brown commented that Congressional Committees gave the Administration, as well as foreign governments, a certain amount of trouble, but we had learned to live with Congressional criticism as a part of the democratic process. We appreciated the difficulty sometimes caused for foreign governments.

President Park reiterated his great appreciation for Secretary Brown's willingness to come to Korea for the inauguration of the Combined Forces Command and asked that the Secretary convey personally to President Carter his thanks for the various measures discussed earlier in the day.

ANB:WHGleysteen, Jr. :ej

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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October 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Report to the President from Secretary Brown (U)

The President has read Harold's account of his meeting with President Park in which Harold presented the President's letter on human rights and noted that while it was not our intention to allow the current situation to affect our security ties with the ROK, as a practical matter it would be difficult for us if there was no return to a liberal trend. Park said he is prepared to accept private and informal U.S. advice on domestic matters, but not if the U.S. publicly criticizes his government by strong statements and actions such as the Ambassador's recall. (S)

The President responded to this by noting "We will decide how to react." (C)

*Zbigniew Brzezinski*

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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Review on October 20, 1985

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0017, Box 66, Folder China (Reds)  
0092 (Jan-May) 1977.

9 FEB 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The People's Republic of China and US National Security Policy

The security policy of the US is, and I believe should continue to be, cast primarily within the framework of the Soviet-American political and military balance. At the same time security planning must increasingly reflect the more complex character of the international system. This is particularly true with regard to our policy towards the People's Republic of China. Whatever the virtues of "triangular" diplomacy, China constitutes a growing power center of continuing importance.

We have gained important security benefits from our new relationship with Peking. We have substantially reduced the danger of a conflict in northeast Asia and eliminated the friction that our China policy caused with major allies such as Japan. At least by comparison with what would otherwise have been the case, the Soviets have so far been forced to divide their military strength. Though this is a consequence of Soviet-PRC tensions rather than better US-PRC relations, the two are not unconnected. Thus, the most important factor for the next decade is that the US-PRC relationship will be a major influence on US-Soviet relations.

I therefore conclude that this Administration must foster a relationship with Peking which gives greater global balance to our national security position. Failure to do so might give us some short term benefits with the Soviet Union but at the price of potentially larger long term costs. Retrogression in our China relations could also have major political costs for you and hinder your management of both domestic and foreign affairs.

Security Concerns in the Evolution of China Policy

In terms of our security interests as seen from my vantage point at Defense, there are three major policy areas of interest which will be affected by the evolution of China policy and the conduct of our relations with Peking:

- US-PRC Relations and Our Dealings with the Soviet Union. Our policies regarding the Chinese will be a growing factor in Sino-Soviet relations and in our efforts to deal effectively with the Soviets. While to date the Russians have been reserved in their responses to the more constructive relationship between Washington and Peking, changes in this relationship are likely to stimulate important reactions from Moscow. Improvements in US-PRC relations and heightened levels of Sino-American cooperation may

330-80-0017, box 66, China (Reds), 092 (Jan-May) 1977

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Date: 1 March 2002  
Chief, Declass Br, Dir & Rec. WHS

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DECLASSIFICATION DATE: 31 Dec 2007

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lead Moscow to inject the "China factor" into future SALT negotiations and other aspects of the diplomacy of detente. This could cause them to seek parity as compared with the US plus China in arms agreements, or could make them more eager to reach such agreements with us and to ease relations with us. Stagnation or deterioration in US-PRC relations could relax Soviet anxieties, harden their negotiating postures with us, and create opportunities for improvements in Sino-Soviet relations.

- Effects of "Normalization" of US-PRC Relations. As you decide how to pick up the unfinished task of establishing a stable basis for future US-PRC relations, key issues of concern to the Defense Department will be the timing, the phasing, and the manner in which our present relationship with the Republic of China or Taiwan -- with whom we maintain a security treaty -- will be altered; the future disposition of certain intelligence functions and regional communications facilities on the island; the impact of any changes in our relationship with Taiwan on key Asian allies, especially Japan; and what actions we might be willing to take to ensure that there is a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

- US-PRC Relations and Third Country Issues. There are a number of third country areas -- Korea, Japan, South Asia, the Middle East and Europe -- where the Washington-Peking dialogue has led to parallel policies which have served the security interests of both sides. Defense, of course, has great interest in this process and of how the China relationship might be used to reinforce our security interests on issues like Korea or in response to any future crisis which might affect both countries.

#### Issues for Immediate Consideration

Our security interests in the evolution of our China policy are clear. They may loom larger and acquire greater importance over the next ten years as our present, "semi-normal" relationship with Peking matures. However, there are some issues that I believe should be addressed early. These are:

- The impact of an enhanced US-PRC relationship on Soviet-American relations and particularly on future SALT negotiations;

- The effect of our actions with the Soviets on our ability to pursue an effective China policy in the future;

- The security of Taiwan under conditions of normalized US-PRC relations; and

- The handling of our security relations in Asia (to include our policies towards friends, allies and the PRC) in the interim, while our longer term China policy acquires shape and direction.

I recognize that China policy raises difficult questions and there may be great uncertainties involved in answering them. But I believe that they

need to be addressed in a thorough manner and that this process should begin soon. They have significant implications for our security policy and obviously for the Defense Department in particular.

In the previous Administration China policy was formulated in a very restricted forum by a very few individuals. I recommend against continuing that practice. Our China policy is an integral part of American foreign policy and should no longer, in my view, be managed differently than other major elements of US national security policy. Beyond that there is the need to fashion a broad policy consensus on China policy within the United States Government. Nor does the previous Administration's practice in this regard fit with the work style you have established for your Administration, a style that produces particularly enthusiastic support among those who have experienced both.

I believe there is a need to bring a broader systematic approach to China policy. You may wish to establish a formal or informal group to review the various aspects of China policy. I have explained all this in greater detail in a separate memorandum to Zbig.

*Harold Brown*

cc: Secretary of State  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Normalization of Relations With the People's Republic of  
China (U)

(8) I have carefully reviewed your memorandum of 20 November, JCSM-335-78, which restates the Joint Chiefs of Staff support for normalization of U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations. I particularly noted several conclusions.

- That normalization--if managed properly--should have a positive impact on Asian stability and may facilitate the maintenance of a substantial and constructive U.S. influence in the Pacific.

- That the end of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China can be compensated by a continuation of strong economic and cultural ties to Taiwan.

- That if adequate provisions for the continuing security of Taiwan are developed, the Mutual Defense Treaty could be terminated.

- That the U.S. should provide security assistance to Taiwan in the post-normalization period.

(8) These points are of central importance; I will bear them in mind as we move toward normalization. I know you recognize that with respect to assurances concerning the security of Taiwan, the PRC leaders have always rejected public and explicit commitments regarding their future handling of a matter they consider a question of sovereignty.

*Harold Brown*

Brz Mat (Don), Geo, PRC Normalization [12/18/78 - 12/31/78], box 9

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MR. NLX-07-091

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Geographic File, Box 9, Folder PRC Normalization (12/18/78-12/31/78).

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

December 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Normalization of Relations With the People's  
Republic of China (U)

I am forwarding, for your information, an exchange of correspondence between me and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It indicates that their attitude toward normalization can be helpful, providing we concentrate on the basic conclusion that they favor normalization and keep their concerns in mind.

*Harold Brown*

Attachments

*Brz Mat (Don), Geo, PRC Nor, [12/18/78 - 12/31/78] box 9*

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

September 16, 1979

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Harold Brown

SUBJECT: Trip to China

The time has come to develop a strategic dialogue and military contacts with China to parallel arrangements we have with the USSR. A visit to Beijing during my trip to Korea and Japan next month would provide a timely opportunity to initiate the process. Fritz Mondale's discussions with Deng and Hua Guofeng indicate that the Chinese welcome my visit. Our current difficulties with the USSR (over the brigade in Cuba) and with the Congress (on SALT ratification) enhance the utility of an early trip.

I would envisage a relatively brief stopover in Beijing -- 2-3 days -- for talks with PRC leaders. I would not expect to engage in the kind of global tour d'horizon of shared political and security concerns which characterized earlier conversations with PRC leaders. Rather, I believe my substantive exchanges with them should concentrate on the global military balance with emphasis on 1) trends in the Soviet defense buildup, 2) the inherent strengths (as well as some vulnerabilities) in the US military posture, 3) the appropriate size and characteristics of China's military capabilities, and 4) arms control issues of mutual interest (to emphasize this latter aspect I suggest having George Seignious accompany me). While I would also hope to see a bit of China, I would certainly avoid visiting any particularly sensitive geographical areas or military installations.

The principal purpose of such a trip would be further to broaden and deepen our bilateral relationship with China. Our relationship with Moscow has long contained a security component (i.e., arms control negotiations), and there have been occasional military-to-military contacts. During my discussions with Defense Minister Ustinov in Vienna, I invited him to visit the US. He said this was not the time to discuss such a visit. With the full normalization of our ties with Beijing, comparable arrangements with China are now appropriate.

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Date: 15 March 2001  
Chief, Declass Br. Div. & Rel. VHS

Beyond this, however, I believe a trip at this time would help us with the Soviets although they will doubtless express discomfort. Indeed I believe it will help us because they will probably feel some discomfort, or at least apprehension. The inference that Sino-US ties could take on more concrete security overtones in the future should provide the Soviets a powerful inducement for greater restraint and sensitivity to US interests. This lever is one of the few we have; it is perhaps the only one which the Soviets will immediately take seriously. And it would vividly demonstrate that failure to take our interests into account in areas of special geographic and historical sensitivity (e.g., Caribbean) can precipitate disquieting US actions toward their own neighbors.

To be sure our relations with neither China nor the USSR would be advanced if my trip appeared hastily contrived for tactical advantage. But that is neither the fact nor our purpose. The trip was conceived, discussed and broached with the Chinese before the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba surfaced as a serious problem. Obviously we should emphasize that in any public statements about the trip's origins and objectives. At the same time we cannot afford to allow the current state-of-play in US-Soviet relations to obstruct policy moves vis-a-vis Beijing which make sense on their merits -- as I believe this does. If we fail to follow up promptly on their positive response to the Vice President's soundings, the Chinese will very probably conclude that our concern about negative Soviet reactions is the reason. This and other similar signs of US timidity could well influence the manner in which the PRC plays the US/USSR/PRC triangular relationship.

In the light of these considerations, I believe we should immediately accept the Chinese invitation, and consult with them with a view to announcing sometime this week dates for a mid-October visit to China. That would permit time for orderly planning, allow for sufficient advance notice to key allies, avoid any connection with a possible "second lesson" China may contemplate administering to Vietnam, and enable the visit to be added to my previously scheduled trip to the region.

*Harold Brown*

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HAROLD BROWN

SUBJECT: Trip to China

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The principal purpose of such a trip would be further to broaden and deepen our bilateral relationship with China. Our relationship with Moscow has long contained a security component (i.e., arms control negotiations), and there have been occasional military-to-military contacts. During my ~~recent~~ <sup>in Vienna</sup> discussions with Defense Minister Ustinov, I invited him to visit the US. With the full normalization of our ties with Beijing, comparable arrangements with China are now appropriate.

*Induced to believe it will help us, because they will probably feel some discomfort or at least apprehension.*  
Beyond this, however, I believe a trip at this time would help us with the Soviets although they will doubtless express discomfort. The inference that Sino-US ties could take on more concrete security overtones in the future should provide the Soviets a powerful inducement for greater restraint and sensitivity to US interests. This lever is one of the few we have ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> Soviet conduct, ~~inter-alia, in Cuba, Afghanistan and Vietnam makes this an~~ appropriate time to remind them that continued efforts to exploit turmoil in the Third World (with military assets, assistance, or proxies) for unilateral political advantage will lead to consequences they wish to avoid.

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Date: 15 March 2003  
Classified By: DR & Red WHS

*And it would vividly demonstrate that failure to take our interests into account in areas of special geographic and historical sensitivity (e.g. Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) precipitates US actions toward neighbors.*

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*It is perhaps the only one which the Soviets will immediately take seriously. <*

To be sure our relations with neither China nor the USSR would be advanced if my trip appeared hastily contrived for tactical advantage. ~~But~~ that is ~~not~~ our purpose, [though the timing may yield ancillary bargaining leverage.] The trip was conceived, discussed and broached with the Chinese before the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba surfaced as a serious problem. Obviously we should emphasize that in any public statements about the trip's origins and purpose. At the same time we cannot afford to allow the current state-of-play

in US-Soviet relations to obstruct policy moves vis-a-vis Beijing which make sense on their merits -- as I believe this does. *on their positive response to the Vice President's soundings, the Chinese will very probably conclude that our concern about negative Soviet reactions is the reason. This and other similar signs of U.S. solidarity could*

-- Substantive exchanges during my visit -- and intelligence sharing *specific* well within that may flow from them -- can expand our capability to monitor Soviet activities and capabilities. *in which the PRC plays the USSR IRCC triangular relationship*

-- The visit should strengthen domestic political support for our foreign policy efforts by demonstrating a capacity to deal with the realities of triangular politics on a hardheaded basis across a broad spectrum of issues. This should help particularly with SALT, but the political benefits would extend beyond that.

-- An evolving dialogue with the Chinese on defense matters can produce, over time, greater benefits in terms of adjustments in the global balance of forces, the complementarity of our respective defense efforts, a greater measure of US influence over PRC security policies, and a more responsible Chinese attitude towards arms control.

It will be important to minimize risks associated with the trip through careful attention to the details. To this end, I will:

-- Not generate Chinese expectations that we may be unable to fulfill -- particularly on the matter of arms sales.

-- Stay away from any gratuitous *Soviet - baiting* "baiting of the Peking Bears" in connection with the trip, and emphasize that it balances parallel arrangements and/or initiatives *(invitation)* with the Soviets. *to Ustinov*

-- Plan for timely advance notice to key US allies of the trip and close consultations with them on the substance.

-- Consult with key Congressional leaders to avoid any misunderstanding about the objectives of the trip.

In the light of these considerations, I believe we should immediately *accept the Chinese invitation* consult with Ambassador Chai about trip dates in mid-October. That would still permit orderly planning, allow for *advance* advance notice to key allies, avoid any connection with a possible "second lesson" China may contemplate administering to Vietnam, and enable the visit to be added to *my* previously scheduled trip to the region.

*Consult with Hagan with a view to announcing in late this week dates for mid-October visit to China*





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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 29, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: My Trip to China

I depart on January 4 for a week-long visit to China. During my four days in Beijing, it is likely that I will meet with Hua and Deng, as well as with leading members of China's defense establishment. Subsequently, I am scheduled to visit various Chinese military units, schools, installations, and defense industries in Wuhan and Shanghai. On my way back, I shall stop in Tokyo and Honolulu to debrief the Japanese government and CINCPAC; I plan to return to Washington on January 16.

The broad objectives of my trip to China are:

- To develop an institutional framework for wider contacts and exchanges between the U.S. and Chinese defense establishments.
- To broaden and deepen the security dialogue between our governments by sharing assessments of the military dimensions of the Soviet challenge, and exchanging views on our respective strategies for countering that challenge.
- To discuss regional security issues of immediate concern (e.g., Korea, Indochina, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan) with an eye to coordinating our policies in those areas to the extent possible.
- To draw the Chinese into a more sophisticated discussion of arms control matters of mutual interest.
- To convey to the Chinese, the Soviet Union, interested allies, and the domestic public that we regard modest steps toward defense cooperation with China as a natural by-product of a normal political relationship. We want further to convey that our relationship with China will evolve as we each see in our own interest, where those interests run parallel; we do not intend to be provocative to the USSR, but we will not let the Soviets dominate the relation between the U.S. and the PRC.

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We have agreed with the PRC to discuss the following agenda: Trends in the global and regional military balance, arms control issues, regional security problems, and bilateral questions of mutual concern.

1. Assessment of the military balance. I plan to provide PRC leaders with a hardheaded rundown on Soviet strategic and conventional military capabilities, emphasizing the dangers implicit in current Soviet attempts to exploit opportunities in the "arc of crisis" running from the Middle East through Southeast Asia. I shall detail the actions we are taking to counter the Soviet challenge, with special emphasis on our expanded defense budget, recent NATO decisions on TNF, our moves to carve out a new and expanded security role in the Middle East/Persian Gulf area, and measures we are taking to develop a Rapid Deployment Force. In return, I shall seek to obtain a better reading on Chinese assessments of Soviet strengths and weaknesses; a fuller appreciation of PRC strategic doctrine; and a clearer understanding of where defense fits into China's modernization priorities, and how these priorities will shape their plans for importing modern military equipment and/or dual-use technology from the West.

2. Arms control. Aside from providing the Chinese a picture of how the Administration's arms control efforts fit into our broader national strategy, I will encourage PRC leaders to recognize the political as well as strategic benefits of a more active PRC role on international arms control issues. More specifically, I plan to:

- Offer to establish special communications facilities between Beijing and Washington (a "hot line") in order to permit rapid and confidential exchanges between our governments during international crises. I would have in mind a "full time" circuit, but less sophisticated and less expensive than the MOLINK. I plan merely to make a general offer as a basis for discussion, leaving the details to be worked out later.

- Urge the Chinese to move their nuclear testing program underground as expeditiously as possible, and indicate a willingness to provide unclassified data concerning underground tests (but not diagnostic materials or restricted information on technology) as an inducement.

- Sound out the Chinese about their accession to multilateral arms control agreements such as the Seabeds Treaty, and Outer Space Treaty.

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- Suggest that the PRC implement swiftly its expressed intent to take a seat in the CCD.

3. Regional security issues. Unlike previous trips where U.S. and Chinese leaders have engaged in a global tour d'horizon on security and political issues, I plan to concentrate on a few areas of special and immediate concern.

- On Korea, I shall take note of recent Chinese assurances that North Korea will not seek to exploit the recent political changes in the ROK, emphasize the importance of continued DPRK restraint, remind the Chinese that direct discussions between authorities in Pyongyang and Seoul are indispensable to promote coexistence on the peninsula, and encourage them to urge the North Koreans to reconsider their attitude toward our proposal for Tripartite Talks which remains on the table. I will add that we are not prepared to initiate direct contacts with the North -- however informal -- to discuss Korean issues without ROK representation.

- With respect to Indochina, I will confirm our position that the U.S. and China share many common objectives in Indochina, acknowledge our continued understanding and acceptance of the division of political/military labor discussed during Vice President Mondale's trip, noting however, political problems the U.S. may face in sustaining current policy efforts if Sino-Thai collaboration in support of Pol Pot forces becomes too blatant and visible. In this latter connection, I intend to reaffirm our conviction that the Pol Pot forces should not be the sole focal point of resistance to the SRV, and explore with PRC leaders the possibility of diminishing the role of Pol Pot and his close associates in order to facilitate the development of a more broadly-based Khmer resistance -- perhaps with Sihanouk playing an increasingly prominent role as a "third force" capable of galvanizing indigenous resistance and wider external support.

- With respect to Pakistan, I intend to inform the Chinese of our intent to improve relations with Islamabad, and explore how they might be helpful in this regard. In addition, I plan to discuss how U.S. - Pakistan and Sino-Pakistan relations may be useful in dealing with current difficulties in Iran and Afghanistan. I shall restate our concerns about Pakistan's nuclear activities, but without high expectations of securing Beijing's cooperation in

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turning them off, and will note that (in Warren Christopher's year-end trip to Pakistan) we reiterated our position about the Pakistani nuclear program but said we would not let it stand in the way of military sales or other cooperation except as we are bound legislatively (e.g., no FMS credits).

- As for Afghanistan, I shall share with the Chinese information on Soviet military activities, indicate to them how we plan to respond to recent developments, and consider with them ways to concert our efforts to counter the Soviet's blatant interventionism and force Moscow to pay a high political price for it internationally. I plan to raise the possibility of joint U.S.-PRC-Saudi action through Pakistan in affecting the situation in Afghanistan. As part of our effort to make the Soviets pay for their actions in Afghanistan, and perhaps to contain them, I will make plain in my public statements that the subject of Afghanistan was discussed with the PRC.

- With respect to Iran, I will give the Chinese a rundown on late developments and seek to elicit PRC support for further U.S. moves to isolate Iran, secure the release of U.S. hostages, and diminish Soviet opportunities to exploit the situation.

4. Bilateral security issues. As I indicated in my memorandum to you of December 14, I believe the nature of our future security connection with China should be left somewhat ambiguous and the attitudes of both sides open-minded. However, I do not intend to encourage any Chinese illusions that we are prepared to contemplate arms sales, joint military planning or formal security arrangements at this stage. I do plan to propose a modest expansion of contacts and exchanges between our defense establishments, and convey USG decisions on key technology transfer cases. Specifically:

- With respect to contacts, I plan to invite my counterparts (Defense Minister Xu and/or Geng Biao, Secretary General of the Military Commission) to visit the United States, expand our respective military attache offices on the basis of reciprocity; increase cooperation in the field of medical research; suggest a more extensive pattern of visits (including professional lectures on modern military programs and tactics) between our National Defense University

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and the PRC Military Academy; reaffirm our willingness to have U.S. Navy ships visit Chinese ports; and offer in due course to have U.S. experts discuss with Chinese counterparts our experience in such support areas as communications and medicine.

- As for technology transfers, I shall convey our decision on the Landsat D case as an earnest of our intent to differentiate between the technology we are prepared to export China on the one hand and that which we are willing to authorize for sale to the Soviets on the other. I do not plan to foreshadow to the Chinese the specific approach we will adopt to implement a China differential within COCOM. I will reaffirm our intent to initiate such an effort after the U.S.-PRC Trade Agreement is ratified by the Congress.

With respect to the future trajectory of Sino-U.S. defense cooperation, I intend to convey to the Chinese our belief that there is ample scope for exchanging views, contacts, and some dual-use technology as a by-product of normal political relations, leaving consideration of more sensitive forms of cooperation for circumstances in which our mutual security interests are more directly and ominously challenged. I shall indicate that this incremental approach is not only most likely to exert a salutary deterrent effect on the Soviets, but insure domestic and allied support for broader Sino-U.S. defense cooperation if it should become necessary in the future.

*Harold Brown*

cc: Secretary of State

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Declassified Documents  
Reference System, CK3100474514.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH VICE PREMIER DENG XIAOPING

TIME: 10:00 a.m., 8 January 1980

PLACE: Great Hall of the People

ATTENDEES: US SIDE

Secretary Brown  
Ambassador Woodcock  
Ambassador Komer  
Mr. McGiffert  
Mr. Holbrooke  
Mr. Armacost  
Brigadier General Smith  
Mr. Oksenberg  
Mr. Platt  
Colonel Gilliland, the Defense Attache to Beijing

Chinese Side

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping  
Plus an equal number of others on their side

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DENG XIAOPING: Since the Shanghai Communique of 1972, our relations have developed in a satisfactory way. Only last year we realized the normalization of ~~final~~ U.S. relations; I visited the United States and later Vice President Mondale visited China. Our subsequent relations have continued the momentum begun by these visits. Secretary Brown, you have come to visit us as the United States Secretary of Defense and therefore your visit itself is of major significance. So I would like to extend a cordial invitation to you, your colleagues and your friends here.

DR. BROWN: Thank you very much Mr. Vice Premier. It has now been one year and one week since normalization and the great value of normalization is not merely the establishment of government relations but the strategic advantages which accrue to both countries which follow from my previous conversations with Vice Premier Geng and you. <http://callisto11.gigam.com/doc/DDRS/WopPDF=DDRS-2767380001>

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NOTE: At this point the photographers departed and the meeting was continued without further interruption.)

VICE PREMIER DENG: This is an <sup>timely</sup> event ~~for time~~.

DR. BROWN: Yes, our visit is taking place when new things are happening in the world. This is proof of the utility of our relationship.

VICE PREMIER DENG: (spoken as hot towels were being passed). China has nothing to export but hot towels such as we are using now.

DR. BROWN: Not so, these are also used in our country where we all know that this <sup>comes from</sup> comes from China.

copy carter library VICE PREMIER DENG: You and Vice President Geng have covered a great variety of subjects in the two sessions you have had with each other. I would like to engage in further discussions with you on matters of mutual concern. Do you have any topics to raise?

DR. BROWN: The day of recognition is now fifty-three weeks behind us. I know that you, Mr. Vice Premier, played a central role in normalization. The strategic value of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States has since become ~~clear~~ to all of us. Vice President Mondale said when he was here that normalization means not only establishment of a relationship but also close consultation in global matters. My trip at this particular time and my discussions with the officials of the People's Republic show the true value of normalization and the need for each party to take actions. We have been discussing a long list of items in the past two days but

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I would like to tell you what has been happening in the United States recently with regard to public opinion <sup>(SECRET)</sup> and public opinion regarding the United States' position in the world. Soviet behavior in the last year or more -- use of Cuban and Vietnamese proxies for military purposes in the Third World -- have had an effect on U.S. public opinion. Soviet fortification of islands off ~~of~~ <sup>off</sup> Hokkaido have also had an effect on American opinion. The continuous Soviet military buildup has finally sunk in to American consciousness as an important fact. But most of all events in Iran and Afghanistan have crystalized the U.S. mood. We were increasing our defense budget and we will increase more. We persuaded our European allies to agree to <sup>deployment of</sup> long range theater nuclear forces on their territory. We intend to increase our military presence in the Middle East, in the Arabian Sea area. We have accelerated our plans to have rapidly deployable military forces. We have planned to increase arms supply to Pakistan. The United States is uniting behind President Carter in these things, and is beginning to play such a role with our allies to organize opposition to Soviet expansion. We have a long list of topics. Perhaps you would say which ones need attention, or perhaps you would like to respond to anything that I have already said.

VICE PREMIER DENG: With respect to global strategy, it can be said that within the last few years China has been making its position clear. Besides we have pointed out that the Soviet Union is the source of international turbulence and crisis and is a threat to

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peace and security in the world. We have pointed out clearly the Soviet policy of hegemony and global expansion. There is only one way to cope with the Soviet Union -- all of us should get ~~united~~ in dealing with the Soviets in an earnest fashion. In the past, people tended to read China's point of view as an attempt to divert attention to other areas. But this was an incorrect point of view. They thought that the Soviet Union's focus was on China. When Chairman Mao was still alive there were a number of occasions <sup>they</sup> expounded that the Soviet focus was in Europe (including the Middle East, North Africa, the Mediterranean, and even the Persian Gulf). The strategic focus in Europe meant that the Soviet Union's strategic focus is on the United States. At that time the Soviet Union had one million troops in the east, but <sup>could</sup> it be said that <sup>all</sup> one million troops were directed against China? We have said against the United States. China and Japan are the next targets, and people ask questions like "what should be said <sup>that</sup> Soviet strategic <sup>forces</sup> ~~is~~ in the west -- in Europe? Three fourths of the Soviet Union's military strength is directed against the West. Basically, the Soviet stance has not changed. What has happened in Afghanistan, Iran, Africa, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and the Middle East show that Europe and the West still remains the strategic focus of the Soviet Union. My Personal judgment is that for a long time the West has not offered an effective response to actions of the Soviet Union, so the Soviet Union has strength left to apply against the East. The Soviet Union has beefed up its Pacific Fleet. Meanwhile

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the Soviets have used Vietnam ("the Cuba of the East") to engage in a direct invasion of Kampuchea, to control Laos and pose a threat to the ASEAN countries. Meanwhile the Soviet Union has redoubled its efforts to pursue a policy of southward thrust toward the Indian Ocean which was the policy ~~which was~~ followed by the Soviet Union from the time of the Czars until the present leadership. Such a line of action by the Soviet Union does not contradict the constant focus on the West, but has limited strategy in the west and strategy in the Asian and Pacific region. I think that Vice Premier Geng mentioned that we ~~believe that we~~ consider Soviet policy to be like a dumbbell -- in the Pacific they are trying to increase their strength of the naval fleet and in the Indian Ocean area they are accelerating steps toward getting access to the Indian Ocean. This strategic policy is a strategic policy of a southward drive. Thus they will have two edges, and the line linking them is the Straits of <sup>Malacca</sup> ~~Maloca~~. If there are troubles this line could be cut immediately.

MR. BROWN: Vice Premier Geng and I did discuss this. Our concepts are very much alike but we did have some differences in detail.

I consider it very important to coordinate our policies to try to keep the peace. There are some particular areas where it is most important to coordinate our policies -- Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iran. We may want to discuss these some more.

VICE PREMIER DENG: What I was driving at was <sup>that</sup> ~~although~~ Soviet strategic focus remains on the West, issues of the Asian and Pacific region have now linked together with those of Europe and

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this is the recent change in the situation. For example, during my trip to the United States I expressed to President Carter that only if Japan, China, Europe, and the United States get united will they be able to deal with the Soviets. Of course this also involves unity of Third World countries situated along this geographic line. Besides we have always emphasized the point that treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union will be of little value. I made the point in the United States that China is not opposed to negotiations or treaties but these will not restrain the Soviet hegemonistic acts. We need to do something down to earth. ~~In this context I cited signing the treaty of Sino-U.S. Friendship -- this is what I mean by down-to-earth moves.~~ At that time I also talked about ~~xxxxxx~~ the U.S./NATO Alliance and how to increase strength with Western European countries. I also talked about the need to increase the defense capabilities of the Japanese. On other occasions I also said that increasing Chinese military capability will help maintain peace and resist Soviet hegemony. I even said that according to our American friends there are one million Soviet troops in the east which we don't think are directed solely against China. If we could ~~pen~~ down two million Soviet troops, what harm would that do? You must be aware of my thoughts.

DR. BROWN. Yes. We are doing all of this. We are increasing our defense capability. The European defense capability is being increased. Japan is increasing its defense expenditure. US/Chinese cooperation is also increasing.

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VICE PREMIER DENG: We are satisfied with what Japan, Europe, and the United States have done, that this is the correct line of action. It would have been better if this could have been done even earlier. If so, some events could have been avoided.

[Please don't regard this as a critical comment].

DR. BROWN: We must take visible parallel actions. Regarding Afghanistan, we have agreed to follow-on talks and parallel actions. For example, we've been giving support to Afghanistan refugees and we are also going to help Pakistan.

VICE PREMIER DENG: The only correct approach to Afghanistan is to give aid to the resistance forces, and we should work together on this. I'd emphasize <sup>that</sup> this kind of aid must be more than symbolic. I must note that Soviet aggression is a question concerning the whole nation. Facts in Afghanistan prove that most of Afghan troops have leaned toward the resistance forces. The Afghan people have been fighting fiercely <sup>against</sup> Soviet aggression. We must turn Afghanistan into a quagmire in which the Soviet Union is bogged down for a long time, engaged in guerrilla warfare.

DR. BROWN: Our actions will have that effect, but we must keep our intentions confidential. With regard to Pakistan, aid will be given much more publicly. We are beginning communications with the Pakistanis about this. We <sup>will</sup> have asked Congress to amend ~~the law~~ <sup>and</sup> limiting military assistance to Pakistan, and we expect Congress to be cooperative. As soon as we have an agreement with President Zia on the amount of assistance, we will start our deliveries.

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Vice Premier Deng ~~said~~ <sup>provided</sup> that aid was more than symbolic, ~~that~~ there would be no difficulty in using Chinese overflight as one way of delivering. It is also important that the PRC supply the ~~Pakistanis~~ <sup>to Pakistan</sup> in Freedom Fighters with arms. We would like to know your plans in that regard.

VICE PREMIER DENG: Since the southward drive strategy of the Soviet Union is to seize warm water ports along the Indian Ocean, Pakistan has become the next target on the Soviet list.

Personally, I must have said it at least ten times to my American friends that the United States should aid Pakistan. With regard to questions on Southern Asia, there is no other way except giving aid to Pakistan. As you know, it has always been our view that Soviet policy favoring India over Pakistan is not appropriate. Regarding India, we have always felt that the United States should try to cultivate good relations, and this has had a good effect. But India is not a stabilizing factor. You already know the general election results.

DE. BROWN: If there is no majority, perhaps you can say how that will come out.

VICE PREMIER DENG: Indira Gandhi has gotten 70% of the vote. It is very difficult to judge at this time how India will go. Indira Gandhi should follow India's previous policy; still India is not the most stabilizing factor in southern Asia. Let's not talk about Indira Gandhi. The present government is thinking of recognizing the <sup>1947-1948</sup> ~~Regime~~ <sup>Regime</sup>. Perhaps after Pakistan has been

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strengthened, India will become a more stabilizing factor. What one should try to achieve is to make Pakistan a genuine stabilizing factor in south Asia. We hope the United States will give sincere thought to this question. If one does not get this clear, ~~then~~ the reaction from India will make one vacillate in one's position. In the past the United States has refrained from aiding Pakistan, probably because of a fear of offending India. Since you now <sup>have</sup> decided to aid Pakistan, I am sure India will strongly object.

DR. BROWN: Our big problem with Pakistan was their attempts to get a nuclear program, although we still object to their doing so, we will now set that aside for the time being and concentrate on strengthening Pakistan against potential Soviet action.

copy carter library VICE PREMIER DENG: That is a very good approach. Pakistan has its own reasons for developing a nuclear program. We ourselves oppose this because we believe it meaningless to spend money on such a program. Pakistan has its own arguments, i.e., India has exploded a nuclear device but the world has not seemed to complain about this. So now you have decided to put <sup>this</sup> aside and solve the question of military and economic aid to Pakistan. We applaud this decision. We give large amounts of assistance to Pakistan. One can say that great amounts of military equipment now in the hands of Pakistani troops comes from China. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ In order to strengthen our links with Pakistan, we have built a highway in the most difficult terrain through the mountains. The question of continuing Chinese aid to Pakistan does not

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exist. Moreover, Chinese armament are rather poor in quality. While the United States has decided to give aid to Pakistan, you should try to convince Pakistan this is a sincere and genuine U.S. effort and make them believe that they will benefit from modern U.S. weapons. I know that the Pakistanis have many grievances against the United States. This has developed to the point that Pakistan has withdrawn from CENTO. Have you approached Pakistan on the aid question?

DR. BROWN: We have given them some information and will give them more. Pakistan has indicated that they <sup>did</sup> not wish to have a survey team until they have received answers to their questions. (How large a program and what we are willing to supply).

copy carter library VICE PREMIER DENG: You should directly approach Pakistan to raise this question. I would like to cite an episode. It was through the work of Pakistan that Henry Kissinger came to China to talk about normalization. Since you were able to talk with <sup>them</sup> about this, you should be able to <sup>talk to</sup> them now.

DR. BROWN: I am aware of this Pakistani help, and this will help put aside some of our reservations.

VICE PREMIER DENG: You may recall that I raised the question of aid to Pakistan with ~~KKK~~ President Carter. He said the U.S. will give aid in proportion to cooperation of the two countries. I said this was not feasible. <sup>the</sup> Pakistanis and ~~the~~ Indians are ~~all~~ afraid of each other. If the population ratio formula should be augmented, <sup>east</sup> Pakistan will be in an increasingly inferior position. We hope that since the United States decided to give aid to Pakistan,

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this will satisfy Pakistan's requirements. We hope the U.S. will not be affected too much by India's reaction. We hope the US will not mention the Pakistani nuclear program because India has already said that the United States has supplied them with information on uranium.

DR. BROWN: We will continue to maintain our position against Pakistani nuclear development, but we will also provide aid to Pakistan. Soviet actions are directed not only at Pakistan but at Iran. The United States is in a different position vis-a-vis Iran. So long as the hostages are held, we cannot have good relations. We need Chinese support on the United Nations sanctions because if there is no vote for sanctions there will be increasing pressure on the United States to take unilateral action against Iran. That could be damaging but necessary. In that event US-Sino relations would be strained. We were grateful for Chinese cooperation in December in the United Nations Security Council and I hope this will continue. We need an affirmative Chinese vote in the UN Security Council.

VICE PREMIER DENG: May I return to Pakistan? I believe it is better if U.S. would enter direct discussions with Pakistan.

Chinese policy with regard to aid to Pakistan has been consistent for the past twenty years. Regarding Chinese aid to Afghanistan, we are supporting the refugees through Pakistan. Regarding how the U.S. feels about giving aid to resistance forces in Afghanistan, you may wish to discuss with the Pakistanis. There are perhaps

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already 400 thousand Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. Regarding  
the ~~question~~ <sup>Council</sup> of the UN Security vote on Iran, the government  
departments concerned in China are still studying this question.  
When one considers India, you should <sup>not</sup> just take into account  
the present circumstances. You should also take into account  
the larger view. One thing to be considered is how much  
practical effect sanctions will have. If the sanctions should  
fail to generate great practical effect, I think it would be better  
not to have a resolution than to have one. As far as China is  
concerned, if ~~the UN should~~ <sup>the UN should</sup> vote for  
sactions, this would cut off communications between China and Iran.  
Ayatollah Khomeini is anti-Chinese now, but the Iranian people  
still have ties to the Chinese people. So the question is  
whether this channel of communication between China and Iran  
should be blocked or retained so that China could play a  
future role in U.S./Iranian relations. ~~Even at present, Pakistan~~  
~~still had contacts with Iran not long ago.~~ ~~Of course, Pakistan~~  
does not have much influence on

(begin 2nd tape)

~~so perhaps your aid to Pakistan will at a certain point have an~~  
~~effect on contacts between Pakistan and India.~~ If China should  
vote for UN Security Council sanctions and the Soviet Union then  
casts a veto, sanctions would not come into effect. Then China's  
word would carry far less weight in the Arab world but the Soviet

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Union would benefit in the process.

DR. BROWN: I have heard these arguments and discussed them with your Foreign Minister yesterday. I would like to make three points. First, nobody has good communications with Khomeini. Second, sanctions will be voted on one way or another. Thus it is not a question of whether there is a vote but of solidarity -- between the United States and its friends, including the People's Republic of China. If sanctions are voted down without a Soviet veto, this will be a great victory for the Soviets. Kidnappings will continue to control U.S./Iranian relations. This is a bad thing. ~~There is no way for the U.S. to compete with the Soviet Union in Iran.~~ As long as hostages are held, the American people will demand some action. The Soviets will have more opportunity to influence and perhaps take over Iran. <sup>Iran</sup> ~~It~~ would be worse than if the Soviets took Afghanistan because of access of Persian Gulf oil in the case of Iran.

VICE PREMIER DENG: There is another possibility. A veto of the UN Security Council resolution would lead to extended Soviet influence in Iran. Khomeini still tells the Soviets that a veto may bring Khomeini and the Soviet Union together. The Soviet Union has partisan forces in Iran -- <sup>Tudeh</sup> ~~Tudeh~~ Party. The Soviet Union has considerable influence on mass organs such as trade units and student organization. I would like to advise the United States not to act irrationally and I think you should slow down the pace of the sanctions issue. It is so complicated ~~that~~

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there are many factors working. Regarding China, it is a question of maintaining contact with the Iranians and this vote will also affect China's relations with Islamic countries. It is a complicated issue. You should go slow. You should study it more. Reconsider. I hope the United States will think this through carefully and weigh the various aspects. Don't rush. Christmas is already over, so you now have ample time.

DR. BROWN: The United States has been quite patient with regard to unilateral action. It is not easier for us if our friends say we should be patient <sup>there is</sup> ~~nothing we can do to help~~. While good contacts with the Iranians is important, how can we do future business with Iran with an Iran <sup>who</sup> thinks kidnapping is an acceptable action. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ But I hear

you. We will consider the matter carefully. A vote is inevitable, but I don't know how fixed the timing is.

DENG: I think the issue could be pursued in a prudent way. Give us more time.

DR. BROWN: Would timing affect the Chinese vote? Would a delay in the vote increase the chances of a favorable PRC vote?

DENG: We will continue to study this matter. It is far too complicated. I have already made my position <sup>very</sup> clear. Since there is not much time left I would like to raise three points. First the Kampuchean question. I hope the United States will stick to its present position. I say this because some countries (for example the United Kingdom) <sup>has</sup> taken an inappropriate position (the recognizing of Kampuchea). There are some countries working

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for a potential Sihanouk government to replace the DRK government. The answer to the question is that in Kampuchea the ~~Khmer~~ <sup>Khmer</sup> force remaining to fight the Vietnamese is the DRK force. If we should adopt inappropriate measures, that would disintegrate the ~~Vietnamese~~ <sup>these</sup> forces in Kampuchea. Actually, what Prince Sihanouk has said has the effect of helping the ~~Vietnamese~~ <sup>Khmer</sup> and the ~~State~~ <sup>Khmer</sup> as well. We do not take Sihanouk's role lightly and think there may be a future role for him. But not now. He refuses the cooperation of various resistance forces, which is not realistic on his part. The Vietnamese objective is to wipe out the resistance forces during the dry season offensive. Three dry season months have already passed and there are only three left. Anyway, we hope to reach an understanding with you that neither will do anything injurious to the resistance forces. I hope the United States Government will consider our viewpoints. Japan sees <sup>this</sup> differently than China. Japan gives aid to Vietnam and in our view this will do harm. Second, as you know, Vice President Mubarak is here. We talked about the Middle East issue. We have told him that we show understanding for the Egyptian position but what both China and the United States should realize is that this puts us in an isolated position vis-a-vis the Arab world. This provides approval for Soviet exploitation. I repeat what I told President Carter. I hope the United States will help Sadat by applying pressure on Israel so that Sadat can carry out his own program. If the United States does not heed these points

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Sadat will be in more difficulty. <sup>Even</sup> ~~now~~ for example, Israeli relations with Egypt have deteriorated. The third point is the question of bilateral relations. In that regard we hope that there will be substance <sup>in this</sup> development.

(I will not mention purchase of F-15 or F-16 aircraft anymore.)

Regarding technology transfer, we hope the United States will adopt a more open approach since this comes under your cognizance, Mr. Secretary.

DR. BROWN: I would like to respond. I have made my views on Indochina clear to the Foreign Minister. We recognize Pol Pot's military contribution, but there is no way he can be reinstated in power; thus, we should think about the longer

term relation which could well involve Prince Sihanouk

DENG: From a longer term point of view, a political solution involving Sihanouk <sup>can't</sup> be ruled out, but we don't like what he is doing now.

DR. BROWN: Regarding Egyptian/Israeli relations, the US is convinced that the solution to the Palestinian problem is a necessary part of reaching a comprehensive peace settlement. We are working with Sadat in moving the negotiations along.

VICE PREMIER DENG: Good.

DR. BROWN: On technology transfer, I have explained that we have drawn a distinction between the Soviet Union and China. For example we will agree to provide LANDSAT D to China, but not to the Soviet Union.

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DENG: I think the scope of technology transfer is too narrow.

DR. BROWN: This will be discussed in some detail by our experts.

U.S. policy on arms sales is that we won't sell arms to the People's Republic of China. But this does not apply to all military equipment. ~~I am drawing a distinction between dual use technology and actual military equipment.~~ I would consider surveillance and warning equipment. ~~For example over the horizon radar.~~ I am prepared to discuss <sup>this</sup> with your technical people on a very private basis. This is a new topic separate from the issue of technology transfer.

DENG: Good. We will discuss this later. We will discuss this this evening. If it is not solved then, maybe it can be addressed later.

DR. BROWN: I agree. This is not the same as discussing F-15s or F-16s. But we ~~had~~ <sup>have</sup> a chance to discuss other things. We have a long relationship in front of us.

DENG: The visit by Vice President Mondale has opened and deepened our ties. I thank you Secretary Brown for coming to visit us. I ask that you convey to President Carter and Vice President Mondale my personal regards. I think that <sup>at</sup> a time like this we need to increase our contacts. Thank you.

DR. BROWN: Thank you. I will convey your words to President Carter and Vice President Mondale. I hope my visit will move us a few steps further to even a closer relationship.

DENG: Your coming here itself is of major significance because you are the Secretary of Defense.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

10 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Aims for Japan's Defense Posture (U)

In the papers being prepared for your use during Prime Minister Fukuda's visit, with respect to defense matters we recommend you tell Fukuda that:

- Japan should increase its defensive capabilities and the effectiveness of its forces by funding greater qualitative improvements in equipment and logistics. Particular emphasis should be given to air-defense and to ASW.
- Japan should assume a share of our soaring defense costs in Japan (e.g., labor costs and other housekeeping expenses).
- We are prepared to expand substantive cooperation in defense matters, to the extent the Japanese find it politically acceptable.

Some time ago you asked me to study where we want Japan to be in defense in five or six years. I have attached a brief statement of my preliminary thinking on this point. It should prove useful as background for the Fukuda visit. In general, we want Japan to expand its capability within the present US-Japan security framework -- not to rearm in any major sense, but to contribute more to its own defense and to our overall conventional military deterrent. At the end of the five-year period, Japan should be able to perform with confidence the air defense role, broaden its ASW coverage and assume a greater share of Northern Pacific sea lane defense, and improve the logistics support of its forces to enhance their capability for sustained operations.

All this can be implemented within the dual constraints of political and fiscal reality, but the Japanese have been moving very slowly. We are particularly disturbed by protracted delays in their air defense and ASW procurement. The percent of GNP Japan will devote to defense this year is declining from its already miniscule 0.9 percent. I believe we need to step up our efforts to get Japan to increase its defensive capabilities; this will be particularly important as we proceed to plan a draw-down of US ground forces in Korea.

H. Brown Collect, CD2,

Harold Brown

Attachment 0000D2b1.pdf

DoD Background Paper: U.S. Aims  
for Japan's Defense Posture

Sec. Def.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: EO 12958  
Date: 28 February 2003  
Chief, Declass. Br. Dir. & Rec. WHS

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## US AIMS FOR JAPAN'S DEFENSE POSTURE

We are in something of a Catch 22 situation with the Japanese on their defense programs. Over the years the Executive Branch and many legislators have publicly urged the Japanese to increase their defense capabilities beyond their steady tortoise-like pace. We haven't been too successful since the Japanese perceive little threat and the US military presence in the area seems assured. Altering either condition would probably be an unmanageable shock to the Japanese. For our part we must tread cautiously given the importance of Japan to us.

### The Japanese Perspective

The latest Japanese Defense White Paper does not envision an external threat to Japan within the next ten years. The Soviets are distrusted and annoy the Japanese with minor harassments, but they do not generate fear. While concerned over the growth of Soviet power in Asia, the Government does not see a realistic scenario involving a Soviet military threat to Japanese security. Japan believes the PRC is weak and inhibited by the Sino-Soviet dispute, but they fear China may damage Japanese economic interests in Southeast Asia. Japan's most pressing security concern is the prevention of hostilities in Korea; they are deeply concerned over expected US force reductions.

Despite this generally relaxed orientation the Japanese see themselves as uniquely vulnerable and feel they must maintain the US-Japan security relationship. Japan carefully watches the US-Soviet strategic balance and the US military posture in Asia. Over time Japan has developed significant, though small, conventional forces in order to reduce the possibilities of political blackmail and to hedge against major changes in US defense policy.

Japan's limited defense also reflects political and constitutional constraints. These powerful domestic restraints have led the Japanese to focus exclusively on homeland defense missions, avoid the designation of a specific external threat, and keep defense expenditures under one percent of GNP. However, Japan's concern about security has been changing over time, particularly since the fall of Vietnam, and the political restraints, e.g., the one percent limit, may be diminishing.

### The US View

For its part the US has never been too sure of what it wants from Japan in the security field. Many Americans still fear a revival of Japanese militarism and are concerned over "too big" a defense buildup. Because of these worries and because we highly value political stability in Japan, we have wisely chosen not to challenge Japanese political constraints and have not pressed them hard on defense or to take on broader defense responsibilities in Asia.

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Date: 28 February 2003  
Chief, Declass. Div., Dir. & Rec. MHS



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In our defense dealings with Japan we have not attempted to define a role for them in countering the Soviets, nor have we discussed a NATO contingency or our plans to reinforce NATO from the Pacific. Japan may remain neutral during a NATO/Warsaw Pact war, and without use of bases in Japan our ability to bottle up the Soviet Pacific fleet would be impaired. We would not want to depend on the Japanese for important military functions which they might refuse to perform once war started in Europe, and this uncertainty makes it difficult to pursue a serious division of defense labor. Further, any effort at this time to define an anti-Soviet defense role would lead to a political crisis in Tokyo.

Nevertheless, the situation in Asia is changing. The growth of Soviet power and the decline of US military power make the Japanese increasingly nervous but not, apparently, to the point where they want to make a significant increase in their defense capabilities. We are partly the cause, since we play down the significance of our redeployments and point to our remaining capabilities.

Given the present level of threat in Asia, we cannot support making the lagging Japanese defense effort a major political issue between our two countries. Nevertheless, we definitely should continue our quiet steady pressures on them to increase their capabilities. Modest increases in Japanese forces are an addition to the power of the alliance and we should welcome them. Moreover, failure of the Japanese "to do more" in defense could adversely affect American attitudes toward Japan and contribute to significant political strains between the two countries, particularly if the economic issues between us should become exacerbated.

#### US Objectives for Japanese Defense

Over the next five years we want Japan to expand the capability of its defense force within the present US-Japan relationship. In this framework increases in Japanese defense will not appear threatening to other countries of Asia. This does not argue for Japan "re-arming" in the usual sense. Rather we want to encourage Japan to improve the capability of its conventional forces along lines that develop greater complementarity between US and Japanese forces. At the end of the five-year period Japan should be able to perform the air defense role with confidence, broaden its ASW coverage and assume a greater share of Northern Pacific sea lane defense, and beef up the logistics capability of its forces to make them a more credible military deterrent. The funds required to do this are not very large, a level of \$1 billion or so above the current \$5.6 billion funding. Such an increase is marginal, in terms of Japan's GNP, raising it to slightly over 1 percent.

We also want to increase our military cooperation and planning with the Japanese. We want to increase the scope of bilateral exercises, operations, and exchange activities, and conclude a bilateral plan for the defense of Japan as a basic document for greater and eventually more task-oriented military cooperation. This increased cooperation and greater

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complementarity of forces should give us more mileage from our forces in Northeast Asia as well as further the utility of the Japanese in our mutual security interest.

Attached is a brief outline of some specific measures we believe Japan should take to improve its defense capability.

What we recommend will not be easy to attain. Even though Japan does not need to make a quantum jump in either defense expenditures or scope of defense responsibilities, almost any enlargement of military capability will be difficult to achieve. The constraints are many: the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been weakened; building a consensus concerning a threat and an appropriate response is a slow task in Japan; and the Japanese are concerned about the perceptions of their neighbors.

#### Two Contingent Concerns

A Regional Role for Japan - Japan has shunned any direct regional security effort. They have allowed us (with some limitations) to use our bases on their soil and contributed individually through economic aid. We, in turn, are not sure what regional security contribution Japan should undertake. Any notion of using Japanese forces on foreign soil in the area is, of course, nonsense. However, we may be able to involve the Japanese in building up the defense capabilities of friendly Asian countries either through military grant aid or through the provision, in untied form, of something akin to our supporting assistance program. Any effort to move in this direction may very well be seen as politically impossible in Japan. Japanese specialists in the agencies are deeply divided over the wisdom and feasibility of this general proposal. While it is not a matter of urgency, you may wish to have a review of this problem at an appropriate time.

U.S. Marines from Okinawa in Korea. Because of the uncertainties associated with the removal of U.S. ground forces from Korea, it might be important periodically to demonstrate our commitment to South Korea and our ability to respond in a crisis by deploying U.S. air and ground forces into Korea. As the USMC Division on Okinawa will be the only ground combat force in East Asia once U.S. Army forces move out of South Korea, one such deployment alternative would employ Okinawa-based Marines. We may also want to consider periodically rotating to Korea some of our Marine air units in Japan. These steps would cause some adverse political reaction in Japan because they would openly link Japan to the active defense of Korea. You may wish to explore in detail the implications of such moves.

Appendix: A Program for Increased Japanese Capability.

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### A Program for Increased Japanese Capability

A significant increase in Japanese capability can be achieved within the current Japan Defense Agency manpower ceiling. Money is a greater constraint than manpower. The Japan Defense Agency budget has remained between .8 and .9 percent of the GNP since 1972. In absolute terms, the budget has grown from \$2.6 billion to \$5.6 billion over the same period. This growth has kept pace with inflation but has not provided for much real growth in capability or funded many major new weapons procurement programs. With a six percent annual GNP growth, defense funding at one percent of GNP for the years FY 77-81 would average \$6.6 billion annually--enough to make a significant start on necessary improvements despite moderate inflation.

Such higher funding would have its emphasis on ASW, air defense, and missile programs. Major programs already in the JDA's FY 77-81 plans include: F-15 introduction (about 125); introduction of P-3C ASW aircraft; importation of 12 E2C AEW aircraft; production of 56 F-1 fighter aircraft; 28 to 32 additional attack helicopters; acquisition of improved HAWK; introduction of shipboard SPARROW and HARPOON; a fleet increase to 60 destroyer-type ships. The FY 77 JDA budget now in final "scrub," however, does not provide a very auspicious beginning: F-15 has been delayed a year; the ASW aircraft has funds only for further study; the F-1 request has been reduced; and shipbuilding requests have been reduced. We need to work for a reversal of this budgetary stagnation next year and beyond.

### Some Specifics for US-Japan Cooperation

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) - Japan's dependence on sea lines of communication increases her vulnerability to submarine warfare. Japan thus needs to acquire first rate ASW capability. Conversely, that capability could be used to deny Soviet exit from the Sea of Japan in the event of a conflict. We need to increase the scope and frequency of combined US-Japanese operations and standardize doctrine and tactics. Japan should acquire greater ASW capability through introduction of the P-3C or equivalent equipment, and greater ASW surface capability through acquisition of more ships and better sensor technology. Japan also should acquire more defensive mining capability and help augment our own limited capability. We should increase the exchange of technological data and increase joint efforts to improve ASW command and control.

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Air Defense - Japan should put the F-15 into service as soon as possible, as well as increase procurement of air defense missiles for their present F-4EJ. She needs to acquire an airborne early warning capability, better communications, a more powerful ground radar system, and improved electronic equipment to enable airborne and surface radar to combat jamming. Japan should acquire the improved HAWK as soon as possible and initiate study of an advanced close-in missile defense system.

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Date: 28 February 2003  
Chief, Declass Br. Div. & Rec. WHS

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Intelligence and Surveillance - We should expand our intelligence cooperation with Japan and seek to have the Japanese do more open ocean and Soviet maritime province surveillance. The Japanese could mount (with our assistance) greater technical intelligence efforts. Navy ASW intelligence programs with the Japanese Navy are an excellent example of what can be done.

Commonality of Forces and Improved Logistics Capability - We should develop with the Japanese mutually supporting logistics systems so that in a contingency situation our forces can be supported from either country's system. Japan also should expand its logistics system and develop greater strategic stockpiles. We should initiate increased combined training and exercises with Japanese forces. We could also accelerate and improve planning in current discussion forums to achieve a better division of labor in an emergency, as well as develop common communications, tactics, weapons systems, and support operations.

The Problem of Cost Sharing - Recognizing that political realities may prevent Japan from achieving the increased capability we would like, we also should pursue cost sharing alternatives. The Japanese may instead find it more palatable to assume a greater share of our collective defense costs. These operational costs are rising rapidly and the impact is beginning to affect our force posture. Labor costs, for example, have risen from \$140 million in 1968 to \$400 million in 1975 despite an almost 50 percent reduction in Japan employees. We now pay all these costs under the Status of Forces Agreement. We should seek to have Japan assume a sizeable portion of them. We further should seek increased but carefully controlled joint use of military bases with the Japanese military forces, with the latter assuming a larger share of base housekeeping costs. There are political obstacles to cost sharing, but not insurmountable ones. We are in the early stages of cost-sharing negotiations and high level US interest should be helpful in nudging the Japanese.

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JAPAN SELF DEFENSE FORCE

PERSONNEL

Air Self Defense Force - 43,000 (97% of 44,575 ceiling)  
Maritime Self Defense Force - 40,000 (97% of 41,400 ceiling)  
Ground Self Defense Force - 155,000 (86% of 180,000 ceiling)

TOTAL - 238,000 (89% of 266,000 ceiling)

<u>MAJOR UNITS</u>	<u>MAJOR EQUIPMENT</u>
<u>AIR FORCE</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- 7 Fighter Wings (12 Squadrons 536 Aircraft)</li><li>- 3 Training Wings (356 Aircraft)</li><li>- 1 Transport Wing (44 Aircraft)</li><li>- 5 Air Defense Missile Groups (162 NIKE Launchers)</li></ul>	<u>AIR FORCE</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- 83 F-4EJ Fighter</li><li>- 196 F-104 Fighter</li><li>- 238 F-86 Fighter</li><li>- 14 RF-4E Reconnaissance</li><li>- 86 T-2 Trainer/Ground Support Fighter</li><li>- 30 C-1 Transport</li></ul>
<u>NAVY</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- 1 Fleet Escort Force (4 Flotillas, 49 Destroyers)</li><li>- 5 Fleet Air Wings (190 Combatant Aircraft)</li><li>- 2 Minesweeper Flotillas</li><li>- 2 Submarine Flotillas</li><li>- Fleet Training Command</li></ul>	<u>NAVY</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- 49 Destroyer/Destroyer Escorts</li><li>- 16 Submarines</li><li>- 36 Minesweepers</li><li>- 34 Patrol Craft</li><li>- 68 P-2J ASW Aircraft</li><li>- 123 Other ASW Aircraft (S2F-1; HELO)</li></ul>
<u>ARMY</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- 12 Infantry Divisions</li><li>- 1 Mechanized Division</li><li>- 1 Field Artillery Brigade, 4 Separate Battalions</li><li>- 1 Tank Brigade</li><li>- 1 Airborne Brigade</li><li>- 1 Helicopter Brigade</li><li>- 4 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups (Includes HAWK)</li><li>- 5 Engineer Brigades</li></ul>	<u>ARMY</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- 790 Tanks</li><li>- 640 Armored Vehicles</li><li>- 80 Self-Propelled Guns</li><li>- 310 Helicopters</li></ul>

Sources: 1976 Japan Defense Agency White Paper  
DIA Military Intelligence Summaries

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SEC DEP HAS DL

4 February 1977

Memo For SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Lest you think I may be exaggerating what a "mess" NATO is, here's a memo from Gen Jones to Don Rumsfeld six months ago which is still "must" weekend reading. Jones is one of your ablest four stars, who lived the NATO problem for at least three tours in Europe, the last as CINCUSAFE.

Since Dave Jones concedes that his diagnosis of the problem is better than his proposed solutions, I also attach a brief chit I did for your transition team which goes further. My reason for raising this issue now is that you may act on DoD reorganization before I address the NATO aspect in my action proposals.

- You raise this with the reorganizers
- This problem is under control

RWK  
R. W. KOMER

cc: J. Weston

it's very hard to have some (high) officials

functional

RWK 2/5  
RWK -

Jones has, as you say, a good eye for the problems I can't really accept your solution, but see the need to have (full time 2 or very senior, but on a few officials) Strategic weapons problems. The NATO shipbuilding, the problem is where to put them in the process.

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0017, Box 73, Folder NATO 092 (Jan-Jul) 1977.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50 USC § 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 23 OCT 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0211

Page determined to be unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
LAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: OCT 23 2015

330-80-0017, box 73, NATO 092 (Jan-Jul) 1977 15-M-0211



13 July 1976

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: NATO and Multilateralism

This memo is the requested follow-up to our discussion on the disconnect between policy and practice in the NATO arena. The disconnect is by no means confined to the Department of Defense, nor even the U.S. Government, but I believe the U.S. Defense community can play a larger role in influencing better NATO integration, in-house and Alliance-wide.

Many of the disconnect symptoms derive from a unilateralism which, to a greater or lesser extent, colors the conduct of all sovereign nations. Governments may typically act in what appears to be the national interest, but when such interests are too narrowly defined, broader interests can be sacrificed for the sake of short term advantage. In many NATO nations, we see abundant evidence that the tail of domestic political and economic expediency wags the dog of Alliance solidarity, multilateralism, and interoperability. For example:

- defense budgets: driven almost exclusively by domestic political constraints; NATO a reluctant afterthought.

- force structure: same story, with the additional complication of "a little bit of everything" thrown in.

- weapons development: fragmented, uncoordinated, duplicative, often competitive. Vehicles using different fuels, guns with different ammunition, incompatible aircraft armament, etc. Standardization, if considered at all, worked after the fact rather than at inception; the U.S. is as guilty as anyone in this regard.

- communications: worse than weapons; analog vs digital; enormous economic and manpower resources tied up in national-only systems which overlap each other (and NATO comm) without the redeeming advantage of redundancy; national and NATO towers stand side-by-side on many German hilltops.

- command and control: myriad systems, designed in national and/or service vacuums; speak different "languages," can't be netted except manually or with costly buffering; some individual improvements but basic problem persists.

- intelligence: as with command/control/communications, substantial resources concentrated with national-only orientation although no Ally capable of national-only defense.

In many instances, the U.S. is the most tenacious practitioner of the "go-it-alone" school, and with understandable reason: worldwide interests and commitments have necessarily produced a national security apparatus organized, trained, and conditioned to support unilateral action at any level of conflict, wherever required.

As I see it, the problem with this apparatus is that it does its job too well. The system emphasizes U.S. global stand-alone capabilities whereas, in a sub-nuclear European context, unilateral U.S. action makes no sense. Moreover, it would do us little good to "win" the U.S. piece of a NATO war by holding the U.S. front if the line caves elsewhere in the Central Region. Yet we tend to devote more energy to the question of how to further strengthen the strongest, heaviest links in the defense chain rather than how to firm up the weakest. *Amey!*

An ironic illustration of this pervasive "blinders-on" perspective in Washington is the recent GAO report which criticized the Army for shortages of equipment, munitions, trained manpower, etc. The underlying implication of these findings--that NATO is weakened by marginal shortages in U.S. forces--is first cousin to the unilateralism which afflicts much of our own planning and misses the broader "weak link" point.

We certainly should continue pursuing our efforts to insure that our own manning and stockage objectives are logical and consistent and then to fulfill them. But we should do so within the context that, in absolute terms, our forces are in good shape and in relative terms, we're like a 280 pound tackle in a 150 pound average line. For example, although the U.S. considered itself short of HAWK missiles (and was, based on the air threat), my experience in Europe was that, by the second or third day of an exercise, 2 ATAF would be requesting redistribution of HAWK resources from the 4 ATAF area. In fact, we found that the U.S. stocks accounted for about 80% of the air delivered munitions in Europe, even though we had less than 25% of the tactical aircraft (about 50% with augmentation). My Army counterpart reported comparable ratios with ground force munitions. Yet, I'd say that 90% of our staff effort and attention focuses on U.S. requirements and only 10% on the broader imbalance. We should not reverse those ratios, but clearly a more balanced institutional approach to the bigger issues is called for.

Fortunately, Gen Haig and his senior officers in Europe have a keen appreciation for these broader issues. Many intelligent, innovative people on both sides of the Atlantic are working these problems hard and striving to overcome or



work around the impediments to improved integration. The fact that we do as well as we do is a tribute to a generation of dedicated internationalists. Many solid improvements have been made, including the formation of AAFCE and the introduction of U.S. ground forces into NORTHAG. Issues such as rationalization and standardization have been isolated and are being worked, albeit slowly. As yet, however, we have not evolved a mechanism for dealing with equally important and perhaps more fundamental problems.

For example, all of NATO is afflicted by different individual interpretations of our nominally common MC 14/3 strategy. The philosophical division over what deters and how flexible should be our response spills over into a whole range of practical policy issues. The Europeans believe visible force structure and a low nuclear threshold deter best. Consequently, when facing decisions on resource allocation, they tend to opt for thinly supported numbers and apparent capability rather than smaller numbers with hard punch and staying power.

Our view, of course, is far different. We believe recognized determination and good capability to sustain a firm defensive campaign are the best insurance against aggression.

Another related disconnect is our divergent threat assessment, particularly in terms of probable warning time. The U.S. has unilaterally promulgated its national estimate of 23 days warning, whereas most of NATO expects no more than a couple of days. (At issue here is not whether 23 days is wrong, for good intelligence and perceptive analysis may indeed provide that much time or more. What is wrong, in my view, is that once this figure becomes enshrined in our planning, the whole DOD program and the success of our strategy for Europe tend to revolve around that figure. What NATO needs is the flexibility to defend with little or no warning, along with the capability to take advantage of whatever warning is available. This doesn't necessarily imply big increases in forces, but might well suggest changes in deployments, equipment, stocks, and logistics schedules.)

Pursuing these and other conflicting conceptions produces many anomalies. The bottom line from the standpoint of readiness is illustrated by the different WRM objectives mentioned earlier: the U.S. working to keep its forces reinforced and supported through the 90th day of a NATO war and beyond, while some of our Allies (on whom the overall success of the defense depends every bit as heavily as on U.S. forces) would fold logistically by the 10th day or earlier.

There is still another fundamental problem, linked to both unilateralism and divergent strategic interpretations, which has similar troublesome implications. The Allies, including the U.S. are content with total reliance on one another to defend the assigned geographic pieces of the front, but have been incapable of meaningful progress toward mutual reliance for logistics and other support. Whether this causes or results from lack of standardization is a "chicken and egg" argument. None of these problems I have sketched can be treated in isolation; they call for corrective action across the board.

In my view, the solution is a gradual process of education, change, and initiative. Although these problems do not lend themselves to a single bold stroke solution, the rework of NSSM 3 currently underway presents a timely opportunity to correct many overarching problems at the highest policy guidance level. We ought to exploit this opportunity to insure that the old unilateralism will not be perpetuated in the new strategy options being developed.

To this end, I believe it is necessary to better clarify, define, and centralize responsibility for NATO defense affairs within the Pentagon. We can thereby get our own house in order as well as create the mechanism for encouraging constructive change in other departments and in Europe. I agree that more teeth should be put into ISA's role as the OSD kingpin on NATO-related activities in the building. Within this strengthened charter, ISA might take the lead in coordinating a high level reexamination of the defense related aspects of NATO, warts and all. Composed mainly of people in the building, with some help from U.S. authorities in Europe, this could be expected to identify many of the fundamental problems (including some we may cause ourselves), which have not yet been surfaced by the vertically organized, functional bureaucracy. With a clearer in-house version of our own "sins of omission and commission" and corrective action visibly underway where appropriate, we will then be in a stronger and more credible position to wade into the areas involving Allied shortcomings.

Among other techniques for sharpening the NATO focus within DOD might be an extension of the current practice for improving FMS; for example, periodic breakfast meetings, attended by appropriate principals, to deal with both broad and specific issues, report progress, and signal continuing high-level interest.

Somehow, we also have to get a handle on better coordination of weapons system development. Perhaps at the phase of formalizing requirements at early DSARC's we need to institute a specific



evaluation of suitability/interface with NATO's requirements. In all cases (but particularly with requirements primarily NATO related) we should examine European systems in development or production which might satisfy our needs. If so, we should consider European procurement, joint development, or co-production as serious alternatives. Because of global mission needs we may occasionally have to proceed with unique and/or incompatible systems, but if so, it is better to do so as a conscious choice, rather than inadvertently contributing to the interoperability problem.

It would also be beneficial to both OSD and the military to have better focal points in Europe for integrating US-NATO activities. There are already myriad committees working pieces of the problem, composed of military, civilian, U.S., and European representatives in various combinations. However, these bodies lack the cohesiveness which might be afforded by, for example, elevating the status and responsibility of the DEFREP to U.S. Mission NATO (perhaps to the equivalent of Deputy Chief of Mission level). In his broadened role the DEFREP could be invaluable as the integrator of the various U.S. defense initiatives as they interface with NATO programs--and vice versa. In the longer term, the NATO orientation of US Forces in Europe, would be greatly strengthened by collocating EUCOM and SHAPE Headquarters.

Finally, it has been my experience that the Alliance does best, in terms of working mutual problems jointly and equitably, when operating through the NATO Infrastructure system (NADGE and TAB VEE shelters are two significant examples). Although the system is cumbersome and imperfect, the "output" has exhibited a far better degree of standardization and consistency than most other NATO programs. Perhaps now is the time to re-examine the Infrastructure system for possible broadened scope and wider participation in major system development.

I sense a growing recognition everywhere that the day of lip-service solutions is past. The Warsaw Pact forces grow more formidable yearly, many major NATO and Allied systems are due for replacement or modernization in the 1980s, and the climate for more integrated action is better than it has been in years. As the Alliance leader, we ought to seize this opportunity to strengthen the favorable currents of change by demonstrating in word and action that we take seriously the "two way street" nature of our professed multilateralism.

  
DAVID C. JONES, General, USAF  
Chief of Staff

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 23 2015

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## HOW TO REORGANIZE DoD TO GET ADEQUATE FOCUS ON NATO PROBLEM

### Why This Is Essential

Despite the fact that the bulk of our GPF (thus the largest single chunk of DoD budget) are primarily sized and configured for the NATO scenario, DoD has never organized itself to give commensurate emphasis to NATO-related issues in its real-life decision process. In fact, the present system produces almost the opposite result. Though SecDefs personally pay a lot of attention to NATO issues (at least two ministerial meetings a year and lots of visitors), these issues then almost invariably get submerged in basically US-oriented decision processes. As a result NATO aspects usually get raised too late or too diffidently to affect real life decisions as much as they should. In effect, the Pentagon machine ignores NATO considerations in 90% of what it really does.

Thus each SecDef finds that the bold words he utters to his fellow ministers, and the directives he issues, get lost in the vast Pentagon bureaucracy. If revamping NATO's feeble conventional posture is high on the new SecDef's agenda, he must find better institutional means of getting adequate follow through.

### What Can Be Done?

The trouble is that the NATO problem area cuts across just about every Pentagon activity. Almost every ASD, and most elements of each service, have pieces of the action. So NATO is everybody's business and no one's. A separate ASD for NATO wouldn't solve the problem, because too many other offices have legitimate interests.

While ISA has traditionally had the con on NATO affairs, this made more sense back when NATO was regarded as essentially a politico-military problem. But the crying need today is for a broadly rationalized NATO defense posture (with more combined R&D, joint weapons development/procurement, interoperable equipment, doctrine, tactics, etc.). This emerging requirement has grown far beyond ISA's ability to manage alone.

Even if his ISA shop were greatly strengthened (which it should be), ASD/ISA is only on the same level with the other ASDs. He can't really order around these autonomous feudal dukedoms. Above all, ISA can't beat up DDRE (which needs it most).

Schlesinger first tried to solve this problem by having his own Special Assistant (Bob Murray), with a small staff, drive the Pentagon toward NATO. It worked for a while, but was so widely resented by the ASDs and services that Jim abandoned it after a year. At present, there is only a DoD Rationalized Steering Group really chaired by a two-star ISA office director, who does splendid work but simply lacks the clout to force NATO-oriented needs down anyone's throat.

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 23 2015

## The Optimum Solution

1. Given the way NATO issues cut across everyone's bow, a high-powered NATO rationalization task force is probably the best way to pull all the dukedoms together. Make relevant ASDs and service secretaries sit on it (on the DSARC model) in order to bring their departments into line.
2. To put enough steam behind a Task Force, have it chaired by a Deputy Secretary of Defense as one of his major functions (again on the DSARC model). Since the senior Deputy already has a full time job with programming, the new second Deputy is the logical man. This also ties in well with the Fitzhugh Panel proposal that he be the operational deputy dealing with NSC, JCS, State, etc.
3. Give DepSecDef and his Steering Group a strong charter from SecDef himself, which clearly spells out what he expects. At a minimum this charter should make the Deputy responsible for supervising NATO-related matters, and the channel to SecDef on them. It also should require that NATO aspects be taken into account in all relevant R&D (DSARC) and programming decisions, and charge the DepSecDef with monitoring this.
4. Give DepSecDef his own modest staff of bright operators (half military) to prepare the papers and do the indispensable follow-through. Without such full-time eyes and ears, he'll never be able to keep abreast of what's going on, much less guide it. To head the staff, find a bright able civilian of stature and give him a three star deputy.
5. First job of new Task Force should be to draw up a NATO-wide action program as basis for a major US initiative at May 1977 NATO meeting.

Let ISA, P&E, I&L, DDRE, etc. continue to do what they're doing now (ISA for example, would continue to handle day-to-day NATO actions) in addition to supporting the new Task Force. In sum, this proposal would add an expediting level with real clout above them as the best way of making sure that the NATO angle gets ground in throughout the Pentagon machine.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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JCSM-41-77

15 February 1977

16 FEB 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: European Capabilities Enhancement (U) *P. aldrige 2/12  
There seems to me  
to be perhaps too  
little 'give' to  
the Hollingsworth  
views in this paper.  
HB*

1. (U) On 30 June 1976, LTG James F. Hollingsworth, US Army, completed a report entitled "An Assessment of the Conventional Warfighting Capability and Potential of the US Army in Central Europe." On 13 July 1976, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were briefed on LTG Hollingsworth's assessment. The report rendered by LTG Hollingsworth offered more than 90 recommendations; however, the Chief of Staff, US Army, selected five issues which he felt warranted the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. They are contained in Appendix A.

2. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff examined these issues, and their principal conclusions are:

a. Warning Time. It is estimated that the Soviets would seek to optimize their advantage in force ratio prior to attack. It is not clear at what point the Soviets believe they would achieve their optimal advantage, but it is the estimate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it would occur no later than 14 days after the beginning of Warsaw Pact mobilization. Within the context of NATO's Central Region, a 7/14-day mobilization assumption could be used for force planning and programming. However, this examination has not validated this assumption within the context of worldwide defense planning and programming. Consequently, a 7/14-day mobilization assumption, as applied worldwide, should be evaluated.

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: **09 SEP 2015** Authority: EO 13526

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Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_

Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

MDR: 15 -M- 0215

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~~SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS~~

~~DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1985~~

15-M-0215

1 330-80-0017, box 74, NATO 320.2 (Jan 15 Mar) 1977

1 of 35 Copies each

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b. Initial Fifteen Days of War. There is a strong requirement to stop a large-scale Warsaw Pact attack without major loss of friendly territory in the initial 15-30 days of war. However, the requirement also exists to be able to continue the conflict and successfully defend for as long as the Soviet Union and its allies are capable of fighting. While it does not appear appropriate to identify a specific constraint within the 180-day period, logistic planning guidance should recognize that there may be as much as 30 days of high intensity conflict at the onset of hostilities.

c. Northern Army Group, Europe, Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the insufficiency of immediately available ground forces in the Central Region and support the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), in his initiatives to correct the situation. Sufficient divisions will be in the active force structure by end FY 1980 to meet the additional requirement for an Allied Forces, Central Europe, reserve corps. However, without pre-positioning of material configured to unit set and improvement in strategic lift, the corps could not be deployed to Europe by M+30. Notwithstanding these factors, a NATO common solution is required.

d. Forward Defense. It is in the best interest of the United States for NATO to adopt a coherent concept of defense and force dispositions that has the capacity for a swift, violent reaction to any violation of NATO territory with inherent capability to defend successfully against a Warsaw Pact attack as near as tactically feasible to the inter-German boundary (IGB) in the Central Region. Whatever decision is reached, it must be a NATO decision not a unilateral US decision.

e. Assessment of US Forces South of the Alps. A requirement exists for a US Army headquarters south of the Alps to control US Army units throughout the Southern Region because of the geography and distance from Headquarters, US Army Forces, Europe.

A more detailed discussion of the conclusions is contained in Appendix B.

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3. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. Warning Time

(1) The Department of Defense, in connection with ongoing National Security Council studies, undertake a detailed evaluation of the validity and implications of a 7/14-day mobilization assumption as the basis for Defense force planning and programming.

(2) Collective Alliance efforts be vigorously pursued to find ways to increase the warning time before a Warsaw Pact attack.

b. The Initial Fifteen Days of War

(1) Logistic support planning for at least 180 days be retained in the Defense Guidance.\*

(2) The first 30-day operational stockage-planning factors be based on consumption rates for a very intense conflict.

(3) War reserve stockage policy be designed to satisfy anticipated combat demands fully through 6 months of a NATO war. Stockage objectives should continue to be based on the assumption that combat continues for 90 days at intense rates and an additional 90 days at sustained rates. Furthermore, planning considerations must include provisions for assessing production wartime requirements beyond D+180.

c. Northern Army Group, Europe, Corps

(1) The requirement for a corps-sized reserve be supported. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that this issue be addressed at the NATO Spring Ministerial meeting (May 1977) to seek a common NATO solution to recognized inadequacies in Northern Army Group, Europe.

(2) In the interim period, through 1980, the United States continue to maintain the additional US Army forces in the "Other Forces for NATO" category. In no event, however, should these forces be "earmarked" until agreement is reached on a satisfactory Alliance solution.

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(3) The Strategic Mobility Enhancement Programs be continued.

d. Forward Defense. NATO consider adopting the concept of a forward defense along defensible terrain at, or as near as possible to, the IGB in the Central Region. To the extent possible within programmed resources of the United States and NATO allies, the United States continue to support USCINCEUR/SACEUR efforts to achieve a NATO concept of defense well forward along the IGB in the Central Region.

e. Assessment of US Forces South of the Alps

(1) The current US Army Southern Europe Task Force (USASETAF) organization continue essentially unchanged in structure but with economies in size where possible.

(2) The forward strategic logistic support base in USASETAF be retained in support of NATO contingency plans in Allied Forces, Southern Europe, and, with the concurrence of the Italian Government, as an alternate support base for US unilateral, non-NATO contingencies.

4. ~~(5)~~ The above conclusions and recommendations were arrived at with the full consideration that the Hollingsworth report dealt with the US Army participation in a possible conflict in the Central Region; it did not attempt to address the joint or combined aspects of the defense of NATO Europe or the total strategic or resource implications which relate thereto. While this assessment, of itself, should not serve as a basis for JCS recommendations to modify strategy or force planning, it will be useful in the subsequent development of JCS-recommended strategy and force posture within existing planning, programming, and budgeting system and Alliance planning procedures.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*Philip D. Shutler*

PHILIP D. SHUTLER  
Major General, USMC  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

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Date: SEP 09 2015

Attachments

Reference:

\* Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, 9 November 1976, "Defense Guidance"

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, PLANNING AND EVALUATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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Administrative QC Review Applied: 13 Jan 2015/WGJ.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
01-15-2015

SUBJECT: The Nunn-Bartlett Report: NATO and the New Soviet Threat  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0017, Box 74,  
Folder NATO 320.2 (16 Mar-Jul) 1977.

This memorandum presents a relatively unvarnished P&E critique of the Nunn-Bartlett report on the state of NATO's defenses and proposals for future action. It concentrates on those areas where we have major disagreements with or reservations about what the Senators have said. A copy of the report is attached. By separate action we are preparing your formal response to the eight recommendations in the report, as requested of you by Senator Bartlett.

Overview

The foundation for the report's recommendations is the belief that the Warsaw Pact can launch an attack with 58 divisions without giving NATO more than 48 hours warning. We are concerned that this is a "worst case" overstatement of the threat that could jeopardize support for a more realistic long-term commitment to strengthen NATO's conventional forces. Such a commitment is required because existing real U.S. and NATO defense problems cannot be corrected quickly without major funding increases. Acceptance of the Nunn/Bartlett "worst case" threat could breed despair when the additional cost implications are realized. Such a situation could suggest sharply reduced conventional forces, increased reliance on nuclear weapons, with all the danger and instability implied by such a major reversal of U.S. policy.

Serious problems exist in Europe. Prepositioned war reserve equipment stocks are virtually non-existent; forces are less than optimally deployed; ammunition stocks and storage facilities are about half of what is currently estimated as required; and units must move to storage sites to pick up ammunition before going to defensive positions. These are but a few of the recognized problems that are being corrected as quickly as funding constraints and production capacities will allow. These problems exist in the context of both unreinforced attack and the 23/30 day mobilization scenarios.

Perhaps the most serious omission from the report is an adequate consideration of costs. While on the one hand the Senators state that the NATO problem they describe can be overcome "within the framework of

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330-80-0017, Box 74, NATO 320.2 (16 Mar-Jul) 1977  
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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUN 14 2016





the political, economic, and military resources now available to the Alliance" (pg. 2) and that "This should be done without weakening powerful hedges in NATO force structure against a protracted war" (pg. 18), on the other hand they propose a "quantum jump" in conventional firepower in the short term. The obvious inconsistency is not explained.

### Threat

The intelligence and foreign policy community's universal judgment is that significant deterioration in East-West relations would be required before the Pact would resolve to go to war with NATO. Such political warning was recently described by the U.S. Ambassador to NATO as "an article of faith" amongst our allies. A significant deterioration in relations would both alert NATO's intelligence reporting and political decision-making systems and lead military commanders to take such steps as are within their authority to improve the peacetime readiness of their forces. Such measures should greatly improve NATO's capability to respond quickly should the Pact begin to mobilize and/or move toward attack positions.

The report's descriptions of the growth and improvement of Soviet ground forces and of the improvement in the ground attack capabilities of Soviet tactical aircraft are broadly correct. However, we are not prepared to accept the description of "a Pact capability to launch such an unreinforced attack from virtually a standing start" (pg. 6).

Even if an attack is to be launched prior to reinforcement from the USSR, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, which are significantly less ready than Soviet forces, must be mobilized and assembled. Extremely complex movement of forces and supplies must take place on an unprecedented scale. Based on our familiarity with the transportation model being used by DIA, we have serious doubts about the validity of recent estimates of Pact combat unit buildup capability. We are additionally concerned that the pre-attack buildup of munitions and other essential supplies has not been adequately considered. Furthermore, a prudent Pact commander would likely take other measures, such as increasing the fraction of naval forces at sea, prior to an attack. Early attacks may minimize NATO's warning time but they also maximize Pact risk if the initial attack fails. We and the intelligence community are studying how long Pact preparations might take and how quickly NATO might see them, pursuant to PRM-10. Based on what we know now, we doubt that the Pact could assemble a force of 58 divisions (all the forces in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR) in such a way as to catch NATO prior to mobilization (pg. 11-12).

### Employment of Forces (pg. 9)

Any NATO posture short of continuously manning all major defensive positions in peacetime will depend for its success on some warning. If the Pact really could assemble a very large force before NATO commanders

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deploy to defensive positions, then the senators' statement that our covering forces are not adequate would be accurate. If, however, Pact buildup capabilities are less than asserted, then it is more likely our covering forces will be able to do their job. In either case, it is inaccurate to picture the withdrawing covering force as "having suffered the agony of defeat" or Pact forces as "flushed with the thrill of victory". A covering force is not expected to hold ground. It trades limited space for the time needed by the main defensive forces to occupy and prepare their positions.

#### Political Implications

We share the senators' concern with the cumbersome nature of NATO's routine decision-making process (pg. 10). However, in a major crisis procedures probably would be greatly accelerated or bypassed and decisions by U.S., UK, and FRG leaders to mobilize would drive the process. This does not mean that the machinery shouldn't be improved. It should.

It is difficult to say what each Ally's "potential contribution" is; however, contrary to the senators' contentions (pg. 2), the defense spending of our European allies has been increasing in real terms since about 1970.

#### Military Implications

In most cases, the areas of weakness in NATO's posture discussed in the report (pg. 11-16) are long-standing and widely recognized. Programs are underway and others are being considered in every area. The U.S. posture which the Senators saw in Europe was largely the result of programs funded in FY 73 and earlier. During that time U.S. involvement in SEA seriously affected our capabilities in and for Europe. Programs since then aimed at improvement are only now beginning to show up in the field.

The seriousness of the East-West malpositioning of NATO forces (pg. 12) depends on just how "few" days of warning NATO will realistically have. In addition, the significant differences in ability to move forces quickly to the battle area attributed to NATO and the Pact appears to be a classic case of the 10 foot tall enemy.\*

There certainly have been instances when foreign sales depleted U.S. stocks or delayed U.S. acquisition. However, contrary to the report's charge (pg. 14 and 16), shortages in war reserve stocks are not primarily the result of limited production capacity and foreign sales.



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 Date: 14 JUNE 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
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 Reason: 3.3(b)(1)+5052.552(b)(3); 10 USC 424  
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The total investment involved in modernizing and expanding forces and filling WRM requirements, swollen by both recent upward revisions and new types of weapons, is enormous. Limited budgets have forced us to get well slowly. One might, however, question the priorities currently assigned both to funding various parts of the total requirement and to the geographic allocation of the new U.S. equipment.

We do not agree with the report's assessment that our air defenses are inadequate (pg. 15). We believe the authorized war reserve level for Hawk missiles to be too high since most studies have shown that the Pact cannot sustain a high intensity threat for more than a few days.

#### Force Planning Guidance

The Senators seem to be misinformed about the nature and purpose of U.S. planning assumptions. The assumption that NATO would have three weeks of warning is tied to the estimate that the Pact would need a month to deploy 86, effective divisions. This may still be a good planning assumption. The possibility of attacks sooner by smaller, less effective, forces has always been recognized and contingency plans have always been made for such attacks.

As you know, in response to PRM-10 we are trying to determine what force planning factors would be most appropriate in light of the current threat. To do this we must estimate as a minimum (1) how fast the Pact can realistically buildup forces with appropriate levels of supplies at the front, (2) the lag time between the start of this Pact's mobilization and NATO's, (3) the degree to which prior political warning should be expected to alter the pre-mobilization posture on both sides, and (4) the criterion (e.g., theater force ratio) to be used in judging the adequacy of NATO's response. While warning time--the time between the beginning of NATO's mobilization and the war--may be the factor of greatest concern to the commander in the field, the other factors are equally (if not more) important in long range force planning.

In discussing changes in NATO's deployment posture, the senators fail to mention at least one other factor which must be considered--the impact a major eastward movement of NATO forces and an increase in their peacetime readiness might have on Warsaw Pact threat perceptions. We forget too often that in their eyes we (or at least the FRG) are the bad guys. Congressman Aspin made this point rather well in his comments on the report. The P&E view is that, all things considered, any major redeployment of forces in Germany should be much more thoroughly thought through than has been the case to date.

*Milton A. Margolis*

Milton A. Margolis  
Acting Director  
Planning and Evaluation

Attachment

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Date: JUN 14 2016

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0017, Box 73,  
Folder NATO 092 (Jan-Jul) 1977.

11 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMUNICATIONS,  
COMMAND, CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS  
AND LOGISTICS)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND  
RESERVE AFFAIRS)  
DIRECTOR FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: NATO Action Program

I broadly endorse Ambassador Komer's impressive NATO action program and request all concerned DoD elements to take it as providing general guidelines for our NATO-oriented activities. Among other things, it provides a sound basis for proposing to the NATO Defense Planning Committee a major long-term defense program exercise along the lines indicated.

Please provide me with any comments you may have on the report by 20 April 1977. I am particularly interested in practical recommendations on how to proceed to carry out the proposals made.

Meanwhile Ambassador Komer will stay on through May at my request to assist me in appropriate follow through. He, working with the Assistant Secretary ISA, will personally supervise the measures necessary to launch the DPC initiatives called for, and establish adequate follow through machinery for the U.S. inputs.

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Date: JUL 13 2016

*Harold Brown*

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15-M-0218

**SECRET**

Report to the Secretary of Defense

**ACTION PROGRAM FOR REVAMPING NATO'S DEFENSE POSTURE**

Here is my brief overall report on the kind of action program which will enable you to get a firm handle on what to do about NATO deterrence/defense--not only the US contribution but, even more important, that of our Allies. It seeks to provide you as Secretary with a broad "systems architecture" for the comprehensive long term effort required if NATO is to maintain a credible deterrence/defense posture at politically acceptable cost. It will be supplemented by a series of Tabs elaborating the supporting arguments and making specific action proposals (some of these you have already seen and acted upon).

Given the magnitude and complexity of this 15-nation problem, it requires a comparably multi-faceted, multi-year approach. I don't pretend to have covered all the important issues involved. Rather I've sought to provide a coherent framework for tackling these problems, plus specific guidelines for dealing with certain key priority areas (management by exception, if you will).

Nor does my report confine itself to initiatives the US might launch at the forthcoming NAC Summit and DPC meetings, important as these are. Rather it sets these within the context of the much larger and longer term collegial effort that is needed to achieve our purposes.

Such an effort must encompass not only better focussed multilateral planning and a higher degree of Allied cooperation but better NATO machinery for getting the requisite performance. While NATO has always been long on statements of good intentions, all too often they have not been carried out in practice. Hence the thrust of my report is quite programmatic. But it is in my judgement quite consistent with emerging national policy in PRMs 9 and 10, and other places. Indeed I see my report as complementing these by providing a practical blueprint for how DoD can best carry out such national policy objectives.

**I. WHY A MAJOR US INITIATIVE IS IMPERATIVE**

I start from the premise that a credible NATO deterrent/defense posture remains central to our own security interests. Moreover, as PRM #9 says, there is no need to review NATO's basic flexible response/forward defense strategy. Indeed doing so could even be counter-productive. Hence I see the key issue as rather how to generate a posture adequate to carry out this strategy--in an era of nuclear parity.

Nor do I see much need to dwell on the Warsaw Pact "threat." The hard evidence is more than sufficient to show evolving WP capabilities, especially for short warning unreinforced attack. Opinions may differ about the seriousness of this buildup, but few would disagree that NATO must address this issue to forestall divisive political argument both in the US and Europe.

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3  
DECLASSIFY ON 31 JUL 2007

EXEMPTED FROM E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4 (2) (1)  
GSD P. 8.2.2 DATE 10/18/2007  
Review/Declassify On 31 Dec 2027  
Other Agency Equival: 1B0



But NATO's problem is not just the growth in WP capabilities. It arises even more from NATO's own internal weaknesses and lack of cohesion. Despite roughly comparable NATO/WP active manpower and resource inputs, NATO's actual defense posture is far weaker and more fragmented than such comparable inputs would imply. While part of the problem lies in our higher manpower costs, it results even more from NATO's failure to allocate defense inputs optimally toward creating the flexible response capability its own strategy calls for, in particular an adequate conventional leg to its deterrent Triad. Nor, though the Alliance itself is premised upon pursuit of a coalition strategy, has NATO ever developed a coalition posture to mesh effectively its disparate national forces. Waste and duplication abound. Hence, as NATO's own assessments amply bring out, its forces lack sufficient readiness, flexibility, WRM, C<sup>3</sup>, interoperability and timely reinforcement capability to offer high confidence defense.

The NATO commanders and other NATO bodies are currently working these problems (I cite their efforts where germane), and gradually achieving some constructive results. But by themselves they can only propose solutions. In a classic alliance of sovereign states like NATO, only the nations themselves can generate the needed collective effort. The Allies are groping toward means for greater "Alliance Cooperation," especially given the persistence of sharp fiscal constraints at a time of escalating costs. But, despite the hopeful rhetoric and much activity, not much concrete will happen in timely fashion without a major added push to build on these beginnings.

A US initiative and consistent US leadership are indispensable to this end. Throughout NATO's history the Allies have looked to the US lead. Generally only US initiatives have succeeded in moving NATO. This remains a fact of life. Therefore, if a revamping of NATO's defense posture is high on our agenda, we ourselves must initiate it and push it home.

This May's DPC is the time to launch this effort, to set the tone which the Allies are awaiting from a new US Administration. Moreover, since the US itself has been the Ally most guilty of the go-it-alone syndrome, we now must prove -- by deeds as well as words -- that we really believe in collective defense. We can't let our suspicious Allies continue to believe that all our talk is really just a cover for US arms sales (they see us as inflexibly pursuing our own economic interests with XM-1, AWACS, F-16, PATRIOT and the like).

A last reason why a new US initiative is essential is that NATO's traditional "business as usual" approach has proved demonstrably inadequate to pull together Allied efforts sufficiently to meet perceived needs at acceptable cost. It suffers from the sin of incrementalism. Ministers periodically approve guidance saying all the right words. Force goals are biennially presented. But performance usually falls short. Clearly something more is needed. Experience suggests that only some kind of concerted and carefully orchestrated long term program,

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starting now, will suffice to galvanize our common efforts. Since this will only happen under US sponsorship, it is a made to order initiative for a new US Administration dedicated to strengthening the Alliance.

## II. THE KIND OF NATO ACTION PROGRAM NEEDED

The issue then becomes one of what kind of US action program is best calculated to achieve the desired results. Here we must also learn from experience. NATO has agreed to many long term defense programs, but few have been carried through to fruition. The last such exercise, AD-70, is a good case in point. It was too vague and unspecific; priorities were loose; nor was there much attention to follow-through. Largely for these reasons its impact was diluted. To avoid these pitfalls this time, any new US proposal for another long term program should be framed around the following guidelines.

A. It must focus squarely on how to bring our Allies along with us in a truly collective effort. Indeed, the crux of the problem is far more the Allies than the US. Their forces (even the FRG's) are in far less satisfactory shape than ours. Post-Vietnam, we have done more to improve our contribution than any of them. One result is a growing imbalance between high technology US forces and less well-equipped Allies. For example, CENTAG (where our forces are located) is in much better shape than NORTHAG. We have more and better equipment, far more WRM, a far larger combat reserve structure. But this imbalance could be an invitation to disaster; we would lose Europe just as surely if the Allies collapsed, even if our forces held.

Thus it would be a fatal flaw if the US focussed primarily on jacking up its own NATO contribution without devoting comparable effort to galvanizing the Allies to do the same. Nor can we afford to risk that as the US increased its share other Allies would slack off. And it would be politically impossible to sell our Congress and electorate on the US alone doing most of the job. But the traditional ways of using the leverage from our own inputs to generate parallel Allied performance have not been terribly effective. We must find better ways to put clear focus on Allied shortfalls and provide incentives for performance.

B. It must stress AFFORDABILITY. Except in event of a sharp rise in tensions, parliaments are quite unlikely to fund big increases in defense budgets to rectify NATO deficiencies. As USNATO recently reported, we can "expect a tough struggle even to maintain existing real levels of defense spending." Hence there is no point in seeking massive add-ons not realistically in sight. In fact this could be counterproductive. So the Allies must be forced to face up to the fact that if they won't increase real defense spending, they must find ways to use such resources as are available to much better effect.

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C. Hence we must stress much greater "Alliance Cooperation." If large budget increases are not in the cards, the only viable alternative is to overcome the historic waste and inefficiencies inherent in NATO's duplicatory and poorly coordinated national defense establishments. Since interdependence has become a fact of NATO life, we should build on it, not ignore it. Creating more of a balanced coalition posture out of the present individually balanced national postures is the only way anyone has come up with yet to get credible deterrence/defense in the 80's at politically acceptable cost. Such rationalization of NATO's defense posture, by leading to increased efficiencies, less overlap and duplication, and elimination of marginal national inputs, would enable NATO to meet many needs via tradeoffs and reprogramming rather than add-ons.

D. To these ends any new plan must be far more programmatic than previous NATO plans. Broad goals can give a sense of direction, but are simply an inadequate stimulus to the concrete measures required. So are the traditional NATO calls for across-the-board percentage increases in overall defense outlays. To get the desired real life impact, any new plan must be as specific as possible about what each Ally is expected to chip in, with proposed time phasing. These inputs must be packaged in such a manner as to facilitate monitoring of performance.

E. It must call for tougher choice among priorities, and reprogramming where essential. If affordability is the key criterion, and an Ally can't provide everything the NATO commanders want, the latter must tell us more precisely what is needed most. Given resources constraints, NATO must focus on first things first -- buying primarily those capabilities we just can't do without, if necessary at the expense of lower priority efforts. So these last also must be more clearly identified in the planning process, and tradeoffs explicitly proposed.

F. The plan must give first priority to initial counter-blitzkrieg defense. Again, this is simply a matter of first things first, given the affordability problem. Obviously, as the PRM #9 draft points out we must worry about sustainability. But until the Allies can perceive a high confidence initial defense capability, they will be deaf to this US concern.

G. The plan must include relevant machinery for implementation. Since NATO's present machinery and procedures are not up to the tasks of framing and carrying out the proposed action program, strengthening them is indispensable to its success. The US must insist that this aspect be included. Above all, means must be devised for consistent Ministerial-level follow through to forestall another "paper" exercise.

H. The plan must stress quality over quantity. Since NATO combat forces will probably remain much smaller than those of the WP, we must find compensatory "force multipliers" to give us qualitative superiority. Advanced technology offers many possibilities which should be systematically exploited on a collective basis (especially since sophisticated systems are so costly that only via cooperative funding can the allies

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field them on an adequate scale). But other often lower cost means of preserving qualitative superiority, such as better training, should also be exploited. Many studies suggest that training rather than equipment is often the decisive variable in force effectiveness.

I. Finally, NATO's long term plan must be consistent with its MBFR stance, and vice versa. These are really two sides of the same coin in terms of mutually reinforcing the common aim of stable deterrence. What follows is consistent with NATO's current MBFR position.

All this is a tall order. While I'm convinced that it is feasible to carry out a program along the above lines over time, there is no blinking the enormous difficulties facing such an effort. To overcome the built-in political and institutional obstacles which have so limited effective Allied cooperation for 27 years will take a consistent long term effort, on a scale never attempted before. The broad Allied consensus required will be particularly hard to reach on practical cooperative measures, many of which will inevitably be at the expense of cherished national programs. We Americans will find it hard to overcome our own go-it-alone proclivities. Even though we are a special case in that we have global commitments beyond those of any other Ally, we too could go a lot further toward rationalizing our own NATO contribution along the above lines -- and using this as a lever to bring along our Allies. Moreover, despite all the difficulties, what viable alternative do we have?

And, as noted previously, NATO as a whole is groping in these directions--as in the call for greater Alliance Cooperation mandated in its own innovative Ministerial Guidance. But a more concrete long term defense program is vital to flesh out this guidance and provide concrete prescriptions for collective action. The rest of this report is devoted mainly to how to provide the necessary impetus -- in programmatic terms.

### III. KEY ELEMENTS OF A CREDIBLE NATO DETERRENT/DEFENSE POSTURE

This section of my report briefly cites what key priority programs seem essential to any such posture for the Eighties. It covers both what the US should do and what we should ask from our Allies, particularly those in the crucial Center Region. I have not sought to include everything important--only what in my view is indispensable. I have framed them largely around SACEUR's Three Rs (Readiness, Reinforcement, Rationalization), which should help enhance their salability.

A. Greater Readiness, especially against short-warning attack. Fortunately NATO's need is not so much for more forces as for better managed, better equipped, more compatible and readier forces. Clearly one of its higher priorities must be readiness to deter and if necessary cope with a short warning attack without much of the prior mobilization we have previously counted on. The US and FRG are programming along these lines, but this is not enough if other key allied sectors lag far behind.

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1. We might promote a NORTHAG improvement program aimed chiefly at getting UK and Benelux forces up to snuff. We could hinge proposed US deployments to NORTHAG to their performance.

2. Allied Crisis management and alert procedures also need overhaul to meet short warning contingencies. This is especially important to the US, since we may need to use Allied reception facilities for US reinforcements before they would be made available under present procedures. More rapid call-up of key reservists may be essential. And key parts of the system needs to be exercised at least occasionally (this happens rarely except in CPX's). Civil emergency planning in NATO needs overhaul to conform to the possible need for more rapid transition from peace to war footing than exists today.

3. Maldeployment of active combat forces too far away from EDP positions is another longstanding problem (which Senator Nunn has agitated). The FRG and Dutch are planning some corrections, but large-scale peacetime redeployment would cost billions which probably could be better spent on higher priority needs! A more cost-effective alternative would be higher peacetime readiness, so that M-day forces could reach their EDP positions earlier. Moving more ammunition to forward storage sites (FSS), being funded via the NATO Infrastructure Program, will facilitate quicker movement to EDP positions by easing ammo uploading and resupply delays. But this program should be expedited.

4. Increase Density of Anti-Armor Systems. While NATO's deficiencies are legion, the only way to get sufficient concerted action on them is to pick out a few of the most critical and mount a special effort. One such is anti-armor, which has long been identified (in AD-70 and Basic Issues) and is especially important to deterring or halting armored blitzkrieg. Currently programmed US holdings per division will be far higher than those of any other Ally (including FRG). Let's use this as a lever to get Allied add-ons, by designing a proposed anti-armor package, including air munitions, with each nation's share clearly identified. NATO-sponsored studies show that it would cost only about 3% of NATO's 10-year defense outlay at present levels, and using available technology, to deny the WP the prospect of quick blitzkrieg victory in the Center Region, chiefly via proliferating ATGMs in APCs and helicopters, air munitions, and scatterable mines, along with new tanks now programmed.

5. Jack Up WRM Levels. Another top readiness priority must be to overcome what Gen Haig calls "one of our most serious deficiencies in ACE today." There is no point in arguing about sustainability or long vs short war when in some respects Allies lack enough WRM to fight more than a few days (especially in new improved munitions with much higher effectiveness). If anything calls for special remedial action this ranks high. But we must be careful that the new NATO consumption standards reflecting Yom Kippur war experience not be so high as to be a disincentive. Better to set sights lower and build up in phases.

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6. Many other important measures could be taken to enhance the readiness of NATO forces. Since good training is such a cost-effective force multiplier, a great deal could be done to exploit the veritable revolution in training techniques and devices. Much more could be done to exploit the increasing urbanization of Western Europe by more planning and training for military operations in built up areas (MOBA). Optimum use of built-up areas, perhaps supplemented by barrier systems, could do much to slow down the blitzkrieg-type attack favored by the Soviets.

All these issues are examined and recommendations made in Tab A.

B. Quicker Reinforcement and More Allied Reserves.

This is also essential to deter or cope with short warning attack, or even one after 30 days. Again, it should be a joint enterprise with our Allies, lest we find them slacking off because the Americans are coming more quickly. Moreover, rapid reinforcement would enhance deterrence if time were available prior to D-day, besides being a needed hedge in case MBFR results in US withdrawals from Europe.

1. Posture for Quicker US Reinforcement. We can and should be able to deploy a lot of tactical air and some ground forces to Europe within 48 hours, as a crisis hedge. But even forces arriving as late as D+15 or even D+30 could still be in time to help meet an initial blitzkrieg thrust. Since we can't predict in advance the likely degree of prior WP reinforcement, hence the likely warning time we'd have, your directive that we program reinforcements against a spectrum of contingencies from 48 hours notice on will help firm up our programming.

In my judgement we should shoot for a 1980 goal of getting at least one division equivalent and 39 tac air squadrons to Europe within 48 hours, and five more divisions and 90 tac air squadrons there by M+15 at the latest. This is ambitious but quite feasible, especially if we enhance readiness, cut back preparation and marry-up time, streamline unit structures to optimize initial defense capabilities, and perhaps restructure POMCUS (maybe emphasizing outsize and oversize items). The optimum mix of enhanced POMCUS/WRM/airlift/sealift to meet this program goal will require detailed analysis.

2. But we also need a lot more help from our Allies to make this quicker reinforcement possible. We should spell this out in programmatic terms and aggressively insist on such quids for this US quo as: (a) better reception and LOC facilities; (b) more collocated operating bases (COBs) for ground as well as air forces; (c) more Host Nation Support (HNS) on an assured wartime basis; and (d) carefully worked out NATO-blessed peacetime agreements to assure that all this is firmly available in timely fashion when we need it--this is a job for SHAPE. All this is cheap at the price (it involves mostly wartime allocation of Allied civil assets).

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3. The US should hinge its quicker reinforcement to quicker European movements forward too. We should call for presently earmarked British, Canadian, Dutch and Belgian reinforcements to deploy more quickly, perhaps as part of a NORTHAG improvement program.

4. NATO further needs firm plans and programs for early use of European intra-theater and even inter-theater airlift to supplement ours. NATO plans on using Allied shipping, why not Allied civil aircraft as well? SHAPE and other NATO authorities are actively working on pooling Allied airlift assets. Perhaps a European CRAF should be set up on the US model for intra-theater use, to lift Canadian forces like their ready air-transportable brigade, to lift European resupply from CONUS, and maybe even to supplement our own lift of US forces. All this should be pulled together into a combined NATO framework, with everyone contributing, not just us.

5. Beyond this most Allies have large unstructured reserve pools which could be used to provide reserve combat forces for sustainability but equipment is lacking. At present the US is the only Ally with reserve divisions in its structure (except for one Dutch); in fact if a war lasted past D+180 we'd be providing literally half the total divisions in the Center Region. SHAPE is addressing the reserve problem in a study due July 1977. We should back its hand by urging greater integration of reserves (they are mostly at present under national command, not earmarked to NATO) into NATO planning and programming. But we must move carefully to avoid worrying Allies that we contemplate an extended conventional conflict for which they are not prepared. Nor should we stress reserves at expense of highest priority on initial readiness (e.g. Allies lack even WRM for first 30 days).

These issues are addressed and recommendations made in Tab B.

C. Rationalization through Greater Alliance Cooperation.

Along with all the other needs cited in this report we must face up to the fact that, though NATO pursues a coalition strategy, its national contingents are far from adequately postured to fight together effectively in coalition war. Unfortunately the Soviet dominated and tightly controlled WP forces seem far better prepared to do so. The NATO Commanders are alert to this problem and trying to address it, but few concrete results have emerged as yet. Hence this too must be a major thrust for the Eighties.

A few key points need to be more widely recognized. First, rationalization is vital at least as much on grounds of military effectiveness as of cost-saving. SACEUR's stress on the need for greater flexibility to enable using Allied forces wherever most needed is a major case in point. Greater Allied cooperation may not yield major budget dividends for a long time, but it will assure greater cost-effectiveness for our outlays.

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Second, such rationalization entails a lot more than standardization or even joint R&D and procurement! Important as these are, they are likely to be the hardest to achieve and to take the longest time. So they are no panaceas. Indeed, interoperability is more feasible over the short term than standardization, thus an important halfway house. More combined logistics, communications, training, exercising, etc. can also provide early dividends, as can greater harmonization of doctrine, tactics, procedures and force structures.

Third, in accord with the basic guideline that we must get the Allies to do more, we should not let our own desire for greater defense cooperation on an Atlantic basis get in the way of encouraging greater cooperation among the Europeans themselves. General principles don't decide concrete cases, but almost anything which pulls the Europeans closer together is in our own interest, except where we can make an overwhelming case that it is far less costly and more efficient for the US to participate fully.

Above all, we should encourage rationalization of European R&D and defense industry, even at some cost to ourselves, in order to make Europe competitive--an essential prerequisite to any larger Atlantic rationalization. We must be very sensitive to European suspicions we seek to dominate the arms trade. This means inter alia supporting the European Program Group (which also serves the important purpose of tying France closer to its Allies).

It also means going for more of a "two way street" in reciprocal arms purchases. - This is imperative if we are ever to get commonality in practice. We must find better ways of convincing our own reluctant Services, Congress, and industry (as well as those of our Allies) that the practical advantages of compatibility among Alliance forces often far outweigh modest differences in technical equipment characteristics. And the only way we'll ever convince anyone that we're serious is to find some good specifics to demonstrate our bona fides. I will propose a menu of them in Tab C.

More of a two-way street is also defensible on straight commercial grounds. Given our enormously greater R&D effort and industrial base, we will inevitably sell Europe far more than we buy. Right now we are trying to sell AWACS, improved HAWK, more F-16s, PATRIOT, HARPOON, TENLEY/VINSON, JTIDS, our ROLAND version, and the like. To protect this huge export potential and overcome deep European suspicions that standardization means "buy American" to us, we simply must be free-traders in defense equipment too (and change restrictive laws and regulations on both sides of the Atlantic).

We further need to overcome those inhibitions about technology release which are based more on commercial protectionism than valid security considerations (in fact some of the latter are dubious as well). DoD paid for most of this technology in the name of the common

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defense, so should use it as such. No-cost or at most low-cost cross licensing should become a firm policy, not least to upgrade the quality of Allied systems and correct the dangerous technological imbalance between us and our Allies.

More specialization is essential to an optimum collective posture. Though Dutch efforts to use this concept to reduce their own defense burden have given it a dirty name, it does make military and economic sense. Smaller Allies waste resources by attempting to maintain full spectrum national forces. Some functions (e.g. air reconnaissance, some EW) should be assumed by the larger powers (as we do in strategic nuclear field) or funded collectively by the Alliance (like C<sup>3</sup>) so that all can reap the economies of scale.

As for the US, we need to NATO-ize our posture more, to encourage the Allies by example to do so too. We are cast as the leaders in NATO, and have the greatest leverage, so we must take the lead here too. Since the US has until recently been the greatest exponent of the "go-it-alone" syndrome in NATO, we have a lot of suspicion to overcome. While OSD, JCS, the Services and the relevant CINCs are now working the problem far more than is visible in any other Allied capital (or even all the rest put together), we still have a long way to go.

My recommendations as to the kind of multi-faceted action program you should direct along these lines appear at Tab C and numerous other places in this report. Besides buying European, cross-licensing, greater technology release, they include:

1. Easing restrictions on offshore purchases.
2. Ratifying the NATO STANAG on reciprocal low-cost training and directing greater US participation in Allied training programs. A two-way street is needed here too.
3. NATO-izing our European command structure by collocation of US and NATO Hqs. Several good options exist.
4. Pressing Stage B cross-servicing (arming) of NATO aircraft, which in turn requires a common family of air munitions.

#### D. REVAMPING NATO'S MARITIME POSTURE

I need hardly go into the "growing Soviet naval threat" to justify arguing that NATO's maritime posture needs revamping too. The difficulty lies in deciding what is feasible within likely fiscal constraints. Meeting presently framed naval requirements has been and remains so expensive as to be a non-starter.

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Therefore, we must cut the coat to fit the cloth. Perhaps we must decide between sea control and force projection in the NATO context. Naturally the Navy prefers both, but what if NATO can't afford both? Moreover, isn't force projection becoming less and less feasible in an increasingly high intensity NATO/WU conflict environment? Can and need we plan to risk high cost ships like carriers in low payoff situations? While our US Navy must posture for many non-NATO contingencies, its relationship to early defense in the NATO scenario needs to be sorted out.

This issue also cuts across that of fast sealift, which SACLANC urges be more fully analysed. While fast sealift could not meet earliest deployment needs (and is unnecessary if there is adequate POMCUS), it should be thoroughly explored for later deployments and initial resupply. To this end we should press NATO to make selected Allied shipping available on M-day instead of on D-day as at present.

Nor has NATO yet managed to pull together its impressive total maritime assets into the more effective collective naval posture which affordability dictates. Since our Navy so dominates the NATO naval picture, it should have the leverage to get more done along these lines. This may, entail among other things, more release of high technology and more US support of Allied naval force postures, especially for closing off crucial "choke points" like the Dardanelles and Baltic exits.

Lastly, we must find better ways to use the highly ready US Marines more optimally in the NATO scenario, especially in the crucial early period. Since we're going to retain a strong USMC, let's plan to use this asset from the outset, not just reserve it for later contingencies.

Further details and recommendations on the above issues are at Tab D.

#### E. Key Functional Areas

Aside from all the above, there are several high priority functional areas where special remedial action is urgently needed, and which are well suited to collegial action. Indeed I doubt that we can ever get the Allies up to snuff on them unless they are addressed collegially. The following list is by no means exhaustive, but it's the most I believe NATO could be gotten to tackle seriously in the near future, even as part of a long-term defense plan. Moreover, these issues are already being worked in NATO right now, so may be ripe for a further push.

1. Better C<sup>3</sup>. This is rightly one of SACEUR's and SACLANC's top priorities (SHAPE is working up a C<sup>3</sup> plan), because it is so central to the unified yet flexible employment of NATO's disparate national

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forces in coalition war. They must all be tied together via effective warning, ADP, battle management, and even target acquisition systems. So C<sup>3</sup> could be a great force multiplier. But a common systems architecture is imperative to guide national programs. Moreover, advanced C<sup>3</sup> systems are so frightfully expensive that only via a common (and probably commonly funded) program could most Allies afford them. Thus here's a near ideal area for collective action (see Tab E for details and recommendations).

2. Interoperable Tactical Communications. This related field, perhaps equally critical to effective and flexible coalition operations, is currently a scandalous mess (so much so that it can be used as a great object lesson of the costs of "go it alone"). Many tactical radios can't operate on the same frequencies, and there is no agreed secure tactical voice. Worse yet, no less than seven different new largely incompatible national systems (including our own TRI-TAC) are coming on line, thus postponing real standardization until the 1990s in this critical field. My proposals are at Tab E.

3. Air Defense. Here is another logical area for collective action, especially since it is being worked by the MC and SHAPE right now. It is also one of the few areas where NATO has a good record of common approaches in NADGE, the Nike and HAWK belts (and co-production) and hopefully now AWACS as a new force integrator and multiplier. Since future systems like PATRIOT will be very expensive, we need a common family of SAMs and guns for affordability's sake alone (this would also help solve our own NIKE Hercules withdrawal problem). Common C<sup>3</sup>, and adequate air-ground interface (e.g. common IFF) are part of the problem. My proposals are at Tab F.

4. Electronic Warfare. Another key area which is highly susceptible to combined NATO planning/programming. The US may be ahead technologically, but the WP is way ahead of NATO operationally (and we are highly vulnerable). Indeed only the USAF has a respectable current capability, and the Allies may never get one unless we take the lead via NATO. My proposals are at Tab G.

5. Greater Consumer Logistics Cooperation. Here we must seek a better balance between traditional national responsibility and multinational measures to secure quick response and adequate flexibility. NATO can't have national logistics in peacetime and still shift rapidly enough to NATO logistics in wartime, especially in case of short warning attack. The US has been way out in front on this issue, because of our need for more combat strength forward and the gradual attrition of our peacetime tail in Europe. So we'd be the greatest beneficiary of the proposals at Tab H (which you have already approved).

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Any NATO-izing of logistics must also address the critical WRM deficiencies. Given persistent Allied shortfalls, I'm convinced that the only way to remedy these is via some form of commonly funded NATO stockpile, perhaps for a common family of modern munitions. We've always resisted this lest it give poorer Allies a free ride and reduce their incentive to build up their own stocks. But minimum essential WRM stocks are so crucial as to require changing DoD policy in my view (Congress has always resisted, and would have to be brought around too). But there should be ways of meeting the free-ride problem, such as putting the stockpile under firm SACEUR control and making it additive to national stocks. Funding such a WRM stockpile via some kind of cost-sharing formula like that for NATO Infrastructure could provide the necessary incentive for participation.

6. Theater Nuclear Warfare (TNW) Modernization. Given perennial Allied nervousness lest we're intent on decoupling, such modernization is in my view an indispensable corollary to validating our conventional emphasis. Moreover, we want to modernize in any case to (a) achieve greater stability and survivability; (b) reduce obsolete unstable systems and unneeded warheads like NIKE; (c) save manpower; and (d) firmly orient important dual purpose systems like nuclear capable aircraft and artillery to initial conventional uses. You know this issue better than I do, but I address it briefly at Tab I.

#### IV. HOW TO GET ALL THIS ACTUALLY DONE--PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Little of the above is new. Practically all of it has been addressed before in one way or another, both here and in NATO, since at least 1964. And in fairness I'll say that the NATO military authorities are tackling most of these issues more vigorously than either NATO's civil authorities or national defense establishments. SACEUR has been particularly energetic. But NATO commanders and civil organs can only propose, they cannot dispose. Only national authorities acting collegially can put their plans into effect and allocate the necessary resources.

So not enough will actually be achieved in practice unless we face up to the real problem, which is that we simply cannot get the indispensable national decisions and funding required from today's feeble NATO machinery, which is not really designed for this purpose.

This system does not give the NATO defense ministers enough of a basis to frame concrete collegial actions. While they say all the right things in their Ministerial Guidance of 1975 (and the biennial revision coming before the DPC this May), this guidance is far too generalized to serve as much of an explicit guide to concrete action. Its call for across the board real increases in defense outlays by specific global percentages is acrimoniously haggled over, but then all too often ignored. Though such broad goals are needed to give a sense of direction, they are an inadequate stimulus to the concrete measures needed.

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The biennial NATO force goals, which are supposed to meet this requirement, do not -- and cannot as the present constituted. They are useful at the margins but are mostly just a collation of existing national plans. They are too short term to affect national programs optimally, loose in priority emphases, and ignore tradeoffs. They deal with only part of what's needed, since it is hard to fit rationalization, flexibility, interoperability, standardization, common logistics, or other collective measures into the force goals exercise. So these have had to be addressed separately.

Granted that the underlying problem of parochial national attitudes (not least our own) can only be changed gradually over time. But we will never get these changed sufficiently unless we attack them vigorously and consistently, by such means as trying to lock nations into agreed multilateral program packages, and devising machinery and procedures which will both facilitate this and put a more effective spotlight on national deviations from it. Surely we can find better ways to get all the Allies to read off the same sheet of music, instead of each tending to go its own wasteful and inefficient way.

Thus perhaps the most important new thrust of this report is toward suggesting better means to generate such collective action. It stresses how to provide the indispensable machinery to facilitate carrying out agreed plans effectively in practice collectively--at politically affordable cost. Unless the US faces up to this fact of life, we risk ending up having proposed just another in a long series of sterile NATO "paper" exercises. For more detail on NATO's organizational hangups and proposed remedies see Tab K.

A. NATO Needs a Programmatic Long Range Plan to Flesh Out its Ministerial Guidance.

Since the traditional fragmented NATO planning system is demonstrably inadequate to meet perceived needs in the 80's, NATO ought to try another long term plan to define key needs as programmatically as possible, set firm priorities, timephasing, and tradeoffs--and address the added planning and implementing machinery needed to carry out the programs proposed. Hence my first recommendation in this key area is that you propose to the DPC in May such an exercise, for submission to it by the Spring 1978 meeting. A draft outline proposal is at Tab J.

B. Structure Master Plans and Program Packages for each Priority Area--another bane of NATO is laundry lists which get lip service but are seldom really implemented. Nor do priority measures get enough visibility in NATO's present force goal cycle, which produces 1,100 separate national force goals which ministers can hardly grasp in toto (or even in the Flexibility studies which produced over 800 proposals). My way around this problem is for each of the key priority areas in the new NATO long range plan to be structured as a separate master plan and

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program package to enable sufficient visibility and efficient program management. They should if possible define national inputs, propose funding and time phasing, and cite tradeoffs. They might vary widely in specificity, detail and financial commitment depending on the degree of consensus reachable. Even a set of broad agreed guidelines in each priority area would greatly facilitate the search for interoperability and standardization. They would provide a means of stacking up proposed US inputs alongside proposed Allied inputs, so that we could use this as a means of leverage to get parallel commitments from our Allies. Last but not least, such program packages would greatly facilitate showing Ministers periodically what is happening, that they can do something about it if necessary.

Each NATO-ized program package should be assigned a specific NATO "program manager." Programming follow-through cannot be left to umbrella committees like the MC, CNAD, or EWG, or for that matter to any committee. Nor should it be allowed to get lost amid a thousand force goals. Someone must be explicitly in charge. Even if he doesn't control funds, he must be responsible for monitoring and reporting. The more line management than can be brought to bear the better. Each program also needs a "shadow" US program manager on whom DoD and JCS can rely to keep tabs on NATO and prod if needed.

Hence the US should propose that as part of the comprehensive defense plan such program packages should be devised in at least the following priority areas:

1. NATO Readiness, Training, and Exercise Program Package Perhaps this is too big to be digestible, in which case it could be broken down into such packages as anti-armor, WRM, training, exercises, etc. (see Tab A).
2. A Quicker Mobilization and Reinforcement Package. This would provide a framework for getting reciprocal Allied actions parallel to our own (see Tab B).
3. A NATO C<sup>3</sup> program package. This plan should build on existing programs wherever possible, but propose funding, including reprogramming of national assets where needed (see Tab E).
4. A NATO Tactical Communication Program Package. Perhaps designed by CNAD, but with a specific program manager (not a committee) to run it (see Tab E).
5. A NATO Air Defense Program Package. (See Tab F)
6. A NATO EW Package (see Tab G).



7. A Consumer Logistics Program Package, designed by a civil/military logisticians working group, with the ASYG for Defense Support as overall program manager, and SHAPE as program manager for the WRM stockpile (see Tab H).

8. A TNW Modernization Program Package, with DoD in effect as program manager and NPG as advisory council (see Tab I).

No doubt some of these packages should be split up or structured differently. Moreover, some might take longer to develop than the year allotted for the "long term defense plan" exercise; however, a year should be more than long enough to at least assess feasibility and develop tentative outline proposals.

C. Other Essential Institutional Changes.

These don't fit readily into the program package format, but they are nonetheless equally important to energizing NATO.

1. Better Machinery for Coordinated Planning/Programming of R&D and Procurement. Clearly this is vital to long term standardization and ultimate cost-saving. The present CNAD system is inadequate, though the national armaments directors try hard. We need something better than the present ad hoc case-by-case patching together when someone wants to sell a new system. Since many new systems are so expensive that NATO can only afford to fund them adequately on a multilateral basis (e.g. PATRIOT, AWACS), we must find better means of doing so.

A first step is the NATO study now underway on a Periodic Armaments Planning System (PAPS) to harmonize national plans over the next 5-10 years. Due this fall, it will show the opportunities for standardization interoperability, joint R&D, and production sharing. But it is only a first step. Who will then decide how to divide up the R&D and procurement pie optimally? Who'll have the clout? This is basically a four-nation problem, since the US/UK/FRG/France produce 85%-90% of NATO equipment. Many are dabbling in this area (EUROGROUP, EPG, CNAD, even EEC), but no adequate solution is remotely in sight to reduce wasteful duplication.

Since ad hoc co-production and offset schemes are more costly than single source procurement, we should try and develop some kind of matrix which would show how each participating ally could get its fair share over time on a multi-project basis, rather than balancing the books on each project. OSD/P&E tried a larger matrix scheme out on NATO but it was ignored. We also need a Nato-wide policy on low cost/no cost cross-licensing, agreed procedures for better technology exchange, and better machinery for developing agreed military requirements as the basis for multilateral programming (perhaps via strengthening the Military

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Agency for Standardization under the MC, which now deals mostly in software. All these issues are addressed in more detail in Tab C.

2. Better machinery is needed to promote interoperability -- which deserves to be pressed hard because it is quicker and easier to get than full standardization. A high level NAC ad hoc committee very usefully spotlighted some key aspects (though reactions to their efforts show the enormous obstacles too). We must institutionalize some such means of providing consistent high level focus, and reporting to Ministers (see Tab C).

3. Stronger NATO logistics machinery is another imperative -- if we are ever to NATO-ize logistics in ways highly beneficial to the US (you have already approved my proposals at Tab H).

4. The NATO force planning system should eventually be expanded to a FYDP process--to enable collective focus on all national resource allocation, not just on earmarked forces. Only in this way can NATO get a comprehensive handle on rationalization (see Tab K).

5. NATO also needs better means of determining real priorities and proposing tradeoffs. This will be like pulling teeth, and to date the NATO authorities have balked at this hurdle because of feared national reactions and the desire to cover everything. But Ministers must insist they take this jump (see Tab K).

6. More multilateral funding mechanisms are vital to common programs. Every successfully executed program to date (Infrastructure, NADGE, NICS, etc) reflected required prior agreement on cost-sharing. Hence we should try to apply this technique wherever feasible to the new common "program packages." Congress may look askance (though it has already strongly supported the Infrastructure Program), but it must be convinced that even increased US contributions are truly cost-effective in terms of bringing the Allies along (see Tab K).

7. Lastly, Pentagon civil and military machinery for dealing with NATO needs matters needs to be strengthened. Though NATO-configured GPF programs take the largest single hunk of your DoD budget, DoD is not adequately structured to give their NATO aspects commensurate focus. Nor are we well-enough organized to exert the needed influence or leverage on our Allies. We need: (a) better institutional and procedural means to educate all concerned to "think NATO"; (b) to strengthen the NATO "cells" in DoD and service components; (c) better coordinating machinery to ensure that these various components are knit together better on NATO issues (often not the case today) and to assure more consistent follow-through. I have already proposed to you separately a series of modest steps which I believe would cumulatively result in major improvements along these lines.

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## V. OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS

This section is a catch-all for a few other important issues that I believe you should make part of your own NATO initiatives program, but most of which should not be handled in NATO channels yet.

A. Discreetly Seek a More Effective French Contribution to Alliance Defense. It is arguable that an early reliable French contribution regardless of whether France formally rejoins the NATO team) is well nigh indispensable to high confidence conventional defense at affordable cost. Otherwise the rest of us will have to pay far more. A great deal of quiet contingency planning has been done already through US and NATO military channels. But the French forces are not only the least well-equipped of any major Ally but the least compatible and interoperable. Thus much needs to be done to harmonize French forces with the rest of NATO's to facilitate coalition operations. Since France is a major arms supplier, her participation in standardization and in rationalization of R&D and defense production is also critical.

Since only nations (not NATO) can offer the necessary quid pro quo incentives, this should become a major but quiet enterprise by the US, UK, and FRG in concert (we should not get out in front). I am assured that this whole problem is being worked separately (e.g. in PRM #20), but I wonder if it is yet being tackled on the broad scale suggested above. Therefore, I urge that you personally assure that this French matter is being pressed vigorously. Even if Giscard's political difficulties and the upcoming French elections require us to move slowly, we still need to have a long term program aimed at getting what we want when we can.

B. Press NATO Exploitation of New Technology on a Systematic Basis. NATO's new Ministerial Guidance logically calls for precisely this as a key means of improving NATO's qualitative edge over the WP. But not much has been done yet to systematize this search within a NATO framework and then use the results to promote rationalized R&D. As a first step, I urge that you endorse a study the UK will probably propose to assess the effects of new technology on tactics and force structure. We are already conducting bilateral studies on the subject with the FRG and Norway.

To tie together all the new technology efforts in the US R&D community, in order to provide leadership to the NATO effort, we should lay on a DoD study of how advanced technology might be exploited to help generate a more credible NATO deterrence/defense posture. A lot of relevant ideas are now circulating in the defense community, and Herb York believes that they merit "very serious further review." He will give you his best preliminary judgement about them before the May DPC, and he and I believe that after the DPC you should lay on a structured study along these lines to help guide the NATO effort. I suggest that, in view of his interest, you ask Dr. York to head this study.



C. Develop a Better Intelligence Grasp of WP Operational Capabilities. As a former intelligence estimator, I have long been depressed at the thinness of the defense intelligence effort devoted to such analysis. After a cursory review, I am still convinced that while we are great at bean counting and technical analysis, we still have a long way to go in realistically analyzing WP operational capabilities. While there are a few talented people working these matters and their results are indicative of what might be done, the vast bulk of [REDACTED] analytic resources are devoted to other things. Thus the sophisticated new assessments so badly needed as a guide to operational planning and programming cannot really be done.

[REDACTED]

D. Other Issues Deserving Analysis. Several other important issues need to be analyzed in the search for an optimum NATO deterrent posture, and the optimum US contribution thereto. Hopefully some of these will be addressed in the PRM #10 exercise, but they will probably also need further DoD analysis in depth. The following are illustrative:

1. We need to analyze (in unconstrained fashion at least initially) the optimum long term balance between US and Allied defense efforts. I am not talking here about burdensharing (a political issue), but about kinds of investment. In a real sense, we may be taking a less cost-effective (though more feasible) route by investing so much in high cost US forces instead of investing more in programs designed to strengthen Allied capabilities (such as doing more R&D for NATO but subsidizing the Allies to produce the end-items, contributing more heavily to joint procurement, or other joint programs such as WRM stockpiles). Doing much about all this may be quite another matter, but if our analyses came up with interesting answers, we'd at least have more incentive to try.

2. How much sustainability in Europe should we program for if the Allies won't do the same? Our DPPG calls for 180 days stocks (90 days in Europe), but the Allies are still below even 30 day interim levels in many key respects. Despite the importance of sustainability, could NATO successfully defend in Europe after our Allies ran out of

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gas? This is not a theological issue of short vs longer war, but a very practical one with large dollar implications. Of course, to the extent NATO had standardized equipment and compatible munitions, our far larger stocks would serve as reserves for the Allies. But all too often this is not the case (which is an argument for more standardization/interoperability and for subsidizing Allies). This also suggests converting some of our War Reserve Stocks to prepositioned unit stocks instead of making added buys.

3. Similarly, why maintain so many reserve divisions which are not deployable until well after the Allies may run out of gas? Most of them can't get there until M+90. So do we need so many reserves, especially since the reserve manpower pool is declining? This too suggests that encouraging the buildup of Allied reserves through contributing to multilateral equipment programs be more cost-effective from our standpoint.

4. What is the optimum balance between the size and weight of equipment and its strategic deployability? As we move into an airlift age, with a growing premium on quick deployment, have our weapons designers and logisticians paid enough attention to the high penalties associated with outsize and oversize cargo?

I don't have good answers on the above, but if you agree they are good questions, why not ask P&E, DDR&E, and JCS jointly to recommend how best to analyze them and who should do it?

## VI. TACTICAL GAME PLAN

Assuming you find the above the kind of NATO initiatives program you want to press during your tenure, there remains the question of how best to lay it on -- both in Washington and in NATO. Though much of the payoff will be long term in nature, with results visible only over an extended period, if you want to see some of these results on your watch the time to start is now.

Much of what I recommend to start the ball rolling is contained in my recommendations in Tabs A-I (some of which you have already approved). But you also need a corollary game plan to push key elements through the Washington bureaucracy, get White House and Allied approval, and then ensure adequate follow-through. Congress will also have to be brought appropriately into the act, because much of what we ought to do will depend on Hill approval too. Moreover, what needs to be done must be carefully time phased so as not to overload the circuit.

However, since we can't achieve our NATO purposes without Allied collaboration (indeed the Allies are really the chief target), the

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upcoming NATO Summit and then DPC/NPG offer a splendid opportunity to start the educational process. Therefore, I urge capitalizing on the novelty value of a new Administration (and DoD team) by calling for NATO to design a comprehensive NATO long term defense plan over the next year. To avoid spooking the Allies unduly, we should only be suggestive at the outset about what this plan should comprise. But we would expect during the exercise to introduce a number of our major initiatives under the guise of US inputs.

As you know this process is already underway and I have been participating in it with ISA, State, and NSC. PRM #9 already calls for such a major NATO defense planning exercise, and the President has approved mentioning it in advance consultation with Allies as a potential US initiative. Since time is short between now and the Summit and DPC a great deal of prompt action is required to assure that all the US actors read from the same sheet of music. I will submit shortly as Tab J a proposed scenario and sequential approach.

I am also working up in conjunction with ISA and others, a few possible short term "quick fix" measures which you might propose to your fellow Ministers for prompt approval at least in principle. I quite agree with Secretary Vance's 4 April letter that these should be economically practicable within existing fiscal constraints, yet have significant impact. I have suggested an anti-armor package, a WRM package, and possibly quicker Allied reinforcement measures, to complement what we are already programming. I will deal with these in Tab L of my report.

VII. IN CONCLUSION, THIS NATO INITIATIVES PACKAGE TRIES TO DO THE FOLLOWING:

-- it outlines in actionable programmatic terms what you need to do to generate a more credible NATO deterrent/defense posture at affordable cost--a goal vital to our national purposes and commensurate with the huge proportion of DoD's budget invested in it.

-- it provides you with a coherent "systems architecture"--an orchestrated set of short and longer term guidelines for the multiyear effort needed to move a sluggish NATO toward this goal.

-- it translates these guidelines into a set of digestible program packages which will greatly facilitate achieving the desired results.

-- it specifies the changes in NATO and DoD machinery indispensable to convert planning into performance and avoid yet another sterile "paper" exercise.

-- it provides a basis for launching the kind of productive initiatives needed at the May DPC.

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-- if nothing else, it serves an important educational purpose in showing both the new team and the old bureaucracy what must inevitably be done to revitalize NATO--sooner or later if not now.

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Last of all, GOOD LUCK! It was mine to propose but yours to dispose. My proposals are admittedly ambitious, and will inevitably get watered down, not just here in Washington but even more in NATO's 15-nation paper mill. But my intuitive feeling is that starting out big is the best way to stimulate so important a process, and that even halting performance in many aspects would be eminently worthwhile. In the last analysis, the need for a more credible NATO deterrent/defense posture is so central to our security interests that we can hardly afford not to try the most promising route. It's been a privilege to help devise one.

*R W Komer*

R. W. KOMER

Special Consultant to Secretary  
of Defense on NATO Affairs

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6 MAY 1976

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In response to Dave  
Aaron's request for  
some "see whiz" numbers  
to use in the President's  
5/10 NATO speech, I  
sent him a package  
(attached) Andy Marshall  
prepared.

Washington National Records Center,  
SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0017, Box 74,  
Folder NATO 320.2 (16 Mar-Jul) 1977.

No DIA objection to  
declassification subject to  
the results of concurrent  
Joint Staff review. JDC 22  
Jan 15

Page determined to be Unclassified  
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Date: OCT 23 2015

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THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE  
(NATO and Warsaw Pact)

Ten years ago, the U.S. advantage in strategic and theater nuclear weapons dominated any assessment of the military balance in Europe. Today, the situation is fundamentally changed, and the conventional balance is much more important. Throughout this period, the NATO policy has been to develop a conventional posture that would maintain a high nuclear threshold while maintaining a credible linkage between conventional and nuclear forces. But the introduction of Soviet combat forces into Czechoslovakia in 1968, along with major force modernization efforts by the Warsaw Pact, have more than offset NATO efforts to improve the comparative balance of conventional forces.

The balance we see in Europe today is not the result of sudden, unexpected improvements in Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces which have been ignored in the West, but the result of steady, long-term Warsaw Pact efforts to improve their conventional and theater nuclear capabilities which have been neither fully matched nor offset by the modernization of NATO forces. The rough parity that exists today in strategic forces has reduced the range of aggression those systems alone can deter. There is a rough standoff in the overall capability of theater nuclear forces of NATO and the Pact as well: although there are important asymmetries in these forces, both sides could use theater nuclear weapons effectively.

The balance of conventional forces is a mixture of factors, some favoring NATO but more, today, favoring the Warsaw Pact. During the past ten years, the Soviets have introduced a new main battle tank, a

sophisticated infantry combat vehicle, two new models of self-propelled, armor protected field artillery, new anti-tank weapons, the most comprehensive ground-based air defense system in the world, and at least five new combat aircraft. Warsaw Pact forces have undergone similar but less rapid modernization programs. These improved capabilities are consistent with evolving Soviet doctrine which stresses an approach to the offensive, different than we had tended to believe in the past -- emphasizing speed, maneuver, and surprise wherever possible. These factors lie behind much of the current concern over the possibility of a sudden attack which would deprive NATO of any extended warning.

There have been improvements in NATO forces as well, particularly in FRG active and territorial forces, and in the U.S. contribution. In NATO, during the past decade we have seen the introduction of 3 new tank models, at least 8 personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles, with variants, 5 new versions of self-propelled artillery, 6 new major anti-tank weapons and 10 new types of air defense weapons. There is a difference, however. Where Warsaw Pact weapons have, in nearly every case, been introduced into the forces of nearly every member of the Pact, many NATO systems have been developed and introduced in parallel, leading to the problems of logistical and operational incompatibility that cause so much concern today. Since the mid-1960s, real defense expenditures by European NATO members have generally increased faster than those of the U.S., although most of the increased resources have been consumed by higher personnel costs in NATO forces.

Arraying various quantitative measures of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in the Central Region of Europe side-by-side for representative years from 1965 to 1975 shows NATO trailing in most areas. The growth in NATO forces has been more than offset by growth in the Warsaw Pact.

KEY:
NATO Total/WP Total (US) (USSR)

QUANTITATIVE BALANCE

	1965	1970	1975
Personnel (Thousands)	800/750 (220) (320)	770/820 (180) (390)	780/910 (190) (480)
Divisions	26/53 (5) (22)	25/58 (4) (27)	25/58 (4) (27)
Tanks <sup>1</sup>	5800/12,600 (1600) (6200)	6000/14,600 (1400) (8000)	6100/16,000 (1400) (9100)
APC <sup>2</sup>	10,600/11,900 (2800) (6000)	13,300/15,000 (2900) (7700)	14,700/17,600 (3700) (11,000)
Anti-tank Weapons <sup>3</sup>	2500/1900 (700) (700)	3200/3400 (600) (1300)	4500/6100 (2400) (3400)
Artillery Weapons <sup>4</sup>	1800/3700 (600) (1700)	1900/5400 (550) (2700)	2589/5695 (500) (2800)
Air Defense Weapons <sup>5</sup>	1600/3200 (400) (900)	2200/4900 (700) (2100)	3200/4800 (700) (2300)

<sup>1</sup> Includes medium and heavy tanks (e.g., U.S. M-60 series, Soviet T55/T62/T72).

<sup>2</sup> Includes tracked and wheeled vehicles used for infantry combat, reconnaissance and command.

<sup>3</sup> Includes vehicle and ground mounted AT missile launchers and guns. Includes those armored fighting vehicles, counted above, which mount an anti-tank guided missile system.

<sup>4</sup> Includes tube artillery and multiple rocket launchers.

<sup>5</sup> Includes air defense missile systems and guns.

Pact growth includes the increases in Soviet forces resulting from the introduction of the Southern Group of Forces into Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet decision to keep these forces in Czechoslovakia resulted in the following increases:

SOVIET SOUTHERN GROUP OF FORCES (CZECHOSLOVAKIA)

Inventories (1970)

Personnel	58,000
Divisions	5 (three motorized rifle; two tank)
Tanks	1,200
APC	1,600
Anti-tank Weapons	290
Artillery Weapons	480
Air Defense Weapons	340

There has been considerable growth in Soviet forces beyond the introduction of five divisions into Czechoslovakia. Most of this growth has been in combat support units above the division level and through increasing the numbers of weapons within divisions.

Tactical aircraft would, of course, provide important combat power for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in any conflict in Europe. The number of aircraft available to both sides is highly dependent on the actual situation as it develops. Today, the Pact could make available approximately 5,400 combat aircraft, compared to approximately 4,500 for NATO. In this area in particular, the quantity of weapons must be



evaluated in light of their characteristics, the operational doctrines of both sides, and the skills of pilots, crews and aircraft control. When these factors are considered, it is possible that NATO has an overall advantage in tactical aviation.

Today, in Central Europe, the Warsaw Pact has numerical superiority in:

- Troops
- Divisions
- Tanks
- Armored personnel carriers (troop carriers, armored reconnaissance vehicles, armored command vehicles and armored fighting vehicles)
- Major anti-tank missile launchers and guns
- Artillery and multiple rocket launchers
- Air defense missile launchers and guns
- Air defense aircraft
- Reconnaissance aircraft
- Ground attack aircraft

NATO has numerical superiority in:

- Tactical nuclear weapons, both artillery and air delivered
- Helicopters

If deterrence should fail, and the Warsaw Pact should attack, there would be important qualitative asymmetries as well. Here the Pact has the advantage of:

- The initiative in choosing the time, place, and nature of the attack.
- More standardized weapons across the alliance.
- A more tightly organized, better protected chain of command.
- Sophisticated, extensive CBR capabilities.
- Readily available reserve forces.

NATO has qualitative advantages in:

- A defensive mission with advantages of familiar terrain.
- Superior individual aircraft capabilities, tactical air pilot skills, and aviation command and control.
- Superior alliance cohesion, for an attack on one would indeed be an attack on all.

Most assessments of the Central Front focus on the quantitative balance or the trends in modernizing Warsaw Pact forces. These are important factors which must be understood and countered by NATO, but, in fact, numbers are not the dominant problem. More important problems are in the organization and coordination of forces at the operational level and in our changing understanding of how the Soviets and their allies would fight. Our understanding of Soviet tactical doctrine is not complete, but much has been learned in the last few years.

Much more needs to be done to understand how the Soviets would use the forces at their disposal in a conflict and what vulnerabilities they would have that NATO could exploit. Numbers and technical characteristics of weapons are only part of the problem.

It is important that the adequacy of the conventional posture is not measured in isolation from other components of the TRIAD. The critical function of conventional forces is to deny an aggressor confidence in a quick win; and by confronting him with the requirement to make a major commitment, prevent him from discounting the risk of escalation.

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**Date: OCT 23 2015**

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Washington National Records  
Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-80-0017, Box 73,  
Folder NATO 092.3, 1977.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NATO Summit Follow-Up

X/54/  
Henry Owen, in his memorandum of May 16, 1977, asked that I indicate how I intend to carry forward the defense initiatives outlined in your 10 May speech at the NATO Summit Meeting.

As you are aware, NATO's Defense Ministers adopted my proposals that NATO design a Long-Term Defense Program to flesh out these initiatives. We are now developing specific work plans in ten key priority areas. NATO also adopted our proposed short-term initiatives for improving antiarmor holdings, selected war reserves, and readiness for forces by end-1978 on a scale to be agreed at the December NATO meeting.

Our plan is to stay at least one step ahead of the NATO action by providing US views sufficiently in advance of NATO actions to permit us to exercise a strong influence on the NATO development of the initiatives, without giving the entire program a "made-in-USA" label. At my request, Ambassador Komer, who was the chief designer of the short and long-term initiatives, has stayed on temporarily to lend his energy and initiative to this task. We will call on Ambassador Bennett and his staff and on our Ambassadors in capitals to lend support as needed. A summary of our organizational approach is in the enclosure.

We are following through on the defense production initiative as an integral part of the Long-Term Defense Program, in coordination with the Department of State where appropriate.

While we're off to a good start, you should know that actually re-vamping NATO's defense posture along the lines we seek will be a long uphill fight. I intend to keep them moving in the right direction, looking forward to a NATO Summit in Washington in late spring 1978.

Harold Brown

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TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
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YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 12/31/83.

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NATO Summit Follow-Up

1. Defense Improvements

a. The Long-Term Defense Program

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Following up the President's proposal that NATO set about development of a long-term defense program, the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in Ministerial Session on 17 May 1977 agreed to prepare a long-term defense program for approval by Ministers in the spring of 1978. Ministers called for submission to them of a progress report in December 1977. They also agreed to consider the need for strengthening NATO machinery in order to ensure effective follow-up action on the programs.

The NATO Defense Planning Committee in Permanent Session set the development of the long-term defense program in motion on 3 June by accepting all ten of our proposed program areas, making the NATO Executive Working Group the steering group, and calling for establishment of a task force in each program area (readiness; reinforcement; reserve mobilization; rationalization-standardization/interoperability; maritime posture; air defense; C<sup>3</sup>; electronic warfare; logistics; and tactical nuclear force modernization). They established an outline timetable for development of the proposed long-term defense program, and also charged the Executive Working Group with the task of recommending strengthened programming and implementing machinery where appropriate. NATO action to date has been fully consistent with US objectives.

Within the Department of Defense, we have established program groups paralleling each NATO program area, to recommend appropriate actions for the United States in those fields, to recommend initial US views on appropriate NATO programming in the field, and to assess NATO organizational machinery and procedures. The scheduling of defense program group actions is such as to facilitate strong support for our Mission to NATO in development of the NATO long-range program.

b. Short-Term Defense Improvements

The Defense Planning Committee in Ministerial Session also agreed to our proposals that the NATO Military Authorities should recommend realistic interim objectives, by nation, capable of being met by December 1978, aimed at (1) increasing holdings of antiarmor systems; (2) increasing holdings of selected war reserve stocks; and (3) improvements where critically needed in the readiness of NATO forces and in Allied capabilities for rapid reinforcement.

We expect that the Defense Planning Committee will review the short-term improvement recommendations when received and invite countries to include them in their formal planning. Follow-up on national decisions will occur during the NATO Annual Defense Planning Review to be

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held in the fall, with results to be reported to Ministers in December. Many of our Allies already have informed the Military Authorities that they intend to agree to significant improvements in their national programs as part of the short-term improvements.

As with the long-term defense program, the Department of Defense has organized a program group for each of the three short-term improvement fields, to recommend US actions and US positions for NATO action.

## 2. Defense Production

### a. Increased Purchase of European Equipment

The Department of Defense has taken the following steps to assist in carrying forward the President's pledge at the London Summit meeting that this administration's decisions concerning development, production and procurement of defense equipment will be taken with careful attention to the interests of all members of the Alliance:

- At the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting on May 18, the Secretary of Defense reiterated the President's point, and emphasized the US intention to consider procuring European systems as part of agreed program packages, such as common families of tactical communications, air and ground munitions, air defense weapons, and electronic warfare equipment. He noted that the primary aim of US purchases from our NATO partners is not economic, but promotion of the combined military effectiveness of the Alliance.

- As noted above, NATO has now begun the development of a Long-Range Defense Program to adapt the deterrent and defense posture of the Alliance to the needs of the 1980s. Among the areas to be included are rationalization of NATO's defense effort and increased standardization/interoperability of its military equipment. The question of increased purchases of European defense equipment will receive full consideration, both in the NATO task force and in the parallel DoD organization.

- The Secretary of Defense has approved a new Department of Defense Directive which establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for achieving standardization and interoperability of equipment with NATO. Among other things, the Directive requires all DoD components to consider available European systems throughout the system development and acquisition cycle.

- In addition, the Secretary of Defense has directed the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force to review available European systems and provide recommendations and/or proposals. The Army has already submitted a comprehensive study evaluating the potential of 112 European systems for possible US procurement. The OSD staff is reviewing the Army study, and will do the same for the other services.

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- DoD is working to facilitate technology transfer between ourselves and our NATO Allies, and has sponsored external research both on this subject and on coproduction and licensing.

Congressional rhetoric in support of our standardization policy, including procurement of European armaments, has been strong. 1976 legislation directs the DoD to provide for the acquisition of equipment which is standardized or interoperable with our NATO Allies and to seek to arrive at cooperative armament agreements in the interests of standardization. But great difficulties arise when we address specific systems with the Congress. In fact, provisions introduced by the House and Senate into the FY 78 Defense Appropriation Authorization Act make equipment cooperation with NATO more difficult. DoD has helped reverse some of these provisions; however, others remain.

We are also having some difficulties in executing Memoranda of Understanding that would promote NATO standardization. There are conflicts between our desire to limit sales to third parties and the need for our NATO partners to meet a competitive price by making such sales, thus expanding their production runs. State Department wishes to submit MOUs to Congress for approval; that will make them much more difficult to reach. I will submit a separate memorandum on this problem.

We are seeking to exempt from the Specialty Metals provision of the Annual Department of Defense Appropriation Act procurement actions which further NATO standardization. This legislation requires that US military equipment use only specialty metals mined and smelted in the United States. It seriously limits freedom to procure equipment from members of the Alliance, and makes cooperative programs more difficult. DoD is again seeking relief from this provision, and we are reasonably optimistic concerning the outcome. We plan next year to seek relief from current restrictions on procurement of clothing and naval vessels or major portions thereof.

As to regulatory practices and defense procurement procedures, with publication of the recent DoD Directive on standardization and interoperability, the Defense Department's house is fairly well in order and the Department is in a much better position to consider acquisition or licensing of European systems on an equitable basis. The difficulties will likely appear in two areas: first, identification of European systems which are cost effective when compared to systems available from domestic sources, and second, when such systems are identified, convincing the Congress that the overall Alliance interests in NATO standardization/interoperability and the two-way street outweigh any short-term economic and political liabilities.

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2b&c. European Cooperation and a Transatlantic Dialogue\*

These questions are treated together because our ability to encourage greater European cooperation is related to our success in realizing a genuine joint examination of how to improve cooperation on a transatlantic basis. We intend to continue and expand several ongoing forms of dialogue on NATO arms development and production with the Europeans, while initiating broader explorations with our Allies on underlying political and economic questions. Such actions would include:

- (a) a concentrated effort to include in the long-term NATO Defense Program measures to promote standardization and interoperability, including a comprehensive, effective planning system;
- (b) expanded bilateral exploration and joint examination of political and economic obstacles to improved cooperation in development, production, and procurement of defense equipment;
- (c) continued bilateral negotiation of cooperative agreements;
- (d) support for the EPG's work, as expressed by the President at the NATO Summit; and
- (e) possible US purchase or licensing of European equipment, hopefully as part of "program packages" called for in the Long-Term Defense Program.

In addressing the question of a joint examination, as with other aspects of the President's defense initiatives, we are working closely with the Department of State at both the policy and working levels. We have achieved a consensus to press forward on bilateral and multilateral fronts with a transatlantic dialogue in any forum in or out of NATO that is agreeable to most, if not all, of our European Allies -- including at least the UK and FRG. Our purpose is to find ways to strengthen cooperation in development, production, and procurement of defense equipment. During the same period we hope it will be possible:

- To have initiated improvements in NATO's planning procedures to define weapons requirements and to develop and produce these weapons.
- To have taken concrete steps to promote a more balanced transatlantic trade in defense equipment.

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\* This section was prepared in conjunction with the Department of State.

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To initiate a joint examination we need to take into account both the methods by which the examination of improved cooperation might proceed and the substantive content. The specific aim of our initial discussions with our Alliance partners in the weeks ahead is to discover with whom, on what particular topics, in what forums, and when we can begin or increase a dialogue leading to understandings on what needs to be done to improve cooperation in development, production, and procurement of Alliance defense equipment. Exploration should pay particular attention to possibilities of involving the French, who, along with UK and FRG as major European defense producers, are essential to transatlantic cooperation. We want to involve them as early as possible but not allow them to stifle the process.

We also want to exert gentle pressure on the EPG in its September meeting as it discusses how to approach transatlantic dialogue from its side. (We are not hopeful that dialogue with the EPG itself will be possible by next May, given the apparently strong French preference to have the EPG go more slowly.) Bilateral discussions with Allies should be aimed at developing common viewpoints. The practical work going on in Alliance forums on standardization/interoperability measures under the long-term defense program will progressively define concrete defense equipment issues.

In terms of substance, our strategy for exploration should be cast in terms of following questions:

- What are the obstacles to improved transatlantic cooperation in weapons planning and production, and how might they be overcome?
- How can North America relate to European cooperation on armaments planning, and how can both of our efforts strengthen NATO defense?
- What methods should we use to promote cooperation in R&D, production, and procurement?
- Is new organizational machinery needed to facilitate this cooperation?

In bilateral discussion of specific cooperative weapons programs we intend to stress our interest in extending cooperation beyond a bilateral basis. We should make use of the potentially large size of the US market. That market should give us leverage to expand European interest in NATO standardization as opposed to simple bilateral sales to the US.

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The US should continue to keep the Europeans advised, both bilaterally and through established NATO channels, of the progress we are making in getting ourselves organized to deal seriously with them in cooperative defense production. Doing so may have the beneficial effect of suggesting parallel actions which could be expanded whenever the Europeans choose collectively to coordinate defense production.

The single most useful step the US could take to bolster its credibility in this area would be to procure one or more significant European weapons systems. Such a decision would greatly facilitate resolution of the issue of how and where to pursue our dialogue with the Europeans. The Department of Defense will work to identify such systems before the May 1978 Washington Summit Meeting.

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Folder NATO 092 (Jul-Dec) 1977.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

10 DEC 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NATO Initiatives and Improvements

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHR

Date: SEP 02 2015

In preparing our FY 79 budget and FY 79-83 FYDP, we have paid special attention to improving our contributions to NATO. This is consistent with the emphasis you have placed on having this country lead the Alliance toward an improved military posture that will mean greater security for all. Although we still have a long way to go, the situation is a hopeful one. Continuation of our progress will depend in part on decisions we make now on the FY 79 budget. Accordingly, I think it is useful to step back from the details of the budget review to take a broad look at the improvements we and our Allies are planning.

The end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam permitted a healthy shift of our attention to Europe. Studies of the military picture there identify two principal concerns. The first is that our current rough parity with the Soviets in strategic forces may make them bolder about using their conventional forces, or make our Allies less confident in resisting Soviet pressures. Our second concern is that the change in the strategic relationship has not been accompanied by any reduction in the Soviet advantage in conventional forces. To the contrary, since the late 1960's Soviet military resources have been increasing steadily, while U.S. defense spending declined until last year. The Soviets have been out-producing the U.S. in tanks by nearly six to one, tactical fighters by two to one, and artillery weapons by eight to one, to cite just three important examples. When we include our Allies the picture improves, but the basic problem remains. The capability of Soviet forces in Europe and the speed with which they could mount an attack have increased markedly.

We should not and probably cannot meet this danger by increasing our present reliance on strategic forces. It would be very risky to let the Soviets take a substantial and visible lead in strategic forces. We will have to continue to respond appropriately with actions of our own to their strategic forces changes, while striving for stabilizing SALT limitations. But an attempt to rely on stronger strategic forces to offset the Soviet conventional force buildup would be dangerous, inconsistent with our arms control efforts, and probably futile to boot. Instead, we must improve NATO's theater forces, particularly those that would be available in the early stages of a war that starts with little warning. We must also make sure that the Soviets see no military advantage in the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

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This Administration inherited and has expanded a substantial program for modernizing our conventional forces and improving their capabilities to fight against Soviet forces in Europe. If we carry through with our programmed modernization and procurement, we will have "heavied up" eleven of sixteen Army divisions and fleshed out a full 26 tactical fighter wings. From FY 77 to FY 83 we are planning to purchase roughly 5,000 tanks and 18,000 anti-tank guided missiles for the Army, and more than 2,000 advanced tactical aircraft (A-10's, F-15's and F-16's) for the Air Force alone.

We must continue that modernization and perhaps even accelerate it in key areas. But this Administration has recognized that it is not enough just to increase resources for NATO. We must make sure that those resources are used effectively. Buying the heavy equipment that an Army division needs to fight effectively in Europe is of little value if that division takes months to get ready for combat or if it arrives only after a failure of NATO's conventional defenses has forced us to resort to nuclear weapons. Nor is that investment of much value unless the division can fight effectively with our European Allies. These premises set the themes for my guidance to the Services in the preparation and review of this year's Defense Program: reinforcement, readiness, and coalition warfare.

As I survey the resulting defense program, I see some real progress being made. Probably the single most important decision this year was to accelerate planned improvements in U.S. reinforcement capabilities. By the end of FY 83, these plans will result in a dramatic increase in the speed with which U.S. Army and Air Force reinforcements could arrive in Europe. Currently we could only augment our deployed ground forces by a little over one division within ten days of a deployment decision; by end-FY 82, we plan to be able to deploy five reinforcement divisions in that time. At present, we could probably get 40 tactical air squadrons from the United States to Europe in a week; by end-FY 82, we plan to move 60 squadrons. The resulting increase in U.S. ability to reinforce NATO is summarized in the table below.

#### REINFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS

##### Army Division Equivalents (1 Brigade = 1/3 Division)

	<u>M-Day</u>	<u>M+10</u>	<u>M+30</u>
Current	5 2/3	6 2/3 - 7 1/3	9-10
FY 83	5 2/3	11	15-16

##### Air Force Fighter Squadrons

	<u>M-Day</u>	<u>M+7</u>	<u>M+30</u>
Current	28	68	100
FY 83	26-34	86-94	108

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Dramatic as these results are, they will be achieved without large cost increases. In the case of the Army, we will reallocate war reserves and equipment not needed for training US-based forces to prepositioned storage in Europe, ready for the all-important units that arrive early. In the case of the Air Force, we plan to exploit the greater availability of tanker aircraft made possible by your decision on the B-1.

Our changes to this year's defense program also included a wide range of measures to improve the readiness of our early-deploying forces. We increased manning of critical combat equipment, such as tanks and aircraft, and the density of artillery and anti-tank weapons. More ammunition will be loaded on combat vehicles, and we plan to continue improving the realism of our training exercises. Finally, our readiness benefits from improved morale and a continuing reduction in drug and race-related discipline problems. In sum these changes should significantly improve the day-to-day readiness of our forces in Europe.

Our European Allies, who supply the major portion of NATO's conventional combat capability, have not been standing still either. Non-US NATO anti-tank guided missile launchers in Central Europe will increase next year by almost 2,000, and stocks of the missiles themselves by 14,000. German stocks alone of anti-tank missiles will total 40,000 by 1982. The United Kingdom, Belgium, and The Netherlands all report plans to improve their reinforcement capabilities.

In order to eliminate duplication in these individual plans and make sure that NATO can fight effectively, this Administration launched two improvement efforts at the NATO Ministerial meeting in May. Our Short-Term Initiatives Program has already produced promising results in three critical areas -- readiness and reinforcement, anti-tank capabilities, and war reserve munitions. The NATO Long-Term Defense Program will integrate long-range programs in ten critical areas of NATO's conventional and theater nuclear capability. That effort will challenge many vested interests and cherished but costly commitments to "go-it-alone" national programming. But if we are successful, we should get a further increase in NATO's effectiveness.

I am optimistic about our prospects, but it will take a sustained effort to realize these plans. Greater efficiency is necessary, but efficiency alone is not enough. It will not do much good to get forces to Europe faster if they lack the modern equipment necessary to be effective in European conditions against improved Soviet forces. This modernization requires an increase in Defense expenditures, although not as large an increase as the Ford Administration programmed. Our early "scrub" of the FY 78 Ford budget cut \$3 billion -- before the further \$1 billion net reduction in the FY 78 B-1 amendment. We have continued working this year to reduce projected spending for FY 79-82. In FY 79 alone these reductions amount to about \$6 billion in constant FY 78 dollars. This still leaves us with a gradual increase in real defense spending, but we need this increase to continue our major conventional force modernization efforts.

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We also need that increase if we are to maintain the momentum of our NATO initiatives. At the May NATO Ministerials we secured with some difficulty a joint commitment to a 3 percent real increase in defense spending. We did not want a greater U.S. effort simply to become an excuse for our Allies to do less, with no overall increase in the conventional capability that we need. In the recent past, of course, it has been the United States that reduced its efforts. Between FY 71 and FY 76, U.S. real defense spending declined by about 2 percent per year (even after excluding the drop in Southeast Asia expenditures), while the European allies combined achieved increases in real defense spending averaging around 2 to 3 percent per year. I do not think we can continue to get needed increases from our Allies without a real increase of our own.

The only measure of budget that our allies or our adversaries will credit is the total budget. Much -- perhaps all -- of the real increase which we plan will go to strengthen forces directly connected with NATO. But the strength of NATO forces is not separable in a meaningful way from the totality of our defense. We could not force others to accept only certain budget accounts as the proper measure in assessing our defense commitment, even if we believed -- as I do not -- that such an assessment would be meaningful. Moreover, playing with allocations is too easy a game -- and all can play at it. If we were to tell others, for example, to disregard the size of our research and development, or intelligence, or central support services, then our Allies could say the same. In the end we would find that everyone had decreased his real efforts while pretending to increase them.

Perhaps even worse, our credibility would be questioned -- and that credibility is central to the success of the entire effort. Our Allies never have been as enthusiastic as we about improvements in conventional forces. We have had some success in pushing such improvement, in part because they value the overall U.S. commitment. That commitment has been enhanced by the actions of your Administration. The NATO initiatives of last spring, and your reaffirmation this summer in PD-18 of the commitment to 3 percent real growth of the U.S. Defense budget, were greeted in Europe as a demonstration of our seriousness and our credibility. The Europeans at last have begun to believe that we are serious. If we were to back off now, I am afraid we would see a reduction and fragmentation of European efforts. Some Allies would be likely to put more emphasis on their independent nuclear capabilities and less on conventional force improvements. Others could well seek a political accommodation with the Soviet Union on the latter's terms. It would be a long time before we ever could put the pieces back together again, or recreate a framework as promising as the present one.

*Harold Brown*

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: NATO Long Term Defense Program (LTDP) - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Over the past two months some of my people have been helping Bob Komer with various aspects of the NATO LTDP. This memo summarizes what we have been able to glean from the Task Force reports after a one-week review. Although we expect substantial changes will have to be made later, Bob and I thought a brief summary of the general magnitude and affordability of the LTDP, as we know it to date, would be of interest to you.

Principal Observations

We identified a list of 35 programs that appeared to us as the ones of greatest military benefit. The total cost of this PA&E list amounts to around \$14 billion for the U.S. and \$22 billion for the Allies during the first six years (1979-84) of the LTDP. (All dollar amounts are in 1977 constant prices.) For 1985-93 the costs, although sketchier, are \$6 billion and \$19 billion, respectively, for the U.S. and the Allies. Three important points are worth noting:

• First, in the context of total defense spending by the Alliance, we are not talking about a lot of money. The U.S. share is only 2%, and the Allied share is only 7%, of projected defense expenditures over 1979-84.

• Second, all but about 25% of the U.S. cost for 1979-83 is already in the U.S. FYDP, whereas over 60% of the Allied portion is apparently not programmed, though we do not have full data on Allied programs. Thus we would have to shift less than one percent of our program to cover the U.S. share of these LTDP initiatives, but the Allies would have to move about 5%. (Of course there are significant variations from this Alliance-wide average. For the Center Region countries the unprogrammed average is slightly less. The main problem is on the Northern Flank, where Denmark and Norway's unprogrammed portion averages 15%. See attached table.) In my view this generally confirms that we are much further along than the Allies in correcting critical deficiencies in NATO's defense posture. It also validates Bob Komer's intent that the LTDP be our lever for getting Allies to join in

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this effort. But we must be careful about the use we make of these numbers, since our Allies might incorrectly interpret these figures to mean that the LTDP is asking more of them than of ourselves.

• Third, notwithstanding the small percent of total projected budgets cited above, we should not assume it will be easy to get the Allies to make firm commitments for this amount. Spending plans for at least the next five years are probably quite firm for most of these countries; therefore, increased spending (above current plans) and/or reprogramming will be necessary if they are to accommodate the unprogrammed costs we have identified. Current long range spending plans for all of the non-US NATO nations combined translate into an average real increase of roughly 2.8% per year. To cover their unfunded LTDP costs in the near-term entirely by budget add-ons, the Allies would have to achieve real increases in their total defense spending of around 4% per year. This is a reason why we need to stay flexible about what items we designate as high priority. It is also a reason why we need to keep up our share of the bargain, such as the commitment to 3% real growth.

#### Program Content

The high priority programs selected for costing will provide important improvements in a number of critical areas. A partial listing by task force of those programs we in PA&E consider of highest priority is shown below:

- Task Force 1 (Readiness): Armor/anti-armor improvement program and thirty days of air-to-surface war reserve stocks.
- Task Force 2 (Reinforcement): Increased prepositioning for U.S. ground forces, accelerated deployment of the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable Group to Norway and cargo modification of wide body passenger aircraft.
- Task Force 4 (Maritime): Improved interoperability and security of maritime C<sup>3</sup>, better air defense for warships, procurement of lightweight ASW torpedoes, and elimination of deficiencies in NATO's mining capability.
- Task Force 5 (Air Defense): A variety of improvements including a much improved IFF and C<sup>3</sup> capability and a better balanced all-weather interceptor capability.
- Task Force 6 (C<sup>3</sup>): Increased interoperability of tactical communications and improvements to NATO's commonly funded long haul communications network (i.e., the NATO Integrated Communications System).
- Task Force 7 (EW): A variety of improvements including low cost communications ECM for ground forces and EW harassment drones to assist in countering the Soviet/Warsaw Pact air defense system.

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- Task Force 9 (Logistics): Thirty days of ground munitions (excluding anti-armor), and a SACEUR controlled common war reserve stockpile (above 30 day level).

### Caveats

In reviewing this material please keep in mind the preliminary nature of our analysis. You should be aware of the following caveats.

- We addressed only what we (PA&E) consider to be the highest priority elements of each program. These represent roughly half of the total number of LTDP recommendations (not including low cost/no cost procedural and policy recommendations), but about three quarters of the total cost.

- Detailed information is not yet available for R/S/I (Task Force #8) and TNF (Task Force #10); therefore, these programs had to be excluded from our analysis. We don't expect to see a TNF input before April and even then, I am told, it will not contain any programmatic recommendations. I fear that some of our Allies, particularly those that want an excuse for foot-dragging, could construe this to mean that improvements to our theater nuclear forces will not keep pace with conventional improvements.

- Costs are very rough. Where the Task Force drafts failed to provide necessary details we developed estimates based on our own assumptions. Further analysis may result in significant changes to the costs for some programs.

- Assessment of unprogrammed cost is uneven. The very high proportion of unfunded Allied costs could be due in part to a lack of knowledge (by the NATO Task Forces and ourselves) concerning the details of Allied long range plans. Our assessment of U.S. programmed costs is based on the current FYDP. We would expect to see some shift in these amounts as a result of adjusted fiscal guidance and programming decisions this summer.

### Future Efforts

We will refine this analysis as we continue our review of the final Task Force reports. As you know, the NATO Executive Working Group (EWG) will meet on 21 March to obtain preliminary national views and to begin preparing a report that ultimately will be approved by heads of state. This report may segregate task force recommendations into at least three categories. The first would contain recommendations that countries firmly agree to incorporate into national programs. The second would include proposals for which the commitment would be less binding, while the third might be a catchall for proposals not ripe for decision. In my view our principal PA&E efforts in preparing for the EWG meeting should involve determining into what categories we would like to see each of the task force recommendations placed.

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Final judgment about what should go into each category will have to be based on feasibility as well as priority. In other words, we may have to put some lower priority programs in Category I if there is Allied consensus on doing them, whereas more important programs may have to be relegated to Category II if too many Allies balk.



Russell Murray, 2nd  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Program Analysis & Evaluation

Attachment

cc: Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering  
Advisor to Secretary of Defense for NATO Affairs  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

*Splendid summary!*  
*RWK*

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NATO LTDP "TOP PRIORITY" PROGRAMS  
(US Dollars in Billions - 1977 Constant Prices)

	1979-84						1985-93		
	(1)	(2)	(2a)	(3)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)	(5)	(5a)
	Projected Total Defense Spending (\$)	Total Cost of LTDP Programs (\$)	As % of Tot Def Spending (2) ÷ (1)	Unprogrammed Cost of LTDP Programs \$	As % of Total Cost (3) ÷ (2)	As % of Tot Def Spending (3) ÷ (1)	Projected Tot Defense Spending \$	Total Cost of LTDP Programs \$	As % of Tot Def Spending (5) ÷ (4)
US	\$654.8	\$14.4	2.2%	\$3.5	24.2%	0.5%	\$1228.0	\$5.8	0.5%
Center Region (Excluding US)	\$258.0	\$14.1	5.5%	\$7.7	54.6%	3.0%	\$480.5	\$12.9	2.7%
Northern Flank (Excluding US)	\$14.9	\$3.2	21.5%	\$2.2	68.8%	14.8%	\$28.3	\$2.9	10.2%
Southern Flank (Excluding US)	\$56.0	\$4.4	7.9%	\$3.9	88.6%	7.0%	\$103.4	\$3.3	3.2%
Total Non-US	\$328.9	\$21.7	6.6%	\$13.9	63.9%	4.2%	\$612.2	\$19.1	3.1%
Total NATO	\$983.7	\$36.0	3.7%	\$17.3	48.1%	1.8%	\$1840.2	\$24.9	1.4%

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Date: 29 January 2005  
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Files, Acc 330-81-0202, Box 32, Folder NATO  
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Date: DEC 24 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: MBFR - Next Steps and Possible Discussion at a  
Summit Meeting

With SALT II approaching a conclusion, we face the question of what impetus should be given to our other arms control negotiations with the Soviets. One negotiation in particular -- MBFR -- is at a critical juncture. At the Summit, you may therefore want to take the opportunity to discuss where we are and what is required to get progress in the negotiations. In addition, independent of what we tell the Soviets, MBFR raises issues which the Administration will have to address in the coming months.

What follows is a brief discussion of the current objectives of the West in MBFR, some of the issues these negotiations raise, an outline of the next steps in MBFR analysis here in Washington and in NATO, and a recommendation for discussions on MBFR at the Summit. If you are satisfied with your state of knowledge on the first two items I (envy you and) suggest that you may wish to move directly to section C on page 4.

A. MBFR Objectives and the Current NATO Position

The overall NATO objective in the MBFR negotiations is to increase the stability of the military situation in Central Europe through an agreement on withdrawals and reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces and through agreement on related stabilizing measures. NATO seeks an agreement that would diminish the Pact's 2 to 1 peacetime advantage in tanks in Central Europe (larger in the period after the Soviets begin mobilization) and essentially eliminate the Pact's superiority in peacetime manpower. Despite these withdrawals and reductions, an MBFR agreement would not rectify the Pact advantage in mobilized strength. MBFR accordingly only complements and cannot replace our plans for strengthening NATO's forces, especially through the Long Term Defense Program.

In June of this year the Warsaw Pact accepted the concept that an MBFR agreement should result in parity between NATO and the Pact in both total military manpower and ground force manpower in Central Europe. This would be established by collective limits for the forces of each side set at overall totals of 900,000 for air and ground force personnel and 700,000 for ground force manpower alone. Unfortunately, the sides differ sharply on what Pact present manpower is.

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NATO and the Pact have also agreed that force reductions would occur in two phases -- the first involving only the US and the Soviet Union and the second including the other participants on both sides with forces in Central Europe. NATO position on how these reductions would take place is:

In Phase I:

The Soviets would withdraw 5 divisions, 68,000 men and 1,700 tanks. Soviet ground force manpower and tanks would be limited at the level remaining after withdrawals.

The US would withdraw 29,000 ground force manpower and a package of 3 nuclear elements -- called Option III -- consisting of:

- 36 Pershing ballistic missile launchers;
- 54 F-4 nuclear-capable aircraft;
- 1,000 nuclear warheads.

US ground force manpower and US nuclear armaments of the type withdrawn would be limited at the level remaining after withdrawal. Cruise missiles would not be limited under the NATO proposal.

In Phase II, both sides would reduce ground forces by the additional amounts necessary to reach the agreed common ceiling levels.

For several reasons, NATO has sought to confine armament limitations in MBFR to Soviet tanks and the three specified US nuclear elements. The Warsaw Pact's large superiority in numbers of most major armaments -- e.g., aircraft, tanks and artillery -- appeared to make infeasible the objective of equality in all armaments. NATO wished to retain the flexibility to increase its armaments through the prepositioning of US equipment and the equipping of European reserve forces.

B. MBFR Issues

The Data Impasse. The Warsaw Pact has accepted the concept that both sides should reduce manpower to parity in the form of an equal ceiling on military manpower on both sides. There is sharp disagreement, however, over the size of reductions the Pact should take to reach this ceiling.

The Pact asserts that it now has 987,000 air and ground manpower in Central Europe. This figure is approximately equal to ours, and thus, according to Pact data, both sides would have to take equal cuts -- about 90,000 -- to end up at a 900,000 ceiling. NATO data, however, shows the Pact to have 1,176,000 personnel, meaning that they would have to reduce their forces by around 280,000 to reach the MBFR ceiling -- a reduction much higher than the amount NATO would have to take to reach the same level.

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The East's refusal to accept significantly larger Eastern than Western manpower reductions is the central issue of the Vienna negotiations - one on which no progress has been made thus far. Western experts believe the East has deliberately tabled incomplete figures on its military manpower as a device for avoiding larger Eastern than Western manpower reductions.

Armament Limits. Throughout the negotiations, NATO has asked for reductions and limitations of Soviet tanks. In December 1975, the West introduced Option III (the 3 US nuclear elements) as an additional inducement to the Warsaw Pact to make the asymmetrical reductions in manpower described above, as well as to accept reductions and limits on Soviet tanks. However, some people, including some of the Allies, now advocate changing our position on Option III, arguing that while reductions and limits on Pact conventional forces would be valuable, the US should not limit its flexibility to deploy Pershing launchers and nuclear-capable aircraft in Central Europe in view of the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire.

Limits on Military Formations. The Soviets have indicated a willingness to make withdrawals in the form of units -- i.e., divisions -- which could include equipment. If this were to take place, reductions of manpower and armaments, in addition to tanks, would also occur.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the West seek residual limitations on the number of Soviet divisions remaining in the area after reductions take place. Such a provision would place limits on the Soviets' ability to increase their military capability by restructuring their forces under a manpower ceiling. Limits on Soviet divisions would also be more easily verifiable than manpower limits.

Limits on military formations are currently under consideration; but they pose two potential problems. First, the Soviets would almost certainly require reciprocity in limits on NATO military formations which could severely limit NATO's flexibility. Second, to date, the Federal Germans have opposed any limitations on the number of units in the area.

Stabilizing Measures. In addition to force reductions, NATO seeks stabilizing measures to facilitate detection of Soviet force buildups, improve verification capability and give NATO leaders a better picture of Soviet intentions in a crisis. NATO's present negotiating position includes four stabilizing measures applicable to US and Soviet ground forces: (1) notification of movements into the area of reductions; (2) notification of major exercises; (3) limitations on the size of major exercises; and (4) exchange of observers at major exercises.

The US has proposed an expanded set of stabilizing measures which NATO has been reviewing since July of this year. The expanded set of measures would apply to all parties to an agreement. The Soviets have

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made clear that they will not discuss stabilizing measures unless they apply to all parties, particularly the FRG. In addition to the types of measures in NATO's present position, this set would include a limit on the number of exit and entry points into the MBFR reductions area, the provision for ground and aerial inspection, a requirement to exchange information on manpower and major changes in force structure, and the establishment of a follow-on organization to deal with implementation of a reduction agreement.

The Allies recognize the military value of these measures, but to date the FRG has objected to the application of several of the measures to their forces, lest the agreement appear to have constituted the reduction area as a special disarmament zone. These measures are important in the US in that MBFR critics on the Hill look on them as the most positive aspect of NATO's current position.

### C. Next Steps

We in Defense are currently reviewing the Western MBFR position with particular emphasis on the Option III offer. Our analysis is looking at a number of possible ways to achieve the negotiating goal of reducing and limiting Pact conventional forces, while protecting US flexibility to deploy theater nuclear forces. Some of the approaches are:

1. Maintaining Option III withdrawals but excluding future longer-range missile launchers which might eventually replace the current Pershings.
2. Setting limits on Pershing missile launchers at levels comparable to future SS-20 deployments.
3. Removing Pershing Missiles from Option III.
4. Withdrawing Option III entirely.

If the scope of Option III is reduced, it may be necessary to revise NATO's demands for reductions and limits on Soviet and/or Warsaw Pact manpower and armaments.

I believe the issue of the future of Option III in MBFR deserves interagency review at an SCC meeting the first part of next year. If the US decides to recommend a change in the MBFR position, we would next seek NATO approval.

### D. MBFR Discussions at a Summit

Since MBFR is an Alliance negotiation, any US proposal at a Summit should be consistent with the Alliance position.

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The best use of US-Soviet high level discussion on MBFR would be to press the Soviet leadership to address seriously the requirements for the East to take larger reductions than the West in manpower to achieve the objective of a common ceiling. Larger Eastern manpower reductions are called for by the Pact's acceptance of the principle that a reduction agreement should result in parity of military manpower and by the real facts as to the present levels of manpower in the area. These reductions are reasonable in view of the geographic situation of the USSR which is directly contiguous to the area of reductions and in view of the military significance of the proposed reductions and related post-reductions limitations the West is willing to accept on its forces.

It would also be useful to make clear to the Soviet leadership that the US cannot accept the data the East has tabled on the size of its forces, and that agreement on the number of Eastern military manpower in the area -- the determinant of the size of Eastern reductions -- is a requirement of any agreement.

I would suggest a cautious (because of FRG sensitivities) exploration of whether the Soviets would be prepared to reduce the readiness and offensively oriented disposition of their forces (especially the group of Soviet forces in Germany -- 20 divisions) as part of a package of stabilizing measures.

*Harold Brown*

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEC 23 1978

Washington National Records Center,  
SecDef Files, Acc 330-81-0202, Box 32,  
Folder NATO 320.2 MBFR (Jul-Dec) 1978.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: MBFR - Discussions at Summit and at Guadeloupe

Discussions at Summit

After reviewing again the status of the MBFR negotiations, I continue to believe that the most useful position to take with President Brezhnev at a summit meeting would be to press him to address seriously the requirement for the East to take significantly larger manpower reductions than the West. The negotiations are at a point where the next logical step would be for one side to start bargaining about the size of the East's additional reductions. It would be more favorable for the West if the Soviets made the first move to bargain. It is unlikely that the Soviets will start to bargain until after a SALT II agreement has been ratified and has thereby endorsed a continuation of East/West detente through arms control. Therefore, I believe the US should await this event, and possible Soviet moves to bargain, before the US itself indicates any willingness to reduce its reduction demands.

If Brezhnev were to indicate that the East might be willing to take significantly larger manpower reductions than the West, although not the very large asymmetry of reductions (3 to 1) called for by Western data, this would be a useful development.

At that point, you might indicate to Brezhnev that the United States would be willing to recommend to its allies that the West not insist that the East reduce its entire superiority in ground and air manpower, but instead be willing to discuss the amount of Eastern superiority which must be eliminated.

Depending on the reactions of the Europeans at Guadeloupe to expanding the set of stabilizing measures (limits on maneuvers, limits on deployments out of casernes, etc.), it would be appropriate to press Brezhnev to move forward on such measures.

Modified Phase I Agreement: You have asked for a concept for a constructive and fair proposal. A modified Phase I reduction agreement which deferred reaching agreement on manpower data to Phase II, but which included a commitment by both sides to reach a common collective ceiling on manpower in Phase II, could be developed to meet this objective. Attached is an outline of such a concept together with a list of some of the advantages and disadvantages of such a course.

330-81-0202, Box 32, 320.2 MBFR (Jul-Dec) 1978

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OSD P.S. 212 Date 31 May 2003  
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This kind of a proposal would constitute a significant departure from the current Western objective of a comprehensive MBFR Phase I agreement. As such, it should be studied in an interagency review and discussed first with the FRG and UK, and then with other allies before being advanced to the East.

It would offer the prospect of reaching agreement sooner. Such a proposal may be useful in the future if disagreement on data continues to block negotiations for a comprehensive first agreement. However, it should not be considered until after a SALT II agreement has been ratified. There are at least three reasons for this. First, it was only in June of this year that the East agreed for the first time that both sides should reduce manpower to parity in the form of equal ceilings on military manpower on both sides. The West should continue to press the East for a longer period to acknowledge that acceptance of this principle and the real facts as to the present levels of Eastern and Western manpower in the reduction area together call for significantly larger Eastern reductions. Second, after ratification of a SALT II agreement, the East may be willing to address this issue seriously and agree to take significantly larger reductions if they are convinced that this is required to get progress toward an agreement. Finally, during the period of debate on ratification of a SALT II agreement, the US should not reduce significantly its MBFR objectives lest it be subject to domestic political criticism for alleged weakness.

I should add that there are serious reservations within DoD about this approach. Many feel that it would hinder future allied efforts more than those of the Warsaw Pact. There is also concern because the Soviets could return forces more quickly at the end of the five year period if the agreement lapsed. Nevertheless, I think this approach worth considering.

#### Discussions at Guadeloupe

Stabilizing Measures. The new element which should be added now to the West's position in Vienna is an expanded set of stabilizing measures. An agreement in NATO on such a set is currently held up by FRG concerns that these measures, if limited to the reduction area specified in MBFR, would discriminate against West Germany as a special disarmament zone.

Discussions at Guadeloupe present an opportunity to urge Chancellor Schmidt to join the other MBFR participants in agreement to the expanded set of measures in view of the fact that they will improve the security of the NATO allies, especially the FRG, by enhancing warning time, facilitating detection of Soviet force buildup and improving verification capability. Before discussing these measures with the Soviets at a high level, the allies need to be consulted and indeed to agree.

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President Giscard would not be helpful in a discussion with Chancellor Schmidt on this subject because the French have encouraged the FRG in the concept of opposing the application of stabilizing measures to the FRG unless the measures extend into the Soviet Union itself.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

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### Outline of Modified Phase I Agreement

A modified Phase I agreement might provide for Soviet withdrawals of 30,000 ground force manpower, in the form of three divisions, and 1,000 tanks, and US withdrawals of 14,000 ground force manpower and 1,000 nuclear warheads. The agreement would include a commitment by both sides to reach a common collective ceiling on manpower in Phase II. The size of Phase II reductions on each side would be dependent on agreement reached in Phase II as to the existing levels of Eastern and Western manpower. It would provide that if such an agreement is not reached within five years, the Phase I agreement would automatically terminate. This time element would be designed to meet repeated Soviet objections that they cannot commit themselves to permanent limits on their forces without assurance that the FRG is also committed to reductions and limitations. Because the data necessary for manpower limitations after Phase I withdrawal would not have been agreed, the Phase I agreement would provide that US and Soviet divisions and the overall number of Eastern and Western divisions would be limited at the level following Phase I withdrawals, pending reaching agreement on manpower data in Phase II. The allies of the US would undertake no binding commitments other than this temporary collective limit on divisions. Soviet tanks and US nuclear warheads would also be limited at the levels after withdrawal.

The agreement could provide for symbolic Allied and East European manpower reductions in Phase I without a limitation on the residual level of manpower. The allocation of such reductions between the participants and the other modalities would be left to each side to determine.

The agreement should contain provisions for stabilizing measures.

The present Western reduction proposal would continue on the negotiating table as an alternative to the modified Phase I proposal.

#### Advantages of a Modified Phase I Agreement

It would be a first step, albeit a small one, in reducing the military confrontation in Europe and establishing some limits on the continuing military competition.

Deferral of the resolution of the manpower data disagreement should make possible a Phase I agreement without relinquishing the Western position on parity of manpower as the outcome of the MBFR process.

The agreement would formalize Eastern acceptance of the principles of manpower parity and collectivity.

Soviet reductions twice the size of US reductions would be politically significant, of some military value, and of some precedential value for Phase II.

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The East would have an incentive to move on the data issue in Phase II, if it wished to obtain significant Western European reductions.

Limitations on the post-reduction level of divisions would be verifiable.

#### Disadvantages of a Modified Phase I Agreement

Western agreement to postpone resolution of the manpower data issue might be subject to domestic political criticism as a sign of Western weakness.

The FRG, which has opposed limits on units, would probably see division limits as a bad precedent.

There would be concern about the possible adverse impact on NATO's Long Term Defense Program of euphoria resulting from Soviet reductions. This is a problem inherent in any reduction agreement. It should be possible to handle it by a balanced public presentation and focus on the large residual Soviet forces.

The Soviets would not be enthusiastic about this proposal, since it would not guarantee significant West European reductions of manpower or of any West European armaments and would not restrict the FRG's ability to increase its divisions if there were subsequent unilateral reductions of divisions by its allies. However, the Soviets appear to want a first agreement of some kind. The choice presented between this proposal and the present Western proposal would probably incline them toward the new proposal.

There would be concern that if the agreement lapsed at the end of five years, the Soviets could more easily return forces than the US.

There would be a question as to whether the size of the Soviet reductions justified the risk of slowing down allied modernization that is entailed in entering into an agreement with the Soviets.

The fact that the US would be the only Western participant to make other than symbolic reductions might be of concern to those Western European participants under budgetary pressure to reduce forces.

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0017,  
Box 77, Folder NATO 471.94 (Jan-Jul) 1977. 8 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Enhanced Radiation Warheads

In view of recent publicity on the subject of "neutron bombs,"  
I thought the attached might be both informative and helpful.

It is important to note that enhanced radiation weapons are not  
a new development. Testing has been conducted since 1961, and the  
potential for use of enhanced radiation warheads has been  
discussed in the NATO forum for several years. Detailed information  
and rationale for development of the warheads was provided to the  
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Ministers of Defense in January 1976.  
We also provided technical information to the NPG permanent  
representatives in the fall of 1976. The NATO authorities have  
supported this program as necessary to improve the effectiveness  
of NATO's theater nuclear force posture.

Should we move ahead with the enhanced radiation warhead program,  
the advantages we see are as follows:

- These weapons are designed to enhance deterrence, but if  
deterrence fails, to satisfy dual criteria:
  - First, to enhance our capability to inflict significant  
military damage upon an aggressor. The credibility of  
our deterrent is rooted in a visible military utility.
  - Second, to minimize damage and casualties to individuals  
not in the immediate target area, including friendly troops  
and civilians. This should enhance the prospects for  
controlling escalation should deterrence fail.
- NATO is a defensive Alliance and might have to fight on  
its own territory. An aggressor should be faced with  
uncertainty as to whether NATO would use nuclear weapons  
against its forward echelons. For these purposes, a  
capability for discrete application of force must be  
maintained and improved.

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 23/12/2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full:   
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MDR: 15-M-6332

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED  
TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 87

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Attachment A is an extract of information provided to our NATO allies. Attachment B is a fact sheet about the warhead. Attachment C portrays the military effectiveness and safety aspects of the warhead.

Harold commented on this subject in an interview on July 1 with NBC News:

"...it (the enhanced radiation warhead) is a useful military adjunct -- .... That's how I look at it myself. It is not designed to lower the threshold for nuclear conflict, and I don't think it will. The use of nuclear warheads in Europe would be a very, very large step towards escalation, and it would not be taken lightly. The enhanced radiation warhead, because of its characteristics which limit the damage to people and to objects to a fairly well specified radius, would allow it to be used in military situations of interest, against tanks, for example, without doing as much damage to people and to things outside that radius. That gives it some military utility."

We have referred to this memorandum in our Weekly Report to the President and following is what was in the report:

"I am sending Dave Aaron an interim paper which discusses the "neutron bomb," emphasizing facts about the weapon's characteristics; rationale for its development, and our judgment that it is not a totally new kind of weapon, but a more effective one for some uses. The paper may be useful in dispelling emotional misperceptions already generated. Some Members of Congress, citing the B-1 vote, have expressed concern about supporting the enhanced radiation warhead program without being assured that you ultimately will decide to proceed. This argues for setting forth a clear Administration position relatively soon."

Attachment D is a proposed Administration position on the issue.



Attachments

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The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 01 2016

Dear Mr. President:

This letter report is in response to your request for a review of the requirement for tactical nuclear weapons, to include those employing enhanced radiation. My conclusions are that:

- Theater nuclear forces make an essential contribution to deterrence of Warsaw Pact attack on Europe. They should be maintained and modernized. This should not require higher yields, but should be aimed at making them more responsive and more effective, with fewer collateral casualties to civilians and friendly military, and less susceptible to being destroyed by a Warsaw Pact non-nuclear attack.
- Theater nuclear forces provide a relatively inexpensive hedge on NATO having to match Warsaw Pact forces on a one-for-one basis because of the uncertainty they cause for the Warsaw Pact planner. Specifically, they force the Warsaw Pact to posture and deploy their forces so as not to enhance their vulnerability to nuclear weapons. In general, this requires them to disperse their forces, which in turn makes it easier for NATO to defend against them with conventional weapons. Our NATO Allies, most of whose forces are conventional, say that the continued presence of strong theater nuclear forces enables them to plan practically and without undue discouragement for the long-term improvement of those forces.
- Those battlefield support weapons referred to as tactical nuclear weapons - artillery and missiles - shore up one end of the deterrent spectrum provided by theater nuclear forces. They provide an essential deterrent through their threat to Warsaw Pact front-line troops and some possibility of escalating in a controlled way and stopping the conflict in case of failure of deterrence of a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact and of NATO failure to contain such an attack by conventional means. The modernization of such weapons should be part of the program.

Department of Energy Declassification Review	
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- Enhanced radiation (ER) technology in some of our battle-field support weapons should increase the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent by increasing military effectiveness against the threat. They also have the potential of reducing collateral (unwanted) damage and avoiding unwanted casualties to noncombatants and friendly troops.
- The political difficulties associated with ER weapons have stemmed from uninformed commentary. We may well be able to ease some of them by pointing out that ER weapons are not a new kind of weapon, but a modified nuclear weapon with damage-limiting characteristics, and that they remain under your control. Furthermore, careful consultations with our Allies before deploying such weapons would help to overcome some of their difficulties.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] This recommendation is supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Warren Christopher has raised the consultation issue with me; I would be prepared, with the Secretary of State, to undertake such consultations promptly, and to forward specific recommendations on how such consultations might be accomplished.

Alternatively, you might want to undertake specific consultations before you make your decision. However, doing so before you make an August 15 decision on production could require a public statement that you were doing so. In turn, that might, in case of an affirmative decision by you, appear to commit at least [REDACTED]

no 8/15  
deadline

Respectfully,

JS 3.3(b)(5), (6)  
OSD Section 6.2 (a)  
DOE Section 6.2 (a)

*Harold Brown*

5 U.S.C. 552

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 01 2016

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 01 JUL 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
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Reason: 6.2 (a)  
MDR: 15 -M- 0333

3/78

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

NODIS

Do not ~~last~~ issue  
any statement re ERW  
J.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Harold Brown *HB*  
Cyrus Vance *CV*  
SUBJECT: ERW and Alliance Consultations

We have been working with the NSC to prepare a plan for Alliance consultations on your three-part policy on enhanced radiation weapons: a US production decision, an offer to forego ER deployment if the Soviets will forego deployment of the SS-20, and Alliance willingness to accept deployment of ER in two years if arms control is unsuccessful. We are seeking to implement the policy in meetings of the North Atlantic Council on March 20 and 22.

We have agreed to a British draft summing up statement to be made by Secretary General Luns at the conclusion of the March 22 meeting which would express an Alliance consensus in support of the policy. (Tab 1). The FRG has not agreed to this draft statement even though the Germans want an expeditious resolution of the issue. While the FRG supports production and deployment, it prefers a linkage to Soviet tanks outside MBFR and wishes to present their arguments during the consultations. However, the FRG has said that if an Alliance consensus develops around the SS-20 linkage, they will join it. It is not clear whether the Germans will hold to their tank argument until the second NAC meeting, which could jeopardize a consensus, or whether they will fall off during the March 20 preliminary meeting.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 20 May 78 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_

Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

MDR: 15-M-0338

U.S.C. 552

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DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: MAY 20 2016

JC, NSA, Brz Mat, Subj File, Enhanced Radiation Weapons and Radiological Warfare, 2-4/78  
Box 17, # 2

R1

15-M-0338

I am going to communicate with Foreign Minister Genscher today and try to persuade him to follow the FRG to join us in supporting the SS-20 linkage on March 20, after they have made their case for tanks.

We are still having varying degrees of difficulty with the Dutch, Danes, Belgians and Norwegians over deployment element. However, we believe clear FRG support for production and deployment will help bring these Allies around or at least induce them to remain silent so that a consensus can be expressed.

Our plan for next week is for the preliminary March 20 meeting to demonstrate an Alliance consensus supporting our approach and to set the stage for a conclusive meeting on March 22. Assuming we are successful, I propose that a White House announcement of the three-part ER policy be made the morning of March 23 along the lines of the draft at Tab 2. Also on March 23, Secretary General Luns would make a supportive statement in Brussels.

*This is probably true -*

While ACDA does not object to the development and deployment of ER weapons per se as part of a NATO modernization program, ACDA believes that coupling this action with SS-20 is not a credible arms control trade off, and that serious consideration therefore should be given to the German proposal to link ER to Soviet tank reduction outside MBFR. ACDA believes such a proposal, which involves closely related limitations, would be more credible to public opinion and have some chance of leading to useful negotiations.

USUN opposes production of ER weapons on the grounds that it would seriously jeopardize our credibility and our whole effort at the upcoming UN Special Session Disarmament.

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Date: MAY 20 2016

We continue to support your decisions made beginning last November in your letter to Chancellor Schmidt and which we have pursued since then.

The issue has festered too long already at considerable cost to Alliance unity. The decision will be made more difficult the longer we wait to follow through in giving the clear lead the Alliance expects of us. The SS-20 offer is an appropriate arms control move for the reasons it was originally advanced in November. The German proposal is potentially highly complex - outside MBFR but what new form? How big a reduction? Covering what area?

To defer pressing for final Alliance action now on our proposal would mean a long delay, until at least after the SSOD and the NATO summit, and such delay would make the problem worse not better.

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Date: MAY 20 2016

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~~SENSITIVE~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON D C. 20301

April 3, 1978

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-81-0202, Box 60, Folder Lance 471.94 (Jan-20 Apr) 1978.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ERW

I understand that Genscher on April 4 is likely to convey a decision by the FRG Security Council to ask you to deploy enhanced radiation weapons in Germany. Such a move, together with FRG and UK concerns expressed to Warren Christopher about how the decision is to be publicly handled, reinforce my belief that there will be very severe costs to an explicit final decision now against ER. These include:

- FRG moves will tend to make the US--and you personally--take all the heat for a "no".
- There will be charges of "another unilateral restraint", that could undermine support at home for foreign policy initiatives, including SALT and possibly even the Panama Canal Treaties.
- Our best public argument for a "no"--the divisive effect of producing and deploying ER on public support for more important defense programs--will be seriously undercut by the likely German position.

I suggest that in light of the rapid changes in the picture since your trip began, we should delay any public announcement until after Minister Genscher's visit gives us a chance to consider the FRG position and perhaps to take some further Congressional soundings.

In the period before an announcement is made, I urge you to consider a decision that would start work on modernized weapons for Lance while leaving open a final decision on whether to complete the installation of the ER feature. This would mean producing the Lance weapon (W-70 Mod3) intended to contain the ER system, without now committing to install the elements that make it an ER weapon. Technically, the Lance weapons that have been designed to contain the ER features can be built without them.

[REDACTED] The ER features can later be added if necessary, but an affirmative Presidential decision to do that would be required.


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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 15 2016

While it is clear that we would also need to modernize the 8" system-- the other immediate candidate for ER--to improve range and safety, the same option (of producing the newly-designed weapon and leaving out the ER feature) may not be available.



A decision to go ahead with the production of the Lance W 70 Mod 3 without committing to completing the ER features would respond to the very real military need to continue to modernize the Lance system. It would also reassure the allies that the ER issue does not imply abandonment of the battlefield nuclear forces, which failure to modernize would be likely to be read as implying. To achieve these ends, an effective and practical program of modernization would be needed even with an absolute and final decision against ER.

I believe combining such a deferral option for Lance with a call for some "equivalent" Soviet action (if we can define "equivalent" with the right degree of precision or imprecision) would reduce criticism of "unilateralism" or "give away". For that reason, I suggest you consider joining a deferred decision with a call on the Soviets to show restraint in deployments of forces related to the security of Europe that will make it unnecessary to consider whether to incorporate ER features into our modernized battlefield weapons. Such a position would not commit the US to ER if the offer is not taken up, but would make clear that our future decisions in this area depend in part on their conduct.

The announcement could be cast in the following form: The President has decided not to proceed now with enhanced radiation features in the nuclear weapons we will be modernizing. He calls on the Soviets to show restraint in force deployments relating to European security, and his future decisions on ER will depend on their actions.

*Harold Brown*

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 15 2016

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 15 Aug 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 6.2(a)  
MDR: 15-M-0339

DOC  
SECTION 6.2(a)

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

Department of Energy Document Review	
1 <sup>st</sup> Review Date: <u>1/2/15</u>	Determination: (Circle Number(s))
Authority DC: <u>1.2.1</u>	① Classification Review
Derived From: _____	2. Upgraded/Downgraded To: _____
Declassify On: _____	3. Contains No DOE Classified Info
2 <sup>nd</sup> Review Date: <u>4/14/2015</u>	4. Coordinates With: _____
Authority: <u>DD</u>	5. Derivative of: _____
	6. Classified by: _____
	7. Other: _____

**SENSITIVE**



## OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-81-0202, Box 66, Folder NATO (Jan-Dec) 1978.

21 August 1978

ADVISOR ON NATO  
AFFAIRS

## MEMORANDUM FOR UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

*Stan*

A powerful case can be made that credible NATO deterrence in the '80s demands a long-range theater nuclear capability to complement our emphasis on conventional defense. Hence DoD ought to press hard to keep this option wide open in the SCC on PRM #38. This won't be easy, because PRM #38 so feebly and ambivalently presents many key issues affecting NATO that one would hardly know so much was at stake:

1. It seriously underplays why the "grey area" issue has become such a live one--chiefly that the shift from US strategic superiority to parity inevitably reduces the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella over NATO. Coupling just can't be as credible as before. To add to the problem, the USSR is fielding a new range of highly visible long-range theater systems (while we are not).

2. This has inevitably led to declining European confidence in the US umbrella, a fact on which the evidence is so overwhelming as to make me wonder why the PRM treats it so gingerly.

3. Nor can the PRM #38 problem be treated in isolation from our other NATO initiatives, MBFR, and SALT. These are all linked in terms of their impact on Allied and Soviet perceptions. For example, European concern that a theater nuclear imbalance is developing could: (a) further degrade Allied confidence in coupling; (b) lead key Allies to strike out on their own in TNF, as the French already are; (c) heighten Allied and Hill fears that we are giving away too much in SALT and MBFR; (d) erode Allied support for conventional force improvements, including the LTDP; and for all the above reasons (e) badly strain Alliance cohesion at a time when we can ill afford yet another schism among Allies.

4. TNF modernization could also be a valuable perceptual offset in case the next US defense budget falls below 3% real growth (a phenomenon which would further shake Allied confidence in US leadership--and in the Carter Administration).

In sum, the overriding problem on which we must firmly fix our sights is that of maintaining Allied confidence in (and Soviet respect for) NATO's deterrent capability, while seeking

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3  
DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 2003

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330-81-0202, Box 66, NATO 471.87 (Jan-Dec) 1978

15-m-0344



to stabilize a satisfactory balance via arms controls (SAL, TAL, and MBFR). This key issue is far too obscured in PRM #38 to provide a valid basis for discussion, much less choice.

In my own view a medium-sized GLCM force would best meet this overriding need: (a) optimum impact on Allied and Soviet perceptions; (b) least provocativeness, hence greatest stability; (c) early timing; (d) cost-effectiveness; and (e) a lever to help us bargain for limits on Soviet theater nuclear expansion. I also find inane the concern expressed in PRM #38 that this would be seen as "decoupling." A credible theater-level deterrent would enhance coupling, while preserving greater US freedom of strategic action.

But GLCMs are not the issue at this point. All we need right now is a positive US decision to endorse the HLG consensus and move on to the next stage. True, this (together with funding FY-82 GLCM IOC) would be a big step down the road, but let's look at the alternative too. US failure after several months to embrace even the very cautiously worded HLG consensus would be a grievous blow to Allied confidence, especially since (as PRM #38 does make clear) we have no viable arms control option to offer in its place--only a renewed assertion that the Allies can still rely on Uncle Sam. How can SecDef defend this position at the next NPG and DPC (where it would shoulder aside the LTDP as Topic No. 1)?

Recommendation. That you make a strong case along above lines at SCC.

*RWK*

R. W. Komer

cc: SecDef  
Chairman, JCS  
Mr. McGiffert  
Mr. Murray

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 29 DEC 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
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MDR: 15 -M- 0344

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 29 2014

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 30 2014

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 9, 1979

Washington National Records  
Center, SecDef Files, Acc  
330-82-0205, Box 19, Folder  
NATO 471.61 (Jan-Jun) 1979.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Cyrus Vance *cv*  
Harold Brown *HB*

Subject: TNF Modernization -- US Diplomacy,  
Your Role and the Schmidt Visit

Background

Soviet theater nuclear modernization efforts, coupled with Soviet attainment of strategic parity, enhance the significance of the situation in which NATO does not have missiles on the continent of Europe that can strike Soviet territory. Although this situation has existed since the early 1960s, it now has political, as well as military, significance: vocal Allied -- (especially West German) concerns about the SS-20 and Backfire and about the SALT II protocol constraints on US cruise missiles manifest this. Chancellor Schmidt defined this issue politically in a 1977 speech.

In order to meet both political and military requirements, we believe that the US needs to take the step of deploying new long-range nuclear systems on the European continent -- either Pershing ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, or perhaps some combination. This would maintain a perception of a firm US commitment to the defense of Europe, forge Alliance unity, and strengthen deterrence by providing credible escalation options. Without prodding from us, the NPG High Level Group (HLG) has reached the same conclusion. The HLG believes that deployments of 200 - 600 additional long-range warheads are all that is needed; there is no need to match the large Soviet long-range theater force, and doing so might be seen as "decoupling" US strategic forces from Europe. The total number of US nuclear warheads in Europe would be held constant and might even decrease.

Diplomacy

We are embarked on a course designed to secure by December an Alliance consensus for new deployments. The Allies must share in the responsibility for the decision; they agree and are calling for a consensus themselves,

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SEC DEF CONTR No. **02456**

330-82-0205, box 19, NATO 471.61 (Jan-Jun) 1979

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- 3 -

There are risks for us as well. For instance, the political reaction from Moscow will strain US-Soviet relations. The Europeans' desire for complementary TNF arms control efforts could burden the SALT process, even if we are able to devise a workable proposal for negotiating TNF. But, if we fail to take this step, the problem will remain with the Alliance, seriously aggravated by the knowledge -- here, in Europe, and in Moscow -- that NATO was unable to respond.

### Your Role

Your personal role -- first in private and later in public -- will be pivotal in influencing the outcome. Until you have communicated your views to the European leaders, we are likely to find ambivalence as we consult with their governments on how to proceed. These leaders are influenced by the legacy of the neutron bomb affair. For this reason, once leaders in Europe are prepared to deal with the issue, it will be necessary for you to go on record publicly.

Even though a formal, public NATO consensus would not be reached until year's end, at the earliest, it's important for you personally to become engaged now. If Allied leaders see US leadership, they'll assume that in the end NATO will decide for deployment, and they will begin to work toward that end. If they are unsure of where you stand, they will try to put off a decision and not become politically exposed.

### Alternatives

Recognizing the risks, we could, of course, decide now not to pursue this potentially rough course and adopt a fall-back position. For example, we could stand aside from the leadership role and hope that the issue subsides. Or, we could seek only new deployments at sea (of SLCMs) or in the UK (of GLCMs); or, we could commit more SSBNs to NATO. But these fall-backs, if adopted now, would not be seen as answering the challenge posed by Soviet deployments. Nor would they ease European doubts about US political will and commitment to European security; on the contrary, these doubts could even increase. The ultimate outcome could be a weakened NATO and a Western Europe more independent of the United States. More immediately, should it become known that the US was attempting to side-step the issue of

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Date: DEC 30 2014

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- 4 -

new long-range TNF deployments, chances for SALT ratification would clearly be harmed.

Some of these fall-backs (SLCM) might be more politically acceptable if the Europeans conclude in the face of US leadership that a consensus on Continental systems is not possible.

#### Schmidt Visit

If you agree with the course outlined here, your personal role in our diplomacy should begin with the Schmidt visit. Schmidt has got to be convinced of both our constancy and our willingness to accept the responsibility of leading the Alliance -- and Germany -- to a consensus for deployments in the face of political wavering in Europe and hostility from the Soviets.

You should also give the Chancellor an opportunity to tell you if he sees real problems for Germany in following the course toward eventual deployments. If he has strong misgivings, or if he has ideas on how to respond to the problem militarily in ways different from the consensus of the HLG, we should know now.

Schmidt's domestic situation encourages procrastination and equivocation on his part. The Left Wing of his own party -- the main source of his problem -- wants to avoid deployments, largely because of fear of damage to Ostpolitik; the opposition and his coalition partner (the FDP) favor deployments. Schmidt's strategy for managing this situation involves his conditions for deployments in the FRG: it must be an "Alliance decision;" at least one other NATO country on the Continent must participate concretely in deployments; a deployment decision must be accompanied by sincere arms control attempts.

We share Schmidt's interest in SPD party unity and the political and humanitarian gains of Ostpolitik for the German people. But at the same time, Schmidt has to realize that there are stakes that transcend the vicissitudes of German politics. Schmidt probably agrees: he wants an Alliance consensus and US leadership to help contain the problem on his Left and to limit the impact of Soviet political and propaganda maneuvers.

In June, you should tell Schmidt that you believe that the Alliance faces an important military and political problem and that some deployments are needed to correct it,

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 30 2014



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- 5 -

including deployments in Germany -- probably of the Pershing II missile. You should tell him that the US intends to work with other countries on this basis and to move to an Alliance consensus by December. You will have to convince the Chancellor of your determination to bring about the conditions (including second country participation in deployments and a serious TNF arms control approach) that would make a deployment consensus as painless as possible for him and for Germany. You will want to make clear to Schmidt that you are sensitive to his -- and Germany's -- political problem on this issue, and that you are therefore willing to accept primary responsibility, though his support of our efforts is necessary.

Ideally, it would be desirable if Schmidt responded by giving you unconditional agreement to deployments in Germany. He will almost certainly not do so, at least partly out of concern that we would only make a perfunctory effort to meet his conditions; but we can expect him to be fairly positive and to indicate his support. He does not want the burden of derailing deployments after you have indicated that you think there's a need, especially since he was instrumental in raising the issue in the first place.

Even if we can't expect an unconditional agreement to deployment in Germany, presenting your thoughts to Schmidt will show him that you have assumed a firm lead and that the burden for not going forward with deployments will be that much more on his shoulders. Also, having given him this chance to state misgivings, he'll feel he has less freedom to maneuver later on if he does not give you a negative signal.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurs with the thrust of this memorandum.

Office of the Secretary of Defense *5 U.S.C. 552*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *30 Dec 2014* Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: *X* Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: *15* -M- *0351*

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
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DEC 30 2014



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May 18, 1979

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: TNF Modernization (S)

The President has approved the general approach outlined in your memorandum of May 9, and, more specifically, he has authorized: (S)

-- SCC studies aimed at pulling together by the end of June an initial TNF modernization proposal which will be discussed bilaterally with the allies in July. (S)

-- A letter to Schmidt outlining the U.S. approach to the TNF problem as described in your memorandum. This letter could also preview a possible link between TNF and MBFR progress, making it clear that the latter would not be an obstacle to the necessary steps on TNF within the context of the LTDP. (S)

I will have my staff by in touch with yours regarding the proposed text of such a letter, which we could submit to the President in time for dispatch to Schmidt, so that Schmidt can consider it before coming to Washington. (S)

Office of the Secretary of Defense 545.6 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 24 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
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Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M-0352

*Zbigniew Brzezinski*

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

DEC 24 2014

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Review on May 18, 1985

SEC DEF CONTR No. 02582

330-82-0205, box 19, NATO 471.61 (66 Jan - Sept) 1979

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15-m-0352

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 05 2016

5 JUL 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces

In response to your request, this memorandum outlines my recommendation for the modernization of NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNFs). I believe the US should take a firm lead in bringing the Alliance to a decision on both TNF modernization and a parallel arms control approach by the end of this year.

The program I recommend, which is set forth at Tab A, is designed to serve as the basis for bilateral consultations with key Allies in July and thereafter as the program to be submitted for review to the NATO High-Level Group. At this stage we would not be asking our Allies for definitive political approval--that should come in December. Rather, we should be asking them only to approve placing the program before the High-Level Group, an expert body not invested with political authority, for analysis and recommendation. We should recognize that this consultative process may lead to program modification and be prepared, within reason, to accept that result.

Program for NATO LRTNF Modernization

(1) Systems Mix: The program I propose consists of a mix of PERSHING II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). Such a force would have military advantages--hedging against the failure of one type of system, flexibility to select the best weapon for each mission--and the political advantage of affording opportunities for widespread participation among the Allies. This latter consideration in particular argues against a pure PERSHING force since its range vs. the Soviet Union would be too limited to allow deployment in the UK. Finally, the program provides a reasonable basis from which to pursue an arms control approach; in particular, by including cruise missiles with which the Soviets have been so concerned in SALT II, the program should provide a basis for leverage in any arms control negotiations.

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~  
~~Unauthorized disclosure subject to~~  
~~administrative and criminal sanctions~~  
~~Handle as Restricted Data on foreign~~  
~~classification. Section 114b, Atomic~~  
~~Energy Act 1954.~~

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Review on 29 Jun 85

JC, NSC, Inst Files, 77-81, SCC 176 TNF 669 7/5/79, #10 box 104 15-m-0355

Introducing more systems into the mix to be initially proposed to the Allies, e.g., air-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles or a new medium-range ballistic missile, would not in my view be appropriate at this time. ALCMs have the same pre-launch vulnerability problems as aircraft; if their range were over 600 km (which for military reasons would be desirable given Warsaw Pact defenses), any US aircraft on which they were deployed (plus all US aircraft of the same type unless observably different) would count under SALT II. Only with a greatly accelerated program could the MRBM be available by 1985 and therefore it should be viewed as a follow-on to the PERSHING II. As to sea-launched cruise missiles, the point you made to Schmidt about playing down these systems to discourage Allies from avoiding participation still holds. However, we should keep sea-based systems in our back pocket in case the PERSHING II/GLCM approach fails to receive allied support. Our current R&D program for SLCM preserves this option, and sea-based forces may ultimately be required to achieve the required degree of survivability in the force.

(2) Force Size: The High-Level Group recommends a net increase of 200-600 in NATO LRTNF warheads. I support that conclusion both from the point of view of providing a credible military capability and of responding to Soviet TNF modernization. At this time I recommend we propose to the Allies a LRTNF program involving 476 additional warheads, anticipating that the Allies may somewhat cut it back. My reasons for recommending this level of increase are that:

- It would provide a significant addition to our military capabilities and hence to deterrence.
- It would give us flexibility to let the Allies argue us down modestly on numbers and yet still have a significant program.
- It would give us flexibility within the parameters of the HLG consensus to go up, if Soviet deployments continue to increase, or to go down in the context of an arms control agreement while still accomplishing the minimum necessary modernization.

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 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: JUL 05 2016



-- It is large enough to show the Soviets that we mean business and the Allies that we are serious about preserving their security. Yet it is not so large as to provoke the Soviets into an arms race or unduly frighten European publics over an increased emphasis on nuclear defense in Europe.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend going in with a larger force because of the uncertainties associated with future allied participation and arms control involving LRTNF. If the US could be assured of achieving a net increase of 400-500 land-based long-range warheads, the JCS might support a program similar to the one at Tab A, when augmented by SLCM, to achieve the size force recommended in the Joint Strategic Planning Document. At Tab B is the program the JCS would prefer as a starting point. ~~Either is reasonable.~~ Militarily, and practically speaking, the JCS recommendation and my own differ little. The real issue is what mix and level is best as a going-in position for negotiation with our Allies.

(3) Basing and Participation: Permanent wide-spread basing of LRTNF would be the most significant form of LRTNF participation. Five countries are principal candidates for such basing: FRG, UK, [REDACTED]. Our preliminary consultations suggest that there is a reasonable possibility of basing in each of these countries but only if the deployment is carefully managed (individually and collectively) from a political point of view.

The program I propose includes basing in each of these countries. While basing in all these countries is not essential for a viable PII/GLCM program, we need at a minimum (1) basing in the FRG, (2) plus, in order to meet the German condition that at least one other continental country participate, basing either in [REDACTED] and (3) basing in either the UK or [REDACTED] in order to achieve adequate numbers.

The LRTNF presented to the Allies should be structured so that all participating countries receive their first LRTNF deployments as nearly simultaneously as possible. In this way, all will undertake the political burden at the same time and none will believe it can make an initial commitment that it can later avoid.

In the case of the FRG, Chancellor Schmidt introduced what may be a new dimension during his recent conversation with me, i.e., his desire that no weapons based in the FRG be able to strike Moscow. [REDACTED]

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

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Date: JUL 05 2016



Accordingly, some favor proposing only PERSHING IIs for the FRG. I believe, however that we should initially ask the FRG to accept GLCM in addition to PERSHING II, primarily to achieve wide-spread participation. [redacted] will probably prefer GLCMs, in part for cost reasons, but will almost certainly have difficulty accepting them unless GLCMs are also based in Germany. Moreover, it may well be that we can appropriately modify GLCM range; we are looking at this question now.

As for the other Allies, we can rule out the [redacted] and [redacted] as direct participants because of their peacetime no-nuclear basing policy. [redacted]

(4) Costs and Cost Sharing: I estimate that the program outlined above will cost (in 1979 \$) about \$370 million for R&E in addition to costs already sunk, \$1391 million for procurement, and \$240 million each year for operations and maintenance once the force is fully fielded.

Cost sharing will depend, in the first instance, on whether any of the systems are "dual-key", i.e., the launchers are owned and manned by Europeans with the US having custody of the warheads. Since the user country would presumably pick up the launcher procurement costs and subsequent O&M, such an arrangement would cut the costs to the US. On the other hand, dual-key arrangements might make subsequent arms control negotiations for medium-range systems of these sorts somewhat more difficult by raising questions of noncircumvention and nontransfer, as well as potentially involving dual-key systems in a bilateral "gray area" negotiation. The Germans have made clear they do not want a dual-key arrangement for political reasons; I am not certain what the position of the other countries will be. I believe maximum participation is more important than modest reduction in US costs or prejudgment of arms control arrangements. Therefore we should, in our consultations with our Allies, take no strong stand on LRTNF ownership arrangements.

The most feasible form of NATO-wide financial participation would be some form of NATO infrastructure funding for construction of basing facilities for LRTNF. In addition, I believe we should consider other forms of cost sharing, e.g., having an ally provide security forces to support a US LRTNF

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

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OSD 3.3(b)(5)  
JS 3.3(b)(6)

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Date: JUL 05 2016



unit based on its soil. If it eventually turns out that our GLCM/PERSHING II approach fails and we rely on US sea-launched cruise missiles to augment NATO LRTNF, there are no obvious ways for cost sharing by the Allies.

*Harold Brown*

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Date: JUL 05 2016

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GLCM/PERSHING II LRTNF FORCE MIX

**Cost-Sharing Notes:**

- Facilities construction could be picked up by NATO Infrastructure Funding into which the US pays about a 27% share.
- Replacement and Operating & Support costs could be paid by those Allies which own and man LRTNF stationed on their territory. US manning would probably require the US to pick up these costs.
- Recovery for Operations could be provided by those Allies which own and man LRTNF stationed on their territory while US manned LRTNF would require that the U.S. provide this manpower.
- Manpower for security could be largely provided by the Allied country concerned regardless of whether the U.S. or the Ally owned and operated the LRTNF systems.

(Costs are in millions of FY 79 dollars. Unsunk R&D costs are \$300M for Pershing II and \$74M for GLCM)

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Date: JUL 05 2016

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JS 3.3 (b)(6) + 6.2 (a)

OSO SECTION 6.7(a)

~~SECRET~~

GLCM/PERSH II LRTNF FORCE MIX  
(JCS Recommendation)

(Costs are in millions of FY 79 dollars. Unsunk R&D costs are \$300M for Pershing II and \$75M for GLCM)

Cost-Sharing Notes:

- Facilities construction could be picked up by NATO Infrastructure Funding into which the US pays about a 27% share.
- Procurement and Operating & Support costs could be paid by those Allies which own and man LRTNF stationed on their territory. US manning would probably require the US to pick up these costs.
- Manpower for Operations could be provided by those Allies which own and man LRTNF stationed on their territory while US manned LRTNF would require that the U.S. provide this manpower.
- Manpower for security could be largely provided by the Allied country concerned regardless of whether the U.S. or the Ally owned and operated the LRTNF systems.

a/ The MRBM should be developed as a follow-on to the Pershing II.

JS 3.3 (b)(6) + 6.2 (a)

OSD SECTION 6.7(a)

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: JUL 05 2016

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 05 Jul 2016 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: Deny in Full:

Declassify in Part: X

Reason: 3.3 (b)(5) + 6.2 (a)

MDR: 15 -M- 0354



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GLCM/ALCM LRTNF FORCE MIX

Costs are in millions of FY 79 dollars. Unsunk R&D costs are \$175 M for ALCM and \$74 M for GLCM)

Assumes 10 ALCMs per aircraft. Number of aircraft correspond to the current number of UK Vulcans which will be replaced by Tornado aircraft in the early 1980s.

b/ Assumes facilities already available to support aircraft are sufficient to accommodate additional requirements for ALCMs.

c/ Assumes F-111 as a nominal launch aircraft and charges all O&S costs of the aircraft to the LRTNF mission.

d/ To be provided later.

JS 3.3(b)(6) + 6.2(a)  
OSD SECTION 6.2(4)

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 05 2016

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3 SEP 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: September 4 SCC Meeting on TNF Arms Control  
ACTION MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, W

Date: DEC 30 2014

The purpose of the September 4 meeting is to approve a strategy for preliminary exchanges with the Soviets on TNF arms control, and to make some final decisions on modalities for such exchanges to propose to the Soviets. An agenda paper for the meeting, prepared in the Working Group, is at Tab A-1.

The meeting comes a bit late in a sense, given the President's reply to Brezhnev's letter to the President (Tab E). The procedure adopted by Brezhnev in this and the apparently similar letters he sent to the heads of state of our NATO Allies was obviously designed to make propaganda points by depicting the US as stalling. The President's reply to Brezhnev (Tab G) should serve to close off this particular Soviet gambit. It also provides the basic confirmation of the SCC's July 31 conclusion that the US should move forward with talks with the Soviets on long-range theater nuclear systems, a confirmation reinforced by proposing an initial meeting in early October.

Strategy for the Preliminary Exchanges

The agenda paper (p. 2 of Tab A-1) sets out a six-point set of guidelines for conducting the exchanges. These guidelines are consistent with and incorporate the July 31 SCC conclusions, and we recommend you approve them\* as the basis for consultations with the Allies in the SCC and, subsequently, for the initial round with the USSR. Briefly, the guidelines state that:

- Our objective in the exchanges will be to discuss, and to the extent possible, define with the Soviets the scope of the negotiations on TNF which will take place in SALT III.
- The US position will be based on the principles for arms control involving TNF decided by NATO Ministers last December.
- We will not table a specific proposal during the preliminary exchanges.
- We will begin by presenting our view of the framework for negotiations involving TNF and thereafter describe and present rationale for the specific principles reflected in the US position.

\* State has sent a general description of our approach (but not, curiously, the guidelines as such) to the UK, FRG and Italy (Tab I). We may have some feedback from these Allies before the SCC meeting.

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Classified by: Dir, DOD SALT TF  
Review on: 3 SEP 2000

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- We will put down a marker on Backfire but not in the preliminary exchanges ~~discuss specific ways of dealing with this system.~~
- We will reject Soviet efforts to limit US "FBS", insisting that the first step in negotiations should be limited to long-range land-based theater nuclear missiles. We would say that this would be without prejudice to the question of whether US and Soviet aircraft would be addressed in a subsequent step.

The "FBS" formula warrants special attention. Quite apart from Soviet pressure on "FBS" (Brezhnev's recent letter spoke not only of dealing with such systems but also of eliminating the "bases" from which they operate), we can expect close questioning by Allies on our attitude toward inclusion of aircraft at some point in the negotiations and some pressure from the FRG and others to espouse early the general proposition that aircraft on both sides could be limited. The formula above is designed to temper any Allied inclinations to soften on "FBS" by hewing firmly to the NATO principles, and leaving open the question of whether the US would be prepared to take up aircraft in the negotiations after an agreement on missiles. We have not answered that question specifically for ourselves (although the IDD reflects a general disposition to expand the scope of negotiations in subsequent steps)--and my personal inclination is that we should not make an issue of the abstract desirability of limiting aircraft someday. However, tactically, it would be unwise to begin our consultations with the allies by a major shift in our position (and wildly unrealistic to think we can have a different line with the Allies and with the Soviets on so central an issue). I think our line with the Allies at the SCG should be:

- Of course we recognize the abstract attractiveness of putting some limits on aircraft that are long-range and nuclear capable.
- BUT
  - Limiting aircraft is immensely complicated--and the Allies should be learning through the SCG that limiting missiles is complicated enough. Unlike missiles, aircraft raise all kinds of dual use and POC problems.
  - Missiles really are the dynamic and (from both sides' perspectives) critical part of the LRTNF problem.
  - There is no clear way of bringing in aircraft and giving the US and NATO an advantage in the talks. (On most reasonable ways of looking at US and Soviet aircraft of similar capabilities, the US doesn't close the gap that exists looking only at missiles.)
- Tactically, indicating any flexibility would be bad:
  - First and foremost, the Soviets aren't talking about limiting US and Soviet aircraft, but only US aircraft. There is no reason to believe they have the slightest interest in a genuinely mutual and reciprocal aircraft limit. Putting mutual aircraft limits into the play could/would be as likely to slow and complicate the talks as advance them past an obstacle.

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Date: DEC 30 2014

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-- The Soviets have advanced the FBS point before in both SALT I and II and eventually dropped it. There's no proof they'll do so again, but equally no reason to decide now that they will collapse the talks over FBS.

-- These are preliminary talks, not the actual negotiations. Before we think seriously about either expanding the scope of the talks vastly beyond what NATO decided in December in the IDD principles and/or hinting at compromise on a fundamental issue of principle (equality and reciprocity of limits) we should hear out the Soviet position and present our own.

- Finally, the proposed "element" is far from slamming the door permanently on some kind of aircraft limits: It proposes, consistent with the December principles, to start with missiles, without prejudice to possible later limits on other systems.

We must recognize that our Backfire position makes us slightly pregnant on aircraft--especially to the extent that we would consider seeking limits on Backfire in the negotiations as a "TNF" system. However, the July SCC conclusion and the proposed "element" are appropriately vague on the issue--and leave our Backfire principle as some counter-weight to their FBS point.

In any event, it will be important that we establish a firmly grounded interagency set of talking points on this nexus of issues for use with Allies (especially at the September 15-16 SCG) and, ultimately, with the Soviets. We recommend that you encourage the SCC to direct that this be done by the Working Group (headed by NSC staff) or by the SCG Delegation (chaired by Reg Bartholomew).

You should also note that the guidelines set out in the agenda paper govern our approach at a minimum for the opening round of talks. Whether we can or should stick with those guidelines throughout the period of preliminary exchanges cannot be foreseen now. Once we have set out in full the US position and heard Soviet views, we may reach a point where we must decide whether any part of our current position is negotiable in the preliminary exchanges. The Allies may question us on this. We recommend that our response should be that at the present time we do not envisage altering our current position during the preliminary exchanges. You may want to raise this point with your SCC colleagues to see if they agree.

At Tab C is a background paper on strategy for the preliminary exchanges. Although reviewed in an earlier draft by the Working Group, it is largely a State product--much too wordy and prematurely venturing into "talking points" which need not and should not be addressed until the SCC addresses actual instructions to our negotiating team--and has not been cleared at staff level. You should avoid having the SCC give "approval" to this paper.

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Date: DEC 30 2014

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Modalities.

The agenda paper (p. 3 of Tab A-1) lays out a recommended set of modalities for the talks--teams of "senior officials" meeting in Geneva, with the first round starting in early October and lasting for about a month and a second round "during the winter." Spurgeon Keeny would head the US team. We recommend you approve this approach. Further, we should tell the Soviets who will head our team, so that they know what level of "senior officials" we have in mind.

The agenda paper also sets out a good formula for consulting our Allies. We would use regularly scheduled SCG meetings, as well as briefings in the NAC as we did in SALT I and II.

Announcements.

The scenario envisaged in the agenda paper involves delivering to the Soviets here in town our proposals for modalities (to the extent not already done in delivering the President's reply), and suggesting to them that formal agreement might be made and announced at a meeting between Muskie and Gromyko at the UNGA during the latter part of September. We see no problem with this procedure, recognizing, however, that the Soviet response could be quick, leading to an earlier announcement.

The agenda paper (p. 4 of Tab A-1) contains draft texts for both joint and unilateral statements on the talks. It is difficult--indeed impossible--to envisage agreeing with the Soviets on a joint text that would fully meet US needs. Thus, we must anticipate making a unilateral statement, regardless of what, if anything, we agree with the Soviets. We see no need for the SCC to put these texts in concrete at this stage. We will need to fine-tune them in light of circumstances at the time of their use.



WALTER SLOCOMBE  
Director  
DoD SALT Task Force

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 30 2014



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEC DEF HAS SEEN  
19 APR 1977

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

16 APR 1977

1-21655/77

*no action*

*4/19*  
*Save for 4/1*  
*lunch up 20 x CI*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Zaire - Uncertain Future -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U)

(S) The month-long invasion of the Shaba Region has cast into doubt Zaire's future unity and stability by eroding the prestige and authority of Mobutu and his government, upsetting Zaire's economic stabilization program, and increasing Zaire's already excessive foreign debts. Nigeria's diplomatic initiative and OAU action appear to hold little promise for immediate resolution of the situation. France's influence in Zaire, and possibly other African states, is at a new high as the result of its response to Mobutu's requests for military assistance. On the other hand US (and to a lesser degree Belgian) influence in Zaire and among African moderates has suffered somewhat, at least in Zairian eyes from the limits we have placed on our aid. Introduction of Moroccan military forces last week added a new dimension to the conflict. The outlook is uncertain. Hard policy decisions for the USG may be in the offing.

(S) General US objectives are:

- Prevent, preferably by diplomatic means, the partition of Zaire.
- Avoid making Zaire appear as a test of American will or a major East-West confrontation.
- Prevent, if possible, a situation which would be perceived as another victory for USSR/Cuba and further destabilize the tense southern Africa situation just as we start our new initiatives on Rhodesia and Namibia.
- Encourage improvement in Zaire's relations with neighboring states, including Angola.
- Avoid the emergence of a hostile regime if Mobutu falls.  
(March 1977 CIA assessment of the effects of a "radical" successor is attached.)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 14 2015

Classified by Director, Africa Region, OASD  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 12-31-85

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTL DAT  
15-Jan-2015



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*4/19*  
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- Favor, in the "post-invasion" era, a more broadly-based and effective government for Zaire.

~~(S)~~ Current US policy is to provide qualified support to Zaire's central government. The President has approved State's consultations with Congress on a program that would extend further tangible support, but in a precisely limited manner. It would:

- Provide Zaire additional military support only in the amount already approved by Congress, i.e., the approximately \$30 million remaining in FY 76 and FY 77 FMS credit plus the residue of earlier fiscal year credits.

- Restrict equipment deliveries to non-lethal items.

- Approve \$13 million in requests now pending, including approximately \$9 million in FY 76 credit for a C-130 aircraft to be delivered in May.

- Accelerate implementation of approved economic assistance (\$14.9 million for PL-480 food and \$16.6 million in security supporting assistance for commodity imports).

~~(S)~~ The degree of US influence over events in Zaire is very limited. Events which could necessitate a US reaction include:

- Seizure of Kolwezi by the invaders (would dramatically alter the military and psychological situation in Zaire).

- Confirmed use in Zaire by third country (e.g., Morocco) forces of US equipment.

- Abortion of Nigerian and allied diplomatic initiatives designed to ameliorate the situation within Zaire.

- Zaire's exhaustion of all remaining FMS credits with concomitant pleas for more.

- Request by Zaire for lethal equipment readily available only from US sources, e.g., M60 tanks.

- Strong signals that Mobutu is likely to be ousted by a coup, voluntary departure, etc.

- Pressures by Belgium, France, or others for the USG to do more.


- Serious escalation of the fighting with resultant requests for US aid to help beleaguered Moroccan or other friendly troops.

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Date: SEP 14 2016

~~(S)~~ If events in the fluid situation warrant, the most likely types of US reaction options to review would include:

- Maintaining our present posture.
- Extending additional political support for third country, OAU, or UN mediations (or even interventions).
- Providing lethal items to Zaire or to third countries involved in Zaire.
- Increasing US FMS. This would involve reallocating FMS credit from other country programs or requesting a supplemental security assistance appropriation.



David E. McGiffert  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
International Security Affairs

Enclosure - 1  
CIA assessment

Prepared by:  
Mr. Milton H. Hamilton  
X-79755, OASD/ISA(NA)

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 14 SEP 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0367

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 14 2015

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INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

22 May 1978  
MAY 23 1978

DEP SEC HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Towards Zaire

At the NSC working Group meeting this morning, Chaired by Dave Aaron, there was considerable discussion of the U.S. intermediate and longer term policy with respect to Zaire. The two alternatives posed were: (a) the U.S. should be greatly concerned about the future of Zaire and the political, economic, security, and diplomatic steps we might take to ensure Zaire's solvency; and (b) Zaire is essentially a European-African problem, and our role should be minimal. State is preparing a paper now for interagency review on this subject. The paper is to be ready by Wednesday, and another Working Group meeting is scheduled for Thursday. An SCC meeting may be scheduled on Friday.

The second major topic of discussion was Zaire's security situation. It is felt that the Zairean armed forces are not able to provide the essential security environment for the return of the expatriate community to Kolwezi. (It may be that expatriates working elsewhere in the country will take the Shaba conflict as a sign that they ought to leave.) This means great difficulty for Zaire's economy. It was decided that U.S. support for an international peacekeeping force was a desirable thing; however, we could not decide on the character of our support for an international force until we had a clearer idea of our longer run objectives in Zaire. (We will work with DIA to develop our own ideas on possible peacekeeping forces.)

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 30 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 5 -M- 0374

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: \_\_\_\_\_

*RTM*  
Robert J. Murray  
Deputy Assistant Secretary

DEC 30 2014

*I will keep you informed*  
Copies to: SecDef,  
ASD/ISA, Africa Reg/ISA

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1978

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15-M-0374





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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

May 30, 1978

Washington National Records Center,  
SecDef Files, Acc 330-81-0202,  
Box 72, Folder Zaire, 1978.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Anticipated French Request for Airlift

I understand from General Haig that the French Government is likely to approach us through Ambassador Hartman in Paris for airlift of their personnel, and of the bodies of victims, out of Zaire. Zbig tells me that this is consistent with, although not definitely agreed at, your discussion last Friday with President Giscard. The indications are that the French will need up to 10 more sorties than were required to bring them in. Those numbers were 20 C-141 sorties plus one C-5 sortie. There were an additional 10 to move our own people into position. A specific request is likely later today.

I believe that since this is an airlift for withdrawal of French forces, and we have already helped them in a similar way on the way in, approval of their request can be justified. In fact not agreeing now would probably lose us a good deal of whatever good will we have gained so far. Removal of personnel and bodies would be a further example of U.S. willingness to stay involved in a humanitarian effort. Moreover, it would enable the French to devote more of their airlift assets to bringing in the multinational force.

Therefore, I would urge that we respond favorably to such a French request. If we do so, I would further suggest that you give general approval of this magnitude of effort rather than approving it piecemeal. The latter tends to undercut the political credits we can build up (though I doubt that we can count on much public thanks).

A more fundamental question is likely to arise in connection with the needs for airlift support that we can expect from the multinational African force that we believe is being formed to replace the French and Belgium military forces. That response is likely to signal our degree of long term involvement. I do not believe that an affirmative response to the French request for airlift in support of their egress from Zaire commits us to a similar affirmative response in connection with bringing in multinational African forces. To some extent, as explained above, it may temporarily avert some of the French pressure to do so.

The decision on U.S. support for the multinational force depends upon our conclusions with respect to the longer term prospects in Africa, and about our relations with the Soviet Union. To some extent, I think we are

330-81-0202 box 72, Zaire 1978

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EXEMPTION ORDER 11800  
DECLASSIFY ON Notification by Orig.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

DEC 29 2014

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-1642

committed by the rhetoric that we have already used about the Soviets and the Cubans in Africa. If we fail to supply logistics support, as distinct from combat support or even advisors, I believe we will be seen by the west Europeans, the Soviets and the Chinese, as well as the Africans and the Middle Eastern countries as all words and no actions. I would make such support, however, contingent on the long range plan by the French, the Belgians, and some African countries for stability in Zaire. So far, no satisfactory plan has been forthcoming--Indeed the Belgians and French were not on speaking terms about it last week.

There is considerable doubt in my mind that feasible actions by the U.S. in Africa alone constitute a real response to Soviet and Cuban actions there, whether the latter are part of a long range plan or a varied set of examples of opportunism. I think we have to find a way to punish the Cubans economically (which will require more cooperation from other western countries than has hitherto been forthcoming). In the case of the Soviets I believe the steps already underway to bring us into closer collaboration with the PRC as regards the Soviet Union are the most important single initiative that we can take.

*Harold Brown*

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 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: DEC 29 2014

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 29 DEC 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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 Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
 MDR: 15-M-0375

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21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIR

SUBJECT: Suspension of Ethiopian Security Assistance Program (S)

19 Apr  
(S) I have reviewed the Ethiopian situation in light of your query regarding the President's instructions that we suspend security assistance for Ethiopia and am reluctant to see the USG take so precipitate a step at this time. The PRC decision to progressively restrict our relations with the radical Mengistu regime by delaying delivery of lethal equipment in the pipeline (a modified Option 4) still appears more in keeping with our principal objective of preserving our residual position in Ethiopia for the contingency that friendlier, pro-western elements eventually may return to power. A sudden US suspension of security assistance, coupled with the impending reductions in the US military presence in Ethiopia, could adversely affect our relationship with whatever moderate elements remain and jeopardize our position in the future.

(S) I also fear for the safety of American citizens in Asmara and Addis Ababa if we suddenly announce a suspension of US military assistance to Ethiopia. Earlier this week our Charge was instructed to inform the EPMG of our intentions to reduce the MAAG and close Kagnev Station, with negotiations on the latter beginning as soon as possible. DoD estimates that complete withdrawal of both personnel and high priority equipment items from Kagnev can be completed within thirty days of the conclusion of negotiations.

(S) While I agree that we should review the situation regularly and be ready to modify our plans on short notice, I still believe the risks to US interests and personnel would rise sharply after a sudden suspension of security assistance. I therefore urge that we continue on the measured, deliberate course set by the PRC.

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 30 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0372

*Harold Brown*

~~CLASSIFIED BY Sec Def~~  
~~SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF~~  
~~EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED~~  
~~AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 85.~~

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, W  
Date:

DEC 30 2014

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X-1183

15-m-037





CM-1796-78  
30 January 1978

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-81-0202, Box 52, Folder  
Africa 092 (Jan-9 Feb) 1978.

1/31  
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: US Forces Which Can Be Deployed to the Horn of Africa

3714/97

The attached background paper updates the memorandum I gave  
you on 23 December and which you forwarded to the President.

  
GEORGE S. BROWN, General, USAF  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment  
a/s

Office of the Secretary of Defense 54.5.6.532  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 29 Oct 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M- 0373

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 29 2014

~~Classified by OGCJCS  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1165  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 1985~~

330-81-0202, box 52, Africa 092. (Jan-9 Feb) 1978

148

SECRET SENSITIVE

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-0277

15-M-0373

## Background Paper for use by the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: US Force Which Can Be Deployed to the Horn of Africa (4)

1. US military forces which could be made available, if required include:

## - Air

- Tactical Air Fighter Squadron (24 F-4) from USEUCOM can launch in 12 hours after notification and arrive 8 hours later.
- Tactical Air Fighter support for a ground division (3 squadrons/72 F-4 fighters) plus 6 aircraft RF-4 recce element from USEUCOM can launch with initial elements 12 hours after notification. Last squadron can close in about 72 hours.
- Tactical Air Fighter support for a division (3 squadrons/72 F-4 fighters) from CONUS can launch within 24 hours after notification with last squadron closing in about 96 hours.

## - Naval

- Carrier Task Group from WESTPAC can steam from Subic to vicinity of Horn of Africa in 13 days; from Yokosuka in 14-19 days.
- Cruiser Task Group can steam from Mediterranean to Horn of Africa via Suez in about 6 days.
- LPH (helicopter carrier) Task Group can steam from Mediterranean in about 8 days.
- Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) with 1,200 troops and supporting helos aboard 5 ships can steam from Mediterranean to Horn of Africa via Suez in 8 days.

## - Ground

- Airborne Battalion Combat Team with 1,100 troops can be airlifted from Italy to Horn of Africa in 2 days.
- 82d Airborne Division can begin deploying by air in 18 hours with division closing Horn of Africa in about 14 days with 15,000 troops.
- 101st Air Mobile Division can begin deploying by air in 18 hours closing Horn of Africa in about 18 days with 18,000 troops.

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 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: DEC 29 2014

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
 Date: 31 May 2005  
 Chief, Declass Br, Dir & Rec WHS

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

2. Constraints:

- Airlift availability precludes simultaneous movement of both Army divisions and associated TACAIR.
- Overflight and en route landing clearances will be required for airlift.

Prepared by:  
COL J. C. Conlin, USMC  
Chairman's Staff Group  
X75257

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 29 2014

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INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

03 NOV 1979

In reply refer to:  
I-23377/79

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8 1 1

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 29 2014

Washington  
Folder

National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0205, Box 21,  
S[omalial], 1978.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Sale of Defensive Arms to Somalia - ACTION MEMORANDUM

Subsequent to your luncheon discussion October 26 with Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary Vance sent the memo at TAB B to the President (DOD was not asked to coordinate). Cy recommends we offer to sell two C130s and to carry out certain Corps of Engineer - supervised construction projects, both financed by Saudi Arabia. Cy also recommends sending a military survey team. ISA and JCS agree on the projects proposed. JCS also agrees we should send the survey team. ISA disagrees.

The Joint Staff favors sending the military survey team now because, as we increase our Indian Ocean presence, Somalia becomes more important to U.S. interests as a source of support, and we should make our own independent assessment of Somali needs. The Joint Staff recognizes the constraints of Saudi funding, but feels that this should not deter us from making our survey. Implicit in the JCS view (describe at TAB C), is that we should be prepared to spend our own money if necessary.

The ISA view is that sending a survey team raises Somalia expectations well beyond any U.S. capacity to fulfill (there is no FMS money available and perhaps well beyond any Saudi interest in fulfilling (Siad Barre has been a supporter of Sadat and it is far from clear that the Saudis will treat him more generously than Nimeiri in Sudan). We conducted a military survey in Sudan over two years ago and have twice negotiated letters of offer and acceptance for an air defense program with the Sudanese, only to have it fall through when the Saudis did not fund it--although we had received assurances that they were prepared to do so. Also, ISA is concerned that a military survey would put us out ahead of the Saudis, and that this would lessen whatever chance exists for Saudi funding. Accordingly, ISA recommends against a survey team until we are clear about the financial prospects with Saudi Arabia.

Classified by ASD/ISA  
Declassify on 3 Nov 1987

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 29 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15 -M-0393

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330-82-0205, box 21, 5, 1979

SEC DEF COUN No. X-0498

15-m-03



We believe step one should be to inform Saudi Arabia that, in response to their repeated requests, the USG is prepared to provide certain equipment (2 C130s) and military related projects (Corps of Engineers) if Saudi Arabia is prepared to fund them. We should keep the Saudis in the lead, and not appear more anxious to move ahead than they are. We will want to consider the timing of our approach to the Saudis carefully, in light of our decisions on Morocco, Sudan, and perhaps Yemen. We don't want to overload the Saudi circuit.

One final caution: Somalia is hip-deep in supporting the Ogaden insurgency. At some point the Ethiopians will be back on the attack, and the Somalis may be looking to us for help. Almost surely we will be loath to involve ourselves. If we are too generous in our military assistance, however, we may unintentionally imply a commitment we do not intend to honor.

If you agree, I recommend you send the letter at TAB A to Secretary Vance.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 29 2014

*David E. McGiffert*

David E. McGiffert  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
International Security Affairs

3 Attachments  
a/s

Conferred in  
your notes from  
10/25 VBB.  
CD-11/8

Coreur  
PWT  
6 Nov 29

My recollection of your debrief of the  
BVB lunch of 10/25 was that  
the thrust of your agreed there should  
be no survey team at this time.  
I strongly agree with that conclusion  
and don't understand how the Vance  
memo reached a different result.  
I'll take care through my own  
channels of States future to  
coordinate.

~~SECRET~~

*[Signature]*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

8 NOV 1979

Washington National Records Center,  
SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0205, Box 21,  
Folder S[omalia], 1978.

The Honorable Cyrus Vance  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Cy,

With reference to your October 28 memo to the President on the sale of defensive arms to Somalia, my feelings are that we should move ahead with the 2 C-130s and with one or both of the Corps of Engineers projects (I would give priority to the Merca port project). President Siad told Ambassador Petterson only a week ago that he was eager to have these projects started. As an initial step (and before there are any further consultations with the Somalis), we should obtain a firm assurance from the Government of Saudi Arabia that it is prepared to provide funds for this purpose.

I believe, and recall general agreement at the October VBB lunch, that we should not send a military survey team. Once the engineering project(s) and C-130 program are under a survey might be useful, but only if we have firm assurance that Saudi Arabia is prepared to fund additional Somali purchases. This will help us avoid a repeat of the embarrassing situation we have encountered with Sudan, where we conducted a military survey over two years ago and, on the basis of assurances of Saudi funding, have twice negotiated letters of offer and acceptance for an air defense program, only to have it fall through because Saudi Arabia changed its mind.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 24 2014

Sincerely,

*Harold*

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 24 Dec 2014 Authority: F  
Declassify: X Deny in Full:  
Declassify in Part:  
Reason:  
MDR: 15 -M- 0392

cc: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

330-82-0205, box 21, S, 1979

Classified by ASD/ISA  
Classify on 8 Nov 89

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Sec Def Cont Nr. 04929

15-m-0



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

18 MAR 1978

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-81-0202, Box 68,  
Folder South Africa 092, 1978.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Policy Guidelines for Official Relations with the Republic  
of South Africa (S)

(S) The racial policies of the Government of South Africa, which violate internationally accepted standards of human rights, have resulted in a gradual deterioration in relations between South Africa and most nations of the world, including the United States. There is at present no evidence that the South African Government is likely to alter its policies sufficiently to reverse this trend toward increasingly strained relations with the United States in the near future.

(S) Based on the US Government's 1977 embargo on the transfer of arms and military related goods and services to South Africa, and on recent policy guidance provided by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs through specific decisions on defense oriented relationships, it is essential that no actions or statements by officials or elements of the Department of Defense present even the appearance of a new or higher level of cooperation between the United States and South Africa.

(S) The following guidelines are not all-inclusive and are presented only as examples of the limitations currently imposed on US-South African military contacts:

- (S) The US Air Force Eastern Test Range Tracking Station near Pretoria will not be used without clearance through OASD/ISA.

~~CLASSIFIED BY~~  
~~SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF~~  
~~EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED~~  
~~AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFY ON 31 DEC 84~~

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 31 2014

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330-81-0202, box 68, S, 1978

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X-0805

15-0403

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- (S) Specially instrumented aircraft of the US Air Force and US Navy, designed to collect geomagnetic or satellite telemetry data, will not be staged out of South Africa without clearance through OASD/ISA, which can be anticipated only if the mission is essential to national interests and cannot be performed by other means.
- (S) US Navy ships will not use South African port facilities without clearance through OASD/ISA unless such use is demanded by emergency conditions and circumstances do not permit formal approval procedures.
- (S) South Africa is not eligible to participate in any phase of the US Security Assistance Program--involving materiel or training; grants, credits, or sales.
- (S) An embargo has been established on the export of all US origin commodities and technical data to South African armed forces or police entities.
- (S) Commercial sales of military-related items to South African civilian buyers are subject to close scrutiny by the Departments of State and Commerce. This restriction includes spare parts which may have been provided for under pre-1977 sales contracts. The objective is to preclude the possibility that any sale by an American firm would lead indirectly to an increase in South Africa's military or paramilitary capabilities.
- (S) South African citizens, military or civilian, will not be enrolled in any US military school or course, either as resident or correspondence students; neither will they be enrolled in any resident or correspondence course supported by DoD elements, such as those offered by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency for civilians representing friendly countries.
- (S) Invitations from representatives of the South African Government in the United States to attend ceremonies, dinners, receptions, cocktail parties or similar official or semi-official functions will not be accepted by personnel above the grade of O-7 or GS-16 without clearance through OASD/ISA.
- (S) Official visits to South Africa are strictly controlled and will continue to be cleared through OASD/ISA in accordance with existing directives. Non-essential visits will not be approved. Visits by general or flag officers will not be approved if their missions can be performed by personnel of lower rank.
- (S) Letters of congratulations and similar correspondence, such as may be sent routinely to senior counterparts in a friendly country on national holidays, will not be sent to South African officials without clearance through OASD/ISA.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 31 2014

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- (P) Support (financial, logistical, or other) will not be provided for any international sporting event, without prior clearance through OASD/ISA, if South African citizens are expected to participate in the event. Similarly, the Services will not fund official travel for US participants in a sporting event if South Africans are expected to take part. The private, individual participation by a serviceman on leave, traveling at his own expense, would not require such official clearance but should not be encouraged.

- (C) Research and other contracts between DoD elements and civilian firms or institutions will not involve cooperation with the South African Government or contacts between DoD personnel and South Africans without clearance through OASD/ISA.

(A) Since all contingencies cannot be covered in this memorandum, action officers should not hesitate to contact OASD/ISA, telephone 697-9755 or 697-9753, for specific guidance.

*C. W. Dumas*

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

DEC 31 2014

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 31 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full:   
Declassify in Part:   
Reason:   
MDR: 15 -M- 0403

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
~~EYES ONLY~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

SECDEF HAS  
22 00

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 11 2016

October 22, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
~~THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY~~  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

*10/23 approved  
The proposal makes me quite uneasy*

SUBJECT: South Atlantic Nuclear Event *TS*

Attached is an unclassified discussion paper prepared by the State Department for use at the mini-SCC meeting tomorrow, October 23. (U)

*Christine Dodson*  
Christine Dodson  
Staff Secretary

Attachment

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS  
DOCUMENT. DATE:  
13-Jan-2015

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 11 Jul 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: x  
Reason: 3.3 (b)(1)  
MDR: 15 -M- 0406

5 U.S.C. 552

330-82-0205, box 21, South Africa, 1979

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~~EYES ONLY~~

SEC DEF CONTR NO. X- **04687**

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EO 13526  
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

### Situation

The Intelligence Community has high confidence, [REDACTED] that a low yield atmospheric nuclear explosion occurred in the early morning hours of September 22 somewhere in an area comprising the southern portions of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, the southern portion of Africa and a portion of the Antarctic land mass. [REDACTED]

We are unlikely to obtain any more information on the event in the near term--if at all.

Our information has not become public, but it could leak at any time. If it does, most observers will assume that South Africa tested a nuclear device. Public attention will also focus on what the USG has done about the event, and on implications for the efficacy of U.S. intelligence systems generally and test ban monitoring capabilities specifically.

### Effects on U.S. Policies

The likelihood that an atmospheric nuclear explosion did occur and the possibility that South Africa has tested a nuclear device, impinge on our global nonproliferation and African policy interests. Our nonproliferation policy is to prevent any non-nuclear weapons state from acquiring nuclear explosives or the means to produce them. In countries at or near the nuclear threshold, we seek constraints on nuclear facilities and activities so as to impede their use in explosive programs. In the event a non-nuclear weapons state succeeded with a nuclear explosives program, we would seek an international reaction that discouraged others from following the same path.

For two years we have attempted to negotiate South Africa's acceptance of IAEA safeguards on its enrichment plant (which, if South Africa has tested a device, is almost certainly the source of the material used) and to obtain its adherence to the NPT. We believe South Africa only recently has begun to consider seriously the economic and other consequences, including inability to complete two nuclear

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Date: JUL 11 2016

OSD 3.3(b)(1)  
CIA 3.3(b)(1)

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Review on 23 OCT 1985

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- 2 -

power reactors now under construction near Cape Town, if it fails to meet these conditions. But in the absence of these controls, South Africa faces no significant impediment to establishing a nuclear weapons capability, if it is prepared to pay a political price. South Africa might then support nuclear weapons programs in other politically isolated states, such as Israel and Taiwan.

The nonproliferation stakes could be high if the September 22 event caused a rupture in our nuclear negotiations with South Africa. But, failure to take action in response to the September 22 event could make more difficult efforts to deter proliferation elsewhere, e.g. Pakistan and India.

Public disclosure of a probable nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic region will lead most African states to urge strong action against South Africa, almost certainly going beyond nuclear-related sanctions. We already face the immediate prospect of a United Nations Arms Embargo Committee report calling for the end of all forms of nuclear collaboration between UN member states and South Africa. Should the nuclear event leak, it will make even more difficult the daunting job of producing a draft resolution which Western members of the Security Council could accept.

*It will also cause a bid off to other nuclear states.*

Public disclosure of information about the nuclear event would also come at a bad time for efforts to achieve settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia. In Rhodesia, disclosure of a possible South African nuclear capability might have some cautionary effect on the negotiating positions of the parties at Lancaster House, but most likely would sharpen the lines already drawn.

With respect to Namibia, the South African response to the most recent Contact Group demarche will, when known to SWAPO and the Front Line, confirm already strong African suspicions that the SAG intends to work toward an internal settlement while stringing along the West and the UN as long as possible. Disclosure of the nuclear event would further diminish, and perhaps finally end, Front Line willingness to pursue implementation of the UN plan.

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Date: JUL 11 2016



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Date: JUL 11 2016

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### Tactical Issues

The following elements must be considered in developing a U.S. response to the September 22 event that minimizes potential damage to our nonproliferation and African policies.

### Congress and the Public

Because of the likelihood that information on the September 22 event will become public, we should very soon inform key members of Congress (in addition to the leadership of the Select Intelligence Committees, already briefed) of our intelligence, our conclusions concerning the nature of the event, the foreign policy implications of the present situation, and actions we are taking. So as not further to enhance the likelihood of a leak, these consultations should be conducted with members only (excluding staff) and with the minimum number of members. We should stress the extreme sensitivity of the information and the perhaps irreparable harm that a leak would cause to U.S. interests, particularly to other African and nonproliferation policy initiatives. Appropriate members would be the Senate and House leadership, perhaps the chairmen and ranking minority members of the foreign affairs committees, and possibly a few other members with strong identifiable interest in the problem. *This will almost certainly cause info to become public*

We should have available a new contingency statement for use in case of a leak. Such a statement should confirm that the U.S. has data pointing to a nuclear explosion, ~~that~~ that no corroborating evidence has come to light, and that we are in consultation with concerned governments. (Proposed contingency statement at Tab A).

In any public discussion of the nuclear event, we must be in a position to respond to criticism of our test verification capabilities (an approach to this problem is at Tab B). *that location if it occurred is very uncertain*

### International Consultations

We have already informed the UK, France, the FRG, Canada and Australia of our initial satellite information, and have sought their assistance in obtaining corroborating information. The UK and France, in particular, have political interests that will be affected by the way we handle

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Date:

JUL 11 2016

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- 4 -

this problem, particularly if it becomes a public issue. The British have recorded their concern regarding the need to consult with them on how we plan to handle this issue. They have stressed the importance of arriving at a coordinated position covering public response, handling in the UN, and approaching the South Africans.

We should consult soon with the UK and France, and to some degree with others. Specifically, we should inform appropriate governments of the status of our evidentiary base, and discuss with them the tactical implications of our inability to prove or disprove that South Africa has tested a nuclear device. While we should be prepared to take into account the concerns and ideas of other governments, the U.S. -- as the potentially most politically exposed nation -- cannot allow other governments to significantly modify a course of action designed to meet U.S. objectives.

#### Approach to SAG

South Africa is the most likely responsible party by virtue of its geographic location, its advanced nuclear status which includes a uranium enrichment capability, and evidence that it has actively explored development of a nuclear explosives capability. No other threshold state meets all these conditions (although we must consider the possibility that Israel could have detonated a device in this remote geographic area).

A case can be made for not going to the South Africans on this issue: On the one hand, the evidence is not strong enough to permit a categorical accusation; on the other hand, the South Africans are likely to treat our raising of the subject in any form as an accusation. If the South Africans are "guilty", they are unlikely to admit it and in all probability will deny it vehemently. If they are not guilty, we must assume they will react violently and probably conclude that there is no further point in discussing broader nuclear issues with the U.S.

Not to go to the SAG, however, leaves us vulnerable -- particularly if the intelligence on the September 22 event becomes public -- to charges that the USG did not respond with prudence or that we are unwilling to confront the

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*but unless  
we do something  
(not so secret)  
we're vulnerable to  
worse accusations*

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Date: JUL 11 2016

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likeliest perpetrator. On balance, there seems more to be gained than lost by addressing the subject with the SAG.

Modalities. Nuclear policy issues in general are treated by an extremely small circle of officials in the South African government. In a matter concerning nuclear weapons development, we should assume that very few government officials below the Prime Minister (who is also Minister of Defense) and a few atomic energy officials would be involved. It is entirely possible that the Foreign Minister would be unaware of the nuclear test, and quite probable that Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Brand Fourie (our usual contact on nuclear matters), would be unaware, even though the latter is a member of the South African Atomic Energy Board.

For maximum effectiveness, an approach should be to the Prime Minister, the most responsible official and who without question knows whether South Africa has tested. The approach should be on as restricted a basis as possible -- the session should be private and other officials should not be aware of it. The Prime Minister thus would have the greatest flexibility in responding, and would have less reason to stage a hostile reaction for domestic consumption. Finally, raising the matter with the Prime Minister avoids using the channel (Fourie) in which our nuclear negotiations have been conducted.

We should avoid explicit linkage between the nuclear test problem and the nuclear negotiations. The importance of the test issue transcends that of the details of the negotiations and should be addressed accordingly. In addition, if the South Africans are not "guilty", they will be disposed to look for any hint that we are trying to increase the stakes involved in the nuclear negotiation. A proposed approach to the SAG is at Tab C.

Since our credibility with the SAG is low and particularly so on nuclear issues, we should consider asking the UK and France to join us in a demarche. Both have standing in the matter: the UK is the only other depositary power for the LTBT with which the SAG has diplomatic relations and the UK has important political interests in the region; France is currently South Africa's most important nuclear supplier. Both, are nuclear weapons states. A

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- 6 -

tripartite demarche would underline the distance between this subject and our own nuclear negotiations, and it probably would not be lost on the SAG that the three parties concerned are the three Western members of the Security Council.

Effect on Nuclear Negotiations. Separate from the tactical issue of how to approach the SAG in a manner that preserves the possibility of reaching an accommodation with the SAG on broader nuclear issues, is the question of whether our negotiating objectives should change. The objectives we now seek, NPT adherence and full-scope safeguards, establish a reasonable nonproliferation regime for South Africa's nuclear program. Adding further conditions would almost certainly disrupt the negotiations.

Nonetheless, our own suspicions and likely publicity concerning the September 22 event will increase the difficulty of justifying continuing nuclear cooperation with South Africa and of defending it politically in the U.S. and elsewhere. In the absence of clarification of the nature of the suspect event it is dubious that the Congress would accept a proposal to continue nuclear cooperation. The policy choice here is between maintaining a willingness to continue nuclear cooperation under adverse political circumstances or abandoning efforts to reach a nuclear accommodation with South Africa and thereby relinquishing all prospects -- slim as they may be -- of attaining our nonproliferation objectives in South Africa.

If we could offer the SAG a convincing case that we knew it had tested a nuclear device, we would be in a strong position to demand more from the SAG in return for continued U.S. nuclear cooperation, to demand that it meet certain conditions as a prerequisite for resuming negotiations on nuclear cooperation, or we could stop the negotiations-- with the onus on the SAG. Our evidentiary basis, however, does not support such approaches.

#### Informing the Soviets

We need to decide whether to inform the USSR of the situation. It is possible, although not likely that the Soviets have relevant information. They seem already aware that we have some nuclear related concern toward South Africa, and may learn more as a result of our consultations with other governments. If in these circumstances we fail to bring the Soviets into our confidence, we would leave them unrestrained to use their information in whatever way meets their own interests. We would also damage the continued

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: JUL 11 2010

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- 7 -

effectiveness of US-Soviet cooperation on nonproliferation, a subject we have tried to bring the Soviets to view in terms other than their own parochial interests.

Informing the Soviets cannot be done without risk; in providing our evidence and its implications to the Soviets, we may fail to restrain them from seeking political capital. For this reason, we should defer a decision on consulting the Soviets until after we have informed the Congress, met with key allies, and raised the issue with the SAG.

#### UN Sanctions

We do not have enough evidence to accuse South Africa of having tested a nuclear device, but once our information becomes public others will demand sanctions. Since our evidence points to the possibility that South Africa conducted a nuclear test, it will be difficult to argue credibly against adoption of some form of sanctions against South Africa -- particularly since the SAG has not met our conditions for nuclear cooperation after two years of talks.

Any UNSC response to debate on a South African test will reflect the mood in the General Assembly, although in practical terms, the Western powers can exercise some control through the prospect of vetoing an unacceptable resolution. We could introduce a resolution both for the added political benefit of taking the initiative, and in the interest of shaping the outcome to conform to our objectives.

It would be advantageous to build into a resolution an automatic termination under defined conditions. Such conditions presumably would be, at least, South Africa's immediate pledge of no (or no further) testing, adherence to the NPT and placement of all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards. This would be consistent with our negotiating position with South Africa, although as a precedent for other proliferation cases it would go beyond the requirements of U.S. law. A stiffer resolution would "outlaw" South Africa until it had dismantled all nuclear facilities of military significance and permitted international verification of its action. This would be more acceptable to the Africans, but our support for it would imply that we believed South Africa had tested. South Africa would undoubtedly reject such conditions in a resolution.

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- 8 -

An appropriate self-terminating resolution would give the South Africans a way out of their situation and some incentive to take far-reaching actions of nonproliferation significance. It is doubtful that they would take advantage of such an opportunity. Sanctions of unlimited duration, however, would confirm for South Africa that its place in the world community is untenable; this would reduce any prospect of a change of course in Pretoria.

Finally, the South Africans have the capability to retaliate against sanctions with some effect. Whether they would wish to do so is questionable, in view of the importance of uranium sales to South Africa's foreign exchange earnings. The threat or fear of such action could, however, significantly influence the attitudes of our allies. The UK, for example, receives something more than 50 percent of its uranium from South Africa; there are financial relationships involved as well. Similarly, the West Germans look to South Africa for nearly half their uranium, the Japanese would view with alarm any major dislocation in the world uranium supply market, and a number of other countries would be affected to varying degrees. The U.S. could make up any uranium shortfall caused by South Africa's withdrawal from the world market, but only by dipping into the strategic stockpile. Australia and Canada have the resources to make up the difference, but we do not know what their attitudes would be. (We understand the Canadians are looking into this issue.)

*This may  
make  
more  
sense.*

Should information on the September 22 event not become public, and the U.S. therefore does not raise the issue in the UN, there is still the possibility at an appropriate point of introducing a sanctions resolution in response to lack of progress in our nuclear negotiations with South Africa. There is also the likelihood that we soon will have to take a position with respect to a nuclear cut-off resolution introduced by the African States. In the absence of a leak regarding the September 22 event, we should face that contingency in the context of US-SAG nuclear negotiations.

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Date: JUL 11 2016

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TAB A

Contingency Statement

If asked:

The U.S. Government has indications suggesting the possibility that a low yield nuclear explosion occurred on September 22 in an area of the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic including portions of the Antarctic continent and the southern part of Africa. No corroborating evidence has been received to date. We are continuing efforts to determine whether such an event took place, and are in consultation with other governments.

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Implications for Public Perceptions of  
Test Ban Verification Capability

When knowledge of the September 22 signal becomes public, critics of nuclear test bans may comment on the significance of this event as an indicator of U.S. capabilities to verify test ban treaties. If by that time we have additional high-confidence information which resolves the ambiguities in the event's nature, location, and originating country, the Congress, press, and public are likely to conclude that the event illustrates strong U.S. capability to detect and identify even small nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

However, if any of these three ambiguities are not resolved before the event becomes public, critics may attempt to use it to deprecate U.S. verification capabilities, both for atmospheric tests and more broadly. Administration spokesmen should be prepared to respond promptly along the following lines:

1. The U.S. has several systems capable of detecting nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, and plans to deploy additional systems with even greater sensitivity. All such systems inherently provide higher confidence of detection for large explosions than for very small explosions.
2. If the September 22 event was a nuclear explosion, it was of such a low yield that we would not have expected it to be reliably detected by the U.S. systems covering that region of the globe at that time. Therefore, there is no reason to conclude that U.S. monitoring systems were not operating at their expected level of performance.  
*(but obviously less than perfect)*
3. On the contrary, this event illustrates the important fact that even very small explosions which may be below the normally expected sensitivity threshold of monitoring systems have some chance of being detected. Thus, any state which attempts to hide such a small explosion runs a risk that it will be detected. Even when the information is ambiguous, as in this case, it can alert states to the possibility of an explosion which they may be able to investigate using other methods. In the present case, such investigations are continuing.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~*but perfect  
unidentified*

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 11 2016



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TAB C

Approach to South Africans on Nuclear Event

(To be handled with Prime Minister P.W. Botha)

-- I have been instructed to see you personally to inform you of a matter of great sensitivity.



OSD 3.3(b)(1)  
CIA 3.3(b)(1)

- We are concerned about how the event will be viewed by the international community when it becomes public knowledge that an atmospheric nuclear explosion has taken place within an area which includes South Africa.
- We are now engaged in highly restricted consultation with other concerned states regarding the implications of the information.
- Recalling the statements made by Prime Minister Vorster in August 1977 regarding the SAG's nuclear intentions and mindful of the obligations of the parties to the LTBT, my government invites the SAGs comments.

If Asked:

Q. Are you accusing South Africa of conducting a nuclear test in the atmosphere?

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A. I have described the conclusions that one draws from our technical evidence.

Q. Do you intend to make this public?

A. No. But we cannot exclude that it will become so. If it does, we intend to respond to inquiries along the following lines: (read and/or hand over contingency press guidance).

---

Q. Does the U.S. now intend to make additional demands on South Africa for nuclear cooperation?

A. We believe the arrangements set forth in the Joint Minute of June 1978 provide for a reasonable nonproliferation regime; we intend to stick by them. We are under no illusion, however that completion of the arrangements will be made much more difficult if the information should leak. We are taking every possible step to prevent this from happening, and should it leak we will vigorously support whatever agreement we reach. There would be a greater possibility that the Congress would reject the settlement on the basis of suspicions that South Africa has tested. The simultaneous closing aspect of the proposed settlement protects South Africa from taking irrevocable steps in a situation in which the U.S. cannot complete its side of the arrangement.

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Date: JUL 11 2016

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Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-81-0202, Box 52, Folder Africa 092 (Oct-Dec)  
1978.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS  
DOCUMENT. DATE:  
09-Jan-2015

OCT 7 1978

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Nkomo, Mugabe, and the All-Parties Conference (APC) (U)**

(C) State Department and CIA reporting from southern Africa suggests that Joshua Nkomo, President of ZAPU, is unlikely to join an APC because he represents a minority ethnic group and is not confident that he could win a free election. He seems more confident of his military option, based on continued military support from the USSR and Cuba, and on the personal loyalty of President Kaunda in Zambia (ZAPU's safe haven). Nkomo is also depicted as a personality who does not wish to share political power. The other leaders, including Robert Mugabe of ZANU, all of whom represent the ethnic majority, apparently fear and distrust Nkomo and probably are not anxious to share power with him.

(c) The field reporting also seems to indicate that Mugabe, because of his relatively weak political and military positions, might be willing to attend an APC without Nkomo. It is possible that Mugabe's chief supporters--Tanzania, Mozambique, and China--might endorse an APC without Nkomo because they are uncomfortable with the Soviet influence they see in ZAPU.

(S) If all of this is true, I think we should consider a 'Mugabe option' of supporting an APC despite the possibility that Nkomo would not come. The other four nationalists would be representative of the majority in Rhodesia. The disadvantage of a settlement without Nkomo would be his continued pursuit of a military solution with Soviet/Cuban support. However, there would, I think, be a good chance that the prospect of being left out plus the pressure from the front-line Presidents would then bring Nkomo to join an APC; if so, so much the better.

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 Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
 MDR: **15 -M- 0407**

Harold Brown

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 14 2015

~~SECRETARY OF DEFENSE~~  
~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~  
~~DATE 02-01-2001 BY 60322 UCBAW/STP~~  
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283

15-m-0407



## THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

FEB 20 1979

The Honorable David D. Newsom  
Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Washington National Records Center,  
SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0205, Box 52,  
Folder Rhodesia, 1979.

Dear Mr. Newsom:

The situation in Rhodesia appears to be getting increasingly difficult. Repeated efforts to promote a negotiated settlement have yet to show any substantial promise of success.

Under these conditions, it might be useful to begin considering alternatives that would earlier have seemed unlikely. One which has been put forward by my staff is to try to gain the participation of one of the two Patriotic Front leaders in internationally monitored elections. Mugabe would appear a more likely candidate than Nkomo.

We recognize that this approach has drawbacks and would be difficult to accomplish. Both Nkomo and Mugabe view themselves as candidates to be the future head of a black revolutionary government. It would be hard to involve either in the election process. It would also mean splitting the Patriotic Front and having one guerrilla leader in opposition. Nevertheless, this solution would seem preferable to its apparent alternative: a Salisbury government faced by two guerrilla leaders with growing Soviet/Cuban support. In any case, it would seem easier to involve one guerrilla leader than to gain the support of both, as in our current "all parties" approach.

A memo elaborating these ideas is attached. I suggest that, in any event, we should have a look at where we go next on Rhodesia, considering this as well as other possibilities.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 30 2014

Sincerely,

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 30 Dec 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 15-M-0408

cc: The Honorable David Aaron

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Declassify on 20 Feb 1985

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330-82-0205, box 21, Rhodesia 1979

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15-m-0408





INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-81-0202, Box 52, Folder Africa 092  
(Jun-Sep) 1978.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: PRM 34 - US Relations With Morocco and Algeria

The PRC will meet June 8, 1978, at 1630. The agenda for the meeting is attached. The central issue is whether or not the US should allow Morocco to use US military equipment in the Western Sahara and Mauritania. An interagency working group has prepared a background paper for discussion by the PRC (TAB A). A memorandum of law on this subject is at TAB B.

Morocco

This problem has been brewing since late last summer when the Polisario insurgents, bolstered by increased supplies of Soviet weapons from Algeria's inventory, began to increase the frequency and magnitude of their operations. It became an issue here last fall when the Moroccan government, seeking an effective defense against the insurgents, requested US approval for the purchase of OV-10 aircraft and Cobra helicopters specifically for use in the Western Sahara and Mauritania. Although the State Department and DoD favored the sale, informal discussions with key members of Congress disclosed there was considerable opposition there, stemming from the unresolved question of self-determination in the Western Sahara. Subsequently, the House Committee on International Relations held hearings on this question but the results were inconclusive and no further action was taken for several months. With the controversy growing over US aircraft sales to the Middle East, the State Department decided it was unwise to press the issue with Congress, and in March 1978 informed Morocco that we had decided not to proceed with the sale "at this time." Meanwhile, French intervention with fighter and reconnaissance aircraft to protect French citizens in the area had taken the pressure off Morocco and brought about a temporary military stalemate (TAB C).

Now the situation has changed. The issue over the Middle East aircraft package was resolved favorably, and the attack in Zaire by Soviet/Cuban trained rebels has created a more receptive mood in the Congress towards

330-81-0202, Box 52, Africa 092 (Jun-Sep) 1978

EXEMPT PER EO 13526, Sec 3.3 (b) (1)  
OSD FS 212 Date 11 May 2005  
Review/Declassify On 11 Dec 2030  
Other Agency Equity: TBD

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X-1727

15-m-0412

US assistance to African countries. The change has come none too soon. King Hassan appears to be questioning the value of a close relationship with the US, and we must find a way to allay his concern or risk permanent damage to US interests in a country we consider strategically important.

There appears to be general agreement among State, DoD and NSC Staff that we should be more forthcoming towards Morocco, but it is not a simple decision matter. State and DoD lawyers have agreed that we must amend our bilateral agreement with Morocco if US equipment is to be used outside its borders.

### Algeria

If we agree to Moroccan use of US equipment in the Sahara there is a corollary issue--the impact on our improving relations with Algeria which have been carefully nurtured by both Algiers and Washington. Although our political interests are greater in Morocco, Algeria with its large oil and gas reserves, and a growing market for US goods and services, is more important to us economically. Algeria appears to be backing the Polisario primarily with the hope of establishing a client state in the Western Sahara to facilitate the export of Algerian minerals via the Atlantic, but there are other facets. Algeria's Sahara policy reflects the personal views of President Boumediene, and any move by the US to be more helpful to Morocco in the Sahara will have a debilitating effect on US/Algerian relations.

There has been little international interest in the Sahara dispute. Only one country, the Ivory Coast has recognized Moroccan and Mauritanian sovereignty in the Western Sahara. The UN and the OAU have avoided the issue for two years. US behavior in the disputes between Morocco and Algeria, however, will influence attitudes toward the US of friendly Middle Eastern, European and African countries. US policies will have a negative impact on many of these countries to the extent they are perceived as part of a US "failure" to oppose effectively the growth of Soviet/Cuban military influence in Africa.

### Towards a New US Approach

The principal elements of the present US strategy are:

- No US weapons for use in the Western Sahara and Mauritania.
- Suspension of approval for new arms transfers to Morocco. *should change*
- No US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in the Western Sahara.
- No US role in mediation. *If we could play a constructive role, this could help.*
- Formal US neutrality on the merits of the Sahara dispute.

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 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: DEC 30 2014

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In response to PRM 34 the interagency working group has suggested two alternatives to our present strategy:

- Closer alignment with Morocco (a complete turnabout from our present strategy including recognition of Moroccan and Mauritanian sovereignty over the Western Sahara).

- More active US promotion of a negotiated settlement.

A complete turnaround in our present strategy seems infeasible at this point, because it would mean de facto US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. That ~~issue~~ would leave us in a difficult position with the Congress. In addition, the US has said that it will not take a public position on the self-determination question because the UN has asked the OAU to deal with the entire issue. Active US promotion of a negotiated settlement, however, is in line with the growing inclination in the US to do more in Africa, and it appears there would be some chance of success. The Moroccan and Algerians are reported to have met on two occasions earlier this year to discuss the dispute. Unfortunately, this approach alone will not solve our immediate problem with Morocco.

## Recommended DoD Position

I recommend that you decide on a strategy that includes both an aggressive US effort to promote a negotiated settlement, and closer alignment with Morocco, but short of a complete turnabout from our present strategy because of the attendant Congressional problem. I believe we should:

(Moroccan arms request)

- Agree to Moroccan use of US military equipment in Mauritania (but not in the Western Sahara), and seek Moroccan assurances that the use would be so limited. *I'd favor this as admin policy but need Congressional approval*
- Revise our bilateral military assistance agreement to permit Moroccan use of U.S. equipment in Mauritania.
- Agree to the sale of OV-10\* aircraft and Cobra helicopters for use in Mauritania (and expedite their delivery). *Agree*
- Lift the suspension in effect on new arms transfers to Morocco.

\* Evidently King Hassan now wishes to purchase only helicopters, but the formal request for OV-10's is still pending.

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**Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS**  
**Date: DEC 20 2014**

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(Recognition of Moroccan/Mauritanian Sovereignty in the Western Sahara)

- Emphasize in statements to the two governments that US approval for use of US equipment in Mauritania does not mean the US has recognized Moroccan and Mauritanian sovereignty in the Western Sahara. *agree*

- Go on record with a clear public statement favoring self-determination in the Western Sahara. *agree*

(US Role in Peace Negotiations)

- Actively promote a negotiated settlement of the dispute in the Western Sahara--but avoid direct participation. *agree*

(Defending our relations with Algeria)

- Make no concessions, but explain our position on the Western Sahara clearly--that we are in favor of a negotiated settlement, and we are providing arms to Morocco for defensive purposes only. *am*

(Visit by a Special Emissary)

- Dispatch a special emissary to Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania to explain US actions and to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement. *ag*

*David E. McGiffert*  
DAVID E. MCGIFFERT

Assistant Secretary of Defense

Enclosure - 1

1. Agenda

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 30 2014

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS *54.54.53*  
Date: *30062014* Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: *15-M-0412*

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301  
17 October 1979

In Reply Refer To:  
1-23376

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0205, Box 16, Folder Morocco, 1979.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Arms Supply Policy towards Morocco - "Option Three"

In accordance with decisions reached at yesterday's PRC meeting, the Department of Defense has prepared a brief for "Option Three." A copy is attached for your use in preparing the presentation to the President. As I noted in the meeting, Defense strongly supports this option; I understand that Secretary Brown also gave it his personal endorsement in his discussions with you and Secretary Vance last Friday. If we can do anything else to assist, please let me know.

*W. Graham Clayton*

cc: Secretary Vance

Office of the Secretary of Defense *545.652*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *30 Oct 2014* Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: *X* Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: *15-M-0416*

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

DEC 30 2014

*330-82-0205, Box 16, Morocco 1779*

Classified by *ASD/LSA*  
Declassify on *17 Oct 85*

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-*04604*

*15-M-0416*  
*R-1*

### OPTION THREE

This option will be helpful in restoring a military balance and will substantially improve Morocco's general military capabilities vis-a-vis Algeria. Further, it will also improve Morocco's military capabilities in support of western objectives in selected military security situations throughout Africa, e.g., Zaire. It would also greatly please the King and improve our access and leverage with him. Of equal importance, it would be a clear signal to the POLISARIO and their supporters that the US was willing to stand by the King, thereby inducing a greater willingness to negotiate.

All agencies agree that a diplomatic rather than a military solution to the Western Sahara conflict is required. However, before negotiations are possible, the military situation must stabilize. The King must feel confident enough to negotiate, and the POLISARIO and their supporters must realize that they cannot win a military victory. Given the POLISARIO's recent escalation, including increasingly frequent attacks into Morocco proper, the US Government should now liberalize its arms sales policy to include sale of OV-10 aircraft and other equipment and training useful to Morocco not only in the Western Sahara but in maintaining the balance vis-a-vis Algeria.

Some assistance can and should be rendered immediately, but the full package must be conditional on the King's willingness to negotiate. We favor a commitment to provide Morocco at least 6 OV-10 aircraft, Cobra-TOW helicopters, and other material useful to his defense in the Sahara, but the OV-10's will not in fact be delivered until an actual start is made on negotiations. This package, as well as associated training and technical assistance will not win the war for Rabat. But it will help stabilize the situation in the near term and encourage both sides to come to the negotiating table. While this option runs the risk of tempting King Hassan toward greater intransigence and will meet some resistance in Congress, it more nearly serves US objectives in North Africa and provides greater possibilities for starting negotiations.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 30 2014

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**Rand**  
SANTA MONICA, CA 90406

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17 MAR 1977

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-80-0017, Box 33, Folder 320.2 (Jan-May) 1977.

3/17

CD -

March 14, 1977

*see my notes on this  
cover letter. I've  
glanced through the  
first few pages & judge  
that their conclusions  
accord with my ~~own~~ prejudices.  
But I hope they (and we) are  
willing to have our views  
changed by what we  
may learn in  
the future*

HB

W  
D  
D

JOHN P. WHITE  
or Vice President

The Honorable John M. Sullivan  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower  
and Reserve Affairs), Designee  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Jack:

As per your request, enclosed is a paper that discusses our view of the major manpower problems facing the DoD. We have tried to keep it short, but trust that it is understandable. Rick Cooper, who heads our manpower group, and I are the principal authors and we will be pleased to discuss it with you if that would be useful.

In my judgment, the problems that most deserve the attention of the Assistant Secretary and provide opportunities for the largest returns are:

1. Effectively managing and institutionalizing the AVF. The AVF works, but it will not achieve its full promise without active management attention from the highest levels in OSD.
2. Adjusting manpower requirements to meet the changes that have occurred in the defense structure and in relative manpower and equipment costs. This will require strengthening OSD's role in the establishment of requirements. Probably the single largest change to be made is to increase the size of the career force at the expense of first-termers.
3. Integrating and modernizing the compensation and retirement systems in order to increase management flexibility while assuring equitable pay. The historically separate treatment of these two basic elements of manpower compensation has caused major inefficiencies. Without this integration promotion and tenure cannot be tied back to actual requirements. The current structure is so inflexible that senior management cannot exercise any meaningful control.

*Right - but I  
suspect judgment  
on whether we can  
make it work  
through the 1980's*

*Yes - but  
some of it can  
best be done in detail  
in the services.*

*I think  
we must do this  
but in a way  
that gives  
"pay" (including some  
equivalent vested benefit  
to people with say  
10 years service)*

I fully appreciate that this is a very tall order. But the alternative is to devote a lot of energy to adjustments that are "easily doable" (e.g., advertising budgets, enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, commissary and PX privileges, etc.) but fail to address the fundamental problems.

I hope that you will find this helpful. Don and I are looking forward to seeing you on Thursday.

(CD) 330 80-0017 Box 33 320.2

Sincerely,

[John P. White]

*Orig to C&D  
for Mr. Duncan 3/18*

14 MAR 77

March 14, 1977

## MAJOR MANPOWER ISSUES

### I. INTRODUCTION\*

This paper is intended to provide a broad overview of the major manpower issues currently facing the Department of Defense. It is directed at important problems, and opportunities for improvement, that will face M&RA over the next several years. It is a guide to where general changes appear warranted and not a prescription for specific solutions. Naturally, the changes themselves will require substantial, specific examination.

The paper is limited to manpower issues, with emphasis on the possibilities for increased efficiency and reductions in overall manpower costs. The issues are examined in the specific context of enhancing mission performance or holding mission performance constant while reducing costs. Broad policy changes of the kind suggested here could lead to long-run annual manpower cost savings of over \$5 billion.

Skyrocketing manpower costs, tight defense budgets, and the advent of the All-Volunteer Force have all served to make defense manpower one of the most important concerns in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. It is common for those in Washington to observe that manpower represents 60 percent of the defense budget. It is uncommon, on the other hand, to hear any careful and articulate discussion of why these costs are such a large share of the total budget and how they might be reduced while enhancing (or at least not degrading) mission effectiveness. In fact, despite growing manpower costs, there has been too little effective adjustment in DoD management and programs as reflected in the patterns of labor usage and compensation. The DoD continues to use its human resources in ways consistent with a set of prices and assumptions that are no longer realistic.

There have been important underlying changes in the last decade that have been reflected in this increase in manpower costs and are at the root of the problem. First, the size of the forces has shrunk significantly since Vietnam to the current level of 2.1 million, largely by reducing "teeth." Second, and more importantly, the number of units of equipment and the size of the various operating units, as well as the proportion of time that they operate, have been markedly reduced, without proportionally reducing

\* Tables A, B, C, and D provide background data on the size and compo-



headquarters and support establishments. Third, the fundamental national decisions to pay first term servicemen a market wage and to pay all DoD personnel (military and civilian) earnings equal to average pay in the private sector (comparability) has meant a significantly larger wage bill than was true in the past. This has been combined with an ever increasing cost in current dollars of commitments made earlier for retirement benefits. The final change over this period, although paradoxically not the most fundamental, has been the introduction of the All Volunteer Force (AVF).

However, the AVF provides an important backdrop to be used by OSD managers examining manpower issues. AVF symbolizes the shift in our basic national philosophy to providing defense forces at their market cost. Therefore, it should be used as a vehicle for assuring that the policies adopted for manpower and personnel are cost effective. Up until now the AVF has been viewed as a problem of meeting accession requirements (e.g., recruiting objectives, advertising budgets, etc.). But the real implications of ending the draft are much larger, and a fundamental reexamination of how the DoD utilizes human resources is called for. Consequently, this paper focuses on three overriding issues: (1) the requirements process, (2) personnel management and (3) the management of training. Before turning to these, it is helpful to summarize the progress of the AVF to date.

## II. THE VOLUNTEER FORCE

### Background

In the late 60s, the volunteer force emerged as one of the few alternatives for dealing with growing inequities in the selective service draft. The increasing number of young men reaching military age each year and relatively constant (or decreasing) force sizes meant that a smaller proportion were facing induction. (See Figure 1.) Because the pay for junior military personnel was substantially below that for comparably aged and educated civilian workers (see Figure 2), those who were not serving (about 80 percent of the military aged male population) benefitted substantially at the expense of those who were.

The Congress accepted the argument of the Gates Commission that those who served should not have to pay a large financial price in addition to the

other burdens of involuntary service and accordingly raised first-term pay in November 1971. Interestingly, raising pay to the market level was sufficient to attract the number of volunteers required and this has been the case throughout the 70s, with only minor exceptions.

#### Early Experience with the Volunteer Force

The All-Volunteer Force has worked. The first few years without the draft have shown that the military services can attract a socially representative mix of the desired quantity and quality of new recruits without the pressure of the draft. A brief review follows.

Cost. The cost of the AVF per se and the few hundred millions of dollars that could be saved from the return to the draft are a relatively small factor in the recent increase in manpower costs. Most of the increase in manpower costs can be attributed to two decisions by the Congress: first, the decision to make career military and DoD civilian pay comparable to private sector pay, and second, expensive retirement benefits.\*

Quantity. With the exception of modest recruiting shortfalls in the Army and Marine Corps during the first year of the AVF (and more recently during the transition quarter), the Services have successfully met their quantitative recruiting objectives. Moreover, the early difficulties were not indicative of long-term fundamental problems, but rather reflected shortages of recruiters in the field, unnecessarily restrictive quality standards, and unusually large accession requirements.

Enlisted Accession Requirements. The key AVF issue is not manpower supply at the current pay rates, but rather manpower demand--i.e., accession requirements. Contrary to what should be expected under a system of considerably increased pay per accession, the accession requirements have increased over those of the draft era through deliberate Service policies that limit the flow into the career force. (See Table 2.)

Quality. The quality of new recruits, as measured by such indicators as mental aptitude and educational attainment, has increased

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\* To illustrate, defense manpower costs increased from \$24.1 billion in fiscal 1964 to \$57.2 billion in fiscal 1976--nearly a 150 percent increase. Of the \$33.1 billion increase, \$14.2 billion went to civilians, \$5.1 billion went to retired personnel, \$1.7 billion went to the reserves and family housing budget accounts, and \$9.0 billion went for active duty personnel pay increases that would have occurred anyway under the draft. Thus, even if the 1971 pay increase for junior military personnel is counted as an AVF cost increase (which it properly should not), the \$2.0 billion AVF costs in fiscal 1976 represented only six percent of the total \$33.1 billion larger total costs in FY 76 vs. FY 64 (see Table 1).

since 1971 and substantially so since Fiscal 1975. (See Table 3.) The real quality issue is whether the current standards, driven by the Services' policy of quality maximization, are too restrictive and whether the right balance among individual quality criteria are being maintained. Current quality standards are considerably higher than they have been in the past and probably higher than they should be, given other considerations.

Unemployment. High unemployment rates, though certainly aiding the recruiting effort, are not responsible for the success of the AVF. The future of the volunteer force does not depend on continued high unemployment. In fact, a 10 percent increase in the unemployment rate for young males results in only a 2 or 3 percent increase in the number of enlistments. On the other hand, the Services have used high unemployment rates to achieve unusually high quality standards, and there should be concern that they will unrealistically base future quality standards on what has been achievable during the recession, rather than on what is required.

Social Representation. A steady increase in the number of blacks entering the military during the 70s is not a result of AVF policies. The proportion of blacks in the force would have been approximately the same with the draft. Instead, the increase is a result of the substantial increase in the proportion of black young men found eligible for military service, the unusually high unemployment rates experienced by blacks (relative to whites), and the lower wages paid to fully employed blacks relative to whites. (See Table 4.) At the same time, this increase in black representation does not indicate that the AVF is manned by the poor. Today there are as many recruits from middle and high income areas as there were during the lottery draft. (See Table 5.) In addition, regional composition and urban/rural makeup of current accessions is remarkably similar to what was experienced under the draft.

While the AVF has been fundamentally successful; there are still problems. Any system that attempts to attract several hundred thousand new people per year, under a wage system that is relatively slow to adjust, will face management problems. These management problems are solvable, but it will be necessary for OSD to do a better job of identifying the right number of accession requirements, the quality mix, quality standards, and necessary adjustments to market changes. The Services tend to maximize both the quality and quantity of initial accessions, then attribute failures to inadequate resources or the illegitimacy of the fundamental concept. OSD's management role is therefore critical to the continued success of AVF.



### III. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

As indicated earlier, manpower requirements are a fundamental issue in terms of the overall cost and effectiveness of the force. Naturally, manpower requirements should be determined in broad terms by the overall missions and consequent force structure--that is, the actual numbers of divisions, ships, wings, etc., and their makeup (e.g., the mix of armored and infantry battalions and the mix of tactical and strategic aircraft), as well as by the support structure necessary to assist the operating forces in peace and war. A major element of this structure in the determination of manpower is the amount and type of equipment used by the forces. The number, quality, and skill level of personnel required is largely determined by the capital intensity of the force, the degree of automation, and ease or difficulty associated with the operation and maintenance of the equipment.

Manpower represents about 60 percent of operating and support costs. Although it is very difficult to determine exactly what percentage of the force performs support functions because of definitional and data problems, a rough breakdown is possible. About 40 percent of all DoD personnel are actually engaged in manning and direct maintenance of combat related forces. About 30 percent of all DoD personnel (and a much higher proportion of the civilian work force) are engaged in central support activities, such as training, medical services, centralized logistics, headquarters administration, etc.; another 15 percent are engaged in major command and base operations activities, and about 15 percent more are in a transient status (e.g., trainee, patient, prisoner) at any one time.

Over recent years, the mission, nature of the force structure, and the actual equipment being employed in terms of both numbers and sophistication have changed significantly. Unfortunately, with these changes and the parallel adjustments in operating forces, there have not been complementary changes in the support structure. For example, the actual number of platforms that require support has been markedly reduced and yet reductions in the numbers of bases and depots that support this equipment, particularly in the CONUS, have been consistently resisted. The result has been an ever increasing



share of defense costs for support, at the expense of combat forces. Thus, the fixed costs have been spread over a decreasing number of units of equipment (UE). This is compounded by the fact that many of the current approaches to structuring and posturing the forces were developed for specific and different missions and environments than is currently the case. For example, during the 50s and 60s, the strategic forces were oriented towards a single strike counter-value mission (massive retaliation) while the general purpose forces were postured for a long slow build-up to war in Europe. In the 70s, as these doctrines have been called into question and the forces have been adjusted accordingly, the support structure has been slow to follow suit.

There are a number of reasons for this lack of adjustment besides the usual bureaucratic lethargy. First, the determination of the number of maintenance personnel required and the distribution of those personnel in various facilities is dictated by policy rather than by intrinsic mechanical maintenance of safety requirements. These policies tend to be conservative and, more importantly, there is very little incentive to experiment with more cost effective policies. Second, the number of bases in the CONUS is often driven by political considerations. The actual closing of bases is difficult for all the obvious reasons and this difficulty is compounded by the fact that a very large proportion of the support personnel are civilians.

Third, the variety of specific tools and approaches used to determine requirements such as management engineering teams, econometric modeling, and simple analysis of previous requirements, do not embody strong incentives for experimentation. The requirements process is seen largely as house-keeping. All too often, the approach is to take a snapshot of the world and try to duplicate the image in new organizations or in support of new systems. This procedure makes it difficult to break out of existing manpower utilization patterns.

Finally, the manpower requirements function in the Service is organizationally separated from personnel management. As a result, the requirements process is insensitive to rising personnel costs, increasing training requirements, and changes in quality mix, thus making it difficult for the personnel system to meet requirements. The personnel system, when faced with

cost or other difficulties, is unable to review a wide range of options, including the fundamental need, and is forced instead to look for solutions limited to its own domain. As long as the organizational entity that actually carries the cost is precluded from questioning the demand, it is unlikely that there will be fundamental changes, at least within the Services.

It should be obvious that the personnel structure should be determined by requirements. The characteristics of the personnel structure--that is, (1) the mix of military, civilian, and contract hire personnel used; (2) the experience mix; (3) the quality mix; and (4) the individual skill mix (including skills received through training)--should change with changes in the mission requirements and costs of the force. The basic problem in the DoD is that the numbers and kinds of personnel used to perform given functions have remained remarkably the same over time, with the result that large amounts of resources are probably being wasted. Consequently, the new administration has a major opportunity to effect significant efficiencies and cost savings by altering the mix of personnel types and, possibly, the mix of personnel and equipment. Three separate kinds of tradeoffs will be discussed here: first-term/career substitution, military/civilian substitution, and capital/labor substitution.

First-term/career substitution. Changes in the mix of first-term and career uniform personnel, particularly enlisted, probably offer the most significant opportunity for major improvements. With the end of the draft and the increases in pay and recruiting costs, the cost of first-term personnel has risen dramatically relative to that of career personnel. (See Table 6.) Yet the Services continue to rely on the same mix of first-term and career personnel that they had during the pre-Vietnam era. (See Table 7.) A substitution of career enlisted personnel for first-termers would not only help to reduce the enlisted accession requirements, as previously discussed, but would result in increased efficiency and substantial cost savings as well. A shift from the current mix of 60 percent first-termers and 40 percent careerists to a 55-45 mix or a 50-50 mix would lead to better utilization of junior personnel by having them in jobs for which they are better suited and, as a result, would lead to major cost savings, probably over a billion dollars.

Military/civilian substitution. Should civilians be substituted for military, given the increase in the cost of military personnel? Probably not. Rough estimates indicate that substituting direct-hire civilians for military personnel would yield only marginal cost savings, at best, because direct-hire civilians are also very expensive. (See Table 8.) On the other hand, it does appear possible to make significant cost savings by contracting out for many of the more than one million direct-hire and indirect-hire civilian positions. This issue involves a number of important policy and efficiency questions, as well as cost, and should be examined with considerable care, but an examination would be timely.

Capital/labor substitution. There should be opportunities for substituting capital for the now higher priced personnel. There has been little response in terms of changing the mix of manpower and equipment over the past decade even though the cost of manpower relative to the cost of equipment has risen by some 40 to 50 percent. (See Figure 3.) Consideration ought to be given to finding ways of substituting equipment for manpower, such as the development of less maintenance intensive systems and automating currently labor intensive support functions. Significant changes will take a great deal of time because it is unlikely that there are many situations in which high payoff changes can be made by making modifications of current weapons and equipment. Consequently, the changes that must take place are in the *development* of new items of equipment.

Much has been written about the potential for reducing life cycle costs by making "correct" tradeoff decisions early in the system development cycle. The methodology for making these tradeoffs is still in its infancy. Not only is it very difficult to predict the increase in mean time between failure of an item for a given investment in research and development, it does not necessarily follow that maintenance manpower will be reduced. As discussed above, organizational variables dominate the requirements for manpower. And there is very little incentive, given current budget practices, for managers to substitute equipment for people. This is not simply a DoD problem but, in fact, has some of its causes in the way the Congress examines programs and appropriates funds. Nevertheless, the introduction of new weapon systems does provide a potential opportunity for changing the support structure. Given the large changes in relative prices, adjustments certainly would have been made in the private sector.

These three examples illustrate ways that basic changes can be made to achieve either increased capability or cost savings or both. In summary, because the determination of manpower requirements is the key to the control of manpower costs, the management problem is to develop effective strategies and procedures for setting manpower requirements. *Only major changes will make a major difference.*



#### IV. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

In addition to coordinating the personnel management system with the manpower requirements process, as discussed above, there are major opportunities for improving the personnel management system. Currently, recruiting, training, assignments, promotion, and compensation are a complex patchwork of prior marginal adjustments to specific problems. However, significant improvements will not be made until OSD addresses both the specific subsystems (compensation, recruiting, etc.) and the connections between these subsystems.

Up to the present, the three basic military personnel subsystems--the promotion and tenure system, the retirement system, and regular military compensation--have been largely uncoordinated and often used inconsistently. The last Administration proposed changes in both (1) the promotion and tenure system (Defense Officer Personnel Management Act [DOPMA] and (2) the retirement system (Retirement Modernization Act [RMA]). Even though the subjects are intrinsically related, these two proposals were offered separately to, and considered separately by, the Congress. Neither act was passed. In addition, the last Administration was required by law to undertake a "quadrennial review of military compensation." By all accounts the review is less than a landmark study. The new Administration now has the opportunity to consider all these elements systematically and propose major improvements. In doing so, a number of basic problems should be understood.

##### Promotion and Tenure

The personnel policies developed over the past 30 years reflect a management orientation geared more toward structuring an internally coherent personnel system than toward achieving the desired force structure in terms of requirements. They are based largely on notional standards and the provision of predictable career patterns followed by early retirement. To illustrate, DOPMA (and the supporting enlisted personnel management plans) was largely an attempt to tidy up the present system by using internal personnel logic focused on career progression, rather than a restructuring in response to the changes that have occurred in the overall environment.



Fundamental changes in the system ought to be considered. Yet, there is the persistent tendency to focus on symptoms rather than causes. For instance, the up-or-out system helps prevent the military from encountering all the problems associated with the Civil Service System and yet it is continually questioned. The problem with up-or-out is not the basic concept, but rather the ways that it has come to be applied over the years. We will give just one example. A recent survey shows that nearly 50 percent of all enlisted personnel would prefer to remain technical specialists rather than assume supervisory responsibilities, but the promotion system either forces them into supervisory positions or out of the Service altogether. By developing a personnel management system that allows senior service members to meet the requirements for both technical and supervisory positions, the integrity and basic intent of the up-or-out system could be maintained by broadening the policy to allow for promotion within the skilled areas while simultaneously meeting mission requirements.

#### Compensation

The military compensation system has many of the same problems as the promotion and tenure system. It was developed for the needs of a different environment. It emphasizes rewards for time served rather than accomplishments. In addition, there have been marginal adjustments to solve specific problems over the years (e.g., bonuses, proficiency pay, flight pay, etc.) so that the current system is a patchwork of separate legislative and regulatory changes. Adjustments are needed that will allow the DoD to meet dynamic supply and demand conditions in the market and shifts in its own changing needs. This should mean more emphasis on performance and less on tenure. OSD should avoid the mistake of the last Administration of focusing on small budgetary items such as commissary privileges and reenlistment travel benefits. Such "reforms" save little money and cause great dissatisfaction among the troops.

The amount of military pay is clearly a major issue. Under current law, pay is set according to the so-called comparability principle. Although originally intended to keep Federal pay (military and civilian alike)

competitive with the civilian sector, the actual result of the current system is to pay far more than necessary. Indeed, summing all of the components of the compensation package reveals that military officers earn about 70 percent more, and enlisted personnel about 30 percent more, than comparably aged and educated civilian workers. (See Figures 4 and 5.) The comparability principle, as it has been rigidly interpreted, focuses on average pay. This ignores the realities of the market where there are wide differences in compensation for different occupations. The appropriate market analog is *competitiveness*, not comparability.

The composition of the pay package is another major issue. Numerous studies indicate that military personnel do not value the many hidden and not-so-hidden benefits that make up the pay package as much as these elements cost the government. Accordingly, the DoD ought to consider revising the package so that the individual recipients place the appropriate value on what they receive (i.e., basic pay, allowances, tax advantage, medical care, retirement, and so forth).

A preferred approach to compensation policy would be, first, to integrate the numerous elements of the overall package into a cohesive whole and, second, to base pay levels on competitiveness, rather than on comparability. This means, for example, more extensive use of discretionary differential pays such as bonuses and revising the current pay-table approach to setting military pay. Specifically, changing the current rank and years-of-service pay table to a rank and years-in-grade pay table, coupled with increased flexibility in the promotion points (particularly at the junior pay grades), could provide incentives for the most qualified personnel to remain and simultaneously provide adequate compensation for the less outstanding but still useful members of the force. The end result would be increased efficiency at substantially reduced compensation rates.

#### Retirement

Retirement costs are one of the fastest growing and largest components of manpower costs, having grown from \$477 million in FY 56 to more than \$9.0 billion in FY 78. (See Table 9.) The present retirement system is based

on a series of conditions that no longer prevail, such as a small standing military, a heavy concentration in the combat arms, and limited pay. Originally retirement pay was viewed more as deferred payment than as retirement benefits are viewed in the private sector. Now that military pay equals or exceeds civilian pay, the retirement system should be reexamined in terms of its basic purposes.

The actuarial cost of the current retirement system adds between 40 and 50 percent to regular military compensation for those who retire in contrast to between 5 and 20 percent of salaries and wages for standard private retirement programs. (See Table 10.) Yet, the Services have no incentive under the current policy to economize on retirement costs, both because these costs do not enter the Services' own budget accounts and because they enter the DoD budget when paid rather than when incurred. Even more importantly, the nature of the provision of retirement after 20 years of service, and not before, means that there is very little turnover between the 8th and 20th years, followed by large losses. Consequently, the DoD has practically no flexibility in adjusting personnel to meet requirements for those serving between the first term and the 20th year. At the same time, strong financial incentives for early retirement mean that many outstanding officers and enlisted men are lost to the Service during their most productive years.

## VI. MILITARY TRAINING

Military training is one of the most costly and important functions performed by the DoD. In FY 77, 18 percent of all military personnel were engaged in or supported formal training, at a cost of about \$6.25 billion. The cost of all training is much larger because there is extensive on-the-job training (OJT) to teach skills needed for actual job assignments that are not provided in formal training. Though it is difficult to pinpoint the exact amount of OJT, rough estimates place the value of instructor and trainee time spent in OJT in the neighborhood of an additional \$3.5 billion.

Given its cost, Congress has recently started to monitor and authorize the amount of military training. Unfortunately, Congress and other critics



of the cost of training tend to dwell on symptoms, such as student-staff ratios, rather than on causes. The key to gaining a successful hold on the totality of training costs and effectiveness lies in integrating training policy (both formal and on-the-job training) with manpower requirements and personnel management.

The four dominant elements of military training are: (1) enlisted entry training (both recruit and skill training), currently costing about \$3.5 billion; (2) initial officer training and professional development, about \$900 million; (3) flight training, about \$1.2 billion; and (4) career skill and NCO training, about \$400 million. Large training costs result from: the number of people trained, the breadth and scope of military training, and the organizational incentives facing the training establishment. The emphasis here will be on enlisted specialty training, but there is evidence to suggest that significant improvements could also be made in initial officer training and professional educational development.

In the simplest terms, training requirements are driven by the numbers of people trained each year and by the amount of training given to each. The number of people trained each year is in turn largely a function of accession and retention policy, given the emphasis on entry level training. Consequently, high training costs can largely be traced to the relatively large accession requirements that have resulted from the continuing policy of a first-term oriented enlisted force. Training cost could be reduced substantially by moving to a more career intensive force, because fewer accessions means fewer trainees.

Further cost reductions could be obtained by training first termers less and careerists more. The current emphasis on broad-based entry level training stems largely from three factors:

First-term orientation of the force. Given the current first-term/career mix, first-termers are often used in jobs that would be much better performed by careerists. Consequently, it is necessary to attempt to provide first-termers with a wider range of technical skills than would be the case if they could be limited to entry level jobs.

Career orientation of training. There has been a tendency to interpret the need for a wide range of technical skills to mean that entry level



skill training should provide the knowledge base that the individual will need throughout his entire service career. However, only a small fraction of the entrants (between 15 and 25 percent) actually make the military a career, and, of those who do, some change specialties.

Assignment flexibility. Personnel planners like a broad, knowledge-based approach to training because, in principle, it facilitates flexibility in assigning personnel across weapons systems and among locations, and can be used as the basis for career advancement testing. Unfortunately, the variety and complexity of the weapons systems means that the presumed flexibility of broad training may be more myth than fact.

The result of this approach is that entry level training is too broad, stresses "theory" rather than practical, job-related skills, and is often irrelevant to actual tasks, thus leading to extensive OJT. Fewer entrants and more careerists would allow a basic change in training philosophy. Teach new entrants only the skills necessary to do entry level jobs and provide careerists with the broad knowledge base necessary to perform more sophisticated jobs and provide supervision.

A change in philosophy will be resisted by the training establishment. The training establishment--by design or default--generally defines the needs for, develops, carries out, and evaluates training. Obviously, it has little incentive to reduce training activities and there has been no adequate institutional push from the outside to force it to do so. At the next level, the Services tend to view dollars lost from training as not transferable to other Service needs, so there is little incentive to cut the size of the training establishment. Finally, a significant portion of the training establishment is civilian (about one-third) which increases the problem of closing bases. Consequently, OSD will have to play a larger role in training management if new approaches are to be adopted. This is doubly true because *the training problem can only be worked in the context of an improved requirements process and personnel management system.*



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Study of Use of Military Manpower - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

This memorandum reports the results of the study on Use of Military Manpower which you directed on January 27, 1977. Seven supporting studies have been conducted by the MRA&L staff as part of that overall effort. Brief summaries are provided at the tabs indicated below.

<u>NAME OF STUDY</u>	<u>TAB</u>
(1) Use of Women in the Military	A
(2) Use of Civilians in Place of Military Personnel	B
(3) Stability of Assignments	C
(4) Revised Medical Standards for Accessions	D
(5) Contracted Base Services	E
(6) Geographical Consolidation of Bases	F
(7) Length of Recruit Training	G

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The above list contains six of the seven studies you requested in your January 27 memorandum. The seventh, "tying together of reserve and active forces" is being handled by PA&E in their study of reserve and guard forces. We have added a recruit training study, and have identified at Tab H other important aspects of manpower use.

Two major conclusions stand out. First, our annual requirements for recruiting young men can be reduced by as much as 15-20% through use of more women, conversion of military positions to civilian, and stabilization of assignments through reduced attrition of first-term enlisted people. This reduced demand for young men can be an important factor in making the all-volunteer force continue to work in the face of a declining youth population. It can also save training costs and avoid the need for greatly expanded recruiting expenditures.

9 Jun 77

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OSD 340 80-0017, box 33, 320.2 (1 June - May) 1977

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### Use of Women in the Military

The number of enlisted women in uniform has increased four fold from 1966 to 1976. Women as a percentage of the force have increased from 0.8% to 5.3% in the ten year period. This represents more than double the percentage of women at the height of WW II. Most of the growth has been since 1971.

For the most part the growth has been efficient. Women are being promoted at about the same rates as men, in all occupations open to women. They continue in Service at about the same overall rates as men, although they have higher loss rates than men in non-traditional occupations, and lower loss rates than men in traditional occupations.

Women are much cheaper to recruit than high quality men -- in fact we do not now accept all the high quality women who are willing to enlist. Further expansion in the use of enlisted women can improve quality and avoid increases in recruiting budgets.

All Services are planning increases in the number of enlisted women in 1978. The Army's current plan, however, calls for no growth in enlisted women after 1979. We believe the Army can effectively use more enlisted women in the 1980s and beyond. This issue will be raised in the July manpower issue paper. The Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps plans continue significant expansion in the use of women through 1982, as shown on the attached table.

The number of women the Navy can use is limited by the law that precludes women from serving on Navy ships. The Navy's growth plan approaches that limit by 1983. Many additional Navy positions could be filled by women if this law were changed or repealed.

During floor debate on the Military Procurement Authorization Bill, Senator Proxmire offered an amendment to authorize the Secretary of Defense to expand the job classifications to which female members of the armed forces may be assigned. DoD supported the amendment, but recommended minor language changes (copy attached). During the debate, Senator Proxmire modified his amendment to accommodate Senator Nunn. The amendment, as passed, requires us to study women in the military, to report within six months a satisfactory definition of the term "combat", and to recommend appropriate legislation to open more positions to women. Our study for you on use of women in the military could form the basis of the required response to Congress.

Our background study concludes that there are still many unanswered questions, including: What are the costs in terms of flexibility, response to uncertainty, readiness, and deployability of having more women in the military who are precluded from combat service? What is the impact of women with small children on these factors? What is the comparative lost time of men and women? In the coming months we will be working with the Services to find answers to these questions and others.

Substitute for Senator Proxmire's Amendment

Sec. (a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Secretary of Defense is authorized, under such regulations as he shall prescribe, to expand the job classifications to which female members of the armed forces may be assigned. The Secretary of Defense may include, but is not limited to, the following types of duty within the job classifications to which female members of the armed forces may be assigned:

(1) permanent duty assignment to hospital ships, transport ships, and other ships of the Navy of similar classification not expected to be assigned combat missions and temporary duty assignments to any other vessel not likely to be used for combat mission purposes during such temporary duty assignment;

(2) permanent duty assignment as pilots and navigators in aircraft not likely to be used in combat missions; and

(3) such other temporary or permanent duty assignments as the Secretary of Defense determines can be made to eliminate discrimination against female members of the armed forces without adversely affecting the ability of the military departments to carry out their respective missions.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the Secretary of Defense to place female members of the armed forces in positions where they are likely to be personally involved in combat.

Sec. (b) The Secretary of Defense shall define the terms "combat" and "combat mission" for purposes of this section and such terms shall apply uniformly to all branches of the Armed Forces of the United States except in cases where the Secretary of Defense determines uniform application is impracticable and authorizes exceptions to be made.



The second conclusion is that there is room for further economies in our base structure and base services. Attempts to make any significant re-alignments will encounter broad political opposition. Overcoming this opposition will require the support of the Services, as well as personal involvement of you and the DSD.

The following table summarizes the study results. It shows potential changes that could be made from FY 1977 levels of military and civilian strength, and annual male accessions. The savings shown are based on a relatively favorable FY 1977 recruiting market. The market is expected to be much tougher in the 1980s. Should the Services be unable to recruit the required number of high school graduate men, we would be faced with choosing from among four alternatives: (1) a return to the peacetime draft, (2) a reduction in the strength of the armed forces, (3) a reduction in the quality of accessions with associated higher loss rates and a less reliable force, or (4) an increase in enlistment bonuses and other recruiting expenditures. The last alternative is expensive. For example, an increase in cost of \$5,000 per male high school graduate accession would add more than a billion dollars to manpower costs annually. Taking the initiatives listed below would reduce the propensity of being forced to choose from among those four undesirable alternatives, as well as providing the savings shown.

Potential Long-Term Changes from FY 1977 Levels\*

	<u>Strength</u>		<u>Annual Male Accessions</u>	<u>Annual Savings \$FY 77 Millions</u>
	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>		
1. Women	-	-	-16,000	- 50
2. Civilianization	-57,000	+50,000	-13,000	- 90
3. Stability	-18,000	-	-35,000	-210
4. Medical Standards	-	-	-	0
5. Contracted Services	**	**	**	**
6. Base Consolidation	**	**	**	-280
7. Recruit Training	- 5,000	-	- 1,000	- 40
<hr/>				
TOTAL	-80,000	+50,000	-65,000	-670

\* These studies have been conducted independent of each other. There may be some overlap in the reductions shown.

\*\* Not available at this time.

Some of the actions required to effect the changes on the above table are already planned by the Services. In addition, the Services are permitted to propose broad changes to their approved programs in their Program Objective Memoranda (POMs), which are now being submitted. Their new proposed programs may change our estimates of potential savings. We will evaluate their POMs and submit potential issues for your decision in the manpower issue paper in July. Any overlap in the reductions identified in the table above will be resolved during the POM review process.

Enclosures

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. P. White', with a stylized, sweeping flourish extending from the end.

John P. White

NUMBER OF WOMEN ON ACTIVE DUTY AT END FY (000s)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Projected</u>					
	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	
Army								
Officers	4.8	5.1	5.9	6.7	7.3	7.9	8.5	9.0
<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>43.9</u>	<u>44.4</u>	<u>46.3</u>	<u>48.4</u>	<u>50.4</u>	<u>50.4</u>	<u>50.4</u>	<u>50.4</u>
Subtotal	48.7	49.5	52.2	55.1	57.7	58.3	58.9	59.4
Navy								
Officers	3.5	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.8
<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>19.2</u>	<u>19.3</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>20.5</u>	<u>22.5</u>	<u>24.7</u>	<u>26.4</u>	<u>28.5</u>
Subtotal	22.7	22.8	23.5	24.5	26.7	29.1	31.0	33.3
Air Force								
Officers	4.8	5.0	5.4	5.8	6.5	7.2	7.9	8.6
<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>29.2</u>	<u>31.0</u>	<u>34.6</u>	<u>40.2</u>	<u>42.3</u>	<u>44.3</u>	<u>46.3</u>	<u>48.2</u>
Subtotal	34.0	36.0	40.0	46.0	48.8	51.5	54.2	56.8
Marine Corps								
Officers	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>5.8</u>	<u>6.7</u>
Subtotal	3.4	3.5	3.9	4.2	5.1	5.8	6.3	7.3
DoD Total								
Officers	13.1	14.1	15.5	17.0	18.5	20.1	21.6	23.0
<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>95.4</u>	<u>97.8</u>	<u>104.0</u>	<u>112.8</u>	<u>119.8</u>	<u>124.7</u>	<u>128.9</u>	<u>133.8</u>
TOTAL	108.5	111.9	119.5	129.8	138.3	144.8	150.5	156.8

### Use of Women in the Military

*We should be  
able to do this -  
+ go help further  
in some cases (eg Navy)*

The number of enlisted women in uniform has increased four fold from 1966 to 1976. Women as a percentage of the force have increased from 0.8% to 5.3% in the ten year period. This represents more than double the percentage of women at the height of WW II. Most of the growth has been since 1971.

For the most part the growth has been efficient. Women are being promoted at about the same rates as men, in all occupations open to women. They continue in Service at about the same overall rates as men, although they have higher loss rates than men in non-traditional occupations, and lower loss rates than men in traditional occupations.

Women are much cheaper to recruit than high quality men -- in fact we do not now accept all the high quality women who are willing to enlist. Further expansion in the use of enlisted women can improve quality and avoid increases in recruiting budgets.

All Services are planning increases in the number of enlisted women in 1978. The Army's current plan, however, calls for no growth in enlisted women after 1979. We believe the Army can effectively use more enlisted women in the 1980s and beyond. This issue will be raised in the July manpower issue paper. The Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps plans continue significant expansion in the use of women through 1982, as shown on the attached table.

The number of women the Navy can use is limited by the law that precludes women from serving on Navy ships. The Navy's growth plan approaches that limit by 1983. Many additional Navy positions could be filled by women if this law were changed or repealed.

During floor debate on the Military Procurement Authorization Bill, Senator Proxmire offered an amendment to authorize the Secretary of Defense to expand the job classifications to which female members of the armed forces may be assigned. DoD supported the amendment, but recommended minor language changes (copy attached). During the debate, Senator Proxmire modified his amendment to accommodate Senator Nunn. The amendment, as passed, requires us to study women in the military, to report within six months a satisfactory definition of the term "combat", and to recommend appropriate legislation to open more positions to women. Our study for you on use of women in the military could form the basis of the required response to Congress.

Our background study concludes that there are still many unanswered questions, including: What are the costs in terms of flexibility, response to uncertainty, readiness, and deployability of having more women in the military who are precluded from combat service? What is the impact of women with small children on these factors? What is the comparative lost time of men and women? In the coming months we will be working with the Services to find answers to these questions and others.



## Use of Civilians in Place of Military Personnel

The cost of people on the job (that is, given they have been recruited and trained), is about the same, on the average, whether they are military or civilians, as long as they are doing the same job. The savings from conversion of military jobs are in recruiting, training, and other personnel support. These savings include reductions in military strength in addition to the jobs converted: a reduction of military positions in operating units generate additional military strength reductions in recruiting and training activities. Overall we expect to save about \$2,000 per year for each position converted from military to civilian. Further savings may be possible if the demilitarized function can be performed by a contractor.

The Services tend to oppose civilianization for three reasons: First they fear, with some justification, that civilian spaces are more likely to be cut than military. Second, military manpower provides a better hedge than civilian manpower against the uncertainties of mobilization. Third, civilians are generally considered less responsive than military. In addition military positions in the United States provide jobs for military people between overseas or shipboard assignments. This is particularly important in the Navy and Marine Corps.

*To what extent will this increase*

The study identified about 50,000 positions, currently filled by military, which probably could be shifted to civilian without any measurable reduction in military capability. Conversion of these positions could result in reductions in strength, annual enlisted accessions, and cost, as follows:

*turbulence if total number of overseas spots stay the same?*

### LONG TERM CHANGES FROM FY 1977 LEVELS

	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>ACCESSIONS/YR</u>	<u>COSTS (\$ FY 77 MILLIONS)</u>
Army	-15,000	- 4,200	- 36
Navy	-14,000	- 3,400	- 23
Marine Corps	-	-	-
Air Force	-28,000	- 5,000	- 29
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	-57,000	-12,600	- 88

We are comparing Service POMs to the study recommendations and will examine options to convert more military positions to civil service or contract. If any of these options make sense, we will present them in the manpower issue paper.

### Stability of Assignments

The stability of assignments study addressed two main issues: (1) permanent change of station (PCS) moves, and (2) first-term attrition, the loss of individuals from the military before the completion of their initial term of contracted service.

The number of PCS moves in FY 1978 is projected to be 14% less than in FY 1975. This saves \$220 million compared to the cost that would result were there as many moves budgeted in FY 1978 as in FY 1975. These savings resulted primarily from lengthening tours in CONUS and overseas.

Table 1 (attached) shows recent trends in number of PCS moves by type of move. The moves associated with bringing new people on active duty and training them prior to their first assignment (accession moves) and moves to send people home after the completion of active duty (separation moves) account for 60% of total moves. Accession and separation moves are independent of the length of time people serve at each duty station, but are very sensitive to changes in first-term attrition.

The remaining 40% of the moves (rotational, operational, unit, and training moves) are correlated directly with the length of time people spend at each assignment. Table 2 shows the trend in the average time on the job between PCS moves for all people whose tour is terminated by one of these types of moves. This average is up from 26 months in FY 75 to 29 months in FY 78. The average includes people on "short tours" (such as 12 month tours in areas where wives and families are not permitted), as well as those on normal tours of 36 months duration. It also includes people whose tours are extended and those whose tours are shortened because of hardship transfers and other special circumstances.

We have been successful in lengthening average tours. There appears to be little potential for further curtailment of PCS moves for career personnel, without adverse impact on readiness and morale. However, we can achieve savings by reducing first-term attrition.

First-term attrition is now higher than at the peak of the Vietnam War. By reducing first-term attrition, both the number of young people who must be recruited and the number of accession and separation PCS moves can be reduced. There is a potential to achieve gradually a reduction in accessions of 35,000 per year with an annual savings of about \$210 million (\$150 million in training and PCS costs and \$60 million in recruiting costs).

The first-term attrition projections in the Service POMs are being evaluated. The manpower issue paper will contain alternatives addressing first-term attrition. In addition, Rand is currently studying this issue, and a report is scheduled for completion in October 1977.

TAB C

TABLE 1

PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION MOVES  
(000)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Estimated</u>		<u>Percent Change From FY 75 to FY 78</u>
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	
<u>Types of PCS Moves</u>					
Accession <u>a/</u>	512.8	472.3	489.7	463.6	- 10%
Separation <u>b/</u>	519.1	497.0	460.6	437.4	- 16%
Rotational <u>c/</u>	406.4	388.2	395.4	349.7	- 14%
Operational <u>d/</u>	145.5	149.5	143.0	131.0	- 10%
Organized Unit <u>e/</u>	8.8	15.6	17.1	19.9	+126%
Training <u>f/</u>	131.1	84.4	90.8	87.0	- 34%
Total	1,723.7	1,607.0	1,596.6	1,488.5	- 14%

- a/ Accession moves bring people on active duty, transfer them as necessary for initial training and take them to their first permanent duty station.
- b/ Separation moves send people home who have been discharged.
- c/ Rotational moves transfer people from CONUS to overseas and back.
- d/ Operational moves transfer people within CONUS or theater.
- e/ Organized unit moves result from permanent transfer of an entire unit from one location to another.
- f/ Training moves send people to and from schools for training in excess of six months (except for initial training counted in accession moves).

*2 - 3 mos  
1.5 x 10<sup>6</sup> moves = 15 mos. This is where that number comes from.  
w/o Accession & separation it's 29 mos*

TABLE 2

AVERAGE MONTHS BETWEEN PCS MOVES a/

<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>Percent Increase FY 75 to FY 78</u>
26	26	27	29	13.3%

- a/ For people who have completed initial training and who continue on active duty.

### Revised Medical Standards for Accessions

This study examined the potential for increasing the size of the qualified applicant pool through changes in existing medical standards. Current medical standards result in the disqualification of about 15 percent of the mentally qualified male applicants. The medical conditions leading to disqualification are numerous but eight conditions account for more than two-thirds of the total disqualifications (see table).

#### Disqualifying Medical Conditions (Applicants)

Overweight	14%
Underweight	7%
Orthopedic	14%
Eye	8%
Ear and Mastoid	8%
Skin	7%
Blood Pressure	4%
Other Circulatory	5%
All Others	33%

The largest potential payoff would come from revising the weight standards. Weight standards account for 21 percent of the medical rejections of applicants. The weight standards for retention are substantially more restrictive and result in the forced release of trained personnel who are otherwise qualified; thus increasing accession requirements.

A 10 percent change in weight standards for accessions would permit about 7,000 applicants now rejected annually to serve. The Services would oppose any relaxation of entry standards for overweight since these men generally have a higher attrition rate than others, are believed to be less physically fit, and are considered to present a poor military appearance. The Army is the only Service currently accepting overweight men. All Services enlist large numbers of underweight men.

The study recommends that four-year test programs be established to determine the cost-effectiveness of revised medical standards for enlistment. For purposes of these tests, 2 percent of the male high school graduate accessions should be men who do not meet current DoD medical entrance standards. Sufficient numbers of marginal cases in each medical rejection category should be included to permit statistical evaluation of the cost and effectiveness of lowering medical entrance standards. By initiating the tests now, we will be able to judge the relative effectiveness and costs of revised medical standards as we strive to meet accession requirements faced with the declining youth population of the 1980's.

*This needs  
careful study &  
testing.*

TAB D



### Contracted Services

Currently there are a number of initiatives for converting in-house functions to contract performance within the military departments and Defense Logistics Agency. For example:

- o The FY 1978 civilian authorization request reflects anticipated savings of 3,800 civilian manpower spaces from economical contracting.
- o A memorandum to the military services and defense agencies was issued by the DASD (Installations and Housing) strongly urging increased contracting in base operations.
- o A redrafted instruction has been prepared to improve our implementation of the OMB circular on contracting. These revisions should lead to more contracting of commercial and industrial-type functions.

The passage by the House of Representatives of Section 809 of the House Authorization Act restricts additional conversion to contracts until 15 March 1978. If not eliminated in the Senate-House conference, this Section would delay our pending conversions until 15 March 1978. After 15 March 1978 Congress may extend the moratorium and impose additional restrictions on contracting-out.

We are working with Legislative Affairs and Comptroller people to eliminate this restrictive Section of the Bill. It is important to convince the Congress that: (1) DoD needs to find economies, and (2) contracting out, in some circumstances, correctly applied, can produce savings; but that (3) DoD will not take an arbitrary and wholesale approach to contracting out.

At this time, we cannot project savings that would result from increased contracting. However, our studies of Vance AFB which operates under contract shows that when jobs were converted to contract about 20 percent of the in-house civilian manpower costs were saved.

*Problem is to  
Convince Congress*

### Geographical Consolidation of Bases

As reported to you by ASD(I&L) on 15 February 1977, considerable progress has been made in tightening up our base structure. Since 1969, over 500,000 military and civilian positions have been eliminated through reductions in nonessential overhead and support functions including the closure of over 400 activities and installations in the United States, with an annual cost avoidance of \$4.5 billion.

Mr. Duncan has already acted on the I&L recommendations by approving the base realignments listed in the memo of February 15, 1977. The realignments covered have the potential of reducing annual Defense costs by more than \$280 million, if fully implemented as proposed. In addition, Mr. Duncan tasked the Military Departments for another base realignment package on March 12, 1977. This new package, together with the results of the Domestic Long Range Base Structure Study due to be completed in August 1977, should identify the extent that geographic consolidation of bases can be accomplished. MRA&L is working with the Services to implement these actions.

*B.g. to here*


TAB F

### Recruit Training

The length of recruit training is different for each Service: Air Force - six weeks, Army - seven weeks, Navy - eight weeks, Marine Corps - eleven weeks. There are reasonable explanations for most of the differences in length of recruit training, but the study shows that the Navy and Marine Corps programs could be reduced by one week with little impact on the readiness of operational units.

The Navy and Marine Corps each devote one week of recruit training to KP duties - called service week. The Army and Air force have eliminated service week, relying instead on contractors to operate food services. It would appear that the Navy and Marine Corps could follow the same procedure. Elimination of service week would permit reduction of Navy and Marine Corps recruit training by one week, saving training costs of over \$40 million per year, and reducing military strength by 5,000.

We expect the Department of Navy POM to propose reducing Marine Corps recruit training to ten weeks, but to continue Navy recruit training at eight weeks. In the July manpower issue paper, we expect to present for your consideration alternatives which would reduce the Navy to seven weeks and, if necessary, the Marine Corps to ten weeks of recruit training.



### Other Important Aspects of Manpower Use

There are four aspects of manpower use, not discussed in other parts of the study on the use of military manpower, that merit mentioning:

1. Increased accessions of recruits with below average mental test scores. Can we use productively a larger number of people who score below average on the mental standards test? During the draft period, all Services used much higher percentages of men scoring below average on mental tests than they do now. As part of the all-volunteer force study, we will be examining the quality requirements for initial accession, to insure that they do not result in unnecessary costs. *7-12-68 1/2 retention of such enlistees is the question.*
2. Increased reenlistments. Should we continue to bar from reenlisting some willing enlisted people who perform adequately in their jobs, but do not meet current reenlistment standards? These people fall into three categories:
  - (a) Those who have not been promoted to meet the "up-or-out" standards.
  - (b) Those who have not obtained high school diplomas. *See Staff Comm action.*
  - (c) Those who do not meet medical standards for reenlistment (especially weight) which are more stringent than the entrance requirements.

It may be possible to reduce accession requirements by allowing such individuals to continue serving in those jobs for which they are qualified. This issue will also be considered as part of the assessment of quality requirements in the all-volunteer force study.

3. Efficiency of the training establishment. Can we save money through consolidating operations, shortening courses, and reducing staff and overhead? We have already moved to have the Army conduct all undergraduate helicopter pilot training. We have completed a study on reducing the length of Navy and Marine Corps recruit training. During the POM review and in subsequent months, we will be looking at ways to reduce staff and overhead costs in the training establishment, with emphasis on the validity of staffing standards.
4. Efficiency in other support forces. Can the number of people in central supply and maintenance be reduced? Currently, 36% of DoD civilians work in these areas. There will be pressure to reduce the number of people committed to these functions as part of President Carter's desired reduction of the federal work force. The MRA&L staff will be focusing attention on these support forces in the coming months.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1 DEC 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Conserving Male Manpower in the Air Force

You asked for my comments on the attached paper.

A DoD study performed at my direction and published in May 1977, entitled, Use of Women in the Military, generally supports the analysis in the Binkin/Bach study published by the Brookings Institution. There are about 320,000 positions in the Air Force which could be filled by either men or women. While any of these positions could be filled by women, no analysis has been made of the impact of filling all or even most of them with women.

Binkin and Bach in their study were not making any such sweeping proposals. They argued that many positions were open and that further progress in the use of women should be made in the Air Force and in the other services. Our study showed the same facts and reached the same conclusions. Based on this evidence, I have directed major increases in the use of women by Fiscal Year 1983. The projected growth is shown in the following table.

Female Enlisted Personnel (000s) and Percent  
of Total Enlisted Force, by Service

	FY73		FY77		FY83	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Army	17	2.4	46	6.8	80	11.8
Navy	9	1.9	20	4.4	40	8.7
Marine Corps	2	1.1	3	2.0	7	4.2
Air Force	15	2.6	35	7.3	72	15.0
DoD-wide	43	2.2	105	5.9	199	11.1

There is obviously a potential for use of even more females than currently programmed. But it takes years for people to develop into qualified noncommissioned officers. A too rapid rate of growth in accessions can result in an imbalance of women in the junior ranks. There may also be supply limitations in the number of females who will enlist.

The attached paper also raises the issue of whether a decrease in the demand for males by the Air Force would materially aid recruiting in the other services. Because the Air Force may, in fact, be quite different and more civilian-like than the other services, particularly in peacetime, few enlistees may be willing to accept enlistment in the other services. Moreover, those enlistees gained by the other services from the Air Force would be unlikely to enlist in the combat arms or the Navy engineering ratings -- the main recruiting problems for the active forces today.

Although the Air Force may differ from the other services in peacetime, wartime is a different matter. Almost all Air Force personnel assets have to be deployable to any part of the globe to fight under widely varying combat and climatic conditions. We believe that female military personnel can be so deployed. However, civilians cannot be used in these circumstances unless they are simultaneously members of the Selected Reserve. Moreover, there appear to be many instances in the blue-collar area where civilianization is more expensive in the long-run.

*Harold Bruner*

Attachment  
a/s

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

U.S. AIR FORCE

To H. Brown -  
Brief comment  
J. C.

A significant opportunity to conserve military male manpower may exist in the Air Force. A recent Brookings Institute study indicated that while combat considerations would limit Navy/Marine Corps to only about 8-9% women, USAF had the potential to absorb up to 76% without any changes to current law. When this is viewed in combination with certain other recruiting and retention statistics, it appears that unnecessary demands are being imposed by the Air Force on the dwindling national male youth pool. These demands, in turn, are straining scarce resources of the Army and Navy to compete among themselves for the leftovers. Additionally, life is significantly easier and more civilian-like in the USAF.

This conclusion can be drawn from the aforementioned non-combat environment in which most live and from various published indicies. For example, the USAF is not forced to take in the lower mental groups as are the other Services; they do not have a problem in retaining people in their career force; they do not have a deserter or unauthorized absentee problem; they achieve nearly 100% high school or high school graduate equivalents in recruiting; their extensive base complex within the United States offers a home-near-home arrangement which can hardly be considered equivalent to the arduous military existence of the combat arms or sea duty people in the other Services. As a matter of fact, it may well be that extensive civilization, in addition to significantly enhanced utilization of women, could be achieved to further minimize unnecessary drain on male youth. All of this should be reviewed and new programs initiated.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

APR 13 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: James T. McIntyre (Signed) Jia  
SUBJECT: Report on the All-Volunteer Force (AVF)

As you know, OMB performs in-depth analytical studies of selected subjects as a part of the budget review process. As a part of our detailed examination last fall of Defense manpower and training, OMB began a review of the current All Volunteer Force (AVF). Because of growing public and Congressional interest in the AVF, we have examined future military manpower requirements and compared alternative ways to meet those requirements: the AVF, a modified version, a reserve draft, an active duty draft, and universal military service.

? The AVF has been highly successful to date in meeting its quantitative and qualitative goals for the active force (but not the Army Reserves and National Guard). However, some modifications in the management of the AVF appear to be necessary to avoid very large cost increases in future budgets as the size of the prime recruiting pool of military-age males starts to decrease in 1980. Unless policy changes reduce present standards and allow larger numbers of enlistments from lower entrance test score categories, we estimate that an additional budgetary cost of \$14 billion per year could be required by 1985 to maintain the current quality and quantity of military manpower through voluntary enlistments. Other than the areas where DOD is already moving forward (e.g., increased use of women), our principal suggestion would be to gradually reduce active duty military force levels, substituting increased contracting out of support functions at bases within the U.S. — *doubt the significance.*

The cost of the AVF is a controversial issue. The GAO recently concluded that the move to the AVF caused annual budgetary cost increases of more than \$3 billion. DOD, however, believes that GAO greatly overstates the costs and understates the savings attributed to the AVF. A central objective in our study was to develop a methodology for estimating the true cost of alternative military manpower policies. In addition, we addressed the social cost of the utilization of manpower for Governmental purposes (i.e., by calculating the value of these manpower resources in their alternative use in the private sector).

WACF, Subj, Ex ND 8 1/20/77-1/20/80, Box ND 29



We have reviewed our study and its conclusions with Defense, (NSC) staff, and the Domestic Policy Staff. DPS has raised a concern -- which we will examine closely -- as to the impact on youth unemployment of any efforts to ease recruitment shortages by replacing young males with women or older men. The relationship of AVF modifications to youth unemployment is not readily apparent, since so much depends on whether unemployed youth would have the capability to perform required military tasks.

We will be hearing more in the coming months on the AVF. Senator Nunn is likely to hold another set of hearings to examine the alternative of national service, and the Congressional Budget Office will soon release a report on the same subject. Because of this continuing attention, I believe you would be interested in glancing at the attached six page executive summary of the OMB Report on the All Volunteer Force. We will continue to work with your other relevant advisors to assess the AVF and suggested alternatives to it.

Attachment

February 7, 1978

Summary of the Report on the All-Volunteer Force (AVF)

Since 1973, the United States has used the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) approach for meeting military manpower requirements. Recently there has been an intensification of interest in the AVF in all quarters. Congress and its staffs, academia, research groups, the Department of Defense, and the Press are all concerned about the question of whether or not the AVF is successful now and can be successful in the future at an affordable cost. In response to Senator Nunn's continuing interest in the AVF, the General Accounting Office has recently completed a study of the cost of the AVF, and a study is expected soon from the Congressional Budget Office on national service programs. The purpose of this report is to give the President a preliminary analysis of the problem now, before having to react to proposals from outside the Executive Branch.

Prior to the increased involvement of the United States in international affairs, the U.S. was able for many years to avoid the creation of a large professional military force. Conscription was only used during times of extraordinary national emergency (the Civil War and World War I). However, World War II necessitated the draft on a large scale, and with a short break in 1947-48, the draft stayed in effect due to the continuation of the cold war and the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Because of the use of conscripts in the highly unpopular and traumatic Vietnam War, the draft came under increasing criticism in the 1960's.

On February 20, 1970, the Gates Commission on an All-Volunteer Force reported in favor of abolishing the draft and relying upon voluntary enlistments. The Gates Report stated that the All-Volunteer Force ". . . is a system for maintaining standing forces that minimizes governmental interference with the freedom of the individual. . . ." The Gates Report also stated that the draft ". . . has been a costly, inequitable, and divisive procedure for recruiting men for the Armed Forces. . . ." With the cessation of the Vietnam War in 1973, the All-Volunteer Force became a reality.

At its inception, the AVF was opposed by many who said it would be too costly and composed too much of poor and minority people. The lack of a draft would cause the Reserve components to fail to meet their manpower needs. The quality of recruits would decline. Despite these predictions, however, it is fair to say that the AVF has been highly successful to date in meeting its quantitative and qualitative goals for the active forces, but not for the Army Reserve and National Guard. Nevertheless, future recruitment problems are predicted for the AVF because of the projected decline (beginning in 1980) in the population of non-prior service males between the ages of 17 and 21:

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Projected Population Estimates  
(Millions)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Males</u> <u>Age 17</u>	<u>Males</u> <u>Ages 17 to 21</u>
1976	2.1	10.7
1980	2.1	10.7
1985	1.8	9.6
1990	1.6	9.0
1995	1.8	9.7
2000	2.1	10.3

The downward demographic trend in the prime recruiting pool of military age males, plus the possibility of decreased unemployment rates for teen-agers, will combine to intensify the recruitment problems of the military services in the next few years. In order to compete for the declining pool of available young males, the study estimates that very large salary increases (e.g., an additional \$14 billion dollars per year by 1985) would be necessary to maintain the current quantity and quality military manpower mix through voluntary enlistments unless policy changes (see below) are instituted.

The major alternatives analyzed in the report are summarized below:

- ° The Current AVF: This alternative assumes that the manpower needs of the military will continue to be met by voluntary enlistments with no significant changes in policy. Because of the decreasing size of the pool of non-prior service males, this approach assumes constantly increasing recruiting and advertising costs and higher salaries and bonuses to compete with the outside market.
- ° The Modified AVF: This approach considers the effect of changing policies with regard to such factors as entrance standards, use of women, attrition rates, use of civilians, and the ratio of first-term to career enlisted personnel.
- ° The Reserve Draft: This provides for a registration and three months' training program for enough personnel to make up Individual Ready Reserve shortfalls, which is the most serious deficiency of the current AVF approach.
- ° The Active Duty Draft: This alternative would reinstate the Selective Service System for males, using a lottery. Wages for first-term enlisted personnel would be reduced.
- ° National Service: The option analyzed in the report is compulsory military service for males. Other options could include either a voluntary ("minimally coercive") or compulsory national service that meets both civilian and military manpower needs.

Concerning the Current AVF, the report concludes that the AVF has been able to furnish sufficient numbers of personnel for the Active Forces (99% of authorized strength). The quality of personnel provided by the AVF for the Active Forces is also adequate in terms of DOD's existing physical and mental requirements. In terms of mental capability, while the services have achieved fewer enlistees who score above average on tests, they have greatly surpassed the expected number of those who score in the average range and significantly reduced the percentage of those who score below average (from FY 1974 to FY 1976, the Army was able to reduce the percentage of recruits scoring below average from 19 percent to 8 percent of total accession). In addition, the AVF has provided an Active Force which is broadly representative of our society in terms of income and geographic distribution:

Percent Distribution of Earnings of Parents of Recruits (May 1975)  
Compared with U.S. Family Income (March 1975)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>All Services</u>	<u>U.S. Family Earnings March 1975</u>
\$ 0 - \$ 2,000	8.7	3.9	8.9	3.6	6.4	5.3
3,000 - 7,999	24.0	17.8	20.6	17.7	20.5	21.0
8,000 - 10,999	19.6	16.3	17.1	17.8	18.1	14.5
11,000 - 13,999	15.2	17.8	16.2	19.4	17.0	14.8
14,000 - 19,999	18.7	23.1	23.5	25.3	22.0	22.3
20,000 +	13.9	21.1	13.6	16.2	16.0	21.8

Although the proportion of blacks in the services has increased since the inception of the AVF, this trend has leveled off in the past three years. The increased percentage of blacks in the AVF represents a significant increase in the number of blacks scoring high enough on the standardized tests to qualify for entrance, as well as the decision of blacks to take advantage of employment opportunities offered in the military services:

Black Representation  
(Percent)

<u>Year</u>	<u>DOD</u>		<u>Army</u>		<u>Navy</u>		<u>Marine Corps</u>		<u>Air Force</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
CY 1964	1.8	9.7	3.3	11.8	0.3	5.9	0.3	8.7	1.5	10.0
CY 1974	2.8	15.7	4.5	21.3	1.3	8.4	2.5	18.1	2.2	14.2
CY 1975	3.1	16.1	4.8	22.2	1.4	8.0	3.0	18.1	2.5	14.6
CY 1976	3.4	16.6	5.2	23.7	1.6	8.0	3.4	17.0	2.8	14.7

The biggest problem for the current AVF appears to be in meeting the manpower requirements of the reserves. As shown on the following table, there are growing shortfalls in several categories of Selected Reserve forces:



Authorized Versus Actual Average Strength - Selected Reserves  
(Thousands)

Component	FY 1975		FY 1976		FY 1977	
	Auth	Manned (%)	Auth	Manned (%)	Auth	Manned (%)
Army National Guard	400	98.5	400	94.8	390	93.3
Army Reserve	225	102.3	219	96.8	212	91.5
Navy Reserve	106	101.9	106	92.4	96	100.0
Marine Corps Reserve	37	86.5	32	96.9	34	85.3
Air National Guard	95	98.9	95	97.9	93	97.8
Air Force Reserve	51	92.2	52	96.2	52	92.3
Total	925	97.8	904	95.5	878	93.6

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) (which would provide replacements during a mobilization situation) is diminishing rapidly in size. This fall-off has been caused primarily by the fact that two-year draftees used to serve four years in the reserves after completion of active duty tours. Current enlistees serve 3 to 4-year active duty terms, leaving only 2 to 3 years of reserve service. With the completion of the reserve obligation of most Vietnam veterans, the Army IRR was down to 165,000 enlisted personnel in early FY 1977 (compared to a 1973 total of 685,000). However, the seriousness of this shortfall is difficult to estimate until DOD completes on-going requirements studies.

The Modified AVF would take steps to minimize the projected cost of maintaining the AVF by making policy changes to reduce the required number of accessions of non-prior service males in the average or higher mental categories. Possible changes include increased utilization of women (highly promising), relaxation of mental/educational standards, relaxation of physical standards, reduction of first-term attrition, the use of more civilians in support positions (primarily contractor personnel), and increasing the percentage of career (as opposed to first-term) personnel.

By putting together various combinations of policy modifications to the AVF, it appears feasible to hold the projected cost of the AVF in line with the increases in real wages expected in the civil sector. This would be accomplished by placing less demand on the decreasing supply of military age males by substituting from other sources. For example, assuming a 15 percent youth unemployment rate in 1985 (compared to the 1975 actual rate of 20 percent), the effects of a series of possible policy modifications on the military compensation cost of the AVF would be as follows (dollars in billions):

Manpower Cost of Unmodified AVF . . . . .	33.7 *
Double Annual Accessions of Women . . . . . (from 32,000 in 1977 to 64,000 in 1980)	- 4.5
Reduce Attrition Rate to DOD Objective . . . . .	- 4.8
Contract Out 50,000 Support Positions . . . . .	- 1.7
Recruit 40,000 (10%) from those Scoring Below Average on Mental Tests . . . . .	- 5.6
Revised Total (Modified AVF) . . . . .	17.1 *

\* Compared with 1975 military compensation costs of \$19.5B.

It should be emphasized that the possible policy modifications outlined above are not necessarily recommended at this time. Further analysis is needed by DOD on the specific effects of such changes. However, assuming that some of the policy changes are desirable and can be successfully accomplished, a modified AVF could greatly alleviate or even potentially avoid the substantial cost increases which would otherwise be necessary to meet future manpower requirements on a voluntary basis.

Recent Secretary of Defense decisions indicate the DOD is moving in the right direction on most of the policy changes which appear to be desirable for the AVF. An exception appears to be the slowness of DOD to proceed with civilianization of additional military support billets at domestic installations. Because of the cheaper cost of contractor personnel, this action could significantly reduce direct personnel costs. In addition, reduced military accession requirements would lead to decreased recruitment and training costs. The report recommends that active duty military force levels be reduced by the substitution of about 50,000 contractor personnel performing support functions at U.S. bases over a three-year period.

*Navy  
impact of  
seminar show  
billets*

Concerning the Reserve draft, the report concludes that it would be premature to impose a draft for reservists. DOD is currently reassessing the assignments, capability, and requirements of its Reserve Forces under current scenarios. DOD is considering more imaginative approaches to filling the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) directly by voluntary means (e.g., enlisting high school juniors and seniors for four months active duty, annual retainer pay, educational assistance). In addition, the Reserve Compensation System Study is studying the relationships of the market, the mission, the current requirements, and compensation alternatives. Until these studies are completed, it would be too early to make major policy decisions on how to meet the personnel needs of the Reserve Forces.

The reactivation of the Active Duty Draft is not recommended in the study because of the high social costs involved (e.g., disruption of education and job plans; coerciveness; and imposition of a "conscription tax" on draftees representing the difference between what they could earn in the civilian market place and their military service pay levels). The amount

of budgetary savings resulting from a reinstitution of the draft would vary depending on the wage rates which the Government would pay and the alternative against which the draft is compared. Assuming that draftees' pay was reduced to the minimum wage level, the near-term budgetary savings from a reinstatement of the draft would be less than \$3 billion per year. However, if pay levels for first-term personnel were not reduced below current rates there would be no significant near-term savings. Of course, unless some of the policy changes outlined previously for a modified AVF were implemented, the cost of the all-volunteer approach would escalate greatly in future years, and the savings from having a draft would increase comparably.

The cost of a National Service approach to meeting military manpower requirements would be very high. Although there are many possible variants of national service, the study focused on compulsory national military service of about one million men per year. Under this option, budgetary costs of military manpower by 1980 would increase by about \$10 billion per year over current levels if these personnel were paid at the minimum wage. However, the budgetary cost is only a portion of the true social cost which is measured by the value of these same manpower resources in their next best alternative use (i.e., the private sector). Here the model used calculated the social cost of national military service to be \$78 billion in 1935. Moreover, compulsory national service would generate more manpower than the military services could usefully absorb. If the national service program were voluntary and included civilian sector service, the military's recruitment problems would be intensified because of the need to compete with civilian service for manpower.

The report recommends that the Department of Defense continue to operate with the AVF and implement the following management initiatives:

- An update of DOD's January 1974 Report on quality requirements for the AVF based on job analyses which will enable DOD to estimate how many more Category IV's (below average mentally) and/or non-high school graduates are acceptable.
- A review by DOD of specific support functions at domestic bases (now performed by military personnel) which can be accomplished more economically and effectively by civilian contractor personnel. An objective should be established to reduce the active duty force levels by about 50,000 military personnel over a three-year period as a result of increased contracting out of support functions at domestic bases.
- The conduct of experiments to evaluate the performance of women in a wide range of occupational specialties, with the objective of substantially increasing the number of women in the services as the pool of available young men decreases in size over the next several years.
- The implementation of the recommendations of the DOD study on physical standards to make the maximum feasible utilization of people wanting military careers who are now denied them because of marginal weight or orthopedic restrictions.
- Further review by DOD of personnel requirements and compensation options for the Reserve Force.





MANPOWER,  
RESERVE AFFAIRS  
AND LOGISTICS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

15 FEB 1979  
SECDEF HAS SEEN

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Active Force Enlisted Recruiting--Trends and Outlook

Active force enlisted recruiting results thus far in FY 1979 are a matter of concern to us and all of the Services. None of the Services achieved their December or first quarter FY 1979 recruiting objectives. This was the first quarter since the draft ended in which no Service made its objective. Shortfalls are also expected to be reported for January.

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Although total recruiting objectives last quarter were only 2 percent lower than in the same quarter last year, total accessions declined 9 percent. New female accessions were 11 percent above last year's total, but the Services had programmed a 13 percent increase. New male accessions were 12 percent below last year while the Services had programmed a 4 percent decline. The high school diploma graduate proportion among new accessions remained high, though below last year's proportion, for all Services except the Marine Corps. They were also the only Service recruiting a larger number of graduates than in the same quarter of last year. The number of high school graduates entering the other Services declined by about 15 percent over the year.

We have discussed these unfavorable trends with the Services and tentatively concluded that current recruiting problems are the cumulative result of a number of factors:

a. Tougher Recruiting Market. The market is more difficult to work due to increased employment among 18-19 year old males and a tripling of Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) enrollment over the last year. Male likelihood to enlist, as evidenced by our market surveys, has declined and remains low. Also, the military offering has become less attractive. The eligibility for G.I. Bill educational benefits terminated at the end of 1976. The Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP) benefits are far less valuable. Further, entry military pay has not kept pace with changes in the minimum wage, median earnings of 18-year old workers, and changes in consumer prices.

b. Emphasis on Maximizing High School Diploma Graduate Accessions. A tougher FY 1978 market was masked somewhat by lower overall accession requirements and continued success in attracting relatively high percentages of high

7 Feb 79

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A



school graduates. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps emphasized the accession of high school graduates by limiting non-graduate enlistments. Subsequent inability to recruit the numbers of graduates desired resulted in FY 1978 recruiting shortfalls in the Army and Navy. Concentration on the high school graduate market appears to have degraded our recruiting effectiveness in the non-graduate segment of the market.

c. Other Factors. An array of additional factors appears to be contributing to the overall problem:

(1) Efforts by the Services to more evenly flow accessions into their training bases -- thus impairing their ability to take maximum advantage of the seasonal nature of the recruiting market.

(2) Recent highly publicized instances of recruiting malpractice and subsequent Congressional hearings.

(3) The continuing debate on the All Volunteer Force (AVF) (with the attendant criticism of the quality and representativeness of military personnel) and discussion of a possible return to mandatory registration and the draft itself.

(4) Widespread unfavorable publicity on living conditions for Service personnel overseas.

Recruiting prospects for the balance of the year are highly uncertain. With no change in market conditions, significant quantity or quality shortfalls are likely. There are, however, reasons to look for an improvement. The Army has dropped its numeric restrictions on recruiting of non-high school graduates. The Army and Air Force are adjusting their recruiting goals to take advantage of the historically better recruiting periods in the third and fourth quarter of the fiscal year. The number of 18-19 year old unemployed males may very likely increase in the months ahead. The CETA build-up is over, and program participants should be coming back into the market. Finally, preliminary data indicate that this year's freshman college enrollment (male) declined more than did the population.

We were aware of these trends (as well as the potential for change) during the budget review. However, we believed it would be premature to recommend substantial increases in recruiting resources based upon data available at that time. We are still not ready to make such a recommendation. However, if the Services' recruiting efforts continue to falter, we are prepared to examine a range of alternatives from increased resources to readjustment of quality goals/entrance standards.

The on-going dialogue within the Congress and the media on the "deficiencies" of the AVF and the possible restoration of the draft will continue to hamper our recruiting efforts. Nonetheless, we still have confidence in the AVF and our ability to sustain it through such supportive management actions

(e.g., attempts to reduce attrition, lump sum re-enlistment bonuses, enhanced educational benefits and shorter initial enlistment tests) as have recently been taken. Should you wish to discuss this matter with the Services in the Armed Forces Policy Council, a talking paper is attached.

Attachment  
As stated



**ROBERT B. PIRIE, JR.**  
**Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary**  
**of Defense (MRA&L),**

## TALKING PAPER

Subject: Active Force Enlisted Recruiting

Current Status:

- Strength
  - At the end of FY 1978 and the first quarter of FY 1979, all Services were within 1 percent of planned end strengths.
- Recruiting
  - October-December 1978 was the first quarter in the AVF period in which no Service made recruiting goals.
  - All Services failed in January to meet goals.
  - Recruiting has been less effective over the last year due to market conditions; unfavorable publicity; some of our own management actions; and the AVF, registration and draft debates.
  - We hope for some improvement in the enlistment market in the months ahead.
    - We see no likelihood of additional recruiting resources at this time.

Action Required:

- It is imperative that every effort be made to turn the recruiting situation around within existing resources.
- At this time of critical national debate on the AVF, it is particularly necessary to insure that we are doing everything possible to achieve realistic recruiting goals.
- I see no easy road back to conscription under any circumstances, short of mobilization. Should recruiting falter due to uncontrollable market conditions and after prudent adjustment of quality goals, it must be clear to all that we in DoD have exhausted every reasonable recourse to bring about a maximally effective recruiting program to get the necessary accessions and maintain strength.
- I remain confident in our ability to sustain the AVF through dedicated and supportive management actions.

10:19 JUN 22 AM 11:52



**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350**

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

21 June 1979

*[Handwritten signature]*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**Subj: Parity Policy for Navy Recruiting - INFORMATION**

**JUN 25 1979  
MEMORANDUM  
DEP SEC HAS SEEN**

Based on our recent discussions, I have directed a thorough review of the current Navy policy to achieve parity for racial and ethnic groups in recruiting. We are giving high priority to exploring the legal issues involved, defining precisely the manpower and personnel implications of the policy, and developing and analyzing the impact of alternative policies. I have asked my staff to complete this work in order that I might provide a comprehensive paper to you not later than 30 July 1979.

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The current Navy policy is designed to ensure that each of the four groups--caucasian, black, hispanic, and other--are enlisted in such a mix as to allow each group comparable opportunity for upward mobility in the Navy. The policy ensures that a particular group does not shoulder the burden of the less desirable jobs on a proportional basis that is drastically out of line with the proportion of its members in the total force.

The Navy requires that 83% of its new recruits be eligible to attend initial skill training. This percentage of school-eligible personnel has proven, over time, to be a valid predictor of quality. Obviously, we would like 100% of our recruits to be school-eligible but we recognize that this is simply not realistic. Basically, school eligibility status can be achieved by scoring sufficiently high on the entry tests.

The current parity policy requires that the Navy, while maintaining 83% school eligibility of all those being enlisted, also maintain a minimum of 75% school eligibility in each of the four groups mentioned above. In so doing, the Navy assures that the significant majority of the recruits in each group that we do bring in will have reasonable opportunity for upward mobility and long term success and that we will not develop a disproportionate number of individuals of any one racial group in the non-school eligible segment of the force.

A bit of history helps in understanding this issue. In the early 1970s, before parity was adopted, the Navy had a disproportionate number of minorities in the less desirable occupations and large numbers of them, due to failure to meet minimum school requirements, had little or no chance to move out of these jobs and advance. As a result of several incidents of a racial nature, the Navy undertook a careful study of equal opportunity practices and policies. Some of the more publicized incidents took place aboard USS KITTY HAWK (October 1972), USS HASSAYAMPA (October 1970), and USS CONSTELLATION (November 1970) and at the Naval Training

21 Jun 79

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*[Handwritten initials and date]*  
6/25/79

330-82-0204, Box 39, 340, 1979




Center, Great Lakes (July 1970), Naval Station Keflavik, Iceland (October 1970) and Naval Station, Midway Island (November 1972).

A key finding of the investigations was that a lack of upward mobility and employment in the least desirable jobs were important factors in the unrest and severe personnel problems. In October 1972, school-eligible goals were set at 81% for majority personnel, at 67% for minorities. In April 1973, after the Hicks Subcommittee report was issued, the goal for all personnel, majority and minority, was set at 81%. The Navy Affirmative Action Planning Task Force convened in October 1975 and reviewed the representation of minorities in all Navy ratings. They found a serious underrepresentation of minorities in a number of occupations. The parity policy, coupled with management actions to ensure that qualified minorities are enlisted and attend schools in these underrepresented ratings, was adopted to correct the problems that contributed to the incidents the Navy experienced.

Prior to the Navy Affirmative Action Plan (NAAP) promulgation in July of 1976, the leaders of NAACP were contacted and asked to review the document. The recruitment policy was explained and statistical information was presented which showed that blacks and other minorities were beginning to increase in representation, show greater upward mobility as a group, receive fewer "less than honorable" discharges, and in general, were increasing in the petty officer ranks. The NAACP endorsed the Navy Affirmative Action Plan at its annual convention in Memphis in June of 1976. Contacts with the Black Congressional Caucus in 1974 through 1976 also explained the parity policy. It was first viewed with disapproval but was accepted after the statistical indicators showed improvements for minority personnel. In fairness, I understand that the term "parity" was not used in these discussions with the NAACP or the Black Caucus. Rather, the policy was explained as an equal opportunity initiative to prevent the clustering of minorities in the unskilled areas and to avoid recognized problems which led to earlier racial unrest.

As I mentioned at the outset, we are actively reviewing all aspects of the current policy and the legality and impact of any alternatives. I will keep you fully informed and will provide the results of our analysis by July 30.



R. James Woolsey  
Acting Secretary of the Navy



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

27 DEC 1979

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Career Retention

The broad attention being given to our recent recruiting shortfalls has obscured what may well be a more serious problem in terms of the readiness of our military forces: the alarming drop in the retention of our mid-career personnel. While this issue may become entangled in the public debate about registration and the draft, it is actually unrelated to it. These men and women are now volunteers, have been so in the past, and would be under any future military manpower scheme, including the draft. However they are now electing not to remain in increasingly greater numbers. If this trend persists it will have grave consequences for the armed forces.

The problem is this: retention rates at the second enlistment point were until last year typically between 60% and 70%; they now are measured at 55% or below. Similar trends can be seen at later enlistment thresholds. This drain of experienced personnel hurts our ability to man and train an effective force, and this is magnified by the resultant increase in our recruiting requirements. In short, we are losing experienced supervisors and instructors and are being forced to replace them with new recruits who need instruction and supervision. This spiral very quickly will lead to a noticeably less effective military establishment if decisive action is not taken.

I believe the key to appropriate action lies in enhancing both the real value and the perceived value of a military career in the eyes of the American people. This can be done through better and more competitive compensation, through improvements in working and living conditions, and, of great importance, through demonstrated interest and concern by top national leadership.

27 Dec 79

Our servicemembers who joined the All-Volunteer Force in the early years are reenlisting at the end of their initial term at a satisfactory rate. On the other hand, we have seen a significant decline in the retention of more experienced career military personnel--people who are critical to the operation and maintenance of an increasingly complex military force. The problem is particularly serious at the second reenlistment point, which tends to signal the member's intentions with respect to longer term career plans. This drop and its effect on the pool of experienced personnel is further aggravated by abnormal peaks in the number of personnel reaching retirement eligibility. The following table reflects the downward trend in second term retention:

Second Term Retention Rates (%)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
1975	57	65	46	68
1976	55	63	44	65
1977	53	59	47	65
1978	49	54	44	57
1979	48	51	46	53

The attached chart displays the impact of these retention trends on the experience mix of each of the Services. In the Army, the number of soldiers with over four years of service has increased by almost 40,000 since 1974, yet the Army remains below its experience objective because of a shortage of people with 8-18 years of service. Navy career content was below the required experience level in 1974 and has remained so over the last five years despite an increase in the number of sailors with 5-10 years of service. The overall deficit is more critical today because it is now concentrated in the later career years. Marine Corps trends and current status are very similar to the Navy's. The Air Force, on the other hand, currently meets its overall career objective because of high procurement and retention in past years. Recent second term reenlistment trends, however, coupled with a programmed decrease in the size of the first term force indicate this favorable condition may be jeopardized in the immediate future.

The net result of these deficiencies is both an increase in the need for new recruits and a reduction in the readiness of our Armed Forces. For example, in November 1979 the number of Navy ships with substandard readiness ratings because of manning considerations was 43% above the level in 1977.

Our research indicates that economic considerations are a paramount contributor to the decline in career retention. To combat this I have initiated actions aimed at paying bonuses at critical decision points to those whose skills are in the shortest supply. We started paying reenlistment bonuses in lump sum rather than installments in April of 1979. The FY 1981 budget request provides for a 51.4% increase in reenlistment bonus funds; funds for second term reenlistments were increased to \$119 million. In addition, we are drafting legislation to increase the maximum level of reenlistment bonus from \$12,000 to \$15,000 (from \$15,000 to \$20,000 for Navy nuclear personnel) and to extend bonus eligibility to 14 years of service rather than the present limit of 10 years. While these bonus actions may assist in stemming the flow of critical personnel, they may also exacerbate problems in those areas to which they do not apply.

Bonus actions deal more effectively with distributive problems than with general career enhancement. We must also deal with the more general problem. Inadequate wage growth compared to most other sectors of the American economy during this decade coupled with large and highly visible inequities in the reimbursement of travel and housing costs are seen as major contributors to our present deteriorating state. The FY 1981 budget contains an added \$122 million to reduce by about one-eighth the amount which military personnel must pay out of their own pockets when they are reassigned from station to station. The budget also contains a 7.4% pay raise for military personnel, while 6.27% is allocated to civilian personnel.

These things will help, in themselves and as a signal of interest and concern. They will not, as a one-shot effort, erase the serious concern that prevails on compensation issues in the armed forces. After all, the 7.4% pay raise is likely to be less than inflation and as such probably could not be differentially distributed to especially compensate mid-career personnel, even if that were legally viable. The travel reimbursements are still far from compensatory, and far below what we pay civil servants of equivalent seniority. The basic pay of entry level personnel will fall even further behind the minimum wage. Thus I believe that we will need to continue to press to improve military compensation generally.



Two pieces of legislation now before the Congress will make it easier to adjust military compensation to meet our needs. The Civil Service Pay Reform Act will sever civilian and military pay scales, making it possible to provide needed raises to the military without providing automatic increases to civil service workers. The Uniformed Services Retirement Benefits Act, an outgrowth of the Zwick Commission, would increase incentives for mid-career personnel. I am, however, pessimistic that either act will pass in the next session. The first is bitterly opposed by the Civil Service unions. The second, because it reduces 20 year retirement benefits, was opposed in this building by the military services, and outside by the various military and veterans associations. I have been working to secure acceptance of the Act by the Services, but I'm not sure how successful my efforts will be. A highly visible and contentious public fight over this issue would not help our retention problems. However, the structural changes embodied in the act would be very useful. On balance, I believe the two bills would be beneficial and we should press for passage early in the next session.


Beyond compensation improvements, I believe we need to enhance further our campaign of positive leadership. We need to appear as active in support of our military personnel as we are, in fact, active in improving military quality of life. Actions such as conducting a retirement ceremony for a senior enlisted member of the Armed Forces in the White House would be useful. Strong administration support of pro-military personnel initiatives before Congress will present another positive aspect. As the Commander-in-Chief, your support and the rejection of unjust or inaccurate criticisms of military personnel would make important contributions.

*Harold Brown*

# ENLISTED EXPERIENCE MIX


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
YEAR OF SERVICE

NAVY




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MARINE CORPS




YEAR OF SERVICE

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

January 4, 1980

MEMORANDUM TO: Jasper Welch

FROM:

John White *W*

SUBJECT:

SECDEF Memorandum for the President on Career Retention

A close reading of Harold's memorandum reveals a mixed picture on enlisted retention. Retention rates are down but the number of people being retained in the career force is up (see attached graph). Between 1974 and 1979, the career force grew by 11,000, at a time when the total enlisted force was being reduced by 100,000. Both first term retention rates and first term retention increased over this period. Second term retention rates decreased but second term retention was about the same due to the increased number of first-term reenlistees reaching their second reenlistment point. This pattern is entirely consistent with the experience distribution we predict will emerge from the proposed military retirement reform.

	Enlisted Force Size (000s) by YOS					
	1-4	5-10	11-15	16-20	21-25	26-30
Current Steady State	1,000	395	185	160	40	10
Retirement Proposal	1,000	410	185	140	45	10

Specifically addressing the points you raised in your note:

- o While retaining more personnel to the 10-year point and then encouraging them to leave will not produce the current "objective" profile contained in the memorandum, Harold and I both agree that it will produce a lower cost (about 20% savings in steady state) and equally effective enlisted force. It will reduce requirements for NPS accessions, increase the availability of journeyman level skills and mitigate pressures to carry excess numbers of supervisors and senior technicians to the 20-year retirement point. Stated differently, it will eliminate the discontinuities at 20 YOS that characterize each of the "objective" profiles contained in the memorandum.
- o We are not prepared, however, to allow second term retention, particularly in the Navy, to fall below current levels. To hedge against the possibilities that the retirement legislation will not be enacted or that first-term retention will slip, we have increased second-term (Zone B) reenlistment bonus commitments by 200% in real terms (\$ 1980) from \$38M in 1979 to \$119M in 1981.

WHCF, Subj, Exec, 1107, 1/1/80-1/20/80 box ND-8

With respect to the rest of the memorandum, we support the Secretary's recommendations to enhance both the real and perceived value of a military career and to further demonstrate the interest and concern of our top national leadership in military personnel. We believe that the compensation initiatives in the 1981 budget are sufficient to meet our manning objectives. Ceremonial actions of the type recommended should be considered. However, the Department should be particularly careful to avoid understating the value of military compensation.


If the military leadership continues to denigrate military compensation programs, then it will be extremely difficult to convince the military people that they are receiving a fair shake. The perceived value of their military pay will fall further below actual levels and adequate recruitment and retention performance will be achieved only at much greater cost.

If you and Zbig decide to forward Harold's memo to the President, please include this paper as an attachment, since I believe the President would be interested in our assessments of the Secretary's points.

Attachment



# ENLISTED CAREER FORCE (Over 4 Years of Service)



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 29, 1980

ND-1  
SP3  
TR  
FG13

COPY CARTER LIBRARY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Career Retention of Enlisted Personnel

I want to provide assistance where I can to alleviate the serious problem we face in retaining mid-term military personnel.

I would therefore appreciate it if you would take the initiative in suggesting good opportunities for speeches, visits and statements that will make clear my own personal support for the men and women in the armed forces. I am more than willing to eliminate unjust and inaccurate criticisms of military personnel or military life.

The constant drum of negative statements from Defense Department officials and top military officers regarding U.S. capability is a severe depressant on morale. A coach would never denigrate his own athletic team as a ploy to increase budget allotments.

Also, excessively frequent transfers of military personnel should be eliminated. I understand that the average stay of a person at any one post is very brief.

You should assess other factors involved in low reenlistment problems. When I served in the Navy, money was not the predominant concern.

J.C.

WHCF, Exec, FG13, 1/1/80-3/31/80, box FG 107

EXECUTIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1980

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, White House  
Central Files: Executive, Subject File,  
Box ND 8, Folder ND 7, 1/1/80-1/20/80.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*  
STEVE SIMMONS *Steve*

SUBJECT: Brzezinski and Brown Memos re Career  
Retention of Enlisted Personnel

We agree with Harold Brown and Zbigniew Brzezinski that more needs to be done to enhance "both the real and the perceived value of a military career". However, we believe it would be very ill-advised to elevate the civil service pay reform and military retirement legislation to White House priority status at this time, and strongly recommend against it for the following reasons:

- The issue of whether you should personally announce the Messages to Congress on these two initiatives was explicitly discussed in an extensive decision memo in May, 1979. Arguments pro and con on your personal involvement in this as a high White House priority were outlined, and you decided against such personal involvement. If anything, the legislative situation with respect to these two initiatives is worse today, and the arguments against your personal participation are even stronger. Also, after an extensive decision making process these initiatives were approved just last month only as "must pass departmental" items.
- As Frank Moore suggests, neither of these initiatives will pass this session. Despite all of Scotty Campbell's efforts to find a leader on the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee such as Mo Udall was on civil service reform, he has not succeeded for pay reform. A key House staffer told us it will be "virtually impossible" for the House Committee to report this bill, there is no Committee Democrat pushing for it, and only the Republicans support it. The bill is still at the subcommittee hearing stage, and Subcommittee Chair Gladys Spellman is opposed. On the Senate side there has also been no pay reform leader found and only one hearing has been held. Scotty Campbell, who is our designated leader on this matter, tells us he is "neutral" about getting you and White House staff involved personally. Legislative prospects for the military retirement proposals are also bleak.

RECEIVED

APR 3 1980

CENTRAL FILES

WHCF, Subj, Exec ND7 1/1/80 - 1/20/80, box ND8

We cannot simply "discount opposition by Federal employee unions" as suggested in the Brzezinski memo. These unions strongly oppose the pay reform legislation and have a critical influence on the House Committee. They perceive it as cutting future pay raises, and they are right. Opposing this legislation is their number one priority. As Harold suggests in his own memo, the retirement legislation has been opposed by the military services and various military and veterans associations. This is certainly not the year to push legislation that might upset these constituencies. And for you to support both of these would only combine opposition to both packages, joining veterans with Federal employees.

- If you or White House staff become significantly involved in pushing these initiatives, when they fail this will appear as a personal loss for you which will not help our legislative record. Also, we have a full legislative platter as it is. We simply do not have adequate resources to take on such a divisive issue, especially in light of its prospects for passage.

We believe that as a policy matter both of these initiatives are needed, and that we have served a valuable public policy goal by stimulating debate on them and getting the legislative process started. They should be priorities for us next Congress. But for now, we strongly recommend that Scotty Campbell continue to take the lead with respect to pay reform (we will continue to keep track of this initiative), and Defense should continue to push for the retirement proposals. We recommend you check disapprove on both the check boxes provided by Zbig, and Frank Moore strongly concurs with our recommendation.

However, we do agree with Harold that it is of "great importance" to demonstrate "interest and concern by top national leadership" for the military. Thus we agree that your personal participation in ceremonies supporting the armed forces, personal rejection of unjust criticisms of military personnel, and personal support for increases in military bonuses and allowances you already approved in the budget process would be helpful. Such actions would be good policy as well as good politics. We recommend you send the attached memo to Harold suggesting this.

Attachment





THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JAN 16 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I am promulgating today a change to DoD Directive 1332.14 (Enlisted Administrative Separations), including a completely new Enclosure 8 on Homosexuality.

The revision contains no change in policy. It reaffirms that homosexuality is incompatible with military service. In order to provide workable policies and procedures for all the military departments, however, and to provide the strongest possible basis for supporting these policies and procedures in court, it is important that applicable provisions be both clear and uniform.

Under heretofore existing DoD Directives, discharge of homosexuals was not mandatory. The revision, however, makes discharge mandatory for admitted homosexuals and establishes very limited grounds for retention in the event a member who claims not to be a homosexual solicits, attempts or participates in a homosexual act or acts. In order to justify retention under these circumstances the member must prove affirmatively that the conduct was a departure from his or her usual behavior, that it is unlikely to reoccur, that it was not accomplished by force or coercion, that the member is not a homosexual or bisexual, and that his retention under the circumstances would not adversely affect discipline, good order or morale. The purpose is to permit retention where it is shown, for example, that the act occurred solely as a result of such matters as immaturity, undue influence, intoxication, or a desire to avoid or terminate military service, and the other required findings can be made. This means, of course, that in the case of multiple acts, the burden of justifying retention will be even more difficult. The net result of the new provisions will be a clarification and strengthening of DoD policy, with safeguards that should enable the Department to sustain its position in the courts.

I have personally worked on this problem from time to time during most of the four years I have served in the Department. I firmly believe that the most important aspect of our policy is the ability to keep homosexuals out of the service and to separate them promptly in the event they are in fact enlisted or commissioned. The revised procedures accordingly make it clear that the mere fact of homosexuality

*5JCS  
DJS- info  
- info*

does not provide a basis for processing for Misconduct, but that if homosexual acts occur in circumstances where, for example, comparable heterosexual acts would have constituted Misconduct under applicable DoD or service regulations, those acts can, as in Misconduct cases, result in less than honorable discharges. In other words, while homosexuality cannot alone be grounds for a less than honorable discharge, the fact that the member is a homosexual or that the conduct involves homosexuality cannot be used to exempt the member from disciplinary action or administrative proceedings that would otherwise be appropriate. The Directive also gives the individual services some latitude in providing for secretarial review.

Various helpful comments and suggestions about the content of these regulations have been received from the military departments, some of them conflicting. All have been given careful consideration, and as many as possible incorporated in the final regulations being promulgated herewith. I am satisfied that the Department's problems in this area can be more effectively and efficiently handled under these uniform procedures than has been possible heretofore. The military departments should promptly revise their appropriate personnel policies and procedures to conform to this revision.

*W. Graham Clayton, Jr.*  
W. Graham Clayton, Jr.



MANPOWER,  
RESERVE AFFAIRS  
AND LOGISTICS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24 JAN 1979  
SECDEF HAS

29 JAN 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Peacetime Registration

*1/24  
CJ should be  
made aware of the  
position I intend to  
take & of this memo.  
H3*

In answer to the three questions I understand you put this morning:

1. Registration could be resumed by executive order. Legislation would be required to reinitiate the draft.

2. Legislative exceptions to the privacy act would be required if we were to undertake "passive registration" by use of existing social security, income tax, or other data files.

3. Present legislation authorizes only the registration of males. Registration or drafting of women would require new legislation. Any male only registration or draft scheme would face uncertain prospects in the face of a sex discrimination suit.

On the larger issues, you may find the attached draft memorandum and associated tabs helpful. I discussed this memorandum with the Mobilization Steering Committee (chaired by Mr. Resor, participated in by the JCS, the Service Under Secretaries, Service Vice-Chiefs and OSD officials) this morning and would with more time have modified the paper to take account of views expressed there. In brief, I recommend that DoD take a position that emphasizes that we are a consumer of Selective Service outputs, rather than manager of the Selective Service System. As a consumer, we have articulated our requirements. It is universally agreed that the Selective Service System cannot now meet those requirements. Many observers (CBO, the President's Reorganization Project, the acting head of the Selective Service System himself) have concluded that the system could meet our requirements without peacetime registration if various planning and ADP improvements were made. Under the circumstances, a concerted effort should be made over the next months to introduce these improvements and assess their effects. If their effects are not so substantial as has been predicted, or if our requirements change, then by the end of this calendar year we might recommend registration to the President.

W 27

19 Jan 79

330-82-0204, box 36, 327, 1979

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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I recommend this position because I think that the potential divisiveness and volatile feeling associated with the draft make it important not to recommend peacetime registration unless and until we can demonstrate that it is a necessary means to achieving clearly articulated ends. The discussion this morning, and over preceeding weeks, makes it clear to me that we are not yet in that position. As I see it, three types of considerations might justify a request for peacetime registration. Though many in the Services and the JCS find those considerations compelling, I think we are not yet in a position to press them.

1. Our goals for receipt of inductees. A debate about whether registration is needed if the Selective Service is to meet our wartime goals for receipt of draftees obviously could pivot around the goals themselves. By this view peacetime registration would accelerate our wartime receipt of draftees by fifteen days. If we could train draftees fifteen days faster than we now say we could train them, and if the consequent marginal gains in our supply of trained manpower from M+100 to M+150 were significant, then registration might be advisable.

*This could  
also have  
legislation  
(deployment  
overseas  
before  
war?)  
now  
prohibited!*

Last year we reviewed our requirements for inductees and set them high enough to generate full utilization of training base capacity. This led to a greatly intensified set of requirements for the Selective Service System, as follows.

#### Selective Service Delivery Schedules

	<u>1st Inductee</u>	<u>100,000 Inductees</u>	<u>6-Month Total</u>
Old	M+110	M+150	390K
New	M+30	M+60	650K

Our calculations suggest that if inductees came faster than this there would be no room in the training base for them. Tab B of the attached memorandum articulates our assumptions and calculations.

This morning General Kroesen suggested both that we ought to change these often articulated and previously agreed upon goals and that the Army could take steps that would substantially expand the training capacity bottleneck. He favored registration on these twin assumptions. I would favor exploring these assumptions -- including our real capacity and the costs and time required to achieve the alleged higher capability -- before committing ourselves.

2. Our assessment of the means for achieving induction at the required rate. Projections of the capabilities of the Selective Service System are theoretical. The procedures for reactivating the draft have not been designed or tested. There is uncertainty about the post-mobilization responsiveness of Selective Service. The more elements of the draft system that are exercised in peacetime, the less uncertainty there will be. Therefore, it may be said, the Department of Defense ought to minimize risk by pressing for registration now.



It is certainly possible that this may prove to be a correct argument, but I think now is the wrong time to press this point of view. This morning, Jim Woolsey urged that we press for a local test of the Selective Service process, and endorse peacetime registration if the system fails that test. I am inclined to the view that we should have some such evidence before pressing for registration.

3. The collateral goals allegedly furthered by peacetime registration. Arguably, the symbolic and collateral effects of peacetime registration are so desirable that we should undertake it for these reasons even if it is not required to achieve wartime mobilization. In conversations with the Army and the JCS staffs I have frequently heard this notion, although it has not been fully articulated. By this view, registration is desirable because it will provide useful recruiting information, remind citizens of their basic obligation, produce contact with recruiters possibly leading to recruitment, induce uncertainty that may at the margin encourage reserve enlistment, etc. For the moment, at least, I do not dispute these goals, although I think it is questionable to what extent they would be accomplished by registration. The overriding point, however, is that in the debate that will ensue if registration is proposed, these collateral goals in themselves cannot justify registration to Congress and the public. The only thing that can justify peacetime registration is the central function of registration itself: it is a means to provide inductees on a realistically required timetable.

In this circumstance I think it is wisest to pursue collateral goals straightforwardly and separately. I would emphasize two points to the Chairman and others who value the symbolic and collateral effects of registration. First, an intense national debate over registration would confuse, perhaps undermine, and certainly divert energy from other more pointed initiatives that we will advance in regard, for example, to pre-trained manpower. Second, because at present the case for peacetime registration is flawed at the core, if we raise the issue now we run a substantial risk of losing it. That loss would have innumerable adverse effects. Not only will it be divisive and disconcerting, it would send the worst kind of signal to our allies, to our enemies, and to our own citizens. Worst of all, it would severely retard efforts to reinstate registration if and when circumstances made the case for it vastly stronger.

Enclosures

*R. B. Oliver*

Principal Deputy Secretary  
of Defense (Official)



MANPOWER,  
RESERVE AFFAIRS  
AND LOGISTICS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files,  
Acc 330-82-0271, Box 1, Folder 110.01, 1979.

OFFICE OF  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3 OCT 1979  
SECDEF HAS SEEN

19 OCT 1979

WGC 10/22  
RBP I will need to  
make some tentative  
decisions on these  
at the 10/22 - DRB  
meeting. Save this  
paper for then. HB

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Adequacy of Pay Issue

We have completed the high-intensity study of the military pay adequacy issue that you asked us to do last July. To enable us to meet the requirement for substantive supporting material during the current Program/Budget cycle, I intentionally narrowed the focus of the study and concentrated on only the most severe problems.

In support of your need for information in this area prior to your discussions with the Director of OMB and the President, I am forwarding the attached tentative decision paper (Tab A). This paper summarizes the study effort in very abbreviated terms and indicates staff recommendations. I am not yet ready to make recommendations, and prefer to wait until Service comments are in and I have had a chance to talk to the Services about them. The full study report, together with formal Service comments and my recommendations, should be available to you by the end of the month.

Robert B. Pirie, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics)

Attachment

19 OCT 79

330-82-0271, box 1, 110.01, 779

## TENTATIVE DECISION PAPER

### o Background

- In recognition of economic perturbations, pay adjustment policies, and recommended changes to military retirement, Sec Def asked for study of pay adequacy in terms of effects on attraction and retention.
- ASD(MRA&L) organized OSD/Service task group to perform study.
  - limited time (six - eight weeks)
  - limited scope (general adequacy plus specific problem areas)
  - goal: recommendations for legislative program to be submitted in January 1980.

### o Study Results

- Military real income has not, since 1972, kept pace with real income of representative non-military U.S. workers.
  - inflation has impacted on nearly all-but real income comparisons show military lagging others by 7% to 15%.
  - a return to 1972 relationships could require \$2-4 billion in added annual compensation.
  - military as a "calling" becoming financially less appealing to volunteers considering entering or remaining compared to non-military alternatives.
- Stratified analyses suggest that comparative shortfalls are slightly more severe in the 25-34 year old range (officer and enlisted mid-career).
- Inventory versus requirements analyses indicate that shortfalls are most severe in very early enlisted and mid-career officer and enlisted areas.
- wide geographical differences in CONUS housing costs impact unevenly and substantively on compensation of military.

- Frequency of moves coupled with amount of reimbursed PCS travel costs takes a large and unevenly distributed bite out of compensation
- reassigned members personally absorb as much as \$1 billion annually in unreimbursed costs. //
- a quarter billion dollars of this occurs during the actual transit event. //
- mileage rates (only movement costs reimbursement) have not changed since 1976 for members and 1974 for dependents. //

o The study suggests and the staff, both OSD and Service, agrees that attraction, retention, motivation, productivity, and manpower readiness can be effectively enhanced by realistic and meaningful increases in selected compensation elements. *Reimbursing for PCS + variable housing costs would be consistent with proposed pay reform.*

o Suggested Alternatives -

- Variable Housing Allowance. A high priority requirement aimed at a major source of dissatisfaction. Deserves immediate attention in a manner compatible with overseas precedent and in keeping with earlier (PCMC et seq.) decisions. *counting fringe benefits (unreimbursed PCS is a negative one) and regional pay adjustments.*

—Alternative 1: Provide a VHA to all members equal to the difference between authorized BAQ and local housing costs. Annual cost estimated at \$600 million.

—Alternative 2: Provide a VHA to all personnel equal to the difference between local housing costs and 115% of authorized BAQ. Annual cost estimated at \$300 million. *g*

—Alternative 3: Provide a VHA to all members equal to one-half the difference between local housing costs and 125% of authorized BAQ. *g*

--Staff Recommendation: Submit authorizing legislation (amending Title 37 to extend overseas station allowance enabling language to CONUS -- no numbers/dollars included) and propose initial implementation for FY81 at Alternative 2 level.



- PCS Cost Reimbursement. An essential corrective action to rectify a major inequity universally viewed as a disincentive to reenlistment/extension -- particularly when compared to civilian, both federal and private, practices. Deserves visible, meaningful attention in both short and long term.
- Alternative 1: Administratively implement the authorized, but not currently used; concept of monetary allowance in lieu of transportation (MALT) plus per diem (\$35 per day plus 7¢ per mile) in place of the current 10¢ per mile flat rate for members. Annual cost estimated at \$111 million.
- Alternative 2: Reorient reimbursement structure to pay mileage for family unit or single member only at 18.5¢ per mile plus logical per diem for food and lodging in transit (\$45 per day for sponsor/member and \$15 per day for each additional family member). Annual cost estimated at \$225 million -- use of 15¢ per mile vice 18.5¢ per mile reduces estimate to \$190 million. ✓
- Alternative 3: In addition to actual movement cost reimbursement, provide a per diem for pre-move and post-move periods when members/families must utilize non-permanent lodging facilities. Annual costs estimated at \$31 million per day authorized (data indicates average used is a total of 20 days before and after).
- Staff Recommendation: Implement the MALT plus per diem (Alternative 1) in FY80 identifying resources in the current budget cycle AND submit legislation to implement the 18.5¢ per mile plus \$45/\$15 per diem alternative in FY81. Additionally, include in the legislation provision for a maximum of four days (normal "proceed" time) of pre-and post-move per diem. Estimated cost profile: FY 1980 - \$111 million (reduced as time lapses before implementation) and FY 1981 - \$350 million (\$240 million above FY80 if "MALT plus" were implemented). *probably less much*
- Basic Pay Line Adjustment. Recognition that the general level of regular military compensation has eroded substantially vis a vis a spectrum of non-military measures, that the erosion is not uniform across all members, and that increased compensation can effectively attack specific attraction retention problems. Deserves consideration as a real and a perceived positive step toward enhancement of military service as a professional alternative.

—Alternative 1: Submit legislation to provide a general, across the board, out-of-cycle pay increase to all personnel. A number increase rates could be considered. Estimated costs in FY80 are \$276 million per percent increase. The 3.18% increase needed to achieve the 10.41% total increase initially recommended by the Pay Agent would require \$880 million.

—Alternative 2: Submit legislation to selectively increase basic pay for officers and enlisted personnel in the 6 to 12 year of service (YOS) career segment and for entry level enlisted members as a means of enhancing compensation at critical career decision points and encouraging the retention of higher quality personnel. Estimated FY 1981 costs are \$150 million.

—Staff Recommendation: Submit legislation to authorize an average 2% basic pay increase for mid-career officers, an average 2% basic pay increase for enlisted members with 4 to 10 years of service, and an average 3½% increase to entry level enlisted personnel (Alternative 2).

o Summary

- VHA:	Alt 1 - full supplement of BAQ	\$600M
	Alt 2 - full supplement of BAQ with 15% "deductible,"	\$300M
	Alt 3 - ½ supplement of BAQ with 25% "deductible."	\$100M

- PCS Reimbursement

Alt 1 - MALT plus per diem in FY80	\$111 M
Alt 2 - 18.5¢ per mile plus \$45/\$15 per diem for move	\$225 M
Alt 3 - Per diem for pre- and post-move periods (4 days)	\$125 M

- Pay Line Adjustment

Alt 1 - 3.18% across the board increase	\$880 M
Alt 2 - selective basic pay increase	\$150 M

## - Recommendations

	FY 1980	FY 1981
VHA - Alt 2		\$300 M
PCS - Alt 1	\$111 M	
Alt 2		\$225 M
Alt 3		\$125 M
Pay - Alt 2		<u>\$150 M</u>
	<u>\$111 M</u>	\$800 M

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1980

ND 7-5 U  
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TR 93  
ND 13  
PE 8-3  
FG 13

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To Secretary Harold Brown

As you know from our previous discussions, I am committed to the principle that a career in the military should be at least as rewarding as a career elsewhere in our society. The Warner/Nunn amendment, which incorporates a number of the initiatives first proposed in our January budget, should be supported with the modifications you have indicated. We should also continue to seek enactment of the other legislative proposals we have submitted to the Congress.

In order to offset the many challenges and hardships of military duty, I would also like to make further improvements in the present health care program. For example, your suggestion of providing dental care for dependents seems to me a desirable step.

Finally, we should continue to press for Civil Service pay reform to allow us to reflect the differences between military and civilian government service in future pay decisions.

Sincerely,

*Jimmy Carter*

The Honorable Harold Brown  
Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

WHCF, Name File, Brown, Harold



MAR 7 11 53 AM '77

Washington National Records Center, SecDef  
Files, Acc 330-80-0017, Box 5, Folder 020 DoD  
(May-Sep) 1977.

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-53-77  
4 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Presidential Pardon Program

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the possible expansion of the pardon program that the President announced on 21 January 1977 and have assessed the potential impact on the Services.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not recommend expansion of the program already announced by the President. However, a Presidentially directed review of discharges granted to Service members during the Vietnam era following guidelines which President Carter announced on 24 August 1976, "...that each case should be handled on an individual basis in accordance with our nation's system of military justice," which would be initiated upon application by the former Service member would be supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Granting blanket or categorical upgrade discharges in a way that failed to utilize the existing system, including the statutory boards established by the Congress and which operate under Military Department guidelines, could impact adversely on the discipline within US military forces. Specifically, such action could:

- Erode compliance with military orders, which is essential for proper military functioning and discipline at the present time and in the future.
- Be counterproductive to efforts to reduce absence and desertion.
- Reduce the recognition for honorable service of the vast majority of former Service members who successfully completed their military duty.

*JK - 3/7*  
*I will be glad to discuss this position to the President as the Joint Chiefs idea of compassion - and conjunction of the dating and signing*  
*transmission should not be the JCS (unlike the Services) have no responsibility in carrying out upgrading program.*  
*If should also respond to their arguments. For example, there is a time lapse effect. Most of their offers to me pre-1975 seven years of travel followed by rehabilitation is not an incentive to desert. On the other hand, you got nothing from the Army GIC's price makes one want to be cautious about blanket action.*  
*4206*  
*followed by rehabilitation is not an incentive to desert. On the other hand, you got nothing from the Army GIC's price makes one want to be cautious about blanket action.*

HTS



RG 330, 80-0017, box 5, 020 DoD, May-Sep 1977


d. Make deserting or evading seem a viable option to some individuals ordered to military duty in the event of a future mobilization.

e. Provide the cloak of respectability to military offenders whose offense had no connection with the Vietnam war.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support a program that would insure that the public is fully aware of discharge review procedures currently established. Furthermore, they believe that the Services are prepared to consider any request initiated by an individual to have a discharge reviewed with the objective of having it upgraded in character.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request their views be made a part of the DOD position on the President's Pardon Program.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

  
GEORGE S. BROWN  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

May 26, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status Reviews for Servicemen Missing in  
Southeast Asia

You have asked for my recommendations concerning status reviews for MIAs.

As you know, since mid-1973 DoD has conducted status reviews only upon the written request of a missing serviceman's primary next of kin or upon receipt of conclusive evidence of death, such as the return of his remains. The Woodcock Commission concluded (as had the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, and the Department of Defense) that there is no evidence that any American servicemen are alive and being held against their will in Southeast Asia.

It is true that the Southeast Asian governments probably have significantly more information about our missing men than they have given to us. There is no reason to believe, however, that continuing to carry servicemen as missing in action puts pressure on Hanoi to provide information on our missing men. In fact, the opposite probably is true; it puts pressure on us to make concessions to Hanoi.

Status review, and obtaining of a complete accounting, are two distinct issues. An accounting that confirms death by direct evidence validates a declaration or presumption of death for a missing serviceman, but it is not a legal prerequisite to a status change.

Given the overwhelming probability that none of the MIAs ever will be found alive, I believe the time has come to allow the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force to exercise their responsibilities for status reviews as mandated by law even though we have not received a full accounting.

Reinstitution of reviews will of course be controversial. Certain members of the Congress, some families of the missing men, and others will charge that it is an abandonment of our MIAs.

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Should you agree with this recommendation, the status reviews will be accomplished in a way which minimizes the anguish to the families. This will require detailed planning and coordination among your staff and the Departments of Defense and State. At a minimum, I would seek to ensure that:

- the resumption of reviews will be preceded by (1) an expression of our strong commitment to obtaining further information about the missing men and (2) careful preparation of concerned groups for the change of policy.

- the decision will be discussed forthrightly with the National League of Families.

- appropriate Senate and House leaders and key members will be given advance notice.

- the procedures for status reviews will be uniform among the Military Departments, in accordance with legal requirements, and announced through simultaneous letters from the Service Secretaries to the PW/MIA families.

- the public will be informed of the reasons for reinstituting status reviews and assured that this does not detract from our determination to obtain an accounting. (I suggest that the public announcement would be most effective coming from you, but I am prepared to make it instead.)

Your decision:

1. Reinstitute status reviews in accordance with the foregoing:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

2. Presidential statement to apprise public:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

3. Prepare for your approval a detailed plan of procedure:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

*Harold Brown*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/GDS~~

June 16, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Status Reviews for Servicemen Missing  
in Southeast Asia

The President has approved your recommendation of May 26, 1977 that the Department of Defense reinstitute status reviews for servicemen missing in Southeast Asia. In this connection, the President directs the Department of Defense to prepare for his consideration a detailed plan of procedure for implementing the policy. The Department is instructed to proceed with case work on the files in the meantime. The President will decide the date for announcement by the Department of Defense apprising the public of the reinstitution of case reviews.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSA, Brzez Mat, MIA 4/77-9/80  
box #4

~~SECRET/GDS~~

7/13/82  
~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, White House Central  
Files: Executive, Subject File, Box ND 15, Folder ND 7-2,  
1/20/77-1/20/81.

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

A Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct has completed its evaluation of the efficacy of the guidance provided to Servicemembers by the Code since its establishment by President Eisenhower in 1955.

The Committee has revalidated the Code of Conduct and has proposed two Executive Orders to strengthen it. These proposed Executive Orders are being forwarded through the Office of Management and Budget, with my recommendation for your approval.

A copy of the Committee's Report, provided herewith, contains background and rationale for the proposed Executive Orders.

Respectfully yours,

*C. W. Dumas*

Enclosure

Report filed - C. W. Dumas Attachment  
#3465

WHITE HOUSE, Exec, ND 7-2 1/20/77-1/20/81

box ND-15

EXECUTIVE ORDER \_\_\_\_\_

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10631, A CODE OF CONDUCT  
FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

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The Code of Conduct has been an established standard of behavior for all members of the Armed Forces of the United States for more than twenty years. It has helped individuals in captivity to sustain their moral and physical strength and to survive extreme torture and abuse. However, experience indicates that certain words of the Code have, on occasion, caused confusion resulting in training divergencies. Therefore, it is appropriate to clarify the meaning of those words.

Accordingly, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, Article V of the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, prescribed by Executive Order No. 10631 of August 17, 1955, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war,  
I am required to give name, rank, service number and  
date of birth. I will evade answering further questions  
to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or  
written statements disloyal to my country and its allies  
or harmful to their cause."

The White House,

EXECUTIVE ORDER

PRESCRIBING AMENDMENTS TO THE MANUAL  
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1969  
(REVISED EDITION)

Members of the Armed Forces of the United States who are captured and held prisoner by a hostile armed force are effectively outside the direct operational control of United States military authorities. Recent conflicts involving members of the Armed Forces indicate a need for establishing and maintaining a chain of command among prisoners of war or detained personnel. The senior member of all Services must be provided the necessary command authority over all members of the Armed Forces with whom he is imprisoned or detained. The present wording in the Manual for Courts-Martial should be amended to provide such authority.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Title 10, United States Code, Chap. 47) and as President of the United States, I hereby prescribe the following amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Revised Edition), prescribed by Executive Order Number 11476 of June 19, 1969.

Section 1. The third paragraph within paragraph 168 is amended by striking out the third sentence and inserting the following in place thereof:

"A commissioned officer of one armed force is not 'his superior commissioned officer' with respect to a member of another armed force merely because of higher rank. However, a commissioned officer of one armed force is, within the meaning of Article 89, 'his superior commissioned officer' with respect to a member of another armed force if duly placed in the chain of command over that person. In addition, when members of more than one armed force are prisoners of war or otherwise detained by a hostile entity so that circumstances prevent resort to the normal chain of command, a commissioned officer of one armed force who is not a medical officer or chaplain is 'his superior commissioned officer' with respect to a member of another armed force who is his junior in rank."



Section 2. The first paragraph within paragraph 170a is amended by inserting the following after the second sentence:

"A warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer of one armed force who is senior in rank to a member of another armed force is senior to that member under the same circumstances that a commissioned officer of one armed force is the superior commissioned officer of a member of another armed force for the purpose of Articles 89 and 90." See 168.

Section 3. The first paragraph within paragraph 171b is amended by inserting the following after "See 138b":

"A member of one armed force who is senior in rank to a member of another armed force is the superior of that member with authority to issue orders which that member has a duty to obey under the same circumstances as a commissioned officer of one armed force is the superior commissioned officer of a member of another armed force for the purposes of Articles 89 and 90". See 168.

The White House,

4922

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON D C 20301

JUL 25 1977

Honorable Thomas B. Lance  
Director, Office of Management and Budget  
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Bert:

In compliance with Executive Order No. 11030, I am enclosing proposed amendments to Executive Order Nos. 10631 and 11476. The first would amend the Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces, clarify its meaning and reduce conflicting training practices. The second would amend the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 1969 (Revised Edition), so as to support interservice command authority under conditions of military necessity such as captivity. I recommend that the proposals be submitted to the President for his signature.

The Code of Conduct was established on 17 August 1955, when President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10631. The Code was the product of the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War (PWs), appointed by the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the experiences and conduct of PWs during the Korean conflict. Almost twenty years later and after numerous captivity experiences in Vietnam, North Korea, Cambodia, Laos, and the People's Republic of China, enough controversy and speculation had developed to order a review of the Code to reaffirm its validity and to recommend any necessary changes in its phrasing or allied training guidelines.

On 4 May 1976, a Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct was convened to review the Code. This Committee heard extensive testimony concerning guidance the Code provided to members of the Armed Forces who were PWs in Southeast Asia, as well as on captivity problems created or exacerbated by the Code.

Following testimony by returned PWs and other experts in PW matters as well as extensive deliberations, the Committee concluded the proposed executive order amendments are critical to adequate future training and support of American PWs.

The full Report of the Defense Review Committee is provided for information.

Sincerely,



Enclosures a/s



MANPOWER AND  
RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1976 DEC 20 15 11

OFF SECY OF DEFENSE

17 DEC 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct  
--DECISION MEMORANDUM

Reference: Decision Memorandum, 8 Mar 76, Subject: Review of the Code  
of Conduct

On 26 March 1976, the Deputy Secretary of Defense chartered the Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct, "...to formally review the Code ...and to reaffirm the validity of the Code of Conduct for its intended purposes or to recommend changes as necessary."

Members of the Committee included:

Mr. John F. Ahearne, Acting ASD(M&RA), Chairman  
Lt. Gen. A. P. Clark, USAF (Ret.), former PW, Vice-Chairman  
Mr. Vernon McKenzie, Acting ASD(HA)  
Honorable Richard A. Wiley, General Counsel of the Dept of Defense  
Dr. Roger E. Shields, DASD(IEA)  
Maj. Gen. Travis R. McNeil, USAF, replaced on 15 Nov 76 by  
Maj. Gen. Charles G. Cleveland, USAF  
Rear Admiral W. P. Lawrence, USN, former PW  
Brig. Gen. R. C. Schulze, USMC, replaced on 25 May 76 by  
Brig. Gen. J. V. McLernan, USMC  
Colonel George E. Day, USAF, former PW  
CWO2 Donald J. Rander, USA, former PW

The Defense Review Committee held twenty-one plenary sessions during which 50 individuals were interviewed. Four permanent subcommittees concentrated their deliberations on specific issues. To assure a broad spectrum of views concerning the efficacy of the Code of Conduct, those interviewed included ex-prisoners of war from World War II, Korea, and Southeast Asia; individuals detained by hostile forces during peacetime, representatives or organizations concerned with PWs, experts in PW behavior, and personnel associated with the work of the 1955 Defense Advisory Committee which drafted the Code of Conduct.



512/184  
11

On 16 August 1976, the Defense Review Committee completed its report and provided the final draft, for comments, to the Joint Committee on Military Justice (JCMJ), and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who in July 1975 requested that they be given the opportunity to review the findings of the Defense Review Committee prior to implementation. The JSCMJ comments, concerning the legal aspects of the Review Committee recommendations were received 10 September 1976, and the comments of the JCS were provided 6 December 1976.

Committee consideration of the JCS and JSCMJ comments is provided at Section VI of the report.

In summary, the Report's recommendations include:

- a. Clarifying word changes to Article V, to reduce ambiguities and restore the originally intended meaning. The implementing vehicle for this clarification is a proposed Executive Order.
- b. Clarification of the command authority of the senior PW. The implementing vehicle for this is a proposed Executive Order modifying the Manual for Courts Martial.
- c. Promulgation of a thorough revision of the DoD policy directive concerning training in support of the Code of Conduct. A proposed revision has been provided as part of the Report.
- d. Procedures for debriefing repatriated PWs to insure that any individual having information on violations of law, regulation, or policy must report such information to proper authorities.

These recommendations followed extensive deliberation. Especially in the case of the clarifying word changes to Article V, significant emotional issues surfaced. Accordingly, the Committee took great care during its review to try to determine a course of action with the greatest potential for benefit to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine subjected in the future to the misfortune of capture. Throughout the history of the Code, a variety of training adjustments have failed to eliminate confusion stemming from the present wording. The Committee concluded that the current wording of Article V, "When questioned should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth..." is widely misunderstood. The originally intended meaning of this Article could best be restored by modification of the wording to read, "When questioned should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give my name, rank, service number, and date of birth..." The Committee favored this clarified wording in addition to (not in lieu of) renewed emphasis in training.

Article IV of the Code states in part, "...If I am senior, I will take command..." The original framers of the Code assumed this injunction,



backed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, was sufficient to insure support of the senior military member in a captivity situation. The verbiage in the Manual for Courts Martial is subject to extensive debate on this point. There is significant support for the interpretation that an individual servicemember is only required to obey the orders of a superior of another Service when both servicemembers are assigned to the same military unit. The proposed Executive Order amends the Manual for Courts Martial to provide the senior servicemember command authority over all other servicemembers in captivity.

The most consistent, unsolicited statement made by the testifying returned Southeast Asia Prisoners of War (PWs) concerned the need for uniform, consistent Code of Conduct training by the Services. The absence of such training resulted in animosity between individual PWs and groups of PWs who behaved according to variations in instructions issued by the different Services. Ambiguities and periodic changes in training conducted within an individual Service served to exacerbate the situation. The resulting confusion was not anticipated by the framers of the 1955 Code of Conduct, who expected that training in the articles of the Code would be uniform within the Services and monitored by DoD to insure continued consistency. However, DoD only issued brief and general training guidance, and its implementation by the Services has not been effectively monitored.


During the sessions of the Committee, the problems encountered by the PWs were specifically addressed. The deliberations led the Committee to conclude that the training problems can be resolved. The first step is OSD remedial action in terms of clarified training policy guidance; the second step is effective continuing monitorship of Service training programs to assure consistent interpretation of the Code of Conduct.

Most of the Vietnam PWs interviewed by the Committee expressed great bitterness that there were no prosecutions of those PWs who were charged with serious violations of the UCMJ. The Committee learned that debriefings were structured to avoid the collection of information which might incriminate the PW. As a result, investigations were passive and were initiated only in response to formal charges by PWs. Further, there appeared to be a clear disinclination to prosecute. The Committee first considered mandating investigations through a proposed Executive Order, but reconsidered and chose the alternative of recommending specific debriefing procedures to surface information regarding misconduct.

Proposed letters to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, transmitting a copy of the Report (for information of the President) and the Report's two proposed Executive Orders (for signature by the President) are at Enclosure 1. Also at Enclosure 2 is a proposed memorandum to Assistant Secretaries, OSD, approving the Report for implementation planning and directing commencement of such planning.

It is recommended that you:

- Sign each of the transmittal letters at Enclosure 1.
- Sign the Memorandum to Assistant Secretaries, OSD.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John F. Ahearne". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "J".

John F. Ahearne  
Chairman  
Defense Review Committee  
for the Code of Conduct

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

VIA ALPHA CHANNEL

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass. Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 11 2016

April 30, 1979

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS ~~(EYES ONLY)~~

CNA-78(U)

Library of Congress, Harold Brown Papers, Box  
4, Folder Alpha Channel File, 12/78-7/79.

A. ~~(S)~~ The Comprehensive Net Assessment, 1978, is a much needed review of the elements of our competition with the Soviet Union. However, I believe that in many ways it paints too optimistic a picture of our current position. In particular, your assessment of world attitudes, although correct as of today, does not consider adequately the relation among the dislike, the respect, and the fear with which the USSR is regarded. Is it better to be feared or loved (or rather, not disliked)? "The Prince" gave one answer. Another comparison that is inadequately addressed, I think, is the respective vulnerability of the US and the USSR to economic and political forces over which we may have little control. In a number of areas we, perhaps more than the Soviet Union, face serious risks that could significantly alter the current balance. I would like to note some of these for your consideration. Further, in keeping with the format of your assessment, I would like to comment on the military balance, where I would again take some exception to the picture you present; in some cases it seems too optimistic, in others perhaps too pessimistic.

~~(S)~~ The most important changes in the non-military aspects, of our world position vis-a-vis the USSR, have been (not necessarily in order of importance):

1. The President's stress on human rights, which has been instrumental in improving our image throughout the world.
2. Our increasing energy vulnerability, coupled with the recent upheavals in Iran and Soviet penetration of Afghanistan and the Red Sea area.
3. The achievement of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, reaffirming the US role as the only major power who can talk effectively to most if not all of the significant Middle East players.
4. The widening PRC door to the West, including the Sino-Japanese treaty, and a major (though tactical and perhaps temporary) PRC attempt to play "the American card."

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15-4-0508

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

SEC DEF CONTR No. 02206

Downgraded to Secret  
Date: 26 Nov 2014  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

LC, Brown Papers, Alpha Channel File, 12/78-7/79, bx 4

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 Date: MAR 11 2016

5. Continuing US-Soviet competition in Africa, with the Soviets setting the pace, increasing their influence and also African apprehensions about them.
6. Continued and perhaps increasing strains in the Warsaw Pact alliance.
7. FRG reexamination of its policies toward Eastern Europe and the USSR, prompted both by internal politics and perhaps a perceived change in the balance of external factors.
8. Continued turmoil in Southeast Asia and increased Soviet influence there.
9. Aborted US efforts to establish normal relations with Cuba, and the increasing violent opposition to repressive regimes in Central and South America.
10. The growth of Euro-communism and terrorism, with increased general political instability from Portugal to Turkey.

B. ~~(S)~~ Although the President's personal involvement and moral leadership have given the US again an image of decency and fairness in world affairs, we cannot count on friendships alone to preserve US interests. In areas where changes have occurred, even to our benefit, there remain serious risks. My review of the above list suggests to me we live in a less benign world than we did two years ago, and that we face increased chances for major political and economic setbacks. The question is how nations now friendly to us will behave if faced with internal upheaval or external threats backed by Soviet power. As but one example, we have more friends in Africa today than two years ago, but the Soviets and their Cuban allies are more of a military force in that area because of their successful operations in Ethiopia and their demonstrated willingness to intervene militarily in their interest. Thus, I do not believe that any estimate of the numbers of our friends in the world, as provided in your assessment, is a reliable measure of our influence -- especially as in that table Botswana, Belgium and Brazil are counted equally.

1. ~~(S)~~ Of central concern is our continuing vulnerability to interruption (political or military) of oil from the Persian Gulf. In spite of the Administration's intensive efforts to produce a coherent energy program with Congress, we cannot foresee independence from Gulf oil for more than a decade -- perhaps much longer than that. Our Allies will remain dependent through the turn of the century. Should that oil

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~



flow be cut off, the western alliance would have few alternatives but to try to reopen the Gulf by military force or to accommodate politically in whatever way was demanded to restore the flow. The prospects of successful use of military force to this end are at best uncertain. Continued loss of Gulf oil would not only destroy western economies, it would threaten fragmentation of the alliance itself. I believe that this situation poses a most grave risk to us, one which has increased dramatically in the past two years, and with no counterpart that the Soviets face.

~~1st~~ There is the additional economic threat posed by even the current oil situation. Our and our allies' economies are vulnerable to major oil price increases -- say of a factor of two or more in real dollars. In the long run such a price rise would create alternative energy sources; in the short run it would be disastrous. We now pay \$45 billion to foreign nations to import oil -- roughly one third our Defense budget. That number will surely increase this year with adverse effects on our balance of payments and further stimulation of inflation. So long as these trends continue, our own economic health lies in the hands of others. The Soviet Union's energy problems are not of this magnitude, nor so susceptible of manipulation by others.

2. ~~2nd~~ Oil is not our only strategic import. We must likewise import cobalt, chrome, and a variety of other materials which may be subject to cut-off or arbitrarily increased prices. We will be increasingly dependent on world trade in the coming years. Again, though the Soviet empire is not at times self-sufficient in agricultural commodities, it remains so in raw materials. And it can accommodate, albeit painfully, to agricultural deficit by shifting its ratio of consumption of meat to cereal.

3. ~~3rd~~ I am convinced that, as your assessment notes, we will continue to maintain and expand our world trade and political leadership in international affairs. The appeal of western concern for the individual citizen and his economic welfare remains in stark contrast to Soviet oppression. Yet it is this very contrast that, in my view, continues to pose problems for the Soviets -- problems they may choose to solve internationally by subversion or force, their own or surrogates'. Thus, it is in part because of our political and economic appeal, and their lack of it, that we may face increased risk of the use of military force from the Soviets.


4. ~~4th~~ In a different way, our international economic competition with the USSR is affected strongly by the Soviet concentration on military research and development. The opportunity cost of this concentration is a deprived non-defense industry which cannot compete in the worldwide commercial market. Soviet technology might instead be used to improve production of commercial aircraft, autos, trucks and oil, and to develop

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Date: MAR 11 2016

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

a petro-chemical industry -- but it is not. We and our Allies, in contrast, exploit our technology in non-defense industries to develop and sustain a clear competitive advantage vis-a-vis the Soviets in world markets. In the past two years, we have maintained this advantage, with concomitant international, economic and political benefits. For example, China's interest in normalized relations with us has been driven in part by US technical superiority. This coupling of our commercial leadership with a free, political tradition is, in my view, our strongest international asset. Thus, I would be loath to trade to the Soviets our technical lead in any area for short-term or unsure political accommodations. In this regard I differ with some of the suggestions in your assessment.

C. ~~(S)~~ On the general military balance, I believe your assessment may be in some places too stark (on strategic forces) and in others too optimistic (general purpose forces).



JS 3.3(b)(5)

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

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Date: MAR 11 2016

JS 3.3(b)(5)

~~AS~~ I do not wish to imply I am content with our strategic position. Indeed, the trends are quite bad over the next five years. Deficiencies in our C<sup>3</sup> survivability and endurance are particularly troubling. And we cannot be other than greatly concerned about Soviet advantages in many measures of strategic force capability -- and in TNF and conventional forces as well -- in the early-to-mid 1980's. A confident, aggressive Soviet leadership is likely to have a relaxed attitude toward precipitating crises, and in them. The potential for miscalculation and catastrophe will be substantial. I therefore think we need to increase our strategic force programs above what is now approved. Without that, I foresee grave difficulties. But I do not feel that the nation is now in peril because of the strategic balance or that we are now so perceived by our friends and Allies.

2. ~~AS~~ Conversely, I am concerned about your estimate that we have begun to achieve a better balance in NATO. I certainly agree that the LTDP is a great step forward, but it is as yet only promise. The actions of both Congress and inflation on our FY 1980 budget are yet to be seen. We have not yet achieved any major changes in our actual capabilities in Europe. The Pact strength grows on the basis of its previously established momentum. Soviet theater nuclear forces are being modernized to the alarm of our Allies. In addition to strengthening our forces and our lift, we must improve our C<sup>3</sup>, electronic warfare, and intelligence. All of this will take time and money, which we have decided to provide but whose results do not yet show. The US will need to exercise vigorous leadership in NATO on the LTDP, and especially on theater nuclear forces.

~~AS~~ Currently, the Soviet Union fields forces that would cost us 40 percent more than we are now spending annually, and is increasing its expenditures by not less than three percent per year. In total, NATO and the Warsaw Pact today spend about the same amounts on defense. Unless we can match Pact expansion in the long term, we will slide behind rapidly in military capabilities across the board. In five years, certainly before ten years time, the military balance will in that case have shifted adversely. But well before it does, it will cast before it a political shadow. In any era of strategic nuclear parity (which is the most favorable situation we are likely to have at any time in the 1980's), Soviet conventional capabilities will be more able to threaten our global (what used to be called "strategic") interests.

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Date: MAR 11 2016

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~3.~~ Because of their larger military forces, and because many of the areas for potential military action are near Soviet borders, the Soviets hold some advantage over us in mounting limited intervention operations. Key areas of concern include the Mid-East, Persian Gulf, and Korea. We are pressing development of quick reaction plans and capabilities, but remain limited by our strategic lift.

3. ~~3.~~ I must stress that planned funding will not by itself allow us to maintain the precarious military balance that now exists, if the Soviets continue their trends of the past fifteen years. Our FY 1980 obligational authority, the best measure of our long term funding, increased only 1.7 percent in real dollars over 1979 based on 6.5 percent inflation. Our actual FY 1980 obligational authority may show little or no real increases over FY 1979. Furthermore, if current inflation rates persist, the preliminary budget targets for FY 1981 would allow for no real growth. It is unlikely that we will be able to sustain even current force levels should this no-growth policy continue. At the same time, opportunities exist (and will have to be exploited in any event) for greater Allied contributions to military efforts, better cooperation with them to produce greater effectiveness, and several areas of opportunity for exploitation of technological breakthroughs. If we can exploit these various potential advantages while avoiding political dissolution in our alliances and the perhaps even greater risk of an attitude, associated with some in the new generation, that sees little to choose between democratic and dictatorial values, we may be able to avoid a military-political crisis that would require a return to a defense share of GNP corresponding to that of the 1950's and 1960's (or even the early 1940's). It is less likely that we will be able to hold to the present share. I will present a more detailed analysis of some of these issues in the forthcoming PRC meeting on Defense Consolidated Guidance.

4. ~~4.~~ In the past two years, the Soviets have continued to stress technology to improve significantly their military capabilities. Military R&D in the Soviet Union is of high priority; the current level of effort as measured in dollars approaches twice that of the US. They are moving forward with an intensive and comprehensive program of development -- and deployment -- of systems: strategic and tactical; ground, air and naval; nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. We are just now seeing the results of this emphasis in systems being deployed or in advanced testing:

- a. Their new ICBM guidance systems (SS-18 and SS-19) will have approximately the accuracy of Minuteman III.
- b. Their new SLBM (SS-N-18) has a MIRV system [REDACTED] comparable to TRIDENT I.

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Date:

MAR 11 2016

JS 3.3(b)(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY



mounts, so apparently does their willingness to use military forces to intervene on a global scale. Thus, I feel we are entering an era where direct military confrontations between the US and the Soviet Union will become more rather than less likely. Should that be true, it is my firm belief that we must be prepared to meet the Soviets wherever we must rapidly and with whatever military capabilities are necessary. The first task of US forces must be to deter military action; they can only do so when it is clear that they are capable of success in any ensuing conflict. Today our military forces are marginal for such deterrence. Tomorrow they may be inadequate. ←

~~AS~~ In light of these problems, I believe a major review of US policies and forces and budgets should be undertaken by the National Security Council, based on a further assessment of the risks we now face, and the details we will present to the PRC on our programs. I concur that PD-18 remains a valid framework for national strategy, but I believe the problems we now face demand more than the "certain changes in emphasis" that your assessment recommends.

*Harold Brown*

cc: Secretary of State (~~EYES ONLY~~)

*Zbig - I believe there should  
be an NSC meeting on this subject.*

*#B*

5 U.S.C. § 552  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDL ESD, WHS  
Date: 11 MAR 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(5)  
MDR: 15 -M-0508

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAR 11 2016

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 02 2016

SEP 5 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: FY 81-85 Defense Program

I anticipate that we will soon need to discuss (with a widening audience and an increasing degree of specificity and commitment) defense programs as well as the overall level of defense spending, in the course of our efforts to gain support for SALT II ratification. To prepare for these discussions, I have highlighted in the attachment the major features of the FY 81-85 Defense Program as it now stands at the Basic Level. This is what I recommend we present to illustrate (but not yet commit to) what our program is likely to be in responding to various senators' questions in the course of the SALT II debate.

The Basic Level program that I describe in the attachment is intended to reflect an annual 3% real growth rate. However, at this relatively early stage in our annual ZBB process (before the FY 1981 budget scrub), the Basic Level program is still somewhat more ambitious than that. As you see below, a 3% program is roughly midway between the Minimum and Basic Levels. (Incidentally, the \$11B TOA spread for FY 81 corresponds to less than a \$3B difference in outlays.)

	Outlay Growth		TOA (\$B)	
	80-81	80-85	FY 81	FY 81-85
Basic Level	4.0%	3.9%	161	957
NATO Commitment	3%	3%	157	922
Minimum Level	2.0%	2.4%	150	881

During the next three months we will converge on a program between the Basic and Minimum Levels that meets our NATO commitment to 3% real growth:

- By late November we will have ranked the programs by priority within each level.

EXEMPT PER EO 12958, Sec 3.1 (b) (2)  
GPO P-2-212 - Date 13 March 2003  
Review/Declassify On 24 Dec 2028  
Other Agency Security TBD

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~  
~~Unauthorized disclosure subject to~~  
~~administrative and criminal sanctions.~~  
~~Handle as Restricted Data on foreign~~  
~~dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic~~  
~~Energy Act 1954.~~

Declassified by: ~~SEA DDF~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

15-m-0514

Declassify on:

15 SEP 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

- As the FY 81 budget is prepared between now and early December we will carefully reexamine the costs of each program. This "scrub" will reduce the Basic Level program by, perhaps, \$3B in FY 81 TOA.

- As a final step in preparing the detailed program to submit to Congress, a program that will meet our NATO commitment, the lowest priority programs in the November ranking will be dropped.

The attachment provides highlights of the 5-year program that I believe we can fund at about the Basic Level. It should be suitable for your meeting with Ed Muskie and Bob Giaimo tomorrow. You may not want to use all of the detail shown. With your concurrence and after you have decided how to handle the broader aspects of SALT II ratification and Defense spending, I intend to provide the same information to the chairmen of both Armed Services Committees and to other key senators, including Senator Robert Byrd, who has written to ask me for such material. I will make certain that they understand that while this is illustrative of our programming at the moment, it is neither a substitute for our formal submission of the FY 81 budget next January, nor a guarantee that every item on the list will survive the remainder of the budgetary process.

As to FY 1980, an amendment to bring the budget up to a 3% increase in expenditure will not add any new programs to what we submitted in January 1979; it will enable those programs to be funded in the face of the inflation levels experienced in 1979 and anticipated in 1980.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 02 2016

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FY81-85 DoD PROGRAM AT THE BASIC LEVEL

JS 3.3(b)(5)(9) + 6.2(a)

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

ICBMs: MX full scale development starts in 1980, first operational units in 1986. All Minuteman improvements completed by 1985.

SLBMs: First Trident missiles deploy in Poseidon submarines in 1980. First Trident submarine deploys in 1981. One new Trident SSBN funded each year through FY83, SSBNX (new ballistic missile sub) starts in FY84, 1½ SSBN per year thereafter. By 1985, Trident I missiles in 8 Trident SSBNs and 12 of the 31 Poseidon SSBNs.

Airbreathing Leg: By 1985, 80% of the 150 B-52Gs will carry 12 cruise missiles each. New Cruise Missile Carriers are scheduled to be operational in FY87, but R&D is hedged to be able to accelerate that date if necessary.

Strategic C<sup>3</sup>: By FY85, provide 6 E-4Bs for airborne command posts, ALCS (air launch control system) for 200 MM IIIs, two-way UHF communications via satellite to ICBMs and bombers, enough additional TACAMO aircraft (for communicating with submarines) to permit 100% airborne operations in Lant and Pac, and 6 mobile ground terminals for DSP satellite readout to enhance survivability of tactical warning of enemy missile launchings.

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

Ballistic Missiles: Pershing II initial procurement in FY81; operational in 1983, all 198 Pershing IAs replaced by P-II by end FY85.

Cruise Missiles: GLCM initial procurement in 1981; operational by December 1983, in hard shelters in 5 countries by end FY86.

ARMY GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Structure and Equipment: Activate 3 new tank battalions and a new National Training Center in 1980. Start procurement of a new armed armored personnel carrier (IFV/CFV) in 1980. Procure 3900 XM-1 tanks and 3700 IFV/CFVs by Mid-'80s; also activate 10 new maneuver battalions (6 tank, 4 mechanized) in existing divisions; convert 5 existing infantry battalions to tank or mechanized.

Fire Support: In 1981 start buying Copperhead semi-active laser guided 155mm projectile in quantity. By mid-'80s buy 180 General Support Rocket System launchers, complete a force of about 1000 TOW-equipped AH-1 helicopters, and procure about 300 attack helicopters equipped with the new Hellfire missile.

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Air Defense: Start Patriot procurement in 1980. At a cost of almost \$4 billion, by FY 85 procure about 100 Patriot and 100 Roland SAM fire units, 500 DIVADs (division air-defense) anti-aircraft gun units, and 1100 Stinger man-portable SAM launchers.

Sustainability: By Mid-'80s, achieve an inventory of war reserve munitions adequate to 1) preserve our current ability to support US and ROK forces in Korea for 30 days, 2) increase the sustainability of US forces in Europe from the current 30 days to 60, and 3) add a capability to sustain selected US forces in a non-NATO contingency for 120 days of combat. In addition to this growth in sustainability, much of the inventory will be modernized in the process and, as a result, additional amounts of some older, less effective types of ammunition will also be available.

Reserve Readiness: Increase the manning level of our reserve components through enlistment and reenlistment incentives, and fund increased full-time manning of selected reserve units to improve readiness.

#### NAVY GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

##### Shipbuilding Plan:

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>Total</u>
Trident SSBN	1	1	1	0	0	3
New SSBN	0	0	0	1	2	3
SSN-688	1	1	1	1	0	4
SSN-FA	0	0	1	0	2	3
DDX	0	0	0	0	1	1
DDG-47	2	3	3	4	4	16
FFG-7	3	3	0	0	0	6
LSD-41	0	0	1	0	1	2
MCM	0	1	0	4	4	9
TAGOS	5	0	0	0	0	5
T-AO	0	0	2	2	0	4
T-AKX 1/	1	2	1	2	1	7
ARS	1	2	1	0	0	4
Total	14	13	11	14	15	67

1/ For USMC administrative lift.

Ship Deliveries: By FY85, we should take delivery on a CVM, the final LHA, 42 FFG-7s, 9 DD-963s, 6 DDG-47s, 24 SSNs, and possibly 4 DDG-993s ordered by Iran.

Ship Force Levels: At end FY79: 535 ships (458 active, 54 reserve, 23 Military Sealift Command (MSC)); by end FY85: 563 ships (506 active, 13 reserve, 44 MSC).

Surface Ship ASW: By FY85, 60 ships will have towed sonar array that will greatly enhance surface ship ASW, 200 LAMPS MK III ASW helicopters are funded for use on these ships through FY85.

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Maritime Patrol Aircraft: P-3C production to continue through FY85. Two P-3 squadrons equipped with Harpoon anti-ship missiles now, all 24 active squadrons equipped by FY85.

Tactical Air: Tactical aircraft procurement (for Navy and USMC) about 800 for FY81-85: F/A-18s, F-14s, KA-6Hs, E-2Cs, and EA-6Bs. This will support 14 Carrier Air Wings (12 Active, 2 Reserve), and 4 Marine Air Wings (3 Active, 1 Reserve).

#### MARINE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Amphibious Assault Lift: Even with no new amphibious ship funding, the FY85 lift capability would meet our objective of a 1.15 division/wing team assault lift capability. To permit modernization we have also programmed 2 new LSD-41s (FY83 and FY85). Funds are also provided to examine an alternative amphibious ship design, and to carry on the development of the air-cushion landing craft in FY81.

#### AIR FORCE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Aircraft Procurement: Procure about 900 aircraft in FY81-85: F-16s, A-10s, F-15s, TR-1s, E-3As, and EF-111A conversions.

TacAir Force Structure: In FY80, US F-15s will first be stationed in Japan (stationed in Europe in 79). In FY81, the first USAF F-16s will be stationed in Europe. During FY81-85, the force structure will grow from 35 wings to 40½; the active forces will gain 7½ squadrons and the reserve 10 squadrons.

Readiness: During the FY81-85 period the combat training activity rates of fighter and attack aircrews in the active force will be increased at an average annual rate of 6.6%. By FY85, the average aircrew will be receiving 38% more cockpit training time than in FY80.

#### MOBILITY PROGRAMS

Strategic Airlift: The first KC-10, allowing very long range deployments of tactical air forces, will be delivered in FY81. The C-5 wing modification, extending service life from about 8,000 hours to 38,000 hours, will be executed in FY82-87. The program to stretch the C-141s to increase capability by about 30%, and to add air refueling, will be completed by FY82. Cargo handling features for about 36 commercial passenger aircraft in the CRAF enhancement program should be funded through FY85.

Sealift: Arrangements for the surface analogue of CRAF have been made for 600 NATO ships to augment existing plans for the use of about 270 US flag ships in wartime. For rapid deployment, particularly for non-NATO contingencies, in addition to the Marines' amphibious assault capability, funds are provided to permit administrative, over-the-beach landing of enough equipment and supplies to support a full Marine brigade from pre-loaded dedicated ships, probably of commercial design.

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Army Deployment to Europe: Divisions by M+10: FY79: 3  
(10 days after US decision to reinforce and NATO decision to mobilize). FY82: 6  
FY86: 9

This tripling of our early deployment capability will be achieved principally through the pre-positioning of Army equipment in Europe.

Air Force Deployment to Europe: US-based tactical aircraft available for deployment by M+2: FY79: 1050; FY85: 1500 (+450 aircraft, +42%).

USMC Deployment to Europe: Starting in 1981 supplies and some duplicate equipment pre-positioned in Norway and Iceland will reduce deployment time from a matter of weeks to a matter of days.

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 02 May 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, National Security Affairs,  
Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Folder DoD, 11/79.

[Nov 1979]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: FY81 Presidential Review, Department of Defense

I am concerned that the OMB paper, subject as above, does not by itself provide an adequate basis for your consideration of the FY81 DoD budget and FY81-85 program. In particular, the first two sections ("Overview" and "Issue #1: Level of the Defense Budget") represent a perception so different from my own, and bear upon matters of such fundamental importance to the security of the nation, that I believe you are entitled to these additional views as a matter of fairness to you in the decision-making process.

It is of course true that the level of the Defense budget always has been, and always will be, decided in the light of other demands that compete for our national resources. But, it is just as true that the choice -- unlike much of the rest of the federal budget -- must also reflect demands over which we have little control because they are imposed on us by the Soviet Union and its allies. In my opinion, the treatment in the OMB paper of this latter factor -- the Soviet threat, the balance, and the trends in that balance -- is inadequate and misleading.

The situation we face today is the result of 15 years or more of failing to match a steady, resolute, and comprehensive growth in the Soviet Defense program. During each of those years, when the budget was being formulated, similar arguments to those contained in this week's OMB analysis could be and were made. They were made successfully, and the present situation is in part the result. While we were spending hundreds of billions of dollars in Vietnam at the expense of building our forces for the future, the Soviet Union was building the unprecedented force we face today. While we have stopped the decline in Defense spending and -- much to your credit -- have even turned it around to real growth, it is important to understand that the results of a 15 year trend cannot be repaired in one, or even five years. In my view, the OMB paper does not address that key point satisfactorily; the problem did not start last year or the year before, nor will it be cured in the next five. We must broaden the horizon from such a narrow concentration on this budget year.

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The situation in Europe, in my opinion, is far from satisfactory. The OMB paper, on the other hand, states that the military balance will show continued improvement even at the Minimum budget level. That is correct but -- because it deals only with trends in the balance, rather than the balance itself -- is seriously misleading. The trend in the balance -- now badly adverse -- will improve; the balance itself will remain adverse and by many measures will not improve. In the material we prepared for the PRC last week on the Defense budget -- which I take to be the source of the OMB's statement -- there was only one indicator in which NATO showed a superiority in 1985, given the Minimum level program. That was in the maximum number of air-to-ground capable aircraft, where we showed a superiority of 1.3:1. However, under the same conditions, we would also be outnumbered in air-to-air capable aircraft by 2.3:1, raising a serious question as to the survivability of our superior number of air-to-ground aircraft, and the significance of that sole area of superiority in Europe.

In all the other measures we calculated, the Warsaw Pact would have an advantage over NATO: a slight advantage in total number of tactical aircraft, a 10% faster rate of tactical aircraft modernization, a 70% advantage on the ground on the Southern Flank, a 100% advantage on the Central Front, a 180% advantage on the Northern Flank, and a 3:1 or 4:1 advantage in sustainability. Those balances are what we will face in 1985, in spite of the "improvements" that the OMB has highlighted. In my opinion, they are seriously unfavorable.

I also caution you not to be misled by OMB's table showing that "our projections of Soviet forces' readiness against NATO has declined sharply as more and better intelligence has become available." What you see there is not a marked reduction that has occurred in the readiness of Soviet forces, but a marked increase that did not occur. Actually, part of that is because we have changed our counting rules. The OMB comparison also fails to note that in 1970 we predicted that the effectiveness (i.e., measured in Armored Division Equivalents) of a Soviet division would increase by about 15%; now that 1979 is here, we find that it has increased by twice that much. But all of that is quite beside the point. No matter who predicted what how long ago, today NATO is at a disadvantage on the ground in Central Europe at M+10 by a factor of 2.2:1, which in my opinion is cause, not for complacency, but for deep concern.

Another example that I consider seriously misleading -- even if literally correct -- is the statement that our projections show continued improvements in the ratio of ROK/US ground forces

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versus North Korea in the next decade even at the minimum level. At the minimum level, that balance will by 1985 still be 1.74:1 in favor of the North Koreans. In 1977 (when in PD-18 you directed a policy of no further degradation in that or other such balances), we had thought the ratio was 1:1, or slightly better. But now, at the current rate, the balance will still be 1.46:1 against us and the ROKs as late as 1990. The fact that the balance is improving should not be allowed to obscure the fact that it is currently unsatisfactory and likely to remain so for some time to come.

And in one final geographical assessment, I consider the treatment of the Persian Gulf area totally inadequate. The PRC material, which the OMB has, points out that if we had to counter the Iraqis alone -- quite apart from any Soviet or Cuban forces -- today, we would be at more than a 2:1 disadvantage on the ground (measured in Armored Division Equivalents) for at least 3 weeks, even if we could devote our whole current mobility force to the deployment. If there were also to be a simultaneous NATO crisis (perhaps orchestrated by the Soviets), the 3 weeks would grow to 5. Our capability for intervention with more than a token force in that area of the world today, therefore, depends on 1) weeks of advance warning, 2) immediate action on that warning, and 3) no simultaneous crisis elsewhere -- far from an impressive capability and, in my opinion, quite unsatisfactory. The OMB paper gives no inkling of that, but I think it must enter your deliberations.

Beyond the question of specific military balances, there is the far larger issue of US leadership. The OMB paper cites a decision by the FRG to limit its real growth in defense spending to 1½-2% (we feel that a higher figure is likely for 1980 before that year ends), points out that the Japanese have been reluctant to increase the allocation of their resources to defense, and notes that the US allocates more to defense on a per capita basis and as a percent of GNP than Japan, Germany, the UK, or France. Though perhaps not intended, one possible inference -- the most likely one, I think -- to be drawn from all that is that if our allies are devoting less to the common defense than we are, we should cut back.

We must press (and we will) for greater efforts on the part of our allies. But I urge you not to abandon our position as leader of the free world's military alliance. If we elect to cut the burden we bear to no more than that borne by any of our allies, we will have become a follower rather than the leader. We will have said that our alliance is like a convoy in which the speed of all is set by the speed of the slowest

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member. We must continue to lead and continue to spend what is truly required if we are to maximize the incentive for our allies to hold up their end. If we fall back, there is, in my opinion, no chance that they will carry on without us.

We must not look at this issue as making sure that no slacker takes advantage of the United States. Rather, we must continue to recognize that the common defense is not only in our own interest -- even if we should have to bear an extra measure of the load -- but is actually a matter of the survival of our world. I urge that you not let recitations of our allies' performance distract you from the real issue. We will work on our allies, and have been far more successful during the past thirty months in pushing them to greater efforts than ever before. But we must maintain our leadership to be able to do so, or for there to remain any point in our even trying.

I mentioned that we held a PRC meeting last week on the Defense budget and program. With the exception of Jim McIntyre, whom I did not press because I recognize that doing his job requires him to take a different perspective, every participant at that meeting agreed that a growth in defense significantly higher than the earlier projected 3 percent per annum is needed. I think that view has also become a consensus of the country at large. It clearly is shared by some key members of the Congress and other persons of influence. Yet the position recommended by the OMB staff in this paper is wholly at odds with such a view. I recognize that the OMB has its own responsibilities to you, and that they must play the Devil's advocate. But the contrast between their position and the vast majority of other responsible voices, my own included, is very great. Moreover, I remain concerned that we will be correctly seen as justifying inadequate defense program growth by using questionable arithmetic.

I feel quite sure, were you to adopt anything like the OMB staff's recommended analysis, budget level or program, that all chance for the ratification of SALT II would vanish. The consequences, political, military, and international, would be many and damaging. As one of them, I have no doubt that in the aftermath our requirements for strategic forces would rise. We would then face the choice between paying for them by cutting back on our general purpose forces, or increasing the defense budget, or some combination thereof. Given the unsatisfactory nature of our general purpose force balances as outlined above, the former would, in my opinion, be unacceptably risky. The latter would face you with a far greater economic problem than the one before you now.

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MEMORANDUM

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 26 2015

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Folder DoD, 11/79.

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November 15, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
SUBJECT: FY 81 Defense Budget Review

Attached is Harold Brown's memorandum to you on the OMB Defense budget book. In addition, I wanted to give you my own views on the program that I believe is required to meet our strategic military and political requirements. I strongly believe that whatever "percentage" increase results should be derived from our programs and not vice versa.

The Program

A zero based budget is a major accomplishment of your Administration, but it is important to recognize that it is biased against innovation and new investment. This is because overhead, O&M and continuing activities are always protected in a minimum program.

This year, Harold is trying to protect crucial new nuclear programs such as LRTNF and, in particular, MX by placing them well within the minimum program. As a consequence, procurement for general purpose forces has been pushed to the margin where you must decide among a welter of programs and activities whose military importance may not be immediately self-evident.

OMB's answer is to push for less capable systems (e.g., FFG in place of AEGIS ships) and cut back procurement programs directly related to our allies' support for the NATO emphasis of our general purpose forces -- war reserve stocks and items we would buy in the two-way street program.

To help you through this thicket, these are the programs I consider it essential to include and the reasons therefor:

(1) Basic nuclear modernization -- MX, LRTNF, strategic cruise missiles, TRIDENT.

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(2) Adequate naval power. In particular, we should go forward with two AEGIS ships to guard against the greatest threat to our navy -- the Backfire bomber. To drop one AEGIS and substitute three additional FFG's (whose main mission is ASW where we are in good shape) makes no military sense, and carries the "perceptions" argument too far.

(3) Continued procurement of major military items -- particularly fighters -- close to the FY 80 projected level. You should be aware that apart from a few modest increases, Harold's "Basic" FY 81 program will generally slow the rate of procurement below what we asked for in the FY 80 budget.

(4) War reserve stocks. There must be an adequate program to reduce what is the major vulnerability and weakness in our NATO posture recently underscored by NIFTY NUGGET. Real capability to fight requires a better balance between our weapons systems and the ordnance and spare parts they consume.

(5) AV8B (U.K. HARRIER) and ROLAND (French air defense system). Substantial procurement is essential for survival of the NATO two-way street, one of your key contributions to a more rational allied defense effort.

(6) Rapid Deployment Force programs. In particular, we need to go forward with pre-positioned Marine Corps stocks on ships, more KC-10 tankers and begin R&D on new CX long-range, large-size cargo aircraft.

(7) Procurement of the EF-111 to cope with the extremely intensive Soviet air defenses in East Germany which protect their blitzkrieg capability.

#### The Alternatives

I have directed my staff to look hard at alternatives.

-- We could cut back military construction, but most of it is directly related to needed force modernization.

-- We could hold down readiness; however, this has been one of your highest priorities.

-- We could postpone new starts in ships, guns and aircraft and reduce production rates in ongoing programs. But it is essential to acquire adequately capable systems. Whether in NATO, at sea or in the Third World, we now confront either Soviet forces equipped with the most modern weapons or other nations so equipped by the Soviet Union. In the Middle East,

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Soviet clients are now receiving their most advanced equipment -- T-72 tanks and MIG-25 aircraft. As our analysis of our options in the Persian Gulf make clear, without continued modernization we will have difficulty meeting these threats let alone the test of the central front in Europe. (For example, there are questions whether some of our most modern equipment, such as TOW, can even penetrate the armor of the T-72.)

### The Budget Level

Both Harold and Jim have kept their personal positions close to their vests and rightly so. But it is our clear impression that the OMB staff is pushing for Band 1 which, in our judgment, would kill SALT outright; and DOD is pushing for Band 4 or 5 which is clearly excessive. The program I recommend involves an expenditure in the area of Band 3; that is, \$156.4 billion TOA, \$143.6 billion outlays (current dollars). This would provide total growth of 5.8 percent in TOA and 4.1 percent in outlays. This presumes Jim McIntyre is correct that he can squeeze \$3 billion out of a vigorous budget scrub.

In my judgment, any less will not make clear our determination to reverse recent military trends and over the next decade eliminate the most important deficiencies and imbalances. As Harold points out, this is where OMB's analysis is most deficient. It is these trends that have fueled the political pressure for a more vigorous program to modernize our military posture. If we go for less, I do not believe we will have the broad consensus to support both SALT and an adequate yet prudent defense program -- a consensus that has eluded us since the war in Vietnam and which you have an opportunity to forge, not only for FY 81 but for the difficult decade ahead.

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or Enhanced as of 24 July  
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Date: JAN 26 2015

JUL 21 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Washington National  
Records Center, SecDef  
Files, Acc 330-82-0216,  
Box 10, Folder 100.54

SUBJECT: Budgeting for the RDF and Southwest Asia (20-30 Jul) 1980.

(S) This memorandum responds to your request for our perspectives on where we stand at this stage of the budget process in supporting the RDF and Southwest Asia Security Framework decisions.

(S) As you know, the DRB just completed its initial review of the Service POMs; the process involving Service reclama and further decisions by the Secretary of Defense is soon to get underway. In general, the Services' POMs were highly responsive to the Consolidated Guidance directive that readiness be improved at the expense of modernization and force structure, if necessary. As a result, we now expect that those combat and support units that might be sent to Southwest Asia will be highly effective upon arrival. It is important to understand however that early US combat capability in Southwest Asia is now limited by the finite amount of lift capacity, not by the number of available forces or their peacetime readiness. For this reason many of our program changes deal with the lift problem through a combination of lift enhancements and prepositioning.

(S) It is no more possible to characterize a portion of the Defense Program as exclusively for the RDF than it is for NATO. Many of our general purpose forces could be made available for a conflict outside of Europe, given adequate deployment time. This memo does not attempt to cover the bulk of the effort that DoD is putting into RDF-related (but not RDF-specific) forces, such as full funding of the Navy's carrier and amphibious assault forces. Nor does it describe major RDF-oriented program enhancements that preceded this summer's POM review, including such major decisions as last fall's C-X and MPS program commitments and the decisions in the CG this spring to increase RDF flexibility by designating 6 1/3 active divisions (4 light and 2 1/3 heavy) for possible RDF deployment, while reducing previously planned prepositioning in Europe. M M M

(S) What we have done in this memo is to provide a sense of what changes we tentatively have decided to make in seven programs that are directly related either to the RDF or to our power projection and sustainability capabilities more generally. These changes give a reasonable estimate of RDF requirements that were not fully reflected in the Service POMs. These few programs at issue do not constitute a major fraction of the resources that the POM's commit to the RDF, but not all of these programs could be provided for at the Minimum Level budget without major adverse impact on important NATO and strategic programs.

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A. RDF Support:

1. Items included within this program constitute an omnibus support package for the RDF in the areas of Army service and engineer support, medical support, munitions, war reserve spares, and "special equipment" such as water purification and port handling equipment and camouflage gear.

2. The POMs provide only an austere level of support for a 3 1/3 division, 4 TFW, 3 CVBG RDF sized to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from an invader other than the Soviet Union. In fact, the level of support is so austere that the means of moving supplies along captured lines of communication, as well as the levels of medical support, prepositioned munitions and spares, and water-related equipment, would limit the employment of this force to areas relatively close to friendly ports and airfields. Furthermore, deployment of existing support to Southwest Asia would leave NATO short unless additional reserves were to be activated or further progress made in Host Nation Support.

3. We believe that additional funds are required if this 3 1/3 division "baseline" RDF is to be fully effective at distances from ports that may well prove to be necessary. These funds, totalling about \$200-300M in FY 82 and \$1.5B in FY 82-86, would do the following:

-- provide operating costs for 20,000 European HNS reservists, as well as the funds needed to procure equipment for, and enhance the readiness of, US RDF-designated reserve units; } M

-- provide funds for twelve aeromedical surgery facilities eight USN and two USAF hospitals, and one hospital ship; and } M

-- provide funds for 30 days supply and prepositioning of USMC and Army munitions, and stockpiling of an additional 30 days supply of munitions in CONUS. } B

4. In order to provide the necessary support for an expanded, 6 1/3 division RDF sized against a limited attack by the Soviet Union, we estimate it will require another substantial funding increment in FY 82-86 depending on the extent to which we choose to drawdown on our support for NATO. } E

B. Bases for RDF Operations:

1. The POM contains about \$33M in FY 82 and \$119M FY 82-86 partially funding the DoD program to construct a pier at Diego Garcia for offloading MPS ships and to make selected airfield improvements.

2. The DRB has recommended full funding for the SecDef-approved programs at Diego Garcia and Lajes (a key enroute base). In addition, it recommended funding to: M



-- upgrade facilities in Oman and Kenya consistent with expressed commitments and US needs. B

-- construct a rear-staging facility and one-division cantonment at Ras Banas in Egypt; and B

-- plan and design only for the possible upgrading of Diego Garcia to enable B-52 operations. B

The cost of these additions to the POM is about \$400M in FY 82 and \$700M in FY 82-86.

*BUILD 2<sup>ND</sup> REAR BASE*

C. JCS Directed and Coordinated Exercise Program: *2 FURTHER UPGRADE DCA* } E

1. The Service POMs were developed before the establishment of the RDJTF command structure and hence do not explicitly provide for RDJTF exercises. As a result, RDJTF exercises could only be held under the POM guidelines at the expense of other needed exercises, and, owing to the nature of the JCS exercise program, those of EUCOM in particular. Given the need to exercise our European forces and the US commitment to the LTDP and to European security more generally, such a trade-off is not acceptable. ✓

2. Accordingly, the DRB has recommended providing additional funds to support one major RDJTF exercise (consisting of a headquarters battalion and squadron-sized Army and Air Force components, and a MAU) in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean per year. The funds will also permit the exercising of the maritime pre-positioning ship concept. The cost of doing the above will be about \$60M in FY 82 and \$600M FY 82-86. (It should be noted that the relatively high costs of RDJTF exercises reflect the cost of needed airlift and sealift to the theater.) B

D. Indian Ocean Naval Forces

1. The POM, providing \$3274M in FY 82 and \$19670M FY 82-86, funds ship operations at the historical average of about 45 days per quarter. This would not meet the Indian Ocean presence requirements established in the 16 April 1980 White House Memorandum. Moreover, any attempt to meet these requirements at the current funding level could only be achieved at the expense of operating tempos elsewhere or other programs.

2. Consistent with the White House guidance and other US commitments, the DRB has recommended allocating an additional \$157M in FY 82 and \$1223M FY 82-86 to permit the continuous presence in the Indian Ocean of one carrier battle group and, at least 70% of the time, one amphibious group. This funding would also permit the retention in the active forces of CORAL SEA as a deployable carrier through FY 86. This will ease our carrier availability problem as well as improve morale and retention by reducing time away from homeport. M B

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Date: JAN 26 2015

3. In addition, we have estimated that to maintain a second carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean on a continuous basis would require another funding increment of \$134M in FY 82 and \$742M FY 82-86. E

E. Near-Term Prepositioning Ships (NTPS)

The Navy POM provided adequate funds to support the operations and maintenance (O&M) of the NTPS program. These seven ships (3 RO/ROs, 2 Break-bulk, 2 tankers) will provide a large portion of the equipment and support of a 12,000 man MAB. The NTPS program, scheduled to be in effect by the end of this month, costs \$104.9M in FY 82 and \$583.7M FY 82-86, not including the possible need to replace USMC equipment stocks drawn down in CONUS. N

F. SL-7 Funding:

1. The POM does not provide funds for the procurement of the eight ship SL-7 program, assuming instead that funds for procurement will come from MARAD or FY 81 DoD dollars. It does, however, program conversion of these fast container ships to RO/ROs at the rate of two in FY 82 and six in FY 83. Yet the funds included in the POM (\$216M in FY 82 and \$233M in FY 83, or \$449M FY 82-86) would, as the POM itself recognizes, not be sufficient to accomplish the conversions.

2. The DRB has recommended funding these conversions in full, although it has extended the program one year to lessen the financial impact in FY 83. Conversions will now take place at the rate of two in FY 82 and three per year in FY 83 and FY 84. The costs above the POM are \$2.4M in FY 82 and \$251.2M FY 82-86. Like the POM, it has been assumed that no FY 82 DoD dollars will be required for procurement of the ships. M

H. CRAF Enhancement Program:

1. The CRAF Enhancement Program provides additional inter-continental cargo airlift capability during emergencies. The DoD commitment to the LTDP is for 65 new convertible aircraft. Through FY 81, funds for 13 of these have either been made available or have been requested.

2. The POM provides funds (\$100.3M in FY 82 and \$783.6M FY 82-86) for the additional 53 aircraft modifications. Yet the POM has distributed the dollars in such a way that only 12 of the 52 aircraft modifications are likely to be funded. Thus, it would be more realistic to state the POM funding for the CRAF Enhancement Program as \$20M in FY 82 and \$228.2M in FY 82-86.

3. The DRB has recommended a restructuring of the funding profile of the CRAF Enhancement Program so that 37 of the 52 aircraft would receive funds. This would add \$65.8M in FY 82 and \$302.1M FY 82-86. B

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4. In order to fulfill the LTDP commitment completely, an additional funding increment of \$14.5M in FY 82 and \$253.3M FY 82-86 would be required. E

As the FY 82-86 DoD program is refined, further changes may prove to be appropriate. As you know, the Odeen procedure provides for a potential mini-PRC review of the Program after the Amended Program Decisions are promulgated in late August. It may be appropriate to review RDF-related issues again at that time.

*W. Graham Clayton, Jr.*

W. Graham Clayton, Jr.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 545.6 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 26 Jun 2015 Authority: EO 13526  
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 Date: JUL 26 2016

Washington National Records Center,  
 SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0216, Box 15,  
 Folder 110.01 (1-3 Dec) 1980.

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POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING

December 2, 1980

Time and Place: 2:00-3:00 p.m.; White House Situation Room

Subject: Defense Budget

Participants

State

Secretary Edmund Muskie  
 Reginald Bartholomew, Director,  
 Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy  
 William Ashworth, Asst. Dir.,  
 Weapons Evaluation and  
 Control Bureau

OSD

Secretary Harold Brown (Chairman)  
 Dep. Sec. W. Graham Claytor, Jr.  
 Amb Robert Komer  
 Under Secretary for Policy  
 Russell Murray, Asst. Sec. for  
 Program Analysis and Evaluation

OSTP

Benjamin Huberman  
 John Marcum

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

JCS

General David Jones

NSC

General Jasper Welch  
 General William Odom  
 Victor Utgoff

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
 John Koehler, Dep. to the Director  
 for Resource Management

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION  
 AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT. DATE:  
 04-10-2015

OMB

James McIntyre  
 Edward Sanders, Assoc. Dir. for  
 National Security and  
 International Affairs

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Harold Brown, as Chairman, asked that the group comment on the Defense paper that provided an estimate of the size and scope of the collective Defense program facing the free world and the United States, as its leader, if current national security guidance is to be followed and its goals achieved. Brown explained that the purpose of the paper was to set the context for consideration of the Defense budget. (2)

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~~Review December 2, 2000~~

~~Extended by Z. Brzezinski~~

~~Reason for Extension: NSC I.13(e)~~

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 15-m-0534

330-82-0216, box 15, 110.1 (1-3 Dec) 1980



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The paper developed estimates of what it will take in ground, air, and naval forces of the U.S. and allies to produce various force level ratios between them and the Pact in critical geographical and functional areas. This also describes what these forces will cost the U.S. and its allies in money and manpower to implement current national security policy. The quantitative estimates are developed for two levels of assurance that the free world's forces are adequate; for two dates, 1987 and 1995, for achieving either level of assurance; and for two levels of contributions by the rest of the free world - one reflecting more equitable sharing of burdens by all nations, and an alternative where other nations continue on their current course. He noted that the alternatives which seemed most realistic to him in resource terms do not provide for simultaneous conflicts in Europe and SWA at force ratios that would give us confidence (let alone for an additional conflict in Korea). (S)

Brown first asked Stan Turner for an estimate of Soviet reactions to the various free world build-ups presented. Turner replied specifically with regard to the chart on strategic balance indicators that showed a steady and substantial Soviet advantage from '75 to '81, followed by a significant erosion of that Soviet advantage from '81 to '87. (The indicator in question presented the ratio of residual forces following a Soviet first-strike counterforce and a U.S. retaliation counterforce.) Turner noted that this particular indicator showed a much earlier and more dramatic erosion of the Soviet advantage than other analyses with which he was more familiar. Others agreed with this observation. (S)

Brown replied that this particular indicator is merely one measure. It emphasizes the effects of U.S. advantages, particularly in cruise missiles and SLBMs, and perhaps overemphasizes them. Turner then said that such an erosion of the Soviet advantage would encourage the Soviets to respond, although he thought that they would also look to the results of a U.S. first-strike. Brown noted that a U.S. first-strike case would not show such a dramatic erosion of Soviet advantages since cruise missiles could not be counted upon in that case. Turner replied that in any event the growing U.S. capability to attack Soviet silo-based missiles would encourage the Soviets to rebase their missiles to a mobile mode and to attempt defenses or other counters against the U.S. cruise missile program. (S)

General Jones thought the paper useful as a whole but thought that it understated our difficulties in the strategic balance. In particular he thought that looking only at ratios of residual strategic force obscured the heavier weight of the Soviet attack in megatons, assumed away current deficiencies in C<sup>3</sup>, and assumed that the U.S. five-year program would continue to schedule contrary to what has happened in the past. Russ Murray said that some monies were added in the financial accounting to cover C<sup>3</sup> improvements and other modernization, and that needed readiness improvements were funded before force structure growth. General Jones replied that in his view the analysis underestimated the resources needed to correct C<sup>3</sup> deficiencies and readiness shortfalls. (S)

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Harold Brown and Jim McIntyre both noted that difficulties in increasing U.S. military manpower will eventually constrain force structure increases. Russ Murray indicated that the analysis recognized this difficulty and chose programs which minimized the need for additional military manpower. Much of the increase in armored division equivalents, for example, was obtained through modernization rather than increases in numbers of divisions per se. Brown and McIntyre expressed skepticism as to whether further increases in pay could attract commensurate increases in recruits.  
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Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 5 U.S.C. 8552

Date: 26 JUL 2016 Authority: EO 13526+

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In Brown's opinion the key issue raised by the paper is the role of the other free world countries -- what can we expect they will do, how should we proceed to encourage them to do more, and what should we do if they fail to respond as we would want them to. Ed Muskie agreed, seeing little hope for major increases even if the Soviets invade Poland. Turner added that intelligence reports do not lead to an expectation of much outrage in Western Europe over an invasion of Poland. Komer was in some disagreement and thought that there was the distinct possibility of a right-wing coalition developing, particularly in the FRG. (S)

Jim McIntyre thought the FRG was more apt to react in a way best calculated to protect its East European trade. Brzezinski agreed on this point but added that the FRG could well find that an increase in their defense budget would be a necessary part of that strategy because the FRG would also have to maintain good trade relations with France and the United Kingdom. France and the UK might well stop trade with the Eastern bloc and increase their defense budgets in reaction to a Soviet invasion of Poland. (S)

Muskie then asked what we were to do if the Allies in fact do not make an increased contribution. Brown replied that was indeed the crucial question and that in his judgment we should let the NATO theater absorb the shortfall in capability, which is what we have told them we would do. In Komer's view the Allies will eventually react when they see we are serious and when other external factors threatening their security occur as they surely will. Brown continued, proposing that we maintain our budget as if the Allies were doing their share but that we reallocate our forces away from NATO and towards Southwest Asia since only we can effectively shore up that theater. The Allies will not do more if we do less, and we cannot get to a point where Western European military security from the Soviets is a greater concern for us than it is for the Western Europeans. (S)

There was agreement by all that we should continue to press the Allies, that their reluctance to increase their defense budget is due in large part to the current economic situation, but that if the Allies do not make larger increases, Brown's proposal is the proper one (that is, let the shortfall occur in NATO and re-allocate U.S. forces away from NATO). (S)

Brown then turned to specific issues, first the binary chemical weapons plant. Turner predicted that there would be opposition in Europe to deployment of binary chemical weapons simply because it is a change. Brown replied that if so, we should adopt a course which breaks the decision into small steps and put off the question of deployment until we had stocks in being. Komer agreed that the plant decision should not hinge on prior approval for forward deployment; the advantages of the new weapons would accrue in large measure even without peacetime forward deployment. (S)

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Brzezinski asked how long would it take to deploy the weapons in a crisis (Answer: two weeks or so by sea, a few days by air), and would special construction be needed to receive them (Answer: No). Bartholomew stated that we could manage allied reactions with a proper approach, the elements of which included emphasizing the safety of the new weapons and assuring our Allies that we were proposing no new doctrine on chemical warfare nor anticipating any greater dependence on chemical warfare than at present. (S)

Brown proposed that we adopt a course as follows: Accept the Congressional adds for the binary facility for FY-81, which are expected to fund initial plant construction and the initial tranche of equipment, but announce that no further decisions will be taken for some time. If any minor FY-82 monies are needed, we would treat as part of the decision to accept the FY-81 Congressional adds. Brzezinski agreed with this approach and no others expressed opposition. Bartholomew added that a program which emphasized aerial-delivered bombs rather than the current emphasis on artillery shells would facilitate management of Allied reaction. General Jones expressed support for a program that included both. (S)

Brown then turned to the Nuclear Land Attack Tomahawk program. There is concern that moving to procurement in this program in FY-82 could complicate implementation of NATO's LRTNF program. Brown proposed that by retaining \$3-4 million in RDT&E we could protect a FY-84 IOC and minimize any potential difficulty. This was agreed by all. (S)

Brown raised the question of the proper level of military construction in Southwest Asia for FY-82. Bartholomew voiced concern that the currently proposed levels are systematically below those that we have previously announced to Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and to the United Kingdom for Diego Garcia. Brown replied that the levels proposed were chosen in light of a judgment that the Congress would finance only a limited amount of military construction in Southwest Asia and the reductions from previous goals elsewhere were needed to fund the Ras Banas construction in Egypt. Bartholomew, in response to a question from Brown, expressed confidence that we could have an access agreement for Ras Banas with Egypt in time for Congressional action in the spring. Welch expressed concern that there was disconnect between what was needed in facilities and what appeared feasible to get Congress to fund. Brown agreed but said we cannot get out of the game and must proceed as best we can. (S)

Brown raised the general issue of funding for joint programs with our European allies, the problem being that we will not be able to provide funds for these programs as expected in all cases. In particular, for Poland he proposed that we request only \$65 million in FY-82 vice the \$355 million planned and defer the rest of the

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planned program into the out years. It appears as though the FRG may also fall out of the Poland program due to the need to finance cost growth in the Tornado fighter bomber. This proposal was accepted. (S)

Brown pointed out that POMCUS set 7 was being delayed because of a lack of sufficient equipment and that the siting of set 6 was not yet firm, raising the possibility of a delay in that set also. Brown asked whether State was agreeable to defer POMCUS set (pre-positioned Army unit equipment) 7. Bartholomew agreed, stating that that was consistent with the general decision to let capability shortfalls appear in NATO. (S)

With respect to the security assistance enhancement package for Southwestern Asia previously recommended by the SCC, it was noted that State has filed its formal support with OMB. McIntyre suggested that OMB chair an inter-agency group to review this issue in detail prior to the scheduled 8 December meeting with the President on the defense and foreign affairs budget. This was agreed. (S)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

July 20, 1977

Washington National Records Center, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0017, Box 56,  
Folder 471.94 (May-Aug) 1977.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Case for Continuing with Two Cruise Missile Programs

*X 2057*  
You asked for comment on whether or not Tomahawk and ALCM are unnecessarily duplicative systems.

Attached is a point paper which sets forth the argument for continuing both development programs for the time being. Now that we have opted for the cruise missile system in preference to the B-1, I believe that it would be unwise to terminate either cruise missile program until we have achieved the operational capabilities on whose prospect the decision was based.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment  
a/s

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *27 Jan 2015* Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: *X* Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: *15-M-0604*

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 27 2015

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~~AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31Dec83~~

*15-m-0604*

*330-80-0017, box 56, 471.94 (May-Aug) 1977* Sec Def Cont Nr. *X-2160*

20 July 1977

POINT PAPER  
ON  
CONTINUATION OF BOTH ALCM AND TOMAHAWK PROGRAMS

The principal considerations are:

1. Risk: The risk represented by the ALCM program is different from that of the TALCM (TOMAHAWK Air-Launched Cruise Missile) program. The ALCM is less mature in its development and test program, having had only six flight tests of which four were successful, although all tests have been in conjunction with a B-52 bomber. The TOMAHAWK, on the other hand, has had 22 flight tests, 18 of which have been successful; however, it is untested and unevaluated in the context of the B-52 operational weapon system.

The cruise missile will now be crucial to maintaining the bomber leg of the TRIAD. I am therefore convinced that it is appropriate to minimize the risk by maintaining both of these programs in parallel until either or, preferably, both have completed comprehensive tests in the B-52 environment. Furthermore, cancellation now (or soon) of a cruise missile program could raise questions about the B-1 decision, and about our determination to pose a severe air-breathing threat to the Soviets into the 1990s. In the long run it may indeed prove to be economical to pick only one for the inventory, though depending on the number of different applications (ALCM, GLCM, SLCM - nuclear and/or antiship), several different designs may be appropriate for the inventory.

2. Competition: Continuing both ALCM and TOMAHAWK in RDT&E will create a healthy competition between the two missile configurations as strategic air-launched cruise missiles. We expect, as a result, both programs will achieve better performance and lower cost than if there were only one program.

At about \$1M per missile in recurring costs (for a buy of 3000 to 5000 missiles), even a 10 to 15% cost reduction by virtue of competition will realize a savings to the government of \$300M to \$750M. Such a savings in procurement costs, together with the importance of reducing risk by having a back-up program, is a worthwhile trade for the additional RDT&E expenditure required to carry both programs at least to the point of final production selection.

3. SALT Aspects: Dropping ALCM could result in foreclosure of air launched cruise missile options during SALT as a result of constraints on TOMAHAWK. TOMAHAWK, having an identical external configuration for SLCM, GLCM, and bomber-launch (including B-52 and cruise missile carrier) application, may create weapon counting complications. Should there be a SALT constraint on GLCM/SLCM, the bomber-carried TOMAHAWK may be also constrained. ALCM, having an entirely different configuration from that of TOMAHAWK, and not being launchable from submarines, will avoid any potential SALT entanglement between sea-launched cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile from a strategic air launch cruise missile system. Such an option should be preserved until the SALT situation is clarified.

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4. Legal Aspects: If signed into law, the Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1978 directs that: "Competitive cruise missile development programs shall continue until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives that (1) a single airframe for the cruise missile can be selected which meets all operational requirements, and (2) cost data clearly establish that termination of the competitive cruise missile development programs will result in lower development and procurement costs for the cruise missile."

5. Asymmetric Strengths: The two systems have different strong points and, thus, are not 100% comparable:

- a. TOMAHAWK:
  - Longer range (2000 nm vs 1500 nm).
  - Probably cheaper in missile unit cost.
  - More matured in missile tests.
  - Essentially common missile for SLCM and GLCM missions.
- b. ALCM:
  - More matured in system test for B-52 Launch.
  - Avoiding entanglement with SALT constraint which might be placed on GLCM/SLCM.
  - Single-Service management and thus, better system integration.
  - Compatibility with existing SRAM support equipment.

As time goes by, many of these will be resolved one way or the other, and a decision between them should then be possible for this application.

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Date: JAN 27 2015

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

August 19, 1977

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 27 Jan 2015 Authority: EO 13526

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Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

MDR: 15 -M- 0605

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Choosing a Single ALCM Development Program

x. 2 - 17  
Your memorandum of August 5, 1977, raised questions about our plans for parallel development of the cruise missiles for the B-52. As I indicated in our conversation last week, I do not believe that we are ready to select with confidence one design (and contractor) for the air-launched cruise missile mission. Nor could we defend adequately a selection of either missile and contractor at this stage. The ALCM missile has yet to be modified to its long range (ALCM-B) version. The modification is relatively straightforward, (basically "stretching" it by adding two sections). But a successful flight test of the modified missile is indicated before this missile could appropriately be selected. The TOMAHAWK (TALCM) missile has had sufficient flight tests to tell us about its flight characteristics, but has never been mated to or launched from the B-52. Again, we believe the mating is a straightforward engineering task. But until it is demonstrated, we cannot convincingly argue that TALCM is the preferred missile. To arrive at the point where we could select either missile with the required confidence will take a minimum of 6 to 9 months of testing to conduct the necessary flight tests and evaluation of each. Based on such preliminary test results, a selection could be arrived at by a year from now, in mid-1978. However, with this much additional effort required for parallel programs, I believe it will probably make good management sense to carry the programs in parallel all the way through as a carefully conducted competitive flyoff, with selection by October 1979. The savings that could be achieved by not carrying the parallel program through a flyoff is about \$200M to \$300M, depending on how soon the parallel program is terminated, and which missile is selected. The benefits to be expected from maintaining the parallel program through the flyoff are as follows:

- (1) The competition can be fairly determined on an objective basis from the operational tests conducted by SAC crews on B-52s.
- (2) The technical characteristics of the successful missile will probably be superior because each contractor will be working hard to maximize his "score" on the indicated

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EXEMPT PER EO 12958, Sec 1.4(b)(1)  
OSD 65 212 Date 10 Apr 2012  
Review/Declassify on 11 Dec 2027  
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performance parameters, including radar cross section, reliability, guidance performance (the guidance systems are only about 70% common), and operational flexibility of the technique for mounting in the B-52. The merits of a stacked rack (9 TALCM) and a rotary rack (7 TALCM or 8 ALCM) for internal carriage are debated. A competitive flyoff will let the competition settle the argument.

- (3) The unit cost of the successful missile will probably be lower because of each contractor's motivation to incorporate manufacturing economies into his design.

In summary, I expect the life cycle cost of the program will be less with a competitive flyoff in spite of the increased R&D cost; as a bonus we should get maximum performance and minimum risk of contractor protests. Finally, we hedge against program disaster in the unlikely event of one contractor completely failing to meet program objectives.

You asked when we could certify to the Congress that the requirements of language in the FY 78 Authorization Bill have been met. The clearest case for assurance of meeting operational requirements and for knowledge that the termination would produce minimal cost is at the end of the flyoff in October 1979. Prior to that we could make the certification based on our internal estimates at almost any time, conceivably even before the preliminary development flight tests from the B-52 are completed for both missiles. I question, however, whether we could be convincing to the Congress. There is likely to be protracted acrimonious exchange with the defenders of the missile that was selected out; making a choice after flyoff would greatly reduce (though not eliminate) the points of argument. I have attached answers to the other questions you asked with the exception of tentative deployment plans. I assume you were asking about numbers, intended utilization, and basing. We are still sorting these out and I will provide an answer later.

*Harold Brown*

Attachment

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5

CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT AND COSTS

Date: JAN 27 2015

Either ALCM-B or TALCM is capable of meeting a limited IOC of one aircraft with six production missiles by March 1980. Full operational capability on a completed modified B-52G with twenty missiles and six spare missiles is currently scheduled for June 1981. The initial deployment buildup is tied to the planned availability of updated B-52Gs by mid-81. A modification rate of at least three B-52s per month is planned.

Air launched cruise missile production rate is planned to reach twenty per month by the end of 1980 and forty per month by 1981.

The cost estimates shown below reflect a conservative government estimate of development costs for the air-launched cruise missile program:

	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>To Complete</u>
Development			
ALCM-B	\$173.9M	\$139.6M )	\$29.9M
TALCM	103.0	98.2M )	

A concurrent expenditure of production funds of \$111.7M in FY 78, \$149.1M in FY 79 will be required. The TALCM funding requirement is contingent on the concurrent TOMAHAWK missile programs. If the schedules and funding levels of the TOMAHAWK programs should be changed, this TALCM funding has to be adjusted accordingly.

An earlier decision between these air launch options would reduce the apparent funding requirements. At the same time it would significantly increase both technical and cost risks, and would deprive the government of an alternative should technical problems arise with the selected option.

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## ALCM PROGRAM PLAN

During its validation phase, the AGM-86 or ALCM-A successfully demonstrated compatibility with the B-52 weapon system and operational flight envelope.

During the proposed competitive flyoff, ALCM development stresses the engineering design of the ALCM-B or extended range ALCM with emphasis on the aerodynamic characteristics of the vehicle, its flight characteristics during ejection from both the B-52 bomb bay and pylon, verification of both the extended range capability and radar cross section of the production design of ALCM-B, and producibility demonstrations for production cost verification of the ALCM-B system.

Contractor flights of ALCM-B are expected to commence by February 1979 with government demonstration flights by SAC crews to commence by mid calendar 1979.

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## **TALCM PROGRAM PLAN**

The purpose of this competitive flyoff is to insure selection of the cruise missile option that provides the optimum mix of operational performance, flexibility and life cycle costs to the user with minimum adverse impact to the current bomber force.

Given its maturity of missile design and demonstrated flight performance, the TALCM demonstration will emphasize its compatibility with the B-52 as a standoff launch platform. Initial wind tunnel and actual flight tests will explore and demonstrate the TOMAHAWK capability from a variety of B-52 operational flight envelopes including both bomb bay and pylon launches. Demonstrations will include exposure to the entire strategic bomber weapon system maintenance cycle to insure total insight into the operational performance capability of the TOMAHAWK in an air launch mode.

Captive flight tests will begin three months after Convair receives a B-52, initial contractor launches will commence five months after B-52 availability with SAC crew launches commencing by mid calendar 1979.

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JAN 27 2015

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM

		FY 78				FY 79				FY 80				FY 81			
MILESTONES	FY	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	CY	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
DECISION: PT Δ (1 ACFT; 6 PROD MSLS)																	
LIMITED IOC																	
RDT&E	AGM 86-B	10 FLTS				10 FLTS				9 FLTS							
	AGM 109																
R&D FUNDING	AGM 86-B	\$173.9M				\$139.6M				\$24.9M				\$5.0M			
	AGM 109	\$103.0M				\$98.2M				\$23.2M				\$5.0M			
	TOTAL	\$276.9M				\$237.8M				\$24.9M				\$5.0M			
PRODUCTION	CONTRACTOR #1	12 MSL/CONTR				18 MSL/CONTR				263				480			
	CONTRACTOR #2																
MISSILE DELIVERIES	CUMULATIVE																
		\$104.6M				\$139.1M				\$370.5M				\$475.2M			
PROC FUNDING																	
B-52 MOD	CAE INTERIM																
	CAE & AVIONICS																
1st IN: 1st OUT Δ (LIM IOC ACFT)																	
20 MSLS ON 1 ACFT + 6 SPARES																	
1st B-52 COMP MOD																	



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 15 2016

September 11, 1978

Library of Congress, Harold Brown Papers, Box 4,  
Folder Alpha Channel File.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weapons Systems, Military Capabilities, and Perceptions

You will recall the meeting of the NSC on August 15, on the subject of U.S.-Soviet competition with special reference to the military balance. The issue of the relationship of U.S. weapons systems programs to public and governmental perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet balance has been raised at that meeting and since.

I have been giving further thought to this matter, and have reached a number of preliminary conclusions. These are listed below and are followed by a list of specific systems. I believe we need to proceed with a substantial selection of these in order to respond both to military needs and to political perceptions.

1. Though each of the major (and some of the minor) programmatic cancellations and deferrals effected by this Administration was made for sound programmatic reasons, cumulatively they have combined with the relative paucity of new starts to convey the impression, both to our allies and to some of our own public, of unreciprocated unilateral restraint--our detractors would say, unilateral disarmament. We do not know how the Soviets view these matters, but we should also be concerned about their perception.

2. We need to begin some systems that can be identified as initiatives of this Administration. Differing degrees of program commitment--full-scale development, production, deployment--are appropriate for consideration, depending on the particular case. But nothing less than full-scale deployment will count in the actual military balance, and at least some of these systems will have to be deployed if we are to change perceptions.

3. Military utility, relative effectiveness, and cost should be the principal criteria for going ahead with such new systems. But anticipated political effects, particularly effects on our allies or on the Soviets, can weigh heavily in such decisions. These effects include such considerations as the creation of parity in a geographical area or at a particular level of escalation; the promotion of arms control agreements; or the conveying of a sense of U.S. technological superiority.

Classified by ~~SEC DEF~~  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3  
DECLASSIFY ON 31 Dec 2008

Downgraded to Secret  
Date: 02 Dec 2004  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

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4. In general, strategic systems will have the greatest effect on perceptions, though there are exceptions--ERW, for example.

\* \* \*

Here are some examples of systems whose implementation would affect perceptions as well as military capabilities. Because they are not equivalent in nature, I do not present them as alternatives. However, I believe we will have to move forward with a substantial number of them to have a significant effect.

I emphasize that funds for the next steps have been programmed for very few of these systems. Thus any encouragement engendered by the thought that these systems exemplify the lead we could have over the Soviets in technology should be severely tempered. What this memorandum contains are ideas, potential development programs, and possible prospective deployments. These by no means offset the Soviet forces in being, or the Soviet systems in serial production.

Moreover, the systems described below are not a substitute for an increase in the size of the defense program. They are the part of what would constitute an increased program, specific reasons for increased expenditures. In no way could they substitute for the rest of our forces and defense costs; they are examples of the additions that need to be made in order to offset the military and perceptual advantages that the Soviets have been accumulating. They are opportunities: advantageous if taken (or, rather, bought); useless if forgone.

1. M-X. Next decision is full-scale development, separately or in a joint program with Trident C-5 missile. Without it, we will not have even by the late 1980's a quick-response hard-target capability comparable to that the Soviets will possess early in the 1980's. A related question is survivability, both short-term and enduring.

2. Alternate launch point land-based system. Some mobile system of this kind (there are two or three alternatives) can assure a survivable land-based ICBM, not dependent on warning, provided a solution can be found to the outstanding technical and cost problems. Other alternatives for increasing survivability will have comparable costs, but different balances of military value and political difficulties.

3. B-X. A new bomber, of range and payload comparable with that of Backfire, but more effective, because of recent very significant technological advances, of which you are aware. This bomber would be greatly superior to the Backfire (and the B-1) in ability to penetrate air defenses because of a combination of low detectability features,

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Department of the Navy  
DON/AA DRMD  
Date: 2016 Authority: EO  
Declassify: Deny in Ft  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3 (1)  
MDR 2016 -M-



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3

Improved countermeasures and improved defensive systems. It would be particularly effective in combination with a cruise missile attack because the "fixes" to the Soviet air defense required for the cruise missiles would be at cross-purposes with those required for the bomber (and vice versa). As you are aware, we could start full-scale development of such a bomber as early as 1979 and achieve IOC by 1984. Juxtaposition with B-1 could pose some political problems, but also has some potential for political justification--as you know, we had it in mind when the B-1 was cancelled.

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4. ERW. Political perception exceeds purely military effect. Production of modernized 8" and Lance nuclear warheads that can be deployed without ERW but converted in months to ERW is a feasible and low-dollar-cost option (given the need to modernize in any event), at the cost of some degradation in military effectiveness if the ERW conversion never is made.

ok ?

5. GLCM. One way to offset Soviet long-range theater nuclear forces. At the protocol deployment limit of 600 km, GLCMs (and SLCMs) cannot reach the Soviet Union from the FRG, though Soviet 600-km GLCMs from East Europe (or SLCMs) can reach all of FRG. But at the 2500-km test range limit, GLCMs can reach much of European U.S.S.R. from the FRG and the U.K. (as can SLCMs of that range from the oceans adjacent to Europe). These systems are in full-scale development--the next issue is deployment. To deploy in the early 1980's will require acceleration of the process of making basing arrangements, planning targeting, etc.

ok ?

6. Pershing II (XR-extended range). Range to 1500 km. Not limited by SALT, but NATO option III offered to the Soviets in MBFR reduces numbers of Pershings by 36 and limits the U.S. to 72 launchers for SSMs of range greater than 500 km. Would be a new development; much larger and less mobile than GLCM.

?

7. Tactical cruise missiles of radius in the 1000-km category, with terminal guidance (10-foot accuracy or better), carrying conventional warheads, and reusable--to reduce costs greatly. Needs a bit more thought about targets (I am pushing the concept hard) but could soon be ready for full-scale development.

MIRV's

8. Cannon-launched Guided Projectiles (Copperhead). Introduction of laser guidance to artillery shells will allow us to employ the thousands of artillery tubes already deployed as precision guided weapons capable of making a direct hit on a moving tank at ranges in excess of 10 kilometers. We will begin production of laser-guided shells in 1979, reaching IOC in 1980.

ok ?

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Date: AUG 15 2016

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 5 USC 55  
Date: 15 AUG 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(1)  
MDR: 15-M-0599

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4

9. Assault Breaker. This program is a new initiative intended to break up an assault of massed armor without using nuclear warheads. It applies the MIRV concept to tactical forces: a tactical missile is launched at a column of tanks; as it approaches the column, its warhead separates into 20 or 30 bomblets, each of which has a heat seeker which guides that bomblet to an individual tank. Development has just started, but we have the program on an accelerated pace to achieve a field demonstration in 1981 and to begin production in 1983. *ok?*

10. Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). This will be our first "fire and forget" missile. It will allow USAF and naval air to achieve air superiority even if outnumbered. This missile will out-range missiles on Soviet aircraft and allow our F-15s and F-16s to engage two or three aircraft at a time since the radar guidance system in AMRAAM becomes autonomous shortly after launch (current air-to-air systems are either short-range or require the aircraft's radar to track the target during the entire flight of the missile). We have just begun an accelerated development of this missile and expect to begin production in 1984. *ok?*

11. SURTASS. The Surface Towed Array Surveillance System is a new submarine detection and tracking sensor that is the result of a major breakthrough in acoustic array technology. This 8000-ft-long line array will be towed behind surface ships accompanying carrier task forces, or can be used in conjunction with the present SOSUS bottom-mounted arrays to extend the coverage and accuracy of the SOSUS system. Whereas previous ship sonars or arrays were limited to detection ranges of the order of 10 to 100 miles, SURTASS will have a range of [REDACTED] depending on propagation factors. SURTASS can be used also to provide a submarine surveillance or ASW capability in remote regions where we do not have bottom-mounted arrays, e.g., the Indian Ocean. The system will become operational in 1981 on the TAGOS ships. *ok?*

\* \* \*

As the programming and budget process proceeds, I shall be considering systems and ideas that we will want to implement. Technology offers us one possible way to offset some of the advantages the Soviets hold in so many aspects of the military balance; but unless we move from the idea stage to tangible increases in capability, the ideas will not mean very much.

A number of these initiatives can take major steps toward incorporation into our military capabilities in the FY 80 program. Others will do so later. I and others in DoD will be considering with Cy and Zbig now to make maximum use of these actions internationally, and with the Vice President in terms of domestic perceptions. At some key internal decision points you will wish to make your own inputs on the interaction of perceptions and programs. You may wish to make the key announcements yourself.

OSD 3.1.1

NAVY

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 15 2016



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Washington National Records Center,  
SecDef Files, Acc 330-82-0216, Box  
44, Folder 471.94 (Jan-Apr) 1980.

26 FEB 1980

411-7

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ALCM Competitive Flyoff Results

This is the expanded report on flyoff results I promised you earlier. Judged in terms of the mission objectives of the twenty free flight tests, twelve were completely successful, six were partially successful and only two were unsuccessful.

In the two failures the missiles did not fly because of malfunctioning deployment or unfolding mechanisms. This problem was compounded in one failure by faulty flight computer logic. At any rate these problems were eliminated by improving quality control and changing the computer logic.

There were six missions which terminated early but during which the missiles flew long enough to provide a total of seven hours of successful flight data. Two of these had test-peculiar problems related to range safety of no operational significance. Two missiles stalled out because their flight control computers commanded them to fly at too steep an up angle. One missile engine failed because of an overheated bearing cavity and the guidance system of another missile failed. These problems are typical of missile development programs and not evidence of any generic design or engineering shortcoming. In all cases, the problems have been identified and remedied, and quality control procedures have been intensified. There is every reason to believe that the missile performance we expected will be achieved.

During the twelve completely successful missions over 47 flying hours were accumulated and 20,000 nautical miles flown. Among the capabilities demonstrated in this flyoff program were: full missile speed, altitude and range capability; accurate navigation ability (over 120 navigation updates were made using terrain contour matching); terrain following capability over water and very rough mountains; ability to launch from B-52s whether carried internally or externally; and the compatibility of missile and warhead.

These competitive flight tests, along with simulation and ground testing, have confirmed the integrity of both ALCM designs and their performance capabilities. We are fortunate to have

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two designs that will meet our performance requirements. The tests provide data adequate to select the best system for production. Also after source selection, we plan to conduct nineteen follow-on test and evaluation flights with the selected cruise missile to further improve our confidence in system reliability and provide the Strategic Air Command with mission planning experience.

We anticipate meeting production and deployment schedules, which provide for First Alert Capability (first B-52G modified on the regular production line, equipped with twelve missiles) in September 1981 and initial operational capability (first squadron of B-52G equipped with 12 external ALCMs) in December 1982. We will be producing 480 ALCMs per year at this point to equip all B-52Gs with external ALCMs by late 1986.

*Harold Brown*



*APM*



EXECUTIVE

ND 7-1

ND 16

FG 2

VX

FG 1

FG 38

DPS

5

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

October 25, 1979

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, White House  
Central Files: Executive, Subject File, Box ND 7,  
Folder ND 7-1, 9/1/79-1/20/81.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE *Rm*

SUBJECT: U.S. SERVICEMEN KILLED UNDER 20th CENTURY PRESIDENTS

Because we are all starting to talk publicly about your record of maintaining the peace, I asked the Library of Congress to research the records of your predecessors and thought you would be interested in the results:

- You are one of only three presidents in this century who did not commit U.S. troops to combat.
- Yours is the first administration in 56 years (since Harding) during which not a single American serviceman has lost his life in combat.

Here are the specific foreign involvements by administration:

Ford -- Mayaguez  
Kennedy/Johnson/Nixon -- Vietnam  
Truman/Eisenhower -- Korea  
Franklin D. Roosevelt -- World War II  
Coolidge/Hoover (January, 1927-January 1933) --  
136 Marines killed in Nicaragua  
Harding -- No troops killed in combat  
Wilson -- World War I  
Taft -- 7 Marines killed in Nicaragua  
Theodore Roosevelt -- No troops killed in combat.

Because of our recent history and because of the many pressures and temptations facing any president, your record in this area deserves to be emphasized in the coming months.

cc: Hamilton Jordan  
Jody Powell  
Stu Eizenstat ✓

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Rick Hertzberg

WACF, Sub. Exec. ND 7-1, 8/1/79 - 1/20/81, box ND 7



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEC 23 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Carter Administration Defense Legacy

Since 1977, the Carter Administration has been funding steady and significant increases in defense spending--to offset a continuing 20 year growth of Soviet military capabilities and to compensate for the underinvestment in U.S. defense that characterized much of the Vietnam and post-Vietnam period. The record is four annual real--after inflation--defense expenditure increases in a row.

During the decade of the 70s, the Soviets invested approximately \$240 billion more than we did in defense equipment and technology. Recognizing this challenge, we planned for real growth in defense expenditures. Our strategy also recognized that it would be tremendously expensive, and probably wasteful, to compete directly with the Soviets in terms of quantities of equipment built. Instead, we aimed to offset the Soviet advantage in numbers by applying technology to equip our forces with weapons that outperform their Soviet counterparts. We also emphasized meeting the need for more and better equipment to our Allies, along with a Long Term Defense Program that provided for real growth in the defense expenditures of our NATO Allies.

Strategic Modernization Program

When this Administration took office, our nation's ability to maintain the unambiguous strength of its strategic deterrent was being eroded by two alarming trends: the first was the massive buildup of Soviet strategic forces over the past 15 years, and the second was the progressive obsolescence of our own strategic forces, most of which had been produced and deployed in the 1960s. The first priority of our strategic modernization program was to restore confidence in the survivability of our strategic forces. To do that, this Administration implemented a comprehensive program to modernize all three legs of our strategic TRIAD.

In 1977 we were faced with a choice between modernizing our bomber force by replacing the B-52s with the B-1 bomber, or by augmenting the B-52s with cruise missiles. The cruise missile was selected because of its superior ability to penetrate Soviet defenses. The cruise missile poses a fundamental problem for the Soviets by forcing them to deal with a large number of targets with very small radar signatures, as opposed to a few

bombers with large signatures. The first cruise missile will be deployed on an alert B-52 next year. This program has been a major achievement, and one on which I am confident the new Administration will build.

While our submarine systems are not faced with a near-term survivability problem, the previous Administration correctly hedged to a degree against a future antisubmarine threat by initiating the development of a quieter submarine (TRIDENT) and the development of a longer range missile (TRIDENT I). Management controls established during the past four years have resolved many of the problems of the TRIDENT submarine program--one, USS OHIO, is undergoing sea trials now--but some further delay in attaining initial operational capability is still anticipated. The longer range of the TRIDENT I missile allows it to cover all of its targets while greatly increasing the area that anti-submarine forces must search. The TRIDENT I missile is now operational in five POSEIDON submarines, and we plan to convert seven additional POSEIDON submarines to carry the TRIDENT missile.

Our modernization program also had to deal with the survivability of our Minuteman ICBM force, which was threatened by the combination of a three-fold increase in quantity and two-fold improvement in accuracy of Soviet ICBM warheads. We completed the design of the M-X missile and basing system in response to this threat and initiated a full-scale development in 1979. We have made major accomplishments in carrying the program this far. It will require the full energy and persistence of a new Administration to carry out this complex, but critical, program. Alternative solutions would introduce different, but equally difficult issues.

In the aggregate these programs will double the spending on strategic systems in comparison to the early 70s, but will still be far less in real terms than the amount we spent for strategic systems in the early 1960s. These new systems, in combination with our refined strategic employment doctrine, will enable the U.S. strategic forces to preserve deterrence and maintain equivalence in the face of the persistent and long term Soviet challenge. While these systems will lead to improved military capability, our first priority has been to increase substantially the survivability of these forces, thereby discouraging any hopes the Soviets might have for a successful disarming surprise attack. We have also been aware that expenditures on the strategic forces, beyond those needed to assure strategic equivalence, would probably come at the expense of the conventional forces.

#### Conventional Forces

We have vigorously pursued the strengthening of our conventional forces--providing more modern equipment, actions to improve readiness, and significant increases in the levels of many of our fighting forces. We have substantially increased



our ability to reinforce rapidly our allies in Western Europe. Primarily by prepositioning equipment, we will be able by 1984 to double our ground forces in Europe, and triple our air forces, in less than two weeks. Our ground forces now include more tank and infantry battalions, and more artillery tubes--an augmentation that will continue through the next several years as the result of procurements undertaken during the past few.

We have enhanced readiness and combat endurance by improving the Reserve Components. Some reserve personnel are now equipped with new equipment and reservists are assigned to units structured to complement and provide needed depth to our active forces.

We have produced modern, guided-missile equipped surface ships; we have begun deployment of ship-, air- and submarine-launched HARPOON cruise missiles; and we have continued improvement of our anti-submarine warfare capability. Equally important to our strength at sea has been our success in reducing the chronic backlog of ship overhauls, and our resolution of \$2.7 billion in long-standing shipbuilding claim disputes.

The program we leave for the new Administration to execute during the FY 81-84 period will field an active Air Force of 26 fighter and attack wings and will modernize--and in some cases enlarge--the active and reserve components of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tactical aviation. (This constitutes the first full-scale modernization of U.S. tactical air forces since the 1960s.)

### Strengthening the NATO Alliance

At its outset this Administration launched several major initiatives to strengthen NATO's deterrent and defense capabilities, which had languished during and after the Vietnam conflict. We have forged a new commitment within the NATO Alliance to meet the Soviet challenge--by increasing defense spending throughout the Alliance, by launching an ambitious Long Term Defense Program, by modernizing our theater nuclear forces in Europe, and by taking the first steps toward negotiating mutual limits on NATO and Soviet nuclear weapons in Europe. We have begun the collaborative design and production of new weapons, and also proposed an innovative concept of jointly developing "families" of new systems, under which Europe would take the lead in some and North America in others.

### Burden Sharing

Because our strategy is heavily dependent upon full participation by Allies, the Carter Administration has given consistent high priority to measures that would lead to parallel allied increases in defense effort. We have energetically pressed for at least 3% real annual growth in NATO defense budgets. We have similarly urged that Japan increase its spending on its own



defense and its contribution to the support costs of U.S. forces in Japan. Through seeking increased Host Nation Support--in peace and war--from our allies, we have managed to secure major increases in such support and thus avoid future support costs that the U.S. itself would otherwise have to incur.

### Forces for Rapid Deployment

We are developing a long overdue capability to respond more quickly and effectively to threats to our vital interests in other parts of the world with our Rapid Deployment Forces. Four years ago, we had little such capability. Today, there are a number of programs underway that are designed to improve U.S. capability and to deploy and sustain our rapid deployment forces. These initiatives include:

- A program to procure Maritime Prepositioning Ships, which will provide operational flexibility and allow us to avoid the problems of large, permanent U.S. bases overseas in sensitive areas. (In the interim, we have assembled a seven-ship force of commercial-type vessels that already provides us with an immediate maritime prepositioning capability in the Indian Ocean.)
- Several important airlift improvement programs, such as C-5 life extension, CRAF enhancements, and the C-X and KC-10, to strengthen significantly our power projection capabilities.
- Obtaining the cooperation of key states along deployment routes to provide access and overflight rights essential for an effective U.S. response to distant contingencies. In the regions where our interests are most threatened, the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean, we have energetically and successfully sought access to facilities needed in a crisis from Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and Egypt.
- Improving the facilities at Diego Garcia--the only base to which we now have access in the Indian Ocean area.

### Defense Technology

During the past four years we have made major advances in critical military technology. Examples of major accomplishments include development of precision guided weapons to offset Soviet armor, and major advancements in low observable technology to defeat the massive air defense system developed by the Soviet Union. We are also exploiting the more than 5 year U.S. lead in microelectronics for leverage in future military systems. Thus we leave the next Administration an invaluable legacy on which they will undoubtedly expand.

But it is important to note that these technologies will, in general, not appear in deployed systems until the mid-80s. Getting our modern technology deployed in the field now will

depend on successfully bringing into production many of the systems and technologies developed in the early-to-mid 70s. There has been considerable progress during this Administration in our major modernization programs, but there is also much to be done in the future.

### Military Capability

Our armed forces today are better able to carry out their assigned missions than they have been at any time since the Vietnam War. Our total military capability is greater because of:

- Force structure improvements. The combat capability of our 16 Army divisions has been enhanced significantly; eight combat battalions have been added to the active force, and five light infantry battalions have been converted to armored or mechanized units. Additional combat support units have also been added. The net result is an Army that can now generate significantly more combat power than five years ago. As for the Navy, we are just now ending a long period during which the size of the fleet was allowed to shrink drastically. Today the Navy is growing once again. This year we have 540 ships in the fleet, and the program we recommend to our successors provides for another 50 ships by 1984. Since 1976, the Air Force has shifted its procurement balance to tactical aircraft, adding about 100 fighter and attack aircraft as of this year, with about 400 more scheduled for the next few years--part of a planned force increase to 40 wings.

- Investment in modernization. This Administration saw at the outset that heavy investment in long-overdue, essential modernization would be necessary. Our military investment over the past four years has paid dividends in military capability today, and will do so well into this decade.

- The Carter Administration built up war reserves of spare parts and munitions, and encouraged our NATO allies to do the same; ammunition storage in Europe was increased by nearly 55% since 1976.

- Increased readiness. Our deployed strategic forces (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers) are fully combat-ready. With respect to our conventional forces, some of the most important readiness improvements were:

- The reduction of maintenance backlogs. For example, the backlog of ships awaiting overhaul was reduced from 68 in '76 to fewer than 20 at the end of 1980.

- Enhancing our ability to move forces rapidly to where they would be needed in time of war.

-- Increasing and improving the training our troops receive.

Major progress was made in all these areas, progress that must be sustained into the future.

The major readiness problem the Administration confronted has been the shortage of experienced military personnel. Much of this shortage is due to a history, since 1974, of inadequate pay for our men and women in uniform. The Administration's Fair Benefits package, the 11.7% pay raise, and the passage of the Nunn-Warner Amendment have resulted in an increase in military compensation in FY 81 that will significantly narrow the gap between the military pay and pay in the civilian sector for the first time since the mid-70s. This correction is already having a tangible and positive effect on recruiting and retention.

In summary, the accomplishments of this Administration in strengthening our national security have been significant. Particularly in the areas of strategic forces, Alliance defense efforts, and high technology weaponry, we have set programs in motion that will assure the security of the United States and permit effective pursuit of our foreign policy interests during the decade of the 1980s and beyond. We have increased the real resources devoted to national security in response to the continuing growth of Soviet defense spending, and we have faced up to the tough decisions on how best to allocate these resources. And, in many cases, we have invested in technology and Alliance cooperative programs that will contribute to our security in far greater measure than their actual cost.

Over time, I expect the past five years, of which four were the Carter Presidency, will be seen as a watershed period for U.S. defense--a time when America's post-Vietnam concerns about defense excesses matured into a public conviction that our military forces must be unambiguously strong and reliable, yet carefully employed. I think that we can all take pride in having contributed to the creation of this sound and balanced national consensus.

*Harold Brown*



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WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

*Def Review*

DIA Reviewed - No Critical DIA Equity Observed, No  
Objection to Declassification. DIA declassification Decision  
is Subject to the Review Results of Other Agencies//hvcj/12  
July 2017.

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS + 5 U.S.C § 552  
Date: 06 Sep 2017 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(2)(4)(5)(8) + 6.2(a)  
MDR: 15 -M- 1772

26 September 1978

*doc # 199*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

These are copies of the talking papers which my staff and I will use in presenting the mid-term Defense Review on Friday. The one exception is the highly sensitive paper on "Stealth Systems" which should be read only by you, Zbig, and the one or two members of Zbig's staff who are cleared for it. I suggest that on Friday we reserve discussion of that subject to that small group after the regular meeting.

*Not in 2005*  
*9/29*

Because we will lead off with and emphasize the Strategic Program, it probably will dominate the agenda; the General Purpose and R&D presentations will thus be shorter than the corresponding papers might indicate.

*Harold Brown*

Enclosures

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~  
~~Unauthorized disclosure subject to~~  
~~administrative and criminal sanctions~~  
~~Handling Restricted Data on force~~  
~~dissemination, Section 1.1b, Arms~~  
~~Energy Act 1954~~

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Date: SEP 06 2017

330-81-0212, box 1, 337 WH, 1978

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*26 Aug 78*



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STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PLAN

- o Should we maintain the viability of our ICBM force by developing a new missile with survivable CONUS-basing during the 80s? Even if we proceed at a fast pace, we will have almost a 5-year period of high vulnerability of the ICBM force, during which we must depend more strongly on the SLBM and bomber force. Also, at that development and production pace, we will introduce a significant funding bulge in the 84-86 period.
- o Should we develop the new ICBM as a "mostly common" missile so that major subsystems of it (including the engines) could be used to upgrade the missile in the TRIDENT submarine?
- o Should we develop a cruise missile carrier to replace (in the late 80s) the 150 B-52Gs now programmed to carry cruise missiles?
- \*o What is the future of the penetrating manned bomber?
- o Is there an opportunity to, and should we, point SALT III to achieving a major quantitative drawdown in strategic forces with the objective of getting older forces, costly to maintain, out of our system while still maintaining essential equivalence with the smaller modernized force remaining?

This paper describes a modernization plan for the strategic deterrent forces of the United States. The plan is designed to maintain essential equivalence in the face of the buildup of strategic forces in the Soviet Union within the anticipated mutual constraints of SALT II. The requirement for modernization of our strategic forces is driven by three factors. First, force obsolescence; i.e., the need to replace aging elements of the force in order to maintain current capability. Second, force vulnerability; i.e., the need to increase the survivability of the forces in order to maintain current capability in the face of a growing Soviet counterforce threat. Third, force balance; i.e., the need to increase the capability of the force to keep pace with force increases under way in the Soviet Union. I will discuss each of these factors in turn.

\*To be discussed separately.

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1. Coping With Force Obsolescence. In planning for the maintenance of the strategic forces, one must consider a 30-year or even 40-year planning cycle. It takes on the average, 10 years from the time system development begins until full operational capability (FOC) is achieved. The useful operational life of these forces is on the order of 20 years with some systems lasting 30 years. Thus, the forces operational today and in the early 1980s were developed in the 1950s (B-52s) and the 1960s (Minuteman and Polaris/Poseidon). In that respect, we are confronted with a catch-up problem, in that no significantly new vehicles have been introduced into the bomber force for about 20 years, nor in the ICBM force for about 10 years. By contrast, the Soviet Union has maintained a continuous program of developing new systems and modernizing their forces throughout this period. We have, in effect, been living off the fat of our development efforts in the 50s and 60s; now, in order to maintain the force into the 90s, we must undertake the development of several systems simultaneously, thereby causing a strain in R&D funding requirements during the first five or six years of the 80s, at the same time we have peak procurement fund requirements for the TRIDENT submarine and C-4 missile.

The obsolescence problem is different for each leg of the TRIAD. The SLBM force is in good shape. We are completing the development of a new missile, the C-4, and beginning the production of a new submarine, the TRIDENT. Both of these should last beyond the end of the century.

The ICBM force has had a pause of about a decade in modernization. The MM II missile began development in 1963 and began deployment in 1965. The second-stage engine is already showing signs of deterioration and we can expect by the mid-80s to be faced with the alternatives of retiring the force, replacing the force with new missiles, or undertaking an expensive overhauling of the missiles. The MM III missile began development in 1965 and deployment in 1970 and has essentially the same second-stage engine as MM II. We can expect to have aging problems with it in the late 80s and may be required to replace or overhaul it by 1990. Since it takes about ten years to bring a new missile to FOC, it is time now to consider the development of a replacement missile for the Minuteman force.

The backbone of the strategic bomber force is the B-52 which was developed in the early 50s and entered the operational force in 1955. The age of present B-52Gs and B-52Hs range from 16 to 20 years, and we estimate that these aircraft will be structurally sound until about 1990. We are undertaking a major replacement of the electronics in these aircraft to reduce the downtime and expensive maintenance now required; to extend the useful life of the B-52s much beyond 1990 may require structural modifications (reskinning) and reengining, both of which would entail major expense with dubious results. A better alternative would be the development of a new airplane designed to achieve FOC in the early 90s which requires a start in the early 80s. A new airplane would be appropriate whether we want the bomber force to penetrate only, to be a carrier of cruise missiles only, or to be capable of both missions, although the optimum design of the aircraft will be dramatically different depending on which of these alternatives is selected.

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In sum, the development in the 80s of both a new missile and a new airplane would be required to maintain current capability in the ICBM and bomber forces. The submarine (TRIDENT) and missile (C-4) already under development will be sufficient to maintain capability in the SLBM force beyond the end of the century.

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2: Limiting Force Vulnerability. The Soviet Union has made major advances in the past five years in the development of a strategic counterforce which by the early 80s will pose a serious threat to our ICBM force (in their silos) and by the mid-80s to our bomber force (at their air bases). Additionally, they continue to make major investments in strategic air defense which will increasingly threaten the ability of our bombers and cruise missiles to penetrate in the late 80s. On the other hand, while they have an extensive R&D program in ASW, we do not anticipate that they will be able successfully to attack our at-sea SSBN force during the 80s (beyond that it is difficult to forecast).

The counterforce threat to our Minuteman force has been extensively studied this past year by the Defense Science Board and others.

Thus, in order to maintain the present retaliatory capability of our ICBM force without being forced into a launch under attack posture, we must find a more survivable way of basing our ICBMs. With the quantity of RVs and with the accuracy the Soviets will have by the early 80s, fixed basing is not survivable. We have studied a variety of mobile basing systems of which the most promising in the medium term are multiple aimpoint (MAP), air mobile and ground mobile systems. Any of these could provide new bases for our ICBM forces by the mid-80s which would effectively restore the capability of the surviving force to its present level. However, all of these basing systems entail considerable expense (on the order of \$10B in procurement alone, excluding costs of any new missile and excluding operating costs of the system, which will be particularly high for air and ground mobile systems

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The penetrativity of our bombers and cruise missiles is being challenged by a new generation of Soviet strategic air defense systems that will begin to enter their forces in the early 80s. We are developing an improved ECM system (based on the B-1 ECM design) and intend to upgrade the B-52 ECM in the early 80s. However, this is probably a losing battle with the enormous radar cross section and limited low-altitude performance of the B-52. On the other hand, our cruise missiles, with radar cross sections 1/10,000 that of the B-52s, will defeat the currently deployed air defense systems, and seriously stress the new air defense systems. In addition, we are developing a second generation cruise missile which we expect to defeat the new air defense system.

While we do not anticipate a serious threat to our SSBNs during the 80s, we must be concerned that an ASW breakthrough could occur by the late 80s that could pose a problem in the 90s. Therefore, the SSBN (TRIDENT) now being produced to replace the POSEIDON force in the mid-80s

At the same time, a new missile (C-4) has been designed to have ranges in excess of 5,000 n.m., so the submarine's patrol area is increased by an order of magnitude over the POSEIDON/C-3 combination, thereby greatly complicating the ASW task and requiring the Soviet sensors to have greater detection range than they now have

Finally, the submarine has been designed to spend a greater percent of its time at sea

We have some concern about Soviet potential use of non-acoustic detection systems; it is too early to know when and whether these will become important. The corresponding detection phenomena become increasingly effective against larger submarines. Thus, we will want to explore smaller submarines than TRIDENT as possible follow-ons.

In sum, a new basing system is needed for our ICBM force by the early to mid-80s. Additional dispersed bases are needed for the bomber/cruise missile force. Even with the new ECM on the bombers, the B-52s will probably seriously decline in ability to penetrate after the mid-80s; also, they probably cannot be hardened to facilitate base escape. For both of these reasons, a new bomber is indicated by the late 80s. These actions are needed to maintain present capability. Cruise missiles will successfully penetrate air defenses into the late 80s, but a second generation system with reduced cross section is needed by then in order to maintain the force enhancement presently projected for cruise missiles. The present modernization program for the SSBN and SLBM force is adequate to maintain force survivability through the 80s, and possibly into the 90s.

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3. Force Enhancement to Maintain Equivalence. Since 1970, the Soviet Union has embarked on a strategic force modernization program of impressive proportions. They have increased the number of ICBM RVs sixfold by MIRVing the SS-17, -18 and -19, the last two of which are particularly significant because of their large throw-weight and accuracy. They are introducing BACKFIRES into their force at the rate of about three a month, although they assert these will not be used to attack the United States; also, they apparently have a new larger bomber under development which will be unambiguously strategic. They are testing a new MIRV system for their SS-X-18, which will give them seven RVs per SLBM in the early 80s, and they have a new SSBN (TYPHOON) and probable MIRVd SLBM under development (and probably a single RV replacement for the SS-N-6 as well).

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Therefore, in order to maintain essential equivalence, we would have to do more than maintain present capability as discussed in the previous two sections; we must be prepared to increase the capability of our strategic forces to offset the force enhancements being made by the Soviet Union. We do not, however, have to copy their modernization program; we need only to match it by what we consider to be appropriate aggregate measures. Our Force modernization program should emphasize features (such as guidance technology) in which the U.S. excels and we should take advantage of programs needed anyway (for obsolescence or vulnerability reasons) to get the desired enhancement as a part of these force replacement efforts. The following section describes a representative force modernization program that:

- (a) is balanced across the TRIAD to maintain essential equivalence through the 80s and beyond, assuming both sides are subject to SALT II constraints;
- (b) accommodates with the minimum number of programs the combined problems of force obsolescence, force vulnerability and force balance;
- (c) reaches a "steady-state" total spending of about \$9B per year (compared to FY 79 funding of \$5.4B), except for a funding bulge in 1983-85 caused by the overlap of the TRIDENT/C-4 production program wind-down and the new ICBM program start-up. This bulge is unavoidable unless we push the new ICBM IOC to 1990 or beyond;
- (d) exploits to a maximum extent U.S. technological leads (in guidance technology, low-detection techniques and advanced aerodynamic materials, e.g.), and phases programs for maximum production efficiency (i.e., selects production rates for lowest unit cost).

4. A Representative Strategic Force Modernization Program. The ICBM modernization program is summarized in Tab A. It includes the development of a new missile (called the mostly common missile and designed so that the TRIDENT program would be able to use many of its subsystems) beginning in FY 79, with an IOC of 1985 and FOC in 1990. Also, a new basing mode would be developed for this missile. A parallel development program would begin in FY 79 of the MAP and either or both of air mobile and ground mobile basing systems. Full-scale development of the best system would start in FY 80 to achieve IOC in 1985 with FOC by 1988.

so the program would redress the balance as well as solving force obsolescence and vulnerability problems. ICBM vulnerability would not be reduced significantly until 1987, about five years after the silo attack threat becomes serious, so in the intervening period

However, we have reasonably high confidence of the viability of these two forces during that period, and we can increase the alert posture of the bombers to further enhance that confidence. Because the bomber and even the SLBM force will begin to be subject to possible erosion in the late 1980s and afterwards, we need to rebuild the ICBM leg before then.

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The SLBM modernization program is already underway with the TRIDENT submarine and C-4 missile. The plan envisions building 15 TRIDENT submarines during the 80s (7 of which are already funded), and concurrently beginning R&D on a new smaller and cheaper submarine with the same size missile. If the submarine resulting from the R&D program promises to produce a more effective force, we would have the option of beginning production on this new submarine in place of additional TRIDENT production. Beginning in 1979, the C-4 missile (also called TRIDENT I) will be produced for backfitting on the POSEIDON submarine and, as submarines become available, for installation on TRIDENTs. This C-4 will allow much larger patrol areas than the present C-3 missile because it has about twice the range (for a given payload); also, it will have improved effectiveness because [REDACTED]. A development program would be started in 1982 to use subsystems developed for the "mostly common" ICBM to upgrade the C-4. By replacing the C-4 first stage (and possibly second stage) with the larger stages developed for the ICBM, we could exploit the potential of the TRIDENT launch tube [REDACTED]. In fact, the R&D expense of this modified C-4 would be less than 1/4 of what has been projected for the D-5 (TRIDENT II) missile; the modified C-4 could enter production in 1982 (without interfering with the production schedule of the "mostly common" ICBM), reach IOC by 1984 and FOC in the 90s, at about the time the POSEIDON submarines would begin phasing out of the force (we believe we will be able to extend POSEIDON life to range from 25 to 30 years). Further incremental improvements to the modified C-4 are technically feasible for deployment in the late 1980s or early 1990s (these have not been costed in Tab A). [REDACTED]

The bomber modernization program includes the development of a cruise missile carrier (CMC) beginning in 1981 with an IOC of 1988 and an FOC in the early 90s. The CMC is not conceived as a force enhancement program, but as an equivalent replacement for the 150 B-52Gs rather than accepting the reliability and penetration problems and expenses involved in maintaining that fleet beyond 1990 (by which date the B-52Gs will be 30 years old). We would expect to modify a transport-type aircraft for this application, thereby minimizing R&D expenses. The major options are (a) a wide-body commercial jet (like the 747) which could carry 60 or 70 cruise missiles and probably cost about \$100 million, and (b) an AMST-like transport which could carry 20 or 30 cruise missiles and probably cost about \$50 million, for a total acquisition cost (in either case) of about \$5 billion; most of these expenses would be incurred after the peak funding for the ICBM acquisition program. We also envision moderate expenses for upgrading the B-52Hs (including new avionics and a new ECM system) to maintain them as a penetrating bomber force until the end of the century, when they will be 40 years old. Forty new austere inland bases are planned to allow dispersed basing of the bomber and cruise missile carriers. This overall program is directed to maintaining the capability of the bomber force by solving the dual problems of obsolescence and increasing vulnerability.

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Additionally, the program envisions producing 3,000 cruise missiles beginning in 1980 with an IOC of 1982 and FOC of 1988. As we start production of the cruise missile, we would also begin development of second generation cruise missiles with reduced detectability. The second generation missile would be phased to enter the force with or before the new CMC in the late 1980s (IOC), achieving FOC in the early 90s. After the B-52Gs were retired from the force, the first generation missiles would be transferred to and carried only on the B-52Hs, which would function as a CMC or penetrating bomber, or both. The first generation cruise missiles represent a significant enhancement over our present bomber capability; the second generation cruise missiles maintain that enhanced capability in the face of the improved air defense expected by the late 80s.

5. Commentary on the Modernization Program. Each of the modernization programs is detailed in Tab A, with a spread of year-by-year costs, deployed capability, and surviving capability after a counterforce strike. It can be seen that the force buildup during the period unambiguously maintains equivalence, even after riding out a preemptive strike. Such a force requires significant increases in funding for strategic programs, to a "steady-state" total spending of about \$9B per year, except for a significant bulge in the 83 to 85 period. This bulge reflects the catch-up problem we have after "idling" for the past 10 years. However, even the bulge year spending is far less than estimated for the Soviet's strategic program and less than our own strategic program during the years (late 50s, early 60s) when we were building our strategic force.

We have considered several options for decreasing the funding demands while still maintaining the basic thrust of the plan. The least damaging option (to maintaining equivalence) is to limit the Cruise Missile Carrier and the C-4 improvement programs to R&D only, maintaining an option to begin production in the late 80s or early 90s. The production decision would be a force enhancement issue and could be decided on the basis of Soviet actions in the 80s. Slipping these two programs doesn't, however, eliminate the funding bulge in the 83-85 period. That can be done only by eliminating the survivable basing ICBM program which is close to giving up the ICBM leg of the TRIAD. We believe the TRIAD concept has served the country well and should be maintained.



We have also considered several options for force enhancement which treat the contingency of a collapse in SALT followed by a Soviet "breakout" in strategic forces. We would have several relatively inexpensive options for quickly building on the baseline force. The quickest would be to triple the production rate of the cruise missiles, achieving 3,000 missiles by 1985, and 6,000 missiles\* by 1988; in that case, we would also move the IOC

\*These increased production requirements exceed projections of special nuclear material availability. However, if the DOE is provided timely notification, options are available to support the added requirements.

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of the cruise missile carrier to 1984. This program would cost an extra \$3 billion and compress spending in the early 80s. The other option would be to accelerate the development of incremental improvements to the modified C-4 missile. This option would not add cost to the baseline program but would concentrate the spending more in the early years.

It is interesting to speculate on the reaction of our allies to a significant U.S. thrust in strategic programs. We may be able--and are trying hard--to get our NATO allies to spend more on conventional weapons for the defense of Europe. But, we can expect no effective assistance from them on maintaining our strategic deterrence. They have not developed the technology or the industrial base necessary for strategic weapons, and it would take them a decade to achieve it. Moreover, they recognize this and count on us to provide strategic deterrence as the backbone of our overall deterrence to aggressive action by the Soviet Union. They also recognize the very significant fallout that occurs to the Theater Nuclear Forces as a result of our strategic programs (GLCM for example, derives directly from ALCM/SLCM). In sum, we believe that our allies will respond quite positively to the U.S. embarking on a vigorous (and visible) program to modernize strategic forces.

The modernization program presented reflects SALT II constraints, but was designed with an eye to SALT III. Assuming that SALT III will bring reductions in SNDVs and MIRVs, the obvious options for the U.S. would be to schedule an early phase out of those elements of our force that were aging, were getting expensive to maintain and had less effectiveness. Candidates for early phaseout (on a reciprocal basis with Soviet reductions in SALT III) are:

SNDVs	-	Minuteman II (450) Titan (54) B-52Ds
SNDVs and MIRVs	-	MM III (phase out completely after the new ICBM instead of on a one-for-one replacement basis).
		POSEIDON (phase out at 25 years instead of stretching some to 30 years)

If we could agree to a significant reciprocal drawdown of forces in SALT III, we could phase those systems out of our forces with a worthwhile reduction in operating expenses but without suffering a serious disadvantage in balance, inasmuch as our remaining forces would be as modern and as effective as the remaining Soviet forces.

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A. Introduction

1. Guidance for General Purpose Forces

- o When we had strategic nuclear force superiority, we could tolerate some conventional force inferiority with less risk than we can today.

Today our strategic nuclear forces are in a condition of essential equivalence, and their planned modernization is needed just to hold our own, not to regain our former superiority (which is beyond our grasp in practical terms).

Thus, though we must improve our strategic nuclear forces, it would be very dangerous to do so by sacrificing the capability of our conventional forces, which now must be relatively stronger than they were in our era of strategic nuclear superiority.

(Aside) The loss of our strategic nuclear superiority has also degraded the credibility in the eyes of our NATO allies of our willingness to use our strategic forces in the defense of Europe. This has made the potential effectiveness -- and thus the credibility -- of our theater nuclear forces more important now than in the past.

- o Explicit policy guidance for the General Purpose Forces is contained in the Consolidated Guidance.

2. General Purpose Forces Funding Trends

- o In FY79, the General Purpose Forces account for roughly \$80B -- or a bit over 60% -- of the DoD budget when most central support costs are allocated to primary mission areas.
- o Fairly rapid growth over past few years will taper off to something under 2% in real terms over the next 5 years, given the Basic Level program.

3. Threat

NATO

- o In keeping with steady Soviet growth in other fields, both the ground and air threat to NATO have grown for at least the past 10 years:

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- In quantity, mainly by expansion of structure of ground combat units, plus growth in numbers of support units.
- In quality, by significant equipment modernization.
- o By the mid-'70s, this growth had reached the point that the Pact, in the judgment of US intelligence community, would not believe it necessary to complete reinforcement from the Soviet Union before attacking NATO. We have thus changed our assumptions regarding how much warning we can expect, and this, in turn, has had profound effects on our strategy and the design of our forces.
- o Ratio of Pact-to-NATO ground force firepower:
  - Now -- unfavorable, especially in first few weeks
  - Mid-'80s, without NATO action, worse because of projected 20-25% increase in Pact firepower.
  - Mid-'80s, with programmed modernization, somewhat better, but still not conducive to confidence.

Against odds like these, NATO must fight as a coalition, not a loose band of independent forces. This means, among other things, improved rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.

- o In tactical air:
  - Total aircraft, NATO outnumbered by about 35% in terms of in-place forces, but has slight advantage after mobilization and reinforcement. Same picture in mid-'80s as now.
  - In air-to-air capable a/c, outnumbered by 90% in in-place forces, 25% after mobilization. Picture worse in mid-'80s.
  - In air-to-ground, NATO has a lead in range-payload, but it's shrinking.
  - We have a lead in training and combat experience, better avionics and ordnance. They have advantages in more potent ground defenses, ECM, and aircraft simplicity and maintainability.

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### Naval Threat

- o Soviet land-based naval air will overtake their submarine force as the most dangerous threat in certain scenarios.
- o Soviet General-Purpose Submarine force will drop from about 260 boats now to about 220 in mid-'80s, but increase from about a third nuclear to more than half, and from about a quarter to about a third with cruise missiles. But NATO's ASW capability will continue to grow relative to this threat in the '80s.
- o Soviet Surface Fleet will drop from about 265 to about 235 major combatants, but increase in capability with better new ships.
- o Soviet Amphibious Assault capability is growing to global capability, though much smaller than ours. Either of these forces, if first to arrive in a third country, could face the other superpower with a fait accompli, or a direct military confrontation.

### B. Europe-Oriented Issues

#### 1. Issue: What to Do About Short Warning?

##### Land Forces

- o Prepositioning. Current DoD program prepositions 5 division sets of equipment in Europe, with tentative plan to go to 8 by 1986. (Would preposition all active Army divisions and brigades except: those already in Europe, the 82nd Airborne, the 101st, the 2nd Mech., and units in Panama and Alaska.)
  - Only practical way of coping with short warning: a tenth the cost of buying enough strategic airlift to get to Europe by M+10.
  - Not inherently more vulnerable than having the same equipment arriving in theater by airlift after D-Day.

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- (But we still need strategic airlift:
    - For non prepositionable items (e.g., helicopters)
    - For redeployment
    - Most of all, for non-NATO contingencies.)
  - Considering prepositioning USMC equipment on flanks. Norway may request such action, and provide facilities.
  - A problem is Congressional reluctance to prefinance NATO infrastructure funding.
- o Increasing Army manpower in Europe by 8000 by 1984.
  - o Increasing manning level of Army combat units from 95% to 97%.
  - o Adding essential early support manpower and equipment.

#### Air Forces

- o Expanded USAF access to Allied bases will enhance reinforcement rate, survivability, and operational flexibility, without higher US manning.
- o Increasing facilities and storage to support high surge rates early in war. (1.3 sorties/day/aircraft at Basic Level; at Enhanced Level, 2.6 for first week, 2.3 for rest of month.)

#### 2. Issue: How to Offset Increases in Pact Force Strength?

- o What we do has multiplier effect in Europe through influence on Allies.

#### Force Structure

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- o "Heavying Up" active Army forces:
  - Why?
    - Soviet firepower requires the protection and cover provided by the heavy units' tanks, APCs, and SP artillery. (Pact artillery up 50% since 1965.)
    - Far better tactical mobility of armored and mechanized units needed for smaller NATO forces to cope with local Pact breakthroughs.
    - Light units have better strategic mobility -- weigh 30% less -- but poor tactical mobility and great vulnerability to heavy, protected Pact units.
    - Same kinds of threat now exist in other theaters.

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- How?

- Converting 3 active divisions (24th, 9th, 2nd.) (US active divisions will be 37% light instead of 53%; total: 46% instead of 57%)
- Adding 9 (7 at Decremental Level) active heavy battalions (by taking advantage of existing command structure, more efficient than adding new brigades or division).

- (Note: Army studying light/heavy mix; interim results 11/15, final results in March; near-term budgets not affected by outcome.)

- o Increasing artillery density (126 tubes added: about 1/3 increase in 155mm SP tubes).
- o Army redeploying a heavy brigade from southern Germany to northern as precursor to US corps-sized reinforcement in weakest area of Center Region.

Equipment Modernization

- o Army entering period of major equipment modernization.
  - XM-1 tank: more mobile, much better armor, better firepower.
  - IFV to accompany XM-1. Must protect troops, need firepower (TOW) of IFV. (Congress has funded IFV in FY79.)
  - 155mm SP production and TOW-equipped AH-1S well along.
  - In prospect: AAH, Patriot, Roland, Copperhead -- all major improvements. Problem is accommodating funding.
- o USMC modernizing, too: converting from 105mm to 155mm, adding TOWs to helicopters, etc. (Future landing craft unsettled.)
- o USAF: replacement of F-4s with A-10s, F-15s, and F-16s greatly increases capability with little increase in peacetime manning.

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C. Other Issues

1. Issue: What Is the Proper Allocation of DoD Funds Between Long-Term Investment in Ships and Urgent Near-Term Programs?

- o The Navy generally agrees with the mix of ships in the building program, and with its 5-year funding relative to the rest of the Navy budget. The issue is the total funding.
- o The Basic Level program funds 67 ships, implying a long-term force level of no more than 400 ships.
- o The Decremental Level program funds almost as many (64), but retires the 42 least-capable ships in the Navy early. Effect on real capability liable to be less than on perceptions.
- o The Enhanced Level buys 94 ships, implying a long-term force level of perhaps 550 ships.
- o More ships could be built:
  - FFG-7s; current program 6-8/yr; capacity 11-12/yr
  - DD-993s for non-Aegis carrier escorts
  - AOs
- o Possibilities for lower cost ships being examined:
  - SSBN alternative to Trident
  - SSN alternative to SSN-688 class
  - DDX as replacement for DDGs, DLGs, CGs.
  - Conventional carrier for FY80 budget.

2. Issue: Are We Allocating Enough of Our Resources to Readiness and Logistic Support?

- o The ability of our standing military forces to fight effectively on and shortly after D-Day depends strongly on the routine, day-to-day condition of their equipment (aircraft, ships, tanks, etc.), and their training on it.

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- o Readiness depends on adequate stockage of spare parts, proper funding for overhauls, properly trained manpower, and the necessary facilities. Partly because of the complexity of these activities, but also because of the great difficulty of eliminating subjectivity from the measurement of actual readiness, neither we nor any nation has been able to determine precise input/output relationships between funding and readiness.
- o Certain things, however, are clear:
  - Our material readiness leaves much to be desired.
  - The trends have not been encouraging.
  - Additional funding would help.
  - A dollar invested in repairing equipment we already own is liable to buy more combat effectiveness than a dollar invested in buying still more equipment.
- o Therefore, the FY80 program selectively increases the FY79 funding for maintenance activities by about a half-billion dollars. We believe this is vitally important to assure that we have a real fighting capability, although it is neither a glamorous activity, nor susceptible to rigorous analysis.
- o These funds are vulnerable. They are controlled through the appropriations process only, not requiring authorization. Over the years, glamorous procurement items added in the authorization process tend to end up being paid for by reductions in appropriations of this kind.

3. Issue: How Much USMC/Amphibious Lift Should We Maintain?

- o Our amphibious lift force is expensive. Its tonnage exceeds that of the entire Soviet major combatant force. On a long-term basis, buying and operating the ships alone (i.e., without the helicopters, boats, etc.) costs about \$1.2 billion per year.
- o More than 40 amphibious lift ships -- representing about \$14 billion investment at today's prices -- will have to be retired in the late '90s, so the costs of keeping this lift capability will not be trivial.

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- o Our lift in the '60s was enough for 1-2/3 Marine Division/Wing Teams (or "MAFs"). It subsequently dropped to 1-1/3, but was modernized to an all-20-kt force. Our program now -- at the Basic Level -- is for 1.15 MAF lift (the .15 being an allowance for ships "trapped" in overhaul). At the Decrement Level, it would drop to 1.00 MAF lift, and we would cancel the planned construction of 3 LSD-41 class ships.
- o The utility, and even the feasibility, of amphibious assault against modern defenses has been severely questioned, and we know it is an expensive capability to maintain. But we also know that Marines afloat have been most useful as peacetime evidence of US presence. What we decide about our amphibious fleet may well depend on developments in the no-longer embryonic Soviet capability for amphibious assault in remote areas of the world.

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An Investment Strategy for Defense R&D

- o How should we best respond to the continuing disparity in Soviet-US defense investment?
- o What is the role of and long term funding strategy for defense R&D?
- o How should we develop and apply the defense technology base?
- o How can we best exploit the advantage of our broad commercial technology base?
- o What strategy should we pursue to translate our technological edge into operational advantage in the field?

Cumulative effects of a 10-year disparity in capital investment have resulted in the Soviet Union achieving about a 2-1 advantage over the US in military hardware deployed with their ground forces. In the past, our technological edge tended to offset their numerical advantage. However, now the Soviet Union is challenging us in technology; in effect, trying to beat us at our own game. In 1968, Brezhnev stated clearly his position on technology:

The center of gravity in the competition between the two (world-opposed) systems is now to be found precisely in (the field of science and technology), ... making the further intensive development of the latest scientific-technical achievements not only the central economic but also a critical political task, (and giving) to questions of scientific-technical progress ... decisive significance.

We have seen a manifestation of this view in the impressive buildup of Soviet defense R&D since that time, both in system development and in technology base (the seed programs on which future system developments will be based.) Our intelligence information cannot describe with confidence the size or the composition of the Soviet R&D defense budget. However, it does provide us excellent data on some of the products of their R&D program as their new systems are field tested. Based on this kind of information, we have reconstructed their R&D programs in a number of important fields and compared these with corresponding programs in the US.


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Table 1 describes ongoing system developments in ICBMs, SLBMs, strategic bombers, cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, tactical aircraft, helicopters and tanks, and compares these with the comparable US system development efforts programmed in our FY 79 budget. We conclude that the Soviet Union leads in size of effort in six fields, are about even in one, and are behind in one (cruise missiles). We further estimate that the aggregate scope of the Soviet system development programs in these fields is about twice that of the US. That is not to say that their programs are twice as effective (indeed, some of them are poorly conceived), but it does represent a reasonable basis for estimating their investment level in R&D.



Other selected areas where we have intelligence--for example, in the design of surface effect ships--also indicate substantially larger investments in the technology base than we make. Overall, we estimate that the Soviet investment in technology base is probably more than twice the comparable US investment. This does not mean that they have a better program, since they have had a lot of catching up to do. Also, they may be making wrong choices, but if their programs (i.e., in HEL) are large enough, they don't have to choose among approaches--they can do them all. In any event, during the period of the Soviet technology buildup, the US has decreased its defense technology base (in real dollars) to about one-half of what it was in 1964. In another few years the positions in the "catch up game" may be reversed.

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It is thus clear that we are being seriously challenged in defense technology; however, we should not make a mirror-image response. We are evolving an R&D investment strategy to make maximum use of the special advantages the US enjoys. This strategy has the following components:

1. Maintain the R&D budget at 10% of the total defense budget on the average. Experience shows that this is consistent with a good balance among innovation, modernization, force structure, readiness, and sustainability. As the defense budget grows at a 3% rate, so also will the R&D budget, which will prevent further widening of the disparity in R&D spending.

2. Within the R&D budget, grow the technology base (now at \$2.6B) at a 7% rate. If we maintain that growth rate for 10 years, we will be back to our (real) spending rate in 1964, and approximately equal to the Soviet spending rate this year. Whatever else we cut back in the budget (even other R&D funds), we should hold firm to this plan. Our technology edge gives us an equalizer to the Soviet numerical advantage, and maintaining that edge in the future depends critically on restoring our technology base program. In whatever other ways our allies may be able to support us, their programs cannot substitute for effort on our technology base. In fact, they depend on our technology base program as much as we do.

3. Even if we maintain the first two policies, we will be behind the Soviet Union in R&D spending for at least the next decade. So we must be smarter and/or better R&D managers. In the systems development field, we must make -- and are making -- better selections. In ICBMs for example, the Soviet Union just completed the parallel development of four separate ICBMs at a probable cost (R&D alone) of more than \$500M per year per system. On the other hand, we are considering a single ICBM program from which we would derive a new SLBM program by careful attention to commonality in the design phase. Similar economies are being planned in the "family of weapons" concept, in which we and our NATO allies undertake to share development expenses of major new tactical programs.

4. Another important consideration is making much better use of the technology developed for commercial applications. Two fields of enormous importance to defense -- computers and Large Scale Integrated circuits (LSI) -- are today driven by commercial (not military) markets (even though they were spawned by investments from defense technology funding in the 50s and 60s). Recognizing this, we need to adapt our system designs and detailed specifications to components and systems being developed for commercial markets. This will provide R&D savings and the reduced unit costs associated with commercial production runs.

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But adapting to commercial components requires that our procurement specialists, who have set the standards since 1940, must learn to adapt to other standards. That is a difficult educational process, but we are pushing it very hard. The Soviet Union has neither this problem nor this opportunity, since they don't have a commercial industry remotely comparable to ours.

5. Finally, when we identify technologies that are highly leveraged for defense programs and are not being developed commercially, we must pursue them boldly in order to transfer them quickly from the labs to the field. The following are examples of high leverage technologies whose development is being accelerated so they can be fielded in half the ordinary development time:

- Low detectability aircraft and missiles -- systems, like ALCM, which defeat fire control radars by their low detectability.
- Fire and forget missiles -- air-to-air missiles which allow the capability to engage several aircraft at a time, thereby defeating a numerically superior opponent.
- Assault Breaker -- a combination of cluster munitions and terminally guided munitions which, in an employment concept analogous to the MIRV in strategic systems, allows one tactical missile to engage a platoon of tanks.

In sum, the strategy is to grow the R&D budget at about 3% per year, and the technology base at 7% per year; to be extremely selective in promoting a concept from technology to systems development; to force maximum use of commonality between Services and with our allies; to adapt defense system acquisition to make much greater use of commercial developments; and perhaps most importantly, to spend boldly on technologies which have high military effectiveness to get them into the field in half the normal acquisition time.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

LRTNF  
Doc #160 (54)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

June 13, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HAROLD BROWN

SUBJECT: Proposal for a Freeze on LRTNF

The first part of this paper is a brief history, the second consists of talking points for you to use with Schmidt.

Attachment

cc: Secretary of State  
Deputy Secretary of State

No DIA objection to declassification subject to the results of concurrent State review. JDC 14 Jan 15

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The Schmidt Proposal

In his June 9 speech at the SPD convention in Essen, Schmidt made the following statement:

"My recent effort to use the time available to us for negotiations before any future deployment occurred was rejected by the Soviet side. A few in the West have diligently sought to misunderstand the proposal as (my) going soft.

"I stand by what I said: It would be useful for peace if on both sides one did not deploy for the next three years, rather negotiated instead over mutual limitations (of weapons)."

Embassy Bonn believes Schmidt's major motive in making this statement was to set the stage for the Soviets to ease away from their reluctance to enter into TNF negotiations, perhaps as early as during his trip to Moscow. The German press interpreted the June 9 statement as a marker to the Soviets that Schmidt intends to discuss his proposal with them. Other possible factors behind Schmidt's returning to his TNF arms control proposal include (a) a genuine concern about a perceived impasse in arms control and a desire to impart new momentum in that area, and (b) pacifying the left wing of his party.

Schmidt's actual position and motivations are made somewhat unclear by the ambiguity stemming from his earlier statements on TNF arms control and the Federal German Government's subsequent clarifications. In mid-April, he told an audience in Essen:

"The Soviet Union's objection that it would be prepared to negotiate only if NATO lifts the double decision of Brussels is not acceptable. A first step in the right direction could be if both sides simultaneously for a certain number of years renounced the stationing of new or additional medium range missiles, or if they used this time for negotiations."

Several days later, the Federal Chancellery denied that Schmidt's remarks applied equally to the NATO and the Warsaw Pact:

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"...The Soviet Union should also not deploy any additional modern LRTNF during the next three years just as is already the case on the Western side.... Let it be noted that, during the three years, the only thing which would not be done would be that which one can effectively verify, i.e., the deployment of operational weapons."

The FRG mission to NATO similarly issued a clarification of Schmidt's remarks, but with a different twist: "...it would make the negotiations easier if the Soviet Union would be prepared to discontinue the production and deployment of additional modern medium range systems."

In both these clarifications, the FRG affirmed its continued support of the December 1979 decisions.

None of the statements or clarifications contained any reference to a production freeze by the West, or to a halt in base construction by either NATO or the USSR.

Senator Biden, who met with Schmidt earlier this week, said he (Biden) believes the FRG "will keep its position consistent with regard to TNF modernization, will maintain a position consistent with that taken by the alliance in December, will not suggest or offer the slowing up of the siting process."

#### The Soviet SS-20 Program

The Soviets currently have 18 operational SS-20 bases with 162 launchers. Another 8 bases are in various stages of construction. We estimate that construction will begin on 7 additional bases within the next several years.

#### The NATO LRTNF Modernization Program

We have agreement in principle with the UK, FRG and Italy on the phasing of LRTNF deployments. We expect GLCM, site selections by the end of the summer. GLCM construction will begin in the UK in June 1981, in Italy in January 1982, and in the FRG in August 1983. The Belgians have not lived up to their commitment to endorse the December 1979 decision, and it appears increasingly doubtful that they will do so in the near future. Elements of the Belgian Flemish Socialist Party have been quoted to the effect that either (a) Soviet willingness to enter LRTNF negotiations or (b) a Soviet moratorium on SS-20 deployments would be sufficient to obviate the requirement for deployment of GLCMs in Belgium. The Netherlands has also not endorsed the December 1979 decision, and a review of their position is not expected before late 1981. There is no evidence that the Dutch government will then be any more prepared to take a positive decision than it was last December.

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Implications of a Deployment Moratorium  
for the Soviet and NATO Programs

An SS-20 deployment moratorium would be difficult to verify without a halt in SS-20 base construction, but that could create pressures for a freeze on construction of NATO LRTNF facilities -- which we could not accept.

Were the Soviets, in accepting a moratorium, to finish all SS-20 bases currently under construction but declare that no missiles would be deployed to those bases, we would be hard pressed to verify with high confidence their compliance. In order to verify positively such a Soviet move, it would be necessary for the Soviets to cease construction on all currently unfinished SS-20 bases, and we could then have some confidence that no new SS-20 missiles were being deployed.

On the other hand, such a Soviet construction halt would create pressures for a similar freeze on NATO's part, and some of our NATO allies might regard this as a fair arrangement. The NATO program requires a number of construction and construction-related activities, however, which must begin fairly soon and occur at a rapid pace if the GLCM/PII IOC of 1983 is to be met. Thus a reciprocal Soviet requirement for a halt in NATO construction would impede, and possibly prevent, the implementation of the LRTNF decision.

o A mutual LRTNF deployment moratorium could legitimize the Soviet lead in LRTNF and severely prejudice any real progress in LRTNF arms control negotiations.

The Alliance position on LRTNF arms control continues to be that those negotiations can only be successful if they are based on equality in rights and ceilings. A freeze which NATO agreed to could legitimize the current Soviet advantage -- even if that freeze lasted only for three years. Furthermore, the Soviets could claim that they entered into LRTNF negotiations based on the existing LRTNF balance in Europe, which they claim is equal. This would undercut the agreed NATO position, and could affect the outcome of the negotiations.

o The Soviets could manipulate a freeze to retain the current imbalance after the scheduled end of the freeze. ✓

If LRTNF arms control negotiations were in progress in mid-1983, pressure would be placed on the US, the FRG and the UK by both the Soviets and some NATO allies to delay the scheduled GLCM and PII deployments. This could occur even if the arms control talks were neither particularly fruitful nor close to agreement. The European left could argue that the negotiations were in fact occurring, in large part thanks to a moratorium, and that deployments of new LRTNF by NATO would jeopardize not only the conclusions of an agreement but even the talks themselves. The Soviets could be expected to engage in similar

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propaganda. The net result, of course, would be a perpetuation of the current imbalance for an indefinite period of time.

o The achievement or even the pursuit of a freeze could undermine the Dec 12 NATO discussion.

The Belgians are looking for excuses not to confirm their decision to participate. They said they would confirm it within six months of Dec. 12 if the Soviets were not forthcoming on LRTNF arms control. The Soviets have not been, but they could easily respond to the Schmidt approach by saying they'd discuss a freeze. The Belgians could take that as a basis for concluding the Soviets had been forthcoming, and explicitly adopt the Dutch position, withdrawing their endorsement of the Dec. 12, 1979 decision. Given Danish and potential Norwegian softness, this would put great pressure on Italy to renege on its acceptance of GLCM deployments and with that, Schmidt's own conditions for participation would cease to be met.

#### Conclusions.

For Schmidt, the benefits of his proposal are short-term: to give a push to LRTNF arms control, to halt Soviet SS-20 deployments, and, perhaps, to score a coup during his Moscow visit, and to assuage the left wing of the SPD prior to the election. For NATO, the risks are more long term and are potentially quite serious: (1) we may curtail our ability to deploy LRTNF in 1983. (2) we may fail as an Alliance to implement the December 12 LRTNF decision. (3) we may lose an opportunity through arms control to achieve equality in LRTNF, and (4) we may create a situation in which Soviet opportunities for driving wedges between NATO members are greatly increased.

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INDEX

SCC Meeting of 1 September 1977

PRM/NSC-30, Terrorism *(1)*

Agenda	NSC Memorandum of August 29, scheduling the meeting and summarizing the topics to be raised.
Talker (Read)	Talking paper for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Tab A (Read)	PRM-30, Terrorism
Background Information (Scan)	
Tab A-1	Department of State Position
Tab B-1	Department of Justice Position

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PRM-30 - TERRORISM

I. Introduction

This review must be understood against the background of the present organization for handling terrorism at the interdepartmental level and the policy of the previous administration.

In 1972 in connection with the terrorist killings of Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich, the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT) was established by Presidential Memorandum. The Cabinet Committee met once, established a working group, and has never convened again. The working group, however, chaired by the Department of State representative, has remained active in the intervening five years, meeting frequently, and expanding to include representatives from more than twenty-five agencies. This CCCT working group has been effective in increasing the level of informal interagency coordination and exchange of information, but the inaction of the Cabinet Committee itself has meant that the working group could neither bring policy issues to Executive attention nor exercise crisis management authority in actual terrorist incidents. Not surprisingly, some issues have remained unresolved.

There has been close coordination and general agreement between federal agencies on operational tactics and broad guidelines for dealing with terrorist incidents. Each agency, of course, has exercised its own judgment in the crisis management of those incidents over which it has jurisdictional responsibility. In a few incidents where the jurisdictional responsibilities of domestic agencies and those of the Department of State have overlapped, differences have arisen between the agencies on tactical decisions regarding what "concessions" can or should be made in order to protect hostage safety.

The experience of the CCCT and its working group, therefore, points to two central issues for this review.

- a. U.S. policy and capabilities for dealing with terrorism.
- b. Organization and procedures for dealing with terrorism at the interdepartmental level.

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## II. Policy and Capabilities

### A. Should there be an explicit policy for negotiating with terrorists?

Publicly addressing the question of negotiating policy and tactics on terrorism at the NSC level should be avoided. If the U.S. Government must take a public stance on terrorism, it should emphasize that terrorist acts are crimes which are subject to our federal and local laws when committed domestically and to the practices of international law where they involve the United States abroad. Acts occurring in a foreign nation are subject to the laws of that nation. Such a stance could be expressed as follows:

The U.S. Government will take all measures permitted by law in cooperation with local law enforcement agencies to prevent acts of terrorism and to bring to justice those who commit them. Furthermore, the Secretary of State will seek cooperation with foreign governments to combat terrorism.

More explicit policy and negotiating tactics should be left to the agencies and departments within their jurisdiction because the demands for guidelines and practices differ for the Department of State and national security agencies on the one hand and for domestic agencies on the other. To the degree practical, however, interagency memoranda of understanding should be used to increase interagency coordination of policies and procedures.

It was considered desirable by the working group, however, to examine alternative interagency policies that would not be publicly announced but which would provide an interagency understanding of the general premise from which all agencies would initially approach negotiations in particular terrorist incidents. Four options were considered.

Option A. Hard Line. This would be a policy of "no negotiations, no concessions," and retaliation. This policy would be urged on other governments as well.

Option B. No Concessions. Communications would be established with terrorists for talking, but no concessions would be made. Other governments involved in an incident would also be encouraged to adhere to this policy.

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Option C. Firm but Flexible. Managers of terrorist negotiations would seek to balance the aim of deterring future acts with the aim of protecting and saving lives of hostages. Publicly the negotiating posture would be firm and unyielding while seeking through negotiations to discover minor concessions that would save the lives of involved persons. The U.S. Government, however, would not pay ransoms or release prisoners.

Option D. Maximum Flexibility. Protection of hostages and saving lives would be paramount. Negotiators would have rather wide latitude in concessions if they achieved the goal of release of hostages.

A preponderance working group favored the "firm but flexible" option. Agency representatives felt that it would not be excessively constraining but that it would encourage a tough stance against terrorists, yielding minor concessions and thereby having a deterrence effect on other terrorists.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

That a "firm" policy with flexible strategies be adopted by all agencies and that the U.S. Government take no public stance on terrorism other than to condemn it as a crime, to promise the full use of the law to deal with it as a crime, and to seek cooperation with other governments to combat terrorism.

#### B. The Adequacy of Capabilities for Dealing with Terrorism.

Both the legal authority and the law enforcement capabilities are considered adequate for responding to acts of terrorism committed within the U.S. as long as they involve conventional means of violence. Terrorism involving mass destruction or a number of smaller scale acts staged simultaneously could exceed the responsible agencies' ability to respond effectively. It is the upper range of the spectrum of violence, therefore, that is the cause for future concern. Preventive capabilities are less certain.

Special areas for both agency and interagency concern about capabilities were identified by the Committee:

- Although U.S. Customs Service capabilities are believed adequate for the present, more dangerous materials and weapons components being brought into the U.S. would require expanded capabilities.

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- The Energy Research and Development Administration has considerably improved upon its nuclear device detection capability with advanced technology and through the deployment of duplicate NEST Team equipment and personnel to the East Coast. However, further expansion of these capabilities may be required. Coordination and training with the Department of Defense for disarming and disposal of such devices is presently underway to provide greater capability for such events.
- U.S. military capabilities for countering terrorism, both at home and abroad, are believed generally adequate, but need a continuing assessment as the nature of terrorism evolves. Legal constraints upon the use of military forces in the United States must be recognized.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

That these concerns, as well as others that may become appropriate through changing circumstances, be addressed by an interagency working group on a continuing basis.

#### III. Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence on Terrorist Activities.

Terrorism has been defined as violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, or threats of such acts, which appear to be intended to further political, social, religious, or economic goals by assassination, kidnapping, or intimidating or coercing the public or a government or to obtain widespread publicity for a group or its cause, and includes activities directly supportive of such acts. It is generally categorized as either domestic or international. International terrorism transcends national boundaries and domestic terrorism does not.

International terrorism includes violent attacks or threats of attacks likely to cause serious injury to U.S. citizens abroad or damage to U.S. interests abroad by any terrorist group, whatever its political persuasion, opposed to U.S. policies or U.S. presence abroad. It does not cover purely domestic terrorism in the United States or within countries abroad, or the activities of revolutionary and liberation movements as such.

Responsibility for the collection and dissemination of intelligence on the foreign aspects of international terrorism rests with the foreign intelligence agencies as defined in Section 5 of Executive Order 11905. Within

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the United States and its territories, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is authorized, subject to guidelines issued by the Attorney General, to collect and disseminate intelligence on both foreign directed and domestic groups which may engage in acts of international terrorism. The FBI is also responsible for the collection and dissemination of intelligence on U.S. domestic terrorism. The working group did not address the adequacy of U.S. domestic intelligence efforts and the recommendations that follow are directed toward the collection and dissemination of intelligence on international terrorism.

The present intelligence effort with respect to international terrorism is a fragmented one, neither tightly organized nor closely coordinated in either its collection or analytical aspects. This effort includes the discrete responses of Intelligence Community members to (a) the national-level Key Intelligence Question guidance, (b) special requests for intelligence support from the CCCT working group, and (c) internal departmental requirements.

A more coordinated community approach would provide: (a) focus to departmental programs, (b) better organization of resources, (c) a more rational work effort, (d) a more useful product at both the departmental and national levels, and (e) better and more comprehensive support for agencies charged with handling terrorist threats and incidents.

A subcommittee on international terrorism should be formed under the Critical Collections Problem Committee to address technical problems that require coordinated resolution and response.

A. In the short term, it would:

1. Examine existing legal problems and seek uniform interpretations of existing orders and guidelines.
2. Develop procedures for ensuring coordinated evaluations of international terrorist threat reporting.

B. In the midterm, it would:

1. Press for the assignment of new collection priorities in DCID No. 1/2 for coverage of international terrorism.

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2. Define data base needs for meeting Intelligence Community responsibilities, and recommend appropriate steps to ensure compatibility and possible data-sharing among those existing and planned data base systems developed by member agencies.
3. Consider, assess, and recommend new analytical tools for handling threat assessment and projection tasks more effectively.

C. In addition, the subcommittee would be responsive to such other broad foreign intelligence problems and interests as may be referred to it by the chairman of the interagency group concerned with the U.S. Government's program for combatting terrorism.

D. The subcommittee would report at intervals of six and twelve months after organizing to address these intelligence problems, recommending such steps as may be required by the DCI and at the NFIB level for resolution of those problems.

E. The subcommittee would act in consonance with the provisions of Executive Order 11905 dealing with foreign intelligence activities. The subcommittee would not be empowered to alter the assignment of intelligence jurisdiction for terrorism or to waive, alter, interpret, supercede, or rescind intelligence regulations or guidelines of any agency or of the Intelligence Community.

The Executive Committee of the Working Group constituted under the SCC which is proposed in Section IV would have responsibility for discussing and proposing policy recommendations regarding the adequacy of domestic and international intelligence efforts. The Executive Committee, which has the responsibility in developing policy recommendations would coordinate its efforts with the CCPC Subcommittee chartered to deal with technical intelligence problems.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

That the Director of Central Intelligence establish a subcommittee under the CCPC to address the technical problems as outlined above.

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#### IV. Organization

##### A. Lines of authority and jurisdiction for handling terrorist incidents.

The Department of State has primary responsibility in terrorist incidents involving U.S. citizens and interests that occur outside of the United States. The Department of Justice has a preponderance of statutory responsibility for investigation and prosecution of crimes characterized as terrorism that take place in the U.S. and that are violations of Federal law. Other Federal agencies do exercise jurisdiction in specific circumstances. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has exclusive responsibility for the direction of law enforcement activity affecting the safety of persons aboard aircraft "in flight". The U.S. Secret Service has important responsibilities in the protection of the President, other U.S. officials, visiting foreign dignitaries and foreign missions. The Department of State (Security) has important responsibilities for the protection of diplomats and official guests of the U.S. A variety of Federal agencies share statutory law enforcement jurisdiction for criminal activity of a terrorist nature. Thus, coordination is required in incidents that impact on these established jurisdictional interests and responsibilities. Such coordination is accomplished formally by Memoranda of Understanding or other procedural arrangements negotiated between interested agencies or informally through a task force organization (or other crisis management organization), which is facilitated by long standing working relationships among individual agency representatives. Presently the SCC of the National Security Council is the next level where interagency issues can be resolved if agencies are unable to reach formal or informal agreements. Because Presidential Directive 2 gives the Special Coordination Committee of the NSC responsibility for crisis management, a new working group on terrorism could be properly subordinated to the SCC.

##### B. Should an Interagency Group Continue to Exist?

There is broad consensus that the CCCT Working Group has performed several useful functions which should continue. Some interagency group, therefore, should be reconstituted under the SCC with redefined functions, membership, and structure.

1. Tasks. The primary purpose of the group should be pre- and post-incident exchange of information. It would not be charged with incident management because that remains the

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responsibility of the agencies in whose jurisdiction an incident occurs. The group would:

- (a) Provide a continuing exchange of information and ideas among agencies having jurisdictional and support responsibility for combatting terrorism.
- (b) Identify key individuals having operational responsibility within each agency and facilitate the development of effective working relationships among these individuals.
- (c) Provide a forum for the frank discussion of terrorism issues.
- (d) Provide a framework for the encouragement of research and development relevant to the problems of combatting terrorism.

2. Structure and Membership of an Interagency Group.

- (a) The membership of the interagency group should consist of agencies having jurisdictional and/or support functions relating to combatting terrorism.
  - (1) Appropriate senior level representatives (and alternates) of each agency should be designated to serve on the interagency group.
  - (2) The minimal security clearance for attendance at Working Group meetings should be SECRET.
- (b) The interagency group should be chaired by Justice and/or State because these agencies have lead responsibility for domestic and international terrorist incidents. (State has expressed a strong desire to hold the chairmanship. Justice has urged a co-chairmanship with State. If a co-chairmanship cannot be arranged, Justice insists on holding the chairmanship.)
- (c) There should be an Executive Committee of the interagency group which would develop policy recommendations.

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- (1) The Executive Committee would be composed of representatives from State, Justice, CIA, Treasury, DOD, ERDA, DOT, and the NSC Staff.
- (2) The Chairman of the interagency group would also serve as chairman of the Executive Committee.

The dispute over the chairmanship of the Interagency Group and the Executive Committee could be resolved one of three ways.

Option A. State as Chairman. (State, Treasury, DOD/JCS, CIA and DOT support this option.) The State Department arguments are attached at Tab A.

Option B. Justice and State as Co-Chairmen. Since both State and Justice want to be involved in the leadership of the interagency group, one way to resolve the problem is to establish a co-chairmanship. (Justice and ERDA support this option. DOD/JCS, Treasury, DOT, State, and CIA object to a co-chair arrangement.) The Department of Justice arguments are attached at Tab B.

Option C. Justice as Chairman. This option is supported by Justice and ERDA if a co-chairmanship is not possible.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

That an Interagency Group and Executive Committee should continue, reconstituted under the SCC with the functions, membership, and structure described above.

On the chairmanship issue, the Working Group could make no single recommendation. Rather, three options are presented for decision.

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