

HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1947-1950

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The first volume in an important new series that will provide a comprehensive history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), *The Formative Years* traces the evolution of OSD from its establishment in September 1947 to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. As the title indicates, these were years of beginnings that ushered in the present-day era of service unification and saw the development of policies and programs that would have lasting impact on national security. A richly documented volume, it draws on a wide variety of primary and secondary sources to present a commanding account of the evolution of both defense organization and national security policy during the critical post-World War II years.

The book opens with the swearing-in of the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, who faced the dual challenge of effecting unification of the armed forces and of reconstituting U.S. defense policy to meet an increasing array of problems and threats abroad, the Cold War with the Soviet Union heading the list. As Forrestal discovered, to make unification work, he needed more authority and assistance than the 1947 National Security Act gave him. His successor, Louis Johnson, had the benefit of amendments in 1949 that enhanced the secretary's power. But like Forrestal, Johnson confronted fierce interservice competition for scarce funds and deeply divisive quarrels, especially between the Air Force and the Navy, over the assignment of roles and missions. A series of chapters on the making of the defense budgets for the period strikingly illuminates the intricate relationships among strategic policies, military programs, roles and missions, and money.

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Problems abroad threatened to embroil the United States in conflicts for which it was largely unprepared. Students of foreign affairs will be especially interested in the chapters on assistance to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine, the partitioning of Palestine and the ensuing Arab-Israeli conflict, the civil war in China and its repercussions throughout the Far East, including the early stages of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the Berlin crisis of 1948-49, which nearly led to a military showdown with the Soviet Union. Subsequent chapters examine the development of the atomic energy program and growing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the origins of the worldwide Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and the drafting of NSC 68, the landmark policy paper that in 1950, on the eve of the Korean War, proposed an unprecedented program of peacetime rearmament.



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History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Formative Years, 1947-1950



James Forrestal, First Secretary of Defense, 1947-49.

*HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE*

Alfred Goldberg, General Editor

VOLUME I

**THE
FORMATIVE
YEARS
1947-1950**

Steven L. Rearden



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Foreword

In December 1939 I was present when George C. Marshall, then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, delivered an address before the American Historical Association in Washington. I listened but I did not hear, nor did I remember much of what he said. It was only after reading the address in recent years that I became aware of the understanding and wisdom that informed his observations. "In our democracy," Marshall declared, "where the government is truly an agent of the popular will, military policy is dependent on public opinion, and an organization for war will be good or bad as the public is well informed or badly informed regarding the factors that bear on the subject." Accordingly, he considered it "very important that the true facts, the causes and consequences that make our military history, should be matters of common knowledge," and "therefore, it is to the historian . . . that we must turn for the most essential service in determining the public policy relating to National Defense."

Since World War II, thanks to Marshall and other like-minded civilian and military leaders, the government has kept the American public better informed about the history of its military establishment than about any of its other major activities. Through the extensive publication of scholarly volumes, the military services have fulfilled their obligation to record their history and keep the nation apprised.

The history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is to the history of the Department of Defense as the history of the military establishment is to the history of the United States. In the years since World War II the Department of Defense, and especially OSD since 1947, has played a central role in the making and execution of national security policy at the highest levels of government. To provide a permanent and comprehensive historical record, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has undertaken to publish a thorough, objective, critical, and analytical history. The overall plan for the OSD history provides for an open-ended series of volumes in chronological sequence, each covering

several years, with time periods determined by a number of common characteristics, principally a high degree of internal unity and beginnings and endings that are distinct and significant. Within this chronological framework, the major themes are treated topically. It is hoped that these volumes will stimulate additional research that will further amplify the history of OSD.

This first volume of the series, *The Formative Years, 1947–1950*, is especially important because it provides a foundation on which succeeding volumes may build. Since an exhaustive history of OSD is impossible, the volume aims rather to illuminate the main events, policies, and personages of these early years and to point up the tensions and tribulations, successes and failures, that attended the reordering of the nation's defense structure. This has required the historian to exercise with the utmost discrimination his primary responsibility of selecting the topics to be treated. The focus is on the larger problems and issues of national security policy that gained the attention of OSD; while the perspective is primarily from the OSD vantage point, the presidential and National Security Council perspectives are not neglected. Major themes include the origins and organization of the National Military Establishment; the progress of unification; the availability, competition for, and use of resources; and the role of OSD and the military services in carrying out the international responsibilities and commitments of the United States during the early stages of the Cold War.

Because of the need to establish the basic discipline of the subject, the treatment of *The Formative Years* is more narrative than analytical, but interpretations and conclusions are not wanting. The authority of the volume derives chiefly from the rigorous study and extensive use of OSD primary source materials, to which the author had full access. Secondary accounts were used selectively. Living sources, in the form of interviews, were especially valuable, contributing much to the originality and flavor of the book.

Steven L. Rearden, the author of this volume, holds a Ph.D. degree in history from Harvard University. From 1974 to 1976 he served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, after which he undertook work on *The Formative Years*.

This publication has been reviewed and its contents declassified and cleared for release by concerned government agencies. Although the manuscript itself has been declassified, some of the official sources cited in the volume may remain classified. This is an official publication of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

ALFRED GOLDBERG
Historian, OSD

Preface

The National Security Act of 1947 stated the intent of Congress to provide for the "authoritative coordination and unified direction [of the armed forces] under civilian control but not to merge them." To exercise this direction and control, the act designated the Secretary of Defense. Until then and since 1789, the President had provided unified direction in his capacity as Commander in Chief, an arrangement that worked reasonably well as long as he had the time to devote to such matters. By the early 20th century, however, as the United States emerged as a world power, and as the burdens thrust upon him increased, the President relied ever more heavily on subordinates to help him discharge his military responsibilities. During World War II President Franklin D. Roosevelt often improvised with organizational mechanisms to which he delegated increasing authority. By the end of the war, with the United States confronting security problems unprecedented in scale and scope, the need for organizational reform appeared more urgent than ever. Two years later, in the summer of 1947, Congress moved to remedy this situation by passing the National Security Act.

Although addressed principally to the question of service unification, the National Security Act went well beyond reorganizing the armed forces; its overall purpose was to erect an integrated structure to formulate national security policy at the uppermost level of government. One of its most innovative features was to provide the President with a full-time deputy for military affairs. Breaking with tradition, it subordinated the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the newly established Air Force to the Secretary of Defense, thereby creating a new layer of civilian authority between the military services and their Commander in Chief. Over the past three and a half decades this arrangement has undergone progressive refinement, chiefly toward further strengthening the secretary's power to exercise direction and control. Each step along the way has been strongly attacked and strenuously defended. In general, however, this trend has proved inexorable.

This volume traces the evolution of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from its establishment in September 1947 to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. During this period two men occupied the office—James Vincent Forrestal (17 September 1947 to 28 March 1949) and Louis Arthur Johnson (28 March 1949 to 19 September 1950). Though vastly different in style and personality, both were similarly motivated by a strong desire to serve their country and by a belief that the job they were doing ranked as one of the most important in public service. As the title indicates, these were OSD's formative years, an especially important period because it was one of origins and beginnings. Basic relationships and policies were established during this period and decisions were made that had long-term consequences, both at home and abroad.

The account presented here is essentially a policy history of OSD, drawn from the office's internal files and other documentary collections. Built around a narrative framework, it examines how the office came into being, how it operated, and how it dealt with the multifaceted problem of national security. It is not a history of the early Cold War, though Cold War problems do indeed bulk large; nor is it a compendium of accomplishments under unification, though like the Cold War, unification is a recurring theme. Because of lack of space and time and the need to keep the book manageable, some subjects have been given only brief mention or omitted. Among these are intelligence, strategic planning, overseas base rights, personnel and manpower policies, industrial mobilization, logistics, and the evolution of research and development programs, all of which may be treated more fully in future volumes. Variations between chapters in organization, structure, emphasis, and focus and differences in breadth and depth of treatment result from judgment of what was important and to some extent derive from the amount and quality of available evidence.

Arrangement and presentation of so large and complex a subject as the history of OSD are always difficult. Technical terms, which abound in military parlance, have been held to a minimum; the use of abbreviations and acronyms has been for the sake of brevity and in many instances was simply unavoidable. Choosing the best order of chapters posed a special problem. Overlapping issues ruled out a purely chronological treatment. It seemed best therefore to adopt a thematic structure and to group chapters dealing with similar or related subjects.

A word of caution is in order as regards statistical data used in this volume, especially in connection with budgetary matters discussed in Chapters XI, XII, and XIII. Not surprisingly, in view of the complex nature of the budget process, discrepancies occasionally appeared between the numbers in one source and those in another, though usually the discrepancies were minor. At all times official documents were used to reconcile the data and to present statistical materials as accurately as possible from contemporary sources.

A further caveat concerns the use of the terms *National Military Establishment*, or *NME*, and *Department of Defense*. Although both refer to the same basic organization headed by the Secretary of Defense, they should not be used interchangeably because they apply to different time periods. The National Military Establishment was the term adopted by Congress when it unified the armed services in 1947. It remained the defense establishment's official designation until the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act converted the NME into a full-fledged executive department, thereafter known as the Department of Defense. At the risk of some confusion to readers, but in the interest of historical accuracy, usage of the terms National Military Establishment and Department of Defense follows their chronological application.

* * * * *

During the preparation of this volume I became deeply indebted to numerous institutions and individuals for their assistance. In particular, I wish to extend grateful thanks for the research help I received from the Modern Military Division of the National Archives, the Harry S. Truman Library, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, the Naval Historical Center, and the Army Library in the Pentagon.

An early draft of the manuscript was reviewed by a broad group of scholars and former Defense Department officials, who presented written and oral comments at a seminar held in the Pentagon on 21 April 1981. Among those who participated in this seminar were former Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General J. Lawton Collins, Brig. Gen. Noel F. Parrish, Marx Leva, John H. Ohly, Forrest Pogue, Robert J. Donovan, Kenneth W. Condit, Ronald Spector, Walter Moody, Benis Frank, William Z. Slany, Dean Allard, Samuel F. Wells, and Robert Pollard. Subsequently, additional comments were received from Francis O. Wilcox, Ambassador Theodore C. Achilles, and Samuel R. Williamson. All were extremely generous in sharing their time and ideas and in making helpful suggestions for sharpening and clarifying the text. Among those I interviewed in connection with preparing the volume, I would especially like to thank Mr. and Mrs. Donald F. Carpenter for their gracious hospitality.

This book began as a project originally assigned to Harry B. Yoshpe, whose research notes proved invaluable. Within the Office of the OSD Historian I owe a special debt to Alice C. Cole, Roger R. Trask, and Stuart I. Rochester, all of whom contributed in more ways than I can possibly enumerate here. As critics, editors, and friends, I feel they were as much my collaborators as my colleagues, a pleasure to work with, unstinting in their help, and totally dedicated

to the highest professional standards in bringing this volume to fruition. For allowing me to draw on their knowledge and insights, I need also to thank Rudolph A. Winnacker, Samuel A. Tucker, Max Rosenberg, Richard M. Leighton, and Ronald Hoffman. To Doris M. Condit, who is completing the volume to follow mine, I am especially grateful for both her assistance and encouragement. Gloria Moore, assisted by Marguerite Cowherd, Debora O'Connor, and others, prevailed over the word processing machine to produce a genuinely fine typed manuscript for the printer. Miss Moore and Ruth E. Sharma painstakingly proofread the final copy.

My heaviest obligations are to my wife, Pamela, for her unswerving moral support; to John H. Ohly, a marvelous friend and keen critic whose personal knowledge of events added a dimension that the written record can never convey; and to Alfred Goldberg, for all manner of things, particularly the opportunity he gave me to write this book and the incisive editorial skills he brought to bear on its completion.

STEVEN L. REARDEN

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History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

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CHAPTER I

17 September 1947

The drama of the occasion could not have been lost on those who attended the swearing-in of James Forrestal as the first U.S. Secretary of Defense at high noon on 17 September 1947. The ceremony, the initial step in starting the machinery that Congress had authorized two months earlier in the National Security Act, signified the beginning of extraordinary change in the organization and direction not only of the military establishment, but indeed, of the whole national security structure. The impact of the occasion was compounded by the irony that the new secretary should be the former Secretary of the Navy and the ceremony should take place in the Navy Department building, for the Navy had been the most reluctant of all the services to see the new order come into being and Forrestal himself had initially been among the leading proponents of a very different form of organization of the military establishment.

The drama of the event was further heightened by the urgency which surrounded it. Originally scheduled for 22 September, the ceremony had been advanced to 17 September after receipt of a cable in the White House on 15 September from President Harry S. Truman directing that Forrestal take office without delay. The President, then homeward bound from the Rio de Janeiro Inter-American Conference on hemispheric peace and security, had read in his daily intelligence reports a warning that the communist government of Yugoslavia, locked in a territorial dispute with Italy, might attempt to seize the city of Trieste, still under occupation by U.S. and British military forces. He felt that under the circumstances Forrestal should take office at once, even though it would preclude his own attendance at the oath-taking, originally arranged for the day of his scheduled return to Washington.

To administer the oath of office, Forrestal had called on the Chief Justice of the United States, Fred M. Vinson, an old friend who had served with him

earlier in the President's Cabinet. Forrestal, standing at attention, solemnly repeated the words of the oath after the Chief Justice and, by so doing, permitted the National Security Act to become fully effective as of the next day. After the ceremony, Forrestal met with a group of close advisers over a buffet luncheon at which time they reviewed the current emergency and discussed future plans.

The next day, 18 September, Forrestal paid a brief visit to the Pentagon, across the Potomac River in Arlington, Va., to examine space arrangements for his new office and to attend the swearing-in of John L. Sullivan as Secretary of the Navy and W. Stuart Symington as Secretary of the Air Force. Kenneth C. Royall, previously Secretary of War, who had automatically become Secretary of the Army, acted as host. As the President had desired, the civilian leadership of the new military establishment was in place and ready to function.¹

From Hot War to Cold War

Forrestal took up his new duties at a critical juncture in the nation's fortunes. Although the Great Depression and World War II were history, the era of peace and prosperity so eagerly anticipated in 1945 was threatening to evaporate by 1947. Surging inflation, reconversion of industry from military to civilian production, pent-up demand for consumer goods, shortages of key industrial items, and the reabsorption into American society of 10 million or more demobilizing soldiers, sailors, and marines created fresh challenges at home. Abroad, two years after the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, much of the world—Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the Mediterranean—remained in a state of upheaval. Rivalry and disagreements between the Soviet Union and the victorious Western allies heightened the tension and in some quarters had already given rise to fears of a third world war, possibly an atomic war with untold horrors.

If the economic problems at home required new solutions, the deteriorating international situation would compel the assumption of extensive new responsibilities. Whatever course future events might take, World War II had dictated a dramatic and permanent alteration in the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world. Isolation from Europe's quarrels and avoidance of entangling associations in other areas of the world—the traditional cornerstones of U.S. security—had become outmoded precepts by the end of the war. The long reach of modern weapons and the immense destruction they had visited on so much of the earth, determining the outcome of World War II, had pro-

foundly affected the shape of the postwar world. Germany and Japan lay in ruins; most of Europe, economically exhausted and diminished, struggled to recover its strength. As the only major participant to emerge from the war relatively unscathed, the United States occupied an unrivaled position of political and economic power. On the Eurasian land mass the Soviet Union, though weakened by horrendous casualties and destruction, had emerged as the predominant power and the only country likely to challenge U.S. preeminence.

Postwar U.S. policy, as it took form during the conflict, accepted as a central tenet that henceforth the United States should take the major responsibility, in concert with other countries, including the Soviet Union, for preventing the outbreak of yet another global catastrophe. In 1944–45 the United States became a leading force behind the creation of the United Nations (U.N.).² The ultimate effectiveness of the U.N. depended on the postwar cooperation and collaboration of the five permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Britain, and the Republic of China—each with a veto power.³

Even before the war ended, disputes between Washington and Moscow threatened to undermine the U.N. concept of maintaining international peace and security through cooperation among the member states. Against a background of generally unfriendly U.S.–Soviet relations since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the wartime partnership was shaky from its very beginning. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, perceived it as a basis for a permanent collaboration. At the Tehran Conference in 1943 and again at Yalta in early 1945, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill pledged their countries to full cooperation to defeat the Axis and achieve a secure and lasting peace. But despite much wartime talk of solidarity, collaboration between Moscow and the West remained limited except in the provision of military aid to the Soviets by the United States and Great Britain. Relations were correct but not overly cordial, and as a rule the Soviet Union kept military and political contacts with Washington and London under tight control.

As World War II ended, East-West differences became more pronounced, with the emergence of basic disagreements over the organization of the U.N., termination of lend-lease, and surrender terms for Germany. In April and May 1945 the persistent underlying suspicion and distrust between the Soviets and the West manifested itself openly in Stalin's bitter accusations that the British and Americans were engaged in secret negotiations over surrender terms with the Germans. Even more divisive was the fundamental disagreement over the status of Eastern Europe, where the installation of pro-Soviet regimes, backed in most cases by the presence and might of the Red Army, seemed to violate U.S.–

Soviet understandings that these countries would be allowed self-determination. By the time Roosevelt died in April 1945, a quarrel over composition of the Polish Government had placed serious strains on U.S.-Soviet relations. As Prime Minister Churchill described the situation a month later in a message to President Truman, Eastern Europe was rapidly falling behind an "iron curtain" of Soviet domination and communist dictatorships.⁴

Except for Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and a handful of others who urged a "get tough" policy, authorities in Washington, including President Truman, remained cautiously optimistic that U.S.-Soviet differences would eventually be resolved in a reasonable and peaceful fashion. But at the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 new problems arose over Soviet demands for German reparations. After the collapse of the London Foreign Ministers Conference in September 1945, controversies over basic issues followed in rapid succession during 1946-47: the Azerbaijan crisis, the impasse in the U.N. over atomic energy, the crumbling of four-power cooperation in occupied Germany, and the protracted haggling over the Axis satellite treaties. At the same time, Soviet control over Eastern Europe continued to tighten, while in Western Europe and parts of Asia there appeared ominous signs suggesting a pattern of mounting communist activity aimed at exploiting the economic and political disarray left by the war in order to bring about the installation of governments directly or indirectly subservient to the Soviet Union.⁵

Uncertainty prevailed in Washington about ultimate Soviet intentions and capabilities. On the one hand, substantial evidence suggested that the Soviet Union was in reality a crippled giant whose wartime sacrifices had left it incapable of posing a serious threat for many years. Although the Soviet Government never published an official count, figures accepted in the West for Soviet wartime casualties ranged beyond 20 million killed. Factory damage had been exceptionally severe, almost total in some areas that invading German armies had occupied, causing sharp declines from prewar industrial output. With agricultural production also down because of the war's disruptions, famine reportedly occurred in parts of the country, even in the usually productive farmlands of the Soviet Ukraine. Western intelligence agencies reported pessimistically on the Soviet Union's prospects for early recovery and speculated that reconstruction would require a decade or more of energetic rebuilding.⁶

On the other hand, in spite of economic difficulties, the Soviet Union remained a formidable military power after the war, though it had practically no strategic air force and no surface navy of any significance other than coastal patrol vessels. Its major strengths lay in the Red Army, larger than any ground force in the West, and a growing submarine fleet. Like the United States and Britain, the Soviet Union demobilized after the war, but it still kept substantial

forces under arms.* Despite a war-weakened economy and the pressing demands of reconstruction, Soviet policy accorded first priority to the military in the allocation of resources. In terms of money spent, Soviet postwar defense budgets down to 1950 were estimated as roughly equivalent to those of the United States. The Central Intelligence Agency calculated that between 1948 and 1949 Soviet defense expenditures rose from the equivalent of \$12.5 billion to \$16.5 billion. But because of Russia's less developed economy, these figures represented, respectively, 23.2 and 28.9 percent of the Soviet gross national income.⁷

Although much of the evidence was sketchy, Western intelligence organizations consistently credited Soviet forces with awesome capabilities that they believed greatly exceeded apparent Soviet postwar security requirements. In March 1946, after the United States had withdrawn most of its combat forces from Europe, the Soviet Union was thought still to have approximately 51 divisions in Germany and Austria and 40 more divisions in Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.⁸ Two years later, despite announcements from Moscow of an ongoing program of demobilization, U.S. Army sources estimated that total Soviet forces, excluding allied satellite armies, consisted of 4,100,000 men and had stabilized at about 175 line divisions,† all "effectively organized for combat" and supported by a substantial tactical air force. This same report saw no signs that Soviet forces would resume a peacetime posture soon. On the contrary, they remained "virtually on a war footing" and could, if called upon during an emergency, expand to 320 divisions within 30 days. These estimates proved to be greatly exaggerated.⁹

Soviet commitment to a vigorous research and development program aimed at modernizing weapons and correcting weapon deficiencies also caused the United States much concern. During a speech to Soviet Communist Party members in February 1946, Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov declared that the Soviet Union was doing everything "to assure that our Army is second to no other Army as regards newest types of armament."¹⁰ Such remarks reinforced suspicions in the West that, with the help of captured German scientists, the Soviet Union would be armed in a few years with turbojet aircraft and a variety of

* Precisely how large a Soviet demobilization took place after World War II has never been positively established because of Soviet secrecy in such matters. Official Soviet estimates claimed that large-scale reductions from the wartime peak of 12,000,000 troops occurred in several stages between 1945 and 1948. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev noted in January 1960 that Soviet armed forces were reduced to a strength of 2,874,000 in 1948, but this figure apparently did not include border police and other quasi-military forces. For a fuller account, see Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970*, 9-11.

† Soviet divisions had about 9,000-12,000 men, depending on the type of division, some two-thirds of the strength of U.S. divisions. Moreover, it became known later that many of these 175 divisions were not full strength; some had only cadres.

offensive and defensive guided missiles.¹¹ Scattered evidence appearing as early as 1945 suggested further that the Soviet Union also had a "super-priority" program to acquire nuclear weapons, with 1953 sometimes mentioned as the likely date for achieving "quantity" bomb production.¹² Such reports and predictions, against the backdrop of deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations and increasing communist political and subversive activities in Western Europe and Asia, produced serious concern in Washington over future Soviet intentions.

The Strategy of Containment

The development of a U.S. policy to deal with the widespread unsettled and threatening conditions that had resulted largely from inability to reach agreement with the Soviets on outstanding issues spanned a period of nearly two years after the cessation of hostilities in Europe in the spring of 1945. It took time and the actual frustrating experiences of those years for officials in Washington and the American public to become convinced that agreements with the Soviets on major postwar issues could not then be reached and that the Soviet Union was bent on expanding its power. The favorable image and goodwill that the Soviet Union had acquired as an ally in World War II did not dissipate overnight. Moreover, changes in policy had to proceed in concert with public opinion and be shaped by what Congress and the American people would accept and support. The postwar American public was more concerned with pressing domestic problems than with what seemed less urgent international troubles.*

During this period of policy formulation, there emerged a dominant view that the Soviet Union was a hostile and expansionist power with whom lasting good relations seemed highly unlikely, at least for a long time to come. As time went on and Soviet actions appeared more patently menacing, dissenting views became less acceptable, with loyalty-security investigations and inquiries by the House Un-American Activities Committee inhibiting debate among public officials and federal employees. After President Truman fired Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace in September 1946 because of a speech criticizing U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, there remained in the Cabinet no one who seriously

* Truman was well aware of these realities and moved cautiously in developing policy. In the summer of 1946, for example, he directed his special counsel, Clark Clifford, assisted by George M. Elsey, to compile a status report on U.S.-Soviet relations and prospects for the future. The resulting paper, submitted in September, took an exceptionally gloomy view of the situation and held out little hope for an early U.S.-Soviet reconciliation. According to Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, 221-22, Truman found the report "too explosive to distribute," so it never left the White House. Also see Krock, *Memoirs*, 419-82, where the Clifford-Elsey report is reprinted in full.

questioned the threatening nature of Soviet intentions or the need for a firmer U.S. policy toward Moscow.¹³

Since they lacked precise details of what the Soviet Union hoped to accomplish, authorities in Washington had to rely on information supplied by U.S. foreign service officers and observers stationed in or near the Soviet Union. According to these reports, Soviet policy and the preservation of a war-making capability far in excess of what seemed necessary to guard against a now-impotent Germany and Japan had two aims: to disguise the Soviet Union's internal weaknesses and, at the same time, to facilitate the "inevitable" victory of Marxist-Leninist ideology.¹⁴

Of the reports reaching Washington, none had a stronger impact on official thinking than those of George F. Kennan, U.S. Minister-Counselor in Moscow from 1944 to 1946. A foreign service career officer, with special training in Soviet affairs, Kennan had acquired an understanding of the Soviet Union that few of his State Department contemporaries could equal. Drawing on his background of knowledge and experience, Kennan became convinced that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union rested on outmoded assumptions of common interests fostered during World War II and that it failed to cope effectively with the basic problem of Russian and communist expansionism.

Kennan achieved almost instant prominence with his "Long Telegram" of 22 February 1946—a cable of some 8,000 words to Washington from Moscow, expressing his concern over Soviet actions and urging his superiors to educate the American people on the "realities" of the situation. Although he did not recommend specific changes in policy, Kennan expressed confidence that the "problem is within our power to solve—and that without recourse to any general military conflict," if the American people were properly informed why the Soviets acted as they did.¹⁵ Despite its high security classification, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal persuaded the State Department to permit wide distribution of the message to several hundred senior military officers. In late May, at the instigation of Forrestal and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Kennan returned to Washington to become Deputy Commandant of the new National War College.¹⁶

It was at Forrestal's suggestion that Kennan wrote his celebrated "X" article on the reasons for Soviet conduct. Initially intended only for Forrestal's private and personal edification, the paper so impressed him that he wanted others to share it. In July 1947 it appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, the quarterly journal of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although authorship was attributed to "X," perceptive journalists quickly recognized Kennan's style and disclosed the author's name within a few days.¹⁷

In the X article, Kennan viewed Soviet policy as the product of ideology and history—a blending of the Marxist-Leninist vision of a world socialist state and the historic czarist expansionist impulse. The emphasis Kennan placed on historic impulses in his article suggested that he judged ideological considerations of secondary importance. He saw the Soviets as opportunists whose basic strategy was to probe and exploit the weaknesses of their enemies. Nonetheless, he was profoundly impressed by the impact of communist ideology on the current generation of Soviet leaders and doubted whether their mindset would permit them even to contemplate a reconciliation with the West.

Kennan viewed the future in mixed terms. He felt optimistic that with the eventual passing of the current generation of Soviet leadership, a new group, more open to accommodation with the West, would come to power. He doubted whether the Soviet system could long survive. Its inefficient methods, its repressive police state tactics, and its disregard for human rights doomed it to certain wholesale transformation, if not extinction. This long-range prediction would come to pass, however, only after vigorous exertion of outside pressure to contain Soviet expansion. In the immediate years ahead, he expected the Soviets to seize every available opportunity to realize their goal of world domination. "In these circumstances," he argued, "it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Such a policy, he maintained, should consist of "the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy."¹⁸

What Kennan said and what he intended to say in his X article have since become the subject of widely varying interpretations. Some have seen it as a virtual call to arms, while others have given it a more cautious reading.¹⁹ In the main, the issue has centered on the use of the word "containment," which unfortunately Kennan never fully defined at the time. Its usage in the article clearly implied that successful resistance to the spread of Soviet influence and power would entail conflict, but what kind of conflict Kennan neglected to say, and this critical omission led readers of the article to contemplate a host of possibilities, including recourse to direct military action. Yet for Kennan himself, a war with the Soviets was the very thing that containment was meant to avoid. In his memoirs, he insisted

that the article was in reality a plea—addressed as much to our despairing liberals as to our hotheaded right-wingers—for acceptance of the belief that, ugly as was the problem of Soviet power, war was not inevitable, nor was it a suitable answer; that the absence of war did not mean that we would lose the struggle; that there was a middle ground of political resistance on which we could stand with reasonable prospect of success.²⁰

By the time the X article appeared, events in Europe and the Mediterranean had already forced a major reassessment of U.S. policy. Rising communist guerrilla activity in Greece, continual Soviet pressure on Turkey to make concessions and grant territorial rights, and the failure of the European economy to regain its vitality were problems that could no longer be ignored and on which the United States felt compelled to take immediate action. On 21 February 1947 the First Secretary of the British Embassy handed State Department officials two notes, one on Greece, the other on Turkey. The thrust of both messages was the same: Britain, on the verge of bankruptcy, had no choice but to terminate her security commitments to both countries.²¹ U.S. officials contemplated the grim possibilities, including an eventual communist takeover in Greece. Should Greece fall, warned the U.S. ambassador in Athens, "the whole Near East and part of North Africa as well are certain to pass under Soviet influence."²² Resolving to meet the crisis head on, representatives of the State, War, and Navy Departments hurriedly developed recommendations that President Truman promptly approved. On 12 March he presented to Congress in person a statement of policy thereafter known as the Truman Doctrine. He called for the United States "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Truman asked for the emergency appropriation of \$400 million in economic and military aid to preserve "democracy" and "free institutions" in Greece and Turkey.²³ In truth, neither country was democratic by American standards, especially Greece, which was run by a right-wing oligarchy. Bothered by this ironic contradiction but choosing to overlook it in consideration of the larger problem, Congress responded favorably to the President's request and in May 1947 authorized assistance to begin immediately.²⁴

Proposal of the Marshall Plan to rehabilitate the war-torn nations of Europe swiftly followed. As the faltering of British power in Greece and Turkey brought home to U.S. leaders, the industrialized countries of Western Europe were on the verge of economic and, for some, even political collapse because of their deep social and economic troubles. The index of industrial production (100 in 1938) for the greater part of Europe (excluding the Soviet Union) rose from 68 in the first quarter of 1946 to 83 in the last quarter, but slipped to 78 in the first part of 1947. Since the base year of 1938 was one of depression, even 83 represented a disappointing showing; the setback to 78 pointed to impending disaster.²⁵ Chronic high unemployment, food shortages, rationing, black markets, social protest movements, and worsening prospects for the future created a setting ripe for communist and other radical parties to acquire converts and make inroads into the political system. In France and Italy, for example, the local communist parties piled up nearly a third of the popular vote in the 1946 elections. No government in Rome or Paris felt it could stay in power without including com-

munists, but once in office the latter seldom cooperated and often tried to frustrate effective governmental action on social and economic problems.²⁶

In the United States, worry over conditions in Europe had been growing steadily since the end of the war, but the Truman administration did not propose decisive action until after the Greek-Turkish aid program had received generally favorable reception in Congress. On 29 April 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall, having just returned from a disappointing round of talks in Moscow, summoned Kennan to his office and instructed him to oversee the immediate preparation of recommendations to help revitalize the European economy. "The result of the talks with the Russians," said Kennan of Marshall's attitude,

had compelled him to recognize, however reluctantly, that the idea of approaching the solution to Europe's problems in collaboration with the Russians was a pipe dream. It was plain that the Soviet leaders had a political interest in seeing the economies of the Western European peoples fail under anything other than Communist leadership. The general realized that for us to delay action to shore up these economies, merely lest independent action disrupt great power "collaboration," was simply to play into Communist hands. We had already delayed too long. The hour was late. Time was running out. "The patient," as he put it in his radio address to the nation on the day of his return, "is sinking while the doctors deliberate."²⁷

The development of proposals in response to Marshall's call for ideas quickly became an effort that mobilized much of the State Department. Marshall named Kennan Director of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), a new organization within the State Department in charge of assessing important issues and formulating policies of possible long-term consequence. Averse to recommending another program similar to the Greek-Turkish aid measure, Kennan and many of his colleagues felt that the Truman Doctrine, with its sweeping rhetoric, was dangerously antagonistic toward the Soviet Union and, if taken literally, could embroil the United States in a limitless number of open-ended commitments.²⁸ The offer of assistance that Secretary Marshall unveiled in his Harvard commencement day speech on 5 June 1947 was, by contrast, a reserved and cautious initiative that avoided any mention of the Soviet Union or the communist threat. Although containing communism was obviously an important consideration, Marshall insisted that U.S. objectives were limited to "restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole."²⁹

The beleaguered Western European nations immediately acclaimed Mar-

shall's proposal of assistance. Still, large hurdles had yet to be cleared. Despite its earlier support of the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Republican-controlled 80th Congress did not look favorably on the application of the plan to *all* of Europe, including the Soviet Union, should it choose to participate. This question resolved itself eventually when the Soviets refused to have anything to do with the plan. Even so, the very size and scope of the proposal—an estimated \$17 billion stretched over a five-year period—required Congress and the administration to think long and hard before taking action. The administration obtained an interim appropriation late in 1947; after the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, followed by rumors of possible war in Europe, Congress approved the President's pending requests for full authorization and additional funding.

Thus, from 1947 on, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan stood as major elements of U.S. international policy. The doctrine, though initially applied only to the support of Greece and Turkey, contained a sharply stated intention of opposing the imposition of totalitarian regimes on countries against the will of their people. The Marshall Plan, a multibillion dollar long-term undertaking, completed in 1952, aimed at revitalizing the economies of Western Europe. What made these two initiatives appear so closely akin, despite their differences of approach, was the concept of containment outlined in Kennan's X article of July 1947. Both sought to thwart Soviet expansion; the X article added a theoretical framework for the emerging strategy. Given the commonly shared objectives of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, it is little wonder that President Truman chose to characterize them as simply "two halves of the same walnut."³⁰

State of the Armed Forces

In announcing the Truman Doctrine and undertaking the Marshall Plan, the United States indicated its intentions to assume a degree of responsibility for the welfare and security of other countries unprecedented in peacetime. It remained to be seen whether and to what extent the United States would, if called upon, back up its new undertakings with military force. Such a policy could bring about a need for a high level of military preparedness to meet U.S. commitments to deter and, if necessary, combat aggression, as well as carry out its other responsibilities. But the administration did not provide the military with guidance about what kinds of contingencies to plan for. Under these circumstances, efforts to define the precise role of the military provoked difficult questions. What should be the organization, size, and composition of the armed forces? What degree of readiness should they strive to maintain? How and where should they

be deployed? And what kinds of weapons should they develop and stockpile in anticipation of possible needs?

Despite steadily worsening U.S.-Soviet relations, the U.S. military establishment prior to 1947 had concentrated its energy, time, and resources necessarily on matters other than meeting possible Soviet threats—demobilizing huge wartime military forces; providing occupation troops in Germany, Italy, Austria, Trieste, Japan, Korea, and elsewhere; and adjusting the size and composition of forces in response to reduced appropriations. Coping with the threats and contingencies that might arise from the disturbed international situation played little part in shaping U.S. military requirements immediately after the war. Rather, the determining factors were domestic, chiefly the country's overwhelming desire to resume a peacetime existence and a firm commitment by the Truman administration to lift the wartime burden of military expenditures, balance the federal budget, and expedite the return of servicemen to their civilian pursuits.³¹

Consequently, while relations with the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate, demobilization ranked as the top priority of U.S. military authorities. Of the more than 12 million troops under arms at the time hostilities ceased in 1945, fewer than 1.6 million were still in uniform when demobilization officially terminated on 30 June 1947.³² Not surprisingly, this headlong reduction in strength cut deeply into effective combat power. On V-J Day—2 September 1945—U.S. armed forces consisted of 91 Army and 6 Marine divisions, all combat-trained and ready; a huge inventory of aircraft organized into 213 combat groups in the Army Air Forces; and 1,166 combat vessels in the Navy. Twenty-two months later, as demobilization ended, this "once-mighty host" had shrunk to an Army of 10 understrength divisions, only 2 of which were organized for combat; a Marine Corps of 2 divisions, also below authorized strength; an Army Air Forces with only 11 fully operational groups out of a total of 63* in existence; and a Navy consisting of 343 combat ships.³³

Postwar budget cuts increased the pace and scale of demobilization. In 1946, as part of a government-wide effort to hold down costs and balance the budget, President Truman ordered that the budget for the War and Navy Departments not exceed one-third of estimated total government income and adopted the "remainder method" of calculating future military budgets, subtracting budget estimates for the rest of the government from the projected ceiling before recommending a military appropriation.³⁴ The approved military budget ceiling for fiscal year (FY) 1947 came to approximately \$14 billion, compared with \$42

* Not all of these groups were manned or equipped and some probably existed only on paper. For several years after the war overall Air Force combat group strength fluctuated greatly, and the number of operationally ready groups was consistently less than the total number of groups reported.

billion the year before. Faced with this enormous cutback, the Army and the Navy contemplated the inevitable prospect of further strength reductions. To meet the President's goal, the services accelerated the discharge of veterans and cut back on recruitment. The Army suspended monthly draft calls, and on 31 March 1947 the Selective Service Act was allowed to expire. By midyear the Army and the Navy had become once again all-volunteer bodies filled largely with young and inexperienced recruits.³⁵

To what extent, if any, the posthaste wholesale demobilization of U.S. armed forces encouraged the Soviet Union to pursue apparently aggressive and threatening policies may never be known. Certainly, though, the process caused uneasiness in some quarters in Washington and narrowed the options available to the State Department by circumscribing courses of action dependent on the show or use of substantial force.³⁶ The precipitate decline of U.S. military power, accelerated by falling military budgets, carried ramifications that went well beyond military policy. Yet the supreme irony of demobilization is that while it was in progress, the country's leaders repeatedly proclaimed the need for a firm military posture to support a successful foreign policy. "We must face the fact," declared President Truman shortly after World War II ended, "that peace must be built upon power, as well as upon good will and good deeds."³⁷

As necessary and as unavoidable as the drastic dismantling of the mighty World War II military machine may have been, it appeared obvious before the end of the war that growing involvement and responsibilities abroad would require the United States to maintain a peacetime military establishment of unprecedented size. What strengthened this view initially was not so much the hostility displayed by the Soviet Union as the lesson of the interwar years and the tragic debacle of Pearl Harbor. In virtually all quarters of the government, civilian as well as military, there took root the conviction that never again should the United States allow itself to become as vulnerable as it had been in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Regular Army had dwindled to an average yearly strength of about 150,000 men and the Navy (not including Marine Corps) to an average strength of less than 100,000. Not all contingencies could be foreseen, but after having fought two world wars less than a generation apart, the need to be prepared for a third such conflict provided ample incentive for the War and Navy Departments to develop precautionary plans.

In addressing the problem of future military manpower needs, one possible approach that received close attention during and immediately after World War II was universal military training (UMT). Hardly a novel concept, the idea of UMT had been discussed since the late 18th century and the presidency of George Washington, whose advocacy of a large "trained militia" had since been the inspiration for numerous bills in Congress and other plans to establish a national

mobilization base of "citizen armies" in a perpetual state of readiness. During World War II, as the United States experienced difficulties in mobilizing and training the large forces that the war effort required, UMT again attracted attention.³⁸ During and after the war, General Marshall remained a strong supporter of UMT.

In October 1945 President Truman asked Congress for the "basic elements" of the postwar defense establishment: (1) a "comparatively small" Regular Army, Navy, and Marine Corps; (2) a "greatly strengthened" National Guard and Organized Reserve; and (3) a general reserve force composed of male citizens who had undergone a course of "universal training." The President's argument in favor of UMT stressed that it would be less costly than a large standing Army and Navy and that future emergencies could be met and dealt with through prompt mobilization. "The sooner we can bring the maximum number of trained men into service," the President said,

the sooner will be the victory and the less tragic the cost. Universal training is the only means by which we can be prepared right at the start to throw our great energy and our tremendous force into the battle. After two terrible experiences in one generation, we have learned that this is the way—the only way—to save human lives and material resources.³⁹

Predominantly negative reactions to his proposal prompted Truman in December 1946 to appoint a blue ribbon advisory commission on UMT headed by Karl Compton, a distinguished scientist. The commission's report, delivered to the President on 29 May 1947, recommended that every able-bodied 17- or 18-year-old male receive six months' basic military training followed by one of a number of optional ways of discharging the post-basic training obligation, primarily by a period of service in the Organized Reserves or National Guard.* The cost was estimated at \$1.75 billion annually.⁴⁰ Critics launched a swift and vigorous counterattack, some claiming that UMT would contribute little to national security since the commission's plan contained no provision for integrating UMT trainees into the active armed forces except in time of national emergency. Other opponents labeled UMT a disguised form of peacetime conscription, alien to American tradition, undemocratic, excessively expensive, and likely to lead to the "militarization" of American society. Faced with determined opposition, Congress delayed action on the proposed legislation.⁴¹

Equally discouraging to UMT proponents was the lukewarm attitude of the

* Universal service as defined in the report embraced any form of useful service to the country, not only military, although it was expected that most eligibles would receive training of a military character.

services toward the proposal. The public record showed that the War and Navy Departments strongly favored such a system, but off the record many military men, especially in the Navy, were in fact skeptical whether UMT, by itself or as the predominant feature of postwar military policy, fully addressed the matter of preparing for war. After the near-total disaster of Pearl Harbor and the defeats that followed, mobilization potential seemed less important than capabilities in-being that could both absorb an enemy attack and respond effectively. Service planning during World War II for the postwar period had emphasized the need for sizable ready forces, backed by trained reserves, which could operate successfully in the opening stages of a future war—a permanent peacetime military establishment that included a 25-division army; a 70-group air force with a substantial number of strategic bombers; and a navy with 339 major combat ships and 3,600 aircraft divided between two major fleets.⁴²

Military planners understood fully that estimates of peacetime needs had to be flexible. Requirements could go up or down depending on the exact nature of postwar overseas commitments, unexpected crises, availability of funds, and organizational adjustments arising from the impending unification of the armed forces. An added and even more uncertain factor that had to be considered in postwar planning was the impact of new military technologies, which had proliferated during the course of World War II. With the advent of atomic weapons, jet aircraft, radar, guided missiles, and a vast array of other weapons stemming from defense-related scientific breakthroughs, the possibility became increasingly real that future wars would bear little resemblance to those of the past. To be sure, military and scientific leaders consistently played down the idea that the age of “push-button warfare” had arrived or even that it was on the horizon. Yet it was impossible to deny the revolutionary effect of the recent innovations or that future scientific advances would create more imponderables with regard to weapons and strategic plans.⁴³

The most dramatic new weapon was, of course, the atomic bomb. In the summer of 1946, a year after the detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States conducted Operation CROSSROADS, atomic test explosions at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific. The two CROSSROADS shots starkly confirmed that the atomic bomb had introduced a truly revolutionary advance in weaponry. One group of technical observers regarded atomic weapons as so destructive that, if “used in numbers,” they could both “nullify any nation’s military effort” and “demolish its social and economic structures and prevent reestablishment for long periods of time.”⁴⁴ As the world’s only nuclear power until 1949, the United States enjoyed, in this one field at least, an absolute military superiority that partially offset worries over the weakening effects of demobilization. Not everyone believed that atomic weapons would or should be used again. But as long as they were avail-

able, there could be no doubt about the capacity of the United States to inflict great destruction on any would-be aggressor.

In actual military planning, however, nuclear weapons occupied a limited role in the years directly following World War II. Atomic bombs produced in these years remained primitive devices, awkward to handle and difficult to transport. Each bomb weighed an average of 10,000 pounds and required specially modified delivery aircraft. Also, the scarcity of fissionable material imposed severe restrictions on the output of bombs. Despite the high priority accorded them and their obvious importance to national security, atomic bombs were so few in number in the years immediately following the war that military planners hesitated to predict whether their use would produce decisive results. An Army Air Forces study prepared in April 1947 emphasized that while the atomic bomb was indeed a potent new element in modern warfare, it would probably remain for the next decade or so "a strategic weapon to be expended only when and where its destructive force will contribute most toward the defeat of the enemy."⁴⁵ In other words, nuclear weapons were in a special category by themselves, and while their availability afforded certain advantages, it did not mean that conventional forces would not be needed.

The complexity of new weapons such as the atomic bomb further complicated military planning by blurring the customary delineation of service roles and missions, thus demonstrating the need for changes in defense organization. Yet, even though the wartime conduct of joint operations had demonstrated the need for a permanent mechanism to provide continuous interservice collaboration, the pattern of overlap and duplication continued after the war, especially among the air services, where the Navy and Marine Corps resisted the Air Force's claim to the primary and dominant role. On top of the tight postwar budgetary situation, the persistence of heated interservice competition made it extremely difficult for the President and his advisers to work toward a rational peacetime force posture.⁴⁶

The Road to Unification

Of the many problems that confronted the nation's military leadership after World War II, none aroused more controversy than the effort to establish unified direction, authority, and control over the armed forces. In the history of U.S. military organization, World War II was indeed a watershed, for it demonstrated clearly that efficient and effective organization, at all levels of activity, could be just as important to operational success as having the right strategy or the most up-to-date weapons. Victory had been achieved not merely by force of arms or superior industrial capacity, but also by coordinated strategic and logistical plan-

ning based on closely screened intelligence, by the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, and by the organized and systematic application of scientific and technological research to the military effort. By the time the war ended, it seemed clear that a return to the prewar separateness of the services would be ill-advised.

In fact, service unification was by no means a new idea, although prior to World War II it rarely received serious consideration. Between 1921 and 1945, Congress looked at some 50 bills to reorganize the armed forces. Proponents of these measures included advocates of "scientific management" and governmental reform, legislators who sympathized with the movement for increased autonomy of military aviation, and economy-minded congressmen in search of cures for the Great Depression. Opposed by both the War and Navy Departments, only one of these bills reached the floor of the House, where it met defeat by a vote of 153 to 135 in 1932.⁴⁷

Developments during World War II forced a general reassessment of unification. As the war progressed, it became obvious that victory would require as never before the concerted efforts of all involved, military and civilians, to formulate strategy, mobilize resources, and direct forces in the field. There emerged a vast network of some 75 major joint (i.e., interservice) agencies and interdepartmental committees to coordinate the war effort. Most were temporary and not all were totally successful, especially in the area of logistics, where competition between the Army and the Navy for manpower and production resources posed endless problems. But by and large these agencies performed well and undoubtedly filled an essential need. Without them the course of the war might have been much different.⁴⁸

If close coordination at home was essential to victory, it proved also indispensable on the various fighting fronts. The Pearl Harbor disaster and the course of events in the several wartime theaters left no doubt that centralized control of operations was more effective than the prewar system of voluntary interservice cooperation. Teamwork became the keynote to victory, and commanders exercised operational control over joint forces—land, sea, and air—involved in the great campaigns of the war. The results in Europe were especially impressive, while in the Pacific command problems and friction between the Army and Navy persisted throughout the conflict. But by the end of the war few opponents of service unification seriously questioned the need for and value of unified control over forces in the field.⁴⁹

Of the new wartime machinery, probably the most important component was the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), created in January 1942 to act in combination with the British Chiefs of Staff and to coordinate the planning activities of the Army and Navy. Operating without any formal charter or

statutory authority, the Joint Chiefs, including the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, quickly emerged as President Roosevelt's principal military advisers, in which capacity they exercised unrivaled influence over the development of strategy and military policy. Since the JCS reported directly to the President, these matters were largely outside the purview of the Secretaries of War and Navy. Critics, fearing a possible diminution of civilian control of the military, questioned such procedures, but had to admit that the Joint Chiefs rendered a valuable service by providing a broader and more coherent method of managing the war.⁵⁰

Although many factors militated in favor of postwar service reorganization, none captured the public imagination quite so strongly as the coming of age of air power. From the beginning of the war the aircraft carrier replaced the battleship as the Navy's primary offensive weapon, while the enormously expanded Army Air Forces became a near-autonomous service, overshadowing both the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces. With the advent of the atomic bomb, many felt that air power was destined to become the decisive weapon of the future. Since 1919 most Army airmen had championed the cause of a totally separate air department, coequal with the Army and the Navy, as the best means of exploiting the full potential of military aviation. In the wake of World War II and evidence of the important role air power had played, they felt more confident than ever that their dream of an independent service would at last be realized.⁵¹

Despite widespread agreement on the need for postwar organizational reform of the military, the road to unification was strewn with obstacles. The basic difficulty, from the moment serious discussion of the matter began in 1944, was to find a plan of reorganization on which the War and Navy Departments and their respective supporters in Congress could agree. As debate progressed, it revealed deep philosophical differences and suspicions between the services that no amount of compromising or word juggling could totally resolve. The best that could be accomplished, as it turned out, was to legislate a structure acceptable to the services, test the new arrangement, and hope that time and patience would yield a workable and effective organization.

At the heart of the debate was the question of exactly how the services should interrelate and whether, or to what extent, aviation should become an independent service in the postwar organization. By and large, consideration of these problems turned on the relative merits of two competing plans—one developed in the War Department, the other in the Navy. The Army unification plan had many variants and was presented under several guises, but all followed a common theme calling for one department, a single civilian secretary of

defense, a single military commander or chief of staff, a single military high command, and functionally unified service branches for air, sea, and ground warfare. The Navy consistently took exception to these proposals, partly because it feared the loss of Navy and Marine Corps aviation to a unified air force and partly because it also suspected that a closely unified military establishment under a single secretary would result in a downgrading of naval forces. Even more alarmed was the Marine Corps, which saw unification not only as a threat to the continued operation of its air arm but as the first step toward absorption by the Army. Fearing for its very existence, the Corps reacted sharply, and even at times expressed dissatisfaction with the Navy for not mounting stronger resistance.⁵²

In October 1945 the Navy advanced its own proposals. Broader in scope than anything the Army had yet put forth, the Navy plan was largely the product of a special study group headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a former business partner and close personal friend of Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. Under the Eberstadt plan, unification took second place to the need for a general tightening of government-wide coordination for national security on a more permanent and far-reaching basis than had been achieved during the war. The military departments would remain separately administered entities but would concert their efforts through an array of interservice and interagency boards and committees, including agencies for the coordination of intelligence, resources planning, military education and training, logistics, scientific research and development, and strategic planning. The Eberstadt plan also envisioned the creation of a national security council, composed of the President and his most senior advisers, to act as a kind of board of directors to provide overall guidance and policy direction, similar in function to Britain's Committee of Imperial Defence.⁵³ In presenting the Eberstadt plan to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Forrestal heartily endorsed it as a model for legislative action:

I do not appear here simply in opposition to unification of the War and Navy Departments. I prefer here to present a comprehensive and dynamic program to save and strengthen our national security. I do not feel that unification of the services meets these requirements. . . . [Current proposals] fail to give adequate attention to an effective coordination of all the departments concerned with national security. . . . The immediate integration necessary is that of the War, Navy, and State Departments. Beyond that . . . there will be required to meet our problems of the future the creation of a mechanism within the Government which will guarantee that this Nation shall be able to act as a unit in terms of its diplomacy, its military policy, its uses of scientific knowledge, and finally, of course, in its moral and political leadership of the world—a leadership that shall rest on moral force first and on physical force so long as we shall need it.⁵⁴

The committee hearings that followed Forrestal's presentation served only to widen the Army-Navy rift over unification. As might have been expected, War Department spokesmen greeted the Eberstadt report with about as much enthusiasm as the Navy Department had displayed for the Army plan. They saw it, essentially, as an attempt by the Navy to obscure the issue and felt that it overlooked the potential benefits of unification as a means of improving the command, control, and management of the armed forces. By the time the committee recessed its hearings in mid-December 1945, Forrestal was convinced that the entire investigation had been a farce. Because Army partisans dominated the panel (just as Navy partisans controlled the House and Senate Naval Affairs Committees), he felt that the Navy had not been allowed to present its case in full and that the committee itself was "a highly prejudiced body which had reached a conclusion in advance."⁵⁵

With nerves becoming frayed on both sides of the debate, President Truman intervened with detailed recommendations of his own. As a former member of the Senate Appropriations and Military Affairs Committees and as head of the wartime Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, Truman had been shocked by the "appalling waste" and "numerous unnecessary duplications" that his investigations had uncovered in the Army and the Navy. The whole "antiquated defense setup," he concluded, was in need of a drastic overhaul.⁵⁶ In an article written for *Collier's* in 1944 while he was campaigning for the vice presidency, he had suggested that the only effective solution was "a single authority over everything that pertains to American safety."⁵⁷

It followed naturally that Truman initially espoused the position taken by the Army. On 19 December 1945 he notified Congress of his preference for a single department of national defense unified under the authority of a single civilian secretary. Truman emphasized that close unification was indispensable for two reasons—to promote sound fiscal management of the armed forces and to enable the United States more effectively to discharge its new global responsibilities. He felt that unification would yield significant economies, especially by consolidating supply and support functions. Within the framework of a single department, he proposed separate establishments for air, sea, and land forces, a military chief of staff, and authority to create central coordinating and support organizations, both military and civilian, as the need arose. As for the Eberstadt plan's proposal of a national security council, Truman appeared uninterested; he thought that for the time being the existing State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), created in 1944, provided sufficient coordination of political and military policy.*⁵⁸

Instead of settling the matter, the President's message seemed only to add fuel to the fire. Congress had as much interest as the President in saving money,

* For discussion of SWNCC, see Chapter V.

and the suggestion that unification would result in significant economies won for the idea a growing number of supporters. Even so, each side had its faithful followers who seemed prepared to hold out as long as necessary rather than capitulate to proposals they deemed unwise, unsound, or threatening to their favored service or to national security.⁵⁹ In late December, therefore, the Senate Military Affairs Committee appointed a subcommittee to investigate the possibility of a compromise. Its members included Sens. Elbert D. Thomas, Warren R. Austin, and Lister Hill, assisted by representatives of the Army and Navy—Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad (an Army Air Forces officer) and Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford. Study proceeded through nine subcommittee “prints,” or drafts, but the final product (S. 2044), submitted on 9 April 1946, leaned too far in the direction of the Army plan for Navy witnesses to give it their endorsement.⁶⁰

Exasperated by the continuing deadlock, President Truman on 13 May 1946 called Forrestal and Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to the White House and handed them identical letters urging them to reach agreement promptly on a mutually acceptable plan of unification.⁶¹ The secretaries reviewed the situation and on 31 May reported to the President that they agreed on 8 of the 12 points under consideration. The four points still in contention were: (1) whether to create a single military establishment that placed all the services under a single secretary; (2) whether to establish a separate air force having coequal status with the Army and Navy; (3) whether the Navy should retain land-based aircraft it deemed essential in support of certain naval operations, such as naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping; and (4) the role and mission of the Marine Corps and its air component.⁶² Since these four points, as Truman saw it, constituted the “basic issues” of the entire debate, he was understandably “deeply disturbed” over the lack of progress.⁶³

On 15 June 1946 the President stated his views on these four controversial points. First, he reaffirmed his support for a single military department and a single secretary of national defense. Each service within the overall organization should be headed by a civilian with the title of “Secretary.” However, only the secretary of national defense would serve as a member of the Cabinet. Second, there should be three coordinate services—an army, a navy, and an air force. Third, Truman endorsed in principle the retention of land-based aviation by the Navy, but he indicated at the same time that land-based aircraft used for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping “can and should be manned by Air Force personnel.” Lastly, the President upheld the separate existence of the Marine Corps, including its supporting air component, with functions essentially the same as those advocated by the Navy.⁶⁴

That same day Truman sent letters to the chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Military and Naval Affairs, advising them of the areas in which he would entertain compromise. In addition to the four points listed in his letter

to Patterson and Forrestal, Truman mentioned eight other "basic principles" upon which unification of the armed forces should rest. Moving in the direction of the Eberstadt plan, the President endorsed the creation of a council of national defense, a national security resources board, a central intelligence agency, an agency for military procurement and supply, a research and development agency, and a military education and training agency. Also, the President dropped his earlier request for a single military chief of staff and recommended instead the continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a statutory basis.⁶⁵

Despite the President's new proposals, the deadlock persisted. Many in the Navy still opposed a single department and objected strenuously to the possible loss of their land-based aviation, convincing Congress that the time had not yet come to enact legislation. After the 79th Congress adjourned, Forrestal on 7 November 1946 called a meeting at his Georgetown home with Army and Navy representatives to discuss areas of further compromise. It was decided that General Norstad and Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, a personal friend of Forrestal's, should work together on the preparation of fresh recommendations to break the impasse.⁶⁶ Weeks of intense work finally produced what became known as the Patterson-Forrestal agreement, submitted to the White House on 16 January 1947. At the same time Truman released a proposed executive order containing a clarification of service roles and missions;* two days later he notified the recently convened 80th Congress that he would soon submit new legislative proposals in line with the agreed compromise.⁶⁷

Compared with earlier Army and Navy efforts to compose their differences, the Patterson-Forrestal agreement contained the substance of a very real and serious compromise, with most of the concessions coming from the Army. Instead of a single department, the agreement called for an organization under the overall direction of a secretary of national defense authorized to establish "common policies and common programs for the integrated operation" of the armed forces, consisting of separately administered Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the Marine Corps), and the Air Force. Also, the agreement reaffirmed the need for a council of national defense, a national security resources board, and a central intelligence agency. It advocated continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and further recommended that they be assisted by a full-time joint staff. Finally, the agreement called for creation of a war council, headed by the secretary of national defense, to consider "matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces."⁶⁸

While the Patterson-Forrestal agreement marked a major step forward, many details had yet to be ironed out before legislation could be enacted. In the

* For details, see Chapter XIV.

Senate, consideration of the President's recommendations fell to the Armed Services Committee, which as of 1 January 1947 united the previously separate Military and Naval Affairs Committees. A new bill (S. 758) moved through committee hearings without significant difficulty, and on 9 July 1947 a slightly reworked version won approval on the Senate floor. In the House of Representatives, an identical bill (H.R. 2319) came before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Bowing to Navy and Marine Corps complaints that H.R. 2319 still did not safeguard their interests sufficiently, the committee recommended a new bill (H.R. 4214), which varied considerably from the original measure by further limiting the authority of the secretary of defense and by enhancing the status of the military departments. After the full House accepted this legislation, a Senate-House conference committee resolved the differences. On 26 July the National Security Act of 1947 reached President Truman, who immediately signed it into law.⁶⁹

The National Security Act of 1947

Like most legislative acts that are products of compromise, the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 253) accommodated a variety of viewpoints, fully satisfying none. Unification was the law's first and foremost goal, but not its only purpose, for while it dealt largely with the military, it addressed problems affecting other aspects of the nation's security as well.

As originally introduced in February 1947, both S. 758 and H.R. 2319 consisted of three titles, the first of which dealt with unification of the armed services, the second with coordinating machinery for national security, and the third with miscellaneous items—personnel, administrative, funding, and other transitional matters. In the final legislation Congress added a "declaration of policy" or preamble, and reversed the order of Titles I and II, thus "placing first things first," as one member of the Senate put it. The name of the organization provided for under Title II was not resolved until the very end of the legislative process. The Senate designated it the national security organization and called its head the secretary of national security. The House used the terms national military establishment* and secretary of defense. The conference committee adopted the House language.⁷⁰

* The term National Military Establishment (NME) was not defined in the act and remained a vague and unsatisfactory designation. In submitting amendments to the act to Congress in 1949, Truman asked that the National Military Establishment be converted into an executive department to be known as the Department of Defense. Congress enacted the change. See Chapter II.

The preamble, written by the Senate Armed Services Committee, set forth the law's general objectives. "In enacting this legislation," it read,

it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States, to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.⁷¹

In other words, the National Security Act sought to prescribe new ways for the executive branch to formulate and execute national security policy and at the same time to retain the traditional prerogatives and responsibilities of existing institutions.

The law's various titles elaborated on this prescription. Title I established coordinating machinery for national security and, in general, followed the recommendations and terminology of the 1945 Eberstadt report. A major innovation was the creation of the high-level policy advisory body, the National Security Council (NSC), composed of the President as chairman, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the military departments, and the chairman of another new agency, the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), charged with the formulation of policy and standby emergency plans for industrial and civilian mobilization. A third new body, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), replaced the non-statutory Central Intelligence Group, which since January 1946, as successor to the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), had exercised nominal responsibility over interdepartmental intelligence matters. Now legally chartered, the CIA was placed "under" the NSC to collect, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence affecting national security and to provide certain central services of common concern for the benefit of all existing intelligence agencies, which were to continue as in the past.⁷²

Title II dealt with the various components of the National Military Establishment: the powers and duties of the Secretary of Defense; his relationships with the military departments; and the roles and functions of several staff support agencies. Section 202(a) defined the Secretary of Defense as "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security." Follow-

ing the Senate version rather than the more restrictive bill passed by the House, the final legislation assigned the Secretary of Defense four specific responsibilities: (1) to establish "general policies and programs" for the National Military Establishment as a whole; (2) to exercise "general direction, authority, and control" over the military departments; (3) to "eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research"; and (4) to supervise and coordinate the preparation and execution of annual military budgets, including the formulation and determination of the budget estimates to be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget (BoB).

This assignment of functions and duties did not carry with it commensurate powers or authority. Because the military departments—numbering three with the creation of the Department of the Air Force—retained the status of "individual executive departments," they were still largely autonomous organizations, with nearly full control over their internal affairs. In fact, all powers and duties not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense became part of the authority of each respective departmental secretary. Furthermore, any service secretary, after informing the Secretary of Defense, could appeal any decision by the latter relating to his department. For the Navy and Marine Corps, the law added even more protection by guaranteeing maintenance of their aviation components, operation of land-based aircraft, responsibility for certain functions, including naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping, and conduct by the Marine Corps of "such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."

In addition to these restraints on the secretary's power and authority, Congress limited his top-level statutory staff, permitting him to appoint not more than three special assistants "to advise and assist him," making no provision for an under secretary or any assistant secretaries. These limitations on the secretary's staff support—later recognized as one of the law's most glaring defects—stemmed from compromises that endeavored to placate Navy opponents of unification as well as members of Congress who argued that a secretary of defense might become a "super secretary" and surround himself with a Prussian-style general staff. The secretary could hire as many civilian employees as he might require and could draw on the services for military aides and other staff assistance, but he was specifically prohibited from establishing a "military staff."

The remainder of Title II dealt with the creation of the War Council,* as recommended in the Patterson-Forrestal agreement, and with the organization and duties of three separate bodies, often referred to as the secretary's "staff

* Composed of the Secretary of Defense, the three service secretaries, and the service chiefs, and having the function of advising the Secretary of Defense "on matters of broad policy pertaining to the armed forces."

agencies" because they existed within the NME but were not part of any military department. Two of these agencies—the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board—owed their inclusion in the law almost solely to the influence of the Eberstadt report. They operated exclusively under the Secretary of Defense but were constituted in such a way as to give the military departments dominant leverage in their day-to-day operations. Each board was to have a civilian chairman with powers circumscribed by the absence of any decision-making authority and the presence of military department representatives whose unanimous consent was required for any action. The Munitions Board (MB), which replaced the Army and Navy Munitions Board (in existence since 1922), received specified responsibilities in the areas of military procurement, production, supply, and industrial mobilization. The Research and Development Board (RDB), successor to the nonstatutory Joint Research and Development Board, which in 1946 had replaced the wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development, acquired comparable responsibilities for scientific research and development as related to national security.

Additionally, Title II provided a statutory basis for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and officially recognized them as the "principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense." Subject to their superiors' direction and authority, the Joint Chiefs were to prepare strategic and logistic plans, provide for the strategic direction of the military forces, establish unified commands in strategic areas, formulate policies for joint military training, review the major materiel and personnel requirements of the armed forces, and provide U.S. military representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. The statutory members of the JCS would be the uniformed chiefs of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, "if there be one." Congress made no provision for a JCS chairman or other head of the organization. It did, on the other hand, recognize the Joint Chiefs' need for staff support and thus created a permanent full-time Joint Staff, limited to 100 officers, under a military director.⁷³

Title III contained a variety of miscellaneous provisions. It substituted the Secretary of Defense for the Secretary of War in the line of presidential succession and eliminated the Secretary of the Navy from the succession; * prescribed the salary scale for senior officials; authorized the Secretary of Defense, the NSRB chairman, and the Director of Central Intelligence to appoint advisory committees and hire part-time consultants; protected the status of civilian personnel who might be transferred from one agency to another; and authorized the appropriation of funds to carry forward the provisions of the act.⁷⁴


* The reorganization also had the effect of eliminating the service secretaries as members of the President's Cabinet.

CHART 1

ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

30 SEPTEMBER 1947



Perhaps the premier accomplishment of the National Security Act was its recognition that the military had a vital part to play in the development of national policy in peacetime as well as wartime. Critics could and often did complain at the time that the law threatened the "militarization" of foreign policy.⁷⁵ But in fact it simply acknowledged that the preservation of national security was a constant responsibility of the utmost importance, requiring the government to concert its efforts as closely as possible. After the experience of World War II and in the face of worsening postwar relations with the Soviet Union, no other course of action so readily suggested itself. In these circumstances, the National Security Act promised to fill an obvious gap by providing much-needed improvements in the coordination of measures for national security.

Whether the law would actually prove workable, however, remained to be seen. Under the rubric of unification, the act established a system which clearly lacked essential elements of cohesion. It placed enormous responsibilities on the Secretary of Defense but denied him, or so it seems in retrospect, the full power and authority to do his job. With allowance for no more than a bare minimum of senior staff assistance and with powers defined as "general," the secretary's effectiveness would depend primarily on his own ingenuity and forcefulness and on the degree of voluntary cooperation that the subordinate elements of the NME were willing to extend. "With coordination, rather than unification, as the motto," one historian has noted, "even the establishment of a co-equal Air Force could be considered a step backward, leading to triplification."⁷⁶ Yet as contradictory and inadequate as the law may have been, it should be emphasized that anything stronger or more definitive was probably unobtainable at the time in view of the sensitive issues involved and the intensity of the debate surrounding the act's origins. The only way to determine whether changes in the act were needed or desirable was to subject it to a period of rigorous testing.

CHAPTER II

The Unification Act on Trial

With the passage of the National Security Act in July 1947, the long road to unification of the armed forces appeared near an end. Yet in reality, the journey was only beginning. The act itself was essentially an expression of purpose and intent; it remained to be implemented. A legacy of traditional rivalry and more recent suspicion and antagonism over the unification question still divided the services. Differences over roles and missions, division of available funds, kinds of military forces needed and their management, and, of course, the kind of organization required to deal with these problems all remained to be worked out. Warily, and in some instances reluctantly, the services entered upon what promised to be a new era.

The First Secretary of Defense

In selecting the first Secretary of Defense, President Truman wanted someone who shared his views regarding both the major purposes and the potential of the National Security Act. Specifically, he wanted someone who believed in the need for unified direction of the armed forces and the tighter integration of military functions that could lead to significant savings. His first choice had been Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, a former federal judge, holder of the Army's Silver Star and Distinguished Service Medal for heroism during World War I, and, as his record during the recent debates indicated, a staunch supporter of unification along the lines the President had in mind. When Patterson declined the appointment for personal reasons, Truman turned to Forrestal. Without debate and with only a voice vote, the Senate confirmed Forrestal's nomination early

in the morning of 27 July 1947, only hours after the President had signed the National Security Act into law.¹

It was ironic that Forrestal, the Navy's most prominent spokesman in its opposition to unification, should become the head of the newly "unified" National Military Establishment. Yet, in his erstwhile capacity as leader of the opposition, Forrestal had done as much as anyone to shape the legislation that had finally emerged. His working familiarity with the law's contents and his intimate involvement with its origins were assets that few others possessed. Moreover, he was well known and highly respected in Congress and over the course of his years in government had acquired considerable experience in public administration. Filled with seemingly boundless energy, he was a tireless worker who devoted himself fully to whatever job he undertook.

Born on 15 February 1892 in Matteawan, now part of Beacon, N.Y., he was christened James Vincent Forrestal, though in later years he dropped the use of any middle name or initial and as Secretary of Defense often signed his correspondence with only his last name.² His ambition as a youth was to become a journalist, but after three years of working for local newspapers he became convinced of the need for a college education, entered Dartmouth in 1911, and transferred to Princeton the following year. There he continued to show a strong interest in journalism, but at the end of his senior year he failed to receive his degree for lack of sufficient credits. Apparently without funds to take courses to complete the degree, he left college to enter business. In 1916 he joined a New York investment firm which eventually became Dillon, Read and Co., Inc.

When the United States went to war in 1917, Forrestal enlisted in the Navy, trained as an aviator, and at the time of the Armistice was serving as a lieutenant junior grade in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He then returned to the bond department of Dillon, Read, where he rose rapidly to become the firm's leading bond salesman and a wealthy man. In 1938, at age 46, he succeeded Clarence A. Dillon as the company's president. Although Forrestal showed little interest in politics, he registered as a Democrat and supported the New Deal policies of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, to the consternation of many of his Wall Street colleagues. In June 1940, as the German army was marching through France, he accepted an invitation to come to Washington as one of Roosevelt's special administrative assistants. After serving briefly as liaison for Latin American economic matters, an assignment he did not find stimulating, he was nominated on 5 August 1940 to the post of Under Secretary of the Navy. "Probably the last thing that Forrestal expected," noted one Navy historian, "was that he would spend the rest of his life in the service of the government, but so it turned out."³

Most of Forrestal's activities as Under Secretary centered on the coordina-

tion of naval logistics. More than any other individual, he was responsible for "buying" what the Navy needed. As head of Navy procurement, he held a job of fundamental importance to the successful prosecution of the war and one he discharged with skill and innovation. His approach to this aspect of Navy Department administration was essentially that of an investment banker. Finding many of the Navy's procedures out-of-date, he introduced a wide variety of business-type reforms, including the extensive use of statistics and fiscal controls to help manage the Navy's far-flung procurement activities.⁴

Although procurement responsibilities alone made Forrestal a central figure in the wartime military establishment, he gradually acquired other duties and interests that involved him in an ever-broadening range of national problems. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, his immediate superior, had a history of heart trouble, and as his health deteriorated he turned over to Forrestal more and more of the management of the Navy Department. When Knox suffered a fatal heart attack on 28 April 1944, it was "almost a foregone conclusion," as Admiral William D. Leahy put it, that Forrestal would be Knox's successor.⁵ In fact, President Roosevelt nominated Forrestal on 9 May. Commenting on the speedy action of the Senate in adding its approval, Arthur Krock of the *New York Times* remarked that he considered Forrestal's appointment "the best thing for the Navy, for the War, and for the country."⁶

As World War II neared an end, Forrestal began to acquire a national reputation as one of the most industrious and articulate men in Washington. Yet he consistently shunned publicity and would have little to do with politics. He had, as one interviewer described it, a "passion for anonymity."⁷ While serving as Secretary of the Navy, he gradually developed a philosophy of administration that would stay with him the rest of his career. Successful government, he believed, depended on teamwork, and successful teamwork, in turn, depended on keeping friction to a minimum. Believing that a "decision that leaves scars" should be avoided whenever possible, he preferred that decisions be arrived at through discussion and reasoning. Rather than overcome opposition by fiat, he preferred to leave avenues of retreat for dissenters.⁸

Before the end of World War II Forrestal was becoming increasingly alarmed by the mounting evidence of Soviet hostility toward the West and the effects that international communist activity might have, both internally and externally, on the security of the United States. In the developing Cold War he played a key role, both as Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of Defense, in the formulation of policies aimed at containing the spread of Soviet and communist influence. Although often criticized then and since for being excessively reactive and overly hostile toward the Soviets, Forrestal had no doubt that the Soviet Union posed a real and deadly menace that required constant readiness and

vigilance on the part of the United States. "To be prepared for war," he often said, quoting George Washington, "is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace."⁹

The "Unified" NME

When Forrestal officially took up his duties as Secretary of Defense on 17 September 1947, he confronted the realities of a job that posed management difficulties of the first magnitude. With 2,300,000 military and civilian personnel, an annual operating budget of \$10 billion, and responsibilities to support and defend worldwide U.S. interests, the newly created National Military Establishment was a colossus, the largest and most costly agency in the federal government. Nothing like it had ever before existed. As an "establishment" rather than an executive department, it was a unique and somewhat nebulous entity. Existing law, tradition, and usage could provide only partial guidance for how the Secretary of Defense should perform his duties. To the extent that this would allow him to develop his own precedents and customs, it afforded him greater freedom of action than he might have otherwise enjoyed. But at the same time, deep-rooted traditions, customs, and interests of the services could just as easily handicap him and thwart his best intentions and endeavors. "This office," Forrestal observed to his friend Robert Sherwood shortly before taking office, "will probably be the greatest cemetery for dead cats in history."¹⁰

The unified NME that came into being consisted basically of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the three military departments, and several statutory staff agencies under the secretary. Unlike its detailed provisions about the military departments and the staff agencies, but in keeping with the general practice in chartering government departments, the National Security Act made no provision for the secretary's own office except by implication through permitting him to secure such assistance as he might require. Since OSD lacked statutory standing, it came into existence as an extension of the secretary himself, to provide him with necessary staff assistance. Restricted to the exercise of "*general* direction, authority and control," Forrestal viewed himself more as a policymaker than an administrator. "My own personal desire," he said in outlining his plans for OSD, "is to keep it as small as possible, not only for reasons of economy, but because my own concept of this office is that it will be a coordinating, a planning, and an integrating rather than an operating office."¹¹

While OSD served as Forrestal's immediate base of operation, he never regarded it as his sole source of advisory or staff support. On the contrary, he looked to his three statutory staff agencies *—the Joint Chiefs, the Munitions

* The War Council was also a statutory body, but it was not an agency.

Board, and the Research and Development Board—to carry the major burden of analyzing issues, developing plans, furnishing ideas and recommendations, and coordinating, within their respective areas of responsibility, the activities of the various components of the military establishment. In his initial directive on staff responsibilities, dated 16 September 1947, he stated his policy as follows:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, [and] the Research and Development Board . . . will be used as the primary staff of the Secretary of Defense within their respective spheres of activities, in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act, with no intermediate layers of authority within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Matters reaching the Secretary of Defense will be referred to one of these agencies, whenever appropriate. The agencies will either act upon such matters, or in the case of matters involving questions of major policy, will make their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.¹²

These three agencies came closer to being unified structures than anything else created by the National Security Act. With membership in each case drawn from the military departments, they were broadly representative of the entire NME and were assigned statutory functions that cut across departmental lines. The Munitions Board, generally speaking, dealt with procurement, production, and supply; the Research and Development Board operated in the area of science and technology; and the Joint Chiefs formed the secretary's principal military planning and advisory staff. Under the law, the Joint Chiefs had three other major functions: to serve as principal military advisers to the President, to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces, and to perform a rather vaguely defined responsibility that called on them "to establish unified commands in strategic areas."

In reality, each of these agencies was the statutory successor to a similar agency which had existed prior to unification. But all of the successor agencies differed in significant respects from their predecessors. The principal new change—from nonstatutory to statutory status—carried with it both a clarification of responsibilities and a legal obligation to accept and perform certain duties. At the same time, their activities became subject to a greater degree of supervision than previously. As parts of the overall establishment, their operations came under the constant surveillance of the Secretary of Defense.

The military departments, on the other hand, occupied a somewhat different position. Although integral parts of the NME, they had the status of executive departments, each separately administered by a civilian secretary who retained all powers and duties not specifically conferred on the Secretary of Defense by the new act. Far from deprecating or wishing to limit the role of these secretaries,

Forrestal made it plain that he regarded them as his principal managers. "It was my idea at the outset," he recalled some months after taking office, "that the Departments should retain autonomy, and with that, prestige, not merely in order to increase the position and prestige of the individual secretaries, but from a practical point of view to spread the burden of the work which would fall upon this office."¹³

Apparently Forrestal had little or no voice in choosing the departmental secretaries. But while he may have had other candidates in mind, he found Truman's selections agreeable. All three in any case were experienced administrators who had consistently demonstrated their managerial ability. His Secretary of the Army,* Kenneth C. Royall, an attorney from North Carolina, had served in uniform as fiscal director of the Army Service Forces in World War II and afterwards as Under Secretary of War to Judge Patterson. For several weeks after Patterson stepped down in July 1947, Royall had been Secretary of War. The Secretary of the Navy was Forrestal's former Navy Under Secretary, John L. Sullivan, a native of New Hampshire. A Dartmouth and Harvard Law School graduate, Sullivan had also served, during World War II, as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. The Secretary of the new Air Force, W. Stuart Symington, a Missouri business executive, had served as Assistant Secretary of War for Air since 1 February 1946.

In striving to develop and maintain close working relations with the services, Forrestal felt it advisable to utilize a variety of organizational devices. One of these was the War Council, mandated by the National Security Act and used extensively by Forrestal as a forum for the discussion of major policy issues. Its official members were the Secretary of Defense, the three departmental secretaries, and the three service chiefs.† Others who often attended War Council meetings included the chairmen of the RDB and the MB, the Executive Secretary of the NSC, Rear Adm. Sidney Souers, and a representative of the State Department, either George F. Kennan or Charles Bohlen, both leading experts on the Soviet Union. By law, the Secretary of Defense held the power of decision over any issue the War Council might consider. In actual practice, however, decisions were normally recorded as reflecting a consensus of the official members. Meetings were scheduled for every other Tuesday, prior to which a member of Forrestal's staff would prepare a formal agenda. After each meeting, following procedures similar to those adopted by the NSC, the War Council secretary,

* The National Security Act had redesignated the War Department the Department of the Army.

† The Marine Corps was not generally recognized as a fourth service until some years later. Hence the Marine Corps Commandant was not a member of the War Council or of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this time.

initially John H. Ohly, circulated a summary of the day's discussion and issued an official record of actions.

Indicative of the importance he attached to staying in close touch with the civilian leaders of the services, Forrestal in October 1947 created a second advisory body known as the Committee of Four, composed of himself and the three service secretaries, which alternated its biweekly meetings with those of the War Council. Procedures were essentially the same as those in the War Council, but with a somewhat stronger emphasis on confidentiality. In general, the committee addressed itself to matters that did not require the immediate attention of the service chiefs or that the service secretaries might discuss more openly in the absence of their military advisers. As a means of encouraging uninhibited discussion, Forrestal directed that Committee of Four meetings be conducted in utmost secrecy and that its records be accorded the highest security. All stenographic notes and transcripts were destroyed after the preparation of official minutes, which were then locked in a safe in Forrestal's or Ohly's office. There was no general distribution of minutes and only committee members or their senior aides were permitted access.¹⁴

The cumulative effect of these organizational arrangements was to produce an administrative system unlike any other in the federal government. Although the NME was technically unified, each component retained its own individual identity and operated in its own sphere. There were no pyramids of line and staff organizations as in the Army or in the usual structure of a federal department. Rather, the entire system rested on a network of agencies and departments linked together in horizontal fashion. The military departments were largely, if not entirely, self-administered under their own organizational format and procedures, while at the same time the service secretaries, staff agency heads, and certain other senior officers and officials reported directly to the Secretary of Defense.

Progress and Problems

During his 18 months as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal worked unceasingly to promote service unification. "The basic problem," as one of his aides aptly described it at the time, "was that of effecting, simultaneously, a marriage between the Departments of Army and Navy and a divorce between the Departments of Army and Air Force."¹⁵ Since the Army Air Forces was already nearly independent of the Army when the National Security Act was passed, it was relatively easy to separate them without undue disruption of their established routines. The process began on 26 September 1947, when Forrestal issued the first in a series of "transfer orders" that legally transferred the property, functions, and

personnel formerly assigned to the Army Air Forces to the new Department of the Air Force. With the signing of the final transfer order on 22 July 1949, "divorce" became total and final.¹⁶

While overseeing the Army-Air Force separation, Forrestal also worked assiduously to effect a happy and compatible "marriage" of the services as well. Ever aware that the Navy found the term "unification" abhorrent, he avoided using it whenever possible and generally spoke of "integration." His first concern was that steps taken in furtherance of unification should not lessen the morale and readiness of the armed forces. As much as he felt an obligation to unify, he felt also a duty to arrest and reverse the weakening effects of the postwar demobilization. "We have an act," he explained, "which was given us by Congress, and I propose to administer that act in accordance with the letter of the law, but with the spirit behind it which has as its eventual goal the achievement of a really integrated and thoroughly meshed military organization whose fundamental mission and objective is the security of the United States."¹⁷

Forrestal's whole approach to unification may be summed up in a single phrase—"evolution, not revolution." He believed firmly that steps taken to unify the services should be part of a rational and orderly process and not the result of change for the sake of change or appearances.¹⁸ He cautioned that integration might take "many months and maybe years."¹⁹ Yet through patience, determination, and persuasion, he gradually compiled a substantial list of accomplishments: a comprehensive evaluation of strengths and weaknesses in reserve force capabilities; a uniform military pay scale; a broad study of civil defense needs; a review of service medical requirements and hospital facilities; a single comprehensive annual NME program of legislative proposals for submission to Congress; a uniform Code of Military Justice approved by Congress; and initiation of a catalogue program developed and run by the Munitions Board to coordinate much of Army, Navy, and Air Force procurement.²⁰

One of Forrestal's earliest unification measures was the consolidation of the Air Transport Command of the Air Force and the Naval Air Transport Service into the Military Air Transport Service, or MATS. Intended in part to eliminate service duplication, MATS promised the advantages of simplification of command and operational economy.* When MATS came into existence on 1 June 1948, with Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, USAF, as Commander and Rear Adm. John P. Whitney, USN, as Vice Commander, it marked a step toward interservice integration. Not only did MATS exemplify unity of command, it also incorporated the principle of interchangeability of command, since Air Force and Navy officers alike could hold the top-ranking position.†²¹

* The Navy retained some of its transport squadrons for its own use.

† The principle was not observed in practice, for no Navy officer ever commanded MATS.

Despite such achievements as MATS, Forrestal's evolutionary approach could not bring about the integration of the services he had hoped for. This became most evident in the struggles between the services over the application of the "balanced forces" concept to their force structures, which Forrestal supported as best calculated to meet the overall military needs of the United States rather than those of the individual services. It did not mean dividing available funds equally among the services. But with funds in limited supply, the services felt shortchanged and subject to force-level ceilings that each argued would jeopardize national security. The Navy especially—with its tradition of opposition to unification well established—dug in its heels and gained a reputation for disputatiousness and recalcitrance. "Almost every time a unification program was suggested," recalled one of Forrestal's close advisers, "you could count on the Navy to oppose it."²² But the Air Force probably constituted no less a problem for Forrestal because its aggressive drive for money and forces greatly complicated the already difficult budget problem.

The services disagreed strenuously over a number of major issues having to do with unification. They quarreled over their respective roles and missions, argued over budgetary allocations, opposed the proposals to consolidate bases and installations, and resisted other efforts at integration that they feared might diminish their autonomy or established functions. At critical conferences in 1948—Key West in March and Newport in August*—Forrestal tried to persuade the services, especially the Navy and the Air Force, to set aside their differences and work together. But even his power of persuasion could not resolve all of the more important, divisive issues, and some others that appeared to have been settled continued to be bones of contention.

The repeated inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide Forrestal with unanimous advice on such sensitive matters as roles and missions, the allocation of funds among the services, and fully integrated strategic plans further aggravated the divisions and rivalries. Except for Admiral Leahy, who served as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief with no additional duties, each of the Joint Chiefs was also the senior officer of his service and therefore played a dual role. As service chiefs, they were principal military spokesmen and operated under the authority of their departmental secretaries. But as JCS members they formed a corporate body, representing all elements of the armed forces, and reported directly to the Secretary of Defense and through him to the President. This two-hatted role contained inherent difficulties. Many civilian and military observers doubted that any man had the time to do full justice to both functions or could so completely divorce himself from his service concerns that the advice he rendered as a member of the Joint Chiefs would be genuinely objective.

* See Chapter XIV.

Without definitive guidance from the Joint Chiefs on key issues, other parts of the system could not operate effectively. The Research and Development Board and the Munitions Board in particular found that they could not deal adequately with their most important problems because the Joint Chiefs could not agree on and provide them with certain basic premises on which satisfactory action on those problems depended. But the boards were also incapacitated by the deeply divisive nature of the problems that confronted them, most of which stemmed from interservice disputes over such major issues as the allocation of resources and the assignment of responsibility for programs that could have a long-term bearing on service functions. Lacking the power of decision, the chairmen had only their power of persuasion to help break the deadlocks that kept the boards from fulfilling their assigned missions.²³

Such disorder and confusion raised serious questions about the role, the authority, and the functions of the Secretary of Defense. Although Forrestal had readily conceded that unification would require the services to make numerous adjustments, he failed to anticipate the enormous volume of work that he would encounter and the many adjustments that he himself would have to make. After a short while on the job, he found his time taken up with unexpected administrative and policy matters, his efforts to integrate programs challenged by skeptics in the services who questioned the extent of his "general" powers, and his policies for unification threatened by continuing interservice feuds and competition. The days never seemed long enough to do what had to be done, nor did the limited size and authority of his staff offer much relief from the burdens that fell on Forrestal directly. The more work and the more unsolved problems that accumulated, the more obvious it became that Forrestal needed stronger powers if he was ever to deal successfully with the conflict and controversy, establish his authority, and make his decisions stick. In short, his job required him to be more of a commander than a coordinator.

Perhaps one of the most painful experiences of Forrestal's public career was reluctantly concluding that the statute he had done so much to engineer contained serious defects; moreover it may have cost him many of his friends in the Navy. In the end he found himself turning more and more to the Army for support. Upon returning to temporary duty early in 1949, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was amazed at how "highly discouraged" Forrestal had become:

He is obviously most unhappy. At one time he accepted unequivocally and supported vigorously the navy "party line," given him by the admirals. Only today he said to me, "In the army there are many that I trust—Bradley, Collins, Gruenther, Wedemeyer, and Lemnitzer and Lutes, to name only a few. In the navy I think of only Sherman and Blandy among the

higher ones. Possibly Conolly, also." It must have cost him a lot to come to such a conclusion.²⁴

In retrospect, no one can say precisely at what point Forrestal's views changed. Like his overall approach to unification, it was probably an evolutionary process. At no time, even after he accepted the need for a law with stronger powers, did he ever capitulate to the Army's position that a thoroughly centralized system was the only answer. But as one controversy piled on another, he moved steadily toward centralization.

The earliest clear indication that Forrestal harbored concerns about the inadequacy of the National Security Act came late in February 1948 in a top secret progress report to President Truman. The study contained four parts—a brief introduction, a rundown of the NME organization and Forrestal's immediate office, a summary of progress in solving major issues, and a statement on problem areas for future consideration. Although he made no specific recommendations on organization, Forrestal hinted broadly that the National Security Act was defective in several features. He saw the possible need for a deputy or under secretary of defense (something he had opposed during the unification debate) to help with administrative chores; commented on the debilitating effects of service rivalries; and stated that he was exploring avenues for obtaining closer unity and less partiality from the Joint Chiefs. On the other hand, though, Forrestal did not seek any major legislative surgery because he felt that the new organization was fundamentally sound and needed, at most, only minor adjustments to work more efficiently.²⁵

As time went on, however, Forrestal privately expressed increasing dissatisfaction with the law and began canvassing friends and colleagues for recommendations. Once again he sought the advice and assistance of Ferdinand Eberstadt, who had been instrumental in developing the Navy's unification plan in 1945. When Forrestal became a member of former President Herbert Hoover's commission on executive branch reorganization, he arranged in May 1948 for Eberstadt to head the commission's task force on national security organization.²⁶

With the Eberstadt inquiry under way, Forrestal on 3 August asked the service secretaries for their views on changing the National Security Act. At the same time, he invited some of the top leaders of the NME and members of his staff to a series of informal evening meetings in the Pentagon.²⁷ To stimulate and focus the discussion, Forrestal's staff listed more than 100 organizational and substantive matters in need of attention, including such questions as: Should the Joint Chiefs be reorganized; should a single chief of staff be appointed; should the Secretary of Defense exercise direct managerial control over the military

departments; and should the Secretary of Defense have a larger staff with an under secretary and several assistant secretaries? ²⁸

To Forrestal's request for comments, each military department replied with a detailed memorandum. The Navy, by and large, opposed any major change in the law, urging preservation of the status quo.²⁹ In contrast, the Army and Air Force favored more centralized authority. Together with strengthening the powers and administrative control of the Secretary of Defense, the Army again came out in favor of two of its basic goals—a single chief of staff and the elimination of separate military departments.³⁰ The Air Force took a more cautious position: It endorsed the single chief of staff concept but wanted to preserve the departments as three separate and distinct establishments.³¹

During the final months of 1948, Forrestal put aside whatever doubts may have remained in his mind and spoke openly of the need to amend the National Security Act. While characterizing it as "an excellent piece of legislation" and "a sound basis for the unification of the Armed Forces," he told the Eberstadt Task Force on 30 September that his reasons for seeking changes in the law were "our general experience to date" and "the heavy workload of problems that had required attention." ³² In his first annual report, published in December 1948, he outlined the changes he thought were needed: (1) appointment of an under secretary to act as his "alter ego"; (2) designation of a "responsible head" of the Joint Chiefs; (3) removal of the limitation on the size of the Joint Staff in order to expedite JCS paperwork; (4) creation of a Personnel Board, with statutory authority, to establish uniform personnel practices among the armed services; (5) elimination of the service secretaries from membership on the National Security Council; and (6) clarification of the powers of the Secretary of Defense, including deleting from the current law the word "general" to describe the extent of his direction, authority, and control over the military departments.³³

Almost concurrently with the issuance of Forrestal's annual report, the Eberstadt Task Force wound up its investigation and turned over its findings to the Hoover Commission. In their report to the commission, Eberstadt and his associates applauded the progress already made under the National Security Act as "a long step forward" toward a more efficient and unified system of military administration. But they agreed with Forrestal that the powers and authority of the Secretary of Defense needed strengthening, that he should have additional staff assistance, and that the performance of the Joint Chiefs could be improved with the appointment of a full-time JCS chairman to oversee military planning. Going a bit further, the committee recommended improvements in teamwork and cooperation among the services, expansion of research and development, prompt preparation of civilian and industrial mobilization plans in case of a sudden

national emergency, and more vigorous study of defense against unconventional forms of attack.

The committee also said that it had uncovered many instances of haphazard and sloppy fiscal management by the military departments and strongly urged that Congress overhaul procedures for the development and execution of military budgets. As one measure, the task force recommended the creation of the post of "controller" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Assuming these changes were made, a majority on the task force believed that the existing law would work with considerably improved efficiency and effectiveness. A minority, led by former Secretary of War Patterson, challenged this view and felt that waste and unnecessary duplication would continue until Congress enacted a totally new law. As he had so many times during the unification debate of 1944–47, Patterson championed the Army's plan for a unified, single department of defense.³⁴

By the beginning of 1949, all signs pointed toward a revision of the National Security Act. Deciding that some of the desired changes could not await legislative action, Forrestal took matters into his own hands and in January named General Eisenhower, only recently retired, and now president of Columbia University, to serve as temporary presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs, pending legislation to create a permanent chairman.* At the same time, President Truman publicly committed himself to revision of the law. In his annual State of the Union address on 5 January 1949 and in his subsequent budget message to Congress for fiscal year 1950, he called for "further improvements in our National Security legislation."³⁵ The following month brought added pressure when the Hoover Commission made recommendations similar to those of the Eberstadt Task Force.³⁶

The development of the administration's detailed legislative program was handled by a committee composed of Marx Leva, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, George M. Elsey of the White House staff, and Charles B. Stauffacher, Assistant Director in charge of administrative management for the Bureau of the Budget. Elsey and Stauffacher favored amending the law to give the President and the Secretary of Defense broad freedom and flexibility to reorganize the military establishment as they saw fit, with emphasis on trimming the power of the services and establishing a system of centralized command and control along lines similar to those the President had endorsed in 1945. As a further means of strengthening the secretary's authority, they wanted to strip the staff agencies of all statutory duties and vest in the Secretary of Defense the power of assigning their functions—a change that neither Forrestal nor Eberstadt had felt was necessary. Leva, as Forrestal's representative, resisted such drastic amendments

* On Eisenhower's duties, see Chapter V.

and was eventually successful in confining discussion to the general list of proposals contained in the secretary's recent annual report. But he could not persuade the White House and BoB representatives to abandon their proposal to vest the present statutory functions of the staff agencies in the secretary, with the power to assign them as he saw fit.³⁷

Out of these discussions came a report for the President, signed on 10 February 1949, by Forrestal, Director of the Budget Frank Pace, Jr., and Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President. They agreed that the National Security Act should be amended to achieve three goals: (1) to convert the NME into a single executive department; (2) to enable the Secretary of Defense to exercise "effective direction and control" over the armed services; and (3) to provide improved civilian and military staff facilities for the President and the Secretary of Defense. They went on to recommend an 11-point legislative program to achieve these goals: (1) convert the NME into an executive department known as the Department of Defense; (2) change the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force from "executive departments" to "military departments" within the Department of Defense; (3) remove the restrictive modifier "general" from the description of the secretary's direction, authority, and control; (4) delete the specific statutory duties of the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (5) provide broad authority for the Secretary of Defense to delegate the performance of his functions; (6) provide for an Under Secretary of Defense and three Assistant Secretaries of Defense in place of the Special Assistants; (7) redefine salary scales of the secretaries of the military departments, leaving the Secretary of Defense as the only official receiving compensation at the rate of a department head; (8) eliminate the language giving the service secretaries the statutory right of appeal to the Director of the Budget and the President and also delete the language reserving to the three military departments all powers and duties not vested in the Secretary of Defense; (9) provide that the Secretary of Defense be the only statutory member from the National Military Establishment on the National Security Council; (10) create a position of JCS Chairman and remove the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief from membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (11) remove the current ceiling limitation on the number of officers assignable to the Joint Staff.³⁸

The only undecided issues were whether the JCS Chairman should have the title of chief of staff to the Secretary of Defense and whether service combat functions listed in the current law should be deleted. Taking these matters under advisement, Truman on 16 February rejected the idea of a single chief of staff and decided against any change in the wording of the act with respect to service roles and missions.³⁹

Combining these decisions with the contents of the Forrestal-Pace-Clifford

memorandum, Truman in early March 1949 sent Congress his recommendations for amending the National Security Act.⁴⁰ On one of the President's proposals—the creation of the position of Under Secretary of Defense—Congress acted promptly. The House approved a bill (H.R. 2216), which had been submitted the previous month, the very day the President transmitted his message. The Senate followed on 18 March, and on 2 April the bill (P.L. 36) became law.⁴¹ As for the remainder of the President's recommendations, legislative action was still pending when, on 28 March 1949, Forrestal relinquished his duties to Louis Johnson.

Changing of the Guard

Before Forrestal was actually replaced, it had been widely rumored for several months that his days in Washington were numbered. Although the evidence is by no means conclusive, it strongly suggests that his "retirement" was involuntary and forced upon him by a combination of factors, including White House disenchantment with his performance, the political "debts" that the President had incurred in the 1948 election campaign, and Forrestal's own increasingly unstable health. Ever disdainful of mixing in politics, Forrestal had remained throughout his tenure on the fringes of the President's "inner circle," an outsider regarded by senior White House aides as suspect in his loyalty to the President. What others interpreted in Forrestal as the qualities of an intellectual—his constant probing of problems with questions, his capacity to assess issues from many angles, and his ability to see more than one solution—came across to Truman as signs of weakness and indecision. "Poor Forrestal . . .," Truman once remarked. "He never could make a decision."⁴²

The final blow to Forrestal's standing with the President was probably the rumor during the 1948 presidential campaign that he had tried secretly to make a "deal" to stay on as Secretary of Defense in case Truman's Republican challenger, Thomas E. Dewey, won the election.* By the end of the year Drew Pearson and Walter Winchell—two of Forrestal's most hostile press critics—were predicting that he would soon be fired. The President's decision was never officially announced, but by late January 1949 all outward indications pointed in

* Meetings between Forrestal and Dewey did in fact take place prior to the election, but they were held with the knowledge and approval of Truman to brief Dewey on foreign policy matters (interview with Marx Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77). Dewey later recalled that he had given "some consideration" to naming Forrestal to his Cabinet, but felt that any decision of this kind would have been "presumptuous" before the election (Rogow, *James Forrestal*, 276, quoting a letter from Dewey to Rogow). Forrestal denied any unauthorized contacts or discussions with Dewey during the course of the campaign (address to Natl Press Club, 1 Feb 49, *Public Statements of James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, 1947–1949*, V:1041).

the direction of Forrestal's imminent departure, with Louis Johnson, Truman's chief fundraiser in the recent campaign, often mentioned as the heir-apparent.

In sharp contrast to Forrestal, Johnson had made politics the focal point of his entire career. The eldest of five children of a struggling Roanoke, Va., grocer, he was born on 10 January 1891 and named Louis Arthur Johnson, though like Forrestal he eventually abandoned the use of any middle name or initial. In 1912, after graduating in law from the University of Virginia, he moved to Clarksburg, W.Va., reportedly on advice he had received that it was "a young man's town." There, in partnership with a friend, he established the legal firm of Steptoe and Johnson, specializing in corporate law. The firm prospered and within a few years it opened branch offices in Charleston, W.Va., and Washington, D.C.⁴³

Johnson ran for the West Virginia House of Delegates in 1916, won handily, and went on to become floor majority leader as well as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. When the United States entered World War I in 1917, he resigned from the legislature and joined the Army. Sent overseas as an officer in the American Expeditionary Forces, he saw combat during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives in 1918. After the war he became active in the U.S. Army Officers Reserve Corps and rose quickly to the rank of lieutenant colonel. From then on he was always known to friends and admirers as "Colonel" Johnson.

After his one term in the West Virginia legislature, Johnson never again served in elective office. During the interwar years he continued to practice law and, at the same time, became deeply involved in veterans affairs. In 1919 he helped found the American Legion, soon to emerge as the nation's largest veterans organization. In 1924 he was a delegate to the Democratic national convention, and in 1932, while serving as national commander of the American Legion, he acted as veterans coordinator for Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidential campaign. Four years later his name surfaced as a possible candidate to succeed George H. Dern as Secretary of War. The job went instead to Harry H. Woodring, an ex-governor of Kansas, and Johnson became Assistant Secretary of War.

Johnson served as Assistant Secretary of War for a period of just over three years, from June 1937 to July 1940. It was unquestionably one of the most turbulent tenures in the history of the War Department, marked by incessant feuding between Woodring and Johnson. As Assistant Secretary, Johnson had responsibility by law for procurement and industrial mobilization planning, a job roughly similar to the one Forrestal later performed as Under Secretary of the Navy.⁴⁴ Beginning in 1938, as President Roosevelt moved cautiously toward a policy of rearmament, Johnson and Woodring commenced their quarreling in earnest. Woodring, an isolationist, favored a go-slow policy on rearmament, while Johnson pressed for accelerated procurement, especially of aircraft. The result was

an almost daily battle between them over whose views would prevail. The resulting "holy show," as Harold L. Ickes called it, kept the War Department confused, frustrated, and demoralized for lack of consistent direction.⁴⁵

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 added urgency to the need for smooth, efficient management of the War Department. Johnson, having clearly established himself as an interventionist with no qualms about rearming, became convinced that Woodring's job would soon be his; he was bitterly disappointed when in the summer of 1940 Roosevelt fired Woodring and replaced him with former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson.* Within days of his confirmation, Stimson requested permission from the White House to replace his assistant secretary.⁴⁶ Johnson, complaining that he had been "unfairly treated" and deceived, saw no choice but to resign. "I reported to the White House on summons on Thursday," he remembered,

. . . and to my surprise was offered the appointment as Secretary of Commerce. I told the President I frankly didn't want it, (but he may have me boxed) and that I wouldn't accept it except on the condition that when he fired Stimson, as he would have to fire him (and he knows now he will have to fire him), I became Secretary of War, the only job in which I am interested in the Big City.⁴⁷

After leaving the War Department in July 1940, Johnson resolved to bide his time before accepting another high-level government post. During the war years he worked off and on with the Office of Alien Property Custodian and from March to May 1942 served as Roosevelt's "personal representative" to India.†⁴⁸ Insisting that a nasal infection and the Indian climate threatened him with permanent physical disability, he cut short his mission after less than three months and returned to the United States.⁴⁹

Following the war Johnson became active in a number of business ventures and sat on the boards of several large industrial companies, among them the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation, a major government contractor. Still with an eye toward politics, he emerged as one of Truman's most active and loyal supporters during the President's uphill struggle in 1948 to remain in the White

* Stimson and Frank Knox, who was appointed Secretary of the Navy at the same time, were Republicans, selected by Roosevelt to signify the need for national unity in time of crisis.

† Prior to Johnson, the senior U.S. representative in India had held the title of commissioner. Johnson refused to use this title: "He said that he was head of the largest law office south of Philadelphia and that in both of the Virginias the title 'Commissioner' meant one thing and one thing only: a conspicuously unsuccessful lawyer. Such being the case he could under no circumstances accept a position with the title of 'Commissioner' attached to it." Memcon G Howland Shaw with Johnson, 11 Mar 42, *FRUS 1942*, I:617.

House. Late in the campaign, with contributions drying up, Johnson took on the task of chairing the President's finance committee. In the words of Truman's daughter, Margaret, Johnson "proceeded to accomplish miracles."⁵⁰ There were even rumors that he had backed the President with \$250,000 of his own money.⁵¹ After the election, as reports circulated that Forrestal would soon be replaced, Johnson was mentioned repeatedly in the press as the frontrunner to be the next Secretary of Defense. He later insisted that he took the job at Forrestal's suggestion, but aides to Forrestal were skeptical. "It just galled him [Forrestal]," recalled one, "to think that an office he had created to be above and beyond politics would become a spoil of the 1948 campaign."⁵²

Whatever his personal views of Johnson may have been, Forrestal made every effort to facilitate a smooth and efficient change of leadership. The transition period lasted two months, from the end of January 1949 until 28 March, and was apparently prolonged by Forrestal's determination not to give up his job until he had completed work on the proposed amendments to the National Security Act. To acquaint Johnson with some of the matters he would face, members of Forrestal's staff compiled a detailed inventory of urgent organizational and substantive issues awaiting action.⁵³ Under pressure from the White House to expedite his departure, Forrestal on 2 March tendered his resignation and asked that it take effect around the end of the month.⁵⁴ Immediately after Forrestal's resignation letter reached Truman's desk, Johnson moved into a temporary office near the Mall entrance of the Pentagon and began keeping regular office hours.⁵⁵

During Forrestal's final days as Secretary of Defense, his aides noticed a steady deterioration in his stamina that they attributed to overwork. "Jim is looking badly," remarked Eisenhower. "He gives his mind no recess, and he works hours that would kill a horse."⁵⁶ Interviews with several of Forrestal's close associates, including Marx Leva, John Ohly, Stuart Symington, and Donald Carpenter, confirm that his powers of concentration were beginning to fail, but they do not agree on whether Forrestal had lost the ability to discharge his official duties. At times he appeared totally in control, but on other occasions he showed a definite lack of confidence in his own judgment. Carpenter saw the tragedy in the making. "This was the man who a year before had been keen, quick, and decisive, who had given me twelve answers in as many minutes or less. Now in twenty minutes he couldn't answer one question."⁵⁷

Although many, possibly including Truman, had suspected for some time that Forrestal's mental condition was deteriorating, the first indisputable evidence that he was having a nervous breakdown did not appear until 29 March 1949, the day after he left office, following a farewell reception for him at the Capitol.⁵⁸ Leva and Eberstadt hastily arranged for him to visit his friend Robert Lovett in

Florida, but when rest failed to revive his spirits he was brought back to Washington and admitted to the Bethesda Naval Hospital for psychiatric treatment. Despite signs of recovery he apparently suffered a relapse; in the early hours of 22 May 1949 he jumped or fell to his death from an unguarded window on the hospital's sixteenth floor. On his desk in the hospital room, he left behind, copied on a notepad, a quotation from the "Chorus from Ajax" of Sophocles, of which these poignant lines are singularly apropos:

*Worn by the waste of time—
Comfortless, nameless, hopeless save
In the dark prospect of the yawning grave.*⁵⁹

Johnson Takes Command

When Louis Johnson became Secretary of Defense on 28 March 1949 he inherited from Forrestal a defense organization still in transition. Amendments to the National Security Act had not yet been passed, but broad agreement had been reached on what they should be, and Congress was holding hearings. The new post of Under Secretary of Defense had been created, but an incumbent had yet to be named. In the minds of many Pentagon officials, Forrestal's departure had left a vacuum that no one could ever truly fill. Deeply admired, even revered by his staff, he had commanded their devotion and respect through thick and thin. His successor was an altogether different personality, and his way of doing things took getting used to.

From his service as Assistant Secretary of War, Johnson retained familiarity with the problems of the military, but after nearly a decade he needed to acquaint himself with many new developments in strategy and weaponry. On some issues, however, his mind appeared to be made up. He seemed to feel that with the coming of atomic weapons, strategic air forces rather than land- or sea-based forces or a balanced mix of all three offered the best assurance of security. On this key issue, his advent favored the Air Force over the other services and appeared to signal a stepped-up reliance on land-based air power that must have chilled the Navy.⁶⁰ Instead of abating during Johnson's tenure, interservice rivalry intensified, thus further complicating the search for a *modus vivendi* that would make unification work as its proponents envisioned.

Johnson was satisfied that the basic structure of the defense organization, with the changes contained in the proposed National Security Act amendments, was sound and that the administrative procedures Forrestal had established were in no immediate need of revision. Like Forrestal, he wanted to hold down the

size of his office and placed heavy emphasis on the role of his staff agencies as his principal sources of advisory support.⁶¹ He saw the greatest room for improvement in the application of a more businesslike approach to defense management leading to the elimination of what he termed the "costly war-born spending habits" of the services. Although many of Forrestal's unification measures had doubtless saved money, as Congress and the White House intended, the savings had seldom been apparent because inflation and growing Cold War pressures combined to push military expenditures steadily upward during his tenure.* Often implying that Forrestal had been lax in rooting out waste and unnecessary expenses, Johnson set out to rid the military of "fat" and to improve "muscle."⁶² Attaining a higher level of efficiency and lowering expenditures were two of Johnson's paramount aims.

Once installed in office, Johnson moved quickly to begin realizing his objectives. At his first press conference he made two announcements that set the tone for his tenure: first, that he had vacated Forrestal's old office space and was moving into the quarters that had formerly housed the Secretary of the Army,[†] and second, that he had decided that economy measures originally projected for implementation over a period of 30 months would now be applied "all at one bite."⁶³ Testifying before a congressional committee several months later, he promised savings of a billion dollars by the end of 1949 and another half billion by the end of 1950.⁶⁴ Rumors quickly spread that his real purpose in making such statements was to attract attention to himself and use the Pentagon as a springboard to the White House. Over network news one evening he was described as a "tornado that walks like a man . . . kicking anything that gets in the way."⁶⁵ Like Forrestal, he was an energetic and seemingly tireless worker, but unlike Forrestal he operated to such an extent by fiat and directive that his critics viewed him as a virtual dictator.

Some of Johnson's staff appointments reinforced the high-handed image. That two of his closest aides—Louis Renfrow, who served without any specific assignment of duties, and Paul H. Griffith, his "public affairs" assistant—were American Legionnaires with little government experience left him vulnerable to charges of cronyism. As Under (later Deputy) Secretary of Defense he named

* Forrestal's problems in controlling the budget are discussed in Chapters XI and XII.

† The Pentagon was originally built for the War Department, which occupied the building beginning in April 1942; its most impressive office, with scarlet carpets and adjacent private dining room, was that of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. When the NME moved into the building in September 1947, Secretary of the Army Royall retained Stimson's office, located in the "E" ring (of the Pentagon's five concentric rings, the outermost or "E" ring, then as now, housed the top-echelon officials) between the eighth and ninth corridors of the third floor. Forrestal settled for a smaller office in the E ring between the sixth and seventh corridors. With Johnson's arrival, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army switched offices.

Stephen T. Early, who had previously served as President Roosevelt's press secretary. Like Renfrow and Griffith, Early had little knowledge of defense matters and lacked experience in military management.

As Johnson's economy drive gathered momentum, he used it effectively to step up the integration of service programs. In contrast to Forrestal, he relied more on the advice of his own staff and less on that of the service secretaries. Without fanfare or explanation, Johnson dissolved the Committee of Four, leaving the War Council as the only forum for regular collective discussion.⁶⁶ By exercising much tighter control over the purse strings, Johnson effectively denied the services much of the independence of action they had enjoyed under Forrestal. Not everyone felt comfortable under the new arrangements, and some officials exercised the option to resign or go elsewhere.

First of the Forrestal holdovers to quit was Secretary of the Navy Sullivan, whose letter of resignation on 26 April 1949 represented an act of protest against Johnson's controversial money-saving decision to cancel construction of the Navy's giant supercarrier, the U.S.S. *United States*.^{*} Sullivan was promptly replaced by Francis P. Matthews, a lawyer-banker from Omaha, Nebr., who had worked closely with Johnson on fundraising in the 1948 campaign. Dubbed the "rowboat secretary" by the press for his lack of experience, Matthews candidly admitted that he entered upon his new job with "little prior training or preparation." He promised to learn quickly, but as an "outsider" senior Navy officers regarded him with reserve, if not suspicion.⁶⁷

Only a day after Sullivan announced he was leaving, Secretary of the Army Royall also resigned. Although a staunch supporter of unification, Royall had become something of an embarrassment to the Truman administration. A southerner with segregationist leanings, he had consistently tried to block or delay implementation of a 1948 executive order directing racial integration of the Army.⁶⁸ Said Johnson of Royall's departure, "I am glad he's gone."⁶⁹ Royall's successor was Under Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, a lawyer and newspaper publisher from North Carolina who supported administration policy on integration. By the summer of 1949 the only remaining member of the Forrestal secretarial "team" was Secretary of the Air Force Symington. Finding himself increasingly at odds with Johnson's cost-cutting policies, he made it plain that he would leave; in April 1950 he readily accepted an invitation from Truman to become Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.⁷⁰ Thomas K. Finletter, an attorney from Philadelphia who had headed the President's Air Policy Commission in 1947, took Symington's job.

John H. Ohly, one of the three original special assistants, probably summed

^{*} See Chapter XIV.

up the feelings of many when he once characterized Johnson's methods as unsophisticated and sometimes "ruthless." But unlike the military departments, OSD adjusted rather easily to Johnson's presence. To allay fears that he would fill the office with unqualified political appointees, Johnson assured his staff that politics would not intrude on OSD hiring practices. "I felt certain that he would go back on his assurances," recalled Donald F. Carpenter, who remained temporarily as Chairman of the Munitions Board, "and as soon as he did I would resign immediately. To my surprise he never did. I never had as complete backing from a superior as I had from Louis Johnson." Marx Leva received the same assurances, with the same results. "He gave us every backing," Leva said, "and the relationship was fine." Wilfred J. McNeil, who had served as Forrestal's special assistant for budgetary matters, likewise stayed on and grew to respect Johnson as an able and competent administrator. "The first months were a little rough," McNeil remembered, "but I thought in the last 6 months he turned out to be a pretty good Secretary."⁷¹

The 1949 Amendments

While Louis Johnson moved vigorously and most assertively to consolidate his power and authority, Congress pondered the administration's proposed amendments to the National Security Act. In general, most of the actions Johnson took had the support of Congress—not necessarily because Congress favored his tactics and methods, but because it wanted the economies they appeared to promise. Few denied that Forrestal had done a commendable job, but with Johnson driving and pushing, the expected savings that had prompted many legislators to vote for unification in the first place now appeared closer to reality. For this reason alone, removing impediments that had hobbled Forrestal's efforts eventually received nearly unanimous endorsement on Capitol Hill. The chief opposition to the amendments came in the House, where Carl Vinson, one of the Navy's most powerful supporters during the original unification struggle, used his position as Chairman of the Armed Services Committee to fight for the preservation of the existing system. But with virtually the entire House, and the Senate as well, convinced that unification should not be thwarted at this promising juncture, Vinson faced a losing battle. What might have become a second unification debate never materialized.

Despite an administration plea for prompt legislative action, Congress followed a leisurely course because of lengthy Senate hearings and Vinson's delaying tactics in the House. On 24 March 1949, just four days before Forrestal stepped down, Sen. Millard E. Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, opened hearings on a bill (S. 1269) he had drafted to amend the

National Security Act in general conformity with President Truman's recommendations. As one of his last official acts, Forrestal led off the testimony with the candid confession that "my position on the question has changed." Although he hedged giving unqualified endorsement to the Tydings bill, Forrestal was convinced that it contained the essential provisions necessary to make the law serve its intended purpose. The two changes he deemed most important were, first, clarification of the secretary's powers by removing the restrictive adjective "general" from describing the extent of his "direction, authority, and control"; and second, strengthening the secretary's staff support through the addition of an under secretary of defense, a chairman of the JCS, and assistant secretaries in place of the special assistants. Neither change, he argued, would result in a fundamental departure from the principles or objectives of the original law. "Once this fact is recognized," he said, "it becomes evident that the proposals in the Tydings bill would place no powers in the Secretary of Defense which are not already vested in the President."⁷²

Witnesses who followed Forrestal generally supported his position, although none except former Secretary of War Patterson fully endorsed the bill as written; no one expressed unalterable opposition. By and large, Army and Air Force spokesmen were more in favor of the legislation than were those from the Marine Corps and Navy. General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, believed the Tydings bill conferred "entirely too much power" on the Secretary of Defense. And, he complained, "I do not think the National Security Act has been given a fair trial."⁷³ After Louis Johnson's advent, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Dan A. Kimball offered further reservations, arguing that there was probably no need for the bill since Johnson was a "very strong man," with "very decided opinions," and "extremely capable."⁷⁴

The most controversial issue to come up at the Senate hearings concerned the administration's proposed changes affecting the Joint Chiefs, particularly the proposal to delete their statutory duties. Although the Tydings bill departed somewhat from the administration's original 11-point program by retaining the statement of duties for the secretary's three staff agencies, the wording was such in each case that the Secretary of Defense could easily reassign their functions as he saw fit. In addition to sending the Secretary of Defense a memorandum protesting this and several other minor parts of the Tydings bill,⁷⁵ the Joint Chiefs appeared together before the committee on 7 April 1949 to air their views. Speaking for all as senior member at the time, Admiral Louis Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, said:

The way the section now reads in the proposed legislation, the Secretary of Defense . . . could give them [the chiefs' statutory duties] to any-

body else he wanted, and we think they are proper functions for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and they are functions which we now perform.

. . . .

If you didn't have that amendment, the Secretary of Defense could tell anybody to do that function, he could appoint a board, he could detail it to any person to do it, and while I do not think the present Secretary of Defense would do that, I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be protected in this way.⁷⁶

Although Secretary Johnson had previously sent the committee a letter reaffirming the administration's position,⁷⁷ the senators found Denfeld's statement more persuasive and decided to amend the Tydings bill by restoring approximately the same language contained in the existing legislation to describe the statutory duties not only of the Joint Chiefs but of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board as well.

After a three-week recess, the Senate committee reconvened its hearings on 5 May 1949 to consider further amendments to the Tydings bill, looking specifically at a proposal drafted by a task group under Ferdinand Eberstadt and McNeil to streamline the preparation and execution of annual military budgets in line with the recommendations of the Hoover Commission and the Eberstadt Task Force. Persuaded by McNeil and other witnesses—including Hoover and Eberstadt—that these measures would result in more "business-like operations" and save money, the committee adopted the budget amendments as Title IV to the National Security Act. On 12 May it reported a slightly revised bill (S. 1843), retaining the essential provisions of S. 1269, to the full Senate, which approved it on 26 May.⁷⁸

Hearings before Vinson's House Armed Services Committee commenced on 28 June 1949, with an appearance by Secretary Johnson, his first congressional testimony on the proposed amendments. As soon as the formalities were out of the way, Johnson and Vinson locked horns, with the latter openly challenging the witness to produce hard evidence that legal difficulties posed insurmountable barriers to the effective execution of the current statute. "I do not believe," Vinson contended, "that the point can properly be made that experience under the law has shown the power of the Secretary of Defense to be too weak." Johnson disagreed and termed the current setup as nothing more than "a half of loaf [sic]." His reasons for supporting the proposed amendments, he said, were twofold: "First, I think the security of the Nation can't be adequately protected without having this additional authority. I think secondly that it is going to cost the Defense Establishment more than our economy can bear unless we have this law." Vinson remained unconvinced.⁷⁹

After taking additional testimony from a number of other witnesses, the House committee voted by a narrow margin (13 to 12) to suspend its hearings in favor of conducting a probe of alleged scandals concerning procurement of the B-36 bomber.* Confident that the Senate bill would now do nothing more than gather dust, Vinson reconvened the committee on 14 July to consider a measure (H.R. 5632) that closely followed the Title IV amendments in S. 1843. To force action, President Truman indicated that he would exercise his powers under the Reorganization Act of 1949, and on 18 July he transmitted to Congress Reorganization Plan No. 8, containing most of the provisions in the Senate legislation. Vinson, discovering that he had been outmaneuvered, promptly released H.R. 5632 to the House floor, where it passed without difficulty. A conference committee accepted the House bill as Title IV and the Senate bill for the rest of the legislation. With the addition of President Truman's signature, it became law on 10 August 1949.⁸⁰

The amended legislation of 1949 (P.L. 216) made a number of significant changes in the original act of 1947. Most importantly, it clarified and increased the power and authority of the Secretary of Defense. The National Military Establishment was converted into the Department of Defense (DoD), an executive (Cabinet-level) department, and the three subordinate departments were demoted to the status of "military departments." At the same time, the Secretary of Defense acquired unqualified "direction, authority, and control" over the entire organization and became the "principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense."† The military departments would still be separately administered by respective secretaries, but specifically under the "direction, authority, and control" of the Secretary of Defense. Moreover, these secretaries lost their previous statutory right to make reports and recommendations relating to their respective departments directly to the President or the Director of the Budget—in effect a right of appeal of decisions taken by the Secretary of Defense—although along with the members of the Joint Chiefs, each secretary was given the new statutory privilege of making recommendations to Congress. The secretaries also lost their statutory membership on the National Security Council, but shortly after the new law was passed, Johnson directed that they should continue to accompany him to all NSC meetings.⁸¹

Second, the law bestowed on the Secretary of Defense the power to exercise increased direction, authority, and control through the members of his staff. The under secretary was elevated to the rank of deputy secretary, given the power to

* On the B-36 probe, see Chapter XIV.

† This change from the 1947 language—which had read "principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to national security"—represented a narrowing of the secretary's role. At the same time, it reinforced his position within the Department of Defense.

act for the secretary during the latter's absence or disability, and accorded precedence within the department after the secretary, thus eliminating any uncertainty over where he stood in the pecking order. Also, the three special assistant positions became assistant secretaries, a rank that accorded them greater stature and increased their ability to act effectively on the secretary's behalf. The law further specified that one of the three assistant secretaries should serve as "Comptroller," in which capacity he was authorized to act as the secretary's principal deputy for budgetary and fiscal matters. Under the new Title IV, the comptroller became caretaker of the military budget, with responsibility for prescribing uniform budgetary and accounting procedures for the military departments. However, he was specifically prohibited from allocating funds in a manner that might render any of the services incapable of discharging its legally assigned functions. In other words, budgetary controls were to be used to achieve greater efficiency and economy and not to subvert or destroy the separate and independent identities of the services.

Third, Congress mandated several important changes in the internal structure and composition of the Joint Chiefs. The post of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, unoccupied since Admiral Leahy's retirement in March, was abolished and in its place Congress authorized the appointment of a full-time JCS Chairman, senior in rank to all other military officers, to advise the President and the Secretary of Defense and to expedite JCS business. While acknowledging the chiefs' need for additional staff support, Congress rejected the President's suggestion to remove all limits on the size of the Joint Staff, fearing that such action might result in the creation of a "military staff," and agreed only to increase its size from 100 to 210 officers. At the same time, it reiterated its opposition to a "single Chief of Staff," tried to restrict the influence of the JCS Chairman by denying him a "vote" in JCS debates, and turned down the President's recommendation to eliminate the chiefs' statutory duties as enumerated in the 1947 act. These limitations were, however, practically meaningless since they had no direct bearing on the Joint Chiefs' ultimate role in the formulation of military policy. As Johnson pointed out, the Joint Chiefs did not hold formal voting or "decide"; they were advisers and responsibility for final decisions rested with the Secretary of Defense or, if necessary, the President.⁸²


Lastly, the 1949 amendments gave the Secretary of Defense more control over his other statutory staff agencies—the Research and Development Board and the Munitions Board. Subject to the authority possessed and granted by the secretary, the chairman of each board acquired the power of decision over all matters falling within each board's jurisdiction. In addition, while leaving their statutory duties essentially intact, Congress reworded the boards' functions with a view toward strengthening their coordinating power. Elsewhere in the law, Con-

gress changed the name of the War Council to the Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC) and added the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman to its membership.

As an expression of political philosophy the 1949 amendments marked a departure from the concept of decentralized authority that the 1947 version of the law had labored to establish. No longer could there be any legal basis for the services to question the power and authority of the Secretary of Defense, except in specific and carefully defined areas. The real significance of the amended law was the removal of impediments that experience over the first two years had demonstrated to be obstacles to unification. "We finally succeeded," wrote Truman with a sigh of relief, "in getting a Unification Act that will enable us to have Unification and as soon as we get the cry babies in the niches where they belong, we will have no more trouble."⁸³

As important and necessary as the 1949 amendments may have been, they did not, in fact, solve the basic problem as easily as Truman imagined. The machinery established in 1947 groaned and creaked along not merely because of organizational shortcomings or "cry babies" who opposed unification, but because of legitimate disagreements over strategy, competition among the services for scarce dollars, and divergent opinions over the composition of forces best suited for the support of national policy. The experience of World War II, followed swiftly by the onset of the Cold War, accentuated the need for a crisp and efficient organization for national security. But the ultimate test of the new organization would not be the extent of centralization or decentralization of control; it would be how capable it proved of protecting the nation's vital security interests.

CHART 2 ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 10 AUGUST 1949



CHAPTER III

The Office of the Secretary of Defense

The creation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was one of the most innovative and significant changes that unification wrought in the U.S. military establishment. Lacking a statutory basis—the offices of Cabinet secretaries have not generally been established by law—OSD came into being as an extension of the secretary and developed gradually as Forrestal and his successors enlarged their authority over the vast defense organization. Although OSD received initially perhaps the least public notice of the major organizational changes resulting from the National Security Act, its fundamental importance as an authoritative extension of the secretary's powers became evident almost immediately. Key appointments by Forrestal and Johnson, combined with expanding functions, set OSD solidly on the road to becoming the central executive office for the whole defense establishment.

Forrestal came to the position of Secretary of Defense with views about the new military establishment conditioned by his role in fashioning it. He hoped to exercise effective control through coordination of the activities of the military departments rather than by command decision. It did not take him long to realize that he had misjudged the scope of the problem and the depth of negative feelings he faced in seeking to secure the goals envisioned in the National Security Act. The ideal of a small staff of able people effectively resolving major issues and moving steadily toward integration of functions of the military services could not be translated into practice.

OSD sat on top of a vast military establishment that spanned the world. The Army and Navy for 150 years had been sovereign and independent departments with jealously guarded prerogatives and traditions. The new Department of the Air Force, sprung full-grown from the Army, was instinct with a sense of

power and mission derived from its success in World War II, the central role of air power in postwar strategic plans, and U.S. possession of the atomic bomb. Most tradition-conscious of all the services, the Marine Corps was also the most sensitive to threats to its unique status. Regardless of whether they had supported or opposed unification, all of the military services had inherent doubts and suspicions about the new structure and especially about the role of the Secretary of Defense and his immediate staff. Although holding widely disparate views on unification, they generally agreed on the preservation of a large measure of service autonomy and freedom of action in relation to OSD.

Gaining control over such an array of great and proud sovereignties presented a truly formidable challenge for Forrestal and his handful of assistants in OSD. Forrestal's early hope of achieving policy direction and effecting important and useful unification measures through voluntary cooperation and coordination could be realized only in part. The problem was, of course, more complex than simply resistance to OSD or evasion of its control. Much of the difficulty stemmed from the interservice rivalry that creation of the Air Force had only compounded. Both Forrestal and Johnson found themselves frustrated and often defeated by the inability or unwillingness of the services to pull together as a team. Much of the difficulty also resulted from the absence of an adequate OSD mechanism to deal with a wide range of problems at the secretary's level. A good relationship between OSD and the military departments necessarily was the most important element in making the new organization work; more than anything else the nature of this relationship determined how OSD evolved into something quite different from what Forrestal originally envisioned.

Forrestal's Staff

When he took office in September 1947, Forrestal may well have felt like a mariner setting out on a voyage into little known and uncharted waters. He had only the language of the National Security Act and his nearly seven years of experience as Under Secretary and Secretary of the Navy to guide him. In the words of the 1948 Eberstadt Task Force, "he had no office, no staff, no organization chart, no manual of procedures, no funds, and no detailed plans."¹ It is probable that he had few firm ideas on how his office should be organized and run, except that it should be small and concentrate on matters of policy and coordination.

The National Security Act gave the Secretary of Defense wide discretionary authority in organizing his office. For his immediate needs it allowed him direct staff support from three sources. He could appoint three civilian special assistants

whose salaries, at \$10,000 per year, equaled those received by departmental under or assistant secretaries. He could hire, subject to Civil Service Commission regulations, as many professionals and clerical aides, including part-time consultants, as he required. And he could request the services to detail officers as assistants and personal aides to him. In addition, Forrestal could draw on the resources of several "staff agencies"—the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Research and Development Board, and the Munitions Board. From the outset, Forrestal viewed and treated chairmen of the boards as members of his immediate staff.

A few weeks before his swearing-in, Forrestal formed an ad hoc committee, with Ferdinand Eberstadt as the senior member, to survey his staff requirements and make recommendations on the organization of his office.* In keeping with Forrestal's known views, the committee felt that a small staff would be sufficient and recommended that Forrestal divide the activities of his immediate office into functional areas—legal and legislative matters, budgetary and fiscal affairs, and public relations—with a special assistant serving as principal coordinator for each area. The committee also recommended that Forrestal consider naming a fourth assistant, for administrative matters. Obviously the committee assumed that OSD's principal functions would be limited. No one involved in these discussions took into account the possibility that Forrestal's responsibilities might include a wide range of substantive matters that could not be handled by the secretary personally, that could or should not be delegated to the services or the staff agencies, and that were not legal, legislative, or budgetary.²

Recommendations to Forrestal from Donald C. Stone of the Bureau of the Budget in late August differed from those of the Eberstadt group, stressing the secretary's need for a staff composed heavily of specialists to analyze substantive issues and interpret programs and plans. Stone also advised against assigning the special assistants specific duties, arguing that "the most effective use of these assistants will be for work which cuts across organizational lines." "The broad objective," he added, "should be to establish an arrangement under which the special assistants can render the maximum assistance to the Secretary of Defense and have to that end the maximum breadth of point of view and of experience in day-to-day operations."³ Forrestal accepted Stone's advice in part in preparing the job descriptions for the special assistants. The day before he was sworn in he issued a directive stating that while they would each work within "generally assigned spheres of activities," they should nonetheless endeavor to "operate as a team, rather than along separate and distinct functional lines."⁴

In press releases of 17 and 23 September, Forrestal announced the selection

* Others who served on this committee included Richard M. Paget, Rear Adm. John Gingrich, Arthur C. Hill, Marx Leva, Charles Detmar, Maj. Gen. Clinton F. Robinson, USA, and Frank Nash.

of his special assistants, all of whom, though relatively young, possessed impressive credentials. For two of the jobs he selected former Navy Department aides—Marx Leva, assigned responsibility for legal matters and legislative liaison, and Wilfred J. McNeil, named to coordinate budgetary and fiscal affairs. The third special assistant was John H. Ohly, whose previous position as Special Assistant to Secretary of War Patterson helped blunt possible Army and Air Force criticism that Forrestal's staff was top-heavy with Navy people. In contrast to the others, Ohly at first had quite loosely defined duties. Instead of public relations, as the Eberstadt committee had proposed, Forrestal indicated that Ohly's principal task was to assist "on liaison with other of the various agencies that are grouped around this organization."⁵ As it turned out, Ohly's functions eventually encompassed far more than this original assignment.

Although the special assistants came from widely different backgrounds, they all had in common an intense admiration for Forrestal. At 46, McNeil was the oldest of the group. Born and raised in Iowa, he had never graduated from high school and lacked further formal education. After serving in the Navy in World War I, he had held a variety of business and banking jobs in the midwest before moving to Washington in 1934 to become a circulation manager for the *Washington Post*. As a member of the Naval Reserve, he entered on active duty in 1941 and served in Washington until he left active service in 1945 with the rank of rear admiral. Named Navy fiscal director in 1944, he stayed on in a civilian capacity to help Forrestal devise and implement the measures that modernized the Navy's budget management. McNeil became widely known as one of the most informed and perceptive budget managers in the federal government. When Forrestal became Secretary of Defense in 1947, he considered it essential that McNeil join him in OSD.⁶

Through McNeil, Forrestal met Marx Leva. Only 32 at the time he was named special assistant, Leva was a native of Alabama, a graduate of the Harvard Law School, and a former clerk to Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. During World War II Leva saw extensive combat action with the Navy in the Mediterranean and in the invasion of Normandy. As the war drew to a close, he was reassigned to Washington, where he joined McNeil's staff as General Counsel. Of those who served in OSD, Leva was perhaps Forrestal's closest personal confidant.⁷

The choice of Ohly for the third position was Leva's idea. Lest Forrestal's staff appear Navy-dominated, Leva recommended the selection of someone from the War Department to add "balance." Four years older than Leva, Ohly was a graduate of Williams College and the Harvard Law School. After practicing law in New York, he moved to Washington late in 1940 to join the staff of then-Assistant Secretary of War Patterson. Specializing in manpower and related

matters during the war, he became Patterson's special assistant after the war and then served as Executive Secretary of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training (the Compton Commission). As organizing for OSD began in 1947, Leva, who had known Ohly only casually, recommended him to Forrestal. "Having recently been the Secretary of War's special assistant," Ohly recalled, "and being fairly widely known among personnel in both the Army and the Air Force as a result of this association, I was apparently regarded as a person who, in a sense, might represent the Army and Air Force in the new office."⁸

In addition to the three extraordinarily capable special assistants, Forrestal and Johnson had the good fortune to be served by many other officials of outstanding ability and talent, among them Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Vannevar Bush, Karl Compton, Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General Joseph T. McNarney, Robert Blum, Najeeb Halaby, Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons, Felix Larkin, John Noble, Jr., and Col. Robert J. Wood. During the Forrestal period especially, according to Ohly, OSD was a "very . . . demanding and stimulating place to work and, even at the time and still more in retrospect, [I] considered it to be a great privilege to be associated on a day-to-day basis with the people who were my . . . working companions. . . . One had a sense of mission and purpose, of being a part of an important, constructive undertaking." Speaking of Forrestal, Halaby wrote: "The too brief time I spent working for him was one of the most exciting and stimulating periods of my life." This sense of mission and rewarding experience must have infused much of the OSD staff and made possible the large accomplishments of such a small band of dedicated public servants.⁹

Operating on the same narrow interpretation he initially applied to his statutory powers and assuming that the service secretaries would be his principal managers, Forrestal during the early months vastly underestimated his need for staff support. The mistake was soon apparent. "Forrestal, at the outset, didn't know this and didn't believe it," Ohly recalled. "This was one of the lessons of the first year—a lesson that Forrestal reluctantly, but readily and quickly as soon as it sank in, accepted."¹⁰

Consequently, while it remained small compared with many other government offices, OSD experienced the rapid growth, both in size and in complexity of operations, typical of a new organization. Forrestal moved into the Pentagon on 22 September, bringing with him en masse his Navy office of about 45 employees, of whom more than 80 percent were support personnel—secretaries, clerks, mess attendants, chauffeurs. As the volume of work increased, the number of employees rose to 173 by the end of January 1948 and to 347 by the beginning of 1949. Thereafter, until the Korean War brought about a further increase, the size of the office fluctuated between 350 and 400 employees, of whom 15 to

20 percent were military "on loan" from the services. The vast majority of those who worked in OSD were civilians, many handling complicated technical, analytical, and administrative tasks that Forrestal had not originally imagined the office would be concerned with.¹¹

Forrestal's office, as initially delineated in an October 1947 organization chart, provided for three major levels of organization—the 3 special assistants, 7 "offices," and 19 staff "divisions," each headed by a permanent high-ranking civil servant, with the special assistants exercising general supervision in their respective spheres of activity.¹² By leaving day-to-day matters in the hands of subordinates, Forrestal hoped to keep his special assistants free from routine responsibilities and permit his staff to operate on their own without constant administrative oversight or central direction that might distract him from more important matters. As Forrestal later explained, he wanted to develop "a small staff of highly competent individuals who would constitute a kind of a permanent secretariat and who would provide a continuity of experience and skill that would be unaffected by political changes and the accession to office of successive secretaries of defense."¹³

For a variety of reasons, chiefly because it did not take into account the character of the problems with which OSD would have to contend, the organizational blueprint of October 1947 was never implemented as charted. In particular, there was virtually no provision for staff support in substantive areas other than budgetary, legal, and legislative affairs. Faced with a rapid succession of international crises—in Greece, Italy, Palestine, and Germany—the office became burdened with a large number of diverse and complex problems, many of which Forrestal had to handle himself. "It wasn't more than a few weeks, I think," Ohly remembered, "before Forrestal began to realize that this whole thing was impossible, though he gave way rather reluctantly. He obviously needed an under secretary. The special assistants were seriously handicapped. We operated as though we were under secretaries, but there was just so much we could get away with. And yet someone had to take the initiative and do things."¹⁴

As Ohly's characterization of the situation suggests, the role of the special assistants was somewhat ambiguous, both from a legal standpoint and within the structure of the office itself. Although Forrestal had not intended that they be administrative officers in the usual sense because their primary job was to advise and assist him rather than manage staff activities, it was inevitable that supervision of the OSD staff would be thrust on them—they were the secretary's only statutory assistants. This unsought and unwanted acquisition of supervisory duties forced the special assistants to spend much of their time on administrative matters—what Forrestal termed the "dustpan chores."¹⁵

The delays in obtaining qualified people made it difficult to perform many

prescribed functions. Numerous high-level positions remained vacant for months at a time; in several instances, attempts to fill them proved abortive and the positions were eliminated without ever being occupied. The jobs hardest to fill were positions requiring a combination of administrative skills and expertise in substantive areas. Some were short-term appointments, lasting from a few days to several months, but most were permanent staff positions with policy and administrative responsibilities. Initially, Forrestal looked to private industry as a principal source of executive-level talent and compiled a list of more than 100 professionals and businessmen he thought might serve in various capacities. He quickly found, however, that the government's low salaries, compared with those in the private sector, effectively kept most promising candidates from accepting positions. As the 1948 election neared, the possibility of a change of administrations caused many job offers to go unanswered.¹⁶


In the spring of 1948, Forrestal brought in the New York management consulting firm of Cresap, McCormick and Paget to study the organization of OSD within the framework of existing legislation. The firm's findings called for no drastic overhaul but did point to several areas where OSD efficiency and effectiveness could be improved, primarily by clarifying staff assignments and lines of authority and by appointing additional aides and assistants to help the secretary with routine administrative chores.¹⁷

After conferring with his staff and representatives of the Paget survey group, Forrestal decided to implement most of these recommendations. His office prepared a detailed organizational manual and Forrestal approved its publication in June 1948. In September a new organization chart showed an office structure with the special assistants clearly in charge of OSD's administrative and operational staff (see Chart 3). Still insistent that his office remain small and close-knit, Forrestal balked at surrounding himself with a large personal staff; he agreed only to the designation of one of his military aides, Col. Robert J. Wood, USA, as the "executive" for his immediate office.¹⁸

Evolution of Staff Responsibilities

The changes wrought over the summer of 1948 did not constitute a formal reorganization; rather, they were designed to lessen the burdens on the secretary and to remove doubts as to areas of activity and responsibility. Actually, internal coordination was never a serious concern for Forrestal. Despite its apparent organizational flaws and shortcomings, OSD was a remarkably well-integrated office because of its relatively small size and the close personal friendships among the special assistants. Because they got along well together, because they respected

CHART 3
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 31 DECEMBER 1948



each other's talents, and above all because of their loyalty and devotion to Forrestal, the special assistants operated excellently as a team. "Marx Leva and I were in and out of each other's offices perhaps 50 times a day," Ohly recalled.

Since my room was significantly larger because it was at the end of a corridor, he would often use a part of it for holding a conference or we would use it together for a joint meeting. McNeil's office was on the other side of Forrestal's with only Forrestal's dining room (which we also used as a conference room) separating Forrestal's office from his. So we were always in close proximity. In addition, at least during the first ten to twelve months—before we got involved in so many different things—we had lunch together nearly every day in a small dining room right across the hall from the Secretary's office, usually just the three of us alone, but sometimes with the military aide and one or two others added. These daily lunches provided us with an opportunity to bring each other up to date on our activities during the preceding twenty-four hours and to exchange ideas. These occasions played an important role in the process of ensuring the effective operation of the office.¹⁹

Of the three, Ohly's job as Forrestal's coordinator for national security matters was perhaps the most varied in terms of day-to-day activities. By June 1948 Ohly supervised two offices—the Office of the Secretariat, which he himself ran, and the Special Programs Division, later renamed the Office of Special Programs, under his deputy, Robert Blum. The secretariat served chiefly as a clearinghouse for business flowing into OSD and it provided staff assistance to the War Council and a number of interservice committees and study groups. The Office of Special Programs—manned by only a few people—was more substantively oriented; it provided staff assistance to the secretary on politico-military intelligence, internal security, and related matters, occasionally undertaking or participating in special studies of these subjects. It also handled liaison with the military departments, other staff agencies, and the NSC, SANACC, CIA, and other organizations.²⁰

More an assistant than an adviser, Ohly viewed himself mainly as an expeditor whose principal functions were to facilitate the handling of business outside the responsibility of Leva and McNeil, keep Forrestal informed on major policy issues, and follow up for the secretary on these matters. A workaholic like Forrestal, he thrived on long days at his desk writing lengthy detailed memoranda on basic issues. "Ohly was a real secret weapon," remarked one staff member. "He could turn out more good work under pressure than any man I've ever seen." ²¹

As OSD steadily broadened its jurisdiction, initial responsibility for taking on these new areas tended to fall on Ohly, whereas the more clearly defined

areas of responsibility of Leva and McNeil grew chiefly in depth rather than breadth. While working in OSD, Ohly handled matters concerning international affairs, manpower, reserves, and health that would later require the services of several assistant secretaries and special assistants to the Secretary of Defense.

Although Leva had more clear-cut duties, Forrestal often called on him for confidential advice and assistance on a wide variety of matters. As the chief legal adviser, Leva exercised responsibility for two offices—the Office of the Counsel, which he personally headed, and the Office of Legislative Liaison, directed by Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons, USA.²²

The Office of the Counsel under Leva had two working staffs—the Legislative Services Division (sometimes identified as the Legislative Analysis Division), headed by Felix Larkin, who also functioned as Leva's principal deputy; and the Legal Services Division under John Noble, Jr., which provided legal advice to OSD and its staff agencies. The Legislative Services Division worked in conjunction with Persons's office, acted as its legal counsel, and provided it with studies and interpretations of existing and pending legislation.²³

Because of his trust and confidence in Leva, Forrestal combined the highly important responsibilities of general counsel and legislative affairs into one organization. The combination worked smoothly and efficiently, chiefly because of the close personal relationship between Forrestal and Leva and the ability and experience of Leva's staff. General Persons had been in charge of Army congressional liaison since 1939, and Felix Larkin had served previously as a legal counsel to the Senate special committee investigating national defense. Persons served as the point of contact between the military departments and the committees and members of Congress.²⁴

McNeil headed what was initially the largest and most complex part of OSD. Essentially, McNeil and his staff were Forrestal's money managers, with wide-ranging authority to direct and coordinate all NME budgeting, accounting, auditing, statistical reporting, and administrative procedures. Prior to the June–September 1948 organizational adjustments, execution of these functions was not as effective as Forrestal and McNeil wanted. The Paget survey uncovered a major weakness—the absence of an adequate system for collection and analysis of statistical data. To lend emphasis to the statistical reportage function, the 1948 changes placed the Office of Progress Reports and Statistics on a par with the Budget Office under McNeil.²⁵

McNeil was a somewhat controversial figure, partly because of his extremely sensitive and influential position and also because of a purported pro-Navy bias. Forrestal always thought highly of McNeil and trusted him completely, as did most members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees where, as Leva remarked, McNeil built up “quite a personal following.” “But,” added Leva,

"he really was never able to get rid of his pro-Navy bias." In Army and Air Force circles McNeil was sharply criticized for alleged favoritism toward the Navy, a charge that may have been true but is difficult to document because of McNeil's reluctance to commit his thoughts to paper. "There are times," he once noted, "when the less that is reduced to writing, the fewer the complications in the future."²⁶ This seems to have been a rule of thumb that McNeil applied to his day-to-day operating procedures.

McNeil's greatest achievement during this period, and perhaps for all of his 12-year career in OSD, was the development and successful establishment of uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures for DoD *—perhaps the most important unification tool available to the Secretary of Defense. Mandated by Title IV of the 1949 legislation amending the National Security Act, the adoption of this prescription owed much to McNeil's persistence in persuading Congress of its importance. The Bureau of the Budget objected to the provisions specifying the comptroller as a statutory position and placing statutory authority for the uniform comptroller system in an official subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, but Congress accepted the first provision and modified the second to place the authority in the hands of the secretary.[†]

Two other offices established in 1948 completed the inner OSD staff—the Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP), created to study the kind of civil defense program the nation ought to have, and the Office of Public Information (OPI). Whereas OPI became a permanent OSD fixture, the OCDP had only a short life in OSD, from March 1948 to the summer of 1949.[‡]

Changes Under Johnson

With one major exception, the OSD organization of September 1948 remained essentially unchanged until Congress amended the National Security Act in August 1949. The exception was the addition of the position of Under Secretary of Defense, originally requested by Forrestal and authorized under legislation (P.L. 36) approved by President Truman on 2 April 1949. The act called for the appointment of an under secretary to perform duties prescribed by the secretary and to exercise the secretary's duties and responsibilities in the event of his illness or absence.²⁷ The 1949 amendments converted the post of under secre-

* See Chapter XIII.

† The BoB opposition was based on the principle that full statutory responsibility for all of an agency's functions should reside in the head of the agency and not be parceled out to subordinates. See Senate Cte on Armed Services, *National Security Act Amendments of 1949*, 206–08, 236–38.

‡ For information about these two offices, see appropriate sections below in this chapter.

tary into that of deputy secretary and accorded him precedence within the department after the secretary.

The first Under/Deputy Secretary, Stephen T. Early, appointed 2 May 1949, was a native Virginian like Louis Johnson. Born in 1889, Early became a reporter for the United Press in Washington and in 1913 joined the Associated Press, where he built a reputation as an able newsman. After serving as an infantry captain in France in World War I, he acted as Franklin D. Roosevelt's press aide in the 1920 election campaign and again in 1932. Appointed White House press secretary the following year, he was the only one of the President's original top White House staff still alive when Roosevelt died in 1945.²⁸

Like Johnson, Early was reputed to be quick-tempered, but because of his public relations background, he was better than Johnson at projecting a favorable public image. Hanson Baldwin of the *New York Times* attributed Early's Pentagon appointment to the fact that he "knows his way well around the political jungle of Washington and is very pleasant and skillful in his relations with the press." Marx Leva found him a likable and friendly person and considered Early "one of the finest men who ever lived."²⁹

Johnson often waxed effusive in his praise of Early's ability and contributions. But his precise role and importance in the Defense Department are difficult to ascertain. He was not a general manager, as many of his successors became, nor was he a figurehead. On military matters and defense policy his knowledge was limited; he seldom participated in substantive deliberations and spent much of his time handling administrative matters or providing guidance on dealing with the news media. Spared a long list of assigned duties, he was free to roam, act sometimes as a troubleshooter, and be available for consultation when Johnson needed him.³⁰

In contrast to the usual pattern following shifts at the top, Johnson's advent as secretary occasioned neither immediate replacement of key personnel nor significant realignment of responsibilities. His avowed goal of greater economy and efficiency signaled a more active OSD role, but not one that necessarily required wholesale changes in the existing office organization. In fact, Johnson made changes piecemeal and not as part of any discernible master plan of reorganization.

Despite these signs of continuity, Johnson's office by the end of his tenure had changed substantially from the one he inherited from Forrestal. One reason, to be sure, was the passage of the 1949 amendments, originally requested by Forrestal, who had learned from bitter experience the need for consolidation of power and authority in the hands of the secretary and his immediate staff. But besides this, the creation of NATO and the launching of a global military assistance program added heavy responsibilities beyond those Forrestal had faced.

Moreover, the President's strong emphasis on cutting expenditures provided a task that accorded with Johnson's predilection for "executive action"—a personal management style quite different from Forrestal's. Since the services would not or could not make the necessary cuts on their own, other methods had to be devised and applied.

In these circumstances, Johnson was more dependent on his staff than Forrestal had been and used it increasingly as his mechanism for exercising direction and command authority over the services. As a lawyer and former Assistant Secretary of War, he no doubt had some inkling of the legal and practical problems he could expect to encounter. Lacking Forrestal's familiarity with recent national security issues and realizing that the job Truman wanted him to do was too large for one man to handle alone, Johnson was selective in the matters he attended to personally and wound up delegating considerable authority to his staff. The result was an office operating more and more in the forefront of management, administration, and policymaking on the secretary's behalf.

Johnson began his term with a no-nonsense approach that bore every indication of transforming OSD into a headquarters organization with lines of command and authority similar to those of a general staff. The day after taking office, he named a management adviser, General Joseph T. McNarney, USAF, and instructed him to explore ways of achieving reductions in expenditures and of improving efficiency and performance throughout the NME. One of the earliest changes to result from McNarney's investigation was the appointment of Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, USA, as Executive Secretary, with responsibility for managing the flow of information and paper through the secretary's immediate office.³¹

Johnson also held regular staff conferences, a practice that Forrestal had largely eschewed in favor of less formal staff discussions or one-on-one meetings.³² In May 1949 Johnson established the Staff Council, composed of his immediate aides and advisers and headed by the Under Secretary of Defense, to assist in solving "current problems and new problems requiring staff action" that were not brought up in the War Council. Although seemingly limited, the Staff Council's responsibilities proved to be rather substantial, as evidenced by its close involvement in planning the strategy for the prosecution of Johnson's economy drive.³³ But as a consultative, planning, and advisory body, it was ill-equipped to act on its own suggestions, and in August 1949 Johnson vested operational oversight of the economy measures in the newly created Defense Management Committee.*

The 1949 amendments affected OSD in a number of significant ways. In

* See later in this chapter.

addition to ending the anomaly of a secretary of defense heading an establishment rather than a department, the new law upgraded and clarified the authority of the secretary's statutory assistants. The under secretary became the deputy secretary and the special assistants became assistant secretaries ranking after the secretary, the deputy secretary, and the civilian heads of the three military departments. Also Congress prescribed that one of the assistant secretaries should be the comptroller of the Department of Defense. Like the secretary and his deputy, the three assistant secretaries were subject to Senate confirmation.

The conversion of the special assistants into assistant secretaries brought with it a partial realignment of staff functions. The offices headed by Leva and McNeil stayed essentially the same; both men were named Assistant Secretaries—Leva for legal and legislative affairs and McNeil as Comptroller. However, Johnson assigned the third new statutory position for different responsibilities from those that Ohly had had; * it became the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration and Public Affairs), a position filled by Paul H. Griffith. Like Johnson, Griffith was a former national commander of the American Legion. A veteran of both world wars, Griffith had also served as Johnson's military aide during the latter's brief assignment in India in 1942.³⁴

As an administrative organization, Griffith's office consolidated the functions of the administrative office, previously under McNeil's supervision, with routine responsibilities formerly under Ohly for providing clerical and staff support for the Armed Forces Policy Council (formerly the War Council), the Staff Council, the Service Academy Board, and the Civil Defense Liaison Office. The "public affairs" in its title was misleading, since the Office of Public Information remained a separate organization with its own director, under the general supervision of the deputy secretary. According to Leva, Griffith was a "roly-poly, pleasant man" who served mainly as Johnson's "personal troubleshooter."³⁵

All of the other responsibilities the third special assistant had exercised under Forrestal, except those relating to politico-military affairs, were distributed to other offices, principally the deputy secretary and the executive secretary. As a temporary measure, Johnson in August 1949 named his former War Department executive officer, Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, USA (Ret.), as his consultant for politico-military affairs. The following November President Truman nominated Burns for one of four statutory positions created by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Upon confirmation by the Senate, Burns received the title of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance). As a practical matter and for organizational purposes, Burns was the equivalent of a fourth assistant secretary.³⁶

* Ohly left OSD in November 1949 to become Deputy Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in the Department of State.

The forerunner of the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA), Burns's office had the responsibility for State Department, NSC, NATO, and military assistance matters. Described by one of his subordinates as "a great person and a great balance wheel" who kept the office's business on track, Burns was apparently one of only a few close aides who could speak openly and candidly to Johnson. But because of a heart condition, Burns rarely spent a full day at his desk and relied heavily on his two principal deputies—Najeeb E. Halaby, who managed the Office of Foreign Military Affairs (OFMA), including the State Liaison Section, and Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, head of the Office of Military Assistance (OMA).³⁷

The addition of an assistant for politico-military affairs was one of Johnson's most significant moves. Yet he accompanied this step with an action that seriously limited the utility and effectiveness of the office. Under restrictions that Johnson imposed on State-Defense contacts, he and Burns were the only Pentagon officials authorized to deal directly with the State Department.* As designated Defense representatives to several interdepartmental committees, Halaby and Lemnitzer either worked around or disregarded Johnson's prohibitions on contacts, taking liberties that Burns neither officially condoned nor condemned. Work thus managed to get done, but under conditions that many officials in Defense and State regarded as outlandish.³⁸

On 10 August 1949 Johnson created the Defense Management Committee (DMC), charging it with "achieving reductions in expenditures throughout the Department of Defense consistent with maintaining military effectiveness."³⁹ The DMC consisted of four members—an under or assistant secretary from each military department and a full-time chairman who played the leading role in the committee's activities. As chairman, Johnson appointed his management adviser, General McNarney, one of the most able and respected staff officers ever to serve in the Pentagon. As Army Deputy Chief of Staff McNarney had been a key figure in the 1942 reorganization of the War Department and had held major appointments overseas and in the United States during and after World War II. As a management specialist with a broad range of experience, McNarney was exceptionally qualified for a difficult and unpopular job.⁴⁰

Until the Korean War, the DMC had as its most urgent task finding ways of cushioning the shock of recent budget cuts which mandated an immediate billion dollar reduction in military expenditures.† Assuming the possibility of additional savings, Johnson in December 1949 directed the committee to find areas in which the elimination of waste would result in the release of dollars and personnel for use in improving military effectiveness. Such a task, McNarney

* See Chapter V.

† See Chapters XII and XIII for discussion of these cuts.

CHART 4
OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
23 MAY 1950





CHART 4
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
23 MAY 1950



committees of each chamber), legislation affecting the armed forces passed normally through four. While constituencies for the individual services persisted within both committees, the overall effect of the reform was to broaden the outlook of the members to include the whole military establishment and bring about more decisions that took into account the needs of all services rather than simply a particular one.

In a second change of great consequence for the military departments, Congress endeavored to streamline the budget process by combining annual military appropriations for all of the services (excluding those for military construction and other contingency items requiring individual authorizations) into a single bill, instead of providing funds separately for each service as in the past. Technically, the first "unified" military budget was the one Forrestal submitted to Congress in January 1948 for fiscal year 1949 (1 July 1948 to 30 June 1949). But because the estimates had been prepared the year before without executive branch coordination of the separately prepared War and Navy Department budget estimates, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees treated Army and Navy requests as two separate bills. Congress appropriated the bulk of the Air Force budget for fiscal year 1949, included initially in the Army's estimate, under an emergency supplemental appropriation act. The first full-year budgetary request for all three departments to be considered as a single piece of legislation, that for fiscal year 1950, was sent to Congress in January 1949.

Congressional relations required much personal attention from the Secretary of Defense. According to the Eberstadt Task Force, Forrestal spent approximately 14 percent of his work day on routine congressional matters—taking and making telephone calls, responding to congressional requests, receiving visitors, and giving testimony.⁴² The figure would doubtless have been far higher had the task force attempted to calculate the time Forrestal spent on other aspects of congressional matters, such as staff briefings, correspondence, and the development of legislative proposals.

Relations between OSD and Congress fell into three overlapping clusters of activities: (1) those involving Forrestal and Johnson personally in overseeing the formulation and subsequent processing of legislation, the presentation of testimony, the establishment and maintenance of contacts with congressional leaders, and other functions requiring their direct participation; (2) those relating to budgetary and fiscal matters connected with the appropriations process, a job spearheaded by McNeil and his staff; and (3) those concerning the preparation of other legislation, a task falling under Leva's supervision and including coordination with the military departments, the Bureau of the Budget, the White House, and the appropriate congressional committees.

In the first category, Forrestal was clearly more effective and successful than

later conceded, was practically impossible. "With the tight dollar ceilings then in effect," he said, "there was little or no headroom for spectacular economies."⁴¹ After the outbreak of the Korean War brought greatly enlarged military budgets, the committee concentrated on assuring the best use of resources and promoting efficiency rather than reducing expenditures.

Congressional Liaison

Dealing with Congress demanded the constant attention of the Secretary of Defense and became one of his most time-consuming tasks. It also required much of the time and attention of Leva and a staff created for that express purpose. In addition, the military departments maintained substantial staffs for congressional liaison.

This extensive organizational apparatus seemed to bear out the Washington saying, presumably derived from Chaucer's aphorism about man and God, that "the Executive proposes, but Congress disposes." This greatly simplified a very complicated relationship, but it clearly applied to national defense, where congressional oversight of the military establishment extended into almost all of its activities. Congressmen, as representatives and advocates of their constituents, concern themselves with defense contracts, selection of weapon systems, opening and closing of military installations, assisting active and retired service personnel with problems, and seeking greater efficiency and savings. These activities have derived from the extensive powers relating to defense granted to Congress under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution.

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, effective January 1947, anticipated the National Security Act and had important implications for the new national security structure.* This effort by Congress to "unify" itself by streamlining the committee structure facilitated legislative action on matters affecting the armed forces. Until 1947 the House and Senate had handled defense matters separately through naval and military affairs committees. When the 80th Congress convened, the House and Senate each merged its two separate committees into an "armed services" committee. Henceforth, instead of having to run the gauntlet of as many as six committees (including the appropriations

* The act (P.L. 79-60) reduced the number of congressional committees; banned the introduction of private bills; authorized an annual legislative budget; increased congressional salaries; imposed more stringent controls on lobbyists; and created professional committee staffs to advise committee members and to expedite the preparation of reports. This last provision gave Congress a major instrument for examining proposed legislation and conducting investigations. But in the late 1940s the new congressional staff system did not yet play the key role it later acquired.

Johnson, especially in cultivating congressional support for his policies and programs. The Republican-controlled 80th Congress may have given Harry Truman endless headaches, but it presented fewer problems for Forrestal. He treated defense matters as bipartisan and engaged in regular consultation with the leaders of both parties in both houses. The "Forrestal style," developed while he was Secretary of the Navy, involved considerable personal lobbying at informal luncheons, at gatherings in his home, and on trips aboard the presidential yacht *Sequoia* on the Potomac.⁴³ Congress paid heed to what Forrestal said and recommended, even when it disagreed with him, and was generally cooperative.

Johnson lacked Forrestal's skill in dealing with Congress. His personality, which some in Congress found abrasive, doubtless reduced the effectiveness of his efforts to forge a supportive consensus; Congress was no more united than the services in behalf of his policies. Also, while Congress favored economy in principle, many members reacted hostilely when base closings and cutbacks in other programs adversely affected their home states or districts, as evidenced by the furor over Johnson's decision in the spring of 1950 to close a number of military hospitals. Despite these sources of friction, Johnson retained a core of congressional supporters in both parties until the Korean War period.

On the day-to-day Defense-congressional working level, the role of OSD during the Forrestal-Johnson period went through several stages of development. Congressional affairs were from the beginning of unification a "gray area." Although the National Security Act provided that the Secretary of Defense should determine the budget estimates, it contained no comparable provision giving him specific authority to determine the legislative program for the whole NME or to control all relations of the establishment with Congress. His power was implied rather than explicit, and therefore at times open to challenge. The result was an initial period of some confusion, often accompanied by bickering among the services, over the priority of legislative programs.

At the beginning of his tenure, Forrestal had to rely on the services to bear much of the burden of preparing legislative programs and dealing with Congress. The Secretary of Defense would expedite this process and harmonize conflicting views.⁴⁴ Each military department had its own congressional liaison office with personnel who over the years had become well-versed in processing legislation and had developed and cultivated useful contacts on Capitol Hill. Rather than dismantle this system, Forrestal sought to exploit it, both to restrain the growth of his immediate office and to avoid duplication of functions. But as in other areas where he initially relied on voluntary cooperation, Forrestal found little help and soon realized that existing arrangements, amid an atmosphere of intense inter-service rivalries, were not effective for his purposes.

The matter became acute during consideration of the emergency supple-

mental budget requests in the late spring of 1948, when differences among the services emerged over the relative priority of several pieces of pending legislation, including the Army's selective service bill and Air Force proposals for an air engineering development center, a long-range missile proving ground, and a radar warning system. Unless Congress received prompt guidance on which of these measures to expedite, it seemed likely that none would come up for floor action before adjournment. Forrestal finally broke the impasse by throwing his full support behind the selective service bill. That such a situation could have occurred in the first place left him deeply disturbed. He resolved to find new and more effective procedures before the next session of Congress.⁴⁵

Forrestal's dissatisfaction with existing arrangements prompted several notable changes, beginning in July 1948 with the appointment of General Persons to serve principally as Leva's deputy for legislative liaison, but also as an assistant to McNeil on congressional appropriation matters. As the Army's congressional liaison officer since 1939, Persons knew well the difficulties of dealing with Congress. He had a staff of three uniformed officers with responsibilities along functional rather than departmental lines to assure that all proposals were "keyed into" the legislative goals set by the Secretary of Defense. "In other words," as Forrestal put it, "the policies and decisions of the Secretary of Defense are controlling on the three Departments—and Major General Persons, operating through his three deputies, has the responsibility for seeing to it that these policies and decisions are adhered to by the Departments."⁴⁶

Having established a line of demarcation between the legislative activities of the departments and those of OSD, Forrestal next reorganized procedures governing the development and submission of legislation. The new procedures applied both to the initiation of legislative proposals, excluding appropriations, and to the preparation of service reports and comments on bills originating in other executive departments or in Congress. Henceforth, no service could submit legislation that was not part of an integrated "annual legislative program," cleared and coordinated by Persons's office acting for the Secretary of Defense. The first such package, approved by Forrestal in late November 1948 for submission the following January to the 81st Congress, requested congressional action on 88 pieces of legislation, each given a priority rating and designation of service responsibility for legislative processing. In eight cases, where proposed legislation cut across service lines, OSD assumed responsibility.⁴⁷

After Johnson took over, key legislative liaison activities focused increasingly on the budget. Other major actions were the 1949 amendments, treated separately from OSD's annual legislative program, and the B-36 aircraft investigation,*

* See Chapter XIV.

which Leva handled personally under the supervision of Deputy Secretary Early. In addition to the regular legislative program, the Office of Legislative Liaison developed and regularly updated, in collaboration with the NSRB, an emergency legislative listing to be submitted to Congress in the event of a national emergency.⁴⁸

As with the budget, efforts to control the legislative program were affected by the relations between the individual services and Congress. Congress was generally willing to cooperate, but there were always senators and representatives disposed to do favors for special interests and push separate back-door legislation, especially in the area of public works. "Obviously the theory is better than the actuality," Leva confessed. "You still had people on end runs but you held it down to a degree."⁴⁹ Such was probably the best that could have been achieved at that time, even with centralized control.

The Public Relations Front

When Forrestal took office in September 1947, he did not fully appreciate the extent to which the public relations activities of the services would complicate his mission. Public relations as a large-scale, organized activity of the military services had come into its own only as recently as World War II, but it had acquired a momentum that proved difficult to arrest. In the postwar period it quickly became more vexing than Forrestal could possibly have anticipated, for each branch of the military relied increasingly on public relations as a major weapon in furthering its particular budgetary and organizational interests. The growing scarcity of budget dollars and the publicity surrounding the 1945-47 unification controversy further intensified the interservice "press war" to the point that Forrestal feared serious damage would be done to the military's prestige and credibility. Although both Forrestal and Johnson made major organizational changes, these efforts failed to ameliorate the situation.

In spite of the NME's public relations problems, Forrestal enjoyed good relations with the news media. He held one or more press conferences a month and often met with reporters for informal off-the-record background talks, which sometimes took place in his office over cocktails and a buffet supper paid for by Forrestal. His only real "enemies" in the news media were Drew Pearson and Walter Winchell, who sought to convey the impression that Forrestal was a dangerous political conservative. Much of their vitriolic criticism centered on Forrestal's opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine, which had earned him the hostility of many Zionist supporters. Pearson's attacks on Forrestal were often outrageously personal. According to Jack Anderson, Pearson's associate at the

time, these attacks were inspired by Pearson's belief that Forrestal was "the arch-representative of Wall Street imperialism and of a world view that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable." Pearson's determination to "get" Forrestal appalled Anderson, who readily conceded that his boss's efforts "passed the bounds of effectiveness, not to speak of propriety."⁵⁰

An important aspect of public relations that worried Forrestal from the beginning (and all subsequent secretaries of defense) was the apparent disregard by many officials for the security of classified information. About a month before he was sworn in as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal made it clear that he intended to clamp down on those who "leaked" sensitive data to the news media. Writing to Vannevar Bush, he noted that since the end of the war, officials handling scientific work had regularly and routinely given the press access to technical military information. "With the general international situation as it is," he argued, "it might be well to review this open publicity policy and start putting the brakes on the flow of information to the American public which, unfortunately, reaches all foreign sources." Forrestal favored press coverage for important events and developments, but he believed strongly nonetheless that "there comes a time when the worldwide press wire must be excluded from the various experiments and projects carried on by the military of this country."⁵¹

Despite his advocacy of closer control over the dissemination of defense information, Forrestal did not want to assume direct responsibility for the management of military public relations. As he stated at his first news conference: "I look to the three departments to run their own public relations" On 10 October 1947 he further clarified his position in a directive that provided for (1) separate administration of public relations in the military departments, pending completion of a study on the feasibility of a joint press room in Washington and such other key cities as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco; (2) assignment of responsibility for public relations matters of concern to his office to an assistant and three liaison officers, one from each service; and (3) prior clearance by OSD of all statements involving OSD personnel and functions, speeches by members of the War Council, and releases affecting two or more services on which they had not reached agreement.⁵²

That same day Forrestal circulated a confidential memorandum on security procedures that directed the Joint Chiefs to review and, if necessary, redefine "in terms appropriate for present conditions the security classifications used by the armed services." In addition, he asked the departments to report jointly on the NME legal powers to enforce security classification rules against various categories of individuals, including NME civilian employees, contractors and other suppliers, and representatives of the news media.⁵³

However effective these steps may have been for some purposes, they did not

stop the press war among the services. Less than a month after Forrestal issued his two directives, a Navy civilian engineer sent an unsolicited letter to the *Washington Post* accusing the Air Force of having "jumped the traces" of security by recently disclosing that one of its latest aircraft was capable of near-supersonic speeds.⁵⁴ Similar incidents over the next several months combined to produce a rising tide of charges and countercharges between the Navy and the Air Force. Some of these episodes dealt with alleged security breaches, but often they involved derogatory statements made by one service about another.⁵⁵

In an attempt to stop the flow of embarrassing and sometimes harmful stories about the services, Forrestal in late 1947 suggested that the news media readopt the policy of "voluntary censorship" practiced in World War II. Reporters covering the Pentagon, although generally sympathetic to Forrestal's concern, felt that plugging "leaks" of classified or derogatory information was up to the government, not the press.⁵⁶ Unable to enlist substantial media support for voluntary censorship, Forrestal reluctantly agreed that his office should assume stronger and more direct controls over press relations. Following War Council discussion on 3 February 1948, he unveiled an amended policy: "No article which touches on a *controversial subject* shall be published, nor shall any public address which touches on such a subject be delivered" by a ranking NME official without prior approval of the Secretary of Defense. Although the thought that this policy might constitute a "gag rule" temporarily alarmed the Pentagon press corps and some members of Congress, they soon realized that they had little to fear. Forrestal chose not to define what was meant by "controversial," noting only that "one such subject is *the budget*"; in practice the order affected only a handful of top officials.⁵⁷

Forrestal in March 1948 asked William R. Mathews, publisher of the *Arizona Star*, and Frank Kluckhohn, a reporter for the *New York Times*, to study "the possibility of re-organization for greater unity of the public relations branches of the Armed Services."⁵⁸ Mathews and Kluckhohn advised against full centralization of public relations activities but recommended the appointment of a director of public relations (either civilian or military) to guide and unify policies. They also suggested the desirability of combined press rooms, radio rooms, and photographic laboratories, and of conducting joint security review, analysis, and accreditation. However, in a confidential introduction to their report, Mathews and Kluckhohn cast doubt on whether these changes would lead to any dramatic improvements:

Our conversations with the three civilian Secretaries convinces [sic] us that they need to impose sterner discipline on those officers and employees who continue to foster interdepartmental jealousies. . . . No improvement in

public relations can be expected until this situation is corrected. Until the civilian heads of the departments clearly express their will to make unification work, they will continue to be pushed by members of their staffs to exploit their particular service at the expense of the others.⁵⁹

Acting on the findings of the Mathews-Kluckhohn report and earlier recommendations in the Paget report, Forrestal on 2 July announced the appointment of Harold B. Hinton, veteran Washington bureau correspondent of the *New York Times*, as "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Office of Public Information." Hinton's appointment did not alter the services' existing public information organizations or operations. Rather, it established a central reference point through which the press and the services could make contact with one another. As head of the new Pentagon press room, opened on 11 August 1948, Hinton had charge of an interdepartmental staff and assumed responsibility for "the development of over-all public information policy for the National Military Establishment, and for coordination of its public information activities."⁶⁰

Still, controversy continued, highlighted by apparent misreporting of a speech made in Los Angeles on 17 July by Secretary of the Air Force Symington. According to an account appearing the next day in the *New York Times*, Symington had made several "off the cuff" remarks highly critical of the Navy and of Forrestal personally for alleged pro-Navy decisions and inept handling of unification.⁶¹ It later turned out that the report in the *Times* had been based on an unauthorized text that had been unexplainably released to the wire services in Washington. Realizing that the text prepared by his speechwriters contained objectionable material, Symington and a friend, John A. McCone,* had rewritten it at the last minute in Los Angeles to eliminate those portions that they knew would cause offense to Forrestal and the Navy. The "off the cuff" remarks had in fact never been uttered by Symington but had been replaced by the toned-down version. Unaware of these facts, Forrestal ordered Hinton to conduct an investigation and, meanwhile, mentioned to President Truman that Symington might have to be fired. When he returned to Washington, Symington explained to Forrestal what had happened. A telephone call by Forrestal to McCone and Hinton's followup report confirmed the mixup and the matter was dropped, but not without its effect on the relationship between the two men.⁶²

As a result of continuing "leaks" and a flow of newspaper and magazine articles on Air Force-Navy friction, Forrestal in his first annual report noted the need for "further and firmer administrative steps" in the area of military public

* A prominent industrialist and a friend of Forrestal also, McCone later served as Under Secretary of the Air Force, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Director of Central Intelligence.

relations. The Eberstadt Task Force also concluded that "special pleading" by the services had become intolerable and recommended "tighter and more effective control of policy than has heretofore existed" ⁶³

The event that finally triggered adoption of stronger measures was the publication on 15 March 1949 of two United Press stories that contained classified information. One story described the B-36 performance characteristics; the other quoted from a top secret Air Staff study on the ability of the Air Force to conduct strategic bombing of the Soviet Union. As William Frye, Hinton's deputy and later his successor, recalled:

The inside of the Pentagon that day was something to forget if you can. I remember particularly a scene in Mr. Forrestal's office—present were Forrestal, Johnson, Eisenhower and Frye—with the General striding up and down the room asking rhetorical questions to the general effect were we living in a nest of traitors? I spent all that Monday in a futile—a predestined futile—attempt to get some idea for Topside as to where the "leak" had occurred.⁶⁴

Convinced by this episode that no other course was possible, Forrestal on 17 March directed the establishment of a consolidated Office of Public Information (OPI), headed by Frye, as the sole agency in Washington for the public dissemination of military information. Several days later Forrestal ordered that OPI assume responsibility immediately for all "security review and clearance of manuscripts" and that "no information of any kind whatsoever relating to performance or capabilities of new weapons or new equipment of any type . . . be released to the public without specific clearance from this office." These measures had the complete support of Secretary Johnson, who at his first press conference told reporters that there "will be no vying between the three services for headlines. There will be no releasing of things that are labeled secret." ⁶⁵

To implement the secretary's order of 17 March, Frye hurriedly issued 10 "consolidation directives" which summarily transferred the public relations tasks of the services to OSD. The first of these directives, dealing with security review procedures, gave OPI sweeping authority to decide the classification of material and to control the release of information on any subject. Protests from the press and the military departments soon caused Johnson to limit OPI review to the narrow range of information "which is classified for security reasons." ⁶⁶ But otherwise, the reorganization of public affairs proceeded without major incident. At the end of May 1949, Frye reported the consolidation in the Pentagon complete, with claimed annual savings of \$550,000 and a reduction in personnel (military and civilian) from 475 to 339—291 in OPI, 16 in the Army, 17 in

the Navy, and 15 in the Air Force.* Approximately a year later the figures were 225 in OPI, 39 in the Army, 27 in the Navy, 29 in the Air Force, and 22 in the Marine Corps.⁶⁷ However, the figures for the services did not tell the whole story, since the military departments continued to maintain field public relations officers and personnel for training, troop indoctrination, and "special study" functions that in effect constituted public relations activities.

OPI never became the information clearinghouse that some hoped or feared it might be. In spite of its authority to review material for release, OPI was almost powerless to stop the flow of unauthorized disclosures and "leaks." Throughout Johnson's tenure interservice feuding continued unabated, fueled to new levels of intensity by his economy drive and such controversial decisions as his cancellation of the Navy's supercarrier in the spring of 1949. The cure sought through the consolidation of public affairs merely forced the services to find other avenues for making their grievances known. Since the end of World War II, civilian organizations, reserve groups, and retired officers had taken an active part in promoting service viewpoints. Now, with the loss of most of their public relations functions to OSD, the services relied more heavily than ever on these interest groups to carry the message.

Johnson's insistence on handling his own public relations undermined the effectiveness of OPI. "My press appointments," he told Frye on one occasion, "are none of your business." During his 18 months in office Johnson made 48 public speeches but held only five press conferences, the last on 1 March 1950, some seven months before he left office. His first two meetings with the press, Frye recalled, "were so disastrous that frequent or regular press conferences would have hurt rather than helped him. That is why I strove mightily to prevent him from having any more." As time went on, Johnson developed the practice of making all major announcements himself, usually without advance notification to OPI. Deputy Secretary Early and Johnson's immediate office acted as his personal staff in these matters. "So far as unification of public relations within his own office is concerned," Frye contended, "I am sure he thought he had it, but, of course, what he had was complete chaos."⁶⁸

In September 1949, Early, to whom OPI reported, expressed serious doubts about the soundness of the organization, particularly whether it should be more centralized or decentralized. The services, hoping to regain control of their own public affairs offices, favored the latter. In contrast, a Defense Management Committee study, referred to Early in April 1950, urged action to strengthen OPI and

* The Office of Public Information, according to the semiannual reports of the Secretary of Defense for January 1–June 30, 1950, and January 1–June 30, 1951, was a department-wide activity supported by funds supplied jointly by OSD and the military departments. Few if any of the personnel of OPI were carried on the OSD personnel rolls.

remove all question of its responsibilities. After conferring with Johnson, Early informed the committee that reorganization of public information activities would have to await the selection of a replacement for Frye, who had resigned in February 1950.⁶⁹ Since no appointment was made until late 1950, Early's announcement in effect pigeonholed the report, leaving the question of public affairs reorganization unresolved for almost a year.

Civil Defense Organization

The creation of the Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP) on 27 March 1948 marked a further step in OSD's organizational evolution. Like public affairs, the problem of civil defense was sufficiently large and complex to require a separate organization. Civil defense was the first of what would become many special activities requiring a degree and level of coordination that only OSD could adequately provide. The assumption at the time OCDP came into existence was that it would study what kind of agency there should be and what kind of program was needed. But despite a promising beginning, plans floundered for political reasons.

Prior to the creation of OCDP, civil defense planning in the United States had received little attention. During the early days of World War II an Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) had directed a loosely organized effort to coordinate state and local emergency measures in the event of German or Japanese attacks on coastal cities. But by 1943, as the enemy threat diminished, interest in civil defense began to wane, and in June 1945 OCD was abolished. With the advent of atomic weapons and long-range aircraft, civil defense reemerged as a matter begging for attention. Immediately after the war at least two studies—one by the Army Provost Marshal General's office and another by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey—urged renewed consideration of nationwide civilian protection.⁷⁰

A War Department study completed in February 1947, under the direction of Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, USA, proved the catalyst for OCDP's creation. The Bull report strongly affirmed the need for a nationally coordinated civil defense program. Although it took the position that major civil defense functions "are not appropriately military responsibilities," the report acknowledged that civil defense preparations were not likely to be effective without some military advice and participation. Consequently, in offering suggestions on how to organize and administer the effort, the report straddled the issue. Anticipating passage of a unification law, it called for a federal civil defense agency separate from the armed services but under the authority and guidance of the Secretary of Defense.⁷¹

In October 1947, Forrestal referred the Bull report to the War Council,

which became bogged down in debate over whether the proposed agency should be a separate organization, possibly under the President or the NSRB, or an operating part of the military establishment. President Truman temporarily quieted the controversy in mid-November by advising the council that he wanted the Secretary of Defense to take charge of peacetime civil defense planning even though in wartime the President might personally assume control of civil defense.⁷²

Forrestal released the Bull report to the public in February 1948 and announced his intention to establish a "civilian unit to plan a comprehensive civil defense organization and program."⁷³ The ensuing search for a director typified Forrestal's continual difficulties in finding good people. Turned down by four business leaders, he finally secured the services of the president of Northwestern Bell Telephone, Russell J. Hopley, a Republican, who lived in Omaha, Nebr. Leaders of the Nebraska Democratic Party protested to the President, but because Hopley's appointment had already "leaked" to the press, the White House considered the matter closed.⁷⁴

When Hopley arrived in Washington at the end of March, Forrestal outlined the duties and responsibilities of the new Office of Civil Defense Planning. Designated "personal advisor and deputy" to the secretary,* Hopley had the task of preparing "a program of civil defense for the United States, including a plan for a permanent federal civil defense agency." In addition, OCDP would coordinate all civil defense matters within the NME, provide liaison with governmental and private agencies, and initiate such interim measures as might seem "necessary or appropriate in furtherance of an adequate system of civil defense." Hopley and several of his associates served without compensation.⁷⁵

Considering the magnitude of the task, Hopley and his staff did their work in a remarkably short time. Toward the end of July 1948 Hopley circulated a draft report for comment. After receiving responses from Forrestal's special assistants, the Joint Chiefs, and others in the Pentagon, OCDP prepared a slightly revised plan which Hopley reviewed before the War Council on 31 August. On 1 October he submitted the final report to Forrestal who released it to the press in mid-November and sent copies to interested government agencies, all members of Congress, and all state governors. Considering his job finished, Hopley returned to Omaha. Hoping to keep OCDP together as the nucleus for a permanent organization, Forrestal in December recruited Aubrey H. Mellinger, the retired president of the Illinois Telephone Company, as interim head.⁷⁶

A highly detailed 301-page document, the Hopley report proposed a comprehensive program geared to wartime rather than peacetime requirements. It

* Sec. 1120 of the National Defense Manual, issued in June 1948, listed Hopley's title as Assistant to the Secretary, OCDP.

covered every aspect of civil defense down to block warden level and required an estimated force of 15 million volunteers. On the federal level, it recommended the creation of a permanent agency reporting to the President or the Secretary of Defense, preferably the latter, since "a very large part of the civil defense program will require continuous coordination" with military agencies.⁷⁷

Reactions to the Hopley report were so mixed that President Truman deferred action on it. Only the Army endorsed it without reservation, and only the Federal Works Agency urged its rejection. Most of the other interested government agencies agreed that a program developed and run by the military would be unacceptable to the public and therefore ill-advised, a criticism in which the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs concurred.⁷⁸ In contrast, public reaction to the report was generally more favorable. Many editorial writers applauded the report's effort to come to grips with a complicated and grim subject. Discordant remarks were few, though vicious criticism came from some press commentators waging a vendetta against Forrestal. Walter Winchell, for example, called the report a "nightmare" and judged it "the greatest internal threat to our liberty since the British burned the White House in 1814." Drew Pearson, another inveterate critic of Forrestal, also denounced it. The *Daily Worker*, a communist newspaper, dubbed the report Forrestal's "'cold war' dream for the American people."⁷⁹

Aides had earlier cautioned Forrestal that Hopley's recommendations to place civil defense under the military might prove controversial and jeopardize acceptance. In transmitting the report to President Truman, Forrestal therefore had avoided either endorsing or rejecting it. However, he felt strongly the need for a permanent agency, and in January 1949 he sent draft legislation to the White House calling for the creation of an office of civil defense under Title I of the National Security Act. He suggested that the office be a separate agency under the NSRB in peacetime, but that the President have power in time of war to transfer the agency to military control or constitute it as a separate independent agency.⁸⁰

Forrestal's plea fell on deaf ears. On 3 March, the day following announcement of Forrestal's resignation, Truman advised him that he saw no urgent need for a permanent agency and that future civil defense planning would be done by the NSRB as a routine staff function. Before leaving office Forrestal discussed the President's decision at length with Louis Johnson. Both agreed that the NSRB could not handle civil defense as a staff function. Unlike Forrestal, Johnson openly supported Hopley's recommendation that civil defense should be under OSD direction and supervision and repeatedly urged the President to reconsider his decision, but Truman indicated no desire to reopen the matter.⁸¹

In view of the President's attitude and the absence of funds for its operation,

Johnson on 1 August 1949 dissolved the Office of Civil Defense Planning and placed its dwindling staff and functions under an Assistant for Civil Defense Liaison. The discovery in September 1949 that the Soviet Union had recently exploded an atomic device sparked public interest in civil defense and led to the adoption in Congress of several resolutions urging a stepped-up effort. But it required the impact of the Korean War to prompt the creation by Congress early in 1951 of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, a separate civilian agency under the President.⁸²

Joint and Special Committees

For dealing with many problems of interservice concern and handling matters that did not necessarily require the time or support of a permanent staff or could not be adequately handled by his own staff, Forrestal often turned to joint committees and study groups. Some of these committees were carryovers from World War II, when in many instances the creation of a joint board or committee had been the only practical and effective way of securing interservice cooperation and coordination. But many were new, established as the most feasible and least expensive method of initially exploring a growing number of widely different issues, with a view to recommending what ought to be done next. Johnson, by contrast, inheriting an ongoing and expanded staff organization from Forrestal and therefore having less need for committees, campaigned effectively to diminish the use and number of joint and special committees.

During his early months in office Forrestal was energetic in organizing and activating committees—some entirely interservice in composition, others composed exclusively of outside advisers and consultants, and still others with a mixed membership of service and private sector representatives. The most prominent of these bodies were the Committee on Civilian Components (the Gray Board), formed to examine the status and organization of Reserve and National Guard forces; the Advisory Commission on Service Pay (the Hook Commission), to recommend a uniform military compensation system; and the Committee on Medical and Hospital Services, to advise on improving medical services and eliminating duplication of facilities.⁸³ As time went on, Forrestal established joint committees to study such matters as the welfare and recreation of servicemen and their families, military education, the release of classified information to the public, and even the serving of kosher food in military mess halls.⁸⁴

Forrestal's use of joint committees served a number of purposes. It lessened the burdens on his office, which could not have handled all of these matters; it brought the services into "grass roots" contact with one another on matters of common concern; it furthered his efforts to save money. Moreover, this practice

accorded with Forrestal's concept of policy coordination. Since the committees reported directly to him, no intermediate layers of bureaucracy intruded. Although some of them, such as the Committee on Medical and Hospital Services, dealt with ongoing responsibilities, many were temporary, with clearly defined assignments of a limited nature, and the only trace of their existence is a final report.⁸⁵

A disadvantage of the large number of permanent and ad hoc committees was the enormous complexity of keeping track of them and of coordinating their activities so that their recommendations, if adopted, would become part of an integrated policy. Realizing the problem, Forrestal in September 1948 directed his administrative office to undertake a continuing study of joint boards and committees, with a view toward eliminating, consolidating, and relocating them as circumstances dictated. Some committees, mostly those that were inactive, were subsequently terminated, while others, such as the Armed Services Petroleum Board, were reconstituted with fresh membership and more clearly defined functions.⁸⁶

New administrations and new department heads, in their search for organizational and administrative improvements and economies, often wage vigorous campaigns to get rid of superfluous boards and committees. Johnson made the elimination of committees a cause célèbre as part of his highly publicized effort to root out waste, inefficiency, and duplication. Two days after taking office he abolished eight boards and committees outright. After three months in office, Johnson claimed that he had disposed of 133 "unnecessary or duplicating" interservice boards and committees.⁸⁷

Exactly how much money he saved by this purge Johnson never said. Many of the abolished groups, such as the Lehigh University Bomb Damage Project, had been inactive and without funding for some time, while others, though technically dissolved, continued to operate under different formats. The Committee on Medical and Hospital Services, for example, became the Office of Medical Services and acquired the status of an OSD staff agency, with a full-time director and a permanent staff.⁸⁸ As a means of saving money, Johnson's "war" on committees was probably of marginal benefit. But as a way of streamlining and consolidating activities that had grown rather diffuse, it served a useful purpose and gave OSD's internal organization more cohesion.

Despite the organizational issues that continued to beset it, OSD was a working reality by mid-1950, although it was substantially changed from the office Forrestal had established almost three years earlier. It was much larger and more conspicuous than Forrestal had probably imagined it would become, and its activities affected actions and decisions at virtually every level of the Department.

As with the confederation put together under the National Security Act, Forrestal's concept of a small office concentrating on policy and coordination proved unrealistic in the face of the issues that confronted him. Forrestal had not intended to command or to coordinate by fiat, but he found it almost impossible to do otherwise. He also soon discovered that to exercise more power he needed a stronger staff that could administer and direct as well as coordinate.

With Johnson at the helm, active management more and more replaced coordination through voluntary service cooperation as an underlying tenet of the office. Most of the ad hoc bodies established by Forrestal disappeared or became absorbed within the regular staff, while, at the same time, Johnson fashioned a new network of such bodies to prosecute his economy objectives and point up OSD's growing role in the direction of the whole defense establishment. As a result of the various legislative measures enacted in 1949, OSD began to assume its ultimate form, with a deputy and assistant secretaries, and an assistant to the secretary for politico-military affairs, later to become the highly influential and important Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The establishment of these new centers of authority allowed the secretary to exercise more effective direction of DoD through his staff. By the beginning of the Korean War, OSD had the emerging image of a cohesive agency organized and staffed for the purpose of bringing the entire Department of Defense under the secretary's purview and authority.

CHAPTER IV

The Staff Agencies

In addition to the staff and advisory support they received through OSD, Forrestal and Johnson had at their disposal a number of specialized boards and committees known as the "staff agencies" to advise and assist them in carrying out their duties. These staff agencies fell into two categories—statutory* and nonstatutory bodies. The two statutory boards—the Munitions Board (MB) and the Research and Development Board (RDB)—had much in common and indeed constituted a distinct organizational category. The nonstatutory agencies, created by the Secretary of Defense rather than by Congress, did not constitute a category of like agencies comparable to the statutory boards. Their differences were more pronounced than their likenesses. They had different origins, different purposes, different functions, and different organizations. Still, they represented extensions of the secretary's staff, and in time all evolved into specific staff offices in OSD, forsaking their committee and board status.

The Research and Development Board and the Munitions Board had a pre-1947 existence as nonstatutory bodies. Under the National Security Act, they acquired statutory responsibilities and, like the rest of the defense establishment, became subject to the "direction, authority, and control" of the Secretary of Defense, as did the Military Liaison Committee (MLC), created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and reorganized by Forrestal in 1948 as an OSD staff agency. While the activities of the MLC often ranged well beyond the corridors of the Pentagon, those of the RDB and the MB were largely in-house and related in the main to the discharge of the secretary's third major assigned duty in the National Security Act: "Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplica-

* The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also a statutory body under OSD, is treated in Chapter V.

tion or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research." To explore and organize functions that did not fall under these organizations, Forrestal and Johnson created, as the need arose, several non-statutory bodies that likewise served as staff agencies—the Personnel Policy Board (PPB), Civilian Components Policy Board (CCPB), and Office of Medical Services (OMS).

The use of these boards and committees to deal with specialized problems of common concern to the services accorded with Forrestal's disinclination to surround himself with a large number of aides and advisers. In effect, they augmented the activities of the secretary's immediate office and were integral parts of his staff support system. Like the military departments, they also exercised a considerable measure of control over their internal operations.

The staff agency arrangement derived directly from the World War II experience of relying on boards and committees to effect coordination. The common characteristic of the staff agencies was their composition—each was essentially a triservice committee whose members, while responsible to the Secretary of Defense, were at the same time responsible to their separate services. In these circumstances board members from the services found it difficult and often impossible to serve two masters with conflicting interests. As these boards and committees grew in number and stature, the great faith that Forrestal placed initially in voluntary cooperation and "teamwork" soon gave way to a realization that he needed added authority over the staff agencies as much as he needed added authority over the services.

The Munitions Board

During World War II and afterward, the term "logistics"* had come to apply to practically every support activity in which the armed forces engaged to carry out their functions. Understood in this sense, consideration of logistic factors was indispensable to the formulation and execution of strategic plans. In recognition of the key role of logistics, the National Security Act established the Munitions Board as a staff agency under the Secretary of Defense. Successor to the Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB), the new organization served as an arm of OSD with the assigned function of logistic planning to assure adequate and efficient industrial support for the armed forces in both peace and war.

As an ongoing agency, the Munitions Board inherited an already functioning organization when unification became law in 1947, but its predecessor, the

* As used here, logistics included the design and development, procurement, movement, storage, supply, and maintenance of materiel; movement and hospitalization of personnel; provision of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services.

ANMB, created by joint agreement of the War and Navy Departments in 1922, had not been particularly effective in carrying out its major task of planning industrial mobilization for war. During the 1920s the absence of joint strategic plans, which were prerequisite to mobilization planning, and disagreements between the Army and Navy over the board's functions had severely limited its operations. Improved Army-Navy relations and preparation of joint strategic war plans in the 1930s made it possible for the ANMB to perform more effectively. Prior to and immediately following Pearl Harbor the ANMB played an active and prominent role in mobilization planning. But with the advent of the War Production Board in 1942 and the growing reliance of the services on their own logistical agencies, the ANMB's importance declined, and from 1943 to 1946 it had no chairman. After the war attempts to revitalize the board met with only limited success. Although the War and Navy Departments professed interest in joint logistic planning, neither was willing to give the ANMB the final word in such matters.¹

As reconstituted by the National Security Act, the Munitions Board consisted of a civilian chairman, appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation, and an under or assistant secretary from each of the three military departments. The board's supporting organization, inherited from the ANMB, consisted of six staff divisions keyed to functional activities such as procurement, products, and services and a complex array of interagency and industry advisory committees, many of which apparently existed only on paper. The first Chairman of the MB, Thomas J. Hargrave, had been Chairman of the ANMB. Hargrave served in a part-time capacity and alternated weeks between Washington and Rochester, N.Y., where he served as president of the Eastman Kodak Co. Because of his busy schedule, Hargrave made no attempt to exercise supervisory responsibility over the board's operating staff and committees and relied on a three-member executive committee, composed of a high-ranking officer from each service, to provide day-to-day supervision.²

Shortly after becoming Secretary of Defense, Forrestal revealed his intention to give the Munitions Board full jurisdiction "in all industrial matters with which the Armed Services are concerned."³ He wanted the board to take the lead in developing policies for current joint logistical planning and joint procurement and, by so doing, to assume major responsibility for the allocation of resources and the elimination of waste and needless duplication in purchasing. But because of important differences of opinion on the respective functions of the Munitions Board and the National Security Resources Board under the new law, Forrestal delayed making any changes until a general assignment of responsibilities could be worked out.* Once he was able to bring about an agreement, Forrestal acted

* On the MB-NSRB quarrel, see Chapter V.


on two fronts. First, on 24 November 1947 he granted the MB chairman final authority in the assignment of NME-wide procurement responsibilities to individual services and, second, he moved to give the board's staff closer day-to-day direction by naming Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, USA, a former commanding general of the Army Service Forces, as Deputy Chairman and senior member of the MB's executive committee.⁴

In explaining the need for these changes, Forrestal found it difficult to convince Hargrave that he needed a full-time deputy. Service members of the board supported Hargrave on this and even questioned whether the Secretary of Defense possessed the authority to make such changes. Officers on the executive committee and even some civilians who sat on the board for the services tended to consider themselves representatives of their respective organizations rather than members of a staff agency responsible to and under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. They reasoned that it was improper for the Munitions Board to accept responsibility for current logistical planning and operations and argued that its main activity should be confined to the coordination of industrial mobilization plans developed individually by each service.⁵ Such attitudes could not have given Lutes cause for much optimism in his new position.

After assuming his post as Deputy Chairman in January 1948, Lutes discovered in the board's internal procedures serious problems that often delayed or prevented action. Some of the most serious obstacles originated in the attitudes and practices of the services. The admiral representing the Navy on the staff had to refer all important matters to his department before making a recommendation to the board, and the Air Force representative appeared to follow certain fixed policies of his service on matters concerning budgets and naval aviation. Lutes tried to secure acceptance of Forrestal's concept and asked for a strong charter vesting the board with clear-cut responsibility. However, several months passed before OSD and the services finally agreed on exact wording for the charter.⁶

The resulting directive, approved by Forrestal on 9 June 1948, satisfied no one, least of all one of its principal authors, John Ohly, who termed it "inadequate from the outset because of the speed with which it was originally prepared." Much of the charter merely reiterated in more detail the board's statutory functions, including the coordination of supply programs, the development of policies for establishing and assessing industrial mobilization requirements, the maintenance of liaison with other agencies, including the Joint Chiefs and the NSRB, and the stockpiling of critical materials. In an apparent concession to the services, Forrestal revoked the power of decision in assigning procurement responsibilities granted to the chairman the previous November, but he added a provision empowering the board to assemble, analyze, and review "current and mobilization programs for military requirements presented by the several departments."

CHART 5
MUNITIONS BOARD
MARCH 1948



Additionally, as Lutes had suggested, the charter made several significant changes in the MB's internal organization aimed at reducing military departmental influence in the board's affairs. A more unified staff structure consisting of a director (Lutes) and three military directors, one from each service and each having responsibility for specific areas of the board's activities, replaced the executive committee.⁷

Under Secretary Johnson, the Munitions Board underwent further internal reorganization and had its charter revised to take account of several new duties. Part of the impetus for these changes came from Johnson, whose desire to reduce bureaucratic overhead and whose well-known antipathy for committee-type operations prompted the Munitions Board to take a fresh look at its organizational needs. The reorganization, announced in July 1949, eliminated or consolidated many of the board's committees and separated staff functions into four distinct areas—military programs, industrial programs, military supply, and facilities.⁸

The 1949 amendments affecting the Munitions Board marked an important step in its evolution from an organization largely dependent for its effectiveness on voluntary service cooperation to an organization through which the Secretary of Defense could exercise line authority over all logistic activities in the military establishment. In two areas Congress enjoined the board to act rather than simply make recommendations. It directed the board to regroup, combine, or dissolve "existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement, production, and distribution" when this would promote "efficiency and economy," rather than limiting its duty to making recommendations for such changes; and it charged the board with "assignment of procurement responsibilities" rather than simply making recommendations for such assignments. Even more significantly, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to vest in the board's chairman such powers of decision over matters falling within the jurisdiction of the board as the secretary wished.⁹

Despite Johnson's reputation for taking bold actions, he moved cautiously in implementing the new law as it pertained to the Munitions Board. He could have given the chairman unfettered power to make decisions, thereby reducing the other board members to the status of an advisory committee. Instead, in a new charter issued 3 November 1949, he confined the chairman's decisionmaking to matters "on which the other members of the Board are not unanimous," which allowed him to override only split votes.* Other provisions of the charter pertained to new responsibilities, including advising the Secretary of Defense on the industrial feasibility, not just the requirements, of JCS strategic and logistic plans. In an amendment to the charter, Johnson in May 1950 assigned to the board

* Not until 1952 under Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett did the MB Chairman acquire full power of decision. See DoD Directive No 5126.5, sec IV-A.-1, 29 Jul 52.

the task of determining the U.S. position on military production matters relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹⁰

Despite efforts to strengthen the board's authority and to streamline its organization, a number of chronic difficulties continued to hinder its effectiveness. One of the most serious difficulties was the small pool of available talent to fill mid-level managerial positions on the board's staff. OSD's largest organizational unit, the Munitions Board had more than 100 military and 500 civilian employees by the end of June 1949. Certainly, in good part this civilian predominance may be attributed to military disinterest. According to General Lutes, the services begrudged promoting officers detailed to the MB and other OSD staff agencies. Of 110 officers in the 1948-49 class of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, only 8 expressed any interest in serving with the MB. "It is also significant," Lutes added, "that although 40 other officers indicated a preference for logistical staff duty, it was *not* desired at joint agency level."¹¹

Another serious recurrent problem was recruitment and retention of a qualified board chairman. After Hargrave resigned in September 1948, Forrestal decided to turn the chairmanship into a full-time position but found it almost impossible to recruit a qualified successor, in large part because of the uncertainties of the impending presidential election. Qualified Republicans were averse to accepting the job for fear of being "tainted" by association with a Democratic administration, and Democrats were loath to serve in view of opinion polls showing that President Truman would soon be out of office.¹² Eventually, after being turned down by 11 prospects, Forrestal prevailed on Donald F. Carpenter, the outgoing Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee, to head the Munitions Board temporarily. Carpenter served until 30 June 1949, after which the MB had no chairman for nearly five months. Not until Truman nominated Hubert E. Howard, an officer of the Shasta Coal Company, did the Senate in November 1949 approve a new chairman.¹³

By their very nature, most of the activities of the Munitions Board could not be expected to produce significant results except over long periods of time, and its accomplishments during the 1947-50 period were indeed modest. Forrestal's view that the board should assist unification by leading the way in eliminating waste and unnecessary duplication was partially realized by its active direction of the cataloging of all items used by the services. Obviously, a system under which items, such as the barrel of a rifle or the crankshaft of a motor, could be designated by the same name and number, regardless of manufacturer or user service, would increase the flexibility of the supply system and diminish the "deadlining" of equipment for want of spare parts. Taking a special interest in this subject, the board launched a four-year program to identify and catalog each item in the equipment inventories of the three services. By the end of June 1950 it had

approved 877,000 item descriptions or about 35 percent of the approximately 2.5 million in the inventory.¹⁴

If cataloging stood out as notable, other aspects of the board's work were clearly less successful, although the fault did not always lie entirely with the board. During Carpenter's tenure, for example, the board gave top priority to the stockpiling of strategic materials such as tin, copper, and rubber, but the high cost of many items, competitive buying from industry, and rigid budget ceilings combined to hinder the effort. After the outbreak of the Korean War and the emergence of certain shortages, there were calls in Congress for an inquiry, but none was ever held. Carpenter later said he would have welcomed the opportunity to testify. "In 1948," he explained, "it was difficult to buy and prices were high. Later, in early 1949, however, business dropped off and supplies were abundant. Prices fell and companies begged us to buy. It was an ideal time to buy from every standpoint, but congress [sic] wouldn't appropriate the money and we couldn't."¹⁵

The Munitions Board was perhaps least effective in the one area in which Forrestal had hoped it would make its major contribution—current supply and procurement. Part of the problem, to be sure, rested with the Joint Chiefs, whose differences over roles and missions prevented them from providing the guidance needed for assigning priorities for board programs. Without such guidance and "without clear (to all) backing from the Secretary of Defense," the Munitions Board was reluctant to act and generally permitted each service to make the final determination of its procurement and supply needs. Under these "permissive" procedures, fully coordinated logistical plans were more often a hope than a reality. Furthermore, no chairman was ever willing to press his colleagues for decisions, a practice that left numerous questions dangling for weeks and months at a time. According to Lutes, the chairman relied excessively on voluntary cooperation and tended to lack "a Department-of-Defense sense of mission." Lutes's criticism may be somewhat harsh, for, as Carpenter recalled, "Forrestal frequently asked if I didn't want more authority. I told him I preferred it as it was as I wanted the board members to feel the responsibility of the board's actions."¹⁶

The Research and Development Board

During and immediately after World War II, each of the services strenuously sought to exploit the military applications of the tremendous scientific and technological advances that had occurred and were continuing. The major breakthroughs that these efforts had produced in such areas as nuclear fission, jet propulsion, and electronics had led to great improvements in the combat capabilities

of the armed forces. Yet because these efforts were largely uncoordinated, and hence often improperly or inadequately focused, duplicative, and unrelated to unified strategic plans, their effectiveness was seriously limited. For this reason and because of the diminishing funds and resources after 1945, it seemed imperative to create a single coordinated military research and development (R&D) program. To deal with this and related tasks and to ensure effective coordination between the military establishment and the civilian scientific community, Congress in the National Security Act established another staff agency—the Research and Development Board.

The RDB, like the Munitions Board, inherited the organizational structure of a predecessor nonstatutory organization, the Joint Research and Development Board (JRDB). The Secretaries of War and Navy had created the JRDB on 6 June 1946 to fill the void left by the phasing out of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), which had coordinated military research and development during World War II.¹⁷ The principal architect, organizer, and director of both these predecessor agencies had been Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution in Washington, D.C. During the war Bush had emerged as the foremost scientific administrator in the country, having served simultaneously as Director of the OSRD, Chairman of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment of the JCS, and Chairman of the Military Policy Committee, which had overseen the Manhattan Project. In these capacities Bush had become convinced of the need for “a unitary program directed to sound military objectives.” Named Chairman of the JRDB in 1946, he set out to carry on the task, begun during the war, of enlisting members of the scientific community as “full and responsible partners” in the work at hand.¹⁸

The National Security Act established a seven-member Research and Development Board composed of a civilian chairman appointed by the President with Senate approval and two representatives from each of the three services. The act stated the board’s purpose as advising the Secretary of Defense “as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in assuring adequate provision for research and development on scientific problems relating to the national security.” To provide continuity of direction and leadership, Forrestal asked Bush to stay on as chairman. Bush hesitated to accept because of a recent disagreement with the White House over the legislation proposed for the National Science Foundation. But in a reassuring face-to-face meeting, President Truman persuaded Bush to take the job; he was sworn in on 30 September 1947.¹⁹ Like Thomas Hargrave, his counterpart at the Munitions Board, Bush served in a part-time capacity, but his experience and prestige and his permanent residence in Washington enabled him to be a more effective staff agency chairman than Hargrave.

Having strong views about the role and organization of the RDB, Bush began immediately to draft a proposed charter for the board, which he submitted to Forrestal in late October. The composition of the board emerged as a controversial issue between Bush and the service secretaries.²⁰ Because Bush believed that effective military planning and effective R&D planning depended on a close relationship between the military and the RDB, he felt that the service representatives should be uniformed officers, preferably the service chiefs themselves and their immediate deputies for R&D. Except for the chairman, Bush saw no point in having civilians on the board. The secretaries—Royall, Sullivan, and Symington—objected, pointing out that any budgetary authority the RDB might exercise would require civilian as well as military representation, since ultimate accountability for the use of public funds rested in civilian hands. Forrestal agreed with Bush but could not persuade the service secretaries to name the chiefs to the board.* Bush dropped his proposal at this time, but at the Newport conference in August 1949 he persuaded the Joint Chiefs to let the RDB Chairman sit with them on "all appropriate occasions."[†]²¹

Acting on advice from Ohly and Leva, Forrestal rejected Bush's draft directive and ordered a new one prepared. Completed in 24 hours, the new directive was approved by Forrestal on 18 December in time for convening the board on 19 December.²²

The revised charter stated the board's responsibilities more precisely and vested the RDB with somewhat greater authority. On matters of "major policy" the board could make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense; on "all other" matters it could resolve disagreements among the departments and agencies and make decisions having the authority of the Secretary of Defense. However, it could not direct or control the internal administration of R&D activities of the services. The charter defined RDB's powers and duties to include the following: prepare an annual integrated master plan of research and development; allocate among the departments and agencies of the NME responsibility for specific R&D programs and projects of joint interest; survey R&D activities and recommend new projects; establish methods for exchanging information on programs and projects among NME departments and agencies; participate in coordinating the R&D budgets of the military departments and recommend to the Secretary of

* As a practical matter, the dispute over service representation ended largely in Bush's favor. In an apparent effort at reconciliation, the secretaries decided to appoint an all-military delegation, though the officers they selected were not the chiefs. In addition to Bush, the original membership of the RDB was: Army, General Jacob L. Devers and Maj. Gen. Henry S. Aurand; Navy, Admiral DeWitt C. Ramsey and Rear Adm. Paul F. Lee; Air Force, General Joseph T. McNarney and Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie.

† Despite this agreement, there is no evidence that Bush or any other RDB Chairman ever sat with the Joint Chiefs at any of their official meetings.

Defense the "appropriate scope" of their R&D effort; keep the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries apprised of the status of scientific research; and, finally, promote the correlation of research and development with strategic and logistic plans. The charter also emphasized the need for close coordination between the RDB and the Joint Chiefs, and for keeping the chiefs informed about new weapon systems.²³


Like the Munitions Board, the RDB conducted most of its work through committees of civilian and military personnel. Each committee dealt with a specialized area, such as aeronautics, guided missiles, or electronics, and had panels to study and make recommendations on more specific subcategories. The committees functioned independently, set their own rules and work schedules, and relied heavily on the board's staff under the Executive Secretary Lawrence R. Hafstad, a physicist who later became a vice president of General Motors in charge of all of its research laboratories. The staff supported and coordinated the efforts of the committees by providing secretaries for each and full services for the board itself, including implementation of decisions. Up to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the RDB employed a full-time staff of about 250 civilians, augmented by 1,500 part-time consultants and advisers from academic institutions, industry, and the various bureaus and research facilities of the armed forces.²⁴

In December 1948 the RDB received responsibility jointly with the JCS for overseeing the work of the newly created Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG). A nonstatutory support agency, WSEG was "to provide rigorous, unprejudiced and independent analyses and evaluations of present and future weapons systems under probable future combat conditions." It was initially expected that WSEG would become a part of the JCS organization after a year of operations, but as the scheduled date of the transfer neared, WSEG and RDB officials became concerned that its full subordination to JCS authority might impair its objectivity and effectiveness. Absent any JCS objections, no final decision on a transfer was made and WSEG continued to operate under joint RDB-JCS sponsorship.*²⁵

A frequent criticism of the RDB's committee system held that it was more efficient in improving existing weapons than in exploring the potential of new ones. In most instances, the committees operated in tandem with their equivalent agencies in the military services; the committee on ordnance, for example, dealt with the appropriate ordnance office in each service. The military members of each committee normally came from these same offices and usually emphasized those matters of immediate concern to their services. "However competent the individual civilian scientists of the committee might be," complained one critic,

* On the origins and early activities of WSEG, see Chapter XIV.

CHART 8
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD, 1948



"they simply could not compete in ideas with the competent military members who spent their full time thinking about specific weapons." ²⁶

By the time Bush left the RDB in October 1948 there was a growing consensus among its members that the committee system was flawed. According to General McNarney, an Air Force board member, the basic defect in the committee structure was inability to cover the entire field of military R&D. The problem stemmed, in McNarney's view, from the committees' "excessive autonomy," the absence of uniform procedures, the lack of an effective mechanism for correlating committee recommendations, and the apparent unwillingness of the committees to take the initiative in rooting out unnecessary duplication of effort. For example, he cited no fewer than 35 ongoing and often redundant guided missile projects. Lest the RDB lose sight of objectives, McNarney strongly urged the adoption of closer internal administrative controls.²⁷

Efforts to eliminate these problems yielded few basic changes. In 1949, as part of the DoD reorganization, Congress granted the board chairman, subject to the authority vested in him by the Secretary of Defense, the power of decision over all matters within the RDB's jurisdiction. However, as with the Munitions Board Chairman, Secretary Johnson in September 1949 authorized the RDB Chairman to make decisions only on those questions "on which the other members of the Board are not unanimous." At this time, acting on recommendations of the Defense Management Committee, the RDB also adopted a new scheme of organization under which the committees still sat as advisory groups, while the board's staff was reorganized into divisions, each having administrative responsibility, under the supervision of the executive secretary, for a general area of research.²⁸

The RDB had the good fortune of enjoying consistently high-caliber leadership. Bush, an electrical engineer by training, was an extremely energetic and innovative administrator, a highly respected member of the scientific community, and an ardent advocate of close military-scientific cooperation. As a rule, he worked easily with military leaders and enjoyed their confidence, even though he was often critical of their procedures and dubious of their ability to deal with scientific and technical matters.²⁹

When Bush stepped down in October 1948, Forrestal converted the RDB chairmanship to a full-time position and appointed Dr. Karl T. Compton, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Nationally known for his work in physics, Compton had been involved in the Manhattan Project in World War II and had previously served on the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and as Chairman of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training. For health reasons, Compton resigned in March 1950 and was succeeded by William Webster, a utility company executive from New England

and former Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission.³⁰

Despite its able and talented chairmen, the RDB encountered many of the same difficulties that plagued the Munitions Board. A major difficulty was the long delay of the Joint Chiefs, because of their inability to agree on unified strategic plans and requirements, in providing the strategic guidance that the board required before it could prepare annual master R&D programs for the whole military establishment. Because of the JCS failure to provide timely strategic guidance, the first integrated master program did not become available until February 1949, much too late to be used in preparing FY 1950 R&D budget estimates. However, the next year, when a master program became available in time, it played little part in determining which service research proposals would be covered in the FY 1951 budget estimates. With Johnson's economy drive in full swing and reduced budget ceilings, these budget decisions, like many others, were largely made by the Defense Management Committee on its own separate assessment of needs and priorities.³¹

In contrast to these difficulties was the RDB's success in preparing annual Consolidated Technical Estimates (CTEs) of the likely performance characteristics, capabilities, and probable future availability dates of weapons. While the first of these CTEs in 1948 covered only 3 major weapon systems and 17 technical fields of military R&D, the CTE for 1949 was more complete and remarkably accurate in its predictions. It contained, in addition to a special appraisal of atomic warfare, estimates of 15 major military operational areas, including, for example, air defense, where it predicted the introduction of surface-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles within the next 5 to 10 years; airborne and amphibious warfare; and strategic air warfare.* The board was especially active also in promoting and facilitating the exchange of technical information among the military departments and developing policy for the allocation of responsibilities for projects and facilities of interest to two or more services.³²

The most important question in assessing the performance of the RDB in these years was whether it constituted an effective mechanism for achieving, as Bush had hoped, a "unitary program" for such a vast and complex sphere as

* Other areas covered by the 1949 CTE included refinements in antisubmarine warfare detection systems; chemical and biological warfare; combat air support with high-performance carrier-based aircraft; intelligence; land combat, including new tanks, antitank weapons, mines, and mine-detection equipment; psychological warfare activities; food, clothing, and medicine; and sea combat. The board estimated that long-range surface-to-surface missiles would be ready for testing by 1956 but cautioned that their quantity production would probably not begin until two to five years after evaluation. Until then, manned bombers would remain the primary strategic delivery system, with all-jet medium (B-47) and heavy (B-52) bombers entering service in the early 1950s.

military R&D. Unfortunately, it lacked the authority and organizational structure for decisionmaking needed to coordinate effectively. Lacking authority to enforce decisions on projects and priorities among the services and any voice in the allocation of R&D funds, the board was generally at the mercy of the services. Overall, as General McNarney had pointed out, the board's performance gave the appearance of being weak and diffuse and therefore elicited persistent criticism that it failed to exploit the full potential of modern science and technology on behalf of national security.³³

Nonstatutory Staff Agencies

Almost immediately after taking office, Forrestal found himself increasingly faced with a flow of functional problems that did not fall within the jurisdiction of any of the statutory staff agencies. He recognized quickly that some organizational mechanism was needed to deal with the problems, but at this early stage of his tenure he did not consider it practical to create a permanent staff in his office for the purpose. A possible solution was the establishment of nonstatutory bodies comparable in form and function to the secretary's staff agencies, operating as direct extensions of the secretary's authority. This approach appealed to Forrestal, as he advised President Truman on 28 February 1948:

I am now considering the desirability of establishing one or more small additional staff agencies to cover fields which are of mutual interest to all the services and which do not properly fall within the jurisdiction of the regular staff agencies. I have in mind, for example, the possibility of taking the present joint board of the Armed Services in the field of military personnel, of making it directly responsible to me, and of giving it the task of coordination and direction of all military personnel matters. Similar techniques might also be desirable to insure unified direction in military education and training, and in some other fields.³⁴

Such an approach, at least in the areas of military personnel and medical affairs, received the endorsement of the Eberstadt Task Force. Over the course of time it resulted in the creation of three small nonstatutory agencies—the Personnel Policy Board, the Civilian Components Policy Board, and the Office of Medical Services.

PERSONNEL POLICY BOARD

World War II and the demobilization that followed focused sharp attention on the human element in the armed forces and the problems associated with

people. The postwar standing force was far larger than ever before in peacetime and it raised problems of recruitment, training, and retention of officers and enlisted personnel that proved difficult to resolve. Questions of a fundamental nature had to be answered: Should reliance be placed on Selective Service or UMT or on volunteers, or on a combination of these? What incentive would be needed if volunteers were to be relied on? How should integration of racial minorities and women be handled? Since many of these questions involved issues common to all of the services, they seemed to require some sort of a unified approach and, to some extent, the development of common policies and programs.

As a rule, each service determined its own policies and administered its own programs, with resulting inconsistencies in practice. The creation by the two services in 1942 of the Army–Navy Personnel Board, renamed the Armed Forces Personnel Board or AFPB in 1947, had marked the first step toward providing an official forum for matters of common interest. But as an interdepartmental body, the AFPB could only function in an advisory capacity and, in the interest of preserving harmony, it usually avoided major, controversial issues.³⁵

After unification an avalanche of personnel problems soon descended on OSD, among them the following: the need to reform the pay structure of the armed forces to take into account existing inequities and a host of other factors; the need for a uniform system of military justice; orientation and morale in the services, especially in the overseas occupation areas; recruiting practices; retirement policies; reserve forces; service housing; recreation and welfare; interchange of personnel among the services; the officer grade structure; and the question of participation in politics by military personnel. The National Security Act had not provided a specific mechanism for dealing with personnel problems, and the need for an agency with power and authority beyond that of the AFPB grew more and more apparent.³⁶

By the summer of 1948 Forrestal realized that he needed an agency in his office to exercise greater and more effective control over personnel matters throughout the military establishment. However, it was not until late December, after a frustrating six-month effort to recruit a qualified person, that he designated Thomas R. Reid, Vice President in charge of human relations of McCormick and Company of Baltimore, to organize and chair a Personnel Policy Board. To act as staff director of the board, Forrestal appointed Brig. Gen. Charles T. Lanham, an Army officer experienced in personnel matters. That same month, in his first annual report, Forrestal suggested statutory clarification of his powers "over a broad range of personnel matters."³⁷

With help from others, Reid drafted an "interim directive" for the board which Forrestal approved on 22 February 1949. This directive described the board's purposes as the study of military and civilian personnel policies through-

out the NME, development of uniform policies, elimination of unnecessary duplication and overlapping, and placement under one authority of all interdepartmental bodies concerned with personnel policy matters in the NME together with the functions of such bodies. Initially, this responsibility rested with the whole board, composed of a civilian chairman and an under or assistant secretary from each military department, but on 31 March 1949 Secretary Johnson transferred the power of decision to the chairman, thus reducing the other members to an advisory status. Johnson reaffirmed this change in a permanent charter in August which also spelled out in greater detail the PPB's functions—to develop policies for recruitment, pay and allowances, job classification, interservice exchange and transfer of personnel, promotions, standards of efficiency, separation and retirement, and recreation and welfare. With a full-time staff of approximately 35 civilians and 12 uniformed officers, the PPB was one of the smallest organizations in the NME.³⁸

Under Chairman Reid and his successors,³⁹ the PPB was extremely active, initiating continuing studies on such matters as military welfare and morale, civilian and military pay, officer promotion, women in the armed forces, and racial integration. The role of women had taken on greater importance after the passage in June 1948 of P.L. 625, which established the Women's Army Corps (WAC), Women in the Air Force (WAF), and Women Marines as permanent components of their services. The Navy did not establish a separate component but integrated women into its ranks. In the sensitive area of racial integration, the PPB endeavored to establish implementing guidelines for Secretary Johnson's policy, announced on 6 April 1949,* calling for equality of treatment and opportunity in the armed forces. The Air Force and Navy by and large made better progress toward integration than the Army, which tended to drag its feet. In general, the board played a constructive role in furthering racial integration, but when the Korean War erupted in June 1950 integration was still far more policy than practice.⁴⁰

CIVILIAN COMPONENTS POLICY BOARD

Another problem that Forrestal deemed in urgent need of comprehensive study was the place of the National Guard and other military reserve organizations in the combat forces of the United States. In November 1947 he constituted the Committee on Civilian Components, a six-member interdepartmental group, known also as the "Gray Board" after its chairman, Assistant Secretary of the

* This followed Executive Order 9981, issued by President Truman on 26 July 1948.

Army Gordon Gray,* and directed it to make a "comprehensive, objective, and impartial study" of the civilian components of the armed forces.† One of the committee's major proposals was establishment of a permanent joint interservice committee to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on "reserve force policies and procedures of joint or common interest to the reserve forces of all the services."⁴¹ Almost a year later, Secretary Johnson constituted the Civilian Components Policy Board as a permanent entity in his office "to develop overall policies, coordinate and maintain surveillance over the plans, policies and programs" relating to civilian component matters.⁴² The CCPB reflected the need of the Secretary of Defense for a unit that could provide him with continuing advice and assistance on reserve affairs.

On 30 June 1948 the Gray Board submitted its report entitled "Reserve Forces for National Security." Forrestal released it to the public on 11 August, earlier than originally intended, after leaks disclosed much of its contents. Some of the report's more provocative suggestions drew sharp criticism from reserve organizations, members of Congress, and state governors. The most controversial finding maintained that the reserve forces, especially those of the Army and the Air Force, needed to be streamlined under a more unified structure, with closer ties to the active armed forces. Thus, the state-run National Guard would be federalized and merged into a single federal reserve force for each service: the National Guard of the United States for the Army; the United States Air Force Reserve for the Air Force; and the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve under the Navy Department.⁴³

In transmitting the report to President Truman, Forrestal stated no position on the Gray Board findings and merely commented that it would require "weeks of study . . . before definite decisions can be reached." Truman wanted action on the report deferred indefinitely, probably because of the controversial recommendation to merge the National Guard and the Organized Reserve and federalize them. "It is a most interesting document and one that deserves a lot of study," he told Forrestal, "but, at this time, it is filled with political dynamite and during a Presidential campaign can defeat its own purpose." In October 1948 Truman issued Executive Order 10007 directing the Secretary of Defense to establish

* The other members of the committee were John Nicholas Brown, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air; Cornelius V. Whitney, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force; Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain, USA; Vice Adm. William M. Fichteler, USN; and Brig. Gen. John P. McConnell, USAF.

† The Naval Reserve, composed of the Fleet Reserve, Organized Reserve, Voluntary Reserve, and Merchant Marine Reserve; the Marine Corps Reserve; the Air and Army National Guard; the Air and Army Organized Reserve Corps; the Reserve Officers' Training Corps; the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Coast Guard Reserve; the Civilian Pilot Training Program of the Civil Aeronautics Authority; and the Civil Air Patrol.

"vigorous and progressive programs" for strengthening the Organized Reserves and National Guard and to prepare a new report within 60 days on the actions taken, along with any proposals for legislation or other measures considered necessary.⁴⁴

In his report to the President after the election, on 12 December, Forrestal praised the Gray Board report as the "most thorough and constructive study" ever made of the reserve forces and urged immediate consideration of legislation to combine the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve, but he reserved judgment on merging the comparable Army components until after further study. Army Secretary Royall considered federalization of the National Guard unwise at the time. The most vigorous opposition came from lobbyist groups, including the National Guard Association and the Reserve Officers' Association. Subsequently, during consideration of a bill (H.R. 1437) on the composition of the Army and Air Force, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees both insisted on provisions guaranteeing the Air Guard's separate identity.*⁴⁵

In May 1949 Secretary Johnson established the Civilian Components Policy Board to assist him in dealing with reserve affairs, including still-pending recommendations of the Gray Board.⁴⁶ Its final charter, issued on 19 August 1949, following two slightly different earlier versions, required the board to initiate and coordinate plans for the reserve forces and to ensure that policies, plans, and programs for these forces, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, were in accord with roles, missions, and strategic plans agreed on by the JCS. The board would make recommendations on major policy to the Secretary of Defense and exercise full authority in other policy matters within its scope of responsibility.⁴⁷

Because of the delay in spelling out its functions and in finding a chairman, the CCPB did not begin to operate until almost three months after Johnson announced its creation. The first chairman, William T. Faricy, a railroad executive from Chicago, served from 3 August 1949 until 1 May 1950, when he was succeeded by another railroad executive, Edwin H. Burgess. The board consisted of 19 members—an under or assistant secretary from each military department, uniformed representatives of the major civilian components, and a regular officer from each of the three services.† All, including the chairman, served part-time, with meetings approximately once a month. To enable the board to function without numerous emergency meetings, Johnson authorized the chairman on 12

* Congress did not act on the bill during the 1949 session. A compromise version, P.L. 604, was passed in June 1950 and signed by the President on 10 July as the "Army and Air Force Authorization Act of 1949."

† Civilian component representation consisted of two Army National Guard officers, two Army Reserve officers, two Naval Reserve officers (one Naval Air), two Marine Corps Reserve officers (one Marine Air), two Air National Guard officers, and two Air Reserve officers.

September 1949 to act between meetings on all matters other than those of major policy.⁴⁸

Unlike the Gray Board, the CCPB did not make any recommendations for sweeping reorganization of civilian components. It concentrated almost exclusively on nonlegislative matters such as promotion of joint federal-state utilization of facilities, improvements in training, and acceleration of efforts to upgrade combat readiness of Reserve and National Guard units. Few board reforms had time to take full effect prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. Apparently Johnson did not view the CCPB as a permanent organization, for at a staff meeting in June 1950 he expressed the hope that it would come under the Personnel Policy Board.⁴⁹ But with the war and the sudden need for more trained manpower than the regular forces could provide, this idea was quickly abandoned.

OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES

The Office of Medical Services was the last of a succession of organizations created in OSD between 1947 and 1950 to deal with various medical problems of the armed forces. The first of these organizations, the Ad Hoc Committee on Medical and Hospital Services, was established by Forrestal in December 1947 under the chairmanship of Dr. Paul R. Hawley, a retired Army major general serving as chief medical director of the Veterans Administration. The other members were the chief medical officers of the services.* The impetus for creation of the Hawley Board, as it was generally referred to, came from several sources—the Bureau of the Budget, which feared that the separation of the Army and Air Force would give rise to separate and possibly duplicate medical facilities; the private medical community, speaking through the American Medical Association (AMA), which had long sought a stronger voice in the medical affairs of the armed forces; and the military departments, the Army in particular, which feared a serious postwar shortage of doctors and dentists.⁵⁰

The immediate event that prompted Forrestal to take action was a conference in early November 1947 with representatives of the Army Medical Advisory Committee on the impending shortage of medical officers. As a result of this meeting and other discussions that culminated in a meeting of the Committee of Four on 25 November, Forrestal decided to establish the Hawley Board. He deferred decisions on whether to set up a general medical advisory committee of his own and to study the question of establishing a single medical service for the armed forces.⁵¹

* Maj. Gen. Raymond W. Bliss, Surgeon General of the Army; Rear Adm. C.A. Swanson, Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery; and Maj. Gen. Malcolm C. Grow, the Air Surgeon.

On 1 January 1948 Forrestal directed the Hawley Board to prepare "a thorough, objective and impartial study of the medical services of the Armed Forces with a view to obtaining, at the earliest possible date, the maximum degree of coordination, efficiency and economy in the operation of these services." Working through 21 subcommittees, the board examined and reported on such matters as medical intelligence, medical budgets, research, training and education, aviation medicine, hospital design and utilization, and preventive medicine practices. Forrestal also hoped (although it was not part of the mission) that the Hawley Board would look closely at the possibility of a single medical service that could deal with all of these matters, but the Navy's strong opposition at the outset prevented serious exploration of the idea. Similar proposals from time to time thereafter drew equally unreceptive responses from the Navy, and the Air Force as well.⁵²

To enlist the support of the medical community in forestalling the impending doctor shortage, the Hawley Board recommended creation of a joint military-civilian policy advisory group, a proposal strongly endorsed by a resolution of the American Medical Association in July 1948 after Congress reenacted selective service. Since doctors and dentists were allowed draft deferments, it seemed quite possible that special legislation might be required to prevent a shortage of medical personnel, a step that might prove impossible without the AMA's backing. The AMA's endorsement brought matters to a head; in August Forrestal placed the question of a policy advisory body before the War Council. The council concurred in the Hawley Board's recommendation, and after further discussion with NME officials and members of the medical community Forrestal established the Armed Forces Medical Advisory Committee on 9 November 1948 under a chairman who would serve also as the secretary's deputy for all medical matters affecting the NME. Forrestal's directive asked for recommendations on general policies and programs covering development of medical and allied services capable of effectively supporting the armed forces, elimination of duplication and overlapping in the service medical departments, and furtherance of cooperation and understanding between the civilian medical community and the armed forces. In addition to its chairman, Charles P. Cooper, a former telephone company executive and chairman of the board of trustees of Presbyterian Hospital in New York City, the committee initially consisted of nine civilian doctors and the chief medical officers of the three services.⁵³

The most urgent item on the Cooper Committee's agenda was the threatened shortage of physicians and dentists. Rather than subject doctors to the draft, the committee proposed an all-out campaign to encourage voluntary service. With considerable fanfare, Forrestal launched the campaign at a press conference on 25 February 1949. At about this same time he asked the committee to con-

sider a recommendation he had received from the JCS calling for "studies and measures intended to produce, for the support of the three fighting services, a completely unified and amalgamated (single) Medical Service."⁵⁴ Although the committee did not report until April, Forrestal concluded on his own and advised Johnson before leaving office that he favored establishment of a single medical service. The Cooper Committee, on the other hand, concluded that "it was not feasible at this time to present the definitive organizational structure" of a unified medical service. For the time being and as a first step toward unification of medical services, the committee recommended that the Secretary of Defense appoint a full-time director of medical services to establish and control the medical policies and programs of the armed forces.⁵⁵

Johnson accepted this suggestion and in May 1949 established the Medical Services Division, later renamed the Office of Medical Services, with a director authorized to set and control "general policies, standards and programs for the medical services of the three military departments and appropriate agencies of the National Military Establishment." In doing so, Johnson disregarded the Hawley Board recommendation to set up an agency modeled after the Personnel Policy Board, with an assistant secretary as a civilian deputy to the Secretary of Defense serving as chairman. The Cooper Committee continued to function as an advisory body reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, but now with an all-civilian membership. Finally, in June 1949 Johnson dissolved the Hawley Board and transferred its duties to the Medical Services Division.⁵⁶

During its first year of operation, the Office of Medical Services and its director, Dr. Richard L. Meiling,* dealt with a variety of old and new problems. The threat of a doctor shortage persisted, but with effects not nearly as serious as predicted, thanks to a combination of factors—an increase in voluntary enlistments, more efficient utilization of personnel as a result of reforms recommended by the Hawley Board, the use of part-time civilian consultants, and reduced service requirements for physicians. The office achieved considerable success in improving the DoD blood program, developing a uniform women's health program for all of the services, and consolidating service medical publications.⁵⁷

In spite of its successes, the office was often the center of controversy, chiefly because of Johnson's highly criticized hospital reduction proposals. In keeping with his general policy of cutting expenditures, Johnson felt that "the medical economy of our nation cannot support three complete and independent military hospital systems during a national emergency." Claiming expected savings of \$25 million, Johnson in February 1950 ordered the closing by 30 June of 18 military hospitals with some 8,000 beds.⁵⁸

* Dr. Raymond B. Allen served only the first three months as Director and was succeeded by his Deputy Director, Dr. Meiling.

This proposal, following the earlier recommendations of the Hawley Board,* affected veterans and dependents more than it did active duty servicemen. Critics questioned both the wisdom of Johnson's decision and his figures; in the spring of 1950 a congressional panel headed by Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (S.C.) of the House Armed Services Committee launched an investigation. The resulting publicity reflected adversely on Meiling and his staff and added fuel to accusations, following the outbreak of the Korean War, that Johnson's policies had diminished the nation's ability to meet an emergency.⁵⁹ In any case, with the onset of hostilities, the need for hospitals increased and few in fact were closed.

The Military Liaison Committee

In a different status from the other OSD staff agencies was the Military Liaison Committee, created along with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Operating as part of the military rather than as an agency of the AEC, by law the Military Liaison Committee served as the commission's principal adviser on the military application of atomic energy. Accordingly, the AEC had the duty to "advise and consult with the Committee on all atomic energy matters which the Committee deems to relate to military applications, including the development, manufacture, use and storage of bombs, the allocation of fissionable material for military research, and the control of information relating to the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons."⁶⁰

On 17 January 1947 the Secretaries of War and Navy approved a charter for the MLC that listed the committee's statutory functions and set its membership at six, three each from the Army and Navy, with the senior in rank, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, USA, designated as Chairman. The charter provided that MLC members should serve as the military members of the Atomic Energy Committee of the Joint Research and Development Board. It also authorized the MLC to form consultative committees and panels, to establish a permanent secretariat, and to promulgate additional rules of procedure and administration.⁶¹

Also in January 1947 the Secretaries of War and Navy established the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), an interservice organization reporting directly to the Army and Navy. Broadly speaking, AFSWP was the agency that succeeded to the military functions of the Manhattan Engineer District (MED). The initial purpose behind the creation of AFSWP was to provide an interservice agency "fully and completely responsible within the Military Establishment for all aspects of atomic warfare short of operational and technical

* In February 1949, responding to Hawley Board recommendations, Forrestal had ordered the closing of three general hospitals and other reductions in medical facilities.

command of the field use of atomic weapons." In actual practice, however, AFSWP exercised a more limited role. The first chief, Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, former Director of the MED, objected to the generalized description of his duties and sought more specific authority. After lengthy negotiations, Groves and the JCS agreed to a revised directive, issued in July 1947, that narrowed the scope of AFSWP functions to those of a technical agency concerned mainly with training troops in the handling and assembly of atomic weapons.⁶²

Although the National Security Act of 1947 had no direct effect on MLC functions and responsibilities, it became apparent that changes would have to be made in MLC's organization and that lines of authority needed adjustment. Strained AEC-MLC relations at the time over such questions as military access to classified atomic energy data and the custody of nuclear weapons added to the pressures for change.* Although matters of policy were certainly uppermost, it was also obvious that personalities were involved and that the AEC wanted Brereton replaced by a civilian to assure closer civilian control of atomic matters within the NME. Forrestal accepted the idea of a civilian chairman, but he had the impression that the overall relationship was "a very unhappy one" and passed on to one AEC member the MLC view that "contrary to the public statements . . . as to cooperation, we were actually getting none."⁶³

To help improve matters, Forrestal asked his staff for a study of the military organization for atomic energy. The report, submitted in January 1948, recommended that AFSWP be abolished and its functions assumed by the three services. The MLC as a statutory body should be reconstituted as a staff agency under the Secretary of Defense, with a chairman appointed by the secretary and two representatives from each military department, and given full authority to deal with the AEC on behalf of the entire NME.⁶⁴

At a special meeting of the Committee of Four on 25 February 1948, Forrestal made it clear that he intended to accept the recommendation to place the MLC under the Secretary of Defense. As a first step he proposed to replace Brereton as MLC Chairman with a "top-level civilian." The service secretaries did not object to losing control of the MLC, but Navy Secretary Sullivan had earlier opposed any alteration in the organizational status of AFSWP, arguing that it should continue as a joint agency in the interests of interservice collaboration. The meeting ended with a consensus to reorganize and strengthen the MLC but to give further study to AFSWP's future.⁶⁵

On 26 March 1948 Forrestal approved a revised MLC charter, effective 12 April, which affirmed that AFSWP would continue to operate "as presently constituted," i.e., as a separate organization. Otherwise, the charter made substantial changes. The MLC would have a chairman appointed by the Secretary

* See Chapter XV.

of Defense and two members from each military department. Although it could not direct or control the administration of atomic energy activities within any of the military departments, the MLC now had the authority to exercise, on behalf of the entire NME, the authority conferred by the Atomic Energy Act, including surveying the nation's overall atomic military requirements and recommending allocation of responsibility for the conduct of military atomic energy activities.⁶⁶

To head the reconstituted committee, Forrestal named Donald F. Carpenter, a vice president of Remington Arms, who replaced Brereton on 8 April 1948. In addition to his duties as MLC Chairman, Carpenter served as "personal advisor and deputy" to the Secretary of Defense, in which capacity Forrestal authorized him "to make final decisions on all questions, except those of major policy, which fall within the jurisdiction of the Military Liaison Committee." Orally, Forrestal instructed Carpenter that one of his first efforts should be to improve AEC-MLC relations. But despite the presence of a civilian chairman, the committee failed to establish a close and cordial working relationship with AEC. "It was said, and with some truth," Carpenter recalled, "that members of the A.E.C. thought all military officers were damn fools and officers thought all A.E.C. people were damn crooks. This was an exaggeration, of course, but still there were strong feelings."⁶⁷

When Carpenter became Chairman of the Munitions Board in September 1948, he recommended William Webster as his successor to head the MLC. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Webster also held a degree in engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and had previously served as a consultant to the AEC and as Chairman of the JRDB's Atomic Energy Committee. When Webster resigned in October 1949, Secretary Johnson named Robert LeBaron as Chairman, a post he held until August 1954. A research chemist, LeBaron had studied nuclear physics in Paris with Madame Marie Curie after World War I.⁶⁸

In May 1949 Johnson asked Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act, making the post of MLC Chairman a presidential appointment, with the same salary and status as the Chairman of the RDB or Munitions Board; he urged that the position be open only to civilians. The Joint Chiefs recommended that Congress make the appointment of a civilian permissive rather than mandatory. Congress adopted the JCS position in the resulting legislation (P.L. 347), approved on 11 October 1949 as the Military Liaison Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act.⁶⁹

Because of the highly secret and sensitive nature of its work, the MLC rarely received public notice. A small organization with a support staff of about 20, it operated in an extremely technical and specialized field, surrounded by tight security. As an advisory body, it participated actively in the debates on a

number of controversial issues, such as who should have custody of atomic weapons, development of the H-bomb, and determination of levels of production of fissionable materials. At other times, given the composition of its membership and its responsibility for allocating certain functions and duties, the MLC became a battleground for interservice rivalries. But in dealing with the AEC, committee members invariably joined ranks to present a common front.*

Unlike most of the other staff agencies, the MLC possessed considerable freedom to act independently and was therefore often more responsive and effective in resolving questions and initiating projects. This freedom to act derived largely from two sources—the high degree of confidence that both Forrestal and Johnson had in the committee, and the broad interpretation the MLC applied to its statutory obligation to review AEC activities dealing with “military applications.” The committee felt that it had an obligation to monitor the entire atomic energy field, including procurement of raw materials; weapon research, development, and production; combat readiness for atomic warfare; and the status of the nuclear stockpile.⁷⁰ At a time when the military’s familiarity with these matters remained severely limited, the MLC was often the only military agency capable of assessing whether military needs were being met.

Despite differences in origin, size, composition, and duties, the staff agencies had one thing in common—they were essentially interservice committees that reported to and served under the direct authority of the Secretary of Defense. As such, they were an extension of his immediate office—under OSD but not *in* OSD. This rather unique arrangement had both advantages and drawbacks. In providing necessary staff support, the staff agencies gave Forrestal and Johnson a mechanism for addressing many of the technical matters that officials in OSD were not equipped, organized, or trained to handle. But if this was the theory, it was not always the fact, owing to constant internal and external pressures that often deflected these agencies from their purpose and detracted from their effectiveness.

The principal flaw in the staff agency concept was its reliance on voluntary cooperation, a carryover from before unification, when joint boards and joint committees had coordinated many common War and Navy Department activities. But unlike the relatively cooperative relations that characterized the war years, the postwar period was rife with dissension among the services, owing to competition for limited funds and contention over roles and missions and a host of other controversial questions. The opportunities for differences of interest and opinion and for prolonged debate thus became considerable. The debilitating

* MLC activities are discussed in further detail in Chapter XV.

effects manifested themselves quickly and led Forrestal and Johnson to realize that some of the boards and committees would have to give way to another form of organization.

Logically, that new organization would entail a change from the staff agency system to the staff office under a single head responsible to the Secretary of Defense. For all practical purposes, this was what Forrestal had in mind when he reconstituted the MLC in 1948, making the MLC Chairman his adviser and deputy for atomic energy matters. The nonstatutory agencies—the Personnel Policy Board, the Civilian Components Policy Board, and the Office of Medical Services—had chairmen of corresponding rank and status from the very beginning. The 1949 amendments extended the principle to the Munitions Board and the RDB; eventually both became staff offices at the assistant secretary of defense level.

For the staff agencies, as for the rest of the military establishment after unification, the underlying issue was centralization versus decentralization of power and authority—whether OSD or the services would have the ultimate voice in deciding and directing policies. Having operated independently for so many years, the services had developed traditions and procedures that in many instances clashed with the goals of unification. Under the War and Navy Departments, the civilian element at the top had rarely been able to dominate the professional soldiers who ordered the affairs of the services. OSD was different. It had power and received more as the years went by. As civilian authority grew, so too did the likelihood that military and civilian officials would come into conflict. The staff agencies, where these tensions often converged, became arenas in which battles for power and influence were joined repeatedly. But obviously there also existed a reservoir of common sense, joint responsibility, and goodwill on the part of all involved, permitting constructive organizational change where clearly warranted and leading to creative accomplishments.

CHAPTER V

OSD and the National Security Structure

Although itself a mighty empire, the National Military Establishment, with OSD at its head, was only one element of the new national security structure and had to function within the larger framework, which included both existing and newly created components. The State Department had been a key component of the structure from the beginning of the Republic. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in existence since 1942, received statutory status in 1947. Although part of the NME and responsible to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS also constituted the highest professional military body in the overall security structure and had responsibilities beyond the NME, notably to the President. The other major elements—the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency—were all created by the 1947 legislation. Making OSD and NME work was sufficient challenge in itself, but they had also to mesh with these other parts of the national security organization. As a principal architect of the new structure, and designated by law as “the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security,” Forrestal felt he had a special responsibility for seeing that it operated effectively.

From the beginning, Forrestal stressed the importance of OSD establishing sound working relationships with and contributing to the effective operation of the entire defense structure. These relationships expanded and grew more complex as time went on. In many instances, old ties, based on separate War and Navy Departments, had to be redefined or adjusted to accord with the realities of a unified military establishment. Such adjustments were seldom easy, and they did not always result in good working relations between the defense establishment and agencies outside the Pentagon.

In these external relationships, Forrestal and Johnson both played active

and highly visible personal roles. Forrestal remarked that "there are tasks which I cannot escape if the machinery, as set up under the Act, is to function,"¹ but given their wide-ranging duties, he and Johnson found it increasingly necessary to delegate to their staffs responsibilities for handling external relations. This led to a pattern of interdepartmental and interagency associations and working arrangements that further centralized administration of the military in OSD.

The National Security Council

The Secretary of Defense had to look first to his relationship with the President, in whom resided ultimate responsibility for protection of the nation's security. During the initial years of the new defense establishment, secretaries of defense sought to define their role and position in relation to the President and other elements of the national security structure. The President, too, had to define his relationships with such new agencies as the NSRB, CIA, NME, and particularly the NSC. But in Harry Truman's day, the authority and importance of the Chief Executive came to be epitomized in a single, brief sentence, engraved on a sign that sat atop his Oval Office desk: "The buck stops here."

Within the new structure the National Security Council stood at the summit as the President's chief policy advisory body. The idea for such a body first emerged formally in the 1945 Eberstadt Report; Forrestal had quickly endorsed it as an essential element of any future national security organization. Some viewed it as being akin to Britain's closely knit Committee on Imperial Defence.² Forrestal had argued in 1944 that without such an entity to formulate and oversee policy, "we should not be able to deal with the problems and relationships arising during the postwar period."³ Truman initially saw no need for such a council, but as the unification debate progressed his attitude changed. Although circumstantial, the evidence suggests strongly that Truman accepted the NSC to placate Forrestal and to eliminate grounds for the Navy's opposition to unification.⁴

The 1947 act charged the NSC "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security" and "to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power and to make recommendations to the President on these matters." Membership included the President; the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the three military departments; and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. The President could also name as members, subject to Senate approval, other officials designated in the act. The Director of Central Intelligence was to advise and make

recommendations to the NSC on intelligence activities. The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act removed the service secretaries from membership, added the Vice President, and designated the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the council's "principal military advisers."⁵

As first Executive Secretary of the NSC, President Truman appointed Rear Adm. Sidney W. Souers (USNR), who before the war had been a successful businessman in St. Louis. A reserve officer, Souers spent the latter part of World War II in the Office of Naval Intelligence and afterwards became the Director of Central Intelligence,* a post he held from January to June 1946. As Executive Secretary,† Souers served chiefly in a coordinating capacity and, at times, as Truman's adviser on intelligence matters. "In fact," recalled one White House aide, "President Truman used Souers primarily as his liaison with the intelligence community. He used to refer to Souers as his intelligence man and, frequently, as his 'cloak-and-dagger' man."⁶ John Ohly remembered Souers as playing a more significant role, noting "he exercised great influence in getting the NSC under way and in facilitating its function."⁷ When Souers resigned in January 1950, his assistant, James F. Lay, Jr., who, like Souers, had close ties with the intelligence community, succeeded him.

At the outset, the NSC staff, under the executive secretary, consisted mainly of junior level military and foreign service officers who rotated on a "loan" basis from their departments. NSC consideration of a problem customarily involved three stages, beginning with preparation of a paper, usually by the NSC staff or the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Then an interdepartmental group of senior advisers or "consultants" would comment and make recommendations on the papers. The third stage was formal council discussion, followed by submission of adopted papers to the President for his approval and instructions on implementation. Rarely did Truman voice objections to or turn down the council's advice.⁸

On certain occasions, such as periods of acute tension during the Berlin blockade of 1948-49 and the threatened Chinese Communist attack on the U.S. naval base at Tsingtao in the fall of 1948, the NSC became involved in almost day-to-day consideration of the crises.‡ But most of the time it dealt with matters of long-range importance. Matters that reached the NSC fell broadly into four categories: (1) U.S. policy relating to a country or geographic area; (2) policy relating to broad functional areas, such as foreign trade, mobilization, or atomic energy; (3) questions of organization and procedure pertaining to NSC operations, foreign intelligence, and internal security; and (4) basic national security

* Central Intelligence Group, predecessor of CIA.

† Souers served as a civilian.

‡ See Chapters VIII and X.

policy.⁹ Forrestal thought the last category deserved the council's closest attention. "It seems to me," he argued,

that our policy with respect to particular countries must take into account our interests throughout the world and our ability, as a practical matter, both from an economic and a military standpoint, to protect these various interests. In my opinion it is abundantly clear that priorities must be established, and this cannot be done rationally in the absence of a definitive world policy.¹⁰

Forrestal looked on the NSC not only as an advisory body but as a fact-finding agency, charged with identifying problem areas for the President's consideration.¹¹ Once the President had settled on a particular policy, NSC would assume responsibility for its coordination and execution. Forrestal presumed (correctly, as it turned out) that the President would seldom attend NSC meetings and that the major burden of followup would fall on the Secretary of Defense in his capacity as the President's "principal assistant . . . in all matters relating to national security."¹² The NSC, as Forrestal viewed it, would call matters to the President's attention and propose policies for his decision. Souers would serve as the "buckle" between State and NME, an indispensable coordinating role according to Forrestal.¹³

While maintaining a rather narrow view of the NSC's role, Truman eventually conceded that it was "a badly needed new facility." In his memoirs he criticized both Forrestal and Johnson for trying to turn the NSC into "an operating super-cabinet on the British model," a charge probably meant to apply more to Forrestal than Johnson.¹⁴ Truman set forth the council's role in a memorandum he issued to council members in July 1948:

The Council does not determine policy or supervise operations, except for its responsibility for general direction of the Central Intelligence Agency. Nor is it an implementing agency, since execution and administration are the responsibility of the respective executive departments and agencies. The Council's function is to formulate national security policy for the consideration of the President. With complete freedom to accept, reject and amend the Council's advice and to consult with other members of his official family, it is the prerogative of the President to determine such policy and enforce it. The Council serves as a channel for collective advice and information to the President regarding the national security, which is a coherent and discrete part of the President's total responsibilities. Therefore, as an agency primarily useful to the President, the Council considers only matters requiring his attention. It avoids matters concerning interdepartmental coordination of operations or supervision of interdepart-

mental committees created for that purpose, except in the field of coordination of intelligence operations for which the Council is legally responsible.¹⁵

Truman chose not to participate regularly in the NSC's deliberations, attending fewer than a dozen of its 57 formal meetings prior to the Korean emergency. According to James Lay, the "president's decision not to attend the NSC meetings was based, first, upon his concern that discussion might be terminated prematurely by any expression of his own views and, second, upon his conviction that by not attending he could best preserve his full freedom of action with respect to NSC policy recommendations."¹⁶

Forrestal, feeling a special responsibility for seeing that the council functioned effectively, sought to fill some of the vacuum created by Truman's early unwillingness to become personally involved in NSC operations. From his daily relations with Forrestal on NSC and politico-military matters, John Ohly retained vivid recollections of the secretary's role:

He certainly felt a strong obligation to have the Council used for the policy-developing role that he believed it could assist, and while . . . his office took very little direct part in the preparation of NSC papers, a very large portion of the policy papers that came out of the Council had their origin in requests for the development of policies that emanated from him or his office—most frequently in the form of memoranda to the Executive Secretary suggesting or requesting the preparation of a national policy on a particular country, area, or other subject, but sometimes in the form of an oral request on his part to the Executive Secretary and sometimes in the form of requests to one of the departmental secretaries to prepare and submit directly to the Council a paper suggesting the need for a policy paper. Especially in the first year, he repeatedly turned to the Council whenever he felt that there was a need within the military establishment for the development of a national policy within which military planning and operations might go forward. He also took very seriously his responsibility as a Council member to contribute to the Council's discussions, and he was regularly briefed by Blum and often by Gruenther before attending Council meetings. He considered himself a kind of catalyst to make the Council operate and he was continually asking to be brought up to date on where particular matters referred to the Council stood. He saw a great deal of Souers, especially in the first months, and Blum was in daily contact with Souers and I frequently was too; and Souers would sometimes pour out his troubles in getting the State Department to move on requests put to them for the initial development of a policy paper whose preparation Forrestal had sparked by a request to the Council. He often used War

Council and Committee of Secretaries meetings as an occasion to discuss matters that were to come before the Council, in a sense, though not formally in most instances, as a means of developing a coordinated military establishment position; moreover, War Council discussions sometimes resulted in a decision on his part to ask, or have one of his service secretaries ask, the NSC to take up a subject.¹⁷

In 1949 a combination of factors—Secretary Johnson's desire to exercise closer control over politico-military affairs, his disinclination to use the War Council to consider such matters, and the elimination of the secretaries of the military departments from NSC membership—led to a restructuring of OSD-NSC relationships. Desiring to establish close working-level contact, Johnson in April named General Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff, as his consultant to the NSC. General Burns succeeded Gruenther in the NSC role four months later. Burns selected and assigned Defense representatives to the NSC staff, including one uniformed officer as the official DoD member and three additional officers, one from each service, as Defense "advisers" to the NSC.¹⁸

Although the 1949 amendments had stripped the service secretaries of their NSC membership, one or more of them usually accompanied Johnson to council meetings.* In addition, one or more of the Joint Chiefs usually attended, as did a number of other officials by special White House invitation or at the request of NSC members. With so many people participating, staff coordination and the reconciliation of divergent views became increasingly difficult. Consequently the council was preparing fewer and fewer papers for the President's consideration.¹⁹

In July 1950 Truman took several steps to remedy this situation. He limited attendance at NSC meetings to statutory members, statutory advisers, and a few designated officials, including Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder and White House Special Assistant W. Averell Harriman. He also restricted attendance from the Joint Chiefs to the Chairman, General Bradley. Further, the President ordered the creation of a senior NSC staff, composed of a ranking representative of each NSC member and of the JCS. This new group assumed responsibility for projects formerly handled by ad hoc committees and provided high-level continuous staff support.²⁰

Thus, as the Korean emergency unfolded, steps were in progress to improve the operational efficiency of the NSC, an indication of Truman's increasing reliance on the council. In fact, after July 1950, NSC deliberations as a part of the policy process appeared to be a more useful tool for the President than previously. Yet the NSC itself could not determine national policy, for that preroga-

* This on Johnson's specific order. See p. 53.

tive belonged to the President. Rather, in Truman's words, it served solely as "a place for recommendations to be worked out."²¹

Although the NSC concentrated primarily on foreign and defense policy, it occasionally became involved in matters having important domestic consequence, such as internal security. Among his first major NSC initiatives and indicative of the broad central role he thought the council should assume, Forrestal in March 1948 proposed an investigation of internal security procedures because, as he put it, of the absence of "assurance that there is sufficient coordination of security functions between all interested departments and agencies." Forrestal's initiative led to the preparation, with the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), of a report (NSC 17) in June 1948 which concluded that the "United States is not adequately secure internally at the present time" and recommended the appointment of a special assistant to advise the council on internal security policy. But after the Justice Department and others raised questions about the powers and duties of the proposed special assistant, the NSC deferred action and asked the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee to look into the matter.²²

Forrestal continued to view internal security as lax and urged the prompt adoption of appropriate countermeasures. Meanwhile, SANACC and the Justice Department, the latter intent on protecting the interests of the FBI, became involved in a time-consuming exchange of views. Alarmed by the delay, Forrestal in October went to the President, who ordered Souers to place the subject on the NSC agenda.²³ Even so, the matter dragged on for another four months, until February 1949, when Forrestal, Attorney General Tom Clark, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover arrived at a compromise that divided internal security responsibilities between two groups—the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC), created in 1939 and chaired by the FBI, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), a new body composed of representatives from State, Treasury, Justice, and the NME. The IIC would coordinate investigations of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and intelligence matters relating to internal security, while the ICIS would control overall non-investigatory internal security matters. The NSC appointed an observer to sit on both committees, but beyond this and the review of periodic reports the council made no effort to become directly involved in the activities of either body.²⁴

Relations with the State Department

Although Forrestal accorded the NSC the prime position in his conception of the new structure ordained by the National Security Act, direct dealings

between State and Defense became increasingly important and extensive. Frequent direct communication between the secretaries of the two departments lessened the NSC's burden and facilitated action in situations demanding immediate decisions or recommendations. These exchanges became an integral part of the policy process and clearly demonstrated that the union of "foreign policy" and "defense policy" had begotten what henceforth would be known as "national security policy."

Military participation in the conduct of foreign policy had increased enormously during World War II and its turbulent aftermath, raising questions in the State Department about its own constitutional and traditional prerogatives to conduct foreign policy. The extensive range of business between the military establishment and State was of the highest policy significance, including such matters as foreign economic affairs; export controls; atomic energy issues; regulation of armaments; the occupation of Japan, Germany, Austria, and Korea; foreign military assistance; base, overflight, and refueling rights in foreign countries; and U.S. participation in international organizations.

The advent of the National Security Council affected relations between the military establishment and State. The role and responsibilities of the NSC remained unclear during 1947, and State appeared reluctant to use it as a principal forum for considering national security policy. Forrestal's enthusiastic efforts to make the NSC a strong policymaking body that could provide guidance to the JCS and the military services no doubt impressed some State Department officials as an effort to inject the NME into the making of foreign policy. Some of these officials may well have regarded the NSC as a potential intruder on the department's foreign policy prerogatives. Fortunately, relations between Forrestal and the top leaders of the State Department—Marshall and Lovett—were good, and gradually mutual suspicion between the two departments diminished as the NSC began to operate in ways useful to both State and the NME.

While serving as Secretary of the Navy Forrestal had necessarily developed a close interest in foreign affairs. As Secretary of Defense, he took note of and expressed his views on almost all issues with politico-military implications. Because of Forrestal's frequent and obvious involvement, critics sometimes accused him of trying to "horn in" on the State Department's work and even of trying to take over the making of foreign policy, a charge Forrestal consistently denied. Concerning his relationship with the State Department, he wrote:

In their business I do not interfere. The military establishment exists to support the objectives set by the Secretary of State and approved by the President. What those objectives may be is not for me to say. It is my job to see to it that our military potential is equal to the requirements of

those objectives—in other words, to insure that our policy does not outstrip our power.²⁵

Forrestal's efforts to downplay his role seem in retrospect not especially convincing. He personally handled much of NME's business with the State Department throughout his tenure. Initially, he and Secretary of State Marshall considered meeting regularly as the Committee of Two, in much the same fashion as the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy had met during and after the war as the Committee of Three.²⁶ The committee might include Admiral Souers as an *ex officio* member, and the secretaries of the military departments would be invited to attend when considered appropriate. But after only two meetings, the second on 3 November 1947, the Committee of Two quietly ceased to exist, perhaps because the NSC had begun to take hold and possibly because the service secretaries voiced resentment over their exclusion.²⁷ Thereafter Marshall and Forrestal conducted their regular business either directly or at meetings of the Cabinet and the NSC.

Because Marshall was away frequently from Washington on business for weeks at a time, Forrestal often dealt with Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, who was probably more responsible than anyone else for minimizing personal frictions in relations between the NME and State. According to one account, Lovett was perhaps Forrestal's "most trusted friend" in Washington. Lovett served as a naval airman during World War I, and then, following a career similar to Forrestal's, he joined the investment banking house of Brown Brothers, Harriman in 1921. Through Forrestal in 1940 he met Assistant Secretary of War Patterson, who persuaded him to come to Washington as an adviser to the Army on air procurement. As Assistant Secretary of War for Air from 1941 to 1945, Lovett played a key part in the vast and successful expansion of the Army Air Forces. After little more than a year back in private banking, he returned to public service when Marshall became Secretary of State in 1947. "Throughout his public career," his biographer notes, "the patterns of administrative style and the ideological outlook Lovett brought to the War Department persisted: a passion for statistical analysis, an objective evaluation of policy options, a reputation for candor and a capacity to relate national security requirements to domestic concerns and political considerations." ²⁸

Below the secretarial level there initially existed an elaborate network of direct contacts that had developed between the State, War, and Navy Departments since World War II as well as an important formal consultative body, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), composed of an assistant secretary from each of the departments. SWNCC was to formulate recommendations "on questions having both military and political aspects" and to coordinate

views between the State Department and the military services on "matters of interdepartmental interest." In October 1947 SWNCC became the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), with the addition of an Air Force member and an OSD "observer." By the time SWNCC became SANACC, its organization had become large and complex, with a secretariat, 10 standing committees, and 9 ad hoc subcommittees. Its principal function, consuming roughly 60 percent of its effort, was to coordinate policy for "occupied areas," but it also dealt with such matters as psychological warfare, foreign military assistance, international conferences, dissemination of foreign policy information, release of military information to foreign governments, industrial and technological security, and petroleum reserves in South America.²⁹

Creation of the NSC raised the question of whether SANACC should remain in existence. Forrestal tended to view it as an anachronism and anticipated that the NSC gradually would assume its functions. Also, according to Ohly, Forrestal was wary of entrusting policy formulation to "the bowels of some sub-committee at the 6th echelon down." But after receiving the results of a study of SANACC he ordered early in 1948, Forrestal recommended to the President on 28 February 1948 that SANACC be preserved and incorporated into the NSC structure.³⁰

After inconclusive discussions within the War Council and between State and Defense, the NSC in August 1948 agreed that SANACC would continue to operate for six more months, in effect as an NSC subcommittee. It would no longer have jurisdiction over occupied areas; this became a joint responsibility of the Army and State Department. It was also prohibited from dealing with other matters of limited interest that could be coordinated more expeditiously directly between departments.³¹

On his departure from office Forrestal left behind a recommendation that Johnson seek a prompt resolution of SANACC's future. Johnson opposed SANACC's request for another six-month extension and recommended SANACC's dissolution, noting that it had met only twice and acted on only 10 papers since the previous August. In June 1949 the NSC adopted Johnson's recommendation and the President approved it.³²

During Forrestal's tenure, even before SANACC's disappearance, the day-to-day coordination of foreign policy matters, other than those the secretary handled personally, came under Ohly's office. Occasionally Ohly's principal assistant, Robert Blum, or another assistant, Najeeb Halaby, would draft background position papers for Forrestal's information. But initially Ohly's staff was so small and spread so thin that it had all it could do simply monitoring progress on papers or issues, assigning responsibilities, and providing working level liaison without ordinarily involving itself in the substance of such matters. As a rule,



Forrestal and his three Special Assistants: left to right, Marx Leva, John H. Ohly, and Wilfred J. McNeil. Ca. March 1948.



The Forrestal "team." With Forrestal, left to right, are Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington, and Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan.



John H. Ohly, Special Assistant to Forrester and Johnson and subsequently Deputy Director, Mutual Defense Assistance Program.



Marx Leva, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and subsequently Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legal and Legislative Affairs.



Wilfred J. McNeil, Special Assistant to Forrestal and Johnson and the first Comptroller of the Department of Defense.



Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz reading his farewell address that provoked sharp criticism from the Air Force, 15 December 1947.




General Carl A. Spaatz, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, 1947-48.



Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, 1945-47, who favored close unification of the armed services.



Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, USAF, a leading unification planner in 1946-47 and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Air Force, 1947-50.



The Spirit of '47






President Truman signing the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, 10 August 1949.



A conference between Forrestal and General Dwight D. Eisenhower.



Forrestal in Germany, November 1948, with General Lucius D. Clay (left) and Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, Commanding General, U.S. Air Forces in Europe.



George C. Marshall, Secretary of State,
1947-49.



Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of
State, 1947-49.




James E. Webb, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1946-49, Under Secretary of State, 1949-52.




George F. Kennan, Mr. "X," first Director of State's Policy Planning Staff (1947-49) and leading advocate of containing Soviet expansion.



Forrestal in conference with the Joint Chiefs, 1948. Left to right: Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USAF, Adm. Louis E. Denfeld, USN, Gen. Omar N. Bradley, USA, and Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, USN.



Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs, and their advisers at the Newport Conference, August 1948. Left to right: Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, USAF, Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USAF, Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA, Gen. Omar N. Bradley, USA, Adm. Louis E. Denfeld, USN, Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford, USN, Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, USA.




An Air Force B-29 bomber, backbone of the strategic bombing fleet in the late 1940s.



A nuclear weapon of the "Fat Man" type, most common atomic bomb stockpiled by the United States after World War II.

The CROSSROADS "Baker" day explosion, 25 July 1946, part of the first postwar U.S. testing of nuclear weapons.



work substantive in nature, requiring the development of recommendations or a response to a particular problem, was "farmed out" to the Joint Chiefs, the services, or one of OSD's staff agencies. Later, the addition of well-qualified civilian and military personnel permitted Ohly's office to become more deeply involved in substantive issues such as NATO and MDAP.

A principal organizational weakness continued to be the absence of any single point of contact where State Department officials other than Marshall and Lovett could elicit a prompt, fully coordinated statement of the NME position.³³ As early as October 1947 Deputy Under Secretary Dean Rusk and others at State began complaining to Ohly about having to deal with as many as four or five offices in the NME. With the complaints multiplying, Ohly in July 1948 suggested to Forrestal the need for closer coordination by OSD of politico-military affairs within the NME.³⁴ But with the amendments to the National Security Act taking priority, Ohly's recommendation received substantial but inconclusive consideration at this time.³⁵

Toward the end of Forrestal's administration, several developments—the impending signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, planning for a worldwide military assistance program, and the increased obligations that these undertakings appeared likely to entail—made more urgent efforts to provide for closer coordination by OSD of all politico-military affairs within the NME and to establish clear lines of communication between the NME and State. Further impetus for such action resulted from a change of leadership in the State Department in January 1949, when Dean Acheson succeeded Marshall and James E. Webb, former Director of the Budget, replaced Lovett. As previous head of the BoB, Webb had extensive experience in organizational matters; after joining the State Department he assembled an ad hoc State-NME committee composed of Blum, General Allen of the Joint Staff, and Assistant Secretary of State Charles E. Saltzman, Chairman of SANACC, to study improvement of State-NME coordination. Although the results of this investigation were tentative, by the time Johnson succeeded Forrestal in March 1949 State and the Pentagon had agreed on the need for a high-level office in OSD with "very broad powers" to coordinate foreign affairs for the military.³⁶

Shortly after taking office, Johnson initiated his own study of this question, with discussion focusing on whether principal responsibility for politico-military matters should be vested in OSD or the JCS.³⁷ Johnson decided to have it in his office and, in fact, wanted virtually all liaison with State under his direct supervision. Over the course of the next several months he moved policy responsibility for occupied areas from the Army to OSD, ordered his immediate staff to monitor all correspondence between the services and the State Department, and set up a State Liaison Section to act as the "central point" for all communications

with State other than those involving intelligence and similarly sensitive matters.³⁸ Finally, in November 1949 he regrouped all politico-military functions under General Burns and named him Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance).*

Since the State Department had been urging centralized OSD control and management of politico-military affairs for some time, it should have been pleased with Johnson's organizational moves. But in fact, State reacted adversely, charging Johnson with attempting to stifle State Department access to the military and thereby thwart the effectiveness of Secretary Acheson. Throughout Johnson's tenure reports appeared frequently in the press of an Acheson-Johnson "feud" that went beyond legitimate disagreements over policy and involved conflicts of personality. Such reports apparently had some foundation. "In Johnson's day," Leva recalled,

it was a wheeling-dealing fighting operation. Having fought his way from Clarksburg, West Virginia, to his law firm in Charleston, to his law firm in Washington, and having Dean Acheson, the very patrician son of the Bishop of Connecticut, looking down his nose at any normal human being like Louis Johnson . . . I think Johnson resented him. . . . Johnson thought he had a pretty good set of intellectual equipment, and you really could never talk to Dean Acheson for long without getting a put-down feeling.³⁹

Johnson consistently downplayed stories of a feud, calling them "cockeyed reports," and never commented publicly on the matter after leaving office. On the other hand, in his memoirs Acheson recorded vivid recollections of Johnson's behavior and attributed the turbulent state of their relationship to Johnson's being "mentally ill." "His conduct," Acheson insisted, "became too outrageous to be explained by mere cussedness. It did not surprise me when some years later he underwent a brain operation."⁴⁰

Whatever the sources of friction, the Acheson-Johnson feud placed severe strains on State-Defense relations. Though ostensibly intended to streamline coordination and make it more manageable, the Johnson order greatly reduced effective "Indian level" contacts between State and Defense. According to Paul H. Nitze, who became Director of the Policy Planning Staff at State in January 1950, the results were "irritating and time-consuming discussions" that generally slowed the processing of policy papers meant for the NSC.† It proved quite impractical for Johnson's office, through Burns, to monitor all aspects of State-Defense relations, and occasionally even Johnson conceded as much. In the spring

* For a more detailed discussion of Burns's office and responsibilities, see Chapter III.

† According to Ohly, relations between State and Defense on MDAP matters did not seem to be much affected by Johnson's order.

of 1950, for instance, he restored policy responsibility for occupied areas to the Army.* But otherwise, his general policy remained officially intact until the Korean War compelled a reassessment and some loosening of restrictions.⁴¹

The National Security Resources Board

Both Forrestal and Johnson through personal experience in the field understood the importance of having an organization within the national security structure that could deal effectively with the problems of industrial mobilization. As Under Secretary of the Navy, with major responsibility for industrial mobilization, Forrestal had observed the damaging effects of the absence of a permanent mobilization agency in 1941–42. Despite the creation of the War Production Board and an impressive effort by industry, absence of effective central machinery and procedures resulted in continuing competition for scarce resources, and in delays, waste, and confusion. Not until the establishment of the Office of War Mobilization in 1943 did an organization appear that had sufficient power and authority to impose order.⁴²

To avoid similar difficulties in any future national emergency, Congress, adhering closely to the Eberstadt recommendations, provided in the 1947 act for a permanent agency—the National Security Resources Board—“to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization in the event of war.”† The board was to be composed of a civilian chairman and such representatives of executive departments and independent agencies as the President might designate. Forrestal and the Bureau of the Budget disagreed over whether the board should be constituted at the Cabinet or sub-Cabinet level. Forrestal argued that appointment of Cabinet-level officials would buttress the board’s statutory authority and enhance its overall status. The BoB recommended membership at the sub-Cabinet level to enhance the position of the civilian chairman, who did not have Cabinet rank. Agreeing with Forrestal, President Truman in 1947 designated the Secretaries of Treasury, Defense,

* See Chapter IX.

† Such advice was to include the following: identification of potential shortages in resources, manpower, and productive facilities to meet potential wartime requirements; policies for ensuring the most effective wartime mobilization and utilization of U.S. civilian manpower; policies for the wartime unification of the activities of all federal agencies involved in the mobilization effort and for the establishment and conservation of adequate reserves of strategic and critical materials; programs for the effective use of the nation’s natural and industrial resources to meet military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy, and for the adjustment of the economy to war needs and conditions; and the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities essential to the nation’s security.

Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor to serve as board members, later adding the Secretary of State.⁴³

Neither Forrestal, despite his continuing interest in the NSRB, nor Johnson ever became deeply involved in its operations. Like the National Security Council, the NSRB served as an advisory agency to the President, but it never developed major policy papers on a regular basis for presidential consideration. Nor did the board ever acquire sufficient prestige or stature to give it preeminence in its field.

One reason often suggested for the board's disappointing performance was the handicap under which its chairmen labored in obtaining cooperation from Cabinet-officer board members who outranked them, the difficulty foreseen by the Bureau of the Budget.⁴⁴ The first chairman was Arthur M. Hill, president of the Greyhound Corporation and a personal friend of Forrestal's. After Hill resigned in the fall of 1948, Truman and Forrestal failed to find anyone to serve in his place on a full-time basis until Stuart Symington took the job in April 1950. After Hill's departure, John R. Steelman of the White House staff served as acting chairman until Symington's appointment.⁴⁵

The NSRB also experienced great difficulties in establishing an identity of its own. Initially, Hill tried to operate the NSRB as an independent planning agency, separate from both the White House and other federal departments and agencies. During Hill's chairmanship the board met on the average of once a month and made strenuous efforts to establish close interagency cooperation and coordination and to assure, through the creation of an interdepartmental staff group in April 1948, that all NSRB members would have regular contact with the board's planning staff. These arrangements proved unavailing; instead of increasing the board's independence and effectiveness they promoted confusion and delay in the preparation of reports and papers. This, in turn, raised questions about the viability of board operations under interagency direction.⁴⁶

In addition to its leadership and identity troubles, the NSRB encountered a number of other serious obstacles. Unlike the RDB, the MB, and other agencies with well-established antecedents, the NSRB had to build its staff from scratch. This put the board at a disadvantage in carrying out the functions assigned it by the National Security Act and in dealing with other agencies. Its relationship with the Munitions Board was a special case in point. Already a well-staffed agency that had been performing many of the functions now assigned by law to the NSRB, the MB felt compelled to continue to perform these functions until the NSRB became adequately staffed to take them over, and even then was reluctant to yield some of them. The two boards differed strongly on where to draw the line of responsibility between them for joint functions and how to deal with certain basic problems, such as responsibility for overall mobilization planning, deter-

mination of requirements, and procurement of materials for the strategic stockpile.⁴⁷

Anxious for an early resolution of these differences, Hill and Munitions Board Chairman Thomas Hargrave, with the help of Forrestal and Ferdinand Eberstadt, hammered out a settlement at a meeting on 30 October 1947. Rather than assigning detailed responsibilities, the agreement established procedures for identifying each board's sphere of interest: the NSRB to have jurisdiction over general plans for mobilization, including the formulation and promulgation of an annual industrial mobilization plan; the Munitions Board to concentrate on the development of subsidiary plans in support of military requirements and the stockpiling of critical raw materials.⁴⁸

Despite the Hill-Hargrave agreement, differences over the respective responsibilities of the two boards in some areas, as well as over other issues, persisted, and relations between them remained competitive and adversarial. According to Donald Carpenter, Hargrave's successor, the Munitions Board "pretty much ignored" the NSRB and went its own way on most matters. The two agencies often worked at cross-purposes; an example was their heated quarrel in the spring of 1949 over military-industrial requirements for war, which turned on how to go about calculating and allocating claims on resources from the civilian and military sectors. The MB eventually gave way and agreed to use the NSRB's approach, which required that the MB first provide estimates of military need.⁴⁹

In July 1948 the NSRB moved its offices from the Pentagon to the Executive Office Building, a move apparently inspired at least in part by the desire to silence criticism that Forrestal was "dominating" Hill and the board. Ironically, from this point on the NSRB gradually ceased to function as an independent agency and became more and more a presidential advisory staff. Steelman, busy with other matters in the White House, dropped the practice of holding regular board meetings. Well before 1950 it was clear that the NSRB needed a new charter or extensive reorganization, or perhaps both. Despite an annual budget of \$3.5 million and a full- and part-time staff of 373 employees, the NSRB was floundering, an organization still in search of a clear-cut mission. The board might logically have extended its activities into the operational management of mobilization plans, but President Truman had categorically rejected this step in May 1948, directing that NSRB remain a planning agency.⁵⁰ In December 1949 Steelman proposed that the functions of the board be transferred to its chairman and that the board itself be converted into an advisory body to the chairman rather than to the President, as theretofore. This proposal, implemented in Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 25 of 1950, effective 9 July 1950, a few months after Symington became chairman, completed the board's transformation into what was essentially a presidential staff agency. When the Korean War erupted,

the NSRB was still without a clear mandate as to what its role should be in time of national emergency. The confusion in the NSRB in the wake of the North Korean attack proved extremely damaging to the board's prestige and contributed to its steady eclipse after the establishment in December 1950 of the Office of Defense Mobilization to control and coordinate wartime mobilization.⁵¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, by statute "the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense," were in practice also principal military advisers to the other major elements of the national security structure. The President, the NSC, the State Department, the Congress—all relied on the JCS for professional military judgment over a wide range of national security questions, from military assistance policy and regional alliance issues to base rights and atomic energy matters. Directly or indirectly, the Joint Chiefs often found themselves prominently involved in the policy process, responding to requests for information and recommendations from many different sources. At the same time, they operated as an OSD staff agency on whose effective performance of its functions the whole NME—the secretary and his staff, the other staff agencies, and the military services—heavily depended.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been in existence since 1942,* the organization acquired statutory standing and responsibilities only with the passage of the National Security Act. These responsibilities included among others: provision for strategic direction of the military forces; preparation of strategic and joint logistic plans; establishment of unified commands; formulation of policies for joint training of the armed forces; and review of major material and personnel requirements in accordance with strategic and logistic plans.⁵²

The act designated as members of the JCS the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (in place of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces), and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, "if there be one." This last position was held by Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, who had been appointed to the position by President Roosevelt in July 1942 and had continued to serve under President Truman. Except for the fact that he was the senior and presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs and had no service responsibilities, Leahy's position bore little resemblance to the subsequently created post of JCS chairman. Unlike later chairmen, Leahy participated as a full member in all decisions of the Joint Chiefs and represented the

* On the origin of the JCS, see Chapter I.

President in their deliberations. He was not their primary spokesman in advising the President. He served until illness forced his resignation in March 1949, after which the post of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief lapsed.⁵³

The other JCS members at the outset of unification in 1947—General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and General Carl Spaatz—had all achieved great renown during World War II. Eisenhower in Europe and Nimitz in the Pacific had been two of the most celebrated theater commanders. Spaatz had been the outstanding American air commander, serving in both Europe and the Pacific. Within eight months all three chiefs had stepped down. Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, who had spent the war in Washington until he received a sea command during the last year, succeeded Nimitz as Chief of Naval Operations in December 1947. Eisenhower's successor in February 1948 as Army Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, had served as commander of the 12th Army Group that had spearheaded the drive across France in 1944 and had served as head of the Veterans Administration since mid-1945. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who took over from Spaatz at the end of April 1948, had distinguished himself as a combat air commander in Europe and had since served as head of the Central Intelligence Group and as Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Two additional changes in the membership of the JCS occurred during the Forrestal-Johnson era. Bradley's elevation to Chairman of the JCS in August 1949 opened the way for General J. Lawton Collins to become Army Chief of Staff. An outstanding corps commander in Europe during the war, Collins had held a series of important positions after the war, most recently as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. When Denfeld resigned under pressure in November 1949, his successor as Chief of Naval Operations was Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, a distinguished combat commander and staff officer. Sherman, who had played a major role in bringing about the compromises that made the National Security Act possible, was much admired and respected by his peers in the Department of Defense. His brilliant career came to a tragic end with his premature death in July 1951.⁵⁴

The National Security Act established a support organization for the Joint Chiefs known as the Joint Staff, composed initially of a director appointed by the Joint Chiefs and 100 full-time officers, drawn in approximately equal number from each service. Staff work assignments followed functional lines in support of a committee-type organization inherited from the pre-unification structure. Whenever Forrestal or Johnson had a question for the Joint Chiefs, they customarily transmitted a written memorandum, which was channeled through JCS committees for preparation of a response. With an enormous backlog of unattended business already facing the Joint Chiefs at the onset of unification and with new

requests for advice or action coming in almost daily from OSD, the Joint Staff soon found itself with far more work than it could handle and the backlog continued to grow. In 1949, responding to Forrestal's complaints about insufficient staffing, Congress raised the ceiling on the size of the Joint Staff to 210.*⁵⁵


From 1947 until 1949, the Director of the Joint Staff, Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, USA, acted as the principal connection between OSD and the Joint Chiefs for practically all day-to-day business. In fact, Gruenther worked so closely with Forrestal and others in OSD that he functioned virtually as a fourth special assistant to the secretary. Gruenther had served in World War II as Chief of Staff of General Mark W. Clark's U.S. Fifth Army in North Africa and Italy and after the war as Deputy Commandant of the new National War College. With extensive experience in staff and related assignments, he had become one of the most able administrators in the Army. So highly did Forrestal rate Gruenther's ability that at one point he spoke of him as "my principal military advisor."⁵⁶

The requirement that the Joint Chiefs establish "unified commands" gave them limited but important responsibilities in operational matters. To this extent, the National Security Act provided a legal basis for refining the Unified Command Plan (UCP), approved by President Truman on 14 December 1946, authorizing the creation of seven unified commands.† Under the approved UCP concept, the Joint Chiefs exercised strategic direction over all elements of the armed forces in each command and designated one of their members as "executive agent" with operational command and control over all forces within a particular unified area. By a separate provision of the UCP, the Strategic Air Command

* The Joint Staff represented a modification of the JCS committee structure that had come into being in World War II. It consisted of the office of the director and three staff groups—the Joint Intelligence Group, the Joint Strategic Plans Group, and the Joint Logistics Plans Group. These groups provided staff support for three separate part-time committees—the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, and the Joint Logistics Plans Committee—each composed chiefly of senior officers whose primary responsibilities were still within their respective services. The JCS organization also included several part-time boards and committees for such matters as munitions allocations, petroleum, transportation, communications, civil affairs, and meteorology, which were supervised by the director, though they were not part of the Joint Staff. Four separate offices—the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the Joint Secretariat, the Historical Section, and the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Military Staff Committee—existed outside the Joint Staff and reported directly to the Joint Chiefs.

† The seven unified commands were the Far East Command (FECOM), the Pacific Command (PACOM), the Alaskan Command (ALCOM), the Northeast Command (NECOM), the Atlantic Fleet (LANTCOM), the Caribbean Command (CARIBCOM), and the European Command (EUCOM). By the end of 1947 all but the Northeast Command were in operation. Negotiations with Canada over the respective responsibilities of U.S. and Canadian forces delayed activation of the Northeast Command until 1950.

CHART 7
ORGANIZATION OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 22 OCTOBER 1947



(SAC) became the first "specified command," * although the JCS did not officially define the term until 1951.⁵⁷

The Joint Chiefs presented a more complex problem than did the other OSD staff agencies. Unlike the Munitions Board or the RDB, each of which had an independent civilian chairman, the Joint Chiefs were truly and wholly tripartite in form, even with the presence of Admiral Leahy, whose role and influence declined steadily after unification. Lacking an independent head free of individual service bias, the Joint Chiefs operated not as a corporate body but as a group of individuals often unable to act responsibly in a joint capacity except on matters that did not impinge on their service-related interests. Thus, the early months of unification witnessed numerous deadlocks on key issues that forestalled action down the line in the military departments and staff agencies. Forrestal hoped to instill in the Joint Chiefs a "new and impartial outlook," a task he considered "my most important job."⁵⁸ His effort began the day he took office and was still more hope than reality when he left.

Amid an upsurge of international tensions early in 1948, Forrestal deemed it imperative to settle the most divisive existing interservice issue—the question of service roles and missions. The resulting Key West agreement of March 1948 † modified and enlarged the duties of the Joint Chiefs. It recognized their responsibility for "general direction" of all combat operations; empowered them to authorize commanders of unified commands "to establish such subordinate unified commands as may be necessary"; and reaffirmed the existing practice of designating a JCS member as executive agent for each unified command.

Another provision of the Key West agreement attempted to clarify the Joint Chiefs' role in the budget process. Strictly speaking, the JCS had no legal responsibility to recommend a dollar or manpower budget; their only statutory obligation in this regard was "to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans." As interpreted by Forrestal in the light of his "team" management approach, this provision of the law required direct participation by the Joint Chiefs in correlating force requirements with annual budget estimates. Accordingly, the Key West agreement conferred upon the Joint Chiefs the duty:

To prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for his information and consideration in furnishing guidance to the Departments for preparation of their annual budget estimates and in coordinating these budgets, a statement of military requirements which is based upon agreed strategic considerations, joint outline war plans, and current national secur-

* The equivalent of a unified command but normally composed of forces from only one service.

† See Chapter XIV.

ity commitments. This statement of requirements shall include: tasks, priority of tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance concerning development of military installations and bases, equipping and maintaining the military forces, and research and development and industrial mobilization programs.⁵⁹

This definition of JCS responsibilities notwithstanding, it soon became apparent that the budgeting system Forrestal hoped to introduce might not work as planned. Continuing disputes among the services over the priority of forces, strict budget ceilings set by the President and the Bureau of the Budget, and difficulties in obtaining a clear-cut statement of basic national security policy from the NSC served effectively to cripple Forrestal's efforts to develop a unified budget. During the preparation of the FY 1950 budget estimates in 1948, he found the Joint Chiefs unable to settle on a joint strategy and bitterly divided over the allocation of funds.* The lesson was plain—either the Joint Chiefs would have to exercise more discipline among themselves or the Secretary of Defense would have to assume major responsibility for the details of preparing estimates.

Forrestal explored less drastic solutions, including a suggestion that the Joint Chiefs appoint full-time deputies to expedite JCS business. But for a number of reasons, including the fact that a group of "little chiefs" might resemble a general staff—repugnant to Congress and prohibited by law—Forrestal decided not to pursue it.⁶⁰ In his first annual report he recommended "designation of a responsible head" for the JCS "to whom the President and Secretary of Defense [would] look to see to it that matters with which the Joint Chiefs should deal are handled in a way that will provide the best military staff assistance to the President and the Secretary of Defense."⁶¹ The Eberstadt Task Force and the Hoover Commission also recommended appointment of a chairman.⁶² But by the time legislation was enacted as part of the 1949 amendments, Louis Johnson had so restructured the budget process that the Joint Chiefs' role in it had diminished in importance.

As a temporary measure, Eisenhower served in a part-time nonstatutory capacity as "presiding officer" of the JCS beginning in January 1949.† Technically, he had the status of "principal military adviser and consultant to the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense." His only assigned duty was to preside over the JCS, a function that Eisenhower thought made him "informal"

* See Chapter XII.

† The official dates of Eisenhower's service as acting chairman were 11 February 1949 to 10 August 1949. However, he began attending meetings with the Joint Chiefs on 24 January and met with them for the last time on 28 June 1949.

chairman.⁶³ However, none of these titles accurately describes the role he played. Because of his obligations as president of Columbia University, he came to Washington only a few days each month and actually presided at only 12 JCS meetings.⁶⁴ Gruenther, a long-time personal friend, handled the administrative chores and continued to handle most of the duties that he had performed before Eisenhower's appointment. In substantive areas, Eisenhower worked only on the development of strategic plans and the correlation of budget estimates and generally paid no attention to legislative matters. He clearly viewed his assignment as limited and made no attempt to become part of the day-to-day routine.

General Omar N. Bradley became the first Chairman of the JCS in August 1949 and, like Eisenhower, served as senior and presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs, with no service responsibilities or command authority. But Bradley was a statutory official with responsibilities to the President and the Secretary of Defense. His official duties were to preside at JCS meetings; to provide the agenda for the meetings; to assist the Joint Chiefs in prosecuting their business "as promptly as practicable"; and to inform the Secretary of Defense and the President of those issues before the Joint Chiefs on which agreement could not be reached. A provision that the Chairman would "have no vote" had little practical consequence, given the nature of JCS deliberations (voting, as such, did not take place) and Bradley's scrupulous avoidance of expressing opinions that might influence decisions.⁶⁵

Only a month after Bradley became Chairman, the JCS also acquired a new Director of the Joint Staff, Rear Adm. Arthur C. Davis, who had served with distinction in both world wars and most recently as a member of the JCS Joint Strategic Survey Committee. Davis proved a worthy successor to Gruenther, skillfully handling day-to-day relations between the JCS and OSD during a difficult period.⁶⁶

Like Forrestal, Johnson sought a close working relationship with the Joint Chiefs, relying heavily first on Eisenhower and then on Bradley as his go-between.⁶⁷ Yet all too often his policies produced bitter dissension and distrust, as demonstrated by the "revolt of the admirals" in the fall of 1949.* Moreover, Johnson used the Joint Chiefs in a more limited capacity than Forrestal had done, assigning them what seemed lesser tasks than they had been accustomed to.† At the same time many of the traditional, sometimes mundane, tasks of military affairs passed from professional to civilian hands. The most far-reaching changes stemmed from Johnson's economy drive, which effectively denied the Joint Chiefs the controlling voice over strategy by placing the final say on major weapons systems in OSD, where economic as much as military considerations governed

* See Chapter XIV.

† In particular reference to NATO and MDAP, see Chapters XVI and XVII.

decisions. Strategy, leaning toward reliance on air-atomic retaliation, became increasingly a spinoff of the budget process rather than vice versa as Forrestal had intended.

On the larger national security scene the JCS also encountered problems, conflicts, and ambiguities that required numerous adjustments in their relations with other departments and agencies. Whether they were to have free and direct access to the President or to render advice to the President through the Secretary of Defense was never made explicit. During World War II President Roosevelt had consulted directly with the Joint Chiefs on most military matters, bypassing the Secretaries of War and Navy. Truman, however, generally referred military matters to the service secretaries and, after 1947, to the Secretary of Defense.⁶⁸ In practice, under both Forrestal and Johnson, the Joint Chiefs in their presidential advisory role were expected to present their positions through the Secretary of Defense and often accompanied him to the White House. Although kept on a short leash, they were called on often to brief the President, sometimes at White House request and sometimes at the behest of Forrestal or Johnson.

The 1949 amendments made the Joint Chiefs statutory advisers to the National Security Council in addition to the President and the Secretary of Defense. Prior to 1949, although NSC papers were often circulated to the JCS through Forrestal, at times the Joint Chiefs were either not consulted or received reports so belatedly that they delivered comments too late to influence policy—notably during the Berlin crisis as it developed in 1948.⁶⁹ After 1949, with the statutory requirement for consultation, the JCS tended to have more input and more influence in NSC deliberations even as they were losing influence under Johnson within the Department of Defense. Only occasionally did they attend NSC meetings (only the Chairman after July 1950), and NSC papers even after 1949 were routed through OSD, but by the end of Johnson's tenure the JCS had become a regular and integral part of the NSC review process.

The Joint Chiefs' relationship with the State Department changed considerably as the result of the unification and reorganization of the military establishment under a secretary of defense. During and immediately following World War II, the Secretary of State periodically requested and received advice directly from the JCS; this was especially true after James F. Byrnes replaced Edward R. Stettinius as secretary in 1945.⁷⁰ After 1947 the JCS continued to advise State on politico-military matters—for example, evaluating U.S. strategic interests in Greece and Turkey, examining the military implications of a U.N. trusteeship in Palestine, helping to establish criteria for military assistance and NATO membership—but now through more formal channels, with requests from the Secretary of State or the State member of SANACC addressed to the Secretary of Defense and duly passed on to the Joint Chiefs through OSD. Relations between

State and the JCS had sometimes had a prickly side—the political and military approaches to a national security problem did not always coincide, as during the Berlin crisis and negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty, to cite two instances; but each organization found easy and timely access to the other to be mutually beneficial. As the relationship between State and the JCS became more formalized and constricted, particularly under Johnson, whose close monitoring of State-Defense contacts strictly limited communications between the two, a valuable link in the national security apparatus was seriously impaired. By July 1950, State's Paul Nitze was urgently calling for more direct and earlier JCS involvement in the deliberations of both the NSC and State's Policy Planning Staff.⁷¹

Although the Joint Chiefs rendered advice on a day-to-day basis mainly to agencies within the executive branch, they also briefed and reported to the Congress on military affairs. As the heads of their respective services, the Joint Chiefs were called before Congress to appraise threats, justify budgets, and explain strategy. The 1949 amendments established the right of any JCS member to express disagreement with administration policy and to present to the Congress "on his own initiative, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendation relating to the Department of Defense that he may deem proper." In practice, this prerogative created a dilemma for the Joint Chiefs. As described by General Maxwell D. Taylor some years later:

The hearings on the defense budget are usually the most difficult for the Chiefs, as they raise inevitably the issue of their divided responsibility toward the Executive and Legislative branches of the government. . . . Very shortly a Chief of Staff will find himself in the position either of appearing to oppose his civilian superiors or of withholding facts from the Congress. Personally, I have found no way of coping with the situation other than by replying frankly to questions and letting the chips fall where they may.⁷²

During 1949 and 1950 the Joint Chiefs generally exercised their frankness prerogative sparingly and discreetly, though the "revolt of the admirals" in the fall of 1949 was a flagrant exception. They testified unenthusiastically and resignedly in behalf of the 1950 military budget and dutifully endorsed the FY 1951 budget even though they again had reservations and "concurred out of loyalty rather than conviction."⁷³ Faced often with the choice between taking issue with their civilian superiors or going against conviction and not voicing their personal views to Congress, the Joint Chiefs for years continued to walk a narrow line when on Capitol Hill.

The expanding role of the Secretary of Defense and OSD, the emergence of the NSC, increased congressional oversight—all of these had the effect of further reducing the power and influence of the Joint Chiefs, a process that had been

under way since the end of World War II. The very structure of their organization—the “dual hatting” dictated by law—made it awkward, if not at times impossible, for them to function as effectively as they might have wished. External factors, such as inadequate funding, lack of guidance on basic national security policy, and the uncertain impact of new technologies, compounded the problem. Still, the JCS played a key role in making U.S. national security policy, and presidents, the NSC, secretaries of defense, and Congress sought and valued their advice. They were indispensable to the functioning of the military establishment under Forrestal and Johnson and of the larger national security structure because they provided the professional military judgment without which the whole process would have lacked credibility.

The Intelligence Community

Behind the efforts of the President and his advisers to formulate sound national security policies stands an ever-present need for accurate and reliable information about the capabilities and intentions of potential enemies. Before 1947 there existed no central organization for the collection, collation, and analysis of intelligence.* Intelligence activities were scattered throughout the government, with little effective means of coordination. Each military service had its own intelligence branch as did the State, Treasury, and Justice Departments. Reports reaching the President's desk thus emanated from a variety of sources, and often, according to President Truman, contained conflicting information.⁷⁴ These shortcomings, added to evidence of past intelligence failures, particularly Pearl Harbor, prompted the inclusion of the Central Intelligence Agency in the National Security Act.

The CIA was a lineal descendant of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), created in July 1941† by President Roosevelt to collect and analyze intelligence data and to conduct clandestine operations behind enemy lines. Despite its many remarkable accomplishments, the OSS never achieved the status of a “national” intelligence organization. Those agencies which maintained their own intelligence services rarely concerted their efforts except on an informal or ad hoc basis.⁷⁵

Mindful of the coordinating difficulties he had encountered, the Director of OSS, William J. Donovan, in November 1944 recommended to the White House the postwar creation of an independent intelligence agency. In the fall

* As the predecessor of the CIA in 1946–47, the Central Intelligence Group had no statutory basis and lacked adequate resources to play a truly central role.

† The title of Office of Strategic Services was adopted in June 1942.

of 1945 the Eberstadt Report endorsed a similar proposal, but the President did not agree. As of 1 October 1945, Truman relieved Donovan, abolished the OSS, and divided its functions between the State and War Departments, with the former gaining the research and analysis branch and the latter the remainder of the organization.⁷⁶

On 22 January 1946 Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), under a Director of Central Intelligence, and a National Intelligence Authority (NIA), composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and a representative of the President, Admiral Leahy, to supervise CIG activities. Fearing that a national intelligence agency might become a "gestapo," Truman imposed severe restrictions that allowed the CIG to exercise little more than nominal authority over the intelligence community. Once described as a "holding company," it was totally dependent for its funds, personnel, and facilities on the largesse of other agencies. Effectively crippled from its inception, the CIG limped along until Truman recognized its defects and early in 1947 accepted the need for an agency with increased authority.⁷⁷

During the unification debate, proposals to replace the CIG with a strengthened agency met with virtually no resistance. The unsettled international situation and memories of Pearl Harbor reinforced arguments by Forrestal and others that effective intelligence gathering and analysis were indispensable to national security. The National Security Act placed the CIA under the NSC, an arrangement that gave the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) direct access to the President and his top-level advisers. Whether the DCI should be a military officer or a civilian was left to the President to decide, subject to Senate confirmation of his appointee. The question of whether Congress should specifically authorize the CIA to engage in covert operations also came up; in the end Congress sidestepped this delicate issue, leaving it up to the President.⁷⁸

The agency's duties were broadly worded, but the emphasis throughout was on "national security," which in the context of the act implied foreign rather than domestic intelligence. The tasks assigned to the agency included: (1) to advise the NSC on intelligence matters relating to national security; (2) to make recommendations on the coordination of such intelligence; (3) to correlate and evaluate such intelligence and provide for its dissemination to other agencies; (4) to perform for existing intelligence agencies common services as directed by the NSC; and (5) to perform "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security" as the NSC might direct. The FBI was exempted from opening its files to the CIA unless the DCI asked for information in writing.⁷⁹

Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, head of the CIG since May 1947, remained Director of Central Intelligence. At its first meeting in September, the

NSC asked the DCI to sit regularly with the council as an "observer and adviser." In December, the NSC approved the creation of an Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), composed of the principal intelligence officers from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS, and the Atomic Energy Commission, to provide coordination between the CIA and other intelligence agencies.* The DCI sat as chairman of this group but was not technically a member. Most of the committee's work concerned procedural matters, although on occasion it dealt with matters of substantive intelligence as well.⁸⁰

NSC guidance to the CIA took two forms—specific intelligence directives dealing usually with procedural matters, and general policy papers clarifying CIA functions. The council gave the CIA responsibility for conducting covert psychological warfare, placed the agency in charge of planning clandestine political operations, and authorized the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) to conduct paramilitary operations as well as political and economic warfare.⁸¹

The principal proponents of these measures were Forrestal, Marshall, and George F. Kennan, Director of State's Policy Planning Staff. They assumed, as did Truman and the other members of the NSC, that covert action would be approved only on an occasional basis, when a crisis arose that could not be handled through the normal diplomatic process, as in Italy in 1948.† Accordingly, OPC initially operated within a narrow realm. Its paramilitary operations prior to the Korean War were limited to plans and preparations for stay-behind nets in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Its other activities included the establishment of contacts with Soviet refugees and émigrés; the sponsorship of anticommunist groups such as the National Committee for Free Europe, composed of prominent American lawyers, businessmen, and philanthropists; and the development of organs for political warfare such as Radio Free Europe.⁸² Since President Truman knew of and approved these actions, he apparently viewed them as legitimate CIA functions and not as part of the "strange activities" for which he later so roundly criticized the agency.⁸³

Like most new organizations, the CIA experienced growing pains. Hillenkoetter, an able and dedicated career officer, with 30 years in the Navy, lacked the rank, the prestige, and to some extent the experience to provide effective leadership. He had spent most of his service life at sea, and he returned to sea duty when he stepped down from the DCI post in October 1950. A relative newcomer to Washington, he had to deal with a group of older intelligence services—G-2 of the Army, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Directorate of Intelligence of the Air Force, and the counterespionage arm of the FBI—by

* In 1949 the Director of the FBI was added to the committee.

† See Chapter VI.

comparison with which the CIA was a parvenu, despite its large assets, great hopes, and potentially great power. The CIA's personnel, inherited from the CIG, consisted largely of men who wanted to remain in intelligence work at the end of World War II, "but were not in great demand in the military services." As one former CIA deputy director put it, "The quality was mediocre."⁸⁴ Whether the quality of the military intelligence services was better seems to have been open to question.

Worried by suggestions that the CIA was stacked with "deadwood," Forrestal in January 1948 secured NSC approval of an outside survey of the CIA's organization, staffing, and interagency activities.⁸⁵ To make the survey Forrestal recruited Allen W. Dulles, who had directed OSS operations in Switzerland during World War II; Mathias F. Correa, a New York attorney and a wartime assistant to Forrestal; and William H. Jackson, a New York investment banker who had served with Army intelligence in Europe. In March, at the suggestion of the War Council, the NSC expanded the scope of the survey to include the "intelligence activities of State, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force . . . for and with the authority of the respective heads of those departments."⁸⁶

Forrestal hoped that the Dulles-Correa-Jackson survey would lead to changes that would end bickering and competition within the intelligence community and establish higher professional standards. However, he candidly admitted that the CIA faced an uphill battle against the entrenched opposition and suspicion of the other intelligence services. As he told President Truman:

The emergence of this new boss has not been entirely accepted by the traditionally secretive and autonomy-minded military intelligence groups. I have consistently taken the position that CIA should be strengthened, and its coordinating authority recognized by these service groups, but in a field like intelligence, such objectives cannot be accomplished by fiat.⁸⁷

Part of the problem, Forrestal believed, stemmed from the reluctance of the military to entrust CIA civilian employees with highly classified information. "Their theory," he explained, "is that military men are likely to be better disciplined and that the Government has greater control over a person in uniform than one who is not in uniform."⁸⁸

The survey group's report, dated 1 January 1949, sharply criticized CIA and departmental intelligence operations. Calling for reforms to strengthen intelligence procedures, it stressed the need to eliminate unnecessary duplication and to improve overall coordination of the intelligence function and production and correlation of information.⁸⁹ The NSC did not get around to discussing these findings until after Forrestal's departure. Secretary Johnson referred the report to

his management adviser, General McNarney, who, with Carlisle H. Humelsine of the State Department, prepared joint recommendations which were adopted piecemeal by the NSC in July–August 1949 as NSC 50. Although the majority of approved recommendations closely followed those presented in the survey group report, there was one important exception. Whether as a face-saving gesture on behalf of the CIA or as an honest expression of belief, the NSC did not wholly concur in the report's assertion of leadership and policy deficiencies and attributed most of the CIA's difficulties to the newness of the organization and a lack of common understanding between the CIA and departmental intelligence agencies concerning their respective missions.⁹⁰

The reforms authorized under NSC 50 helped but did not immediately solve the CIA's problems. Within the intelligence community, coordination remained voluntary and the production of estimates often depended on a consensus among agencies involved, although dissenters could offer their objections to particular statements. As a result, these "coordinated" papers were often vague and general. Short-term estimates and daily summaries received priority over long-range estimates, especially because of demand, but also because they were easier to produce, usually involved less difficult predictions, and afforded the producers a higher degree of visibility within the community. Most assessments dealt with enemy capabilities rather than intentions, a justifiable practice since capabilities could be subjected to measurement while intentions could not.⁹¹

Another continuing problem—biased reporting by the services—resulted in questionable estimates of Soviet and Soviet-bloc capabilities and exaggerated appraisals of existing dangers. Perhaps the most celebrated example occurred during the war scare of March 1948.* According to the Eberstadt Task Force of the Hoover Commission, each service regularly used intelligence for self-serving purposes:

Partly because of their natural service interests, partly because of inter-service budgetary competition, our estimates of potential enemy strengths vary widely, depending upon the service that makes them. The Army will stress the potential enemy's ground divisions, the Navy his submarines, the Air Force his planes, and each estimate differs somewhat from the others. . . . Out of this mass of jumbled material, and harassed often by the open and covert opposition of the older agencies, CIA has tried to make sense. That it has not always succeeded has not been entirely the fault of CIA.⁹²

This is not to say that the intelligence provided the Secretary of Defense and other NSC members did not contain serious appraisals with a high degree

• See Chapter X.

of objectivity. Most often it was the absence of data, not the way the reports were produced or who produced them, that detracted from their reliability. If one factor outweighed all others in causing uncertainty within the community, it was probably the lack of verified information in sufficient quantity to answer key questions. At a time when such highly sophisticated intelligence tools as U-2 spy planes, reconnaissance satellites, and high-speed computers had yet to make their appearance, intelligence analysts often had little more to go on than hearsay reports and intuition. Estimates could vary widely in their accuracy and some problems could practically defy analysis.

The relationship between the Department of Defense and the intelligence community constituted an indispensable link in the national security chain. In many respects it was the very first link in the chain, for the intelligence agencies provided the basic information for estimating the capabilities and intentions of potential enemies. These threat estimates, in turn, provided an important part of the rationale for concepts of future war, development of strategic plans, statements of force requirements, and ultimately requests for money from the services. Forrestal's recognition of this seminal importance of intelligence inspired his strong efforts to bring about the creation of an effective overall intelligence apparatus responsive to the needs of the defense establishment. Rivalry and contention among the competing agencies inevitably marked the evolution of the apparatus during these early years and for many years after. Although the military services often had doubts about the authenticity and reliability of information and of each other's and the CIA's estimates of the threat, they did not question the key role played by intelligence and gave it strong and consistent support.

CHAPTER VI

The Challenge of Communism: Greece, Turkey, and Italy

Throughout the three years that James Forrestal and Louis Johnson served as Secretaries of Defense, a continual series of international crises acted as a constant reminder of their mission to oversee the readiness of the nation's military defenses and to assist the President in developing effective measures to safeguard vital U.S. interests. Inevitably, the Soviet Union remained the central concern of U.S. foreign policy. By late 1947 relations had become so strained that the dialogue between Washington and Moscow often seemed little more than propaganda exchanges. In the minds of many Americans there was little doubt about the nature of the Soviet menace. With the large Red Army still in being and the United States openly committed to "containment" of Soviet expansion, the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation became very real.

That confrontation might have occurred in a number of places—Iran, for example, where Soviet pressure had been unrelenting since the end of World War II; or Korea, where a temporary dividing line had effectively separated the country into two hostile camps; or occupied Germany, the scene of incessant East-West quarreling over who would control Central Europe. But it came earliest in the Mediterranean, where Greece and Italy, almost at the same instant, came under communist threat, either directly or indirectly. The waning of British power and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean had left Greece, and Turkey also, vulnerable to varying forms of Soviet pressures. In Italy, chaotic postwar conditions offered a fertile breeding ground for an internal takeover by a strong Communist party.

By the time Forrestal took up his responsibilities as Secretary of Defense in September 1947, the United States had already announced the Truman

Doctrine and the Marshall Plan to meet the communist challenge. The crisis in the Mediterranean became the first major test of the containment policy and a baptism on the international scene for the new defense organization.

The Struggle for Greece

Since the end of World War II both Greece and Turkey had been under intense and mounting pressures—Greece from a communist-instigated civil war and Turkey from Soviet demands for territorial concessions and control of the Black Sea Straits. Even though the threats took different forms, authorities in Washington tended to view them as part and parcel of the same problem. "Greece needed aid," President Truman recalled,

and needed it quickly and in substantial amounts. The alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the iron curtain across the eastern Mediterranean. If Greece was lost, Turkey would become an untenable outpost in a sea of Communism. Similarly, if Turkey yielded to Soviet demands, the position of Greece would be extremely endangered.¹

The more serious and immediate threat was to Greece. Since liberation from the Germans in 1944, Greece had experienced continuing political upheaval and violent disorders that not even a substantial British presence in the country had been able to suppress. Because of their investments and other commitments in Egypt and the Persian Gulf, the British saw Greece as a country of major strategic importance for the protection of their lines of communication through the Eastern Mediterranean. After the Germans withdrew, the British acted quickly to preserve their interests by restoring to power the Greek monarchy and the London-based Greek government-in-exile. Leftist resistance groups, led by the communist-dominated Popular Army of Liberation (ELAS), opposed the monarchy's return and in December 1944 attempted a coup d'état, hoping to establish a "people's democracy." British troops intervened to put down the insurrection, but the uneasy peace that followed had little chance of enduring.²

During 1945–46 conditions in Greece showed no signs of improving. Living standards remained depressed; soaring inflation undermined the national economy; and the repressive practices of the Greek Government, dominated by a small circle of right-wing politicians, contributed to a weakening of popular support. Early in 1946 the communists and other left-wing opposition groups formed an alliance and turned once again to armed insurrection, this time through guerrilla warfare. Operating mainly in the north from strongholds in the Grammos Mountains, the guerrillas grew steadily in strength, in large part

through assistance provided by the neighboring communist regimes of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Despite British economic aid and the presence of approximately 30,000 British troops (as of September 1946), the inadequately trained and poorly motivated Greek armed forces found it practically impossible to contain this threat.³

Before 1947 U.S. involvement in Greece had been purposely limited to providing relief supplies through the United Nations and making occasional "show-the-flag" visits by U.S. warships. These visits, initiated in 1946 at Forrestal's suggestion while he was Secretary of the Navy, offered evidence of growing U.S. concern and also suggested a possible readiness to act should the situation deteriorate. However, not until after announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 did Task Force 125 (renamed Sixth Task Fleet in June 1948) establish a permanent presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and acquire capabilities to operate against opposition or to provide support for missions ashore. As long as Britain took responsibility for Greece, the President held back from directly involving the United States.⁴

The British announcement in February 1947 of termination of aid to Greece and Turkey changed the outlook dramatically and evoked swift U.S. reaction.* In his speech of 12 March to Congress, President Truman asked for a one-year appropriation of \$400 million in grant aid assistance. Pending on-site inspection of needs, the State Department tentatively proposed to allocate \$300 million to Greece, divided almost evenly between economic and military aid; and \$100 million to Turkey for military and related security projects such as the rehabilitation of the Turkish railroad system.⁵ Congress was generally supportive of the program, but during hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the administration's proposal came under attack from two sources—from Republicans who wondered whether bypassing the U.N. would set a precedent for future U.S. unilateral action; and from liberal Democrats, like Sen. Claude Pepper of Florida, who expressed concern about the sharp deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations. However, the committee unanimously agreed the situation was so serious that U.S. intervention seemed the only way to forestall disaster. Congress concurred, and on 22 May 1947 the Greek-Turkish aid act (P.L. 75) became law, authorizing the full amount of the administration's request.⁶

To carry out the assistance program, the State Department established two aid missions—one in Athens, the other in Ankara—which operated in collabora-

* See Chapter I. There is substantial evidence that beginning in October 1946 the State Department was preparing plans for a program of American assistance to Greece and that the American ambassador in Athens was taking an active part in advising the Greek Government. See Alexander, *The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-1947*, 217-20.

tion with the U.S. embassies. During the congressional debate, administration spokesmen had stressed Greece's need for economic aid and had indicated that the role of U.S. military personnel would be limited to providing technical help, training, and logistical support. The chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), Dwight P. Griswold, a former governor of Nebraska, was designated "supreme authority" in Greece for all aspects of U.S. assistance. He reported to the Secretary of State, who exercised overall control of operations and policy. As finally constituted, AMAG consisted of economic and military branches with U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force assistance groups.⁷

At the time of AMAG's establishment, neither it nor the British mission in Greece had the organization or the authority to provide operational advice to Greek combat units.⁸ The British, with fewer than 8,000 soldiers, wanted to get out as soon as possible. But under strong pressure from the State Department they agreed not to dismantle their mission or scale down their operations at a rate that might cause an interruption of assistance. American supplies began arriving on 1 August 1947 and by the end of the year had totally replaced British support.⁹

When Forrestal became Secretary of Defense, the Greek aid program, already organized and under way, did not engage his immediate attention. But Greece quickly attracted greater concern from the NME when the Greek Government's steady loss of control over the countryside to the growing force of communist insurgents threatened the success of U.S. policy. In July 1947 the State Department had learned of stepped-up infiltration from the north, and in September Griswold reported an increase in communist guerrilla strength to around 16,000, a figure that was probably on the conservative side.* Faced with this grim estimate, Griswold concurred with his senior military adviser, Maj. Gen. William G. Livesay, USA, that the Greek National Army's (GNA) permanent authorized strength should be increased from 120,000 to 130,000 and that an existing temporary overstrength of 20,000 should be continued until the end of 1947. Griswold and Livesay also recommended that U.S. officers provide operational advice to Greek Government forces.¹⁰

After an on-site inspection, Maj. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Army Intelligence, reported in October that he had found a demoralized and disorganized Greek army facing a well-trained and well-armed force of insurgents with close Soviet and Soviet-satellite support. He urged the prompt formation of a U.S. Advisory and Planning Group to furnish advice to top U.S. officials in Greece "on the developing situation and in the coordination of the U.S. military

* Retrospective accounts generally credit communist forces with a much larger strength. O'Ballance, *Greek Civil War*, 142, shows them increasing from 13,000 in March 1947 to 18,000 in May and to 23,000 in July.

effort" and to advise the Greek Government and its military forces. Chamberlin also recommended the assignment of U.S. Army observers to GNA units down to division level "with the duties of energizing operational action, restoring the offensive spirit and advising on planning and operations."¹¹

The National Security Council accepted, and on 4 November 1947 President Truman approved, Chamberlin's recommendations. Concern that Congress might feel it had been misled and might object to the assignment of combat advisers caused temporary deferral of action until Secretary of the Army Royall could meet with congressional leaders.¹² Apparently without objection from Congress to the President's decision, Forrestal arranged the establishment in December of a Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) in Greece with an authorized strength of approximately 200 officers and enlisted men. Although technically part of AMAG, the advisory group constituted in reality a separate mission, organized under terms of reference that placed it in direct communication with the Joint Chiefs and, through them, with the Secretary of Defense.¹³

It soon became apparent that despite its ties to the Joint Chiefs, JUSMAPG would be very much under the authority and direction of Secretary of State Marshall, who even picked its director. The Joint Chiefs had designated General Livesay Director of JUSMAPG when they established the organization on 31 December 1947. Marshall and Eisenhower felt that Livesay, also the head of AMAG, should center his attention on supply problems in Greece and that another officer should head JUSMAPG. Eisenhower prepared and referred to Marshall a list of five new candidates, including Maj. Gen. James A. Van Fleet. "He is definitely not the intellectual type," Eisenhower explained, "but is direct and forceful and has a fighting record that would make anyone respect him." Impressed by Van Fleet's credentials, Marshall, with President Truman's consent, took steps to assure his appointment, which carried with it a promotion to lieutenant general when he left for Greece in February 1948.¹⁴

Having agreed not only to assist but to advise the Greek army, authorities in Washington recognized that they stood on the threshold of a totally new crisis, one that if it deteriorated further could bring a call for the introduction of U.S. combat forces to relieve the beleaguered GNA. Knowing what might lie ahead, Forrestal sought to explore other options, and at a luncheon meeting with military intelligence officers on 9 December he asked Chamberlin what he thought of using Polish troops, the remnants of General Wladyslaw Anders's World War II corps, then in England. Chamberlin demurred, arguing that the Greeks would resent the introduction of foreign soldiers.¹⁵

Even if the use of foreign troops would not be welcomed, the continuing weakness and low morale of the GNA and the adoption of more aggressive

tactics by the insurgents suggested that no other course might save Greece from a communist takeover. On 24 December 1947 the communists announced the formation of a "Free Democratic Greek Government." The next day, in an apparent effort to establish a capital, they launched a major assault against the garrison at Konitsa, a town barely five miles from the Albanian border. Fighting raged for more than a week, with heavy losses to both sides, but the communists failed to dislodge the town's defenders. The GNA claimed a great victory, but with 500 casualties it was at best a Pyrrhic one; U.S. intelligence analysts labeled it merely the first of many larger battles to come. The CIA reported in its January world estimate that the recent fighting at Konitsa "demonstrates that the insurgents are strong enough to make dangerous local attacks, and that there are increased central direction and coordination of activities on both sides of the border. The guerrillas cannot yet hold open ground, but reports of preparations in Satellite territory suggest plans for the occupation and defense of substantial areas in Greece." ¹⁶

Serious debate over the possible use of U.S. combat troops in Greece began early in January 1948, when the NSC staff circulated a report (NSC 5) outlining steps that the United States might have to take to prevent Greece from falling under communist domination. NSC 5 conceded that "US measures to date have been inadequate to thwart the Communist advances" and that the current aid program, scheduled to expire in six months (but likely to be extended), would not strengthen the Greek Government sufficiently to enable it to withstand communist pressure. Even so, the NSC staff took the optimistic view that the Greek army, "if strengthened, adequately equipped, operationally and technically well advised, and assured of continued US support, can eliminate guerrilla forces composed of Greek nationals alone." This would change only if communist forces from Soviet satellite countries overtly intervened. NSC 5 recognized the possibility of such intervention and urged NSC approval of the "full use" of U.S. political, economic, and, if necessary, military power to keep Greece free. More specifically, the report recommended that:

The United States should be prepared to send armed forces to Greece or elsewhere in the Mediterranean, in a manner which would not contravene the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, if it should become clear that the use of such forces is needed to prevent Greece from falling a victim to direct or indirect aggression and that Greece would thereby be afforded a reasonable chance of survival.

However, the report contained a significant reservation: If the United States became involved militarily in Palestine, the extent of its military operations in Greece should be reconsidered immediately.¹⁷

On 8 January 1948, in response to an informal request for their views, the Joint Chiefs advised Forrestal that any "additional deployment" of U.S. troops to Greece would automatically raise the question of partial mobilization and that deployment of any "appreciable military strength" would make such mobilization "a necessity."¹⁸ This was among the first of many such warnings that the Joint Chiefs sent to the Secretary of Defense over the next two years concerning the implications of policies that might require the use or deployment of substantial U.S. forces. John Ohly, Forrestal's special assistant who handled national security affairs, concurred with the JCS assessment. On 12 January Ohly indicated that he considered NSC 5 incomplete and ambiguous because it took for granted that the United States could send troops to Greece without considering such factors as the reaction of Congress, the availability of forces, or the competing demands of other crises. Summing up his concerns, Ohly said:

We can't continue to proceed on the assumption that (a) we have enough U.S. military forces to go everywhere, and (b) we will face only one crisis at a time instead of a possible series of simultaneous crises in Italy, Greece, Iran and Palestine. We can't use the same regimental combat team (that we can barely scrape together) in four places at once.¹⁹

At its meeting on 13 January the NSC discussed NSC 5 at length and then directed the staff to rework the report in the light of the discussion and a separate paper prepared by State's Policy Planning Staff. The discussion revealed divided opinion within the State Department on sending U.S. combat troops to Greece. Forrestal wondered if some of the recommended measures did not overstep the bounds of presidential authority and suggested that the NSC study this aspect further. Under Secretary of State Lovett said that Secretary Marshall remained uncommitted to any position, although he had expressed "complete agreement" with the JCS views. Marshall's concern, Lovett stressed, was that sending troops into Greece would be a gamble which, if it failed, might start World War III.²⁰

A revision of NSC 5 (5/1) underscored the need for congressional consultation and listed alternative measures the United States might take to defeat the communist guerrillas. It recommended continuation and strengthening of U.S. assistance as the most readily available tool for supporting the Greek Government. Other options involving use of military power included deployment of a token combat force, commitment of available forces as necessary to put down the insurgency, strengthening of U.S. forces in the Mediterranean outside Greece, or partial mobilization as an indication of U.S. determination to resist communist expansion.²¹

On 12 February 1948 the National Security Council devoted almost its

entire meeting to an examination of NSC 5/1. Forrestal said that the Joint Chiefs had again warned that any further involvement of U.S. forces in Greece would necessitate partial mobilization. As a precaution, Forrestal suggested that someone should brief Senators Vandenberg and Taft and Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, the leaders of the Republican Party, and endeavor to obtain their views. He thought that when the time came to make a definite decision on the use of troops, public opinion in the United States would be divided. He guessed that some newspapers, such as the *Chicago Tribune*, would claim that the United States was trying to provoke a war with the Soviets, while others, such as the *New York Times* and the *New York Herald-Tribune*, would be more understanding if they had the necessary background. Much would depend, Forrestal added, on the size of the force involved. A regimental combat team, for example, might provoke less controversy than a division.

Marshall questioned whether a regimental combat team would be sufficient. He described the outlook as "exceedingly grave" and added that "we are playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out." Marshall believed the United States must show its resolve, for "if we appear to be weakening, we will lose the game and prejudice our whole national position, particularly since we are now involved in the European Recovery Program." While he agreed with Forrestal that the use of troops would "put the President in a bad position," Marshall stated that "we must nevertheless be ready" and that the NSC should offer a definite recommendation to the President.

Marshall expressed doubt about various sections of the paper and disappointment that the paper had not examined the problem of whether "a token force would do enough good to justify the hazards."²² After minor amendments, the council adopted a revised draft (NSC 5/2), and on 16 February the President approved it. The key recommendation called for strengthening U.S. assistance to Greece.²³

Following the President's action, the NSC Executive Secretary, Admiral Souers, asked the Joint Chiefs to comment and make recommendations from a military perspective on the options outlined in NSC 5/2.²⁴ However, at just about this time, dramatic and dangerous developments in Central Europe—a Soviet-directed coup in Czechoslovakia* and rumors of a possible Soviet invasion of West Germany—effectively preempted the attention of Washington, and almost two months elapsed before the JCS replied. Greece did not return to the JCS agenda until after the administration in late March had asked Congress for a supplemental increase to the proposed FY 1949 budget to bolster U.S. defenses. But as discussion of the supplemental progressed, it became apparent that the

* See Chapter X.

Joint Chiefs wanted an increase well in excess of anything President Truman, for economic reasons, was willing to request.*

In their comments on NSC 5/2, forwarded to Forrestal in mid-April, the Joint Chiefs agreed that ending aid to Greece was unacceptable but stated that strategically "Greece is not an area which could correctly be chosen for major operations effort on our part." The JCS preferred the option in NSC 5/2 for continuing and strengthening the existing U.S. assistance program to Greece. They recommended against sending token or larger U.S. armed forces, stating that "such forces will probably be unnecessary if Soviet satellites do not initiate open warfare and will be insufficient if the Soviet satellites do attack." "On balance," the JCS warned,

it would appear that United States token forces would do little good unless dispatched as evidence of our intention to back them up to any extent that might reasonably become necessary and unless, further, it is *known* that we are ready and able to do so effectively. These conditions could not, however, be met at present even if there were not other areas where it may well become unavoidable to undertake military action with our currently relatively weak forces.²⁵

On 19 April Forrestal sent to the NSC a memo drafted for him by the JCS. He pointed out that any appreciable deployment of U.S. forces in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East, which he termed "militarily unsound" unless certain conditions were met, would make partial mobilization necessary. Given the world situation, Forrestal reported that the JCS recommended both immediate steps to increase military manpower and "increased appropriations . . . for strengthening the potential of our National Military Establishment in all respects."²⁶

Truman, steadfastly holding his ground on the size of the supplemental military budget, on 13 May 1948 limited the administration's request to \$3.1 billion or about one-third the amount originally sought by the Joint Chiefs. Less than two weeks later, after correlating the comments of the Joint Chiefs, the State Department, the NSRB, and the CIA on each of the alternative courses of action set forth in NSC 5/2, the NSC staff issued a report (NSC 5/3) recommending against the immediate dispatch of U.S. troops to Greece either as a token force or for military operations. The reasons cited included a recent upturn in the aggressiveness of the Greek army, hesitancy on the part of the Soviet satellite countries to increase aid to the Greek guerrillas, and the reluctance of the Joint Chiefs to commit U.S. forces without partial mobilization and aug-

* The debate over the FY 1949 supplemental is examined in Chapter XI.

mentation of overall U.S. capabilities. The report added that the NSC should reexamine the problem not later than November, or earlier "if the situation in Greece should deteriorate." After brief discussion on 3 June, the NSC adopted a revised paper (NSC 5/4) with only one minor amendment, and on 21 June President Truman approved it.²⁷

The administration's decision against armed U.S. intervention did not, of course, signal the abandonment of U.S. economic and military assistance. On the contrary, as long as it appeared that the Greeks themselves could fight and eventually win the war, this aid remained as fundamental to the attainment of vital U.S. objectives in Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean as it had been originally. NSC 5/2 strongly reemphasized that failure to continue and strengthen the aid programs could have adverse consequences far beyond the collapse of the Greek Government: "Resistance to Communism by countries not now under pressure would be discouraged; the success of the European Recovery Program . . . might be jeopardized; and the USSR would take further action to destroy our position on the Eurasian land mass." Thus, the administration's operating assumption continued to be that aid to Greece had both symbolic and pragmatic values beyond Greece itself. Any letup could undermine not only the Greek Government's chances of survival but also free world confidence in the United States, and thus set the stage for further Soviet and communist expansion.²⁸

Congress fully approved the general policy adopted by the administration, but when the time came in the late spring of 1948 to renew the Greek-Turkish aid program, Congress took into account the possibility that the communist guerrillas might be defeated in 1948. Accordingly, as part of the Foreign Assistance Act that included the European Recovery Program, Congress authorized a \$275 million military aid program for Greece and Turkey for the year ending 30 June 1949, the amount proposed by the President, but it limited the appropriation to \$225 million. Since this did not foreclose a supplemental appropriation for the withheld amount, the State Department in late June advised the aid missions in Athens and Ankara that support for military operations against the Greek guerrillas should continue as planned and that every effort should be made to meet the essential needs of the Turkish armed forces.²⁹

Meanwhile, the fighting in Greece intensified. With advisory assistance from General Van Fleet, the GNA in April launched Operation DAWN, employing three divisions in a successful action against an estimated 2,000 insurgents in the Roumeli area of east-central Greece. In June Operation CROWN, a somewhat stronger offensive against the communist redoubts in the Grammos Mountains, resulted in heavy casualties to both sides. After a period of recuperation in Albania, communist forces reappeared in strength, and in September and October they inflicted large losses on the GNA at Kastoria. Shaken by this setback after


months of heavy fighting, the Greek Government proclaimed a state of martial law throughout the country.³⁰

In mid-October 1948 Secretary Marshall visited Greece to see for himself how the war was progressing. He found the Greek army tired, discouraged, and too much overage in grade. Marshall recommended a temporary 15,000-man increase in the size of the GNA, replacement of overage personnel, and relief of exhausted front-line veterans by fresh troops.³¹ To save time, he cabled a summary of his proposals to Lovett in Washington, who turned at once to Forrestal for advice on finding the necessary funds. Forrestal, checking hastily, found that nearly \$50 million of the \$225 million recently appropriated for Greek-Turkish aid had not yet been firmly allocated.³² But when he approved the troop increase, it was on condition that related costs be met from the \$150 million already allocated to Greece from FY 1949 funds. On 31 October, just 10 days after the dispatch of Marshall's cable, the U.S. mission in Athens received instructions to inform the Greek Government that the United States had agreed to cover the cost of rations and uniforms for the 15,000 men, subject to Forrestal's stated condition.³³

The administration followed up the decision to support the temporary buildup by tentative allocation of \$150 million to the Greeks and \$75 million to the Turks. But from time to time over the next few months the Government adjusted these allocations to take into account changing estimates of the needs of the two countries and particularly an unanticipated acceleration of expenditures in Greece in early 1949 as a result of renewed heavy fighting. In the end, \$170 million of the \$225 million allowed by Congress went to Greece and \$55 million to Turkey.³⁴

Not only increased aid requirements but also the 1948 stalemate in the fighting prompted Washington to talk of reassessing long-range U.S. objectives in Greece. As early as August 1948 State's Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey, George C. McGhee, thought that the National Security Council should take another look at Greece and establish definite criteria for future military assistance. He wrote Lovett that if Operation CROWN proved successful in breaking the back of the communist insurgency, the United States could reasonably expect the war to end soon. But with the short-lived success of the GNA offensive and the disastrous setback at Kastoria, hopes for a rapid conclusion began to fade. In October 1948 the CIA deduced from evidence of continuing Soviet and satellite aid that while the guerrillas no longer seemed capable of effecting "a military domination of Greece," their hit-and-run tactics "will continue seriously to hamper Greek rehabilitation and economic recovery." If Western vigilance in Greece was relaxed, the guerrillas might be able to resume the initiative.³⁵

In November, the Joint Chiefs reminded Forrestal that it was necessary to



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look beyond the current conflict and to accept the strategic necessity of U.S. aid for some years to come. "Greece and Turkey stand in the way of Soviet expansion in this area," they argued, "and thus it is highly important to our national security interest that neither falls under the control or domination of the USSR." Once the Greek civil war was over, the JCS thought that Turkey, rather than Greece, should be the focal point of future U.S. efforts:

The present economic and political situation in Greece is precarious. Even with considerable military and economic assistance from the United States, Greece will in all probability never have the capability of successfully resisting those attacks in force which the USSR and/or her satellites could launch against her long northern frontier. Greek military spirit is now woefully lacking. On the other hand, the military potential of Turkey, coupled with its high national spirit and geographic situation, makes it possible for the nation now to resist Soviet aggression to the extent of imposing appreciable delay and eventually, with continued U.S. aid, to offer strong resistance to invasion.³⁶

In view of the uncertain situation in Greece and Turkey, the NSC on 16 December 1948 ordered its staff to prepare a detailed analysis with recommendations. This led in March 1949 to Truman's approval of NSC 42/1. Even with the current military stalemate, NSC 42/1 was optimistic that U.S. assistance would eventually turn the tide in favor of the Greek Government. One especially encouraging sign was the deep rift that had developed in 1948 between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. A permanent break between Moscow and Belgrade could seriously disrupt the unity of the entire Soviet bloc; for the Greek guerrillas it could mean loss of an important ally and an end to use of Yugoslav territory as a sanctuary. Looking at long-term U.S. security requirements in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, NSC 42/1 incorporated the views of the Joint Chiefs, arguing that U.S. interests would best be served by concentrating on strengthening the Turkish armed forces. The objective of assistance to Greece should be a Greek military establishment capable of maintaining internal security and resisting communist domination of the country. The paper warned against any immediate or premature reduction of U.S. help and stated that the NSC should keep the situation in Greece under continuing review.³⁷

Despite NSC agreement on Greece's need for continued assistance, opinions differed on the actual size and scale of Greek requirements. In the fall of 1948 Van Fleet had recommended spending between \$450 and \$541 million in fiscal year 1950 to rebuild and strengthen the Greek armed forces. Ambassador to Greece Henry F. Grady felt that expansion was not the key and that so large an effort would place intolerable strains on the Greek economy, resulting in paralysis

of agriculture and industry. Grady recommended instead that military assistance remain at the approved FY 1949 level of \$150 million. After further study by State and Defense, Forrestal on 23 December 1948 endorsed compromise FY 1950 figures of \$200 million for Greece and \$100 million for Turkey.³⁸

In January 1949 Greek-Turkish aid came under the scrutiny of the newly created Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee (FACC), an interdepartmental advisory group set up to develop plans for worldwide foreign military assistance. The Bureau of the Budget recommended only \$150 million for Greece and \$75 million for Turkey; the FACC, supported by the State Department, settled on \$178 million for Greece and \$102 million for Turkey. At Acheson's request, Truman in May 1949 asked Congress for a deficiency appropriation of \$50 million to keep the Greek-Turkish aid program going beyond its expiration date of 30 June 1949. A continuing resolution (P.L. 154) solved the problem until Congress in October 1949 passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, earmarking \$211 million for Greece and Turkey through fiscal year 1950. The Joint Chiefs recommended allocating \$130 million to Greece and \$81 million to Turkey.³⁹

By this time the outcome of the fighting in Greece was no longer in doubt. During 1949 the impact of U.S. assistance became increasingly evident as the GNA transformed itself into a sturdy fighting force. Following the near-disaster at Kastoria, the Greek Government took steps to rid its army of incompetent officers. In January 1949 Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, the hero of the 1940 Albanian campaign, came out of retirement to take over command of the Greek armed forces. Coincidentally, the rebel leaders made the fateful decision to abandon guerrilla warfare and shift to more conventional tactics. Lacking adequate preparation, logistic support, and training for this kind of action, the communists suffered several costly defeats.⁴⁰

What sealed the fate of the communist guerrillas was the widening rift between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. As NSC 42/1 had predicted, the strained relations between Belgrade and Moscow adversely affected the Greek insurgents. As the price for his continued cooperation and assistance, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia insisted that the guerrillas pledge their loyalty to his brand of communism rather than the Soviets'. When the guerrilla leaders refused, Tito closed the Yugoslav border in July 1949 and denied them further support. Demoralized and exhausted, the insurgents in October 1949 declared a unilateral cease-fire.⁴¹

In the months immediately following the collapse of the communist insurgency, the United States reduced and reorganized its military mission in Greece. Responding to a suggestion from Van Fleet, the Joint Chiefs in March 1950 obtained Secretary Johnson's approval to consolidate U.S. Army, Navy, and Air

Force aid groups with JUSMAPG into a single Joint U.S. Military Aid Group (JUSMAG).⁴² At the same time the JCS approved a reduction in the number of U.S. advisers serving in Greece and turned down a British proposal for a combined Anglo-American aid group. They reasoned that since the United States provided the funds, it should retain primary responsibility. Deputy Secretary of Defense Early agreed with the JCS rejection of a combined mission and approved their proposal to discuss coordination of aid operations along functional lines with the British.⁴³

The Joint Chiefs were satisfied that, with additional training and supplies, the Greek armed forces would be able to hold their own against a renewal of guerrilla warfare. On 7 December 1949 they advised Secretary Johnson that "the general situation in Greece is encouraging and should continue to improve unless there is a decidedly adverse over-all change in the Balkan situation." They estimated guerrilla forces still in Greece at fewer than 2,000 while approximately 8,000 combat-fit guerrillas were in Albania and Bulgaria. Assuming no resumption of heavy fighting, the GNA soon would begin to demobilize under plans calling for a permanent force of 80,000 in addition to small air and naval establishments. The Joint Chiefs realized that Greece, a poor country, could not support a large peacetime army, even with considerable outside assistance. "In a global war," they noted, "the role of the Greek Government would be little more than to cause maximum delay to enemy invasion of that country."⁴⁴

Of the long-range U.S. position in Greece, the Joint Chiefs noted that the decision in 1947 to provide assistance had prevented a communist takeover and had established the United States in place of Britain as the predominant power in Greece and in the entire Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. As long as the United States was locked in an ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, Greece was likely to remain both a focal point of international tensions and an important factor in determining control of the region. The JCS believed, therefore, that for the indefinite future the United States should maintain and protect its foothold in Greece as a means of assuring continued influence in the general area. "Until the complexes of world power have developed and the nature of the solution of the ideological conflict becomes more discernible," they said, "it would be unsound for the United States to agree that any foreign nation should assume a position of dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean."⁴⁵

The Joint Chiefs' views appear to have been broadly representative of official sentiment in Washington. Although Greece was no longer in serious danger, the State Department in March 1950 advised against any "abrupt or excessive curtailment" of military aid that might encourage the communists to resume the war. At the same time, State presented to the NSC an analysis of what it felt the United States had accomplished, directly and indirectly, in Greece:

The action taken by the United States with respect to Greece, together with related developments, has so far prevented Greece from falling under communist domination and the ensuing adverse psychological and political results outlined in NSC 42/1. The principal related development was, of course, the Tito-Cominform rift, which led to the cessation of Yugoslav aid to the Greek guerrilla movement and contributed to its internal demoralization, and it may well have been this development which tipped the scales of victory in our favor. While this is a possibility, it is on the other hand a probability that Tito could not have undertaken or made good his defection had the United States adopted a less firm position in Greece and permitted the communists to take over that country. In this respect, United States policy in Greece has been successful beyond expectations.⁴⁶


Aid to Turkey

At the same time that U.S. officials focused their attention and efforts on the war in Greece, they watched closely developments in neighboring Turkey, where Soviet pressure and internal problems presented another opportunity for communist exploitation. Although the situation in Greece appeared more urgent and received closer attention from Washington, the threat to Turkey was thought to be no less real; in some respects it demonstrated to U.S. officials more clearly than the Greek civil war the imperialistic designs of Soviet policy. Strategically and politically, the United States considered the Soviet threat to Turkey no less important than the threat to Greece.

Pressure against Turkey began building in March 1945 when the Soviets denounced the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December 1925. Soon it became clear that the Soviets wanted, among other things, revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936, which regulated passage of Soviet and other non-Turkish vessels through the Black Sea Straits. In particular, the Soviets wanted the right to establish a Soviet garrison on the Straits. After more than a year of threats and demands, the Soviets officially denounced the Montreux Convention in August 1946. The Turks, with Anglo-American diplomatic support, rebuffed stepped-up Soviet propaganda and pressure, including demands for the retrocession of the eastern Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan.* A war of nerves, waged by the Soviets at a low but steady level of intensity, continued throughout 1946 and into 1947.⁴⁷

Turkey was included under the Greek-Turkish aid act to offset these Soviet pressures and enable the Turkish Government to speed up modernization of its

* Turkey ceded these two provinces in northeastern Turkey to Russia in 1878 and regained them in 1921.



Mediterranean Area (1948)

armed forces without imposing an added burden on the civilian economy. By 1947 Turkey felt compelled to maintain its armed forces at nearly full mobilization and to allocate more than one-third of its budget to military requirements at the expense of needed improvements in the civilian sector. The Joint Chiefs viewed the purpose of military aid to Turkey as being much different from aid to Greece, where putting down the communist insurgency assumed top priority. In Turkey the objectives were broader—to stiffen Turkey's will and ability to resist Soviet threats and to improve its military capability to conduct a strong holding and delaying action in the event of a Soviet invasion.⁴⁸

Military assistance began in May 1947 with the arrival in Ankara of a special U.S. delegation to assess Turkish military requirements. In July the two countries signed a bilateral aid agreement and the United States created the American Mission for Aid to Turkey (AMAT), composed of separate Army, Navy, and Air Force advisory groups. These operated, as in Greece, under the general authority of the Chief of Mission (Edwin C. Wilson) appointed by the Department of State. Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride, Chief of U.S. Army Group, served as Coordinator, Armed Forces Group.⁴⁹

In 1949, with the establishment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, overall administration of the Turkish aid program passed to State's Director of Mutual Defense Assistance, James Bruce, while the Department of Defense exercised direct supervisory responsibilities. Within Defense, day-to-day direction and control came under the Office of Military Assistance (OMA), with the planning and implementation of military policies handled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.* The job of coordinator in Turkey was abolished and General McBride became chief of the merged Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT). As head of JAMMAT, McBride reported to the U.S. Ambassador, George Wadsworth, on matters of general policy, and to the Joint Chiefs on the formulation and execution of military programs.⁵⁰

From the beginning in 1947, the military departments and the JCS handled almost exclusively the details of Turkish aid. Usually this process did not involve the Secretary of Defense or his office. An exception occurred early in 1948 when the Army and Air Force failed to meet their shipping schedules. Acting on a complaint from the State Department, Forrestal ordered the military departments and the Munitions Board to conduct an investigation. The subsequent report did not provide a solution for the immediate problem but suggested that as more "ready-for-issue" supplies entered the pipeline and as Turkish port facilities improved, delays would disappear. A major cause of the delay was the shipping schedule drawn up originally on the basis of experience in Greece, where initial

* Chapter XVII treats the administration of MDAP in detail.

deliveries had involved such short procurement lead-time items as food and forage. But the items requested by Turkey, chiefly rather sophisticated military hardware, required longer leadtimes for procurement and repair of used equipment. By the end of the year, after adjustment of delivery schedules, the program functioned without serious difficulty.⁵¹

In the course of providing aid, the United States quickly realized how woefully unprepared the Turkish armed forces were for modern warfare. Turkey's major asset, greatly admired by U.S. military observers, was the courage and toughness of its soldiers.⁵² Basically a World War I force, the Turkish army lacked mobility and was commanded by officers who were largely untrained in mechanized warfare. Obsolescent equipment of heterogeneous origin contributed to the difficulty of finding spare parts and ammunition. The Turkish navy, although somewhat better prepared, had few modern warships and almost no up-to-date shipyards. The Turkish air force had practically no offensive capability and lacked an integrated air defense organization. Other shortcomings included inadequate harbors, outmoded industry, decrepit road and rail transportation, and poor telephone and telegraph communications.⁵³ As a neutral country until February 1945, Turkey did not participate in World War II, a fact that largely explained its lack of modern military forces.

Because of these enormous deficiencies, U.S. military assistance ranged from the provision of new equipment and training to the construction of roads, airstrips, harbors, and communication facilities.⁵⁴ For this reason, economic and military assistance were sometimes almost indistinguishable. The objective was to reduce the size of the Turkish armed forces while increasing their firepower, mobility, and overall effectiveness through the modernization of weapons and the development of an air force equipped with fighters and light bombers. In addition, U.S. authorities pressed for a general reorganization of Turkey's military establishment. The Turkish Parliament in June 1949 enacted a series of laws giving the Minister of Defense clear authority over the armed forces and creating a Supreme Council of National Defense to manage the allocation of resources in case of war. The compulsory retirement of more than 100 senior officers followed in October, opening the way for the advancement of younger men being trained by U.S. advisers in the techniques of modern warfare.⁵⁵

The Turkish Government repeatedly expressed in 1948–49, both in public and private, its hope that U.S. assistance would lead ultimately to some form of U.S.–Turkish alliance. The State Department tried to discourage this notion, but after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 it found Turkey more determined than ever to obtain a written guarantee of U.S. protection against Soviet attack. To demonstrate continuing friendship and support, General McBride early in 1950 opened staff talks with senior Turkish defense planners

to coordinate U.S.-Turkish war plans. And, with State Department approval, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins visited Ankara in March 1950. Collins assured Turkish President Ismet İnönü that, in the event of a U.S.-Soviet conflict, the United States would launch "a tremendous strategic air offensive . . . against Russia which would be of immense help to Turkey as well as the countries of Western Europe."⁵⁶ Turkey's admission into the North Atlantic alliance was still two years in the future, but by early 1950 considerable groundwork had been laid.

As the United States and Turkey became more closely linked through military assistance, the possibility arose of using Turkish territory and facilities to support U.S. offensive action against the Soviet Union in the event of war. By the summer of 1948 the Joint Chiefs generally agreed, and Forrestal concurred, that U.S. war strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean should be to secure control of the Cairo-Suez area and from there launch air attacks against the Soviet Union.⁵⁷ Presumably, they also eyed Turkey as a convenient forward base and as a possible jumping-off point for defending or recapturing the Middle East oil fields.

In December 1948 Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington thought the matter of providing bases for B-29s and B-50s of sufficient importance to circulate in the National Security Council a report (NSC 36) that recommended initiation of discussions with the Turkish Government and submission to Congress of a request for funds to finance construction of Turkish airfields. Operating from Turkey, Symington argued, U.S. and allied forces might successfully prevent a Soviet air attack against the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Bases in Turkey probably would be lost within three or four months after the outbreak of a war, but if U.S. aircraft could deliver initial "crippling attacks" against Soviet industry from these bases, the expense of their construction would have more than justified itself.⁵⁸

At an NSC meeting on 16 December Symington elaborated on his proposal, presenting Air Force views that the airfields should be as small and inconspicuous as possible, since runways of 8,000 and 10,000 feet would be a "dead giveaway" of U.S. plans. The Air Force wanted a series of short strips, expanded if necessary with mats, from which heavy bombers could take off with jet-assist engines. Lovett voiced concern about the possible Soviet reaction to airfield construction in Turkey. He urged that construction should be done as inconspicuously as possible, using local labor under Turkish supervision, with funding separate from the regular military assistance budget. Further, he did not think the United States should insist on formal guarantees from the Turkish Government of U.S. access to the airfields in the event of war. The NSC agreed that the project should go forward, but not without further examination by the NSC staff, which

was asked to prepare a report on the airfields question in conjunction with a general review of U.S. policy toward Greece and Turkey.⁵⁹

The staff report, circulated early in March 1949 as NSC 42, suggested a variety of measures the United States might take to strengthen Greece and Turkey against communism and the Soviet Union,* including proceeding with construction of the bases if the Joint Chiefs deemed it a strategic requirement. The report advised that funding for the bases should be obtained from Congress with the least possible publicity and that the position of the Turkish Government should be ascertained on allowing U.S. use of the airfields even if Turkey were not at war. Before President Truman's approval could be sought, the new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, told the NSC on 22 March that in light of the recently negotiated North Atlantic Treaty, he wanted to study the question of peripheral bases such as the ones proposed for construction in Turkey. The council adopted NSC 42 after deleting the paragraphs relating to Turkish air base construction but agreed that within three weeks the State Department should submit its views on such construction for council consideration.⁶⁰

At about the same time, the Joint Chiefs proposed stockpiling 12,000 barrels of aviation fuel (AVGAS) in Turkey. Forrestal, about to leave office, took no action on the matter and left it for Johnson to handle. Moving quickly, Johnson on 2 April 1949 asked that the JCS proposal be placed on the NSC agenda and considered with the proposal to construct airfields in Turkey, currently being studied in the State Department.⁶¹

In reply to Johnson's request, Acheson on 14 April told the NSC that both construction of airfields and stockpiling of gasoline "would be regarded by the Soviet government as a threat to the security of the U.S.S.R., and would stimulate further Soviet pressure on Turkey and perhaps Iran." Beyond this, the timing was wrong and the sudden appearance of U.S. forward bases on Turkish soil might lead the Soviets to the "erroneous conclusion" that the North Atlantic Treaty was not truly defensive in purpose. Rather than drop the idea altogether, however, Acheson proposed further study by State and reconsideration by the NSC "when more favorable circumstances justify."⁶²

With President Truman presiding, the NSC on 21 April recorded its approval of Acheson's position. During the discussion, Johnson said that the NME still favored airfield construction and AVGAS stockpiling but concurred in the State Department's opposition to taking action, given existing circumstances. The President, noting that he had fully discussed the question with Acheson, endorsed the report's suggestion that State "should keep the matter under continuous review" and present it again to the NSC if necessary.⁶³

* For the substance of these recommendations, see the discussion above concerning NSC 42/1, p. 159.

Since Truman apparently objected only to the timing of the airfields proposal and not its substance, the Air Force began making plans to go ahead, receiving the close cooperation of Ambassador to Turkey George Wadsworth. In October 1949 Wadsworth and Turkey's defense minister, Hüsni Cakir, signed a secret tentative agreement calling for joint rehabilitation of three airfields to be used for training Turkish pilots.⁶⁴ The money involved in launching the project, although not extravagant (\$9.5 million), raised eyebrows in the State Department, where officials again worried about the effects such action might have on U.S.-Soviet and Soviet-Turkish relations. What concerned State most was not the actual construction of the bases, but rather the accusations the Soviets might make if the United States participated openly. Consequently, if construction went forward, State preferred that it be done covertly or strictly as a Turkish enterprise. One Air Force representative responded that State's attitude was "sissy-like and unrealistic," that U.S. participation was necessary to guarantee quality work, and that failure to authorize construction would seriously impede the development of an operative and effective Turkish air component.⁶⁵ On 3 November 1949, acting on a request from the Air Force, General Lemnitzer, Director of the Office of Military Assistance, OSD, submitted the matter to the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC) for a decision.⁶⁶

At a meeting on 5 January 1950 of State and Defense officials, including James Bruce, Director of Mutual Defense Assistance, Lemnitzer received the go-ahead to earmark mutual defense assistance funds for construction of the Turkish airfields. However, in deference to the State Department's objections, an ad hoc State-Defense committee undertook to investigate alternative methods of control and supervision of construction. The committee's report of 9 February refrained from any definite recommendations but termed it questionable whether U.S. involvement could be concealed. The group concluded that since Defense and the U.S. assistance group in Turkey would not take responsibility for a covert operation, State would have to conduct it.⁶⁷

In the light of these findings, John Ohly, Bruce's deputy, notified Lemnitzer on 28 February that the State Department would approve the project but that "it is imperative that . . . it should appear that the work is being done for Turkey, compatible with the needs of the Turkish air force, and not for the United States of America in view of the needs of our armed forces." Two months later, in advising Lemnitzer on anticipated testimony before the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress on how military assistance funds might be used for Turkish airfield construction, Ohly recommended that "details of size, strength, and location of airfields not be testified to if such is possible, and if such not be possible, that such testimony be given only in executive session." Ohly noted that the plan was to use these funds to resurface runways at three bases in western Turkey

and to develop two other bases in southern Turkey, one with a 10,000-foot runway. Indicating that the work would begin soon, the United States on 4 May 1950 notified the Turkish Foreign Ministry of the imminent arrival in Turkey of U.S. supervisory and construction personnel.⁶⁸

As the debate over air base construction suggests, Defense was generally more enthusiastic than State in seeking military ties with the Turks. Yet the differences had more to do with tactics and timing than basic policy. Located at a key strategic juncture overlooking access routes throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, like Greece, figured prominently in the region's security. As a possible jumping-off point for air operations against the Soviet Union's southern flank, Turkey had even more value than her neighbor to the west and by 1950 acquired in the eyes of both State and Defense officials the status of an important friend, if not as yet an essential ally.

The Communist Threat to Italy

In Italy, the third Mediterranean country to come under heavy communist pressure after World War II, the problems took yet another form from those facing Greece and Turkey. Combined U.S.-British occupation of Italy lasted until the signing of a peace treaty in February 1947. Having experienced a lenient occupation, the Italians were shocked when they learned the terms of the treaty—a reparations bill totaling \$350 million, loss of their colonial empire in Africa, and firm prohibitions on such categories of armaments as heavy tanks, submarines, and bombers. In addition, the treaty limited Italy to an army of 250,000 men, a navy of 25,000, and an air force of 25,000, with 200 fighters and 150 transports. The area in and around Trieste, long a source of controversy with neighboring Yugoslavia, was to become a "free territory" with 10,000 U.S. and British troops in occupation.⁶⁹

On top of what many Italians considered an unfair and humiliating treaty, Italy by 1947 also faced enormous internal difficulties stemming from high inflation, chronic unemployment, government instability, food shortages, and agitation by leftist political elements. In trying to restore parliamentary democracy, Italy faced an uphill battle. During the two years immediately following the war, the ruling Christian Democrats, led by Premier Alcide de Gasperi, had tried to deal with the country's domestic issues by sharing power with the communist and socialist opposition. But in May 1947, with his coalition partners effectively blocking efforts to revive the economy, de Gasperi took the bold step of dissolving the government and forming a new cabinet without communists. Although caught off guard at first, the communists soon retaliated by inciting a

wave of violent strikes and demonstrations in an attempt to discredit and topple de Gasperi's government.⁷⁰

By September 1947 U.S. officials feared that Italy was on the verge of a communist-launched civil war in which the Soviet Union, through agents operating from Yugoslavia, might assist insurgents in northern Italy in starting a rebellion similar to the one in Greece. At the time, in accordance with the terms of the peace treaty, final preparations were in progress for the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. occupation force of approximately 2,000 administrative personnel, leaving behind only the 5,000-man U.S. peacekeeping force in Trieste. Alarmed that the end of the occupation might signal the start of a communist offensive, the Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Hillenkoetter, warned President Truman on 15 September about conditions in Italy and the implications of the impending withdrawal of U.S. and British troops. He outlined possible courses of U.S. action to assist the Italian Government, ranging from not removing the troops to using U.S. equipment and instruction to maintain Italy's security forces at the maximum strength authorized by the peace treaty. Hillenkoetter observed that the latter probably was as far as the Italian Government could go under existing internal political conditions.⁷¹

Worried like Hillenkoetter that conditions might deteriorate rapidly once American and British forces withdrew, Forrestal favored an early reassessment of U.S. policy toward Italy. At a meeting of Defense and State officials on 25 September to prepare for the first meeting of the National Security Council the next day, Under Secretary of State Lovett presented a detailed briefing on the Italian situation. Forrestal summed up Lovett's remarks by saying that "if we decide to let Italy go we are, at the same time, deciding to abandon Europe."⁷² At the organizing meeting of the NSC on 26 September, with President Truman in attendance, he again drew attention to the problem in Italy, but deferred to Lovett to place it in further perspective. "He pointed out," Forrestal noted,

that our failure to act would mean the negation of any effort we had made in Turkey and Greece for the obvious reason that Italy lies athwart the line of communication to those regions. Furthermore, he said the whole position in the Middle East would be threatened to the extent that, with the line of communications through the Mediterranean dominated by a Russian satellite, both Iran and Iraq and Saudi Arabia would have to reassess their position vis-à-vis Russia.⁷³

In response to an informal request from Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs on 30 October submitted their views on Italy, which Forrestal promptly relayed to the NSC. Although deeply concerned by the situation in Italy, the Joint Chiefs were not optimistic about the prospects of possible U.S. intervention. They

pointed out the limited availability of U.S. surplus equipment needed by the Italians and indicated that a show of force by the United States could best be mounted by air and naval units. If direct intervention became necessary, the maximum ground forces immediately available would be four divisions—two Army and two Marine. "It is of great importance," they stressed, "to avoid committing these ground forces in an area where they may suddenly find themselves confronting enemy forces overwhelmingly superior in strength and with no possibility of early and adequate reinforcements." Such reinforcements, they added, would require a partial mobilization. However, any commitment of U.S. forces to the Eastern and Central Mediterranean region should not be made "without adequate assurance that passage through the Straits of Gibraltar will not be denied to our forces."⁷⁴

On 14 November 1947 the National Security Council adopted and sent to President Truman a report (NSC 1/1) taking into account the comments of the Joint Chiefs and additional recommendations developed by the NSC staff working in conjunction with State's Policy Planning Staff. The paper stated that because of Italy's strategic position astride lines of communication in the Mediterranean, the United States should provide "full support" to the Italian Government in the form of economic and financial assistance. However, the NSC advised against commitment of combat troops and recommended confining military assistance to technical advice to the Italian armed forces. In the event of the establishment of an illegal communist government, the United States ought immediately to extend the "strategic disposition" of its forces to Italy and other parts of the Mediterranean and seek Italy's consent to use Italian air and naval bases. The United States should also suspend economic aid to communist-controlled parts of the country and halt the withdrawal of all remaining U.S. occupation forces. Because of the uncertain situation in Italy, the NSC called for a reexamination of its recommendations before the Italian election scheduled for April 1948.⁷⁵

Shortly after Truman approved the NSC recommendations, the Italian Government, fearing stepped-up communist agitation and clandestine aggression from Yugoslavia, asked the United States for small arms and other military equipment. On 9 December 1947 the President tentatively approved Italy's request but asked Admiral Souers to discuss the matter with Forrestal before taking any action. Later in the day Souers did so at a meeting in the Pentagon of the Committee of Four. Secretary of the Army Royall, who had earlier opposed such a course, warned that supplying the arms would deplete the Army's war reserves and would be justified only if the situation was "potentially critical." Forrestal stated his personal conviction that "we should proceed to furnish such aid as we could," but he asked whether, before taking action, it would not be advisable to discuss

the matter with congressional leaders. On 11 December he called various legal aspects of the proposal to the attention of the State Department, indicating that they would have to be resolved before action could be taken on the Italian request.⁷⁶

To answer Forrestal's questions, the NSC on 18 December 1947 asked SANACC to study the legislative and policy requirements for furnishing military assistance to the Italians. The committee did not submit its findings until mid-January 1948, by which time U.S. intelligence analysts tended to discount the possibility of Italy falling victim to an armed communist uprising or a Yugoslav invasion. In its report to the NSC, SANACC drew attention to the weakness of Italy's internal security forces and urged a favorable response to the request for help lest the situation take a new turn for the worse. The committee felt that the President, acting under his plenary powers as Commander in Chief, possessed ample authority to order the transfer of arms on a reimbursable basis. After checking, the State Department reported that Italy could pay for a portion of the requested equipment and supplies.⁷⁷ Although still skeptical, Forrestal on 12 February joined with the other NSC members in adopting the SANACC position.⁷⁸ Truman approved the NSC action and on 10 March directed Forrestal to expedite the shipment of arms. Earlier, Lovett had advised Forrestal that since the materials could not be delivered to Italy before the Italian elections, they should not be given a priority that would hinder aid to Greece and Turkey. But Lovett urged that the Italian program go forward because of its psychological importance to Italy.⁷⁹

With the issue of arms aid at last resolved, the NSC turned to other aspects of U.S. policy in Italy and on 11 March adopted two reports. The first of these, NSC 1/2, stated that while the communists did not presently seem inclined to mount either a general strike or an armed insurrection, their policies and objectives continued to pose a serious threat to the survival and future of Italian democracy and to the Western orientation of the Italian Government. Consequently, the United States should make "full use" of its political, economic, and, if necessary, military power to keep the current Italian Government in office and prevent Italy from falling under communist or Soviet domination. Specifically, the United States should extend economic aid and trade concessions to Italy, counter communist propaganda with an effective U.S. information program, assist Italy to reestablish close ties with other Western governments, and provide the Italian armed forces with equipment, supplies, and technical advice. Should these measures prove insufficient or should the communists attempt to seize power through an insurrection or other illegal means, then the same general course of action recommended in NSC 1/1 should be followed.⁸⁰

The other paper (NSC 1/3) dealt with Italy's national elections in April

and the possibility of a communist victory or communist participation in the Italian Government. Against either of these possibilities, the NSC endorsed a series of measures the United States should take to keep the de Gasperi government in power. If the communists did well in the elections and could not be kept out of the government, then the United States should immediately strengthen its forces in the Mediterranean, build up (unspecified as to size) its military capabilities, provide arms and other military equipment to anticommunist Italian forces, intensify the anticommunist propaganda campaign in Italy, step up support of the Christian Democrats and other anticommunist groups, and reappraise the adequacy and effectiveness of U.S. aid to Greece, Turkey, and France. Complete domination of the government by the communists would require additional measures, including limited mobilization of U.S. forces, further strengthening of U.S. capabilities in the Mediterranean, military staff talks with selected other countries, and financial and military support for the anticommunist Italian underground.⁸¹

Following the President's approval of these policies on 15 March 1948, the Joint Chiefs moved quickly to develop operational plans to enlarge the U.S. ground and air forces in Europe and North Africa and to reinforce the U.S. naval task force in the Mediterranean. While the Navy prepared a plan to augment and intensify its patrols throughout the area, the Air Force made available two fighter squadrons and a heavy bomber squadron for possible redeployment on 24-hour notice from Germany to bases in Italy. In addition, the U.S. European Command earmarked a reinforced regimental combat team for immediate airlift, if necessary, from Germany to Greece, Italy, or Palestine. Units in the United States, including a Marine division and an Army division, with tactical air support, were also placed in readiness in case reinforcements were needed.⁸²

Meanwhile, the Italian Government, concerned about possible adverse voter reaction, asked the State Department to hold up arms shipments until after the April elections.* In the view of Secretary Royall, this request raised questions about the arms aid program. "It seems to me," Royall told Forrestal, "that the whole matter of shipment of arms should be reexamined after the [Italian] election in light of the necessities for arms and the danger of furnishing them at the time."⁸³

As election day neared, the United States intensified its efforts to defeat the communists. According to unofficial accounts, much of the credit for the outcome belonged to the CIA, which mounted a well coordinated and highly suc-

* Some weapons were scheduled to arrive before the election. The Italian Government agreed to take delivery on condition that a means could be found to keep the existence of the arms a secret.

cessful campaign, supplying money and teaching American political techniques to anticommunist candidates and their supporters. Private American citizen groups, labor unions, and distinguished Italian-Americans also lent their support to what developed into an anticommunist crusade. The cumulative effect of these pleas, favors, promises, and warnings helped evoke a decisive repudiation of the left. On 18 April 1948 Italian voters rejected the communists and gave the Christian Democrats and their allies strong majorities in both the Italian Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.⁸⁴

After the April elections Washington no longer considered Italy in imminent danger of a communist takeover. As the expected communist uprising failed to materialize and new threats arose in Berlin and elsewhere, Italy dropped temporarily from the list of countries requiring U.S. military assistance. On 28 July 1948 the Joint Chiefs advised Forrestal that Italy's internal security seemed reasonably assured for the time being and that further assistance to the Italian armed forces should be considered in the context of an overall military aid policy. Forrestal accepted these recommendations and so informed the Secretary of State on 6 August. He also suggested possible Italian purchases of military equipment through private channels.⁸⁵ In April 1949 Italy became a member of the North Atlantic alliance, thus acquiring automatic eligibility for U.S. grant aid when in the following October Congress established the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

In view of Italy's participation in NATO and MDAP, the NSC staff early in 1950 initiated a policy review to ascertain what further steps the United States should take to combat Italian communism. Its report (NSC 67) found that while communist strength and influence had declined since 1948, Italy's pro-Western government remained vulnerable to political attacks from the Communist Party and communist-controlled labor unions. The political position of the Italian Communist Party was stronger than that of any other communist organization outside the Soviet bloc. Moreover, the Party included a paramilitary force estimated to number 75,000 men. Although the Italian armed forces were numerically superior and better equipped, their ability to cope with an insurrection would be severely tested if the communists received outside assistance. For these reasons, the staff stressed, the United States should remain alert to signs of external and internal aggression by the communists against the Italian Government and in an emergency be prepared to strengthen U.S. forces in the Mediterranean and order their deployment to strategic points on the Italian peninsula.⁸⁶

In general, the analysis and recommendations in NSC 67 did not differ significantly from NSC 1/2 and NSC 1/3. However, it appeared to the Joint Chiefs that the reference in NSC 67 to the possible deployment of forces went somewhat beyond earlier commitments. At an NSC meeting on 20 April 1950

JCS Chairman General Bradley asked for clarification.⁸⁷ Accordingly, Johnson and Acheson drafted new language to indicate that any decision regarding the commitment of U.S. forces to Italy would be consistent with overall strategic plans and would be made only after consultation with the Joint Chiefs. President Truman approved the amended paper (NSC 67/1) on 24 April.⁸⁸

In fact, as happened in Greece, Italy had turned the corner by the summer of 1950. With a heavy infusion of U.S. economic and military aid after 1947, Italy was now on the road to recovery and stability, despite the continued activities of a large indigenous communist party. In southern Europe and the Mediterranean generally, containment had proved a successful strategy, but it had also demonstrated the imposing challenge facing the United States as leader of the free world. In repeated instances, available military resources had been deemed insufficient by the JCS to meet the possible demands of foreign policy, though by and large these demands had failed to materialize. The defeat of the communist guerrillas in Greece, the strengthening of Italy's internal security, and the bolstering of Turkish capabilities to resist Soviet aggression had all been undertaken in the full knowledge that they would entail substantial costs and possibly grave risks. The impressive results in the Mediterranean, however, tended to overshadow the inherent dangers of containment and to encourage confidence in Washington that the United States could meet its new responsibilities and effectively thwart communist expansion elsewhere as well.

CHAPTER VII

Israel and the Arab States

At the eastern end of the Mediterranean, Palestine and most of the nearby Arab states—Egypt, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq—had been within the British sphere of influence since the end of World War I.* But by 1947, as with Greece and Turkey in the same region, the British sought relief from responsibility for the security of Palestine. They looked to the United Nations and the United States to take over the wearisome and costly burden of trying to maintain order in the Holy Land, where Arab and Jewish nationalists were on a collision course over the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. An area of great strategic importance since ancient times, the Middle East† had become of even more vital significance, especially to the West, with the discovery during the 1920s and 1930s of immense oil fields in the Persian Gulf region. In these delicate circumstances, U.S. officials had to weigh a vexing mix of factors—oil, domestic politics, national security—that made problems in Greece and Turkey look comparatively simple.¹

The Middle East had long engaged Forrestal's attention; after World War II it caused him increasing concern. The central role of oil in the future politics of the Middle East became a near obsession with him. The Secretary of Defense had firsthand knowledge of the vast potential of Middle East oil from his work at Dillon, Read in the 1930s when he had helped arrange financing for the giant oil consortium in the Persian Gulf area that later became the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco). Since the end of World War II he had repeatedly

* Syria and Lebanon were under French mandate from 1920 to 1946 and 1920 to 1943, respectively. French influence remained strong in Lebanon.

† As used here, Middle East refers specifically to Israel and the Arab states. The State Department used Middle East and Near East interchangeably during this period.



Middle East (1950)

indicated to friends and colleagues his deep concern that worldwide petroleum production might not keep pace with burgeoning demand, that American backing of the Jews in Palestine would alienate the Arab oil states and drive them into the Soviet camp, and that the long-range interests of the United States and its European allies would suffer seriously from disruption of the flow of Middle East oil. Others, including the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of State Marshall, Under Secretary of State Lovett, and the Near Eastern office of the State Department, shared Forrestal's concerns. But according to a Forrestal biographer, "they were less committed than Forrestal, perhaps less emotionally involved."²

Forrestal's repeated warnings that U.S. support of a Jewish state in Palestine could have disastrous results faced overwhelming opposition that in the end produced a policy favorable to the Jewish side. But in retrospect it seems probable that no policy could have prevented the turmoil that enveloped Palestine and the prolonged consequences that ensued—an unresolved Arab refugee problem, continuing anxiety over oil supplies, and a tinderbox environment that touched off four Arab-Israeli wars in 25 years.

The Partition of Palestine

Palestine burst on the world scene with dramatic suddenness in the wake of World War II. Predominantly Arab in population, Palestine was also the historic homeland of the Jews and the focal point of efforts by the World Zionist Organization after its founding in 1897 to reestablish a Jewish state.*³ In exchange for Zionist support against the Central Powers in World War I, the British Government in 1917 issued the Balfour Declaration, announcing that it favored and would use its "best endeavors" to secure "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."⁴ At the same time, however, Britain also pledged to give Palestinian Arabs self-government as a way of mobilizing their opposition to the Turks. Two years after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Palestine and Transjordan (carved out of Palestine) became British mandates under the League of Nations. Caught between conflicting promises, Britain tried to resolve its dilemma by postponing a final decision on Palestine's future and endeavoring to limit Jewish immigration as it swelled in the 1930s after Adolf Hitler's rise to power in Germany. A British "white

* In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the most active advocate of a Jewish state was the founder of the World Zionist Organization, Theodor Herzl. Zionists often differed among themselves over whether their goal should be a Jewish "state" or a Jewish "home." Herzl wanted a state, but to win adherents to his cause he compromised and spoke of creating a "homeland," a euphemism that never disguised his real intentions, as outlined in his 1895 pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat*.

paper," issued on the eve of World War II, called for the establishment of an Arab-Jewish state within 10 years, but neither the Arabs of the region nor the World Zionist Organization viewed this as a realistic or acceptable solution.⁵

Following World War II, as survivors of the Nazi holocaust sought refuge, Jewish pressure to secure a national home in Palestine intensified. British authorities tried in vain to stop the stream of illegal Jewish immigrants, whose growing numbers alarmed the Arabs. As tensions mounted, violence and terrorism swept Palestine, becoming virtually uncontrollable in spite of the presence of 100,000 British troops. Anxious to rid themselves of an intolerable burden, the British early in 1947 petitioned the United Nations General Assembly for relief from the mandate.

The United States, for its part, officially pursued a policy of noninvolvement and neutrality. Shortly before his death in 1945 President Roosevelt had repeated earlier assurances to Saudi King Ibn Saud that the United States would not take any action without consulting both Arab and Jewish leaders. On succeeding Roosevelt, Truman was immediately informed by State Department officials of the Roosevelt assurances and the overall sensitivity of the Palestine situation. Moved by the plight of the European Jews and sympathetic to Zionist aspirations, he later recalled that the fate of the victims of Nazism was "a matter of deep personal concern." Although careful not to stray too far from Roosevelt's evenhanded approach, he believed the Balfour Declaration had been a "solemn promise," one that the United States had some obligation to help keep, and as a minimal step—what some would see as the beginning of a steady tilt in favor of the Jews—he asked the British as early as Potsdam (July 1945) to lift Jewish immigration restrictions.⁶

Truman's support of Jewish settlement in Palestine appears to have been motivated as much by politics as sentiment. In October 1946, commenting on Truman's appeal to the British to admit 100,000 displaced Jews to the Holy Land even as delicate negotiations were in progress, James Reston wrote in the *New York Times* that the President's Palestine policy was influenced by the forthcoming congressional elections and the pro-Zionist campaigning of Republican presidential aspirants Robert A. Taft and Thomas E. Dewey. During 1947 it became clear that Truman might well face an uphill battle the next year even to win the Democratic Party nomination, much less retain control of the White House. His decision to contain Soviet expansion in Greece and Turkey, while generally popular in Congress and with the public, had stirred rumblings of apprehension and discontent among some liberals, members of the New Deal coalition that had kept a Democrat in the White House since 1933. Some critics, such as former Vice President Henry A. Wallace, contended that worsening relations with the Soviets were avoidable and that Truman's policies were needlessly

provocative. With Republicans attempting to co-opt the Palestine issue, Wallace calling for a reconciliation with Russia and obtaining significant endorsements from some liberals for an expected third-party bid, and middle-of-the-road voters disgruntled by the effects of postwar inflation, Truman's chances of keeping the presidency appeared dim.⁷

The White House strategy to improve Truman's prospects is usually credited to Clark M. Clifford, the President's Special Counsel. In a 43-page memorandum, dated 19 November 1947, Clifford detailed measures to restore the President's flagging popularity—a reinvigorated party organization; tougher steps to hold down federal expenditures and check inflation; tax reforms; appeals to selected ethnic groups and to black voters in the big cities; and last but not least, support for the Jewish cause in Palestine, a move calculated to win the backing of Jews and liberals. To refine and implement the Clifford strategy, Truman authorized the creation of a "Research Division," financed by and nominally a part of the Democratic National Committee, but actually under Clifford's supervision.⁸

The injection of the Palestine issue into American domestic politics struck Forrestal as cynical and dangerous and reinforced his view that the United States would be making a serious mistake if it supported creation of a Jewish state. Despite Forrestal's strong opposition to the pro-Zionist trend of Truman's Middle East policy, his views on the matter rarely influenced or changed thinking in the White House. Seldom did the machinery of the National Security Council, the mechanism through which Forrestal preferred to operate in such matters, come into play on the Palestine issue. His role was a backseat one, with the State Department and Truman's political advisers competing up front for the driver's seat. Forrestal singled out Clifford and David K. Niles, Truman's liaison with the Jewish community, as principal architects of a policy that, he is alleged to have told the NSC, was developed for "squalid political purposes." Yet often it was Forrestal's own sympathies that were at issue. Branded by some critics as anti-Semitic, he nonetheless clung to the belief that "no group in this country should be permitted to influence our policy to the point where it could endanger our national security."⁹

During the late summer and early fall of 1947 authorities in Washington watched the situation in Palestine continue to deteriorate. With Britain preparing to withdraw its harassed military forces and political authority, the United Nations established a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to study and make recommendations to the General Assembly. On 31 August 1947 the UNSCOP filed its report, recommending unanimously that the British mandate be terminated and that independence for Palestine be granted at an early date. To carry out its recommendations, the committee offered two choices—a majority plan, with Zionist support, to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish

states; and a minority plan, opposed by Arabs and Jews alike, to turn Palestine into an independent federal union. These plans, along with an Arab-sponsored proposal to declare Palestine independent and let events take their course, were scheduled for debate at the upcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York.¹⁰

On 10 October, in response to an oral request from Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs submitted a special study on how the evolving situation in the Middle East might affect U.S. security interests. Should the British abdicate unilateral responsibility, as seemed imminent, the JCS predicted that the United States would encounter "strong pressure to assume joint responsibility, or at least provide assistance in putting the [partition] plan into effect." Acceptance of such a responsibility would lead to a hostile reaction from the Arab states, resulting in a general loss of U.S. prestige and influence and facilitating Soviet penetration of the Middle East. They especially feared that the British mandate would give way to a multinational trusteeship which, if enforced through the U.N. Security Council, could lead to Soviet participation, which they regarded as plainly undesirable. They feared also that to exclude the Russians the British might propose a joint trusteeship with the United States, which would place unacceptable demands on the "extremely small" U.S. strategic reserve. Above all, the JCS feared that efforts to implement partition would "gravely prejudice" U.S. access to oil fields in Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia—countries that strongly opposed Jewish settlement in Palestine. Citing recent estimates that U.S. oil reserves could run out in a generation, they warned that loss of the Middle East would leave the United States in the extremely dangerous position of having to plan for future military emergencies on the basis of fighting an "oil-starved" war.¹¹

Over the course of the next several weeks Forrestal put off further discussions of the Palestine problem until completion of a highly secret round of meetings in October and November in Washington between U.S. and British officials. Held at the request of the British after they announced their plans to withdraw from Greece and Turkey, these exploratory "Pentagon talks," as they later became known, involved high-ranking civilian and military representatives. Their chief purpose was to review strategic and politico-economic questions of mutual concern in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and to examine what might have to be done to protect common U.S. and British interests should the equilibrium of the area become seriously threatened in the wake of the British pull-back. Palestine was among the topics initially scheduled for examination, but when the conferees got down to business they decided that the Palestine question was "a thing apart and not to be debated in these discussions." Even so, the meetings touched on Palestine, with a consensus emerging that any further deterioration of the situation there could have a destabilizing effect on neighbor-

ing countries and leave the entire Middle East ripe for Soviet subversion and propaganda.¹²

At the conclusion of the Pentagon talks in November, Forrestal contemplated sending the President a memorandum expressing his misgivings over the Palestine situation.¹³ However, he dropped the idea when Secretary of the Army Royall suggested a discussion in the NSC and submitted a report defining issues and expressing concern, particularly over the prospect that the United States might be asked to contribute troops under a U.N. trusteeship.¹⁴

Royall circulated his report among the council members, but before they could meet to discuss it the U.N. concluded its debate on the Palestine partition. On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly voted 33 to 13 in favor of a resolution calling for partition. Over the next few days Forrestal learned from Lovett and others that lobbying by Zionists and their U.S. friends and supporters had been strenuous, sometimes to the point of threatening reprisals:

Lovett reported on the result of the United Nations action on Palestine over the week-end. He said he had never in his life been subject to as much pressure as he had been from the Jews. . . . [Bernard] Baruch had told . . . the French that unless they voted in favor of the Palestine partition, the Jews would see to it that the French got no help under the Marshall Plan. . . . The zeal and activity . . . of the Jews had almost resulted in defeating the objectives they were after.¹⁵

Pleased with the outcome of the U.N. vote, Truman endeavored to minimize its potential consequences for the United States. At a Cabinet luncheon on 1 December, he cited limitations in the resolution making it unlikely that the United States would become further involved. Forrestal, skeptical, failed to see how the resolution could be implemented without the presence of an outside peacekeeping force to which the United States might be asked by the U.N. to contribute. As he assessed it, events had taken a serious turn. "I said," he noted in his diary, "I thought the decision was fraught with great danger for the future security of this country."¹⁶

During the weeks following passage of the U.N. resolution, U.S. and British relations with the Arab states took a dramatic turn for the worse, while in Palestine Arab and Zionist groups began arming for a possible military showdown. In January 1948 the British Government announced that it had had enough and would unilaterally terminate its mandate by 15 May. Watching closely the continuing buildup of tensions, Forrestal became more than ever convinced that the United States stood on the threshold of involvement in a Middle East war. On 21 January 1948, venting his concerns and frustrations, he personally drafted

a memorandum setting forth his views. He expressed the most irritation with U.S. political leaders, Republicans and Democrats alike, who seemed oblivious to the "broad implications" for U.S. security in the Middle East and who felt in some cases that financial contributions from Jewish voters entitled them to "a lien upon this part of our national policy." Because of the recent U.N. resolution, Forrestal expected two issues to emerge in the months ahead—demands to give or sell arms to the Jews in Palestine and requests for unilateral U.S. intervention as a "moral obligation." "It is realized," Forrestal concluded,

that, in the light of the complexities of the Middle East [and] our commitments in the U.N., the solution of this problem will have many difficulties but I do not believe this should preclude the effort to achieve acceptance of the principle that this issue shall not be a basis of barter for a bloc of votes between the two parties.¹⁷

Later in the day, Forrestal showed the paper to Under Secretary of State Lovett who, according to Forrestal, "agreed in general with the conclusions." Lovett in turn showed Forrestal a paper (PPS 19) prepared by State's Policy Planning Staff that reflected similar thinking. The paper recommended that the United States make no attempt to help implement the U.N. resolution on partition and "endeavor as far as possible to spread responsibility for the future handling of this question." Although it was obvious that the Zionists would strongly oppose such a proposal, Forrestal and Lovett agreed that it represented a sensible approach to an almost insoluble problem.¹⁸

On 12 February 1948 Secretary of State Marshall asked the National Security Council to review another Policy Planning Staff paper (PPS 21) outlining further options the United States might pursue on Palestine, including the creation of a trusteeship.¹⁹ A few days later Marshall mentioned the matter to Truman, who authorized the State Department to take whatever steps it felt necessary and to "disregard all political factors."²⁰ Marshall and Lovett thought they had Truman's full approval of a new initiative, but it turned out they were mistaken. When U.S. representatives placed the trusteeship proposal before the U.N. Security Council on 19 March, Truman became livid and accused "people on the 3rd and 4th levels" of the State Department of wanting "to cut my throat" by reversing U.S. policy.²¹ On 25 March he recovered his composure sufficiently to issue a public statement, drafted jointly by Clark Clifford and State Department representatives, affirming U.S. support of the trusteeship plan on a temporary basis if it would restore order pending a permanent settlement.²²

Despite the President's repeated disclaimers of possible U.S. military intervention, Forrestal could not shrug off his worry that the gathering storm in

Palestine would eventually involve U.S. troops. As a precaution, in late March he asked General Gruenther to put the Joint Staff to work on a detailed estimate of the size and kinds of forces that might be required. Upon notification that the State Department was also interested, Forrestal's office on 2 April requested the Joint Chiefs to step up their study and to consider these specific points: (1) the forces required to maintain law and order under a temporary trusteeship; (2) the composition of such forces in terms of the nations that would furnish contingents; and (3) the military implications of the course of action proposed. As a frame of reference, the JCS were to assume, on the basis of guidance provided by State, that Jewish and Arab defense groups would abstain from further violence (i.e., that a battlefield truce would be arranged) and that the United Kingdom would accept a fair share of the responsibility for implementation in cooperation with the United States.²³

The Joint Chiefs transmitted their recommendations to Forrestal on 3 April, apparently before receiving these new instructions. The Joint Chiefs stated that it would be extremely difficult to enforce a trusteeship with forces currently available and that participation in any peacekeeping action would require partial mobilization at home, with at least three to four months of advance preparation. To maintain law and order in Palestine, even with the cooperation of the warring parties, the JCS estimated force requirements as follows: Army, 1 corps of 3 divisions plus appropriate corps service and special troops, totaling 100,076 personnel; Navy, 6 destroyers or destroyer escorts, 6 harbor patrol craft, and 1 air reconnaissance squadron, totaling 3,124 personnel; Air Force, 1 squadron of troop carriers, 2 squadrons of liaison-type aircraft, 1 photoreconnaissance squadron, and necessary maintenance units, totaling 921 personnel. As a practical matter, the Joint Chiefs doubted whether these forces would suffice. They considered it unrealistic to estimate force requirements on the assumption of a battlefield truce "since both the degree of effectiveness and the duration of a truce are matters of such serious doubt that it would be militarily unsound to reach any other conclusion." If the United States, Britain, and France joined together in the peacekeeping exercise, the Joint Chiefs believed that the ratio of forces should be about 45 percent American, 45 percent British, and 10 percent French. Soviet participation, if so directed by the U.N. Security Council, would probably require an even larger U.S. contribution. If the peacekeeping force were also asked to enforce the U.N. decision on partition, the JCS foresaw the "distinct possibility of major involvement" leading perhaps to global warfare and all-out mobilization in the United States.²⁴

Whether an honest and realistic appraisal or simply a veiled bid for additional appropriations, the Joint Chiefs' response struck John Ohly, Forrestal's special assistant, as "shocking"; he wondered why the JCS, since the prospect

of such an emergency "has been obvious for so long," had not previously given the issue more attention. They failed, he told Forrestal, "to come to grips with the precise problem . . . to wit: the size and type of forces required *upon the assumption* that a truce can in fact be worked out between the two responsible groups in Palestine." "While I believe," Ohly added, "they are entitled to express their opinion on the workability of any truce, such a question is essentially a political one, upon which the State Department alone is responsible for giving the final answer." ²⁵

The next day, 4 April, Forrestal met with the Joint Chiefs, Gruenther, and Dean Rusk, head of the State Department's Office of Special Political Affairs, to consider further the feasibility of a temporary trusteeship in Palestine. Rusk explained that the idea had to be examined in relation to alternative courses of action. If the United States did nothing, the Soviet Union would probably take steps on its own to gain control of Palestine, either through the infiltration of specially trained immigrants or by capitalizing on the widespread Arab violence against the Jews. Additionally, Rusk feared the slaughter of thousands and maybe hundreds of thousands of Jewish settlers, which might compel the United States to act and end up sending forces substantially in excess of those required under the trusteeship plan. Rusk also pointed out that U.S. peacekeeping forces in Palestine might be advantageous from a strategic standpoint and provide an opportunity to construct bomber bases in the Middle East. Despite Rusk's arguments, the Joint Chiefs refused to budge from their stated position. Without an effective cease-fire, which they deemed virtually impossible, they saw little hope of establishing a successful trusteeship and felt that a commitment of anything less than 100,000 U.S. troops would be "unwise." ²⁶

After the meeting, Admiral Leahy handed President Truman a memorandum recapitulating the JCS estimates and assessments of 3 April. Although Truman apparently made no immediate response, he stated several weeks later during a news conference that the United States would send troops to Palestine only at the specific request of the U.N. and in concert with other U.N. members.²⁷

Forrestal and Lovett now felt that any new initiative by the United States should concentrate on stemming the spreading violence in Palestine.²⁸ Accordingly, on 23 April U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Warren Austin obtained the Security Council's approval of a resolution establishing a U.N. Palestine Truce Commission, composed of the United States, France, and Belgium, to help restore and maintain order—an obligation that carried with it no provision for the use of troops for enforcement. Meanwhile, as British forces carried out their withdrawal, Jewish leaders in Palestine formed a provisional government and on 14 May 1948 declared the creation of the new state of Israel. The United States promptly granted *de facto* recognition. Apprehensive over Arab reaction but no

doubt relieved that the partition question was finally resolved, the State Department notified Forrestal that "the prospects for the use of any U.S. forces had become almost nil."²⁹ Such pronouncements were soon to prove highly premature.

The First Arab-Israeli War

During the remainder of 1948 and on into 1949 events in Berlin and China tended to overshadow the crisis in Palestine, but not to the extent that Forrestal ignored what was happening in the Middle East. Almost as soon as Israel announced its independence, allied forces of the Arab League,* led by Egypt, Transjordan, and Syria, launched an invasion. The U.N. Security Council, reacting promptly, called for a cease-fire and imposed an arms embargo on the Middle East, but mediation efforts failed to bring about a general armistice until 1949. During this period, short bursts of fierce fighting, especially around Jerusalem, were followed by lulls that allowed both sides to regroup their limited forces. Despite their numerical inferiority, Israeli forces astonished the world by defeating the Arab states and gaining control of territories well beyond the original limits of the Jewish state envisioned in the U.N. partition plan. For Israel, the war brought a stunning and welcome victory that confirmed the rebirth of a nation; for the Arabs it was an awesome humiliation that intensified their opposition to the presence of a Jewish state in the Middle East.³⁰

During the early stages of the war in the summer of 1948, Forrestal received numerous requests from the State Department for military personnel to protect U.S. consulate facilities in Palestine and for logistical support of U.N. mediation efforts, headed by Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte. Although the number of troops involved was small, both types of requests raised important questions of policy, as such commitments would make it difficult for the United States to maintain the appearance of neutrality or remain removed from the actual fighting.

At no time did Forrestal's military advisers welcome the introduction of U.S. troops into Palestine for any purpose. When the British withdrawal left the U.S. consulates in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv unprotected from Arab terrorists, the State Department in May and again in June requested Marine Corps security guards. On both occasions, Forrestal turned to the Joint Chiefs, who strongly opposed sending Marines and advised that if the situation became intolerable, the State Department should evacuate its personnel. They made the same arguments they had presented a few months earlier in opposing the use of U.S. armed

* Formed in March 1945 as a regional organization by Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen for mutual support and cooperation, the league focused much of its attention in succeeding years on Palestine.

forces to implement the trusteeship plan. Any use of U.S. troops would not only draw down and tie up forces that might be needed elsewhere but could create an undesirable precedent and give the Soviet Union an excuse to introduce its own forces into the area. In these circumstances the Joint Chiefs envisioned the possibility of a Soviet-American confrontation and reiterated their concern lest the conflict in Palestine escalate into global war.³¹

Despite these dire warnings, Forrestal was inclined to accept the risk and to grant the State Department's request for protection of the consulate in Jerusalem, but he doubted whether the consulate in Tel Aviv, well behind Israeli lines, was in any immediate or serious danger. Forrestal wanted the President to make the decision in full awareness of the possible implications of greater involvement. Accepting Forrestal's judgment, Truman in mid-July ordered "approximately a dozen" (13 were sent) Marine guards posted to Jerusalem, but directed that no assistance be sent to Tel Aviv.³² As these forces proved inadequate in the face of stepped-up terrorist activity, Forrestal in October, with Truman's approval, ordered increased protection for the Jerusalem consulate.³³

Providing assistance for Bernadotte's mediation mission posed a more difficult question, although initially it seemed no more than a straightforward effort to help restore peace. In early June 1948, acting on the advice of Marshall and with Forrestal's concurrence, Truman announced that the United States, as a member of the truce commission, would provide its "fair share" of observers and logistical support to help Bernadotte negotiate a peaceful settlement. Subsequently, Forrestal named the Chief of Naval Operations as executive agent for the operation and dispatched 21 officers, 7 from each service, to Palestine to act as observers of a cease-fire that Bernadotte had called for. Since France, Belgium, and Sweden had also agreed to provide contingents of similar size, U.S. involvement appeared no more than part of an international effort under U.N. auspices to resolve the conflict as quickly and as peacefully as possible.³⁴

Within a few weeks Bernadotte put forth tentative proposals that in the eyes of Israel and its American friends had radical implications for the future of Israel. On 28 June, after arranging a temporary truce, Bernadotte met with Israeli and Arab representatives at Rhodes, where he outlined plans for a settlement, including a proposal that the original partition plan be modified to give the Negev desert to the Arabs and western Galilee to Israel. Israel summarily rejected Bernadotte's suggestion that it relinquish the Negev. At their conventions that summer both the Republican and Democratic Parties adopted planks in their campaign platforms condemning any border changes that did not meet with Israel's approval.³⁵

In spite of these rebuffs to Bernadotte's mediation efforts, the State Department continued to encourage and support his mission, with no apparent objection

from President Truman. In mid-July, as he prepared a new peace initiative, Bernadotte urgently requested that the United States provide an additional 100 noncommissioned officers and enlisted men for logistical support of the officer observers previously requested. Aware of the disinclination of the Joint Chiefs to meet Bernadotte's request, Forrestal made no attempt to solicit their advice and instead referred the request to the Committee of Four. At a meeting on 20 July, Forrestal and the service secretaries discussed the matter with Charles Bohlen, Counselor of the State Department. In Bohlen's opinion, "maintenance of the truce was the cheapest possible way of solving the Palestine situation, and if the truce were successful, it would be one of the most favorable developments that we could hope for in the world situation." Any assistance Bernadotte requested should be given "the most serious consideration." Otherwise, in the absence of a cease-fire, Bohlen believed, Bernadotte would turn to the U.N. Security Council, and that would almost certainly lead to the introduction of Soviet observers into Palestine.³⁶

Noting Bohlen's arguments, the Committee of Four agreed on the following: (1) an effective cease-fire should be negotiated and maintained; (2) should the State Department request "very substantial" personnel and equipment to assist Bernadotte, the NME should do "everything possible, consistent with other urgent undertakings," to provide such assistance; (3) the Department of the Navy should detail the senior naval officer in the Eastern Mediterranean to obtain a "clear and exact picture" of Bernadotte's needs; and (4) based on State Department advice and the mediator's requirements, the Joint Chiefs should begin preparing for an extended U.S. role in truce observance operations.³⁷

Forrestal's office immediately asked the Central Intelligence Agency for up-to-date intelligence on Palestine. In its report on 27 July, the CIA expressed doubt that Bernadotte could achieve a permanent settlement but felt that with adequate support the U.N. mediator could maintain an "unstable truce" until the U.N. could take up the problem again or it could be referred to the International Court of Justice. The Soviet Union, the CIA stated, had already made arms shipments to both Israel and the Arab states in an effort to promote instability in the region and thereby undermine the positions of the United States and Britain. Collapse of the truce and intensification of hostilities would serve Soviet purposes, while measures that might prolong the truce would be detrimental to Soviet objectives.³⁸

Since President Truman had earlier approved U.S. participation in Bernadotte's mediation efforts, Forrestal apparently saw no need for further consultation with the White House. There is no record that either he or Marshall discussed the matter with Truman before acting on Bernadotte's request. Once Marshall officially confirmed the details of Bernadotte's needs, Forrestal on 28 July

directed the Joint Chiefs to consider "as a matter of highest priority" both the feasibility and the military consequences of stepped-up U.S. assistance. Assured by Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Commander of the Sixth Task Fleet in the Mediterranean, that the personnel and support were available, the Joint Chiefs on 31 July reported that they could foresee no immediate or insurmountable difficulties and that Admiral Sherman had already been directed to increase the U.S. contribution. Soon the additional observers and their equipment began arriving in Palestine.³⁹

Despite this increased help, Bernadotte found it difficult to enforce a new cease-fire; in early August he asked the United States to provide an additional 125 enlisted personnel to bolster his peacekeeping mission. At the same time, on 11 August, a report reached Forrestal of a recent conversation in London between U.S. Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. According to Douglas, Bevin had spoken of "clear evidence that USSR is displaying keen interest" in Palestine, proof of which was that the Soviets were supplying arms to the Israelis through Czechoslovakia. Bevin considered it likely that the Soviets would seek to rekindle hostilities in Palestine and produce chaos elsewhere in the Middle East.⁴⁰ Although Forrestal had seen many similar reports before, this one especially seemed to alarm him, and he recorded the following entry in his diary:

... Bevin foresees that if the Russians are unsuccessful in their efforts in Berlin, they will immediately step up their efforts to exploit the chaos and disorder in the Middle East, if the U.S. and U.K. fail to stand firm, he said, on vital matters in regard to Palestine and the Middle East. In general, both nations will suffer a defeat just as profound and just as dangerous to their future security as would be involved in any reverses in Germany.⁴¹

On 12 August Forrestal and Marshall met to develop a strategy. In Forrestal's view, Bernadotte's request for additional help merited prompt action. "If we're going to do this at all," he told Ohly, "it should be done fast." However, before landing any new troops, Forrestal wanted to check on provisions for their safety and logistical support.⁴² Within a week he received notification of a critical shortage of transportation and communications equipment. Ohly immediately informed the State Department, which agreed that the landing should be postponed. But at a press conference on 18 August, Marshall suddenly announced that the United States would honor Bernadotte's request and that the 125 additional observers were on their way to Palestine. "The source of his erroneous information is unknown," Ohly told Forrestal, "but the statement has been made and taken by [the] U.N. as a commitment." The next day, to avoid

any loss of U.S. credibility, Forrestal directed the Navy to provide the requested assistance as soon as personnel and equipment were available.⁴³

Having watched the confusion and commitments mount, the Joint Chiefs were now convinced that the United States stood on the threshold of sending combat troops to Palestine. On the same day as Forrestal's directive, they protested to him the absence of any clear and coherent policy on the use of U.S. forces to implement U.N. decisions on Palestine. The Joint Chiefs worried that repeated requests for observers would lead to large-scale U.S. involvement, with the distinct possibility that the Soviets or one or more of their satellites might also intervene. Citing the "worsening world situation and the international appreciation of our current lack of military preparedness," the JCS argued that any attempt to enforce peace in Palestine with American troops could rapidly exhaust U.S. reserve capabilities, risk a confrontation with the Soviets, and jeopardize the success of U.S. policies elsewhere. "In short," the Joint Chiefs said,

since our policies in a number of areas and countries are at least partly based on our ability to provide troops and military equipment, either currently or under certain future contingencies, the non-availability of such troops and equipment as a result of United States participation in Palestine peace enforcement might render these policies meaningless because incapable of military support.⁴⁴

Since Forrestal usually indicated when he concurred with a JCS position, his failure in this instance to register any opinion suggests that he may not have fully supported these views. On 19 August, the same day he received the JCS memorandum, he presented it for discussion in the NSC, the first time that Palestine had ever appeared on the council's agenda. After glancing over the memorandum, Marshall asked for a postponement of discussion to allow the State Department to examine it. Offering an offhand opinion, Marshall said he thought that the JCS had exaggerated the problem and that one threat—the possibility of Soviet intervention—seemed highly remote as long as the United States, France, and Belgium were the only countries authorized by the U.N. to assist in peacekeeping operations. He also believed the presence of armed troops to enforce a truce to be less desirable than uniformed observers. He had confidence that through diplomatic pressures Israel and the Arab states could be persuaded to observe a permanent cease-fire.⁴⁵

In contrast to Marshall's optimism, intelligence reports held out little prospect of an early resolution. At OSD's request, the CIA on 31 August issued an addendum to its July estimate and forwarded copies to President Truman and the NSC. Still pessimistic over the chances for a permanent settlement in Palestine, the CIA speculated that Bernadotte, for lack of sufficient support and

assistance, might soon give up efforts for a permanent cease-fire and refer the entire matter back to the U.N. Security Council. As for the Soviet Union, the CIA thought that Moscow was continuing to follow a course "productive of instability and insecurity in the Middle East." One report, labeled "possibly true," had Syria about to enter the Soviet camp; other reports, also unconfirmed, suggested that Syria would soon grant the Soviet Union base rights in exchange for military aid against Israel.⁴⁶

Without minimizing the potential dangers or possibility of failure, the State Department replied to the Joint Chiefs' paper of 19 August by stressing that U.S. policy toward Palestine had three principal objectives: maintenance of an effective truce; negotiation of a permanent settlement that would assure Israel's independence; and reestablishment of friendly relations with the Arab states. In explaining this policy to the NSC on 2 September, Lovett cautioned that the Department of State "was not willing to make a commitment not to send U.S. troops to Palestine." However, he saw no need for an immediate decision and felt that the moderate Arab leaders, such as King Abdullah of Transjordan, would eventually seek peace. Forrestal, indicating no disagreement, thought the subject should be viewed in a broad context and mentioned the need to consider U.S. actions in Palestine in relation to their possible effects elsewhere in the Middle East—in such places as Iran, Iraq, and North Africa. He characterized the entire region as "a piece of flypaper." "Getting stuck on any one part," he said, "would get us stuck on all." But he declined to elaborate and quickly shifted discussion to Greek-Turkish aid allocations.⁴⁷

The inconclusive deliberations at this meeting were probably unavoidable in view of the President's absence and the administration's growing preoccupation with the upcoming election. With the politicking heating up, the Middle East became an increasingly important factor in the campaign, as evidenced by the furor over Bernadotte's final report, which recommended U.N. control of Jerusalem and Arab control of the Negev, with Israeli sovereignty over western Galilee. On 17 September, two days after submitting his proposals, Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by members of the Stern Gang, a Jewish terrorist organization. Marshall, having consulted earlier with Truman, promptly endorsed the Bernadotte plan, calling it "a generally fair basis for settlement."⁴⁸ But Jewish leaders in the United States reacted with such outrage that Truman eventually backed off and refused to have anything to do with the plan on the grounds that it was contrary to the Democratic Party platform.⁴⁹

After Truman's repudiation of the Bernadotte plan, the State Department all but abandoned hope of an early negotiated settlement, but it remained interested in exploring the feasibility of U.N. control of Jerusalem through the creation of an international police force of 4,000 to 6,000 men.⁵⁰ Forrestal

probably knew that Truman would never accept such a proposal, especially if it involved a U.S. contribution, yet he was annoyed that the State Department would even consider it. Blaming the overriding influence of "domestic political considerations," he saw a complete breakdown of the policy process. "This unexpected request," he insisted, "was an example of how the Palestine situation had drifted without any clear consequent formulation of United States policy by the NSC."⁵¹

The Joint Chiefs, fearing that Soviet troops might participate in the proposed Jerusalem guard, were no more receptive to the idea than Forrestal and again advised that no decisions be taken that might involve U.S. combat forces. As a possible alternative they suggested that if Jerusalem could be designated a U.N. trust territory, as the original partition plan had envisioned, recruitment of a police force and other administrative functions might then be turned over to some other country or countries authorized to act on behalf of the U.N. as the city's "administering authority."⁵² Forrestal thought the suggestion had merit and urged Lovett to place it before the NSC for further study. But as long as the JCS opposed any commitment of U.S. forces, Lovett questioned whether an effective means of implementation could be found. "This Department," he told Forrestal, "is not aware of any government which would be prepared to undertake the onerous and expensive obligations of administering the Jerusalem enclave unless it might be the Provisional Government of Israel, which would be bitterly opposed by Arab states, or possibly some Arab government, which would be opposed by Israel."⁵³

Truman's triumph in the election helped remove for the time being the tremendous political pressure that had weighed down U.S. policy for more than a year. But it did not expedite any new decisions promising an early end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In a report (NSC 27/3) Truman approved on 24 November 1948, the NSC finally, if somewhat belatedly, ruled out direct U.S. intervention as a possible option. Looking at the Joint Chiefs' proposal to place Jerusalem under an international "administering authority," the council could find "no practicable way of providing a UN police force for Jerusalem which would meet the requirements of UN administration of Jerusalem and which would also be consistent with the security interests of the United States." If the U.N. succeeded in making Jerusalem an international enclave, the United States should insist upon a police force composed of individuals recruited through the U.N. Bulk contingents supplied by U.N. member countries should be opposed. Under no condition, the report added, should the United States accept any proposal for a Jerusalem police force which would call for the provision of armed force units by the United States, the Soviet Union, or Soviet satellite countries.⁵⁴ In fact, nothing of this sort occurred.

Toward the end of 1948 intelligence reports from Palestine suggested that both the Arabs and the Israelis were seriously interested in a permanent truce and that a cease-fire agreement in effect around Jerusalem on 1 December might be extended throughout the entire area of conflict. However, later in the month came reports that Israeli forces had launched a new offensive in the Negev and that some units might have penetrated Egyptian territory. The State Department, regarding the situation as still precarious, wanted U.S. observers to remain on the scene until the new U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission could begin to function.⁵⁵ Complaining that it posed a drain on their limited resources, the services asked for relief from their obligations as soon as possible, but complied with Forrestal's request to lend temporary logistical support to the new commission. After formal truce negotiations commenced early in 1949, the need for U.S. personnel and equipment steadily diminished, resulting in a gradual phaseout of the operation.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the Arab-Israeli conflict moved from the battlefield to the negotiating table, where Ralph J. Bunche, acting in Bernadotte's place, successfully separated the warring parties with a series of armistice agreements. Although militarily Israel had won its right to exist, the Arab states refused to grant recognition or to discuss a permanent settlement that included acceptance of the Jewish state. Consequently, the negotiations, which finally concluded in July 1949, concentrated mainly on cease-fire terms and a territorial settlement reflecting the military situation at the time. The war had finally ended, but permanent peace remained a distant vision.

Aid to Palestinian Refugees

A tragic and unfortunate consequence of the Arab-Israeli war was the problem created by the flight of several hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs from their homes to seek safety in refugee camps set up by the U.N. in southern Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, an area along the Egyptian-Israeli border under Egyptian control. Although the problem was mainly the concern of the State Department and the U.N., the National Military Establishment found itself in 1948 and for some time thereafter devoting considerable attention to the plight of the refugees, partly for humanitarian reasons and partly out of apprehension over the destabilizing effect that large numbers of displaced Arabs could have on the Middle East.

The first involvement of the NME in the refugee matter resulted from a State Department request on 27 August 1948 to provide U.N. refugee camps with emergency medical supplies.⁵⁷ John Ohly, recognizing the urgency of these



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needs as well as the opportunity to further U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East, advised Forrestal on 2 September to take swift action. Providing emergency assistance, Ohly noted, would alleviate the "virtually intolerable" living conditions in the camps and, additionally, would help to counter Arab distrust of the United States and offset chances that the Palestinians would fall under communist and Soviet influence. "The consequence of these conditions," Ohly insisted,

coupled with this growing feeling of hatred toward the Americans, cannot be over-estimated in terms of our security. I hardly need emphasize the strategic importance of the Middle East to the United States, both from the standpoint of its resources and from the standpoint of our actual war plans. A continuance of present conditions will not only provide the very type of chaos and dissension which breeds communism, and upon which the Soviet Government will be certain to capitalize, but also threatens the possibility of retaining the important friendship of the Arab countries, of continuing to capitalize on the oil resources of the Middle East, and of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the entire Palestine problem.⁵⁸

Persuaded by these arguments, Forrestal immediately directed the Navy to obtain an estimate of medical needs in the refugee camps and to consult with State, Army, and Air Force on the possibility of providing "other forms of assistance."⁵⁹

The JCS, sharing Ohly's worries, urged Forrestal on 22 September to take whatever steps might be necessary to secure "generous assistance" for Arab refugees. Expressing deep concern for the deterioration of U.S. prestige throughout the Arab world, the Joint Chiefs noted that Britain, whose own image had also suffered from its involvement in Palestine, was already providing refugee assistance. Lest Britain alone reap the advantage with the Arabs, the Joint Chiefs strongly recommended immediate refugee aid as a step toward improved U.S. relations with the Arab states that would "strengthen our military position" in the Middle East.⁶⁰

After consulting with Lovett on the JCS recommendations, Forrestal on 1 October emphasized to President Truman "the importance, from the standpoint of national security, of taking all possible measures to assist" the Arab refugees. Truman's response was sympathetic but noncommittal. Without authorizing any specific action, he expressed the sincere hope "that some means can be found for meeting this situation."⁶¹

For the next few weeks Forrestal's office exchanged ideas with the State Department on how to carry out the President's expressed desire. In response to Forrestal's directive of 2 September, the Navy in October outlined two possible courses of action. Ideally, the Navy proposed using 2 cargo vessels with operating

personnel, 750 to 1,000 additional support personnel, and 12 to 15 transport aircraft, at a cost of \$55 million for one year. Anticipating opposition to both the cost and diversion of resources, the Navy proposed an alternative plan that would provide medical supplies, food, blankets, and other necessities to the refugees on a short-term basis. However, owing to legal restrictions on the disposal of U.S. property and the unavailability of funds in the budget, the Navy doubted that the United States could offer either program without congressional approval.⁶²

In view of the possible legal complications, the State Department in late October temporarily suspended plans for emergency assistance and advised OSD to take no direct action until the U.N. sent a formal request for relief aid.⁶³ Rather than ask Congress for new legislation, State supported a U.N. resolution that would establish through voluntary contributions a \$32 million Palestine relief fund. The U.N. General Assembly adopted the resolution establishing the fund on 19 November 1948, and the President announced shortly thereafter that he would ask Congress to contribute half the proposed amount. The congressional hurdle was eventually cleared when on 24 March 1949 Truman signed Senate Joint Resolution 36, which authorized \$16 million for Palestine relief.⁶⁴

Although relief assistance served an immediate purpose, both the United States and the U.N. viewed it as a temporary measure to ease camp conditions until permanent arrangements could be made to repatriate or resettle Arab refugees. Such an arrangement, however, hinged on the achievement of an Arab-Israeli peace, which in the spring of 1949 appeared most uncertain.

With growing awareness that the refugee problem might go unresolved indefinitely, State on 4 May 1949 asked the NME to look at its probable effects on U.S. military and strategic interests in the Middle East. Replying on 14 June for himself and the Joint Chiefs, Secretary Johnson stated that continuation of the problem could have "serious repercussions." As long as the current situation existed, he said, it would "serve to perpetuate and aggravate conditions of insecurity, unrest, and political instability, with attendant opportunity for Soviet penetration" of the Middle East. Johnson admitted the difficulty of singling out any "specific, direct effect" the refugee problem would have on "U.S. military (as distinguished from strategic) interests in the Middle East," but he emphasized its unsettling effect on U.S. relations with both Israel and the Arab states and hence its undermining of the U.S. strategic position. For this reason, Johnson said, the NME would support whatever measures the State Department thought necessary for a solution.⁶⁵

The State Department already had under consideration a plan that (assuming Israeli and Arab cooperation) would repatriate Palestinian Arab refugees to Israel or resettle them in Arab states over a three-year period at an annual cost

to the United States of \$40–50 million. However, when Truman asked the National Security Council on 1 July to examine the effects of an across-the-board cutback for military and international aid expenditures, the Joint Chiefs took a new look at Arab refugee relief in the light of other priorities and were decidedly less inclined to support a costly program. “While such a program,” they advised, “would promote our strategic interests by contributing to the general stability of the Middle East area, it could be entirely omitted without serious military implications.” Its value to the U.S. strategic interests, they concluded, did not warrant the expenditure if the President decided at the same time to limit other categories of the military and international aid budget.⁶⁶

Although he conveyed the Joint Chiefs’ views for NSC consideration, Johnson made no attempt to block the State Department from seeking funds for the relocation of Arab refugees. In reporting to the President, he joined the rest of the NSC in endorsing an allocation of \$20 million to \$40 million, depending on the scale of assistance the President and the State Department might agree on. Truman on 23 November authorized State to propose to the United Nations a less ambitious Arab refugee work-relief program and to offer a U.S. contribution of half the funds.⁶⁷ On 8 December the U.N. General Assembly approved an 18-month program at a cost of \$54.9 million. With Johnson supporting State’s presentation, Congress appropriated \$27.5 million for the program under Title III of the 1950 omnibus foreign assistance bill signed by Truman on 5 June 1950.⁶⁸ The United States remained committed to bringing about a long-term solution of the refugee situation, but until Israel and the Arabs could resolve their differences and negotiate a settlement of the Palestine question, such stopgap measures appeared to be all that could be hoped for. Well intended as these measures appear to have been, they hardly seemed likely to bring permanent peace and stability as long as Israel and its Arab neighbors remained divided over a final settlement of their differences.

Arms Shipments to the Middle East

Nothing indicated more clearly the tortuous nature of U.S. policymaking in the Middle East during these years than efforts by the Truman administration to stem the flow of arms to the region. Having followed a path of hesitations and reversals the year before, from 1949 on the United States became increasingly pro-Israel. But the Truman administration continued to seek friendly relations with the Arab states as well in an effort to curb Soviet influence. Washington did not find it an easy policy to implement. “I had a feeling of dissatisfaction with everything we did,” Secretary of State Acheson later conceded.

I didn't think we had as clear an idea of what we were trying to do or knew what we were trying to do as well as we did in Europe. . . . We didn't want to take them over; we didn't want to arm them and have them fighting with us. All we wanted them to do was to go along on their own way and stay out of the other fellow's clutches.⁶⁹

Underlying the difficulties of deciding a course of action was the absence in Washington of a consensus on how far the United States should go in aiding Israel. After Acheson became secretary in January 1949, the State Department grew more openly responsive to and protective of Israeli interests. But even after Forrestal's departure, the Pentagon remained opposed to helping or supporting Israel if such actions appeared to threaten relations with the Arab world or upset the delicate balance of power that kept tensions in the Middle East from erupting into a new war. In most instances, Johnson deferred to the advice of the Joint Chiefs.

Having won its independence, Israel's paramount concern became one of survival. Fearing a resumption of armed conflict, the Israeli Government in March 1949 asked Washington for permission "to offer positions as advisers to a limited number of retired United States Army officers, or Reserve officers on inactive status" to provide technical assistance in organizing and training the Israeli Army. While favoring the request in principle, State considered it advisable to postpone granting permission until renewal of hostilities in Palestine appeared no longer likely.⁷⁰

Johnson opposed the Israeli request. He told Acheson on 3 June that probably the only "suitable method of providing the kind of technical assistance" the Israelis wanted would be through the establishment of a military mission composed of active duty personnel. Even though there existed no serious legal barrier to the hiring of inactive reserve officers, retired Regular Army officers could not accept Israeli employment without violating their oath to support the U.S. Constitution. Beyond the legal obstacles, Johnson considered it inadvisable as a matter of national policy to establish a military mission in Israel, since its presence on Israel's side could expose the United States to serious risk of "overt involvement" should the Arab-Israeli conflict resume. As a practical matter, Johnson added, the Joint Chiefs doubted whether Israel's Army had "any dire need of foreign technical assistance." Johnson therefore recommended that, absent important political considerations, the State Department should defer action on the Israeli request until the situation in the Middle East had stabilized. When the Israeli Government made no new inquiries, State treated the matter as closed.⁷¹

There remained the question of arms assistance. Over the course of the summer, as Israel and the Arab states completed the signing of armistice agree-

ments, the threat of renewed hostilities appeared to recede, prompting the U.N. on 11 August to terminate all restrictions in effect during the truce, including a general arms embargo. Britain, France, and the United States, to avert an arms race in the Middle East, immediately gave assurances that shipments of arms and munitions to Israel and the Arab states would be limited to those required for internal security purposes.⁷²

On 1 September 1949 Truman endorsed a State Department recommendation that arms transfers to Middle East countries be limited to those necessary for the maintenance of "internal law and order" and the "reasonable requirements of self-defense." Subsequently, in October, Truman approved NSC 47/2, reiterating essentially the same policy. The United States, the report read, "should permit the export of reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab states limited to such arms as are within the scope of legitimate security requirements." After the 1 September action, Truman directed that "no public statement be made" of the arms policy and that export approvals be handled with as little publicity as possible.⁷³

During the next few months the need arose for further clarification of U.S. policy in the face of British plans to turn Egypt into an anti-Soviet bulwark through a substantial expansion of its armed forces. Contending that an Egyptian buildup would precipitate a Middle East arms race, the Israeli Government and Jewish activist groups in the United States urged the State Department to block Britain from carrying out the plans.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, Israel asked Washington for permission to buy sizable quantities of sophisticated weapons, including F-84 jet fighters, Sherman tanks, and heavy artillery, but refused to provide information concerning the proposed use of these items or the composition of the Israeli armed forces.⁷⁵ Just as the State Department was preparing to inform the Israeli Government that it could go ahead with the purchases, the Munitions Board, as the coordinating agency in the Department of Defense, advised that there was insufficient information to justify the granting of export licenses.⁷⁶ Apart from irritating the Israelis, the board's intervention touched off a heated quarrel between State and Defense over what NSC 47/2 meant by "legitimate security requirements."

In an effort to reconcile conflicting viewpoints, the NSC staff initiated a review of U.S. arms policy in the Near East, and in late March 1950 completed a draft report (NSC 65). The paper focused on the British plan for an Anglo-Egyptian military partnership, concluding that in general such cooperation should be encouraged as improving the strategic position of the West. However, since the Egyptian buildup could pose a threat to Israel, NSC 65 also advised that the United States should "remain alert to the danger of an arms race" in the area and the possibility that Israel, faced with Egypt's import of heavy arms, might

turn to the communist states for weapons it could not get from the West. For these reasons and to placate Israel's American friends in case the study leaked, State felt that Israel's requests for arms should be given special preference and proposed the inclusion of a statement (paragraph 11-*e*) recognizing "the peculiar defense situation in Israel deriving from the lack of stability in its relations with the Arab states, and Israel's consequent uneasiness."⁷⁷

While approving the rest of the study, Johnson and the Joint Chiefs strongly opposed paragraph 11-*e*. At a meeting of the NSC on 6 April, General Bradley, speaking for the JCS, expressed doubt about the advisability of a policy that failed to treat Israel and the Arab countries alike. He felt that if the paragraph remained in the paper it would inevitably result in a tendency to show favoritism toward Israel, alienating the Arabs and possibly disrupting lines of communication through the Mediterranean. Johnson, too, thought paragraph 11-*e* would give priority to Israel. Although Acheson disclaimed such an intent, he did not argue and agreed to delete the paragraph. He and Johnson drafted substitute language that added to another paragraph a stipulation that U.S. arms exports should take into account the "undesirability of increasing the instability and uneasiness in the Arab-Israeli area."⁷⁸

The Defense Department's victory was short-lived. At a Cabinet meeting on 14 April Truman told Acheson and Johnson that he thought the amended paper (NSC 65/1) could be construed as pro-Arab and that he was returning it to the NSC for reconsideration. Acheson said that in his opinion there were three points to consider: (1) the military necessity for arming the Egyptians; (2) the fact that the United States was not doing what it should to arm the Israelis properly; and (3) the possibility of Britain, France, and the United States obtaining assurances from purchasing countries that the procured weapons would not be used for aggression. Truman liked the last idea and a few days later indicated that Acheson should try to obtain a tripartite declaration on arms shipments to the Middle East.⁷⁹ To remove the President's objections to NSC 65/1, the State Department on 25 April submitted a revised report (NSC 65/2) containing three new concluding paragraphs that incorporated Acheson's views. First, the United States should give "sympathetic consideration" to Israel's requests for "defensive military equipment sufficient to discourage Arab attack from beyond its borders." Second, a concerted effort should be made by Britain, France, and the United States to deny arms transfers to any country refusing to renounce aggression against another Middle East state. And third, the United States should impress upon Britain and France the importance of avoiding a resumption of an Arab-Israeli war and seek a public declaration from them that they were prepared to take "vigorous action both within and without the United Nations" should any attempt be made to renew hostilities.⁸⁰

Although NSC 65/2 had yet to be approved, the State Department saw no reason to delay plans for implementing it. In late April State asked Defense to comment on two papers that Acheson intended to use during meetings the following month with the British and French foreign ministers. The first, on the need for careful review of arms shipments to the Middle East, elicited little reaction. The second paper, elaborating on the NSC's recommendation that Britain, France, and the United States publicly announce their intention to take "vigorous action" against Arab or Israeli aggression, evoked a strong rebuttal, as it contained a draft declaration committing the three powers to maintain and protect the current frontiers of the Middle East states.⁸¹ On 4 May the Joint Chiefs advised Johnson that such a commitment would be "incompatible" with U.S. security interests because it would undoubtedly obligate the United States to intervene with troops in the event of another Arab-Israeli war. "Regardless of their strength," the JCS warned, "participation by United States armed forces in the enforcement of peace among the nations of the Near East must be viewed as the probable genesis of a series of otherwise unacceptable United States deployments to the Near East."⁸²

In communicating these views to the State Department, Johnson asked only that Acheson "avoid reaching any agreement with the British and French which would have adverse military implications for the United States." After Acheson left for London, however, Johnson proposed that the NSC modify the final paragraph of NSC 65/2 by tacking on a single sentence that would clarify the meaning of the term "vigorous action."⁸³ The sentence read: "Such action would not involve the use of U.S. military forces." Except for the addition of this sentence, the conclusions as they appeared in NSC 65/2 remained unchanged in the final report, NSC 65/3, which Truman approved on 19 May 1950.⁸⁴

Acheson, though slightly hobbled by Johnson's amendment, wasted no time in putting the policy into effect. On 25 May news arrived from London that the American, British, and French foreign ministers had agreed to a common position on Arab-Israeli matters and had signed a tripartite declaration. This affirmed that Israel and the Arab states were all entitled to "a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole"; that the sale of arms would depend on assurances of nonaggressive use; and that the three governments issuing the declaration would take immediate action, consistent with their obligations as U.N. members, to protect existing Middle East frontiers and armistice lines.⁸⁵

If the chief purpose of the tripartite declaration was to forestall a Middle East arms race, its chances for success appeared from the outset rather doubtful. The day the document was signed the State Department sent Johnson a letter reminding him of the shift in policy since the 14 April Cabinet meeting and

advising that approval and processing of Israeli requests for "equipment of high military potential" should no longer be delayed. Bending to what he termed the overriding importance of "broad policy considerations," Johnson on 28 June indicated that the Department of Defense would cooperate fully.⁸⁶ Because the tripartite declaration imposed no serious restraints, granting that "a certain level" of preparedness was for purposes of "legitimate self-defense," Israel, so long as it continued to be threatened by its Arab neighbors, seemed entitled to a steady flow of arms assistance. The Arab states, threatened in turn by the expanding Israeli arsenal, could exercise their own claims for additional weapons. Thus, conceived as a brake on the Arab-Israeli arms race, the tripartite declaration instead became a license for arms expansion. A year of fitful policymaking had ended on yet another ambiguous and ominous note.

Middle East Oil and Security

A prime concern throughout the deliberations over U.S. policy on Israel and the Arab states—a matter that became increasingly troubling to military planners as American policy tilted toward Israel—was the security of Western oil holdings in the Persian Gulf area. As it affected their immediate postwar strategic planning, the Joint Chiefs readily acknowledged the need for an active Middle East defense; in 1945–46 they began conducting preliminary studies as part of a general planning operation known as PINCHER. Assuming the outbreak of a general war, the PINCHER studies anticipated a strong Soviet attack against Suez and the Persian Gulf and offered the gloomy prediction that Soviet forces could sweep practically uncontested through the entire region. Despite growing U.S. investment in the Middle East and projections of future American and European dependence on Middle East oil, the Joint Chiefs, characteristically, were reluctant to propose a buildup of U.S. forces in the region, since an effective defense would require diverting significant military resources from other theaters. Sidestepping any definite decisions or commitments, the JCS took the position that defending the Middle East was largely a British responsibility because of Britain's predominant interest and influence in the region.⁸⁷

By 1947 the evident decline of British power compelled a reassessment of security arrangements for the Middle East oil fields. British and American representatives discussed the subject at the Pentagon talks in Washington between mid-October and early November. The meetings revealed an earnest desire by both countries to preserve peace and stability throughout the Mediterranean and Middle East; to maintain the territorial integrity and independence of Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Iran; and to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing a foothold of power or influence anywhere in the region. But beyond agreeing on

general principles, the British, strapped economically and weakened militarily, could offer no firm commitment in support of specific objectives without "adoption by the United States of a parallel policy."⁸⁸

With the United States and Britain both seeking to avoid sole responsibility for the region at a time of mounting tensions over Palestine, military planners in Washington became increasingly concerned about the defensibility of the Middle East, the security of its oil fields, and the maintenance of vital lines of communication through the Suez Canal and Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

In late 1947 and early 1948, in a series of stopgap measures seeking some margin of protection for U.S. interests, the Navy added a reinforced Marine battalion to its forces in the Mediterranean and established Task Force 126 in the Persian Gulf to show the flag periodically and to coordinate the passage of Navy tankers through the area. Whether these steps would lead to a fuller, more permanent commitment to defend the Middle East remained to be seen. During the early spring of 1948, while trying to agree on the details of a joint emergency war plan, the Joint Chiefs differed over the allocation of assets to the Middle East in the event of general war with the Soviet Union. Without denying the strategic importance of the area and its oil reserves, the Army and the Air Force maintained that available forces would be insufficient to mount an effective defense. Consequently, they recommended that the United States establish its defense perimeter in the Eastern Mediterranean, leaving most of the Middle East open to invading Soviet forces. The Navy, arguing that it would be impossible to conduct a war of any duration without access to Middle East oil, took issue and asked the Secretary of Defense to use his influence to break the impasse.⁸⁹

Faced with this division of opinion, Forrestal sought help from the NSC, hoping that the State Department would provide guidance for a decision on the basis of political and diplomatic considerations. However, at a meeting of the NSC on 20 May 1948, Marshall and Lovett declined to take a position, expressing concern over the absence of a definitive policy but leaving it to the military to arrive at their own consensus. The NSC limited its action to requesting the JCS to reexamine the feasibility of successfully defending the Middle East oil region in the event of a general war with the Soviet Union.⁹⁰

After lengthy deliberations, with frequent prodding from Forrestal's office, the JCS on 28 July finally adopted a unanimous position, which Forrestal passed on to the NSC. The Joint Chiefs stated that, for emergency planning purposes, U.S. forces would establish their main defense line in the Eastern Mediterranean rather than the Middle East and hold positions, including air bases for long-range attacks against the Soviet Union, in the Cairo-Suez-Khartoum area. In all likelihood the Middle East oil fields would fall to invading Soviet forces sometime dur-

ing the early stages of the war. While noting that plans were under study for regaining a portion of the oil-producing region, the JCS cautioned that the Soviets would probably retain control until the second year of the war. In an apparent reference to the effects of the Palestine issue on U.S. relations with the Arab states, the Joint Chiefs also warned that the ability of U.S. forces to retake the oil fields would depend to some extent on the "political situation" in the area.⁹¹

On 2 September 1948 the NSC briefly discussed the JCS paper in connection with an NSC staff report outlining possible alternative measures for keeping the Middle East oil fields out of Soviet hands. Marshall questioned the Joint Chiefs' gloomy assessment, suspecting they might be underestimating U.S. strength and overstating the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union. Seeing no imminent danger of a Soviet attack on the Middle East "on a wholesale basis," he wanted additional time to study the situation and to develop a more detailed plan of action. At Marshall's request, the council deferred further discussion pending a review of policy and plans by the State Department.⁹²

Marshall's calm notwithstanding, Forrestal believed that the United States should explore every possible avenue for ensuring an adequate supply of oil for future contingencies on the assumption that U.S. access to the Middle East could some day be blocked. Forrestal was buttressed by a report by the Special Subcommittee on Petroleum of the House Armed Services Committee which forecast that rising oil consumption in the United States and rapid depletion of domestic reserves might soon leave the armed forces without sufficient fuel supplies during a national emergency.⁹³ After receiving recommendations from the Armed Services Petroleum Board, which reviewed the House study, Forrestal proceeded with a number of initiatives. He asked Assistant Secretary of the Navy Mark E. Andrews to report on the status of U.S. efforts to promote increased petroleum production in Latin America, especially Mexico; asked the Petroleum Board to undertake a resurvey of coal resources in the United States; requested General Lutes, Staff Director of the Munitions Board, to discuss with the military departments the matter of establishing a reserve stockpile of petroleum products; asked for the consideration of measures for the protection of oil fields and other oil facilities in the United States and in other parts of the Western Hemisphere, including Venezuela, Curacao, and Aruba; and advised the State Department of the importance of obtaining oil rights in Eritrea and Somalia. Earlier, he had asked the NSRB and the Munitions Board to explore how quickly and to what extent the development of a synthetic fuel industry might reduce crude oil requirements. Whatever conclusions the NSC might reach on the Middle East security question, Forrestal had no doubts that the United States would be running a grave risk if it did not find alternative oil sources.⁹⁴

For the foreseeable future, however, the United States and especially Western Europe would have to depend on the Middle East as a primary source of oil. There remained then the critical question of what might be done to protect against the threats posed by a Soviet occupation and exploitation of the Middle East oil fields in the event of a war.

On 6 January 1948 Forrestal asked Admiral Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, if any steps were being taken to prepare for such contingencies. Souers replied that there was some consideration of the problem but no firm plans had yet been developed. Conceding "a definite requirement for formulation of such plans," he asked Forrestal to consult with the Joint Chiefs and to refer their views to the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee for further study.⁹⁵

At OSD's request for an opinion, the Joint Chiefs on 8 April confirmed the need for "immediate detailed plans" for coping with a Soviet threat to the oil fields and concurred that SANACC should study the problem further. Shortly thereafter, at Ohly's instruction, Under Secretary of the Navy W. John Kenney asked SANACC to prepare detailed recommendations, exercising "utmost secrecy." Working quickly, SANACC on 20 May approved findings for submission to the NSC.⁹⁶

The SANACC report (SANACC 398/4) identified the Persian Gulf oil countries of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran as those requiring primary attention. Because of heavy British investment in the area, SANACC recommended that all contingency plans be coordinated with London. The issues were complex. If the Western allies, in the face of a Soviet attack, evacuated the Middle East and left its oil facilities intact and operational, the enemy could and likely would utilize Middle East oil for military operations. The easiest and quickest way of preventing Soviet forces from exploiting the Middle East fields would be to render surface transport and refining facilities inoperable through the destruction or removal of vital pieces of equipment. Moreover, it would also be necessary to plug or otherwise block the oil wells to prevent the Soviets, on their withdrawal from the region, from setting the wells on fire and permanently depleting their resources. But plugging operations, unlike the process of rendering surface equipment inoperable, would require 30 to 60 days with the resources likely to be available.

Because demolition and plugging could render the oil wells useless for an extended period, jeopardizing the economic well-being of both the oil-producing states and the whole Western world, SANACC concluded that such steps should be taken only as a last resort if defense of the region proved impossible. There were other reasons, too, for being careful. Without advance preparations—operational planning, stockpiling of certain equipment, and training, organizing, and

positioning of necessary personnel—it might be impossible to carry out such operations before an attacker seized the oil fields and their facilities. Yet overt advance preparations in the area might lead local governments to suspect that the United States was preparing to abandon the defense of their homelands, creating a psychological climate that could be adverse to U.S. interests and possibly interfere with completion of the operation itself. Moreover, under international law, neither the United States nor Britain had the right to enter the territory of a friendly or neutral country in time of peace, and destroy or damage its natural resources, without its consent. As for destruction of resources in wartime, even though that might be advantageous to the country affected as well as to the allies in their efforts to defeat the invading enemy, such action could lead to claims later for assistance or compensation to redress the damage. The study recommended the development of demolition plans that gave due regard to these considerations, the discussion and coordination of such plans with the British, and, to minimize any unfavorable local consequences, authorization for the Secretary of State to consult, at his discretion, with the government of any country that might be affected by their implementation in an effort to obtain its consent and acquiescence.⁹⁷

On 19 August 1948 the NSC staff circulated a report (NSC 26) which endorsed most, but not all, of the SANACC study's major findings. This report occasioned recurrent discussion in NSC meetings through the remainder of 1948 and elicited written comments from State and the NME. These exchanges identified more clearly the extremely complicated technical and political considerations pointed up by SANACC that would require attention in any contingency plans. On 6 January 1949 the NSC adopted an amended report (NSC 26/2) and sent it to President Truman for his information and consideration.⁹⁸

During the remainder of 1949 and the first half of 1950, the Joint Chiefs held firm to their conviction that weaknesses in available forces would prevent an active defense of the Middle East in a war with the Soviet Union. In their annual reviews of emergency war plans, the JCS therefore assigned the Middle East a low order of priority and looked to the British to protect the area as best they could. At the same time, an increasing surplus of oil on the world market lessened the urgency of finding alternative sources of supply and raised the possibility that U.S. companies might even curtail drilling and reduce exploration in the Middle East, leaving the region to European firms.⁹⁹ Assuming the continuation of surpluses, JCS planners estimated that with strict rationing in an emergency the United States could avoid the need for Middle East oil imports for two years or longer. Scheduled cutbacks in the FY 1951 military budget further affected U.S. plans for the area; in May 1950 the JCS reassigned the Marine battalion stationed in the Eastern Mediterranean to duties elsewhere.¹⁰⁰

In the long and turbulent history of the Middle East, perhaps no other brief period witnessed more rapid and profound change than the years immediately following World War II, during which U.S. involvement in the region became unavoidable. The Palestine conflict underscored with seismic effect the volatility of a region that had historically been unstable and had lately become even more dangerous. Hesitatingly but steadily siding with Israel, the United States found its policies in the Middle East often at cross-purposes and its interests frequently in jeopardy. By 1950 Israel and its Arab neighbors appeared on the verge of an arms race, with a renewal of hostilities seemingly inevitable. Even more serious, there loomed the threat of Soviet penetration or, in the event of a war, a Soviet invasion that U.S. military planners saw themselves virtually powerless to stop. As it held the line in the Mediterranean, the United States appeared to be, militarily at least, in retreat from the Middle East, but with such instability prevailing and the long-term strategic and economic stakes in the region so high, a reversal of course seemed only a matter of time.

CHAPTER VIII

The Crisis in China

China—still another land torn by years of civil war—remained a continuing source of concern and commanded the attention of the Defense Department throughout the Forrestal-Johnson years. Like Greece, China was one of the “hot spots” of the early Cold War, where Communist and Nationalist Chinese armies battled for control of the country.* Although weakened by years of war, internal strife, foreign occupation, and economic turmoil, China remained potentially a great and powerful nation. It emerged from World War II in the eyes of the United States as the most likely candidate to take Japan’s place as the major power in East Asia. The escalation of fighting in China clouded the picture and forced the United States to consider the possibility that a communist victory in the civil war would result in Soviet domination of China and eventually other parts of Asia. What happened in China would influence the course of events throughout the region.

Despite the perceived dangers of a communist victory and the probable consequences for East Asian security and stability, the Truman administration did not seem as concerned about China as about Europe and the Mediterranean. Although both State and Defense agreed that the threat posed by the Chinese Communists was serious and affected U.S. interests, they differed on what could be done about it. Given the enormity of China’s internal difficulties and the demonstrated inability of the Nationalist regime to provide honest and effective government, the State Department saw little hope of defeating the Communists and came to favor a policy of gradual disengagement. Defense Department officials, who generally disagreed with this position, never argued that China was

* Throughout this chapter “Nationalist” and “Communist” are capitalized when referring to the Chinese.

more important than Europe. But they maintained that the State Department continually underestimated the gravity of the Chinese Communist threat and the need for effective measures to keep it contained.

Roots of American Involvement

During the first 45 years of the 20th century, American political and economic policy in China had two main objectives—to curtail interference by the European powers and Japan in China's internal affairs, and to secure through the "open door" concept equal trade opportunity for all nations. Burdened with a backward economy, an enormous population, and a long history of exploitation by foreigners, China had become a republic in 1911 with the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty and the rise to power of Sun Yat-sen. Strongly nationalistic, Sun launched China on a promising social and economic modernization effort. However, after Sun's death in 1925 his movement split violently and irreconcilably into two factions—the Nationalists, who, under Chiang Kai-shek, established their capital in Nanking * and were recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of China; and the Communists, led by Mao Tse-tung, who, with nominal backing from the Soviet Union, operated for a time out of Canton before fleeing northwest to set up new headquarters in Yen-an. The outcome of the civil war was still in doubt in 1937 when Japan invaded China; the two sides declared a temporary truce so that they might concentrate on repelling the Japanese.¹

To many Americans during World War II, Chiang's Nationalist government became the symbol of Asian resistance to Japanese aggression. Madame Chiang was well known in the United States and a popular figure in the press. By establishing close relations with influential American business and political leaders, she succeeded in rallying significant support for her husband's regime and in fostering the development of a loosely knit group, known as the "China Lobby," which championed close ties between the United States and Nationalist China. Glossing over evidence of misrule and corruption by his government, the China Lobby promoted Chiang as the deserving leader of a noble cause who would some day complete the transformation begun by Sun Yat-sen and turn China into a progressive, modern nation.

U.S. policy in World War II aimed at establishing China under the Nationalists as a major world power (a member of the "Big Five") and returning the

* This chapter employs the traditional Wade-Giles system of romanizing Chinese characters, which was in use at the time of the events discussed, rather than the recently introduced pin-yin system.

territory taken by Japan since the late 19th century. The execution of this policy suffered from the low priority given the China Theater; from the refusal of the Nationalists and their Communist rivals to join forces against the Japanese; and from the failure of Chiang's regime to make effective use of U.S. assistance. Under wartime lend-lease arrangements, China received approximately \$1.5 billion in U.S. supplies, much of which fell into the hands of profiteers and inept administrators.* Yet as corrupt and inefficient as his government appeared to most observers on the scene, Chiang continued to enjoy strong U.S. support. In September 1945 he elicited from President Truman a promise of additional military aid to develop his armed forces "for the maintenance of internal peace and security," but not "for use in fratricidal warfare or to support undemocratic administration."²

While accepting these terms, Chiang must have known that he could never abide by them. Even before Japan's surrender it was obvious that the wartime Nationalist-Communist truce would collapse, with renewed civil strife inevitable. In a secret agreement at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin exacted concessions involving Chinese territory as the price of the Soviet Union's entrance into the war against Japan. In exchange for the concessions, confirmed in a Sino-Soviet treaty in August 1945, the Soviet Union recognized the Nationalists as the sole legitimate government of China, but effectively abrogated its pledge almost immediately by turning over large quantities of captured Japanese weapons to Mao's Communists. The competition quickened as Communist and Nationalist forces scrambled to assert their authority over the parts of China previously occupied by the Japanese. To help the Nationalists, the United States airlifted and sealifted large numbers of Chiang's troops to north China and landed 50,000 U.S. Marines in the Tientsin-Peking area, chiefly to assist with the repatriation of Japanese soldiers, but also to block Communist forces from seizing the cities.³ When Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, visited China on an inspection tour a year later, this U.S. force, substantially reduced in numbers, was still there. "One thing is clear," Forrestal concluded, and that was "that the Marines were the balance of order in China during the last six months."⁴

Hoping to reverse the drift toward all-out civil war, President Truman in December 1945 sent the recently retired Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall, to China as a "neutral" mediator. Despite early success in arranging a cease-fire, Marshall found the road to a permanent settlement strewn with almost insur-

* The figure of \$1.5 billion is from Young, *China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945*, 120-21, and includes assistance valued at \$210 million provided in 1946. Lend-lease aid actually utilized during the war totaled about \$800 million. Early in the war China also received a U.S. credit of \$500 million to secure internal dollar-backed loans; of this sum, \$300 million was used during the war, the balance afterward.

mountable obstacles. To put pressure on the Nationalists to negotiate, Marshall embargoed arms shipments to China from the U.S. mainland in late July 1946 and from U.S. Pacific bases in mid-August. Yet nothing seemed to work. Neither the Communists nor the Nationalists appeared seriously interested in accepting what Marshall saw as the ideal solution—a coalition government. Writing off his mission as a failure after the cease-fire broke down and fighting resumed in Manchuria, Marshall returned to the United States in January 1947 to assume new duties as Secretary of State. In a personal statement at the end of his mission, Marshall strongly criticized the intransigence he had encountered on both sides and spoke pessimistically of the chances for a peaceful settlement as long as “reactionaries” in Chiang’s government and “irreconcilable Communists” held out against a “fair compromise.”⁵

The Wedemeyer Mission

Marshall’s return to Washington amid reports of escalating fighting in Manchuria set the stage for a running debate, until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, over what further steps, if any, the United States should take to support Chiang. That the Nationalist position was deteriorating was readily apparent in 1947. Even with a two-to-one advantage in manpower, Chiang’s forces in Manchuria had found themselves overextended and adopted a defensive posture.* The Chinese economy, bending under the weight of military requirements, neared the brink of collapse from inflation. Even more ominous, reports of growing numbers of defections to the Communists signified loss of confidence in Chiang’s government.

Despite Chiang’s obviously precarious position, opinions in Washington differed on how to respond. The opening event of the ensuing long debate was a meeting on 12 February 1947 of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, with Marshall and Forrestal dominating the discussion. The day before, Marshall had sent Forrestal and Patterson for their consideration certain recommendations on U.S. policy toward China, reflecting his recent experience there. Among other things, Marshall advocated that the United States (1) “continue to encourage China to achieve unity by democratic methods of consultation and agreement”; (2) “maintain a constructive and sympathetic . . . attitude in determining the extent to which conditions in China should improve as a prerequisite to giving

* At the end of 1947, U.S. Army Intelligence credited the Nationalists with a force of 2,723,000, the Communists with a strength of 1,150,000 (*China White Paper*, 322). Mao Tse-tung, on the other hand, claimed in December 1947 that his army had a strength of 2,000,000. See Clubb, *Twentieth Century China*, 285.

economic assistance"; and (3) withhold any military aid to China "which would contribute to or encourage civil war."⁶

At the meeting Marshall told Forrestal and Patterson that the Kuomintang leaders "had overestimated their ability to solve the Communist problem" and that it was almost impossible to convince Chiang Kai-shek that only "drastic political and military reforms" could save China. The only solution to China's troubles, Marshall argued, was to replace the "reactionary clique" in the Chinese government with liberals from both the Kuomintang and Communist parties. Forrestal offered the opinion "that the United States might as well face the fact that if the United States withdrew its support from the Central Government, the influence of the U.S.S.R. in China was bound to proportionately increase." Forrestal went on to recommend the sending of a financial and economic mission to China, not necessarily to provide funds but to help China improve its own situation and to demonstrate continuing U.S. interest in its problems. Both Forrestal and Patterson said they wanted to discuss Marshall's proposals with their staffs.⁷

Forrestal's concern reflected worries prevalent throughout the military since 1945. By 1947, China had become the subject of increased attention in Congress as well, especially among conservative Republicans favorably disposed toward the Chiang government. Pressed from both directions at the same time, Marshall felt compelled to take action. In May he lifted the embargo on arms deliveries, and in July he asked Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, the U.S. commander in the China Theater from 1944 to 1946, to head a military fact-finding mission to China and Korea. A close and respected friend of Chiang,* Wedemeyer occasionally served as Forrestal's unofficial adviser on Chinese matters. In 1946 he had prepared, at Forrestal's request, what turned out to be a pessimistic appraisal of Marshall's efforts at that time to negotiate a settlement on the basis of a coalition government. Strongly suspicious of the Communists and of State Department foreign service officers in China who harbored, as he later put it, a "definite animus against the Nationalists," Wedemeyer championed a "fundamental change" in U.S. policy even before he left for China. "In a word," he later recalled, summing up what he conceived to be the purpose of his mission, "I had a double task: to convince the Chinese that they must produce proof that American aid would not be wasted; and to convince Washington that aid must be given."⁸

In his confidential report to President Truman, submitted on 19 September 1947, Wedemeyer painted a grim picture of conditions in China. Although longer and more detailed, Wedemeyer's report in many ways resembled Chamberlin's

* From 1944 to 1946 Wedemeyer had also served as chief of staff to the Generalissimo, who was Supreme Commander, China Theater.

almost-simultaneous report on Greece;* both depicted a deteriorating political, economic, and military situation in the face of a highly organized and determined communist enemy. To meet China's difficulties, which were on a far greater scale than Greece's, would require a much more sizable commitment of U.S. resources. Militarily, the tottering Nationalist position in Manchuria demanded the most immediate attention. "Continued deterioration of the situation," Wedemeyer warned, "may result in the early establishment of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately in the evolution of a Communist-dominated China." Dubious of Chiang's current ability to mount an effective counterattack, Wedemeyer favored placing Manchuria under a U.N. trusteeship.

Accepting assurances he had received from Chiang that reforms would soon be forthcoming, Wedemeyer recommended stepped-up economic and military assistance, including advisory aid to Nationalist forces. "Notwithstanding all the corruption and incompetence that one notes in China," he argued, "it is a certainty that the bulk of the people are not disposed to a Communist political and economic structure." Chiang's position had to be shored up before the Communists secured additional military advantage. Admitting that the military situation had deteriorated and now favored the Communists, Wedemeyer did not believe that it was too late to effect a reversal on the battlefield. He therefore urged increased materiel assistance (mostly ammunition), prompt training of a Chinese air force, and assignment of U.S. advisers to Chinese field units, training centers, and particularly logistic agencies to prevent them from being ransacked by Chinese war profiteers.⁹

The controversy that later arose in the United States over the Wedemeyer report resulted largely from the administration's decision not to release it to the public or to inform the appropriate committees of Congress about its contents. Only the President, Marshall, Lovett, and Forrestal received copies. Lovett advised Forrestal that President Truman wanted no further distribution.¹⁰ Exactly why the report was withheld is not clear. When the report finally was declassified and published in 1949, the State Department offered the official explanation that Truman and Marshall questioned Wedemeyer's proposal of a U.N. trusteeship in Manchuria and thought it could damage Sino-American relations: "It was the conviction of the President and the Secretary of State that any such recommendation, if made public at that time, would be highly offensive to Chinese susceptibilities as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, and representing the Chinese Government as incapable of governing Chinese territory."¹¹ Wedemeyer suspected other motives and considered the real reason to be a coverup by Marshall of his intention to continue pursuing what Wedemeyer termed a "do-nothing policy."¹²

* Concerning the Chamberlin report on Greece, see Chapter VI.

Some of Wedemeyer's suggestions were, in fact, promptly acted upon, though not to the extent he had recommended. In early November 1947 Marshall and Forrestal approved munitions shipments to the Nationalists from surplus stocks in the Marianas and agreed that the Air Force should expedite the training and equipping of Chinese air units.¹³ Later in the month, Marshall met with Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, who was about to depart for China to replace Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas as chief of the U.S. Army Advisory Group. Unwilling to allow Barr to exercise any responsibility for strategic plans or operations, Marshall agreed that he could advise Chiang Kai-shek on operational matters on an "informal and confidential basis." But beyond these limited steps, Marshall questioned whether the United States should or could do more without risking total involvement and the abandonment of its commitments elsewhere. China's problems and needs seemed so large, so complex, to the Secretary of State that they seemed to defy any reasonable remedy. "It is an extraordinarily difficult thing," he observed, ". . . to find out what might be done that would be productive of a result justifying the doing."¹⁴

The China Aid Act

During the winter of 1947-48 the question of extending aid to the Nationalists became one of the issues related to what Forrestal and others in the NME saw as the absence of a definite China policy with established objectives. Believing that the situation in China required attention at the highest level, Forrestal in January 1948 asked the National Security Council to prepare a report "at the earliest possible date" on current and future policy. Specifically, Forrestal requested a study addressed to four problems: (1) recent and anticipated developments in the military, economic, and political situation in China; (2) the likely effect of these developments on current or projected U.S. programs for military and economic assistance to the Chinese Government; (3) the extent, character, and terms of any further military or economic assistance the United States might choose to furnish; and (4) current and probable competing demands upon the United States by other countries for military and economic assistance and, in relation to these demands, the relative priority of Chinese requirements.¹⁵

The response from both the NSC and the State Department was not at all what Forrestal had sought. During an NSC meeting on 12 February 1948, Marshall sidestepped Forrestal's questions by disclosing that he would soon ask Congress for legislation to make available about \$550 million in additional nonmilitary aid to China. Reading from a prepared statement that he later used for congressional testimony, Marshall told the council that the purpose of this

proposed assistance was to arrest China's accelerating economic deterioration and to demonstrate confidence in the Chinese Government. He did not favor additional military aid, he said, and cautioned that any attempt to seek a military solution would oblige the United States virtually to take over the Chinese Government and provide such enormous economic and military subsidies that the welfare and security of the United States itself might become threatened. "On the side of American interests," he argued,

we cannot afford, economically or militarily, to take over the continued failures of the present Chinese Government to the dissipation of our strength in more vital regions where we now have a reasonable opportunity of successfully meeting or thwarting the Communist threat, that is, in the vital industrial area of Western Europe with its traditions of free institutions.

Present developments make it unlikely . . . that any amount of U.S. military or economic aid could make the present Chinese Government capable of reestablishing and then maintaining its control throughout all of China.¹⁶

Marshall's proposal took Forrestal and his advisers by complete surprise. Apparently, it had not been cleared in advance with the White House, the Bureau of the Budget, or the NME. If the situation in China was truly beyond redemption, as Marshall implied, why risk further involvement of any kind? On 21 February Secretary of the Army Royall urged Forrestal to seek clarification of the State Department's intentions. "I am somewhat concerned about the China aid situation," Royall said, "fearing (1) that it might be too late to accomplish anything by such aid and (2) that the embarkation on an aid program may lead to at least implied military commitments." ¹⁷ A few days later Forrestal responded:

I fully share your concern about the China program, and believe that our position with respect to China should be formulated at the earliest possible date. The present lack of a clearly defined position will become particularly serious if efforts are made in the Congress to earmark a portion of the general China aid program for military purposes. A number of Congressmen have stated their intentions of pressing for such an allocation.¹⁸

On 26 February and again on 12 March Forrestal renewed his request to the NSC for a policy statement on China. The second time he met with some success. Pending further study of overall policy by the State Department, the NSC staff on 26 March issued a draft report (NSC 6) on short-term China assistance. The report stated that in view of the worsening conditions in China,

the most important and practicable objective should be to prevent the communist conquest of the country by encouraging internal reforms and providing necessary assistance. At issue were the kind and amount of assistance the United States should offer. Military members of the staff argued for both military and economic assistance "on a scale sufficient to retard economic and military deterioration and provide that Government with an opportunity to stabilize its internal political and military situation." The Joint Chiefs seconded the views of the service staff members in favoring both limited economic and military aid. The JCS pointed out that "the situation in Greece emphasizes that economic aid has little value unless and until internal conditions of law and order are established to the degree that the economic aid will serve the purpose for which intended" and that "it would be unwise to extend economic aid to China without the military assistance which will provide the National Government some means with which to improve the present situation of internal armed conflict."¹⁹

State Department and NSRB representatives opposed military aid as unnecessary since Secretary Marshall's proposed economic assistance would free sufficient foreign exchange assets to permit the Chinese to purchase military supplies on the world market. In supporting only economic aid, they recommended that it be furnished with two goals in mind: to retard further economic deterioration and to provide the Chinese Government with an opportunity to acquire "limited" military supplies with its own resources.²⁰

Before NSC 6 could come up for discussion in the NSC, events on Capitol Hill had already decided the issue. On 2 April the Republican-controlled Congress passed the China Aid Act of 1948 (P.L. 472, Title IV), which authorized \$436 million in assistance for one year. As Forrestal predicted, China's supporters in Congress succeeded in providing military assistance by having \$125 million set aside for "additional aid" to be administered by the President for purposes proposed by the Chinese Government. In the light of these developments the NSC deemed it pointless to discuss NSC 6 further and discarded the paper.²¹

Immediately following President Truman's approval of the China Aid Act on 3 April, Sen. Styles Bridges, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and an ardent Chiang supporter, asked Forrestal for an appraisal of the military assistance the Chinese needed. On 8 April Forrestal asked his special assistant for budget matters, Wilfred McNeil, to undertake the appraisal.²² Based on the findings of the Wedemeyer report and on data supplied by the outgoing chief of the U.S. Army Advisory Group, General Lucas, an ad hoc committee appointed by McNeil estimated that the minimum necessary to assist the Chinese Government in ending hostilities and restoring a satisfactory measure of stability was approximately \$973 million, exclusive of Chinese navy costs. The committee also noted that shortly after Congress passed the China Aid Act, the Chinese

Defense Ministry submitted an itemized request for military equipment and proposed allocating the \$125 million as follows: ground and service forces, \$87.5 million; air force, \$28 million; and naval forces, \$9.5 million. The committee also recommended: (1) full funding of the \$125 million authorization; (2) integration of military aid to China into an overall military assistance program; and (3) supervision of military aid by U.S. authorities to insure proper usage.²³

Secretary of the Navy Sullivan and Secretary of the Air Force Symington both concurred in the ad hoc committee report and recommended its transmittal to the Senate Appropriations Committee. Secretary of the Army Royall dissented. "I am not convinced," he told Forrestal, "that \$125,000,000 military assistance should be granted to China, particularly when it is estimated that under present conditions a *minimum* of more than \$1,000,000,000 military assistance would be required to accomplish real results." He refused to endorse the full report and concurred in only those parts dealing with the allocation of the \$125 million, if granted, and the integration and supervision of assistance should Congress appropriate any money.²⁴

Meanwhile, the State Department recommended to President Truman administrative terms to govern granting of the \$125 million to China. Marshall wrote the President that Congress intended that the Chinese themselves should decide how the money would be used. He recommended that the President designate the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the grant aid, based on an agreement on administrative terms to be negotiated between the United States and China. Following Marshall's suggestions, Truman on 2 June charged the Secretary of the Treasury with execution of the grant and established administrative procedures, including monthly reports from the Chinese Government on the purposes of its grant aid expenditures.²⁵

At a meeting with Marshall and Royall a few days later, Forrestal expressed concern whether the Chinese would use the grant money properly. The basic issue, he said, "seemed to be the degree of guidance which should be extended to the Chinese Government in spending the \$125 million grants." Marshall had no objection to giving the Chinese advice on where to purchase their supplies, but he drew a sharp distinction between this and direct U.S. involvement in the programming of assistance, "lest the U.S. Government be placed in a position of underwriting the entire Chinese military program and running the Chinese Government."²⁶

Forrestal declined to press the matter, but at another meeting between Marshall and Royall on 11 June the issue arose again, this time in connection with efforts in Congress to add a "Greek-Turkish proviso" to the China Aid Act

appropriation, requiring U.S. authorities to exercise the same degree of administrative control over aid to China as they did over aid to Greece and Turkey. Royall expressed regret that another assistance program was in the offing and reiterated that further aid without close supervision would be a mistake and lead to waste. Marshall did not doubt the accuracy of Royall's prediction but advocated holding to the President's instructions of 2 June on administration of Chinese grant aid. Referring to a proposal to place advisory teams with the Chinese army, he said that "the important thing was how to do this without getting sucked in" by the Chinese. Wedemeyer, who was also present, in a surprising reversal of his attitude of a year earlier, fully agreed in view of military conditions in China, and expressed doubt whether sufficient time remained to save Chiang's regime from collapse. Citing an absence of "moral courage" on the part of the Chinese Government, Wedemeyer "feared that the U.S. would be blamed for the final debacle" if it became further involved. By the end of the meeting Royall agreed that the Greek-Turkish proviso ought to be deleted and that the 2 June instructions should be followed.²⁷

The debate in Congress culminated on 28 June with the appropriation of the \$125 million "additional aid" and without inclusion of the controversial Greek-Turkish proviso. Several days later, however, Senator Bridges and Rep. John Taber, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, sent President Truman a joint letter urging him to "check the expenditure of this \$125,000,000 very carefully." Under further pressure from Rep. Walter Judd, a former medical missionary in China and a strong Chiang supporter, the State Department agreed to reexamine the matter and had its Legal Division consider possible options allowing the NME "to go into procurement for the Chinese."²⁸ As a result of these efforts, Truman issued a new directive on 28 July carrying over the provisions of the earlier one and adding a clause establishing procedures by which the Chinese Government could procure supplies or services from U.S. Government agencies, including the NME.²⁹

To speed up action, Forrestal and Marshall agreed on the consolidation of the U.S. Army Advisory Group, the U.S. Air Division, and the U.S. Naval Advisory Group into a single Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) to the Republic of China. Plans for such a merger had been discussed off and on with the State Department since early 1946, but the absence of legislative authority and interservice disagreements over command responsibilities had permitted no progress by the end of the year.³⁰ Not until the spring of 1948, as it became increasingly apparent that Congress intended to continue military as well as economic aid, did the matter again acquire sufficient importance, both in the Pentagon and State Department, to receive serious attention.

Since the plan involved military policy, Forrestal looked to the Joint Chiefs to take the leading role in organizing JUSMAG. But heated disagreements between General Barr, chief of the Army Advisory Group in China, and Rear Adm. Harry R. Thurber, senior member of the U.S. Naval Advisory Group, forced him to intervene.³¹ This personal feud between the heads of the two China advisory groups brought into question how effectively the proposed joint mission could function. Although reluctant to take sides in the dispute, Forrestal questioned Barr's leadership ability and thought the situation in China required a higher ranking officer, someone with more prestige, like General Mark Clark.³² Marshall disagreed. Knowing from firsthand experience the difficulties in dealing with Chiang Kai-shek, he thought Barr was doing a commendable job. Whether or not he agreed, Forrestal did not raise further objections; in late August 1948 he notified Marshall that Admiral Thurber had been relieved. "I trust that this step," he told Marshall in passing along the news, "coupled with the formation of the Joint Advisory Group, will forestall any further difficulties."³³

With the concurrence of the JCS that existing authority justified creation of a joint military advisory group in China, Forrestal obtained Marshall's agreement to its establishment. On 17 September 1948 the service secretaries issued a joint directive setting up JUSMAGCHINA.³⁴ To resolve the question of command, Forrestal recommended, and the JCS agreed, that the directorship of JUSMAGCHINA should rotate among the three services on a seniority basis, with General Barr designated as first director.³⁵ As it turned out, he was the only director.

Like the China Aid Act, the creation of JUSMAGCHINA was largely a symbolic gesture. Its mission was "to assist and advise the Chinese Government in the development of modern" air, sea, and ground forces. However, U.S. personnel could not enter a combat area or advise anyone other than Chiang Kai-shek on matters of strategic plans and military organization.³⁶ As a result of these and other limitations, the advisory group in China, unlike the one operating in Greece, functioned mainly in an administrative capacity.

Advisory assistance to China ceased almost as soon as it began because of stepped-up heavy fighting that appeared to threaten the safety of the command center in Nanking. On 2 November 1948, the day after JUSMAGCHINA officially began operation, its Joint Advisory Council and the U.S. Ambassador, John Leighton Stuart, decided that no additional military personnel should join the command. Shortly thereafter, acting on standing orders from the Joint Chiefs, Barr began evacuating his people to Tokyo, leaving behind a small housekeeping force, which withdrew later. Effective 3 March 1949, JUSMAGCHINA formally suspended all operations.³⁷

Tsingtao: The Last American Bastion

With the waning fortunes of the Chiang government and the inability of U.S. assistance to reverse the course of events, the American presence in China underwent a rapid decline in 1948–49. The China Aid Act constituted little more than a last-ditch effort, prompted by political pressures, to redress a seemingly hopeless situation. The military momentum had swung to the Communists by 1948, forcing the Nationalists to adopt a defensive strategy that could only here and there delay the enemy advance. A few Nationalist units still fought bravely and with determination, but by and large Chiang's armies had lost the willingness to fight. As the defeats mounted and as defections increased, many of Chiang's supporters began to question his leadership. With Nationalist armies being pushed back on nearly every front and Chiang's government disintegrating from within, the prospect of a Communist victory loomed ever larger.

The impending demise of Chinese Nationalist rule brought a growing realization in Washington that the days of active U.S. involvement in China might be numbered and that decisions would soon have to be reached concerning reduction or withdrawal of U.S. forces. Attention centered initially on the exposed position of the city of Tsingtao on the Shantung peninsula, site of the largest U.S. Marine garrison in China and training center for the Chinese Navy.

On 3 May 1948 the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Western Pacific, Vice Adm. Oscar C. Badger, alerted the Chief of Naval Operations to the possibility that the U.S. base, with its 3,600 officers and enlisted men and their dependents, might be in danger. Citing the recent Communist victory at Weih-sien to the west, Badger warned that Tsingtao was one of the few remaining Nationalist-controlled cities on the peninsula and that it could become the target of a Communist attack. Although U.S. naval intelligence saw no immediate danger and predicted that the Communists would not engage the U.S. troops in the city, Badger was worried because Nationalist forces in Tsingtao were making few preparations for defense. He felt that unless the United States was prepared to make an ignominious retreat, his forces should be authorized to assist Nationalist forces in the defense of Tsingtao and some essential suburban facilities.³⁸

After considering Badger's cable, the Joint Chiefs, through Admiral Denfeld, agreed to refer the matter to Forrestal, with a suggestion that he consult with the State Department. Pending the outcome of these discussions, Denfeld advised Badger that the Joint Chiefs approved his suggestion that U.S. forces assist the Nationalists in defending Tsingtao and suburban facilities if necessary. The State Department reacted strongly to the failure to consult the President and the

Secretary of State before sending instructions to Badger, pointing out that it constituted "a procedural precedent of grave import."³⁹

The War Council examined the Tsingtao situation further at an 18 May meeting at which Charles Bohlen, Counselor of the State Department, represented Marshall. According to Bohlen, Marshall believed that it would be a "terrible mistake" for U.S. troops to engage in open conflict with the Communists. Marshall strongly opposed any U.S. participation in the fighting and felt that the United States should avoid taking sides in the civil war "at all costs." The secretary held these views, Bohlen said, even though he recognized that withdrawal from Tsingtao would involve loss of U.S. prestige in the Far East.⁴⁰

Once again Forrestal and Marshall took opposite sides. Accepting a JCS suggestion, Forrestal urged a study of the Tsingtao problem by the NSC, a proposal that State resisted as long as Badger had permission to help defend the city.⁴¹ After several weeks, the Joint Chiefs changed their position. On 10 June they notified Forrestal that, subject to his approval, Badger would receive new instructions stating that the defense of Tsingtao was a Chinese Nationalist responsibility and that he should evacuate his forces and their dependents if the city were threatened. Badger was so instructed on 14 June.⁴²

In the wake of these developments the NSC staff initiated a study of Tsingtao. The State representative on the staff favored withdrawing U.S. forces at once, but the service representatives wanted to postpone the evacuation until an attack became clearly imminent.⁴³ Before the conflicting views could be reconciled, the Soviet Union on 24 June imposed a blockade of land and canal traffic to Berlin.* The NSC now began to worry that an immediate pullout from Tsingtao would have a damaging effect on American credibility and make it difficult to convince Western Europe that the United States intended to stand firm in Berlin. On 15 July, after recommending that the President authorize the dispatch of B-29 bombers to England and Germany as a show of force, the NSC decided to take no further action on Tsingtao for at least 30 days, allowing Badger's current orders to stand.⁴⁴

For the rest of the summer Communist forces made no overt moves imperiling the security of Tsingtao. But with the approach of autumn they launched a new offensive and by late September had captured the city of Tsinan, leaving Tsingtao more vulnerable than ever on the Shantung peninsula. At the direction of the NSC, representatives of State and Navy met to consider possible U.S. action in regard to the Shantung peninsula. They called for the immediate closing of unnecessary shore installations and the quiet removal of U.S. surplus property. Further, the State Department was to inform the Chinese

* See Chapter X.

Government that the United States would not assume responsibility for protecting Tsingtao, but would offer to strengthen the city's defenses to avoid any appearance of weakness or intention to withdraw U.S. forces.⁴⁵

The NSC discussed the Tsingtao problem extensively at a meeting on 7 October. Secretary of the Army Royall favored total withdrawal from Tsingtao. Both Lovett and Forrestal argued that any decision "must be a function of our over-all China policy," but felt that no firm course could be set until after the U.S. presidential election. Although the NSC reached no final conclusion on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Tsingtao, it did agree that the JCS should furnish Admiral Badger "what he needs to carry out the current orders." Any alteration of these orders should await NSC consideration of an expected report on the position of the U.S. on China. Lovett subsequently wrote the NSC executive secretary that the situation in Tsingtao was "critical" and asked him to place the matter on the agenda for the next NSC meeting without waiting for the broad study on China policy. Lovett preferred that U.S. Navy dependents be evacuated from Tsingtao, shore-based naval activities transferred to shipboard, and Admiral Badger's defensive position strengthened.⁴⁶

President Truman took action on the issue before the NSC could meet again. Stung by Republican criticism that he was pursuing a policy of "appeasement" in China, Truman sought to delay the evacuation from Tsingtao until after the election. In a handwritten note to Forrestal, dated 18 October, Truman mentioned a recent conversation he had had with Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration. On Hoffman's advice, the President added, "I would suggest that the withdrawal from Tsingtao not take place at this time, and that aid [under the China Aid Act] to North China be expedited."⁴⁷ On 21 October the NSC agreed that the President's "suggestion" constituted a directive and that Admiral Badger should be ordered to stay in Tsingtao.⁴⁸ Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs cabled Badger to use his forces as necessary for the protection of U.S. interests within the Tsingtao perimeter, prepare for evacuation of U.S. dependents and U.S. and other nationals, and be prepared for evacuation of American forces pending receipt of specific JCS authorization.⁴⁹

Forrestal directed the Army and the Navy, in coordination with the Munitions Board, to accelerate deliveries of small arms and ammunition as directed by the President on 18 October.⁵⁰ Most of these supplies, amounting to approximately 800 tons, came from World War II stocks in Japan and arrived in China in November–December 1948 in unopened crates that turned out to contain much equipment that was either in poor condition or useless for lack of spare parts.⁵¹ Chiang's decision in the fall of 1948 to give first priority to forces in the south rather than to troops actually engaged in combat in the north further reduced the immediate usefulness of these weapons. The destinations and

approximate percentages of supplies to be delivered were: Shanghai, 60 percent; Tsingtao, 10 percent; and Tientsin, 30 percent. Most of the equipment items earmarked for Tsingtao and Tientsin did reach their destinations but, at Chiang's request, items intended for Shanghai were diverted in December to Formosa (Taiwan),⁵² a prudent move in retrospect, but one that further denied his forces on the mainland the help they needed. All in all, despite an intensified effort by the United States, this assistance proved of minimal value.

On 3 November 1948, the day following Truman's surprising victory at the polls, the NSC held a special meeting at the request of the President to reexamine the recent JCS instructions to Admiral Badger. Truman, at his home in Independence, Mo., did not attend but had indicated through Forrestal a desire for advice on changing Badger's orders. The long and sometimes rambling discussion once more failed to produce a consensus on what to do about the Tsingtao marines. Forrestal thought an immediate evacuation unnecessary and argued that a complete withdrawal could jeopardize American influence in North China. But he sensed the meaning of the President's request and offered no objections to a State proposal (NSC 11/1) for the orderly withdrawal of dependents and the gradual transfer to shipboard of shore-based activities, and, as agreed earlier between State and Navy, the landing of marine reinforcements and a general strengthening of the U.S. Navy's Tsingtao defenses.⁵³ The NSC believed that if the two operations were coordinated and conducted simultaneously, the evacuation of dependents and the liquidation of shore installations would be looked upon as an integral part of the Navy's preparations to defend itself and could be carried out without jeopardizing Nationalist morale or encouraging a Communist attack on the city. Evacuation now began in earnest and by the end of the year had largely cleared Tsingtao and North China of nonmilitary people who wanted to leave.⁵⁴

The decision to withdraw dependents was supposedly without prejudice to a final decision on the status of Badger's naval forces and the marine garrison. But within a few weeks the military situation turned from bad to worse, leaving the Tsingtao garrison more exposed than ever to enemy action. By early December Manchuria and practically the entire North China plain were in Communist hands. To conserve what remained of his beleaguered forces, Chiang decided to abandon the Shantung peninsula and ordered the Chinese naval facilities at Tsingtao removed to Formosa and to Amoy, on the mainland opposite Formosa.

On learning of Chiang's decision, the State Department asked the NSC whether it would serve any useful purpose for U.S. forces to remain in Tsingtao. Judging that it would not, State recommended that Badger proceed quickly to complete the evacuation of dependents, suspend all training activities, and

withdraw his forces as soon as the Chinese disclosed publicly that they were closing their base. In addition, State recommended against establishing U.S. naval training facilities on Formosa or Amoy after the Chinese made their move.⁵⁵

At its meeting on 16 December the NSC accepted Forrestal's request that it await the views of the JCS before deciding on the State Department proposals (NSC 11/2) to evacuate Tsingtao, but this bought Forrestal only a few days' time. When the JCS responded to NSC 11/2 four days later, they concurred in its proposals.⁵⁶ Unable to rally support that might block or postpone the departure order, Forrestal reluctantly accepted the decision without ever personally endorsing it. Truman approved a slightly revised NSC report (NSC 11/3) on Christmas Eve, thus initiating a phased withdrawal that ended in May 1949 without serious incident.⁵⁷

Deeply disappointed, Forrestal considered the withdrawal from Tsingtao a major setback, though what he hoped to accomplish by keeping the marines there is not clear. They were no longer—if ever in fact they had been—the source of stability and order that Forrestal had considered them in 1946. By the end of 1948 the military initiative had so completely passed to the Communists that the U.S. presence in North China ceased to operate to the Nationalists' advantage. Tsingtao was a doomed city, isolated and vulnerable to attack at any time, providing little more than an exit for foreign nationals fleeing China. Unlike the British in Hong Kong, the Portuguese in Macao, and the Russians in Port Arthur and Dairen, the United States had no established rights to Tsingtao and could not have insisted on staying, unless by use of force, after the Nationalists left. Given the realities of the situation, it is puzzling that Forrestal expected a handful of marines to influence or alter events.

Waiting for the Dust to Settle

By the beginning of 1949, diplomatic and intelligence reports from China were more pessimistic than ever.⁵⁸ The Nationalist regime lurched toward certain defeat. Having lost control of Manchuria and most of North China, Chiang Kai-shek's disorganized and demoralized armies reeled from one battlefield setback to the next and steadily gave ground with less and less resistance. Battered by continuing high inflation, China's economy was a shambles. Intelligence analysts had long noted signs of unrest within the hierarchy of the Nationalist government. Now, with increasing frequency, they spoke of a cabal to overthrow Chiang and put a peace party in power. Before his rivals could act, Chiang in his New Year's Day message to the nation offered to step down and called on the Communists to enter peace talks.⁵⁹

In Washington, the Communists' apparent impending victory mandated a full-scale reevaluation of U.S. policy. Although Forrestal had spoken repeatedly of the need for such a study for nearly a year, the Director of State's Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, had accorded it low priority, feeling that there was little to be gained until events in China pointed in a clear direction. The first draft of a State Department report (PPS 39) on the subject appeared only in September 1948. Much of the paper consisted of a survey of demographic, economic, military, and political conditions in China, from which emerged the general conclusion that the Nationalist regime would soon be replaced by a Communist government controlling most, if not all, of China. Further, the report warned that a Communist victory probably would result in an increase in Soviet power and influence in China, though to what extent could not yet be ascertained. Given the realities of the situation and the limited American capacity to influence events, the United States could not expect to realize any of its traditional objectives in China for quite some time and should therefore adjust its long-range planning to allow for utmost flexibility. In the foreseeable future U.S. policy toward China should: (1) continue to recognize the Nationalist government as presently constituted; (2) make a decision on recognizing the Communists in the light of prevailing circumstances if and when a Nationalist collapse should occur; and (3) prevent, so far as possible, short of military intervention, China's becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union.⁶⁰

In discussing the report's findings with Forrestal, Kennan advised him not to draw hasty conclusions, either in writing off China as a lost cause or on the possibility of a last-ditch effort to prevent a Communist victory. The collapse of Nationalist China was approaching so rapidly and the consequences were so unpredictable that only through constant and thorough reexamination, Kennan believed, could the United States develop an effective and workable policy. Assuming that the Communists would not establish full control for some time, he speculated that the United States might have to have several policies toward China's separate regions. More important in Kennan's view was the need for a definite policy toward Formosa. Pointing to the island's possible strategic importance to the United States, he thought perhaps the NSC should consider the strategic consequences of Soviet control of Formosa.⁶¹

Kennan's general analysis drew no immediate objections, either from Forrestal or from within the State Department. It was increasingly obvious that Nationalist rule would not last long, but less clear was what would replace it and when. After studying the problem for several months, the NSC staff gave up trying to write a detailed paper and on 11 January 1949 circulated a brief report (NSC 34/1) that avoided, as Kennan had urged, hard and fast recommendations. Approved by President Truman early the following month, NSC

34/1 doubted whether China would soon be unified under a stable, independent, and friendly regime and advised that the primary policy should be to prevent China from becoming "an adjunct of Soviet power." Toward this end the United States should:

- a. Make appropriate plans and timely preparations in order to exploit opportunities in China while maintaining flexibility and avoiding irrevocable commitments to any one course of action or to any one faction.
- b. Regard efforts with respect to China as of lower priority than efforts in other areas where the benefits to U.S. security are more immediately commensurate with the expenditure of U.S. resources.⁶²

The adoption of a new policy roughly coincided with a change of leadership both in China and at the State Department in Washington. On 21 January 1949 Dean Acheson succeeded Marshall as Secretary of State; the same day Chiang Kai-shek stepped down as President of the Republic of China.* Although he fully endorsed the new policy, Acheson considered NSC 34/1 somewhat "obscure in phraseology" and sought to remedy this defect through a followup report (NSC 34/2), approved in March 1949.⁶³

Whereas NSC 34/1 assumed an indefinite period of political disorder in China, with the Communists the dominant but not the only controlling element, NSC 34/2 looked farther ahead and assumed virtually complete Communist rule, accompanied by extensive Soviet penetration. Acheson doubted whether the United States could realistically expect to prevent China from falling under Soviet influence or whether it could extricate China from the Soviet bloc until internal conditions were ripe for the emergence of a "grass roots" anti-Communist resistance movement—what he later termed a "third force," aligned neither with the Nationalists nor the Communists. He recommended that the United States maintain, "so far as feasible," active official contact with all political elements in China and continue to recognize the Nationalist Government "until the situation is further clarified." Along these same lines, he also recommended that the United States reaffirm its friendship with the Chinese people, but withhold full support from any non-Communist regime in China until it had demonstrated an independent capacity to offer effective resistance to Communist rule. As for how long it might take for this policy to bear fruit, Acheson ventured no further than to draw a comparison. "The Kremlin," he pointed out, "waited twenty-five years for the fulfillment of its revolution in China. We may have to persevere as long or longer."⁶⁴

* Chiang was replaced by General Li Tsung-jen as Acting President but continued to exercise much of his former power. Chiang went to Formosa late in 1949 and resumed the presidency on 1 March 1950.

Acheson, in what he later admitted was an unfortunate choice of words, characterized this policy as one of waiting for the dust to settle, a metaphor intended to imply marking time but also suggesting burial of the Nationalist regime. In truth, Acheson wanted to dissociate the United States from the Nationalists as quickly as possible while seeking to cultivate ties with other political elements in China in an effort to draw China away from the Soviet Union.⁶⁵ But his plan—a gradual reduction of aid and support for the Nationalists and a search for the elusive “third force” (abandoned at the end of 1949, but later resumed)—proved highly controversial and unproductive.

During his remaining weeks as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal grudgingly supported Acheson’s actions in the face of growing criticism in Congress and from influential pro-Nationalist lobbying groups. Still the dominant issue, as it had been the year before, was whether to continue military aid, even though it appeared highly probable that additional shipments to the mainland would fall into Communist hands. Suggesting several alternate courses of action without commenting on which one he preferred, Forrestal requested the NSC to consider the matter.⁶⁶

On 3 February, with Acheson presiding, the NSC examined the subject at some length. Acheson readily conceded that from the military point of view continuing delivery of arms would be a waste, but he cautioned the council to bear in mind the possible political repercussions in the United States of stopping aid. The State Department, he added, was “split down the middle” on the issue; he himself was inclined to terminate assistance. As an alternative Secretary of the Air Force Symington suggested, with Forrestal’s approval, the diversion from China to Okinawa of scheduled deliveries and an indefinite suspension of new export licenses pending resolution of the situation on the mainland. Acheson accepted their view and proposed that President Truman meet with congressional leaders to explain the decision.⁶⁷

Two days later, with the necessary stop-shipment orders on his desk for signature, Truman met with congressional leaders at the White House. Instead of endorsing the action the President proposed to take, they unanimously condemned it both as a betrayal of Nationalist China and as an admission of U.S. inability to deal with the expanding communist threat. In the words of Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg (Mich.), the senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the United States by this action would stand accused of being the one “who gave poor China the final push into disaster.” “This blood,” Vandenberg declared dramatically, “must not be on *our* hands.”⁶⁸ Finding no support among the legislators, Truman backed down and told Acheson on 7 February that scheduled assistance should go ahead, but on a delayed-delivery basis wherever possible “without formal action.”⁶⁹

Truman and Acheson may have assumed that the problem would solve itself when legislative authority under the China Aid Act expired on 2 April 1949. But in early February a group of 51 House Republicans wrote the White House urging creation of a commission to investigate the situation in China. Three weeks later Sen. Patrick McCarran, a Nevada Democrat, introduced legislation to create a loan fund of \$1.5 billion to stabilize China's economy and to continue military assistance. Though McCarran's proposal was largely self-serving (it called for a third of the aid to be in silver, of which Nevada was a principal producer) and probably stood little chance of passing, Acheson saw it as a sign of growing congressional unrest. To divert Congress from considering new legislation he requested a temporary extension of the China Aid Act. Rather than amending the law, Congress passed new legislation in April 1949 which confirmed the President's authority to provide China with assistance until 15 February 1950 but made available no additional appropriations. Assuming that the amount originally earmarked for military aid would be fully obligated by the time the extension took effect, Acheson considered it no longer incumbent on the United States to render military assistance, especially since Congress had not provided additional money for the purpose.⁷⁰

Taking cognizance of congressional sensitivities, Acheson refrained temporarily from further dissociating the United States from the Nationalists and advocated a "wait, look, see policy" until events in China had run their course. The news was not encouraging. By spring, peace talks between the Nationalists and the Communists had collapsed, followed by a resumption of fighting that left South China exposed to a Communist invasion. From the momentum generated by their 1948 victories, the Communists felt more confident than ever of ultimate success. In April 1949 they launched their attack, captured the Nationalist capital of Nanking, and moved on to take Shanghai. On virtually every front the Communists held the upper hand.⁷¹

The smashing success of the Communist armies evoked a strong backlash of public opinion in the United States against the White House and State Department. Throughout the country the Nationalists, personified by Chiang Kai-shek and his wife, had enjoyed a generally favorable image and reputation for almost 20 years. Disturbed by what they read in newspapers and heard over the radio about China, the American public still found it difficult to comprehend the mounting disaster. An opinion survey prepared by the State Department in April 1949 found deep concern among political commentators that a Communist victory in China would have a serious effect on the strategic position of the United States throughout Asia. As for dealing with the problem, a majority of the commentators endorsed the administration's inclination to procrastinate while a strident minority condemned this approach as a "do-nothing" policy.⁷²

Once again, intense reaction in Congress led to stepped-up calls for new assistance, demonstrating the effectiveness of Chinese lobbyists and the popularity of their cause among a hard core of congressional supporters. Although composed largely of Republicans, the so-called "China bloc"* in Congress cut across party lines and worked closely with such influential anticommunist groups as the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Daughters of the American Revolution, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Farm Bureau Federation.⁷³

Within the administration itself opinion continued to be divided. After Johnson succeeded Forrestal in March, the fragile consensus achieved at the beginning of the year soon collapsed and infighting resumed between the Pentagon and State Department. Personalities played a major part, but so too did legitimate disagreements between Acheson and Johnson over such questions as Formosa and whether the Nationalists on the island should receive military aid. In Johnson's view, Acheson's policy in China and throughout the whole of East Asia was weak and ineffectual and continually placed the administration in embarrassing positions politically. A case in point was the administration's frustration resulting from the arrest by the Chinese Communists of the American Consul General in Mukden, Angus Ward, who was released only after being convicted of espionage. Convinced that President Truman was listening to the wrong advice, Johnson dropped hints that the State Department was stumbling blindly and that it lacked accurate and reliable information about China.⁷⁴

The constant criticism put the State Department on the defensive throughout 1949 and into 1950. In a belated effort to educate the public on how the current crisis had arisen, Acheson in April 1949 resurrected the idea, discussed but rejected the previous November by Truman and Marshall, of publishing an official history of U.S.-Chinese relations over the past decade. Truman now greeted the project with enthusiasm and detailed his special counsel, Clark Clifford, to review the manuscript. Johnson, after seeing a draft copy, unsuccessfully tried to block publication on the grounds that its contents contained material that could adversely affect "future developments in China." Acheson disagreed; with Truman's approval, on 5 August 1949 he released the so-called "China White Paper" to the public. Focusing on the period since 1944, the paper contained a lengthy narrative of military and diplomatic events as well as extensive documentary materials, all intended to demonstrate to the American people that the responsibility for reverses suffered by the Nationalist armies in China lay not with the United States but with the Nationalists themselves.⁷⁵

* Congressional members of the China bloc included Sens. Styles Bridges (N.H.), William F. Knowland (Cal.), and Patrick McCarran (Nev.), and Reps. Walter H. Judd (Minn.) and Joseph W. Martin (Mass.).

As one of Acheson's biographers has observed, the China White Paper was "a fair, accurate, and scholarly presentation and analysis of the facts," but it required close reading and was so detailed that it is likely that only a "few people other than academics and China experts" bothered to examine it. "As a means of explaining to Americans why their government should not be held responsible for the fall of Nationalist China, it left a great deal to be desired."⁷⁶

In any case Acheson's critics wanted action to restore the Nationalists to power or, at the least, avert a complete defeat. Among a number of hastily concocted schemes, one that received considerable attention from Nationalist supporters in the United States came from Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault (USA, Ret.), the celebrated World War II commander of the Flying Tigers and a close friend of Chiang Kai-shek. Chennault proposed an elaborate delaying action, patterned after the strategy employed against the Japanese in World War II, that would establish defense lines in the "great Western Zone" of China supplied by a U.S. airlift.⁷⁷ A similar plan, prepared by the Chinese embassy in Washington, envisioned establishment of a defense perimeter along a line determined by Nationalist-held territory from northwest to south China and called on the United States to provide assistance in the initial amount of \$287 million.⁷⁸

State and Defense both rejected Chennault's proposal after studying it closely. Embassy officials in China considered Chennault's plan "as a whole . . . impractical and of doubtful value to furtherance of US national interests." The Joint Chiefs fully concurred, questioning the feasibility of last-minute attempts to carry out operations on the scale envisioned by Chennault and his Chinese friends. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs doubted the soundness of the basic strategy and its military practicality in the face of a superior enemy force and the apparent inability of the Nationalists to rally followers, enforce discipline, and maintain morale among their troops.⁷⁹

China's supporters refused to give up and continued to argue that Nationalist reverses resulted from inadequate U.S. help. Insisting that the situation could still be salvaged, the China bloc mustered its strength and in September 1949 succeeded in adding Section 303 to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, authorizing \$75 million in unvouchered funds for military aid to "the general area of China." * The sponsors hoped for stepped-up assistance to the Nationalists, but by the time the legislation passed, Nationalist authority on the mainland extended nominally to no more than a handful of provinces and even these soon capitulated to the Communists. On 1 October 1949, Mao Tse-tung and his followers proclaimed the People's Republic of China, with Peking (Peiping) as its capital, symbolizing the end of Nationalist government on the mainland. Intelligence analysts agreed that anti-Communist opposition in China, except for scattered

* On the origins of this legislation, see Chapter XVII.


guerrilla operations, probably would not exist after 1950.⁸⁰ The dust was beginning to settle, but whether it would permit a clearer picture of the situation remained to be seen.

The Question of Formosa

By the end of 1949 the unrelenting advance of Communist armies had left only Formosa and a handful of nearby islands in Nationalist hands. Most of the Chinese who took refuge on these islands owed allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and wanted him to resume leadership of the Nationalist government. Chiang, who had been looking for just such an opportunity for a number of months, readily agreed. On 8 December 1949 he closed his headquarters on the mainland and established in Taipei a temporary capital from which he exhorted his followers not to give up their cause. The Communists promptly declared Formosa to be an integral part of the "new" China and made known their intention to seek the island's "liberation" at the earliest opportunity.⁸¹

The struggle for Formosa appeared likely to become the final and decisive battle of the Chinese civil war. According to intelligence estimates in late 1949 and early 1950, the Nationalist forces on the island enjoyed a relatively secure position. Anticipating expulsion from the mainland, Chiang had stockpiled arms and ammunition on Formosa for nearly a year. Although vastly outnumbered in manpower, the Nationalists still possessed marginal superiority in air and naval forces. By establishing a naval blockade of the mainland and by bringing military pressure to bear with air power, they hoped to keep the Communists off balance. The earliest expected date for a Communist attack was 15 July 1950. Because of uncertain weather conditions during the summer typhoon season, the logistical difficulties of organizing an invasion force, and Nationalist air superiority, U.S. naval intelligence concluded that it was impossible to assume a reliable date for a Communist takeover but observed that "there seems to be little doubt . . . that Taiwan will in due course fall into Communist hands."⁸²

The transfer of the Nationalist regime to Formosa brought to the fore a problem that the United States had wrestled with off and on since World War II. In the Cairo Declaration of 1943 the United States had recognized Formosa as a part of China and had agreed to support China in reclaiming the island from Japan. At war's end the United States had assisted Nationalist forces in establishing control of Formosa. But early in 1949 U.S. policy shifted. In the absence of a Japanese peace treaty specifying the disposition of the island, President Truman approved an NSC recommendation (NSC 37/2) calling for Formosa to become virtually autonomous under its own "local non-Communist Chinese regime." The purpose behind this policy was to prevent the chaos on the mainland from



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spreading and to spare the island's native inhabitants from being inundated and exploited by a wave of Nationalist refugees.⁸³ The strategy failed. As the Nationalists suffered one defeat after another on the mainland, they swarmed by the tens of thousands to sanctuary on Formosa.

With the growing Nationalist presence on Formosa, there appeared a need for further clarification of U.S. policy. Worried about the consequences of a Communist victory on the mainland, Secretary Johnson requested the NSC in June 1949 to undertake "a study of the current situation in Asia" and recommend a plan of action to achieve specific objectives. Shortly after Johnson made his request, the State Department began working on a China policy paper of its own and asked Johnson to designate a general officer to provide State with informal advice and assistance. State made clear that this officer's assistance "would constitute in no way a prior commitment of the National Military Establishment for any recommendations which the Department of State may make regarding our policy toward China." Johnson rejected this proposal, preferring that State prepare the paper alone and submit it to the NSC, although he promised to make available requested documentation and answer specific questions posed to the NME by the State Department as it proceeded.⁸⁴ Johnson's behavior pointed up his differences with the State Department and his determination to make the NSC the central deliberative body on Asia policy. As the review progressed, it became obvious that a divisive debate was brewing over the question of Formosa, though initially all agreed that the island's protection or defense should not become a U.S. responsibility.

Earlier, in March 1949, at the request of the State Department, the Joint Chiefs had evaluated Formosa's strategic significance for the United States. In August, once again at State's request, they repeated the exercise. On both occasions, the findings were essentially the same. Barring unforeseen developments, the Joint Chiefs did not consider Formosa of sufficient strategic importance to warrant a commitment of U.S. protection. They emphasized, however, that their assessment rested less on strategic considerations than on deficiencies in U.S. capabilities caused by budgetary limitations and military commitments elsewhere. In view of these constraints and the narrow range of options they permitted, the JCS deemed it inadvisable for the United States to attempt to prevent a Communist takeover of the island. Following this advice, the NSC in October approved a strongly worded message advising Chiang Kai-shek not to count on U.S. military intervention if the Communists tried to attack Formosa.⁸⁵

The State Department interpreted this action as paving the way for the United States to disengage from the Nationalists and to open channels for pursuing a detente with the Chinese Communists on the mainland. But before any such measures could be taken, the NSC staff in late October circulated an un-

numbered draft report, responding to Johnson's request of June, containing recommendations that, if adopted, would result in an entirely different policy. The report stated that for the foreseeable future the most urgent policy concern in Asia should be to reduce the threat of spreading Soviet influence. China, in all probability, would soon come under complete Communist control, but it would be some time before it could pose a significant threat to neighboring countries. It appeared more likely that Soviet-directed actions, utilizing the momentum of the revolution in China, would undermine and eventually destroy the peace, national independence, and stability of nations throughout Asia. Rising nationalism and anticolonial sentiment offered fertile soil for the Soviets to work their influence. Suggesting a kind of domino theory, the report saw Communist control in China supporting the introduction of Communist regimes in Burma and Indochina, and then other communist efforts in Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia. The United States "should oppose communism in China, both overtly and covertly, by all practicable means short of United States military forces."⁸⁶

The report strongly urged adoption of measures similar to those proposed to combat communism in Western Europe, including stepped-up economic aid to help ameliorate abysmal Asian living standards and the conclusion of a regional defense pact or "Pacific Association" * of noncommunist Asian and Pacific nations. It further recommended that the United States specifically define its security interests in the Pacific by establishing a defense line running through Japan, the Ryukyus, Formosa, and the Philippines and concluding a peace settlement with Japan. The report's most radical proposal advocated that "the United States should obtain title to Formosa and the Pescadores and transfer them to the trusteeship of the Pacific Association."⁸⁷

In the opinion of a special State Department study group, composed of area desk officers and Far East consultants, the basic defect of this paper was its tone—hostile and insensitive to the realities of change in Asia, with undue emphasis on preserving the status quo. Listing alternative recommendations, the study group downplayed the effectiveness of military measures, including military assistance, in stopping the spread of Asian communism and urged patience and flexibility in dealing with the new regime in China. "If an Iron Curtain is to be rung down," the group advised, "let it be the Communists who ring it."⁸⁸

When Acheson showed the study group's proposals to President Truman on 17 November, he described the problem as a choice between two courses of action: constant opposition to the Communist regime, harassment, and covert and overt attempts to bring about its overthrow; or an effort to detach Communist China from subservience to Moscow and to encourage more favorable behavior

* The association never materialized in this form.

by China toward the United States. Acheson added that he and his advisers leaned toward the second policy, which they saw as comparable to supporting Tito in Yugoslavia.⁸⁹

While Acheson's thoughts moved in one direction, Johnson's went in another. Apparently feeling that the recommendations in the NSC draft report needed pointing up, Johnson in early December asked the Joint Chiefs for "an opinion as to whether or not there was anything the Military Establishment ought to be doing [on Formosa] that affected the security of the United States, regardless of what might be the Government's political objectives."⁹⁰ The Joint Chiefs referred the matter to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), but before the JSSC could respond formally, Johnson acted on his own. On 15 December he sent to Truman, then vacationing in Key West, a memorandum urging military aid to the Nationalists on Formosa. Referring to the current State and Defense study of the NSC draft paper on Asia, Johnson wrote:

Generally speaking, the [military] staffs agree that efforts should be continued and perhaps increased to deny Formosa to the Communists. The nature and extent of such efforts are now being considered in some detail for the purpose of defining them more accurately. They include political and economic aid, and also military advice and assistance short of overt military action.

It is generally agreed that it is not in our interest to become involved to the extent of placing the American flag on Formosa. The cost and risk, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be excessive.⁹¹

To bolster his case, Johnson sent two enclosures—a letter written by a personal friend of Truman's, Sen. Homer Ferguson of Michigan, who confessed to being "greatly distressed" by the situation on Formosa; and a summary of the views of General Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in the Far East. In MacArthur's opinion, the Potsdam agreement of 1945 obligated the United States to protect Formosa pending a determination of the island's legal status and the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty. Such protection, he believed, could be provided without a commitment of U.S. troops, merely by making Formosa eligible for aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and by issuing a declaration that the United States would treat any attempt to invade the island as an act of war. The United States should make clear at the same time that it would also consider Nationalist use of Formosa as a base to launch an attack against the mainland as an act of war.⁹²

Truman returned to Washington on 20 December. Two days later, during lunch at Blair House, Johnson gave the President further information but learned "that I had lost my fight on Formosa." "The President did not disagree

with the military considerations," Johnson remembered. "I was told, without quoting him directly, that he wasn't going to argue with me about the military considerations but that on political grounds he would decide with the State Department." Treating the matter as closed for the time being, Johnson left the next day for a vacation in Florida.⁹³

Apparently unaware that Truman had already reached a decision, the Joint Chiefs on 23 December forwarded their official response to Johnson's request for recommendations on Formosa. Adopting a position similar to MacArthur's, the Joint Chiefs advised taking military measures, short of committing combat forces, as soon as possible as part of an overall effort to thwart the spread of communism in Asia. They recommended the authorization of a "modest, well-directed, and closely supervised program of military aid" and suggested that MacArthur visit Formosa to conduct a military survey of the island's requirements.⁹⁴

On 29 December 1949, with Truman presiding, the NSC held a special meeting to discuss the Joint Chiefs' recommendations in connection with deliberation on NSC 48/1, a revised version of the October report on Asia that now reflected the State Department viewpoint. The overall policy objective was redefined as not merely to curb the expansion of Soviet power and influence but also "to assist in the development of truly independent, friendly, stable and self-sustaining" Asian nations through political and economic rather than military measures. The United States should encourage noncommunist forces to take the initiative, show the way with economic and political support, and foster cooperation and consultation among Asian nations. Any regional association should be voluntary and should serve initially to promote mutual aid and self-help. For countries facing an "immediate threat" of communist aggression, the United States should provide military advice and grant assistance "to the extent practicable."

On security arrangements, NSC 48/1 took the position that the United States had a legitimate and longstanding interest in preserving a defense perimeter in the Pacific but ought to avoid involvement on the Asian mainland. As to Formosa, the paper offered two proposals. The first, a statement drafted in the State Department, called only for economic and diplomatic measures to block a communist takeover. The other reiterated the views of the Joint Chiefs:

The United States should aggressively pursue the policy of denying Formosa and the Pescadores to the Chinese Communists. The successful achievement of this objective will primarily depend on prompt initiation and faithful implementation of essential measures of self-help by the non-Communist administration of the islands. In addition to the diplomatic and economic

means provided for by the NSC 37 Series, the United States should undertake a modest program of military advice and assistance to be integrated with a stepped-up political, economic and psychological program against the further extension of Communist influence and control over Formosa. Such a program should of course only be undertaken without committing United States forces or seriously risking United States involvement in overt military action.⁹⁵

The NSC discussion on 29 December was, in a very real sense, a mere formality. Since Truman had already said he would rule against him, Johnson saw no reason to attend and prolonged his Florida vacation. In his absence, Acting Secretary Stephen Early attended, accompanied by General Bradley. For the record, Bradley stated that the Joint Chiefs "proposed to supplement . . . present economic and political measures by looking into the possibility of modest military assistance" to Formosa. This assumed, of course, that the United States would stand behind the Nationalists on the island as part of a policy to halt the advance of communism in Asia. However, if political considerations made it desirable to terminate support of the Nationalists, then perhaps, Bradley admitted, the JCS proposal went too far.

Acheson noted that, as he understood it, the Joint Chiefs were not recommending a commitment of U.S. forces. Rather, they expected Formosa to fall eventually and wanted to buy time. He wondered whether the price was worth it. To foster the major objective of weaning the Chinese Communists away from the Soviet Union, the United States should adopt a low profile in Asia, place itself on the side of Asian nationalism, and avoid further identification with reactionary governments. He added that Formosa, while important to the United States, was not vital and that the Nationalists had sufficient money to buy small arms and supplies. Truman concurred, saying that for "political reasons" he would go along with the State Department recommendations. Thus the NSC rejected the proposal to provide "overt" aid to Formosa and added a new paragraph to NSC 48/1 directing the programming of MDAP funds for the "general area of China" to begin immediately. With these and several other modifications, Truman approved the report (NSC 48/2), but noted, referring to the added paragraph: "A program will be all right, but whether we implement it depends on circumstances."⁹⁶

The following day New York and Washington newspapers carried stories, derived from unidentified sources, that the NSC was bitterly divided over policy toward Formosa and that Louis Johnson had tried to force a decision in favor of providing aid. Drew Pearson, whose column was usually friendly toward Johnson, attributed the split to the Acheson-Johnson feud and cited views "expressed

around the State Department that Johnson's interferences could not be entirely divorced from his law firm, which once represented the brothers-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek and the Soong dynasty."⁹⁷ Johnson wisely refused even to acknowledge the charge and the press paid it no further notice.

The State Department and White House did not get off so easily. Angered by what they termed the President's decision to abandon Formosa, members of the China bloc launched a torrent of criticism and denunciation against Acheson and Truman. On 5 January the President counterattacked with a public statement reaffirming his decision not to provide "military aid or advice" or otherwise to involve U.S. forces on Formosa "at this time." * The inclusion of the words "at this time" was at the suggestion of General Bradley and appeared to provide a loophole for a possible future change of policy. But in a speech to the National Press Club a week later, Acheson dampened such speculation by indicating that Formosa and South Korea fell outside the U.S. defense perimeter in the Western Pacific. Although it was unclear whether Acheson had ruled out intervention if either of these areas came under direct communist attack, the current thinking behind U.S. policy was unmistakable. For the time being anyhow, the administration proposed to avoid commitments that might entangle the United States in a conflict on Formosa or in the vicinity of the China mainland.⁹⁸

Despite official pronouncements, government policy toward Formosa remained in flux down to the outbreak of the Korean War because of continuing attacks from the China bloc and attempts by Johnson to reopen the issue. During this crucial period, moreover, Acheson failed to carry through on his policy of completely detaching the United States from Chiang's regime, for neither he nor desk officers in the State Department wanted to see Formosa fall for reasons that could be blamed on the United States. Their hedging kept hopes alive in the Pentagon that a reversal of policy might take place.

The State Department's eleventh-hour wavering, combined with an upsurge of communist guerrilla activity in Indochina, the apparent arrival in Communist China of Soviet military and political advisers, and the rumored massing of Communist troops opposite Formosa, set the stage for Johnson and the Joint Chiefs to resume their campaign for aid to Chiang's regime. Having lost on the question of overt assistance, Johnson shifted to another tack. On 10 January he indicated to the Joint Chiefs that MDAP funds appropriated under the "general area of China" provision could be spent for both overt and covert purposes. The JCS duly recommended that \$30 million of the \$75 million appropriated by Congress be used for covert operations on Formosa and in Tibet. Johnson referred the Joint

* Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 350–51, suggests that Truman's statement was meant for both foreign and domestic consumption—to counter Chinese Communist claims that the United States intended to occupy Formosa and to quiet the China Lobby at home.

Chiefs' proposal to the State Department and also requested Acheson to provide guidance on whether the military departments should continue to process military assistance to Formosa under the China Aid Act.⁹⁹

Acheson did not reply immediately. Instead, he ordered a study team, headed by Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup, to review current assistance to Nationalist China, including programs that had yet to run their course under the China Aid Act and MDAP. Meanwhile, in response to British concern about the security of Hong Kong, State in March denied the Nationalists export licenses for 25 M-4 Sherman tanks and 25 F-80 jet fighters on the grounds that this high-value military equipment might fall into Communist hands through defection or capture and be used against Hong Kong or elsewhere.¹⁰⁰

The following month Acheson proposed discontinuance of procurement for or transfer of U.S. Government military materiel to the Nationalists after completion of deliveries under the \$125 million grant aid program. Citing the President's statement on 5 January as the basis for his decision, Acheson said that henceforth the Nationalists could look to "the American commercial market" as a source of supply. Aides in Johnson's office questioned the advisability of this action and deemed it tantamount to a complete cessation of sales and assistance. But on 6 May Johnson indicated to Acheson that pending a review of the U.S. military position in regard to Formosa, the Department of Defense would comply with the cutoff proposal. Within a few days all military assistance to Formosa through Defense channels ended, except for approximately \$6 million worth of equipment in process of procurement or delivery prior to 14 April.¹⁰¹

Despite the cessation of military assistance, neither the Pentagon nor the State Department regarded the matter as totally resolved as long as Chiang's forces continued to offer resistance. Sometime in the spring of 1950, for example, Paul H. Nitze, Kennan's successor as Director of State's Policy Planning Staff, approached the Joint Chiefs informally to inquire whether defending Formosa would be possible if it seemed necessary for political reasons. "The upshot," Nitze recalled, "was that the Chiefs decided that we could not prudently make the forces available to defend Taiwan despite a determination that it was politically important to do so."¹⁰² The JCS challenged a State Department staff report, prepared in April for Acheson's use in mid-May at talks with the British and French foreign ministers, which contended that "adequate military supplies" were readily available to Chiang's forces. Noting the constraints imposed on Chinese procurement of arms, they questioned the accuracy of the State Department's assertion and proceeded to argue that deteriorating conditions in the Far East compelled a reexamination of policy on assistance to Formosa. Johnson was, of course, sympathetic, but before launching a new initiative on Chiang's behalf, he asked the JCS for a "further expression of views" concerning the "desirability, or necessity,

from a military point of view, of continuing military assistance to the Chinese Nationalists." ¹⁰³

A further exchange of correspondence between the Pentagon and State Department prompted a meeting on 25 May between Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and General Burns, Johnson's assistant for politico-military matters. Rusk was prepared to concede that State might have overestimated Chiang's ability to obtain arms. Earlier, he had proposed some revisions to the State Department position paper on aid to Formosa to reflect the JCS reservations on the matter. But for the time being Rusk refused to consider any basic change of policy toward Formosa. He did agree to study any recommendations the Joint Chiefs might make and to examine the possibility of "broadening" State guidelines on aid. However, Acheson ultimately authorized only minor concessions that extended merely to the resumption of assistance, excluding tanks and jet aircraft, until all remaining funds (approximately \$2 million) appropriated under the military assistance provision of the China Aid Act had been exhausted.¹⁰⁴

The advent of the Korean War in June 1950, and especially the Chinese Communist involvement in that conflict later in the year, put an end to the drift in administration policy toward rapprochement with Communist China. The war eliminated any thought the administration may have had of extending recognition to the People's Republic of China. On the more limited question of Formosa, the war's outbreak caused Acheson to reassess the problem and adopt a position that followed closely the Defense Department view on the need for aid and assistance. As it turned out, the Korean War proved to be a dominant influence affecting the policy of the United States toward the two Chinas for at least two decades thereafter. Under that influence, U.S. policy by the end of 1950 shifted substantially to accord more with the views held by Forrestal and Johnson between 1947 and 1950 than those of Marshall and Acheson.

CHAPTER IX

The Spreading Turmoil in Asia

During World War II and immediately following, American officials looked to China to become the leading power in Asia and a key ally of the United States. By 1950, with mainland China in the hands of the Communists, they had to confront a dramatically different situation in which the Soviet Union had gained a powerful ally on the Asian continent and most of the Far East seemed vulnerable to communist penetration. "In Europe," as Louis Johnson described the shifting international scene in March 1950, "the situation is improving. In Asia, it bears watching."¹

While U.S. attention in the Far East focused on China after 1945, other areas of Asia also demanded the attention of the defense establishment. Sensitivity to the fate of countries in East Asia other than China—Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Indochina, and Malaya—persisted throughout the Forrestal-Johnson period, and became keener after the Communist takeover in China. Not all of these countries received the same degree of attention or attracted the same level of concern; some engaged Forrestal and Johnson directly, others did not. In Korea, where an American-backed regime in the South faced a communist threat from the North, Forrestal and Johnson consistently deferred to their military advisers, who downplayed the country's strategic importance and urged withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces at the earliest opportunity. In Japan, where the United States had a more compelling interest, delicate negotiations over post-occupation base rights and security arrangements required Forrestal and Johnson to monitor developments more closely and play a more active role. Indochina, the scene of both communist and nationalist insurgencies against French colonial rule, did not involve the United States directly until 1950 and claimed relatively little attention in OSD prior to 1949. As with China, State and Defense often disagreed in their

estimates of the threat to American interests in these other Asian areas and how to deal with them; only in Indochina did a consensus emerge without lengthy debate. But in all instances there was a shared apprehension over the spreading unrest in Asia and a searching reassessment of policy in the context of containment.

Japan Under U.S. Occupation

If the fall of mainland China was reason for grave concern in the late 1940s, U.S. officials could take comfort in developments in Japan where, despite tensions stemming from the U.S. occupation, the United States had enjoyed complete control since September 1945. Technically, the occupation was an Allied operation under a multinational Far Eastern Commission (FEC) with headquarters in Washington and a quadripartite Allied Council in Tokyo, the latter composed of American, British, Chinese, and Soviet members. But, having carried the brunt of the Pacific war, the United States in 1945 had insisted on a free hand in Japan's postwar administration. Consequently, the terms of reference of these organizations in effect left ultimate policymaking responsibility to the United States, with executive powers entrusted to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who also served as Commander in Chief, Far East Command (CINCFE), the U.S. theater organization.

By the time Forrestal became Secretary of Defense in 1947 the occupation of Japan was two years old and well along toward accomplishment of the desired objective—the creation of a democratic Japanese state. Forrestal's past dealings with MacArthur had been few and had left him of the opinion that the general possessed "a high degree of professional ability, mortgaged, however, to his sensitivity and his vanity." Yet after visiting Japan on his tour of the Far East in 1946 Forrestal had only praise for MacArthur's "splendid work."² Leaving the particulars of policy and administration to the Army and the State Department, Forrestal assumed limited responsibility for matters in occupied areas. "I could, I suppose," he acknowledged, "gather to myself the direction of policy of our occupying forces in Germany and Japan, but in so doing I would leave myself that much less time to plan the permanent organization of OSD."³

Forrestal's interest in Japan thus focused on major policy issues rather than on day-to-day problems of the occupation. Soon after becoming Secretary of Defense he encountered the question of whether the United States should proceed with the negotiation of a final Japanese peace settlement. In March 1947 MacArthur told a gathering of foreign correspondents that he considered the Japanese ready for a peace treaty and that the time had come to end the occupation.⁴ The State Department accepted MacArthur's recommendation and in

July extended invitations to the 10 other members of the FEC to attend a peace conference in August or September. Responses to this proposal were favorable except for those from Nationalist China and the Soviet Union, both of which raised procedural objections. When subsequent exchanges failed to reconcile the differences, the State Department canceled the conference.⁵

In September, at the first meeting of the newly created War Council, Forrestal made it plain that he was not altogether disappointed by the cancellation of the peace conference. Because the National Military Establishment had just come into existence, he felt that it would be difficult to give a considered opinion on the details of a treaty. Forrestal's chief concern was whether the United States should insist on base rights in Japan after the occupation—a subject that Secretary of the Navy Sullivan thought should be examined by the Joint Chiefs and the NSC. General Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, stated a preference for keeping a base in Okinawa and vacating bases in Japan since the permanent presence of U.S. military facilities there would be a source of animosity and an irritant in future relations with Japan. The War Council adopted no decisions and left unclear what position the NME would choose if State revived efforts to negotiate a treaty.⁶

As it happened, the State Department also was in no hurry to reopen the issue. Following the breakdown of negotiations for the proposed conference, State's Policy Planning Staff, under the direction of George Kennan, initiated a study of the problems connected with a Japanese peace treaty. Kennan reported their conclusions to Secretary Marshall on 14 October, advising that no treaty should be concluded until Japan had achieved a greater degree of political and economic stability. To obtain additional information, Kennan recommended that the State Department send "some high official" to Japan at once to discuss the matter directly and in detail with General MacArthur.⁷ At a luncheon meeting with Forrestal several weeks later, Kennan elaborated on why he thought the time not yet ripe for a peace settlement. According to Forrestal's diary record of the discussion, Kennan felt that "socialization of Japan had proceeded to such a point that if a treaty of peace were written and the country turned back to the Japanese, [it] would not be possible under the present economic machinery for the country to support itself." Left on its own, Japan would be faced with ruinous inflation and budget deficits which could result in an economic collapse that would provide a golden opportunity for communist agitation.⁸

On 8 December 1947 Secretary of the Army Royall recommended that the NSC examine the treaty question; Forrestal concurred and suggested focusing discussion on two issues: a determination of policy on holding a peace conference, its timing, the participants, and voting procedures; and U.S. policy objectives in a peace settlement. To expedite NSC consideration of the former, he

asked Royall to draw up a paper "summarizing the facts, issues and alternative solutions."⁹ However, in January 1948, when Royall learned that the State Department intended to send a "high official" to Tokyo on a fact-finding mission, he and Forrestal agreed that any future initiative for NSC consideration should originate in State.¹⁰

Kennan undertook the fact-finding mission himself, traveling to Tokyo in March for a series of briefings and what proved to be, after a cool introduction, an interesting and constructive exchange of views with MacArthur in which the two reached a general meeting of minds. Although anxious for an early treaty, MacArthur agreed with Kennan's assessment that Japan's economic and political recovery was an important prerequisite. To Kennan's point that the United States should gradually reduce its control of Japanese affairs, MacArthur replied that a relaxation of U.S. control was close at hand as a result of reforms instituted early in the occupation. As for Japan's post-treaty security obligations, MacArthur questioned the feasibility of retaining U.S. military installations in Japan because others (including the Russians) could have legitimate claims to do likewise. He proposed instead a chain of U.S. bases from the Aleutians in the north, through Okinawa and down to the Philippines in the south, from which the United States could effectively control with air power not only the approaches to Japan from the mainland but practically the entire expanse of northeast Asia. He realized the Navy might object to relinquishing the U.S. naval base at Yokosuka (Tokyo Bay) and to operating out of Okinawa because of the latter's poor harbors and frequent typhoons, but he thought those objections could be overcome by developing new port facilities on the island.¹¹

Kennan summarized his findings in a report (PPS 28), which, with minor stylistic changes, reached the members of the National Security Council in June as NSC 13. For the time being, Kennan suggested, the United States should not press for a treaty but should concentrate instead on strengthening Japan's economy preparatory to ending the occupation and withdrawing American forces. During this transition phase, the United States should thin out its forces in Japan and gradually turn over to the Japanese increasing responsibility for their own government, welfare, and internal security. Post-treaty security arrangements need not be decided immediately but ought to include retention, over the long term, of island facilities south of the 29th parallel. Eventually, Kennan proposed, U.S. access to Yokosuka should be placed "on a commercial basis," with most of the naval facilities currently there transferred to Okinawa. After studying these proposals over the summer, the NSC staff in September issued a slightly amended report (NSC 13/1), recommending that the future of the Yokosuka base be decided on the basis of the international situation prevailing at conference time and that Japan's war potential be controlled through restrictions on

the stockpiling of *strategic war materials* and the prohibition of the manufacture of weapons and civil aircraft.¹²

Forrestal referred NSC 13/1 to the Joint Chiefs, who raised several major objections. The first concerned the designation of the 29th parallel to delineate the northern edge of the area of U.S. post-treaty strategic control in the north-east Pacific. To the southeast of Japan and slightly above the 29th parallel lay Marcus Island and the Nanpo Shoro south of Sofu Gan, which the Joint Chiefs felt should also fall within the U.S. sphere along with the Ryukyus. Second, they expressed concern over the possible loss of the Yokosuka naval base. And finally, they questioned the wisdom of imposing economic controls that would leave Japan permanently demilitarized. Under current international conditions, the Joint Chiefs said, "it may well become extremely important to our national security for Japan to be capable of providing some degree of military assistance to the United States, at least to the extent of Japan's own self-defense."¹³

On 30 September, with Forrestal presiding, the National Security Council considered NSC 13/1 in detail. JCS reservations concerning demilitarization, though noted, were not directly discussed, but Kennan, representing the State Department, agreed that the report could be amended to extend the area of U.S. post-treaty control to include Marcus Island and points in the vicinity of Sofu Gan. Most of the remaining discussion revolved around an Army-State disagreement over the future role of the FEC and the procedure for terminating Japanese reparation payments. As a result, the NSC made no decisions on the paper as a whole. Meeting again a week later, the council avoided further delay by agreeing to consider the contested issues separately, adopting the rest of the report as NSC 13/2, which Truman approved on 9 October.¹⁴

On 21 October Forrestal asked the Joint Chiefs for an elaboration of their views on Japanese security requirements and, in particular, whether the eventual peace settlement should include provision for "limited" Japanese rearmament. After an extended period, during which they obtained detailed views from MacArthur, the JCS replied in March 1949 that any increase in the Japanese military forces beyond those planned for internal security did not appear practicable or immediately advisable. They concurred with MacArthur that any attempt to rearm Japan prior to a treaty "would destroy the character and purpose of the occupation." However, in view of worldwide instability, they reaffirmed their earlier statement on the desirability of having Japan as an ally and suggested that "anticipatory measures" should be undertaken at an early date to plan for a post-treaty Japanese home guard consisting of ground and sea forces (but not an air arm) capable of repelling an invasion. As a first step, they recommended revision of NSC 13/2 to allow stockpiling of arms to equip the nucleus of a Japanese army and navy.¹⁵

Shortly before leaving office, Forrestal submitted the Joint Chiefs' recommendations to the NSC, which referred them to its staff for study. The staff subsequently circulated a slightly revised policy paper (NSC 13/3), which, though it contemplated no drastic changes, reiterated the need for effective Japanese internal security forces and recommended that "primary war facilities" currently designated as available for reparations should instead be utilized as necessary to promote Japan's economic recovery. However, the report made no mention of stockpiling arms or of taking other anticipatory measures that might eventually lead to Japanese rearmament. The council adopted NSC 13/3 on 6 May 1949 and Truman approved it the same day.¹⁶

By the spring of 1949 the United States clearly had shelved the idea of an early peace treaty and remained committed to maintaining the occupation for the indefinite future. Until Japan's economy became self-sufficient and Japanese society and government regained self-confidence, a strong U.S. presence in Japan seemed essential. Meanwhile, under the NSC policy, the United States would gradually thin out its army of occupation, reduce its direct involvement in Japan's internal affairs, promote the strengthening of Japan's economic, social, and political institutions, and assist Japan in developing effective internal security forces.

This policy, however, was never fully implemented because of growing pressure in both Japan and the United States to expedite the conclusion of a peace treaty. Although MacArthur had made enormous strides toward achieving significant economic, social, and political reforms, there was mounting evidence by 1949 that his occupation policies were becoming counterproductive and that communist agitators were exploiting the occupation to foment anti-American sentiment. Instead of gradually relaxing the authority of the occupation along the lines he and Kennan had discussed in the spring of 1948, MacArthur continued repeatedly to intervene in the day-to-day affairs of the Japanese government. A case in point occurred in December 1948 when, during parliamentary consideration of a wage bill, MacArthur summarily instructed the Diet to raise the wage base, an action that threw the Japanese government's budget calculations into chaos. As a result of this and other instances of interference, many Japanese became disillusioned with MacArthur's leadership, leading to a steady decline of American prestige and increasing challenges to U.S. authority. By the summer of 1949 disenchantment with the American stewardship became manifest as Japan experienced a wave of small-scale strikes, industrial sabotage, and random acts of terrorism against Japanese officials who worked for the occupation. For Japan itself and for the future political stability of East Asia it was by no means certain that the occupation was still serving a useful purpose.¹⁷

At the same time, events on the China mainland underscored the need for

preserving close U.S.-Japanese relations. Although it was still too early to ascertain the full effects of a communist victory in China, military and diplomatic analysts in Washington generally agreed that a radical shift in the Asian balance of power need not occur as long as Japan remained firmly in the American orbit. But they disagreed over the relative priority of military and political objectives and how best to assure Japan's continued protection. When he became Secretary of State in January 1949, Dean Acheson made it clear that he viewed the resumption of movement toward a treaty as the key to retaining Japan's friendship and, hence, the security of U.S. interests in the Far East. But before he could proceed, he had to overcome the resistance of Louis Johnson and the Joint Chiefs, who thought a treaty was still "premature" and would leave Japan exceedingly vulnerable in the face of the ominous and growing communist threat on the mainland.¹⁸

Acheson's efforts to reopen the Japanese treaty question received new impetus when the Soviets, in late May 1949, proposed informally at the Palais Rose conference in Paris that the Council of Foreign Ministers consider a Japanese treaty simultaneously with the settlement discussions with Germany and Austria.* Acheson had no desire to let the Soviets reap a propaganda victory; if a Japanese treaty was to be written, he wanted it to be the product of an American initiative, not a response to Soviet pressure. Anticipating that the Soviets might follow through with a formal proposal and perhaps even a draft treaty, Acting Secretary of State Webb asked the NSC to have the Joint Chiefs reexamine their strategic security requirements in Japan with a view toward negotiation of a Japanese treaty. At the same time, Webb asked Johnson for a progress report on the occupation. In particular, Webb wanted to know what steps had been taken to reduce the "psychological impact" of the occupation on the Japanese people; what base facilities were being developed on Okinawa to replace those in Japan; what were the capabilities of Japanese internal security forces; and how far MacArthur had progressed in implementing various political and economic reforms.¹⁹

The NME quickly responded with two reports. One, a digest of measures taken under current policy to reform and rebuild Japan, Johnson sent directly to State for information.²⁰ The other paper, containing the views of the Joint Chiefs on U.S. strategic requirements in Japan, became NSC 49 and went to council members in mid-June. Arguing that Japan was an "extremely important" strategic base for projecting military operations throughout northeast Asia, the JCS cautioned against any immediate change of policy leading either to a lessening of U.S. influence in Japan or ending of the occupation with a peace treaty. They feared that without a visible American presence, Japan would become a

* For the discussions relating to Germany and Austria, see Chapter X.

target of Soviet and communist expansion—another victim, like China, of “the developing chaos on the Asiatic mainland.” In these circumstances, the JCS advised, it would be militarily unsound for the United States to do anything at the present time that might weaken its control of the Asian offshore island chain. Japan had a twofold strategic value—as a potential source of manpower and industrial production in the event of war and as a political ally helping to maintain the Far East balance of power in favor of the United States. Giving up control of Japan in the foreseeable future, the JCS argued, would leave the United States in an untenable position if a major war erupted in the Western Pacific.²¹

Turning to the question of specific security needs, the Joint Chiefs stated for the first time a definite requirement for the retention of the Yokosuka naval base, pointing out that poor weather conditions in Okinawa made it an unsuitable alternative. They reiterated their endorsement of limited Japanese rearmament and recommended approval of a Japanese defense force before ending the occupation. In view of Japan's recent economic and political disturbances, the Joint Chiefs also favored, to the extent necessary, a strengthening of Japanese internal security forces. Yet with or without these measures, they were fully convinced that

a peace treaty would, at the present time, be premature since the continuing Soviet policy of aggressive communist expansion makes it essential that Japan's democracy and western orientation first be established beyond all question, and since global developments are still in such a state of flux that measures leading to the risk of loss of control of any area might seriously affect our national security.²²

The State Department postponed response to the JCS comments and in September opened exploratory talks with the British Foreign Office on the attitude of Britain and her Commonwealth partners toward the early holding of a Japanese peace conference. As a means of staying in touch with developments, Secretary of Defense Johnson had earlier transferred all policymaking responsibilities for military government in Germany and Japan from the Department of the Army to his own office and had named Assistant Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Voorhees as his deputy for occupied areas. However, Voorhees found himself excluded from the State Department's negotiations. Acheson, determined to press ahead with Japanese treaty negotiations as quickly as possible, at a meeting in Washington on 13 September secured the cooperation of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who agreed to use his good offices in lining up the British Commonwealth countries behind whatever treaty the United States might choose to propose.²³

Several days after his talk with Bevin, Acheson met with President Truman and Deputy Secretary of Defense Early to discuss the next step. Describing his meeting with Bevin as "purely exploratory," Acheson insisted that nothing had been or would be agreed to without "proper staff work" and presidential approval. He recommended that as a first step the Joint Chiefs should provide a fresh statement of "essential security requirements." Early responded that the matter would be given prompt attention. He thought a written request unnecessary, but Truman believed that a letter would be helpful in sharpening the issues.²⁴

Adhering to the President's wishes, Acting Secretary of State Webb wrote to Johnson on 3 October, formally requesting the Department of Defense to conduct a fresh study of Japanese security requirements with a view toward placing a draft treaty before the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference in January 1950.²⁵ State also sent along a seven-page analysis of the Joint Chiefs' earlier study (NSC 49), taking issue with the JCS contention that the U.S. presence in Japan was a stabilizing influence and suggesting that, on the contrary, the occupation had reached the point where its continuation was likely to produce only adverse results. "The only hope," State argued,

for the preservation and advancement of such democracy and western orientation as now exist in Japan lies in the early conclusion of a peace settlement with that country. From the political point of view, the achievement of our objectives with respect to Japan are [sic] now less likely to be thwarted by proceeding promptly to a peace treaty than by continuance of the occupation regime, provided that essential U.S. military needs in Japan are assured in the treaty or other concurrent arrangements.²⁶

The Joint Chiefs directed the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to prepare a draft response, while in late November Voorhees went to Tokyo to obtain the views of General MacArthur.²⁷ MacArthur warned Voorhees that a prolonged occupation could destroy the present Western orientation of the Japanese. In fact, he saw them growing extremely impatient with their current status; he felt the time had come to give serious thought to a treaty. However, he disagreed with State's proposed approach to the negotiations and insisted that it would be a mistake to present the matter at the British Commonwealth Conference, where he expected Australia to raise procedural objections. Furthermore, he felt that the United States should make an effort to include the Soviet Union in peace talks to avoid later accusations by Moscow that its interests had been ignored. From recent discussions with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik, MacArthur felt optimistic that the U.S. and Soviet positions could be reconciled if the United States agreed to recognize Japan as a nonaligned state like Sweden and Switzerland. Going into a peace conference, he added, the

United States should negotiate with all possible flexibility and on the basis of broad principles looking toward assuring Japan's future neutrality, disarmament, and equality with other nations.

On the question of security requirements, MacArthur doubted whether Japan's economy could support rearmament or whether the Japanese people had any desire to revive a significant military capability. Despite the communist conquest of China, MacArthur did not see Japan as an immediate target of Soviet expansion; if the Soviets continued to expand their power and influence in Asia, it would be to the south with the goal of obtaining warm water ports. For this reason MacArthur questioned the necessity for retaining U.S. bases in Japan and reiterated his belief that control of Okinawa would give the United States ample strategic leverage in East Asia. However, if the United States insisted on having bases in Japan, they should be small and inconspicuous, isolated from the general population, and largely self-supporting.²⁸

On returning to Washington, Voorhees conveyed MacArthur's views to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. However, this information had negligible effect on their recommendations; on 22 December the Joint Chiefs notified Johnson that they still considered a Japanese peace treaty premature because of continuing military and political instability throughout the Far East. Further, they reaffirmed their requirement for the Yokosuka naval base, established new requirements for retention of existing Army and Air Force installations in Japan, and insisted that any treaty negotiations should include participation by the Soviet Union and the "*de facto* Government of China." Johnson concurred and forwarded the Joint Chiefs' remarks to the State Department and the NSC.²⁹

The State Department reacted with disappointment and irritation. Although Acheson could understand and accept the Joint Chiefs' need for base rights, he found their other requirements utterly unrealistic and virtually unattainable—a setback for the cause of settlement and an embarrassment for the State Department in its negotiations with the British. Truman reacted similarly; at a meeting of the NSC on 29 December he hinted that unless the JCS adopted a more flexible attitude he might override their objections. Their insistence on having Red China and the Soviet Union at a peace conference he dismissed as technically irrelevant. The only countries that needed to be represented, Truman said, were the three original signatories of the Potsdam Proclamation—the United States, Britain, and Nationalist China. Because the Chinese Nationalists had since fallen into disarray, the decision to negotiate a treaty now rested entirely with the United States and Britain and was in no way contingent upon Soviet participation. In other words, Truman was satisfied that a Japanese treaty was feasible and he was tired of hearing arguments—real or contrived—on the necessity for further delay.³⁰

Despite the President's statement, progress in mending the State-Defense split was exceedingly slow and was not made any easier by strained relations between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs. As a minimum, the JCS wanted assurances that a peace settlement would not jeopardize U.S. base rights. In early February 1950 they flew to Tokyo to discuss the matter directly with MacArthur. He reiterated his belief that bases were unnecessary and that a demand for them should not be used to delay a treaty. Even though he termed the Joint Chiefs' visit "helpful and constructive," MacArthur felt that they lacked sufficient personal knowledge and experience to understand the problems of Asia and speculated that their resistance to a treaty was the result of orders from Louis Johnson. The meetings in Tokyo thus failed to resolve any outstanding differences. When the Joint Chiefs returned to Washington they promptly reported to the President that they still thought a treaty was premature.³¹

Truman was growing increasingly impatient and irritated by the absence of action. On 20 February, after examining a list of proposals drawn up in the State Department, he made it clear he wanted no further delays and directed Acheson to prepare a report for the NSC. But a week later, at a drafting conference attended by State and Defense officials, a snag developed. To avoid antagonizing the Japanese, State wanted to postpone base rights negotiations until a peace treaty was an accomplished fact. To the JCS representative, this epitomized "the manifold evils of . . . pactomania" and could cost the United States dearly in terms of security requirements. "They used the same false assumption they have used for a number of months," he observed, "that we should have a treaty *now* because we could not occupy Japan 'indefinitely.' I believe . . . we can well resist peace treaty action *now* without taking the position that we think there should never be a treaty."³²

As the stalemate continued, details of the State-Defense quarrel leaked to the press. In Johnson's opinion, the disclosures had to be coming from the State Department, which was looking for some way to put pressure on the Pentagon to change its views on a treaty. At a meeting with Acheson and the Joint Chiefs on 24 April, Johnson pointedly accused the State Department of lax security and elicited an agreement that Acheson would put a lid on publicity. Johnson explained that when the treaty issue had first come up, his immediate reaction had been to endorse the idea of a peace settlement, but after reading the recent cables and press comment he had changed his mind and now agreed with the Joint Chiefs that a treaty in the immediate future was ill-advised. Acheson, of course, took exception and commented at length on the proposals of both the State Department and General MacArthur. Air Force Chief of Staff General Vandenberg remarked that MacArthur's position was somewhat misunderstood in Washington. Vandenberg had the impression that what MacArthur

really wanted was not a treaty per se, linked to security requirements, but the propaganda advantage of proposing a peace conference and having the Soviet Union refuse to attend. Acheson did not dispute this, but he urged the Joint Chiefs to bear in mind that without the promise of a treaty, the U.S. position in Japan would steadily deteriorate. He added that should the Soviet Union propose a peace conference along the lines suggested by the United States in 1947, the United States could not possibly refuse to attend and would be forced to participate in ways that could injure American interests. Johnson revealed that he and General Bradley would make a special trip to Tokyo in the near future to confer with MacArthur.³³

Less than a month later, on 18 May, Acheson appointed John Foster Dulles, a prominent Republican with extensive experience in foreign affairs, as head of a study team on the drafting of a Japanese peace treaty.*³⁴ That same day President Truman told a news conference that negotiations for a treaty would begin "when the time is propitious . . . and I hope that won't be too far off."³⁵ The following month Dulles and Johnson left on separate missions to Japan; while their visits overlapped, there is no record that they conferred with one another but some indication that they deliberately avoided each other. After arriving in Tokyo on 17 June, Johnson went to MacArthur's headquarters and delivered what one observer described as "a 15-minute harangue" that denounced "the State Department crowd" for plotting to withdraw American forces and for trying to undermine U.S. security interests and portrayed Dulles as an "impractical man who approached the world's problems with a religious, moral, and pacifistic attitude."³⁶

Because Johnson arrived in Japan dead set against a treaty, his meetings with MacArthur must have made him somewhat uncomfortable.† In written comments, MacArthur once again expressed his view that the peace treaty was absolutely essential to retain Japanese goodwill. By committing itself to this objective, MacArthur argued, the United States would also strengthen its overall moral and political position in the Far East and regain some of the initiative lost by the disastrous turn of events in mainland China. He now thought it unnecessary to include the Soviet Union and China in the peacemaking process.

* Dulles had been active in foreign affairs since serving as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Versailles Conference in 1918–19. Since 1945 he had served in various official capacities as a U.S. delegate to the U.N. and as a special consultant to the Secretary of State. In 1948 he had been an adviser to Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican candidate for President. His appointment as head of the working group on the Japanese peace negotiations was apparently designed to obtain the widest possible bipartisan support.

† Nevertheless, according to MacArthur biographer D. Clayton James, Johnson was the "only long-term friend MacArthur had in the Washington 'inner circle' in 1950." See James, *Command Crisis*, 9.


On security arrangements, MacArthur still believed that the United States should not establish permanent bases in Japan; however, as an alternative he thought would be acceptable to both the Japanese and the Joint Chiefs, he suggested a broader concept under which the United States would have "unrestricted freedom" as a "protecting power" to take whatever tactical dispositions were necessary for Japan's defense. Any such action would be undertaken in consultation with the Japanese government. As for implementation, he favored inclusion in the peace treaty of a simple clause, drawn from the language of the Potsdam Proclamation, reserving for the United States the right to maintain forces in Japan "so long as irresponsible militarism exists in the world" as a threat to Japan's peace and security.³⁷

Johnson returned to Washington with MacArthur's written statement. There is no indication that Johnson either agreed or disagreed with MacArthur's position. Before he could formulate and submit his own report, communist forces on 25 June invaded South Korea, prompting a rapid reassessment in Washington of U.S. security requirements in Japan. Under the pressure of events U.S. officials found it imperative to compose their differences. To be sure, no treaty for Japan emerged immediately. But as the Korean War progressed, Johnson and the Joint Chiefs moved steadily closer to the State Department's view that a peace settlement was essential for stability in Asia and the strengthening of U.S.-Japanese relations.

Divided Korea

In Korea, as in Japan, Forrestal and Johnson faced the problems of a prolonged military occupation. A poor country with a backward economy and under Japanese occupation from 1910 until the end of World War II, Korea had had no recent experience in self-government. At the Cairo Conference in November 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek agreed that after the war Korea should "in due course" become again a sovereign nation. But little was done to plan for Korea's future. When Japan suddenly capitulated in 1945, Allied commanders hurriedly divided responsibility for Korea between the United States and the Soviet Union pending the creation of an indigenous government. As a temporary measure for administering the country, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel, with American troops occupying the South and Soviet forces taking control of the North.³⁸

During the two years immediately following World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union both espoused the same objective—the peaceful reunification of Korea under a single government. But as in Germany, the onset of the Cold War clouded unification prospects. Having no desire to see U.S.



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troops stay in Korea indefinitely, President Truman in September 1945 issued a statement pledging that the United States would gradually turn over to the Korean people all "the responsibilities and functions of a free and independent nation." In December 1945, the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow approved the establishment of a Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission to negotiate Korea's reunification. Between March 1946 and October 1947 the commission held 62 meetings in a vain attempt to reach a settlement. Although it resolved a number of disputes, the commission was never able to agree on which political groups should be included in a provisional Korean government.³⁹

Feeling that responsibility for a settlement rested with the State Department, Forrestal ranked Korea low on his agenda when he became Secretary of Defense.⁴⁰ The NME's principal concern was a question raised repeatedly by the Army after the war: How long would U.S. troops, numbering approximately 45,000, have to remain in Korea? Faced with a general shortage of troops to meet requirements elsewhere, the Army favored withdrawal at the earliest opportunity and by September 1947 had persuaded the State Department to reappraise policy on Korea.⁴¹

Intelligence estimates, the Wedemeyer report, and studies prepared by the Joint Chiefs to assist the State Department in its reappraisal all agreed that an early U.S. withdrawal would leave South Korea vulnerable to a communist takeover. Truman sent General Wedemeyer to China and Korea in the summer of 1947 * to gather facts and to make recommendations. Wedemeyer's report of 19 September 1947 painted a discouraging picture of communist-inspired subversion in South Korea and the threat of outright aggression by the North against the South. Citing evidence of a Soviet-directed buildup of North Korean forces, which he estimated at 125,000 troops, Wedemeyer strongly urged that the United States bolster the lightly armed 16,000-man Korean security force in the South. Otherwise, once U.S. and Soviet occupation forces were gone, Wedemeyer saw nothing to stop the pro-Soviet regime in the North from achieving Moscow's goal of "a Communist-dominated Korea." The Central Intelligence Group concurred in Wedemeyer's assessment, and added that "a unified Korea under Soviet domination would constitute a serious political defeat for the US."⁴²

The JCS, in response to a request from State, drafted a memorandum on "the interest of the United States in military occupation of South Korea from the point of view of the military security of the United States," which Forrestal sent without comment to Secretary Marshall on 26 September. Contrary to the assertion by President Truman in his memoirs, the Joint Chiefs probably had not

* See Chapter VIII.

seen the Wedemeyer report prior to submitting their views.* There were obvious similarities in the two reports, though on the whole the JCS placed a lower priority on Korea than either Wedemeyer or the intelligence community. Like Wedemeyer, the Joint Chiefs considered the situation in Korea to be tense; they therefore advised against a "precipitate withdrawal," warning that a sudden reduction of the American presence under the current circumstances would adversely affect U.S. prestige throughout the Far East and elsewhere. But from the standpoint of "military security," the JCS saw nothing that should keep the United States in Korea indefinitely. If a major war erupted, Korea would be of "little strategic interest" to the United States and any threat posed by enemy occupation of the Korean peninsula could be easily neutralized by air power.⁴³

At this same time the Soviet Union proposed that all occupation forces in Korea be withdrawn "during the beginning of 1948."⁴⁴ Apparently influenced by the JCS assessment that the U.S. position in Korea was ultimately "untenable" and consequently looking for a "graceful exit," the State Department gave the Soviet proposal close attention.⁴⁵ With Truman's concurrence, Marshall decided not to reject the Soviet suggestion directly and placed a separate proposal before the U.N. seeking recommendations on how to prepare the Koreans for independence before the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops. In mid-October the United States introduced a resolution in the General Assembly providing for the establishment of a U.N. temporary commission on Korea to observe elections for a Korean national assembly, after which governmental functions would be transferred to the Koreans and foreign troops would withdraw. A Soviet counterresolution endorsed the withdrawal of occupation troops but left the establishment of a government to the Koreans themselves without specifying procedures. On 14 November 1947, with the Soviet bloc abstaining, the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of a resolution patterned on the U.S. version.⁴⁶

As withdrawal now appeared increasingly probable, Forrestal in December asked John Ohly to prepare a policy paper on Korea for discussion in the NSC. Assuming, as the Joint Chiefs had indicated earlier, that Korea was of "little strategic interest," Forrestal wanted definite plans developed for the termination of U.S. military commitments as soon as possible.⁴⁷

A SANACC subcommittee undertook the requested study and in January

* Wedemeyer submitted his report on 19 September 1947 directly to Truman, who passed it along to the State Department. Forrestal did not officially receive a copy until 2 October, at which time Under Secretary of State Lovett cautioned him against further distribution (ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 2 Oct 47, RG 330, CD 6-1-20). Although there may have been prior informal interagency discussions of the report, there is no evidence to support Truman's contention that the Joint Chiefs had the Wedemeyer report "available to them" when Forrestal sent Marshall their memorandum on 26 September (Truman, *Memoirs*, II:326).

1948 submitted a preliminary report (SANACC 176/35). Predicting correctly that the Soviet Union would never allow U.N.-sponsored elections in North Korea, the committee recommended that the United States proceed with elections in the South, set for 31 March by the U.N. resolution. Allowing time for a Korean government to organize itself, this would permit withdrawal of U.S. troops to begin in August and end by mid-November 1948. Because of the continuing threat from the North, the committee felt that reasonable efforts should be made to strengthen the South Korean government with economic and military aid.⁴⁸

While concurring generally with SANACC's findings, the JCS in late February advised Forrestal that troop withdrawals would entail risks that should not be minimized, notably the likelihood of eventual Soviet domination of Korea. However, they remained convinced that Korea was not of sufficient strategic value to warrant the indefinite presence of U.S. combat troops beyond "the earliest practicable date" for withdrawal.⁴⁹ "The JCS," noted a member of Forrestal's staff after examining their comments,

accept eventual domination of Korea by the USSR as a probability if U.S. troops are withdrawn, but recommend strengthening of the existing South Korean constabulary within present legally authorized limits as a temporary deterrent and to give the new government "a measure of security" upon U.S. withdrawal.⁵⁰

Finding the SANACC report useful but premature in some of its conclusions, NSC Executive Secretary Souers requested preparation of a basic "position paper."⁵¹ The result in March was SANACC 176/39, circulated to the members of the National Security Council, recommending that every effort be made to create conditions that would permit the withdrawal of U.S. forces by 31 December 1948. Since the Soviet Union, as expected, had recently barred U.N.-supervised elections in the North, the committee concluded that Soviet policy remained "the establishment in North Korea of a satellite regime claiming authority over the entire country and backed by the arms of a Soviet-trained and equipped army." In view of this threat and the South's weaknesses, the report endorsed continued U.S. economic and military assistance to South Korea, including the expansion, training, and equipping of South Korean security forces. The objective of the military buildup was to be the creation of forces adequate for the maintenance of internal security needs. Also, the United States should not become so "irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that any action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea [i.e., the Soviet Union], could be considered a *casus belli* for the U.S."⁵²

Meanwhile, on 18 March 1948 the CIA distributed the latest intelligence estimate on Korea. The report predicted unequivocally that if events continued on their current course, South Korea would eventually be absorbed into the Soviet orbit. To survive after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, any government elected in South Korea would require massive economic, technical, and military aid. Intelligence analysts thought the upcoming South Korean elections would result in a government dominated by ultraconservatives and probably headed by Syngman Rhee, a strident anticommunist. Such a regime was likely to be "unpopular and unreliable" and "incapable of withstanding ideological and military pressure" from the North. Delaying withdrawal until an adequate South Korean defense force could be organized "would serve to postpone a successful North Korean invasion but, by itself, would not prevent it." Fundamental economic and political problems—an "ox cart" economy and an unstable political system, with numerous factions vying for power—would remain in any case. In sum, South Korea faced the "imminent threat of military extinction" and there appeared to be very little the United States could do to prevent it short of continued and extensive subsidization of the new government.⁵³

Seeing no new evidence that might alter their views, the Joint Chiefs on 1 April advised Forrestal that they had no objections to the recommendations in SANACC 176/39. The next day the NSC discussed the paper. Forrestal asked how much "face" the United States might lose in withdrawing from Korea. Under Secretary of State Lovett conceded that the United States might lose "some," but he did not consider it serious. He felt that this was "the best we can expect to do" and noted that the report was fully satisfactory to the State Department. The strongest objection to the paper came from Royall, who argued that predicating U.S. withdrawal on the establishment of internal security was unrealistic since "the Koreans have never had internal security" and dissident elements made its attainment now highly improbable. He thought therefore that the United States should do "the best we can for them" but not make "the establishment of an adequate internal security force a prior condition to our withdrawal." The rest of the council agreed and the paper, amended to reflect Royall's point, was forwarded as NSC 8 to President Truman, who approved it on 8 April.⁵⁴

Following the approval of NSC 8, with basic U.S. policy toward Korea seemingly decided, OSD ceased for the time being to play an active role in Korean matters. In fact, judging from the few memoranda on Korea that came to Forrestal's attention after April, his main concern seems to have been the smooth and efficient termination of U.S. involvement. To meet the requirements of NSC 8, the Army in May submitted a plan of withdrawal that provided for a preparatory phase beginning on 15 May 1948, the tactical withdrawal commencing

ing on 15 August, and completion of the withdrawal by 15 December. However, in July, at the request of the State Department, the Army modified its schedule, delaying the start of the withdrawal to 15 September and completion to 15 January 1949.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, the U.N. supervised the formation of a South Korean government. Elections took place somewhat behind schedule on 10 May and resulted, as U.S. intelligence had predicted, in a victory for the ultraconservatives. On 12 July the South Korean Assembly adopted a constitution; the following week it chose the country's first president, Syngman Rhee; and on 15 August the country held ceremonies marking the end of U.S. military government and the birth of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Anticipating formal recognition of the ROK government, President Truman appointed John J. Muccio, a career diplomat, as his Special Representative to Korea with the personal rank of ambassador and gave him authority to negotiate the withdrawal of forces and all remaining transfers of authority.⁵⁶

Except for the notable absence of any elections, comparable events occurred north of the 38th parallel. In September 1948 the North Koreans constituted a Democratic People's Republic. Claiming jurisdiction over all Korea, it challenged the legitimacy of the U.N.-sponsored ROK government in the South. The Soviet Union promptly recognized the communist-dominated regime and announced on 19 September that it planned to withdraw its forces from Korea by the end of the year.⁵⁷ The State Department thereupon petitioned the U.N. General Assembly to reexamine the Korean question.⁵⁸ Before the U.N. could act, a succession of communist-led mutinies among units of its constabulary severely shook the ROK government. Although the revolts were crushed, the very fact that they had occurred raised serious questions concerning the reliability of South Korean defense forces and the intentions of the North Korean regime.⁵⁹

In November 1948 rumors swept the South that North Korea was plotting an invasion to reunite the country by force under a communist dictatorship. Citing military intelligence reports that credited the North Korean Army with decisive superiority, Special Representative Muccio urgently requested the U.S. Army to postpone final withdrawal of its forces pending the organization and training of a more reliable South Korean constabulary. As a temporary measure, the Army agreed to leave in place one reinforced regimental combat team of 7,500 men.⁶⁰ But budget pressures and the fact that these forces had been scheduled for redeployment elsewhere caused senior Army officials to grow impatient and to inquire when the withdrawal could be resumed. In January, with Forrestal's encouragement, Royall requested a discussion in the NSC but was persuaded by the State Department not to press the issue until the NSC staff

could conduct a thorough review of the deteriorating situation throughout South Korea.⁶¹

Early in 1949, with preparations for the evacuation of the remaining U.S. forces continuing, the Army sought MacArthur's advice on the timing and likely effects of the final withdrawal. On the latter, MacArthur speculated that the Soviet Union would never agree to U.S. proposals on Korea and that North and South Korea would "continue quarreling." He stated bluntly that the United States could not train and equip South Korean forces capable of stopping a communist invasion occurring simultaneously with communist-inspired internal disorders. "The threat of invasion possibly supported by Communist Armies from Manchuria will continue in [the] foreseeable future," he said, and he was pessimistic about South Korea's chances for survival. "It should be recognized," he added, "that in the event of any serious threat to the security of Korea, [U.S.] strategic and military considerations will force abandonment of support." As for the best time to complete the withdrawal, he believed that 10 May would be an appropriate date since it was the anniversary of the Korean elections and "Koreans are much affected by tradition."⁶²

The CIA predicted that if U.S. forces were withdrawn in the spring there would probably follow a North Korean invasion of the South, possibly assisted by the Chinese Communists. It questioned whether the United States could afford the loss of prestige that would follow a communist victory in South Korea. Further, the CIA disagreed with MacArthur's assessment of the combat potential of South Korean defense forces and argued that an energetic program of U.S. assistance and training would eventually enable them to withstand a communist attack. Doubting whether South Korea could acquire such capabilities before the end of 1949, the CIA recommended postponing complete U.S. withdrawal until the beginning of 1950 and using the additional time to upgrade South Korean forces for large-scale field operations.⁶³

Although State, Navy, and Air Force intelligence organizations concurred in the CIA estimate, Army intelligence dissented, arguing that a North Korean invasion should be regarded as a "possibility rather than a probability" and that the real issue was not South Korea's military vulnerability but its political and economic weaknesses, which left the country susceptible to a communist takeover without war. Reversing the CIA's argument, Army intelligence wondered what the United States could gain by committing additional resources to a regime that appeared destined to collapse under the weight of its own internal defects:

If continued economic and military aid to the Republic of Korea, to the extent presently projected, plus the presence of a United Nations Commission, are not sufficient to sustain South Korean morale and will to resist

Communist expansion, it appears doubtful that the presence of a small United States combat force would do so.⁶⁴

Against this background of widely differing advice, the State Department, assisted by the NSC staff, prepared a report (NSC 8/1) that endeavored to provide an acceptable middle course of action. The paper supported MacArthur's view on the necessity for prompt withdrawal but warned that as long as hostile forces were present in the North, South Korea should continue to receive political support as well as economic, technical, and military assistance. To implement this policy, the United States should remove the last of its combat troops by 30 June 1949 and, in the process of leaving, transfer to ROK defense forces a six-month stockpile of military equipment and supplies together with an emergency reserve. Also, the United States should establish a permanent military advisory mission and seek legislative authority for a continuing program of military assistance. Specifically, the report called for U.S. support of a ROK army of 65,000 troops that would be "capable of maintaining internal order [and] assuring border security"; a navy for coastal defense; and an adequate police force.*⁶⁵

After examining these recommendations, the Joint Chiefs on 22 March presented Forrestal with a list of suggested changes. Their main worry was that NSC 8/1 would obligate the United States to furnish South Korea with major air and naval support. For purposes of clarification, they recommended that a provision be added limiting any air detachments to those "suitable for maintaining internal order . . . [and] border security" and that references to a ROK navy be changed to "ROK Coast Guard." The NSC accepted these recommendations and forwarded the amended paper (NSC 8/2) to President Truman, who approved it on 23 March.⁶⁶ Shortly thereafter, the Army completed plans for the phased withdrawal of all remaining American troops by the end of June 1949 and began turning over to ROK security forces surplus equipment with an estimated replacement value of \$110 million.⁶⁷

On 20 April the United States extended *de jure* recognition to the ROK as the sole legitimate government of Korea. As news of the impending withdrawal circulated through South Korea, State Department observers reported "a sense

* With regard to the objectives of the military assistance program, NSC 8/1 contained an apparent internal contradiction. In its analysis, NSC 8/1 called for a buildup of forces "capable of serving effectively as a deterrent to external aggression and a guarantor of internal order in South Korea." The report's conclusions, however, spoke of forces capable only of preservation of internal order and border security, and set specific limits on the size of the force the United States would assist. This inconsistency was apparently never noticed either by the NSC or by the Joint Chiefs when they reviewed the paper; nor did it have any real bearing on the size of the envisioned program, since only the report's conclusions constituted operative policy.

of crisis bordering on panic" spreading "from high government circles to the people at large." Fearing that the North Koreans would try to take advantage of the situation by stepping up infiltration of the South, Ambassador Muccio on 26 April asked the U.S. Army to provide the ROK Coast Guard with 30 additional patrol boats. The Army, citing its previous substantial assistance to the South Korean Coast Guard, felt that Muccio's request was unjustified. To pressure the Army into compliance, the State Department refused to concur in the issuance of final withdrawal orders to local U.S. commanders in Korea.⁶⁸ At the Army's urging, Secretary Johnson on 4 May wrote Acheson, pointing out that delays had already caused "serious logistical and budgetary problems" and that further postponement would mean additional expense. Acheson's response was noncommittal, but a few days later, after consulting with Muccio, State waived its objections and the withdrawal proceeded on schedule.⁶⁹

Completion of the withdrawal of U.S. forces on 29 June 1949 marked a significant new phase in U.S.-South Korean relations, but it did not mean an abdication of American responsibility. Technically, South Korea was now a fully independent and sovereign country, but as a practical matter it remained heavily dependent on U.S. aid and support for both solvency and security. Acknowledging a continuing obligation, the Army on 1 July established a United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) consisting of 500 officers and enlisted men under the command of Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts. KMAG then became an integral part of the American Mission in Korea (AMIK) and operated under the administrative control of Ambassador Muccio.⁷⁰

To ensure provision of the military assistance called for in NSC 8/2, President Truman asked Congress to include money for Korea in a comprehensive military assistance program proposed in July. As finally approved in October, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 named Korea, Iran, and the Philippines as grant aid recipients under Title III. Of the \$28 million earmarked for these countries in fiscal year 1950, \$10.2 million was tentatively set aside for Korea.*

In arriving at this figure for South Korea, the Truman administration took into account a variety of factors. First, commitments in Europe and the Middle East were judged more important and had prior claim to aid money. Preparing Korean forces to resist full-scale communist aggression was not—and never had been—an avowed policy objective. As NSC 8/2 made clear, the purpose of the American assistance program in Korea was to create forces of sufficient size and strength to assure internal order and maintain border security. Also, U.S. observ-

* The origins and development of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program are discussed in detail in Chapter XVII. Also see Kaplan, *A Community of Interests*, 35-49.

ers in Korea doubted that the South Korean economy could effectively absorb large amounts of military aid or that the ROK forces would use it for the purposes intended. Moreover, President Rhee, given to vehement anticommunism and unpredictable behavior, remained a big question mark. On one occasion, in the summer of 1949, General Roberts warned that the establishment of high levels of ammunition stocks in South Korea might encourage the ROK to launch a preemptive attack against the North. Until the United States could be certain of Rhee's intentions, prudence dictated a policy of caution in shipping arms to South Korea.⁷¹

At the same time, it was obvious that South Korea faced very real and serious problems of internal and border security that only the United States could help solve. Marauding guerrillas and communist-inspired internal disorders were nearly everyday occurrences and posed a continuing challenge to the stability of the ROK government. Frequent clashes along the 38th parallel between ROK and North Korean forces added to the tension. Above all, there loomed the shadow of invasion from the North, supported possibly by Communist China and/or the Soviet Union. In addition, South Korea's economy was a shambles, with rampant inflation and shortages of key items. Without outside military assistance, South Korea could not support adequate security forces or maintain complex modern weapons.⁷²

The actual provision of aid to Korea depended on a number of preliminary actions, including negotiation of a bilateral aid agreement, which was not signed until January 1950; a detailed on-the-spot review of ROK requirements by a U.S. survey team; and approval of a final program for procurement action by the Director of Mutual Defense Assistance. Only then did the State Department begin approving the allocation of funds to Defense. Further delay occurred because, under the JCS-assigned priorities, major portions of the equipment earmarked for Korea were not available from excess or war reserve stocks and had to be ordered from commercial sources under new contracts. Hence it was that by June 1950, on the eve of the North Korean attack, only about \$52,000 worth of signal equipment and \$298,000 worth of spare parts were en route to South Korea; less than \$1,000 worth of materials had actually arrived.⁷³

In the opinion of U.S. officials in Seoul, the major deficiency of the program was the failure to adapt to growing South Korean requirements. As early as September 1949 Roberts and Muccio expressed concern that the United States was underestimating ROK needs in the face of what appeared to be a North Korean buildup of sizable proportions. They were skeptical that \$10 million would be sufficient to maintain effective South Korean security and stated that the only feasible objective within these fiscal restraints would be to replenish the arms and equipment on hand. Citing preliminary intelligence reports, they

warned that North Korea was acquiring modern Soviet fighter aircraft and advised that the Republic of Korea felt compelled to obtain comparable weapons from the U.S. or other Western suppliers and would do so with its own available resources if the United States did not provide them as aid. The following month Muccio confirmed that the ROK Army had recently expanded from 65,000 to 100,000 men and hinted that the United States should adjust its assistance accordingly. In view of the recent communist victory in China and Soviet support of North Korea, Muccio did not consider these figures excessive.⁷⁴

By the beginning of 1950, Roberts and Muccio both pressed for increased military assistance to South Korea. In his first semiannual report in January 1950, Roberts pointed out that North Korea continued to receive considerable Soviet military aid. He estimated that the North Korean Army could mobilize in seven days for a three-division assault against the South through the Wonsan-Seoul corridor. To help counter this threat, Roberts recommended \$9.8 million in additional MDAP aid. He proposed funds for fighter and transport aircraft, improved armaments for the ROK Coast Guard, and additional signal and engineering equipment, long-range howitzers, and machine guns and heavy mortars for the ROK Army. Strongly endorsing Roberts's proposals, Muccio asked that they receive prompt and careful study.⁷⁵

These proposals appeared to have little chance of acceptance given the cost-cutting mood in Washington and the low priority assigned Korea by the JCS. According to Acheson, an appeal to Congress for additional money was simply out of the question. "There was great Congressional hostility to American activities in Korea," Acheson recalled.

This, I think, was in part a real lack of interest in the Congress in Korea—it seemed to them a long way off, something not intimately connected with American interests, a further drain of money. It was also used, from time to time, by some of the people in Congress as a method of harassing the Administration on its Far Eastern policy. . . . [We] always operated on a rather thin margin of popular support and congressional support.⁷⁶

For the administration, the overriding question was whether increased aid was necessary and consistent with approved policy. To explore these points further, the State Department asked General Lemnitzer, Director of OSD's Office of Military Assistance, to prepare an assessment. Lemnitzer replied that, from a purely military standpoint, the current level of assistance accorded with existing policy guidelines; any increase might require a revision of NSC 8/2. He found most controversial Roberts's request for Korean air support, which Lemnitzer termed "beyond the concept" of agreed policy. Even so, he declined to state that the requested aid was unnecessary and suggested that while there appeared to be


no military justification, he was willing to abide by a decision reached solely on the basis of political considerations.⁷⁷

Shortly after, Muccio returned to Washington for extended consultations. Meeting with Lemnitzer and other Defense representatives on 10 May, Muccio reiterated his endorsement of additional assistance and drew attention to the necessity of filling "gaps" in the South Korean defense posture, including lack of protection from air attack and insufficient coastal patrol capabilities. Lemnitzer adhered to his earlier position that the question of additional aid was essentially political and that only the State Department could resolve it. South Korea, he noted, was not considered vital to overall American strategic interests in the Far East, to which the ambassador agreed. As for air support, Lemnitzer reminded Muccio that existing policy did not permit support of a South Korean air force but that Defense would approve such assistance if NSC 8/2 were suitably amended.⁷⁸

As a result of the Muccio meeting, the State Department on 15 May forwarded to Lemnitzer a revised proposal for additional Korean assistance. Omitting the earlier request from Roberts for air support, State proposed a supplement of \$5.8 million—\$4.5 million for the ROK Army and \$1.3 million for the Coast Guard. A few days later, noting that Defense had informally agreed to raise no objections if State recommended additional assistance, OSD transmitted the revised proposal to the Joint Chiefs for examination. However, the matter became academic with the North Korean invasion on 25 June and the subsequent need for massive emergency assistance on a scale never before contemplated. In July OSD instructed the Joint Chiefs to cancel their study.⁷⁹

The Emerging Conflict in Southeast Asia

Compared with Korea and Japan, where the United States maintained substantial forces after World War II, Southeast Asia was an area of minimal U.S. involvement and therefore received less attention in OSD than any other part of the Far East before events in China required a rapid reassessment in 1949–50. Other than in the Philippines, where U.S. bases and other concessions created inherent obligations, reinforcing long-term ties, the United States had no special interest in Southeast Asia, although the JCS considered it an area of high strategic importance. During World War II the United States had tried to discourage the revival of European empires in the area and, to this extent, offered tacit support for anticolonial and nationalist aspirations. But with the advent of communist rule in China in 1949, U.S. attention turned increasingly to the establishment of a line of containment, as in Europe, to block further communist



Southeast Asia (1950)

expansion. In particular, the prospect of a French collapse in Indochina, serving perhaps as the catalyst for communist takeovers elsewhere in Southeast Asia, most alarmed OSD officials. With funds and legislative authority readily available, they wasted no time in developing, in collaboration with the State Department, a program of military assistance.

A French colony since the 19th century, Indochina was in many respects the jewel of the French Union, certainly the most profitable and, in terms of natural resources, perhaps the richest French possession. After the Japanese occupation of Indochina in 1941, the French authorities there remained loyal to the pro-Axis Vichy government in France. When the United States recaptured the Philippines, the Japanese grew fearful of an attack on Indochina and in March 1945 took precautions against the French changing sides by throwing out the colonial regime. After Japan surrendered, the French landed a force of more than 20,000 troops in Indochina but found their control challenged by a well-organized resistance movement, the Vietnam Independence League, or Viet Minh, under the leadership of the veteran communist revolutionary, Ho Chi Minh. In striving to broaden his base of support, Ho played down ideology and stressed economic and social reform, giving his movement the appearance of a nationalist rebellion. Efforts to negotiate a settlement proved abortive and, as neither side appeared able or willing to offer significant concessions, a guerrilla war of steadily growing proportions began to engulf the country.⁸⁰

Prior to 1949 and the communist victory in China, the United States tried to avoid direct involvement in French efforts to regain control of Indochina. During World War II, President Roosevelt strongly opposed the restoration of French authority and instructed the State Department to study the feasibility of placing Indochina under international trusteeship. After the war, however, these plans gave way before an overriding desire in Washington to preserve close U.S.-French cooperation and collaboration in Europe. The United States adopted a neutral position on Indochina that gave France a free hand to operate as long as its presence in the area had local popular support.⁸¹

By 1948 Forrestal began to receive State Department reports suggesting that France was losing the struggle for Indochina. At the time, the State Department saw no conclusive evidence of direct contact between the Viet Minh and the Soviet Union.⁸² But in his diary Forrestal recorded a different view emerging from a conversation in July with former Ambassador to the Soviet Union William C. Bullitt, recently back from a trip to Indochina. Bullitt had no doubt about the communist orientation of the insurgency; while he favored some reduction of the French presence in Indochina and increased reliance on local security forces, he also warned that a complete French withdrawal would be the same as "turning over this vast area to the Communists led by Ho Chi Minh." Forrestal

offered no observations of his own on Bullitt's warning. His more immediate concern appeared to be that France now had 100,000 of its "best troops" tied down in Asia while the Berlin crisis threatened Europe.*⁸³

As the months passed, French control in Indochina continued to slip, even as authorities in Paris pumped more men and equipment into the conflict. Amid reports of a worsening situation, State's Policy Planning Staff conducted an in-depth study and in July 1949 forwarded its findings to the NSC. The Planning Staff report (NSC 51) acknowledged that "the Indochinese situation is in an advanced stage of deterioration" and criticized the French Government for squandering its resources on a mission "which can be justified only in terms of Gallic mystique." State was concerned that France was diverting American economic assistance designated for home recovery to help shore up her military and political position in Southeast Asia. A "constructive solution" of the conflict, State maintained, depended on the French "yielding their claims of sovereignty to a native regime."⁸⁴

With the communist takeover in China, the United States reversed its position, gradually adopting a more active role in Southeast Asia and shedding its neutralist stance for one of open support of the French and their Vietnamese allies.⁸⁵ In December 1949, the NSC completed another detailed review of the Far East (NSC 48/1) and, anticipating the domino theory, found a possible link between the communist victory in China and the instability in Southeast Asia.† The NSC report observed that "if southeast Asia also is swept by communism we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia."⁸⁶

In early 1950 the State Department initiated a reexamination of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Defense Department proceeded to program the \$75 million appropriated by Congress in October 1949 for military aid to the "general area of China" under Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. Johnson favored allocating the bulk of the money to Formosa but was overruled by President Truman, acting on Acheson's advice. Eliminating Formosa as a recipient in effect left most of the funds to Southeast Asia.‡ On 20 January 1950, citing continuing communist "penetration into Southeast Asia," the Joint Chiefs proposed a military assistance program that allocated \$15 million for Indochina and \$10 million for Thailand. Johnson and Acheson both endorsed the proposal, and on 10 March Truman approved it in principle.⁸⁷

* The Berlin crisis is discussed in Chapter X.

† The State Department defined Southeast Asia as including the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, and Burma.

‡ Small amounts from this fund later went to Japan and Korea.

Acheson, while fully committed to this assistance, was not eager for it to begin until he had wrung certain concessions from the French, preferably direct Vietnamese participation in the program and a promise from Paris that ultimately, after the communists had been defeated, Indochina would gain independence.⁸⁸ Johnson and the Joint Chiefs supported these objectives, but they thought that Acheson was making a mistake by delaying action. "It appears obvious from intelligence estimates," the Joint Chiefs warned, "that the situation in Southeast Asia has deteriorated and without United States assistance, this deterioration will be accelerated." Arguing that containment of communist expansion should take priority, the JCS urged "early implementation of military aid programs for Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma."⁸⁹

Acheson's efforts to exact concessions availed little and seemed to officials in the Pentagon a waste of precious time. The French commander in Indochina, General Marcel Carpentier, considered his Vietnamese allies incompetent and resisted giving them a voice in any aid program, while authorities in Paris refused to discuss the political future of Indochina as long as fighting continued. Acheson readily conceded that French footdragging, along with the refusal of the British and Dutch to accept any responsibility, posed a serious dilemma. "The United States," he remarked, "can't take it over and we can't allow them [the Europeans] to walk out on us. We need every bit of help that we can possibly get."⁹⁰

Meanwhile, Johnson continued to press for a decision to move ahead, looking to the NSC for support. On 18 April 1950 the council adopted NSC 64, addressed directly to the growing conflict in Indochina. Based on a State Department draft, NSC 64 asserted that "the threat of communist aggression against Indochina is only one phase of anticipated communist plans to seize all of Southeast Asia." As preventive action, the paper urged State and Defense to prepare "as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures designed to protect United States security interests in Indochina." Johnson did not consider this statement sufficiently inclusive and suggested that the program be extended to all the threatened countries of Southeast Asia. Truman, while approving the report, took note of Johnson's suggestion and stipulated that he wanted to review proposals based on the paper.⁹¹

With definite objectives now set, assistance for Indochina acquired fresh momentum. In Defense the shipment of aid to Indochina received a priority "higher than any other military assistance program." On 1 May, to expedite the transfer of arms, President Truman released to Defense \$13 million of the \$75 million in Section 303 funds. And on 8 May, at a meeting in Paris, Acheson and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman exchanged pledges of mutual support and cooperation in Indochina. This agreement cleared the way for the

inauguration of aid shipments later that same month and led also to an intensified examination of French equipment priorities, after which the Joint Chiefs in June recommended an additional \$16 million for Indochina.⁹² By the eve of the Korean War the United States had taken the fateful first steps that would eventually lead to direct involvement in the struggle for Indochina.

Establishing a firm U.S. policy in the Far East during the years between World War II and the Korean War was difficult given the constant turmoil and convulsion in that troubled region of the world. As in Europe, the consistent objective of U.S. policy was to contain communist expansion. But unlike the actions it took in Europe, the Truman administration hesitated to invest heavily in Asia lest it weaken the U.S. position elsewhere. Although the debacle in China prompted a partial reassessment, U.S. policy in the Far East, for the most part, became firmly established only after the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950.

Before 1950, only in Japan did the United States appear determined to draw the line against communist advances in Asia. As the Chinese Communists moved toward ultimate victory in 1949, the State Department sought to strengthen ties with Japan by expediting negotiation of a peace treaty—a move deemed premature by Louis Johnson and the Joint Chiefs. Yet despite their disagreement, State and Defense concurred that Japan should remain firmly within the U.S. sphere of influence. By the summer of 1950 the broad outlines of a settlement were beginning to emerge and the following year would produce a treaty. The groundwork had been laid, with the Cold War in Asia the major stimulant, for the transformation of Japan from a defeated enemy into a close ally.

Beyond Japan, however, U.S. policy envisioned limited commitments that followed logically from the Truman-Acheson philosophy of "Europe first." As for Korea, its sharp division along the 38th parallel between communist and noncommunist regimes had been clearly established by 1950. While the United States supported the new government in Seoul with economic and military aid to prevent a communist takeover, it did not consider South Korea vital to its security interests. The Joint Chiefs, Secretary of State Acheson, and President Truman all placed South Korea outside the U.S. "defense perimeter" in the Western Pacific. U.S. military forces, except for an advisory group, had all left by mid-1949. Although Korea was soon to become a hot area of the Cold War, the extensive military involvement of the United States in that conflict was not anticipated and was certainly not ordained by policy decisions taken prior to June 1950.

The other Asian area of looming importance, Indochina, was also only of secondary concern to U.S. policymakers until 1950. To assist the French against the growing Viet Minh insurgency, the United States initiated a modest military aid program in the spring of 1950. Thus began a process of involvement that was to mushroom into massive proportions in the 1960s. But despite the increased attention given it by the NSC in 1950, Indochina remained one of the smallest recipients of U.S. aid until the Korean War.

The role of the Defense Department in Asia from 1947 to 25 June 1950 was to assist in the practical implementation of policy and programs formulated for the most part by the State Department, the NSC, and the President. This meant maintaining occupation forces in Japan and Korea, giving aid to the Chinese Nationalists in their struggle against the Communists, and administering military assistance programs for Asian recipients. Forrestal and Johnson both consistently urged a higher level of attention and effort, feeling that the Far East potentially held as much importance as Europe for the United States. But their influence on policy was marginal, and where occasional disputes arose between the Defense and State Departments the latter usually prevailed. Not until the communist attack on South Korea did the Truman administration accord the Far East the increased attention and priority that the Defense Department had been calling for.

CHAPTER X

The Berlin Crisis

From the spring of 1948 to the summer of 1949, the most dangerous national security issue that confronted the United States was the crisis in Germany, centering on the city of Berlin. The immediate cause of the emergency was the decision by the Soviet Union to blockade all highway, rail, and canal traffic into the city from the west—an effort apparently calculated to force American, British, and French authorities to relinquish control of Berlin's western sectors. A flash point of Cold War tension, located 110 miles inside the Soviet-occupied portion of Germany, Berlin was exceedingly vulnerable to Soviet pressure. If the Western powers could be forced out, their prestige and influence would be severely—perhaps irreparably—damaged throughout Germany and across Europe as well. Recognizing the high stakes involved, the Western powers chose not to retreat and held their ground at the risk of war.

The "German Question"

Writing in the summer of 1946, while still Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal observed that of the many trouble spots around the globe, Germany was of key importance to "the whole question of destruction or peace."¹ Indeed, for almost a century perhaps no other country had caused more anxiety or had done more, directly or indirectly, to destabilize world affairs. Even as World War II reduced much of Germany to rubble, the question of Germany's future weighed heavily on those searching for peace and stability in Europe.


Forrestal probably had in mind less the prospect of Germany once again becoming an aggressor than the overall complexity of solving the so-called

"German question" at a time of deteriorating Soviet-American relations. At the end of World War II the primary aims of postwar U.S. policy had been to reduce Germany's war-making capacity through denazification, demilitarization, and deindustrialization, and to work for effective and lasting cooperation with the Soviet Union in rebuilding a peaceful and nonaggressive German state.² By September 1947, when Forrestal became Secretary of Defense, U.S. attitudes and policy toward Germany had changed significantly.

Much of the East-West difficulty over Germany arose from the political and administrative agreements negotiated in 1944-45 which divided the country into four zones of Allied occupation. Under the governing authority of an Allied Control Council (ACC), American, British, and French forces occupied the western two-thirds of Germany while Soviet forces exercised control in the east.³ According to the Potsdam agreement of 1945, these arrangements were meant to be temporary; their purpose, in addition to assuring Germany's complete pacification, was to provide a framework in which political and economic reforms would take place, leading eventually to the regeneration of a united, peaceful, and democratic nation.⁴

Also in 1945, the Allies divided Berlin, the capital city and center of German culture, into four separate sectors and vested authority for the city's administration in a quadripartite Kommandatura. From the beginning of the occupation, Soviet authorities implicitly recognized the Western powers' right of transit across the eastern zone. For purposes of access and supply, the Western powers had use of one railway, on which they operated military trains to and from Berlin; one main highway for motor convoys; and three air corridors. Freight too heavy or too expensive to transport by these means came in via barge through a series of canals. But except for an air control agreement negotiated in the fall of 1945, Western access to Berlin was not spelled out and confirmed by written guarantee.⁵

On the level of the Allied Control Council, the breakdown of quadripartite government occurred within a year of its inception, eventually producing the division of Germany between East and West. Major differences existed from the beginning of the occupation, but not until the spring of 1946, when the United States stopped German reparation deliveries from its zone to the Soviet Union, did the conflict come into the open. The United States and Britain insisted that Germany be economically self-sufficient and that industrial production for peaceful purposes (i.e., to meet the minimum needs of the German economy and to provide exports to offset the cost of essential imports) be restored. The Soviet Union, with support from France, voiced fears that a revived German economy would be the prelude to Germany's remilitarization. The Soviets, and to a lesser extent the French, argued that self-sufficiency should be secondary to the col-



Berlin (1949)

lection of reparations and favored keeping Germany as a whole economically weak and dependent. Moving to break the deadlock, the United States proposed a treaty guaranteeing Germany's demilitarization for a period from 25 to 40 years. The Soviet Union, without explanation, ignored the offer.⁶

From this point on, relations between East and West in Germany deteriorated steadily. In the absence of Soviet cooperation in the ACC, the United States and Britain took steps late in 1946 to establish central German agencies for administering the economies of their two zones as one.⁷ On the other side, the Soviet Union operated similar quasi-governmental agencies with the assistance of German agents trained in Moscow during the war.⁸ Zonal boundaries, originally drawn only for administrative purposes, gradually became dividing lines between two competitive systems with their own political, economic, and social values. The Soviet zone evolved into a regimented, socialistic, communist-run "people's democracy" similar to the Soviet-installed regimes in Eastern Europe, while in the U.S., British, and French zones the trend was toward free enterprise and parliamentary democracy.

By 1947 the East-West struggle over Germany had reached a critical state; in Washington a reassessment of policy appeared urgent. Along with "containing" communism under the Truman Doctrine and offering extensive reconstruction aid under the Marshall Plan, the United States began to regard Germany in a fresh light—no longer as a dread enemy but rather as a possible friend and partner whose great potential for assisting and sustaining economic growth appeared vital to Europe's rehabilitation. Reflecting this new outlook, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs collaborated in drafting revised orders for the U.S. Military Governor in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay. The resulting directive (JCS 1779), issued in July 1947, empowered Clay to initiate currency reform and other constructive measures to enhance Germany's ability to establish a sound and balanced economy.⁹ The following April, when delegates of the 16 participating countries gathered in London to conclude administrative arrangements for the Marshall Plan, West German representatives joined them.¹⁰

Despite the progressive disintegration of quadripartite control, both the Western powers and the Soviet Union continued to insist on German reunification as their ultimate objective. The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) meeting in London late in 1947 addressed the issue, but no agreement resulted. The Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov, pressed hard for the resumption of reparation payments, while Secretary of State Marshall refused unless the Soviet Union in exchange would agree to a self-supporting German economy that would not require outside subsidy. Marshall called for an accounting of goods, especially industrial plants, machinery, and equipment, that the Soviets had removed unilaterally from the eastern zone since the beginning of the occupation. Molotov

refused to provide such information in the absence of assurances that the Western powers would open their zones to the collection of reparations by the Soviet Union. He stated bluntly that the Allies had no right to demand data on economic policies in any individual zone. Unable to resolve their differences, the foreign ministers adjourned on 15 December and set no date for reconvening.¹¹

The March War Scare and Its Aftermath

After the breakup of the London CFM meeting, the rift between East and West in Europe continued to widen. Neither side could propose a solution to the German issue that the other would accept. Thereafter, events, pointing ominously toward a possible armed confrontation, moved swiftly.

The collapse of the negotiations in London apparently served as the signal in Moscow for a reappraisal of policy, resulting in the adoption of tough tactics aimed at consolidating Soviet control over East Germany. Stalin, at a meeting with Bulgarian and Yugoslav representatives some time in January 1948, confirmed the new course. "The West," he declared, "will make Western Germany their own, and we shall turn Eastern Germany into our own state."¹² Even as Stalin spoke, the Soviets went ahead with plans involving troop movements and other alarming demonstrations of strength to create a war scare and pressure the Western powers out of Berlin. As if to test the effectiveness of this strategy, Soviet authorities on 6 January demanded inspection of a U.S. military freight train entering the eastern zone and, on 24 January, forced the removal of German passengers from a British train.¹³

The following month the Soviets turned their attention to Scandinavia, demanding that Norway and Finland sign "mutual assistance" treaties that would allow Soviet forces to pass through and fortify certain portions of their territory. Norway promised to study the matter and, in the meantime, made urgent requests to London and Washington for military aid to strengthen its defenses. But Finland, with long borders that left it extremely vulnerable to Soviet invasion, was in no position to offer resistance. Rumors circulated through Helsinki that the Communist Minister of the Interior, Yrjo Leino, was plotting a putsch that would turn Finland into a Soviet satellite. Without further delay, the Finnish Government in late March opened negotiations and on 6 April signed a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the drama shifted to Czechoslovakia, the only East European country that had thus far escaped Soviet domination. Since World War II Eduard Benes, the country's veteran President, and Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister and son of the republic's founder, had tried to steer a course of nonalignment

between East and West. But when they applied for Czech participation in the Marshall Plan in 1947, they apparently tilted too far to the West for Moscow's comfort and triggered growing Soviet pressure on their government.

The crisis reached a head in late February 1948, when Valerian Zorin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, paid an unexpected visit to Prague. Shortly after Zorin's arrival, Prime Minister Klement Gottwald, leader of the Czech Communist Party, called for a general strike and demanded that Benes accept the resignation of all noncommunists in the cabinet. Benes, faced with anti-government demonstrations and unsure of support from the army, capitulated on 25 February and turned over all important cabinet posts to communists, except the foreign ministry, which remained under Masaryk. Within a fortnight, on 10 March, Masaryk's body was found in the cement courtyard of the foreign ministry beneath his office window. Czech authorities labeled the death a "suicide," an explanation that failed to still suspicions in the West that Masaryk had been murdered either by or on orders from Soviet agents.¹⁵

As the signs of a more aggressive Soviet foreign policy became unmistakable, anxieties in the West began to build. Although intelligence analysts found it difficult to predict where the Soviet Union might move next, many suspected that it would be in Berlin, where local U.S. authorities had been reporting stepped-up harassment and other signs of trouble for several months. Responding to these warnings, Army staff planners issued a study in January which speculated that if the Soviets wanted to put pressure on Berlin, the most likely method would be the creation of "administrative difficulties" to hamper Western access to and from the city. In this event, the report recommended that the United States and its allies make every effort to stay in Berlin as long as possible and use air supply where feasible to provision their garrisons. The study suggested that to avoid alienating the local population the Soviets would develop plans to feed Berlin from Soviet Zone supplies before cutting off Western sources. "In any event," the study added, "it would be impossible for the western powers to supply the approximately 2,000,000 civilians in the western sectors of Berlin by air if ground supply channels from the Western Zones were disrupted." The study advised efforts to retaliate if the Soviets moved to force the Western powers out of Berlin and acknowledged that under certain circumstances U.S. forces might have to leave.¹⁶

After reading a preliminary copy of the Army report, Forrestal sensed the need for more detailed plans. He asked whether the report had been discussed with the State Department and whether the Army should refer the subject to the National Security Council. Secretary Royall responded that the State Department concurred in the revised report and saw no reason to refer it to the NSC because the Army, Air Force, and State agreed on the proposed actions.

Some members of Forrestal's staff talked of holding consultations with British and French authorities but apparently dropped the idea in the absence of clear evidence of Soviet intentions.¹⁷

After the Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia matters appeared to take a turn for the worse. The distressing news from Prague, followed shortly after, on 5 March, by a warning telegram from General Clay in Berlin that the Soviets might be planning some kind of military move that could lead to war, sounded an alarm in the West. Evidence suggests that the idea of the telegram may have originated with Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, Army Director of Intelligence, who was in Berlin during the last week of February for consultations with Clay. During their talks, Chamberlin drew attention to the pitiful state of readiness of U.S. forces and the need to rally congressional and public opinion in support of increased military appropriations. The sequence of events suggests that Chamberlin invited Clay to sound an alarm. Clay, insisting that his intelligence reports showed nothing to arouse suspicion, was at first reluctant to voice concern. But after Chamberlin left, Clay gave further thought to the matter and decided to send a message to Washington. Actually, the primary purpose of Clay's message, according to the editor of his papers, "was to assist the military chiefs in their Congressional testimony; it was not, in Clay's opinion, related to any change in Soviet strategy."¹⁸

Clay's "war warning," as the telegram was later referred to in the Pentagon, reached Washington on 5 March through special channels to insure security. Addressing his comments to Chamberlin, Clay said:

For many months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitudes which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness. I cannot support this change in my own thinking with any data or outward evidence in relationships other than to describe it as a feeling of a new tenseness in every Soviet individual with whom we have official relations. I am unable to submit any official report in the absence of supporting data but my feeling is real. You may advise the Chief of Staff [Bradley] of this for what it may be worth if you feel it advisable.¹⁹

Within hours, Chamberlin and Royall had briefed Forrestal on the contents of Clay's message and an Army intelligence unit had begun a "crash estimate" of its possible implications. By evening the word had apparently reached the top echelons of the Navy and the Air Force.²⁰ Unaware of Clay's warning, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, David E. Lilienthal, arrived at the

Pentagon to have dinner with Forrestal and the service secretaries. "When I came into Royall's office," Lilienthal remembered,

he was asking (and later we all explored the question): How long would it take to get a number of "eggs" to, say, the Mediterranean? . . . Symington said the American public was completely misinformed about how quickly we could go into action and what we could do. And so on; it was a rather grim hour of this kind of talk.²¹

Forrestal's calendar shows that the next morning, 6 March, he went to the White House. There is no evidence that he discussed the cable with the President, but it seems more likely than not.²² During the week an ad hoc interdepartmental Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), under CIA chairmanship, took over from the Army the job of evaluating Clay's estimate. On 8 March Forrestal briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee in closed session on universal military training. Although there is no evidence that he discussed the Clay message at the hearing, stories of the telegram's existence began circulating in the press. But when asked at a news conference on 10 March whether he had received a "letter" from Clay, Forrestal stated simply: "I have had no such message."²³

By throwing reporters off, Forrestal was obviously trying to dampen rumors that he probably did not want to confirm without the benefit of further study. Also, he may not have thought that the situation was as serious as Clay had suggested. After his news conference, he and the Joint Chiefs flew to Key West, Fla., where for the next four days they spent most of their time thrashing out a settlement on service roles and missions.* The discussions at these meetings may well have been affected in some measure by the knowledge of the Clay telegram. When they returned to Washington on 15 March, Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs carried with them recommendations that the President should act quickly to increase the military budget, reinstitute selective service, and transfer custody of atomic weapons from the AEC to the armed forces.²⁴

Back in Washington, Forrestal immediately encountered what seemed to him a full-blown war scare. "Papers this morning," he wrote in his diary, "[are] full of rumors and portents of war." He went on:

The fact is, that this country and its government are desperately anxious to avoid war. It is simply a question of how best to do it. If all Europe lies flat while the Russian mob tramps over it, we will then be faced with a war under difficult circumstances, and with a very good chance of losing it.

* See Chapter XIV.

It is inconceivable that even the gang who run Russia would be willing to take on war, but one always has to remember that there seemed to be no reason in 1939 for Hitler to start war, and yet he did, and he started it with a world practically unprepared. Our effort now is to try to make the Russians see the folly of continuing an aggression which will lead to war, or, if it is impossible to restore them to sanity, that we at least have a start which will enable us to prevent being caught flat-footed as we were in 1941.²⁵

The uncertainties that ran through Forrestal's mind also influenced the thinking of intelligence analysts on the IAC who had been given the job of assessing the accuracy and implications of Clay's warning. After several days of wrangling, the committee finally agreed on a compromise estimate that accepted the seriousness of the situation but played down the imminent possibility of war.²⁶ On the morning of 16 March Admiral Hillenkoetter, DCI, hand-carried to the White House a brief memorandum (IM-21) presenting the views of the intelligence community:

- a. An examination of all pertinent available information has produced no reliable evidence that the USSR intends to resort to military action within the next sixty days.
- b. The weight of logic, as well as evidence, also leads to the conclusion that the USSR will not resort to military action within the next sixty days.
- c. There is, nonetheless, the ever present possibility that some miscalculation or incident may result in military movements towards areas, at present unoccupied by the USSR.²⁷

After receiving these cautiously worded findings, President Truman decided that the gravity of the situation in Europe warranted precautionary action. In fact, even before he received the committee's report he had directed his speechwriters to prepare a message to Congress warning of a possible emergency. Unless Congress acted, he told a White House staff meeting on 16 March, the country would be "sunk." The next day, before a joint session of Congress, he affirmed his determination to resist the "ruthless" ways and "growing menace" of Soviet expansion. In what many listeners, including Forrestal, thought was a call for rearmament, Truman urged swift funding of the European Recovery Program, enactment of legislation for UMT, and temporary reinstatement of selective service. Later that same day, House and Senate committees scheduled hearings on a supplement to the military budget.²⁸

Truman's address laid to rest in the United States, at least momentarily, the fear of imminent war. None of the measures Truman proposed could be put into effect overnight; a buildup of U.S. forces, whether through UMT or selective service, would take months or years and was not really a response to the possibility of an immediate conflict. But the idea that the administration was doing something—that it appreciated the danger and was prepared to act—effectively restored calm in an atmosphere of impending crisis. The lesson, Forrestal noted, was “that we have to show conclusively and by decisive legislative action, providing for an immediate as well as long-range strength, that the United States intends to be strong and to hold that strength ready to keep the world both at peace and free.”²⁹

Soviet Interference with Access to Berlin

The Dulles-Correa-Jackson committee * later investigated the March crisis and rendered the judgment that intelligence analysts had initially overreacted to the possible threat of war and had then corrected their mistake by pinning down “a brief short range estimate.” Indeed, by the end of March, the intelligence community, except for the Air Force, which continued to be nervous, generally believed that the danger of war had been greatly exaggerated and that the situation in Europe could again be regarded as militarily stable. In a followup to its report of 16 March, the IAC on 2 April issued new findings, stating that as of 30 March, the “preponderance of available evidence and of considerations derived from the ‘logic of the situation’ supports the conclusion that the USSR will not resort to direct military action during 1948.”³⁰

Although war now appeared unlikely, tensions persisted. In the weeks immediately following the President's speech to Congress, Soviet pressure on Berlin steadily increased. On 20 March, Soviet representatives walked out of the Allied Control Council, ending all semblance of quadripartite government. Ten days later, amid reports of unusual Soviet troop maneuvers in East Germany, Soviet authorities in Berlin announced that new regulations governing transit in and out of the city would take effect on 1 April. These regulations would require (1) that Allied personnel traveling through the Soviet zone present identity documents; (2) that military freight shipments brought in by train be cleared through Soviet checkpoints and obtain Soviet shipping permits; and (3) that all baggage, except personal belongings, be inspected by Soviet authorities.³¹

U.S. officials, both in Berlin and Washington, reacted with renewed concern. Viewing the imposition of these regulations as a “serious matter” that could make “our life in Berlin . . . impossible,” Clay notified his superiors in Washington

* See Chapter V.

that "it is my intent to instruct our guards to open fire if Soviet soldiers attempt to enter our trains."³² With an imminent crisis on his hands, Forrestal on 31 March met with Secretaries Royall and Symington, the Joint Chiefs, former Army Chief of Staff General Eisenhower, and Acting Secretary of State Lovett to discuss possible responses to the Soviet action. Forrestal observed, after the group examined the text of the Soviet Union's proposed restrictions, that they were "not as truculent as could be inferred from Clay's first message."³³ Within hours, Clay informed Washington that he had discussed the situation with his British counterpart, General Sir Brian Robertson, and that he "has agreed to do as we do."³⁴ Discussions in Washington resumed immediately, leading to the decision that Clay should make every effort to avoid an armed confrontation. Later that day Bradley and Clay exchanged views:

BRADLEY: You are authorized to move trains as you see fit. It is considered important that the normal train guard be not increased and that they carry only the arms normally carried. . . .

Furthermore, it is important that our guards not fire unless fired upon. State Department, Secretary of Defense and President concur in this reply.

CLAY: I will of course accept and carry out instructions to the letter. I agree with respect to Russians. I cannot agree that we should not increase guards. I also will instruct guards to open fire only when fire is opened on them. I do not agree that this is a fair instruction to a man whose life may be in danger. Having so stated, you may be assured your instructions will be followed to the letter. I am grateful for them.³⁵

On 1 April Clay and Robertson inaugurated a small combined military airlift to bring supplies into Berlin from West Germany. At the same time, Clay informed Bradley that of three U.S. trains attempting to enter the Soviet zone, two had been denied access and had been forced on to sidings when their commanders refused to submit to Soviet search. The commander of the third train, Clay remarked, had "lost his nerve" and had allowed the Soviets to board. Rather than give in again, Clay and Robertson had suspended rail traffic. "I am giving some thought," Clay said, "to sending a guarded truck convoy through, since this could force the issue whereas rail traffic cannot be moved with others [i.e., the Soviets] controlling the signal system." But he added, "In any event, I propose to depend upon airlift for next several days before taking any further specific action."³⁶

Clay viewed the airlift, relying mainly on small C-47s with limited cargo

space, as a temporary solution that could adequately support the immediate needs of the Allied garrisons but not of the 2,000,000 Germans living in West Berlin. Without surface transportation he doubted whether the city could survive; hence his proposal of armed convoys to test Soviet intentions and "force the issue." But his superiors in Washington were not eager for a showdown and, as Clay himself learned, the "baby airlift," as it was later known, had certain short-term advantages that succeeded in demonstrating the Western powers' determination to remain in Berlin. After approximately 10 days the Soviets relaxed their regulations sufficiently for the Allies to resume near-normal train service.³⁷

From this point on, however, further restrictions on travel came thick and fast, including efforts by the Soviets to impose new controls on air traffic. On 5 April a Soviet fighter buzzing an incoming British passenger plane collided with the aircraft, killing the Soviet pilot and 14 passengers on the transport. British and American authorities in Berlin immediately ordered fighter escort for incoming transport and cargo planes but rescinded the order when the Soviets said that the collision was an accident and that there was no intention to interfere with planes in the corridor. U.S. and British leaders in Berlin accepted this explanation of the crash. To avoid similar incidents in the future, the Soviets proposed that the Western powers submit to prior clearance of all flights by Soviet air controllers, halt all night flying, and stop using instrument landings. The Western powers refused and suggested that any future interference could lead to the use of fighter escorts.³⁸

At the first sign of renewed trouble, Clay revived his idea of dispatching an armed convoy. Cabling Bradley on 12 April, he speculated that the Soviets were bluffing and did not intend war and that a show of force would "win the present issue for us." But two days earlier Bradley had cautioned Clay to exercise the utmost restraint and care. Regardless of what might be at stake, Bradley said, "we doubt whether our people are prepared to start a war in order to maintain our position."³⁹

Lacking authorization to use force to restore and maintain access on the ground, Clay relied more and more on air transport to supply Berlin's needs. As part of a host of new restrictions, the Soviets in early April demanded the closing of Allied aid stations along the autobahn and later ordered canal barges to obtain individual clearance before entering Berlin. In May the Soviets stepped up their harassment by imposing new certification requirements for passengers and freight aboard military trains. Refusing to submit, Clay suspended rail traffic. British authorities did likewise, but the French, offering the excuse, in the words of Clay's political adviser Robert Murphy, that "not a single Frenchman would vote to fight for Berlin," backed away from lodging a protest.⁴⁰ Clay understood their predicament as well as his own.⁴¹

During the following days events moved rapidly in the direction of a show-down. Since late February 1948 U.S. and West European diplomats had been meeting in London to discuss, among other issues connected with the German question, the "political and economic organization" of the three western zones. On 7 June they announced agreement to convene a German constituent assembly to draft a constitution leading eventually to the creation of a West German government.⁴² Prior to this announcement, as part of their efforts to rejuvenate the German economy, Clay and British authorities had agreed on the need for a new, more stable currency, a proposal repeatedly blocked by the Soviets in the Control Council.⁴³ As a result of the London Conference Clay saw no point in further delay and began laying plans for currency reform with or without Soviet cooperation. For the time being, however, these plans did not include introducing the new currency in Berlin.⁴⁴

In the face of French delay in agreeing to implementation of some of the London Conference proposals, Clay recommended that the United States and the United Kingdom "proceed Bizonnally without delay." "Otherwise," he warned, "it will be interpreted by the Soviet as a weakness on our part which will lead to further Soviet aggression."⁴⁵ There could have been little doubt in Clay's mind that the currency reform would provide a major test of Soviet intentions and that it might provoke them into some kind of retaliation.

Although the Soviets were no doubt aware that the currency reform was coming, they did not know the exact date and were therefore obliged to follow a timetable based on their best guesswork. The Allies secretly scheduled the change-over for 20 June, but the Soviets apparently expected it on the weekend of 11–13 June. On 9 June they stepped up their interference with traffic from the west, commencing with the adoption of pass requirements that effectively prevented German civilians from entering the eastern zone by auto or rail. When the currency conversion did not occur as had been anticipated, the Soviets increased the pressure. On 16 June they announced the end of their participation in the Berlin Kommandatura. On 18 June Clay advised Marshal Vasiliy D. Sokolovsky, his Soviet counterpart on the ACC, that the currency reform would become effective in two days, except in Berlin. The following day the Soviets retaliated, stopping Allied and German travel on the autobahn and tightening restrictions on train and barge traffic.⁴⁶

At the request of the three Western powers, a quadripartite meeting of financial and economic advisers took place on 22 June in Berlin to discuss the city's currency. The Soviet representative insisted that there could be no currency for Berlin different from that used in the surrounding Soviet zone and would not accede to quadripartite control of the currency for Berlin. During the meeting the Soviets announced their own currency reform. On 23 June the Allies informed the

Soviets that they intended to introduce into the western sections of Berlin the new deutsche mark of the western zones, over stamped "B" for Berlin. Asserting that the Western powers' currency reform was illegal and part of a scheme to divide Germany permanently, the Soviets suspended all surface traffic from the west into Berlin on 24 June. The city was now virtually isolated.⁴⁷


Berlin Under Blockade

Since there had already been nearly six months of increasing interference with traffic, both Washington and Clay had recognized the possibility of a total surface blockade. Yet the three Western allies had not agreed on a course of action by the time the blockade became a reality. The only advance planning, the Army's study of January 1948, cast doubt on West Berlin's ability to withstand the pressures of a prolonged traffic stoppage. With the blockade less than a day old, Clay reminded Washington that Berlin was exceedingly vulnerable and predicted that the suffering of the city's people "will become serious in two or three weeks." Deeming it essential to restore surface communications as quickly as possible, he again urged his superiors to consider "a determined movement of convoys with troop protection."⁴⁸

Pending a response to his recommendation, Clay joined Robertson in asking for resumption of the combined U.S.-British airlift that had kept Berlin supplied for a short time in early April. On the U.S. side, the task of organizing and operating the airlift fell to Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). On 26 June, by plucking "chairborne" flyers from their desks and by utilizing the only available transports—C-47s—USAFE began making regular supply flights between bases in West Germany and Berlin's Tempelhof airport.⁴⁹

Washington's initial reaction to the blockade was to concur in the revival of the airlift but to defer any decision on other action. On 25 June President Truman reviewed the situation with his Cabinet and then met privately with Forrestal, Royall, and Under Secretary of State Lovett. All agreed that the United States should take "determined steps" to stay in Berlin, but as yet they had no firm idea what these steps ought to include beyond those already taken. The next day the President affirmed his support of Berlin by directing that the airlift be organized full-scale and that the U.S. European Command use every available plane in the effort.⁵⁰

To comply with the President's directive, the Air Force decided to supplement its C-47s with 54 C-54s, which had a much larger cargo capacity. This required the Air Force to move aircraft from bases in Alaska, Hawaii, the Carib-



Germany (1948-49)

bean area, and the United States. Later, as demand for aircraft grew, the British and the U.S. Navy provided additional transports, making the airlift a highly visible demonstration of international and interservice teamwork. By early July the planes then assigned to the airlift had made more than 100 flights from the Rhein-Main Air Base to West Berlin, carrying more than 1,000 tons of food, coal, and other supplies. Each plane carried an average of 9.5 tons of cargo per trip.⁵¹

Despite these impressive early airlift accomplishments, Clay saw a need for additional measures to ward off a possible escalation of Soviet pressure. On 27 June he cabled Washington endorsing a British recommendation that the United States immediately increase its tactical fighter strength in Europe and deploy additional B-29 bombers to England, France, and West Germany. Royall asked Forrestal and Lovett and their advisers to attend a meeting in his office later that same day to discuss Clay's proposals. The group explored three possible courses of action: (1) withdraw from Berlin, in concert with the other Western powers, at an appropriate time in the future, presumably when a West German constituent assembly met around the beginning of September; (2) remain in Berlin by all possible means, including, though only as a last resort, the use of armed convoys for supply; or (3) maintain an unprovocative but firm stand in Berlin utilizing local and diplomatic means to obtain Soviet recognition of the Western powers' right of access. Royall questioned the viability of the first and third choices. The first, he felt, would only drag out matters and would not lead to a permanent solution, while the third depended on continuation of the airlift, which Royall doubted could be sustained for more than 30 to 60 days. Royall admitted that the second option involved some risk of war, but he shared Clay's belief that in a showdown the Soviets would give way. In part, Lovett disagreed. He thought that Clay and Ambassador Robert Murphy were perhaps too close to the situation and that they tended to hold "extravagant views." The real choice, Lovett argued, was whether the United States and its allies preferred to face a war or lose a little prestige for the sake of peace. Withdrawal from Berlin, Lovett conceded, could be "a tremendous setback." A lot, he added, would depend on how far the Soviets were prepared to go. If they wanted war, there was nothing to stop them. But if, on the other hand, they were undecided, they might interpret an allied armed convoy as an act of aggression and respond accordingly.⁵²

Turning to the development of definite recommendations, the meeting agreed that while an immediate withdrawal from Berlin was out of the question, the United States should do as little as possible to exacerbate the situation. In response to a question from Forrestal, General Bradley cautioned that any other course of action would be ill-advised since the United States was militarily unprepared to meet a strong Soviet reaction. Consequently, there seemed no rational

choice but to seek a diplomatic solution, and toward this end Lovett outlined plans for developing a common negotiating stand with the British. Also, strong sentiment materialized for obtaining the views of congressional leaders and, in the meantime, moving ahead on Clay's request for a show of force. For logistical reasons, it did not appear feasible to increase tactical fighter strength in Europe until August; however, the additional B-29s that Clay had requested could move almost at once. The group decided to consult Clay about the proposal to deploy two squadrons of B-29s from Goose Bay, Labrador, to Germany and to seek clearance from the British to station two groups of B-29s in England.⁵³

At a White House meeting on 28 June Lovett briefed the President on the previous day's discussion, after which Truman approved the deployment of B-29s to Germany and directed the State Department to open negotiations for British base rights. He also authorized an indefinite continuation of the airlift. The United States, Truman declared, was going to remain in Berlin, "period." But as the meeting ended he backtracked and indicated that his decision was tentative. The next day he told Admiral Leahy that what he had meant by this was that the United States would endeavor to retain a presence in Berlin "as long as possible." * ⁵⁴

In the absence of a definite commitment by the President, Forrestal recognized that only time and events would determine future U.S. actions. The next move was up to the Soviets. From the incoming intelligence reports it seemed clear that their campaign to oust the Allies from Berlin was only beginning. On 28 June the CIA advised the President that the Soviets were planning to terrorize Berlin with strikes and violent demonstrations and that a puppet East German government might be installed around 3 July. On 30 June the CIA reported knowledge of a secret Soviet directive, issued a week earlier, outlining judicial measures in Berlin in connection with the currency reform, treating all of Berlin as part of the Soviet Zone. Also according to the CIA, East German officials were confident that the Western powers would be forced out of Berlin within three weeks. CIA field agents in Germany believed that "the Soviets mean business in the present crisis." "Having gone this far," the CIA reasoned, "it is difficult to see how they [the Soviets] could back down without a maximum loss of face even in their own camp." ⁵⁵

* Truman's wavering and Clay's urging of armed convoys to break the blockade apparently set off a search for other ways to deal with the situation by putting pressure on the Soviets. At Lovett's request various State Department officials submitted ideas, including a suggestion by John Paton Davies, a member of the Policy Planning Staff, that the Navy institute "a long range blockade" to harass Soviet shipping in the Far East. On 10 July Lovett referred Davies's proposal to Forrestal who passed it along to the Navy for study and comment. But the Navy quickly dismissed the scheme as too risky and saw no legitimate grounds on which it might be implemented. For correspondence regarding this matter, see RG 330, CD 6-2-9.

Also on 30 June the wire services carried an unconfirmed report that the Soviets had launched a barrage balloon obstructing British flight paths into Berlin and that the British were about to issue orders to have the balloon shot down. Suddenly, an armed confrontation seemed imminent. This rumor prompted Forrestal to hold an emergency strategy session attended by Royall, the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Souers, John Ohly, General Gruenther, and Rear Adm. Cato D. Glover, Deputy Director of the Joint Strategic Plans Group.

At the outset, Forrestal reported that he had talked by telephone with Lovett, who opposed authorizing military action of any kind until the existence of the barrage balloon could be confirmed. Also, Forrestal said, Lovett had discussed the matter with Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who thought that the only immediate response should be a diplomatic protest. Admiral Leahy, speaking for the President, advised that Truman remained committed to Berlin, but not if doing so would require military action "that would start a war and he did not seem to believe that at . . . [this] time we had enough soldiers in Europe or in the world to start a war, and he was quite positive on that." Royall took exception and argued that Soviet use of barrage balloons would be "a pretty good showdown issue." But he too felt, as did others at the meeting, that military action would be dangerous and that the matter should first be pursued through diplomatic channels. The meeting adjourned, with agreement that the balloon problem should be reexamined as soon as more information became available.⁵⁶

The rumor that had prompted this conference dissipated almost immediately. On 1 July Clay reported that the alleged balloon sighting was only a rumor and could not be verified. Subsequently, the U.S. and U.K. Governments reached an understanding that "no counteraction should be taken without governmental consultation and approval."⁵⁷ From July on, for the duration of the blockade, the Soviets did not interfere with or hamper air traffic into Berlin.

Weighing the Risk of War: Armed Convoys

During the first three weeks of July the situation in Berlin remained static as the United States took steps to bolster its position against the possibility that the crisis might flare up again. Since 27 June the entire Strategic Air Command had been on extended alert, and when the President approved a show of strength SAC began to mobilize, taking measures unprecedented in peacetime. On 2 July the 301st Bombardment Group moved to West Germany. A little less than two weeks later, after obtaining a formal invitation from the British Government, the NSC recommended, and the President approved, the immediate deployment

to England of two additional B-29 bomber groups—the 307th and 28th. At the same time, although it remained in the United States, the 509th Bombardment Group, containing the nation's only atomic-modified aircraft, went on 24-hour alert.⁵⁸ As Forrestal summarized it, the purpose of these actions was threefold: to reaffirm the seriousness of U.S. intentions; to give the Air Force some needed experience; and perhaps most important of all, to put the planes in place, especially in England, where they could become "an accepted fixture" before the British changed their mind.⁵⁹

As for the future, Forrestal was deeply troubled. At an NSC meeting on 15 July he expressed the view that the American public "was not aware how serious [the] situation really is." Although the airlift was doing its job for the time being, he estimated that by mid-October worsening weather conditions would make air travel between Berlin and West Germany progressively more hazardous and unreliable. Consequently, he believed that a high-level decision should be reached by 15 October on whether or not the United States would attempt to restore surface traffic through armed convoys. Royall added that the American people should be alerted to the possible consequences if the United States intended to stay in West Berlin.⁶⁰

Although Forrestal had raised the question of confrontation with the Soviets, he did not have a ready answer. He regarded the United States as unprepared for a showdown; at the same time he found the President growing more and more determined that the United States should not back down. At a meeting with Truman on 19 July, Forrestal endeavored again to point out the risks, only to be cut short by the President's rejoinder that "we were much better off than in 1940 and . . . that we could encourage the French and other Europeans by supplies of token weapons."⁶¹ Of his future intentions, Truman wrote in his diary: "We'll stay in Berlin—come what may." And he noted: "Jim [Forrestal] wants to hedge—he always does. He's constantly sending me alibi memos which I return with directions and the facts. . . . I don't pass the buck, nor do I alibi out of any decision I make."⁶²

The debate over future courses of action culminated at an NSC meeting on 22 July where Clay, who had been recalled to Washington for consultations, outlined what he saw as the existing options. The evening before the meeting Forrestal had invited Clay to dinner. In a relaxed atmosphere they discussed the feasibility and possible consequences of using armed convoys to break the blockade. Clay, while still in favor of such action, now thought that time was slipping away and that the chances of successfully running the blockade were considerably less than they had been three weeks earlier. The longer the United States waited, he said, the more difficult it would become for the Soviets "to withdraw from a position so publicly taken." Even so, he rated the possibility of war as only one

in four and speculated that "twenty good divisions could hold up the Russians at the Rhine." Where these forces would come from, however, he did not say.⁶³

The NSC meeting on 22 July was a full-dress review, chaired by President Truman, who attended few council meetings prior to the Korean War. Also present by special invitation were the Joint Chiefs. Early in the discussion, Clay expressed the belief, which the President supported, that "if we move out of Berlin we have lost everything we are fighting for." Having thought the matter over, Clay said, while he doubted the Soviets would go to war, the use of armed convoys obviously entailed risks that might lead to conflict. "It is, therefore, desirable," he said, "not to use them until all other ways have been tried and failed." This, he thought, left two immediate options—to continue the airlift at its present rate in the hope that the Soviets would remove the blockade before winter, or to increase at once the number of C-54s assigned to Berlin, build a second airport in the city to handle the expanded traffic, and concert efforts with the British and French to stockpile supplies for the coming months of bad weather.

When the suggestion of enlarging the airlift came up, Air Force Chief of Staff General Vandenberg raised objections. His argument centered on the adverse impact of the airlift on Air Force capabilities to conduct strategic warfare. If war should break out, Vandenberg warned, the Air Force would have the bulk of its transport aircraft tied up in Europe and could easily lose many of them to enemy action. As Truman saw it, Vandenberg's objections begged the issue. The main question, as he later put it, was: "How could we remain in Berlin without risking all-out war?" Truman left the meeting at this point, indicating that the airlift was the best answer and directing the Air Force to provide maximum support in continuing the effort to supply Berlin. Resolving the details quickly, the council agreed to send 75 more planes and begin construction of a new airfield immediately.

Following some further discussion, Forrestal, who had thus far remained silent, raised two points. First, he felt it essential for the United States to have the full cooperation and support of the British and the French; if not, he commented, "we will have to review the whole U.S. position." And second, he thought that the council should realize that the NME would need supplemental appropriations. Marshall replied that such a request to the already-called special session of Congress would be ill-advised. Without elaborating, he said he thought "the reverberations might cause us to lose our support in Western Europe."⁶⁴

The next day Forrestal received a detailed statement of views from the Joint Chiefs on the consequences of enlarging the airlift and the need for contingency plans to mount armed convoys should the airlift fail or be disrupted. As a precautionary step the JCS recommended that the State Department hold talks with

the British and French Governments on organizing composite convoys but that no attempt be made to supply Berlin in this manner until "every other solution has first failed or been discarded." Viewing armed convoys as a course of last resort, the Joint Chiefs were reluctant to endorse their use unless the United States decided that Berlin was worth the risk of war and all possible delaying actions had been taken to permit a buildup of forces. "The use of armed motor convoys to establish a land supply route," the JCS admitted, "is fraught with the gravest military implications including the risk of war and would probably prove ineffective even if only faced with passive interference."⁶⁵ Forrestal concurred in the JCS recommendations and forwarded them to the NSC for consideration.⁶⁶

The NSC took no immediate action on the Joint Chiefs' proposal of contingency planning for armed convoys because the State Department wanted to avoid government-level discussions until the French, who were in the midst of one of their recurrent political crises, had reconstituted their government. After conferring with Lovett, Forrestal on 30 July instructed the Joint Chiefs to pursue the matter bilaterally with the British through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.* Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs in August addressed a proposal to their British counterparts, who replied that the idea of a composite armed convoy was "militarily unsound and politically undesirable." Deciding that it would be useless to press the British, the Joint Chiefs authorized Clay to draw up unilateral plans for a composite convoy but directed him not to discuss them with the British and French commanders. On 9 October Forrestal received confirmation from the JCS of these arrangements.⁶⁷ Thus, from the U.S. standpoint, the option of armed convoys remained open. But as opposition to their use appeared overwhelming, the issue was not discussed further.

The Specter of War Reappears

An important reason for the military's preoccupation with the possible use of armed convoys was the failure of diplomacy throughout the summer and early fall of 1948 to resolve the blockade crisis. After an unproductive exchange of protest notes with Moscow in July, the three Western powers concentrated for several weeks on developing a common negotiating position. Then on 2 August their ambassadors in Moscow met with Stalin in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough. Stalin said he would welcome a negotiated settlement and cited the currency question and the decisions of the London Conference as the two outstanding issues. However, he did not think that these should stand in the way

* This World War II Anglo-American military body continued to function on a limited basis until October 1949.

of resolving the Berlin question. The Western powers, for their part, staked their negotiating position on demands for the prompt lifting of the blockade and the restoration of quadripartite control in Berlin.⁶⁸

Between 6 and 16 August the ambassadors held four unproductive meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. Stalin's assurances notwithstanding, Molotov denounced the London Conference agreements and demanded that their implementation be postponed indefinitely. Claiming that four-power control was no longer operable, he also challenged the right of the Western powers to remain in Berlin, except on Soviet sufferance. On 23 August the ambassadors met again with Stalin who agreed that the two questions of transit rights and currency reform should be referred to the military governors in Berlin for further examination. Held between 31 August and 7 September, these talks, like the ones in Moscow, proved abortive and ended when the Soviets refused to cooperate in establishing a four-power financial commission to regulate banking and currency.⁶⁹

As word flashed to Washington that the talks in Berlin were breaking down, the National Security Council, with President Truman presiding, hurriedly assembled on the afternoon of 7 September to assess the situation. Alarmed by both the drift and import of events, Truman and his senior advisers were all but certain that the United States and the Soviet Union were on the verge of a final showdown. Describing the collapse of the talks as "discouraging and serious," Secretary Marshall admitted that he now regarded the prospect of a negotiated settlement as extremely remote. At Marshall's request, Lovett reviewed the problem in detail. Lovett stated that the situation was one of "serious deterioration," but he added that the State Department did not want negotiations to "blow up" in Berlin. He recommended, and the President agreed, that the United States attempt to resume discussions in Moscow and, if this failed, to take the issue to the United Nations Security Council. The alternative, he warned, might be military action. In view of Lovett's remarks, Secretary Symington suggested that the NSC examine what plans it would implement in case of an emergency. Forrestal thought it was better to explore the matter directly with the President. Later, Forrestal invited Marshall to join him the next day in a meeting with the JCS on the Berlin situation.⁷⁰

This meeting took place the following morning at the Pentagon. Along with Forrestal and Marshall, the participants included the three service secretaries, the Joint Chiefs except for Admiral Leahy, General Gruenther, Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, USAF, Brig. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols, Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and Donald F. Carpenter, Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. No record of the discussion has been located, but a 10 September entry in Forrestal's diary of a conversation with Marshall suggests the probable drift: To help reach "fundamental

decisions" concerning the use, size of effort, and targets for possible air-atomic operations from Britain, Norstad would go to London to sound out the British on using bases there for construction of nuclear-support facilities.⁷¹

On 10 September Clay submitted a request for additional airlift which, if approved, would have depleted the air transport reserve to the point of precluding implementation of U.S. emergency war plans. Although Truman had consistently endorsed the airlift as his preferred course of action, the pressure of events now compelled a reassessment. Three days later Forrestal, accompanied by senior representatives from the Army and Air Force, outlined to the President the status of air-atomic planning and sought Truman's approval of the Norstad mission to England. After the meeting Truman confided in his diary: "Forrestal, Bradley, Vandenberg, Symington brief me on bases, bombs, Moscow, Leningrad, etc. I have a terrible feeling afterward that we are very close to war. I hope not."⁷² As Forrestal recalled the scene, Truman "prayed" that a decision to use the bomb would not be necessary. Yet, significantly, Truman appeared committed to a firm stand and either at this meeting or at a later one with Forrestal on 16 September, he gave his approval for operational planning to proceed.⁷³

On 29 September Forrestal met with the Joint Chiefs, who advised him that preparations for a military emergency were proceeding smoothly. Checklists for actions to be taken in the event of war were ready; U.S. commanders in Germany, Austria, and Trieste had been issued plans for use in case of an emergency; air engineers and representatives of AFSWP would be going to England in a few days; and American antiaircraft units would soon be deployed in Britain if the British could not provide antiaircraft protection for U.S. air bases. Moreover, General Norstad had learned that the RAF Chief of Air Staff, Lord Tedder, was in basic agreement with U.S. thinking "about the immediate use of the A-Bomb." But as a precaution, should the British have a change of heart, the Joint Chiefs continued to consider Spanish, Libyan, Italian, and Pakistani bases as alternative basing areas. Also, studies were under way to find an alternate command post "outside Washington in the event the Pentagon was destroyed." Finally, the Air Force had checked with the Atomic Energy Commission and AFSWP on prearranged plans to transfer custody of atomic weapons in an emergency. Should a military confrontation prove unavoidable, the United States, it appeared, would be ready with a quick and definite response.⁷⁴

While these elaborate preparations continued, intelligence reports offered hope that an armed conflict could be averted. In an addendum to an earlier estimate, the CIA in mid-September conceded "that the possibility of a resort to deliberate military action [by the Soviet Union] has been slightly increased." But it saw no evidence to indicate that the Soviets were mobilizing for war.⁷⁵ As serious as the situation seemed, the search for a peaceful solution continued to

receive first priority. With Clay's request for more airlift still pending and with the State Department talking of referring the Berlin issue to the U.N., Forrestal on 14 September endorsed a State Department proposal that the NSC conduct "a thorough analysis of our future course of action." According to Admiral Souers, President Truman "was also anxious that this be done." On 16 September the NSC agreed and asked the State Department to draft a report.⁷⁶

Subsequently, on 29 September, the United States, Britain, and France petitioned the U.N. Security Council, meeting in Paris, to investigate the Soviet Union's "illegal and coercive measures" to obstruct access to Berlin. At the prospect of resuming negotiations through the U.N., tensions both in Europe and in the United States began to relax. As the threat of war gradually receded, officials in Washington once again looked to the airlift as their primary weapon for combating Soviet pressure against Berlin. Assuming that the airlift would continue, the State Department proceeded to assemble material for a draft report. In response to a State Department request in connection with its preparation of the report, Forrestal on 4 October asked the JCS to give high priority to "preparation of an estimate . . . of the military implications of a continuation of the airlift . . . over the coming winter."⁷⁷

Working quickly, the Joint Chiefs responded with two reports. In essence, they were confident that "on a purely technical basis, air supply to Berlin can theoretically be continued indefinitely provided it is not reduced or disrupted by direct Soviet action." However, they hastened to point out that from "the strictly military point of view Berlin constitutes a strategic liability to the Western Powers." Through a variety of measures, such as flight path obstruction, sabotage, technical interference, or even diversionary tactics such as a blockade of Vienna, the Soviets could very easily cripple the airlift and possibly bring it to a halt. Any of these actions, the JCS felt, could be interpreted as an act of war, but they did not consider even limited military retaliation prudent or advisable. With U.S. transport aircraft and their personnel concentrated in a "small and extremely vulnerable area," the outbreak of sudden hostilities could lead to their decimation.

All things considered, the Joint Chiefs believed that unless an alternative to the airlift were found quickly, the Western powers might have to consider withdrawing from the city. Any reaffirmation of determination to stay should take into account the risks involved and the overall impact on the U.S. armed forces, most urgently the unending drain on men and equipment that threatened the ability of the National Military Establishment "to meet its primary national security responsibilities." The airlift required enormous logistic support, reduced the normal lifespan of aircraft, and was a tremendously expensive and consuming enterprise. Assuming NSC agreement to the augmentation Clay had requested in September, the airlift would employ 248 C-54s (approximately 52 percent of

the fleet) at a cost, over and above normal operating expenses, of \$13,540,000 per month, for which there was no allowance in the current fiscal year military budget. To continue the airlift on an augmented basis beyond March 1949, the JCS said, would require an immediate supplement of \$25 million for the Air Force to procure spare parts and expand depot overhaul facilities.⁷⁸

The Joint Chiefs, accompanied by General Gruenther, presented their views and proposals at a special meeting of the NSC on 14 October. Judging from the two existing accounts of this meeting, Forrestal, although present, did not actively participate in the discussion. According to Gruenther's recollections, Lovett was extremely critical of the JCS position: He accused the Joint Chiefs of having a "case of the jitters" and of exaggerating the risks of the airlift merely to justify additional appropriations. But according to notes kept by an NSC staff member, Lovett indicated his full appreciation of the military's concerns, especially as they related to the budget, and he sought to remind the Joint Chiefs that in July the President had made a definite decision to hold Berlin regardless of the costs and consequences. In furtherance of this decision, Lovett added, "the Department of State also warmly supports the Air Force in its desire to obtain additional funds and authorizations to continue the airlift."⁷⁹

After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs agreed to withdraw their two Berlin papers for further study. Meanwhile, at Lovett's suggestion, the council adopted and sent to the President a list of five specific recommendations: (1) accept Clay's proposal to augment the airlift with up to 66 C-54s; (2) reexamine aviation fuel stockpile requirements; (3) authorize \$25 million in supplemental funds for the Air Force; (4) increase the FY 1949 Air Force personnel ceiling; and (5) approve additional aircraft procurement to offset depreciation and attrition.⁸⁰

Before acting on these proposals, Truman sought the advice of the Bureau of the Budget. Truman and the BoB at this time were engaged in a controversy with Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs over the size of the FY 1950 military budget, and they shared a concern that approval of the NSC recommendations would set a precedent for increased military spending.* Replying to Truman on 21 October, Acting BoB Director Frank Pace, Jr., stated that the requested 66 C-54s could be provided out of existing Air Force and Navy equipment and would thus require no procurement funds. He indicated also that the \$25 million needed for spare parts and overhaul facilities could be found in already appropriated Air Force funds, as could an estimated \$11 million to procure additional transport aircraft for the Air Force. Finally, Pace rejected the idea of increasing the Air Force personnel ceiling. Agreeing with Pace, Truman notified the NSC that he had amended its recommendations to accord with the BoB's suggestions.⁸¹

* For the controversy over the FY 1950 budget, see Chapter XII.

On 26 October Forrestal, in accordance with the President's decision, instructed his special assistant Wilfred McNeil to work with the Air Force and the BoB in developing appropriate arrangements for continued funding of the airlift. According to Air Force estimates, the cost of the operation through the current fiscal year ending on 30 June 1949 would exceed \$150 million and could go higher depending on how long the airlift continued.⁸² In January 1949, to insure that the Air Force would have funds above its operating budget for airlift operations, Symington proposed that Forrestal ask the NSC to approve a "recommendation that the President determine in principle" that the Air Force would receive supplemental funds in the future. Forrestal responded that the principle was already understood and that the action Symington requested was unnecessary. Later, cutbacks in the aircraft procurement schedule led to a reprogramming of funds that temporarily lessened the pressure for supplemental appropriations. For the duration, total airlift operating costs, eventually exceeding \$252 million, were paid out of regular appropriations.⁸³

Ending the Blockade and Airlift

At the beginning of 1949, after more than six months of continuous blockade, Berlin remained the focal point of East-West tensions. From the perspective of the Western powers, the airlift was proving itself an effective response to Soviet blackmail and coercion, but to the residents of West Berlin these accomplishments had to be balanced against the perception that their city's continued control by the Western powers was still very much in jeopardy. Coal, in chronic short supply, sold on the black market during the winter of 1948-49 for as high as \$100 per ton. Food supplies were closely rationed, and much of the food consumed in West Berlin was actually smuggled from East Germany, apparently with the tacit approval of Soviet authorities. With electricity and raw materials also cut to a critical minimum, industry in the western sectors of Berlin operated at less than one-third of pre-blockade volume, idling about 10 percent of the work force. The willingness of the West Berliners to endure these hardships was indeed admirable and heroic. But how long they could tolerate life under such conditions U.S. authorities in Berlin and Washington could not accurately assess.⁸⁴

The Soviet situation seemed almost as dismal. In retaliation for the blockade, the Western powers had ordered a counterblockade, forcing a partial shutdown of commerce between East and West Germany. British authorities apparently were lax in enforcing restrictions, but between the U.S. and Soviet zones trade dwindled to a trickle.⁸⁵ As time went on, the Soviets found it increasingly difficult to explain to the East Germans why the Western allies were still in Berlin. In

terms of protecting its credibility and prestige, the Soviet Union faced a serious and growing dilemma. The question of how the Berlin impasse would affect Soviet control in East Germany and the other satellite countries must have caused considerable worry in Moscow.

The details of the eventual resolution of the crisis have been treated at length elsewhere and need only brief summary. Although efforts to resolve the impasse through the United Nations proved abortive, the avenues of diplomacy soon opened to other possibilities. On 31 January 1949, Stalin, in answer to written questions submitted by a Western news correspondent, hinted that the Soviet Union would be willing to resume direct negotiations if the Western allies would postpone the creation of a West German government until after a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers had reexamined the whole German question. Significantly, Stalin made no reference, as he had on past occasions, to the currency issue as a barrier to a settlement. Seizing on Stalin's remarks as a hopeful sign, U.S. negotiators made further inquiries which in February and March led to a series of highly secret bilateral talks in New York. Wanting to draw Britain and France into the talks, Secretary of State Acheson met repeatedly in April with their foreign ministers to develop a common negotiating position.⁸⁶

From this point on, events moved swiftly as both sides evinced an interest in a prompt settlement. On 5 May 1949 the governments in Washington, London, Paris, and Moscow simultaneously issued an official statement on the results of the negotiations. First, with respect to Berlin, both the blockade and counter-blockade (but not the airlift) would end on 12 May; and second, on 23 May the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet in Paris to discuss the general problem of Germany and Berlin.⁸⁷ The statement did not mention creation of a West German government.

When it became evident that the blockade might be lifted, Army and Air Force planners began to assess the need for continuing the airlift but, at the request of the State Department, took no steps to dismantle the operation until the Council of Foreign Ministers had completed its discussion of the German question.⁸⁸ Earlier in January 1949, acting on a proposal by Royall, the NSC had created a special subcommittee on Germany, composed of the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Army and the Economic Cooperation Administrator, to undertake a thoroughgoing reexamination of U.S. policy toward Germany.⁸⁹ For the development of specific recommendations, the subcommittee appointed deputies, who formed a steering group initially under the chairmanship of George Kennan, Director of State's Policy Planning Staff, and subsequently Ambassador Robert Murphy.⁹⁰

After numerous meetings to consider a succession of draft papers, the steering group tentatively adopted a four-part report, which Acheson submitted to

Truman on 31 March.⁹¹ This report became the basis for talks in April with the British and French foreign ministers on the creation of a West German government. The report affirmed that the ultimate policy objectives should be the restoration of full German sovereignty and the complete reintegration of the German people into the European community, to share as equals "in its obligations, its economic benefits and its security." Toward realizing this goal, the report strongly recommended that the United States press for prompt implementation of the 1948 London agreement, i.e., termination of military government, enactment of an occupation statute reserving to the Western allies certain powers to prevent German rearmament, and unification of the three western zones under a federal government.⁹²

Although the British and the French essentially concurred, there was some feeling in the State Department that the implementation of this policy should be delayed until alternative avenues possibly leading to German reunification had been more fully explored. As one who had followed German affairs closely throughout his career, Kennan felt that the United States would be making a serious mistake if it promoted unification of the western zones without at least trying to include the Soviet eastern zone. Earlier, as a possible solution, Kennan in late 1948 had devised a package of proposals, one of which, known as "Program A," called for the election of an all-German provisional government, followed by a general troop reduction and the withdrawal of remaining occupying forces to specified garrison areas. In somewhat more detailed form, this plan reappeared in early May 1949 as a State Department paper entitled "A Program for Germany."⁹³

It seems clear that, with plans already well advanced for the creation of a West German government, Acheson had little serious interest in pursuing Kennan's Program A. He was spared the necessity of doing so when the Joint Chiefs registered their objections to the plan. Their main criticism was that Program A would isolate and separate U.S. and Allied forces from established lines of communication, hamper a defense along the Rhine, and increase the possibility of a successful Soviet attack against Western Europe. In addition, the Joint Chiefs questioned the logistic feasibility of the proposed schedule for troop withdrawals and warned that any precipitous reduction could adversely affect West Germany's sense of security. In view of the possible consequences, the JCS advised that any reduction in Western forces should be accompanied by the creation of an effective and impartial German police, by continued German participation in the European Recovery Program, and by the clear understanding that Germany as a whole should be oriented in her economic and political policies toward the West.⁹⁴

In the light of the Joint Chiefs' remarks, Acheson decided not to press imme-

diately for troop reductions in Germany but suggested that for negotiating purposes in the CFM he should have the option of proposing troop withdrawals at an early date. The Joint Chiefs agreed that if the opportunity arose Acheson could propose a regrouping of U.S. and Allied forces to positions just east of the Rhine, with a similar redeployment of Soviet forces to locations in northeast Germany on the Baltic, where they could be resupplied easily by sea. As Acheson explained it to the NSC on 17 May, the purpose of this plan was to put pressure on the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Berlin and to deny them any legitimate reason for retaining lines of communication through Poland. In this way, Acheson said, "we could also ease the pressure on Poland." Whether the Soviets accepted the plan or not, nothing should be permitted to delay or interfere with the creation of a West German government. Should the Soviets demand complete German reunification, Acheson felt it would have to be on the basis of consolidating the eastern zone with the regime in the west and not vice versa.⁹⁵

The Council of Foreign Ministers met at the Palais Rose in Paris on 23 May 1949—the same day that a parliamentary council in Bonn proclaimed the creation of a Federal Republic uniting the 11 West German states. Against this background, the foreign ministers devoted the next month entirely to the problems of Germany and Austria. But the discussions led nowhere. Finally, on 20 June, the foreign ministers adjourned after issuing a communiqué confessing their inability to reach agreement on the restoration of German economic and political unity but establishing procedures for further consideration of the issues. The only bright spots were some progress toward settling Soviet claims against Austria and a reaffirmation of the agreement of 4 May that had lifted the Berlin blockade. The stage was now set for what would become in all likelihood a long-enduring division of Germany. In October, while the Bundestag of the Federal Republic held its organizing session in the west, a rival "People's Congress" convened in East Berlin under Soviet sponsorship and declared its intention to turn the eastern zone into the German Democratic Republic.⁹⁶

In view of the CFM communiqué and its reaffirmation of the agreement ending the blockade, the Army and the Air Force again examined the need for an airlift. Although technical studies indicated that the airlift could now be maintained almost indefinitely with proper support and equipment, the wear and tear on men and aircraft was taking a heavy toll. Replacements for aircraft losses, averaging two per month, were becoming increasingly scarce. In June 1949 the Air Force again requested an emergency supplemental appropriation and advised Secretary Johnson that without additional funds it could not guarantee continuation of the airlift beyond the coming winter. With this request pending, the Joint Chiefs reviewed the airlift in July and subsequently reported to Johnson that the buildup of supplies in West Berlin appeared sufficient to warrant gradual phase-

out of the operation beginning 1 August.⁹⁷ After the NSC concurred, President Truman on 28 July approved the recommended action on the understanding that should it become necessary, the airlift could be fully resumed in 90 days. The publicly announced date for ending the airlift was 31 October 1949, but the Air Force succeeded in completing the operation a month ahead of schedule, on 30 September.⁹⁸

Planning for a Possible Future Blockade

Although the ending of the Berlin blockade and the airlift seemed to signal the return to more normal conditions, U.S. officials, including the President, continued to harbor suspicions of Soviet intentions and worried that the Soviets might again obstruct traffic to and from Berlin. Should a second blockade be imposed, there were no assurances that another airlift would provide the solution or that the tensions generated by such an occurrence could be as successfully contained as they had been the first time. Consequently, much discussion in Washington focused on how the United States should prepare to react if the Soviet Union again interfered with travel.

The need for an agreed course of action became apparent initially during the development of a negotiating position just before the Council of Foreign Ministers met in May 1949. As Acheson prepared to leave for Paris, the NSC, with Truman presiding, met on 17 May to review plans for the conference and examine what might happen should the ministers adjourn without reaching a general settlement. It seemed distinctly possible, Acheson thought, that the Soviets would refuse to discuss or negotiate transit rights, in which case they might be secretly planning to renege on their agreement of 4 May and reimpose the blockade. In this event, Acheson saw three options for the United States and its allies: (1) accept the situation and rely on another counterblockade to pressure the Soviets into restoring access; (2) use force to restore traffic, realizing that global war would probably result; or (3) take limited military action and attempt to probe with armed convoys, which would stop only in the event of a full show of Soviet force.⁹⁹ Acheson did not say at this time which option he preferred, but he later privately expressed the thought that the third might be useful as "a method of testing out Soviet intentions." Truman, however, was not enthusiastic about any of these options, feeling that only the first might be used without running a serious danger of war. Wondering if there was a fourth possibility, he told Symington "to keep the airlift handy." The NSC decided at this meeting that Defense, coordinating with State, should prepare a study of possible courses of action if no agreement on Berlin came out of the meeting and the Soviets reimposed the blockade.¹⁰⁰

Johnson on 20 May directed his newly designated deputy for occupied areas, Army Assistant Secretary Tracy Voorhees, to draft the requested report and coordinate it with the Joint Chiefs, the State Department, and the NSC staff. Seeking guidance, Voorhees immediately requested recommendations from the Joint Chiefs and from General Clay, fortuitously on temporary duty in Washington pending retirement from active duty. All agreed that a reimposition of the blockade would be a serious threat to peace, but no one was willing to recommend any action beyond a revival of the airlift and resumption of the counterblockade. Of the three options that Acheson had suggested, they felt that the most dangerous would be an armed convoy probe. Although Clay had suggested much the same measure only the year before, he thought the time had passed when the Soviets could be intimidated and that a convoy probe would provoke a strong response. "An attempt to move a convoy into Berlin with the intent to withdraw if the convoy were met with force," Clay warned, "would be most damaging to our prestige, and to my mind there is no advantage in making such an attempt."¹⁰¹

The findings of the Voorhees inquiry, based largely on the views of Clay and the Joint Chiefs, appeared as a report (NSC 24/2) to the NSC on 1 June. In the event of another Berlin blockade, the paper recommended only two specific actions—an airlift at full operational capacity and a counterblockade. It did not recommend efforts to restore surface traffic with armed convoys or by a "probe." While the CFM was in session and afterward, unless it developed a clear written agreement on Western access rights, the United States should adopt a series of "interim measures," including the buildup of stockpiles in Berlin and maintenance of airlift and counterblockade capabilities. NSC 24/2 also recommended warning the Soviet Union that the United States and its allies would regard a reimposed blockade as a matter of "the gravest concern."¹⁰²

On 2 June, when the National Security Council adopted the Voorhees report, Acheson was attending the CFM conference in Paris and Johnson also was absent from Washington. The council agreed that its recommendations on NSC 24/2 would be subject to Secretary Acheson's concurrence. The only stated objection to the Voorhees report came from Acting Secretary of State Webb, who felt that the final paragraph, referring to the statement of "gravest concern," sounded too much like a possible declaration of war, whereupon the council substituted more moderate language. Defense officials, including Voorhees and Acting Secretary Early, thought that Acheson's concurrence would be merely a formality and that the amended paper (NSC 24/3) would soon be submitted to the President for approval. But a few days later a railroad strike and renewed Soviet interference with barge traffic partially crippled surface transportation between Berlin and West Germany. On 11 June, after exchanging several messages with the State Department, Acheson indicated his concurrence with the proposed policy but

made two additional points: (1) The President should be aware of "how perilously close to war" the reimposition of the blockade would be; and (2) other measures in addition to the airlift and counterblockade which might be used in event of a new blockade should be studied. He also indicated his understanding that he had discretionary authority to determine whether the warning to the Soviets mentioned in the report was appropriate. On 12 June, responding to a further message from Webb, Acheson reconfirmed his approval of the report and accepted Webb's proposal that it be amended to make clear Acheson's discretionary authority about the warning.¹⁰³

Although this procedure involving a substantive amendment to an NSC paper awaiting presidential approval was unusual, it seems clear that the ensuing quarrel was wholly unnecessary and resulted mainly from Louis Johnson's escalating feud with Acheson. Ignoring that the NSC had adopted the report subject to Acheson's concurrence, Johnson felt that only the President had the right to change the original paper. At a meeting of the War Council on 14 June, Johnson argued that giving Acheson the proposed discretionary authority would be a surrender of prerogatives belonging collectively to the NSC. He insisted on sending to the NSC a statement saying, "The carrying out of the policy proposed by the National Security Council is a matter to be determined by the President."¹⁰⁴ Truman agreed and approved the report without the amendment Acheson had proposed.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, he told Webb to inform Acheson that he thought issuing any warning to the Soviets at the CFM "must be carefully weighed in light of situation as it develops at CFM" and that its use would still be left to Acheson's "discretion and judgment."¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, on 16 June the NSC met again to consider several new proposals from the Joint Chiefs. Although the JCS still strongly opposed armed convoys or probes, they felt that Acheson's cable of 11 June required further consideration of how far the United States would go if the Berlin situation took a turn for the worse. They therefore recommended, and the council concurred, that a Soviet administrative order or notification to stop surface movement should not be regarded as constituting a blockade or as cause for the Western allies to suspend travel. But the council did not agree on immediate steps to implement this policy and decided to await future developments.¹⁰⁷

When a new blockade failed to materialize after the Paris conference adjourned, U.S. officials concluded that the Soviets had definitely decided to relax pressure on Berlin. Back in Washington, Acheson on 7 July endeavored to explain to the NSC what had prompted his cable of 11 June and how he now viewed the matter. In light of the conference communiqué, Acheson no longer worried that the Soviets would reimpose the blockade. He described the original blockade as "half-hearted" and questioned whether the Soviets would permit

another airlift. A resumption of the blockade, he added, would probably be the prelude to a general emergency, a warning saying, "Look out, here it comes." This, he felt, explained the choice of words in his cable and why he had characterized the hypothetical situation as being "perilously close to war." Acheson reiterated his opinion that "our posture should be such as to take any reimposition of the blockade, not as a local matter, but as the most serious possible danger." The council noted Acheson's remarks for the record and decided to take no further action unless the Soviet Union initiated another attempt to apply pressure on Berlin.¹⁰⁸

Thus ended the Berlin crisis of 1948–49, with Germany divided for the foreseeable future and Europe spared the threatened clash between the superpowers. Judging from the evidence, the threat of war and the possibility of use of atomic weapons by the United States were more real than most people at the time believed. The operating assumption in Washington held that these weapons constituted the only ready means of retaliation and that they would be used if a settlement could not be negotiated. A strategic alert in late June 1948, followed by heightened preparations for another possible alert in September, underscored both the gravity of the crisis and the serious weaknesses in U.S. capabilities. The more the United States invested in the airlift, the less likely it became that the Air Force could carry out effectively its plans for nuclear retaliation.

In these circumstances, Forrestal and Johnson resisted solutions that might have triggered a chain of events provoking a military confrontation. The dispatch of the B-29s to England and Germany in July 1948 was an obvious show of force but it was also a fairly cautious step that did not automatically threaten an escalation of the crisis. On the other hand, Clay's proposal of armed convoys represented a direct challenge to the blockade and carried with it the risk that Soviet forces might resist. Forrestal, who realized perhaps more fully than anyone else the limits of U.S. capabilities, did not think that the American public was any more prepared for a showdown than was the military. As his job required, he prepared plans in the eventuality that negotiations might collapse, but he was exceedingly reluctant to counsel military action without having first thoroughly explored other avenues. Johnson, if anything, was even more reserved in his advice. When Acheson tried to revive the armed convoy idea in 1949, the Secretary of Defense was stunned and incredulous. Despite the high cost, which probably gave Johnson more pause than anyone, he fully supported an airlift as long as necessary.

Except for the contretemps between Acheson and Johnson over armed convoys, the State Department and OSD worked together more closely on Berlin

than perhaps on any other crisis of the period. Early in the Berlin crisis a consensus emerged that the United States did not want and was in no position to risk an armed confrontation. From this consensus derived patient and prudent policies that narrowly averted a military confrontation. For the time being, the Cold War had been contained.

CHAPTER XI

The Military Budget for Fiscal Year 1949: Rearmament Begins

At the end of World War II the United States moved rapidly to demobilize its military forces from a peak active duty strength of more than 12,000,000 in 1945 to a low of 1,399,000 on 31 March 1947. Despite this enormous reduction, the active military force was still four times the size of its counterpart on the eve of World War II in 1939,¹ an increase that reflected both the large requirements for occupation troops in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere, and a growing realization that grave new threats to American security would require the long-term maintenance of an unprecedented peacetime level of military preparedness. For the first time the United States faced the prospect of indefinitely supporting a large standing military force in time of peace, and it was readily apparent that the task of doing so would be very costly. Annual military appropriations thus rose from \$1.8 billion in fiscal year 1940 to \$10 billion in fiscal year 1948—a fivefold increase.²

This great increase in military appropriations* reflected not only the large growth in size over the prewar military establishment but also the impact of

* Throughout the chapters on budgetary matters, the use of technical terms will be held to a minimum at the admitted risk of some technical inaccuracy. Only six technical budgetary terms will be used—authorization, appropriation, obligation, expenditure, new obligational authority, and contract authority. The basic legislation that authorizes the Executive to undertake an activity is also the *authorization* for Congress to fund the activity. *Appropriations* are the authority granted by Congress for the President or executive departments and agencies to undertake obligations and expenditures. *Obligation* means negotiation of contracts, the placing of orders, or entering into other types of financial commitments. *Expenditure* means the payment of bills and cash withdrawals from the U.S. Treasury. *New obligational authority* is the amount appropriated by Congress, including cash and new contract authorization, minus

postwar inflation and the mushrooming costs of equipping the forces with increasingly complex weapons. Contrary to the expectations of most economists, the United States did not slide immediately into a depression at the end of the war but, instead, experienced a wave of prosperity, a condition the nation had not enjoyed since the 1920s. One untoward consequence was a steadily rising inflation. The consumer price index (1947–1949 = 100), which stood at 76.9 in calendar year 1945, rose to 83.4 in 1946, to 95.5 in 1947, and to 102.8 in 1948.³ Stemming inflation became one of President Truman's top priorities, and he sought through restraints on federal spending to reduce the government debt, swollen from the heavy borrowing of the war years, and to create a surplus in the federal budget.⁴

Inflation generally affected the armed forces as it did the average consumer, by robbing the dollar of its purchasing power. But it was not the sole cause of rising military costs. By the end of World War II the services were becoming increasingly dependent on more sophisticated weapons. These weapons, the products of a technological revolution, added immensely to the versatility and effectiveness of modern military forces, but owing to their greater complexity they were far more expensive to develop, procure, and maintain than the weapons they replaced. With inflation factored into the equation, the price of new weapon systems rose even more rapidly. According to one study, the average flyaway cost of a B-17 bomber in World War II was \$218,000, whereas the comparable cost of a B-36 in 1949 was more than \$3.6 million. The cost of fighters over the same period increased from \$54,000 for a P-51 to \$855,000 for a F-89.⁵

Thus, despite record peacetime appropriations, the services found their buying power greatly diminished and their overall situation relatively little improved over the prewar years. In fiscal year 1941, when the United States began to rearm, military expenditures took 5.4 percent of the gross national product (GNP), increasing to 16.8 percent the following year and to a peak of 37.4 percent at the height of the war in fiscal year 1944. But succeeding fiscal year figures steadily declined, from 36.7 percent in 1945, to 20.7 percent in 1946, and to a postwar low of 4.4 percent in 1948.⁶ Rising costs notwithstanding, the services

appropriations to meet commitments such as previously unfinanced contract authorizations falling due during the fiscal year. *Contract authority* is unfinanced statutory authorization under which contracts or other obligations may be entered into prior to appropriations for the payment of such obligations. The term *military budget* is used to include only those activities undertaken by the military services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and OSD staff agencies and does not include related activities in such fields as atomic energy, foreign military assistance, or other programs having military implications which receive separate appropriations. Until 1976 the U.S. fiscal year was from 1 July of one year to 30 June of the next. (Terms and definitions derived from Smithies, *The Budgetary Process in the United States*, 19. See also DoD Directive 40.11–1, 25 Jan 52, sub: Glossary of Terms Under Comptroller Activities.)

found themselves under constant pressure from the White House and the Bureau of the Budget to hold down new obligations, stretch out programs, and economize in other ways—all during years when worsening relations with the Soviet Union and growing commitments abroad were increasing the possibility that combat use of American military forces might become necessary.

FY 1949 Estimates

The National Security Act of 1947 specifically assigned to the Secretary of Defense responsibility for supervising and coordinating the preparation and execution of annual military budgets.⁷ But when Forrestal took office 17 September 1947, the separate FY 1949 budget requests of the War (including Air Force) and Navy Departments had already been submitted to the Bureau of the Budget in accordance with existing regulations. Since it would have been impractical at so late a stage in the budget process to attempt to review, revise, and integrate these separate requests, Forrestal decided to concentrate on the development of plans for formulating budget estimates for fiscal year 1950.⁸ He had as immediate objectives, first, to establish new principles and procedures for a unified appropriation structure, and second, to elicit from the Joint Chiefs of Staff “integrated” strategic guidance that would facilitate the correlation of budget requests with force level requirements.

Having worked closely with the military budget process since 1940, Forrestal knew the problems he faced and saw a definite need for fundamental reforms. He frankly termed it an “embarrassment” that each service should submit separate budget requests without any effort at correlation. To remedy this situation he directed the Joint Chiefs to submit as soon as possible a joint strategic plan together with an agreed statement of the forces required to support such a plan.⁹

To push matters along, Forrestal established on 3 October an ad hoc budget committee under the chairmanship of Wilfred McNeil, his special assistant for fiscal matters.¹⁰ Meeting regularly with the budget directors of the three services and General Gruenther, McNeil emphasized the need for uniform budgetary, accounting, and audit methods. He stressed repeatedly that the secretary required an agreed strategic concept as an instrument to achieve a unified military budget.¹¹ At Gruenther’s suggestion, the Joint Chiefs adopted a timetable calling for development of a joint outline strategic war plan by 1 January 1948, with annual reviews of the plan around the beginning of each calendar year. However, because of disputes between the Army and the Navy over the purposes of the plan and between the Air Force and the Navy over the assign-

ment of roles and missions in strategic air operations, preparation of the plan fell behind schedule and the chiefs, to allow more time to resolve their disagreements, moved the scheduled completion date to the middle of March 1948.¹²

Meanwhile, on 12 January 1948 President Truman submitted to Congress his budget request for fiscal year 1949 (1 July 1948–30 June 1949). He estimated receipts during this period at \$44.5 billion and expenditures at \$39.7 billion. As part of the administration's program, the President recommended an income tax "cost-of-living" credit of \$40 for each taxpayer and dependent. To recoup this revenue loss and combat the likely inflationary impact of personal income tax reductions, he proposed increased taxes on corporate profits. Assuming the adoption of these measures, the President expected a budget surplus of \$4.8 billion, which he intended to apply toward reducing the public debt, part of his campaign to stem inflation.¹³

The largest new program provided for in the budget was economic assistance to further the recovery of Europe, a program that the President had proposed in a special message to Congress on 19 December 1947 and that Secretary of State Marshall had initially suggested in his Harvard commencement speech in June 1947. For the first full year of the European Recovery Program (ERP), the President estimated expenditures at \$4 billion, in addition to \$500 million previously requested as a supplement to the FY 1948 budget.¹⁴

"Since the close of hostilities," the President said in his budget message, "we have reduced our armed services to a small fraction of their wartime strength." The FY 1949 budget, he stated, provided "only for the minimum requirements" of the armed services and was geared to approximately the same level as the previous budget in the expectation that the new national security structure would bring about a more efficient use of funds and "an integrated and balanced national defense program."¹⁵ Even so, the total military budget itself represented nothing more than the simple sum of the two separate, independently developed War and Navy estimates. Total new obligational authority (NOA) requested amounted to \$9.803 billion, divided as follows: Army, \$4.660 billion; Navy and Marine Corps, \$3.667 billion; Air Force, \$1.470 billion; OSD, \$6 million. Of the Army's NOA, approximately 50 percent was for the Air Force, pending its complete separation from the Army.¹⁶

Even though he did not ask for increased funding, Truman expressed confidence that the overall effectiveness of the armed forces would improve under the FY 1949 budget. To provide trained manpower for use in a future emergency, he again asked Congress for universal military training (UMT); and to guard against being cut off from oversea sources of supply in time of war, he recommended increased procurement and stockpiling of strategic materials. The budget ceiling for military manpower—1,423,000—represented a cutback of

approximately 13 percent from the level proposed in the FY 1948 budget. Nonetheless, the active force structure of the Army would remain at 11 divisions and the Navy would maintain an active fleet of 277 major combatant vessels (destroyer escorts and larger), including 11 heavy carriers. The Air Force, meanwhile, planned to expand from 48 groups to 55 groups.*¹⁷

In sum, the President projected a hold-the-line budget that emphasized the attainment of domestic economic and foreign policy objectives at the expense of improving military capabilities. The main goal was to achieve a budget surplus in an effort to restrain inflation. Abroad, it emphasized economic assistance to help the war-ravaged countries of Europe regain their political and economic stability. Except for stressing the importance of UMT, the President did not indicate that there was any need to increase the nation's military strength, nor did he seem to feel that there might be weaknesses in the nation's defense posture.

The Finletter Report

The assumptions and outlook of the President's budget message of 12 January 1948 reflected little if any concern about a possible U.S.-Soviet military confrontation. Yet with steadily growing commitments abroad since World War II, the United States had acquired the need for unprecedented peacetime military capabilities, putting pressure on the nation's military and civilian leaders to seek the most economical but still effective means of assuring the nation's security. Among the strategic options that presented themselves, none attracted more attention than air power, which had emerged from World War II with the reputation of being the weapon of the future.

Recognizing the importance and potential of air power, President Truman sought to clarify its future role. In the summer of 1947 he established a blue ribbon panel, the Air Policy Commission, to investigate and recommend a "carefully considered" national policy on civilian and military aviation.¹⁸ At the same time Congress launched a similar investigation through the Congressional Aviation Policy Board, headed by Sen. Owen Brewster.† Thomas K. Finletter, a well-known Philadelphia attorney who had served as a special assistant to the Secretary of State during World War II and as a consultant to the U.S. delegation

* In 1948 the usual authorized aircraft strength of Air Force combat groups was as follows: heavy bomber (B-36)—18; medium bomber (B-29)—30, (B-50)—45; light bomber (B-26)—45; fighters (all types)—75.

† The Congressional Aviation Policy Board developed its report from much of the same testimony and other evidence presented before the President's Air Policy Commission. The findings of both panels were essentially the same. For the report of the Brewster Committee, see S Rpt No 949, 80 Cong, 2 sess (1948).

at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, chaired the President's commission. The other panel members were George P. Baker, a Harvard economist specializing in transportation matters, who acted as vice chairman; Palmer Hoyt, publisher of the *Denver Post*; John A. McCone, an engineer and business executive; and Arthur D. Whiteside, chairman of Dun and Bradstreet. Baker, who had served on the Civil Aeronautics Board from 1940 to 1942, appears to have been the only commission member possessing extensive experience in aeronautical matters.¹⁹

During the course of its investigation, from September through December 1947, the commission took testimony from more than 150 witnesses and held over 200 open- and closed-door meetings.²⁰ The open hearings produced a consensus among witnesses that World War II had confirmed the great military potential of aviation and that, especially with the advent of atomic weapons, air power could be of crucial importance in deciding the outcome of future wars. But in the closed-door hearings strong disagreements erupted over how and in what form the United States should strive to develop its air capabilities. What was supposed to be an impartial and "carefully considered" investigation quickly escalated into an emotional competition between the Navy and the Air Force over the relative merits of aircraft carriers and long-range bombers.

The Air Force staked its position on what its Chief of Staff, General Spaatz, termed the "folly" of lowering U.S. defenses in the face of the Soviet threat and therefore the need to maintain strong, ready forces backed by equally strong and ready reserves. Adhering to their service's established postwar position, Spaatz and the other Air Force witnesses pushed hard for a permanent peacetime force of 70 groups in which heavy land-based bombers and long-range fighter escorts would have first priority and would give the United States the capacity to hit enemy targets at vast distances. No other weapon system, the Air Force argued, not even the Navy's aircraft carriers, could perform such a mission. In a subsequent memorandum to Secretary Symington, Spaatz averred that "long-range bombers *can* penetrate deep into enemy territory. They did, especially the RAF, during the war. . . . To attempt to operate from carriers would be a hopeless business."²¹

The Navy took strong exception to such statements and challenged the Air Force to prove its assertions. Admiral Nimitz, the outgoing Chief of Naval Operations, stressed the versatility of sea power and the proven ability in World War II of aircraft carriers to inflict crippling blows against the Japanese homeland. He argued that there was a continuing need for carrier-based aviation and for improved and larger carriers. Reliance on land-based bombers alone, he insisted, would not be a sound or workable strategy. "Unless we retain our ability to control the sea," Nimitz told the commission, ". . . we may eventually find ourselves exchanging long range air attacks which will be indecisive alike against

ourselves and our enemies, but at the same time damaging to our own cities and vital installations.”²²

Forrestal viewed the quarreling with growing dismay. Testifying in closed session on 3 November, he refused to endorse either service's point of view and urged the commission to bear in mind the difficulties of resolving a question as complex as aircraft requirements. Citing the absence of an agreed strategic concept, he stressed the difficulty of estimating how future wars would be fought or their impact on either the United States or its potential enemies. “Conquering the Russians is one thing,” he said, “and finding what to do with them afterward is an entirely different problem.” It could be, he added, that the next time the United States would find itself confronted not with a global conflict as in World War II but with a so-called “containing war” for which long-range bombers and carriers alike might be unsuited. Further, he expressed complete agreement with President Truman that economic stability should come first and warned that “huge sums” spent for defense “might in the long run, be a more dangerous practice than to have a somewhat understaffed military establishment.” In other words, it all boiled down to a question of what the economy could support. What might look desirable or even essential from a military standpoint might not be economically feasible or realistic.²³

To help in preparing its report, the Finletter commission asked the Joint Chiefs for their estimate of Air Force and Navy minimum aircraft requirements without taking into account either the cost or the ability of industry to produce the aircraft. In view of conflicting Air Force and Navy opinions on air power, Forrestal was reluctant to release this information, but he saw no legitimate way of blocking the commission from having it.²⁴ The chiefs strongly endorsed a general buildup of air capabilities, but pointed also to the need for a parallel expansion of other forces—ground and sea—in order “to maintain a balanced, effective military organization.” They recommended a phased buildup of Air Force and Navy aviation culminating in 1952, when, intelligence sources estimated, the Soviet Union was likely to acquire its first atomic weapons. By that time, the JCS believed, the United States should have in being an Air Force of 70 groups and 22 separate squadrons with 12,441 aircraft, backed by 27 Air National Guard and 8⅓ Air Reserve groups with 8,158 planes and a Navy and Marine Corps equipped with 14,474 active and reserve aircraft. Thereafter, to maintain their equipment strength, the services would have to procure 8,505 planes annually—5,200 for the Air Force and 3,305 for the Navy. The Joint Chiefs also advised that when the Soviet Union acquired a substantial delivery capability in “weapons of mass destruction,” it would be necessary to reexamine requirements and augment U.S. air strength.²⁵

The Finletter commission accepted these recommendations but, significantly,

almost totally overlooked the Joint Chiefs' qualifying advice concerning the need for "balanced" forces. In its report to the President on 30 December 1947, the commission took the uncompromising position that U.S. "military security must be based on air power." "Of course," the commission also stated, "an adequate Navy and Ground Force must be maintained. But it is the Air Force and naval aviation on which we must mainly rely." To meet future needs, the commission enthusiastically recommended a 70-group Air Force as a "minimum" requirement and offered somewhat less strong support for the continuing modernization and expansion of naval aviation. The commission expressed dissatisfaction with the current rate of aircraft procurement and urged acceleration to eliminate what it termed "the relative and absolute inadequacy" of present efforts to strengthen air capabilities.²⁶

The White House delayed the release of the Finletter report until 13 January 1948, the day following the submission of President Truman's budget for fiscal year 1949. In response to the report's charge that current air procurement lagged behind military requirements, the White House issued a statement showing that nearly one-half (\$5.2 billion) of the proposed FY 1949 military budget had been earmarked for aviation and related needs.²⁷ But, as critics quickly pointed out, the main issue was whether increased reliance on air power was a truly viable strategy. Broadly speaking, the Finletter report answered "yes," and its findings put renewed public pressure behind the Air Force demand for 70 groups. To the Air Force and its supporters in Congress, this did not go unnoticed.

The Supplemental Decision

The Finletter report did much to stimulate public awareness and discussion of the nation's military requirements. It alerted the country to possible weaknesses in its defense posture, and it also offered what many saw as a convincing argument and guide for corrective action. Yet with or without the report, it was obvious by 1948 that the condition of the armed forces was far from sound and that they needed to be strengthened.

The immediate problem was a critical shortage of military manpower, as evidenced by a steady decline in reenlistments and a dwindling number of volunteers following discontinuation of selective service (the draft) in the spring of 1947. Although all the services suffered, with the Air Force and the Navy losing many of their trained technicians, the Army felt the shortage the most. Army strength on 1 July 1947 had been 684,000—311,000 in the United States and 373,000 overseas in occupied Germany, Japan, Korea, Austria, and elsewhere. Since new enlistments did not keep pace with discharges, the Army numbered

only 552,000 by the end of January 1948 instead of the planned 667,000.²⁸ In alerting Forrestal to this situation, the outgoing Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, noted with concern that the Army was "increasingly unable to mobilize effective land power to support air and sea power in an emergency." Lack of funds for new weapons "destroys readiness," Eisenhower added, "and without readiness in necessary land forces, all so-called retaliatory and even defensive plans are mere scraps of paper."²⁹

Aggravating the Army's manpower shortage were other problems. Early in February 1948 General Lutes, Staff Director of the Munitions Board, circulated a confidential study confirming a recent report in *Newsweek* that the Army lacked sufficient stocks of basic equipment to meet emergency requirements. Should a crisis erupt requiring full mobilization, Lutes questioned whether the Army could outfit more than 50 percent of its active and reserve combat divisions in the following 18 months. Twice within the next few weeks the Committee of Four and the War Council examined this problem, but their discussions led only to a request that the Army conduct another study. Deciding not to wait for the results, Forrestal on 17 February urgently asked to meet with the President.³⁰

Accompanied by the Joint Chiefs, Secretary Royall, and General Gruenther, Forrestal went to the White House the next day. In a formal presentation, Gruenther immediately laid bare the stark realities: There were less than two-and-a-half Army divisions in the strategic reserve for an emergency, and without an infusion of fresh manpower the Army would wind up short some 165,000 men by the end of 1948. In these circumstances, Gruenther warned, the outbreak of trouble in any one of several "explosive points" around the world (Greece, Italy, Korea, and Palestine were mentioned specifically) would make necessary partial U.S. mobilization.³¹ Truman apparently made no response, for 10 days later Forrestal felt compelled to raise the issue with him again, this time in a top secret report detailing the accomplishments and problems of the first five months of unification. Under "major problems," Forrestal put first the deficit in Army manpower. "I cannot overemphasize the importance of this shortage," Forrestal wrote. "It represents a direct and absolute limitation on our ability to back up the State Department's policies. . . . It goes without saying that without the necessary ground troops and other support, our Air Force would not be in a position to carry out its own missions."³²

These warnings alone might not have sufficed to make the President change his position on the military budget. Indeed, pressure from the opposite direction was equally intense. In the face of the President's call for a tax code revision to guarantee a budget surplus, the Republican-controlled 80th Congress offered the alternative of across-the-board tax reduction. On 2 February the House, followed six weeks later by the Senate, did in fact approve a tax cut by a veto-proof

majority, thereby virtually assuring a deficit unless government expenditures were cut.³³ In these circumstances a stiffening of White House resistance to additional military spending appeared almost inevitable. But at this time two events—the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia on 25 February and General Lucius Clay's "war warning" telegram of 5 March—lent strong and effective support to Forrestal's pleas.

Not since the Greek-Turkish emergency a year earlier had a foreign crisis touched off such a dramatic set of U.S. responses. While rumors of war raced through Washington, the Army quickly drew up plans for reinstituting the draft and for a supplemental budget increase of \$750 million. Meanwhile, to spur completion of strategic plans, Forrestal summoned the Joint Chiefs to a closed-door meeting at Key West, Fla., where together they hammered out a new definition of service roles and missions and agreed that reenactment of selective service and a budget increase, not just for the Army but for all three services, should be recommended to the President at once. On returning to Washington on 15 March, Forrestal went immediately to the White House to brief the President and submit tentative proposals. Truman, acknowledging the gravity of the situation, resolved on a show of U.S. force and determination. Two days later he appeared before a special joint session of Congress to condemn the "ruthless course" of Soviet policy and to ask for revival of the draft, enactment of UMT, and full funding of the European Recovery Program.³⁴

Development of the Supplemental

Although the President's speech to Congress appeared to presage a change in the administration's policy, it was none too clear at the time how much of a change the President was actually willing to make. The only military goals he had mentioned specifically related to a buildup of ground capabilities, and here the need for additional appropriations was obvious. The Army's estimate of \$750 million to support an increase in active duty strength was itself a base figure and did not include additional Army requirements for UMT or identifiable equipment deficiencies. Furthermore, the supplemental requirements of the Air Force and the Navy had to be taken into account. On 18 March Truman set a tentative \$1.5 billion limit on supplemental appropriations in the belief that this sum represented the maximum that could be permitted without making it necessary to reimpose domestic economic controls.³⁵

The supplemental's size received further consideration on 20 March at a Pentagon luncheon attended by Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs, and Director of the Budget Webb. To avoid arguing over money, Forrestal suggested that rather than

place a ceiling on requested supplemental appropriations, the administration should try to determine the required strength of the armed forces and then frame a budget estimate. Webb offered a counterproposal. He pointed out that the budget originally submitted in January contained a "deflation potential," which the President hoped to preserve, and that it provided first for assisting European recovery before making any additional substantial military appropriations. Seeking to dissuade the military from taking undue advantage of the current situation, Webb asked whether the services could develop initially a modest proposal and then "take another look" at their needs in three months. In particular, Webb wanted to know what new factors in the international picture necessitated defense increases; how the Joint Chiefs intended to justify new or expanded programs; whether the NSC contemplated any basic change in national policy; and how an expanded military program would affect European recovery, the national economy, and future needs of the armed forces. Partial answers were given, but as Forrestal explained, it was simply too early to provide comprehensive replies.³⁶

Despite Webb's admonitions against excessive requests, separate "flash" estimates for new obligational authority submitted by the three services totaled \$8.8 billion—\$5.8 billion in new contract authority, chiefly for new aircraft for the Air Force and the Navy and tanks for the Army, and \$3 billion in direct appropriations. On 23 March Forrestal hosted a special NSC meeting to discuss these figures and to explore with Secretary Marshall the most effective strategy for presenting supplemental requests to Congress. According to Marshall, who had seen the President the previous day, Truman had been "very specific" in stating his opposition to a large military buildup which the Soviet Union might interpret as a provocative act. Truman's objectives, Marshall reported, were to restore the authorized strength of the armed forces and to convince the Soviets of U.S. determination "without entering into an all-out war effort." "The President," Marshall emphasized, "does not want to go beyond that point at this time." As a matter of general policy, Marshall said he fully agreed with Truman that the supplemental request should be held to the lowest possible figure. He cautioned "against trying to get such a large load of powder that the gun itself would blow up," and advised against "pessimistic or inflammatory" public statements making comparisons of U.S. and Soviet capabilities that might stampede Congress into voting large appropriations. Forrestal warned that Marshall's advice might be difficult to follow. As he read the mood in Congress, he felt certain that another Soviet move in Europe would automatically trigger demands for a substantial U.S. military buildup. He did not want to be placed in the awkward position of asking for a small supplemental now and of having to go back later for more money, telling Congress that his earlier estimate had been insufficient.³⁷

Forrestal's argument was convincing, but not to the extent of winning all

that the services wanted. On 24 March Truman raised the supplemental ceiling to \$3 billion to permit an increase in total military strength from its current level of 1,383,000 to the authorized strength of 1,734,000 by 30 June 1949.³⁸ In forwarding his request to Congress on 1 April the President stated that the additional appropriations would be used as follows:³⁹

	(In millions)
Additional Military Personnel	\$ 775
Aircraft Contract Authorizations	
Air Force	465
Navy	310
Maintenance and Operation	860
Procurement and Production	500
Research and Development	90
Total	<u>\$3,000</u>

Except for the distribution of the aircraft contract authorizations, no allocation of these funds among the services had yet been made. Forrestal, realizing that the President's proposal was still far below service recommendations, sensed trouble brewing over the division of the remaining unallocated portions of the request. "If the President," he remarked, "puts an overall ceiling of around fourteen billion dollars for the fiscal 1949 Defense budget, it will take a hell of a fight to preserve any semblance of a *balance of forces*."⁴⁰

On 25 March, Forrestal, accompanied by the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the details of the administration's proposal. In preparation for the hearing, Forrestal had asked Robert Cutler* to come down from Boston to help write his opening statement to the committee. In his first draft Cutler had described world conditions as exceptionally alarming, but at Marshall's request he toned down the rhetoric.⁴¹ Even so, the version Forrestal delivered contained warning and illustrations of weak points in the nation's defense posture. Recalling the lack of preparedness in the 1930s, Forrestal told the committee that military weakness had invited aggression by Hitler and Mussolini. To prevent a recurrence of such circumstances the United States had to prepare itself now for the difficult challenge ahead. In practical terms, Forrestal said, this meant 350,000 more men for the armed forces through temporary reinstatement of selective service; enactment of UMT as evidence of a long-term commitment to a strong military posture; procurement of additional aircraft to guarantee a fully equipped 55-group Air Force; and an

* A well-known Boston lawyer and banker with military experience during World War II, Cutler later served as a special assistant to President Eisenhower for national security affairs.

additional \$3 billion in fiscal year 1949 to finance these and related measures.⁴²

The administration's other witnesses tended for the most part to reiterate Forrestal's views. Secretary Royall, for example, presented an emphatic defense of the need not only for a strong Army but also for an effective Air Force and a fully prepared Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Denfeld, reported on the need for additional trained manpower for the Navy. Then came Secretary Symington who offered the opinion that the administration's proposed supplement of \$3 billion would not suffice to cover Air Force requirements. Knowing that a number of committee members were strong supporters of air power but not of UMT, Symington played on their sympathies by making repeated references to the recommendations of the Finletter and Brewster reports for a 70-group Air Force. With an additional \$850 million, Symington insisted, the goal of a 70-group Air Force could be fully realized. Forrestal, when recalled to the witness stand to confirm or deny this claim, questioned Symington's figure and estimated that the cost of a 70-group program, if calculated on the basis of a balanced forces concept, would be closer to \$18 billion. The committee was understandably confused.⁴³

The two estimates were based on wholly different sets of assumptions. Symington's calculations took into account only the cost of aircraft procurement to reach 70-group strength, while Forrestal's included not only Air Force requirements but also Army and Navy needs to maintain balanced capabilities. On 2 April, in a letter to committee chairman Chan Gurney, Forrestal endeavored to make this distinction clear.⁴⁴ But the damage had already been done. In the light of the Finletter and Brewster reports, Symington's testimony made it appear that the administration was neglecting the Air Force at a time when the nation could not afford to do so. Without 70-group funding, Symington predicted a bleak future for the administration's policy of trying to strengthen the armed forces. "The press, the Congress, and the people are sold on this Air Force program," he told Forrestal. "To present a program which, in effect, supports UMT and the Army and Navy at the expense of the Air Force, gives a choice to the Congress on the grounds that there is not enough money; and the choice they will make will be the Air Force at the expense of a balanced program for national security."⁴⁵

If Symington were right, Congress might be tempted to take matters into its own hands, vote additional money for an enlarged Air Force, and perhaps shelve the rest of the administration's proposals. Forrestal was aware of these possibilities, but without more detailed information from the services on their requirements, he hesitated to endorse the needs of one over another. On 27 March, after testifying, Forrestal officially directed the Joint Chiefs to prepare detailed estimates of the size and cost of a "balanced military establishment," assuming "the 70 group program and all the supporting elements were to be put

into effect.”⁴⁶ Then later, at the suggestion of General Lutes, Forrestal addressed six specific questions to the JCS with a view to ascertaining whether and in what way they might have changed the opinions they had expressed in their recommendations to the Finletter commission:

1. Has reexamination of strategic plans resulted in affirmation of the previous plan submitted—namely, 70 groups for the Air Force and 14,474 planes for the Navy—and do the same conditions still obtain—To wit: What parallel expansion of other forces is necessary? If not, what modifications are recommended?
2. If the previous recommendations are affirmed, what is the appropriate size of the three services?
3. In case sufficient funds cannot be obtained for the entire foregoing balanced force, what elements do the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend for activation and support, and in what priorities?
4. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the request of the Air Force for a 70 group program, regardless of whether the Army and Navy receive increases?
5. Is there, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, any necessity for “war gaming” the plans presently recommended?
6. Should the Administration, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advocate the 70 air group program, and, if so, should such advocacy include or exclude increases for the other services?⁴⁷

Meanwhile, because of the long lead times involved in the production of aircraft, Forrestal asked the House Appropriations Committee to take several steps to speed up the placement of air procurement contracts. Specifically, he requested that funds for air procurement requested in the original budget (\$1.251 billion) and those sought in the supplemental (now \$725 million, reduced from the previous estimate of \$775 million) be dealt with together in a single bill that would be handled separately from, and in advance of, congressional action on the remainder of the administration’s regular and supplemental military budget proposals. To expedite the letting of contracts, Forrestal further proposed that these funds be made available for use in fiscal year 1948. Of the \$1.976 billion total, the Air Force would receive \$1.223 billion and the Navy \$753 million. The committee took his proposals under advisement; it did agree, however, to handle air procurement in separate legislation.⁴⁸

The proposal to advance the date of availability of aircraft procurement funds did not have much support from Forrestal's budget adviser, Wilfred McNeil. In fact, McNeil, other OSD officials, and the Bureau of the Budget often criticized Air Force procurement management, particularly for numerous instances in which deliveries lagged behind schedule. Also, McNeil questioned the aircraft preferences of the Air Force. In his view, prototypes of new weapons, such as guided missiles, foreshadowed an impending revolution in antiaircraft capabilities for which the Air Force had yet to develop effective countermeasures. During tests conducted in the spring of 1948, for example, some of the Air Force's newest planes, including the B-36, had proved extremely vulnerable to missile attack. Thus McNeil favored a go-slow approach on new Air Force procurement funds and an acceleration of research and development to provide more advanced weapons.⁴⁹

However sage this advice may have been, Forrestal was under increasing pressure from the services not merely to step up air procurement but to expand the entire rearmament effort. Thus far, his chief difficulties had been to convince Congress of the need for balanced forces and to contain the Air Force zealots, but on 13 April, when the Joint Chiefs responded to the questions he had put to them, it became apparent that the Army and the Navy now agreed with the Air Force that the administration's requested supplemental was insufficient.

The Joint Chiefs stated that military planning since submission of their recommendations to the Finletter commission had not altered their views on the need for a 70-group Air Force and 14,474 planes for the Navy. To maintain a "balanced" posture, the JCS added, a parallel expansion of Army forces and of surface and subsurface naval forces should accompany any enlargement of air capabilities. To Forrestal's second question concerning the "appropriate" size of the armed forces, the Joint Chiefs declined to provide a collective estimate. Lacking an agreed strategic concept as a basis for computing and correlating their needs, they submitted a summary of requirements derived from individual service estimates: an Army of 12 active, 27 National Guard, and 25 Reserve divisions; a Navy of 384 major combatant ships; and an Air Force of 70 active, 27 National Guard, and 34 Organized Reserve groups. A buildup to these levels phased over the next four fiscal years would, they estimated, require appropriations approximately as follows:⁵⁰

FY	(In billions)
1949	\$19.30
1950	21.68
1951	22.48
1952	21.90

Since appropriations were not expected to cover service requirements, the JCS recommended that top priority in the immediate future go to rehabilitating the aircraft industry and increasing military personnel strength above its "present dangerously low level." They calculated that \$1.586 billion of the proposed supplemental of \$3 billion would go for these purposes, leaving a balance of \$1.414 billion for other needs. This amount, they insisted, would be insufficient when spread among the services to provide for adequately balanced forces; it would require an additional \$1.252 billion in FY 1949 supplemental appropriations to bring all the services up to their presently authorized strength and maintain them at these levels.

On Forrestal's question of whether there should be an increase of the Air Force to 70 groups if there could not be any comparable increases in the Army and Navy forces, the Joint Chiefs predictably split. The Army and Navy felt that such a unilateral increase "would create a dangerous unbalance of forces, and would result in a situation whereby the Air Force would be unable effectively to deploy—or employ—its aircraft against the enemy." The Air Force took exception, contending that the armed forces were already unbalanced in the direction of ground and sea capabilities and that a 70-group force (along with "some" Army buildup) would merely help to redress the balance. Unable to agree on this basic issue, the JCS considered it pointless to attempt any wargaming.⁵¹

While Forrestal studied the JCS comments and recommendations, Congress began moving ahead on the air procurement authorization, handling it separately, as Forrestal had requested, from the regular FY 1949 military appropriation. On 15 April the House of Representatives voted 343 to 3 in favor of an air procurement bill (H.R. 6226) containing about \$2.8 billion in new obligational authority for immediate use, including an unrequested sum of \$822 million in additional contract authority for the Air Force.⁵² Air power advocates, including Rep. Carl Vinson, known primarily as a stalwart Navy supporter, insisted that this additional contract authority was essential to guarantee a 70-group Air Force. But they could not block the insertion of what Forrestal and McNeil termed a "hooker" in the bill that left to the President the final decision on whether to use the money.⁵³

Forrestal took little comfort in the House's action, for it showed congressional opinion definitely moving in the direction of increased reliance on air power. As the Senate prepared to take up the matter, Forrestal on 17 April posed additional questions for the Joint Chiefs. First, assuming an absolute limit of \$3 billion on supplemental appropriations, what reductions would have to be made in the desired size of the armed forces? And second, if instead of \$3 billion, the supplemental was \$5 billion, what should be the size of each force and how should the money be divided among them? ⁵⁴

As he described it in his diary, Forrestal on 19 April took the Joint Chiefs with him "into a study" to consider these questions in detail—and in total privacy. Early in their deliberations Forrestal concluded that it was impossible to reach agreement on an allocation within a \$3 billion supplemental appropriation. Seeking a compromise that would placate the Joint Chiefs by giving each a little more, he proposed that they prepare fresh estimates based on an additional \$500 million. Under the new estimates that the JCS made, the chief beneficiary of the additional money would be the Air Force, but its expansion would be accomplished largely through the modernization of mothballed aircraft rather than through the purchase of additional new planes. Along with an expansion of Army and Navy capabilities, the Air Force would grow from 55 to 66 groups by the end of fiscal year 1949 and to a full 70 groups by the beginning of fiscal year 1951, at which time the size of the armed forces would level off.⁵⁵ Under this formula, the fund allocation would be as follows:⁵⁶

	(In millions)
Army	\$1,225.8
Navy	1,121.2
Air Force (including Army support)	1,133.3
Total	<u>\$3,480.3*</u>

On the morning of 21 April Forrestal and his aides sought the President's approval of these revised supplemental estimates. Pending BoB review, Truman conditionally agreed to the proposed \$500 million increase and gave Forrestal permission to discuss it with Congress. That afternoon the Secretary presented the revised supplemental estimate to the Senate Armed Services Committee. In what later proved to be a source of major personal embarrassment, Forrestal gave the committee the impression that the proposed increase had the President's unqualified endorsement.⁵⁷

Ceiling Limitations Reimposed

By the end of April Forrestal had apparently achieved major successes on two fronts. He had drawn the services into line on a supplemental estimate that all could accept and defend before Congress, and he had won the President's tentative backing for an increase that seemed to meet both Air Force and congressional objections to the initial \$3 billion supplemental request. What he had

* The source document erroneously shows total of \$3,481.3 million.

not counted on was that the Bureau of the Budget would finally oppose the \$500 million increase as inflationary and convince the President to keep his supplemental request at just about its original \$3 billion level.

At first, the BoB had reserved final judgment on Forrestal's revised request, but after further study it opposed the increase because of the inflationary impact it would have on the economy. Because of the rivalry and competition among the services, the BoB probably viewed Forrestal's request mainly as an attempt to buy peace and quiet in the Pentagon. Thus Webb, ignoring the strong congressional pressures at work, told friends that he believed Forrestal had "lost control" of the military and was being continually "bulldozed" by the services; as a result the rearmament program might now "run away."⁵⁸

Meeting with Forrestal on 6 May, Webb put his cards on the table. Declaring the revised supplemental estimates excessive, Webb proposed deletion and reductions of items that would lower the estimates from \$3.5 to \$3.1 billion. Yet all this was in the nature of an academic exercise. Webb's real point was that even with a \$3.1 billion supplement, FY 1949 expenditures would mount to \$12.8 billion and that to complete and maintain the buildup contemplated would require military appropriations of \$17.1 billion in fiscal year 1951 and about \$18 billion in fiscal year 1952. Implying that budgets of this size would wreck the economy, Webb expressed doubt that it would be feasible, without across-the-board economic controls, to sustain rearmament at the proposed level and still adequately support European recovery, provide for the merchant marine, and implement atomic energy plans. To Forrestal's dismay, Webb proposed reduction of the supplemental to \$2.5 billion so that it would be possible to level off appropriations in fiscal year 1950 and subsequent years at around \$15 billion. To achieve this level, Webb recommended a base of 55 Air Force groups, deferral or cutbacks in programs for naval aviation and antisubmarine warfare, and reductions in Army materiel support.⁵⁹

The following day senior administration officials, including Forrestal, Marshall, and Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, met with President Truman to discuss Webb's proposed cuts in the supplemental. Interested in how others perceived the consequences of such cuts, Truman called for comments from Marshall. According to Forrestal, Marshall observed that U.S. policy, as he saw it, "was based on the assumption that there would not be war and that we should not plunge into war preparations which would bring about the very thing we were taking steps to prevent." The President agreed and added that "we are preparing for peace and not for war." He also predicted that many of the congressmen now voting large sums for the Air Force would vote for reductions the next year.⁶⁰ Truman subsequently jotted down a few more thoughts on the subject in his diary, listing "a balanced sensible defense for which the country can pay" as a

first concern. He seemed to feel that Forrestal had lost sight of this goal. "Marshall is a tower of strength and common sense," Truman wrote. "So are Snyder and Webb. Forrestal can't take it. He wants to compromise with the opposition."⁶¹

While the President and his advisers debated, Congress moved steadily ahead on the air procurement supplemental bill. On 11 May both the House and Senate approved a conference bill that was virtually identical with the earlier House version and appropriated \$822 million more than the President had requested. The next move was up to the President.⁶²

If Truman and Forrestal had seemed at odds earlier, events now impelled them to mend their differences without further delay. Most of the concessions, as one might expect, came not from the President but from Forrestal. Even so, Forrestal was insistent that Truman meet face-to-face with the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries and that at this meeting he read a statement, drafted by McNeil, explaining his budget policy. Webb questioned the need for a meeting and, in any case, saw no reason why the President should have to explain his policy or the decisions behind it. But Forrestal persisted, urged on by McNeil, who told him: "I feel that in this instance the President must support you fully, and that if he expects to limit next year's budget—there is only one way to accomplish it and that is by stating the case in clear-cut language."⁶³

The meeting Forrestal sought took place on the afternoon of 13 May at the White House. Truman's emphatic exercise of authority took Forrestal off the hook by leaving no doubt that the President had made the decisions on budget policy. Reading from a slightly edited version of McNeil's statement,* Truman reiterated his commitment to stepped-up military preparedness, but flatly refused, in the interests of preserving a healthy economy, to approve any budget requiring "large scale deficit financing." It was now clear, he added, based on BoB projections, that a supplement of \$3.481 billion, as the military advocated, would result in a \$15.25 billion military budget in fiscal year 1950 and push total federal obligations to \$50 billion by fiscal year 1952. Because of the revenue loss that would result from the recent tax cut approved by Congress, a budget of this size would make deficit financing unavoidable. Unwilling to accept such a consequence, the President said that he had decided to limit FY 1949 supplemental military appropriations to no more than \$3.199 billion, an amount he still considered excessive

* Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 435, says that the statement Truman read was written to "the President's and Webb's specifications," implying that Forrestal opposed the statement. In fact, the idea of a statement was Forrestal's (or McNeil's) from the very beginning, and Truman's version was substantially the same as McNeil's. For a copy of McNeil's draft, see the entry under 13 May 1948, "Outline of Subject Matter for the President's Use in a Discussion with the Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of the Three Departments, and the Three Chiefs of Staff," Forrestal Diary, 2251-53, Forrestal Papers.

from the standpoint of its impact on the economy. He had reached this decision, he said, because he wanted the military budget for fiscal year 1950 and subsequent years to level off at around \$15 billion. Although he was approving this new ceiling of \$3.2 billion, he was also directing the military services to cut back their buildups now rather than embark on a costly expansion that might later necessitate "a demoralizing demobilization." Moreover, he wanted a reexamination of military requirements in September and again in December "to see if administratively we should not place a ceiling on our program at less than contemplated in the supplemental."⁶⁴

The same day Truman forwarded to the Speaker of the House a further revised supplemental estimate of \$3.159 billion* in new obligational authority, including the \$725 million previously requested for air procurement. The chief beneficiary of this request would be the Army, which would receive \$1.542 billion. But Congress had already just passed an air procurement bill which provided \$822 million more than Truman had requested for such procurement in his regular and supplemental budget requests combined. Any steps toward further adjustment would have to take place in the regular defense budget, still under consideration in both houses. Concerned by the addition of \$822 million, Truman served notice on 21 May when he signed the procurement bill into law that this added unrequested amount would not be used immediately.⁶⁵

The air procurement legislation stipulated that the cash and contract authority it provided should become available for use at once and remain available until 30 June 1950. The Air Force, benefiting the most from congressional sentiment, received \$2.295 billion of the total \$3.198 billion† appropriated for aviation procurement, while the Navy received \$903 million. However, because of the President's decision to postpone use of the unrequested \$822 million, the rapid Air Force buildup envisioned by some in Congress did not appear imminent.⁶⁶

Congressional Action on the Regular Military Budget

With the air procurement portions of the FY 1949 regular and supplemental appropriations out of the way, Congress resumed consideration of the remainder of the FY 1949 military budget request, as amended by the still out-

* This figure was \$40 million less than Truman mentioned at the White House meeting on the same day. Such discrepancies in numbers under frequent discussion and review are not uncommon.

† Although the funds were made available for immediate use in fiscal year 1948, they were treated for accounting purposes as fiscal year 1949 appropriations. Of the total of \$3.198 billion, \$2.798 billion was in the form of new contract authority and \$400 million was for the liquidation of prior year contracts made with contract authority.

standing items in the President's revised supplemental request of 13 May 1948. Summarized, these requests were as follows:

	Original Submission (In millions)	Amended Submission (In millions)
Army	\$4,660	\$ 6,202
Navy	3,667	3,872
Air Force	1,470	991
OSD	6	7
Total	<u>\$9,803</u>	<u>\$11,072</u>

The Air Force revised budget was much smaller because its air procurement money was in the supplemental bill. The President's request for total new obligational authority came to just over \$13 billion (see Table 2).

Although steps were already under way to consolidate all future annual military appropriations into a single bill, passage of the National Security Act came too late in 1947 to permit handling the separate War and Navy Department budgets in this fashion. As a consequence, the FY 1949 military budget was handled, as in the past, under two separate bills, one for the Army and Air Force, the other for the Navy. As the appropriation process went forward, the early wave of congressional enthusiasm for rearmament began to subside.⁶⁷

The House Appropriations Committee trimmed Army regular military appropriation estimates in some noncombat categories by as much as 20 percent and Navy estimates to a lesser extent. The Senate recommended partial restoration of cuts ordered by the House, but the figures finally agreed on by House-Senate conferees and in the bills signed by the President on 24 June 1948 came out somewhat below the administration's estimate.⁶⁸ With the air procurement supplemental added, new obligational authority voted by Congress exceeded the President's total requests by less than \$100 million.

Congress was also cautious in enacting the administration's other rearmament proposals. A bill to reinstate selective service cleared Congress on 19 June 1948 and the President signed it into law five days later (P.L. 759). But UMT met strong opposition from influential lobbying groups and, at Forrestal's suggestion, Truman reluctantly decided not to press the matter for the time being.⁶⁹

The revival of the draft and increases in the FY 1949 military budget lent impetus to efforts to strengthen the armed forces, but these actions fell short of what the services, especially the Air Force, perceived as their minimum requirements. The central question of the budget debate had been and would continue to be whether the armed forces could be strengthened sufficiently without impairing the economy through large obligations that would lead to future budget

deficits and increased inflation. While he favored a strong defense establishment, Forrestal, like Truman, also wanted a sound, viable economy. But where to strike a balance? The debate over the FY 1949 budget did not offer any clear answers, nor did it produce a consensus on the general character, composition, and size of the military forces that the country should maintain. Peacetime rearmament was a new experience for the United States, and it still remained to be seen whether it would prove possible to devise and successfully implement policies and programs that would effectively meet the diverse needs of this new situation.

TABLE 1
Air Procurement Appropriations for FY 1949
(In Millions of Dollars)

	Original Request of Jan 48	Supplemental Request of Apr 48	Total Requested for Air Procurement	Increased by Congress	Granted Under PL 547
Army	—	25 ^a	25	1	26
Navy	464	289	753	—	753
Air Force	700	523	1,223	822	2,045
Total NOA	1,164	837 ^b	2,001	823	2,824 ^c

^aIt is not clear that this item was in the original supplemental request.

^bContains approximately \$112 million not contemplated in the President's ceiling figure of \$725 million for this supplemental request.

^cThis does not include \$400 million for the liquidation of prior year Navy and Air Force contracts. Including this sum, the total cash and contract authority available was \$3,224 million, of which \$26 million was for the Army Corps of Engineers, leaving \$3,198 million for aviation.

Sources: Original and supplemental request figures from (n a), (n d), memo of history FY 1949 regular and supplemental budgets, OASD(C) files; figures on congressional action from PL 547, 80 Cong, 2 sess (1948).

TABLE 2
Administration's Military Budget Requests for FY 1949
(In Millions of Dollars)

	Original Request ^a	Supplemental Request Under Air Procurement ^b	Other Supplemental Requests ^c	Total All Requests
Army	4,660	25	1,542	6,227
Navy	3,667	289	669	4,625
Air Force	1,470	523	222	2,215
OSD	6	—	1	7
Total	9,803	837*	2,434	13,074

* Contains an estimated \$112 million not contemplated in the President's ceiling figure of \$725 million for this supplemental request.

Sources

^a*Budget of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1949*, 635.

^b(N a), (n d), memo of history FY 1949 regular and supplemental budgets, OASD(C) files.

^cLtr James E Webb Dir BoB to the President, 13 May 48, *ibid*.

TABLE 3
Congressional Action on FY 1949 Military Budget
(In Millions of Dollars)

	Original Budget Request ^a	Regular and Sup- plemental Requests after Passage of PL 547 ^b	House Allowed ^c	Senate Allowed ^d	As Enacted ^e	Regular and Sup- plemental Legis- lation Combined ^f
Army	4,660	6,202	5,522	5,914	5,774	5,800
Navy	3,667	3,872	3,605	3,730	3,667	4,420
Air Force	1,470	991	892	905	897	2,942
OSD	6	7	7	7	7	7
Total NOA	9,803	11,072	10,026	10,556	10,345	13,169

Note: Figures have been adjusted to deduct cash appropriated for prior-year contract authorizations in the amounts of \$24 million for the Army and \$82 million for the Navy (shipbuilding only). Cash to liquidate Air Force and Navy prior-year contract obligations for air procurement was appropriated under PL 547.

Sources

^a*Budget of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1949*, 635.

^bIbid, as amended per ltr James E Webb Dir BoB to the President, 13 May 48, OASD(C) files.

^cS Rpt Nos 1621 and 1763, 80 Cong, 2 sess (1948).

^d*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, IV (1948), 94-95.

^ePL 766 and PL 753, 80 Cong, 2 sess (1948).

^fPL 547, PL 766, PL 753, 80 Cong, 2 sess (1948).

CHAPTER XII

The Military Budget for Fiscal Year 1950: Rearmament Levels Off

President Truman's decision in the early spring of 1948 to seek a supplement to the FY 1949 military budget, followed by the debate within the administration over the size and composition of that supplement, set the stage for an even larger and more intense struggle over the FY 1950 budget that fully engaged the Office of the Secretary of Defense.¹ The primary need was to determine the combination of forces most likely to provide maximum security within the limits of the funds that would probably be available and to obtain service estimates of requirements for such forces. As the President had indicated to Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs on 13 May 1948, the probable new obligational authority ceiling for fiscal year 1950 would be \$15 billion.² This tentative decision indicated an early leveling off of the armed forces buildup that the military regarded as neither wise nor timely. As Forrestal contemplated the preparation of detailed estimates, he must have realized that the road ahead would be rocky.

Moreover, Forrestal had responsibility under the National Security Act for providing coordinated budget estimates covering the whole military establishment. Before passage of the act, no one other than the President himself had the authority and power to coordinate the budgets of the two military departments. Each department had responsibility for assessing and determining its own needs without reference to those of the other. Under unification, Congress and the President expected improved budgetary management, the elimination of duplicating expenditures, and a generally more efficient use of the taxpayers' money. The FY 1950 budget was the first to be wholly prepared under the direction and supervision of the Secretary of Defense and, as such, it marked his initial attempt to compute service estimates from start to finish on an "integrated" basis.

Budget Policy and Procedures

While Congress was completing the FY 1949 appropriations process, the preparation of FY 1950 estimates had already reached a critical preliminary stage. January or February was the normal starting time for the budget cycle for the fiscal year that was to begin about 18 months later on 1 July in the following calendar year.* The first 4 to 6 months of this cycle were devoted to the preparation of tentative plans and programs within the military establishment, followed by the issuance at midyear of White House instructions on budget ceilings, submission to the BoB in mid-September of departmental estimates, BoB hearings and conferences on the estimates, presentation of final estimates to the President in December, transmission of the budget to Congress by the President in January of the next calendar year, and subsequently, detailed presentations of the estimates to congressional committees by representatives of the military establishment.³ Because of the time consumed in handling the FY 1949 supplementary request, it was May before Forrestal and his staff could turn their full attention to the next year's budget. As a result, much of the work that would normally have been done earlier to prepare the FY 1950 budget had to be compressed into half the time usually required.

This disruption of the budget cycle was one of two principal factors that hindered Forrestal's efforts to introduce major changes in the budget process. The other factor was the delay by the NSC in carrying out its prescribed task of establishing national security goals and policies to provide a reliable foundation for military planning and budgeting. As Forrestal envisioned the annual budget process, it would begin with the preparation by the JCS of an "annual operating plan" based on the most recent NSC formulation of U.S. goals and policies—a plan that would indicate in some detail the size, composition, proper level of readiness, and desired strategic deployment of the military forces required to carry out such policies.† Then, in accordance with JCS strategic guidance, the Research and Development Board and the Munitions Board would concurrently prepare plans covering such matters as the development of new weapons, the stockpiling of critical materials, and the provision of necessary logistic support

* To illustrate: The preparation of budget estimates for a fiscal year running from 1 July 1950 to 30 June 1951 (FY 1951) would begin early in calendar year 1949, or some 18 months before the commencement of that fiscal year. Moreover, because of the long duration of the full budget cycle, budget officials often were simultaneously involved in one way or another with three successive overlapping budget cycles—in the execution of the FY 1949 budget, the presentation of the FY 1950 budget request to Congress, and the development of FY 1951 budget estimates.

† The Joint Chiefs' budgetary responsibilities were spelled out in the Key West "Functions" paper of March–April 1948.

for the military forces contemplated in the operating plan. Finally, each service, utilizing the assumptions and the information contained in these several plans, would prepare itemized budget estimates of its requirements to support them. If these estimates totaled more than the President's budgetary ceiling, it would then be incumbent on the Joint Chiefs, the staff agencies, and the services to develop modified plans and estimates compatible with fiscal limitations.⁴

Because of their pivotal role in the planning process and because of their extensive planning experience, Forrestal looked to the Joint Chiefs to provide leadership and initiative. One of his first acts as Secretary of Defense was to ask the JCS to formulate a strategic concept that would provide a basis for determining requirements of the services, both individually and collectively. But, after a promising start, serious disagreements among the services over the assignment of roles and missions brought strategic planning to a virtual standstill early in 1948. Notwithstanding the Key West agreement in March, the JCS failed to produce a strategic plan in time for use in presenting the regular FY 1949 appropriation request to Congress or in preparing the emergency supplemental request.

On 19 May 1948 the chiefs finally approved for planning purposes an emergency war plan, code-named HALFMOON,* that satisfied much but not all of Forrestal's request. Keyed to the possible outbreak of war during fiscal year 1949, HALFMOON projected military operations on a global scale, much like those in World War II, with the Soviet Union as the anticipated aggressor. Lacking any political guidance from the NSC, JCS planners assumed that U.S. war objectives would be to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw to its pre-World War II borders and desist from further political and military aggression. Given Soviet superiority in ground forces, the Joint Chiefs assumed the early loss of most of Western Europe and the Middle East and estimated that a ground offensive to recapture lost territory would require at least a year of mobilization and preparation. U.S. forces would concentrate on securing vital bases in the United Kingdom, Okinawa, and the Cairo-Suez area as staging points for a strategic air offensive against primary industrial and military targets in the Soviet homeland. In the Mediterranean, Navy carriers would have the primary task of protecting friendly lines of communication and attacking those of the enemy. To the extent possible, these carriers would also support the strategic air offensive.⁵

Although he raised no specific objection to this plan, Forrestal was troubled by its total disregard for budgetary constraints, which he felt might necessitate an alternative strategy based on existing smaller forces. At a 26 May meeting of the Committee of Four, he discussed this matter with George Kennan, asking specifically whether, in preparing FY 1950 estimates, the military should plan for a

* Changed to FLEETWOOD in August 1948.

military posture for keeping the peace or fighting a war. Forrestal explained that throughout the NME there was some confusion about basic U.S. policy. Kennan acknowledged the dilemma and indicated that he would take up with others at State the possibility of preparing a written statement of U.S. basic policy.⁶

Before Kennan could act, President Truman on 3 June sent Forrestal instructions urging restraint in starting new military programs that might result in a further buildup. With memories of their disagreements over the FY 1949 supplemental still fresh, Truman cautioned Forrestal against making "heavy forward commitments . . . which cannot be supported on a sound basis in subsequent years" and reiterated his belief that the nation's defense posture should rest on a "balanced program." "I feel," the President added, "that it is necessary to accelerate our national defense program at a steady rate rather than to attempt an immediate very large increase." As a first step, he imposed the following military personnel ceilings, effective through September: Air Force, 400,000; Navy and Marine Corps, 519,000; and Army, 620,000 if Congress enacted selective service legislation and 575,000 if it did not. The President also placed limits on the number of active aircraft in the Air Force and the Navy. He made clear that he expected Forrestal "to provide the necessary direction" to the service secretaries and the JCS in accordance with the objectives and limitations stated in his letter.⁷

Forrestal and the service secretaries discussed the President's guidelines on 4 June 1948. Responding to a question from Symington, Forrestal stated that if the Joint Chiefs failed to agree on a strategic plan that could be supported within budgetary limitations, he himself would make the decisions upon which further planning might be based. However, he admitted that such decisions would be difficult and would require a great deal of information not yet available, particularly on the Middle East. His more immediate worry was the condition of the economy. Expressing "serious concern" about the possibility of "run-away inflation," he speculated on the need to reimpose limited economic controls on critical industrial items such as steel, copper, and lead. Any further worsening of the economy, he warned, "would render the ERP and other defense programs entirely meaningless."⁸

Despite his concern over the state of the economy, Forrestal took the position that unstable world conditions dictated that military needs should receive the fullest consideration in determining the budget. Meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 11 June, he appeared confident that the military buildup would be allowed to continue into fiscal year 1950 and probably beyond, but said that he could not guarantee that the buildup would be all that the JCS might desire. The central question, he said, was "whether it's a program for a moderate stiffening of our preparation or whether it's to some extent, not an all-out, but a partial all-out." The day before, he told them, the President had stated "very explicitly

that he was preparing, not for war, but for peace. He was basing his military policy on the assumption that there would not be war." Forrestal was skeptical of the President's premise. "I think," he continued, "it would be of service to him [President Truman] not to try to put him in any corner, and I also want the Secretary of State to reflect on that a little bit, to see whether that is the policy they wish us to hold because upon that decision rests very largely what our financial policy will be." Turning to the procedure for preparing estimates, Forrestal reemphasized the Joint Chiefs' collective responsibility to produce an integrated military plan with force requirements and proposed annual operating levels geared to a prescribed level of annual expenditures. He urged them to make a concerted and sincere effort to differentiate between "what . . . you want in being as against what you would want to do in the event of war." His own view, he added, was that "you cannot escape a greater and possibly more substantive examination of your mutual programs. Someone's going to have to do it." Although the Joint Chiefs acknowledged their responsibility here, they urged Forrestal to bear in mind the unresolved controversies over assignment of collateral roles and missions* and noted that any refinement of HALFMOON would require a clarification of basic national security policy. Stressing the latter point, Admiral Leahy expressed the opinion that the JCS had been "working in the dark" because they did not have an authoritative statement of U.S. national security policy and objectives. The Joint Chiefs, Leahy insisted, "should have information which is a statement of policy, and there is an organization in the Government known as the National Security Council which is supposed to produce that and get it approved by the President. I think that should be done, Mr. Secretary, no matter who tackles it." Forrestal concurred.⁹

No one was more aware of the issue Leahy had raised than Forrestal. During the previous six months he had inquired repeatedly about the status of a project for the development of a comprehensive statement of basic national security policy that had been initiated by the NSC staff in December 1947.¹⁰ But his efforts to spur action had produced nothing more than a general report (NSC 7), circulated in March 1948 at the time of the war scare, recommending a general U.S. force buildup of unspecified size and a "world-wide counter-offensive" aimed at checking the momentum of Soviet expansion.¹¹ Some members of the State Department Policy Planning Staff felt that the paper's recommendations were not sufficiently clear and specific, and Kennan thought that he should discuss it with Marshall before the NSC took it up. The JCS concurred with some of the paper's proposals on how to deal with "Soviet-Directed World Communism" but questioned or recommended qualification of others. As a result, the NSC returned the paper to its staff for revision.¹²

* See Chapter XIV.

With NSC 7 temporarily shelved, Forrestal hoped that Kennan would now prepare a policy statement of the kind they had discussed earlier. On 23 June, Kennan submitted a study (PPS 33) that closely approximated what Forrestal had in mind. Taking into consideration the massive destruction the Soviet Union had suffered in the last war, the slow pace of its recovery, and the restraints these conditions imposed on Soviet actions, Kennan doubted that the Soviet Union was actively planning a war of aggression. He felt the more immediate threat was an accidental conflict resulting from the escalation of some minor incident or Soviet miscalculation. "War must therefore be regarded," Kennan argued, "if not as a probability, at least as a possibility, and one serious enough to be taken account of fully in our military and political planning." Given the choice in these circumstances between a rapid U.S. military buildup in anticipation of, and phased to peak during, some estimated future period of maximum danger, or the maintenance of a steady level of preparedness over an indefinite period, Kennan felt that the latter course would be more effective, both for purposes of deterrence and as a means of demonstrating stability and long-term consistency in U.S. policy. Kennan also felt that while a defense effort that called for the permanent maintenance of a relatively steady level of military strength would lack the advantages of a buildup that fortuitously did peak as planned at the time when the danger was greatest, the steady level would have distinct advantages if the period of greatest danger should occur at some other time than anticipated.¹³

Even though he now had Kennan's views, Forrestal continued to seek specific guidance on the role that military preparedness should play in support of basic national security policy. By this time the crisis over access to Berlin had come to a head, and the Western Powers had initiated an airlift to the beleaguered city. On 10 July Forrestal asked the NSC to undertake, as a matter of highest priority, a study to appraise the degree and character of military preparedness required by the world situation, with reference to the threats posed by the Soviet Union, the relative importance of military and nonmilitary countermeasures, the kinds of armament that should be developed, and all existing and probable international commitments under which the use of force might be contemplated. The proposed study, Forrestal told Truman, was "indispensable to the National Military Establishment in determining the level and character of forces which it should maintain." "Similarly," Forrestal added, "I believe that the preparation of realistic budget estimates and final decisions concerning the size of the national budget, and its relative emphasis on different projects, should be founded on such an evaluation."¹⁴

Truman's reaction was sharp and quick. Although he agreed that the study should be done, he rejected Forrestal's contention that it should serve in some way as guidance for the budget's development. "It seems to me," said the Presi-

dent, "that the proper thing for you to do is to get the Army, Navy and Air people together and establish a program within the budget limits which have been allowed. It seems to me that is your responsibility."¹⁵

On 15 July the President's policy became even clearer when he notified Forrestal that "for immediate planning purposes" the FY 1950 military budget should not exceed \$15 billion. The next day Webb indicated that \$525 million of this amount was to be earmarked for the stockpiling of critical and strategic materials, leaving \$14.475 billion to be allocated among the services and civilian components. This decision seemed to indicate that the White House considered the military buildup close to completion. But as Webb noted, these figures were still tentative. "If necessary," he assured Forrestal, "consideration will be given to an adjustment in this base at a later date if changes in the international situation appear to warrant such action."¹⁶

Preparation of Initial Estimates

On 17 July 1948 Forrestal directed the Joint Chiefs to submit before the end of the month specific recommendations on the size, composition, and degree of readiness of forces for fiscal year 1950. These estimates, Forrestal wrote, should be "based on military considerations alone" and should conform to the National Security Act requirement of a coordinated budget. Moreover, if these original estimates exceeded the administration's ceiling on obligations, the JCS should then be prepared to submit additional proposals for forces of lesser strength and state what effect the lower estimates might have on U.S. security. Forrestal's objectives were obvious: to establish an efficient procedure for calculating military requirements and to force the Joint Chiefs to define their priorities in a way that would facilitate the later revision of the initial estimates.¹⁷

Attainment of these goals did not come easily. A week after receiving their instructions, the Joint Chiefs expressed regret that lack of time and the absence of consensus on planning factors had prevented agreement on service requirements. Despite the Key West understanding, they remained deadlocked over the assignment of collateral roles and missions, particularly with respect to air-atomic operations and the role of aircraft carriers in strategic bombing. The Army and the Air Force insisted that the Navy's stated ship and aircraft requirements vastly exceeded peacetime needs. In view of this and other disagreements, the Joint Chiefs found it impractical to attempt any correlation of military requirements and simply endorsed FY 1950 force levels recommended by the individual services. Based on these unilateral estimates, the JCS submitted personnel requirements on 24 July for more than 2,000,000 to man a regular Army of 12 divi-

sions, a Navy of 434 major combatant vessels, and a 70-group Air Force. No cost figures accompanied these estimates, but when the services submitted itemized computations on 16 August, the total came to almost \$29 billion.¹⁸

Since this amount was twice the size of the President's ceiling, large cuts would be necessary. But Forrestal saw as the more immediate issue the continuing dispute over roles and missions and the obstacles this posed to the correlation of estimates. Determined to resolve it, he met with the Joint Chiefs at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. There from 20 to 22 August, the conferees reached more detailed agreement on the functions of the several services and added a supplement to the Key West accord that would allow the Navy to develop atomic capabilities and to play a role in strategic bombing. At the same time, they approved as an "interim measure" the assignment to the Air Force of primary responsibility for the control and direction of air-atomic operations, but not to the exclusion of any other service.*¹⁹

After Newport, Forrestal was cautiously optimistic that the Joint Chiefs could now effectively correlate the estimates of the services. Earlier, to assist in doing so, he had asked that each service appoint a full-time deputy to review requirements and propose reductions. The services named General McNarney, USAF, Vice Adm. Robert B. Carney, USN, and Maj. Gen. George J. Richards, USA, to serve on this Budget Advisory Committee (BAC). Assisted by approximately 20 senior officers from each service, the BAC commenced "hearings" on 12 August and met regularly for the next seven weeks. The hearings included oral and written presentations, cross-examinations, and rebuttals.²⁰

This elaborate and detailed process did not succeed in reducing the initial \$29 billion estimate to the \$14.4 billion ceiling. On 1 October, when the committee submitted its report, the estimates still far exceeded the BoB ceiling. Based on the requirements outlined in the HALFMOON/FLEETWOOD war plan, the BAC recommended a level of military strength only slightly less than that proposed in the July estimates. The largest cuts were in the Army, reduced from 12 to 10 divisions, and the Navy, trimmed from 434 to 382 combatant ships, with only 12 instead of 16 heavy attack carriers. With procurement, maintenance, and other similar items added to manpower expenses, the BAC estimated costs at \$23.6 billion, not including money for stockpiling critical materials.²¹

Although the budget deputies had fallen far short of their goal, they had at least accomplished one important part of the assigned task—the development for the first time of an integrated statement of force requirements and related materiel requirements that was based on military considerations. In defense of its recommendations, the committee pointed out that maintenance of the armed

* The Newport conference is discussed in further detail in Chapter XIV.

forces at their current size and level of readiness would require \$3.6 billion more in fiscal year 1950 than in fiscal year 1949: \$2.1 billion for aircraft procurement and \$1.5 billion for rising operational and support costs due to inflation. Thus, just to stay even would require a FY 1950 appropriation of \$18.6 billion. Since even this sum would not buy "minimum necessary readiness," the committee recommended an additional \$5 billion, bringing its total estimate to \$23.6 billion.²²

The Paring of Estimates

The paring of FY 1950 budget estimates, beginning in the fall of 1948, was influenced by two commanding circumstances: the intense presidential election campaign and the deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Knowing that opinion polls showed him lagging behind his Republican opponent, Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York, Truman campaigned vigorously through September and October. He stressed his forceful leadership, the alleged "do-nothing" attitude of the Republican-controlled 80th Congress, and his commitment to a sound economy, the end of inflation, and limitations on federal spending. In foreign affairs, Truman downplayed disputes with the Soviet Union and adopted the position that "the door is always open for honest negotiations looking toward genuine settlements."²³

Despite the President's campaign claims, U.S.-Soviet relations remained seriously strained, and for a while in early September, after the collapse of negotiations to end the Berlin blockade, it appeared that the crisis might enter a new, more serious phase. When intelligence estimates warned that Moscow might be planning new "diplomatic ventures" that could touch off a fresh round of crises, Truman authorized contingency preparations, all done in strictest secrecy in an apparent effort not to alarm the public. He confined his own activities, for the most part, to off-the-record meetings with Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs, making sure that retaliatory forces would be ready if needed and that mobilization plans, currently under review by the BoB, could be quickly implemented should matters take a turn for the worse.²⁴ In concert with these moves, Forrestal told Rep. John Taber that he would like to submit a proposal for supplemental appropriations when the new Congress met after the election, mainly to remedy certain deficiencies in Army equipment.²⁵ The whole exercise was kept low-key and discreet to avoid giving the impression of a crisis.

The mounting tensions of September had little if any immediate impact on the budget process itself. Despite talk of preparedness and a possible supplemental, there was no solid evidence that the President was reconsidering his decision to hold the military budget to \$14.4 billion. Obligated to acknowledge

this fact, the Joint Chiefs met with the Budget Advisory Committee over the weekend of 2–3 October to see what they could do to reduce the \$23.6 billion that the BAC had recommended. General McNarney suggested looking first for reductions in “unescapable overhead” items such as research and development, intelligence, industrial mobilization, and stockpiling. But the ensuing discussion produced savings of only a few hundred million dollars, hardly a dent in the BAC total.

The group then turned to a detailed examination of force requirements under the strategic concept of the current emergency war plan. In a foretaste of more bitter quarrels yet to come, the Army and the Air Force jointly challenged the Navy’s requirements for heavy aircraft carriers. To achieve substantial reductions, General Bradley, in accordance with a concept advanced by General McNarney, proposed the deletion of all air, sea, and ground operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The resultant savings, Bradley calculated, would be about \$6.5 billion. General Vandenberg seconded Bradley’s suggestion, but Denfeld and other admirals objected strenuously and insisted on the need for substantial carrier task forces.²⁶

Attempts at further reductions provoked still more divisiveness. The best the JCS could do was to submit a “split” recommendation in the form of two tentative budgets: one for \$15.8 billion proposed by the Army and the Air Force; the other for \$16.5 billion proposed by the Navy. The Joint Chiefs agreed on \$5.1 billion for the Army and \$5.5 billion for the Air Force, but while Bradley and Vandenberg proposed \$5.2 billion for the Navy, Denfeld insisted on \$5.9 billion.²⁷

The next day, joined by Admiral Leahy and the service secretaries, Forrestal met with the Joint Chiefs. Denfeld spoke first from a prepared statement. He defended the strategic plans for operations in the Mediterranean and broadly criticized Army and Air Force proposals for the Navy. Then he launched a broadside assault against the competence of the Air Force. The “unpleasant fact remains,” he declared, “that the Navy has honest and sincere misgivings as to the ability of the Air Force successfully to deliver the [atomic] weapon by means of unescorted missions flown by present-day bombers, deep into enemy territory in the face of strong Soviet air defenses, and to drop it on targets whose locations are not accurately known.” Further discussion confirmed the deep split over the allocation of funds. Forrestal reminded the Joint Chiefs that their preliminary task was to provide a statement of forces that could be supported within the \$14.4 billion ceiling. He also asked them to estimate the size and cost of forces they considered necessary for national security. And finally, he added, if he should decide that a budget of \$14.4 billion was insufficient, he would advise the President of how much he needed.²⁸

On 5 October, Forrestal gave President Truman an oral report on the status of the budget and the possible strategic consequences of limiting new FY 1950 obligations to \$14.4 billion. If war occurred, Forrestal warned, the United States would have no forces available for operations in the Mediterranean and would be restricted to launching reprisal air strikes against the Soviet Union from bases in England. Implying that such a strategy might not assure success, he asked permission to prepare another budget, somewhere on the order of \$18.5 billion, which would include provision for operations in the Mediterranean. Truman consented, but said that the second budget should be held in reserve, possibly for use as a supplemental to the regular budget should the international situation worsen. The President said he did not want it to appear that the United States was arming for war. He indicated that he planned to "explore the international situation" very soon with Secretary Marshall. Despite recent events abroad, Truman obviously did not believe that he faced a situation similar to the previous spring when increased military preparedness had appeared mandatory.²⁹

In compliance with the President's orders, Forrestal on 6 October once again instructed the Joint Chiefs to agree on a distribution of the \$14.4 billion, while holding out the possibility of a later supplemental. "I want to have it clearly established in your minds," he said, "that I am expecting a definitive recommendation from you, as an entity, as to the division of funds in the 1949-50 budget—specifically as to the allocations to the respective services." The JCS could not agree on a tentative allocation of the \$14.4 billion. They submitted to Forrestal a proposal providing \$4.9 billion for the Army, \$4.4 billion for the Navy, and \$5.1 billion for the Air Force, but Admiral Denfeld reserved final approval of this division, "pending examination of the details of the effect of the proposed allocation on the Navy." The JCS did agree that the proposed budget was "insufficient to implement national policy in any probable war situation" and that a supplemental for fiscal year 1950 would be required. "It would appear," Forrestal wrote to the Joint Chiefs in obvious frustration, "that our efforts have degenerated into a competition for dollars."³⁰

Faced with a continuing split among the Joint Chiefs, Forrestal grew increasingly skeptical that the budget could be held to the President's limit of \$14.4 billion. On 8 October he temporarily abandoned efforts to obtain a budget under the ceiling and asked the Joint Chiefs to supply force recommendations for a budget "*in the general area*" of \$14.4 billion.³¹ Meanwhile, with the approval of the BoB, he suspended the normal timetable for the submission of finished estimates until after the election and directed the service secretaries to begin preparing "project estimates" on the basis of alternate force strengths, so that when the Joint Chiefs completed their assignment final budget figures could be assembled quickly.³²

In line with these actions, the Joint Chiefs on 13 October reassembled the Budget Advisory Committee and directed it and the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to prepare an analysis of the forces supportable under a projected budget of \$17.5 billion (or \$16.9 billion plus the cost of stockpiling). How they picked this figure is not clear, but it may have been an approximation of the BAC's earlier calculations of the cost of maintaining the same level of forces and readiness in fiscal year 1950 as in fiscal year 1949. For guidance, the JCS approved a two-part strategic concept that restated the basic tasks of HALFMOON/FLEETWOOD, but on a reduced scale. Part "A" of the concept called for the protection of the Western Hemisphere, the maintenance of overseas lines of communication, a strategic air offensive conducted from bases in the United Kingdom and/or Iceland and Okinawa, and air and sea operations in the Mediterranean as far east as Tunisia and elsewhere to the extent permitted by budgetary limitations. Part "B" stated general requirements for the fulfillment of political commitments, the maintenance of bases in Okinawa and Alaska, mobilization planning, and the provision of administrative and support elements for strategic operations.³³

Meeting with Bradley, Denfeld, and their budget advisers on 15 October, Forrestal declared his willingness to show the President an intermediate budget between the ceiling figure of \$14.4 billion and the BAC's original recommendation of \$23.6 billion. However, he refused to excuse the Joint Chiefs from their responsibility to submit a proposed distribution of the \$14.4 billion. "My job," Forrestal remarked, "is going to have to be to convince the President . . . that we have taken every drop of water out of this thing that we could find—we can't catch it all—but I have got to be able to say that we have gone into this thing from the ground up." ³⁴

Elaborating on what his next step would be, Forrestal on 29 October directed the JCS to submit by 8 November an agreed statement of force requirements based on a budget of \$14.4 billion. By 14 November he wanted a statement of additional requirements which could be maintained on a budget of \$16.9 billion. He indicated that after receipt of these statements, he would resolve any disagreements within a day or so.³⁵

Faced with this promise of immediate action, the Joint Chiefs quickly composed most of their outstanding differences. On 8 November they submitted firm recommendations on the allocation of the \$14.4 billion and the forces to be maintained. They split on one item—the number of heavy carriers the Navy should operate in fiscal year 1950. Forrestal resolved the issue the next day, deciding on a total of eight heavy carriers in two carrier task groups.³⁶ This represented a substantial cut in the Navy's existing carrier strength of 11. A week later the Joint Chiefs recommended funds and forces under a budget of \$16.9 billion. The Secretary of Defense approved these estimates on 17 November on

the understanding that they were possible of attainment within the agreed division of funds.³⁷

Forrestal's Recommendations

After considerable effort over an extended period of time, Forrestal had at last achieved definitive budget estimates and a measure of consensus among his military advisers. To reach this stage, however, he had had to concede, both to himself and to the Joint Chiefs, that the budget of \$14.4 billion would be insufficient and that it should be raised in the interests of national security, even at the risk of some damage to the economy. On this key issue he found himself increasingly at odds with the President, who had evinced little enthusiasm for increased military spending. It must not have been lost on Forrestal that if Truman refused to lift the ceiling, it could be an indication that he lacked confidence in Forrestal's judgment. A choice, perhaps disastrous to Forrestal's prestige and credibility, would soon have to be made. Having in hand two budgets, one for \$14.4 billion and another for \$16.9 billion, he now had to decide which to recommend to the President.

Even before he received the budget figures Forrestal began preparing for a possible confrontation with the President. Knowing that his own efforts might not be enough if he decided to contest the President's ceiling, he launched a search for allies and support outside the military establishment, turning first to Truman's most trusted adviser, Secretary Marshall. Accompanied by Generals Gruenther and McNarney and the Joint Chiefs, he met with Marshall on 10 October to brief him on U.S. war plans and the potential consequences of holding FY 1950 military obligations to \$14.4 billion. But Marshall, who had just returned from Paris, appeared less concerned about U.S. capabilities than about European problems and defenses. The Europeans, Marshall reported, were "completely out of their skin, and sitting on their nerves." Yet despite the tense situation, Marshall doubted that there was cause for undue alarm. He thought that as soon as the United States implemented a program of foreign military assistance, conditions would improve. "It is my distinct impression," recalled Gruenther after the meeting, "that General Marshall, although sympathetic with the Chiefs because of the budget ceilings which have been imposed, was not particularly disturbed over the implications in the field of international relations."³⁸

On 31 October Forrestal tried again to obtain Marshall's backing, asking him point-blank whether the international situation currently warranted either a reduction or increase in U.S. capabilities. "I think it is important to note," Forrestal commented, "that the ceiling of \$14.4 billion will not be adequate to maintain the level of forces which we are scheduled to attain at the end of the

current fiscal year." For this reason Forrestal said he needed guidance from Marshall:

In addition to submitting a budget within the President's tentative ceiling of \$14.4 billion, I feel an obligation to inform him of the weakening of our strength which this budget entails, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and I am also considering sending the President, as my own recommendation, a proposal that he lift the ceiling to approximately 17½ billion—which, in my opinion, while involving some risks, would provide us with forces capable of taking effective action in the event of trouble.³⁹

Once more, Marshall evaded Forrestal's request, refusing to offer a definite opinion. Back in Paris for a meeting of the United Nations, Marshall cabled Lovett in Washington on 8 November stating that he was "not disposed to make a particular point with Forrestal as to existence of an objective world situation independent of our own policies, or as to my responsibilities for analyzing the world situation for military budget purposes." He felt, as he had the previous spring during the debate on the supplemental, that the United States should develop military capabilities "within a balanced national economy, and that the country could not, and would not, support a budget based on preparation for war." "This view," he said, "still holds." Hence, in a message to Forrestal the same day, he stated that the United States would continue to have undiminished world responsibilities until Europe regained strength and stability, that the United States must remain a deterrent to Soviet aggression, that fiscal year 1949 offered no prospect of being any better or worse than 1948 in terms of international tensions, and finally, that U.S. policy should be to build up Western European strength by providing munitions rather than building up U.S. ground forces for deployment in Europe.⁴⁰

If Marshall was dubious of the need for a larger military budget, President Truman was even more so. Buoyed by his come-from-behind election victory on 2 November, Truman exhibited a fresh sense of confidence in the public's support of his policies. The day after the election he wrote Forrestal, reminding him that he had advised him in June to avoid "heavy forward commitments" and not to plan for a military establishment that the nation's economy could not afford. Once again, pending submission of the new budget, Truman imposed ceilings on military manpower and the number of aircraft in the active inventory.⁴¹

Despite these initial rebuffs, Forrestal persisted in his efforts to line up support. Since Marshall had emphasized the European situation as his first concern, Forrestal on 9 November flew to Paris, Frankfurt, Berlin, and London for four days of talks with U.S. and European officials. Facing budget difficulties of their

own, British and French authorities appeared interested in discussing increased U.S. defense spending only to the extent that it might offer direct and immediate benefits to Europe. When Forrestal met in Berlin on 13 November with General Clay, the U.S. Military Governor of Germany, and Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the latter indicated that the maintenance of an effective U.S. deterrent capability and European rearmament should be given top priority, even if attainment of these objectives required deficit spending for the next several years. But Clay disagreed and warned that budget deficits in the United States "would be taken in Europe as a signal that we were on our way to the same inflationary processes which the European nations had found so disastrous." ⁴² In sum, Forrestal's trip proved inconclusive.

Still, Forrestal did not abandon his effort. After returning to the United States, he submitted to the NSC (some time around 17 November) a detailed catalog of U.S. defense commitments prepared by the JCS. Contemplating the long list of requirements, including support of the United Nations, the occupation of Germany and Japan, foreign military aid, and other commitments that would arise after the approval of the North Atlantic defense treaty, the Joint Chiefs were drawn irresistibly to the conclusion that U.S. capabilities were woefully insufficient. "It is essential to our national security," they advised, "to bring our military strength to a level commensurate with the distinct possibility of global warfare." Otherwise, the United States could find itself in a serious and steadily deteriorating position. They concluded:

From the military viewpoint and as evidenced by the consistent trend of the Soviet attitude, our *potential* military power and our determination to resist further Soviet encroachment have not caused the Soviets to cease their aggressions. On the other hand, lack of readiness constitutes, apparently, actual encouragement to aggression while also jeopardizing our national security in the event of war.⁴³

This unambiguous statement left no doubt about the military's position; it did not, however, link forces to national objectives, place a price tag on requirements, or provide any step-by-step analysis of what might happen if the President declined to lift his ceiling on the military budget. Nor did it contain any new evidence to support a conclusion that a budget of \$14.4 billion would be any less capable of maintaining U.S. security than a budget twice or even three times larger. Whatever impact the statement might have had was greatly diminished when a few days later, on 23 November, the National Security Council adopted NSC 20/4, the long-awaited statement of basic national policy that Forrestal had requested nearly five months earlier.

Based on a draft written by the State Department's Policy Planning Staff,

NSC 20/4 presented both in tone and substance a restrained and cautious assessment. While readily acknowledging that the Soviet Union posed a grave potential threat to U.S. security, NSC 20/4 made no mention of any need for increased military preparedness and, in fact, warned against "excessive" armaments as a menace in themselves to the country's economic stability. Militarily, the Soviet Union currently possessed the capability to overrun Western Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Asia, and no later than 1955 it would be able to mount "serious air attacks" against the United States with atomic and other weapons. For the immediate future, the United States could afford to accept some degree of risk, while endeavoring to isolate and contain Soviet influence through a variety of political, economic, and military tactics. A policy developed and applied on these premises, the report said, would require "a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression"; it would also provide a foundation for rapid mobilization in the event of unavoidable war.⁴⁴ Although somewhat ambiguous as a statement of policy, NSC 20/4's message was clear: A military budget limited to \$14.4 billion would not necessarily endanger national security.

Despite the apparent lack of support for his position, Forrestal knew he had come too far—with too many promises to the Joint Chiefs—to retreat. On 1 December 1948 he sent the BoB his formal proposals for a \$14.4 billion budget for fiscal year 1950.⁴⁵ In a letter the same day to the President, he actually outlined three budgets: one which met the President's ceiling of \$14.4 billion, another for \$23 billion, and a third for \$16.9 billion. Forrestal explained that the Joint Chiefs could not in good conscience guarantee that U.S. security would be "adequately safeguarded" under a military budget of \$14.4 billion; they felt they needed an additional \$8 billion to do the job. Forrestal stated that he personally deemed the JCS estimate too high, but he felt compelled because of the JCS position to recommend against adoption of the \$14.4 billion budget. To obtain "a maximum benefit from funds provided for military activities," he advised the President to accept the intermediate figure of \$16.9 billion.

For purposes of ready comparison Forrestal outlined what could be secured with each of the three budgets:

\$14.4 billion

Army: 677,000 men; 10 divisions

Navy (including Marines): 527,000 men; 287 combatant ships

Air Force: 412,000 men; 48 groups

Limited procurement

Nominal reserve forces

Restrictive maintenance

\$23 billion

Army: 800,000 men; 12 divisions

Navy (including Marines): 662,000 men; 382 combatant ships

Air Force: 489,000 men; 70 groups

Substantial procurement for reserve forces

Strong reserve forces

Normal maintenance

\$16.9 billion

Army: 800,000 men; 12 divisions

Navy (including Marines): 580,000 men; 319 combatant ships

Air Force: 460,000 men; 59 groups

Reasonable procurement

Reasonably adequate reserve forces

Near normal maintenance

Each budget, Forrestal added, had its special strategic ramifications that he, the service secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs would be willing to explain at a special briefing. Further, with the last-minute approval of Acting Secretary of State Lovett, Forrestal included a final paragraph stating that Secretary Marshall also favored the \$16.9 billion figure as "better calculated . . . to instill the necessary confidence in democratic nations everywhere than would the reduced forces in a more limited budget."⁴⁶

Truman was not persuaded. The next day he sent the following instruction to Webb: "Attached is a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense in regard to the Budget. I don't know why he sent two [sic]. The \$14.4 billion budget is the one we will adopt."⁴⁷ A week later, on 9 December, Forrestal, the service secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs met with the President to explain their recommendations. The session, complete with charts and oral presentations, lasted less than an hour. But neither at this, nor at a meeting of Forrestal and the President on 20 December, did Truman change his mind in the slightest.⁴⁸ The decision was firm, and it left Forrestal somewhat despondent and shaken, but also a bit in awe of Truman's self-confidence and assertiveness. "I can assure you," Forrestal later remarked somewhat hyperbolically in a speech at the National Press Club, "that in Harry Truman I have seen the most rocklike example of civilian control that the world has ever witnessed."⁴⁹

Congressional Action on the 1950 Budget

On 10 January 1949 President Truman presented to Congress his FY 1950 budget recommendations. Predicting that federal revenues would hold steady at

around \$41 billion, Truman asked for new obligational authority totaling \$41.9 billion, resulting in an estimated deficit of \$873 million. To overcome this deficit and create a surplus that could be used to reduce the public debt, the President requested new tax legislation that would yield \$4 billion in additional revenues in subsequent years and a lesser amount in fiscal year 1950 because of the time lag in collecting taxes. During a period of high prosperity, he said, "it is not sound public policy for the Government to operate at a deficit." He emphasized the importance of a surplus that would make possible reduction both of the public debt and inflationary pressures.⁵⁰

Once again, military costs ranked as the largest single item in the President's budget, accounting for roughly one-third of the requested obligational authority. Force level recommendations remained unchanged from those submitted under the proposed \$14.4 billion budget by Forrestal in December. However, after a detailed review of the military budget, the BoB in late December ordered scattered reductions totaling \$175 million. At the same time, it had set aside an undistributed sum of \$625 million for contingencies, including a military pay raise, an air engineering center, a long-range missile proving ground, and new housing for military personnel—funding for which required prior specific enabling legislation.* The BoB also tentatively added \$800 million for the first year of universal military training, also contingent on separate legislation and not included in the regular military budget. New obligational authority for the NME, exclusive of contingent items,† totaled \$13.420 billion, divided as follows: Army, \$4.505 billion; Navy and Marine Corps, \$4.350 billion; Air Force, \$4.554 billion; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, \$11 million.⁵¹ (Table 5)

As an expression of administration policy, the proposed military budget offered clear and convincing evidence that the military buildup initiated in the spring of 1948 had run its course and that arms expenditures would now level off. Overall, the budget projected the level of obligations and strength of forces to be approximately the same in fiscal year 1950 as in the preceding year. However, because of inflation, the process of leveling-off necessarily entailed some cut-backs and reductions. Aircraft procurement, for example, estimated at \$2.714 billion under the FY 1949 budget, would drop to \$2.167 billion in fiscal year 1950—\$687 million for the Navy and \$1.480 billion for the Air Force. Also,

* The administration eventually requested \$830 million for contingent items; the extra \$205 million was for public works.

† Contingent items at this time included construction projects, military pay increases, and similar activities which by law were not part of the ongoing authority of the military departments and therefore required specific authorizing legislation before appropriations could be made. Hence Congress treated them separately from the rest of the military budget, even though the administration, for accounting purposes in drawing up its budget, included them as part of its total annual submission.

the Navy would have to deactivate three older heavy carriers; the Army would lose one of its organized divisions; and the Air Force would remain at 48 groups. To make up for any apparent loss of strength, the President pointed out in his message that the FY 1950 budget gave priority to the modernization of air power, the expansion of civilian reserve components, and the improvement of mobilization capabilities.⁵²

Enactment of the FY 1950 military budget took the better part of 1949. Because of numerous delays Congress in June passed a continuing resolution (P.L. 154) temporarily authorizing the armed services to spend money during fiscal year 1950 at the previous year's rate. For the first time since the early days of the Republic, Congress, to further the unification process, lumped all military requests into a single bill, H.R. 4146. Hearings on the bill commenced on 31 January 1949, at which time Forrestal appeared before Rep. George H. Mahon's House Subcommittee on Armed Services Appropriations to offer lukewarm support of the President's proposed budget. Said Forrestal in his prepared statement: "The budget before you contemplates the maintenance of the military posture which would give some manifestation of continuing interest in world affairs. It is a budget designed to maintain a military posture for the preservation of peace. It is not a war budget."⁵³

Testimony by the Joint Chiefs echoed this view. They voiced obvious skepticism that the President's proposed budget would guarantee sufficient readiness in a general emergency, but at the same time their own continuing disagreements effectively precluded the suggestion of an alternative. Truman's rejection of Forrestal's compromise "intermediate" budget of \$16.9 billion inevitably led to a renewal of quarreling and competition among the services. Additional funds, they hinted in their testimony, would be welcome. But which service, the committee wondered, should get them? That was still another question, and on this crucial issue the Joint Chiefs differed sharply. As Admiral Denfeld put it, the budget submitted by the President had one inherently important virtue—it "was the best division of funds that we could agree on at that time."⁵⁴

The most controversial issue during the House hearings was whether the Air Force could support an effective strategic deterrent force with the funds being made available. At the committee's request in March, the Air Force developed several alternative budget programs that included up to an additional \$1 billion. Under questioning, Air Force spokesmen stated that the Air Force would use this additional money to expand to 59 groups and to buy fighter aircraft, light bombers, and transports in addition to medium and heavy bombers.⁵⁵ Earlier, another plan, of which the committee was apparently unaware, had projected more modest objectives. In December 1948, with Forrestal's knowledge, the Air Force convened a board of senior officers who in February 1949 recommended a

restructuring of the 48-group force to begin immediately and culminate toward the end of fiscal year 1950. Although no additional money would be involved, the board recommended accelerating production of the intercontinental B-36, together with cancellation of the B-54, a medium bomber similar in design to the B-29 and B-50. As the B-36s became available, they would replace aircraft in two medium-bomber groups. The 48-group structure would thus be preserved, but with enhanced capabilities for long-distance bombing.⁵⁶

On 9 April 1949, with administration approval of this plan still pending,* the House Appropriations Committee published its report on the FY 1950 military budget. Once again, as they had the year before, air power advocates on the committee pushed for increased military preparedness through expansion of the Air Force. The committee felt that reductions could be made throughout the National Military Establishment in such areas as civilian personnel, civilian and military travel, subsistence, clothing, and equipage. It indicated that the Air Force should not be exempted from cutbacks in these areas, but at the same time it wanted to accelerate Air Force expansion. Voicing dissatisfaction with a 48-group program, the committee recommended an increase to 58 groups in fiscal year 1950 and eventually to 70 groups. As a final compromise, the committee increased the Air Force program above the President's budget by approximately \$800 million, making reductions elsewhere so that funds for the accelerated program would be close to \$851 million. The committee also relieved the services of handling retired pay and transferred \$180 million for this purpose from their accounts to OSD. In the bill it presented to the House, the committee recommended an appropriation of \$14.020 billion in new obligational authority not including the President's contingent request of \$830 million, for which Congress had yet to pass enabling legislation. On 13 April, after turning down an amendment to add extra funds for naval aviation, the House voted 271 to 1 to accept the committee's recommended budget.⁵⁷

By the time the House completed action on the military budget, Louis Johnson had replaced Forrestal as Secretary of Defense and had launched his celebrated "economy drive." In swift order he cut back the Navy's shipbuilding program, hired a team of management specialists to conduct an efficiency study of the services, and ordered the elimination of numerous joint boards and committees he deemed superfluous. Appearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 16 June, Johnson offered assurances that if Congress passed the proposed amendments to the National Security Act his efforts would culminate in very substantial savings. "I think," he declared, "we can save about a billion dollars by

* The President approved stepped-up B-36 procurement on 8 May 1949. This matter is discussed further in connection with the roles and missions controversy in Chapter XIV.

cutting out wastage, duplication, and by cutting down unnecessary civilian employment.”⁵⁸

Larger reductions than these were just around the corner. On 1 July 1949, acting on a BoB recommendation, Truman set a ceiling of \$13 billion on new obligational authority for the military for fiscal year 1951.* Although the proposed cutback would not go into effect for a year, early decisions would be required to help ease the transition into the next fiscal year and to avoid sharp disruptions as a result of elimination or reduction of programs. The immediate result was a full reappraisal of projected FY 1950 obligations to bring them as closely as possible into line with FY 1951 estimates. In preparation for future belt-tightening, Johnson on 19 July asked the service secretaries and the JCS to identify ways of reducing expenditures. The following month he placed a ceiling of \$13 billion on FY 1950 obligations and directed General McNarney, chairman of the newly formed Defense Management Committee, to find additional savings. Johnson directed the committee to reprogram FY 1950 military obligations within the \$13 billion ceiling. Working quickly, McNarney's committee completed the assignment by the end of August. Through cuts in planned levels of military and civilian personnel, introduction of improved management techniques, deferral of certain new programs, and other measures, McNarney estimated that obligations could be reduced by \$1.1 billion. This revised budget compared with the President's request of January 1949 as follows:⁵⁹

	President's Request of Jan 49 (In billions)	Revised Budget of 30 Aug 49 (In billions)
Army	\$ 4.505	\$ 4.050
Navy	4.350	3.850
Air Force	4.554	4.400
OSD	.011	.011
Retired Pay	—	.251
Contingent Items	.830	.375
Reserve Fund	—	.063
Total	<u>\$14.250</u>	<u>\$13.000</u>

When the Senate took up consideration of the House-passed FY 1950 appropriations bill in July, it joined the administration's economy drive. Historically, it was the House that usually made budget cuts and the Senate that

* This decision and its ramifications are discussed more fully in the following chapter on the military budget for fiscal year 1951.

proposed restoration and increases, but this time the roles were reversed. The Senate Appropriations Committee eliminated the funds added by the House to support an increase of the Air Force from 48 to 58 groups and partially restored the funds cut by the House from the Army and Navy budget requests. The bill that went to the Senate floor in August was close to the amount of the President's January request, but it directed the Secretary of Defense to achieve savings of \$434 million in "areas not inimical to the national security" by taking advantage of declining fuel prices and by making other economies. To effect this rescission, the committee listed for possible reduction or elimination the following: a new antiaircraft gun, one-year enlistments, "gadgets" for jeeps and trucks, flying hours, the Air Reserve and Air National Guard programs, a new Air Force radio system, and retail sales at military commissaries. By voice vote on 29 August the Senate adopted the committee's recommended changes and passed an appropriation allowing \$12.901 billion for new obligational authority.⁶⁰

On 18 October 1949, after numerous sessions of the House-Senate Conference Committee, Congress approved a compromise version of H.R. 4146 that provided \$13.696 billion in new obligational authority for the armed forces and OSD. Although the Senate backed down on the rescission it had passed, House conferees held firm on the need for \$851 million to fund a 58-group Air Force—the increase partially offset by additional cuts in Army and Navy appropriations. Under separate legislation passed earlier, Congress approved a military pay raise and a military housing bill that together added \$650 million, bringing the full amount of new obligational authority to \$14.346 billion.⁶¹ (Table 5) Although the total approximated what the administration had requested in January, the President's decision of 1 July to place a ceiling of \$13 billion on FY 1950 military obligations, coupled with Louis Johnson's efforts to hold obligations under a ceiling of \$13 billion and cut expenditures, effectively settled the ceiling issue well before Congress took final action. Moreover, on 29 October, as he signed the appropriation bill, Truman served notice that he would impound the extra funds, an action sharply criticized by the House advocates of the additional funds but recognized by congressional leaders to be the President's prerogative.⁶² The result was a further push toward abandonment of the buildup and even a substantial cutback. Personnel strength dropped from its post-demobilization peak of 1,668,000 on 31 January 1949 to 1,460,000 at the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.⁶³

By the time the FY 1950 military budget became law, fiscal retrenchment rather than military buildup had become the watchword both in the White House and on Capitol Hill. The international crises of 1948 that had caused Congress

and President Truman to accept increases in the FY 1949 defense budget had abated, and the outlook by 1949 was one of relative stability abroad amid continuing tensions. At the same time, difficulties at home, centering on the condition of the economy, reemerged as the first order of business.

The chief question pertaining to the FY 1950 military budget was never one of all-out rearmament for war but whether to maintain the level of strength and readiness projected in the FY 1949 expansion. During preparation of estimates in 1948, Forrestal tried initially to steer a middle course between his (and Truman's) concern for the economy and security needs as the services saw them. But as the paring of estimates progressed, doubts about the country's security preyed on Forrestal's mind, and he sided more and more with the services. On occasion, as during the Berlin crisis in the fall of 1948, Truman's thinking appeared to incline in Forrestal's direction, giving the latter reason to believe that the \$15 billion ceiling might be raised and causing him to make promises to the Joint Chiefs that in the end he could not fulfill. Johnson, having taken no part in these discussions with the Joint Chiefs, was free of Forrestal's self-imposed constraints and thus could operate more effectively in achieving Truman's fiscal aims.

Forrestal's experience demonstrated the limits of trying to mold a budget through persuasion. Even such a highly skilled persuader as Forrestal could not overcome the powerful institutional and political forces arrayed against him. He urged increased expenditures for defense, even at the cost of higher taxes or budget deficits or both, during an election year when such measures would be political anathema. And he expected the Joint Chiefs to provide unbiased advice at a time when low budget ceilings exacerbated their normal differences over the allocation of funds. War plans helped little in resolving these disputes because they established a need for forces that only a larger budget could adequately satisfy. The more the JCS pondered the budget problem the more acute it became. Instead of fostering closer cooperation and integration of effort among the services, unification seemed to have intensified some of their differences and disagreements.

The debate over the FY 1949 supplemental and the FY 1950 military budget failed to produce a consensus on such fundamental questions as the size and composition of the armed forces, the degree of danger facing the country, and the allocation of resources for national defense. The only clear trend in the budget process was growing congressional support for greater reliance on air power, already explicit in the earlier actions of Congress. Soon, with the development of the FY 1951 budget, air power would become the keystone of administration policy as well.

TABLE 4
Summary of Force and Budget Proposals for FY 1950

	Service Recom- mendations of 16 Aug 48	BAC Recom- mendations of 1 Oct 48	JCS "Intermediate" Proposals 15 Nov 48	"Ceiling" Submissions 1 Dec 48	President's Budget Request to Congress 10 Jan 49	Actual Strength 31 Dec 48
<u>Army Major Units</u>						
Uniformed Personnel	939,500	800,000 ^b	800,000	677,000	677,000	673,000
Divisions	12	10	12	10	10	11
Independent Regiments	16 $\frac{2}{3}$	6	10 $\frac{1}{3}$	11	11	11
Separate Battalions	139	88	107	81	81	80
<u>Navy and Marine Corps</u>						
<u>Uniformed Personnel</u>						
Navy	574,095	582,800 ^b	485,916	441,617	441,617	444,000
Marine Corps	112,455	112,000 ^b	94,071	85,716	85,716	87,700
Heavy Carriers (CV, CVB) ..	16	12	10	8	8	11
Light and Escort Carriers	18	16	11	11	11	10
Other Major Combatant Ships	400	354	299	269	269	253
<u>Air Force Major Units</u>						
Uniformed Personnel	502,039	499,000 ^b	460,000	412,273	412,273	411,000
Heavy Bomber Groups	3	1	3	2	2 (3) ^c	2
Medium Bomber Groups	17	19	17	12	12 (11)	13
Fighter and Fighter/ Bomber Groups	30	30	24 $\frac{2}{3}$	21 $\frac{2}{3}$	21 $\frac{2}{3}$ (21)	41
Other Groups	20	20	14 $\frac{1}{3}$	12 $\frac{1}{3}$	12 $\frac{1}{3}$ (13)	4
Total Groups	70	70	59	48	48 (48)	60

Fund Apportionment^a

Army	\$10,283	\$ 7,731	\$ 5,575	\$ 4,834	\$ 4,505
Navy/ Marine Corps	9,697	8,215	5,375	4,624	4,350
Air Force	8,790	7,642	5,950	5,025	4,554
Other (OSD, Retired Pay, etc.)	0	0	0	0	841
Total	\$28,752	\$23,588	\$16,900	\$14,483	\$14,250

^aExpressed in millions of dollars.

^bFigures given are for end strength. Source document does not specify basis used to calculate other strength figures.

^cRevised 48-group program of February 1949.

Sources: OSD table, "Summary Comparison of Forces at Various Program Levels Fiscal 1949 Actual and Fiscal 1950 Estimates," 26 Jan 49, rev 4 Feb 49, OASD (C) files; fund apportionment figures for President's Request to Congress, 10 Jan 49, from memo Pace for SecDef, w/attach, 10 Feb 49, *ibid.*

TABLE 5
Congressional Action on FY 1950 Military Budget
(In Millions of Dollars)

	Administration Requested 10 Jan 49 ^a	House Approved 13 Apr 49 ^b	Senate Approved 29 Aug 49 ^c	Final Action (PL 434) 18 Oct 49 ^d
Army	4,505	4,262	4,351	4,161
Navy	4,350	4,228	4,241	4,138
Air Force	4,554	5,341	4,541	5,206
OSD	11	189	202	191
Total	13,420	14,020	13,335	13,696
Contingent Items*	830	—	—	650
Less Rescission	—	—	434	—
Total NOA	14,250	14,020	12,901	14,346

* The two major contingent items were military housing and a pay raise for the armed services. These items were dealt with in separate legislation and were therefore not included in the regular military appropriation under PL 434. On 27 September 1949, Congress enacted PL 351 providing for a military pay increase totaling \$400 million.

Sources

^aMemo Pace for SecDef, 10 Feb 49, w/attach, OASD(C) files.

^bH Rpt No 417, *National Military Establishment Appropriation Bill, 1950*, 9 Apr 49, 81 Cong, 1 sess, 4; memo McNeil for SecDef, 19 Apr 49, PSF, Truman Papers.

^cDerived from H Rpt No 417 and from S Rpt No 745, *National Military Establishment Functions Appropriation Act, 1950*, 22 Jul 49, 81 Cong, 1 sess, 3-4.

^dFigures are from PL 434, 81 Cong, 1 sess, less cash to liquidate prior-year contract authorizations as follows: Army, \$220 million; Navy, \$791 million; and Air Force, \$875 million.

CHAPTER XIII

The Military Budget for Fiscal Year 1951: Rearmament Aborted

By the time Congress finished work in October 1949 on the FY 1950 military budget, the task of developing estimates for fiscal year 1951 was nearing completion in the Department of Defense. Although less turbulent than the preparation of estimates for the year before, formulation of the 1951 budget had its full share of difficulties. Once again the central question was the level of military preparedness, around which revolved the continuing controversy among the services over the optimum composition of U.S. military forces at various alternative budget levels. It seemed clear, in view of President Truman's refusal to lift the FY 1950 budget ceiling, that the United States did not plan a military buildup. The President's policy would change, to be sure, with the onset and intensification of the Korean War in the summer and fall of 1950. But prior to then, his commitment to fiscal restraint remained strong and unyielding.

Changes in the Budget Process

In terms of long-range impact, the most important changes associated with the FY 1951 military budget cycle derived from the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act. These amendments, in addition to strengthening the general powers of the Secretary of Defense, added a new title—Title IV—to the 1947 law that greatly increased his budgetary and other financial management powers and required the services to adopt uniform budgetary and financial procedures.¹ The most far-reaching changes wrought by the Title IV amendments derived from recommendations sponsored by Ferdinand Eberstadt and Wilfred J.

McNeil to give the Secretary of Defense greater leverage over budget management. For McNeil, who took the lead in proposing these reforms, the essence of the secretary's administrative authority lay in his power under Section 404 to approve schedules of obligations and rates of expenditures, a power much resented by the services because it effectively concentrated financial decisionmaking in the hands of the Secretary of Defense and thus clearly diminished their own ability to control the use of their appropriated funds.² McNeil believed that the secretary could and should use this power to force the services to conform to a uniform DoD-wide policy. As a 1976 study of the OSD budget process concluded: "All subsequent improvements in the department's fiscal operations, which extended the Secretary's control, were derived from this legislation."³

Title IV also mandated that, insofar as practicable, budget estimates be sent to Congress in the form of a "performance budget" that would show the amounts of such estimates planned for use in identifiable functional categories of programs and activities.* It required that accounting for and reporting on the use of appropriated funds be handled in the same manner. In addition, operating and capital programs were to be segregated and, insofar as possible, all three services were to use uniform functional categories and procedures. This performance budgeting requirement would permit comparisons of the cost efficiency of each of the services in carrying out comparable programs and activities and ready analysis of what a budget would buy. While mandated by the 1949 law, performance budgeting had actually been in the process of introduction by the services for some time. The Air Force had used it on a trial basis since 1947, the Navy adopted it late in 1949, and the Army put it into effect in 1950.⁴

Because the FY 1951 cycle was more than half over when Title IV became effective in August, its provisions had little impact on the preparation of FY 1951 estimates, which had begun in January 1949. As in the preceding year, Forrestal followed the procedure of placing initial responsibility on the JCS for recommending force requirements and allocation of funds. But he also wanted to improve the process in a way that would diminish competition for funds among the services. Although the JCS had come close to providing what he envisioned, i.e., a budget keyed to the force levels of an overall strategic concept, Forrestal's approach had yet to produce the kind of unified budget with acceptable funding levels that he, the President, and the BoB all desired.

* As later specified by OSD, these areas of activity were: (1) military manpower support; (2) operations and maintenance; (3) major procurement and production; (4) construction; (5) civilian components; (6) other military requirements such as research and development, industrial mobilization, and maintenance of war reserves; (7) nonmilitary requirements such as retired pay; (8) budget allowances for contingent items, housing, and public works; and (9) stockpiling of critical materials.

What worried Forrestal most was the absence of a chairman in the Joint Chiefs, a deficiency that he planned to urge Congress to remedy by authorizing the appointment of a "responsible head" for the JCS.* As an interim measure in November 1948, he asked General Eisenhower to serve temporarily as unofficial chairman and assist the Joint Chiefs in the more orderly discharge of their corporate responsibilities. Eisenhower agreed to undertake the task for a "brief" period or until Congress enacted legislation providing for a permanent, full-time chairman. Titled "principal military adviser and consultant" to the President and Secretary of Defense, he began to work with the Joint Chiefs on a part-time basis in January 1949. Meanwhile, Admiral Leahy, who had ceased attending JCS meetings for reasons of health, had decided to revert to the retired status from which President Roosevelt had summoned him in 1942.⁵

The reasons for selecting Eisenhower were obvious. After serving as Army Chief of Staff and hence as a member of the JCS from 1945 to early 1948, Eisenhower had left military life (technically, five-star officers never retire) to become the president of Columbia University. He remained active in public affairs and continued to enjoy the celebrity status he had achieved in World War II as commander of the invasion of France and the liberator of Western Europe. Moreover, Eisenhower remained one of the strongest advocates of service unification. Given "Ike's" experience, views, and prestige, Forrestal regarded him as the logical choice to help in "the identification of problems and the accommodation of differing views."⁶

Because of his continuing duties at Columbia and the temporary and limited nature of his assignment, Eisenhower rarely spent more than a few days at a time in Washington. Commuting between New York and Washington and the burdens of two jobs perhaps explain his determination to limit his JCS responsibilities. In the job description he wrote for himself, he listed his chief duties as to "help resolve differences of conviction" among the services; advise the Secretary of Defense on organizational matters; provide both the secretary and the President with advice "on questions that do not receive unanimous decisions" in the JCS; monitor, press, and expedite "all work that properly pertains to the Joint Chiefs of Staff"; and help "in the preparation of basic Defense plans—budget based on plan." He felt no obligation to become involved in legislative matters connected with the North Atlantic alliance, reorganization of the military structure, or the appropriation process.⁷

To assist Eisenhower on budgetary matters, Forrestal asked the Joint Chiefs to reactivate the Budget Advisory Committee which had helped assemble the FY 1950 estimates. This time, however, Forrestal wanted the BAC to report col-

* See Chapter II.

lectively to the Joint Chiefs as a body and not individually and separately as before to their own service chiefs. The JCS grumbled that this would erode their individual authority, but they finally accepted Forrestal's request on condition that any recommendation made by the budget deputies should in no way prejudice final JCS action. On 3 March 1949 they appointed Vice Adm. Robert B. Carney, USN, Lt. Gen. Edwin W. Rawlings, USAF, and Maj. Gen. William A. Arnold, USA, as their budget deputies for the preparation of the 1951 estimates.⁸

The Eisenhower "Special" Budget

During the first six months of 1949, budget preparations for fiscal year 1951 involved two largely independent but parallel processes. One process entailed the development within the Pentagon of preliminary estimates—an effort spearheaded by Eisenhower, who endeavored to obtain JCS agreement on strategy and force levels supportable within a likely budget ceiling. The other process, involving chiefly the White House and the Bureau of the Budget, but with some interaction with the top Defense officials, particularly Johnson and McNeil, was concerned with economic and fiscal rather than military considerations in determining the overall size of the budget and allocations among components. Not until July 1949, when one process had produced a budget policy and the other a preliminary military program, did the two processes converge.

The initial operating assumption in the Pentagon was that the size of the FY 1951 budget would approximate that of the previous year. This assumption derived from President Truman's remark, in submitting his FY 1950 budget to Congress on 10 January 1949, that ". . . we should plan our military structure at this time so as to insure a balanced military program in the foreseeable future at approximately the level recommended in this Budget."⁹ At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 24 January, Eisenhower stated that while the current ceiling was \$15 billion, he had the impression from recent talks with the President that Truman might approve a request for as much as \$15.5 billion for fiscal year 1951 and increase this to \$16 billion in fiscal year 1952. There was also some discussion at this meeting of asking the President to set a definite ceiling figure, but the JCS took no action.¹⁰

Eisenhower personally did not consider the President's budget ceiling reasonable or realistic. "Now inflation," he wrote in his diary, "has raised everything so much that even the \$15 billion begins to look inadequate." But he recognized the strong pressures on Truman from Congress and the BoB to "cut and cut." Earlier, just after being asked to serve as JCS presiding officer, Eisenhower had indicated to Forrestal the kinds of forces that seemed to merit priority consideration: stra-

tegic air power, an effective antisubmarine Navy, at least one naval carrier task force, and an Army capable of rapid mobilization for the defense of Alaska, the Suez region, and possibly limited operations in Western Europe.¹¹

In an action near the end of January 1949 that would affect budget planning, the Joint Chiefs approved a new joint emergency war plan known as TROJAN, with planning factors and basic tasks essentially the same as those under the HALFMOON/FLEETWOOD concept developed in 1948, except that TROJAN incorporated an annex that listed and assigned atomic targets for an air-atomic offensive against the Soviet Union. Eisenhower, after examining TROJAN, concluded that it was incomplete. In February, as work commenced on a follow-on plan known as OFFTACKLE, he directed the inclusion of provision for defensive operations in Western Europe, a U.S. reentry into the Western Mediterranean, and the holding of a position in the Middle East.¹² In other words, while personally convinced that strategic air should have first priority, Eisenhower also saw strong requirements for conventional land and sea forces; this obviously could have significant budget implications. Although TROJAN remained the operative war plan for FY 1951 budgetary purposes, Eisenhower had in mind a somewhat different concept of military strategy that he may have felt would help compose differences among the services by reassuring them that each had an important role to play.

By mid-February Eisenhower's ideas had matured to the point where he could put before the Joint Chiefs his so-called "Red Brick" plan for determining the allocation of funds on the basis of strategic priorities. This involved essentially the submission by each service chief of force estimates for all three of the services. Meeting with the chiefs on 14 February, he outlined what he had in mind, called for development of a joint strategic concept to guide the development of estimates, and reaffirmed that \$15 billion should still be considered the ceiling. On 28 February Eisenhower asked the chiefs to submit separately their own "rough approximation" of force requirements.¹³

From this time until the end of June, except for a period of several weeks of illness, Eisenhower devoted his time in Washington primarily to resolving inter-service friction over the allocation of funds. The trouble started on 2 March when the chiefs submitted their rough approximations. The Army and the Air Force had a high incidence of agreement in general, but the Navy was in substantial agreement with the others only on the Army force levels. The Navy wanted to hold the Air Force to its then authorized 48 groups while adding two new heavy carriers to the fleet. In contrast, the Air Force proposed the elimination of all heavy carriers along with all Marine air squadrons, and suggested an active fleet much smaller than that sought by the Navy. Further, the Air Force asked for a 60-percent increase in the number of medium (B-29 and B-50) bomber groups

and proposed that its overall size be expanded to 71 groups. The Army recommended a less severe cut in naval forces than did the Air Force, retaining four heavy carriers but deleting Marine Corps aviation; it recommended 67 groups for the Air Force. Summarized below are the force levels proposed by each service: ¹⁴

	Army Proposal	Navy Proposal	Air Force Proposal
Army Divisions	11	10 $\frac{2}{3}$	11
Independent Regiments	12	11	12
Antiaircraft Battalions	56	52	56
Heavy Carriers	4	10	0
Light and Escort Carriers	12	12	12
Other Major Combatant Ships	269	333	254
Marine Air Squadrons	0	7 $\frac{2}{3}$	0
Marine Battalions	6	11	6
Heavy Bomber Groups	4	4	4
Medium Bomber Groups	12	9	16
Fighter and Fighter/Bomber Groups	30	22	30
Other Groups	21	13	21
Total Groups	67	48	71

Over the next three weeks Eisenhower met frequently with the chiefs, seeking agreement on force levels. As the days went by, however, he became increasingly pessimistic that they could adjust their differences on their own. Privately, he disagreed with the Air Force that heavy carriers were unnecessary. "I feel," he wrote in his diary, "that in [the] first months of war a few big carriers might be our greatest asset. I want to keep ten in active fleet—about six to eight of which should be always in operation." ¹⁵ But as debate progressed, he concluded that the Navy was taking a rigid position. "The situation grows intolerable," he observed on 19 March:

Denfeld apparently wants to do right, but he practically retires from every discussion in favor of [Vice Adm. Arthur D.] Struble [Deputy Chief of Naval Operations], who infuriates everyone with his high, strident voice and apparent inability to see any viewpoint except his own. Moreover, he has that trick in argument of questioning, or seeming to question, the motives of his opponent. ¹⁶

On 21 March Eisenhower went to the hospital for a week with a severe digestive ailment, after which he spent almost six weeks recuperating in Augusta, Ga., and Key West. During this period, on 28 March, Louis Johnson succeeded Forrestal; on 10 April he flew down to Key West with the Joint Chiefs to confer with Eisenhower on his Red Brick concept. Johnson emphasized that he intended to exercise close control over the budget and economize wherever possible. On returning to Washington he launched a systematic search for ways to reduce expenditures through more efficient management techniques and through possible changes in major procurement procedures. Then, in a letter to Eisenhower he asked for JCS views on the military necessity of completing the "supercarrier" that the Navy hoped would become the prototype of a new generation of carriers with a variety of capabilities including delivery of atomic weapons. The chiefs split along predictable lines—the Navy wanted to build the carrier, but the Army, the Air Force, and Eisenhower opposed its construction. Siding with the majority, Johnson on 23 April announced that construction of the supercarrier would cease immediately.*

The budgetary implications of Johnson's cancellation became immediately apparent in the Navy's resistance to further cuts in the fleet. At a JCS meeting on 5 May Admiral Denfeld served notice that he was prepared to fight long and hard for the preservation of the heavy carriers, the Fleet Marine Force, and Marine aviation. Any budget that eliminated these elements, he argued, would "create an unbalanced force" that could not carry out its prescribed functions. The choice as he saw it was simple: Either the Joint Chiefs should make up their minds promptly on the number of carriers and Marine Corps battalions and air squadrons, or they should refer these questions to the Secretary of Defense.¹⁷

On resuming his duties on 11 May, Eisenhower asked the Budget Advisory Committee to price the Red Brick estimates using the lowest force recommendations of any of the three chiefs for each category of forces. For heavy carriers and Marine air squadrons, which the Army and Air Force chiefs had either eliminated or severely reduced, he stipulated force assumptions of 4 and $7\frac{2}{3}$ respectively. The "flash" cost figures submitted the following day totaled \$15.5 billion without provision for stockpiling, retired pay, or OSD requirements. (Table 6) With a minimum allowance for these items, the total military budget would approximate \$16 billion. Eisenhower stated that a budget of that amount was not affordable and that it would have to be cut.¹⁸

After another month without progress Eisenhower tried a different approach. He asked the BAC to prepare a set of cost estimates based on the following:

* The cancellation of the supercarrier and the events surrounding Johnson's decision are discussed in further detail in Chapter XIV.

(1) the maintenance of strengths in each major force category that he specified in his instructions, which included a 10 $\frac{2}{3}$ -division Army, a 57-group Air Force, and a Navy with 263 major combatant vessels, including 6 heavy carriers; and (2) a ceiling of \$14.050 billion in new obligational authority, a figure that he had derived by deducting \$950 million for stockpiling, new construction, retirement pay, and OSD activities from a presumed \$15 billion presidential ceiling for all military purposes. However, he did not specify how the \$14.050 billion should be allocated among the services nor did he indicate what procedure should be employed by the BAC in reducing service estimates if their sum should exceed this figure; he sought only to determine the extent to which a budget of \$14.050 billion would support forces with the composition that he had stipulated.¹⁹

At a JCS meeting on 20 June the BAC presented its estimates, which thereafter came to be designated as the "IKE I" budget. The individual service estimates added up to nearly \$15.4 billion, more than a billion in excess of the ceiling Eisenhower had specified. (Table 6) Johnson, who joined the meeting later in the day at Eisenhower's invitation, reacted vigorously and made it clear that he wanted the estimates reduced. Eisenhower thereupon told the chiefs that further force cuts would be required and later notified Johnson that he would try still another approach.²⁰

The next day Eisenhower asked the budget committee to prepare a new set of estimates based on the following: (1) lower force goals than were assumed in preparing IKE I; (2) reduced aircraft procurement, a lower allowance for flying hours, and decreased provision for pilot training and support services; and (3) a new obligational authority ceiling of between \$13.450 and \$13.750 billion. This new ceiling was derived by deducting from an assumed \$15 billion presidential ceiling the following: \$950 million for construction, stockpiling, retirement pay, and OSD activities, and \$300 million to \$600 million for an unearmarked "kitty" to be available to the Secretary of Defense in meeting unforeseeable developments and possible reclaims.* The BAC's "flash" estimates, which became known as the "IKE II" estimates, totaled \$14.353 billion, an amount which, when the previously deducted items were added, would produce an overall military budget of between \$15.6 and \$15.9 billion.²¹

On 28 June Eisenhower briefed the Joint Chiefs on IKE II and then, after speculating that the assumed \$15 billion ceiling might be substantially reduced, asked for their suggestions on how the budget could be cut still further. After a lengthy discussion, Eisenhower announced that he would prepare a "new and

* A reclama is a request to duly constituted authority to reconsider a decision or proposed action.

final paper" * that would provide \$13.1 billion for the services, \$0.9 billion for stockpiling, retirement pay, construction, and OSD activities, and \$1 billion for retention by the Secretary of Defense for later allocation and other expenses.²²

Truman's Decision to Lower the Ceiling

As he neared the end of almost six months of work on the budget, Eisenhower was reasonably confident that he would soon be able to submit budget estimates that approximated the \$15 billion level recommended by Truman in his FY 1950 budget message in January. However, for some months Eisenhower had been aware that Truman and his BoB advisers had been contemplating across-the-board reductions in federal appropriations because of a threatened recession which, by the spring of 1949, had replaced inflation as the President's primary economic worry.²³ He therefore had strong doubts that his estimates would finally be accepted.

The President's concern stemmed directly from BoB economic projections in April and May that forecast a slowdown in the economy with a consequent gradual increase in unemployment, a decline in prices, and a reduction in federal receipts. If these economic trends continued, the BoB maintained, spending at the levels contemplated in current and projected appropriations would produce federal deficits of \$4 billion to \$8 billion in each of the next four years. The bureau also concluded that, without a tax increase, such deficits could only be avoided or limited by reducing expenditures through a curtailment of programs. On 5 April BoB Director Pace advised the President that his hope of attaining a balanced budget even in fiscal year 1953 was largely dependent on pursuing such a course. Since the military budget comprised the largest area of controllable expenditures, it was logical for the BoB to make defense programs a major target for curtailment.²⁴

At this time Pentagon officials still assumed a \$15 billion ceiling for FY 1951 military appropriations. But even though Secretary Johnson may not have been officially apprised of White House-BoB thinking, he must have had an inkling of a major change in the making. On 25 April, for instance, Pace wrote Johnson about the use of joint intelligence estimates in evaluating proposed requirements, cautioning him to look critically at the basic assumptions underlying the military estimates and to take into account the effects "of fiscal limitations in augmenting the 1951 program." He urged Johnson to make extensive use of both CIA and NSC viewpoints.²⁵

• According to Gruenther (memo for General Eisenhower, 28 Mar 50), Eisenhower did prepare new forces and funds allocations but did not show them to anyone.

A week later Pace requested a meeting, arranged for 12 May, to discuss the budget situation in person with Johnson. As background for the meeting, Johnson received from McNeil a memorandum pointing out the imminent possibility of a federal budget deficit and warning that "there is every likelihood that the allocation to the United States Military Forces will be in the neighborhood of \$13 billion for 1951—one of the reasons being that we have the only large non-fixed item in the budget." And, McNeil added, "being practical about it, probably the only way the President could justify [a higher military budget] . . . would be for deterioration of the international situation."²⁶

Johnson came away from the meeting apparently convinced that mandated cuts were unavoidable. The next day McNeil advised Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs that the budget estimates would probably have to be trimmed to fit within a \$13 billion ceiling and reported that Pace wanted a statement from the JCS of required force levels for fiscal year 1951.²⁷ Eisenhower was understandably perturbed. He confided to his diary:

One of our greatest troubles is inability to plan for a given amount of money. Some new authority always intervenes to cut it down in spite of prior commitment by the president himself. . . . Right now it comes through secretary of defense. We work like the devil on an agreement on a certain sized budget, and then are told to reduce it. We "absorb" everything—rising costs (in the past four years they are bad), increased pay, stockpiling, etc., etc.

Of course the results will not show up until we get into serious trouble. We are repeating our own history of decades, we just don't believe we ever will get into a real jam.²⁸

On 18 May the Joint Chiefs submitted their views to Johnson; not surprisingly, they urged against cutting the budget. "In spite of any apparent easing of international tensions," they stated, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unanimously of the opinion that the basic objectives and military capabilities of the Soviets have not changed." For this reason, they argued, "the same degree of security must be maintained and approximately the same budgetary level of expenditures for military purposes must be maintained for Fiscal Year 1951."²⁹ The following day, in a memorandum drafted by McNeil, Johnson advised Pace of the Joint Chiefs' strong opposition to any reduction in funds and predicted that the NME would require \$16.5 billion for fiscal year 1951 and \$17 billion for fiscal year 1952. "These projections," Johnson added, "make no provision for universal military training, nor do they include the requirements for stockpiling of strategic and critical material which . . . [have] been estimated at \$525 million, or for Foreign Military Assistance."³⁰

In suggesting estimates on the high side, Johnson and McNeil were no doubt playing an old bureaucratic game. Knowing that the ceiling was about to come down, they wanted to improve their bargaining position. But as far as Pace was concerned, the issue was pretty much decided. By 24 May BoB analysts had completed a preliminary and "indicative" survey of where cuts might be made to hold military obligations and expenditures at or near an annual figure of \$13 billion. Recommendations included reductions for fiscal years 1950 and 1951 in military personnel, shipbuilding, flying hours, research and development, and capital investment. As for the national security implications of these reductions, the BoB found that these could "be determined only after an analysis of the strategic considerations that will be involved in a reduction of this magnitude."³¹

Johnson did not respond to the warning signals from BoB immediately. On 25 May, for example, he advised the service secretaries to proceed with budget preparations. But within a few weeks the facade began to crumble. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 20 June, according to General Gruenther, he stated, without citing a source or giving a basis for his remarks, that he expected Congress to cut military appropriations for 1951 to around \$10 billion and would even predict a drastic reduction to around \$7.5 billion for 1952. Johnson added that "through the elimination of unnecessary duplications he was certain that we would be saving at the rate of 1 billion dollars a year after six months, and at the rate of 2 billion dollars annually within a year."³²

On 30 June 1949 Pace submitted his final budget recommendations to Truman. Seeing no new evidence to contradict his earlier analysis, Pace said he was convinced that the threat of a budget deficit was real and that it should be met by immediate cutbacks, chiefly in military spending. "It is believed," he assured the President, "that sizeable reductions are possible . . . in military expenditures, without improperly reducing the Nation's relative readiness for an emergency." Assuming that the President would agree, Pace attached proposed letters for transmittal by the President to the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), the National Security Resources Board, and the National Security Council directing those agencies to study the possible economic and national security consequences of adopting the budget ceiling and revisions that he recommended. The next step, Pace advised the President, was to meet with his senior advisers to explain the situation and enlist their cooperation and support.³³

The meeting took place on the following afternoon. Attendees included the President, Acheson, Johnson, Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder and his deputy, the three service secretaries, the Joint Chiefs, John R. Steelman, Acting Chairman of the NSRB, William C. Foster, Deputy Director of the Economic Cooperation Administration, Edwin G. Nourse, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Admiral Souers, Pace and his assistant, Frederick J. Lawton, and

McNeil of OSD. The most conspicuous absentee was Eisenhower, who had gone to New York on personal business the day before.

As the meeting began, Truman handed Souers and Nourse the letters that the BoB had prepared requesting consideration of what national security and international programs the United States should undertake in fiscal year 1951. Then, reading from a prepared text, Truman indicated the nature of the economic problems facing the country and stated that "if we are to make any significant reduction in the total Federal Budget for 1951, adjustments downward must be made in the allowance for the national security programs."³⁴

After reading his statement, the President emphasized that he had been seeking a balanced defense program for the longer term and that he had never intended to embark on a continually rising program for foreign aid and national defense. The President stated that he would establish ceilings for all major government agencies with the aim of achieving the best balance between security abroad and a sound domestic economy. Recognizing that an economy drive could backfire and do much harm, he wanted to maintain a strong economy and necessary security even at the cost of deficits in fiscal year 1951 and 1952, but he also wanted to achieve a balanced budget in 1952 or 1953.³⁵

At this point Johnson inquired about the ceiling the President intended to set for the military. When told that it was to be \$13 billion, Johnson declared that the tentative figure being used in the Pentagon was actually a bit lower. The only complaint came from McNeil, who took issue with the inclusion of \$500 million for stockpiling in the \$13 billion. "After quite a little argument," McNeil recalled, "Truman said, 'Well, you work it out with Frank Pace.' I did, that afternoon, at least taking the stockpiling out, which still left the budget about \$13 billion." Except for this one issue, there appear to have been no further complaints or objections.³⁶

Revision of Estimates

As soon as the President announced his decision on 1 July, Johnson dropped any notions he may have had of opposing a reduced budget ceiling and moved quickly to get the services to bring their programs within the \$13 billion limit. Once again he turned to Eisenhower for advice. On the evening of 1 July, McNeil telephoned Eisenhower in New York to relay the results of the President's meeting and to convey Johnson's request for his further help. Eisenhower thereupon prepared a new distribution of funds, based on a force structure identical with IKE II except for the deletion of two Air Force fighter groups (Table 6), and recommended that the \$13 billion be allocated as follows:³⁷

	(In millions)
Army	\$ 4,100
Navy	3,800
Air Force	4,500
Miscellaneous	600
Total	<u>\$13,000</u>

On 5 July Gruenther presented Eisenhower's latest recommendations to Johnson, who approved the general force structure and the funds for the Army and Navy, but reduced the Air Force to \$4.3 billion and increased the miscellaneous items to \$800 million. (Table 6) Later that day, after he had learned of the changes, Eisenhower told Gruenther he was disappointed that the Air Force had been cut beneath his proposed figure and thought that the \$200 million cut should be restored.³⁸ Then on 14 July, as a final gesture before relinquishing his JCS duties, Eisenhower wrote Johnson urging him to allocate additional funds for strategic air power. He argued that the proposed aggregate FY 1951 funding had been so reduced that increased reliance on strategic air power had become unavoidable. "Since we have always stressed the value of military preparation as a deterrent to war," Eisenhower wrote, "it seems to me obvious . . . that we cannot and must not fail to provide a respectable long range strategic bombing force." "I realize," he added,

that many factors tend to modify decisions based purely upon logic and reason. However, I am quite certain that if we are erring in any direction it is in failure to allocate a sufficiently high percentage of our reduced appropriations to the certainty that we can launch and sustain a vigorous bombing offensive on a moment's notice. Consequently I believe that all and any changes that you may make in your tentative allocations should aim at preserving and enhancing this capability.³⁹

Whatever the effect of Eisenhower's comments on Johnson, they had little immediate impact on the budget. Rather than press for more groups, the Air Force requested \$505 million to improve the operational readiness of its authorized 48 groups. Among the services, the Navy reacted most vigorously, insisting that the proposed reduction in its force structure would make offensive operations at sea almost impossible. Denfeld asked for another \$110 million to use, along with savings the Navy would make in other areas, to add 4 heavy carriers, 15 destroyers, 1 Marine battalion, and 2 Marine air squadrons to the forces approved by Johnson. The Army, although convinced that its forces would be insufficient to carry out its mission in the event of a general emergency, limited its requests

to one additional division to be organized without an increase in its overall personnel strength and \$33 million to remedy reserve forces equipment deficiencies and for research and development.⁴⁰

Johnson continued to push hard for completion of estimates that would go to the BoB for review and markup.* In this task he had help from General Bradley, who became the first official Chairman of the JCS on 10 August, and from General McNarney, named Chairman of the Defense Management Committee on the same date. Five days later, on 15 August, Johnson sent President Truman a preview of the proposed FY 1951 military budget that varied slightly in forces and funds from the 5 July figures. Johnson said he was confident that a reduction of 100,000 from existing personnel strength would be offset by better training, modernization of equipment, and the more efficient operation of the military establishment as a result of unification. He assured the President that "the Department of Defense recognizes the overriding necessity of keeping military costs within limits which will not endanger the fundamental soundness of our economy—one of our primary military assets."⁴¹ Detailed estimates, totaling \$13.04 billion, went to the BoB on 15 September. (Table 6) As worked out largely under the joint direction of Bradley and McNarney, the military forces to be supported would be the same as those approved by Johnson on 5 July except for the addition of several independent regiments and antiaircraft battalions and two heavy carriers. Aircraft procurement for the Air Force came to \$1.2 billion, and for the Navy, \$600 million.⁴²

The important function of assessing the impact of reduced military expenditures on national security fell to a special high-level NSC committee appointed in July and composed of the Under Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, the Deputy Administrator of the ECA, and a presidential assistant representing the NSRB. The committee appointed a working group that was to function under the direction of the Executive Secretary of the NSC. At the conclusion of the project the NSC special committee was to report its findings to the full council which, in turn, was to make recommendations to the President. Within the military establishment, coordination and direction of NME participation was vested in a group known as the NSC Staff Group on NSC 52, whose regular members were RDB Chairman Karl Compton, General Gruenther, Assistant Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees, General Lutes, McNeil, and John Ohly, who served as the secretary of the NME group.⁴³

The committee presented its draft report (NSC 52/2) to the National Security Council on 29 September, a few days after the President announced that the Soviet Union had successfully detonated an atomic device. Written before the

* A markup involves going through a bill, usually in committee, section by section, and writing in whatever changes are agreed on.

Soviet test became generally known, the report did not address the possible implications of the Soviet test for U.S. security. The committee concluded, among other things, that Soviet policy aimed at extension of Soviet power using "armed force if necessary or desirable to gain its ends." The United States had no choice but to maintain credible defenses, but at the same time care had to be taken "to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions in our way of life." In attempting to strike a balance the committee adopted the following position on DoD requirements:

With the economies which can be effected by 30 June 1950 and during the ensuing year, the Department of Defense can, under the \$13 billion ceiling allocated to it in NSC 52/1, maintain substantially the same degree of military strength, readiness and posture during FY 1951 which it will maintain in FY 1950. However, any further reductions below this ceiling would probably require reductions in forces, combat capabilities and minimum mobilization base, which from a military standpoint, would entail grave risks.⁴⁴

The Joint Chiefs, asked to provide a statement of their views on the findings of the NSC special committee before the council acted, reaffirmed the need for adequate preparedness and warned that reduced expenditures would lead to "less effective implementation of existing policies involving military commitments." They did not recommend an immediate reassessment or revision of basic national policies, but they urged senior officials to recognize that "the ability of the armed forces to take emergency action in the implementation of such policies will of necessity be curtailed."⁴⁵

The NSC, during its discussion of the committee's findings, agreed that while cuts in defense and foreign aid were obviously necessary for domestic economic reasons, they should not be such as to impair key military and international programs and thereby adversely affect national security. Looking ahead to the next several years, Acting Secretary of State Webb indicated that the State Department anticipated a gradual phaseout of the European Recovery Program and aid programs to such countries as Greece and Korea. Johnson stated that he understood the \$13 billion ceiling for military expenditures to be a fixed sum, set by the President, and that even if the Bureau of the Budget eliminated certain items in the proposed FY 1951 estimates the ceiling would remain unchanged. The council adopted a slightly amended version of the report (NSC 52/3) and forwarded it to the President for his information.⁴⁶

The problem Johnson had envisioned, namely that the BoB would seek additional reductions, failed to materialize. Once the Secretary of Defense had made it plain that he could work within the \$13 billion limit, the BoB proposed

no further cuts. During the bureau's autumn markup of DoD estimates, Pace stressed the economic aspects of the budget decisions and indicated his awareness of the military's increased understanding of the close connection between defense and the state of the economy, praising in particular the restraint following disclosure of the Soviet atomic test. The Joint Chiefs did in fact take close note of the Soviet test, but initially they confined themselves to recommending only a careful review of the nation's civil defense program.⁴⁷

Although better relations with the BoB did not bring any increase in Defense funds, they did facilitate OSD's job of processing the finished estimates. In early December McNeil instituted formal reclama hearings at which the services could petition for increases or adjustments in their budgets. Well aware of Army and Navy complaints that they were being shortchanged, McNeil recommended, and Johnson approved, a tenth division and two additional antiaircraft battalions for the Army and an additional attack carrier for the Navy. Instead of only four attack carriers, as Johnson had initially approved, the Navy eventually emerged at the end of the budget process with seven. There is no direct evidence, but it would have been in character for McNeil to have engaged in a behind-the-scenes effort to protect the Navy and undo some of the damage done by Johnson's cancellation of the supercarrier. To help support the requested augmentations, OSD asked the BoB to approve an additional \$353 million for fiscal year 1951. On 16 December the BoB notified OSD of the budget requests to be made to Congress; it allowed Defense only \$78 million above the \$13 billion ceiling.⁴⁸ (Table 6)

The Budget in Congress

After nearly a year of preparation, the President sent his FY 1951 budget to Congress on 9 January 1950. Truman reviewed both the domestic and foreign scenes, pointing out how commitments at home and abroad had affected budgetary decisions. Forecasting that federal revenues would drop to around \$37.3 billion, the President proposed total expenditures of \$42.4 billion and requested new obligational authority of \$40.5 billion. The projected deficit, Truman said, would have been larger had he not imposed strict economy measures to trim anticipated FY 1951 expenses by almost a billion dollars below the level estimated for fiscal year 1950.⁴⁹

For the Department of Defense, the President's budget indicated the onset of a new era of austerity. Although subsequent developments—particularly the outbreak of the Korean War—would radically alter Truman's plans, in January 1950 it seemed clear that his efforts to clamp a lid on military spending would be successful. A notable omission from the budget was funding of uni-

versal military training—an idea that had never really caught on in Congress and that the administration had now apparently decided to shelve as an economy measure. Total obligational authority for military requirements came to \$13.078 billion, \$12.205 billion in new cash and contract authorization plus \$873 million in unused obligational authority carried over from fiscal year 1950.⁵⁰

In terms of force levels, the President's FY 1951 budget showed a military manpower decrease of approximately 110,000 from his recommendations of a year earlier, with the Army and Navy absorbing the losses. The Army would consist of 10 divisions, 48 antiaircraft battalions, and 12 independent regiments, plus a National Guard of 350,000 men and an Organized Reserve of 255,000. The Navy would have 652 ships in its active fleet, including 238 combatant vessels, but only 7 instead of 8 heavy carriers. The Navy and Marine Corps would have 5,900 aircraft in their active forces and 2,500 in the reserve forces. Navy and Marine reservists would total more than 250,000. No funds appeared in the budget for starting new ship construction.

The most notable feature of the proposed 1951 budget was its emphasis on air power, with the Air Force faring much better than the Army and the Navy. The budget contemplated an active Air Force of 48 groups and 13 separate squadrons with 8,800 aircraft and approximately the same authorized personnel strength as the previous year. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve would have 3,400 aircraft.⁵¹

In considering the President's proposed budget, Congress grouped all military requests into an omnibus appropriation bill, H.R. 7786. Hearings before Representative Mahon's House Appropriations subcommittee began in mid-January and continued until 10 March. The leadoff witness, Secretary Johnson, admitted that the Joint Chiefs would have preferred more money, but he assured the committee that the President's budget contained ample funding for legitimate needs. Substantial savings, he insisted, would not derive from weakened capabilities but from increased efficiency, careful management, and cutbacks on unnecessary overhead.⁵²

Although several committee members, including Mahon, questioned the secretary's assertion about "sufficiency," it was the sense of the committee that the administration's decision to curtail military spending constituted a timely and appropriate response to the needs of the economy and that Johnson was doing a commendable job of holding down costs and promoting efficiency. After careful review, the Appropriations Committee sent to the House a bill recommending appropriations of \$12.825 billion. The committee made a number of cuts, including nonequipment contract authorizations and administrative services and retired pay, but increases aimed at strengthening reserve capabilities and naval aviation partially offset the reductions.⁵³

TABLE 6

Summary of Force and Budget Proposals for FY 1951

	BAC "Red Brick" Estimates 12 May 49 ^a	IKE I 18 Jun 49 ^b	IKE II 21 Jun 49 ^c	Eisenhower Recommended 5 Jul 49 ^d	SecDef Approved 5 Jul 49 ^e	Submission to BoB 15 Sep 49 ^f	BoB Accepted 16 Dec 49 ^g
<u>Military Strength*</u>							
Total	Not Given	Not Given	Not Given	1,481,000	1,481,000	1,506,605	1,506,605
Army	Not Given	Not Given	Not Given	630,000	630,000	630,000	630,000
Navy/Marine Corps	Not Given	Not Given	Not Given	435,000	435,000	460,605	460,605
Air Force	Not Given	Not Given	Not Given	416,000	416,000	416,000	416,000
<u>Army</u>							
Divisions	10 $\frac{2}{3}$	10 $\frac{2}{3}$	9	9	9	9	10
Independent Regiments	11	9	9	9	Not Given	12	12
Antiaircraft Battalions	52	46	42	42	Not Given	46	48
<u>Navy and Marine Corps</u>							
Heavy Carriers (CV, CVB)	4	6	4	4	4	6	7
Light and Escort Carriers	12	12	8	8	8	8	8
Other Major Combatant Ships	254	245	222	222	222	222	223
Marine Air Squadrons†	7 $\frac{2}{3}$	18	12	12	12	12	12
Marine Battalions	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
<u>Air Force</u>							
Heavy Bomber Groups	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Medium Bomber Groups	9	13	11	11	11	11	11
Fighter and Fighter/Bomber Groups ...	22	24	22	20	20	20	20
Other Groups	13	16	13	13	13	13	13
Total Groups	48	57	50	48	48	48	48
Separate Squadrons	—	—	—	—	—	13	13

Fund Apportionment†

Army	Not Given	\$ 4,530	\$ 4,357	\$ 4,100	\$ 4,100	\$ 4,097	\$ 4,018
Navy/Marine Corps	Not Given	4,699	4,536	3,800	3,800	3,780	3,881
Air Force	Not Given	6,139	5,460	4,500	4,300	4,323	4,434
Other (OSD, Retired Pay, etc.)	Not Given	0	0	600	800	840	745
Total		\$15,500	\$15,368	\$14,353	\$13,000	\$13,040	\$13,078

* Figures given are for man-year strength.

† Source documents indicate the inclusion of an unspecified number of Navy air squadrons in the 2d through 5th columns but probably not in the last two columns.

‡ In millions of dollars.

Sources

^a*JCS Hist*, II:261–63.

^bForce levels from memo of understanding signed by BAC mems, 18 Jun 49, OASD(C) files; fund apportionment figures from memo Gruenther for Eisenhower, 28 Mar 50, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers, DDEL.

^cMemo Eisenhower for Carney, 21 Jun 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–43; memo Carney for JCS, 27 Jun 49, *ibid*.

^dForce levels from draft memo SecDef for service secs, (unsent, ca 5 Jul 49), OASD(C) files; fund apportionment figures from memo Gruenther for Eisenhower, 28 Mar 50, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers, DDEL.

^eMemo Johnson for service secs, 5 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–43.

^fForce levels from memo Bradley for Johnson, 2 Sep 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–43, and JCS 1800/56, 22 Sep 49, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45); fund apportionment figures from ltr McNeil to Pace, 15 Sep 49, OASD(C) files.

^gForce levels from OSD table, "Fiscal 1951 Budget Comparisons of Major Military Forces," 4 Apr 50, OASD(C) files; fund apportionment figures from ltr Pace to Johnson, 16 Dec 49, *ibid*.

TABLE 7
Congressional Action on FY 1951 Military Budget
(In Millions of Dollars)

	Administration Requested 9 Jan 50	Amended Request 26 Apr 50	House Approved 10 May 50	Senate Approved 4 Aug 50	Final Action 28 Aug 50
Army	4,018	4,114	3,937	4,088	4,088
Navy	3,881	4,094	3,997	4,076	4,076
Air Force	4,434	4,773	4,579	4,750	4,750
OSD	17	17	16	16	16
Total	12,350	12,998	12,529	12,930	12,930
Retired Pay	356	356	342	342	342
Contingencies	372	74	—	—	—
Total NOA	13,078	13,428	12,871	13,272	13,272

— *Source:* OSD Budget Div table, 27 Sep 50, OASD(C) files.

On 13 March the Senate Appropriations Committee opened its hearings before receiving a House-approved bill, a rare departure from custom. Hearings were rather routine until 29 March, when Eisenhower testified. A few days earlier Eisenhower, in his private capacity, had given a speech in which he had said that the United States has "gone as far in favor of economy as it was wise to go." Now, for the committee's benefit, he repeated his views and indicated the deficiencies he saw in the administration's proposed budget. He recommended increased funds for aircraft procurement, antisubmarine warfare equipment, Alaskan defenses, and certain items of Army equipment. Pressed to say how much he thought should be added, Eisenhower ventured a "guess" of \$500 million.⁵⁴

Eisenhower was not alone in advocating larger appropriations. By the end of March 1950 attacks on the administration's budget, both in the press and from concerned members of Congress, occurred with increasing frequency. In their nationally syndicated column, Joseph and Stewart Alsop in February had launched a barrage of criticism at what they termed "Louis A. Johnson's concealed disarmament program." Accusing Johnson of numerous "untruths," they challenged his contention that savings were being made without a loss of military effectiveness.⁵⁵ Air power advocates, led by Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, raised similar questions in Congress and indicated that they would press for an increase of \$647 million in the budget for the Air Force and the air arms of the Navy and Marine Corps.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, a special State-Defense study team under Paul H. Nitze was putting the final touches on a report (NSC 68) that would recommend in broad language large increases in national security programs to counteract growing Soviet power, including an increase in production of atomic weapons. In sum, the pressure to lift the ceiling was mounting, causing problems that neither Johnson nor the White House had yet decided how to face.

At first Johnson ignored the criticism, but he became concerned as it steadily intensified. At an Armed Forces Policy Council meeting on 4 April he discussed at length a possible course of action to deal with the problem raised by Eisenhower's recent testimony. He believed that questions about Eisenhower's and Vinson's proposed budget augmentations would come up at a press conference scheduled for later in the day. He speculated that Eisenhower was misinformed in his allegations of deficiencies because he had not been involved in the budget process since the previous summer and because of Johnson's own failure to keep the general up to date since then. In fact, Johnson contended, the force levels proposed in the President's budget equaled or exceeded those that Eisenhower himself had recommended for fiscal year 1951. However, he did not want any of this leaked to the press for fear it would embarrass Eisenhower.⁵⁷

With apparent reluctance, Johnson drew the conclusion that the only way

to counteract the growing criticism would be for the administration itself to take the lead in proposing a budget supplement. In response to Johnson's request for their views on whether the money in the House appropriations bill was adequate to maintain the "effectiveness of a 48-group Air Force, and Naval and Marine aviation," the Joint Chiefs asked for more money for aircraft procurement and Navy ships.⁵⁸ Some time in mid- or late April Johnson sought and obtained the President's approval for a \$350 million increase in the original budget. "When he came out," according to one account, "he stated privately that his economy program was dead, and that he had shaken hands with the President on it."⁵⁹

On 26 April, Johnson appeared before the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in support of the \$350 million increase—\$200 million for Air Force procurement, \$100 million for additional aircraft for the Navy, and \$50 million to bolster the Navy's antisubmarine capabilities.⁶⁰ Eisenhower, informed in advance of what Johnson intended to propose, reacted warmly. "So far as I can determine," he said in a short note to Johnson, "your recommendations accord exactly with what I personally believe should now be done."⁶¹

Besides allaying Eisenhower's concerns, the request for the additional \$350 million also quieted the critics in Congress. Mahon reopened hearings and, after scrutinizing the revised request, the Appropriations Committee sent an amended bill to the floor recommending increases totaling \$385 million over the amount originally recommended by the committee. Out of the give and take of the parliamentary process, the House on 10 May approved new military obligational authority of \$12.870 billion, a sum well within the administration's self-imposed limit and only slightly larger than that recommended in the Mahon subcommittee's original report.⁶²

Senate action on the FY 1951 military budget did not take place until after the Korean War began; by that time President Truman had sent combat troops to Korea and the Pentagon was preparing a \$10 billion defense and foreign military aid supplemental budget request, the first of several that would be submitted to Congress. With the nation at war, a peacetime defense budget based on peacetime assumptions would no longer suffice. Hence, on 28 August, when Congress finally completed action on the regular military appropriation bill of approximately \$13.3 billion (Table 7), members of the House and Senate already knew that they would soon be voting on large supplemental appropriations.

A glance backward at the budget process between September 1947 and the North Korean invasion of June 1950 offers some revealing insights into the difficulties of trying to answer the classic question: How much is enough? First, it was never clear, either from available intelligence estimates or NSC assess-

ments, whether national security was seriously in jeopardy during this period. The threat to free nations from the Soviet Union and other communist forces, as evidenced by the crises in Berlin, Greece, Italy, China, and elsewhere, was obviously of great concern. But except for the March war scare and the most critical moments during the Berlin blockade, tensions did not rise to an alarming level, thus tending to support arguments such as Kennan's that a steady level of preparedness was preferable to a military buildup aimed to peak at a particular time when a feared danger of a confrontation might or might not materialize. The question then became one of how best to meet the Soviet threat and the extent of the role that military forces should play in conjunction with political and economic measures.

Until the outbreak of the Korean War compelled Truman to reassess the situation, his position on military expenditures followed a recognizable, if not always consistent, pattern. He wanted both a strong defense and a deficit-free budget to promote a sound, healthy economy and reduce the public debt. Yet when faced with what some of his critics considered a choice between national security and the domestic economy, he generally favored the latter, no doubt because he had confidence in the capacity of the United States to deal effectively with the Soviet Union without recourse to military action. His view of the elements needed for sound national security included the Marshall Plan, foreign military assistance programs, and a strong domestic economy, in addition to adequate U.S. military strength. It was a view that derived from his perception of the President as Chief Executive as well as Commander in Chief, and it necessarily subordinated purely military considerations to the broader requirements of the national interest.

In differing degrees, Forrestal and Johnson followed the President's lead. But unlike Forrestal, Johnson rarely, if ever, probed the possible consequences for U.S. military preparedness of the President's policy, challenged the assumptions on which that policy rested, or offered unsolicited advice on the budget that did not accord with the President's position. Johnson's vigorous pursuit of economy was clearly in line with what the White House wanted, but it was also in Johnson's own interest, for it gave him more opportunity to exert pressure on the military services and establish his authority. One scholar no doubt exaggerated when he said "Johnson's actions put the fear of God into the Joint Chiefs and made them real team players," but there was some substance to the statement.⁶³

All this is not to say that military and strategic considerations were disregarded in making budget decisions during the pre-Korean War years—as evidenced especially in the role accorded strategic air power, which seemed destined to emerge as the nation's paramount military force. After the Finletter and Brewster reports of 1948, air power advocates in Congress launched a vigorous—

and in some ways successful—campaign on behalf of the Air Force. Still, the impetus for giving priority to land-based air probably owed more to other factors than to a consensus on strategic policy. Given the imposition of rigid money ceilings, strategic air power had more appeal for most congressmen and most administration leaders than did the perceived alternative of maintaining large naval and ground forces that would require much more manpower and money. Forrestal at first resisted, pointing to the need for a balance of forces best suited to meeting military needs within the total resources made available for the purpose. But by the time he left office the pressures of trying to reconcile divergent service viewpoints, coupled with close constraints on new expenditures, had led him to revise his thinking. Strategic air power attracted support because it promised effective security at a lower cost, an argument that steadily gained adherents from one year to the next, despite the Navy's strong arguments to the contrary. By Johnson's time, with little flexibility left in the budget, it seemed ordained to play the dominant role in the nation's defense plans.

CHAPTER XIV

Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces

Even if they had not had to compete with one another for scarce funds, the services would have come into serious conflict during these years over certain fundamental questions of roles and missions that had long been a source of contention and that became extremely controversial in the aftermath of World War II. To be sure, the annual debates between the services over the allocation of increasingly scarce funds brought these questions to a head, forced their continual consideration at the highest levels, and further seriously aggravated existing interservice tensions; budget restraints made it imperative to eliminate any unnecessary duplications of effort, to find the most economical methods of achieving military objectives, and, sometimes, to make difficult choices among competing weapon systems. But there were other important factors that helped fuel the bitter, full-blown controversies that developed, and complicated and often frustrated efforts to resolve or even control these controversies.

Among the most important of these factors was the urgent need to develop military forces that in size, composition, and capabilities would reflect and adequately respond to the radical changes that had occurred in the world since 1939. These changes had, in turn, completely altered the nature and magnitude of the threats to U.S. security that a peacetime American military establishment would continuously have to be prepared to meet. Foremost among these changes were those tending to polarize global power in and around the Soviet Union and the United States and that had led the United States to assume worldwide leadership responsibilities whose exercise was heavily dependent, among other things, on a capacity to project effective military power in a variety of forms and under many different circumstances to most parts of the world. Of almost equal importance were the dramatic changes in the weapons and the techniques of warfare that had

taken place during World War II or were on the horizon as a result of recent or impending revolutions in military technology—particularly in atomic energy, aeronautics, and electronics—and that now would obviously have to be taken into account through revisions in traditional assignments of functions that had been made long before these new developments were ever dreamed of.

All of these new postwar conditions required major adjustments by military organizations that had been accustomed to thinking about their respective roles and missions in traditional terms that no longer reflected existing realities. Unfortunately the services could not agree among themselves on a new delineation and an appropriate allocation of certain critical functions—partly because the issues involved were very difficult ones and partly because the long-term stake of each service in the manner of their resolution was very large. The resulting interservice quarrels contributed significantly to the budget impasses of these years and proved to be one of the most intractable and disruptive problems that Forrestal and Johnson encountered. Both tried earnestly to settle the differences, the former managing some clarification but the latter only intensifying the friction. In the end, they achieved limited success, and that perhaps largely the result of changes in circumstances that temporarily defused rather than solved the outstanding problems. Regrettably but perhaps unavoidably, disputes over service roles and missions would outlast their administrations and prove almost as intractable for their successors.

Roots of Controversy

Disputes and disagreements over the respective functions of the Army and Navy did not pose a significant problem until the 20th century. "During the 19th century . . .," historian Rudolph A. Winnacker has noted, "Army and Navy missions seldom overlapped, and, in the absence of instant communications, such problems as arose in the field had to be resolved in the field anyway."¹ Decisions about missions invariably adhered to the accepted formula. By custom and tradition, the Army's mission was to wage war on land, while the Navy's was to patrol and protect the sea lanes, using the Marine Corps to conduct limited operations ashore in support of the attainment of naval objectives.

During the interwar years of the 1920s and 1930s, great advances in military aviation complicated the traditional division of functions between the services. In an attempt to solve the problem before it became unmanageable, the War and Navy Departments agreed in 1919–20 to share the development of air power and to integrate aeronautics into their existing establishments.² Critics of this arrangement, led by the outspoken General Billy Mitchell, felt that air power deserved and required the status of a separate service. Despite Mitchell's court-

martial in 1925* for conduct prejudicial to military discipline, air power advocates continued to press their cause, generating fears in the Navy that a separate air force would usurp control of naval aviation. To protect itself against encroachment and possibly also to curb the development of Army land-based air power, the Navy throughout the 1920s and on into the 1930s sought to impose limits on the range that Army aircraft could patrol off the coast.³

In 1935, in an effort to promote harmony and cooperation, the War and Navy Departments adopted an agreement, known as *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (JAAN)*, that defined in broad terms the respective functions of the two services. Adhering closely to the traditional definition of service responsibilities, the *JAAN* confirmed the functions of the Army on land and those of the Navy at sea and designated the Marine Corps "an integral part of the sea forces." With respect to air power, the *JAAN* stated:

a. The functions assigned to the Army air component require the Army to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed for use in support of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal frontiers of continental United States and its overseas possessions, or in repelling air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping within our harbors, or in supporting naval forces to assure freedom of action of the fleet.

b. The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy to provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily used in operations from aircraft carriers or other vessels, or based on aircraft tenders, or for operations from shore bases for observation, scouting and patrolling over the sea, and for the protection of shipping in the coastal zones. These aircraft may be required to operate effectively over the sea to the maximum distance within the capacity of aircraft development.⁴

Although frequently amended, the *JAAN* survived essentially intact through World War II, but by 1945 many of its provisions were no longer pertinent. For one thing, the creation in 1935 of the General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF) and the establishment in 1942 of the Army Air Forces (AAF)† gave renewed impetus to the drive by air power advocates for a separate air

* Contrary to Army regulations, Mitchell had repeatedly spoken out publicly in strong criticism of the Army and Navy on air matters. The widespread publicity attending his trial made both the man and the current air power issue a cause célèbre. Mitchell resigned from the Army after the trial.

† Although the term first came into official use in June 1941, the Army Air Forces in its wartime and postwar form was established by the War Department reorganization of March 1942.

force. Recognizing that total independence would be difficult to achieve in wartime, AAF leaders were content to bide their time. Accordingly, they went along willingly with the March 1942 War Department reorganization which gave the air arm a degree of autonomy it had never before enjoyed. During the war the AAF was officially coequal with the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces, but unofficially it acquired the status of a third service, almost on a par with the Army and the Navy.⁵

Rapid wartime advances in military technology also contributed greatly to making the *JAAN* obsolete. Never before had the scientific community mobilized its talents so fully for military purposes, producing a wave of innovations and discoveries that thrust modern warfare into the age of high technology. The effect, both on the way the war was fought and on the thinking of the military, was revolutionary. Because new weapons, such as long-range aircraft and guided rockets, had a wide range of applications, it was seldom clear whether one service should or could claim a monopoly on their use. In many instances it proved virtually impossible to avoid overlapping or duplicative effort in the employment of these weapons. By the end of the war, as President Eisenhower later observed, science and technology had so "scrambled" traditional service functions that the notion of separate ground, sea, and air warfare was "gone forever."⁶

During postwar discussions of unification it became clear that conflict over roles and missions was much more than an organizational problem, that it involved basic disagreement over strategy and weapons to be used in fighting future wars. In the wake of rapidly deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations from 1945 on, the services essentially agreed that for planning purposes the Soviet Union should be considered the potential aggressor, but they differed over the character of the Soviet military threat and how to meet it.

In addressing this question, each of the services harkened to its experience in World War II. From the Navy's standpoint, World War II had demonstrated conclusively that large aircraft carriers with their complement of combat aircraft were the key to control of the seas. As it moved into the postwar era, the Navy considered its future combat effectiveness dependent upon the expansion of carrier-based air power and the construction of new and larger carriers to handle increasingly larger aircraft. To perform its other functions, the Navy felt it needed to maintain and upgrade other types of forces as well—a versatile and fairly large Marine Corps, including a Marine air arm, surface fighting ships, a powerful submarine force, and long-range land-based aircraft for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and reconnaissance missions. For the longer term, the Navy undertook research and development on a variety of missile weapons; between 1945 and 1950 it devoted more funds than the Army or Air Force to missile development programs. Noting the potential of atomic weapons, many naval planners argued

further that the Navy should give high priority to acquiring and developing an air-atomic capability.⁷

The other services viewed preparedness for a possible war with the Soviets somewhat differently, causing them to question the Navy's assessment of its requirements. The Army, mindful of its unreadiness for World War II, saw a definite need in the postwar era for a sizable ground force in being, ideally about 25 divisions. With funds again meager after 1945, it doubted that the nation could afford both a large Army and a large Marine Corps. "Once Marine units attain such a size as to require the combining of arms to accomplish their missions," the Army argued, "they are assuming and duplicating the functions of the Army and we have in effect two land armies." To solve this problem, the Army advocated that the Marine Corps be reorganized into "a force within the fleet to provide small readily available and lightly-armed units to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries."⁸

Advocates of a separate air force took an equally dim view of the Navy's aviation and ship program. Under the dominant influence of officers from bomber aviation, the AAF emerged from World War II convinced that the air campaigns against Germany and Japan had proved beyond any doubt the role of the land-based strategic bomber as an effective and decisive weapon of modern warfare. Although other weapon systems, such as guided missiles, seemed to hold a similar potential, it was generally agreed that they were a decade or more away.⁹ As a practical matter, therefore, nothing in the near future seemed likely to take the place of the manned bomber. With the development of nuclear weapons and the promise of improved longer distance aircraft like the B-36 for intercontinental missions, Air Force leaders expected land-based strategic planes to play the major role in future wars. In short, they argued, land-based air power had replaced sea power as the nation's first line of defense.¹⁰

Having established a clear claim to the strategic bombing mission during the war, Air Force leaders had no intention of giving it up, or, if they could help it, of sharing it with any other service. As they took a close look at postwar naval planning for sophisticated land-based aircraft and larger carriers, many concluded that the Navy intended to create a rival strategic air force. Although top Navy officials consistently disavowed any such intention, their postwar shipbuilding plans appeared to the Air Force to argue otherwise. During World War II Navy commanders in the Pacific had strongly urged the construction of carriers larger than any then in commission to accommodate bigger aircraft for long-range reconnaissance, attacks on enemy shipping, support for amphibious operations, and antisubmarine warfare. After the war the Navy followed up with plans to turn these recommendations into reality. After the CROSSROADS tests of 1946, at which two atomic bombs were exploded near Bikini Atoll in the Pacific, Navy designers

concluded that to minimize damage from the high winds of an atomic blast new large carriers should be built without the traditional superstructure on the flight deck. Soon to emerge as the product of an exercise headed by Vice Adm. Marc A. Mitscher were plans for a prototype "flush deck" carrier. No ordinary vessel, the flush deck, tentatively named the *United States* with the designation CVA-58, was to be in a class by itself—a 65,000-ton "supercarrier," larger than any naval ship afloat, with the capability of launching aircraft weighing up to 100,000 pounds.¹¹

While design of the supercarrier *United States* progressed in 1946-47, a quiet but intense debate took place within the Navy over the ship's main mission. Most Navy officers believed that their service should have a role in conducting air-atomic operations. But a small, highly articulate minority felt that the supercarrier should play a major part. Their most vigorous spokesman, Rear Adm. Daniel V. Gallery, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Guided Missiles), advocated "an aggressive campaign aimed at proving that the Navy can deliver the atom bomb more effectively than the Air Force can." "If we develop the proper planes and tactics," Gallery maintained, "the Navy can become the principal offensive branch of the national defense system, the one that will actually deliver the knock-out blows."¹²

Although the celebrated "Gallery memorandum" (leaked to and published by columnist Drew Pearson in April 1948) never represented official Navy policy,¹³ proponents of land-based air power saw naval aviation headed directly toward establishment of a competing strategic air force. If not, they wondered, what was the purpose of supercarriers? All intelligence estimates in this period agreed that the Soviet Union's surface navy was limited to small vessels for coastal defense and riverine warfare and a handful of destroyers and light cruisers. Of the world's 7 million tons of combat vessels in 1947, 4 million belonged to the United States and less than 1 million to the Soviet Union.¹⁴ With only 11 percent of the U.S.S.R. defense budget at its disposal in the immediate postwar years, the Soviet Navy perforce had to husband its resources and concentrate on relatively inexpensive vessels of simple design—chiefly submarines copied from captured German U-boats and motor torpedo boats. Although the Soviet submarine force did indeed appear formidable on paper, only a small fraction of the force (less than 10 percent) was stationed within reach of the Atlantic sea lanes.¹⁵ Against such an enemy, critics argued, the U.S. Navy's plans for a new fleet of big carriers seemed misdirected and militarily imprudent. "To maintain a five-ocean navy to fight a no-ocean opponent," as one Air Force general remarked, ". . . is a foolish waste of time, men and resources."¹⁶

The nature of a future war was a central issue in all aspects of strategic thinking and planning by the services. Disagreement over this issue fueled the

roles and missions controversy to the boiling point and threatened to turn traditional service rivalries into one of the most bitter feuds that the military had ever experienced. Recognizing the importance of the question, the Joint Chiefs as early as August 1945 had initiated a study (JCS 1478 series) that they hoped would assist in restoring some semblance of order to the assignment of service functions. The Army and the AAF wanted missions defined in terms of weapons and the medium in which each service operated, i.e., land, sea, and air. Under this formula, virtually all aircraft would be under the command and control of the Air Force, all seagoing forces under the Navy, and all ground forces under the Army. The Navy, realizing that it could lose its air component to the Air Force and the Marine Corps to the Army, mounted resolute and persistent resistance. It argued that military functions and objectives rather than weapons or the medium of operation should be the determining factor in assignment of missions. As the debate progressed, it became enmeshed with congressional and administration efforts to resolve the unification question, adding further to the confusion and controversy.¹⁷

The more the Joint Chiefs discussed the matter, the more entrenched became their differences. The immediate issues on which they found themselves deadlocked were the size of the Marine Corps and whether the Navy should continue to maintain and operate land-based aircraft. Debate over the role of carrier aviation, although looming ever larger as the most controversial issue of all, would come later. Feeling that further discussion was pointless, the Joint Chiefs in June 1946 suspended deliberation of roles and missions until such time as "Presidential or legislative action requires that consideration be revived."¹⁸

In an attempt to break the stalemate, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, with Army concurrence, in November 1946 asked General Norstad and Admiral Sherman, the latter a personal friend, to prepare a joint statement on service functions for possible use by Congress and the administration in developing unification legislation.¹⁹ After many conferences, Norstad and Sherman tendered a paper in the form of a draft executive order, which Forrestal and Secretary of War Patterson forwarded to President Truman in January 1947, together with their final recommendations on a unification bill.*

In general, the delineation of functions in this paper adhered closely to the traditional assignment of roles and missions based on the physical environment in which each service normally operated. The Army received primary responsibility for warfare on land; the Navy, for control of the sea and the air above it; and the proposed separate Air Force, for combat in the air, including strategic bombardment, airlift, and tactical support of ground and naval forces. To encour-

* See Chapter I.

age unified effort, the order directed that "the armed forces shall formulate integrated plans and make coordinated preparations" and that each service "shall make use of the personnel, equipment and facilities of the other services in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased." But how to achieve such coordination and avoid duplication the paper did not specify, leaving the accomplishment of these imposing tasks dependent on voluntary cooperation.²⁰

Perhaps most curious was the draft order's assignment of the Marine Corps "for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." Considering the Corps' experience in the last war, this task did not encompass the full range of its activities. In fact, in their bloodiest and most heroic engagement of World War II—the battle of Iwo Jima—the Marines fought not to secure an "advanced naval base" but to gain control of an airfield for strategic air operations against Japan. The order did state that the Marines were "to assist the Army and the Air Force in the accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by proper authority," but such ambiguity caused critics later to dismiss the document as little more than "a semantic evasion," whose main purpose was to satisfy "the requirement of peacetime military politics, not those of wartime strategy."²¹ Such criticism appears to have some validity but is not totally deserved. In fairness to Sherman and Norstad, they faced an almost insoluble issue that no one else at the time—not even the Joint Chiefs—was willing or able to tackle.

On 26 July 1947, after approving the National Security Act, President Truman issued the Sherman-Norstad statement as Executive Order 9877, which then became, for budgetary and administrative purposes, the official assignment of service roles and missions.²² This action almost immediately caused trouble, for between the drafting of the order in January and its issuance in July, the Navy's supporters in Congress had worked provisions into the National Security Act guaranteeing the continued independence of naval aviation and a permanent role for the Marine Corps in land warfare.* Thus, the wording of the two documents differed, the executive order including language that the Navy and Marines considered less favorable than the language of the act. Adding to the friction brought on by these discrepancies, the Bureau of the Budget in its review of FY 1949 service estimates slashed Air Force appropriations requests by \$1.5 billion.²³ Citing the high cost of ship construction and a backlog of unfinished vessels from World War II, the BoB also wanted to trim \$9 million requested by the Navy for beginning construction of the first supercarrier. While the Air Force did not

* On the drafting of the National Security Act, see Chapter I.

succeed in obtaining restoration of any funds, the Navy saved its supercarrier by agreeing to cancel construction of several other ships so that sufficient money would be available in future years without need for substantial additional appropriations.²⁴

In January 1948, as the FY 1949 military budget request was about to go to Congress, yet another event widened the growing Air Force–Navy rift. In announcing the retirement of Admiral Nimitz as Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy on 6 January released a statement by Nimitz stressing the importance of maintaining strong sea capabilities as the nation's principal force in being. "For the present," Nimitz said, "until long-range bombers are developed capable of spanning our bordering oceans and returning to our North American bases, naval air power launched from carriers may be the only practicable means of bombing vital enemy centers in the early stages of a war." Believing its suspicions confirmed, the Air Force saw the supercarrier not merely as another budget item but as a direct infringement on its legitimate responsibilities—the first step by the Navy toward the creation of a competing air force in violation of the presidentially approved assignment of service functions.²⁵ On both sides, the battle lines had formed.

The Key West Agreement

During his first few months as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal refrained from involvement in the roles and missions controversy, taking the position that the services, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs, should resolve their differences on their own. However, the services, on their own, succeeded in settling only one issue, and that a virtually uncontested issue—that the Air Force, not the Army, should have responsibility for tactical air support of ground forces.²⁶ On more difficult questions—the mission and future size and composition of the Marine Corps and the respective functions of the Air Force and naval aviation—disagreement persisted and flared more and more openly.

In an effort to reconcile the inconsistent treatment of roles and missions in Executive Order 9877 and the National Security Act and thus eliminate a source of both confusion and contention, Forrestal on 20 January 1948 asked the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries to review a revised executive order prepared in his office that would more closely conform with the National Security Act. Although the Navy favored changing the executive order to bring it into line with the language of the act, which it preferred, Secretary of the Navy Sullivan did not find the revision to his liking any more than did the other service secretaries. Recognizing that the draft order did not achieve the objective of providing "clear-cut guidance by removing all misunderstandings as to the tasks

of each Service," Forrestal withdrew it before the Joint Chiefs could submit comments.²⁷ Obviously irritated by the lack of progress toward a solution, he told the service secretaries on 3 February "that until the Joint Chiefs have completed their joint strategic plans, there is no solid foundation on which to base a meaningful assignment of roles and missions." "My present inclination," he added,

is to do nothing about the Executive Order at the present moment, but to work towards a situation under which I will issue a directive simultaneously with a rescission of the Executive Order by the President. This can only come about when the Joint Chiefs have completed what I regard as their A-1 priority project, and is an additional reason—if any such reason is needed—for stepping up the tempo of the work in the strategic planning field.²⁸

Presumably, Forrestal's insistence on completion of joint strategic plans as a prerequisite for assignment of roles and missions grew out of doubts about the identity of the missions that would be assigned under these war plans—doubts of sufficient magnitude to make it impossible to resolve the roles and missions problems.

Before receiving Forrestal's notification of withdrawal the Joint Chiefs on 22 January referred the paper for study to an ad hoc committee composed of General Wedemeyer, Rear Adm. Charles W. Styer, USN, and General Norstad. Citing "limitations in money, manpower and industrial capacity," the committee stated that service functions urgently needed clarification and proposed preparation of a new executive order that more clearly delineated service responsibilities.²⁹ Preferring a guidance statement by the Secretary of Defense to a new executive order, the Joint Chiefs on 4 February instructed the committee to begin work on a statement of service functions that would be promulgated by the Secretary of Defense to replace the President's order. As Forrestal now had in mind precisely such a directive, he readily approved this new course of action.³⁰

Throughout February and into early March the ad hoc committee labored over the new statement. Early in the deliberations Wedemeyer reported to the new Army Chief of Staff, General Bradley, that the committee agreed in principle on all but two problems—whether carrier-based aviation should have a role in strategic air operations, augmenting Air Force bombers, and whether the Army or the Air Force should assume primary responsibility for air defense from land areas. But on those two fundamental issues the committee appeared hopelessly deadlocked. A frustrated Forrestal reported to Truman the lack of progress and his intention to continue to press for a resolution of the roles and missions question. With the transmission of the final report on 8 March, it became clear

how little progress had been made; as evidenced by split views throughout the paper, differences of opinion had actually widened. The Army sided with the Air Force in urging limitations on naval aviation and the Marine Corps that the Navy deemed unwarranted and intolerable.³¹ "In summation," complained the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Denfeld, "the Army and the Air Force seek to shackle, restrict, or otherwise prevent the Navy from exploiting its intrinsic capabilities, by imposing artificial barriers which would serve to prevent such utilization." Conceding "fundamental disagreements" that "can only be resolved by higher authority," the chiefs declared their readiness to meet with the Secretary of Defense "at his convenience."³²

On 11 March, at Forrestal's suggestion, he and the Joint Chiefs, minus Admiral Leahy, flew to Key West, Fla., where they secluded themselves until 14 March. At the conference's opening session Forrestal outlined his views on the assignment of service functions. His first concern was to lay to rest the aviation controversy. The Air Force, he said, should have primary responsibility for air warfare, including strategic bombing, but should not interpret its mandate as excluding the Navy from acquiring and maintaining an air component consistent with its primary mission of controlling the seas. On the other hand, the Navy should not attempt to create a competing strategic air force and should recognize that budget limitations might compel it to "make-do with help, in wartime, from other services." With respect to the Marine Corps, Forrestal called for restrictions on its size and for cooperation between the Marines and the Army in developing common techniques and tactics for amphibious operations.³³

Guided by Forrestal's opening remarks, the Joint Chiefs drafted a new roles and missions statement entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Unable to resolve all details at Key West, the conferees met again in Washington on 20 March, made further refinements in the document, and then submitted it to President Truman a week later. On Forrestal's recommendation, the President on 21 April revoked E.O. 9877, clearing the way for the Secretary of Defense to issue that same day the Functions paper as the new directive on service roles and missions.³⁴

In contrast to the broad delineation of roles and missions in the executive order, the Functions paper endeavored to spell out both the primary and secondary responsibilities of each service. Generally speaking, the basic assignments remained essentially unchanged. Thus, the Functions paper reaffirmed the Army's primary mission to organize, train, and equip forces for sustained combat on land; the Navy's responsibility for combat operations at sea, including antisubmarine warfare, protection of ocean shipping, and mine laying; the Marine Corps' responsibility for amphibious warfare, including the defense of advanced naval bases and operations on land as necessary for the prosecution of a naval campaign;

and the Air Force's responsibility for strategic air warfare, defense of the United States against air attack, and air and logistic support of ground forces. The paper called for the services, under the guidance of the Joint Chiefs, to coordinate their efforts closely, avoid duplication, and work toward "maximum practicable" integration of policies and procedures.

The most innovative and important feature of the Key West Functions paper was its treatment of secondary or "collateral" roles and missions that each service would perform in support of or in collaboration with another service in the execution of a primary function. As a practical matter, Forrestal and the chiefs found it impossible to define the entire range of service responsibilities in terms that completely eliminated overlapping activity. They resolved that the only way to minimize duplication was by fostering joint efforts. Thus, two or more of the services were to collaborate in functions related to amphibious warfare, air defense, and strategic air operations as directed by the Joint Chiefs. In each instance the JCS member having primary responsibility for a particular task was to act as JCS "agent" in the preparation of plans and establishment of requirements for all forces to carry out the function.³⁵

In addition to these formal assignments of responsibility, the Key West conferees reached several oral understandings subsequently summarized in a "memorandum for the record" as a means of clarifying and interpreting the principles contained in the Functions paper. They agreed that while there should be no attempt to abolish the Marine Corps or to restrict it unduly in the performance of its functions, the Corps should not be permitted to grow into a second land army; "for present planning purposes" the conferees limited its maximum strength to four divisions. A similar approach sought to reconcile Air Force-Navy differences over competing activities in aviation. The Navy, after disavowing any desire to create its own strategic air force, received permission to develop capabilities for attacking any target, including inland ones, which might pose a threat to the successful completion of its primary mission. The Air Force denied any desire to "deprive the Navy of its carriers." It was assumed that a combination of the Navy's "purely naval function" and "the contribution which it could make to strategic air warfare" might be justification for construction of a new "large carrier," presumably a reference to the Navy's flush-deck supercarrier.³⁶

Forrestal hoped that the Key West agreement had ended the roles and missions dispute. But he suspected that implementing the agreement would not be easy. Differences over the size of the Marine Corps and responsibility for air defense had indeed been addressed and largely settled for the time being. But there remained the questions of whether the Air Force and the Navy could in fact coordinate their aviation activities and whether the Army and Marine Corps

could collaborate effectively on the ground. No sooner had Forrestal returned from Florida than Secretary Symington called him to report that Generals Spaatz and Norstad were unhappy over a statement in the press release that there had been agreement in all major areas at Key West.³⁷ Until the actual cooperation matched the resourcefulness of the semantic compromises, there could be no genuine harmony or teamwork, and no true resolution of the more troublesome roles and missions questions.

The Newport Conference

While the Key West agreement appeared to resolve many questions, Forrestal soon recognized that it was not a total solution. Even with a fresh delineation of service functions, the fact remained that the Air Force and the Navy viewed one another with suspicion and found it practically impossible to contain their rivalry. Within weeks of Key West they were again at loggerheads.

This time the quarrel centered on the control and direction of air-atomic operations, an issue that had strained interservice relations since World War II. The Army and Navy recognized early after the war that atomic weapons would play a central role in war planning, that atomic forces would receive high priority, and that the division of funds among the services would be greatly affected by this priority. Joining forces in the JCS, they denied the Air Force exclusive control and use of atomic weapons and ensured themselves an equal role in decisions on development and employment of such weapons. Thus, through their membership on the JCS they shared responsibility for establishing quantitative requirements for atomic bombs and for control of the Strategic Air Command as a JCS specified command. By asserting JCS control of strategic target selection, the Army and Navy also assured themselves of participation in determining how the bombs would be used. Although Air Force intelligence prepared the target lists, it did so under JCS guidance and with the help of Navy personnel who made up 30 percent of the target planning staff.³⁸

In spite of these successes in denying the Air Force overriding dominance in atomic matters, the Navy remained unsure of its role in strategic air offensive operations. In the spring of 1948 the Air Force had a monopoly on the means for the delivery of nuclear weapons, and planned to expand its fleet of 30 operational atomic bombers to more than 200 by the end of the year.* The Navy's atomic bomb delivery capabilities, on the other hand, were nonexistent, and their development hinged largely on congressional funding of the super-

* All Air Force atomic bombers at the beginning of 1948 were modified B-29s. During the course of the year these were augmented by B-50s (a refined version of the B-29 with greater flying distance) and a handful of B-36s.

carrier and on the modification, begun in 1947, of three *Midway*-class carriers (45,000 tons) to strengthen their flight decks sufficiently to handle larger aircraft capable of carrying atomic bombs. In addition, the Navy was pushing the development of two planes to carry such bombs—the AJ-1 Savage, a new aircraft designed exclusively for atomic warfare, and the P2V-3C Neptune, a World War II plane being refitted for this purpose. If all went according to schedule, both the AJ-1 and the P2V-3C would be operational aboard carriers by the beginning of 1950.³⁹

On his return from Key West Forrestal reported to Truman that the Navy “was not to be denied use of [the] A-bomb.” However, while discussing implementation of the Key West agreement with the Joint Chiefs several days later, he made a statement that cast doubt on whether the Navy would have sufficient access to nuclear weapons. Meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 20 March, Forrestal said that he “attached great importance” to the JCS “agent” mechanism for settling interservice disputes and that he hoped “the Joint Chiefs of Staff would designate one of their members to be responsible for . . . [insuring] that [atomic] weapons are available in sufficient quantities and in proper condition.” “It is not for me,” he declared, “to tell the Joint Chiefs of Staff which Service member should be designated, but I would like to feel that . . . one member had taken this specific function under his wing.”⁴⁰

At the time Forrestal made this comment he was contemplating the adoption of several measures to streamline the military structure for dealing with atomic energy matters.* One recommendation, requiring approval of the President, was to transfer the custody of atomic weapons from the AEC to a military agency, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), established in January 1947 as an interservice (joint) training and support organization with responsibility for the handling and assembly of nuclear weapons. AFSWP was a separate organization from the Military Liaison Committee (MLC), which had been established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to provide policy coordination between the National Military Establishment and the AEC. Under existing procedures, AFSWP reported to the individual service chiefs. However, the Air Force, having long maintained that three lines of communication would confuse matters in an emergency, wanted AFSWP reorganized to bring it directly under the command and control of the Air Force, acting as executive agent for the JCS.⁴¹

As a step in this direction, General Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff, asked his JCS colleagues on 23 March 1948 to join with him, as he felt the Secretary of Defense had suggested, in petitioning Forrestal to transfer to the Air Force control over all of AFSWP’s operational functions, excluding training and tech-

* See Chapter XV.

nical activities. Referring to the recent Key West agreement that had accorded the Air Force primary responsibility for strategic bombing, Spaatz felt it only logical that he be named JCS executive agent for AFSWP. The other chiefs, while agreeing that the current organization of AFSWP was less than satisfactory, doubted that its defects posed an urgent problem. Admiral Leahy, who responded immediately with written comments, thought it presumptuous of the JCS to designate an executive agent with operational control over nuclear weapons when only the President could authorize their use. Agreeing with a suggestion made by General Bradley, Leahy and Denfeld favored deferring action until the MLC could study the matter.⁴²

In a further exchange of views in mid-July, the Joint Chiefs again proved unable to resolve the question of command and control over AFSWP. With some reservations, the Army supported the Air Force proposal, while the Navy opposed it categorically. Unable to mend their differences, the Joint Chiefs referred the matter to Forrestal, giving him written comments from the Air Force and the Navy. Beyond the disposition of the dispute over AFSWP there loomed the larger issue of whether the Key West agreement contained sufficient provision for Navy participation in strategic air functions. Denying that current lines of command were seriously defective, Admiral Denfeld expressed concern that Air Force control of AFSWP would inhibit and possibly prevent the Navy from acquiring weapons necessary to accomplish its assigned mission. Much of the problem, he suggested, stemmed from the Air Force tendency to think of atomic and strategic bombing as one and the same. "Inter-service cooperation and sound joint planning will be impeded," Denfeld admonished, "unless the principle is wholeheartedly accepted, at all levels, that neither the use of atomic weapons nor the direction of all operations involving their use are to be exclusively controlled by any one Service."⁴³

In an effort to break this latest impasse, Forrestal and the service secretaries met privately on the evening of 19 July to consider a possible compromise. As the discussion progressed, it became clear to Forrestal, as he recorded afterward in his diary, "that the area of disagreement between the Air Force and Navy Air is not necessarily very wide but it is quite deep." Amplifying on a suggestion from Secretary of the Army Royall, Forrestal outlined a means of settling the matter by according the Air Force "dominant interest" in the use of atomic weapons and by limiting the Navy's use to purely naval targets and sorties in strategic operations as directed by the Air Force.⁴⁴ This formula Secretary of the Air Force Symington found largely unacceptable.* "There is no justification," Symington argued,

* It was at this time that relations between Forrestal and Symington became most strained. See Chapter III.

for development on the part of the Navy of special equipment, or organization, for the purpose of dropping atomic bombs:

(a) Unless there are not only enough resources, including money, available to provide fully for the normal missions of all three Services, but also enough to permit consideration of additional military tasks on the part of each Service.

(b) Unless it will result in equal or greater economy of critical fissionable material. (It is a fact that the larger the bomb the more effective utilization of available fissionable materials; and it would seem inevitable that consideration of the Navy dropping the bomb could only result in emphasis on a smaller bomb as against that desired for maximum effectiveness and economy.)⁴⁵

Unable to obtain any appreciable support for his proposed compromise, Forrestal turned for advice to the Chairman of the MLC, Donald F. Carpenter. After reviewing the arguments for and against the reorganization of AFSWP, Carpenter concluded that it would take more than an administrative decision to end the quarrel. "The question of AFSWP organization," he told Forrestal, "is merely a symptom of the fundamental disputes [sic] of strategic bombing. This question must be settled first before any organization can be satisfactorily accepted." Since President Truman had recently ruled against transferring custody of nuclear weapons to the military, Carpenter doubted the urgency of changes in AFSWP organization and advised Forrestal to take his time in making a decision. But after a meeting of the MLC a few days later on 3 August, Carpenter, perhaps influenced by the worsening Berlin crisis, wrote Forrestal that the MLC was prepared to recommend placing AFSWP under the Air Force temporarily to deal with emergencies pending the outcome of a thorough organization study.⁴⁶

Before taking action on Carpenter's proposal, Forrestal wanted to be certain that he had not overlooked other possible solutions. Accordingly, on 9 August he asked Spaatz, now retired, and Admiral John H. Towers, a veteran naval aviator, also retired, for their views regarding strategic warfare requirements, specifically the allocation of functions under the Key West agreement, the role of aircraft carriers under the agreement, the operational control of nuclear weapons, and the use, if any, that should be made of naval aviation in air-atomic operations.⁴⁷ In their reply of 18 August Spaatz and Towers found the Key West agreement "a satisfactory document" as long as the services recognized the principle that even in an area where one had primary responsibility the others could make supplementary contributions. Still, they conceded there could be varying

interpretations, as Spaatz and Towers themselves demonstrated in their separate views on the management of nuclear weapons. Towers believed the Navy might require atomic bombs to perform its primary mission and so should be accorded some operational control over the weapons. Spaatz, while conceding that the Navy might have a need for nuclear weapons, maintained that because of their vital importance to strategic bombing, which was primarily an Air Force function, the control of these weapons should be under the Air Force. Between these two extremes, however, both men saw room for compromise, if only the Air Force and the Navy would accept the idea that "the exclusive responsibility and authority in a given field do not imply preclusive participation."⁴⁸

Hoping to translate this "live-and-let-live" philosophy into a working doctrine, Forrestal invited the Joint Chiefs to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., where they could hold talks in relative seclusion as they had done at Key West. The Newport conference, held 20–22 August, dealt with a wide range of subjects, including two that directly concerned roles and missions. First on the agenda came the strategic bombing question, which the conferees resolved by adding a supplement to the Key West Functions paper, clarifying the term "primary mission" so that the Air Force could not deny the Navy access to atomic weapons or exclude it from planning for strategic air operations. In exchange, the Navy dropped its opposition to placing AFSWP under Air Force control on an "interim" basis, subject to reexamination after the MLC completed its study of the atomic energy organization.⁴⁹

The second decision at Newport bearing on roles and missions concerned the establishment of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) to provide the JCS with technical advice and analysis on the capabilities and performance of new and existing weapons. The idea for such a group had originated early in 1948 with the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, Vannevar Bush, who felt that much of the confusion over roles and missions could be eliminated in the future if the services and the Joint Chiefs had access to sound and impartial technical evaluations of modern weapons by an agency within the military establishment that was independent of the military departments. Forrestal in February 1948 had enthusiastically endorsed Bush's proposal but had found the Joint Chiefs lukewarm to the idea and suspicious that it might interfere with or diminish their authority to develop strategic plans. When the subject came up at Newport, Forrestal succeeded in overcoming the Joint Chiefs' objections to the extent of obtaining their agreement in principle that creation of a weapons evaluation group was "necessary and desirable." However, there was no final decision on the precise form of the organization. According to the official record of the meeting, "it appeared to be the consensus of opinion that the group should be organized directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff but that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff should call upon Dr. Bush to organize the group and get it operating." Working out of the details was left for later.⁵⁰

Taken together, the Key West and Newport conferences provided a much needed clarification of service roles and missions. What these conferences produced was a *modus vivendi* which, while far from perfect, managed some reconciliation of stubborn differences and provided a framework for further discussion. In an age of rapidly expanding technological frontiers, with weapons and strategy constantly being refined, any truly comprehensive or definitive solution was probably impossible. The most meticulously negotiated compromise or specifically detailed description of service responsibilities could not anticipate new developments that were likely to blur roles and missions. Even without the imponderable of technological change there persisted continuing interservice jealousy and mistrust, underlying obstacles to compromise that had been surmounted but not eliminated at Key West and Newport. In his first annual report, published toward the end of 1948, Forrestal readily admitted that while "great progress" had been made, "I would be less than candid . . . if I did not underline the fact that there are still great areas in which the viewpoints of the services have not come together." He stated the most divisive issue simply: "What is to be the use, and who is to be the user of air power?"⁵¹

Escalation of the Strategic Bombing Controversy

The surface harmony achieved at Newport did not last much longer than the brief interlude following Key West. Even as the debate over roles and missions per se receded temporarily into the background, deliberations over budget priorities and relative force structures produced new strains. If anything, service relations, particularly between the Air Force and the Navy, worsened after Newport. Despite agreement that no one service would be allowed to dominate aviation, the Air Force and the Navy continued to bicker, the competition and friction between the two intensifying through 1948 and into 1949 as Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs went about the difficult task of preparing FY 1950 budget estimates. With less money to go around than the services thought they needed, tough decisions had to be made on who would get what. The resulting division of funds satisfied no one in the military, least of all the Navy, which saw major elements of the fleet being denied support that it deemed essential and increasing responsibility for the nation's security passing into the hands of the Air Force, with the likely consequence that land-based strategic bombers would become the nation's principal force in being.*

* On the preparation of the FY 1950 military budget, see Chapter XII.

Although no other decision may have been possible, given the limited funds available and the strategic assumptions on which the budget was based, Forrestal viewed growing reliance on strategic bombing with strong misgiving. Judging from what he had seen of the Air Force—a dedicated, highly motivated, but in many ways young and inexperienced organization—he took no comfort in investing billions of dollars and the nation's security in air power without a full evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses. While preparing the FY 1950 budget, he discussed this problem repeatedly with members of his immediate staff and, on one occasion, sought Symington's views. Symington categorically affirmed that the Air Force, if called upon, could deliver the atomic bomb or any other weapon "where, how and when it was wanted."⁵² Yet despite the Air Force's confidence in its abilities, Forrestal remained skeptical. "The unresolved question," he noted in his diary, "is whether unescorted big bombers can penetrate to targets that have a vigorous fighter defense." He added:

I do not believe that air power alone can win a war any more than an Army or naval power can win a war, and I do not believe in the theory that an atomic offensive will extinguish in a week the will to fight. I believe air power will have to be applied massively in order to really destroy the industrial complex of any nation and, in terms of present capabilities, that means air power within fifteen hundred miles of the targets—that means an Army has to be transported to the areas where the airfields exist—that means, in turn, there has to be security of the sea lanes provided by the naval forces to get the Army there. Then, and only then, can the tremendous striking power of air be applied in a decisive—and I repeat decisive—manner.⁵³

Forrestal's immediate staff shared his concerns. They concurred in the need for a careful review of the role and effectiveness of air power.⁵⁴ Ohly recommended a broad study, similar to that undertaken by the Finletter commission, of current and foreseeable trends in strategic air warfare, suggesting it examine such questions as the types of planes required for strategic bombing, Soviet air defense capabilities, expected attrition rates of penetrating U.S. aircraft, and the likely impact of new offensive and defensive weapons, especially guided missiles.⁵⁵

In late October Forrestal put the problem before the Joint Chiefs, asking them to address two closely related questions: First, what were the chances that U.S. strategic aircraft, operating in accordance with current war plans, could successfully deliver atomic bombs on their targets in the face of Soviet air defenses; and second, what military and psychological effects would successful delivery have on the Soviet war effort? Initially, Forrestal posed only the first question and asked for a reply before the end of the year, apparently hoping to

use the information in his presentation of the FY 1950 military budget. When two days later he raised the second question, he realized that such an evaluation would take time and therefore set no deadline for completion of the project.⁵⁶

The Joint Chiefs decided to treat Forrestal's questions separately. They referred the first to the Air Force and the second to a six-member ad hoc JCS committee, established in January 1949 under the chairmanship of Lt. Gen. Hubert R. Harmon, USAF.⁵⁷ In a preliminary report on the first subject—strategic capabilities—portions of which Forrestal used at a White House budget briefing on 20 December 1948, the Air Force offered assurances that a strategic offensive could be executed with reasonable certainty of success, causing massive damage to Soviet industry and transportation. The Air Force planned an attack in two stages, relying in the first instance on strikes with atomic weapons, followed by a period of conventional bombing to "police" previously bombed areas. When completed, the Air Force insisted, "the destruction and shock caused by this offensive, concentrated into a period of not more than 45 days would, at the minimum, avert defeat for the U.S., buy the time needed to prepare for a conventional war, and shorten the conventional war."⁵⁸

During the next few weeks Air Force claims became the subject of a sharp internal dispute among the Joint Chiefs, revealing that the strategic bombing controversy of the previous summer was still far from resolved. Denfeld pointed to what he considered a serious deficiency in Air Force plans and a potentially critical problem—a dearth of reliable intelligence on Soviet air defenses. Provoked that the Navy should challenge Air Force competence to evaluate strategic bombing, General Vandenberg strongly denied that his plans were deficient and stated that the Air Force analysis was based on estimates by the Joint Intelligence Committee.⁵⁹ When the Joint Chiefs delivered their feasibility report to Forrestal on 17 February 1949 (the companion Harmon Committee report on the effects of bombing would not be ready for several months), they were still split in their assessment. Vandenberg and Bradley reaffirmed the feasibility of a successful air offensive, provided there were no competing claims on airlift resources other than the current demands of the Berlin airlift. Denfeld dissented, maintaining that joint intelligence and operational evaluations were required before accurate estimates of feasibility could be made. A report by the Joint Intelligence Committee on 3 March appeared to confirm most of Denfeld's misgivings.⁶⁰

The split assessment and varying intelligence estimates were hardly the firm answers that Forrestal had been seeking to resolve doubts about the Air Force's strategic bombing capabilities. Forrestal was displeased by the way the Joint Chiefs had handled his request. According to a later account by Ohly, the secretary considered their report of 17 February "to be such a poorly prepared document" that shortly before leaving office he discussed it with Eisenhower, after

which the "whole study" was "put on a more orderly basis." * In April the Joint Chiefs directed the Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare a fresh intelligence estimate of Soviet air defenses and, at the same time, arranged with the newly established Weapons Systems Evaluation Group to conduct a technical analysis of the feasibility of strategic bombing.⁶¹ An anxious Ohly wrote on 19 April, commenting on the status of the strategic bombing study: "JCS seems finally to be on the beam on this" and "things are on the right track procedurally." "My sole worry," Ohly continued, "is the fact that so many issues are either directly or indirectly affected by the character of the answer to this fundamental problem (the flush deck carrier, the wisdom of putting so much money into B-36 and B-50 planes, etc.) and that our strategic planning rests so heavily on a particular answer to this problem which JCS now admits it will take a year to answer."⁶²

The Harmon Report and WSEG R-1

When Louis Johnson became Secretary of Defense in the spring of 1949, resolution of the strategic bombing dispute, as Ohly's April memorandum indicated, was still nowhere in sight, although with Johnson now at the helm it appeared increasingly likely that the Air Force position would ultimately prevail. Whatever his service prejudices or preferences may have been, Johnson put saving money above all else, which readily translated into stepped-up reliance on atomic air power and cutbacks in conventional forces, largely at the expense of the Navy.[†] While his sympathies for the Air Force were never really as strong as the Navy and its partisans imagined, Johnson appeared to have few doubts about the potency of land-based strategic air power or reservations about making it the predominant element in U.S. defense policy.

Had Forrestal remained in office, however, the results might not have been significantly different. By the time he stepped down, Forrestal was apparently convinced, despite his earlier doubts about reliance on strategic bombing and his dissatisfaction with the JCS's February report, that the U.S. atomic bomb threat provided the strongest possible deterrent to Soviet aggression. Forrestal's thinking appears to have been influenced by his trip to Europe in November 1948 and conversations there with European leaders and U.S. authorities. On his return

* Eisenhower shared Forrestal's exasperation. On 14 March 1949 he wrote to his old colleague, Hap Arnold: "I am so weary of this inter-service struggle for position, prestige and power that this morning I practically 'blew my top.' I would hate to have my doctor take my blood pressure at the moment." Ltr Eisenhower to General HH Arnold, 14 Mar 49, Box 5, Eisenhower Papers, DDEL.

† See Chapter XIII.

he prepared a memorandum for briefing the President in which he noted: "The atomic bomb—its potency as a weapon should not be deprecated. Both Clay and [Lt. Gen. Clarence] Huebner believe the Russians do not want their people to know what it can do. Churchill has the same feeling. Clay says the Russians are constantly putting fear into Western Europe by talking about the tremendous power of the Red Army, and we have a weapon far more terrifying which we are apt to underestimate."⁶³

Acting on its own initiative, but with Forrestal's knowledge, the Air Force in late December 1948 had convened a board of senior officers to consider revising its FY 1949 procurement program. In its report to Secretary Symington in February 1949, the board recommended canceling scheduled production of 51 B-45 light bombers and several other aircraft types and using the released funds to procure additional B-36 intercontinental bombers.* Forrestal, after consulting with Eisenhower, accepted the board's proposal and just before leaving office submitted it to the BoB for what he apparently considered routine review and referral to the President for approval.⁶⁴

On 28 March 1949—the same day Johnson was sworn in—BoB Director Pace urged Truman to postpone approval of the revised procurement program and return the entire matter to the Joint Chiefs for further study. Although more concerned about fiscal than strategic implications, Pace shared the Navy's worry about overreliance on nuclear weapons. "If the revised program increases the strategic emphasis on the use of atomic weapons," he argued, "it may create a situation which would not permit the President any alternative as to their use in time of emergency." A few days later, at a White House staff meeting, Truman manifested his personal interest in the question and voiced concern that pursuing the course proposed by the Air Force, making a heavy investment in long-range bombers that could some day be as outmoded as battleships, might be "putting all of our eggs into one basket."⁶⁵ In an effort to allay the President's qualms the Air Force arranged a special briefing for him on 20 April. Worried that the Air Force might monopolize Truman's attention, the President's naval aide, Rear Adm. Robert L. Dennison, urged him to look closely at alternative strategies before making up his mind.⁶⁶ The next day, at Dennison's suggestion, Truman sent a note to Secretary Johnson asking for additional information on strategic bombing plans. "Yesterday afternoon," the President wrote,

I listened with interest to an Air Force presentation of plans for strategic bombing operations, in the event of war, against a potential enemy.

* Subsequently, with approval of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force canceled the B-54 (a further modification of the B-29) in order to expand B-36 procurement. Ltr Johnson to Pace, 2 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 19-1-34.



Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, 1949-50.




Johnson, Forrestal, and Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson at Johnson's swearing-in ceremony, 28 March 1949.



President Truman, with Louis Johnson and General Omar Bradley, viewing the Army Day Parade, 6 April 1949.



Johnson conferring with Under (later Deputy) Secretary of Defense Stephen T. Early, 16 May 1949.



The Johnson "team." Left to right: Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, Johnson, Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews, and Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington.



Swearing-in of General Omar N. Bradley as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 1949.



Meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council, Louis Johnson presiding, August 1949.




Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State, 1949-53.



Thomas K. Finletter, Chairman of the President's Air Policy Commission, 1947, and Secretary of the Air Force, 1950-53.

Paul H. Nitze, Director of State Department Policy Planning Staff, 1950-53, and one of the principal contributors to NSC 68.





General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1949–53.

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, 1949–51.





U.S. C-54s, based at Fassberg in occupied Germany, part of the Berlin airlift.



C-47s unloading at Tempelhof during the Berlin airlift.



First meeting of the North Atlantic Defense Committee, held in the Pentagon with Secretary of Defense Johnson presiding, 5 October 1949.



General Joseph T. McNarney, Chairman of the Defense Management Committee.



Lyman L. Lemnitzer. As a major general, Lemnitzer was Director of the Office of Military Assistance, 1949-50.



The attack carrier U.S.S. *Franklin D. Roosevelt* (CVB-42) operating in the Mediterranean, November 1948.



Artist's sketch of the proposed supercarrier *United States*.



The Air Force's controversial B-36 intercontinental strategic bomber.



Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford, a leading spokesman for the Navy during the 1949 "Revolt of the Admirals," later served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.



Capt. Arleigh A. Burke, head of the Navy's Op-23 unit that spearheaded criticism of the B-36.

I should like to examine an evaluation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the chances of successful delivery of bombs as contemplated by this plan together with a joint evaluation of the results to be expected by such bombing.⁶⁷

Although Johnson promised to make the evaluations available as soon as possible, he advised the President that ongoing and planned studies—the Harmon report on bombing effects and the WSEG feasibility study, the latter not yet formally begun*—might take up to a year to complete.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the Air Force renewed its request for more B-36s, and eventually the BoB yielded, paving the way on 4 May 1949 for Truman to release the money to the Air Force.⁶⁹

As the commitment to a strategic bombing policy appeared to be growing, new evidence suggesting weaknesses in the Air Force position began turning up. On 12 May the Harmon Committee, which had been assessing the potential effects of strategic bombing on the Soviet Union since January, submitted its report to the Joint Chiefs. Treating only the atomic aspects of air offensive plans and assuming a 100 percent successful delivery rate, the committee estimated that strategic bombing would result in a temporary loss of 30 to 40 percent of the Soviet industrial capacity and cause personnel casualties up to 6,700,000. These attacks, the committee found, would effectively disable the Soviet petroleum industry and extensively damage homes and public utilities, making life for survivors in the target areas exceedingly difficult. On the other hand, the committee doubted whether strategic bombing by itself would cause a Soviet surrender, weaken or topple the Soviet government, or prevent Soviet forces from invading selected countries in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. For a majority of the Soviet people, the committee believed, atomic bombing would “validate Soviet propaganda against foreign powers,” fuel resentment against the United States, and unify resistance. The committee’s report speculated further that the use of atomic weapons by the United States would provide the Soviet Union with justification for retaliating with its own weapons of mass destruction. On the whole, despite a less than ringing endorsement, the committee concluded that strategic bombing was “the only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious damage to vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity,” that it would “facilitate greatly the application of other Allied military power with prospect of greatly lowered casualties,” and that “every reasonable effort should be devoted to providing the means to be prepared for prompt and effective delivery of the maximum numbers of atomic bombs to appropriate target systems.”⁷⁰

* The WSEG study did not begin until September because of continuing service disagreements over what kind of tests should be conducted and WSEG’s own startup problems.

Although the Harmon report thus took a generally favorable view of strategic bombing, its qualifications were so numerous that General Bradley found it "maddeningly ambiguous." Clearly though, the report posed a serious challenge to the Air Force's claims for an atomic offensive. Consequently, the Air Force immediately contested the findings, arguing that the committee failed to take into account the collateral damage that would likely result from fires, and that in any case the "30 to 40 percent" damage estimate was misleading because it ignored the selective nature of the offensive—those industries specifically targeted would have received appreciably greater damage. The Air Force's Assistant for Atomic Energy found the report flawed, "biased," and unduly pessimistic.⁷¹ Vandenberg proposed that it be revised, but Denfeld objected; he wanted the report submitted to the Secretary of Defense as written and agreed only to the addition of a JCS covering memorandum expressing certain reservations. These included the Harmon Committee's failure to analyze the full effect of the Air Force's selective targeting system, its tendency to overemphasize psychological consequences that could not be verified, the probability that the Soviets would use weapons of mass destruction whether or not the United States used atomic bombs, the inherent destructiveness of warfare regardless of type, and finally, the tentative nature of the report's conclusions because it had been prepared without benefit of the WSEG study on the feasibility of successful delivery.⁷²

After the Joint Chiefs forwarded the Harmon report with reservations to Secretary Johnson on 28 July, Ohly prepared a detailed critique of the lengthy document. Whether Johnson read the report at the time he received it is not known, although Ohly's comments in a memorandum of 12 October suggest that Johnson had not yet examined it. Ohly believed that the Harmon report, "while extremely important, does not in itself have significance until, first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their views covering the chances of successful delivery of the bombs to the aiming points assumed in this report and, second, this report has been re-evaluated in the light of JCS determinations with respect to the probable success in delivery." For these reasons, Ohly advised against immediate transmittal of the report to the President; he felt that, because of Truman's professed interest in the subject, the Secretary of Defense should alert him about the report's existence but withhold it pending completion of the WSEG study. Accepting Ohly's advice, Johnson on 18 October hand-carried a letter to the White House to let Truman know of the progress to date.⁷³

A month later, on 17 November, Truman responded by asking to see a copy of the Harmon report as well as any comments that Johnson or the Joint Chiefs might care to make on it. After talking about the progress of the WSEG report with the WSEG Director, Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, General Bradley recommended postponing any official presentation. Like Ohly, Bradley believed that no firm

conclusions could be reached until the WSEG feasibility study was finished. Since Hull estimated that the evaluation would not be completed until the middle of January, Bradley thought a report to the President before then "might be a waste of his time."⁷⁴ Johnson informed Truman of Bradley's views, and the President agreed to hold off on a presentation until after 15 January.⁷⁵

The Joint Chiefs officially received WSEG Report No. 1 on 8 February 1950. Earlier, on 23 January, General Hull presented a special briefing on the report at the White House. Besides Truman and members of the WSEG staff, others present included Johnson, Acheson, several other Cabinet officers, Symington, and the Joint Chiefs. In a short introductory statement, General Bradley informed the President that the Joint Chiefs "had not specifically endorsed the conclusions" of WSEG R-1, but that they "considered the study useful for planning guidance." He also expressed the hope that the WSEG findings would not be made public. When Johnson asked what to say to the press about the meeting, Truman suggested that it be characterized as nothing more than a routine briefing on weapon effectiveness.⁷⁶

With these preliminaries out of the way, Hull began the briefing. The major finding of the study, he said, was that a strategic air offensive, conforming to the current emergency war plan, could be carried out presently only in theory. Existing capabilities appeared insufficient to obtain the desired level of success owing to "logistical deficiencies and expected bomber attrition" that would "preclude an offensive on the scale currently contemplated." Logistical deficiencies included insufficient secure overseas bomber bases, competing demands for airlift facilities, weaknesses in aerial refueling capabilities, and insufficient overseas stockpiles of aviation gas. As for bomber losses, WSEG calculated a bomber attrition rate of 30 to 50 percent. The reasons for estimating such high losses, Hull pointed out, were a continuing lack of reliable intelligence on Soviet air defenses and the undemonstrated ability of U.S. aircraft to take appropriate evasive action over defended targets. Assuming the attrition rate to be accurate, the report advised against any bombing with conventional weapons and urged that available resources be devoted entirely to bombing with atomic weapons.

Turning to the performance capabilities of various weapon delivery systems, Hull paid special attention to the B-36, the intercontinental bomber which had top Air Force priority and had recently undergone the scrutiny of a congressional investigation. Attrition rates for the B-36 were comparable, under similar conditions, to those for the B-29 and B-50 medium bombers which made up the bulk of the strategic air fleet. However, because of the limited number of B-36s and the wide dispersion of their assigned targets, WSEG noted, "massed raids" were "precluded for these aircraft." Under the current war plan, B-36 aircraft would operate in small groups from North American bases against targets (14

percent of the total) that could not be reached by medium bombers operating from the United Kingdom. Given its long-distance capabilities, the B-36 had definite advantages, although its ability to penetrate Soviet defenses and drop bombs accurately appeared to be neither more nor less than other available aircraft.⁷⁷ According to one eyewitness, as the briefing ended Johnson exclaimed, "There, I told you they'd say the B-36 is a good plane," but Truman "looked disgusted and snapped, 'No dammit, they said just the opposite.' " ⁷⁸

With the completion of the WSEG study, the debate over strategic bombing moved into a new phase, away from conjecture and toward an ever-increasing search for hard, factual data. Yet the report itself had little direct impact, possibly because its findings added nothing that had not already been guessed or suspected. Strategic bombing could be successful only if the United States invested the determination and resources to make it work. Neither the WSEG nor Harmon reports had settled the question about the military or political prudence of developing forces based primarily on strategic bombing. To this extent, while it weakened many of the claims made by the Air Force, the WSEG study failed to confirm the Navy's basic contention that strategic bombing was highly overrated and unreliable.

After delivering its study, WSEG suspended its investigation of strategic bombing while the Joint Chiefs considered the possibility of a follow-on study focusing on bombing effects. In April 1950 the JCS formally asked WSEG to undertake such an analysis, taking into account the applicable conclusions of the WSEG and Harmon reports. Accorded low priority, this supplementary study was never completed.⁷⁹

The Supercarrier-B-36 Controversy

The debate over roles and missions, the competition for shrinking funds, the argument over the Air Force's strategic bombing capability—all of these battles came to a climax in 1949 in a clash between the Navy and the Air Force over the relative merits of the supercarrier and the B-36. At issue was the still unresolved matter of what role the Navy should have in strategic air warfare. Having bubbled and simmered during the Forrestal period, the controversy finally boiled over during Johnson's early months in office into a fierce, no-holds-barred contest between the two services. Eventually, as news of the dispute leaked to the press, the House Armed Services Committee launched a full-scale investigation. The result was a widely publicized and highly emotional display of interservice feuding that, coinciding with the Harmon and WSEG inquiries, revealed the depth of the division within the Department of Defense over weapons and strategy.

The supercarrier-B-36 fight began with Johnson's decision, shortly after succeeding Forrestal, to review the major procurement programs of each service, starting with the Navy's supercarrier, for which Congress had made money available in the FY 1949 appropriations and on which construction was scheduled to begin during April 1949. Still pending in Congress was a Navy request in its FY 1950 budget for an additional \$43 million for construction. The Navy estimated the cost of the supercarrier, including construction and armament but not aircraft, at about \$190 million. This figure, however, was only the tip of the iceberg, for in addition to the supercarrier, 39 other ships would be required to complete the supercarrier task force, resulting in total construction costs of \$1.265 billion at 1949 prices. No doubt bothered by this high cost but disclaiming any "preconceived notion," Johnson on 15 April asked Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs for their views on the military advisability of completing the carrier.⁸⁰

The responses from the Joint Chiefs followed predictable lines. Admiral Denfeld strongly endorsed the supercarrier and urged that it be allowed to proceed without interruption. After reviewing its history and the reasons for its unconventional design, he praised the versatility that would enable it, with its complement of high-performance aircraft, to accomplish a wide range of tasks: assure control of the seas; protect against enemy submarine attack; mine coastal waters and harbors; direct air attacks against enemy air, ground, and naval forces and enemy lines of communication; support U.S. and allied forces in amphibious and airborne operations; and finally, carry out "other operations including the use of the heaviest atomic bomb." "I am convinced," Denfeld argued in closing,

that our present strategic position is such as to make it mandatory, in the interest of national security, constantly to improve the capabilities of our naval forces. I do not agree that forces and weapons otherwise available in the foreseeable future would permit us properly to meet war conditions without effective, modern naval forces. It is axiomatic that failure to progress is to accept unwarranted deterioration of our strength. I consider that the construction of the UNITED STATES is necessary for the progressive improvement of naval capabilities and is fully warranted as insurance to cover the unpredictable exigencies of the future.⁸¹

The other service heads raised strong objections, questioning in particular Denfeld's assertion that construction of the supercarrier was vital to permit the Navy to discharge its primary functions. Commenting on the absence of a Soviet naval threat "of consequence," General Bradley wondered why the Navy needed more carriers.⁸² General Vandenberg stated flatly that the supercarrier was "designed for bombardment purposes" and would, if completed, merely duplicate the functions of land-based aircraft. Moreover, he noted, it would be far more

vulnerable than the land-based bomber since it would be liable to attack from surface ships and submarines as well as aircraft. Vandenberg insisted that the

relative military value of the large carrier, when compared to other weapons systems procurable with the same resources, is of a low order. . . . If for reasons beyond the control of the Military Establishment, it were found impossible to shift the application of the resources contemplated for construction of the CVA-58 to more necessary developments, I would still recommend, in the interests of the national economy, that these funds not be expended for this project.⁸³

Eisenhower, too, recommended canceling the project.⁸⁴

Faced with a JCS split, Johnson went along with the majority. After clearing his decision with Truman, he directed peremptorily on Saturday, 23 April, that construction of the supercarrier cease immediately.⁸⁵ Johnson's decision to cancel the carrier derived, no doubt, from a mixture of motivations—to save money, to present the image of a forceful leader, a belief that the carrier deserved a low priority and ought to be eliminated. His manner of reaching the decision—without awaiting a detailed analysis, without giving the Navy a chance to present its case directly to him, without consulting Secretary of the Navy Sullivan or Denfeld or notifying them of his proposed action, and without consulting interested congressional committees—enraged Navy leaders and evoked strong reactions in Congress. Sullivan learned of Johnson's decision while on a trip to Texas; he immediately voiced bitter resentment that he had been neither consulted nor notified beforehand. He submitted his resignation in protest on 26 April,* warning in his letter to Johnson that the loss of the supercarrier and Johnson's handling of the matter could have "far-reaching and . . . tragic" consequences.⁸⁶

In the days and weeks following the cancellation of the supercarrier, allegations spread like wildfire through the top ranks of the Navy that Johnson was anti-Navy and that he planned further reductions that would eventually turn the Navy into a second-class fighting force. In an effort to stem these rumors Johnson assured a graduation audience at the National War College on 21 June that it was not his intention to "persecute" either the Navy or the Marine Corps. To underscore his point he said he was asking for \$80 million to modernize two *Essex*-class carriers to give them the capability of launching heavier, more powerful planes.⁸⁷ "I feel," wrote Under Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball, "that

* Although it served as an act of protest, Sullivan's resignation had in fact been pending since 24 March 1949, when, without explaining his reasons, he asked President Truman to be relieved of his official duties "at the earliest date convenient to you." See HASC, *Hearings: Unification and Strategy*, 623.

our fight is pretty well handled, at least for the time being, and I hope permanently. Louis Johnson's address at the War College, I believe, has done a great deal to dispel a lot of questions in everybody's mind on what his future attitude is going to be on Naval Aviation and the Marine Corps." ⁸⁸

Many ranking naval officers refused to accept Johnson's cancellation order as final and began talking of a publicity campaign to educate the public, members of the armed forces, and Congress on the need for going ahead with the supercarrier.⁸⁹ Op-23, an organization research and policy unit under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Administration), undertook to compile background material for this effort. Because of the sensitivity of much of its work, involving mainly studies on Navy organization relating to unification, Op-23 operated under tight security that at times seemed excessive, causing members of the press to suspect that it was engaged also in "dirty business." The head of Op-23, Capt. Arleigh A. Burke, a highly decorated destroyer commander in World War II, came "on board" shortly after its creation in December 1948.⁹⁰

In addition to seeking ways of promoting the merits of the supercarrier, Op-23 spent considerable time collecting information about the B-36's reported technical difficulties. Although the B-36 had been designed for use in World War II to bomb targets in Germany from U.S. bases, technical difficulties had delayed its first test flight until August 1946. The most troublesome problem in the early models was inadequate propulsion power, which prevented the plane from attaining high-altitude cruising speeds and eluding interceptors. The advent in 1947 of the variable discharge turbine (VDT) engine appeared to offer a solution. However, attempts to mate the VDT engine with the B-36 turned out to be a "complete failure," resulting in yet another costly setback. Despite Air Force denials that its difficulties with the B-36 were any more serious than those connected with development of the B-29, Navy aviation experts were dubious and saw the B-36 as a vulnerable target of criticism.⁹¹

Adding to the troubles of the B-36 were rumors of contract fraud and conflicts of interest, stemming in part from the fact that Secretary Johnson had once sat on the board of directors of Consolidated Vultee, the plane's manufacturer. In April and May 1949 an "anonymous document" mysteriously circulated alleging a pattern of corruption in the renegotiation of B-36 contracts even as Air Force studies recommended abandoning the project because of the plane's technical shortcomings. The author of this document proved to be Cedric R. Worth, a civilian assistant to Under Secretary of the Navy Kimball, who subsequently testified under oath that he was unaware of Worth's involvement at the time. Later, a Navy court of inquiry found that Worth had had the active cooperation of Cmdr. Thomas D. Davies, the assistant head of Op-23. Much of Worth's information came from Glenn L. Martin, a disgruntled airplane manufacturer

who had recently lost a lucrative contract with the Air Force when funds intended for lighter aircraft had been transferred to the B-36.⁹²

Worth's allegations attracted national attention when Rep. James E. Van Zandt, a Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, introduced a resolution on 25 May 1949 calling for the creation of a special congressional panel to investigate "ugly, disturbing reports" of wrongdoing in the B-36 program. Some of the rumors, Van Zandt said, implicated Johnson, who was accused of enlisting Consolidated Vultee to help raise Democratic campaign funds, presumably in return for influencing B-36 contracts. Another alleged culprit was Secretary Symington, who was said to be planning to resign following approval of the FY 1950 budget (with more money for B-36s) to head a new aircraft conglomerate that included executives of Consolidated Vultee. In early June, after rejecting Van Zandt's resolution for the establishment of a special panel, the House of Representatives approved a resolution authorizing its Armed Services Committee to conduct a full investigation not only of allegations concerning the B-36 but also the decision to cancel the Navy's supercarrier, the soundness of the Air Force's strategic bombing plan, and the larger roles and missions question.⁹³

While the committee prepared for its investigation, Johnson designated Marx Leva, his special assistant for legal and legislative matters, assisted by Felix Larkin, to assemble the necessary background material and directed Under Secretary of Defense Early to handle the overall coordination. During a meeting of the War Council on 22 June the Joint Chiefs sought to narrow the scope of the investigation by making "a sufficiently strong representation of their belief in the soundness of the strategic bombing concept to convince the committee that disclosure of the top secret information to substantiate this position is unnecessary." Bradley and Denfeld agreed with Vandenberg on this, and Johnson asked Gruenther to draft a statement to this effect. The secretary declared that he would not allow congressional investigators access to JCS files. As for his own role in the B-36 matter, Johnson said that he wanted it clearly on the record that he had not discussed the B-36 with anyone in government until Forrestal and Symington had "presented the subject to him," and that he had supported the B-36 program only on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs.⁹⁴ Johnson fully expected to be vindicated. But given the adverse publicity already generated—and the probability of more to come—there seemed little chance that his reputation would emerge unscathed.

The hearings before the House Armed Services Committee were conducted in two stages. During the first stage, from 9 to 25 August 1949, the committee addressed mainly the rumors and insinuations of irregularities and possible impropriety in the procurement of the B-36. Finding no evidence to substantiate

the allegations, the committee, in its report on this phase of the investigation, cleared all senior officials, both military and civilian, of any wrongdoing. The only disciplinary action the committee recommended was that Cedric Worth, the source of the scurrilous "anonymous document," be fired by the Navy. Committee Chairman Carl Vinson was satisfied that there was not "one iota, not one scintilla of evidence . . . that would support charges that collusion, fraud, corruption, influence, or favoritism played any part whatsoever in the procurement of the B-36 bomber." ⁹⁵

Immediately following the first round of hearings, the Navy convened a court of inquiry to investigate the circumstances of the writing and release of the "anonymous document." Members of the Op-23 unit, including Commander Davies, admitted that they had helped Worth prepare the paper, but the court, accepting their contention that they did not realize Worth intended to circulate the paper externally, found no cause for disciplinary action beyond Worth's dismissal. When the court recessed in September, Capt. John G. Crommelin, a distinguished naval aviator and a long-time critic of unification, called reporters to his home and issued a statement alleging that members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Johnson were intent on eliminating the Navy as a separate service. Amplifying on this statement in rather colorful language, Crommelin insisted that the Navy was being "nibbled to death" by its opponents and that it was his intention to "blow the whole thing open." ⁹⁶

Crommelin's outburst and the publicity it received set the stage for reopening the House investigation. On 6 October, the Armed Services Committee resumed hearings to examine the relative military capabilities of the B-36 and the canceled supercarrier. The leadoff witness, Francis P. Matthews, Sullivan's successor as Secretary of the Navy, endeavored to minimize the controversy, ascribing it to the disgruntled attitude of "several naval aviators," like Crommelin, who had never fully accepted unification and who were now making an issue of the B-36 to vent their frustrations over necessary reductions in the size of the postwar Navy. "No matter how sincere they may claim to be," Matthews stated, "nor how zealously they may crusade for their objectives, it cannot be conceded that they monopolize the loyalty, the honor, or the patriotic devotion of Navy men, even among naval aviators. In my opinion, they do not reflect the views of anything approaching a majority of naval officers." ⁹⁷

If Matthews truly believed his own words, what followed must have shocked him. Over the next few days, amid a vast outpouring of opinions, statistics, and grievances, witness after witness for the Navy sought to convince the committee that the B-36 was an inferior and obsolete airplane; that the concept of strategic bombing, which had given rise to the B-36, was itself militarily unsound and perhaps morally wrong; and that the decision to stop construction of the super-

carrier posed a grave threat to national security by weakening the Navy's future posture. As the first spokesman for the Navy, Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford roundly criticized what he termed the "atomic blitz" approach to modern war—the theory that land-based bombers armed with nuclear weapons could determine by themselves the outcome of a future conflict. "I do not believe," Radford insisted,

that the threat of atomic blitz will be an effective deterrent to a war, or that it will win a war. I do not believe that the atomic blitz theory is generally accepted by military men. However, if, after careful study of all sides of the question, the retaliatory atomic blitz were to become the determined and studied policy of the United States, then, we must have a much more efficient weapon than the B-36 to deliver the blitz. We are today capable of procuring more effective and more efficient planes for the task than the B-36.⁹⁸

Following Radford came a succession of Navy "technical" witnesses who testified to the vulnerabilities of the B-36, including its susceptibility to fighter interception, even at altitudes of 40,000 feet, and the consequent need for long-range fighter escort, which current Air Force fighters could not provide. The Navy witnesses contended that the B-36's shortcomings made necessary a reliable backup system and that the flush-deck supercarrier would have served this function perfectly. Captain Burke, the head of Op-23, testified that carrier-based aviation was not only more versatile than land-based aviation but in certain instances was also more effective in neutralizing enemy capabilities. Burke contended that the supercarrier, by combining all the latest advances in naval aviation, would have given the United States a striking power it never before possessed. "The Navy believes," he argued,

that both the Army and Air Forces would have found the prime striking power and the close support ability of the powerful naval aircraft flown from this carrier a great asset in their own operations. These carrier planes could support our sister services under some circumstances in which they could obtain the help from no other sources, as is now the case in the Mediterranean. Such a valuable carrier won't be available for war unless it is built in peace.⁹⁹

The Navy's final witness, Admiral Denfeld, avoided any direct attack on the B-36 but placed himself squarely in the middle of the quarrel by stating that he fully supported the "broad conclusions" presented by the naval officers who had preceded him. Denfeld assured the committee that he was a strong advocate of air power and of strategic bombing, but he could not accept the

notion that "the initial air offensive is . . . solely a function of the United States Air Force." Furthermore, he disputed Secretary Matthews's claim that the current controversy was the result of a handful of disaffected Navy fliers. "The entire Navy," Denfeld averred,

. . . is gravely concerned whether it will have modern weapons, in quality and quantity, to do the job expected of the Navy at the outbreak of a future war. We have real misgivings over the reductions that are taking place in the Navy today. We are not worried, I assure you, simply because our personal fortunes are tied to the future of the Navy. Rather, it is because we know that the protection of our homeland depends in a large measure upon the Navy's ability to keep any war on the far side of the ocean.

It is not so much the reduction in congressional appropriations that worries us. We realize the necessity for true economy. The national security is only as strong as our domestic economy. Our concern is with arbitrary reductions that impair, or even eliminate, essential naval functions. It is not so much a question of too little appropriated money, but how we are allowed to invest that money.¹⁰⁰

After the Navy, the Marine Corps, represented by its Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates, aired its grievances. Cates insisted that despite the guarantees of the National Security Act and the Key West agreement of 1948 the Marine Corps was on the verge of being eliminated through the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on its size and through budget cuts that threatened to lower its "effectiveness and striking power out of all proportion to any compensating economy of money or manpower." Moreover, Cates asserted, "there is widespread apprehension that the functions assigned our corps by law are being usurped by others," namely the Army, which he accused of coveting full control of amphibious warfare. Voicing similar concerns to those expressed by Denfeld about unwarranted "inroads and incursions," Cates expressed belief that Marine Corps morale was being eroded by a "continuous feeling of apprehension and annoyance sometimes bordering on outright indignation." To remedy these difficulties, Cates proposed that the Marine Corps be protected by Congress against any reduction in the size of its combat forces beyond that "intended when the unification law was passed" and that it be accorded its own representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰¹

The Navy and Marine Corps testimony offered overwhelming evidence of the deep-seated rivalry and serious differences of opinion over strategy and roles and missions that still persisted among the services. Rebuttal testimony by Air Force and Army witnesses aimed less at mending the rift than at refuting specific

allegations. Perhaps the most conciliatory, Army Chief of Staff General Collins assured the committee that the Army was "pro-Air Force and pro-Navy, because the Army is dependent to a large degree on both of these great services in playing its own role in defense of our Nation." As for Cates's specific charges, Collins vehemently denied that the Army wanted to restrict either the size or legitimate functions of the Marine Corps. He conceded that the Army had proposed changes in the Key West Functions paper but these were to facilitate the creation of joint training centers where Army and Marine Corps units would train together. "I regret," Collins said, "that some of our Marine friends have misinterpreted this proposal as an attempt on the part of the Army to deprive the Marine Corps of its responsibilities in the amphibious field. That was not, and is not, our intention."¹⁰²

Secretary Symington and General Vandenberg presented the Air Force response. Taking a full day, Symington refuted item by item the Navy's charges against the B-36, beginning with a detailed narrative of procurement procedures and moving on to a general defense of the concept of strategic bombing and the role assigned to the Air Force. In addition, Symington denounced turning the B-36 issue into a public debate. "It was bad enough," he said, "to have given a possible aggressor technical and operating details of our newest and latest equipment. In my opinion it is far worse to have opened up to him in such detail the military doctrines of how this country would be defended."¹⁰³ Vandenberg offered only a slight variation on Symington's testimony. He stressed the deterrent value of long-range land-based bombers armed with nuclear weapons, praised the military effectiveness of strategic bombing as demonstrated in World War II, and expressed confidence in the ability of the B-36 to perform its mission. As for the supercarrier, Vandenberg had this to say:

I do not believe that it is sound to construct a ship of which the hull was . . . [designated CVA-58], which was given the name U.S.S. *United States* and is popularly known as the supercarrier. I accept the statements of the Navy people that so many aircraft can operate from this ship, that the ship will have a given speed, and that its aircraft—when they are designed, constructed, and manned—will be able to operate from that carrier at the stated range. In other words, I accept the military capability of this ship as stated by the Chief of Naval Operations. My opposition to building it comes from the fact that I can see no necessity for a ship with those capabilities in any strategic plan against the one possible enemy.¹⁰⁴

By far the strongest case of all against the Navy was made by General Bradley, who had become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in August. Presenting what he termed his own "personal views," Bradley pointed to the chain of events

that had led to the current controversy over the B-36—the postwar emergence of the Soviet threat, the adoption by the United States of extraordinary political and economic measures to stem the spread of communism, and ultimately the preparation of strategic war plans, a task shared by every member of the Joint Chiefs. These plans, he said, gave first priority to the strategic air offensive because of the unacceptably high cost to the United States of trying to maintain ground forces comparable in size to those of the Soviet Union. “Lacking such forces in being,” Bradley emphasized, “our greatest strength lies in the threat of quick retaliation in the event we are attacked.”

Turning to the Navy’s charges that the B-36 was an inferior aircraft, Bradley agreed that the plane had imperfections but insisted that “no member of the Military Establishment has said that better types won’t be used when they are available.” Later in his statement he added that he found “some comfort in the fact that we have a long-range bomber that can fly from any base in the world and attack targets in the range of 4,000 miles, and return home.” With capabilities such as these, Bradley argued, the B-36 could not possibly be the real issue. Rather, it had to be the Navy’s irritation over the loss of the supercarrier and other measures taken to reduce military appropriations. Bradley admitted that these reductions had affected the Navy’s capabilities, but he questioned whether the situation in the Navy was unique. “The Air Force and the Army,” he insisted, “can make the same complaint with equal or greater validity.” When the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense over the armed forces was challenged, Bradley added, this amounted to “open rebellion against the civilian control.” He spoke of “‘fancy dans’ who won’t hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals.”¹⁰⁵

By the time Bradley finished his testimony, the Navy’s case against the B-36 had been severely battered. As Bradley had presented it, the real issue was not the B-36 or the merits of strategic bombing but rather a refusal by the Navy “in spirit as well as deed” to accept unification.¹⁰⁶ With the “revolt of the admirals” all but quashed and himself having been cleared of any personal wrongdoing by the committee’s earlier investigation, Johnson took the stand on 21 October in a conciliatory mood. “Successful unification,” he said, “assuredly means that no service can control another, but, just as assuredly, successful unification means that no service can be wholly independent of its sister services.” Regrettably, Johnson added, “the strains and stresses upon the national economy . . . make it impossible . . . for any service to get all that it wants, whether in dollars, in manpower strength, or in matériel.” For this reason Johnson felt fully justified in imposing restraints not only on the Navy but on the other services as well. With surprisingly little interrogation, no doubt satisfied by the previous testimony and ready to recess after two weeks of intensive hearings, the committee

thanked Johnson for his "fine statement," Chairman Vinson saying, "You did the right thing in canceling the carrier and if I had occupied that position, I would have done the same thing."¹⁰⁷

Following the close of the B-36 hearings on 21 October 1949, Johnson instructed the services not to take "reprisals" against any officer who had testified. However, this injunction did not protect Admiral Denfeld, whose outspoken views in direct opposition to the testimony of Secretary Matthews had cast doubt on his loyalty to and respect for civilian authority. Drew Pearson wrote in his "diary" that Johnson had decided to fire Denfeld even before the House committee completed its inquiry. The task of removing Denfeld fell to Matthews. Citing the admiral's "inability to conform" to Defense Department policies, Matthews on 27 October asked for and obtained Truman's permission to replace him.¹⁰⁸ Within days it was announced that he would be succeeded as Chief of Naval Operations by Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, an experienced naval aviator and highly respected officer* who had had no involvement in the B-36 affair. As one of his first acts, after the office had continued to engage in questionable activities, Sherman abolished Op-23. For his efforts to "blow the whole thing open," Captain Crommelin received a reprimand. When he continued to criticize Defense officials publicly, Sherman had him placed on indefinite furlough, soon after which he took early retirement. Meanwhile, Matthews ordered Captain Burke's name removed from the promotion list. This action, coming hard on the heels of Denfeld's firing, drew protests from members of Congress, and after some shuffling Burke's name appeared on a revised list approved by Truman in late December 1949.[†]¹⁰⁹

The controversy was officially laid to rest on 1 March 1950, when the House Armed Services Committee issued its final report on the B-36 inquiry. Looking first at the question of military strategy, the committee suggested that too much emphasis was being placed on joint military planning and that not enough attention was being paid to individual service needs. With the National Security Act less than three years old and having recently been substantially amended, the committee considered unification to be still in a formative stage. The committee saw the possibility of serious damage to the nation's defenses if "too much joint planning is concentrated on individual service questions of a highly technical

* Gruenther, an astute and critical observer, wrote to Eisenhower on 12 November: "I am extremely well pleased with the way Adm Sherman has taken hold. He is probably the smartest U.S. planner living today, and of course he has a beautiful background in JCS matters. Certainly the JCS problems are the real ones today and are the greatest obstacle to true reunification. I am just fool enough to believe that Sherman is going to do much to turn the trick." Ltr Gruenther to Eisenhower, 12 Nov 49, DDE 16-52, Gruenther file, DDEL.

† The episode did not harm Burke's career. He later served as Chief of Naval Operations, 1955-61.

nature." It doubted, for example, the competence of Air Force and Army officers to decide what weapons the Navy might need to carry out its mission, as in the case of the supercarrier, and it applied the same principle to the Navy's criticisms of the B-36. The committee disqualified itself and Congress generally from determining the answers to professional military problems, but it faulted the administration for not consulting more closely with the legislative branch on matters affecting the use of military appropriations and the maintenance of forces. To eliminate wasteful interservice rivalry and competition, it urged the expansion of joint maneuvers, war games, and training, and recommended increased reliance on the findings of technical agencies like the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group before committing large sums to any particular weapon. And it felt strongly that strategic plans should be based on closer assimilation of the views of all three services. But it did not recommend revival of the supercarrier project, although it did deplore "the manner of cancellation."¹¹⁰

The only point on which the committee divided was Denfeld's dismissal. Twenty-three members felt that he had been fired in reprisal for his testimony and condemned the action for discouraging frank and uninhibited discussion and impairing the ability of Congress to perform its constitutional function. Eight members dissented, arguing there was insufficient evidence to indicate a direct connection between the dismissal and the testimony. In their minority report they cited Matthews's mention in his 27 October letter to Truman of a meeting with the President on 5 October—one week before Denfeld's testimony—where the Navy Secretary expressed problems with Denfeld and the possibility of replacing him. Some of the majority were angry enough to request a Justice Department inquiry but settled for inclusion in the record of a supplementary statement challenging the legality of the dismissal.¹¹¹

Were the B-36 hearings productive? "The tangible results of this investigation in the form of legislation or otherwise were small indeed," wrote an OSD staff historian, Henry M. Dater, some time later, "perhaps limited to influence upon the legislation of 1952 which permitted the Commandant of the Marine Corps to sit with [the] Joint Chiefs of Staff when matters of concern to his organization were being discussed."¹¹² There were, however, important intangible benefits. The investigation itself, with its airing of longstanding and festering differences, represented a step forward by the services, however painful and bruising, in coming to terms with unification. Although Symington maintained that the open hearings damaged national security, the opportunity for the Navy to ventilate its case in a public forum no doubt had some cathartic benefit both for the Navy and for the defense establishment generally. Apart from laying to rest accusations of corruption in B-36 procurement, the most valuable contribution of the hearings may well have been in providing an outlet for pent-up frustra-

tions which, without some means of release, might have led to even more serious problems.

These positive results notwithstanding, the B-36 hearings accomplished very little toward resolving the outstanding issues. Competing strategic concepts that had been debated at length since World War II were indeed examined, often in considerable detail, but in the final analysis there emerged no authoritative or definitive answer to the question of what kinds of military forces the United States should have. Between the relative merits of the B-36 and the supercarrier, no decision was ever reached on which was superior; nor were the potential capabilities of new advanced technologies, such as guided missiles, considered. As for the question at the bottom of the B-36 controversy and much of the postwar dissension—roles and missions—the committee largely ignored the subject.

As relieved as he must have been by the favorable outcome of the investigation, Johnson recognized the unfinished work that lay ahead. Three days after the conclusion of the hearings he wrote the service secretaries that the investigation "can be one of the most constructive developments in the unification process that has yet occurred—provided that we utilize what we have learned from these hearings in order to go forward promptly and speedily with the strengthening of our unified military team." Johnson preferred not to think of the task as one of "picking up the pieces," but he called for a careful review of all matters discussed during the course of the hearings, noting in particular that "each of us should personally review . . . roles and missions, in order that we may assure ourselves that they are being adhered to, both in letter and in spirit." A week later, his politico-military adviser, General Burns, urged him to recommend to the President the appointment of a civilian board "to review the country's overall strategic concept . . . [and] the missions assigned to the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force."¹¹³

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, followed shortly by partial mobilization and a general buildup of the armed forces, diverted these initiatives, and roles and missions issues gave way to more urgent and practical concerns. Above all, the war gave the Navy more funds and new opportunities to prove its worth, as it did the Army and the Air Force, thus alleviating the pressures on the services to compete with each other. These developments encouraged closer inter-service cooperation, creating the impression that the services had put their differences behind them—at least for the time being. When the war would end, however, and there would follow a period of retrenchment in which the services again had to compete for limited funds, the old quarrels and strains would resurface. Indeed, the debate among the services over roles and missions, and related matters of weapons and strategy, would recur regularly in the decades to come, if never again as dramatically as in these seminal years.

CHAPTER XV

The Atomic Arsenal

A central issue in the postwar debate over service roles and missions was the question of how future wars would be fought and, in particular, the role of atomic weapons in military strategy. The public's perception of nuclear weapons, based on accounts and pictures of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the writings of such early nuclear war theorists as Bernard Brodie, was that the atomic bomb indeed represented the "absolute weapon."¹ In an age becoming accustomed to rapid advances in military technology, nuclear weapons loomed far larger and more ominous than all other instruments of warfare.

As awesome as the atomic bomb may have appeared to the public, its ultimate role and use by the military were still unclear when Forrestal became Secretary of Defense in 1947. The Navy, as the Key West and Newport deliberations and the supercarrier-B-36 dispute underlined, desperately wanted a role in the future use of nuclear weapons and strongly resented the de facto Air Force monopoly of the means of delivering such weapons after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But in analyzing the full implications of the atomic bomb, both the Navy and the Air Force approached the subject cautiously, unsure that the bomb really mandated a change in basic strategic concepts and in any case reluctant to place too much reliance on a weapon whose availability was still uncertain. Throughout the immediate postwar period the supply of fissionable material remained small, imposing critical restraints on the size and growth of the weapon stockpile. And with international control of atomic energy through the United Nations a much discussed possibility by 1946, it seemed conceivable that nuclear weapons might pass from the scene entirely. That international control seemed less and less likely as time passed did not alter greatly the military's conservative outlook. For the majority of military planners, nuclear weapons represented chiefly a

dramatic enlargement of existing military capabilities that might or might not eventually revolutionize warfare.²

Despite a point of view that was more conservative than that of the general public, the military never doubted that splitting the atom was a breakthrough of major significance. Indeed, after the CROSSROADS tests of July 1946 reconfirmed the extraordinary explosive power of the bomb, the military intensified efforts to explore the possible uses of atomic energy, including its application for power generation and ship propulsion as well as weapons.³ Faced with shrunken budgets that produced chronic deficiencies in conventional forces, the military saw atomic weapons as the most potent counter to Soviet power. Combined with other factors, exclusive possession of the atomic bomb kept the scales tilted in favor of the United States. "As long as we can outproduce the world, can control the sea and strike inland with the atomic bomb," Forrestal observed in December 1947, "we can assume certain risks otherwise unacceptable in an effort to restore world trade, to restore the balance of power—military power—and to eliminate some of the conditions that breed war."⁴

Ironically, just as the military began to take a greater interest in atomic energy, it lost control of it. The Manhattan Engineer District, an agency of the War Department, had overseen the development of the atomic bomb during World War II. After the war, in response to popular sentiment, President Truman asked Congress to enact legislation placing control of atomic energy in civilian hands. As Secretary of the Navy at the time, Forrestal advised against exclusive civilian control, viewing military participation, especially at the policy level, as essential to national security. Congress did not accept his proposal of a high-level military-civilian commission to oversee the program, but it did agree that atomic energy had important military value and should be accessible to the armed forces.⁵

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 endeavored to accommodate military needs within a framework of civilian authority. The act created a five-member Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), with a General Advisory Committee (GAC) to provide scientific advice and a Division of Military Application headed by a military officer; a Military Liaison Committee (MLC), composed of representatives of the War and Navy Departments, to coordinate AEC activities with the armed services; and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE)—a congressional watchdog body. Although the AEC acquired authority over all phases of research, development, and production, the law obliged it to consult with the MLC on matters relating to "military applications, including the development, manufacture, use and storage of bombs, the allocation of fissionable materials for military research, and the control of information relating to the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons."⁶ Yet despite these guarantees of consultation, there was no

assurance that the military would have access to weapons, share fully in decision-making, or be able to influence the content and direction of AEC programs vital to its interests. Such were the uncertainties the services faced as Congress placed the atom under civilian control.

After the National Security Act became effective, responsibility for the military side of atomic energy came increasingly under the Secretary of Defense. Early in 1948 Forrestal, with Army, Navy, and Air Force concurrence, reconstituted the MLC as an OSD staff agency and designated its chairman as his deputy for atomic energy matters.* These changes simplified lines of authority, but they also involved the secretary in a host of new problems that often caused friction between the AEC and NME. During Forrestal's tenure, the most important problems involved the question of which agency should have custody of atomic weapons and the development of a national policy covering the circumstances under which such weapons might be employed; during Johnson's they were whether to accelerate production of fissionable material and whether to proceed with development of the H-bomb. In the search for the answers to these critical questions, these years would prove as formative, and sometimes as stormy, a period for the atomic energy program as for service unification.

The Custody Dispute

By the time Forrestal became Secretary of Defense, debate over custody of atomic weapons was already sharp and seemed likely to intensify even further. When the AEC took charge officially of the nation's atomic energy program on 1 January 1947, President Truman, through Executive Order 9816, transferred all Manhattan Engineer District properties and facilities, including fissionable materials and atomic weapons, to AEC ownership. Custody of weapons thus became a legal function of the AEC which, as part of the transfer, also acquired most of the personnel previously employed and trained by the military in the handling of fissionable materials. Under Section 6(a)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act only the President could authorize the transfer of weapons or atomic materials. From this point on, the question of whether, and if so, to what extent and under what conditions, the military should regain custody of atomic weapons became a matter of serious dispute between the AEC and the armed services.

The new commission recognized the need of the military for access to nuclear weapons but put off discussion of the matter until the commission could be properly organized.⁷ In part, the organizational delay resulted from the controversy over the President's appointment of David E. Lilienthal as AEC chairman.

* See Chapter IV.

A lawyer and executive with an intellectual bent, Lilienthal had formerly headed the Tennessee Valley Authority, where he had shown considerable administrative skill. An outspoken New Dealer and ardent advocate of civilian control of atomic energy, he came under frequent attack from conservatives. Recording in his diary a summary of a conversation with Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Chairman of the JCAE, Forrestal wrote that "the general tenor of Senator Hickenlooper's remarks would lead to the conclusion that he and his Senate associates are very much concerned about a pacifistic and unrealistic trend in the Atomic Energy Commission." Sen. Kenneth D. McKellar publicly declared that Lilienthal might be a communist. McKellar never proved his accusation, but he did help stall Senate approval of Lilienthal's appointment until April 1947.*⁸

Soon after the Senate acted, the commission inaugurated regular meetings with the MLC to exchange ideas and to discuss problems of mutual interest. Custody quickly emerged as one of the top items on the agenda. At a joint meeting on 13 August 1947 the MLC chairman, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, commented that he seemed to remember Lilienthal having earlier implied his willingness to transfer custody eventually to the armed forces. But since Lilienthal was not present at the meeting, the commissioners declined to discuss the matter further. After the meeting Acting AEC Chairman Sumner Pike stated that the commission unanimously opposed transferring custody on the grounds that the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) lacked technical competence for the handling and maintenance of atomic weapons.⁹

The military's dilemma was by now fully apparent. As long as the AEC alone exercised custody, the military was effectively excluded from acquiring the technical expertise Pike said it lacked to perform handling and maintenance functions. Even the AFSWP teams being trained to assemble weapons operated under close AEC supervision and at the end of each training exercise had to return all bombs to AEC custody. The existence of emergency transfer plans notwithstanding, the MLC became convinced that the commission's refusal to share cus-

* Also confirmed as commission members at this time were Lewis L. Strauss, an investment banker; W.W. Waymack, a newspaper editor from Des Moines, Iowa; Robert P. Bacher, a Los Alamos physicist; and Sumner T. Pike, former member of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Initially, their terms of office ran only through 1 August 1948, when President Truman submitted their names for reappointment to staggered terms of one to five years. Because of controversy over reappointment, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to end the initial terms of all commissioners on 30 June 1950, after which terms would expire on a staggered basis, one each year. In 1949 Gordon Dean, a former dean of the Duke University law school and a law partner of Sen. Brien McMahon, who followed Hickenlooper as Chairman of the JCAE, replaced Waymack, and Henry D. Smyth, a physicist who had served in the Manhattan Project, succeeded Bacher. See Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 48-53, 328-32, 356, and JCAE, *Atomic Energy Legislation Through 88th Congress, 1st Session*, 205-06, and 206, n2.

tody jeopardized military preparedness. On 4 September 1947 Brereton asked the service secretaries for support on this matter. All agreed that the MLC should persist in its custody efforts. Satisfied that he could count on this high-level support, Brereton on 12 November wrote to Lilienthal recommending that AFSWP assume custody of atomic weapons and responsibility for their storage and surveillance and requesting the AEC's "formal views" on the matter. Although Brereton was eager for early action, the AEC insisted that the MLC clarify its position in writing.¹⁰

Responding on 16 December, the MLC argued that custody should be transferred to the armed forces for reasons of national security and the need to have a single agency responsible for the nation's atomic arsenal. The MLC contended that it was a "prerequisite to national security that all possible means of defense be available to the Armed Forces for instant use," and that to "launch an attack with atomic bombs under existing conditions, would require a complicated procedure involving the dual responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Armed Forces." The committee also stated that to "fulfill their responsibility for the defense of the United States, the Armed Forces must have the authority to place the forces and weapons at their disposal in strategically sound locations . . . readily available for instant use." The MLC conceded, however, that the services were "not staffed and trained at the present time" to maintain the atomic stockpile in the necessary state of readiness and proposed a gradual transition period.¹¹

Instead of responding immediately, the AEC prepared, and issued on 1 March 1948, a report that supported its earlier contention that the military did not have the technical knowledge or training to cope with the problems of custody but proposed a joint AEC-military training program to prepare the armed forces for surveillance and inspection duties. Lilienthal viewed these findings as "conclusive," but he did not state whether or not he favored their adoption and implementation. Meeting with the MLC on 3 March, he expressed the opinion that only the President could decide whether the military should have custody. Because it involved other departments and the President's constitutional prerogatives, Lilienthal said the commission wanted to avoid making unsolicited recommendations on the custody question either alone or jointly with the military establishment. He suggested that he might consult the President to determine what recommendations Truman would accept from the AEC and the NME. He emphasized that the commission did not view the matter as simply a "jurisdictional issue," and that the purpose of consulting the President was to seek his guidance.¹²

After Lilienthal proposed conferring with the President, Brereton immediately notified Forrestal, sending him a copy of the AEC report and requesting that

he intercede "without delay."¹³ After receiving a joint memorandum from the service secretaries endorsing Brereton's recommendations, Forrestal had his staff draft a letter to Truman setting forth the military's views.¹⁴ However, before signing off on his letter to the President, Forrestal sought technical advice from General Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff, on the feasibility of an immediate transfer. Even though Spaatz strongly supported the idea of military custody, he conceded that he lacked sufficient information to have full confidence in the ability of the armed forces to assume immediate custody of atomic weapons. Moreover, Spaatz had recently proposed in the JCS that the Air Force be designated executive agent of AFSWP. With this proposal still pending, he may have felt that pressing the custody issue might complicate Air Force efforts to gain control of AFSWP. On 30 March Forrestal told John Ohly to take no further action until Donald F. Carpenter, designated to replace Brereton as MLC chairman, had had a chance to acquaint himself with the subject.¹⁵

Carpenter's arrival at the MLC in early April 1948 had a calming effect. Almost overnight, as Carpenter began to deal with the weapons custody question, relations between the AEC and the Pentagon took a promising turn for the better. After lengthy talks with AEC and Pentagon officials in Washington, Carpenter invited the commissioners to join him in an inspection of the Sandia (N. Mex.) weapons storage facility to consider firsthand how the issue might be resolved. Arriving at Sandia on 24 May, Carpenter and the commissioners spent three days listening to AFSWP and AEC senior staffers explain their differences. By the time Carpenter left the base he was convinced that a transfer of authority was necessary and feasible within certain limitations and that the AEC could be persuaded to cooperate if adequate safeguards existed and AEC technicians could inspect and service bomb components on a regular basis. On 2 June he directed Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols, chief of AFSWP, to prepare, for discussions with the AEC and ultimately for submission to the President, "definite recommendations" giving the military authority to withdraw weapons from storage either for training purposes or for possible use in time of national emergency.¹⁶ "I arrived at the conclusion," Carpenter recalled some years later,

that the weapons should be held in custody by the military but that a dual chain of command should be established. The Secretary of Defense could give the order for withdrawal from storage but the order would have to go down through two separate chains of command to prevent any single officer short of the Secretary of Defense from issuing the order on his own.¹⁷

It seems clear that Carpenter had grossly misjudged the commission's willingness to compromise. On 18 June, after examining the "definite recommendations" prepared by Nichols, the AEC commissioners met with the MLC. Lilienthal stated at the outset that the commission had given "long and careful study and

consideration" to the custody question and had now concluded that the proposed transfer "required a higher cost than its advantages justified." Laying his cards on the table, Lilienthal insisted that the problem went beyond technical and managerial difficulties and involved considerations of basic policy, presumably whether civilian or military control should prevail. These questions, he said, were paramount and were wholly for the President to weigh and decide. Consequently, Lilienthal explained, the AEC could not endorse the recommended transfer but would be glad to cooperate in presenting the custody question to the President for decision.¹⁸

Although officially the AEC was unanimous in its position, Commissioner Strauss felt a compromise might still be arranged. After the meeting with the MLC he telephoned Marx Leva, through him urging Forrestal to sit down and talk with the commission before going to the President. Forrestal agreed, and on 23 June Lilienthal joined him for lunch at the Pentagon. Just in case the meeting proved successful, the OSD public relations office stood ready with a draft press release announcing plans for the transfer. The press release was never issued. Although Forrestal and Lilienthal understood each other's point of view, they could agree only on meeting with the entire commission in a week.¹⁹

Joined by Carpenter, Nichols, Vannevar Bush, and Secretary Royall, Forrestal met with the full commission in his office on 30 June. As the discussion progressed it became apparent that both sides were as far apart as ever. Not even the emergency of the Berlin blockade, already six days old, could bring them together. In general, the commissioners favored deferring immediate action, whereas the military representatives wanted the issue decided without further delay. If technical difficulties stood in the way of transferring custody, Bush argued, they should be identified and eliminated by training the required military personnel. Lilienthal did not agree with this course and observed that matters of public policy should be debated publicly. Forrestal responded that his military advisers viewed "military custody of weapons of great importance to our national security." The meeting resulted in an agreement that the President should decide the issue and that the AEC and the military would prepare separate position papers for his consideration.²⁰

Shortly afterward Lilienthal called Clark Clifford, the President's legal and political adviser. According to Lilienthal, Clifford told him that Truman was fully aware of the custody dispute and had expressed strong opposition to "taking atomic weapons away from the hands they are now in." Lilienthal wrote Forrestal about his talk with Clifford and indicated that he had told Clifford that the AEC and the NME would have their views on the custody issue ready to submit to the President at an "early date." Attached to Lilienthal's letter was a draft memorandum addressed to the President, restating in general terms the AEC's opposi-

tion to change in custody procedures. The next move was up to Forrestal, and he duly obliged by asking Truman on 15 July for an appointment the following week.²¹

The confrontation over custody took place on 21 July at a White House meeting attended by Forrestal, the five commissioners, and their advisers. In support of the military's request for the transfer of custody, Forrestal offered four arguments: (1) that a surprise attack could expose the United States to "unreasonable risk of mistake, confusion and failure to act with the necessary speed and precision"; (2) that the military needed to learn in peacetime how to maintain and operate atomic weapons; (3) that giving custody to the NME "will facilitate the storing of the . . . components in the most favorable strategic locations"; and (4) that delivery of the weapons to the NME "should further the research and development activities in weapon design."²² The AEC did not challenge these arguments directly. Instead, it defended the existing arrangement on technical grounds and urged the President to bear in mind that atomic bombs were different from other weapons, requiring special handling which the military might not be able to provide. In the final analysis, however, the AEC felt that "all technical questions are subsidiary" and that the key issue was whether civilian control of atomic energy could be preserved by transferring custodial functions to the military, a problem that the President would have to resolve to his own satisfaction. Truman indicated he needed time to think about the matter.²³

Truman had earlier requested the views of the Bureau of the Budget, and the next day Budget Director James E. Webb presented written comments recommending that custodial functions remain in the hands of the AEC "at least for the present." As Webb saw it, there were four principal reasons for turning down the military's request. First, broad "public policy considerations" and public opinion argued strongly in favor of preserving the current arrangement. Second, the AEC appeared to be doing an "excellent job" of developing weapons and of devising plans for emergency transfer. Third, Webb felt that the AEC was better equipped than the military to do the job, especially in view of continuing inter-service bickering over roles and missions in air-atomic operations. "The Navy and the Air Force," Webb reminded Truman, "are disputing the issue of jurisdiction over the atomic attack. The Secretary of Defense has not, as yet, satisfactorily settled this issue. Until the Military Establishment is prepared to assume the responsibility, it would be a serious matter to transfer the stockpiles." And finally, Webb pointed to the "symbolic value" of the atomic bomb, its importance as an "instrument of international influence," the "provocative utterances of certain highly-placed officers," and the possible adverse reactions abroad if the military gained custody. "The delicate international situation," he warned, "could be made worse if a transfer of stockpile custody were made at this particular time. Such

an action could be construed as secret preparations for a war which this Government regarded as inevitable.”²⁴

After reviewing the arguments, Truman ruled in favor of the AEC. On 23 July he told Forrestal that an immediate transfer of custody was out of the question because of “political considerations,” but added that he might “take another look at the picture” after the November election. When he officially informed Forrestal of his decision on 6 August, he noted existing arrangements between the services and the AEC relating to training, joint inspection, and emergency weapons delivery procedures, and encouraged continued collaboration on and refinement of these arrangements. Lilienthal must have felt that he had won a great personal victory, observing in his diary that the President’s public announcement of his custody decision was “a very important event indeed.”²⁵ According to Carpenter, Forrestal likewise took the decision quite personally and for a while talked of resigning. Carpenter urged him not to do so and then drafted directives, issued by Forrestal on 28 July, setting in motion a review within the military of emergency transfer plans. Even without custody, Carpenter considered the military’s position much improved. “Although the A.E.C. won the decision,” he later noted, “the whole affair had centered so much attention on their [the AEC’s] shortcomings of custody and transfer that they took effective steps to obtain maximum efficiency. The outcome was a vastly improved procedure even though the A.E.C. retained custody.”²⁶

During the remainder of 1948 the AEC and the NME devoted much attention to the testing and improvement of emergency transfer procedures. In November, on the initiative of the AEC, Forrestal and Lilienthal approved a formal statement of principles to govern emergency transfers.²⁷ The following month the AEC and AFSWP held a joint exercise (Operation UNLIMITED) at Sandia to determine the effectiveness of current arrangements. The exercise began with the simultaneous transmission of special code words from the Washington headquarters of the two organizations. Dummies rather than actual weapons were transferred. The operation proved satisfactory in all respects. On the basis of the exercise experience, its directors recommended that such drills be held every six months on initiation from Washington and that the weapon capsules be exchanged in secluded areas.²⁸

Meanwhile, at JCS direction, AFSWP accelerated the training of personnel so that it would be able to assume “full custody and surveillance as soon as possible, if and when the President authorizes the transfer of such responsibilities to the NME.” In an obvious effort to reopen the question of custody, General Nichols in March 1949 endeavored to enlist the support of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. However, Truman and Lilienthal resisted both military and congressional pressures for reexamination. Nevertheless, in May 1949 the com-

mission took the important step of authorizing joint AEC-AFSWP operation and maintenance of storage sites, with the AEC responsible for all stockpile items in storage or undergoing inspection and AFSWP in custody of AEC weapons released for training and maneuver purposes.²⁹

By early 1950 there was no longer any doubt that the military had trained personnel in sufficient numbers to perform the necessary custodial functions of surveillance and inspection; in fact, at several storage sites military authorities were already exercising custody on an unofficial basis under AEC supervision. In view of these realities, an AEC study in March 1950 recommended that the commission obtain the President's approval of the "transfer of custody of stockpile of non-nuclear components of atomic bombs to the Département of Defense" and "delegation of responsibilities for routine maintenance of nuclear components of stockpile weapons to the Department of Defense."³⁰ The MLC and the Joint Chiefs strongly endorsed these proposals, still pending when the Korean War broke out in late June. Then, on 11 July, Secretary Johnson, supported by the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries, appealed to the President to turn over nonnuclear components to the military as a precaution against a wider emergency than Korea. Concurring, the President in the same month began directing the AEC on a case by case basis to transfer the custody of bomb capsules (minus their nuclear explosives) to the Air Force and the Navy for deployment to selected overseas locations.³¹

Though events undoubtedly accelerated the timetable, it seems clear that the AEC's monopoly on custody would have ended as the size of the stockpile increased and as weapons were deployed overseas. Under such circumstances, as Forrestal had argued in 1948, the AEC's limited resources and facilities would make it impractical, if not impossible, for the commission to exercise direct custody. Forrestal's prediction may have been premature, but by 1950 there was no longer any doubt as to its accuracy. Even as ardent an advocate of civilian control as Truman recognized that should a major emergency erupt, the military would be able to respond more quickly if the weapons were readily available. And since the transfer orders he issued in 1950 applied only to nonnuclear components, the principle of civilian control remained basically intact. Later would come the question of transferring nuclear components as well. But on the basis of the decisions taken in 1950, the outcome appeared virtually certain to favor the Defense Department.

Policy on Use of Atomic Weapons

Almost simultaneously with the custody dispute arose the need for a policy clarifying when and in what circumstances the United States would use

nuclear weapons. Although regarded by the military as another instrument of war, atomic bombs so awed the public that the issue quickly became infused with enormous political as well as military significance. Clearly, strategic considerations alone were not enough to determine the use of such destructive weapons, and in 1948 a high-level debate began within the administration over what policy should be adopted.

Prior to this time American policy governing the development and use of atomic weapons rested on understandings and agreements reached with Britain and Canada during World War II, particularly the Quebec agreement of 1943. Because of the close secrecy surrounding the atomic energy program, hardly anyone knew of the existence of the Quebec agreement and the prohibitions it imposed. One part of the agreement specified that the United States and Great Britain would not use atomic weapons "against third parties without each other's consent," while other parts established arrangements for the sharing of information, the allocation of raw materials, and other cooperative efforts through a body known as the Combined Policy Committee (CPC).³²

In effect, the Quebec agreement confirmed that for the duration of the war the development of atomic energy would be a U.S. monopoly. After the war, as Britain and Canada embarked on their own atomic energy programs, disputes arose between Washington and London over the procurement and allocation of raw materials and the exchange of technical data. All parties agreed that the Quebec agreement was no longer a workable arrangement, but despite lengthy negotiations, the CPC seemed unable to find a satisfactory substitute. Although Forrestal as Secretary of the Navy had participated off and on in these talks, it was not until he became Secretary of Defense that he took a leading role, possibly because only then did he become acquainted with the full contents of the Quebec agreement. Upon learning that it prohibited U.S. use of the bomb without British consent, he termed the agreement unacceptable and felt that "it should be immediately denounced."³³ Secretary Marshall and Lilienthal, who with Forrestal formed the American side of the CPC, shared his view that the Quebec agreement was an impediment to U.S. freedom of action.³⁴ One member of the JCAE, Senator Vandenberg, voiced the same concerns.³⁵ In late 1947 negotiations with the British and Canadians resumed, culminating on 7 January 1948 in a *modus vivendi* that nullified the Quebec agreement and substituted other procedures for cooperation and exchange of information. As part of the new arrangements the United States acquired rights to all 1948 and 1949 uranium ore shipments from the Belgian Congo (now Zaire), then the principal source of supply.³⁶

Nullification of the Quebec agreement removed all external constraints on U.S. use of atomic weapons, but no new statement of policy followed. The only applicable statute, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, definitely envisioned the

possible use of nuclear weapons by stressing in its introductory declaration of policy the "paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security."³⁷ Since the law also vested power in the President to set production rates and transfer custody of bombs, it followed that as Commander in Chief he could order their use in a declared emergency just as he could order the use of tanks or airplanes or any other weapon. In short, the decision to employ rested with the President.

Thus the issue that surfaced was not whether atomic weapons *could* be used but whether they *would* be used. What precipitated the debate appears to have been a JCS briefing for the President on 5 May 1948 on emergency war plans. The next day, noting that the plans called for an air-atomic counteroffensive, Truman asked the JCS to develop an alternative plan relying solely on conventional, nonnuclear weapons. Even though the United Nations had been at an impasse on regulation of atomic armaments since 1946, Truman explained that atomic bombs might be outlawed by international convention and thus not available, and that the American people might not permit the government to use atomic weapons for "aggressive purposes."³⁸

To some members of the military establishment, the President's request seemed ill-advised and not to be seriously pursued. First to take issue was Secretary Royall, who earlier had expressed concern over reports that Marshall and Admiral Leahy had made statements implying repudiation of the use of nuclear weapons. Forrestal had done his best to allay Royall's worries, but after Truman's request for a nonnuclear war plan, Royall feared that the United States stood on the threshold of abandoning nuclear weapons as an instrument of national defense. Intent upon a full airing of the matter, he asked the National Security Council on 19 May 1948 for a full-scale review of atomic warfare policy. Choosing his words with obvious care, he mentioned having heard that "in some quarters the desirability of the United States initiating atomic warfare has been questioned particularly on the grounds of morality." Since the Army had previously regarded atomic weapons as integral to military planning, he said, it now felt the need for clarification. Royall proposed that the NSC examine specifically when atomic weapons would be used, the choice of targets, and "an organization capable of immediate engagement in atomic warfare."³⁹

Exactly why the weapons-use question so interested Royall that he proposed placing it before the NSC is far from clear, though it may have been related to the Army's budget problems and legislation pending in Congress to increase the size of the Army through reenactment of selective service. Clearly, in view of the prevailing strategic assumptions, a defense policy that repudiated or minimized the use of atomic weapons would require vastly strengthened conventional forces, and any decision in this regard could have a profound bearing on both the size of the Army and its share of the military budget. Royall does not appear to have

been eager to see the use of nuclear weapons abandoned, but his interest in the possibility suggests an awareness of the impact it could have on the Army's future and its role in military planning in relation to the other services.

The next day the NSC discussed how to deal with the study. Royall immediately brought up the President's recent request for a nonnuclear war plan, saying that the council should determine "if there are any qualifications on our use of atomic weapons." Secretary Symington thought that such a study was a "good idea," for "it would show how much we must rely on the bomb." He stated that "the Air Force felt that if we gave up the use of the bomb we might as well give up our Air Force." Forrestal did not appear eager to continue the discussion and thought the council should consult the President before doing anything more. Lovett suggested bringing in the AEC, but Secretary Sullivan thought that involving the AEC might confuse the issue and complicate settlement of the custody dispute. Obviously, although it recognized that Royall had raised a pertinent matter, the council had yet to devise an acceptable procedure for dealing with it.⁴⁰

After the meeting senior members of the Air Force expressed regret that Royall had raised the issue, fearing that study and discussion in the NSC might lead to the adoption of policies that could effectively hamstring Air Force planning for the use of atomic weapons. They therefore urged Symington to do what he could to curtail the inquiry and prevent it from becoming a full-scale investigation. Acting on recommendations from Maj. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson, Air Staff Director of Plans and Operations, the Air Force on 3 June secured adoption in the NSC of a procedure that divided Royall's request into two parts. First, the NSC staff would prepare a report on how, where, and when atomic weapons might be used; and second, the NME War Council would study the organizational arrangements "to insure optimum exploitation by the United States of its capabilities of waging atomic warfare." However, Forrestal did not take up the matter at the next War Council meeting, preferring first to solicit views informally from MLC Chairman Carpenter and General Gruenther.⁴¹

Inclined to proceed slowly in the matter, Forrestal held a meeting on 30 June with Royall, the JCS, Souers, and others. Royall suggested the need for a decision on the custody issue. Forrestal urged those present not to forget that there were important political aspects to the use and targeting of atomic weapons. "The political thing comes in," he said, "whether or not you gamble that a reduction of Moscow and Leningrad would be a powerful enough impact to stop a war." Royall agreed on the significance of political considerations in providing guidance on the use and targeting of nuclear weapons. The meeting ended without recommendations. When the NSC considered the question the next day, Forrestal asked for a postponement pending a discussion with the President.⁴²

Forrestal and Truman met on 15 July and agreed that weapons-use policy should be flexible. Confronted simultaneously by the military's custody dispute with the AEC and the ominous Berlin crisis, Truman shunned any policy that might restrict his options or authority. He told Forrestal that the decision to employ the atomic bomb should be the President's alone and not the action of "some dashing lieutenant colonel." Forrestal apparently concluded that the President had abandoned the idea of ruling out the use of nuclear weapons and would support planned and militarily prudent use of the atomic bomb. On 28 July Forrestal told the Joint Chiefs to assign top priority to a war plan involving use of atomic weapons and low priority to one not involving such use.⁴³

Meanwhile, the NSC staff, assisted by Air Force representatives, drafted a general policy statement on the use of nuclear weapons. All member agencies of the NSC, except the Army, concurred in the statement. The NSC staff prepared a revised study (NSC 30), which the council took up on 16 September. Royall voiced disappointment that the paper did not state whether atomic weapons would in fact be used.⁴⁴ The essence of the report was a statement of policy that endeavored to cover all contingencies. While acknowledging the propriety of including atomic weapons in military plans, NSC 30 recommended against firm prescriptions as to the time or circumstances under which they would be employed. NSC 30 concluded simply:

12. It is recognized that, in the event of hostilities, the National Military Establishment must be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons, in the interest of national security and must therefore plan accordingly.

13. The decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required.⁴⁵

Although Truman never officially approved this policy statement, there was no doubt that it reflected his thinking. When he met with Forrestal and others on 13 September, Truman had appeared willing to consider the possible use of atomic weapons and, in response to the worsening Berlin crisis, to initiate discussions with the British on the construction of bomb storage sites in England. According to Forrestal's notes on the meeting, "the President said that he prayed that he would never have to make such a decision [i.e., order the use of atomic weapons], but that if it became necessary, no one need have a misgiving but what he would do so." ⁴⁶

Meanwhile, in August and September, the Military Liaison Committee initiated a study on military organization for atomic warfare to help advise the War Council. Despite weeks of effort, the committee could not reach agreement on

what should be done to improve the existing organization, and recommended only that Congress amend the Atomic Energy Act to allow the military to exercise a more direct role in the affairs of the AEC. The most divisive issues the committee faced concerned the control of air-atomic operations and continuation of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project as a joint agency. At the Newport conference in late August, Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs had agreed that, as a temporary measure, the Air Force should serve as AFSWP executive agent in all matters pertaining to the air-atomic aspects of the HALFMOON/FLEETWOOD plan. The Air Force now wanted this arrangement generalized and made permanent, but the Army and the Navy objected that Air Force absorption of AFSWP would curtail their future access to atomic weapons. On 10 September 1948 the MLC voted four to two to maintain AFSWP as a tripartite agency answerable to the three service chiefs individually.⁴⁷

A month later, after Carpenter had become head of the Munitions Board, he sent Forrestal a separate report on defense organization for atomic energy matters. Carpenter maintained that the existing organization suffered from two serious defects: an overconcentration of responsibilities in the MLC and AFSWP and a general absence of channels through which the military services could explore alternative applications of atomic energy. The result, Carpenter said, was a highly centralized system that did little to encourage interservice cooperation and collaboration or advance the state of the art. To remedy this, Carpenter proposed a variety of reforms: decentralization of authority by assigning primary responsibility for atomic energy matters to the three service chiefs, including authority to initiate new projects; expansion of training for military personnel in the handling and surveillance of atomic materials; and development of more joint programs to encourage common use of facilities and the exchange of personnel between services.⁴⁸

Although Carpenter may have sized up the problem correctly, some members of the MLC declined to endorse his recommendations, not necessarily because they disagreed, but because they felt the time for such reforms had not yet come. As a practical matter they saw numerous obstacles—AEC's virtual monopoly of skilled personnel, the slow progress of military unification, a crisis-prone international situation, uneasy AEC-military relations, and congressional resistance to legislation permitting a freer exchange of highly classified information. Furthermore, some committee members fully expected the 1948 election to result in a change of administrations, leading to major policy revisions. All in all, Carpenter's suggestions, while worthy, were considered premature. They were not revived until the early 1950s.⁴⁹

The development of new military applications of atomic energy and the technology to support them did not, of course, await organizational changes

within the military, though progress might have been more rapid had the reforms Carpenter proposed been adopted at the time. Nonetheless, during 1949–50 a steady distribution of information and an expansion of training among the services stimulated research and development. Military leaders vigorously sought to diversify the types of weapons, including the design of a whole family of new devices, from artillery shells to warheads for guided missiles. In addition, they initiated separate projects in conjunction with the AEC to develop nuclear propulsion systems for submarines and aircraft, to explore the potential of radioactive warfare, and to study the feasibility of “breeder” reactors capable of furnishing a continuous supply of fissionable material.⁵⁰

Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War there was apparently little thought given to the possibility that the expanding military application of atomic energy and the weapons-use policy in NSC 30 might some day be in conflict. However, the signs pointed clearly to such a probability. When on 6 April 1949 President Truman publicly reaffirmed that, as in the cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he would not hesitate to order the use of atomic weapons if necessary, he implied that such weapons would be used only under the most dire conditions. But within the military, as knowledge of atomic energy increased and as the applications became more numerous, nuclear weapons seemed less unique and restrictions on their use seemed less likely. By the time of the North Korean attack, military planners saw themselves in what some termed “phase two” of the atomic age—a period, following initial research and development, in which technical progress would remove all practical barriers to the military uses of atomic energy and nuclear weapons.⁵¹ Writing in March 1950, Deputy Secretary of Defense Early expressed his view of the changing situation:

The whole concept of atomic energy as something special is disappearing and the concept of the atomic warhead as a conventional weapon is arising. This is as it should be. All aspects of military thinking must be steeped with such concept—a condition which will be accelerated by placing full responsibility upon each of the services for its appropriate share of atomic operational and service functions. Unless we are prepared to accept the possibility of facing a future emergency in which the know-how of atomic operational and service functions is restricted to an insufficient number of personnel to meet needs, we should take steps now to spread atomic knowledge in these related functions far and wide within the military.⁵²

Although such a broad approach to the potential use of atomic weapons did not take hold until the Eisenhower administration, it was readily apparent by 1950 that for military planning purposes the line between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons was becoming less distinct. Yet for political purposes, as Truman

and his military advisers recognized, the use of nuclear weapons remained a highly sensitive issue that in the years to follow would become only more complicated and difficult to resolve.

Fission Bomb Production

Reaching policy decisions on custody and weapons use rated high priority. But the military saw them as essentially secondary to developing, producing, and maintaining a stockpile of atomic bombs on which the security of the country might ultimately depend. In the years immediately after World War II the AEC stockpiled components for two types of weapons—an implosion-type bomb similar to the “Fat Man” used against Nagasaki and a gun-type bomb similar to the “Little Boy” dropped on Hiroshima. Both types were basically handmade laboratory devices, consisting of nuclear capsules and nonnuclear components, which required assembly before use. These exceedingly bulky and heavy weapons required specially modified aircraft to deliver them against a target. Almost all of the bombs stockpiled immediately after the war were “Fat Man” implosion weapons, weighing approximately 10,000 pounds and having an explosive power equivalent to that of 22,000 tons of TNT (22 KT). Gun-type bombs, although lighter at 8,900 pounds, were less efficient in their use of fissionable material and produced a smaller burst of approximately 12.5 KT.⁵³

TABLE 8
U.S. Nuclear Weapon Stockpile, 1945–1948

Stockpile as of	Nuclear Components		Nonnuclear Components	
	<i>Gun-type</i>	<i>Implosion-type</i>	<i>Gun-type</i>	<i>Implosion-type</i>
30 June 1945*	0	2	0	2
30 June 1946	0	9	0	9
30 June 1947	0	13	0	29
30 June 1948	0	50	2	53

* Figures are for a later date, presumably 31 December 1945.

Source: Ltr Travis Hulsey, History Div, Dept of Energy, to author, 30 Jun 82.

Among the many difficult problems the AEC initially faced, none was more urgent than reversing the decline in production of fissionable materials. During the period between war's end and creation of the AEC, many of the scientists and technicians who had made the Manhattan Project a success left to resume their civilian work. Without sufficient staff, production facilities at Oak Ridge,

Tenn., and Hanford, Wash., had gradually deteriorated. Of the three piles capable of producing plutonium at Hanford, only one was in full operation when the AEC took over on 1 January 1947. Physically, conditions were significantly better at Oak Ridge, where the trouble-free gaseous diffusion process promised a steady supply of uranium-235. But labor unrest and the decision of the Monsanto Corporation in 1947 to pull out of the adjacent Clinton Laboratories created problems that left Oak Ridge operating below peak performance. Limited uranium ore supplies were another inhibiting factor, though less so after the accord signed with Britain and Canada in January 1948. All in all, despite a vigorous rebuilding effort, it took the AEC more than a year to restore its facilities to their wartime level of efficiency and productivity.⁵⁴

Lilienthal later recalled that to his horror and amazement the AEC inherited a stockpile consisting of only one "probably operable" atomic bomb. Figures compiled many years later show an arsenal of nine weapons as of 30 June 1946, but because no official tabulations were kept at the time, the number is approximate, developed from sketchy records.⁵⁵ (Table 8) The AEC submitted its first official inventory count in the spring of 1947, by which time the stockpile had grown to roughly a dozen nuclear cores, but apparently not all were fully operable. When he reported the number during a White House briefing on 3 April, Lilienthal observed that it came to Truman as "quite a shock." Truman subsequently reaffirmed an earlier order continuing bomb production at the current rate.⁵⁶ Production thus became the accepted basis for setting military requirements. Using this procedure, the Joint Chiefs in December 1947 established requirements for a stockpile of 400 Nagasaki-type implosion bombs by 1 January 1953 based on expected ore receipts and existing and planned production schedules for the next five years.⁵⁷

Although production troubles accounted for most of the bottlenecks, wrangling among the services over weapon designs also impeded progress. The Air Force preferred a large stockpile of the Mark III "Fat Man" bomb, but the Navy, having no planes that could carry it and still operate effectively from existing carriers, sought a diversified inventory with a larger number of the lighter weight "Little Boy" gun-type bombs. Although the Air Force objected strenuously, the Navy prepared in March 1948 to proceed with development of a water-penetrating weapon based on the "Little Boy" configuration and a similar but lighter weapon of more "novel design."⁵⁸

Then, in April-May 1948, the United States conducted its second postwar series of nuclear tests, designated SANDSTONE, at Eniwetok in the Pacific. In all, three shots were fired, the first of which, utilizing Mark IV design characteristics, attained the equivalent yield of 37,000 tons of TNT. The second shot surpassed the first with a burst of 49 KT; and the third, demonstrating the feasibility of

powerful lightweight weapons, yielded 18 KT. If the preliminary reports proved correct (as later they did), the United States had scored a "stunning success" that would lead to a whole new generation of weapons, making the existing stockpile of bombs obsolete. The day of tailor-made weapons was fading fast; with the Mark IV would come mass production of components, assembly-line techniques, and a production capacity exceeding the current requirements set by the Joint Chiefs.⁵⁹

After studying the SANDSTONE results, the MLC urged the JCS to reexamine their requirements for atomic weapons. Acting on this advice, the Joint Chiefs on 9 December 1948 notified Forrestal of their desire to reopen the question of military needs, including the possibility of stepping up ore procurement in order to assure "the continued production of fissionable material on a long-term basis." On 28 January 1949 MLC Chairman Webster advised the AEC to expect a revised statement of military requirements. "It is now evident," Webster wrote, "that the currently-established military requirements for scheduled bomb production should be substantially increased and extended. Detailed studies are still in progress and you will be advised at a later date of the number of bombs by category or type which will be required by the National Military Establishment."⁶⁰

Webster's memorandum reached the AEC more than two weeks after it had requested funds for an accelerated expansion program. In his FY 1950 budget message to Congress on 10 January, Truman had recommended an increase to \$725 million in the AEC budget from an estimated \$632 million in fiscal year 1949. Much of the increase was for the construction of a new gaseous diffusion plant at Oak Ridge. Testifying in secret session before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, AEC officials calculated that the Oak Ridge expansion, to be completed in 1951, would increase production capabilities for U-235 by 30 to 32 percent while doubling the output of fissionable material.⁶¹

The military considered enlargement of facilities at Oak Ridge merely a first step. On 26 May 1949 Webster informed the commission that the MLC had recommended, and the Joint Chiefs had approved, military requirements calling for an additional 15-percent increase by 1 January 1956 in the production of fissionable materials above that expected from plants already operating or authorized. Abandoning the practice of computing military requirements in terms of production capabilities, Webster requested that the AEC plan for additional construction at Hanford and Oak Ridge to increase production of both U-235 and plutonium in order to accommodate the higher requirements. "In our opinion," Webster wrote, "it is highly urgent that sufficient funds be obtained in the present session of Congress in order to avoid unnecessary delay."⁶²

Shortly after, on 14 June, the Joint Chiefs approved new military require-

ments for U-235 and plutonium and the number of bombs by the beginning of 1956. This production schedule, in terms of fissionable materials, apparently was identical to that in Webster's letter of 26 May and thus greatly exceeded the AEC's estimate of available U-235 and plutonium by the target date. The Joint Chiefs added that they could not establish definite production objectives beyond January 1956 but suggested that they would probably continue to increase.⁶³

Normally the MLC would have conveyed the JCS recommendations directly to the AEC, but the committee found that the number of bombs requested by the Joint Chiefs was far too low, considering anticipated progress in weapon design, to utilize the specified quantities of U-235 and plutonium. Ultimately the MLC decided not to report this important discrepancy to the JCS. The MLC, composed mainly of officers junior to the Joint Chiefs, may have hesitated to point out errors made by their superiors; also, some of its members worried that referral back to the Joint Chiefs would result in JCS selection of "the radically smaller June 14 requirement" and a cutting back of the plant expansion necessitated by the larger requirement. Consequently, the MLC never sent the AEC the specific weapons requirements in the JCS memorandum of 14 June; the Joint Chiefs never became aware of the discrepancy; and the fissionable materials requirements submitted on 26 May prevailed.⁶⁴

With a new statement of military requirements now before the AEC, a coalition of Pentagon officials and ranking members of Congress began to put pressure on the commission to acquiesce in the proposed expansion. Sen. Brien McMahon, Chairman of the JCAE, acted first on 14 July, urging Secretary Johnson to take a forceful stand. "As matters stand today," McMahon argued, "with the Kremlin rejecting international control, our overriding aim must be the production of fissionable materials and the fabrication of more and better weapons." While McMahon conceded that he and his committee were not privy to stockpile data, he felt sufficiently informed, based on "the facts now known to me," to "hazard the guess that we need additional plant capacity as a safety margin." Johnson's reply was crisp and to the point. "I believe you realize," he said, "that we are very much of a single mind on this subject."⁶⁵

Thinking at the AEC, however, differed, and the commission once again steeled itself for a confrontation with the military. Lilienthal was not convinced that the expansion proposed by the MLC was either necessary or desirable, not because he opposed higher requirements per se, but because he feared the military was making arbitrary demands in a form that would inevitably undermine civilian control of atomic energy. He felt, as in the custody quarrel the year before, that the NME was challenging the AEC's authority. If they wanted more weapons, he thought, the military should explain to the commission how these weapons were vital to national security. With Lilienthal again sounding the alarm against

military domination, other commissioners questioned the practicality of trying to expand production of fissionable materials, citing continuing technical obstacles. They sought to convey the message that Webster and the Joint Chiefs had misread the SANDSTONE results and expected more than was technically possible.⁶⁶

As a means of resolving the issue, Truman on 26 July 1949 directed the National Security Council to create a special committee on atomic energy, composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the AEC. As much as anything else, Truman probably was bothered by the cost of the proposed expansion, estimated at \$500 million spread over a six-year period, with three-fifths of that amount to be expended in the first three years. In his instructions to the committee the President indicated his interest in four general problems: (1) the adequacy, from the standpoint of national security, of the current plans for production of fissionable material; (2) the relative gain in terms of national security to be derived from accelerating the output of fissionable material; (3) the soundness of the timing of the proposed acceleration as it might affect the military budget, research and development programs, and the international picture; and (4) the effect of making offsetting reductions in other areas of national defense to accelerate atomic weapon production without increasing the budget.⁶⁷

At the President's suggestion, the NSC special committee appointed a working group to examine the subject in detail and develop preliminary recommendations. The working group met on 3 August, at which time military representatives proposed both immediate adoption of the NME proposal to expand weapons production and submission of a supplemental budget request to Congress the following week, presumably to take advantage of McMahon's recent show of enthusiasm for the proposed expansion. George Kennan, the State Department representative, objected that such a move would be totally contrary to the President's intentions in creating the special committee. The issue was left dangling, and before the working group could meet again Secretary Johnson suggested to the President that it would be impractical for the AEC to propose a supplemental budget request until the next session of Congress.⁶⁸

Although willing to bide his time, Johnson was determined that neither the State Department nor the AEC should block efforts to enlarge production. Early in September the working group sent to the special committee a draft report arguing that the proposed expansion was both necessary for national security and feasible. The report did not specify how to achieve the objective—whether by additional AEC appropriations or by taking the necessary funds from other national security programs, as the President had suggested in his letter of 26 July. After reviewing the findings with Webster, Johnson stated that it was the responsibility of the commission, as producer of the product, to request additional facili-

ties and increased appropriations to meet Defense requirements, and not the responsibility of the Department of Defense, which he viewed as the consumer. At the suggestion of John Ohly, Johnson agreed to endorse the report if it were separated into three parts, with each agency treating only that part of the subject falling within its sphere of responsibility. Thus, the Defense Department would present its increased military requirements; the AEC would deal with additional facilities and costs needed to meet those requirements; and the Department of State would examine the probable international implications.⁶⁹

The special committee's final report, amended according to Johnson's specifications, went to the President on 10 October, about a month after he had learned that the Soviet Union had detonated a nuclear device in late August. The first part of the report, based on findings provided by the JCS, looked at the "developments, events, and considerations" that had caused them to recommend an accelerated program—the success of the SANDSTONE tests in 1948, the anticipation of breakthroughs in the use and recovery of raw materials, the failure to achieve international control of atomic energy, and the steady growth of U.S. defense commitments in Europe and elsewhere. The report also pointed to the Soviet Union's recent acquisition of a nuclear capability and commented that even though the proposed expansion of U.S. facilities had been under study before this event was known, it now seemed more important than ever for the United States to accelerate the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons to meet military requirements before the Soviet Union acquired a "significant" atomic arsenal of its own. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs, this potential threat made it all the more vital, militarily, psychologically, and politically, for the United States to maintain an overwhelming superiority in atomic weapons and to press ahead with the accelerated program.

In its part of the report, as to cost and feasibility, the AEC foresaw no insurmountable difficulties. Increased production would mean lower unit costs. Instead of \$500 million, as originally estimated, the AEC now believed that expansion costs could be held to \$319 million, spread over a three-year period, with annual operating expenditures thereafter of \$54 million. Moreover, with improved technology the current shortage of uranium ore would not remain a significant obstacle. Indeed, the State Department felt that if the United States made known its intention to accelerate production, Britain and Canada might be persuaded to liberalize their policies for sharing raw materials. Other likely international benefits included an improved deterrent posture, the reaffirmation of American leadership in atomic energy, and the strengthening of resolve on the part of U.S. friends and allies to resist Soviet pressure.⁷⁰

The President approved on 19 October and authorized the AEC to conduct preliminary feasibility studies using \$30 million of current funds for this purpose.

However, he disregarded a suggestion made by some in Congress to submit an immediate request for a supplemental appropriation as a demonstration of U.S. resolve to maintain its atomic energy lead over the Soviet Union. Instead, acting apparently on advice from the Bureau of the Budget, he decided to delay asking for additional funds until January when he promised to include "emergency estimates" for the AEC and the TVA, which would supply electric power to one of the new AEC production plants.⁷¹

To clarify the goals of the program, the President asked Johnson for detailed information about adjustments in "current strategic planning and requirements . . . resulting from the expanded atomic energy program" and "the operational assumptions which underlie the need for the expanded program and the means by which the utilization of the increased quantities of atomic weapons will be integrated with our total strategic plan." Johnson adopted Truman's suggestion to brief him orally on these matters.⁷²

Scattered evidence suggests that the briefing took place on 10 January 1950 and that it followed generally the information the JCS had put together the previous month.⁷³ The Joint Chiefs reaffirmed their strong support for increased atomic production, but cautioned that the benefits to be derived would not diminish the need for other forces or place the United States in a permanently secure position. The employment of atomic energy for military purposes was still "in its infancy," they explained, and until higher production levels were reached, it did not appear probable that operational assumptions or strategic plans would change to any significant degree. The Joint Chiefs made it clear that they would have welcomed an accelerated program in any case; they felt it now more necessary than ever, in order to offset Soviet progress in atomic energy, to preserve the "marked superiority" of the United States in atomic warfare and to "bridge the wide gap now existing between our international military commitments and our military capabilities." Looking ahead, they expected the increased availability of fissionable materials to expedite research and development and to yield a variety of new weapons, including warheads for guided missiles, penetration weapons, and possibly even "super bombs." The result, they believed, would be an atomic arsenal of increased flexibility that would constitute a more effective deterrent.⁷⁴

The debate over whether to step up production was in many respects a technical one, resting on different assessments of the SANDSTONE tests. But like the custody debate, it showed clearly that a wide ideological gulf separated the military and AEC, with the latter increasingly fearful of losing control of atomic energy. The actions taken augured that the days of scarcity were about to end.

News that the Soviets had tested an atomic device came after the recommendations to the NSC had already been prepared, too late in the debate to play

a significant role in the final decision. Johnson was in any event committed to stepped-up weapons production, for it represented the logical corollary to his policy of relying increasingly on strategic air power. And since the AEC would bear all direct development and production costs, the Defense Department would reap the bonus of additional capabilities at no further expense to itself. Truman, while he may have had doubts about Johnson's policy, as demonstrated by his repeated requests for more information on strategic bombing,* still evidently supported it, as yet with no apparent second thoughts on the international implications or concern over the emerging pattern of U.S.-Soviet competition in the realm of strategic nuclear weapons. As long as accelerated production was technically feasible, militarily justifiable, and relatively inexpensive compared with the overall level of military and defense expenditures, Truman saw nothing objectionable. His reaction to the Soviet test would follow a somewhat different course, focusing on other issues as well. In the end this course would lead both to an even larger program and to breakthroughs in nuclear technology that would result in the development of weapons whose destructive capabilities would be of an entirely different order of magnitude from those previously in the stockpile.

The H-Bomb Decision

The debate over accelerating the production of fission bombs was eventually overshadowed by the question of whether to develop and produce a far more powerful weapon—the H-bomb. Scientists estimated that a thermonuclear weapon could have 100 or more times the explosive power of a fission bomb, a prospect that caused many of them to shudder at the thought of building and testing such a device. However, Johnson and the Joint Chiefs saw definite military needs and uses for such weapons and felt that if the United States did not act quickly to exploit them, the nuclear advantage would eventually pass to the Soviet Union.⁷⁵

Although the actual debate over whether to proceed with the H-bomb lasted only a few brief months—from late 1949 to early 1950—the issues it involved dated from World War II. As early as 1942 a team of nuclear physicists headed by J. Robert Oppenheimer had discovered the theoretical possibility of creating a nuclear reaction through the fusion of two hydrogen isotopes—deuterium and tritium. But because of the need for as yet unattainable high temperatures to bring about a reaction, Manhattan Project officials in 1943 decided to forgo construction of a hydrogen or “super” bomb in favor of a fission bomb. A conference of atomic scientists at Los Alamos in June 1946 examined a proposed H-bomb

* See Chapter XIV.

design and judged it "on the whole workable," but the AEC later decided that the cost and diversion of resources were unjustified. For the next several years scientists at Los Alamos and at the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory of the University of California continued to study the H-bomb, with the understanding that their efforts should remain a matter of secondary priority.⁷⁶

On 9 September 1949 the CIA notified the White House that samples of air masses collected over the North Pacific showed abnormal radioactive contamination.⁷⁷ After verification of the report, President Truman on 23 September announced that the Soviet Union had recently detonated an atomic device.⁷⁸ Although the American people did not appear unduly alarmed, Washington officials from the President on down were genuinely disturbed. They knew from reports dating back to 1945 that the Soviet Union had launched a vigorous atomic energy research effort, and they had fully expected that some day the Soviets would succeed in developing nuclear weapons. What took them by surprise was that the explosion came nearly a year earlier than any U.S. intelligence estimate had forecast.⁷⁹ The United States had been caught off guard and its leaders now faced the difficult question of how to respond to this challenge.

In Los Alamos and Berkeley news of the Soviet achievement immediately rekindled scientific interest in the superbomb project as a way of achieving a "quantum jump" to preserve the U.S. lead in nuclear weapons. The two most ardent proponents of an accelerated program, Ernest O. Lawrence and Luis Alvarez of the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory, flew to Los Alamos early in October to discuss the idea with Edward Teller, who was then conducting experiments in thermonuclear physics. Indeed, Teller and some of his colleagues at Los Alamos had been working for some time on the theoretical and experimental projects that would have to precede any efforts to produce a thermonuclear reaction. Teller assured Lawrence and Alvarez that, with proper funding and support, it would probably be possible to achieve a thermonuclear reaction and construct a weapon.⁸⁰

Fortified with this information, Lawrence and Alvarez flew on to Washington. Here they talked with Senator McMahon and Robert LeBaron, who had recently succeeded William Webster as MLC chairman. Both thought the superbomb idea merited further investigation. McMahon, who believed the Truman administration was moving too slowly, took the initiative. Writing to Lilienthal on 17 October, McMahon urged that work on a superbomb be expedited in a fashion "as bold and urgent as our original atomic enterprise." And, he added, referring to the recent decision to expand other nuclear weapon production facilities, it was "the sense of the Joint Committee that the current situation dictates unusual and even extraordinary steps to push ahead these projects."⁸¹

McMahon's letter reinforced what the AEC already assumed—that the

Soviet test would require some form of U.S. response and pose troubling issues for the commission. Previously, during the debates over custody and expanding production of fissionable material, the AEC had always managed somehow to maintain a united front under Lilienthal's leadership. But now, under the pressure of events, a faction openly sympathetic to the increased military application of atomic energy emerged. On 5 October, even before Lawrence and Alvarez visited Washington, AEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss sent his colleagues a memorandum arguing that the time had come for the AEC to accelerate its thermonuclear work. Strauss saw the matter as a choice between two courses of action—expansion of production of fission bombs or “an intensive effort to get ahead [of the Soviets] with the super.” Pronouncing the first action “not enough,” he favored the latter and proposed an immediate meeting of the AEC General Advisory Committee “to ascertain their views as to how we can proceed with expedition.”⁸²

The GAC, composed of leading nuclear experts, met in Washington on 28–30 October to consider Strauss's suggestion. Not one member of the committee was willing to endorse it. The leading opponent, J. Robert Oppenheimer, perhaps the country's most celebrated physicist and generally regarded as the “father” of the atomic bomb, questioned Teller's facts and figures and cautioned that a thermonuclear reaction might not be feasible. The only way to find out was through construction and demonstration of a test device, a course that some GAC members opposed on moral grounds and others because it would divert resources from ongoing, proven programs. In theory the explosive potential of an H-bomb was limitless; in a controlled reaction it would have a destructive impact 20 to 100 times that of current atomic weapons. Because of this awesome potential, at least two committee members—Enrico Fermi and Isidor I. Rabi—urged that the United States make a public declaration renouncing any intention of developing a thermonuclear weapon and asking other nations to join the pledge. All agreed that use of the H-bomb would be tantamount to an act of genocide. As alternative responses to the Soviet challenge, the committee endorsed, among other things, further expansion of fissionable materials production, development of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, and accelerated manufacture of tritium to “boost” the explosive power of fission bombs.⁸³

Caught between the recommendations of the GAC and those of Strauss and the JCAE, the AEC proved unable to move decisively in either direction. The commissioners voted three to two against H-bomb development, with Strauss and Gordon Dean in the minority.⁸⁴ Unable to mend its split, the AEC agreed to refer the matter to the President; on 9 November it sent the White House a summary report containing a description of the bomb's potential, a list of technical difficulties yet to be solved, and a statement of “general considerations” that should be taken into account, such as the possible military, political, and psychological

ramifications of building and testing an H-bomb. Although the report did not mention moral qualms, it was clear that a majority of the commissioners harbored misgivings similar to those recently expressed by members of the GAC. In an appended statement of personal views, Lilienthal told the President:

I have been disturbed by the fact that there exists a widely held notion that an atomic weapon stockpile affords this country a relatively cheap and easy solution of our problems of military security, of the problems of maintaining peace by deterrent and of preventing the spread of Communism. I associate myself with those who believe we have suffered, in many ways, from this over-valuation and wish to add this point: to launch upon a program of Superbombs would set us upon still another costly cycle of misconception and illusion about the value to us of weapons of mass destruction as the chief means of protecting ourselves and of furthering our national policy.⁸⁵

After reading the report, LeBaron concluded that Lilienthal and other opponents of the H-bomb were making a grave mistake. Rejecting the contention "that there is no peace time future for thermonuclear reactions," LeBaron thought that the development of such reactions was "the logical and ultimate goal in nucleonics." He doubted that it would prove the catastrophe the GAC feared and foresaw no real difficulty with the technical aspects if the United States made a firm commitment to "a high priority" program. Moreover, since principles of thermonuclear physics were known throughout the scientific community, he speculated that the Soviet Union might already be hard at work on a superbomb. "The crux of our military concept of peace through power," LeBaron added, "lies in the belief that the atomic weapon gives us the necessary force in a tight package with simple logistic support. If Russia (or Britain) can make a super and we forego the task what happens to our military thesis?"⁸⁶

Like LeBaron, the Joint Chiefs favored development of the H-bomb and backed it enthusiastically. On 23 November they advised Johnson that construction of such a weapon should go forward immediately. Among the arguments they advanced, however, only one—the possibility that a single H-bomb might substitute for a greater number of fission bombs—bore directly on its military usefulness. Otherwise, it was the bomb's political and psychological values that the Joint Chiefs emphasized. They saw it as an improved form of deterrence and as a way of influencing international relations. Most of all, they shared LeBaron's worry about what the Soviets might be doing. "Possession of a thermonuclear weapon by the USSR without such possession by the United States," the JCS argued, "would be intolerable."⁸⁷

Meanwhile, after reviewing the AEC report, President Truman on 19 November reactivated the NSC special committee on atomic energy to study all aspects of the H-bomb question. As he told Acheson several days later, he wanted the entire matter "laid out" in an orderly and organized manner. The special committee—Acheson, Johnson, and Lilienthal—delegated the preliminary phase of the investigation to a working group whose principal members were LeBaron, Paul Nitze, Deputy Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and AEC Commissioners Henry D. Smyth and Gordon Dean. Initially, LeBaron hoped to follow the approach that Webster had used with the fission bomb production problem a few months earlier—that is, he hoped to separate the study into three parts so that the AEC would treat only technical matters, State would report on the H-bomb's possible impact on international affairs, and Defense would comment on the weapon's military implications. But as the working group got down to business, LeBaron's strategy collapsed under pressure from the other members, who wanted to probe more deeply before making any recommendations. As Acheson told Lilienthal, State wanted detailed information on and analysis of delivery capabilities, the proposed use of the H-bomb in war plans, and the possible effects of enemy retaliation with similar weapons. Last, but not least, State felt that in developing conclusions the working group should look at the "moral questions" involved in building the H-bomb.⁸⁸

While the working group labored over a growing list of questions, the opposing sides in the debate reaffirmed their positions. On 21 November McMahon sent Truman a long letter reiterating his support of the H-bomb. Four days later Strauss followed with detailed advice of his own, assuring Truman of the bomb's probable feasibility and stressing the need to keep the United States "as completely armed as any possible enemy." Opponents of the H-bomb remained equally steadfast. Meeting on 2–3 December 1949, the GAC reexamined its decision on the superbomb and reaffirmed without change its report of 30 October.⁸⁹

Amid the continuing swirl of conflicting recommendations, the NSC special committee met on 22 December to survey the progress of its working group. Earlier, Nitze and Lilienthal had discussed a possible compromise. According to Nitze's retrospective account, Lilienthal wanted an overall appraisal of the political and military consequences before making any decision on the H-bomb. Nitze agreed that such a study would be beneficial but, drawing on scientific evidence presented by Teller, Lawrence, Oppenheimer, and others, he told Lilienthal it was possible that the Soviet Union might already be working on its own superbomb and further delay of the U.S. program would only give the Soviets more of an advantage.⁹⁰ Nitze outlined a four-part course of action to Acheson on 19 December:

1. That the President authorize the A.E.C. to proceed with an accelerated program to test the possibility of a thermonuclear reaction;
2. That no decision be made at this time as to whether weapons employing such reaction will actually be built beyond the number required for a test of feasibility;
3. That the N.S.C. reexamine our aims and objectives in the light of the USSR's probable fission bomb capability and its possible thermonuclear capability;
4. That, pending such a review, no public discussion of these issues on the part of those having access to classified materials in this field be authorized.⁹¹

The 22 December meeting produced, as Acheson described it, a "head-on confrontation" between Johnson and Lilienthal and proved totally abortive. Johnson wanted the matter decided on the narrow technical grounds of whether building the H-bomb was feasible; if so, he would agree with his military advisers that the work should go forward immediately. Lilienthal objected and sought to shift discussion to what he termed "the purpose and course of mankind," an issue that Johnson dismissed as irrelevant to the committee's deliberations. Acheson, realizing that his was the swing vote, declined to take sides pending further study. Blaming "the acerbity of Louis Johnson's nature" for blocking progress, he resolved to find a solution through one-on-one talks with Johnson and Lilienthal. The meeting thus ended in a deadlock, a welcome result as far as Lilienthal was concerned. "We reached no conclusion, which is good," he wrote in his journal.⁹²

By the end of December Acheson had made up his mind that the United States should develop and test a superbomb, but he failed to persuade Lilienthal, despite several lengthy conversations. As the days wore on, Johnson grew impatient. Finally, in mid-January he bypassed the special committee and sent Truman a copy of a recent study prepared by the Joint Chiefs analyzing the findings of the AEC's General Advisory Committee. Taking a position similar to Nitze's, the Joint Chiefs doubted the need for a "crash" program and urged instead a determination of the bomb's technical feasibility "as a matter of top priority." The question of production numbers could be decided later. The Joint Chiefs argued that the H-bomb "would improve our defense in its broadest sense, as a potential offensive weapon, a possible deterrent to war, a potential retaliatory weapon, as well as a defensive weapon against enemy forces." They repeated their previous warning that a decision to forgo development of the H-bomb would risk placing the United States "in an intolerable position if a possible enemy possessed the bomb and the United States did not." Lastly, they could see no "moral objections" that outweighed national security, observing that "it is difficult to escape the conviction that in war it is folly to argue whether one weapon is more

immoral than another. For, in the larger sense, it is war itself which is immoral, and the stigma of such immorality must rest upon the nation which initiates hostilities.”⁹³

Truman concluded that the JCS study “made a lot of sense” and directed that copies be sent to Acheson and Lilienthal. Acheson readily perceived the substance of the President’s thinking and asked his deputy for atomic energy matters, R. Gordon Arneson, to prepare a paper which Acheson could propose to the special committee as the text of its report to the President.⁹⁴

Thus, by the time the committee reassembled on 31 January 1950, resolution of the H-bomb question was clearly in sight. Prior to the meeting, the State Department circulated two documents—a draft press release announcing the decision to develop and test a hydrogen weapon; and Arneson’s paper containing a list of four specific recommendations, similar in substance to Nitze’s earlier proposals:

(a) That the President direct the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed to determine the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, the scale and rate of effort to be determined jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense; and that the necessary ordnance developments and carrier program be undertaken concurrently;

(b) That the President defer decision pending the reexamination referred to in (c) as to whether thermonuclear weapons should be produced beyond the number required for a test of feasibility;

(c) That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union;

(d) That the President indicate publicly the intention of this Government to continue work to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, and that no further official information on it be made public without the approval of the President.⁹⁵

Although the meeting on 31 January lasted nearly two hours, it produced no surprises and only a few alterations in the State Department’s recommendations. The most significant change resulted from Johnson’s objection to the inclusion of paragraph (b) in the recommendations. Johnson did not state clearly why he wanted this deleted, but it may have been because he considered the question of production extraneous to the matter at hand and that the military application of the H-bomb might be handicapped if contingent on the outcome of a reexami-

nation of U.S. security policy as proposed in paragraph (c). After further discussion the committee agreed to delete paragraph (b). According to Acheson, "Lilienthal then stated eloquently and forcefully his objections to authorizing investigation and research while a review of our policies was going on, since this . . . would extinguish whatever faint hope there might be of finding a way to prevent development of the weapon." In spite of Lilienthal's plea, Acheson and Johnson supported the revised report. Reluctantly, Lilienthal also signed it.⁹⁶

Shortly after noon the special committee moved to the White House to present its conclusions orally.* At Acheson's suggestion, Lilienthal briefly recapitulated some of his arguments against the H-bomb. Truman listened politely for a while but then interrupted before Lilienthal could finish. "Can the Russians do it?" he asked. Everyone agreed that they could. "In that case," Truman said, "we have no choice. We'll go ahead." Without further deliberation he approved the committee's recommendations and immediate release of the press statement. The decision had been made, and by evening it was headline news.⁹⁷

Acceleration of the H-Bomb Program

Although it ranks in retrospect as one of the most momentous decisions of his administration, Truman did not intend his sanction of the H-bomb to stimulate any frantic burst of activity. Rather, he wanted to accelerate development at a rate that would require neither enormous new expenditures nor any untoward diversion of personnel and other resources from established lines of work. The AEC worried that all-out effort leading to an early feasibility test and quantity superbomb production could seriously impair the output of fission bombs. But after the Joint Chiefs made it plain that they saw no reason for putting the thermonuclear work on a crash basis, the AEC made a preliminary estimate that a minimum of three years would be needed to determine the technical feasibility of the superbomb.⁹⁸

Events shortly intervened to compel a reexamination of the timetable. On 2 February 1950 British police arrested Klaus Fuchs, a German-born nuclear physicist who had worked on the Manhattan Project in World War II and who had also participated in the Los Alamos H-bomb conference in 1946. A few days

* The special committee's written report, derived from Arneson's summary paper, was dated 31 January 1950 but was not actually transmitted to the President until 1 March. The reason for the delay was that the special committee preferred to give an oral presentation first and then develop written recommendations that would accord with the President's decision. Portions of the committee's final report are printed in *FRUS 1950*, I:513-23.

earlier Fuchs had confessed to being a Soviet agent,* but because of British legal procedures which prevented further questioning until his trial, U.S. counter-intelligence had no way of determining how much or what kind of data he had transmitted to the Soviets. Even so, U.S. intelligence sources speculated that he had passed along other data which might have given the Soviets "great assistance" in development of an H-bomb. Two members of the MLC, General Loper and General Nichols, believed that the Soviets might already have an H-bomb in production.⁹⁹

During the H-bomb debate, the Joint Chiefs had played down the need for a crash thermonuclear program and had sided with the State Department in urging that the work be confined to experimental models. Now, with the Fuchs revelation, they backed Johnson in seeking a stepped-up effort with the goal of producing and stockpiling H-bombs.

On 28 February Truman and Johnson met to discuss the matter. "Since your recent decision with respect to work by the Atomic Energy Commission on the hydrogen bomb," Johnson wrote prior to the meeting, "certain developments, which you and I have discussed, make it apparent that the Soviets may already have made important progress in this field of atomic weapons." Warning that precautions should be taken immediately, Johnson urged "all-out development of hydrogen bombs and means for their production and delivery." Truman was nearly persuaded, but before authorizing any action he again activated the NSC special committee, asking it to submit specific recommendations.¹⁰⁰

By the time the President issued his directive, Sumner T. Pike had become Acting Chairman of the AEC, replacing Lilienthal, whose resignation, for personal reasons unrelated to the H-bomb debate and pending since the previous November, took effect on 14 February 1950. Like Lilienthal, Pike had originally opposed the superbomb, but along with the other commission members he now joined in full support of the President's January decision. On 1 March a working group composed of LeBaron, Smyth, and Arneson began consideration of the matter, completing their assignment eight days later with the submission of a report to the President.¹⁰¹

On 10 March Truman approved and ordered implementation of the special committee's findings. The report recommended that the President "note that the thermonuclear weapon program is regarded as a matter of the highest urgency"

* Although news of Fuchs's confession reached Washington on 27 January 1950, it apparently played little part in the H-bomb decision. According to Arneson, "The H-Bomb Decision, Part II," 26, the most readily perceived effect of the Fuchs revelation was that "it marked the end, certainly for the foreseeable future, of joint US-UK efforts to expand areas of cooperation in atomic energy activities." Arneson added: "The Fuchs matter was in the back of everyone's mind—but not dominant" when the NSC special committee met and presented its recommendations to the President on 31 January 1950.

and "note with approval the program for the test of the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon and the necessary ordnance and carrier developments." He was also asked to instruct the AEC to continue preparations for quantity production of materials for thermonuclear weapons and to instruct the AEC and Defense to make recommendations on the scale of preparation for production of such materials. The report rejected the possibility of accelerating the test program but stressed that a prompt decision on thermonuclear weapons materials production would save two years between testing of the weapon and establishment of weapons production capability. The committee anticipated a test of the thermonuclear process by 1952 and completion of a prototype weapon in three years. Cost of the program through the projected 1952 test would be about \$95 million, with additional money needed later for building the prototype.¹⁰²

Unlike the earlier debate over whether to build the superbomb, the decision to begin production when and if testing proved successful came about in rather routine fashion. If the President had any doubts or second thoughts they were not apparent. One of his concerns was whether work on the H-bomb would unduly divert resources from fission weapons. With this in mind, he ordered a followup study on the adequacy of production facilities. The resulting AEC-DoD report, completed in May 1950, concluded that production capabilities were generally adequate for the time being, but expanded facilities would be required to avoid future bottlenecks in production of fissionable materials. With the President's approval, the AEC began to formulate plans for expansion of its facilities, leading eventually to the construction of the huge Savannah River complex in South Carolina.¹⁰³

Unlike the decision to step up production of fissionable materials, the decision to proceed with the H-bomb came at a time when U.S. atomic superiority seemed to face a serious challenge. Truman has often been criticized for his decision, but the question persists: Did he have a viable alternative? Looking back, in 1982, McGeorge Bundy suggested that Truman could have called for a U.S.-U.S.S.R. thermonuclear test ban without precluding the pursuit of theoretical work on a thermonuclear device. But the only real choice appears to have been all or nothing. Even the GAC, which unanimously opposed the H-bomb, agreed that the only way to determine its feasibility was to carry the experiment to its logical conclusion. Although they suffered several setbacks along the way, including the discovery that their original design was unworkable, the thermonuclear scientists still made remarkable progress, producing in November 1952 (Operation Ivy) the world's first thermonuclear explosion, with a yield of 10.4 megatons.¹⁰⁴

As many suspected, the Soviets were not far behind, having apparently launched their own thermonuclear project on or about 1 November 1949—some

three months before Truman gave the green light to the U.S. program. The first Soviet test of a device with "super" bomb characteristics occurred in August 1953, but its yield in the 200-300-kiloton range suggests a different kind of design from that developed by the United States. After the U.S. H-bomb test, the Soviets intensified the tempo of their work and succeeded in producing in November 1955 an explosion estimated at 1.6 megatons.¹⁰⁵

Start of development of the H-bomb capped the formative period in the U.S. nuclear weapons program. Henceforth, with the promise of a much larger arsenal, including bombs and warheads of diversified design and firepower, the emphasis within DoD would shift to improvement of tactics, strategy, and delivery systems. By mid-1950 the United States also had lost its nuclear monopoly and faced the prospect of an ominous arms competition with the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, civil-military wrangling over custody and similar issues would steadily recede in importance, giving way to organizational arrangements that vested increased responsibility for atomic weapons in the Defense Department. Truman's statement of willingness to use these weapons "if necessary," his decision to proceed with thermonuclear development, and the dispatch of bomb components overseas all signaled a growing reliance on atomic weapons and set a course that would profoundly affect the attitudes and actions of future generations.

CHAPTER XVI

The North Atlantic Alliance

As a principal means of strengthening U.S. security in response to intensification of the Cold War, the Truman administration accelerated the atomic weapons program rather than undertake a large-scale and expensive buildup of conventional military forces. Toward the same end, the administration was also engaged in adding a unique new dimension to the basic security structure of the nation—a collective security agreement with Canada and 10 Western European nations providing for mutual defense against armed attack on any of them. This agreement reflected a realization of the growing interdependence of the Atlantic community and a recognition of the extent to which the security of the United States had come to depend on the preservation of the security of Western Europe—a Western Europe which was divided, still debilitated, and threatened by growing Soviet military power. The pursuit of such an alliance constituted a radical departure from past American international security policy and meant the final abandonment of a 150-year tradition of hemispheric isolationism in times of peace.

Since the days of Washington and Jefferson American foreign policy had followed the principle that “entangling alliances” and political involvement abroad were inimical to basic U.S. interests. For generations of Americans it became an article of faith that the United States should remain detached from the quarrels and conflicts of Europe. Reinforced by a disillusioning U.S. involvement in World War I, this conviction still persisted in the 1930s, when isolationists strongly influenced the country’s foreign policy. World War II, however, brought home to Americans how untenable isolationism had become as technology drastically telescoped time and distance.

The United States first participated in a formal collective security treaty in September 1947, when it signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assis-

tance at Rio de Janeiro. The Rio Pact, initially adhered to by most independent Latin American countries, provided that an attack by any country against any American state would be considered an attack against all, requiring each of the signatories to assist in meeting the attack. But establishment of a permanent military organization in support of the alliance was never seriously contemplated, perhaps because no outside threats to Latin America existed.¹

In Europe the situation was different. There, the outside threat was manifest in the form of a Soviet military machine that seemed capable of overrunning the entire continent in a matter of weeks. Notwithstanding the exaggerated claims that Western intelligence sometimes made for Soviet capabilities, there was no doubt that the war-crippled countries of Western Europe remained extremely vulnerable; even with the encouraging beginnings of the economic recovery that the Marshall Plan was making possible, there was still a pervasive fear, on both sides of the Atlantic, that Western Europe might be absorbed into the Soviet orbit. Whether a Soviet attack was imminent was not really the issue. What mattered was that Western Europe was dangerously exposed and that without any plan to preserve its security all the economic help provided by the United States might not ensure its continued freedom and independence.

Movement Toward an Alliance

Winston Churchill, in his celebrated "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Mo., in March 1946, was among the first to propose publicly a military alliance between the United States and Western Europe. Although some considered the idea premature at the time, it steadily gained support on both sides of the Atlantic and by late 1947 had become the subject of serious discussion. When the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in London between 25 November and 15 December 1947, failed to make any progress toward resolving the continuing impasse over German reunification,* British and French officials came away pessimistic about Soviet intentions and ready to consider an anti-Soviet defensive alliance.²

The British acted first. On 13 January 1948 Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin informed Secretary of State Marshall that the British Government intended to approach France and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) with a proposal for a collective security treaty that would pool their military and political resources. Stating that he regarded Bevin's proposal of "fundamental importance to the future of western civilization," Marshall replied that he welcomed the European initiative and that the United States would do all that it could to bring the proposal to fruition. With this encouragement,

* See Chapter X.

Bevin went before the House of Commons on 22 January to call for the formation of a Western European alliance. Paris and the Benelux capitals responded favorably to the proposal, and a meeting held in Brussels resulted in the signing on 17 March of a treaty, which came to be known as the Brussels Pact, establishing the Western Union (WU).³

The total military forces at the disposal of the new defense organization were exceedingly weak. All WU countries had suffered extensive damage during World War II to their cities, towns, and factories. Except for Britain, these countries had been knocked out of the war early, and these defeats, followed by years of Nazi occupation, had led to the near-total disintegration of their armed forces. Moreover, what forces had survived or been reconstituted after the war were mostly scattered abroad in colonial areas or engaged in occupation duties in Germany and Austria. These burdens imposed a heavy strain on their war-wrecked economies. To be effective, the new alliance would require substantial outside help, for which Bevin and others looked to the United States.⁴

In early February 1948 the British Foreign Office considered sending a senior official to Washington to sound out the State Department on possible U.S. support for a Western European defense pact, but it decided to wait "since the moment was deemed unpropitious." The communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the mysterious death of Jan Masaryk, reports of Soviet political pressure on the governments of Norway and Finland, and signs of a Soviet troop buildup in East Germany* suddenly lent urgency to taking the initiative. On 11 March Bevin proposed immediate staff level talks with the United States and Canada to explore ways of improving political and military collaboration. Both governments quickly accepted, with Marshall suggesting that the talks focus "on the establishment of an Atlantic security system."⁵

Marshall's response seemed to suggest that the United States was fully prepared to discuss entering into a formal alliance, but such was not the case. Within the administration itself there had not yet been anything more than preliminary discussion on the matter, and, of course, Congress had still to be consulted. Senior State Department officials concluded that the time was not yet ripe for the United States to enter into formal commitments, but that it should utilize the opportunity provided by the talks to encourage strengthening of the Western Union and prepare the way for possible U.S. association.⁶ Forrestal had also become concerned over the lack of a definite policy toward the Western Union, particularly as it affected U.S. national security, and he asked the NSC to address the matter. The talks, begun on 22 March and lasting more than 10 days, were held at the Pentagon to assure utmost privacy and prevent press leaks. Lord Inverchapel, Ambassador to the United States, and Gladwyn Jebb, Superintendent of the U.N.

• See Chapter X.

Political Department of the Foreign Office, headed the British delegation. The senior U.S. participants included John D. Hickerson and Theodore C. Achilles of the State Department's Office of European Affairs; Lewis Douglas, Ambassador to Great Britain; and General Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff, who served as representative of both the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs and also as unofficial secretary of the conversations. The senior Canadian representative was Lester B. Pearson, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.⁷

The British sought first to clarify the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Western Union. They wanted a firm pledge of military help, but this the American delegation declined to give on the grounds that congressional approval had yet to be obtained. Douglas said only that "US full support should be *assumed*." The British accepted this position reluctantly, whereupon the talks moved into a discussion of the desirable nature of a defense pact. As the United States saw it, Hickerson explained during the second day's meeting, the Western Union was a European undertaking and should remain so as a means of encouraging European unity. With this point firmly understood, it became clear that the U.S. delegation wanted an arrangement that went beyond the current Western Union—an Atlantic or Western mutual defense pact. The British and Canadians concurred in this idea, and it became the frame of reference for the remainder of the negotiations.⁸

The size and organization of the proposed security system received much attention. During the course of the meetings differences over the scale and scope of the alliance and over regional groupings and associated alliances arose and were resolved. There emerged a compromise on a North Atlantic-only alliance but with provision for the eventual inclusion of virtually every noncommunist country in Europe.⁹

As for military collaboration, Gruenther stated that the Joint Chiefs had not yet considered the military implications of an alliance. He wanted it clearly understood that it might not be feasible for the United States to deliver aid "locally" to victims of Soviet aggression and that the United States would have to retain freedom to carry out military actions in accordance with its strategic concepts.¹⁰

At the final conference meeting on 1 April, the American delegation outlined in a document later known as the "Pentagon Paper" what further steps the United States was prepared to take. It envisioned the eventual conclusion of "a collective defense agreement for the North Atlantic Area" in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Borrowing from the terms of the Rio Treaty, the United States suggested that an attack against one alliance member should be considered an attack against all, requiring prompt and effective collective response. The exact composition of the alliance was left undetermined, but after additional consultations through diplomatic channels, the United States proposed

to call a conference that would involve the Western Union countries, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Canada, Eire, Italy, and Portugal. When circumstances permitted, West Germany, Austria, and Spain should also be included in the alliance. Meanwhile, pending establishment of a Middle East security system, the United States and Great Britain would issue a joint declaration pledging to uphold the independence and territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey, and Iran. In furtherance of these objectives, the State Department pointedly stated that it would be necessary to obtain the concurrence of senior officials, including the President and "a few Congressional leaders," particularly Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.¹¹

Development of U.S. Policy

The Pentagon talks of March–April 1948 anticipated the creation of a North Atlantic alliance. What was not certain, however, was how soon and to what extent the United States would pursue the Pentagon Paper's recommendations. That there should be some sort of collective security arrangement was generally accepted. However, the nature and extent of U.S. involvement in such an alliance had yet to be determined and became the subject of considerable debate.

Along with officials in the State Department, Secretary Forrestal saw the need for a careful assessment of U.S. interests and capabilities to avoid haphazard commitments. Alarmed by the communist coup in Czechoslovakia and growing Soviet pressure on Norway, Forrestal became increasingly worried about European security. Even before the Pentagon talks he had asked the NSC to conduct a full review of the military implications for the United States of the European situation, pointing to the need for a "clear cut" policy to meet the growing Soviet threat to Scandinavia and Western Europe. "There have been increasing indications," he wrote,

that these nations must know about, and be tied in with, our own plans, and we must ourselves have a very clear picture of the position which they play in our scheme of security. This has been extensively considered in connection with the European Recovery Program, but I think the time may come when it must be studied on a broader basis, such basis to include important military factors.¹²

Secretary Marshall agreed to a prompt review. On 24 March, only two days after the Pentagon talks began, he sent the NSC a position paper (PPS 27), drafted by his Policy Planning Staff, on U.S. policy toward the Western Union.

A revised version (NSC 9), incorporating major points of the recent Pentagon negotiations, went on 13 April to NSC members for comment and discussion.¹³

NSC 9 recommended that the United States support, but not join, the five-power Brussels Pact and that it explore the possibility of a larger mutual defense agreement involving the United States, the members of the Western Union, and other North Atlantic countries. It also recommended that the United States initiate military assistance to prospective alliance members and participate in Western Union military planning. Assuming the adoption of these measures, President Truman would then call for a conference to draft a collective security agreement modeled on the Rio Treaty. Simultaneously, the United States and Great Britain would issue the suggested declaration on Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Pending agreement on ways of providing mutual aid and assistance, each member of the proposed alliance should determine for itself how best to fulfill its obligations. The proposed treaty should contain a statement of policy that an attack against one member was an attack against all; a delineation of the geographic area protected under the agreement; and a provision for the creation of agencies for regular political and military consultation and collaboration.¹⁴

At the time NSC 9 was circulated in mid-April, Forrestal found himself involved in the preparation of the FY 1949 supplemental budget requests for funds that many in the military hoped would be the first installment of a rearmament program. Since NSC 9 said little about specific military commitments, Forrestal was naturally curious to learn what the State Department envisioned, particularly how much military assistance it felt the United States might supply under the proposed aid program. He received an answer on 23 April during a brief conversation with Under Secretary Robert Lovett, who said that State did not intend writing a blank check but, instead, planned to follow the precedent of the European Recovery Program. Before the Europeans received any military help, Lovett said, they would have to show that they were making maximum use of their own resources. But no matter how much the Europeans provided, it would still be necessary for the United States to make a contribution. When Forrestal asked the amount, Lovett replied: "Not less than three billion dollars"—precisely what Truman had said he would allow for the supplemental military appropriation.¹⁵

The imminent possibility that a European alliance might compete for resources earmarked for U.S. armed forces prompted the Joint Chiefs in late April to ask Forrestal to seek a further clarification of military objectives under NSC 9. "While the desirability of the proposed assistance is recognized," the Joint Chiefs wrote,

it is also clear that its extent must be limited by the necessity for avoiding either undue reduction of resources essential to our national security

or undue interference with our own military requirements. We must also avoid the harmful influence on our global strategy that might result from decision [sic] regarding assistance of this sort dictated by foreign demand rather than appropriateness to strategic plans. Finally, consideration must be given to the possibility that the Soviets might easily capture armament plants in certain [European] locations.¹⁶

Before the NSC could address these points, the State Department on 11 May submitted a revised version of NSC 9 that differed from the earlier draft by omitting specific terms of reference for a treaty, by dropping any mention of support for Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and by emphasizing the need for congressional consultation before taking any action on a treaty. An annex contained a resolution drafted for introduction in the Senate sanctioning negotiations looking to the "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles and provisions of the [United Nations] Charter." Except for advocating that the administration should seek Senate adoption of the resolution, NSC 9/2 recommended against any executive initiatives requiring further congressional action before January 1949. Instead, the next six months should be devoted to exploratory talks between the United States and other North Atlantic countries interested in joining an alliance and staff level conferences on U.S.-Western Union military planning. NSC 9/2 spelled out clearly the obligation of the Europeans to demonstrate a willingness for self-help prior to the commitment of U.S. military assistance.¹⁷

The Joint Chiefs informed Forrestal that NSC 9/2 appeared to assume that the United States would give ample support to a North Atlantic alliance and that the only remaining issue was a procedural one concerning congressional approval of negotiations and a treaty. This, they insisted, was simply not so; the United States had to struggle to meet its own military needs and it had little knowledge of specific European military requirements. They argued the need for thorough exploration of requirements to avoid "any agreement that might unduly influence or jeopardize our optimum over-all global strategy in favor of either direct military assistance or distribution of equipment."¹⁸

The National Security Council took up NSC 9/2 on 20 May 1948. Forrestal pointed out that the Joint Chiefs had called repeatedly for strengthening the U.S. military posture and that they were worried about the impact that military assistance to Europe might have on it. He noted, for example, that the French wanted help for arming 25 divisions and implied that this could impose unreasonable demands on U.S. stockpiles. Lovett, however, considered the Joint Chiefs' fears

groundless since Congress was in no mood to give the President open-ended authority to make substantial arms shipments except perhaps in an emergency. He added that the immediate goal—a buildup of U.S. military forces—could be jeopardized if Congress somehow got the idea that the administration contemplated large-scale foreign military assistance.

Turning to the question of a treaty, Lovett reported that he and other State Department officials had recently completed exploratory meetings with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, as a result, the committee would soon release a statement favoring negotiation of an alliance. The feeling in Congress, Lovett added, was that the United States should not associate itself on a formal basis with the Western Union. For this reason and because of the JCS objections, Lovett suggested, and the council agreed, to defer action on NSC 9/2 until the Senate committee took formal action on the resolution.¹⁹

During the next few weeks two developments served to expedite approval of a final statement of U.S. policy. On 11 June the Senate overwhelmingly endorsed Resolution 239, popularly known as the "Vandenberg Resolution." Designed to test Senate sentiment, the Vandenberg Resolution eventually became the cornerstone of U.S. participation in the North Atlantic alliance. In broad language, it informed the President that within the provisions of the U.N. Charter, the Senate favored efforts by the United States for the "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense" and U.S. "association" with such of these "arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its security." Its adoption indicated that the Senate would be likely to approve a treaty consistent with the resolution.²⁰

Three days later the NSC staff circulated a report (NSC 14) on military assistance to noncommunist countries. This report, in preparation since March, effectively resolved the issue bothering the Joint Chiefs. While recommending that the United States adopt a "comprehensive" military aid policy with the promise of "extensive" assistance, NSC 14 specifically prohibited any such assistance (other than in "exceptional cases") if it would "jeopardize the fulfillment of the minimum materiel requirements of the United States armed forces, as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Moreover, NSC 14 stipulated that foreign military assistance "should not be inconsistent with strategic concepts approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."²¹

In view of these new provisions, the Joint Chiefs dropped all objections to NSC 9/2, whereupon the NSC on 1 July adopted an updated version of the paper (NSC 9/3) which took note of the recent Vandenberg Resolution. At the same time the council adopted NSC 14/1, a slightly amended report on military assistance. Truman promptly approved the two papers.²²

Expanding Military Collaboration

With the approval of NSC 9/3, U.S. involvement in the creation of a Western alliance entered a new phase that saw diplomatic and military talks conducted in tandem. On 6 July 1948, with the international scene now dominated by the Berlin blockade, diplomatic representatives of the United States, the Western Union, and Canada met in Washington for the first in a series of exploratory meetings to discuss, as Lovett put it, "thoughts of closer military, political, economic and spiritual union between the countries of Western Europe," backed by the United States. These negotiations continued through the summer and into the autumn and eventually resulted in general agreement on the need for a formal conference to draft a treaty.²³

Meanwhile, the parties moved steadily toward military collaboration. Initially this took the form of two separate efforts that in time became one. The first of these involved certain arrangements pertaining to HALFMOON, the U.S. emergency war plan which the American, British, and Canadian planners had accepted during meetings between 12 and 21 April 1948 as a "unilateral but accordant" plan for worldwide defense against Soviet military aggression during fiscal year 1949. Yet to be solved was the question of command responsibility for U.S. and British occupation forces (and inevitably for those of France as well) in the event of war.²⁴

On 16 June, when the Joint Chiefs and representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff met in Washington, they considered the feasibility of setting up a line of defense at the Rhine, the place and role of the French in the command arrangements, and the establishment and selection of an overall commander. After both staffs had studied the matter, the JCS on 23 July submitted a formal proposal that there be an allied commander-in-chief responsible to the long-standing but informally constituted Combined Chiefs of Staff, to be augmented by a French member. And if the British and French Governments so desired, this supreme commander would be the U.S. military governor in Germany, General Clay. He would have a British deputy and a French commander for land forces and an American commander for air forces.²⁵

At a meeting in Washington on 13 August the British took the position, and the JCS agreed, that neither Clay nor any of the other military governors should be considered for the position of supreme commander because their occupation duties required far too much of their time to permit proper discharge of additional duties. However, the British still insisted on the need for immediate designation of a supreme commander with broad responsibilities. Noting that Western Union treaty provisions would come into play in the event of a Soviet attack, they suggested that the supreme commander report to the WU Chiefs of

Staff, who would be augmented by an American "liaison" officer. The Joint Chiefs agreed in principle, provided the WU Chiefs of Staff, in turn, were made responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who would have overall strategic authority. Although admitting that the French deserved a voice, even on a temporary basis, the British opposed adding a French member to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Since the conferees agreed that current political considerations precluded designation of an American as the supreme commander, they proposed selection of a French officer as an interim allied commander in Western Europe and the appointment of a standby supreme commander and his deputy (an American and a Briton) who would take over at the outbreak of hostilities. At such time, the French officer would assume command of the land forces. The JCS also agreed to the British suggestion that the air commander be a Briton rather than an American, as the JCS had earlier proposed.²⁶

A week later at Newport,* Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs discussed the alliance and military assistance. Command and control arrangements recently discussed with the British received endorsement, but General Vandenberg brought up the need for a permanent allied rear headquarters west of the Rhine. According to Vandenberg, who had just returned from Europe, the fear that Clay might "wake up some morning with his throat cut" and that American field commanders in Germany would have no alternative command post to go to was causing much concern. The conferees agreed to establishment of such a headquarters and suggested that, for the time being, a European officer with broad authority to coordinate the movement of U.S. and Western Union forces head the new command. The names of three candidates emerged from the discussion: Field Marshal Viscount Alexander, Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, and Marshal Alphonse Juin.†

As for U.S. participation in the allied command, the Newport conferees decided to ask the Western Union to reserve a space for an American officer, either Clay or General J. Lawton Collins, to serve as deputy allied commander-in-chief. There was concern that if the United States agreed to an American supreme commander, particularly Eisenhower, his immense prestige would naturally focus attention on Western Europe, thereby upsetting the more broadly oriented U.S. war plans which regarded operations on the European continent as only one element of U.S. strategy.²⁷

Back in Washington on 23 August, Forrestal secured Marshall's support of

* For the Newport conference, see Chapter XIV.

† Alexander and Montgomery were outstanding British Army commanders of World War II. Juin was the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Defense in France at the end of the war.

the proposal. That same day, exercising utmost secrecy, Marshall wrote President Truman seeking approval of the appointment of a supreme commander and explaining why selection of an American general was inadvisable. Truman immediately approved the command arrangement, adding: "It is my opinion however that we must be very careful not to allow a foreign commander to use up our men before he goes into action in toto." The next day the United States notified both the British and the WU Chiefs of Staff, then meeting in London, of its decision.²⁸

Earlier, in mid-April 1948, just as the U.S.-U.K. bilateral discussions on command arrangements had gotten under way, the newly formed Western Union sought to initiate talks on military collaboration with the United States. Reluctant to become involved without some sort of formal congressional support, the administration waited for passage of the Vandenberg Resolution, which came on 11 June. Less than two weeks later, Marshall notified the Western Union nations and Canada that the United States was "... ready to begin top secret exploratory talks pursuant to Vandenberg Res[olution] ... on 29 June." On the same day, Lovett asked Forrestal how soon he could send representatives to London to participate in talks.²⁹ Both OSD and JCS balked at the short deadline, pointing out that the WU military committee would raise major strategic questions for which American representatives would have no answers. Even official administration policy on military support to the WU nations remained uncertain, and on this basis Forrestal sought and obtained a delay in dispatching representatives to London.³⁰

On 3 July, the day following Truman's approval of NSC 9/3, Forrestal informed Marshall that he had endorsed a JCS recommendation to send to London a joint group of not more than seven officers, headed by an Army general officer.³¹ Subsequently, the JCS selected Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer as the group leader and directed him to join the WU Permanent Military Committee meetings, "on a non-membership basis." Moreover, the Joint Chiefs provided Lemnitzer and his group with detailed instructions (NSC 9/4) on what they could and could not do; particularly, they were to "confine their comments to military matters." The JCS added:

Military negotiations in London should, however, be so conducted as to advance the possibility of eventual close ties, under a United Nations regional security arrangement, between the United States, Canada, and nations outside the "iron curtain" in Europe and its contiguous Atlantic waters.

U.S. participation in the London military talks of the Western Union nations is undertaken "with a view to participating in conversations on

military plans" and with a view to "drawing up a coordinated military supply plan" on the basis of a European Recovery Program precedent...³²

The JCS also informed Lemnitzer of the ongoing discussions with the British and French over command arrangements for emergency military operations in Europe and suggested meshing this into the London military planning. They also warned that for this planning the Western Union could initially expect the assistance of only those American troops already in Europe to support the current WU strategic concept of fighting "as far east in Germany as possible." Finally, the JCS cautioned Lemnitzer against agreeing to military plans or command arrangements that might "unduly influence" U.S. global strategy.³³

Wearing civilian clothes to conceal their identity from the press, Lemnitzer and his group arrived in London on 21 July, assuming their mission to be top secret. But within a day, London newspapers announced the group's arrival and the presumed purpose of the visit. Although this took Lemnitzer by surprise, neither Forrestal nor Marshall had expected that the group's presence would go unnoticed; in fact, Marshall earlier had instructed the American Embassy not to announce in advance but to confirm the group's presence once it became known.³⁴

The JCS had suggested that initially U.S. participation in the London talks be kept to "a period of weeks rather than months." Once it became apparent that the discussions would be long-term in nature, Lemnitzer was recalled to Washington in mid-August to concentrate on the newly authorized military assistance program; Maj. Gen. Franklin A. Kibler, USA, replaced him in London.³⁵

With Truman's approval on 23 August of a French or British commander in Western Europe, efforts to find an acceptable choice and to establish a combined rear headquarters west of the Rhine intensified. Although these actions met with general agreement, the French submitted conditions for their cooperation: a firm commitment of direct U.S. assistance in case of attack, membership on the Combined Chiefs of Staff, increased shipments of military equipment, and a promise that in any emergency the first American reinforcements sent to Europe would go to France.³⁶ Secretary Marshall tried to be reassuring but could make no definite promises. He did point out that there were no plans to reactivate the Combined Chiefs of Staff on a formal basis. Moreover, to meet the French request for equipment, at least in part, President Truman approved in September the transfer of sufficient equipment and spares to bring three French occupation divisions up to combat status. Thereafter, progress at the London meetings accelerated, and by the end of September an agreement on command arrangements and other organizational matters appeared close at hand.³⁷

Results of the London negotiations became public on 5 October 1948, with announcement that the Western Union Permanent Military Committee had de-

cided to create for purposes of military planning a full-time WU defense organization. Field Marshal Montgomery became Chairman of the four-member Commanders in Chief Committee, with headquarters at Fontainebleau, France. The other three commanders were General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, head of allied land forces; Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, in charge of air operations; and Vice Admiral Robert Jaujard, flag officer for naval matters.*³⁸

Shortly thereafter, the Western Union invited the United States to designate military representatives to its Commanders in Chief Committee and its Military Committee on Equipment and Armament.³⁹ The Joint Chiefs agreed on the desirability of having a U.S. representative meet regularly with the Commanders in Chief Committee and on 13 December nominated Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, an experienced World War II combat commander who was Clay's deputy. Huebner's participation, the JCS stated, should be "on a non-membership basis generally in consonance with the terms of reference established for the present United States representative with the Permanent Military Committee of Western Union." Forrestal informed the Secretary of State of the nomination on 18 December.⁴⁰

The Joint Chiefs, as well as the Munitions Board, agreed with Marshall's and Forrestal's suggestion to name a civilian as the representative to WU's Military Committee on Equipment and Armament on a nonmembership basis. Pending Forrestal's selection of a permanent representative, the State Department appointed Ambassador Lewis Douglas in London on an interim basis. In April 1949 Secretary Johnson designated Joseph H. Taggart of the Munitions Board as the permanent representative. He would report to Johnson through the Chairman of the Munitions Board.⁴¹

By the end of 1948, despite the Joint Chiefs' cautions on certain issues, the United States had moved extremely close to a *de facto* alliance with the members of the Western Union. The diplomatic and military talks in Washington and London pointed to a degree of military collaboration far beyond anything the United States had ever before entertained under peacetime conditions. Technically, the United States was still some distance from involvement in an "entangling alliance." Much remained to be done to clarify U.S. responsibilities and to sort out the terms of participation. But from a practical standpoint, the events and decisions that had led the United States to associate itself on the military planning level with the Western Union left little doubt about the eventual course this country would take.

* De Lattre de Tassigny commanded French armies in North Africa and Europe in 1944-45; Robb had been a key RAF officer at Supreme Headquarters, AEF, overseeing the Allied air campaign in Western Europe; Jaujard participated in the Normandy landing in 1944 and held several major French naval commands prior to his Western Union appointment.

The North Atlantic Treaty

Arrangements between the Brussels Pact nations and the United States for closer military collaboration marked a major step toward strengthening their capacity to meet the Soviet threat. By 1948 it seemed unthinkable that the United States would stand idly by if the Soviet Union made an aggressive move against any country in Western Europe. But in translating its growing resolve into the specifics of a treaty, the United States continued to move slowly and with extreme caution. Despite the encouragement of the Vandenberg Resolution, the administration, from the President on down, doubted the wisdom of presenting a major treaty to the Senate in a presidential election year. Truman and the Republican majority in the 80th Congress had become bitter political enemies, and while some Republicans, like Vandenberg, might have been inclined on this particular issue to overlook their political differences with the White House, the attitude of others was more difficult to assess. The prudent thing to do, it seemed, was to wait until after the election.*

Meanwhile, the State Department went ahead quietly laying the groundwork for the eventual negotiation of a treaty. On 6 July 1948 exploratory talks began in Washington between State Department officials and ambassadorial representatives from Canada and the five Brussels Treaty powers. Aimed at fostering a sense of unity and common purpose, these talks resulted in preliminary agreement on three key points: (1) that any North Atlantic security system should be guaranteed by a formal treaty; (2) that it should broadly follow the terms and pattern of the Rio Pact; and (3) that it should enhance the security not only of the countries represented at these talks but also of other strategically important locations in the same general area, namely, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and possibly Eire, Greenland, and the Azores. Sweden, Italy, Spain, and West Germany were also likely candidates for membership, although it was felt that the last two should not be allowed to enter the proposed arrangement any time soon. The fascist Franco regime in Spain had once collaborated with the Nazis; including West Germany would raise the controversial subject of possible German rearmament. The conference recessed in September, and the European ambassadors reported the results to their governments, which agreed the following month, at a meeting in Paris, to join with the United States and Canada in drafting a North Atlantic pact.⁴²

* Truman, *Memoirs*, II:243, alludes to partisan political concerns by mentioning "the lesson of Wilson's failure in 1920," adding, "I meant to have legislative co-operation." Foreign diplomats anticipated a Republican victory in the 1948 elections down to the very day before the voting took place, but were generally convinced that this would have no significant impact on the negotiation of a treaty as long as Vandenberg retained his influence within the party. See, for example, Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, 45, 87-98.

Toward the end of October, with both the military and diplomatic talks having accomplished their initial goals, Forrestal called on the NSC for a progress report on developments under NSC 9/3 and 9/4. He suggested that the State Department and the Joint Chiefs summarize their progress to date and "identify and attempt to resolve major problems with respect to Western Union that must be faced over the course of the next few months." The NSC agreed and on 29 October ordered the recommended studies.⁴³

In replies that reflected their different perspectives, the State Department addressed primarily the problems of negotiating an alliance while the Joint Chiefs focused on the difficulties of transforming U.S. commitments into concrete programs. Summarizing recent diplomatic activities, State expressed confidence that everything was moving on schedule. The Washington talks with the Brussels Pact governments had proved singularly successful—a strong beginning toward achievement of a close and continuing system of collective security. Moreover, it seemed clear that the Western Europeans fully understood the political and constitutional constraints that prevented the United States from rushing into a formal alliance. Assuming continued cooperation, State saw no major obstacles to the creation of an alliance that would satisfy the needs of all concerned.⁴⁴

The Joint Chiefs, looking farther down the road, were more guarded. Although they deemed the military talks in London "encouraging," they pointed out that "much remains to be done, and considerable time must elapse before the minimum requirements for the defense of Western Europe could be met, even with a substantial and long-range U.S. military aid program." While reaching decisions on organization and strategy, the London military conversations had left unanswered some crucial questions. To make the Western Union a true counterweight to Soviet power, the JCS continued, would necessitate an investment of resources "comparable to the requirements of the European Recovery Plan." And a larger alliance, such as the one contemplated by the State Department, would naturally require even more aid. In principle, the Joint Chiefs had no objection, since a militarily strong Western Europe would inherently improve U.S. security. But they believed that the United States must soon decide how far it was prepared to go with its formal commitments and its military aid.⁴⁵

Although not unmindful of these questions, State tended to regard the proposed North Atlantic pact more as a political than a military instrument of U.S. policy. At the NSC meeting of 2 December 1948, Lovett explained that the alliance itself would be mainly a consultative body: It could make recommendations, but only Congress could declare war for the United States. Specific obligations and commitments could be undertaken only within the constitutional processes of each member state. Consequently, the United States would remain free as would each other member to take whatever measures it deemed fitting to stop

Soviet aggression. Yet the alliance would still serve an important purpose by building a bridge across the Atlantic to create a community of common interests. In other words, the military value of the alliance was secondary to its political worth as a symbol of Western unity.⁴⁶

Throughout the political negotiations, State briefed OSD and the Joint Chiefs. Consequently, in late December when State finally submitted a draft treaty for NME comment, it contained no surprises. Following essentially the terms of reference Lovett had sketched before the NSC, the draft treaty called on all parties to consult with each other over any threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any member state; to consider an attack against any one of them as an attack against all; to respond to any such attack by taking appropriate individual and collective action; and to establish a council and a defense committee to deal with matters concerning implementation of the treaty. Two still outstanding issues concerned the geographic areas to be covered by the treaty (principally, whether French North Africa should be included, a position the United States did not favor) and whether Italy should be included as an original signatory (a step that France and the United States favored and the others either opposed or questioned). To resolve these issues and clarify other details, the working group proposed convening a conference that would include the United States, Canada, the five Brussels Pact members, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Eire, and Portugal.⁴⁷

In their comments on the proposed treaty, forwarded to State by OSD on 6 January 1949, the Joint Chiefs expressed satisfaction with the draft, particularly the broad rather than specific terms of the obligation to come to the assistance of alliance members. "Wording less general in nature," they said, "might tend dangerously to affect our freedom of planning and action with respect to global strategy, it being manifest that direct assistance alone might well be neither so practicable nor so effective as steps taken in consonance with over-all strategic concepts." The Joint Chiefs urged the State Department to bear in mind that U.S. participation should not result in any "undue disparity" between commitments and present or prospective military strength. They also expressed uneasiness over the possibility that under the precise language of the draft, alliance members might ask for assistance to defend their colonial holdings. The central function of the alliance, as the Joint Chiefs saw it, was to protect the North Atlantic and Western Europe; they hoped the final treaty would make this clear. Likewise, they noted that the treaty might be construed to cover defense against internal rebellion as well as external aggression. The JCS wondered whether such was the intent, and suggested that it might not be "good business" for the alliance to become the guarantor of each member's internal security. However, they realized at the same time that "political and diplomatic considerations may be overriding."

As for the organization of the alliance, the Joint Chiefs showed skepticism about giving too many specified powers to either the council or the defense committee. They wanted assurance that detailed military planning would be dealt with by professional soldiers and not by foreign or defense ministers. For this reason, they also advised against writing into the treaty the details of alliance organization. Additionally, they recommended that the disagreement over territorial limits be resolved by excluding French North Africa from the alliance and including Italy. Italy's strategic position on the southern flank of Europe made it essential that it participate in the system. The Joint Chiefs saw North Africa, on the other hand, as a French colonial region and opposed use of the treaty to protect colonies.* To round out the alliance, the Joint Chiefs concurred in the proposal to invite Sweden to participate.⁴⁸

With the military thus generally in accord, the State Department proceeded toward a final treaty. This required two delicate negotiating steps: first, convening a conference in Washington of the foreign ministers of the Brussels Pact nations, Canada, the United States, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, and Italy to draft the treaty text for approval by their respective governments; † and second, keeping Congress fully informed about the treaty, chiefly through meetings between State Department officials and Senators Vandenberg, Tom Connally, and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee to assure the treaty's eventual approval in the Senate.⁴⁹

The central figure in both phases of the negotiations, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, later recalled that the most challenging part of his task was to line up Senate support. Although the 1948 elections had returned Democratic control to both houses of Congress, the majority in the Senate fell short of the two-thirds needed to ratify a treaty. This left its fate in the hands of the Republican minority. In discussions with members of the Foreign Relations Committee Acheson encountered opposition from diehard isolationists and from some senators who had previously voted for the Vandenberg Resolution. The most frequent criticism was that the proposed provision for collective security might cause "automatic involvement" of U.S. armed forces and could therefore infringe on the constitutional power of Congress to declare war. Acheson doubted that this would ever happen but agreed to seek a change of wording. On 18 March, after much debate in the international and senatorial groups, the State Department released to the public a treaty text that Acheson felt would satisfy the Senate.⁵⁰

* Technically, Morocco and Tunisia were protectorates of the French Government. Residents of Algeria had all been French citizens since 1 September 1947. But since foreign representation for these areas was conducted through the French Foreign Ministry in Paris, the United States treated them as French colonies.

† Sweden and Eire declined to participate, preferring to remain nonaligned.

On 4 April 1949, 12 nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. Articles 5 and 6 constituted the heart of the treaty, a short document of 14 articles. Article 5 stated:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the [United Nations] Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6 added:

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

Article 12 provided for revision of the treaty any time after 10 years; Article 13 entitled any party to denounce the treaty after 20 years by giving one year's notice of its intention. Article 9 provided for establishment of a council, composed of representatives of all member governments. The council was to consider matters relating to the treaty's implementation and to create any needed subsidiary bodies, including a defense committee which was to recommend measures for implementing the military articles of the treaty.⁵¹

Except for inclusion of French Algeria within its coverage, the North Atlantic Treaty contained no provision unacceptable to the U.S. military. However, during hearings in late April before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, found himself having to explain an apparent contradiction in his own position on the treaty. In a speech to the Daughters of the American Revolution in 1948 Johnson had stated that "mili-


tary alliances are not in the tradition of the United States." He now tried to draw a distinction between military alliances per se, which were formed for the express purpose of waging war, and defensive arrangements like the Rio Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty. He explained that "neither of them, in my opinion, is a foreign military alliance in the customary sense, and therefore my remarks in the [DAR] speech . . . do not apply." Johnson also thought that the terms of the treaty as written did "not give to any foreign nation or group of nations the power to say when the United States should go to war." The committee accepted Johnson's explanation and recommended the treaty for approval. On 21 July 1949 the Senate voted 82 to 13 in favor of ratification, and on 24 August the treaty officially came into force.⁵²

Alliance Organization

The first task that confronted the new alliance was to create an effective organizational framework. This was a difficult task not only because it involved securing the approval of 12 independent nations on answers to difficult and sensitive issues but also because there had not yet been any agreement on the precise functions and activities to be performed by the alliance or on the allocation of responsibilities among its members. To be effective, the structure had to be such that alliance members, allowing for their individual differences, could plan together for common defense, take decisions in an orderly and cooperative manner, and exercise effective operational control over the forces and resources at their disposal. Recognizing the difficulties in arriving at a quick consensus on organization, the architects of the alliance had purposely skirted the issue in the treaty text. In fact, the only reference to organization appeared in Article 9, which called for the establishment of a "Council," a "defense committee," and such other "subsidiary bodies" as necessary.

On 2 April 1949, two days before the treaty was signed, the North Atlantic foreign ministers briefly discussed organization and then appointed an international working group to make recommendations on implementing Article 9. While the working group did not meet until 23 August, a State-Defense team began earlier to develop a U.S. position. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, headed the team, which included 10 other State Department officials, 3 officers representing the JCS, and Najeeb Halaby, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, OSD.⁵³

Within Defense, the Joint Chiefs gave much thought to NATO organization. They proposed to Secretary Johnson a complex organization of councils, committees, boards, steering groups, and regional planning groups that encoun-



Europe in 1949

tered strong criticism from General McNarney and the State Department. "Such an organization in our own Military Establishment," McNarney observed, "would be time consuming and unwieldy; in an international body it would be hopeless." Acheson likewise questioned the advisability of a large complicated structure, stating: "It seems preferable to start with the simplest possible organization and expand it in accordance with demonstrated need rather than establish any agencies which may not be entirely necessary." In response to Acheson's comments, the Joint Chiefs simplified their plan by eliminating some of the agencies originally proposed.⁵⁴

Before the international working group on organization assembled in Washington, U.S. negotiators received detailed instructions that reflected most of the major recommendations developed by the State-Defense team over the course of the summer. Drafted by Perkins and Halaby, these instructions envisioned a treaty organization in two parts—one civilian, the other military. The civilian side would consist of the North Atlantic Council and a special finance and economics committee, composed of top-level civil servants, that would advise the council on the economic and financial impact of recommended defense programs, evaluate the economic capacity of member countries to support such programs, and consider how to distribute the economic burden of supporting the military requirements of the alliance. The military side of the organization would include a defense committee with two subordinate elements, a military council and a military production and supply board. The military council would have a three-member steering and executive group, assisted by a "small staff" to prepare recommendations to the defense committee and to issue directives to the five regional planning groups. These regional groups would be organized along geographic lines recommended by the Joint Chiefs, with allowance for U.S. "participation as appropriate" in the groups for Western Europe, Northern Europe, and the Western Mediterranean. The United States would have permanent membership in the groups for North America (Canada-United States) and the North Atlantic Ocean area.⁵⁵

As a broad outline of how the alliance should be organized, the U.S. proposals encountered no serious objections from the international working group. Minor differences centered on the precise terms of reference for several of the proposed agencies, the timing of their establishment, their exact membership, the location of their headquarters, and their names. Thus the working group, while recognizing the potential need for a body to provide advice on finance and economics, opposed creation of the special finance and economics committee, partly because of disagreement on what its functions should be and partly because its establishment seemed premature; until the military organs of the alliance had developed military requirements and proposed supply and production programs,

there seemed no real need for such a body. Similarly, the conferees agreed on the need for a supply board, but the Europeans wanted the supply board to meet in Washington, whereas the Americans pressed for its location in Europe, arguing that the board's primary purpose should be to increase and coordinate production in Europe and not to serve as a vehicle for European lobbying in the United States for military assistance.

A difference also arose over membership on the steering group and on the regional planning group for Western Europe. Italy requested seats on both, insisting that planning for land warfare in Europe had to be based on coordinated defense of a line running from Trieste in northern Italy all the way up the Rhine to the North Sea. None of the Western Union countries would agree to have Italy join their group, and the United States refused to change its position on the membership of the steering group. The Italians then pressed for a single European planning committee but dropped the idea after assurances from Acheson that arrangements would be made for the three European regional planning groups to meet frequently in combined session.⁵⁶

At its first meeting on 17 September 1949, the North Atlantic Council approved the organizational report of the international working group, adopted rules of procedure for its own meetings, and authorized the following bodies: a Defense Committee (DC) of the alliance defense ministers; a Military Committee (MC) of 11 chiefs of staff and a civilian from Iceland, which had no military establishment; a Standing Group (SG) composed of one representative each from the United States, Britain, and France, functioning as a subcommittee of the Military Committee; and five regional planning groups to develop and recommend plans for the defense of the respective geographic regions. Washington was designated as headquarters for both the Military Committee and the Standing Group. To handle the still unresolved organizational questions, the council appointed working groups to study machinery for coordinating military production and supply and for dealing with financial and economic affairs.⁵⁷

The Defense Committee met for the first time on 5 October 1949 at the Pentagon. In accordance with arrangements for an annually rotating chairmanship, starting with the United States, Secretary Johnson served as presiding officer. As its first actions, the committee directed the Military Committee to begin work on a strategic concept, established the five regional planning groups and directed them to hold meetings by the first of November, and adopted terms of reference for the Military Production and Supply Board (MPSB). In a compromise, the Defense Committee also agreed that the MPSB should have offices in both Washington and London, with its permanent staff located in London.⁵⁸ The North Atlantic Council, meeting again on 18 November, approved this arrangement without objection and also approved the recommendations of another working


group covering the functions, composition, and permanent location of the Defense Financial and Economic Committee (DFEC). The council authorized permanent staff facilities for the DFEC in London and charged it with developing, in cooperation with the Military Committee and the MPSB, overall financial and economic guidance for executing military defense plans. National representation on the DFEC would be at the ministerial or equivalent level of responsibility rather than the senior civil servant level, as the United States had originally proposed. The first U.S. member was W. Averell Harriman, the Special Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration.⁵⁹

The necessity for coordinating the administration of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) with the activities of NATO added some further extremely difficult organizational problems to those that were involved in establishing the new organization itself—problems within the U.S. Government in Washington and overseas as well as in NATO and the individual member countries. In Washington the chief difficulty was to sort out the maze of functions and responsibilities of Defense, State, and the Economic Cooperation Administration. Lines of communication (both command and informational) had to be clarified among the responsible agencies in Washington, their representatives overseas, and the several NATO bodies. In general, Acheson considered policies on NATO “carefully thought out,” but as for implementing them, he conceded later that “we were in no posture to carry out NATO when we entered into NATO.”⁶⁰

Within the Department of Defense Johnson moved quickly to assert his direct control over NATO and MDAP matters and over dealings on such matters with other agencies. Early in November he appointed General Burns, who had served since the summer as a special consultant for politico-military affairs, to the new post of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance). As Johnson’s principal deputy for politico-military matters, Burns coordinated activities of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs (OFMA), which handled the Defense side of NATO-related policy matters, and the Office of Military Assistance (OMA), which provided liaison between NATO and DoD agencies involved in the military assistance program.* In addition, Johnson appointed General Bradley, the Chairman of the JCS, as U.S. representative to the NATO Standing Group and the NATO Military Committee and directed him and his JCS colleagues to provide advice and guidance on NATO military functions. Johnson also directed the Munitions Board to provide U.S. representation on the Military Production and Supply Board and to coordinate U.S. participation in NATO programs for production, supply, and standardization of military equipment.⁶¹

* See Chapter V.

CHART 8
NATO
 DECEMBER 1949



*CONSULTING MEMBERS

The Beginnings of a Strategic Concept

Despite the far-reaching implications of the new relationship, U.S. defense officials remained skeptical that the alliance would substantially affect the military balance in the near future. In Louis Johnson's view, the most immediate gain the United States could expect was an "improved sense of security and stability abroad." The European military establishments on the Continent and their infrastructures, largely destroyed or dismantled during the Nazi occupation, suffered from a dearth of trained officers and enlisted personnel, a lack of organized military units, an absence of support facilities, and a lesser familiarity with the changes in warfare that had taken place during and since World War II. NATO lacked, in short, forces trained and equipped to withstand a Soviet attack. The deficiencies affected planning on both sides of the Atlantic and effectively reinforced the acknowledged need for cooperation and collective action.⁶²

Certainly Europe's need for assistance did not go unnoticed in Washington. On 25 July 1949, four days after the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty, President Truman asked Congress for \$1.45 billion in appropriations for the first year of a comprehensive foreign military aid program, more than two-thirds of the money to go to NATO countries. Opponents criticized the administration's bill as the final abandonment of the United Nations and as the prelude to massive overseas deployment of U.S. combat forces—objections that delayed final legislative action two months. Opponents in the House proved especially obdurate; they did not accept a Senate version of the legislation until late September. On 6 October 1949 Truman signed into law the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.*

Once NATO's organizational machinery had been set in motion and U.S. military assistance had been assured, attention shifted to matters of substance, starting with the formulation of plans for "an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area." This task was particularly urgent because the Mutual Defense Assistance Act conditioned the use of 90 percent of the funds for NATO countries on the formulation of such plans by the NAC and the Defense Committee and their subsequent personal approval by the President.⁶³

To satisfy this statutory condition and also to provide a basis for calculating military assistance requirements, the Defense Committee on 5 October 1949 instructed the Military Committee to start work on a strategic concept and on a medium term defense plan for a period of three to five years. Shortly thereafter, at a meeting of the Standing Group, General Bradley submitted a preliminary

* On the origins and enactment of this legislation, see Chapter XVII.

version of the concept prepared by the JCS. This paper identified major military functions ("basic undertakings") within NATO and designated the alliance members best suited to carry them out. Thus, for planning purposes, in the event of war the United States would have primary responsibility for strategic bombing and, in conjunction with the United Kingdom, would conduct naval operations on the high seas. Instead of trying to duplicate these missions, the other European allies would strive to develop complementary capabilities—tactical air support, air defense, coastal defense, and "hard core" ground forces.⁶⁴

The Standing Group incorporated the form and substance of the JCS working paper in a report which the Military Committee examined at a meeting in Paris on 29 November. Discussion centered on the section that explicitly specified that strategic bombing should include "the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb" against Soviet targets in case of war. The Danish Chief of Staff strongly opposed this reference to atomic weapons and wanted it removed from the text. He argued that if the paper should be leaked, the Soviet Union might, at the onset of hostilities, find it a suitable pretext for dropping an atomic bomb on Copenhagen. General Bradley, sitting as chairman of the Military Committee, "overcame" Denmark's objection, and the paper went to the Defense Committee without change.⁶⁵

When Secretary Johnson arrived in Paris for the Defense Committee's second meeting, scheduled for 1 December, the Norwegian Minister of Defense advised him that the Danish cabinet had given the Danish minister strict instructions against endorsing the reference to atomic weapons. Johnson offered to eliminate the offending phrase in exchange for Denmark's consent to include in the official Defense Committee minutes a statement that strategic bombing included possible use of the atomic bomb. Over initial objections from the Italians and Dutch, the Defense Committee accepted Johnson's formula. The amended paper read that strategic bombing should include "all means possible with all types of weapons, without exception," and the minutes indicated that this definitely meant the use of nuclear weapons should the need arise.⁶⁶

Johnson later learned from Acheson that some of his State Department colleagues feared that the word change had also changed the meaning and that the statement in the minutes carried with it a firm U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons in Europe. Johnson assured them that he had made no such commitment. Since the Europeans had no direct participation in strategic bombing, he said, whether to use nuclear weapons or not remained a prerogative of the United States; the option had not been prejudiced one way or the other. Acheson said he was satisfied and would recommend North Atlantic Council approval of the Defense Committee report. When the council met on 6 January 1950 in Washington, it approved the strategic concept without change, as did President Truman on 27 January.⁶⁷

The Medium Term Defense Plan

By the time the strategic concept had been approved by the North Atlantic Council, the Standing Group, the Military Committee, and the five regional planning groups had begun work on a detailed plan to serve as a guide for the buildup by 1 July 1954 of the required forces. The Standing Group had set this target date in a strategic guidance directive issued to the five regional planning groups on 4 January 1950 and asked the groups to calculate force requirements and submit recommendations by 1 March.⁶⁸ When these arrived, the Standing Group put together an overall plan, computing the minimum desired NATO strength region by region.

The most striking feature of the Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) was the size of the estimated force requirements. It estimated initial mobilization requirements on the order of almost 100 ready and reserve divisions, approximately 8,000 planes, more than 2,800 ships of varying types and sizes, and numerous coastal fortifications.*⁶⁹ Except for U.S. contributions through MDAP, the other alliance members would have the responsibility of financing and equipping these forces. While the plan contained no estimate of the probable cost, it was obvious that the buildup would require enormous expenditures that would interfere seriously with Western Europe's economic recovery. Realizing that the plan was too expensive to be acceptable, the JCS urged the Standing Group to seek more "realistic" requirements.⁷⁰

Despite this JCS warning, the Military Committee, under General Bradley, and the Defense Committee, under Secretary Johnson, approved the MTDP on 28 March and 1 April, respectively, during meetings at The Hague.⁷¹ In approving the plan, the Defense Committee recognized that it was a "first approximation" of force and equipment requirements, directed the Military Committee to proceed urgently with the buildup of the requisite forces, emphasized the need for the planning groups to review requirements on a continuing basis, and called for maximum economy in utilization of manpower and materiel. The Defense Committee also asked the DFEC to ascertain the financial and economic capacity of the individual NATO nations to raise and maintain military forces. This was the opposite of the DFEC proposal of 29 March that the Defense Committee provide it with a detailed cost estimate covering the planned forces together with an indication of priorities among them. Both committees looked to the North Atlantic Council for support of their position.⁷²

* These figures included only four of the five regions, those for the Canada-United States Region being omitted.

The May 1950 NAC Meeting

In the ensuing three months, U.S. efforts concentrated mainly on finding a way of paying for the proposed military forces without, at the same time, endangering European economic recovery. It was plain that, in the absence of massive U.S. military aid, Western European members were economically incapable of raising and maintaining the forces needed for Europe's defense; it was equally plain that even if the United States stepped up its contribution, the Europeans would still have to carry an exceptionally heavy burden. But unless the Europeans could be persuaded to engage in more extensive self-help, there seemed little hope of creating the necessary European defense forces.

Moreover, to make any real progress in dealing with these problems, it was first necessary to deal with the procedural impasse created by the military planners wanting to know the economic and financial resources available to them and the financial planners wanting information from the military on equipment and other military costs before making such determinations. This impasse thus became a central topic of discussion at the NAC meeting in London in mid-May.

In preparation for this meeting, the State Department considered several approaches to break the procedural deadlock and prevent its future recurrence. One of these was a general call for a review of progress in implementing the treaty that included a formula for resolving the impasse and a proposal that the NAC urge the member governments to increase defense forces, and, perhaps most significantly, "create balanced collective NATO forces rather than balanced national forces."⁷³ Another proposal called for the establishment of a permanent commission, representing the 12 NATO governments, to coordinate the planning and execution of economic and political policies, serve as an information clearinghouse, and foster unity and cooperation in attaining common objectives.⁷⁴

After receiving comments on these proposals from the Joint Chiefs, Johnson stated his general agreement to the establishment of a permanent NATO commission but reserved the option to comment on the details before any final action by the North Atlantic Council. On the other proposals, he questioned the practicality of asking the Defense Committee to provide the DFEC with a detailed cost analysis of the medium term defense plan goals because "the required downward revision of . . . force requirements . . . [would] render further work in detailed costing of these first approximation requirements of little useful value." He recommended, as a more realistic approach, that the NAC direct the Defense Committee to start the study, taking into account the forthcoming downward revision of force requirements.⁷⁵

On the subject of forces, the Joint Chiefs believed that the ultimate answer to NATO's force needs depended on West German rearmament. Support for a

German contribution had been building quietly in Washington for some time, almost since the beginning of treaty negotiations, but until the spring of 1950 it remained largely confined to a handful of Army planners.⁷⁶ One of the earliest indications that German rearmament might receive serious high-level consideration appeared in NSC 68, the joint State-Defense policy study on U.S. security requirements submitted to the NSC and President Truman in early April 1950.* Although it avoided specific mention of German rearmament, NSC 68 speculated that "it may be desirable for the free nations, without the Soviet Union, to conclude separate arrangements with Japan, Western Germany, and Austria which would enlist the energies and resources of these countries in support of the free world."⁷⁷

While NSC 68 saw no urgent need for a change of policy, the Joint Chiefs, finding NATO's requirements more than alliance members could meet, wanted German rearmament and membership in NATO brought up for early discussion, preferably at the NAC meeting in May. They recommended, therefore, that Acheson seek NAC approval of a resolution "revising present Western policy towards Germany, and holding out to the West Germans real and substantial hope that they will be given an opportunity to participate politically, economically, and militarily, in Western European and North Atlantic regional arrangements on a basis of equality." The JCS also urged that controls on German industry be quickly lifted and efforts made to convince U.S. allies, especially France, of the need for "early rearming of Western Germany." In view of recent Soviet moves to establish an East German militarized police, the Joint Chiefs felt that rearmament in the West should begin with approval of a proposal currently before the Allied High Commission for Germany to create a 5,000-man West German "Republican Guard."⁷⁸

The State Department, however, felt that the political aspects of German rearmament were of such fundamental importance that a comprehensive NSC study should precede any discussion in an international setting. The Joint Chiefs persisted, and shortly before the conference began they instructed Admiral Richard L. Conolly, the DoD representative with the U.S. delegation in London, to impress on Secretary Acheson the importance of securing a German contribution to NATO.⁷⁹

Acheson, while sympathetic to Conolly's plea, agreed with his own advisers that the European allies were not yet in a position to give objective consideration to a subject as controversial and potentially divisive as German rearmament. Sensitive to the diplomatic hazards which an effort to rearm Germany was sure to encounter, he decided not to introduce the subject and told Conolly on 10 May

* On the origins and contents of NSC 68, see Chapter XVIII.

that the Joint Chiefs should not expect the German rearmament issue to appear on the conference agenda.⁸⁰

During the two weeks immediately before the NAC meeting, Secretary Johnson received from the JCS a steady flow of comments on the numerous position papers being readied by the State Department. Because of the tight deadlines, many of these comments were quickly composed and as quickly passed to the State Department. Johnson therefore thought it advisable to inform Acheson that he had "been unable to give either the papers or the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the close personal attention which they deserve."⁸¹

Johnson's comment in no way indicated dissatisfaction with the JCS or their views. In fact, he had earlier informed General Bradley that he realized the difficult time constraints which they faced and that he would continue to welcome other suggestions they had on improving NATO's capabilities and performance. In particular, he encouraged them to give further thought to "the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Western Germany, Sweden and Spain." Beyond this he hoped that Bradley would use his personal influence with his colleagues on the Standing Group to expedite revision of the MTDP, suggesting that appointment of full-time deputies might speed up the Standing Group's work. He also asked for JCS views on the creation of a permanent NATO command organization and on whether the United States should seek full membership in the five regional planning groups.⁸²

The fourth NAC meeting in London on 15–18 May 1950 concentrated primarily on NATO organizational matters, particularly establishment of a permanent full-time central organization, and adoption of a French resolution which called for general strengthening of NATO forces, exploitation of the latest forms of military technology, standardization of military equipment, and integration of services and facilities for logistic support of collective military forces. General Bradley anticipated no military objections to these proposals and on this basis OSD concurred in them, subject to later comment on the details of implementation.⁸³

To provide continuity through a permanent civilian body, the council established the "Council Deputies to meet in continuous session in London." The NAC defined the deputies' organization as a full-time body of "highly qualified persons" with wide-ranging responsibilities, including the coordination of economic and military programs, the exchange of views among NATO agencies, and the promotion of close cooperation and consultation. The council stated that "the problem of adequate military forces and the necessary financial costs *should be examined as one, and not as separate problems,*" and that cost estimates should not be considered final until the "realistic revision of force requirements which is expected from the current review of defense plans has been completed."⁸⁴

Perhaps the most controversial issue raised at the meeting concerned the Defense Committee's call for "balanced collective forces rather than balanced national forces." In principle, all agreed that this concept was desirable, but such smaller countries as Norway and the Netherlands worried that they might have to give up the development of certain capabilities that could prove vital to their security. They therefore sought definite assurances that such balanced collective forces would come to their assistance in case of an emergency. Other countries, like France, with heavy overseas colonial responsibilities, pointed out that world-wide commitments required the maintenance of balanced national forces. Acheson, reassuring all parties that their interests would not be jeopardized, ultimately secured adoption of the resolution. But the basic issue remained and would reappear at future meetings as a source of dissension and disagreement among the allies.⁸⁵

The NAC adopted a resolution to the effect that any additional military expenditures should be judged not only in the light of economic and financial conditions but that "adequate consideration" should be given to the needs of defense. It also determined that "the combined resources of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty were sufficient, if properly coordinated and applied, to ensure the progressive and speedy development of adequate military defense without impairing the social and economic progress of these countries."⁸⁶

The Department of Defense viewed the NAC meeting in London as a mixed success for the United States. The council had adopted most U.S. proposals and had given the military planners a formula for going ahead with revision of the MTDP in accordance with their best estimate of what NATO could and should hope to accomplish. It had not taken major decisions that would immediately ameliorate NATO's problems, and it had not even considered the crucial issue of German rearmament, but this was more than could reasonably be expected. Acheson, for his part, termed the conference "a useful one" that had served an important purpose by revealing "the gap between ideas and reality." This in itself was a major achievement, Acheson believed, for it brought the alliance members closer together by increasing their sense of unity and mutual respect.⁸⁷

By the end of its first year NATO had turned the corner on a number of important issues. It had established an organizational structure, formulated and approved a strategic concept, and planned a first approximation of forces required to defend the North Atlantic area. These achievements represented substantial progress in a short period and seemed to indicate that an alliance of 12 independent and sovereign nations could indeed function successfully in the pursuit of common goals. On the other hand, NATO remained not much more than a "paper alliance" with no military command structure and no forces under its

direct control. The first year had seen the laying of a firm foundation. The task ahead was to build on this promising beginning so that in time Western Europe and its North Atlantic allies could mount a strong and credible defense against attack.

CHAPTER XVII

The Foreign Military Assistance Program

The same foreboding international conditions that fostered the creation of the North Atlantic alliance also caused the United States to reassess its policies on military assistance to friendly foreign nations. For a year and a half after World War II the United States provided limited military assistance in special situations to a number of countries, including China, the Philippines, France, and several Latin American nations. Some of this assistance was in the form of grant aid under special legislation and some in the form of arms sales, and much of it consisted of surplus World War II equipment. However, it was not until 1947, when crises in Greece and Turkey led to the provision of military assistance on a large scale to both countries* and pointed to the likelihood that other countries threatened by communist aggression would also require military assistance, that consideration was given to the development of a comprehensive military aid program.

Clarifying U.S. Policy

Concerned by the deteriorating situation in Greece and Turkey and the lengthening list of countries that appeared vulnerable to communist aggression, the State Department in March 1947 asked the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for a detailed analysis of the conditions under which the United States might inaugurate and coordinate programs of foreign financial, technical, and military assistance.¹ The committee submitted a draft report (SWNCC 360)

* See Chapter VI.

in April and a revision thereof in October which identified various contingency situations in which aid might be required and concluded that the enactment of foreign aid legislation would be desirable. These reports were referred to member agencies for review and, in the meantime, the administration continued to deal with individual aid requests on a case-by-case basis as best it could under the severely limited authority it possessed for the purpose.² At the time, this authority was largely restricted to the following: (1) under the Surplus Property Act of 1944 to sell, donate, or otherwise dispose of many types of arms and equipment which would have to be declared "surplus" by the armed forces; (2) under several recently enacted laws to provide limited assistance to specific nations—the Philippines, China, Greece, Turkey, and the Latin American Republics; (3) under a 1920 law to sell arms to other countries, a measure of limited practical value in view of the desperate postwar foreign exchange shortage in most countries; and (4) under powers of the Commander in Chief to provide military assistance on a reimbursable basis to protect the security interests of American forces abroad.³

The communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the widespread fear and apprehension that gripped Europe in its aftermath triggered a sharp upsurge in appeals for U.S. military assistance, lending new urgency to the need to reassess U.S. military aid to foreign countries. Reacting to requests for assistance from France, Norway, and other countries that felt threatened, State and OSD officials met over the first weekend in March to draft legislation that would give the President broad authority to furnish military assistance on an interim basis until the next session of Congress. As a vehicle for the new legislation, it was proposed to attach it as Title VI to a bill then under consideration in Congress—the Foreign Assistance Act, which provided, among other things, for economic aid to Europe under the Marshall Plan and the continuation of assistance to China, Greece, Turkey, and Trieste.⁴

The great defect in the administration's Title VI proposal was that it did not include an estimate of costs, unintentionally giving Congress the impression that the interim program would be open-ended and have possible worldwide dimensions. Shortly after Title VI came before the House Foreign Affairs Committee rumors began to circulate in Congress that the administration wanted to start a multibillion dollar program of military assistance, modeled on the lend-lease program of World War II. The actual figure being discussed in the executive branch for an interim program to last until 1 May 1949 was \$750 million, a largely guesswork amount that did not include allowance for long-term obligations resulting from the program. In fact, owing to lack of information, no one in either the Pentagon or the State Department could project an initial cost. Rather than haggle and further delay action on the Marshall Plan, the administration accepted

the deletion of Title VI from the omnibus foreign aid bill passed by Congress; Truman approved it on 3 April.⁵

As a result of the adverse congressional reaction to Title VI, the War Council met on 4 May to discuss whether to recommend something similar under separate legislation. Strongly in favor of shelving the matter, Secretary Symington expressed concern that a debate in Congress over military assistance would endanger the NME's other legislative objectives, especially universal military training, selective service, and supplemental appropriations. Forrestal noted that the day before he had told the House Armed Services Committee that he knew of no plans for a global military aid program. He suggested that other military spokesmen make the same response if asked. Gruenther immediately pointed out that this could be misleading, since the State Department planned to hold conferences on military aid with Senator Vandenberg of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Further discussion was apparently inconclusive, and by the end of the meeting the consensus seemed to be that the NME should do nothing more until Congress had acted on selective service and appropriations.⁶

Contrary to some of the views expressed in the War Council, at least one member of Forrestal's immediate staff still favored something similar to Title VI. Marx Leva cautioned that time was running out for Congress to act. Unlike Symington, Leva felt that the "psychological reaction" in Congress would turn in favor of military assistance and even help in the passage of other legislation. "As a matter of fact," he argued,

many of the people in Congress expect a multi-billion dollar military assistance program. If the Administration were now to propose a military assistance program in the vicinity of \$750,000,000, the sighs of relief from the Hill might help—rather than hinder—the ultimate passage of the "blended" Senate Bill on Selective Service and [Universal Military] Training.⁷

This strategy was never tested. The day after the War Council meeting, BoB Director Webb told Leva and others from State and NME that the President had definitely decided against a massive aid program and wanted the matter dropped for the time being. He added that Truman was dubious about the interim assistance proposal and would be reluctant to back it.⁸ On 7 May, apparently hopeful that the proposal would be reconsidered, OSD and the State Department sent Webb copies of revised draft legislation, but the response was as expected. At a press conference shortly thereafter, Truman publicly reaffirmed his decision not to seek additional authority or funding for military assistance during the current session of Congress.⁹

Temporary Solutions: June to December 1948

As a result of the administration's decision to postpone any further efforts to secure additional military assistance authority, there was a welcome opportunity to give more careful consideration to objectives, policies, and priorities that should apply in the offering of such assistance. In addition, the delay made it possible to take into fuller account the new developments at home and abroad that were rapidly changing the context in which any future military assistance program would necessarily operate, and, in particular, the steady movement of the Truman administration toward a collective security arrangement that would inevitably involve U.S. assistance in many forms, a fact that became increasingly clear during the Pentagon talks with British and Canadian officials during March and April.* In July the National Security Council, in NSC 9/3, laid down principles and procedures to govern the extension of military aid to European countries:

(1) They must first plan their coordinated defense with the means presently available, (2) they must then determine how their collective military potential can be increased by coordinated production and supply, including standardization of equipment, (3) we would then be prepared to consider and screen their estimates of what supplementary assistance from us was necessary, (4) we would expect reciprocal assistance from them to the greatest extent practicable, and (5) legislation would be necessary to provide significant amounts of military equipment but the President would not be prepared to recommend it unless the foregoing conditions have been met.¹⁰

Meanwhile, as part of the effort to gain advance congressional support for a collective security treaty covering the North Atlantic area, Marshall and Lovett met at length with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to explain the purposes of U.S. involvement. During these meetings Lovett downplayed the importance of military assistance as part of the U.S. contribution. On 19 May the committee unanimously approved the so-called "Vandenberg Resolution," proposing the "association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security." On 11 June 1948 the Senate adopted this historic resolution by an overwhelming vote.¹¹

In a parallel action, the NSC staff undertook a study of "the position of the

* See Chapter XVI.

United States with respect to providing military assistance in the form of supplies, equipment and technical advice to nations of the non-Soviet world." The staff's report (NSC 14) was distributed in mid-June. In July, after amendment to accommodate one minor JCS suggestion—that aid recipients should be encouraged to standardize their weapons on U.S. types to the maximum extent practicable—the council and President Truman approved the amended report (NSC 14/1).¹²

Although it applied widely to noncommunist countries, NSC 14/1 was meant chiefly as a guide for implementing NSC 9/3. NSC 14/1 sought to allay JCS fears that a U.S.-European alliance would divert equipment and funds from the strengthening of U.S. armed forces by stipulating that highest consideration would be given to "the fulfillment of the minimum materiel requirements of the United States armed forces, as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Only in "exceptional cases" should the military needs of other countries take precedence. NSC 14/1 stated as the ultimate objective a comprehensive program uniting U.S. and foreign interests to achieve overall reinforcement of anti-Soviet capabilities. To this end, Western Europe should have first priority, and those countries receiving military assistance would be urged to integrate their armaments industries, standardize weapons and materiel to U.S.-accepted types, provide strategic raw materials as reciprocal assistance, and compensate the supplying nation as their economies improved.¹³

By the beginning of July the prospects for adoption of a military assistance program for Western Europe had improved to the point that Forrestal, on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs, appointed General Lemnitzer to represent the United States in direct talks with the Western Union Permanent Military Committee.¹⁴ Two weeks later Lemnitzer went to London as head of a small military delegation, with instructions to ascertain Western Union defense requirements and take part in the development of a coordinated Western Union supply plan to provide guidance for calculating deficiencies that could be filled only through U.S. military assistance. Forrestal, in order to develop and process necessary budget estimates and legislative proposals for the next Congress, desired this information as soon as possible, but not until late fall did the facts and figures begin to trickle into Washington.¹⁵

Meanwhile, Forrestal and his staff began a study of the kind of organization and procedures required for the effective administration of a military assistance program. With no overall mechanism yet established to coordinate policy, screen aid requests, and determine priorities, the United States was obviously ill-prepared to undertake a program on the scale contemplated. Under existing arrangements for operations in Greece and Turkey, the State Department set and directed policy, while the military departments administered the programs. To implement

an effort as large and as complex as that outlined in NSC 14/1, OSD officials foresaw a need for closer interservice and interdepartmental coordination, possibly requiring the creation of new administrative machinery.¹⁶

The NME also had to determine which countries would be eligible for aid under NSC 14/1 guidelines and the types and amounts of aid they should receive. An August 1948 report of the State–Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee listed 59 countries that qualified for aid under NSC 14/1 and designated 22 of them for special consideration, recommending some for “substantial” assistance and others for only “limited” assistance. In the “substantial” category were the three Benelux countries, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. The report did not define what it meant by “substantial” or “limited,” nor did it consider the kinds of military aid the United States should provide. It strongly advised that U.S. military needs be accorded “continuing highest priority.”¹⁷ The Joint Chiefs, after studying the report, generally concurred in its findings but urged caution in its application. They told Forrestal:

There cannot be too much emphasis on the necessity for the most careful consideration of the great potential overall scope of military aid commitments in relation to our national financial and industrial limitations and our own military requirements before specific decisions are made. Also, it must be borne in mind that limited military aid may well prove difficult to limit once it has been begun and that token aid, by definition, bears to the recipient the implication of more to come. Further, aid spread too thin may not be adequate anywhere, whereas concentrated aid where it will best serve the ultimate objective of our own security may be all or even more than we can provide.¹⁸

Along with persistent fears about overextended commitments came renewed concern that major military assistance might weaken American capabilities. In August 1948 the BoB proposed that military assistance requirements be met, insofar as possible, from surplus equipment—stores of arms and military hardware left over from World War II and other items marked for sale or liquidation by the armed forces. On the surface this suggestion appeared to have much to recommend it, but on closer examination OSD legal experts found a rider to the Supplemental Independent Offices Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1949 that redefined “surplus” in such flexible language that the term could be used to describe almost all American property overseas. Loose construction of the law could conceivably result in wholesale transfers from stockpiles in Europe and the Pacific that were really meant for U.S. forces. Forrestal advised the BoB that he was referring the proposal to Secretary of the Army Royall for further study.¹⁹

Royall's response noted both the practical and legal problems of providing

military assistance. With reference to equipment, he pointed out, the huge Army surpluses from World War II had been greatly depleted. Disposal of equipment under earlier programs (e.g., Greece and Turkey), deterioration, and increased requirements occasioned by the Army expansion under the FY 1949 budget had taken their toll on the surplus stockpile. For the most part, the surplus materials that remained from the war were "unpopular" items in limited or unbalanced quantities—rifles for which no ammunition was available, for example. The Army also held in reserve for emergency mobilization purposes enough newer up-to-date equipment to outfit 20 divisions and supply ammunition for 90 combat days. Were all of this equipment made available for military assistance, the Army would expect full reimbursement at current replacement value, a cost that Royall estimated at \$2 billion. Beyond the expense involved, he saw no way of making any supplies available without more clearly defined and enlarged statutory authority, even allowing for legal loopholes. The solution, as Royall saw it, was for Forrestal to take the initiative in "inciting the State Department to take action in presenting, *as a matter of urgency*, general military assistance legislation to the Congress."²⁰

At the War Council meeting on 23 September, Forrestal made clear his determination to keep NME requirements and foreign military assistance programs distinct; he wanted the military assistance budget kept completely separate from the NME budget. His chief objectives in the months ahead, he added, were passage of a military assistance bill, the determination of priorities (presumably to decide the order in which countries would receive aid), and "centralization within the National Military Establishment of responsibility for carrying out and monitoring the foreign aid program." A few days later Forrestal told Royall that enactment of a military assistance law ought to have top priority in the NME legislative program in the new Congress.²¹

Forrestal recognized that the situation in Europe was growing more tense with each passing day and that pressure was building for the United States to take prompt and decisive action. As planning progressed, it became apparent that one of the strongest advocates of aiding Europe militarily was the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the agency charged with carrying out the European Recovery Program. Averell Harriman, the ECA's representative in Europe, argued that Western Europe's mounting anxiety was a direct consequence of its floundering economy, caused in part by defense expenditures of more than \$5 billion a year, and that the only effective remedy would be for the United States to assume a portion of the European defense burden through military assistance. As a temporary measure the ECA strongly favored accelerated shipments of token military aid to manifest U.S. concern for Europe's security.²²

Forrestal, on the other hand, was reluctant, except in very special situations,

to provide military assistance on an ad hoc basis pending the enactment by Congress of broad military assistance legislation. Thus, in October 1948, after discussing the matter in the War Council, he disapproved a recommendation by William Foster, Harriman's deputy in Paris, to transfer fighter aircraft to France. And again, in December, after consulting the Munitions Board, he rejected a French request for surplus machine tools. However, in emergencies he was prepared to respond favorably to foreign requests for military aid, as he did at the height of the Berlin blockade crisis in September 1948 to a French request for spare parts and equipment required to improve the combat readiness of France's three divisions in West Germany. Then, on the advice of the Joint Chiefs and with the concurrence of the NSC, he recommended that Truman, exercising his plenary powers as Commander in Chief, approve the request, and the President did so on 16 September.²³

Development of Program Recommendations

By the beginning of 1949, even though detailed plans and programs were still being developed, it seemed certain that the Truman administration soon would launch an all-out drive to secure congressional approval of a military assistance bill. The President publicly endorsed such legislation shortly after the opening of the 81st Congress. In his inaugural address he listed the strengthening of "freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression" among his four central foreign policy objectives. Truman proposed not only the conclusion of new collective security agreements but also the provision of "military advice and equipment to free nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security."²⁴

The most pressing concern—establishment of machinery to convert the President's general proposal into concrete legislative recommendations—had already been taken care of by the creation in December 1948 of the Foreign Assistance Steering Committee (FASC), composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administrator, Paul G. Hoffman. Under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, the FASC promptly delegated the task of working out specific policy programs to a subsidiary group, the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee (FACC). On 6 January 1949 Forrestal named General Lemnitzer as his representative to the FACC and made provision for necessary staff and technical assistance. General Counsel Alexander Henderson and later Edward Dickinson represented the ECA, while Assistant Secretary of State Ernest A. Gross became FACC Chairman, a post he held until the end of March 1949 when Lloyd V. Berkner, also of the State Department, succeeded him.²⁵

To provide the FACC with basic information that it would need, John Ohly asked the CIA to assess the effect such a military assistance program would have on the ability of friendly governments to resist aggression and to appraise the probable reaction of the Soviet Union. The CIA cautiously predicted in a report in February 1949 that the immediate military benefits would likely be negligible but that the long-term consequences would undoubtedly enhance U.S. security. In Western Europe, the CIA asserted, "the will to resist is unlikely to outrun the visible means of resistance." It followed that if the United States failed to provide military assistance, the North Atlantic alliance would neither serve as an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression nor have the means to contain any Soviet aggression. The report predicted further that the Soviets would probably denounce U.S. military assistance, intensifying their propaganda depicting the United States as an "imperialistic warmonger."²⁶

The FACC set out to combine in a single comprehensive program all ongoing and newly proposed military assistance efforts. This proved complicated, partly because several well-developed and successful programs, such as those in Greece and Turkey, already existed, and partly because little had been done to translate the general policies of NSC 14/1 into specific proposals for individual countries. Moreover, some countries that desired assistance were slow to submit formal requests, and the FACC, lacking detailed information on their equipment deficiencies and without firsthand knowledge of their military production capabilities, could do no more than make rough estimates of their aid requirements.²⁷

Particularly troublesome was the failure of the Western Union to provide adequate information. Instead of providing the comprehensive statement that the United States had requested, the Western Union Military Committee had submitted only a so-called "interim" supply plan, listing equipment and training deficiencies only for selected categories of existing forces stationed in Western Europe. The plan did not cover units deployed in colonial areas. These forces clearly would not be adequate to achieve established Western Union objectives in the event of war with the Soviet Union: (1) hold Soviet forces as far east in Germany as possible; (2) defend against air and airborne attacks; (3) preserve the Middle East as a base for offensive operations; (4) defend North Africa; and (5) control the sea lanes. Moreover, the plan did not include ready reserve requirements, although it indicated that full-scale mobilization would necessitate additional outside assistance. Nor did it compute deficiencies in the critical area of tactical air support or estimate aviation training needs. In sum, the plan was incomplete and contradictory in places and presented a somewhat confusing picture of Western Union capabilities. Yet it constituted the best statement of the allies' requirements that the FACC could obtain.²⁸

Despite inadequate information, by the end of January the FACC had set

itself six major tasks: (1) examination of existing U.S. foreign military policies; (2) determination of the benefits the United States should seek through reciprocal assistance, such as strategic materials (or access to them), overseas base rights, transit privileges, and other comparable concessions; (3) formulation of detailed illustrative country military assistance programs based on both the estimated military needs of recipients and availability of U.S. equipment to meet those needs; (4) estimation of the economic impact that such assistance would have on the United States and the recipients; (5) constitution of an organization to administer and implement these programs; and (6) drafting of a comprehensive military assistance bill for presentation to the Congress. Although it was still too early to make accurate estimates, General Gruenther, the JCS adviser to the FACC, tentatively predicted that the program would take six to eight years and cost around \$10 billion.²⁹

The FACC held to a rigorous timetable and on 7 February submitted two basic papers to the FASC. The first of these, FACC D-3, reaffirmed that top priority in the allocation of resources should go to the needs of U.S. armed forces and the U.S. economy. In Western Europe, the area of greatest concern, the maintenance of sound economies should not be sacrificed to the needs of rearmament. While the primary return sought by the United States should be the preservation of its own and its allies' security, reciprocal assistance was expected to the extent it was appropriate and possible.³⁰

The second paper, FACC D-3/1, provided a guide for the selection and priority rating of possible aid recipients and for fixing the amount and character of the aid that each should receive. It established three groups and listed for each country the general amount of assistance required in fiscal year 1950. The priority rating of each country derived from its political and strategic importance to the United States. The FACC recommended "substantial" aid for the Western Union countries, Canada, and Turkey; "limited" aid for Denmark, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Greece; and "token" assistance for Portugal, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and the American Republics, mainly to assure their political orientation toward the United States. In addition, the FACC also recommended a contingency fund to cover the possibility of aid to India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan and to exploit any "opportunities" in China.³¹

Forrestal requested comments on the FACC proposals from within the NME and then brought up both papers for discussion before the War Council on 23 February. The council concluded that the FACC recommendations had three major defects. First, the proposed policy on reciprocal assistance appeared unduly restrained and undemanding. Royall and Symington argued that the United States should not hesitate to use military assistance as leverage for exacting concessions from other countries, and especially for securing base rights in places like

Greenland. If the United States failed to bargain with aid recipients, it would miss a golden opportunity and repeat the mistake it had made in not insisting on bases as a *quid pro quo* for economic aid under the European Recovery Program. Second, council members felt that Lemnitzer should press the FACC to include Italy in the "substantial" aid category so that it could achieve the level of armament permitted by the Italian Peace Treaty.* And lastly, the War Council recommended that the policy paper state that the United States would not bear the burden of military assistance indefinitely, that the self-help objectives were to enable the Europeans to create the industrial capacity to produce their own arms and munitions after termination of U.S. assistance, but that these should not include weapons for long-range warfare or mass destruction.³²

The FACC adopted the proposed reclassification of Italy and the clarification of self-help policy suggested in the War Council. But on the issue of reciprocal assistance, the State Department representative raised strong objections to the changes favored by the military, arguing that foreign governments would be seriously offended if the United States demanded concessions as a *quid pro quo* for assistance and that they would probably be reluctant to grant long-term base rights in exchange for relatively short-term aid. State also felt that if the United States tried to negotiate such terms, it might have to agree to provide assistance indefinitely. A more effective approach, State believed, would be to seek U.S. access to overseas bases through cooperation and collaboration under the mutual defense and assistance clause of the North Atlantic Treaty. After weeks of inconclusive debate on this issue in the FACC, Lemnitzer on 12 April decided to postpone further discussion and to defer seeking a final decision pending the completion of an ongoing JCS study of overseas base requirements.³³

The JCS study, forwarded by OSD to the State Department on 19 May, recommended that as a general policy the United States should obtain military rights overseas "by the most propitious means available," preferably through bilateral negotiations, using as appropriate the principle of *quid pro quo* in all countries receiving military or economic aid. Whenever possible, the provision and maintenance of facilities for U.S. forces should be spelled out in separate agreements between the United States and the host country.³⁴

After considering the Joint Chiefs' views, the FACC endorsed a compromise position. In general, the United States should try to obtain overseas base concessions through bilateral agreements "to the maximum practicable degree" before extending military assistance. If, however, this seemed impractical or otherwise unsound, the United States should explore other avenues. Thus, in North Atlantic Treaty countries, it might be preferable to negotiate multilateral access agree-

* For a summary of the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty, see Chapter VI.

ments under which a country would provide base rights as part of its contribution to collective security. On the other hand, under no conditions should the United States enter into agreements that might increase the dependence of foreign governments on American assistance, create the appearance that the United States had "purchased or paid for" its privileges with arms aid, or provide any reasonable basis for the Soviets to portray the North Atlantic alliance and military assistance as part of a plan of aggression against the Soviet Union.³⁵

Program Funding: Fiscal Year 1950

By the time policy details had crystallized, the administration had also reached agreement on the size and general composition of a request to Congress for authorization and funding of the military assistance program for fiscal year 1950, its first year of operation. As early as 13 January 1949, during a luncheon meeting, Forrestal and Rep. Carl Vinson had asked Lemnitzer to speculate on the cost for the upcoming fiscal year. He guessed somewhere around \$2 billion. About a month later, Lemnitzer informed the FASC that the FACC was considering first-year funding of \$1.8 to \$1.9 billion, including some portion of the \$600 million in the President's original FY 1950 budget for military and economic aid to Greece, Turkey, and Korea. He added that forecasts of the impact of aid on the U.S. economy indicated no need for domestic controls.³⁶

In preparing itemized costs, the FACC relied initially on JCS estimates developed from the Western Union interim supply plan. Although cautioning that the available information was incomplete and that the Western Union would probably submit additional requirements, the Joint Chiefs on 11 February approved and sent to Forrestal a report which calculated the cost of aid to Western Union at \$995,647,000, most of it to eliminate identifiable deficiencies in Western Union ground forces and support units and to provide equipment, training, and spare parts for frontline aviation and continental minesweeping forces. The breakdown of costs by U.S. service ran as follows: Army, \$730,652,000; Navy, \$113,028,000; and Air Force, \$151,967,000.³⁷

The JCS also advised that they expected initially, to the extent feasible, to fill all foreign aid requests out of the surplus and reserve stocks of the services rather than through new procurement. However, whenever this procedure resulted in a reduction of the reserve supplies of an item to the level which the JCS determined constituted the minimum safe war reserve level for U.S. forces ("the minimum retention level"), any further withdrawals from service stocks would require replacement through new procurement and would have to be paid for out of foreign aid appropriations at their replacement costs.³⁸

On 14 March 1949 the Joint Chiefs informed Forrestal that they estimated first-year worldwide costs at \$1,786,197,400, based on projected requirements for Western Union, previously recommended military aid under the ongoing Greek-Turkish program, specific requests from foreign governments, and obligations contingent upon the signing and ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. The JCS also favored assistance to Saudi Arabia but omitted it from the list of recipients, pending removal of the embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East. They also recommended aid to Canada, Thailand, and certain Latin American countries on a reimbursable rather than grant basis. More than half of the total estimated assistance, \$995,647,000, would go to Western Union nations. Other large allocations included \$100 million for Turkey, \$112 million for Austria, and \$200 million for Greece.³⁹

On 17 March Forrestal advised the Joint Chiefs that he had transmitted their budget recommendations to the FACC but indicated some dissatisfaction over their preliminary estimate that only \$325 million in end items would actually be delivered to recipient countries by 30 June 1950. State and BoB representatives, he said, had expressed "grave concern over the psychological and legislative implications" of this low delivery total. In view of this criticism, Forrestal asked the Joint Chiefs to reexamine their pricing methods and minimum retention levels. He apparently hoped that lowering retention levels significantly would make it possible to step up overseas deliveries by permitting heavier reliance on existing service stocks than on new production.⁴⁰

OSD transmitted to the members of the War Council on 1 April an FACC-developed proposal of \$1.90 billion* which differed from the JCS proposal of 14 March chiefly in its addition of a \$200 million self-help fund for recipient countries. The FACC also endorsed a relaxation in reserve requirements that would permit the services to furnish specific items from below the minimum retention level when the replacement lead-time of such items was short enough to justify the risk. Lemnitzer estimated that under this procedure actual deliveries up to July 1950 would have a value of about \$700 million, including administrative and logistical costs.⁴¹

Continuing discussions among FACC members resulted in some changes in the earlier proposal, principally a reduction of \$165 million for Western Union and elimination, at the request of the State Department representative, of all grant aid to Latin America, changes that reduced the recommended total to \$1.766 billion. (Table 9) In mid-April the BoB recommended to President Truman further and much larger cuts, contending that: (1) time lags in placing orders would permit the obligation in fiscal year 1950 of only \$400 million of the pro-

* The number is given as \$1.986 billion in the source document, the result of an error in addition.

posed appropriation; (2) the FACC-recommended appropriation would place undue strain on the federal budget and raise the question of a tax increase; (3) technical adjustments, such as elimination of reimbursements for stocks declared excess to minimum U.S. requirements, would yield significant savings; (4) proposed aid for Portugal, Austria, Iran, Korea, and the Philippines could be eliminated or reduced without unduly jeopardizing U.S. security; and (5) all contingency reserve and European self-help funds could also be eliminated for the same reason.⁴²

The FACC, hoping to head off White House acceptance of the BoB recommendations, prepared a revised program that came to \$1.518 billion—a reduction of \$248 million from the most recent FACC proposal. With the process of paring estimates now nearing completion, Johnson gave Lemnitzer last-minute instructions to “repeat and emphasize [to the BoB] . . . that several years from now the military assistance program should make possible a reduction in our own military establishment, but that no such reduction can be expected prior to 1952.” Johnson stressed that the State Department, as the agency most responsible, should have the “leading voice” in determining the size of the aid program. And finally, he indicated that while Lemnitzer should support fully whatever level of effort State might deem reasonable and appropriate, he should do so subject to the “clear understanding” that expenditures for military assistance would not be construed as “a justification for a reduction in our own military budget.”⁴³

On 20 April 1949 President Truman approved a request of \$1.450 billion. Later that same day, Acheson and Johnson met with Director of the Budget Frank Pace to confer about several outstanding issues. They agreed that two of the three countries that the BoB had sought to exclude as aid recipients—Korea and the Philippines—should be included but that the third—Portugal—should not be and that the amount originally earmarked for Austria should be cut by almost 90 percent. They also agreed that, contrary to the BoB’s recommendation, there should be both an emergency fund and a self-help fund, but at lower levels than the FACC had recommended.⁴⁴ (Table 9)

At the time the President approved the budget figure there was no way of knowing whether this amount would be sufficient to achieve the purposes of the new program during its first year of operations. The individual country allocations constituted only illustrative approximations of the sums that might be effectively used to launch or to continue (as in Greece and Turkey) the program in each of the countries named on at least a minimal basis. It was intended that within the total approved there should be much leeway to make the substantial adjustments in these illustrative country figures that would undoubtedly be required because of the many major uncertainties that surrounded this new and unprecedented

TABLE 9
Military Assistance Estimates for FY 1950
(In Millions of Dollars)

	JCS Recommended 14 Mar 49 ^a	FACC Recommended Ca 5 Apr 49 ^b	BoB Recommended Ca 15 Apr 49 ^c	Approved 20 Apr 49 ^d
Western Union	995.65	830.85	817.63	801.60
Denmark	36.50	49.99	49.99	48.92
Italy	60.00	44.77	44.77	44.19
Norway	48.80	81.65	81.65	79.72
Portugal	9.00	7.98	—	—
Turkey	100.00	102.30	75.00	102.30
Austria	112.00	102.55	12.00	11.62
Greece	200.00	198.16	150.00	178.16
Iran	12.30	15.20	4.07	15.20
Korea	20.00	17.65	—	10.98
Latin America	86.06	—	—	—
Philippines	5.89	10.13	—	5.74
Packing, Handling, Transport* ..	(274.49)	(124.64)†	(79.27)†	NA
Administration	‡	25.00	15.00	11.37
Emergency Fund	100.00	100.00	—	50.00
Self-Help Fund	—	200.00	—	155.00
Less Pipeline Supplies and Non- reimbursables	No Estimate	— 19.96	— 94.96§	— 64.80
TOTAL	1,786.20	1,766.27	1,155.15	1,450.00

* Distributed in country totals.

† Includes Transportation only.

‡ Included in Packing, Handling, and Transportation.

§ Corrected from an apparent error in the source document, which gives the figure as \$19.96 million.

Sources

^aMemo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 14 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 6-2-46.

^bBoB Dir's Review Book: Military Assistance Program, (n d), PSF, Truman Papers; similar but not totally identical figures in memo Acheson for Truman, (n d, ca 20 Apr 49), *ibid*.

^cBoB Dir's Review Book: Military Assistance Program, (n d), PSF, Truman Papers.

^dMemo Lemnitzer for Gruenther, 27 Apr 49, RG 330, OISA files, N7-1(1)-B.1.

program. For this reason, among others, the bill that the administration forwarded to Congress in July provided for the authorization of a single lump sum for all foreign military aid during fiscal year 1950 and gave no indication of the amounts that might be used to supply aid to specific countries or areas. Given the numerous uncertainties associated with the program—such as different accounting techniques and guesswork estimates of foreign requirements—there was an

obvious need for flexibility to permit later adjustments. But in any case, the size of the program in its first year seemed less important than the idea and spirit behind it. Despite disagreements over details and fears by the services that foreign assistance might weaken them, the Truman administration felt that without a genuine commitment to aiding the rearmament of friendly governments efforts to promote foreign economic recovery and collective security would lack substance and credibility.

MDAP: The Legislative Base

On 8 April 1949 the State Department publicly announced that it had received formal requests from the members of the Western Union, Denmark, Norway, and Italy for military assistance and that a legislative proposal was being prepared in response to these requests. Coming only four days after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, this announcement implied a close linkage between military assistance legislation and treaty ratification. Although the State Department denied such a connection, the message was still clear: Without U.S. military assistance, development of an effective European defense system seemed hardly possible.⁴⁵

The administration moved rapidly to lay the foundation for a successful effort in Congress. On 21 April, the day after Truman approved the military aid request for submission to Congress, Acheson and Johnson met in executive session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and described in detail the proposed program and the reasons for its development. With Acheson's and Johnson's concurrence, the committee immediately released a press statement indicating that the initial request was for \$1.450 billion, of which approximately \$1.130 billion* would go to members of the North Atlantic alliance.⁴⁶ The timetable worked out by the administration with congressional leaders called for hearings on the legislation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to begin on 16 May. But a few days before the scheduled date the Democratic and Republican leaders advised postponement until completion of Senate action on the North Atlantic Treaty, which did not appear likely for six weeks or more. In late June Congress passed a continuing resolution, making it possible to maintain military assistance to such countries as Greece and Turkey without disruption.⁴⁷

Wasting no time after the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty, the President on 25 July 1949 sent Congress his proposals for a comprehensive military aid program. The President explained that the purposes of the proposed legislation were to enable "free nations . . . to protect themselves against the threat

* Including \$150 million in self-help funds.

of aggression and contribute more effectively to the collective defense of world peace." Unfortunately, the obligation of members of the United Nations to settle disputes peacefully was "not sufficient at the present time to eliminate fear of aggression and international violence." Because of "many unpredictable factors," the President declined to put a limit on the duration of the program. He requested an unrestricted authorization for a lump-sum appropriation for fiscal year 1950 of \$1.4 billion that could be allocated at his discretion on the basis of bilateral agreements between the United States and recipient countries, plus \$50 million for continuing aid to Greece and Turkey.⁴⁸

In spite of the administration's hope for quick action, Congress took nearly three months to pass an authorization bill and another three weeks to approve FY 1950 appropriations. In general, Democrats supported the legislation while Republicans, led by Senator Vandenberg, voiced sharp criticisms. Because of partisan disagreements and the unprecedented nature of the President's proposal, Congress showed reluctance to rush to a decision and insisted on extensive committee hearings and lengthy floor debate in each house, especially during consideration of the authorization bill.⁴⁹

During the congressional debate, Johnson testified on several occasions before House and Senate committees in support of the administration's request. His prepared remarks, largely perfunctory, reflected his view that the State Department should assume principal responsibility for defending the size and goals of the program. When asked technical or military questions, Johnson invariably deferred to Lemnitzer or the Joint Chiefs, partly because he was unfamiliar with the details and partly also, perhaps, because he wanted to avoid being identified as an architect of the program.⁵⁰ Lemnitzer later speculated that Johnson resented not having had a chance to participate in the original decision to undertake large-scale military aid.⁵¹

There is no evidence that the absence of strong support from Johnson actually made any difference. It soon became apparent that Congress would not approve the administration's authorization request in its original form, principally because of the provision that gave the President virtually unlimited power to allocate funds as he saw fit, a power that Senator Vandenberg contended would make the President "the number one war lord of the earth." The administration heeded the message; on 5 August it presented a revised bill (H.R. 5895) which divided the proposed lump-sum authorization into three separate authorizations under separate titles and limited the eligible recipients of aid to those countries specifically listed under each title. Title I authorized \$1,160,990,000 for aid to NATO members that had requested assistance; Title II authorized \$211,370,000 for aid to Greece and Turkey; and Title III contained an authorization of \$27,640,000 for assistance to Iran, Korea, and the Philippines. Within each of the three titles

the President would have discretion to determine which nations should receive aid and how much. In addition, the President would have discretionary authority to transfer up to five percent of the funds between titles, although he would first have to notify certain congressional committees.⁵²

Still far from satisfied, the House Foreign Affairs Committee recommended on 15 August that the amount of each authorization be approved in full but that more than 43 percent of the amount for North Atlantic Treaty countries be in the form of contract authorizations. Three days later the bill went to the House floor, where Rep. James P. Richards of South Carolina won approval of two amendments that wholly eliminated the contract authority recommended by the committee and substantially reduced the amount authorized for Title I countries. As passed by the House, H.R. 5895 was a mere shadow of the administration's bill, containing authorizations of only \$819 million.⁵³

The Senate, like the House, had reservations, but it was more generous, perhaps influenced by a feeling of obligation to provide concrete support for the treaty that it had so recently approved. In mid-September, following lengthy joint hearings, the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees reported a bill (S. 2388) containing total authorizations of \$1.314 billion, including \$1 billion under Title I for the following: \$100 million in cash appropriations to become immediately available; an additional \$400 million in cash to become available as soon as the North Atlantic Treaty members adopted a strategic plan for the integrated defense of their territory; and \$500 million in contract authority, also contingent on approval of the strategic plan. The committees also approved the full authorizations requested for Titles II (\$211 million for Greece and Turkey) and III (\$28 million for Iran, Korea, and the Philippines), and included an unrequested authorization of \$75 million in unvouchered funds to be used in the "general area" of China.*⁵⁴ On 22 September, after defeating several attempts to reduce the total, the Senate approved the bill by a vote of 55 to 24. Shortly thereafter a Senate-House Conference Committee accepted the Senate figure of \$1.314 billion; both chambers in late September quickly approved the conference report, and Truman signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 on 6 October.⁵⁵

The new law defined military assistance as the provision or procurement for "eligible nations of equipment, materials, and services" that would strengthen their capabilities for individual or collective self-defense. However, the law specifically prohibited the transfer of manufacturing equipment or other machinery (except machine tools) and support for the construction or operation of any factory or other manufacturing establishment outside of the United States.

* This money could be used by the President as an emergency fund to be accounted for simply by certifying the amounts expended, without specifying the nature of the expenditures.

Title IV dealt with management and operation of the program. Its provisions followed closely the administration's recommendations, with some notable exceptions. First, Congress reserved to itself the right by concurrent resolution to terminate aid to any country; and second, it required that at least 50 percent of all equipment, materials, and commodities be shipped in U.S.-flag commercial vessels. Significantly, there was no "Buy American" directive that would ban off-shore foreign procurement of goods furnished as U.S. aid. The act vested in the President virtually all the authority it granted, with the right to exercise it through any agency or person he might select. Before receiving aid, recipient nations had to sign a bilateral aid agreement spelling out the terms under which assistance would be supplied. Other provisions in Title IV established as legal requirements the pricing formulas and certain other standards and procedures and limited to \$450 million the value of equipment declared excess to mobilization requirements that could be provided as aid without charge to MDAP appropriations, except for expenses incurred in readying such equipment for transfer. The law retained authority to transfer five percent of the funds available under one title for use under another title. Another provision authorized reimbursable aid not only to countries listed in the act but also to other nations that "joined with the United States in a collective defense and regional arrangement"—an extremely important and subsequently widely used authority that, without cost to the United States, greatly facilitated the furnishing of equipment to many nations that could not afford to pay for it.⁵⁶

The next step was to secure appropriations and, in the process, to adopt the original program proposals within the reduced authorization of \$1.314 billion. Anticipating passage of the act, OSD on 16 September asked the Joint Chiefs to revise the previously proposed individual country program allocations, indicating by service the general amount of equipment and funds. The JCS, replying on 23 September, endorsed recommendations prepared by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), which proposed changes only in the scale and timetable of programs for Western Europe. The projected operating budget of \$1,128.76 million was allocated among the three services as follows: Army, \$864.72 million; Navy, \$128.10 million; and Air Force, \$135.94 million. The JSPC tentatively earmarked \$891.50 million for Title I countries and made no changes in Title II or Title III allocations.⁵⁷

By the time President Truman signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, it was clear that fears of congressional cuts had been exaggerated and that the necessary but minor changes that would be required in the program contemplated in the original \$1.4 billion request would not be damaging and would not seriously delay its implementation. In October the President recommended and the Congress, after brief study, approved appropriations in the full amount of the

TABLE 10
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949: Summary of Legislative Action
(In Millions of Dollars)

	Admin Request 5 Aug 49 ^a	House Cte Recommended 15 Aug 49 ^b	House Voted 18 Aug 49 ^c	Senate Cte Recommended 13 Sep 49 ^d	Senate Voted 22 Sep 49 ^e	Conference Agreed 28 Sep 49 ^f
<u>Title I</u>						
<u>NAT Countries</u>						
Cash	1,161	656	580	500	500	500
Contract Authority	—	505	—	500	500	500
NAT Subtotal	1,161	1,161	580	1,000	1,000	1,000
<u>Title II</u>						
Greece and Turkey	211	211	211	211	211	211
<u>Title III</u>						
Iran, Korea, Philippines	28	28	28	28	28	28
General Area of China	—	—	—	75	75	75
 TOTAL	 1,400	 1,400	 819	 1,314	 1,314	 1,314

Sources

^aHR 5895, 81 Cong, 1 sess, House Cte on Intl Rel, *Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943–50*, V, Pt 1; *Military Assistance Programs*, 147–48.

^bH Rpt No 1265, 81 Cong, 1 sess, reprinted in *ibid*, 506–13.

^cHR 5895, as passed 18 Aug 49 and introduced in the Senate, in *ibid*, 501–05.

^dS Rpt No 1068, 81 Cong, 1 sess, 13 Sep 49.

^e*Congressional Record*, 81 Cong, 1 sess, 95, pt 10:13130–68.

^fPL 329, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 81 Cong, 1 sess.

authorization. After months of deliberation and debate military assistance finally had a green light.⁵⁸

Administrative Procedures

Throughout the congressional debate, administration of military assistance received little attention because the FACC had already constituted the nucleus of a working interdepartmental organization that could oversee execution of the program. The President in April 1949 directed the Secretary of State to assume "primary responsibility and authority" for direction of the program because it "is an integral part of our foreign policy." Presumably the same agencies that had developed the assistance program—State, NME, and ECA—would carry it forward after the enactment of legislation.⁵⁹

In acknowledging the President's decision, Johnson emphasized the "crucial importance" of the program to the NME and the extensive "operating responsibilities" the services would have as MDAP moved forward. No doubt hoping to establish an influential military role in directing the program, Johnson proposed that the President appoint in the State Department a top-level administrator who would communicate with the NME "to and through" the Secretary of Defense. The President characterized Johnson's idea as having "real merit" and decided to designate a director for foreign military assistance within the State Department to administer the program.⁶⁰

To clarify responsibilities and lines of authority, the FACC adopted a policy paper to serve as guidance for implementing the President's directive of 13 April. The FACC recommended the distribution of military assistance duties among three agencies. The Department of State should have "primary authority and responsibility for direction of the program"; for "formulating, through interdepartmental coordination, the policies governing MAP"; for "coordinating interests and assigned responsibilities of agencies involved"; for negotiating international agreements; for directing the use and allocation of funds; and for reporting progress. The NME should provide advice on military strategy and policy and carry out the assigned functions of "detailed programming, procurement, supply, delivery, training, observation of end-use, and other military aspects of the program." The ECA should advise, at the policy level, "on the problems of securing a proper balance between foreign economic recovery . . . and military assistance plans and programs," and assist in certain areas where the use of its U.S. organization might be adapted to the program's purposes, as in authorizing the procurement of certain common-use items.

The FACC also proposed retention of the basic FASC-FACC structure and urged utilization of existing agencies to the maximum extent. It recommended

changes only in titles—the FASC to Foreign Military Assistance Steering Committee (FMASC) and the FACC to Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC). The Director for Foreign Military Assistance, serving as a special assistant to the Secretary of State and as permanent Chairman of the FMACC, would supervise a small staff exercising responsibility for day-to-day activities. To deal with regional and country matters, the committee recommended establishment abroad of coordinating bodies modeled after the inter-agency arrangement of the FMASC and FMACC in Washington.⁶¹

Since Congress made no attempt in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 to spell out how the assistance program should be organized and managed, it left the President with virtually a free hand in these areas. The only provisions that specifically regulated the President's authority appeared in Section 406, which empowered him to authorize involved agencies to hire additional civilian personnel as necessary, utilize members of the armed forces in noncombat support roles, hire up to 15 technical experts and engineering consultants, and appoint subject to confirmation by the Senate 4 statutory officials.

On 17 October 1949 James Bruce, a Baltimore bank executive and U.S. Ambassador to Argentina since mid-1947, took office as the first Director of Mutual Defense Assistance. Shortly thereafter, John Ohly left OSD to become Bruce's deputy. Housed in the State Department, the Office of the Director of Mutual Defense Assistance included a small program staff made up of specialists on substantive policy matters, a comptroller staff, a public relations officer, and an intelligence adviser.⁶²

In the Department of Defense the military assistance organization fell under the immediate supervision of General Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance), and General Lemnitzer, Director of the Office of Military Assistance (OMA). Johnson on 25 November 1949 clarified Lemnitzer's duties in a memorandum to Defense officials directing that "all dealings with other Departments in this Program will be to and through my office." The directive assigned as Lemnitzer's chief function the "unified direction and authoritative coordination of the military phase of planning, programming, logistic and training activities in connection with military assistance." Johnson also assigned specific duties to other DoD agencies participating in the program. The JCS had the responsibility of directing all joint overseas military operations and of recommending to the Secretary of Defense broad criteria and policies for military assistance. The Munitions Board was "to develop and recommend policies pertaining to Department of Defense interests in the economic aspects of military and reciprocal assistance" and to evaluate programs, including foreign military production, for their effect on U.S. industrial mobilization plans. The huge task of actual implementation—training of personnel, supervision of

procurement, rehabilitation of used equipment, and transport of supplies—fell on the individual military departments.⁶³

The interdepartmental European Coordinating Committee (ECC), established in London under the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Lewis Douglas, became the political, military, and economic coordinating agency for the program in the European area. General Thomas T. Handy, Commander in Chief, European Command, and Averell Harriman, Special Representative in Europe for the ECA, served on the ECC with Douglas. Handy also served as U.S. Military Representative for Military Assistance in Europe, reporting to the Secretary of Defense on the coordination of economic and military aid programs and to the Joint Chiefs on the activities of the country-level Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs).⁶⁴ The MAAGs operated under the direction of the local chief of diplomatic mission (usually the U.S. ambassador) as part of a country team composed of political (embassy), economic (ECA), and military (MAAG) personnel from the United States posted to the host country. Aid actually reached the recipients through the individual MAAGs.


The decision to establish regional coordinating machinery in Europe reflected the prevailing assumption in Washington that the central purpose of MDAP was to strengthen the North Atlantic alliance. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs created their own network of agencies and committees to monitor the program, integrate its efforts with NATO planning, and assist the MAAGs in developing country programs and recommendations that would further NATO objectives.⁶⁵

Outside Western Europe there were no regional coordinating organizations. In Title II (Greece and Turkey) and Title III (Iran, Korea, and the Philippines) countries, American military advisory and/or training missions, already in place and functioning, made unnecessary any extensive changes. However, new bilateral agreements had to be negotiated with these countries to satisfy the legal requirements of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, and the U.S. mission chiefs acquired additional reporting duties as the local MDAP representatives.⁶⁶

Inaugurating the Program

By December 1949 the entire MDAP organization, with the exception of military advisory groups in Title I countries, stood ready to implement the program. However, no authorized aid could be delivered to a country until a bilateral agreement had been concluded with the country and, in the case of any NATO country, until the President had approved NATO recommendations for the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area. The Army estimated that

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ORGANIZATION FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
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once these requirements were met, deliveries would begin to reach Western Europe in 80 days.⁶⁷

In January 1950, the North Atlantic Council and President Truman approved the strategic concept prepared by NATO planners for the defense of the treaty area.* But the task of negotiating the bilateral agreements proved a temporary stumbling block. The initial difficulty concerned disagreements between the State Department and the British Foreign Office over the facilities Britain would provide as reciprocal assistance and whether exports to Commonwealth countries of British manufactured items similar to those furnished as U.S. military aid would violate U.S. legislation. France raised much the same question regarding shipments to Indochina. Further negotiations with both countries produced compromises which in effect permitted the resolution of these issues on a case-by-case basis.⁶⁸ After quick resolution of several other technicalities, the United States on 27 January signed bilateral agreements with the eight European recipients. That same day President Truman signed Executive Order 10099 confirming administrative arrangements and directed the Secretary of State, with the collaboration of Defense, ECA, and the BoB, to begin implementation of the program.⁶⁹

Because of the late enactment of the legislation, the program administrators had to compress into less than six months all the work of refining detailed plans and obligating funds that normally would have stretched across the entire fiscal year. Originally, in their presentation to Congress, administration spokesmen had estimated that the United States could deliver 56 percent of the proposed materiel and services by 30 June 1950. The administration had based this estimate on the assumption that funds would be available for use as of 1 July 1949 and that there would be a 12-month period in which to operate during fiscal year 1950. The estimate also reflected considerable guesswork, since the JCS, while accepting the Western Union interim supply plan as adequate for budgetary planning, did not regard it as a reliable source for specific country requirements or as a satisfactory guide for actual programming and supply. Not until State-Defense survey teams visited Europe in the late autumn of 1949 did the United States begin to obtain the kind of detailed information on European forces and their deficiencies needed for refining operating programs and initiating supply actions.⁷⁰

Other problems also arose, including criticism by the services that the MDAP organization was inordinately complex and not "well adapted" to efficient operation.⁷¹ Yet in the early stages organizational difficulties may have proved less of a hindrance than the understandable reluctance of the BoB to apportion

* See Chapter XVI.

funds* for obligation until all statutory preconditions had been satisfied and until the Defense Department had conducted a thorough screening of foreign requests and submitted firm programs for approval. By the end of January 1950, the BoB had released only \$32.5 million, of which less than \$1.5 million had been obligated, mainly for administrative services. On 6 March 1950, Johnson exhorted the services to expedite initial and subsequent shipments to Title I nations, to step up equipment rehabilitation, and to increase the pace of procurement for military assistance. This led to a frantic effort to obligate funds as quickly as possible before legislative authority expired at the end of the fiscal year. On the surface, this effort appeared successful. By 30 June, of the \$1.314 billion appropriated by Congress, Defense had obligated \$1.078 billion, though only \$49.3 million of that amount had been expended.†⁷²

In terms of actual equipment deliveries, MDAP achieved few of the goals originally envisioned for fiscal year 1950—leading to disappointment in Congress and among recipient nations. The initiation of supply actions depended on the development of detailed country programs based on carefully screened item-by-item lists of requirements prepared in the field. Then, after Lemnitzer and the Director of Mutual Defense Assistance had reviewed and approved these programs, came the slow and laborious process of selecting, repairing, rehabilitating, sometimes modernizing, packing, and shipping equipment from service stocks, or in some instances, obtaining the equipment through procurement. Thus, initial overseas shipments did not begin until 10 March 1950, when the U.S. Navy turned over nearly 50 Helldiver and Hellcat aircraft to the French navy at Norfolk, Va. Subsequently, as more and more items entered the pipeline, the size and rate of transfers steadily increased, reaching a total of 134,000 tons by 30 June 1950.⁷³

In addition to carrying out its own responsibilities for providing military equipment and training, Defense cooperated with the ECA in initiating the first phase of an effort to increase indigenous European capacity for the production of high-priority military items. The long-term objective of this additional military production (AMP) program was to restore and strengthen Europe's military-industrial base in order to sustain future rearmament. Obviously, an effort of this sort could not be launched overnight. In fiscal year 1950, AMP had a budget of \$85 million; the DoD had received 190 separate AMP projects by 30 June 1950.⁷⁴

* The process of apportionment is designed to limit the amount of funds released for obligation by an agency in a particular time period (e.g., a quarter) to an amount that the agency can in fact effectively utilize during that period. The BoB exercised the overall apportioning function for the government.

† State and the ECA obligated an additional \$2.9 million and expended \$2.4 million.

Renewing the Mandate: Fiscal Year 1951

For fiscal year 1951 the administration sent Congress a military assistance program that was, with minor exceptions, a carbon copy of the FY 1950 program. Adhering to the objectives of the original program developed in the spring of 1949, it represented the second stage of a long-term effort to build, equip, and maintain viable forces among U.S. friends and allies—an annual investment expected to result in a steady improvement of their military capabilities.

Planning for the second year actually began in the summer of 1949, even before Congress had taken up the initial authorization bill. At the time, however, the President and his senior advisers were uncertain whether, and if so to what extent, the United States could afford to continue military assistance beyond fiscal year 1950. Faced with evidence of a threat of economic recession, Truman in July 1949 asked the NSC to study ways of reducing military and international expenditures.* He also approved a BoB recommendation placing a tentative overall FY 1951 ceiling of \$17.770 billion on all national defense (including AEC) and international aid programs and within this total set planning limits for specific programs, including a limit of \$200 million for foreign military assistance and more than a half dozen other programs.⁷⁵ Clearly, if the President's tentative ceiling became firm, military assistance would suffer drastically during the second year.

At the request of Secretary Johnson, the JCS submitted to the NSC detailed comments on the military implications of reduced military assistance in fiscal year 1951. In their analysis, the Joint Chiefs assumed that the extremely low ceiling indicated the President's intent to reduce or possibly eliminate military assistance as an element of U.S. foreign policy. They addressed themselves, therefore, to the impact that large-scale reductions might have on the current and future course of U.S.-Soviet relations and on short- and long-range military planning. In terms of immediate fighting capabilities, the reduction would not significantly affect current aid recipients, but for the long term the consequences could prove catastrophic. Recipients would probably lose confidence in U.S. leadership as well as their will and ability to fight internal subversion and external aggression. In these circumstances, the Soviet Union could reap many cheap victories, while the United States would find itself increasingly isolated and vulnerable. Such conditions, the JCS argued, would inevitably compel a thorough reassessment of strategic assumptions and, in the event of war, leave the United States standing virtually alone against Soviet and other communist forces.⁷⁶

• See Chapter XIII.

In its report (NSC 52/3) to the President on 29 September, the NSC responded to his request in two ways. First, in strict compliance with the terms of the request, it recommended general budgets for each national security program within the \$17.770 billion ceiling; and assuming retention of the ceiling, it recommended elimination of military assistance, saying that any possible allocation within a proposed \$200 million ceiling "would necessarily be of insufficient size to achieve the desired results and might have an adverse psychological effect." Second, having concluded that the amount allowed for military assistance would be insufficient to do any good, the NSC stated that between \$1 billion and \$1.5 billion for military assistance was "essential from the standpoint of national security," the exact amount yet to be determined. The Treasury Department concurred in this recommendation, but Truman, for the time being, took no position on the matter.⁷⁷

The debate over the FY 1951 military assistance program continued for several months after the completion of NSC 52/3. The BoB, which had not participated in the NSC study, raised vigorous objections to FY 1951 funding for Title I MDAP nations. It argued that (1) since FY 1950 funds could not be expended before the end of the fiscal year, the unexpended balance could be reappropriated to provide funds for fiscal year 1951; (2) no decision on a continuing program should be taken until State and Defense resolved a conceptual difference over the purpose and objectives of military assistance; and (3) NATO planning was proceeding so slowly that no program could be ready for submission to Congress. Under Secretary of State Webb strenuously rejected the BoB's proposals, contending that a decision against further aid would "knock the props from under" NATO. In the end, Truman turned down the BoB's advice; in his annual budget message on 9 January 1950 he recommended a FY 1951 MDAP appropriation of approximately \$1.1 billion, including \$500 million in contracting authority.⁷⁸

At the time the President made his recommendation, little budget planning for military assistance had occurred. To develop a detailed submission, the FMACC established four working groups, with John Ohly as overall coordinator. In late January 1950 Johnson asked the JCS and the Munitions Board to lend support and to pay special attention to the development of budgetary programs based on concepts for the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area. He indicated that a broad NATO plan for integrated defense and mutual assistance should be available for presentation to Congress in April 1950.⁷⁹

During the course of the next several months, budget planning for MDAP considered the need for increased expenditures on the assumption that growing Soviet military capabilities, as indicated by the Soviet atomic test the previous August, might necessitate a wholesale strengthening of U.S. and allied mili-

tary forces. The most powerful argument for an increase appeared in a special State-Defense study known as NSC 68, requested by President Truman when he decided to expedite research on thermonuclear weapons.* Completed around the end of March, NSC 68 recommended a "substantial increase in military assistance programs" to upgrade the capabilities of U.S. allies at a rate and to an extent well beyond the current efforts. Although NSC 68 contained no estimate of the cost, a rough approximation in May 1950 by the National Security Resources Board projected the expense of a combined ECA-MDAP program at \$5.4 billion in fiscal year 1951, rising to \$7.1 billion in fiscal year 1953, and tapering off to \$4.7 billion in fiscal year 1955. Responding to rumors that European recovery and MDAP might be merged at an approximate cost of \$5 billion per year, Johnson stated that he would oppose any such action unless it had the President's approval.⁸⁰

Although it raised the prospect of a fundamental shift of policy, NSC 68 had no immediate impact on the initial MDAP estimates for fiscal year 1951. At the outset of the budget process White House and OSD restraints on spending still held, and military planners had to frame their recommendations accordingly. In January 1950, for example, the JCS submitted to the Secretary of Defense a statement of relatively modest long-term requirements to serve as military guidance for the preparation of estimates by the FMACC working groups. They determined that the "development of sufficient military power in Western Europe to prevent loss or destruction of the industrial complexes in that region and to control those areas from which future operations can best be projected" remained the first priority. They also urged, however, that as Western Europe became stronger the United States should impose "definite limitations" and "progressive reductions" on its aid to that part of the world. Although the Joint Chiefs did not forecast when reductions could be made, they suggested that an important factor should be Western Europe's demonstrated willingness to participate in programs of self-help and mutual assistance.⁸¹

By April the FMACC working groups had finished their tasks and had in hand a program estimated at \$1.147 billion. But in May proposals transmitted to the BoB added an authorization for the appropriation of \$100 million for use in the general area of China. In the meantime the Joint Chiefs forwarded to Johnson their views on the distribution among countries of the funds approved by the FMACC for fiscal year 1950. They suggested that the President should also request funds for grant assistance to Latin America. Except for the provision of grant aid to Latin America, all of the Joint Chiefs' recommendations had in fact been incorporated in the FMACC proposals submitted to the BoB. On Lemnitzer's advice, Johnson notified the JCS that it was neither practical nor

* On the H-bomb decision, see Chapter XV. On NSC 68, see Chapter XVIII.

desirable at such a late date to incorporate specific provisions for Latin America, but that Defense would try to convince Congress to liberalize the terms under which these countries could purchase military supplies.⁸²

On 1 June 1950 President Truman requested Congress to authorize appropriations in the following amounts for the program during fiscal year 1951: \$1 billion for the North Atlantic area, \$120 million for Greece and Turkey, \$27.5 million for Iran, Korea, and the Philippines, and \$75 million for use in the general area of China. In addition, he proposed several amendments in the basic authorization legislation: an increase from 5 percent to 10 percent in the amount of appropriated funds that he might transfer for use from one title to another and an expansion of this transfer authority to provide aid to countries not covered by Titles I, II, and III;* removal of existing limitations on the kinds of machinery, tools, and equipment that could be provided for increasing military production abroad; an increase in the number of countries eligible to purchase arms from the United States; and a liberalization of the circumstances and terms for such purchases.⁸³

Unlike the year before, the debate in Congress did not significantly challenge the administration's proposals. Instead of submitting draft legislation, Lemnitzer and Ohly met informally with members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to tell them what the administration wanted, leaving it up to them to decide the form of a bill. It became apparent that the committee's leadership was eager to cooperate in renewing the legislation. In the Senate, where a similar informal conference was held, members of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees reflected the same attitude, although there were some scattered complaints that insufficient attention was being given to the Far East.⁸⁴ The Senate committees recommended full approval of the President's proposals, including the reauthorization of \$214 million in unobligated FY 1950 funds. On 21 June, S. 3809 was introduced in the Senate. The outbreak of the Korean War a few days later accelerated the bill's passage. It cleared the Senate 66-0 on 30 June, went to the floor of the House on 11 July, and passed by a vote of 362 to 1 on 19 July. A week later the President signed the bill into law.⁸⁵

By the summer of 1950 the MDAP was an established fixture of U.S. foreign and defense policy. Although after a half year of operation it had yet to show tangible results or accomplishments other than token shipments of supplies, it had demonstrated its significance. Conceived mainly to energize the North Atlantic alliance, it had already grown into a program of worldwide proportions that substantially enlarged U.S. obligations and responsibilities

* The chief purpose of this requested change was to facilitate aid to Austria and Yugoslavia and thereby encourage the latter to move closer to the West since its break with the Soviet Union. On Yugoslavia's rift with the Soviet Union, see Chapter VI.

abroad. In retrospect, it seems clear that the MDAP constituted a necessary and logical adjunct to the European Recovery Program. Psychologically, it promised to bolster Western Europe's sense of security and commitment to recovery, while reducing the immense disparity between Soviet and Western military forces. In Western Europe and other areas where the communist menace threatened friendly governments and U.S. interests, MDAP would prove a vital contribution toward restoring a balance of power, "an investment in security," as President Truman described it, "that will be worth many times its costs."⁸⁶

CHAPTER XVIII

Renewed Pressure for Rearmament: NSC 68

The creation of NATO and the institution of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program climaxed the historic process after World War II by which the United States committed itself to a role of international leadership. These momentous undertakings placed further burdens on a military establishment already straining to meet its expanded responsibilities under the handicaps of restricted force levels and barebones budgets. Throughout the late 1940s the President and Congress held to the position that the government's first priority should be the restoration of a strong domestic economy and that tight budget restraints represented an essential tool for this purpose. As a consequence, and in spite of deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and looming future responsibilities under the North Atlantic Treaty, they insisted that appropriations for national defense purposes should be kept to the minimum required to meet immediate security needs rather than expanded in anticipation of possible future needs.

Advocates of increased military strength enjoyed only limited success in obtaining additional funds. One exception of sorts was the allocation of more funds for a buildup of air power, and particularly of strategic air power, but this was done within the previously determined budget ceiling by reducing funds that had theretofore been programmed for the Army and the Navy. Another exception was Forrestal's success, in the spring of 1948 following the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, in persuading the President to request a supplemental military appropriation for fiscal year 1949. However, by the end of 1948 Truman had redoubled his efforts to balance the budget by holding military obligations below \$15 billion. The following year, amid evidence of a business recession, the President lowered the military budget ceiling to \$13 billion, while Secretary

Johnson inaugurated his celebrated economy drive to trim fat and eliminate waste from military programs. Retrenchment and belt-tightening became the order of the day; in June 1950 the strength of the armed forces was at or near the low levels reached in 1947 at the end of the World War II demobilization.

While the prevailing pattern was one of close fiscal control and budgetary restraint, events were taking place that would soon redirect the thrust of American national security policy. By late 1949 the cumulative effect of a succession of alarming changes in the international scene had impressed on a growing number of officials the need for a full-scale review of U.S. security policy. Their increased concern was prompted mainly by two new developments—the discovery in September 1949, one to three years earlier than most experts had predicted, that the Soviet Union had exploded an atomic device, and, in the fall, the complete victory of the Chinese Communists over the Nationalists and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The near simultaneity of these events compounded their effect. Together they presented a startling indication of the immense power and enormous military capabilities already possessed by the Soviet bloc and, coupled with increasing Soviet intransigence on critical European issues and continuing evidence of communist expansionist intentions, strongly suggested that American military capabilities no longer were, or at least soon might not be, adequate to protect vital U.S. national security interests. The capabilities of the United States vis-à-vis those of the Soviet Union appeared to be eroding, and a major strengthening of American and other Western military forces was thought to be necessary to prevent Soviet attainment and exploitation of a position of military dominance.¹

Origins and Drafting of NSC 68

Although fiscal constraints still constituted a major barrier to expansion of U.S. military strength and foreign military assistance programs, the ominous international scene at the end of 1949 prompted President Truman to request a review and reassessment of basic U.S. national security policy. The previous assessment (NSC 20/4), initiated by Forrestal and concluded in November 1948, had concentrated on the dangers of Soviet and communist expansion and recommended "timely and adequate" preparedness by the United States. Forrestal had hoped that NSC 20/4 would provide the basis for a judgment about the kind of military establishment that was needed and thereby play an important role in the budget process. While the paper constituted more an assessment of the threats to the nation than a guide for the development of actual programs, it did provide the Joint Chiefs with "political guidance" as they prepared emergency plans.²

State Department analysts, including George Kennan and other members of the Policy Planning Staff, were reluctant to supplement NSC 20/4 with detailed programs, feeling that their preparation might lead to rigidity in the nation's foreign policy.³ The military, on the other hand, not only wanted more detailed guidance but also wanted the paper recurrently updated for use in their continuing review and revision of basic strategic plans. State, partially to accommodate these needs of the military, offered to prepare annual reports on the world outlook that might effectively serve as NSC 20/4 updates, and Johnson, on condition that these annual reports would not "be accepted as a substitute for that integration of domestic, foreign, and military policy which it is the duty of the . . . [NSC] to provide," accepted State's offer.⁴ At the end of 1949, recognizing the need for a reassessment of policy, Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the NSC, proposed a comprehensive analysis and summary report to help clarify national objectives both in relation to present conditions and in the event of war. The NSC on 5 January directed its staff to prepare such a report.⁵

These developments coincided roughly with the culmination of the examination by a special NSC committee, composed of Acheson, Johnson, and AEC Chairman David Lilienthal, of the question of whether or not to develop thermonuclear weapons. Johnson strongly favored building the H-bomb; Lilienthal opposed it; and Acheson had mixed feelings, aware of its dramatic military implications and unwilling to endorse it without an overall "re-examination of our objectives in peace and war." Although Johnson had previously urged the NSC to make a broad review of policy to give guidance to the military in strategic planning, he opposed such a study centered on the H-bomb, arguing that the decision to proceed with development of thermonuclear weapons should be made on the basis of technical merit alone; however, he reluctantly agreed to the study at the insistence of Acheson and Lilienthal.* On 31 January 1950 Truman accepted the committee's recommendations, ordered development of the H-bomb, and asked for a study of its possible foreign policy and strategic implications.⁶

The President's action effectively voided the NSC directive of 5 January and transferred the task of preparing the report to a 10-member ad hoc State-Defense Policy Review Group, in which Paul H. Nitze, who on 1 January 1950 had succeeded Kennan as Director of State's Policy Planning Staff, played the leading role. A former associate of Forrestal's at Dillon, Read and Co., Nitze had previously served as Vice Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey in World War II and as an adviser to Secretaries of State Marshall and Acheson on European economic recovery. The chief DoD representatives on the review group were General Burns, Johnson's Assistant for Foreign Military Affairs and

* See Chapter XV.

Military Assistance; Maj. Gen. Truman H. Landon, USAF, representing the JCS; Najeeb E. Halaby, Director of the OSD Office of Foreign Military Affairs; and Robert LeBaron, Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee.⁷

Like most interdepartmental committees, the review group had to reconcile and assimilate a variety of viewpoints, but it completed this normally protracted process in a remarkably short time. Between 8 February and 27 February it prepared a preliminary report which it circulated to selected outside consultants for comment. Although apparently all copies of this early version were destroyed, an outline of its contents suggests that it closely resembled the final NSC 68 paper except for a section on atomic weapons and a set of conclusions. From the working draft and the comments of the consultants, the review group prepared two reports—a lengthy “State-Defense Staff Study” and a summary entitled “Draft Report to the President.” On 31 March the NSC sent the reports to the White House and copies to State and Defense for coordination. After minor revision, the review group officially referred only the larger paper to the President on 10 April and later to the NSC.⁸

Throughout the drafting of what was to become NSC 68, Johnson consistently took the position that the activities of the State-Defense group should in no way interfere with or influence ongoing policies and programs. His later objections to the report seem to have been based on two concerns—that the original drafting process had circumvented the NSC, and second, that the review group had gone beyond what he understood to be the limits of its charter by addressing itself to more than the impact and implications of developing the H-bomb. Shortly before the review group held its first meeting, Johnson asked the Joint Chiefs for their advice, indicating that the contemplated study should address itself to three general questions: (1) the effect of Soviet capabilities on U.S. strategic objectives in peace; (2) the effect of Soviet capabilities on U.S. strategic objectives in case of war; and (3) the effect of Soviet capabilities on U.S. emergency and long-range strategic plans.⁹ Confined as these questions were to the context of H-bomb development, Johnson had yet to be convinced that the investigation would or should result in any major or far-reaching policy changes.

Although the budgetary implications of the NSC study from the beginning clearly pointed in the direction of greater outlays, both Defense and the BoB proceeded on the assumption that maintenance of a strong economy had to be the primary consideration. On 21 February, Johnson informed the Armed Forces Policy Council that FY 1952 budget planning should assume a ceiling on new appropriations of no more than \$13 billion, the same amount included in the FY 1951 budget that had just been sent to Congress. The next day, he told the services that the need for a “sound national economy” would be the overriding

concern in developing the FY 1952 budget and force-level estimates. Although every effort should be made, he added, to increase combat readiness, "initial planning will assume that these forces will be maintained throughout Fiscal Year 1952 at approximately the planned 30 June 1951 level." But to the President's chief budget adviser, even this appeared open to question. Writing in late March to Leon H. Keyserling, Acting Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Budget Director Frank Pace reaffirmed the importance of avoiding deficits and admitted that the only way of doing so might be "the application of policies even more restrictive than those applied in the 1951 Budget." "Such a course," Pace said, "is the only apparent means, apart from tax increases, by which the President's expressed desire to achieve a balanced Budget can remain a possibility within the foreseeable future."¹⁰

Whereas Johnson and the BoB stood committed to existing programs, others became convinced of a need to reexamine them. The Defense members of the review group at first did not suggest any initiatives that might challenge Johnson's continuing insistence on military "economy." But the State representatives felt bound by no such constraints and pressed hard to convince the Defense delegation that it should take a more open-minded attitude. Bothered by growing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons to offset deficiencies in conventional forces, they saw the United States becoming irrevocably chained to a defense posture that allowed for little, if any, flexibility in protecting its interests or in meeting its commitments. "Acheson believed," Nitze recalled, "that American nuclear weapons were unlikely to stop the Russians if they had once embarked upon an invasion of Western Europe; in his judgment, even attacks upon the Russian homeland would not stop such an attack."¹¹

Although Nitze doubted that a war with the Soviet Union was imminent or inevitable, he was alarmed by the existence of soft spots that afforded the Soviets opportunity to seek gains in such areas as Indochina, Berlin, Austria, and Korea. The Soviets, he believed, having achieved a nuclear capability, would take an increasingly hostile and aggressive line in their dealings with the West, bordering on "recklessness," and thus "the chance of war through miscalculation" could be increased.¹²

Intelligence estimates added to the anxiety. On 1 February Army Intelligence briefed the NSC on Soviet progress in atomic weapons, suggesting that the Soviets would need to deliver only 18 atomic weapons on 9 specific targets* to wipe out one-third of U.S. steel and iron production, cripple governmental operations in Washington, and hamper and delay mobilization and retaliatory efforts.¹³ On 10 February the CIA released its latest report on Soviet atomic

* The report also stated that it would actually require the dispatch of far more than 18 bombs to ensure placing that number on target.

capabilities, forecasting a stockpile of 100 Nagasaki-type bombs by 1953 and 200 by the end of 1955. In carefully guarded language that acknowledged the absence of detailed information on Soviet penetration capabilities, the CIA speculated that a strike with 200 atomic bombs on certain key targets "might prove decisive in knocking the US out of a war." Further, the CIA believed that the Soviet Union "has or can easily produce enough TU-4's (B-29's) and trained crews willing and able to carry to all key US targets any number of atomic bombs the USSR can produce." While noting that "the critical date for a possible all-out Soviet atomic attack on the US would not be earlier than 1956-57," the CIA pointed out that the Soviet Union "might engage in more venturesome diplomacy as its atomic capabilities increase."¹⁴

As it sifted the available evidence, the review group, including the DoD representatives, became more concerned about the nuclear aspects of the problem. LeBaron felt that the CIA estimate of Soviet atomic weapons ought to be reexamined in the light of the recent arrest of Klaus Fuchs for atomic espionage. "The Soviet atomic capabilities," he warned Johnson, "may be considerably higher than the figures given."¹⁵ Burns told Johnson that there seemed to be no firm information on Soviet atomic capabilities and that studies under way might fill the gap. Intimately involved in NATO affairs, Burns could see repercussions across the Atlantic:

At the present time our war plans are based upon the assumption that we have substantial superiority in the atomic energy field, not only with reference to production and stockpiling, but also with reference to ability to hit targets. It seems to be assumed that this superiority is a deterrent on Russian aggression and in turn one of the important reasons why Western Europe is willing to be on our team.

If it is concluded that this superiority is minor or does not even exist, then it is obvious that our own security is in jeopardy and that, in its own self-interest, Western Europe may seek the position of a neutral.¹⁶

Unlike Acheson, who received almost daily progress reports from Nitze, Johnson maintained only occasional contact with the review group's work, chiefly through periodic memoranda from Burns. As the drafting process neared an end, the group prepared a two-page summary to acquaint Johnson with the study and arranged for him to meet with Acheson on 22 March to discuss approval of a final report. But when Johnson, accompanied by his advisers, arrived for the meeting, he accused the State Department of past discourtesies and of trying in this instance to secure his approval of policy recommendations that he had not had a chance to read. Acheson and Johnson then adjourned to a separate room but were apparently unable to hold a civil discussion, whereupon

Johnson ordered his car and left with the group that had accompanied him. Rejoining what remained of the meeting, Acheson reported his private conversation with Johnson to Admiral Souers and James F. Lay of the NSC, who in turn passed this information to the President. Within the hour, Acheson recalled, Truman telephoned him to express his "outrage" over Johnson's behavior and to assure Acheson that he should carry on as though nothing had happened.¹⁷

Reassured by the President's support, the review group pressed ahead with its work, making slight refinements in both the longer study and the executive summary. On 31 March, while Johnson was attending a meeting of the NATO defense ministers at The Hague, his office distributed copies of these papers to the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries for study and comment. The responses that greeted Johnson upon his return to Washington constituted a near-unanimous endorsement of the findings and a JCS suggestion that the two papers be combined into one report.* Further, the Joint Chiefs recommended that implementation of the study's conclusions be coordinated through an agency established under the NSC.¹⁸ The only significant criticism at the time came from Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, who found the conclusions "not sufficiently definitive." Gray found objectionable the use of such terms as "rapid buildup" and "sharp increase." "In other words," Gray said, "it seems to me that the paper is incomplete without a suggestion in general terms either as to size of forces or number of dollars."¹⁹

Much to Acheson's surprise, Johnson readily approved the report and so notified Truman on 11 April, drawing special attention to the recommendation of the JCS. "In recommending your approval of the Conclusions and Recommendations," Johnson told the President, "I do so in the knowledge that the National Security Council organization will be able to propose for your further consideration more detailed programs."²⁰ The State Department offered no objections, and when the NSC met on 20 April it agreed that further action on the report, now designated NSC 68, should be coordinated by an ad hoc NSC committee.²¹

NSC 68: A Summary of Contents

In his memorandum of 31 January 1950 Truman had requested an evaluation of the strategic and foreign policy implications of his decision to develop the hydrogen bomb. The State-Defense review group, finding the action to have vast ramifications, placed a loose construction on its terms of reference and submitted a report that was probably much broader than Truman had expected.

* On 6 April 1950, with the concurrence of General Landon, Nitze recommended and Acheson agreed that the executive summary should be scrapped. See *FRUS* 1950, I:210, n3.

According to Nitze, this in itself was possibly the paper's most significant contribution. "The papers up to that date," he later explained, "dealt largely with the major components of policy rather than policy as a whole. . . . I think the important thing about the paper was the comprehensiveness of the approach rather than the particular recommendations contained therein."²²

Equally distinctive was the report's strong—sometimes even shrill—rhetoric, used in an apparently deliberate attempt to capture readers' attention. "The purpose of NSC-68," Acheson conceded later, "was to so bludgeon the mass mind of 'top government' that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out."²³ Although parts of it were rambling and repetitious, the overall message was clear and unmistakable. Focusing on what it regarded as the aggressive designs of international communism and the Soviet Union's already formidable and growing military capabilities, it warned of impending disaster for the West unless the United States reordered its priorities and devoted significantly more resources to strengthening its military defenses.

The report began with a statement of the underlying conflict between the fundamental goals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Those of the United States, as enunciated in the preamble of the Constitution, the report said, were "to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual." Those of the Soviet leaders, in contrast, were the establishment of "absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control." Characterizing the Soviet Union as a "slave state" pursuing ruthless policies at home and abroad, NSC 68 saw the world divided between two irreconcilable systems—one free, the other a totalitarian dictatorship bent on nothing less than world domination. "What is new," the report argued, "what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free."²⁴

The crucial difference between the free society and the slave state lay in their respective attitudes toward the use of force. The free society regarded war as a last resort and took up arms only if attacked, while the slave state used its military power constantly to threaten or coerce others into submission. Against such an enemy, NSC 68 concluded, the United States would have to resort to new and different ways of meeting the threat:

Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only they are appropriately cal-

culated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who have enslaved them.²⁵

With the character of the enemy clearly identified, NSC 68 next explored the Soviet Union's strengths and weaknesses, giving closest attention to its enormous military capabilities. Citing JCS estimates of Soviet power, the report found that should a major war occur in 1950, Soviet forces could overrun most of Western Europe, drive toward the oil-producing region of the Middle East, and make gains in the Far East; launch air attacks against the British Isles; and attack selected targets in North America with atomic weapons. Soviet air defenses could oppose but not prevent air operations against the Soviet Union and its satellites. With the loss of Western Europe, the United States would have difficulty taking the offensive. After consolidating their control of Western Europe, Soviet forces could then expand the conflict with heavily increased air and sea assaults against Britain, invasions of the Scandinavian and Iberian peninsulas, further operations against the Middle East, further sea and air operations against lines of communication in the Atlantic and Pacific, and continued air attacks against North America.

Nowhere did the report suggest that such a war was imminent or even probable. It presented such a scenario only to demonstrate how easily and quickly Soviet forces could destroy the hard-earned U.S. position abroad, especially in Europe. Since World War II, the paper observed, the United States had pursued two major goals—to promote a healthy international community and to contain the spread of Soviet power and influence. At the same time, however, U.S. military power had lost ground to the Soviet Union. Even with a less developed economy, the Soviet Union in 1949 invested proportionately much more in defense than did the United States—13.8 percent of its gross available resources against 6.5 percent for the United States. Moreover, much of the Russian gross capital investment of 25.4 percent went for war-supporting industries while only a little of the U.S. gross capital investment of 13.6 percent went for such industries.* Although the U.S. economy was far more productive, the onset of a sudden emergency might not permit its full mobilization until after the Soviet Union, with its huge forces in being, had secured an early and perhaps decisive advantage.

In armaments, the United States currently held clear superiority only in atomic weaponry. But faced with an actual Soviet atomic capability and the possibility of a Soviet thermonuclear breakthrough, the U.S. position would gradually erode, resulting eventually in a standoff, with both sides possessing sufficient nuclear weapons to cripple or destroy the other. While cautioning that

* These figures are at variance with those in Chapter I, which are from a 1949 CIA report.

hard evidence about Soviet production was unavailable, the report estimated that by mid-1954 the Soviet Union would have a stockpile of about 200 atomic bombs and delivery aircraft able to inflict serious damage on the United States. In such circumstances, U.S. ability to deter Soviet aggression would be substantially reduced, and the advantage in a war would rest increasingly with the side possessing the greater capability in surviving conventional forces. To retain a credible deterrent, the report urged that the United States step up production of atomic weapons and that it also "increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground and sea strength and that of our allies to a point where we are militarily not so heavily dependent on atomic weapons."²⁶

Although it urged heavy increases in conventional forces, NSC 68 still regarded nuclear weapons as crucial to U.S. security and likely to become more so as the Soviets expanded their atomic arsenal. Here the report awkwardly straddled two stools, for while it endorsed a conventional buildup to lessen dependence on nuclear weapons, it fully expected that in a U.S.-Soviet war atomic weapons would be used, concluding that "only if we had overwhelming atomic superiority and obtained command of the air might the U.S.S.R. be deterred from employing its atomic weapons." While seeking a formula that would reduce dependence on nuclear weapons, NSC 68 found them more necessary than ever. Following this line of logic, it also concluded that it would be virtually suicidal for the United States to issue a declaration renouncing the first use of atomic weapons:

Unless we are prepared to abandon our objectives, we cannot make such a declaration in good faith until we are confident that we will be in a position to attain our objectives without war, or, in the event of war, without recourse to the use of atomic weapons for strategic purposes.²⁷

Against this background of warnings and projected trends, NSC 68 endeavored to assess alternative courses of action, looking specifically at four. Two of these—a return to isolationism and the initiation of a preventive war—were deemed impractical and inadvisable. The role of the United States was to provide world leadership and to forestall wars, not start them. A third option—to do absolutely nothing but continue current policies—seemed no less ill-advised. "From the military point of view," NSC 68 argued, "the actual and potential capabilities of the United States, given a continuation of current and projected programs, will become less and less effective as a war deterrent." This left the fourth option, the only one the report found realistic and prudent—"a substantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world . . . to support a firm policy intended to check and roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination."²⁸

Analyzing the requirements of such a policy, NSC 68 accorded first importance to building up U.S. and allied military forces. At a minimum, the United States should have forces in being or readily available to defend the Western Hemisphere, provide and protect a mobilization base, conduct offensive operations on a scale "sufficient to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity," defend lines of communication, and provide aid to allies. Additionally and as part of a "comprehensive and decisive program," the report endorsed the development of "an adequate political and economic framework for the achievement of our long-range objectives," a "substantial increase" in U.S. military expenditures, substantially greater foreign military assistance, some increases in economic aid, intensification of intelligence activities and covert operations, and stepped-up measures for internal security and civil defense.²⁹

The conclusions of NSC 68 were not startlingly original. By and large the report saw no change in the character of the Soviet threat as described in NSC 20/4 in late 1948. The Soviet Union remained an enemy whose goals and ambitions posed a grave menace to U.S. security and world stability. The situation had become different and, indeed, more dangerous because of the Soviet Union's acquisition of a nuclear capability—a threat that was expected to increase steadily over the next few years, reaching serious proportions by 1954. Yet despite its many dire warnings, NSC 68 was, on the whole, cautiously optimistic that a way to check Soviet power could be found without recourse to war. "In summary," the report said,

we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.³⁰

NSC 68 made no reference to costs, an omission that Acheson later conceded "was not an oversight."³¹ The study group's preliminary calculations suggested the need for annual appropriations of \$35 to \$40 billion.³² But to have included such figures might have jeopardized the study's acceptance, and the development of detailed estimates would no doubt have delayed its completion. The review group had no desire to become bogged down in costing complexities or to include money figures that might spark interservice quarrels over the division of funds. It decided, therefore, to avoid the issue with a statement that its recommendations "will be costly [to implement] and will involve significant

domestic financial and economic adjustments," including probable reductions in domestic programs and a tax increase to avert budget deficits.³³

Reactions to the Study

Despite NSC 68's top secret classification, it gained wide circulation, evoking abundant comment. The Joint Chiefs and the services had earlier voiced their strong support of the report, perhaps all the more because of the tight money restrictions under which they had been laboring and the prospect of securing additional funds.³⁴

Most of the negative criticism followed two lines of argument—that NSC 68 exaggerated the Soviet threat and that its proposals for strengthening U.S. and allied forces were generally excessive. In the State Department, while Acheson and Nitze were apparently in complete accord with the report, others disagreed, though few challenged the study's basic premise of the need to bolster Western defenses. Several, including George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and his deputy, Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., doubted that current programs were as inadequate as the report suggested, with Thompson advocating the appointment of a senior-level panel to study the subject further. "I suspect it would be found," he said, "that no very great increase in our present rate of expenditure would be called for, but rather a better allocation of resources and a unified national policy."³⁵ Looking at the potential costs of the proposed buildup, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Willard Thorp expressed concern that the resulting "drain" on resources might jeopardize U.S. and European stability. "On the economic side," Thorp warned, "I feel that we cannot emphasize enough the disaster which an economic depression would be."³⁶

Some of the strongest criticism came from State's two leading Soviet experts—George Kennan, recently promoted to State Department Counselor, and Charles E. Bohlen, assigned to the U.S. embassy in Paris. Even before the final report was written, Kennan had vigorously objected to what he considered a U.S. overreaction. Downplaying the significance of recent events, including the Communist victory in China and the Russians' newly acquired atomic capability, Kennan wrote Acheson: "There is little justification for the impression that the 'cold war' . . . has suddenly taken some drastic turn to our disadvantage." Moreover, he added "in so far as we feel ourselves in any heightened trouble at the present moment, that feeling is largely of our own making." Kennan criticized growing U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons and "a tendency to view the Russian threat as just a military problem rather than as a part of a broad political offensive." Fearing that a U.S. military buildup could lead to a nuclear arms race

with the Soviets, he urged taking action "at once to get rid of our present dependence, in our war plans, on the atomic weapon." And beyond that step, he believed, atomic exchanges during hostilities could be avoided only if the United States undertook to refrain from use of atomic bombs "on a basis of mutuality."³⁷

On several major points Bohlen concurred with Kennan but he differed on one key issue—the need for a military buildup. Summoned back from Paris in late March for temporary duty in Washington, Bohlen found the report's basic recommendation to be sound. "There can be no question," he told Nitze, "of the absolute necessity in the present world situation of a strong and adequate U.S. defense position. Therefore, the purpose and the general conclusions reached by this study are, in my opinion, unchallengeable." He found the report weakest in its tendency to "over-simplify" Soviet ideology and intentions and in its failure to discriminate between a general buildup of U.S. forces and a selective, qualitative rearmament program. Bohlen urged concentration on research and development programs for conventional weapons—antitank devices, guided missiles for air defense, fighter-interceptors, and antisubmarine measures. With more R&D in these areas, Bohlen believed a whole new defense posture structured around "a much smaller semi-professional" force would follow, imposing a lesser burden on Western economies and running less of a risk of provoking the Soviets.³⁸

An Army study that appeared almost simultaneously with NSC 68 had noted many of Bohlen's concerns and made recommendations for changes. Prepared by a special task force headed by Under Secretary Tracy S. Voorhees and including Vannevar Bush, former Chairman of the Research and Development Board, the report addressed the defense of Western Europe. Like NSC 68, it found current capabilities decidedly inadequate. Yet its remedy did not involve any expensive or heavy buildup of forces. Like Bohlen, the Army task force recommended the accelerated development of new defensive weapons and tactical aircraft, closer management of resources, and "greatly increased" arms production in Western Europe—all of which it alleged could be accomplished without undue increases in U.S. military appropriations or foreign military assistance.³⁹

President Truman's immediate response, conveyed to the NSC on 12 April, was to defer final action on NSC 68 pending the receipt of "further information on the implications of the Conclusions contained therein." Because of the budgetary and economic implications of the report, the President wanted the Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Secretary of the Treasury included in a further examination of NSC 68. "Pending the urgent completion of this study," Truman added, "I am concerned that action on existing programs should not be postponed or delayed."⁴⁰

The President's call for a follow-on study led promptly to the activation of

an NSC ad hoc committee to prepare a report on programs and costs with a target date of 1 August.*⁴¹ To represent the Department of Defense Johnson named Generals Burns and Bradley. On 25 May Johnson instructed the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries to list manpower and equipment deficiencies in U.S. and allied forces and summarize U.S. requirements for a buildup to meet the "general objectives" of NSC 68 by 30 June 1954.⁴² What Johnson hoped to accomplish is not clear, for he personally doubted that Truman would approve NSC 68, and he certainly did not expect him to lift the prevailing military budget ceiling. As Townsend Hoopes noted after a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council on 7 June, Johnson "did not consider it sound to aim at achieving maximum military strength by 1954 and [believed] that planning should be based on the assumption that the President will not approve future requests for appropriations in excess of approximately 13 billion dollars."⁴³

In view of Johnson's attitude, the general feeling in the Defense Department before the outbreak of the Korean War seemed to be that NSC 68 would in all probability lead to little, if any, change in administration policy. Consequently, in planning to meet NSC 68 objectives, the Joint Chiefs and the military departments calculated much more modest force levels and costs than those subsequently occasioned by the Korean War. Still, they requested a substantial increase over existing levels—an increase of more than one-third in personnel strength and a doubling of money. The initial force goals, developed prior to the onset of the war but forwarded by the JCS to Johnson only on 17 July 1950, looked toward a gradual buildup that would peak at the end of fiscal year 1954 and then level off, culminating in a permanent military establishment consisting of the following: an Army of 770,000 organized into 12 divisions, 13 regiments and regimental combat teams, and 95 antiaircraft battalions; a Navy and Marine Corps with 648,367 combined personnel strength, 9 heavy carriers, and 315 other major combatant vessels; and a regular Air Force of 69 wings (formerly groups) and 22 separate squadrons, with a strength of 555,316.[†]⁴⁴ OSD estimated in August that military obligations under these force goals would jump immediately to \$27 billion in fiscal year 1951 and taper off to \$25.8 billion in fiscal year 1955. Related obligations for foreign military assistance, atomic energy, and other items would add between \$5.5 and \$7.8 billion annually.⁴⁵

Judging from these force and cost estimates, the Joint Chiefs, doubtless heeding Johnson's advice to exercise restraint, did not subscribe to the view that NSC 68 mandated a huge expansion of the armed forces. Although they pro-

* On 10 August the newly created senior NSC staff took over from the ad hoc committee direction of further work on NSC 68.

† For actual force levels recommended by the administration for fiscal year 1951, see Chapter XIII.

jected budgets approximately twice as large as the FY 1951 submission, these were still well below the informal estimates discussed among members of the policy review group when NSC 68 was written. Clearly, while the JCS proposals did allow for significant expansion, they fell short of projecting a massive buildup and may well have been merely an updated version of earlier estimates which had been under periodic consideration since World War II. In fact, they were closely akin to the force levels that the Joint Chiefs had proposed to Forrestal in 1948 when they had recommended a FY 1950 budget of \$23 billion.* In other words, it appears that the Joint Chiefs were not tabling a totally new program in the summer of 1950 but rather reviving the basic elements of an old one. Thwarted in their earlier efforts to secure increases, the JCS may have looked upon NSC 68 as a chance to realize long-established goals rather than as a major departure in policy.

Johnson was probably correct that the President contemplated no significant departure from his policy of fiscal restraint, but he may also have misread some of the signals coming from the White House. Initially, Truman exhibited customary caution, telling reporters on 4 May that rumors of an impending rise in military spending were incorrect and that in fact the FY 1952 military budget would be smaller than the one currently before Congress for fiscal year 1951. Just three weeks later, however, he stated publicly that the budget was still "under consideration" and that it would be premature to speculate on its size. Still hedging on a final decision, he met on 23 May with his new budget director, Frederick J. Lawton, and manifested his continuing interest in and concern about the conclusions and recommendations of NSC 68. "The President indicated," Lawton recalled, "that we [the BoB] were to continue to raise any questions that we had on this program and that it definitely was not as large in scope as some of the people seemed to think."⁴⁶

What Truman had in mind is by no means clear, although his remarks to Lawton hint that he had tentatively decided to act on at least some of the NSC 68 recommendations, but apparently not to the extent of launching a major military buildup. Since Forrestal had recommended a much less drastic course nearly two years earlier, Truman's willingness even to consider NSC 68 suggests some change in his thinking and in his perception of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Yet it does not appear that he had been very much converted. Typically, his interest continued to center on the cost of the program and the effect it might have on the economy. Until the outbreak of the Korean War forced his hand, compelling a reordering of priorities leading to the adoption of measures that greatly exceeded the Joint Chiefs' original projections, Truman seemed to have been content to bide his time.

* See Chapter XII.

In sum, the President's apparent concern carried with it no promise of substantial increases in military spending. Because NSC 68 did not specify military force programs and costs, Truman could support the general thrust of the study without any immediate commitment to large-scale outlays. His delay until 30 September 1950 in approving the paper (as 68/1) was apparently a tactical move intended to give the BoB time to examine estimates and cut them down to what the President, still keeping the figure to himself, deemed acceptable. Some limited increase in the military budget, if only to reassure Congress and the public, would probably have occurred in any case. But without the Korean War, it seems most unlikely that a dramatic military buildup requiring the far-reaching commitment of men and resources that NSC 68 implied would have been supported by the President, Congress, or the American people.

CHAPTER XIX

Conclusion

The beginning of the Korean War marked the key juncture in the postwar adjustment of the U.S. armed forces to the changed world created by World War II. As such, it offers a vantage point for looking back on and evaluating the formative years of the Department of Defense. In September 1947 Forrestal, who had called the National Security Act "the most decisive and definitive step taken by this country in the formation of a national military policy since the foundation of the republic,"¹ took office as the first Secretary of Defense amid high expectations. By June 1950 an exhausted Forrestal had died and a second Secretary of Defense was struggling with a vexing array of inherited and new problems. Three years in the crucible of unification and Cold War had sorely tested the new structure, confirming both the wisdom of its establishment and the need for still further adjustments.

In the five years since World War II, little had remained the same in world affairs, least of all the role of the United States. No longer was there a balance of power in the traditional sense. International problems that had once been the responsibility of others, chiefly Britain, now rested increasingly with the United States. The developing Cold War with the Soviet Union and the U.S. policy of containing Soviet expansion led to commitments in the Mediterranean, Europe, and elsewhere that imposed heavy burdens on U.S. resources and energies. Shifting U.S. foreign policy, domestic economic pressures, and technological developments all combined to bring about fundamental changes in U.S. defense policy. The same economic pressures that helped spur organizational reform also affected determinations of strategy, force levels, and weapon acquisition. New and revolutionary technologies that portended radical changes in how future wars might be fought demanded new concepts of national security. Before World War II American defense policy stressed mobilization potential, while relying on the Navy as

the country's first line of defense; after the war, and increasingly after 1947, it stressed collective security and ready forces in being (including reserve forces), with emphasis on air power—chiefly land-based bombers armed with nuclear weapons.

The disarray on the international scene and the uncertain direction of U.S. foreign and domestic policy immensely complicated the task of establishing the new national security machinery. Yet even under more settled conditions, a smooth transition would have been unlikely. Forrestal initially underestimated the enormous complexity of the undertaking. "He assumed," as his friend Ferdinand Eberstadt recalled, "that everybody else was as deeply interested in the success of this enterprise as he was—and he acted accordingly. Naturally, fitting the old feet into the new shoes was not so easy and there were screeches of pain from here, from there, and from everywhere."² In fact, the condition went far beyond a few pinched toes, since it involved changes that would inevitably affect the future of all the military services and the role of the Secretary of Defense.

Before World War II the Army and Navy had been independent entities, each with its own specific functions. The new organizational structure rested on the concept of close interservice cooperation, unified effort, and some sharing of functions. "The goal," as Walter Millis described it, "was to attain unity in diversity, retaining the best features of each."³ But, as soon became evident, for such a system to work required concessions that each service to one degree or another felt compelled to resist. The compromise begged for revision almost from the very start.

Forrestal's major handicap, stemming from the legislative restrictions that he himself helped to formulate, was that while he could make policy, he did not have as much authority as he found he needed to implement it. When experience soon proved that the secretary needed stronger and more clearly defined powers and additional assistance, Forrestal had to modify some of his notions, especially the extent to which the secretary could operate as a paternalistic coordinator. OSD's growth, both in size and authority, mirrored this change in his thinking. Contrary to his original intentions, OSD steadily increased its managerial responsibility. In some areas, as in the preparation and management of budgets, OSD assumed from the beginning a strong role that derived from the secretary's statutory duties. But in other areas, such as public relations, personnel policy, medical matters, atomic energy, and the preparation of legislative programs, the secretary's role evolved from pragmatic necessity, from Forrestal's growing conviction that Defense-wide issues required a mechanism that could effect Defense-wide solutions.

As he strove conscientiously to overcome deficiencies in the 1947 legislation and get a surer grip on the helm, Forrestal recognized the need for legislative

changes. Having led the fight against the Army's unification plan, he was well aware of the Navy's reservations and concerns and sought to be reassuring. He opted for an evolutionary approach that stressed accommodation not merely because he viewed it as more effective in the long run, but because he thought it more likely to elicit cooperation of the Navy and the other services. Too rapid a push for unification, Forrestal believed, might harm the morale of the services and perhaps impair military readiness. The Key West and Newport agreements notwithstanding, Forrestal never obtained the degree of cooperation he needed from the services. The continual interservice battling over roles and missions and a range of other issues prompted criticism that he had lost control of the military to power-hungry admirals and generals.

Johnson, although bedeviled by many of the same frustrations, fared better. Until military reverses early in the Korean War fatally impaired his credibility, he stood out as one of the most forceful administrators in Truman's Cabinet. His slashing economy campaign, summary cancellation of the Navy's supercarrier, and determined efforts to assert his authority and reduce the power and autonomy of the services contrasted sharply with Forrestal's go-slow approach and, although provoking sharp controversy, achieved some impressive results. Johnson, of course, had the benefit of the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act that formally strengthened the secretary's authority. Whether he would have persisted as boldly or been as successful without that legislative mandate invites speculation, although one is tempted to answer in the affirmative. Forrestal himself had taken important steps to consolidate more responsibility in OSD, and the aggressive Johnson doubtless would have accelerated that process with or without new legislation. The passage of the amendments strengthened his hand.

Interservice controversies over roles and missions, war plans, force requirements, and weapon development and employment derived chiefly from the battle over the dollar—the effort by each service to secure what it regarded as its proper share of the defense budget. A service's share of the money affected not only its size but also the development and deployment of its weapon systems, which profoundly influenced the composition of forces and consequently capacity to carry out missions. The imposition of tight budget ceilings by the administration at a time of increasing political and military commitments abroad exacerbated already intense interservice differences and severely handicapped Forrestal and Johnson in their efforts to resolve them. Truman's conservative economic philosophy, vigorously applied by the Bureau of the Budget, and Congress's own determination to economize left Forrestal and Johnson with no carrot to offer the military at the same time that they were having to wield a stick.

In Truman's mind fiscal responsibility meant controlling the public debt, which in turn necessitated balanced budgets, or, preferably, budget surpluses.

Administration budget ceilings actually became the maximum allowed, not merely target projections. Although he permitted appeals at the end of the budget process, such as Forrestal's in December 1948, Truman almost always followed the BoB's advice. What he wanted from his Secretary of Defense was efficient management of the resources allowed.

Congress was no less committed to economy than the President. Even its air power advocates, who campaigned annually for larger Air Force budgets, argued that a defense posture built around strategic air power would in the long run save money by reducing the need for ground and naval forces. Like Truman, Congress generally put domestic matters first on its agenda and looked on military expenditures as the most flexible item in the budget, where it could nearly always make reductions. Sen. Robert A. Taft once admonished Forrestal that "there was a general impression in Congress of waste and extravagance in military spending because of the lack of any criterion by which efficiency could be proved or disproved."⁴ No matter how much "fat" Forrestal and Johnson trimmed from the budget, Congress continued to harbor the suspicion that it could find more.

White House and congressional pressures to hold down military costs left Forrestal and Johnson with little room to maneuver when considering competing service budget requests. Where formerly only two major contestants—the Army and the Navy—had vied for funds, there were now four. The newly independent Air Force was obviously a powerful contender; the Marine Corps, while smaller than the others, had acquired increased stature and public recognition from its impressive performance in World War II. The coincidence of self-interest and national interest lent a compelling weight and credibility to each of their claims. None could be easily dismissed or ignored.

Rapid advances in military technology compounded the money difficulties. It was clearly unrealistic and virtually impossible to fund each and every new technology and weapon system to the degree the services believed essential. With changes in the state of the art occurring at an ever faster pace, a weapon system procured one year might be obsolete the next, or it might be the wrong choice altogether. Since the nature of a future war was nearly impossible to predict, with scenarios ranging from global conflicts like World War II to small-scale "containment wars," no budget could cover all contingencies. "There are many sciences with which war is concerned," Forrestal once observed, "but war is not such a science itself, and any forecast for the indefinite future presupposes a certitude that is not possible."⁵ Funds therefore had to be allocated to meet what appeared to be the most likely danger. Yet worst-case threat assessments focusing on the Soviet Union—a country of immense size and capabilities—only complicated matters more by providing a basis for strategic plans with requirements so vast that they were virtually useless for budgetary purposes.

In trying to manage the Defense budget, Forrestal and Johnson differed significantly in their tactics. Initially, Forrestal relied on voluntary cooperation, hoping that the Key West and Newport agreements and joint strategic plans would provide sufficient basis for resolving interservice friction over roles and missions so that an equitable and logical allocation of funds might follow. Implicit in this approach was the assumption that he would receive agreed advice from the Joint Chiefs. When consensus failed to materialize in the JCS, however, Forrestal saw no choice but to ask the President for more money. On the first occasion, during the height of the war scare in the spring of 1948, Truman yielded under the pressure of events. But when Forrestal returned later that same year with a similar request, Truman rejected it and reimposed a rigid budget ceiling. Johnson, who knew from the beginning that more money was out of the question, readily understood the futility of attempting to negotiate for more funds. As coercive and alarming to the services as Johnson's budget slashing may have been, he was doing the job that Truman wanted him to do.

Whether Johnson's vigorous pursuit of economy weakened national security is a matter of conjecture. Certainly the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 revealed serious gaps and deficiencies in American defenses, not only in the Far East but in Europe as well. But had it not been for the war, these gaps and deficiencies in all probability would have persisted, NSC 68 notwithstanding. It seems highly unlikely also that the allocation of additional funds to the armed forces would have prevented the early reverses suffered by the United States in Korea. Even if Truman had granted in late 1948 the largest JCS request of some \$23 billion for fiscal year 1950, the lead time for translating the proposed programs into operational strength would have been too long to have had any effect in Korea during July–August 1950. And, in any case, with the strategic priority assigned to Europe, any additional strength that might have become available would have been directed there rather than to the Far East.

Probably the most serious charge that can be directed against Johnson's economy measures—that they may have misled the Soviet bloc into thinking that the United States lacked the will to resist communist aggression—cannot, of course, be substantiated. Since no one in the West knows how North Korea reached its decision to attack the South, little plausibility can be assigned to the suggestion that lowering the U.S. defense budget invited the war. A more cogent explanation is that the North Koreans viewed their chances for a successful attack as likely to decrease as additional military strength became available to the South. That the North Koreans launched their assault when they did suggests that they sought to take advantage of the recent Communist victory in China and that they decided to act before the balance of power could turn against them.

But if larger U.S. defense budgets may not have made any significant differ-

ence in the course of events abroad in 1949–50, the same cannot be said for the domestic military scene, especially in connection with trying to resolve the vexing controversy over service roles and missions. As of June 1950, after almost three years of intense effort by Forrestal and Johnson and despite the useful agreements reached at Key West and Newport, roles and missions questions still persisted. Throughout the controversy interservice competition centered chiefly on weapon systems, particularly their research and development and the assignment of operational responsibility for them. If a service could secure firm acceptance of its responsibilities for a mission, it would gain authority to develop and use weapons pertaining to that mission. And in collateral or peripheral mission areas, if it could develop a successful weapon system, it would have a powerful entering wedge to establish additional claims on resources.

Limited funds meant limited capabilities, though it did not follow that the services would limit their aspirations. On the contrary, as long as money was in short supply they had more reason than ever to press their claims. Thus, even after Johnson canceled the supercarrier, the Navy persisted in efforts to secure a role in the strategic air mission to reinforce its case for acquiring bigger carriers, larger aircraft, and nuclear weapons. Perhaps with an eye to developing long-range missiles for strategic purposes, it invested more heavily than either the Army or the Air Force in missile research and development in the 1945–50 period. The Army, also anxious to insure its role in the nuclear age, sought the development of atomic weapons that could be delivered by artillery or missiles. For the Army and the Navy, the spur to diversify their missions and to develop new and imaginative weapons, including nuclear ones, was the prospect of becoming tails to the high-flying Air Force kite if they did not do so. Their survival as peers of the Air Force required that they retain major responsibilities for defense of the nation and that they have adequate resources to discharge these responsibilities.

Inseparable from both the budget and roles and missions debates was the question of strategy and the temptation to give high priority to a single major weapon system—the strategic bomber armed with nuclear weapons. Forrestal, the staunch advocate of “balanced forces,” viewed the air-atomic strategy with skepticism but wound up embracing it all the same. Johnson readily endorsed the strategy, as it allowed him to hold down costs by cutting back on conventional forces. For both, the irresistible attraction was the promise of a relatively economical and readily available system of deterrence based on the intimidating power of atomic weapons.

During the late 1940s the debates over adoption of policies to guide the military in planning for national defense were especially contentious. Military planners agreed that atomic weapons were indeed awesome and that the Ameri-

can monopoly on the atomic bomb gave the United States a definite advantage in any direct conflict with the Soviet Union. Strategic plans developed by the JCS accordingly gave priority to air-atomic capabilities, though not to the extent of excluding Army and Navy capabilities that would require roughly comparable shares of the military budget. But as skillfully as these plans may have been crafted in an effort to equalize service shares, they did not go unchallenged, either by the Navy, which feared its role would eventually be diminished, or by the Air Force, which maintained persistently that effective execution of its mission required larger capabilities and principal control of atomic weapons.

Central to the ensuing struggle to resolve these questions was whether a delivery system such as the proposed supercarrier *United States* was needed to augment the Air Force strategic bombing capability. For Navy leaders, Johnson's cancellation of the supercarrier, which precipitated the "revolt of the admirals," was the ultimate horror of unification: it seemed to confirm their worst fears that an integrated military establishment, run by a Secretary of Defense on the basis of unified budgets and unified planning, would shortchange the Navy and gradually erode its coequal status.

Skeptics of the strategic bombing strategy were not confined to the Navy. Indeed, the BoB at times expressed doubts as did many AEC officials, who felt that the military—especially the Air Force—placed undue emphasis on nuclear weapons. In addition, two independent studies—the Harmon report of July 1949 and WSEG R-1 of early 1950—raised important questions about the effectiveness and feasibility of strategic bombing. But if these studies supported some of the Navy's doubts about strategic bombing, they also reinforced the Air Force's contention that its capabilities needed strengthening. Moreover, despite the alleged limitations and drawbacks of strategic bombing, its critics had nothing more acceptable to offer as a substitute. Shortages of funds, combined with congressional preference for air power over other types of military power, continually undermined opposing arguments. The approaching end of atomic scarcity by 1949 and the decision to proceed with the H-bomb reinforced the trend, so that by the eve of the Korean War the emerging force posture was keyed to air-atomic retaliation against a possible Soviet attack on the West.

Although budgetary and congressional pressures were uppermost in deciding the strategic issues and priorities, events abroad also played a significant part. In the early stages of the Berlin blockade in 1948, the chief alternatives or proposed supplements to the Allied airlift were the use of armed convoys, with a risk of all-out war; harassment of Soviet shipping, a retaliatory gesture dismissed by the Navy as imprudent and improper; or a show of force by sending B-29 bombers to conspicuous bases in England and Germany. Truman, with the unanimous support of the NSC, chose the last. Although the threat was some-

what hollow, since the planes carried no nuclear weapons, this experience reinforced strong sentiment in Washington that strategic air power could play a major role in deterring the Soviets and lent support to placing greater reliance on land-based bombers.

In contrast to the Berlin experience, different conclusions might have been drawn from other international events of the period about strategy and force composition. At the same time the United States moved toward reliance on air-atomic retaliation, it faced a growing demand for conventional forces, primarily Army, to deal with crises in the Mediterranean and Middle East and to meet obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. What is surprising in retrospect is the extent to which the JCS generally subordinated these demands to other considerations.

The Joint Chiefs resisted commitment of forces to such troubled areas as Greece, Italy, and Palestine not only because of limited resources but also because they regarded Western Europe as the area of greatest importance and most vulnerable to Soviet attack. Their concentration on the Soviet Union and Europe meant the relegation of other troubled areas to the status of side shows, although the Navy vigorously pressed for the maintenance of strong naval forces in the Mediterranean. With the exception of Berlin, they were the areas that demanded the most urgent responses, but the Joint Chiefs regarded them as peripheral and were reluctant to divert resources from the major arena in Europe and the strategic reserve in the United States. Moreover, they considered their resources far too limited to perform the tasks that might eventually be required—tasks that usually had to assume worst-case situations. Still, by taking a worst-case view the JCS could demonstrate the need for forces far beyond those available and dramatize service shortages. The Army saw itself as more affected than the other services by these demands for forces in troubled areas around the world—demands that could dissipate its resources in small packets and leave it without adequate forces to fight a major war in Europe and without an adequate strategic reserve in the United States. One effect of these interrelated and interacting considerations was to diminish the capacity of the JCS to offer positive military advice to the President and the NSC about U.S. commitments abroad.

In the main, support for military assistance, including deployment of more troops abroad, derived from the growing U.S. perception of the Soviet Union as a menace, either directly or through surrogates, to the peace and stability of many areas of the world. At the highest political level, grave estimates of the Soviet threat and proposals of countervailing policies appeared regularly, perhaps most notably in NSC 20/4 in 1948 and NSC 68 in 1950. State Department leaders—Marshall and Lovett, particularly—were less alarmed by the Soviet military threat than by the prospective long-term cumulative effects of a prostrate West-

ern Europe and Soviet pressure on peripheral areas. Forrestal took a grim view of the Soviet threat possibly because he was predisposed to do so but also because his position demanded high sensitivity to all signs of potential danger. Yet his warnings were seldom as dire or as pessimistic as those of the military professionals—the Joint Chiefs.

Viewed retrospectively, the military services' estimates of the Soviet threat and Soviet force strengths seem exaggerated. Each U.S. service emphasized the size and capabilities of the forces of its corresponding Soviet service, viewing with alarm Soviet capacity for offensive warfare not only in Europe but elsewhere in the world as well. In spite of the pessimistic military estimates, Truman made economic assistance and collective security the centerpieces of the administration's foreign policy and kept under continuing review questions concerning the mix of U.S. military assistance, troop strength, and nuclear capability that should back up American commitments abroad. Consequently, the role assigned to the military in containing Soviet expansion was from the beginning limited in scope.

Within the military establishment, policy differences over international priorities and commitments persisted throughout the period. The emphasis placed on Western Europe by the President and the State Department was generally supported by the Army and the Air Force, both of which gave first priority in their war and force planning to a major conflict in Europe. The Navy, on the other hand, had played a central role in the Pacific war, and Navy and Marine involvement, particularly at Tsingtao in China, continued for several years after the war. Forrestal and Johnson, like the Navy, appeared to have a stronger concern about the Pacific area than did the Army and the Air Force. Forrestal feared the loss of American prestige in Asia if China came under Communist control. Johnson urged an expanded U.S. role in Asia, including aid for Chiang Kai-shek. Secretary of the Army Royall, on the other hand, repeatedly asked why the United States was in China in the first place and was reluctant to provide either economic or military assistance.

On the Middle East, OSD and the military services usually saw eye to eye. No issue of the time cut more deeply and provoked more heated debate than the highly emotional and politically charged Palestine question. Although Defense was generally at one with the State Department on Palestine matters, Truman overrode the whole national security establishment to recognize Israel in 1948 and lend continued, if erratic, support to the new state against the Arabs. From Forrestal's standpoint the crux of the matter was the need to preserve U.S. and European access to Middle East oil, and he joined Marshall in seeking containment of the conflict. Truman's policy zigzagged over a course that left Forrestal appalled and Defense and State planners deeply worried about the effect of Middle East instability on U.S. security interests in the Persian Gulf and beyond.

Johnson was no more sympathetic toward Israel than Forrestal. Both favored a more balanced approach, which could have worked to the Arabs' advantage and against Israel.

The JCS, despite its concern about the Middle East, consistently recommended against the commitment of any U.S. forces in Palestine, even as few as a handful of Marine guards for the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem. Moreover, while admitting the strategic importance of the Middle East, particularly Egypt as a base of operations, the Army and Air Force, under budget pressure, were willing to forgo forces for use in the eastern Mediterranean in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, since it would have been most affected by such a proposal, the Navy stoutly defended the strategic importance of the eastern Mediterranean and the necessity to retain naval forces there.

On Korea there was general accord, and once the administration took the decision to withdraw American troops it was never seriously challenged, though occasionally the withdrawal date was postponed. At no time during the budget debates of 1948–49 did the Joint Chiefs link their requests for additional forces to a reassessment of policy toward Korea. By 1949 it was probably too late in any event to effect any basic policy change that might have averted the June 1950 crisis. Had American military assistance been 5 or even 10 times as great, South Korea would still have been in danger. As for a prolongation of the U.S. occupation, certainly the presence of American troops would have facilitated a stronger reprisal to the North Korean attack when it finally came. Even so, the North Koreans might still have judged the opportunities for conquest favorable enough to make the attempt.

Any overall appraisal of what OSD accomplished during its first three years must necessarily focus on the two men who were in charge—Forrestal and Johnson. Both rank as strong secretaries, though differences in personality, style, and methods clearly set them apart. If Johnson was boastful, more aggressive, and less sensitive to the ramifications of his actions, he seemed no less dedicated, no less committed to the job than Forrestal. Had Johnson instead of Forrestal been the first Secretary of Defense and forced to grapple with the frustrating issues of the initial period, he might well have behaved more moderately than he actually did in 1949–50. That Johnson was able to step in and take charge immediately reflected not only the force of his personality but also the strong foundations that Forrestal had built.

Forrestal and Johnson played very much different roles as secretaries. The former, reserved and courteous by nature, approached his new responsibilities cautiously. He did not make decisions hastily or lightly, frequently agonizing over them. Concerned about effective leadership, he conscientiously sought the best-qualified people for Defense positions. A consensus-builder and gradualist,

he looked on the early years of the new defense establishment as a period of transition and experimentation. Because of this tentative approach, he was open to changing his outlook and his actions on the basis of experience. Forrestal sought to be a bridge between the President and the military services—a role that sometimes proved thankless and caused him to seem less of a leader than he was, particularly in the eyes of Truman and the White House staff.

On taking office, Johnson immediately manifested traits and behavior that distinguished him from Forrestal. Self-assured and domineering, cultivating the image of a dynamic leader, he gave commands instead of seeking consensus. Much less given to deliberation than Forrestal, he could be precipitate in seeking and making changes and decisions in an authoritative manner—decisions that sometimes had to be modified or rescinded subsequently. By all accounts politically ambitious, he regarded himself as the President's man and may have hoped that the office would prove to be a springboard to the presidency. Other than a few that invited the charge of cronyism, Johnson does not appear to have made appointments on a personal political basis. He did not command from his staff the high degree of loyalty and affection that Forrestal inspired, but he earned the respect of some key OSD holdovers.

In addition to sharply contrasting modes of behavior and action, Forrestal and Johnson differed in their views of some of the important problems they faced. Forrestal worked diligently to create an integrated politico-military structure for making policy through the National Security Council. His close and friendly relations with Lovett helped toward this end. Johnson's near-paranoid attitude toward the State Department, especially his suspicious and hostile attitude toward Acheson, could not help but detract from the effectiveness of the structure Forrestal had cherished. Moreover, Johnson lacked the experience in foreign affairs and the global outlook that Forrestal had acquired during his Navy years. For Forrestal, more intensely than Johnson, the rise of the Soviet postwar threat became a passionate concern demanding vigilance and readiness of a high order. An active proponent of collective security, Forrestal worked to bring about NATO, whereas Johnson was lukewarm toward the alliance and suspicious of the military assistance program developed to help sustain it and other countries. Forrestal regarded domestic political influence as an unwarranted intrusion on national security, frequently deplored its effects, and was profoundly shaken by its dominance in the formulation of U.S. policy on Palestine. Johnson took domestic politics for granted, recognizing its potency and even frequent primacy in determining national security policy.

The experience of the first two Secretaries of Defense confirmed the importance, the high visibility, and the hazards of the office. They were active principals at the highest levels in the making of budgets and national security policy.

Because they were presiding over the formation and shaping of the huge new defense structure, they were the object of close attention from Congress and the public. Responsibility for errors and failures, large and small, throughout the military establishment was visited on them. These are the penalties of holding high public position, but the pressures to perform were especially intense during this period of beginnings, and both experienced to the fullest the frustrations and dilemmas that have continued to characterize the office. Neither Forrestal nor Johnson left office of his own accord; they left at the behest of the President.* For Johnson it meant the end of his public career; for Forrestal it meant the end of his life.

On balance, it seems clear that the achievements of the period outweighed the failures and setbacks. One way of evaluating the new defense establishment is to speculate on how the government would have functioned without it. The vastly increased size and cost of the military establishment over its prewar scale made it the largest claimant on government resources. Between 1947 and 1950 military appropriations and expenditures were an order of magnitude (10 times) greater than they had been in 1939, and national defense received two to three times the share of the U.S. budget it had received in 1939. In military manpower, the increase was five times, and in defense civilian employees more than four times. The largest and most expensive function of the government, defense demanded much more of the time and attention of the President and Congress than it had before the war.

Had the postwar reorganization not occurred, the coordination of the War and Navy Departments would have required more direct attention from the President and his White House staff. This heavier burden would doubtless have required a greatly increased staff in the White House and probably elsewhere, certainly in the Bureau of the Budget, to provide the President with necessary assistance. The organization established by the National Security Act in 1947, therefore, provided the President with the instrument to oversee and coordinate the different elements of the complex defense structure. Some structure was needed, whether this one or some other—with or without congressional sanction. Accordingly, the new defense establishment served a useful, necessary, and even indispensable purpose. It relieved the Office of the President of what would certainly have been a progressively heavier policy and administrative burden. The Secretary of Defense became, in effect, a deputy to the President for military matters and, through OSD, eventually achieved a degree of supervision and coor-

* Truman asked for Johnson's resignation on 12 September 1950 and Johnson left office on 19 September, to be succeeded by George C. Marshall. It was generally believed that Johnson had become a political liability to the administration because the early Korean disasters revealed the exaggeration of his claims of achieving greater military preparedness at lower costs.

dination of the military that would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, for the White House alone.

Slowest progress occurred in getting the services to pull together. The serious differences still in evidence in June 1950 directly reflected the uncertainty, suspicion, distrust, and even fear that characterized relations between the services themselves and with OSD. Even the knowledge that the Secretary of Defense could or would impose decisions on them did not produce accord on some matters, particularly those involving money, roles and missions, and weapon systems. The divisiveness among the Joint Chiefs diminished their stature and their influence within the national security structure and caused greater power and influence to flow to the Secretary of Defense and OSD. This is all the more ironic in view of the resistance of all of the services to greater centralization of power in OSD.

That Forrestal and Johnson nonetheless achieved progress toward inter-service cooperation and integration of some functions speaks well for their devotion to the principles of unification and their persistence in the face of opposition and distrust. This progress could not have been achieved without the assistance of the OSD staff. From the standpoint of centralization of power and hence acquisition of a capacity to make and enforce decisions, OSD provided an indispensable instrument for the Secretary of Defense. Its establishment and growth under Forrestal's and Johnson's leadership represented one of the most important developments in the national security history of the period.

Probably the greatest success of OSD between 1947 and 1950 was the establishment of control over the budget process. The unequivocal language of the national security legislation, reinforced by the Title IV amendment of 1949, gave Forrestal and Johnson the necessary legal sanction to institute a consolidated budget system and impose uniform budgetary, accounting, and audit procedures on the military services. The effect of these changes and of the inability of the Joint Chiefs to agree on programs was to concentrate financial decisionmaking in the hands of the Secretary of Defense and diminish the authority of the services to control and use their appropriated funds.

Another notable achievement was OSD's contribution to closer interdepartmental coordination through the NSC. Much credit belongs to Forrestal, whose persistence in the face of Truman's initial coolness toward the council gradually helped produce a more orderly procedure for dealing with national security issues. Johnson, despite his clashes with Acheson and the problems thus created for staff-level contacts between Defense and State, supported the NSC system. Like Forrestal, he found it useful for formulating policy and coordinating decisions. By June 1950, the NSC had passed the test, winning even Truman's approval, and was becoming a central fixture of the policy process.

Ultimately, the value and importance of OSD became evident through its

overall direction of the defense establishment, as demonstrated by its performance in times of crisis. During the Berlin blockade in 1948, OSD responded quickly, despite the absence of advance planning, by coordinating mobilization of the airlift and by overseeing the development of contingency measures in case the situation worsened. In Greece, it helped overcome delays in the shipment of assistance, delays that could have prolonged the communist insurgency or jeopardized the conflict's outcome. Although less successful in influencing the course of events in Palestine, OSD nonetheless contributed to containing the spread of Arab-Israeli fighting by assuring the prompt deployment of U.S. truce observers and other supporting elements for Bernadotte's peacekeeping mission. OSD's key role in bringing about NATO and in the development and execution of MDAP was a clear manifestation of its rise to leadership. And finally, by the time the Korean War began, Forrestal and Johnson had created a top-level staff that could meet the supreme test of a military organization—overseeing the direction of a war.

As incomplete as they may have seemed in some ways, the achievements of the formative years 1947–50 should not be underestimated. A vast new organization with radically altered relationships and procedures was made to work. By 1950, although unification was perhaps still as much promise as reality, there was no retreating from its basic premises, no turning back from the course Forrestal and Johnson had charted. Accepting the heavy burdens of an indispensable office newly created, with no precedent to guide them, they persevered under conditions of enormous stress, amid circumstances that at times defied their authority. In the end, neither was as successful as he had hoped. But having been the first to serve, they laid the vital foundations on which others could build. This, in itself, was a worthy legacy.

List of Abbreviations

ACC	Allied Control Council
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFPB	Armed Forces Personnel Board
AFPC	Armed Forces Policy Council
AFSWP	Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
AMAG	American Mission for Aid to Greece
AMAT	American Mission for Aid to Turkey
AMIK	American Mission in Korea
ANMB	Army and Navy Munitions Board
BAC	Budget Advisory Committee
BoB	Bureau of the Budget
CCPB	Civilian Components Policy Board
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CEA	Council of Economic Advisers
CFM	Council of Foreign Ministers
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIG	Central Intelligence Group
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CPC	Combined Policy Committee
CY	Calendar Year
DC	Defense Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DFEC	Defense Financial and Economic Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DJS	Director, Joint Staff
DMC	Defense Management Committee
DoD	Department of Defense

ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
ECC	European Coordinating Committee
ERP	European Recovery Program
FACC	Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee
FASC	Foreign Assistance Steering Committee
FEC	Far Eastern Commission
FMACC	Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee
FY	Fiscal Year
GAC	General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission
GNA	Greek National Army
IAC	Intelligence Advisory Committee
ICIS	Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
IIC	Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee
<i>JAAN</i>	<i>Joint Action of the Army and the Navy</i>
JAMMAT	Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
JCAE	Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRDB	Joint Research and Development Board
JSPC	Joint Strategic Plans Committee
JSSC	Joint Strategic Survey Committee
JUSMAG	Joint United States Military Aid Group
JUSMAPG	Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group
KMAG	United States Military Advisory Group to Korea
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MB	Munitions Board
MC	Military Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
MED	Manhattan Engineer District
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MLC	Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission
MPSB	Military Production and Supply Board
MTDP	Medium Term Defense Plan
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIA	National Intelligence Authority
NME	National Military Establishment
NSC	National Security Council
NSRB	National Security Resources Board
OASD(C)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
OASD(ISA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

OCDP	Office of Civil Defense Planning
OFMA	Office of Foreign Military Affairs
OMA	Office of Military Assistance
OMS	Office of Medical Services
OPI	Office of Public Information
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSRD	Office of Scientific Research and Development
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PPB	Personnel Policy Board
PPS	Policy Planning Staff
R&D	Research and Development
ROK	Republic of Korea
RDB	Research and Development Board
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SANACC	State–Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee
SCAP	Supreme Commander Allied Powers
SG	Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SWNCC	State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UMT	Universal Military Training
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
WC	War Council
WSEG	Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
WU	Western Union

Notes

The citations that follow refer to a wide variety of published and unpublished materials. Detail has been kept to a minimum without sacrificing essential information. Readers should consult the bibliography for complete information on the location of archival collections and for the full references (publisher and date of publication) to printed works.

For the period from 1947 through mid-1950, the immediate office of the Secretary of Defense used a subject filing system identified in the notes by the prefix "CD," followed by a sequence of numbers to pinpoint the location of each document. Files within each subject were arranged chronologically and when retired to the National Archives became part of Record Group (RG) 330. Also part of this record group were the files of the various staff agencies and all subordinate OSD offices, except for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who maintained their own filing system. Standardized recordkeeping did not begin to appear until approximately June 1950 when the secretary's immediate office adopted a modified version of the Dewey decimal system. All OSD files retired as part of RG 330 for the period prior to June 1950 are housed in the Modern Military Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Files identified as "OSD Hist" constitute a separate collection in the custody of the OSD Historical Office in the Pentagon. Documents from OSD collections which are also printed in the U.S. Department of State *Foreign Relations of the United States* series are so identified with a dual source citation.

I. 17 SEPTEMBER 1947

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65. Ltr Truman to Chairmen, Congressional Committees on Military and Naval Affairs on Unification of the Armed Forces, 15 Jun 46, *Truman Public Papers, 1946*, 303–05.
66. Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 334–35; Sherman test, 1 Apr 47, in Senate Cte on Armed Services, *Hearings on S. 758: National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services)*, 80 Cong, 1 sess (1947), 154–55.
67. Ltr Truman to Patterson and Forrestal, 16 Jan 47, *Truman Public Papers, 1947*, 99–100; Ltr Truman to President of Senate and Speaker of House, 18 Jan 47, *ibid*, 101–02.
68. Ltr Patterson and Forrestal to Truman, 16 Jan 47, in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 31–33.
69. Caraley, *Politics of Military Unification*, 153–82, and R Earl McClendon, *Unification of the Armed Forces: Administrative and Legislative Developments, 1945–1949*, 30–49, summarize the final legislative action on the National Security Act. For the House hearings, see House Cte on Expenditures in the Exec Depts, *Hearings on H.R. 2319: National Security Act of 1947*, 80 Cong, 1 sess (1947).
70. McClendon, *Unification of the Armed Forces*, 45. The quote is from *Congressional Record*, 7 Jul 47, 8308, cited in *ibid*, n35.
71. PL 253, 80 Cong (61 Stat 495), sec 2, reprinted in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 36 (complete text of law on 35–50).
72. Title I, *ibid*, 36–40.
73. Title II, *ibid*, 40–47.
74. Title III, *ibid*, 47–50.
75. See Campbell, *U.S. in World Affairs, 1947–48*, 13–14.
76. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, *Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense*, Appen A, *Mechanisms for Change—Organizational History*, 9. The author quoted is Rudolph A. Winnacker, Historian, OSD, at that time.

II. THE UNIFICATION ACT ON TRIAL

1. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 295–97.
2. *Ibid*, xvii. Additional biographical information on Forrestal is drawn from the following: Joseph Zikmund, "James V. Forrestal," in Paolo E Coletta, ed, *American Secretaries of the Navy*, II:729–44; Carl W Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon: From Forrestal to McNamara*, 12–64; Douglas Kinnard, *The Secretary of Defense*, 8–43. The only book-length biography of Forrestal is Arnold A Rogow, *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy*, which is not always reliable.
3. Julius Augustus Furer, *Administration of the Navy Department in World War II*, 65.
4. *Ibid*, 65–66.

5. William D Leahy, *I Was There*, 237.
6. *New York Times* (*NY Times*), 12 May 44, quoted in Zikmund, "James V. Forrestal," 729.
7. See Charles Hurd, "No. 2 Men with No. 1 Jobs," 9; interv with Forrestal after his confirmation as SecNavy, *NY Times*, 11 May 44.
8. Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, with Jennie Barnes Pope, *Forrestal and the Navy*, 31.
9. See Rogow, *James Forrestal*, 155.
10. Ltr Forrestal to Sherwood, 27 Aug 47, in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 299.
11. SecDef press conf, 12 Nov 47, *Public Statements of James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, 1947–1949*, I:83, 87 (emphasis added). These volumes are part of the bound collection of public statements of the Secretaries of Defense compiled annually by the Historian, OSD, and located in the OSD Historian's office.
12. Memo Forrestal for service secs and service chiefs, 16 Sep 47, OSD Hist.
13. Memo Forrestal for John H Ohly, 22 Jul 48, OSD Hist.
14. Notes, mtgs Cte of Four, 13 Oct and 13 Nov 47, 1947 notebook (Cte of Four), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
15. John H Ohly, "Progress of Unification," (n d), used for important briefings by OSD officials in 1947–48, Ohly personal papers; *Report of the Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense For Fiscal Year 1948*, 45.
16. Dept of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 32. (Subsequent references to semiannual reports will indicate dates in abbreviated title.)
17. Memo read by Forrestal at War Council mtg, 20 Jan 48, RG 330, CD 8–1–12.
18. See, for example, Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 334.
19. SecDef press conf, 23 Sep 47, *Public Statements of SecDef Forrestal, 1947–1949*, I:28.
20. For a summary of accomplishments during Forrestal's tenure, see "The Unification Notebook, 1947–1949," (n d, prepared in OSD ca 1949); Harry M DeWitt, "The Background and Developments in the Organization for National Security," (memo n d but ca 1953 [chart in study dtd Oct 1952]), sec 13, 49–50. Copies of both in OSD Hist.
21. McClendon, *Unification of the Armed Forces*, 68–69.
22. Donald F Carpenter, "Confidential Recollections of Washington, 1947–1949," Donald F Carpenter Papers, HSTL (hereafter cited as Carpenter Papers).
23. Ries, *The Management of Defense*, 130; memo Lutes for Johnson, 5 Oct 49, Tab A, OSD Hist; memo Lutes for CMB, 5 Oct 49, *ibid*.
24. Robert H Ferrell, ed, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, 156.
25. Forrestal, "Report to the President from the Secretary of Defense," 28 Feb 48, 1–16, 28–30, OSD Hist.
26. Entry, 10 May 48, Forrestal Diary, 2241–62, Forrestal Papers, Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ (hereafter cited as Forrestal Papers).
27. Notes, mtg War Council, 3 Aug 48, 1948 notebook (Amendments to National Security Act), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Forrestal for service secs, 4 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–1. For the record of the evening meetings, see Ohly handwritten notes, filed with notebook entitled "NME Organization Changes," Box 1, Forrestal Papers, Washington Natl Records Center, Suitland, Md. These records are subsequently cited as Forrestal Collection, WNRC.
28. "List of Major Issues and Projects Which Are Being Considered or Which Should be Considered," (n d), filed as Exhibit 6–B in "NME Organization Changes," *ibid*.
29. Memo Denfeld CNO for SecDef, 27 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–1; memo Sullivan for SecDef, 1 Sep 48, *ibid*.
30. Memo Leva for SecDef, 4 Sep 48, *ibid*; memo Royall for SecDef, 15 Sep 48, *ibid*.
31. Memo Symington for SecDef, 14 Sep 48, *ibid*.

32. Memo Forrestal for Cte on the Natl Security Org, 30 Sep 48, *ibid*.
33. *First Rpt of SecDef*, 3–4.
34. Cte on the Natl Security Org [Eberstadt Task Force], *Report to the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government by the Committee on the National Security Organization*, I:13, 26–46, 171–72 (hereafter cited as *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*). Portions printed in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 65–75.
35. Quote from Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 5 Jan 49, *Truman Public Papers*, 1949, 6; also, Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1950, 10 Jan 49, *ibid*, 56.
36. The Commission on Organization of The Executive Branch of the Government, *The National Security Organization: A Report to the Congress*.
37. Memo Stauffacher for Dir BoB, 28 Jan 49, George M Elsey Papers, HSTL (hereafter cited as Elsey Papers). For Leva's position, see memo Leva for SecDef, 7 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–1; excerpts from telcon Forrestal with Leva, 16 Sep 48, *ibid*.
38. Memo Forrestal, Pace, Clifford for the President, 10 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 12–1–1.
39. Memo Leva for SecDef, 17 Feb 49, *ibid*.
40. Special Message to the Congress on Reorganization of the National Military Establishment, 5 Mar 49, *Truman Public Papers*, 1949, 163–66.
41. Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 81.
42. Ltr Truman to Jonathan Daniels, 26 Feb 50, marked "unsent," in Robert H Ferrell, ed, *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*, 174; also Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman*, 15, 407.
43. *Current Biography*, 1949, 298–300. Additional biographical data on Johnson from Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, 65–88; Boyd B Stutler, "Louis A. Johnson—A Prominent West Virginian"; Jack Alexander, "Stormy New Boss of the Pentagon," 26–27, 67–69.
44. James E Hewes, Jr, *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963*, 54, 59–60.
45. Forrest C Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942*, 20–22.
46. Elting E Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson*, 491.
47. Ltr Johnson to AC Spurr, 17 Aug 40, Louis Johnson Papers, Univ of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va (hereafter cited as Johnson Papers).
48. Memcon Calvin H Oakes with Johnson et al, 26 May 42, *FRUS* 1942, I:157–59; memcon Oakes with Johnson et al, 26 May 42, *ibid*, 660–62.
49. Cable Johnson to SecState and President, 14 May 42, *ibid*, 654.
50. M Truman, *Harry S. Truman*, 20.
51. *Current Biography*, 1949, 300.
52. Interv with Najeeb Halaby by John Richards, 6 Nov 72, Columbia Univ Oral History Project (copy in Dwight D Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans), 19. (Eisenhower Library hereafter cited as DDEL.)
53. See "List of Major Issues," 23 Mar 49, attach to memo Ohly for SecDef, 28 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 9–2–45.
54. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 551–53.
55. E John Long memo for the record, 16 Feb 51, OSD Hist.
56. Entry, 8 Jan 49, in Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 152. Also see Dwight D Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends*, 331–32.
57. Carpenter, "Confidential Recollections," 73, Carpenter Papers.
58. Robert J Donovan, *Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949–1953*, 61; interv with Leva by Jerry N Hess, 9 Dec 69 and 12 Jun 70, Oral History Collection, HSTL, 43–44, 48 (hereafter cited as Truman Oral History Collection).
59. *Ibid*, 45–48; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 554–55.

60. Paolo E Coletta, *The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947–1953*, 126–27.
61. Memo Johnson for SecArmy et al, 28 Mar 49, Johnson Collection, WNRC.
62. *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 42–43.
63. SecDef press conf, 29 Mar 49, *Johnson Public Statements, 1949*, I:3–4.
64. House Cte on Armed Services, *Hearings: Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishment, 1949*, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), 2698 (hereafter cited as *Sundry Legislation, 1949*).
65. Transcript, "News of the World," WRC–NBC radio, 24 Aug 49, Johnson Papers.
66. Memo Johnson for War Council (WC) members, 22 Jul 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers.
67. Paolo E Coletta, "Francis P. Matthews," in Coletta, *American Secretaries of the Navy*. II:783–827.
68. Morris J MacGregor, Jr, *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965*, 311–13, 322–25, and passim. Also see Alan L Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates, 1945–1964*, 89–90, 296.
69. Memo Johnson for the President, 23 Apr 49, Johnson Papers.
70. Murray Green, "Stuart Symington and the B–36," 295–310; interv with Stuart Symington by Alfred Goldberg, Roger R Trask, and Steven L Rearden, 20 and 28 May 81, OSD Hist.
71. Memo on Louis Johnson by Ohly, (ca 1949), Ohly personal papers; Carpenter, "Confidential Recollections," 72, Carpenter Papers; interv with Marx Leva by Alfred Goldberg, SA Tucker, and Harry Yoshpe, 8 Mar 74, 34, OSD Hist; interv with Wilfred J McNeil by Alfred Goldberg and Harry Yoshpe, 31 May 74, *ibid*.
72. Forrestal test, 24 Mar 49, Senate Cte on Armed Services, *Hearings: National Security Act Amendments of 1949*, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), 6–27.
73. Cates test, 7 Apr 49, *ibid*, 121, 123.
74. Kimball test, 12 Apr 49, *ibid*, 163.
75. Memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 25 Mar 49, in *ibid*, 261–62.
76. Denfeld test, 7 Apr 49, *ibid*, 115–16.
77. Ltr Johnson to Tydings, 7 Apr 49, *ibid*, 262–63.
78. Test by Eberstadt, McNeil, and others on Title IV, *ibid*, 201ff. For summary of Senate action, see Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 82–84.
79. *Sundry Legislation, 1949*, 2685, 2695, 2703, and passim.
80. Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 82; *Sundry Legislation, 1949*, 2645–56.
81. Memo Johnson for Exec Sec NSC, 23 Aug 49, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47) sec 1.
82. Remarks before New York County Lawyers Association Annual Bar Dinner, 21 Dec 49, *Johnson Public Statements, 1949*, III:671.
83. Ltr Truman to Overton Brooks, 27 Oct 49, PSF, Truman Papers.

III. THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:98.
2. Memo by Leva, 2 Aug 47; (n a) draft memo, (n d), mins of mtg, 8 Aug 47; and (n a) draft memo, (n d); all in RG 330, OASD(MP&R) Records.
3. Donald C Stone, "The Organization of the Office of Secretary of Defense," (ca Aug 47), w/attach showing copy forwarded to Forrestal on 20 Aug 47, Box 83, Elsey Papers.
4. Memo Forrestal for SecArmy et al, 16 Sep 47, OSD Hist.
5. OSD immediate release to press and radio, 23 Sep 47, 17, in *Forrestal Public Statements, 1947–1949*, I:22.
6. *Who's Who in America, 1948–1949*; interv with Marx Leva by Doris M Condit and Steven L Rearden, 10 Jun 77, 7–8, OSD Hist; interv with John H Ohly by Doris M Condit and Steven L Rearden, 19 Apr 77, 33–34, *ibid*.

7. Interv with Leva, 9 Dec 69, 12 Jun 70, 1–9, Truman Oral History Collection; interv with Ohly, 19 Apr 77, 6; *Who's Who in America, 1956–1957*.
8. OSD PR, 23 Sep 47, OSD Hist; interv with Ohly, 19 Apr 77, 6–7; interv with Leva, 10 Jun 77, 7.
9. Ohly comments, ch III, R–F–III–2, Dec 72, OSD Hist; Najeeb Halaby, *Crosswinds: An Airman's Memoirs*, 43.
10. Ohly comments on draft MS, Dec 81, OSD Hist.
11. OSD Roster of Personnel, 22 Sep 47, OSD Hist; *First Rpt of SecDef*, 143; Dept of Defense, *Second Report of the Secretary of Defense*, 326–27 (hereafter cited as *Second Rpt of SecDef*); *Sec: Annual Rpt of SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1950*, 210.
12. Off Admin Services OSD, Progress Rpt, Nov 47, RG 330, OSD Admin Files.
13. "Report to the President from the Secretary of Defense," 28 Feb 48, 3, OSD Hist.
14. Interv with John H Ohly by Alfred Goldberg and Harry Yoshpe, 17 Jul 74, 20, OSD Hist.
15. *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:99–101.
16. See Forrestal's comments on salary problems in memo for the President, 28 Apr 48, PSF, Truman Papers, and at press conf, 11 Feb 48, *Forrestal Public Statements, 1947–1949*, II:356. On the political difficulties Forrestal encountered, see interv with Donald F Carpenter by Steven L Rearden, 12–13 Jun 81, 8–9, OSD Hist. This problem persisted even after the election, owing to rumors that Forrestal intended to retire or that Truman might fire him. Commenting on persistent vacancies in several positions, Ohly advised Forrestal that "none of these jobs can be filled, or will be filled, until either (a) you give clear evidence that you will continue in office, or (b) if you decide against doing so, a specific successor is designated. No good man is going to take a job which directly reports to an unknown boss." Memo Ohly for Forrestal, 7 Nov 48, OSD Hist.
17. Memo John A McCone for McNeil et al, 23 Apr 48, OSD Hist; ltr Cresap, McCormick, and Paget to Forrestal, 6 May 48, OSD Hist.
18. *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:101–02.
19. Interv with Ohly, 19 Apr 77, 31, OSD Hist.
20. *National Defense Manual*, sec 1400, Jun 48; OSD Functional Directory of Key Personnel, 7 Mar 49, OSD Hist; Ohly comments, ch III, R–F–III–8, Dec 82, OSD Hist.
21. Interv with Ohly, 19 Apr 77, 14–15, OSD Hist; Borklund, *Men of the Pentagon*, 40.
22. OSD Functional Directory of Key Personnel, 7 Mar 49, OSD Hist.
23. *National Defense Manual*, secs 1312, 1313, Apr 49, OSD Hist.
24. Functions of Legis Liaison Off summarized from memo Forrestal for service secs, 29 Oct 48, OSD Hist; *National Defense Manual*, sec 1320, Apr 49, OSD Hist.
25. Memo McNeil for Curry and Bordner, (ca May 48), RG 330, OASD(MP&R) Records; *National Defense Manual*, secs 1200–1240, Jun 48, OSD Hist.
26. Interv with Gen J Lawton Collins by Alfred Goldberg, Roger R Trask, Doris M Condit, and Steven L Rearden, 2 Jul 81, OSD Hist; interv with Leva, 10 Jun 77, 9, *ibid*; memo McNeil for Forrestal, 12 May [48], misc material on suppl appro, Mar–May 48 file, OASD(C) Records, DoD.
27. PL 36 printed in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 81.
28. Robert E Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*, 207; *Who's Who in America, 1948–1949*.
29. *NY Times*, 15 Apr 49; interv with Leva, 9 Dec 69 and 12 Jun 70, 76.
30. Interv with Leva, 9 Dec 69 and 12 Jun 70, 76.
31. Memo Johnson for service secs, 29 Mar 49, Doc No I–F–2, OSD Directives Book, Johnson Collection, WNRC; memo Allen for dirs of offices OSD et al, 29 Apr 49, Doc No I–F–8, *ibid*.
32. Memo by Allen, 2 Apr 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers.
33. Memo Johnson for USecDef et al, 5 May 49, OSD Hist. Others who sat on the Staff Council

- included the three Special Assistants (later, the three Assistant Secretaries of Defense); the Chairmen of RDB, MB, and PPB; the deputy to the secretary for medical matters; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; the Executive Secretary, OSD; and others as designated by the Secretary of Defense. For documentation on the Staff Council's role in the economy program, see Staff Council Rpt on Proposal for an Efficiency Study of the NME, (n d), attach to memo Staff Council for SecDef, 15 Jul 49, OSD Hist.
34. Biographical information on Griffith from *Who's Who in America*, 1956–1957.
 35. OSD Functional Directory of Key Personnel, 22 Dec 49, OSD Hist. Apparently Johnson never issued a directive specifically outlining the functions of Griffith's office; functions were assigned piecemeal. Interv with Leva, 10 Jun 77, 13.
 36. Notes, mtg War Council, 26 Jul 49, 1949 notebook (War Council, AFPC, and Cte of Four), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist. Official announcement of Burns's appointment came in memo Johnson for SecArmy et al, 3 Aug 49, *FRUS* 1949, I:365–68. Also see memo Johnson for Exec Sec NSC, 23 Aug 49, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47) sec 1; *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 17.
 37. *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 17, 22, 23–24; interv with Gen Lyman L Lemnitzer by Alfred Goldberg, Lawrence Kaplan, and Doris M Condit, 4 Mar 76, 12–14, OSD Hist; interv with Lemnitzer by Alfred Goldberg and SA Tucker, 21 Mar 74, 40, *ibid*.
 38. Halaby, *Crosswinds*, 49–50; interv with Lemnitzer, cited above, n37.
 39. *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 31, 45.
 40. Ray S Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, in US Army, *The U.S. Army in World War II*, 91–93 and *passim*, details McNarney's role in 1942 War Department reorganization.
 41. Memo Johnson for service secs et al, 9 Dec [49], Tab 11, in Def Mgmt Cte, "Reference Handbook for 1950"; McNarney speech at US Military Academy, 8 Jan 51, OSD Hist.
 42. *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:114B.
 43. See Zikmund, "James V. Forrestal," 741.
 44. Notes, mtg Top Advisory Group, 17 Sep 47, 1947 notebook (Legislative Program), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; Leva memo, 19 Sep 47, RG 330, CD 9–1–9; memo Forrestal for service secs, 17 Oct 47, OSD Hist.
 45. *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, III:138–39; notes, mtg Cte of Four, 4 Jun 48, 1948 notebook (Unification—Legislative Policy), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
 46. Forrestal memo for service secs, 23 Jul 48, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers; OSD PR No 112–48, 29 Jul 48, OSD Hist.
 47. OSD PR No 189–48, 1 Nov 48, OSD Hist; "Legislative Program of the NME for the 81st Congress," approved 26 Nov 48, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers; Forrestal memo for service secs, 29 Oct 48, *ibid*.
 48. See summary memo, "B. 1949–53: Assistant Secretary (Legal and Legislative Affairs)," in Historian OSD notebook, "Legislative Affairs," OSD Hist; notes, mtg AFPC, 23 May 50, 1950 notebook (Unification—Legislative Policy), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
 49. Interv with Leva, 8 Mar 74, 14–15.
 50. E John Long memo for the record, 12 Apr 50, OSD Hist; Long draft MS, "Public Relations on a Unified Military Establishment: First Phase," 24 Oct 50, 33, OSD Hist; Jack Anderson, with James Boyd, *Confessions of a Muckraker: The Inside Story of Life in Washington during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years*, 122–23, 132.
 51. Ltr Forrestal to Bush, 15 Aug 47, OSD Hist.
 52. SecDef press conf, 23 Sep 47, *Forrestal Public Statements, 1947–1949*, I:28; memo Forrestal for service secs et al, sub: Public Relations of the NME, 10 Oct 47, OSD Hist.
 53. Memo Forrestal for service secs et al, sub: Security and Public Relations in NME, 10 Oct 47, OSD Hist.

54. Ltr to Editor, "Plane Speeds," by Hugh L. Hanson, *Washington Post*, 7 Nov 47. For a discussion of Hanson's activities, which generated considerable controversy, see Drew Pearson, "Navy's One-Man Lobby," *Washington Post*, 30 Sep 48; E. John Long, draft ch on Hanson for study, "The Problem of Unified Public Relations," 7 Jun 50, OSD Hist.
55. These incidents are catalogued and summarized in a notebook entitled "Lapses," in OSD Hist.
56. See, for example, ltr Arthur H. Sulzberger to Vannevar Bush, 12 Nov 47, OSD Hist; editorial, "Military Secrecy in a Free Society," *Washington Evening Star*, 5 Jan 48; Nat Finney, "A Voluntary Censor Plan by Forrestal," *Des Moines Register*, 5 Jan 48.
57. Memo Forrestal for service secs and JCS, 4 Feb 48, OSD Hist (emphasis in original); also, OSD PR No 20–48, 13 Feb 48, and Long, "Public Relations: First Phase," 16–18.
58. Memo Capt R.W. Berry OSD for Mathews and Kluckhohn, 24 Mar 48, OSD Hist; Long, "Public Relations: First Phase," 19–20.
59. Memo Mathews and Kluckhohn for SecDef, 1 Apr 48, OSD Hist. Copies of the Mathews-Kluckhohn report were sent to each of the service secretaries, but without the confidential introduction. Long, "Public Relations: First Phase," 27–28.
60. OSD PR No 95–48, 2 Jul 48, OSD Hist. Hinton's appointment became effective on 19 July 1948.
61. See Gladwin Hill, "Symington Assails Defense Quarrels," *NY Times*, 18 Jul 48.
62. Interv with Symington, 27 May 81, 15–20, OSD Hist. For discussion between Forrestal and Truman on Symington's possible dismissal, see Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 463. For Hinton's report, see memo Hinton for Forrestal, 20 Jul 48, OSD Hist.
 During the above-mentioned interview, Symington stated his desire to "clear the record" on the matter of the Los Angeles speech and made available a collection of personal papers, including copies of two speeches—one labeled "Not Given" and the other, dated 16 July 1948, bearing handwritten revisions of the "Not Given" copy. In a letter dated 22 July 1948 to Turner Catledge, acting managing editor of the *New York Times*, Symington insisted that he spoke entirely from the revised copy and that he "went over it carefully with one of Mr. Forrestal's chief assistants on the spot, this just prior to making the address." Also among these papers was a copy of a letter of 20 July 1948 from Capt. R.W. Berry, USN, one of Forrestal's aides, to John O'Donnell, Washington correspondent for the *New York Daily News*, absolving Symington of having made any remarks in Los Angeles critical of the National Military Establishment.
63. *First Rpt of SecDef*, 9; *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, I:147.
64. Ltr Frye to Long OSD, 20 Dec 50, OSD Hist.
65. Memo Forrestal for service secs et al, 17 Mar 49, OSD Hist; memo Forrestal for service secs et al, 20 Mar 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers; SecDef press conf, 29 Mar 49, *Johnson Public Statements*, 1949, I:5.
66. Copies of these directives in "Public Information to 1953" notebook, OSD Hist. The first directive was issued on 14 April 1949, the last on 24 May 1949. Memo Frye for Prichard, Ewen, Leo, and Selden, 14 Apr 49, OSD Hist; memo Johnson for service secs, 7 Jun 49, OSD Hist.
67. Memo Frye for SecDef, 31 May 49, OSD Hist; table, Public Relations Organization, DoD, Apr 50, "Public Info to 1953" notebook, OSD Hist.
68. Ltr Frye to Long, 20 Dec 50, OSD Hist.
69. Ltr Early to James McGraw, Jr, 29 Sep 49, OSD Hist; memo for file by Wayne Althaus OSD, 10 Feb 50, OSD Hist; memo for SecDef, 17 Mar 50, cited in Rudolph A. Winnacker, "Development of Department of Defense Public Relations," OSD Hist; Long, "Public Relations: Second Phase," 14–15; unsigned draft memo, sub: Reorganization of Public Info Activities, 17 May 50, OSD Hist; excerpt, mins, mtg Mgmt Cte, 18 May 50, item 2—OPI, OSD Hist.

70. For summary analysis of civil defense preparations and planning prior to 1947, see Harry B Yoshpe, *Our Missing Shield: The U.S. Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective*, 58–80; B Wayne Blanchard, "American Civil Defense, 1945–1975: The Evolution of Programs and Policies," 26–30; Rudolph A Winnacker, "Civil Defense," 6–9.
71. NME, *A Study of Civil Defense*.
72. Notes, mtgs War Council, 4 and 18 Nov 47, 1947 notebook (Western Hemisphere—Civil Defense), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; Winnacker, "Civil Defense," 15–16.
73. OSD PR 15–48, 14 Feb 48, OSD Hist.
74. Memo Ohly for SecArmy et al, 15 Nov 47, Carl Spaatz Papers, MSS Div, Library of Congress (LC); memo Forrestal for President, 27 Feb 48, PSF, Truman Papers; Winnacker, "Civil Defense," 17–18.
75. Memo Forrestal for SecArmy et al, 27 Mar 48, OSD Hist; Winnacker, "Civil Defense," 19; Yoshpe, *Missing Shield*, 77, 88; ltr Harold B Hinton OSD to Charles G Ross, 14 Feb 49, Confidential File (CF), Truman Papers; *First Rpt of SecDef*, 48.
76. Winnacker, "Civil Defense," 20–23; notes, mtg War Council, 31 Aug 48, 1948 notebook (Western Hemisphere—Civil Defense), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; Winnacker, "Civil Defense," 24–25.
77. Office of Civil Defense Planning, OSD, *Civil Defense for National Security*, 16, 18, and passim.
78. For a summary of agency views, see "Comments from Interested Departments and Agencies," (n d), appen to Winnacker, "Civil Defense."
79. Yoshpe, *Missing Shield*, 97–100, and Winnacker, "Civil Defense," 27–30, survey reactions to the Hopley Report.
80. "Preliminary Draft of Civil Defense Legislation," 7 Jan 49, attach to ltr Forrestal to Steelman, 12 Jan 49, OSD Hist; ltr Forrestal to Truman, 27 Jan 49, OSD Hist.
81. Ltr Truman to Forrestal, 3 Mar 49, and memo Truman for Chm NSRB, 3 Mar 49, both in OSD Hist; Winnacker, "Civil Defense," 34–35; ltr Johnson to Truman, 27 Apr 49, ltr Johnson to Truman, 14 May 49, ltr Johnson to Steelman, 1 Aug 49, all in OSD Hist; Winnacker, "Civil Defense," 36–37.
82. Winnacker, "Civil Defense," 39–53; *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 32–33. On the creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, see Yoshpe, *Missing Shield*, ch III.
83. *First Rpt of SecDef*, 45–47, 49–51.
84. For a partial listing of OSD committees and their functions, see "List of Major Problems," 23 Mar 49, enc to memo Ohly for SecDef, 28 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 9–2–45.
85. Miles, "Office of the Secretary of Defense," 49–52.
86. Memo Ohly for Nicholas Ludington, 29 Apr 48, 4–5, Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Forrestal for Ralph Stohl OSD, 30 Sep 48, cited in "List of Major Problems," 23 Mar 49, 16, RG 330, CD 9–2–45; also see *Second Rpt of SecDef*, 101.
87. Memo Johnson for service secs et al, 30 Mar 49, Doc No II–B–1, OSD Directives Book, Johnson Collection, WNRC; *Second Rpt of SecDef*, 102.
88. DoD PR No 64–49A, 27 May 49, OSD Hist; *Second Rpt of SecDef*, 121; *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 117–18.

IV. THE STAFF AGENCIES

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2. *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, III:40–44; "MB Org History," 7–9.

3. "Report to the President from the Secretary of Defense," 28 Feb 48, 9.
4. SecDef Monthly Journal, Nov 47, OSD Hist; notes, mtg Cte of Four, 9 Dec 47, 1947 notebook (Cte of Four), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; "MB Org History," 8.
5. Memo Ohly for Forrestal, 9 Dec 47, RG 330, CD 18–1–4; memo Lutes for Chm MB, 5 Oct 49, OSD Hist; "MB Org History," 8–9, 13.
6. "MB Org History," 9–10, 15.
7. "List of Major Problems," item I–A–5, 23 Mar 49, enc to memo Ohly for SecDef, 28 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 9–2–45; MB directive, 9 Jun 48, in *National Defense Manual*, sec 1600, 22 Jun 48, OSD Hist.
8. "MB Org History," 24–25, 32–34; MB org chart, Jul 49, OSD Hist.
9. Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 95–96.
10. MB directive, 3 Nov 49, OSD Directive Book, Doc No I–A–19, Johnson Collection, WNRC; memo Johnson for service secs et al, 15 May 50, ISA notebook, OSD Hist.
11. *Second Rpt of SecDef*, 326–27; enc to memo Lutes for Johnson, 5 Oct 49, Tab A, item 13, OSD Hist (emphasis in original).
12. Interv with Carpenter, 12–13 Jun 81, OSD Hist; also see Carpenter, "Confidential Recollections," 40–41, Carpenter Papers. For an example of Forrestal's problem in finding a successor to Hargrave, see summary of his conversation with Henry Isham, entry, 4 Sep 48, Forrestal Diary, 2467, Forrestal Papers.
13. Carpenter, "Confidential Recollections," 40–42, Carpenter Papers; memo Forrestal for Ohly, 15 Nov 48, Ohly personal papers; "MB Org History," 26; OSD Fact Sheet, "The Progress of Unification: A Review of Actions Under The National Security Act," 15 Dec 49, 1, OSD Hist.
14. [Public Affairs OSD], "The Unification Notebook, 1947–1949: A Compendium of Accomplishments in the Field of Armed Forces Unification," 15, OSD Hist; *Second Rpt of SecDef*, 88–89; *SecDef Semiannual Rpt . . . January 1–June 30, 1950*, 46.
15. Carpenter, "Confidential Recollections," 53–54, Carpenter Papers.
16. See Tab A, items 1, 2, 3, 4, enc to memo Lutes for Johnson, 5 Oct 49, OSD Hist; Carpenter, "Confidential Recollections," 51, Carpenter Papers.
17. Melvin Bell, "The Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering: Its Organization and Administration," 4, 16. On the wartime activities of the OSRD, see Irvin Stewart, *Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative History of the Office of Scientific Research and Development*. Herbert F York and G Allen Greb, "Military Research and Development: A Postwar History," 13–25, offers an overview of the postwar R&D organization.
18. Ltr Bush to Robert P Patterson, 18 Jul 47, RG 330, CD 109–1–2; Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy*, 3.
19. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 319–20.
20. See "Proposed Directive," (n d), memo Forrestal for SecArmy et al, 11 Dec 47, Ohly personal papers; memo Leva for Forrestal, 18 Oct 47, D 70–1–5, OSD Hist; notes, mtg Cte of Four, 13 Oct 47, 1947 notebook (Cte of Four), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
21. Ohly memo for the files, 6 Nov 47, Ohly personal papers; memo Ohly for the record, 23 Aug 48, in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 291.
22. Memo Ohly for Forrestal, 10 Dec 47, Ohly personal papers. Details on the drafting of the revised directive from comments provided by Ohly.
23. RDB directive, *National Defense Manual*, sec 1500, 18 Dec 47, OSD Hist.
24. William Webster test, Senate Cte on Appros, *Hearings: Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951*, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 753; *SecDef Semiannual Rpt . . . January 1–January 30, 1950*, 210. Bell, "Defense Research and Engineering," 19, places the number of part-time consultants at closer to 2,000.

25. WSEG directive, *National Defense Manual*, sec 1920, 11 Dec 48; Ponturo, *WSEG Experience*, 61–71.
26. Lloyd Berkner test, House Cte on Govt Opns, Subcte on Org and Admin of the Natl R&D Program, Hearings, 83 Cong, 2 sess (1954), 633.
27. Memo McNarney for SecDef, 29 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 12–2–5.
28. RDB directive, 14 Sep 49, RG 330, CD 109–2–20; RDB staff study, 12 Sep 49, enc to RDB 228/6, (n d), *ibid*.
29. Ponturo, *WSEG Experience*, 23–24.
30. DoD PR No 328–50, 14 Mar 50, OSD Hist.
31. RDB 169/3, 24 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 114–1–11; *First Rpt of SecDef*, 131–32; memo Compton for JCS, 3 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 109–2–10; memo McNarney for SecDef, 17 Nov 49, w/attachs, RG 330, CD 11–1–34.
32. "The Unification Notebook, 1947–49," sec on RDB, 2–5; ltr Bush to SecDef, 22 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 109–1–2; RDB 162/14, 15 Sep 49, attach to RDB 162/13, RG 330, CD 109–2–20.
33. York and Greb, "Military Research and Development," 15–20; ltr Edward L Bowles to LtGen John R Hull, 9 Apr 51, OSD Hist.
34. "Report to the President from the Secretary of Defense," 28 Feb 48, 9–10.
35. *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, III:169–71.
36. Notes, mtgs Cte of Four, 20 Apr 48 and 11 May 48, and mins, mtg War Council, 3 Aug 48, both in 1948 notebook (PPB), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; Ohly critique, R–F–IV–27 and R–V (new)–Non Stat–3.
37. *First Rpt of SecDef*, 4. On the origins of the PPB, see the appropriate subsection in "The Unification Notebook, 1947–1949" and Thomas R Reid, "New Horizons in Personnel Policy," 14.
38. PPB interim directive, *National Defense Manual*, sec 1800, 22 Feb 49, OSD Hist; memo Johnson for SecArmy et al, 31 Mar 49, OSD Hist; PPB directive, *National Defense Manual*, sec 1800, 8 Aug 49, OSD Hist; Reid, "New Horizons in Personnel Policy," 18.
39. Reid, "New Horizons in Personnel Policy," 18; OSD PR No 152–50, 1 Feb 50, OSD Hist.
40. *Second Rpt of SecDef*, 106–17; memo Johnson for service secs and Chm PPB, 6 Apr 49, Doc No III–I–1, OSD Directives Book, Johnson Collection, WNRC. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965*, 364, 376, 398, and *passim* discusses the involvement of the PPB in racial integration and the general problem of desegregating the armed forces.
41. Memo Forrestal for Royall, 20 Nov 47, RG 330, CD 18–1–36; terms of reference for Cte on Civilian Components, (n d), enc A to memo Forrestal for Royall, 20 Nov 47, RG 330, CD 18–1–36; "The Unification Notebook, 1947–1949," General sec, OSD Hist.
42. CCPB directive, 14 Jun 49, *National Defense Manual*, sec 1960.
43. OSD PR No 130–48, 12 Aug 48, OSD Hist; "Reserve Forces for National Security—Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Civilian Components," 30 Jun 48, 9–24, RG 330, CD 18–1–36.
44. Ltr Forrestal to Truman, 2 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 18–1–36, and Confidential File (CF), Truman Papers; ltr Truman to Forrestal, 12 Aug 48, PSF, Truman Papers; EO 10007, 15 Oct 48.
45. *First Rpt of SecDef*, 154–63; memo Forrestal for Truman, 7 Dec 48, in 1948 notebook (National Guard and Reserves), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; notes, mtgs War Council, 23 Nov and 7 Dec 48, in 1948 notebook (War Council), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1949, 497–99.
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47. Notes, mtgs War Council, 24 May and 14 Jun 49, 1949 notebook (CCPB), Ohly Collection.

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 50. *First Rpt of SecDef*, 49; BoB paper, 5 Sep 47, cited in "Draft History of Medical Organization in the Armed Services," (n d), 3, OSD Hist; memo by MajGen RW Bliss USA, 24 Nov 47, Ohly personal papers. Information on the role of the AMA from Ohly comments on manuscript.
 51. "Draft History of Medical Organization in the Armed Forces," (n d), 1–2, OSD Hist; mtg, Cte of Four, 25 Nov 47, 1947 notebook (Health—Medical Services), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
 52. Memo Forrestal for Hawley, 1 Jan 48, *National Defense Manual*, sec 1150; (n a), "Draft History of Medical Organization," 16–17, OSD Hist; memo Acting SecNav for Forrestal, 2 Jan 48, in "Draft History of Medical Organization," 5–8, OSD Hist; memo Joseph R Flynn for Bruskin, 24 Nov 48, Ohly personal papers; *First Rpt of SecDef*, 49–51.
 53. OSD PR No 101–48, 8 Jul 48, OSD Hist; mins, mtg War Council, 3 Aug 48, 1948 notebook (War Council), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; AFMAC directive, 9 Nov 48, *National Defense Manual*, sec 1150, refiled as sec 1950 as of 18 Jul 49. For Cooper's appointment, see OSD PR No 216–48, 12 Dec 48, OSD Hist; OSD PR No 17–49, 27 Jan 49, *ibid*.
 54. Ohly memo for the files, 3 Feb 49, Ohly personal papers; mins, mtg AFMAC, 5–6 Feb 49, 2, *ibid*; SecDef press conf, 25 Feb 49, *Forrestal Public Statements, 1947–1949*, V:1065–86; *Second Rpt of SecDef*, 120.
 55. Memo Forrestal for Johnson, 26 Mar 49, in "Draft History of Medical Organization," 15; AFMAC, "Progress Report—January 11 to July 6, 1949," 25 Jul 49, 10–11, Ohly personal papers.
 56. Directive—Director of Medical Services, 12 May 49, OSD Hist; memo Johnson for SecArmy et al, 30 Apr 49, OSD Hist; Richard L Meiling, "Organizing Medical Services for Defense," 32; memo Johnson for SecArmy et al, 20 Jun 49, OSD Hist; memo Leven C Allen for SecArmy et al, 22 Jun 49, *ibid*.
 57. See AFMAC, "Progress Report—January 11 to July 6, 1949," 25 Jul 49, 4–6; *SecDef Semiannual Rpt . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 118; *SecDef Semiannual Rpt . . . January 1 to June 30, 1950*, 29–32.
 58. Memo Johnson for service secs, 17 Oct 49, OSD Hist; "Chronology—Medical Services and OSD," OSD Hist.
 59. See OSD PR No 7–49, 12 Jan 49, OSD Hist; "House Subcommittee Denounces 'Meiling Plan,'" *Armed Forces*, 6 May 50, 6.
 60. PL 585, sec 2(c), as amended, 79 Cong. For the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act, see Richard G Hewlett and Oscar E Anderson, Jr, *The New World, 1939/1946*, vol I in *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, chs 13 and 14.
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 62. Memo Charles F Brown OSD for Leva, 6 Jan 48, 3, Ohly personal papers; Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, 85–86.
 63. Richard G Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Atomic Shield, 1947/1952*, vol II in *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, 129–30, 136–37, 154–56; entry, 23 Sep 47 (Mtg with Lewis Strauss), Forrestal Diary, 1832, Forrestal Papers.
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65. Draft mins, mtg Four Secs, 25 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–9; ltr Sullivan to Forrestal, 19 Feb 48, Ohly personal papers.
 66. MLC directive, 12 Apr 48, OSD Hist.
 67. Memo Forrestal for Carpenter, 8 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–1; interv with Carpenter, 12–13 June 81, 1; Carpenter, "Confidential Recollections," 15, Carpenter Papers.
 68. Memo Carpenter for Forrestal, 3 Jun 48, OSD Hist; interv with Robert LaBaron by Alfred Goldberg, Samuel Wells, and Doris M Condit, 4 May 76, 12, OSD Hist.
 69. Ltr Johnson to Sen Brien McMahon, 5 May 49, RG 330, CD 32–1–8; S Rpt No 934, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949); *SecDef Semiannual Rpt . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 78.
 70. Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, 66.

V. OSD AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

1. Memo Forrestal for Ohly, 22 Jul 48, OSD Hist.
2. Senate Cte on Naval Affairs, *Unification*, 47–50; Paul Y Hammond, "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal," 899–901; Alfred D Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council: 1945–1947," 369–88.
3. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 19.
4. Sander, "Truman and the NSC," 376–77.
5. Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 36–37, 86, 94.
6. Elmer B Staats, quoted in Francis H Heller, ed, *The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency, 1945–1953*, 171.
7. Ohly comments on draft MS, R-III (new)–NSC–4, OSD Hist.
8. NSC Action Nos 1 and 2 (26 Sep 47), RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; Sidney W Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security," 534–43; *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:8–10. Also see James S Lay's description of NSC procedures in Heller, *Truman White House*, 205–11.
9. Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security," 539.
10. Memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 12 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–18.
11. Leva memo, 24 Sep 47, sub: Mins of a Mtg of the War Council Held in Sec Forrestal's Office on 22 Sep 47, RG 330, CD 9–1–11; notes, mtg Top Advisory Group, 17 Sep 47, 1947 notebook (Grand Strategy), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
12. Draft mins of mtg, 8 Aug 47, RG 330, OASD(MP&R) Records. The 1949 amendments altered the secretary's role by making him "principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense."
13. Notes, mtg Top Advisory Group, 17 Sep 47, 1947 notebook (Grand Strategy), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
14. Truman, *Memoirs*, II:59–60.
15. "The Concept of the NSC," [26 Jul 48], enc to memo Burns for Marshall, 25 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 310.1.
16. Lay, quoted in Heller, *Truman White House*, 206–07.
17. Ohly commentary, R-III (new)–NSC–3–4, OSD Hist.
18. Memo Johnson for JCS, 8 Apr 49, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47) sec 1; memo Johnson for service secs et al, 3 Aug 49, *FRUS* 1949, I:365–68; memo Burns for Exec Sec NSC, 23 Aug 49, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47) sec 1.
19. Falk and Bauer, *National Security Structure*, 37–38; notes, mtg AFPC, 23 Aug 49, 1949 notebook (Grand Strategy), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.

20. Ltr Truman to Johnson, 19 Jul 50, PSF, Truman Papers (copy addressed to SecState in *FRUS* 1950, I:348–49).
21. Truman, *Memoirs*, II:59.
22. Memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 26 Mar 48, Box 28, Carl Spaatz Papers, MSS Div, LC; NSC 17, 28 Jun 48, PSF, Truman Papers; memo for the President, 6 Aug 48, 17th NSC Mtg [5 Aug 48], PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC 17/2, 13 Aug 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
23. See NSC 23, memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 27 Jul 48, PSF, Truman Papers; memo for the President, 20 Aug 48, sub: 18th NSC Mtg, item 2, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC 17/3, 16 Nov 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
24. Memo Sherman for War Council mems, 3 Mar 49, and memo Souers for NSC, 8 Feb 49, both in Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers; Athan Theoharis, *Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan*, 78; NSC 17/6, 18 Jul 49, PSF, Truman Papers. Also see Select Cte to Study Govtl Opns with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, bk II, S Rpt No 94–755, 94 Cong, 2 sess (1976), 45–46.
25. Ltr Forrestal to George S Kaufman, 7 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47.
26. SecDef Monthly Journal, Oct 47; notes, mtg Cte of Four, 28 Oct 47, 1947 notebook (Cte of Two), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Blum for Ohly, 28 Oct 47, RG 330, CD 3–1–16.
27. Ohly commentary, R–III(new)–State Rel–7, OSD Hist; notes, mins Cte of Four, 28 Oct 47, 1947 notebook (Cte of Four), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
28. Rogow, *James Forrestal*, 311; Jonathan Foster Fanton, “Robert A. Lovett: The War Years,” 247.
29. Ltr Stettinius to Forrestal, 29 Nov 44, *FRUS* 1944, I:1466; “Operation of SANACC,” (n d), w/appens, Tab J in “Report to the President from the Secretary of Defense,” 28 Feb 48, 1–2, 3–4, 8–10, 14–17, 18–22, OSD Hist.
30. Memo Ohly for Blum, 9 Jan 48, Ohly personal papers; Robert Blum, “The Operation of the State–Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC),” 17 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–27; “Report to the President from the Secretary of Defense,” 28 Feb 48, 15, OSD Hist.
31. Notes, mtgs War Council, 6 Apr, 4 May, 18 May, 26 May, 15 Jun 48, 1948 notebook (Grand Strategy–SANACC), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; NSC Action No 94, 19 Aug 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; NSC 25, 12 Aug 48, *FRUS* 1948, I:605–06.
32. Ohly memo, “List of Major Problems,” 23 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 9–2–45; memo Souers for NSC, 11 May 49, *FRUS* 1949, I:299; ltr Johnson to Souers, 4 May 49, *ibid*, 299–300; NSC Action No 220, 2 Jun 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; memo Souers for NSC, 3 Jun 49, RG 330, CD 12–1–27.
33. Ohly commentary, R–III(new)–State Rel–8, 10, 13.
34. *Ibid*, 13; memo by Ohly, 12 Jul 48, sub: Office of the Secretariat, Forrestal Collection, Box 1, WNRC.
35. Ohly commentary, R–F–V–10.
36. Ohly memo, “List of Major Problems,” 23 Mar 49, 6, 9, RG 330, CD 9–2–45; memo Ohly for McNarney, 7 May 49, w/enc memo by Robert Blum, (n d), RG 330, CD 12–2–18; Ohly critique, R–III(new)–State Rel–17–18.
37. Memo Leva for Johnson, 5 May 49, Ohly memo for the files, 5 May 49, memo Ohly for Wellborn, 27 May 49, all in Ohly personal papers.
38. Memo Johnson for SecArmy, 27 Apr 49, OSD Directives Book, Doc No I–B–2, Johnson Papers, WNRC; memo Johnson for SecArmy et al, 14 Jul 49, Doc No I–G–9, *ibid*; memo Johnson for SecArmy et al, 31 Aug 49, ISA notebook, OSD Hist.
39. Interv with Leva, 8 Mar 74, 21, OSD Hist.
40. John G Norris, *Washington Post*, 18 Sep 49; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 374.

41. Memo Nitze for SecState, 12 Jul 50, *FRUS 1950*, 1:341–42; Ernest R May, ed, *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief*, 196–97. For a more detailed discussion of the lifting of restrictions, see Doris M Condit's forthcoming volume for the 1950–53 period in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*.
42. For a detailed analysis of wartime mobilization problems, see James W Fesler et al, *Program and Administration*, vol I in *Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940–1945*. For a summary treatment of these problems, see Harry B Yoshpe, *A Case Study in Peacetime Mobilization Planning: The National Security Resources Board, 1947–1953*, 1–6.
43. BoB memo for the President, 8 Aug 47, Elsey Papers; entry, 30 Oct 47, Forrestal Diary, 1901, Forrestal Papers; memo Elsey for Clifford, 30 Oct 47, Elsey Papers; Yoshpe, *Peacetime Mobilization Planning*, 11.
44. Yoshpe, *Peacetime Mobilization Planning*, 12–13.
45. Memo Forrestal for Ohly, 15 Nov 48, Ohly personal papers; Yoshpe, *Peacetime Mobilization Planning*, 14–15, 17, 31, 34, 168.
46. Yoshpe, *Peacetime Mobilization Planning*, 14–15; memo McNeil for Forrestal, 20 Feb 48, RG 330, OASD(MP&R) Records, Box 429, Chron file.
47. Yoshpe, *Peacetime Mobilization Planning*, 49–55; Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 115.
48. Notes, mins Cte of Four, 28 Oct 48, 1948 notebook (Cte of Four), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; ltr Leva to Eberstadt, 30 Oct 47, OSD Hist; memo, (n d), enc to memo Forrestal for Hill and Hargrave, 25 Nov 47, Tab K in "Report to the President from the Secretary of Defense," 28 Feb 48, OSD Hist. Additional memoranda concerning the negotiation of this agreement are filed in RG 330, CD 9–1–12. See also Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 329–32, and Yoshpe, *Peacetime Mobilization Planning*, 51.
49. Interv with Carpenter, 12–13 Jun 81, 10, OSD Hist; Yoshpe, *Peacetime Mobilization Planning*, 52–55.
50. Memo McNeil for Forrestal, 20 Feb 48, RG 330, OASD(MP&R) Records, Box 429, Chron file; Yoshpe, *Peacetime Mobilization Planning*, 24–29, 34–39, 169.
51. Yoshpe, *Peacetime Mobilization Planning*, 16–18, 31, 65–71.
52. Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 45–46.
53. Vernon Davis, "Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy," 9 Oct 62, JCS Hist Div.
54. *DoD Fact Sheet*, 1976, 21, OSD Hist. For a composite portrait of the Joint Chiefs, see Lawrence J Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years*, ch 2.
55. See JCS Hist Div, *A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1978*, 18–20.
56. Forrestal's views quoted in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 497. See biographical data on General Alfred Maximilian Gruenther, Army Public Information Office, (n d); *Who's Who in America*, 1966–67.
57. JCS Hist Div, "History of the Unified Command Plan," 1–5.
58. "Report to the President from the Secretary of Defense," 28 Feb 48, 8.
59. "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 21 Apr 48, in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 278–79.
60. Notes, mtg Cte of Four, 20 Apr 48, 1948 notebook (JCS), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; Ohly memo for the record, 7 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–45; Forrestal to JCS, 17 Jul 48, *ibid*.
61. *First Rpt of SecDef*, 4.
62. *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, I:29–30; Cmsn on Org of Exec Branch of the Govt, *Report*, 17.
63. *NY Times*, 12 Feb 49. For Eisenhower's view of himself as chairman, see his memo to Forrestal, 25 Feb 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers, and Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 157.

64. JCS Secretariat file, "Decisions—JCS, 28 May 1947 thru Dec 1949." The file contains agendas of the meetings.
65. Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 95; Maxwell D Taylor, "Reflections on the American Military Establishment," in Paul R Schratz, ed, *Evolution of the American Military Establishment Since World War II*, 11.
66. Biographical data on Admiral Arthur C Davis, Navy Office of Information, 8 Nov 67.
67. See Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 158, 162, for Johnson's relationship with Eisenhower. Johnson also greatly admired Bradley and once described him as "that brilliant quarterback, one of the best men of any all-time, all-American military team" (*Johnson Public Statements*, 1949, III:650–51).
68. Condit, *JCS History*, II:7.
69. *Ibid*, 162.
70. Schnabel, *JCS History*, I:8.
71. Memo Nitze for SecState, 12 Jul 50, *FRUS* 1950, I:342.
72. Maxwell D Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, 111–13. See also Joseph Harrelson, Jr, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security," 154–59.
73. Walter S Poole, 1950–1952, vol IV in *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy* (hereafter cited as Poole, *JCS History*, IV), 21–22; Condit, *JCS History*, II:253–54.
74. Truman, *Memoirs*, II:56.
75. Thomas F Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency*, chs III–X, is the most detailed and authoritative publication to date on the activities of the OSS. Also see Allen W Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, and Ray S Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA*, chs I–II. Many popular histories, resting on sketchy evidence, have also been published. See, for example, R Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, and Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*.
76. Memo Donovan for the President, 18 Nov 44, in Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, copy of memo on 445, 265–68; EO 9621, 20 Sep 45, 10 *Federal Register*, 12033.
77. Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities, 22 Jan 46, *Truman Public Papers*, 1946, 88; Harry Howe Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, 80; Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 370–76.
78. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 377–410.
79. Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 38–39.
80. NSC Action No 1–b (26 Sep 47), RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; memo Souers for NSC mems, 10 Oct 47, RG 330, CD 3–1–5; NSC Action No 15, 12 Dec 47, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:32.
81. Copies of these policy papers are in NSC Collection, Modern Military Branch, NARS.
82. Anne Karalekas, *History of the Central Intelligence Agency*, 25–36, publ as S Rpt No 94–755, bk IV, 94 Cong, 2 sess (1976).
83. Ltr Truman to William B Arthur, 10 Jun 64, in Ferrell, *Off the Record*, 408. Also see Harry S Truman, "Limit CIA Role To Intelligence," *Washington Post*, 22 Dec 63.
84. Karalekas, *History of CIA*, 11; Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars*, 92; *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:27.
85. NSC Action No 25, 13 Jan 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; memo Souers for Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, 13 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 4–1–14.
86. Notes, mtg War Council, 2 Mar 48, 1948 notebook (CIA), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Souers for Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, 17 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 4–1–14.
87. "Report to the President from the Secretary of Defense," 28 Feb 48, 15, OSD Hist.
88. *Ibid*.
89. Allen W Dulles, William H Jackson, and Mathias F Correa, "The Central Intelligence

- Agency and National Organization for Intelligence: A Report to the National Security Council," 1 Jan 49, RG 330, CD 4–1–14. For a brief summary of the report's findings, see Karalekas, *History of CIA*, 17, 20.
90. Arthur B Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, 1940–1950*, 188–89; NSC Action Nos 231 (7 Jul 49) and 237 (4 Aug 49), RG 330, OASD (ISA) Records; NSC 50, 1 Jul 49, PSF, Truman Papers.
 91. Karalekas, *History of CIA*, 15–16; Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars*, 110; Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, 63; Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment*, 165.
 92. *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:40.

VI. THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNISM: GREECE, TURKEY, AND ITALY

1. Truman, *Memoirs*, II:100.
2. John O Iatrides, *Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist "Second Round," 1944–1945*, looks in detail at the communist-led uprising that followed liberation. For the internal politics of the rebellion, see Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *By Fire and Ice: The Communist Party and the Civil War, 1944–1949*. For the diplomatic background of the conflict, see Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*; Stephen G Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944–1947: Prelude to the Truman Doctrine*; Dimitrios G Kousoulas, *The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939–1953*.
3. Christopher M Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece, 1941–1949*, is an authoritative account of political and military developments during the Greek civil war. Also see Edgar O'Ballance, *The Greek Civil War, 1944–1949*, which deals mainly with the course of events on the battlefield. Information on British troop strength from *FRUS* 1946, VII:208–09.
4. Stephen G Xydis, "The Genesis of the Sixth Fleet," 41–50; Edwin Bickford Hooper, Dean C Allard, and Oscar P Fitzgerald, *The Setting of the Stage to 1959*, vol I in *The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict*, 77–81. Through redeployment and rapid demobilization, TF 125, created in April 1945, was reduced to 1 light cruiser and 2 destroyers by December 1945. During 1947 show-the-flag visits increased, accompanied by a steady buildup of U.S. naval forces. By January 1948 the strength of TF 125 usually included 1 carrier, 3 to 5 cruisers, and up to 12 destroyers. Carriers stayed in the Mediterranean only for short cruises of 2 to 3 months, while cruisers and destroyers were rotated every 6 months. See Dennis M Pricolo, *Naval Presence and Cold War Foreign Policy: A Study of the Decision to Station the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, 1945–1958*, 24–27, 120.
5. Dept of State, *Bulletin—Supplement*, 4 May 47, 853–55. For the President's speech to Congress, see *Truman Public Papers, 1947*, 176–80.
6. Senate Cte on For Rel, *Executive Session Hearings: Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine*, 80 Cong, 1 sess (pub 1973); Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 220–25; Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 171–98; David N Farnsworth, *The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, 92–98.
7. *FRUS* 1947, V:226–31; H Doc 440, 80 Cong, 1 sess (1947), 12–14, 24.
8. Although it was not an official part of their duties, British officers did occasionally influence the operations of the GNA through advice disguised as training instruction. See MajGen SJ Chamberlin USA memo for CoS USA, 20 Oct 47, sub: Rpt on Greece, Pt 2—Summary, 6, RG 330, CD 2–1–6.
9. John Robert Oneal, "Creative Adaptation: Process and Potential for Foreign Policy Making in Times of Crisis," 253–54, 263; Woodhouse, *Struggle for Greece*, 203; O'Ballance, *Greek Civil War*, 153.

10. Memo Marshall for Truman, 16 Jul 47, *FRUS* 1947, V:237–38; cable Griswold to SecState, 15 Sep 47, *ibid.*, 337–40.
11. Memo BrigGen CVR Schuyler on mtg with State Dept reps on Greek situation, 17 Sep 47, *ibid.*, 344–46; memo Chamberlin for CoS USA, 20 Oct 47, RG 330, CD 2–1–6 (portions printed in *FRUS* 1947, V:375–77).
12. NSC Action No 6, 31 Oct 47, RG 330, OASD(ISA)Records; memo Marshall for Truman, 3 Nov 47, with enc, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers. (This memo contains at the bottom a typed notation: “Approved: Harry S Truman [signed] Nov. 4, 1947”.)
13. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 2 Dec 47, RG 330, CD 6–1–29; memo Forrestal for service secs, 8 Dec 47, w/enc, (n d), *ibid.* JUSMAPG was officially activated on 31 December 1947. See memo Forrestal for JCS, 31 Dec 47, *ibid.*
14. Ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 5 Jan 48, *ibid.*; ltr Eisenhower to Marshall, 7 Jan 48, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers, and in Galambos, *Eisenhower Papers*, IX:2184–85; cable Marshall to AMAG, 26 Jan 48, *FRUS* 1948, IV:36–37; memo Eisenhower for JCS, 6 Feb 48, in Galambos, *Eisenhower Papers*, IX:2230.
15. Entry, 9 Dec 47, Forrestal Diary, 1970, Forrestal Papers.
16. CIA 4, 12 Jan 48, 4, PSF, Truman Papers. See Woodhouse, *Struggle for Greece*, 219–21, for a vivid and detailed description of the battle.
17. NSC 5, 6 Jan 48, *FRUS* 1948, IV:2–7.
18. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 8 Jan 48, *ibid.*, 8–9.
19. Memo Ohly for SecDef, 12 Jan 48, RG 330, CD 6–1–21.
20. Memo Henderson for SecState, 9 Jan 48, *FRUS* 1948, IV:9–14; PPS 18, 10 Jan 48, *ibid.*, 21–24; mins, 5th mtg NSC, 13 Jan 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers. See also memo by Kennan, 13 Jan 48, *FRUS* 1948, IV:27–28, which contains a summary of NSC action and portions of Lovett’s remarks.
21. NSC 5/1, 2 Feb 48, enc to JCS 1826/3, RG 218, CCS 092 Greece (12–30–47) sec 1.
22. For the preceding account of the meeting, see mins, 6th mtg NSC, 12 Feb 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
23. NSC 5/2, 12 Feb 48, *FRUS* 1948, IV:46–51.
24. Memo Souers for JCS, 24 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 6–1–21.
25. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 14 Apr 48, *ibid.* (emphasis in original).
26. Ltr Forrestal to NSC, 19 Apr 48, *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:564–67.
27. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 435–38; NSC 5/3, 25 May 48, *FRUS* 1948, IV:93–95; NSC Action No 59, 3 Jun 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA)Records; *FRUS* 1948, IV:101.
28. NSC 5/2, 12 Feb 48, par 8–a, *FRUS* 1948, IV:49.
29. Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948, PL 472, Title III, 80 Cong, 2 sess (1948); Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1948, 80 Cong, 2 sess (1948); cables Marshall to Aid Missions in Greece and Turkey, 23 Jun 48, *FRUS* 1948, IV:108–09.
30. Woodhouse, *Struggle for Greece*, 228–58; O’Ballance, *Greek Civil War*, 162–78; Condit, *JCS History*, II:50–53.
31. Memo Marshall for Lovett, 20 Oct 48, *FRUS* 1948, IV:162–65.
32. Memo Lovett for Forrestal, 22 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–43; memo Forrestal for Lovett, 23 Oct 48, *ibid.* Both printed in *FRUS* 1948, IV:167–68, 171–72.
33. Memo Forrestal for Lovett, 28 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–43; *FRUS* 1948, IV:178–79.
34. *FRUS* 1948, IV:215; memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 29 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–43; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 7 May 49, *ibid.*
35. *FRUS* 1948, IV:124–29, 144–45; CIA ORE 67–48, 8 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 103–1–2.
36. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 24 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–13, and *FRUS* 1948, IV:191–92.
37. Memo for the President, 17 Dec 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC Action No 157, 16 Dec 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA)Records; NSC 42/1, 22 Mar 49, *FRUS* 1949, VI:269–79.

38. *FRUS* 1948, IV:187–91; ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 23 Dec 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–43.
39. Memo Leven C Allen OSD for service secs, 20 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; memo Acheson for the President, (ca 20 Apr 49), PSF, Truman Papers; memo Acheson for the President, 12 May 49, *FRUS* 1949, IV:298–99; memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 23 Sep 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
40. Woodhouse, *Struggle for Greece*, 259–89; O'Ballance, *Greek Civil War*, 179–202.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 25 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 6–5–11; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 30 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 6–1–29; memo Johnson for JCS, 10 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 6–5–11.
43. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 23 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 6–1–29; memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 22 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 6–1–20; memo Early for JCS, 31 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 6–1–21.
44. Memo Vandenberg (for JCS) for SecDef, 7 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 6–5–11.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *FRUS* 1950, V:344–45.
47. Kuniholm, *Cold War in the Near East*, 255–70, 359–78; McNeill, *America, Britain, and Russia*, 13–14; George Kirk, *The Middle East, 1945–1950*, 21–37.
48. Memo Eisenhower (for JCS) for Patterson and Forrestal, 13 Mar 47, *FRUS* 1947, V:110–14.
49. Cable Amb in Turkey Wilson to SecState, 6 Jun 47, *FRUS* 1947, V:193–94; text of Agreement Between Govt of US and Govt of Turkey to Govern Application of Aid Program, 12 Jun 47, RG 330, CD 6–2–20; SWNCC 358/2, 30 Jun 47, *FRUS* 1947, V:255–58; Condit, *JCS History*, II:74.
50. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 31 Aug 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–25; draft directive governing estab and opn of Jr Military Mission, AMAT, (n d), *ibid.*; memo Johnson for Chm JCS and JCS, 11 Oct 48, *ibid.*
51. Ltr Marshall to Forrestal, 12 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–20; memo Ohly for SecArmy and SecAF, 16 Feb 48, memo Lutes for Forrestal, 25 Mar 48, memo LtGen HS Aurand Dir of Logistics USA for Ohly, 17 Mar 48, ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 24 Mar 48, all in *ibid.*
52. See, for example, remarks by Gen Hoyt S Vandenberg CoS USAF in agreed final version of mins, Newport Conf, 20 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–20.
53. Kirk, *Middle East, 1945–50*, 38–40; Richard Word Roberson, "The United States and Turkey, 1945–1952: The Cold War Path to Alliance," 91.
54. Memo Sherman (for JCS) for SecDef, 12 Nov 49, RG 330, CD 6–5–17; Roberson, "U.S. and Turkey," 92–93; Kirk, *Middle East, 1945–50*, 39–40, 42–43.
55. Memo Lemnitzer for SecDef, 9 Nov 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–43; memo Webb for Lay, 6 Mar 50, *FRUS* 1950, V:1236–38; Kirk, *Middle East, 1945–50*, 44.
56. Dept of State position paper, FM D D–lc, 11 May 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers); memo Col Douglas V Johnson USA, 26 Mar 50, *FRUS* 1950, V:1241–47; notes, mtg AFPC, 11 Apr 50, 1950 notebook (Turkey), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
57. Memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 2 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 13–1–13. Portions of this memo appear in *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 1:2–3.
58. NSC 36, 1 Dec 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
59. Memo for the President, 17 Dec 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
60. NSC 42, 4 Mar 49, paras 27, 28, 38, NSC Records, Modern Military Branch, NARS; memo for the President, 23 Mar 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
61. Memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 4 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 19–2–21; memo Johnson for Exec Sec NSC, 2 Apr 48, *ibid.*
62. *FRUS* 1949, VI:1645; NSC 36/1, 15 Apr 49, NSC Records, Modern Military Branch, NARS, and *FRUS* 1949, VI:1654–55.

63. Memo for the President, 21 Apr 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC Action No 205, 21 Apr 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records.
64. US Aide-Mémoire on Turkish Air Fields, 21 Oct 49, RG 330, OMA Records, M8-1(3)-B.4 Turkey.
65. Memcon Dept of State, 27 Oct 49, *ibid*; LtCol TE Holland OMA memo for the record, 21 Nov 49, *ibid*; Holland memo for the record, 9 Dec 49, RG 330, ISA-OMA Records, Box 79, Turkey 1949 folder; memo Holland for Lemnitzer, 9 Dec 49, *ibid*.
66. Memo MajGen SE Anderson Dir P&O USAF for Lemnitzer, 28 Oct 49, RG 330, OMA Records, N7-1(3)-B.4 Turkey; memo Lemnitzer for Chm FMACC, 3 Nov 49, *ibid*.
67. MajGen Joseph Smith USAF memo for the record, 6 Jan 50, RG 341, OPD 686, Turkey (23 Mar 49); memo FACC [sic] Working Group for Ohly, 9 Feb 49, RG 330, OMA Records, 452.1 Turkey (16 Feb 49).
68. Memo Ohly (for Bruce) for Lemnitzer, 28 Feb 50, *FRUS* 1950, V:1234–35; memo Ohly for Lemnitzer, 26 Apr 50, *ibid*, 1250–51; US Aide-Mémoire, 4 May 50, *ibid*, 1257–58.
69. John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement After the Second World War*, 443–47.
70. Giuseppe Mammarella, *Italy After Fascism: A Political History, 1943–1965*, examines Italy's political and social difficulties in the wake of the war.
71. Memo Hillenkoetter for the President, 15 Sep 47, PSF, Truman Papers. On the size and deployment of US forces in Italy, see memo Eisenhower for SecDef, 9 Dec 47, RG 330, CD 6-1–34, also in Galambos, *Eisenhower Papers*, IX:2124–27.
72. Memo by Leva, sub: Mins of Mtg, 25 Sep 47, 27 Sep 47, RG 330, CD 9-1–10.
73. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 320–21.
74. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 30 Oct 47, RG 330, CD 13-1–4.
75. NSC 1/1, 14 Nov 47, *FRUS* 1948, III:724–26.
76. Cable Dunn to SecState, 7 Dec 47, *ibid*, 738–39; notes, mtg Cte of Four, 9 Dec 47, 1947 notebook (Italy), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Forrestal for Marshall, 11 Dec 47, *FRUS* 1948, III:743–44.
77. CIA, SR-15, Jan 48, RG 330, CD 103-5–17; SANACC 390/1, 16 Jan 48, rev 27 Jan 48, *FRUS* 1948, III:757–62; memo Lay for NSC, 9 Feb 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
78. Mins, 6th mtg NSC, 12 Feb 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC Action No 29, 12 Feb 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 17 Feb 48, *FRUS* 1948, III:770n.
79. Memo Souers for the President, 12 Feb 48, with notation of Truman's approval on 13 Feb 48, PSF, Truman Papers, and *FRUS* 1948, III:769–70; ltr Truman to Forrestal, 10 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 6-2–27, and *FRUS* 1948, III:781; ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 17 Feb 48, *FRUS* 1948, III:770n.
80. NSC Action Nos 35 and 36, 11 Mar 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; NSC 1/2, 12 Mar 48, PSF, Truman Papers (portions printed in *FRUS* 1948, III:765–69).
81. NSC 1/3, 12 Mar 48, PSF, Truman Papers (portions printed in *FRUS* 1948, III:775–79).
82. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 14 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 13-1–4.
83. Cable Amb in Italy Dunn to SecState, 12 Mar 48, *FRUS* 1948, III:784; memo LtGen LeRoy Lutes MB for SecDef, 15 Mar 48, and memo Royall for SecDef, 15 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 6-2–27.
84. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars*, 99–102; Mammarella, *Italy After Fascism*, 188–97; Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949*, 41–49; James E Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," 35–55.
85. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 28 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 6-2–27; ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 6 Aug 48, *ibid*. On 24 August 1948 State indicated its approval of the arrangement Forrestal proposed, to place purchase of Italian military supplies on a commercial basis. See ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 24 Aug 48, *ibid*.
86. NSC 67, 12 Apr 50, PSF, Truman Papers.

87. Memo for the President, 21 Apr 50, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; memo Capt WG Lalor (for JCS) for SecDef, 19 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 6–2–35.
88. NSC Action No 290, 20 Apr 50, RG 330, OASD (ISA) Records; NSC 67/1, 21 Apr 50, *FRUS* 1950, III:1486–91; memo Lay for the President, 21 Apr 50, with notation of Truman's approval, PSF, Truman Papers; memo Lay for NSC, 24 Apr 50, *ibid*.

VII. ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

1. Estimates of proven reserves are in JCS 1833/1, 20 Mar 48, RG 218, CCS 600.6 Middle East (1–26–48) sec 1. On the growing importance of Middle East oil and the diplomatic complications it was beginning to cause, see Aaron David Miller, *Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1949*, and Michael B Stoff, *Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941–1947*.
2. Entry, 7 Nov 47, in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 341; interv with Paul H Nitze by Richard D McKinzie, 6 Aug 75, Truman Oral History Collection; Rogow, *James Forrestal*, 181.
3. Robert Silverberg, *If I Forget Thee O Jerusalem: American Jews and the State of Israel*, ch I; Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State*.
4. Balfour Declaration, 2 Nov 17, in Doreen Ingrams, *Palestine Papers, 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict*, 18.
5. Evan M Wilson, *Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel*, 12–21; Palestine Partition Commission, *Report Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament*.
6. Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956*, 161–70; Herbert Feis, *The Birth of Israel: The Tossed Diplomatic Bed*, 18–36; Wilson, *Decision on Palestine*, 34, 96–106; Harry S Truman, *Memoirs*, II:132–42. Also see Leonard Dinnerstein, "America, Britain, and Palestine: The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and the Displaced Persons, 1945–46," 283–301.
7. James Reston, "Truman's Palestine Plea Flouted Foreign Advisers," *NY Times*, 7 Oct 46; Wilson, *Decision on Palestine*, 98.
8. Alonzo L Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism*, 209–11.
9. Entry, 21 Oct 48, Forrestal Diary, 2595, Forrestal Papers (Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 507–08, quotes portions of this entry, but omits the references to Clifford and Niles); Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 344.
10. UN Special Cte, *Report to the General Assembly by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine*; Feis, *Birth of Israel*, 36–43; Wilson, *Decision on Palestine*, 107ff.
11. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for Forrestal, 10 Oct 47, w/enc, RG 330, CD 6–1–8.
12. Statements by US and UK groups on Palestine, (n.d), *FRUS* 1947, V:602 and n l; statements by US and UK groups on retention of British military rights in Egypt and on subversive activities in the Middle East, *ibid*, 584–86, 610–12.
13. Notes, mtg Cte of Four, 25 Nov 47, 1947 notebook (Palestine 1947), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist. John H. Ohly, Forrestal's special assistant, prepared a preliminary draft of a memorandum, but because Forrestal eventually decided against sending it, no copy was retained in the OSD files.
14. Memo Royall for Forrestal, 5 Nov 47, RG 330, CD 9–1–23; memo Forrestal for Royall, 6 Nov 47, *ibid*. For a summary of the report Royall submitted, see ed note, *FRUS* 1947, V:1283.
15. Entry, 1 Dec 47, Forrestal Diary, 1956, Forrestal Papers. For other reports on lobbying of Forrestal, see Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 346–49.
16. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 346.

17. Memo Forrestal, 21 Jan 48, sub: Palestine, Box 2, Forrestal Papers, WNRC.
18. Memo Forrestal, 21 Jan 48, sub: Mtg with Lovett, *ibid*; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 360–61. See also PPS 19, 19 Jan 48, *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:546–54.
19. Entry, 12 Feb 48, Forrestal Diary, 2070–71, Forrestal Papers; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 371–72; NSC Action No 31, 12 Feb 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records. Also see PPS 21, 11 Feb 48, *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:619–25.
20. Memo Marshall for Lovett, 19 Feb 48, *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:633.
21. The quotations are from Truman's private diary, cited in Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman*, 388, and Ferrell, *Off the Record*, 127. Lovett recalled a meeting with the President on 8 March, at which Truman gave conditional approval to the trusteeship plan (*FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:749). After this meeting there was an apparent breakdown of communications between the State Department and the White House. On 22 March Truman told Marshall that while he admitted having approved the trusteeship plan, he was disturbed by the timing of its presentation. According to Marshall, Truman "said that if he had known when it was going to be made he could have taken certain measures to have avoided the political blast of the press" (*FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:750).
22. *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 190–91. For the drafting of this statement, see *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:760, n2.
23. Notes, mtg War Council, 23 Mar 48, 1948 notebook (Palestine), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Ohly for JCS, 2 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47.
24. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for Forrestal, 3 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47.
25. Memo Ohly for Forrestal, 3 Apr 48, sub: Palestine Policy, *ibid*; memo Ohly for Forrestal, 3 Apr 48, sub: Comments on JCS Palestine Paper, *ibid* (emphasis in original).
26. Entry, 4 Apr 48, Forrestal Diary, 2183–85, Forrestal Papers, and *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:797–98. Also see entry, 4 Apr 48, Leahy Diary, MSS Div, LC.
27. Memo Forrestal for Truman, 4 Apr 48, forwarding memo Leahy (for JCS) for Truman through SecDef, 4 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47; President's news conference, 22 Apr 48, *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 229.
28. Ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 19 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47, and *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:832–33; ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 23 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47, and *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:851–52.
29. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949*, 384–95; Truman, *Memoirs*, II:164–65; memo Ohly for Forrestal, 14 May 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47.
30. On the course of the war, see Netanel Lorch, *Israel's War of Independence, 1947–1949*; Trevor N DuPuy, *Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947–1974*, 3–125; J Bowyer Bell, *Terror out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the Palestine Underground, 1929–1949*. For a summary from the Arab viewpoint, see Syed Ali El-Edroos, *The Hashemite Arab Army, 1908–1979: An Appreciation and Analysis of Military Operations*, 243–83.
31. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for Forrestal, 13 May 48, w/enc, RG 330, CD 6–2–47; memo Leahy (for JCS) for Forrestal, 7 Jul 48, *ibid*.
32. Ohly memo for files, 15 Jul 48, *ibid*; memo Ohly for SecNav, 15 Jul 48, *ibid*.
33. Memo Ohly for SecDef, 2 Oct 48, *ibid*; ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 4 Oct 48, *ibid*; memo Ohly for SecNav, 4 Oct 48, *ibid*.
34. Cable Marshall to Austin, 3 Jun 48, *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:1093–95; cable Marshall to US Emb Egypt, 3 Jun 48, *ibid*, 1095; cable Marshall to US Emb Egypt, 6 Jun 48, *ibid*, 1101.
35. See suggestions presented by Count Bernadotte, 28 Jun 48, *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:1152–54; Robert J Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945–1948*, 427–28.
36. Cable Jessup to Marshall, 17 Jul 48, *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:1227–28; notes, mtg Cte of Four, 20 Jul 48, 1948 notebook (Near East—Palestine), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.

37. Memo OSD for service secs, 20 Jul 48, item 1, RG 330, CD 9–1–8. Also see Rusk memo of telcon, 23 Jul 48, *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1236.
38. Memo Ohly for Hillenkoetter DCI, 20 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47; CIA ORE 38–48, 27 Jul 48, *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1240–48.
39. Ltr Marshall to Forrestal, 28 Jul 48, memo Forrestal for JCS, 28 Jul 48, memo Sullivan SecNav for SecDef, 27 Jul 48, memo Gruenther DJS for SecDef, 31 Jul 48, ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 3 Aug 48, memo Halaby OSD for Ohly, 6 Aug 48, all in RG 330, CD 6–2–47.
40. Cable Douglas to SecState, 6 Aug 48, *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1291–94.
41. Entry, 11 Aug 48, Forrestal Diary, 2411, Forrestal Papers.
42. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 470–71; handwritten comments by Forrestal on memo Ohly for SecDef, 13 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47; ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 13 Aug 48, *ibid*.
43. Memo Ohly for SecDef, 18 Aug 48, *ibid*; memo Forrestal for Sullivan, 19 Aug 48, *ibid*.
44. NSC 27, 19 Aug 48, *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1321–24; Condit, *JCS History*, II:105–06.
45. NSC Action No 96–c, 19 Aug 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA)Records; *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1324, n 1; memo for the President, 20 Aug 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
46. Memo Ohly for Hillenkoetter, 26 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47; memo Hillenkoetter for the President, 1 Sep 48, enc ORE 38–48 addendum, 31 Aug 48, PSF/Intelligence file, Truman Papers.
47. NSC 27/1, [3 Sep 48], *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1360–63; memo for the President, 3 Sep 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
48. Cable Griffiths to SecState, 15 Sep 48, *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1397, and extracts from progress rpt of the UN mediator in Palestine, [16 Sep 48], *ibid*, V, pt 2:1401–06; Dept of State PR, 21 Sep 48, quoted in cable Lovett to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, 21 Sep 48, *ibid*, 1415–16.
49. Silverberg, *If I Forget Thee*, 436–38, looks at reactions of Jewish leaders to the Bernadotte plan. For the President's repudiation of it, see Truman, *Memoirs*, II:166–67, and Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, 428–29.
50. Ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 18 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47, and *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1488–89; memo Ohly for JCS, 19 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47.
51. Entry, 21 Oct 48, Forrestal Diary, 2595, Forrestal Papers (portions in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 508). Although Forrestal's diary credits these remarks as having been made at 25th meeting of the NSC on 21 October 1948, the official memorandum of minutes makes no reference to them. See memo for the President, 22 Oct 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
52. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 29 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47, and *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1524–25; ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 30 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47, and *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1525n.
53. Ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 4 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47, and *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1547–48.
54. NSC 27/3, 16 Nov 48 (adopted 23 Nov 48, approved 24 Nov 48), *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1591–94.
55. Memo Col Laurin L Williams USA for CoS USA, 3 Dec 48, RG 330, CD 2–2–4; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 542; ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 23 Dec 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–47, and *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1686–87.
56. Memo Ohly for SecNav, 24 Dec 48, memo Ohly for SecNav, 8 Mar 49, ltr Forrestal to SecState, 14 Mar 49, memo Forrestal for SecNav, 15 Mar 49, memo W John Kenney for SecDef, 17 Mar 49, all in RG 330, CD 6–2–47.
57. Ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 27 Aug 48, *ibid*.
58. Memo Ohly for SecDef, 2 Sep 48, *ibid*.
59. Memo Forrestal for SecNav, 2 Sep 48, *ibid*.
60. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 22 Sep 48, *ibid*. Also see cable Lovett to SecState, 28 Sep 48, *FRUS 1948*, V, pt 2:1427–28, where JCS recommendation is misquoted as "general assistance."

61. Ltr Forrestal to Truman, 1 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–27, and *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:1444; memo Truman for SecDef, 4 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–27, and *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:1444, n2.
62. Memo Forrestal for service secs and JCS, 2 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–27.
63. Ltr Forrestal to SecState, 8 Nov 48, *ibid.* Also see cable Lovett to Rusk, 18 Oct 48, *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:1491.
64. Memo Lovett for Truman, 6 Nov 48, *FRUS* 1948, V, pt 2:1554–55; cable Lovett to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, 19 Nov 48, *ibid.*, 1614; White House Statement concerning US Assistance to Palestine Refugees, 7 Dec 48, *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 958; Statement upon Signing Resolution for Relief of Palestine Refugees, 24 Mar 49, *Truman Public Papers*, 1949, 180.
65. Ltr Acheson to Johnson, 4 May 49, *FRUS* 1949, VI:971–73; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 14 Jun 49, *ibid.*, 1134–35.
66. Memo Acheson for Truman, 9 May 49, *ibid.*, 983–84; NSC 52, 1 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–50, and *FRUS* 1949, I:350–52; memo Ohly for Lay, 20 Aug 49, tab A, RG 330, CD 5–1–50.
67. NSC 52/3, 29 Sep 49, 9, RG 330, CD 5–1–50, and *FRUS* 1949, I:390; Dept of State memo for the President, (n d), *FRUS* 1949, VI:1505–06.
68. Memo Acheson for Johnson, 23 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–47; memo Johnson for Acheson, 5 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 6–3–27; memo JH Burns for Johnson, 20 Jan 50, *ibid.*; ltr Truman to the Pres of Senate and Speaker of House, 30 Jan 50, *Truman Public Papers*, 1950, 136–38; Senate Cte on For Rel, *Executive Session Hearings: Reviews of the World Situation, 1949–1950*, 81 Cong, 1 and 2 sess (pub 1974), 125ff.
69. Acheson Seminars, 15–16 May 54, reel 5, track 1, 13–14, Acheson Papers, HSTL.
70. Ltr Webb Acting SecState to Johnson, 6 Apr 49, *FRUS* 1949, VI:898–99.
71. Ltr Johnson to Acheson, 3 Jun 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–47, and *FRUS* 1949, VI:1087–89.
72. Dept of State, *Weekly Review*, 1 Feb 50, 10.
73. Memo Acheson for Truman, 1 Sep 49, *FRUS* 1949, VI:1341–42; NSC 47/2, 17 Oct 49 (approved 20 Oct 49), *ibid.*, 1439.
74. Memo Webb USecState for Lay, 27 Feb 50, PSF, Truman Papers, and *FRUS* 1950, V:763–66. On the efforts of Jews in the United States to influence U.S. policy, see for example, memcon Acheson with Henry Morgenthau, 9 Jan 50, *ibid.*, 671–74.
75. For a summary of Israeli arms requests received by the United States between late 1949 and early 1950, see ltr Webb to Johnson, 25 May 50, attach to memo, (n d), RG 330, CD 9–4–29.
76. Ltr Capt FP Mitchell, Jr, USN (for MB) to John C Elliott Munitions Div State, 8 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 6–2–47.
77. NSC 65, [28 Mar 50], PSF, Truman Papers, and *FRUS* 1950, V:131–35; (n a), briefing memo, 6 Apr 50, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47) sec 2.
78. Memo for the President, 7 Apr 50, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
79. Memo Lay for NSC, 17 Apr 50, PSF, Truman Papers; memo Battle, 14 Apr 50, *FRUS* 1950, V:135, n6; memo George McGhee for Acting SecState, 17 May 50, *ibid.*, 138.
80. Memo Lay for Burns and Fahey, 26 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 6–2–47; memo Rusk for Lay, 25 Apr 50, w/enc, *ibid.* For the report as amended, see NSC 65/2, 10 May 50, PSF, Truman Papers.
81. Dept of State, FM D D–2a, 20 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers), and *FRUS* 1950, V:135–38; Bradley (for JCS) memo for SecDef, 2 May 50, RG 330, CD 9–4–29 and CD 337 (Four Powers); Dept of State, FM D D–3a, 28 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers), and *FRUS* 1950, V:138–41.
82. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 4 May 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers).

83. Ltr Johnson to Acheson, 6 May 50, RG 330, CD 9–4–29; NSC Action No 300, 17 May 50, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records.
84. NSC 65/3, 17 May 50, PSF, Truman Papers, and *FRUS 1950*, V:163–66; memo Lay for the President, 18 May 50, with notation of Truman's approval, 19 May 50, PSF, Truman Papers.
85. "Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East," 25 May 50, Dept of State, *Bulletin*, 5 Jun 50, 886. Also see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 396.
86. Ltr Webb to Johnson, 25 May 50, RG 330, CD 9–4–29, and *FRUS 1950*, V:913–15; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 28 Jun 50, *FRUS 1950*, V:942–43.
87. On the development of the PINCHER plans, see Schnabel, *JCS History*, I:145–60. Also see Rosenberg, "The U.S. Navy and the Problem of Oil," 53–56.
88. Dept of State Paper, (n d), *FRUS 1947*, V:575–76; UK memo, (n d), *ibid*, 581.
89. Rosenberg, "The U.S. Navy and the Problem of Oil," 57–59; memo Denfeld for SecDef, 19 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 7–1–19; Condit, *JCS History*, II:286–93.
90. Memo for the President, 21 May 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; memo Souers for SecDef, 21 May 48, RG 330, CD 13–1–13; memo Ohly for JCS, 24 May 48, *ibid*.
91. Memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 2 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 13–1–13, and *FRUS 1948*, V:2–3.
92. Memo for the President, 3 Sep 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; mins, 19th mtg NSC, 2 Sep 48, *ibid*.
93. For a summary of the House Subcte report, see memo Valentine B Deale OSD for SecDef, 8 May 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–27.
94. Memo Ohly for service secs, 14 Sep 48, item 2, RG 330, CD 9–3–9. For earlier discussion of petroleum development in Latin America, see entry, 16 Jan 48, Forrestal Diary, 2026–27, Forrestal Papers.
95. Memo Ohly for Souers, 6 Jan 48, Ohly personal papers; memo Souers for Forrestal, 16 Jan 48, RG 330, CD 7–1–9.
96. Memo Ohly for JCS, 26 Jan 48, RG 330, CD 7–1–9; memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 8 Apr 48, *ibid*; memo Ohly for Kenney, 9 Apr 48, *ibid*; mins, SANACC 67th mtg, 20 May 48, RG 353, Box 71.
97. SANACC 398/4, 25 May 48, RG 353, Box 71.
98. NSC 26, 19 Aug 48, PSF, Truman Papers; NSC Action No 167, 6 Jan 49, NSC Docs, Modern Military Branch, NARS.
99. Condit, *JCS History*, II:293–302; memo RAdm BB Biggs Armed Services Petroleum Bd for SecDef et al, 2 May 49, RG 330, CD 7–1–9.
100. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 551; memo Robert J Wood for SecDef, 16 Feb 49, Box 2, Forrestal Papers, WNRC; memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 4 May 50, RG 330, CD 7–1–9; Rosenberg, "The U.S. Navy and the Problem of Oil," 60.

VIII. THE CRISIS IN CHINA

1. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from secondary works, including John K Fairbank, *The United States and China*; Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission*, which deals with the World War II period; Lisle A Rose, *Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945–1953*; William W Stueck, Jr, *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947–1950*; Russell D Buhite, *Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945–1954*; Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–1945*.
2. Annex to memo Acheson to Truman, 13 Sep 45, *FRUS 1945*, VII:561–62.
3. FF Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1924–1949*, 227–29; Benis M Frank and

- Henry I Shaw, Jr, *Victory and Occupation*, vol V in *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, V:529–48.
4. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 179.
 5. Dept of State, *United States Relations With China With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949*, Dept of State Pub No 3573, 355–56, 686–89 (hereafter cited as *China White Paper*). For an interesting reappraisal, crediting Marshall with more than he thought he had accomplished, see Steven I Levine, "A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: The Marshall Mission and Manchuria," 349–75.
 6. John Carter Vincent Dir Off FE Affairs to SecState, 7 Feb 47, *FRUS* 1947, VII:793–94. (The text of this document sent to Forrestal and Patterson by Marshall on 11 Feb 47.)
 7. Mins, mtg of Secs State, War, and Navy, 12 Feb 47, *ibid*, 795–97.
 8. Stueck, *Road to Confrontation*, 38–44; Albert C Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 303, 368–69, 383, 388.
 9. Rpt Wedemeyer to the President on China-Korea, 19 Sep 47, RG 330, CD 6–1–20; *China White Paper*, 764–814 (includes Wedemeyer's report and appens relating to China), quotations on 766 and 773.
 10. Ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 2 Oct 47, transmitting Wedemeyer rpt, RG 330, CD 6–1–20. The date of Lovett's transmittal letter and the prohibitions it contained on distribution suggest that Truman was in error when he claimed in his memoirs that the Joint Chiefs had the Wedemeyer report "available to them" at least as early as 25 September 1947. See Truman, *Memoirs*, II:325–26.
 11. *China White Paper*, 260.
 12. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 397–98.
 13. Mins, mtg Cte of Two, 3 Nov 47, *FRUS* 1947, VII:908–12; memo Symington for SecDef, (ca 25 Nov 47), Spaatz Papers, MSS Div, LC.
 14. Cable Lovett (for Marshall) to Stuart, 28 Nov 47, *FRUS* 1947, VII:923; *China White Paper*, 324; Marshall test, 11 Nov 47, Senate Cte on For Rel, *Hearings: Interim Aid for Europe* (S.1774), 80 Cong, 1 sess (1947), 44.
 15. Notes, mtg War Council, 16 Dec 47, 1947 notebook (China), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; notes, mtg War Council, 3 Feb 48, 1948 notebook (China), *ibid*; memo Ohly for Exec Sec NSC, 16 Jan 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–3.
 16. Entry, 12 Feb 48, Forrestal Diary, 2070, Forrestal Papers, portions in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 372; Marshall state re China to cong ctes, (n d), *China White Paper*, 380–84.
 17. Memo Ohly for SecDef, 5 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–11; memo Royall for SecDef, 21 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–26.
 18. Memo Forrestal for Royall, 26 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–26.
 19. Memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 26 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–3; memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 12 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–18; memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 1 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–45.
 20. NSC 6, 26 Mar 48, *FRUS* 1948, VIII:44–50; memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 1 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–45.
 21. Memo for the President, 2 Apr 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; *China White Paper*, 387–90. See also John H Feaver, "The China Aid Bill of 1948: Limited Assistance as a Cold War Strategy." The China Aid Act was actually Title IV of PL 472, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.
 22. Ltr Bridges to Forrestal, 3 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–11; memo Ohly for SecDef, 5 Jun 48, *ibid*.
 23. Dept of Defense Ad Hoc Cte rpt on Mil Assist for Natl Govt of China, (n d), attach to memo Ohly for SecDef, 5 Jun 48, *ibid*. Also see encs 1 and 2 of VK Wellington Koo Chinese Amb to US to SecState, 2 Jun 48, *FRUS* 1948, VIII:82–83, for an itemized breakdown of Chinese requests.

24. Memo Sullivan and Symington for Forrestal, (n d), RG 330, CD 12–1–11; memo Royall for Forrestal, 12 May 48, *ibid*.
25. Memo Marshall for Truman, 14 May 48, *FRUS 1948*, VIII:75–76; ltr Truman to Marshall, 2 Jun 48, *ibid*, 79–80.
26. Memcon by Marshall, 7 Jun 48, *ibid*, 84–88.
27. Memcon by Marshall, 11 Jun 48, *ibid*, 90–99.
28. Ltr Bridges and Taber to Truman, 1 Jul 48, *ibid*, 107–08; memcon by Lovett, 9 Jul 48, *ibid*, 109–11.
29. Ltr Truman to Marshall, 28 Jul 48, *ibid*, 124–25. Also see ltr Truman to Forrestal, 28 Jul 48, *China White Paper*, 950, confirming NME participation in the President's directive. On the previously agreed arrangements regarding NME assistance with procurement, see ltr Marshall to Forrestal, 17 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, VIII:99.
30. See ltr Patterson to Acheson, 24 Apr 47, w/enc ltr Patterson to Forrestal, 24 Apr 47, *FRUS 1947*, VII:961–62; memo Forrestal for Marshall, 20 Jun 47, *ibid*, 968–70.
31. On the background of the Barr-Thurber feud, see cable Stuart to Marshall, 11 Jul 48, *FRUS 1948*, VIII:266–67, and memo Ohly for Forrestal, 26 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–44.
32. Notes, mtg Cte of Four, 9 Mar 48, 1948 notebook (China), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist. Forrestal's views on Barr appear to have been influenced by Wedemeyer and Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., former Commander U.S. 7th Fleet. See Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 383, and entry, 18 Mar 48, *Forrestal Diary*, 2143, *Forrestal Papers*.
33. Memcon by Marshall, 7 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, VIII:86; ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 24 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–44.
34. Ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 26 Jul 48, *FRUS 1948*, VIII:267–68; ltr Marshall to Forrestal, 4 Aug 48, *ibid*, 268–69; ed note, *ibid*, 269; memo Royall for Forrestal, 23 Sep 48, w/attach, 17 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–44.
35. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 24 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–44; memo Gruenther for Ohly, 1 Oct 48, *ibid*.
36. "Directive Governing the Establishment and the Operation of JUSMAGCHINA," 17 Sep 48, *ibid*.
37. Condit, *JCS History*, II:453–54; ed note, *FRUS 1948*, VIII:269–70; Frank and Shaw, *Victory and Occupation*, 640.
38. Cable Badger to CNO, 3 May 48, *FRUS 1948*, VIII:310–11. Also see RAdm Thomas B Inglis CNI, memo for info, 5 May 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–7. The figure 3,600 military personnel is from memo Forrestal for NSC, 21 May 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–7, and *FRUS 1948*, VIII:314–16.
39. Cable Denfeld to Badger, 12 May 48, *FRUS 1948*, VIII:312; memo Butterworth Dir State Off FE Affairs for SecState, *ibid*, 312–13.
40. Notes, mtg War Council, 18 May 48, 1948 notebook (China), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
41. NSC 11, 21 May 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–7, and *FRUS 1948*, VIII:314–16, derived from JCS 1330/26; memo CNO for JCS, 14 May 48, RG 218, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 9. For State's position, see ltr Lovett (for Marshall) to Forrestal, 28 May 48, *FRUS 1948*, VIII:316–17.
42. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for Forrestal, 10 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–7. Also see ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 17 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, VIII:319–21.
43. Memo Robert Blum OSD for Lay NSC, 19 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–7; NSC staff study, (n d), attach to draft oral state by Exec Sec NSC, 13 Jul 48, RG 218, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 10, cited in Condit, *JCS History*, II:457.
44. Memo for the President, 16 Jul 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC Action Nos 77 and 79, 15 Jul 48, RG 330, OASD (ISA) Records.
45. Memo Col Carter W Clarke USA for CoS USA, 27 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 2–2–4; *China White Paper*, 319–20; memo for the President, 1 Oct 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC

- Action No 121, 30 Sep 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records: notes, mtg War Council, 5 Oct 48, 1948 notebook (China), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
46. Memo for the President, 8 Oct 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC Action No 127, 7 Oct 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; ltr Lovett to Souers, 14 Oct 48, *FRUS* 1948, VIII:326–28.
 47. Memo Truman for Forrestal, 18 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–7, and *FRUS* 1948, VIII:181.
 48. Memo for the President, 22 Oct 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; memo Gruenther for JCS, 21 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–7.
 49. Ltr Lovett to Consul General at Tsingtao, *FRUS* 1948, VIII:331–32; Condit, *JCS History*, II:460.
 50. Memo Lutes for Forrestal, 26 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–30; memo Lutes for Forrestal, 28 Oct 48, *ibid*; ltr Royall to Truman, 29 Oct 48, *ibid*.
 51. Badger test, 19 Jun 51, Senate Cte on Armed Services and Cte on For Rel, *Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East*, 82 Cong, 1 sess (1951), pt 4, 2747. Also see Frank and Shaw, *Victory and Occupation*, 641.
 52. "History of the China Aid Program," enc to memo Wedemeyer for Royall, 1 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–30; memo for the President, 17 Dec 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers. Also see Stueck, *Road to Confrontation*, 63–65.
 53. Memo for the President, 4 Nov 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC Action No 139, 3 Nov 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; entry, 3 Nov 48, Forrestal Diary, 2820, Forrestal Papers. Also see cable Lovett to Stuart, 9 Nov 48, *FRUS* 1948, VIII:334–35.
 54. Memo Souers for Truman, 3 Nov 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers. A handwritten notation at the bottom of this memo states that the President approved the NSC recommendations on 5 November 1948. Frank and Shaw, *Victory and Occupation*, 640.
 55. Frank and Shaw, *Victory and Occupation*, 639–41; enc to NSC 11/2, 14 Dec 48, *FRUS* 1948, VIII:339–42.
 56. Memo for the President, 17 Dec 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; Leahy (for JCS) for Forrestal, 20 Dec 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–7.
 57. Memo Blum for Forrestal, 24 Dec 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–7; NSC Action No 165, 24 Dec 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; NSC 11/3, 23 Dec 48, PSF, Truman Papers; memo Lay for Truman, 24 Dec 48, *ibid*. On the windup of U.S. activities in Tsingtao, see Frank and Shaw, *Victory and Occupation*, 643–48.
 58. For a sampling of reports emanating from China, see *FRUS* 1949, VIII:1ff. For an analysis of the Nationalists' military collapse, see General Barr's 1949 final report, portions in *China White Paper*, 325–38.
 59. Memo Hillenkoetter for Forrestal, 20 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–7; CIA ORE 27–48, 3 Nov 48, PSF, Truman Papers; O Edmund Clubb, *Twentieth Century China*, 294.
 60. Memo Kennan for Marshall and Lovett, 24 Nov 48, *FRUS* 1948, VIII:211–12; Dept of State rpt, PPS 39, 7 Sep 48 [circulated as NSC 34, 13 Oct 48], *ibid*, 146–55.
 61. Notes, mtg Cte of Four, 26 Oct 48, 1948 notebook (China), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist. Also see PPS 39/1, 23 Nov 48, *FRUS* 1948, VIII:208–11; memo Kennan for Marshall and Lovett, 24 Nov 48, *ibid*, 211–12.
 62. NSC 34/1, 11 Jan 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:474–75. For Truman's approval of NSC 34/1, see memo Souers for NSC, 4 Feb 49, *ibid*, 484–85.
 63. Memo for the President, 4 Feb 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; memo Souers for Truman, 3 Mar 49, *ibid*.
 64. NSC 34/2, 28 Feb 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:492–95.
 65. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 306; David S McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years*, 187–88.
 66. Cable Barr to Maddocks, 26 Jan 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:481–82; memo Royall for Forrestal, 26 Jan 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–30; NSC 22/3 w/enc, 2 Feb 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:479–80.

67. Memo for the President, 4 Feb 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
68. Arthur H Vandenberg, Jr, with Joe Alex Morris, eds, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, 531, emphasis in original (hereafter cited as *Vandenberg Papers*). Also see memo BrigGen Marshall S Carter for Exec Secretariat, 7 Feb 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:485–86.
69. Memcon with Truman by Acheson, 7 Feb 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:486; memo by Souers, 8 Feb 49, *ibid*, 486–87.
70. Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941–50*, 499–501; Stueck, *Road to Confrontation*, 116, 146; *China White Paper*, 407–09; memo Acheson for Souers, 4 Apr 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:507–08.
71. Senate Cte on For Rel, *Executive Session Hearings: Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949–50*, 81 Cong, 1 and 2 sess (pub 1974), 38 (hereafter cited as *Econ Assist to China and Korea*); Liu, *Military History of Modern China*, 266–70; Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, 501–02.
72. Opinion Report, 22 Apr 49, RG 59, Dept of State Files, NARS.
73. There is a concise treatment of the activities of the China Lobby in AT Steele, *The American People and China*, 112–18. For a fuller assessment, see Ross Y Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics*.
74. Notes, mtg AFPC, 22 Nov 49, 1949 notebook (China), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; ltr Webb to Johnson, 20 Jun 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–30.
75. Ltr Johnson to Acheson, 21 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–30. On the origins and drafting of the *China White Paper*, see *FRUS* 1949, IX:1365–1409; Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, 492, 502; Robert P Newman, "The Self-Inflicted Wound: The China White Paper of 1949," 140–56.
76. McLellan, *Dean Acheson*, 194.
77. Trans of conv, Chennault, Rusk, and Philip Sproue, 11 May 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:520–23. Also see House Cte on Intl Rel (For Aff), vols VII and VIII in *Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee 1943–50, United States Policy in the Far East* (pub 1976), III, pt 1:241–68.
78. Memo Koo for Acheson, 15 Aug 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:529–33.
79. Cable Stuart to Acheson, 30 May 49, *ibid*, 524–25; memo Johnson for Exec Sec NSC, 18 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–30, and *FRUS* 1949, IX:556–58.
80. CIA ORE 76–49, PSF/Intelligence file, Truman Papers.
81. Richard P Stebbins et al, *The United States in World Affairs, 1949*, 432.
82. Memo of info by RAdm Carl F Espe, 26 May 50, RG 330, CD 6–4–6.
83. Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, 531; NSC 37/2, 3 Feb 49, approved 4 Feb 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:281–82.
84. Memo Johnson for Exec Sec NSC, 10 Jun 49, in House Cte on Armed Services, *United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense*, VIII:218 (hereafter cited as *United States–Vietnam Relations*); ltr Webb to Johnson, 12 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–30; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 22 Jul 49, *ibid*.
85. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for Forrestal, 22 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–6; memo Johnson for Souers, 2 Apr 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:307–09; NSC 37/7, 17 Aug 49, *ibid*, 376–78; NSC 37/8, 6 Oct 49, *ibid*, 392–97.
86. Memo by Charlton Ogburn, Jr, State Bur of FE Aff, 2 Nov 49, *FRUS* 1949, IX:160–61; memo Lay for Rusk, Burns, and Fahey, 26 Oct 49, w/attach, 25 Oct 49, PSF, Truman Papers.
87. Memo Lay for Rusk, Burns, and Fahey, 26 Oct 49, w/attach, 25 Oct 49, PSF, Truman Papers.
88. Memo Philip C Jessup to SecState, 16 Nov 49, w/attach, 14 Nov 49, *FRUS* 1949, VII, pt 2:1209–14.

89. Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson*, vol XVI in Robert H Ferrell, ed, *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, 125–26.
90. Johnson test, 14 Jun 51, *Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East*, 2577.
91. Memo Johnson for Truman, 15 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–6.
92. Ferguson ltr in official file (OF) 150–G, Truman Papers, cited in Smith, *Dean Acheson*, 128; memo Tracy S Voorhees USecArmy for Johnson, 14 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–6.
93. Johnson test, 14 Jun 51, *Hearings: Military Situation in Far East*, 2578. Also see Johnson's and Gen Bradley's test, 26 Jan 50, *Executive Session Hearings: Reviews of the World Situation, 1949–1950*, 230–49.
94. NSC 37/9, 23 Dec 49, *FRUS 1949*, IX:460–61.
95. NSC 48/1, 23 Dec 49, PSF, Truman Papers. Printed, with the exception of the full conclusions, in *U.S.–Vietnam Relations*, VIII:225–64.
96. Memo for the President, 30 Dec 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC 48/2, 30 Dec 49, *FRUS 1949*, VII:1215–20. NSC 48/2 contains the revised conclusions to NSC 48/1, agreed to at the 29 December 1949 meeting of the NSC.
97. Drew Pearson, "Johnson, Acheson Cool Off Tempers," *Washington Post*, 30 Dec 49.
98. Tsou, *America's Failure in China*, 529–38; Statement by the President on U.S. Policy With Respect to Formosa, 5 Jan 50, *Truman Public Papers, 1950*, 11–12; Stueck, *Road to Confrontation*, 142; Dept of State, *Bulletin*, 23 Jan 50, 111.
99. Memo Johnson for JCS, 10 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 6–3–30; memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 20 Jan 50, *ibid*; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 1 Feb 50, and ltr Johnson to Acheson, 14 Feb 50, both in *ibid*.
100. Ltr Rusk to Johnson, 21 Feb 50, *ibid*; Acheson test, 24 Jan 50, *Econ Assist to China and Korea*, 193–200; ltr Acheson to Johnson, 7 Mar 50, *FRUS 1950*, VI:316–17.
101. Ltr Acheson to Johnson, 14 Apr 50, *FRUS 1950*, VI:325–26; memo Lemnitzer for Johnson through Burns, 5 May 50, RG 330, CD 6–3–30; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 6 May 50, RG 330, CD 6–3–39, and *FRUS 1950*, VI:339.
102. Nitze, "The Development of NSC 68," 175. Stueck, *Road to Confrontation*, 146, dates the incident as having taken place in April 1950 and cites his own interview with Nitze as his evidence. Stueck says, in error, that Acheson approached the JCS. Also see interview no. 4 with Nitze by Richard D McKinzie, 5 Aug 75, 22–25, Truman Oral History Collection.
103. FM D C–10, Dept of State, 24 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers); memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 2 May 50, RG 330, CD 9–4–29; memo Johnson for JCS, 6 May 50, RG 330, CD 6–3–30.
104. See memo Rusk for Douglas MacArthur II State Off of Eur Rgnl Affairs, 5 May 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers) May 1950; memo Burns for RAdm AC Davis Dir Jt Staff et al, 29 May 50, w/memo Burns for Rusk, 29 May 50, RG 330, CD 6–3–30; ltr Acheson to Johnson, 1 Jun 50, *FRUS 1950*, VI:351–52.

IX. THE SPREADING TURMOIL IN ASIA

1. Remarks by Johnson before the Overseas Press Club, 3 Mar 50, *Johnson Public Statements, 1949–50*, III:764.
2. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 32, 179.
3. Memo Forrestal for Ohly, 22 Jul 48, OSD Hist.
4. Memcon John M Allison, 20 Mar 47, *FRUS 1947*, VI:449–50, n71.
5. *FRUS 1947*, VI:467–68, 523–25; Robert A Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan: Second Phase, 1948–50*, 182–83.
6. Notes, mtg Informal War Council, 22 Sep 47, 1947 notebook (Japan), Ohly Collection OSD Hist; memo Leva, 24 Sep 47, RG 330, CD 9–1–11.

7. Memo Kennan for Marshall and Lovett, 14 Oct 47, *FRUS* 1947, VI:536–37; PPS 10, 14 Oct 47, *ibid*, 537–43. Also see Frederick S Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan*, 59–62.
8. Entry, 31 Oct 47, Forrestal Diary, 1903, Forrestal Papers; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 328–29.
9. Memo Royall for SecDef, 8 Dec 47, RG 330, CD 9–1–37; memo Forrestal for SecArmy, 13 Dec 47, *ibid*. Also see memo Blum for Ohly, 12 Dec 47, *ibid*.
10. Memo Royall for SecDef, 28 Jan 48, *ibid*; memo Ohly for SecDef, 28 Jan 48, *ibid*.
11. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950*, 382–91; ltr Kennan to SecState, 14 Mar 48, *FRUS* 1948, I:531–38. For summaries of Kennan's conversations with MacArthur, see *FRUS* 1948, VI:697–719.
12. PPS 28, 25 Mar 48, *FRUS* 1948, VI:691–96; NSC 13, 2 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 3–1–9; NSC 13/1, 24 Sep 48, NSC Records, Modern Military Branch, NARS.
13. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 29 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–33.
14. Memo for the President, 1 Oct 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; memo for the President, 8 Oct 48, *ibid*. Also see NSC Action No 138, 26 Oct 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records, by which the views of the JCS on Marcus Island and the Nanpo Shoto were officially incorporated into NSC 13/2.
15. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 21 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 16–1–5; memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 1 Mar 49, *ibid*, and *FRUS* 1949, VII:671–73.
16. Memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 11 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 16–1–5; NSC 13/3, 6 May 49, *FRUS* 1949, VII:730–36; NSC Action No 214, 6 May 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records. Truman Library informed author that NSC 13/3 was approved by the President by Memorandum Approval No 214, 6 May 49, but no copy of this memorandum is in Truman Library files.
17. Cable Sebal to SecState, 4 Jan 49, *FRUS* 1949, VII:605–07; memo Bishop for Butterworth, 18 Feb 49, *ibid*, 659–62; memo Bishop for Butterworth, 18 Feb 49, *ibid*, 662–63; Fearey, *Occupation of Japan*, 112–13; Dunn, *Peace-Making*, 87–88.
18. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 428; McLellan, *Dean Acheson*, 265–68.
19. Cable US Deleg to CFM to Truman and Webb, 23 May 49, *FRUS* 1949, III:917; memo Webb for Exec Sec NSC, 23 May 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–33; ltr Webb to Johnson, 23 May 49, *ibid*.
20. Memo Leven C Allen for SecArmy, 27 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–33; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 1 Jul 49, *ibid*.
21. Rpt, JCS, 9 Jun 49, *ibid*, and *FRUS* 1949, VII, pt 2:774–77.
22. *FRUS* 1949, VII, pt 2:775–76.
23. *Ibid*, 853ff; memo Johnson for SecArmy, 27 Apr 49, OSD Directives Book, Doc No I–B–2, Johnson Papers, WNRC; Condit, *JCS History*, II:505; notes, AFPC mtg, 20 Sep 49, 1949 notebook (Japan), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; Acheson memcon, 13 Sep 49, *FRUS* 1949, VII, pt 2:858–59.
24. Acheson memcon, 16 Sep 49, *FRUS* 1949, VII, pt 2:860.
25. Ltr Webb to Johnson, 3 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–33.
26. Dept of State comments on NSC 49, 30 Sep 49, enc to ltr Souers to NSC, 4 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–33; NSC 49/1, 4 Oct 49, PSF, Truman Papers.
27. Memo Voorhees for SecDef, 14 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–33; Condit, *JCS History*, II:505.
28. Transc of JSSC mtg, 14 Dec 49, enc to memo MajGen Carter B Magruder for JH Burns OSD, 16 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–33.
29. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 22 Dec 49, *ibid*, and in *FRUS* 1949, VII, pt 2:922–23; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 23 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–33, and in *FRUS* 1949, VII, pt 2:922; memo Johnson for Exec Sec NSC, 23 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–33.
30. Memcon Maxwell H Hamilton, 24 Dec 49, *FRUS* 1949, VII, pt 2:924–26; memo Burns for

- SecDef, 4 Jan 50, Box 103, Johnson Papers, WNRC. Also see Dean Rusk memo for the file, 24 Jan 50, *FRUS* 1950, VI:1131.
31. No detailed account of MacArthur's meetings with the Joint Chiefs has been found, but for a summary of the discussions, see Butterworth memcon, 5 Feb 50, *FRUS* 1950, VI:1133–35. MacArthur's personal opinion of the Joint Chiefs is recorded in Jessup memcon, 9 Jan 50, *ibid*, 1111. The Joint Chiefs reported their views orally to the President on 11 February 1950 (*ibid*, 1133, n2), but whether they also filed a written report at this time is not clear.
 32. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 431; *FRUS* 1950, VI:1139, n4; DM-310-50 to Op Deps, 1 Mar 50, RG 218, CCS 335.14 (1-10-50), quoted in Poole, *JCS History*, IV:439 (emphasis in original).
 33. John B Howard memcon, 24 Apr 50, *FRUS* 1950, VI:1175–82; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 431.
 34. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 432.
 35. News Conference, 18 May 50, *Truman Public Papers*, 1950, 420.
 36. William J Sebald, with Russell Brines, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation*, 252–53.
 37. Memo by MacArthur, 14 Jun 50, *FRUS* 1950, VI:1213–21; memo by MacArthur, 23 Jun 50, *ibid*, 1227–28.
 38. For the origins of these wartime arrangements, see Arthur L Grey, Jr, "The Thirty-Eighth Parallel," 482–87, and James I Matray, "Captive of the Cold War: The Decision to Divide Korea at the 38th Parallel," 145–68.
 39. Statement on the Liberation of Korea, 18 Sep 45, *Truman Public Papers*, 1945, 324–25; Truman, *Memoirs*, II:319–24; Soon Sung Cho, *Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility*, 137–58; Stueck, *Road to Confrontation*, 22–28, 82–84.
 40. Japan dominated discussion in the War Council. See notes, mins War Council, 22 Sep 47, 1947 notebook (Japan), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo by Marx Leva, 24 Sep 47, RG 330, CD 9–1–11.
 41. Memo SWNCC for JCS [SWN-5694], 15 Sep 47, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Stueck, *Road to Confrontation*, 75–82, 84–86.
 42. "Report to the President: China—Korea," (n d), enc to memo Wedemeyer for Truman, 19 Sep 47, RG 330, CD 6–1–20; CIG SR-2, (n d, ca Sep 47), RG 330, CD-2 (Korea).
 43. Memo Forrestal for Marshall, 26 Sep 47, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).
 44. Cable Jacobs to Marshall, 26 Sep 47, *FRUS* 1947, VI:816–17.
 45. Memo Wedemeyer for Forrestal, 30 Aug 48, 4, RG 330, CD 6–2–41, summarizes discussions in State Dept and notes that no NME representatives were present at these discussions. Also see *FRUS* 1947, VI:818, n27, and 820–21.
 46. Truman, *Memoirs*, II:326–27; *FRUS* 1947, VI:832–35, 853–54, 857–59.
 47. Memo Ohly for Robert Blum, 8 Dec 47, RG 330, CD 9–1–38.
 48. SANACC 176/35, 14 Jan 48, summarized in James F Schnabel and Robert J Watson, *The Korean War*, vol III in *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, pt 1:15–16 (hereafter cited as Schnabel and Watson, *JCS History*, III).
 49. SM-9671 to SANACC, 21 Feb 48, in Schnabel and Watson, *JCS History*, III, pt 1:16.
 50. Memo Robert Blum for Ohly, 24 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–45.
 51. SANACC 176/37, 29 Jan 48, in Schnabel and Watson, *JCS History*, III, pt 1:16–17.
 52. NSC 8, 2 Apr 48, derived from SANACC 176/39, 22 Mar 48, PSF, Truman Papers. Portions printed in *FRUS* 1948, VI:1163–69.
 53. CIA ORE 15–48, 18 Mar 48, PSF/Intelligence File, Truman Papers.
 54. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 1 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–45; memo for the President, 2 Apr 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; memo Souers for the President, 2 Apr 48, *ibid*

- (handwritten notation at the bottom of this last memo indicates President's approval on 8 April 1948).
55. Memo Wedemeyer for SecDef, 30 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–41, and in *FRUS 1948*, VI:1225–26, 1234–35, 1276–79. Also see Schnabel and Watson, *JCS History*, III, pt 1:19–20.
 56. Dept of State, *Weekly Review*, 1 Sep 48, 7–8; Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, 204–11; Robert K Sawyer, with Walter Hermes, ed, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War*, 34.
 57. Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, 211–15; Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 35–36.
 58. Cable Lovett to Muccio, 20 Sep 48, *FRUS 1948*, VI:1307–08.
 59. Cho, *Korea in World Politics*, 230–33; Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 39–41.
 60. Cable Muccio to SecState, 12 Nov 48, *FRUS 1948*, VI:1325–27; Schnabel and Watson, *JCS History*, III, pt 1:21.
 61. Ltr Forrestal to Royall, 25 Jan 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–41; ltr Royall to Acheson, 25 Jan 49, *FRUS 1949*, VII:945–46; ltr Acheson to Royall, 25 Jan 49, *ibid*, 946.
 62. Cable CINCFE to Dept of Army, 19 Jan 49, cited in Schnabel, *JCS History*, I:30; Schnabel and Watson, *JCS History*, III, pt 1:23; *FRUS 1949*, VII:945, n2.
 63. CIA ORE 3–49, 28 Feb 49, PSF/Intelligence File, Truman Papers.
 64. Enc A to *ibid*.
 65. NSC 8/1, 16 Mar 49, NSC Records, Modern Military Branch, NARS.
 66. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 22 Mar 49, PSF, Truman Papers; memo for the President, 23 Mar 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC Action No 195, 22 Mar 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records. Also see Schnabel and Watson, *JCS History*, III, pt 1:25, and NSC 8/2, 22 Mar 49, *FRUS 1949*, VII: 969–78.
 67. Info memo MajGen Roy T Maddocks Dir P&O USA, 28 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–24; Schnabel, *JCS History*, I:27.
 68. Dept of State, *Weekly Review*, 1 Jun 49, 12; cable Muccio to SecState, 26 Apr 49, *FRUS 1949*, VII:995–97; memo SecArmy for SecDef, 4 May 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–24; notes, mtg War Council, 12 May 49, 1949 notebook (Korea), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
 69. Ltr Johnson to Acheson, 4 May 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–24; ltr Acheson to Johnson, 10 May 49, *ibid*; memo Butterworth for Maddocks, 13 May 49, *FRUS 1949*, VII:1022–23; memo Webb for Souers, 6 Jun 49, PSF, Truman Papers.
 70. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 44–47.
 71. OSD, "Brief History of U.S. Military Assistance to the Republic of Korea," (n d), attach to memo Lemnitzer for Walter Surrey Dept of State, 13 Sep 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records, N7–1(3)–B.11 Korea.
 72. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 97.
 73. *Ibid*, 103; memo Lemnitzer for staff of House Cte on For Aff, 30 Jun 50, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records, 091.3 Korea.
 74. Ltr Roberts to Muccio, 31 Aug 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records, N7–1(3)–B.11 Korea; ltr Muccio to SecState, 16 Sep 49, *FRUS 1949*, VII:1079–80; cable Muccio to SecState, 11 Oct 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records, N7–1(3)–B.11 Korea.
 75. US Military Advisory Grp to ROK, Semiannual Rpt for Period Ending 31 Dec 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records, 091.3 Korea; Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, 102; cable Muccio to SecState, 25 Jan 50, *FRUS 1950*, VII:15–18.
 76. Trans of Acheson Seminar, 13 Feb 54, 9, reel 1, track 1, Acheson Papers, HSTL.
 77. Memo Ohly DepDir MDAP for Lemnitzer, 16 Feb 50, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records, 091.3 Korea; memo Lemnitzer for Dir MDAP, 5 Apr 50, *ibid*.
 78. Memcon by Niles W Bond, 10 May 50, *FRUS 1950*, VII:78–81.
 79. Memo Ohly for Lemnitzer, 15 May 50, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records, 091.3 Korea; memo Leven C Allen for JCS, 26 May 50, *ibid*; memo Allen for JCS, [19 Jul 50], *ibid*.

80. Hooper, *The Setting of the Stage to 1959*, 93–94. On events leading up to and the course of the war, see Edgar O'Ballance, *The Indochina War, 1945–1954: A Study in Guerilla Warfare*.
81. Cordell Hull, *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, II:1595–98; cable Acheson to Robertson, 5 Oct 45, in *United States–Vietnam Relations*, 49; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 671–72. Also see George C Herring, "The Truman Administration and the Restoration of French Sovereignty in Indochina," 97–117.
82. Dept of State, *Weekly Review*, 21 Jul 48, 7–8. For State's pessimistic view on the course of the war, see Bohlen's briefing of the War Council filed in notes, mtg War Council, 31 Aug 48, 1948 notebook (Far East–Southeast Asia), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
83. Entry, 9 Jul 48, Forrestal Diary, 2355–56, Forrestal Papers.
84. NSC 51, 1 Jul 49, PSF, Truman Papers.
85. On the evolution of U.S. policy from the point of view of the State Department, see Gary R Hess, "The First American Commitment in Indochina: The Acceptance of the 'Bao Dai Solution,' 1950," 331–50.
86. NSC 48/1, 23 Dec 49, in *United States–Vietnam Relations*, VIII:248.
87. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 20 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 6–3–30; memo Burns for Johnson, 6 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; ltr Rusk to Burns, 7 Mar 50, *FRUS 1950*, VI:752; ltr Truman to Acheson, 10 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 6–3–30.
88. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 671–73. Also see EH Giusti et al, *History of the Indochina Incident, 1940–1954*, in *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam*, 145–48 and passim (hereafter cited as Giusti, *Indochina Incident*).
89. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 10 Apr 50, in *United States–Vietnam Relations*, VIII:308–13. Also see Johnson's endorsement of JCS views in his memo of 14 April 1950 to Acheson, in *FRUS 1950*, VI:780.
90. Acheson test, 1 May 50, in *Reviews of the World Situation, 1949–50*, 293. For Carpentier's views, see Hooper, *Setting the Stage*, 174. On resistance from Paris to Acheson's proposals, see Giusti, *Indochina Incident*, 153–65.
91. NSC 64, 27 Feb 50, *FRUS 1950*, VI:744–47; NSC Record of Action No 288, 18 Apr 50, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records.
92. Memo Lemnitzer for Bruce, 19 Apr 50, *FRUS 1950*, VI:787–89; ltr Truman to Johnson, 1 May 50, RG 330, CD 6–4–16; ed note, *FRUS 1950*, VI:812; JCS 1721/55, 12 Jun 50, RG 330, CD 104–1–22.

X. THE BERLIN CRISIS

1. Ltr Forrestal to James P Warburg, 20 Aug 46, quoted in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 194.
2. On the development of wartime policy and postwar objectives, see Paul Y Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," in Harold Stein, ed, *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*; Earl F Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946*; John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949*.
3. William M Franklin, "Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin," 1–31; Philip E Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," 580–604.
4. See "Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period," in "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference," 1 Aug 45, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers—The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, II:1481–85.
5. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 533; Steven L Rearden, "American Policy Toward Germany, 1944–1946," 150–51.

6. James F Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, 159–203. Also see BU Ratchford and William D Ross, *Berlin Reparations Assignment: Round One of the German Peace Settlement*, and John H Backer, *Priming the German Economy: American Occupational Policies, 1945–1948*.
7. Lucius D Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 163–84.
8. See Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution*; JP Nettl, *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 1945–1950*.
9. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 237–38; Dept of State, *Bulletin*, 27 Jul 47, 186–93. Clay says this directive had been under development since the fall of 1945, when he discussed it with others in Washington.
10. W Phillips Davison, *The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics*, 12.
11. Documents on the Fifth Session of the CFM, London, 25 Nov–15 Dec 47, in *FRUS 1947*, II:676–830. See also Davison, *Berlin Blockade*, 16.
12. Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, 153.
13. Jean Edward Smith, *The Defense of Berlin*, 100.
14. Andre Fontaine, *History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean War*, 352–55; notes, mtg Cte of Four, 9 Mar 48, 1948 notebook (Norway), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; ltr Norman Armour to Royall, 1 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–37; Nikolaj Petersen, *Britain, the United States and Scandinavian Defence, 1945–1949*, 15.
15. Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950*, 291–94; Fontaine, *History of the Cold War*, 340–44. Cable Steinhardt to SecState, 30 Apr 48, *FRUS 1948*, IV:747–54, provides an account of the coup from the perspective of the U.S. embassy in Prague and downplays direct Soviet involvement.
16. See, for example, Jean Edward Smith, ed, *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945–1949*, I:447, 502, and *FRUS 1947*, II:905–07; also see Wilson D Miscamble, “Harry S Truman, the Berlin Blockade and the 1948 Election,” 307. Memo LtGen AC Wedemeyer USA for SecArmy, 2 Jan 48, w/attach staff study, RG 330, CD 6–2–9; memo Royall for Forrestal, 19 Jan 48, w/attach, revised staff study, *ibid*; Condit, *JCS History*, II:129–30.
17. Memo Ohly for SecArmy, 12 Jan 48, memo Royall for SecDef, 19 Jan 48, memo Robert Blum for Ohly, 13 Jan 48, memo Blum for Ohly, 21 Jan 48, all in RG 330, CD 6–2–9.
18. The conversations between Clay and Chamberlin are summarized in the explanatory note to doc no 340, *Clay Papers*, II:568. Clay recounts overcoming his misgivings in *Decision in Germany*, 354. See also Jean Edward Smith, “The View from USFET: General Clay’s and Washington’s Interpretation of Soviet Intentions in Germany,” in Hans A Schmitt, ed, *U.S. Occupation in Europe After World War II*, 64–85.
19. Cable Clay to Chamberlin, 5 Mar 48, *Clay Papers*, II:568–69.
20. Ltr MajGen S LeRoy Irwin to USACoS, 4 Jan 49, RG 330, CD 12–1–26.
21. Lilienthal, *Journals*, II:302.
22. Entry, 6 Mar 48, Forrestal Diary, 2121, Forrestal Papers.
23. Memo Royall for SecDef, 10 Jan 49, w/attach chron, RG 330, CD 12–1–26; entry, 8 Mar 48, Forrestal Diary, 2125, Forrestal Papers; SecDef press conf, 10 Mar 48, *Forrestal Public Statements, 1947–1949*, II:429–30.
24. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 390–94.
25. Entry, 16 Mar 48, Forrestal Diary, 2139, Forrestal Papers, and in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 394–95.
26. Memo Blum for SecDef, 23 Dec 48, Forrestal Papers; memo MajGen S LeRoy Irwin for Gen Collins, 4 Jan 49, w/attach memo Irwin to CoS, 4 Jan 49, RG 330, CD 12–1–26.
27. Memo Hillenkoetter for the President, 16 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–26.
28. Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, 353; entry, 16 Mar [48], Eben A Ayers Diary, Eben A Ayers Papers, HSTL; Special Message to the Congress on the Threat to the Freedom of Europe, 17 Mar 48, *Truman Public Papers, 1948*, 182–86; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 397, ed note.

29. Forrestal test, 18 Mar 48, in Senate Cte on Armed Services, *Hearings: Universal Military Training*, 80 Cong, 2 sess (1948), 31 (hereafter cited as *UMT Hearings*).
30. Dulles et al, "A Report to the National Security Council: The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence," 1 Jan 49, 74–75, RG 330, CD 4–1–14; CIA ORE 22–48, 2 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–26.
31. Cable Murphy to SecState, 20 Mar 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:883–84; Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 355–57; Off of Mil Govt for Germany, *Documented Chronology of Political Developments Regarding Germany*, 87; telecon TT–9286, 31 Mar 48, *Clay Papers*, II:600–01 (contains text of Soviet note on restrictions).
32. Cable Clay to Bradley, 31 Mar 48, RG 218, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 16; "Russia" folder 3, Clark M Clifford Papers, HSTL.
33. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 407–08.
34. Telecon TT–9286, 31 Mar 48, *Clay Papers*, II:601.
35. Telecon TT–9287, 31 Mar 48, *ibid*, 605–06.
36. Cable Clay to Bradley, 1 Apr 48, *ibid*, 607. Also see Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 359.
37. Telecon TT–9286, 31 Mar 48, *Clay Papers*, II:602; Davison, *Berlin Blockade*, 64–65.
38. Davison, *Berlin Blockade*, 65–67; ltr Murphy to SecState, 6 Apr 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:890–91.
39. Cable Clay to Bradley, 12 Apr 48, RG 319, P&O 092 and 381; telecon TT–9341, 10 Apr 48, *Clay Papers*, II:622.
40. Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, 315.
41. Cable Clay to Draper, 7 May 48, *Clay Papers*, II:649–50.
42. Communiqué of London Conf on Germany, 7 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:313–17.
43. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 185–207. Also see *Clay Papers*, I:398, 429–31, 434–36, 512; II:553–54, 558–61, 574–78, 589–96, 643–44.
44. *Clay Papers*, II:669–70, 680–86; Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 212, 362–63.
45. Cable Clay to Draper, *Clay Papers*, II:656–57.
46. Ed note, *FRUS 1948*, II:909–10; cable Murphy to SecState, 19 Jun 48, *ibid*, 910–11; status rpt, "The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions, 1948," 7–8 (copy in RG 330).
47. Cable Murphy to SecState, 23 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:912–14; cable Clay to Draper, 23 Jun 48, *Clay Papers*, II:693–95; cable Clay to Royall, 25 Jun 48, *ibid*, 697–99.
48. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 363–65; cable Clay to Draper, 25 Jun 48, *Clay Papers*, II:696–97.
49. Harold Larson, "The Berlin Airlift," in Goldberg, *USAF History*, 235.
50. Truman, *Memoirs*, II:123; Jacob D Beam memo for the record, 28 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:928–29; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 451–52.
51. *First Rpt of SecDef*, 69; Larson, "The Berlin Airlift," 235–36.
52. Cable Clay to Draper, 27 Jun 48, *Clay Papers*, II:707–08; memo re State-Defense mtg of 27 Jun 48, (n d), Ohly personal papers; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 452–53; memo Ohly for files, 28 Jun 48, Ohly personal papers.
53. Memo for files, 28 Jun 48, Ohly personal papers; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 452–54; Condit, *JCS History*, II:133–34.
54. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 454–55; cable Marshall to Douglas, 28 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:930–31; memo Royall for Bradley, 28 Jun 48, *Forrestal Diary*, 2328, *Forrestal Papers*; entry, 29 Jun 48, Leahy Diary, MSS Div, LC.
55. Memo Hillenkoetter for the President, 28 Jun 48, PSF/Intelligence File, Truman Papers; memo Hillenkoetter for SecDef, 30 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 2–2–2.
56. Excerpts from telecon between USecState Lovett and SecDef Forrestal, 30 Jun 48, Box 2, *Forrestal Papers*, WNRC; trans of conf, SecDef with JCS, 30 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 9–3–13. Also see *Forrestal memo*, 30 Jun 48, *Forrestal Papers*, WNRC. There is also a brief summary of this meeting in entry, 30 Jun 48, Leahy Diary, MSS Div, LC.

57. Cable Clay to Bradley and Royall, 1 Jul 48, *Clay Papers*, II:711–12; cable Marshall to USEmb London, 9 Jul 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:956.
58. Lovett memcon, 14 Jul 48, w/attach cable from Bevin, 14 Jul 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:965–66; NSC Action No 77, 15 Jul 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; entry, 15 Jul 48, Forrestal Diary, 2362–63, Forrestal Papers; Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, pt 1:234.
59. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 457.
60. Memo for the President, 16 Jul 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
61. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 459.
62. Ferrell, *Off The Record*, 145.
63. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 459–60.
64. Memo for the President, 23 Jul 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; Truman, *Memoirs*, II:124–26 (Truman quotation on 125). For a summary of decisions reached at the meeting, see NSC Record of Action No 84, 22 Jul 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records.
65. Memo Ohly for SecDef, 23 Jul 48, forwarding JCS 1907/3, 21 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–9. Also see Condit, *JCS History*, II:141–44.
66. Memo Forrestal for NSC, 26 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–9. Also see ltr Forrestal to SecState, 28 Jul 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:994–95.
67. Ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 30 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–9; Condit, *JCS History*, II:145–46; memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 9 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–9.
68. Cable Smith to SecState, 3 Aug 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:999–1006; Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow*, 242–46.
69. For a summary of negotiations in Moscow and Berlin, see Davison, *Berlin Blockade*, 158–62. The U.S. records of these talks are published in *FRUS 1948*, II:1016–1140. Also see Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow*, 246ff, and Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 369–71.
70. Memo for the President, 9 Sep 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers. Also see Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 483–84, and Truman, *Memoirs*, II:128. Truman incorrectly states that this meeting took place on 9 September 1948.
71. Calendar for 8 Sep 48 and entry for 10 Sep 48, Forrestal Diary, 2476, 2488, Forrestal Papers.
72. Ferrell, *Off the Record*, 148–49. For Clay's request for additional aircraft, see cable Clay to Bradley and LeMay, 10 Sep 48, *Clay Papers*, II:852.
73. Entries for 13 Sep 48 and 16 Sep 48, Forrestal Diary, 2494, 2501, Forrestal Papers.
74. Memo Col Robert J Wood OSD for SecDef, 29 Sep 48, Box 2, Forrestal Papers, WNRC.
75. CIA ORE 22–48 (Addendum), 16 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–26.
76. Notes, mtg Cte of Four, 14 Sep 48, 1948 notebook (Berlin), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; NSC Action No 113–b, 16 Sep 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records.
77. John C Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949*, 453; ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 1 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–9; memo Ohly for JCS, 4 Oct 48, *ibid*.
78. JCS 1907/9, 13 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 104–1–1; JCS 1907/11, 11 Oct 48, and decision on 13 Oct 48, RG 218, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 18. Also see Condit, *JCS History*, II:151–54.
79. Gruenther memo for the record, 25 Oct 48, RG 218, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 19, quoted and cited in Condit, *JCS History*, II:154–55; memo for the President, 15 Oct 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
80. Condit, *JCS History*, II:155; memo Souers for the President, 15 Oct 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
81. Memo Truman for Dir BoB, 18 Oct 48, PSF, Truman Papers; memo Pace for the President, 21 Oct 48, *ibid*; memo Truman for NSC, 22 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–45.
82. Memo Forrestal for McNeil, 26 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–3–45; memo Eugene M Zuckert ASecAF for Forrestal, 31 Jan 49, w/attach USAF Compt rpt, 3 Dec 48, *ibid*. Also see House Cte on Appros, *Hearings: National Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for*

1950. 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), pt 1:32 (hereafter cited as *NME Appropriation Bill for 1950*).
83. Memo Symington for Forrestal, 13 Jan 49, RG 330, CD 6–3–45; memo Forrestal for Symington, 4 Feb 49, *ibid*; *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, Fiscal Year 1949*, 239–41.
 84. Memo MajGen AR Bolling DepDir of Intel for CoS USA, 24 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 2–2–4; memo Bolling for CoS USA, 7 Jan 49, *ibid*; briefing for SecDef, Jt Intel Cte of JCS, 15 Jan 49, RG 330, CD 9–3–38.
 85. Davison, *Berlin Blockade*, 250–51.
 86. For a detailed account of the negotiations by a leading participant, see Philip C Jessup, "Park Avenue Diplomacy—Ending the Berlin Blockade," 377–400. Also see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 267–74; Davison, *Berlin Blockade*, 254–80; and Smith, *Defense of Berlin*, 128–30. The record of U.S. diplomacy in lifting the blockade is in *FRUS 1949*, III:643–817.
 87. *FRUS 1949*, III:751.
 88. Notes, mtg War Council, 26 Apr 49, 1949 notebook (Berlin blockade), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
 89. Ltr Royall to the President, 10 Jan 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–22; NSC Action No 176, 27 Jan 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; memo for the President, 27 Jan 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
 90. Memo Robert Blum for SecDef, 21 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–22; enc to memo Ohly for Allen, 7 May 49, RG 330, CD 12–2–18. Also see memo Geoffrey W Lewis State Off of Occupied Areas, 28 Jan 49, *FRUS 1949*, III:87–89, and memcon Robert D Murphy, 9 Mar 49, *ibid*, 102–05.
 91. Memo Blum for SecDef, 30 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–22; memo Acheson for the President, 31 Mar 49, *FRUS 1949*, III:142–43.
 92. Paper prepared in Dept of State, 31 Mar 49, *FRUS 1949*, III:143–53. Also see the earlier draft of this paper as enc to memo Voorhees for Steering Grp, 28 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–8.
 93. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–50*, 421–26; "A Program for Germany (Program A)," 12 Nov 48, *FRUS 1948*, II:1325–38; "A Program for Germany—Revision," 9 May 49, enc to ltr Acheson to Souers, 16 May 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers, and *FRUS 1949*, III:903–09.
 94. See Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 291–92; Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–50*, 442–45; memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 11 May 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–8; notes, mtg War Council, 12 May 49, 1949 notebook (Berlin Blockade), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 14 May 49, *FRUS 1949*, III:875–76.
 95. Memo for the President, 18 May 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
 96. US Del to CFM to Truman and Acting SecState, 23 May 49, *FRUS 1949*, III:915–17; communiqué of 6th sess CFM, 20 Jun 49, *FRUS 1949*, III:1062–65; Stebbins, *US in World Affairs, 1949*, 177–96.
 97. Ltr Royall to SecDef, 25 Apr 49, w/attach Army draft study, 21 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–9; memo Symington for SecDef, 27 Jun 49, *ibid*; memo Ohly for SecDef, 22 Jul 49, *ibid*; Condit, *JCS History*, II:159.
 98. NSC 24/4, 25 Jul 49, *FRUS 1949*, III:839–40; NSC Action No 236, 27 Jul 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; memo Souers for the President, 28 Jul 49, PSF, Truman Papers; Larson, "Berlin Airlift," 241.
 99. This identification of options is from memo for the President, 18 May 49, PSF, Truman Papers. For a slightly different phrasing of possible courses of action, see cable Acheson to Webb, 22 May 49, *FRUS 1949*, III:818.
 100. Memo for the President, 18 May 49, PSF, Truman Papers; memo Souers for SecDef, 18

- May 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–9. The quote of Acheson's views is from his cable to Webb, 22 May 49, *FRUS* 1949, III:818.
101. Memo Johnson for Voorhees, 20 May 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–9; memo Clay for Gruenther, 25 May 49, *Clay Papers*, II:1168–70. For JCS views, see study, (n d), Appen A to NSC 24/2, 1 Jun 49, *FRUS* 1949, III:821–24.
 102. NSC 24/2, 1 Jun 49, *FRUS* 1949, III:820–21.
 103. Memo for the President, 2 Jun 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC Action No 219, 2 Jun 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 298–99; cable Acheson to Webb, 11 Jun 49, *FRUS* 1949, III:831; ltr Webb to Acheson, 12 Jun 49, *ibid*, 831–32 and n4 on 832.
 104. Notes, mtg War Council, 14 Jun 49, 1949 notebook (Berlin blockade), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; NSC Action No 223–c, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; memo Johnson for Exec Sec NSC, 14 Jun 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers.
 105. Memo Souers for the President, 14 Jun 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers. Truman's signature of approval, including rejection of the Acheson amendment, is on this document. On its adoption the report was renumbered NSC 24/3.
 106. Cable Webb to Acheson, 15 Jun 49, *FRUS* 1949, III:833.
 107. Memo Souers for the President, 16 Jun 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; memo for the President, 17 Jun 49, *ibid*.
 108. Memo for the President, 8 Jul 49, *ibid*.

XI. THE MILITARY BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1949: REARMAMENT BEGINS

1. Dir of Stat Services OASD(C), Table P 22.2, 7 Sep 66, OSD Hist.
2. Dir for Program and Finan Control OASD(C), Table FAD 800, 31 Jan 78, OSD Hist.
3. Bur of Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1949, 308. Another revealing aspect of inflation was the increase in the wholesale price index (based on 1926 prices), which rose from 105.8 in 1945 to 121.1 in 1946, to 152.1 in 1947, and to 165 at the beginning of 1948. *Ibid*, 302.
4. See Truman, *Memoirs*, II:37–38.
5. Dept of Air Force, Selected Aircraft Procurement Data, as of Jun 68, A.8, 1, OSD Hist.
6. OASD(C), Table FAD 119, 25 Jan 65, OSD Hist.
7. PL 253, sec 202(a) (4), 80 Cong, 1 sess.
8. *First Rpt of SecDef*, 38–39.
9. Forrestal's views quoted in memo Nimitz CNO for JCS, 27 Sep 47, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 6.
10. Memo McNeil for Deale, 21 Oct 47, RG 330, OASD(MP&R) Records, Box 429; MajGen CP Cabell DepDir JS memo for record, 3 Oct 47, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 6.
11. Mins of mtgs of ad hoc budget cte are filed in RG 330, OASD(C) Records, Box 1. Also see notes, mtgs Cte of Four, 13 and 28 Oct 47, 1947 notebook (Strategic Plans), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
12. Condit, *JCS History*, II:227–28; memo Norstad for Royall, 2 Oct 47, RG 330, CD 12–1–6; memo Ohly for Forrestal, 15 Oct 47, RG 330, CD 12–1–8; JCS 1800/6, 29 Jan 48, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 6.
13. Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1949, 12 Jan 48, *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 20; Excerpts from Annual Message, The President's Economic Report to the Congress, 14 Jan 48, *ibid*, 71.
14. Annual Budget Message, FY 1949, *ibid*, 20, 29–31.
15. *Ibid*, 26.
16. *Budget of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1949*, 635; NME, "Changes

- in the Army, 30 June 1947–30 June 1950," 6 Apr 49, 1, copy from Arleigh Burke papers, Dept of Navy.
17. *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 27–29, and *Truman Public Papers*, 1947, 64. Figures for Army strength from NME, "Changes in the Army, 30 June 1947–30 June 1950," 6 Apr 49, 4. Figures for size of Navy from Tab B to Appen B, JCS 1796/14, 11 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–4.
 18. The President's letter of instructions, 18 Jul 1947, is reprinted in *Survival in the Air Age: A Report by the President's Air Policy Commission* (Finletter Report), v–vi (hereafter cited as *Survival in the Air Age*), and in *Truman Public Papers*, 1947, 344–45.
 19. Condit, *JCS History*, II:199–200. Biographical data from *Who's Who in America*. 1956–1957.
 20. Transcripts of these hearings may be found in the collection designated President's Air Policy Commission: Records, 1947–48, HSTL.
 21. Gen Spaatz test before President's Air Policy Cmsn, 17 Nov 47, RG 330, CD 2–1–7; memo [Spaatz] for SecAF, 7 Jan 48, Box 28, Spaatz Papers, MSS Div, LC (emphasis in original). On the origins of the 70-group concept, see Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace*, 1943–1945.
 22. State Adm Chester W Nimitz, 12 Nov 47, 2278 and passim, file B20–1–Nimitz 11/12, President's Air Policy Cmsn Records, HSTL.
 23. Memo Felix Larkin, (n d), 1947 notebook (Bibliography), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
 24. Notes, mtg War Council, 4 Nov 47, 1947 notebook (Strategic Plans), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
 25. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 11 Dec 47, w/encs, OASD(C) files, DoD.
 26. *Survival in the Air Age*, 8, 24–28, 31, and passim.
 27. Statement by the President Upon Making Public the Report of the Air Policy Commission, 13 Jan 48, *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 61.
 28. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army*, 1948, 6; *First Rpt of SecDef*, 141.
 29. Memo Eisenhower for SecDef, 7 Feb 48, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers.
 30. Memo Lutes for SecArmy, 5 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–3; memo Royall for SecDef, 7 Feb 48, *ibid*; memo Ohly for SecArmy et al, 10 Feb 48, Spaatz Papers, MSS Div, LC; memo Ohly for SecArmy et al, 17 Feb 48, *ibid*; ltr Forrestal to Truman, 17 Feb 48, OSD Hist.
 31. Entry, 18 Feb 48, Forrestal Diary, 2086–88, Forrestal Papers; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 374–77.
 32. "Report to the President from the Secretary of Defense," 28 Feb 48, 27–28, Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; copy also in PSF, Truman Papers.
 33. AE Holmans, *United States Fiscal Policy, 1945–1949: Its Contribution to Economic Stability*, 85–86, 92–96.
 34. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 390–94; memo Royall for SecDef, 15 Mar 48, w/enc, (n d), OASD(C) files, DoD; Special Message to the Congress on the Threat to the Freedom of Europe, 17 Mar 48, *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 182–86.
 35. (N a), memo, 19 Mar 48, OASD(C) files, DoD.
 36. (N a), memo, (n d), sub: SecDef mtg of 20 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 100–1–16, and RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.
 37. Mins, 8th mtg NSC, 23 Mar 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
 38. Memo Forrestal for service secs, 24 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–4. Also see ltr Truman to Forrestal, 26 Mar 48, OASD(C) files, DoD.
 39. Letter to Speaker Regarding Additional Appropriations for the National Security Program, 1 Apr 48, *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 198.
 40. Forrestal quoted in Robert Cutler, *No Time for Rest*, 246 (emphasis in original).
 41. *Ibid*, 248–53.

42. *Hearings: UMT*, 325–32. For Marshall's suggested changes in Forrestal's prepared remarks, see memo Marshall for Forrestal, 23 Mar 48, *FRUS* 1948, 1:541–42.
43. *Hearings: UMT*, 380–98; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 400–02.
44. Ltr Forrestal to Chan Gurney, 2 Apr 48, OASD(C) files, DoD; NME PR 44–48, 3 Apr 48.
45. Memo Symington for Forrestal, 31 Mar 48, Spaatz Papers, MSS Div, LC.
46. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 27 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–4.
47. Memo Lutes for Gruenther, 6 Apr 48, and memo Forrestal for JCS, 8 Apr 48, both in *ibid.*
48. *Forrestal Public Statements, 1947–49*, IV:521–22; House Cte on Appros, *Hearings: Supplemental National Defense Appropriations Bill for 1948*, 80 Cong, 2 sess (1948), 2–5 (hereafter cited as *Supplemental Appropriations for 1948*).
49. Memo Larkin for SecDef, 17 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–12; memo McNeil for SecDef, 1 May 48, OASD(C) files, DoD.
50. These figures are from memo Leva for SecDef, 13 Apr 48, OASD(C) files, DoD. Condit, *JCS History*, II:205, gives slightly different estimates, as follows:

FY 1949	\$19.301 billion
FY 1950	21.725 "
FY 1951	22.533 "
FY 1952	22.780 "

 Condit uses as his source JCS 1796/14, 11 Apr 48, but the OSD file copy of this same paper (CD 9–2–4) contains no cost estimates.
51. JCS 1796/14, 11 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–4. Also see the slightly revised version of this paper labeled draft memo for SecDef and dated 15 Apr 48, *ibid.*
52. Figures from an undated and unsigned draft history of the FY 1949 supplemental debate in OASD(C) files, DoD. As reported in the press, the amount voted by the House was \$3.2 billion, but this was *total* obligational authority containing approximately \$400 million to pay for prior year contract obligations.
53. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 412–17.
54. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 17 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–4.
55. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 418; memo Frank Pace Acting Dir BoB for Sen Bridges, 29 Apr 48, OASD(C) files, DoD.
56. OSD Off of Budget, Proposed Distribution of the Supplemental Military Estimate, FY 1949, 20 Apr 48, OASD(C) files, DoD; memo LtGen cW Rawlings for Spaatz, 21 Apr 48, Spaatz Papers, MSS Div, LC.
57. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 418; Forrestal test, 26 Apr 48, *Supplemental Appropriations for 1948*, 3–5; Spaatz test, 27 Apr 48, *ibid.*, 54; *Forrestal Public Statements, 1947–1949*, III:575–79.
58. Memo Pace for Sen Bridges, 29 Apr 48, OASD(C) files, DoD; Lilienthal, *Journals*, II:350–51.
59. Entry, 6 May 48, Forrestal Diary, Forrestal Papers (portions in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 429–30).
60. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 430–31.
61. Ferrell, *Off the Record*, 134.
62. *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, IV (1948), 92–94; S Rpt 1223, 80 Cong, 2 sess, 30 Apr 48.
63. Memo McNeil for Forrestal, 11 May 48, misc material on suppl appro, Mar–May 48 file, OASD(C) files, DoD. Also see draft memo Forrestal for Webb, (ca 12 May 48), *ibid.*
64. State by President to SecDef, service secs, and CoSs, 13 May 48, PSF, subject file, Truman Papers (portions quoted in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 435–38).
65. Letter to Speaker Transmitting Supplemental Appropriations Estimates for the NME,

- 13 May 48, *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 255; Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Providing Funds for Military Aircraft, 21 May 48, *ibid*, 272.
66. Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1948, PL 547, 80 Cong, 2 sess.
67. On the shift of attitudes in Congress, see Edward A Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963*, 74–89; Elias Huzar, *The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by Congress Through Military Appropriations, 1933–1950*, 182–84.
68. *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, IV (1948), 89–95.
69. Memo Forrestal for the President, 28 May 48, PSF, Truman Papers.

XII. THE MILITARY BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1950: REARMAMENT LEVELS OFF

1. Among published works on the development and execution of the FY 1950 budget, the most detailed is Warner R Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner R Schilling, Paul Y Hammond, and Glenn H Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets*, 1–266. For additional reading see Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense*, 89–107; Lawrence J Korb, "The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Conflict in the Budgetary Process, 1947–1971," 21–42.
2. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 435.
3. Arthur Smithies, *The Budgetary Process in the United States*, 243–48.
4. "Planning for National Security Under the National Security Act of 1947," (n d, ca Aug–Sep 47), RG 330, OASD(M&P)Records; *First Rpt of SecDef*, 41–42.
5. Condit, *JCS History*, II:285–93.
6. Memo Leva for Ohly, 26 May 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–30.
7. Ltr Truman to Forrestal, 3 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–4.
8. Notes, mtg Cte of Four, 4 Jun 48, 1948 notebook (Unification—1950 Budget and National Objectives), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
9. Conf of SecDef with JCS, 11 Jun 48, NME Organization Changes Book, Box 1, Forrestal Papers, WNRC.
10. NSC Status of Projects as of 6 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–6. Memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 12 Mar 47, RG 330, CD 9–2–16, is typical of these requests.
11. NSC 7, 30 Mar 48, *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:545–50.
12. See memo Butler Acting Dir PPS for Lovett, 9 Apr 48, *ibid*, 560–61; memo Forrestal for NSC, 17 Apr 48, *ibid*, 561–64; memo for the President, 4 Jun 48, 6–7, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
13. PPS 33, 23 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 2–2–2, pubd as NSC 20/2, 25 Aug 48, *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:615–24.
14. Memo Forrestal for Ohly, 23 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–20; memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 10 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–50, pubd as NSC 20, *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:589–92; ltr Forrestal to Truman, 10 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–20, and in *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:592–93.
15. Memo Truman for Forrestal, 13 Jul 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
16. Ltr Truman to Forrestal, 15 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–20; memo Webb for Forrestal, 16 Jul 48, OSD Hist.
17. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 17 Jul 48, OSD Budget Book for 1950 (hereafter cited as "OSD Budget Chron"), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; copy in RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 9.
18. "Correlation of Budgets, of Army, Navy and Air Force with Strategic Planning," and "Force Requirements to Be Used in Formulation of FY 1950 Budget for National Defense," attaches to memo Wedemeyer for CoS USA, 28 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–9; JCS 1800/8, 24 Jul 48, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 10; OSD table, "Summary Comparison of

- Forces at Various Program Levels, Fiscal 1949 Actual and Fiscal 1950 Estimates," 26 Jan 49, rev 4 Feb 49, "OSD Budget Chron," Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
19. Ohly memo for the record, 23 Aug 48, in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 290–93. Also see Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 476–77.
 20. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 450, ed note; "Chronology of FY 1950 Budget Preparation and Submission: Narrative Description," 2, in "OSD Budget Chron," Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:131–32.
 21. "OSD Budget Chron," 2; *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:132–33; OSD table, "Summary Comparison of Forces of Various Program Levels, Fiscal 1949 Actual and Fiscal 1950 Estimates," 26 Jan 49, rev 4 Feb 49, "OSD Budget Chron."
 22. Condit, *JCS History*, II:232–33; *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:133.
 23. On Truman and the 1948 campaign, see Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, 395ff, and Irwin Ross, *The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948*.
 24. CIA ORE 22–48 (Addendum), 16 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–26; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 487, 489–90; memo Webb for the President, 16 Sep 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
 25. Entry, 24 Sep 48, Forrestal Diary, 2518, Forrestal Papers; excerpts in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 494.
 26. JCS trans of mtg, 2 Oct 48, and record of mtg, 3 Oct 48, both in RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 10, pt 1.
 27. "Tentative Allocation Under Special Concept," tab to SecDef budget mtg with three secs and JCS, 4 Oct 48, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) Bulky Package 2.
 28. SecDef budget mtg with three secs and JCS, 4 Oct 49, *ibid*. Also see entry, 4 Oct 48, Leahy Diary, Leahy Papers, MSS Div, LC.
 29. Entry, 5 Oct 48, Forrestal Diary, 2543–44, Forrestal Papers (portion quoted in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 498).
 30. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 6 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–23; ltr Leahy (for JCS) to SecDef, 6 Oct 48, *ibid*; ltr Forrestal to JCS, 8 Oct 48, "OSD Budget Chron," Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
 31. Ltr Forrestal to JCS, 8 Oct 48, "OSD Budget Chron" (emphasis in original).
 32. Ltr Frank Pace, Jr, Act Dir BoB to Forrestal, 13 Oct 48, *ibid*; notes, mtg Cte of Four, 12 Oct 48, 1948 notebook (Unification—1950 Budget), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Forrestal for service secs, 14 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–25; *Eberstadt Task Force Rpt*, II:133.
 33. Memo JCS for McNarney, Carney, and Richards, [14 Oct 48], enc to JCS 1800/12, 15 Oct 48 (discussed in JCS on 13 Oct 48), RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 10. Also see Condit, *JCS History*, II:245.
 34. Entry, 15 Oct 48, Forrestal Diary, 2576 and *passim*, Forrestal Papers; excerpts and editorial comment in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 502–06.
 35. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 29 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–25.
 36. Memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 8 Nov 48, "OSD Budget Chron"; memo Forrestal for JCS, 9 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–25.
 37. Memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 15 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–25; memo Forrestal for service secs, 17 Nov 48, *ibid*.
 38. Entry, 10 Oct 48, Forrestal Diary, 2555–63, Forrestal Papers (excerpts in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 500–02); Schilling, "Politics of National Defense," 183–84.
 39. Ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 31 Oct 48, *FRUS 1948*, I, pt 2:644–46.
 40. Cable Marshall to Lovett, 8 Nov 48, *ibid*, 654–55; cable Marshall to Forrestal, 8 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–25, printed in *FRUS 1948*, I, pt 2:655.
 41. Ltr Truman to Forrestal, 3 Nov 48, OASD(C) files, DoD.
 42. Entry, Forrestal Diary, 11–13 Nov 48, 2639–52, Forrestal Papers (excerpts in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 521–26); [Gruenther] memcon with Gen Revers, 11 Nov 48, [Gruenther] memcon with Ramadier Fr Min of Def, 11 Nov 48, [Gruenther] memo of SecDef mtg with

- Br Min Def and CoS, 13 Nov 48, all in PSF, Truman Papers; memo Forrestal for Truman, 20 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–25. Also see entry, 13 Nov 48, Forrestal Diary, 2653, Forrestal Papers (excerpts in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 526). Portions of this conversation also summarized in Gruenther, memcon with Amb Smith, 13 Nov 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
43. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 2 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 6–4–4, and in *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:656–62, circulated as NSC 35, 17 Nov 48. As reproduced in *FRUS*, the word “potential” is italicized; OSD file copy of JCS memorandum shows the word in capitals.
 44. NSC 20/4, 23 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 22–1–33, and in *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:663–69.
 45. Ltr Forrestal to Webb, 1 Dec 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–25.
 46. Ltr Forrestal to Truman, 1 Dec 48, *ibid*, and in *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:669–72.
 47. Memo Truman for Webb, 2 Dec 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
 48. Entry, 20 Dec 48, Forrestal Diary, 2698–2701, Forrestal Papers. Also see Schilling, “Politics of National Defense,” 199.
 49. Address, 1 Feb 49, *Forrestal Public Statements, 1947–1949*, V:1031.
 50. Annual Budget Message to the Congress: FY 1950, *Truman Public Papers, 1949*, 44–45.
 51. *NME Appropriation Bill for 1950*, pt 1:13; ltr to Forrestal, 22 Dec 48, “OSD Budget Chron,” Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Frank Pace, Jr, Dir BoB for Forrestal, 10 Feb 49, w/attach, (n d), OASD(C) files, DoD.
 52. OSD table, “Summary Comparison of Forces at Various Program Levels, Fiscal 1949 Actual and Fiscal 1950 Estimates,” 26 Jan 49, rev 4 Feb 49, “OSD Budget Chron”; *Truman Public Papers, 1949*, 55–62.
 53. *NME Appropriation Bill for 1950*, pt 1:17.
 54. Denfeld test, 16 Feb 49, *ibid*, 43. For a summary of JCS testimony, see Condit, *JCS History*, II:253–54.
 55. See testimony of SecAF Symington, 31 May 49, *NME Appropriation Bill for 1950*, pt 1:227ff.
 56. Memo Symington for Forrestal, 25 Feb 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers; “History of B–36 Procurement Presented to House Armed Services Committee by Maj Gen F.H. Smith, Jr.,” (n d), 1–4, USAF Files, AF/CVAH(S) 168.04–1 sec 25.
 57. H Rpt No 417, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), 4, 30–31, 42–55; *Congressional Record*, vol 95, pt 4:4498–4536; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, V (1949), 222; *The Budget of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1950*, M21.
 58. *NME Appropriation Bill for 1950*, 32.
 59. Agenda for mtg of War Council on 26 Jul 49, John Sherman Sec War Council, 20 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 114–1–17; notes, mtg War Council, 9 Aug 49, 1949 notebook (1950 Budget), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo McNarney for Chm MB et al, 10 Aug 49, RG 330, CD 109–2–22; memo McNarney for SecDef, 30 Aug 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–25.
 60. S Rpt No 745, *Military Functions Appropriation Act, 1950*, 81 Cong, 1 sess, 22 Jul 49, 5–11; *Congressional Record*, vol 95, pt 9:12426; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, V (1949), 223–24.
 61. PL 434, 81 Cong, 1 sess.
 62. Statement by the President upon signing the National Military Establishment Appropriation Act, 29 Oct 49, *Truman Public Papers, 1949*, 538–39; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, V (1949), 225.
 63. *Second Rpt of SecDef*, 318.

XIII. THE MILITARY BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1951: REARMAMENT ABORTED

1. Smithies, *The Budgetary Process*, 232–34. Also see “Report on Implementation of Title IV, National Security Act of 1947 as Amended, as of 15 March 1954,” prepared in OASD(C), 3–8, OASD(C) files, DoD.

2. Interv with McNeil, 7 Jun 76, 26–30, OSD Hist. Information on service attitudes from Henry Glass, OASD(C), as derived from conversations by the author with Ronald Hoffman.
3. Memo R Hoffman for A Goldberg Hist OSD, 26 Nov 76, 3, OSD Hist.
4. *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 59–60; *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1950*, 97; memo McNeil for SecNav, 18 Nov 49, OASD(C) files, DoD.
5. Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 150, 157; Eisenhower test, 29 Mar 50, *DoD Appropriations for 1951*, 680; Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends*, 329.
6. Ltr Forrestal to Truman, 9 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 5–1–25.
7. Memo Eisenhower for Forrestal, 25 Feb 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers.
8. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 6 Dec 48, OASD(C) files, DoD; JCS 1800/36, 3 Mar 49, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 14.
9. Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1950, 10 Jan 49, *Truman Public Papers, 1949*, 56.
10. *DoD Appropriations for 1951*, 680–81; memo Gruenther for Eisenhower, 28 Mar 50, 1, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers (hereafter cited as Gruenther, “FY 51 Estimates”).
11. Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 8 Jan 49, 153; memo Eisenhower for Forrestal, [ca 21 Dec 48], Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers.
12. Condit, *JCS History*, II:293–96.
13. Gruenther, “FY 51 Estimates,” 1; memo Eisenhower for Bradley, Denfeld, and Vandenberg, 28 Feb 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers.
14. Condit, *JCS History*, II:261–62.
15. Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 157.
16. *Ibid*, 158.
17. Memo Denfeld for JCS, 4 May 49, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 15, cited in Condit, *JCS History*, II:263.
18. Gruenther, “FY 51 Estimates,” 2.
19. BAC memo for understanding, 18 Jun 49, OASD(C) files, DoD; memo Adm Robert B Carney USN Chm BAC for Dir JS, 20 Jun 49, *ibid*; Gruenther, “FY 51 Estimates,” 3; Condit, *JCS History*, II:268.
20. Gruenther, “FY 51 Estimates,” 3; memo Eisenhower for SecDef, 20 Jun 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers.
21. Memo Eisenhower for Chm BAC, 21 Jun 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–43; memo Carney Chm BAC for Chm JCS, 27 Jun 49, OASD(C) files, DoD.
22. Gruenther, “FY 51 Estimates,” 3–4.
23. Hints of Eisenhower’s suspicions and expectations recur throughout his diary during the early months of 1949. See Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 159 and *passim*.
24. Memo Frank Pace, Jr, Dir BoB for the President, [ca Apr 49], PSF, Truman Papers; BoB memo, 6 May 49, *ibid*; memo Pace for the President, 5 Apr 49, RG 51, BoB Series 47.3.
25. Memo Pace for SecDef, 25 Apr 49, 2, OASD(C) files, DoD.
26. Memo Pace for SecDef, 2 May 49, *ibid*; memo McNeil for Johnson, 11 May 49, *ibid*.
27. Gruenther, “FY 51 Estimates,” 2.
28. Ferrell, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 159.
29. Memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 18 May 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–43.
30. Memo Johnson for Pace Dir BoB, 19 May 49, *ibid*.
31. Memo BoB Natl Security Br for Pace, 24 May 49, RG 51, BoB Series 47.3.
32. Memo Johnson for service secs, 25 May 49, OASD(C) files, DoD; Gruenther, “FY 51 Estimates,” 3.
33. Memo Pace for the President, 30 Jun 49, w/attach draft ltrs to Chm CEA, Acting Chm NSRB, and Exec Sec NSC, CF, Truman Papers.

34. Memo Frederick J Lawton (n d, drafted 6 Jul 49), Frederick J Lawton Papers, HSTL; state of President before NSC, JCS, Chm of CEA, ECA, and Dir BoB [1 Jul 49], PSF, Truman Papers.
35. Memo Lawton (n d, drafted 6 Jul 49), Frederick J Lawton Papers, HSTL.
36. Interv with McNeil, 7 Jun 76, 17, OSD Hist; Gruenther, "FY 51 Estimates," 4.
37. Gruenther, "FY 51 Estimates," 4; draft memo Johnson for SecArmy et al, (n d), OASD(C) files, DoD. Also see Eisenhower test, 29 Mar 50, *DoD Appropriations for 1951*, 682.
38. Memo Johnson for SecArmy et al, 5 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–43; Gruenther, "FY 51 Estimates," 4–5.
39. Memo Eisenhower for SecDef, 14 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 16–1–17 (copy in Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers).
40. Condit, *JCS History*, II:274–75.
41. Ltr Johnson to Truman, 15 Aug 49, PSF, Truman Papers.
42. Ltr McNeil to Pace, 15 Sep 49, OASD(C) files, DoD; memo Bradley Chm JCS for SecDef, 2 Sep 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–43.
43. Memo Souers for Webb USecState et al, 5 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–50.
44. NSC Draft Rpt 52/2, 2 Sep 49, *ibid*.
45. OSD Summary of JCS Views, attach to memo Ohly for Lay, 6 Sep 49, 21–22, *ibid*.
46. Memo for the President, 30 Sep 49, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers. Also see NSC 52/3, 29 Sep 49, *FRUS 1949*, 1:386–93. President Truman did not participate in the NSC 52/3 discussions, nor, because the report contained no recommendations requiring actions or decisions not already taken, did he give it his approval. His acceptance of the paper served as tacit endorsement of its conclusions.
47. Trans of discussion following budget presentation, 21 Oct 49, OASD(C) files, DoD; memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 18 Nov 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–50.
48. Ltr McNeil to Pace, 13 Dec 49, w/attach, OASD(C) files, DoD; ltr Pace to Johnson, 16 Dec 49, RG 330, OASD(M&P) Records, Box 32, Budget Program, FY 51 file.
49. Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1951, 9 Jan 50, *Truman Public Papers, 1950*, 44–106.
50. *Ibid*, 62.
51. Johnson test, 12 Jan 50, in House Cte on Appros, *Hearings: Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951*, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 45–46 (hereafter cited as *Hearings on DoD Appropriations for 1951*); state before Armed Services Subcte, House Cte on Appros, *Johnson Public Statements, 1949–50*, III:705.
52. State before Armed Services Subcte, House Cte on Appros, *Johnson Public Statements, 1949–50*, III:704–13.
53. H Rpt No 1797, 81 Cong, 2 sess, 21 Mar 50, 265–331.
54. Eisenhower test, 29 Mar 50, *Hearings on DoD Appropriations for 1951*, 679–84, 699.
55. See Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Matter of Fact," 13 Feb and 20 Feb 50, *Washington Post*.
56. *NY Times*, 31 Mar 50.
57. Notes, mtg AFPC, 4 Apr 50, 1950 notebook (1951 Budget), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
58. Memo Johnson for JCS, 5 Apr 50, OASD(C) files, DoD; notes, mtg AFPC, 25 Apr 50, 1950 notebook (1951 Budget), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
59. Paul Y Hammond, "NSC–68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Schilling, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets*, 337.
60. Johnson state, 26 Apr 50, *Hearings on DoD Appropriations for 1951*, 833–44. Also see House Cte on Appros, *Additional Supplemental Hearings: DoD Appropriations for 1951*, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 1–11 (hereafter cited as *Additional Supplemental, 1951*).
61. Ltr Eisenhower to Johnson, 25 Apr 50, Johnson Papers (copy in Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers).

62. OSD Budget Div table, "Action on FY 1951 Appropriation Estimates," 27 Sep 50, OASD(C) files, DoD.
63. Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 101.

XIV. ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES

1. RA Winnacker, "The Historical Framework," in *Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel*, Appen A: *Mechanisms for Change—Organizational History* (July 1970), 4.
2. Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1964*, 1:33–34.
3. Alfred Goldberg, "Between World Wars," in *History of USAF*, 29–45; Julius Augustus Furer, *Administration of the Navy Department in World War II*, 358–59; Robert Greenhalgh Albion, *Makers of Naval Policy, 1798–1947*, 369–76; Archibald D Turnbull and Clifford L Lord, *History of United States Naval Aviation*, 176–92, 278–81.
4. *JAAF*, ch I, para 4, and Ch II, paras 23a–b, enc to memo Robert J Wood for SecDef, 2 Nov 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–26.
5. Wilhelmine Burch, "September 18, 1947," in Goldberg, *History of USAF*, 99–100. On the 1942 War Department reorganization, see Cline, *Washington Command Post*, 90–106.
6. Dwight D Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961*, 246, 250.
7. David A Rosenberg and Floyd D Kennedy, Jr, *U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the Strategic Role*, pt 1, ch III. Also see Hooper, *Setting the Stage*, ch III.
8. Memo Eisenhower for JCS, 15 Mar 46, in Galambos, *Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, VII:929.
9. Benson D Adams, *Ballistic Missile Defense*, 9–10.
10. Huntington, *The Common Defense*, 373; Vincent Davis, *The Admirals Lobby*, 193–95; John T Greenwood, "The Emergence of the Postwar Strategic Air Force, 1945–1953," in Alfred F Hurley and Robert C Ehrhart, eds, *Air Power and Warfare: Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 18–20 October 1978*, 215–44. For contemporary statements on the new role of air power, see Carl Spaatz, "Strategic Air Power: Fulfillment of a Concept" and "Evolution of Air Power," and George C Kenney, "Strategic Air Command."
11. Memo Capt Arleigh A Burke USN for JAC, 11 May 49, A21/1–1/1 Navy-Carrier file, OP–23 Records, NHA; unsigned memo for SecDef, 16 Feb 49, Box 2, Forrestal Papers, WNRC; Coletta, *The United States Navy*, 32–33; Rosenberg and Kennedy, *Aircraft Carriers in the Strategic Role*, 102–05; Norman Friedman, *U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History*, 239–53.
12. Gallery quoted in Norman Polmar, *Aircraft Carriers*, 501–02; Rosenberg and Kennedy, *Aircraft Carriers in the Strategic Role*, 40–41.
13. According to Gallery, the Navy went to considerable lengths to dissociate itself from his memorandum. After a futile search for the memo in his office files following his retirement, he concluded "they must have burned the memo, original, copies and all." Daniel V Gallery, *Eight Bells and All's Well*, 230. In fact, copies do survive and are on file in OP–23 Records, NHA.
14. Air Policy Bd briefing (AC/AS–2), 16 Sep 47, Spaatz Papers, MSS Div, LC.
15. Robert W Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice*, 131; Kenneth R McGruther, *The Evolving Soviet Navy*, 9–15. The figure of 11 percent is from Abraham S Becker and Edmund D Brunner, "The Evolution of Soviet Military Forces and Budgets, 1945–1953," 31.

16. MajGen HJ Knerr USAF, "If We Should Fight Again," 24; also quoted in Huntington, *Common Defense*, 377.
17. Galambos, *Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, VII:701–06, 927–32, 976–77, 997; Huntington, *Common Defense*, 374; David A Rosenberg, "American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization: The Navy Experience," in Hurley and Ehrhart, *Air Power and Warfare*, 247–48.
18. As quoted in Schnabel, *JCS History*, I:246.
19. Sherman test, 1 Apr 47, *Hearings: NME . . . Unification*, 154–55.
20. Draft EO, in *ibid*, 3–5.
21. *Ibid*, 4; George W Garand and Truman R Strobbridge, *Western Pacific Operations*, vol IV in *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, 443–712; Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 269; Millis, *Arms and the State*, 175–76.
22. Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 267–70.
23. Memo GF Schwarzwald BoB for Lawton, 31 Mar 48, Box 83, Elsey Papers; memo Symington for SecDef, 16 Dec 47, Spaatz Papers, MSS Div, LC; Greenwood, "Postwar Strategic Air Force," 231.
24. Memo Burke for JAG, 11 May 49, A21/1–1/1 Navy-Carrier file, Op–23 Records, NHA; Coletta, *United States Navy and Defense Unification*, 58. See also SecNavy Sullivan's letter of resignation in *NY Times*, 27 Apr 49.
25. Nimitz, "The Future Employment of Naval Forces," 15 Dec 47, attach to Dept of Navy PR, 6 Jan 48, OSD Hist; Greenwood, "Postwar Strategic Air Force," 232.
26. Memo Eisenhower for SecDef, [1 Nov 47], RG 330, CD 13–1–6; also in Galambos, *Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, IX:2037–38.
27. Memo Forrestal for service secs, 20 Jan 48, with proposed revisions, in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 270–74. Condit, *JCS History*, II:171, 173–74, summarizes Army and Air Force responses. For Navy views, see memo Sullivan for SecDef, 30 Jan 48, A19/2 Key West Conf (Roles and Missions) file, Op–23 Records, NHA.
28. Memo Forrestal for service secs, 3 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–26.
29. JCS 1478/20, 22 Jan 48, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7; JCS 1478/21, 28 Jan 48, *ibid*.
30. Decision on JCS 1478/20, 4 Feb 48, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7; memo Lalor for Wedemeyer, Norstad, and Styer, 5 Feb 48, *ibid*; memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 6 Feb 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–26; memo Leva for Gruenther, 11 Feb 48, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.
31. Memo Wedemeyer for CoS USA, 10 Feb 48, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7; memo Forrestal for Truman, 27 Feb 48, PSF, Truman Papers; draft paper on functions of armed forces and JCS w/attach A, N, and AF states, (n d), RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.
32. Memo Denfeld for Leahy, 28 Feb 48, A19/2 Key West Conf (Roles and Missions) file, Op–23 Records, NHA; memo Spaatz (for JCS) for SecDef, 8 Mar 48, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.
33. "Notes for Friday—Opening of Mtg," (n s, probably Forrestal), 11 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 100–1–16; also see Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 390–91.
34. See EO 9950, 21 Apr 48, revoking EO 9877, in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 285.
35. Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21 Apr 48, *ibid*, 276–85.
36. Gruenther memo for the record, 26 Mar 48, printed as amended and issued 1 Jul 48, *ibid*, 286–89.
37. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 395. In press release, Forrestal announced: "Decisions have now been reached on all controversial points, and I believe that there is now general accord on practically all matters which were previously unresolved." See NME PR No 38–48, 26 Mar 48, OSD Hist.

38. Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, pt 1:276–84; Robert D Little, *Building an Atomic Air Force, 1949–1953*, vol III in Lee Bowen and Robert D Little, *The History of Air Force Participation in the Atomic Energy Program, 1943–1953*, pt 2:316–19.
39. Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, II, pt 1:42, pt 2:316. Existing and planned Air Force capability figures from “Annual Report of the Military Liaison Committee to the Secretary of Defense for the Fiscal Year 1948,” 20 Sep 48, 24–27, in RG 330, CD 25–1–38. The figure of 30 operational aircraft is as of 30 June 1948. Rosenberg, “American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization: The Navy Experience,” 255, discusses the development of Navy capabilities.
40. Entry, 15 Mar 48, Forrestal Diary, 2135, Forrestal Papers (see also Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 393); mins of mtg of SecDef and JCS, 20 Mar 48, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.
41. Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, pt 1:111–13.
42. Memo Ohly for SecDef, 29 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–30; memo Ohly for SecDef, 19 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–16; Condit, *JCS History*, II:184–85.
43. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 28 Jul 48, RG 218, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 11; memo Denfeld for SecDef, 28 Jul 48, *ibid*.
44. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 464.
45. Memo Symington for Sullivan SecNav and copy to SecDef, 21 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 16–1–8.
46. Memo Carpenter for SecDef, 30 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 31–1–2; memo Carpenter for SecDef, 3 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–46.
47. Memo Forrestal for Spaatz and Towers, 9 Aug 48, OSD Hist (portions in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 468).
48. Memo Spaatz and Towers for SecDef, 18 Aug 48, Forrestal Diary, 2547–49, Forrestal Papers.
49. Ohly memo for the record, 23 Aug 48, in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 290–91.
50. Ponturo, *WSEG Experience*, 22–33; Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 291.
51. *First Rpt of SecDef*, 9.
52. Memo Symington for SecDef, 5 Oct 48, in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 493–94.
53. *Ibid*, 513–14.
54. Memo Leva for SecDef, 10 Sep 48; [Ohly] draft memo, 5 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 12–2–8 and CD 23–1–19; memo Page for Ohly, (n d), memo Riley for Ohly, 6 Oct 48, memo Wood for Riley and Page, 13 Oct 48, all in Ohly personal papers.
55. [Ohly] draft memo, 5 Oct 48, Ohly personal papers. According to Ohly, the memo was drafted for possible use by Forrestal. Ohly is not sure whether Forrestal ever saw it, but it was circulated within OSD and elicited the responses from Forrestal’s military aides. (Author’s conversation with Ohly, 21 Mar 80.)
56. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 23 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–19; memo Forrestal for JCS, 25 Oct 48, *ibid*.
57. Memo Lalor for Harmon et al, 12 Jan 49, *ibid*.
58. USAF briefing paper for the President, 16 Dec and 20 Dec 48, Box 2, Forrestal Papers, WNRC. For Forrestal’s use of this paper at his meeting with the President on 20 December 1948, see the entry for 20 Dec 48, Forrestal Diary, 2698–2701, Forrestal Papers, and Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 537–38. The Air Force presented a similar assessment to the Joint Chiefs on 21 December 1948. See JCS 1952/1, 21 Dec 48, in Thomas H Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds, *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950*, 357–60.
59. Condit, *JCS History*, II:316–17.
60. Memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 17 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 23–1–19; Condit, *JCS History*, II:318.
61. Memo Ohly for SecDef, 27 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 23–1–19; memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 14 Apr 49, *ibid*; Ponturo, *WSEG Experience*, 50–53.
62. Memo Ohly for Riley, 19 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 23–1–19.

63. Forrestal memo, 15 Nov 48, Box 2, Forrestal Papers, WNRC. Also see Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 537–38.
64. Memo Symington for Forrestal, 25 Feb 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers; memo Eisenhower for Forrestal, 28 Feb 49, Box 2, Forrestal Papers, WNRC; MajGen FH Smith, Jr, "History of B-36 Procurement," undated study provided House Cte on Armed Services, secs 22 and 25, copy in OSD Hist.
65. Memo Pace for the President, 28 Mar 49, RG 51, BoB Series 47.3; Eben Ayers Diary, 8 Apr 49, Ayers Papers, HSTL; memo RB Landry USAF for the President, 16 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 12–2–28. The phrase "putting all of our eggs into one basket" is Landry's rendering of Truman's thoughts at the meeting.
66. Memo Landry for the President, 19 Apr 49, PSF, Truman Papers; David Alan Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," 76.
67. Memo Truman for SecDef, 21 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 23–1–19.
68. Ltr Johnson to Truman, 27 Apr 49, *ibid.* On the status of the WSEG study, see Ponturo, *WSEG Experience*, 53–58, and memo Ohly for SecDef, 7 May 49, RG 330, CD 23–1–19.
69. Memo Pace for Eisenhower, 1 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 19–1–34; memo Vandenberg for Symington, 2 Apr 49, *ibid.*; ltr Johnson to Pace, 2 Apr 49, *ibid.*; ltr Johnson to Truman, 27 Apr 49, *ibid.*; Smith, "History of B-36 Procurement," 26–2.
70. "Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from the Strategic Air Offensive," 11 May 49, portions in Etzold and Gaddis, *Containment*, 360–64. This is a brief summary of the Harmon Report. Also see Condit, *JCS History*, II:313–14.
71. Omar N Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life*, 501; Little, *Building an Atomic Air Force, 1949–1953*, pt 2:346–47.
72. Memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 28 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 23–1–19.
73. Memo Ohly for SecDef, 12 Oct 49, *ibid.*; ltr Johnson to Truman, [18 Oct 49], *ibid.*
74. Memo Truman for SecDef, 17 Nov 49, *ibid.*; memo Bradley Chm JCS for DepSecDef, 18 Nov 49, *ibid.*
75. Memo Johnson for Truman, 21 Nov 49, *ibid.* A handwritten notation at the bottom of this memo indicates that it was shown to the President on 23 November 1949 and that Truman "okayed presentation for after Jan. 15."
76. [N a], "History of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, OSD," vol II, "1 September 1949 to 30 June 1950," 31–32, WSEG Records, IDA; Ponturo, *WSEG Experience*, 74–75; Philip M Morse, *In at the Beginnings: A Physicist's Life*, 258.
77. WSEG Rpt No 1, enc to memo Hull for JCS, 21 Jan 50, OSD Hist. This version of the report appears to be the executive summary from which Hull briefed the President. The full report, including support data, ran to 10 volumes and is part of a special WSEG collection in RG 330, NARS.
78. Morse, *In at the Beginnings*, 258–59. Morse observed that during the briefing Johnson "seemed more interested in watching faces than in listening."
79. Ponturo, *WSEG Experience*, 75–76.
80. *Hearings: NME Appropriation Bill for 1950*, 568–69; memo Capt Herbert D Riley USN for SecDef, 9 Mar 49, Box 2, Forrestal Papers, WNRC; memo EP Pennebaker, Jr, for Capt Thackrey USN, 4 Oct 48, A21/1–2 Air Force file, Op-23 Records, NHA; ltr Johnson to Eisenhower, 15 Apr 49, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers (Johnson sent copies to members of JCS).
81. Memo Denfeld for SecDef, 22 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 21–1–3.
82. Memo Bradley for SecDef, 22 Apr 49, *ibid.*
83. Memo Vandenberg for SecDef, 23 Apr 49, *ibid.*
84. Johnson test, 14 Jun 51, *Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East*, 2636–37; ltr Johnson to David Lawrence, 16 Jul 51, Johnson Papers. Johnson received a letter from Eisenhower,

- dated 20 April 1949, containing an expression of the General's views on the supercarrier, but no copy of this letter can be located.
85. NME PR No M-17-49, 23 Apr 49, OSD Hist. Also see memo Johnson for SecNav, 23 Apr 49, and ltr Johnson to Truman, 23 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 21-1-3.
 86. Sullivan's letter of resignation in *NY Times*, 27 Apr 49; *Hearings: The National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy*, 47-48.
 87. OSD PR No M-192-49, 21 Jun 49, OSD Hist; *Washington Post*, 22 Jun 49. For the full text of Johnson's speech, see *Johnson Public Statements, 1949-1950*, I:183-97. On the purpose of the carrier modernization, see memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 10 Jun 49, RG 330, CD 21-1-3, and MLC, "Annual Report for FY 1949," 1 Aug 49, 14-15, RG 330, CD 319.1 (MLC).
 88. Ltr Kimball to Radford, [9 Jul 49], Box 4, Kimball Papers, HSTL.
 89. See draft memo for CNO, (n d), memo Ofstie for Op-05B, [ca May 50], memo Gallery for Op-05B, 2 May 49, all in A21/1-1/1 Navy-Carrier file, Op-23 Records, NHA.
 90. On the origin and activities of Op-23, see the testimony of Capt Arleigh A Burke, 12 Oct 49, in *Unification and Strategy*, 255ff, and Paul Y Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics," in Stein, *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*, 505-07. Biographical material on Burke from Robert William Love, Jr, ed, *The Chiefs of Naval Operations*, 263-319.
 91. Smith, "History of B-36 Procurement," secs 7-13; memo Symington for SecDef, 4 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 19-2-24.
 92. The "anonymous document" is printed in House Cte on Armed Services, *Hearings: Investigation of the B-36 Bomber Program*, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), 53, 528-33 (hereafter cited as *B-36 Investigation*); Worth test, 24 Aug 49, *ibid*, 524-25; Kimball test, 25 Aug 49, *ibid*, 607-08; Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," 506.
 93. *B-36 Investigation*, 11-15; Clark R Mollenhoff, *The Pentagon: Politics, Profits and Plunder*, 124-25; H Res 234, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949); *NY Times*, 10 Jun 49.
 94. Mins of mtg by Townsend Hoopes Sec Staff Council, 13 Jun 49, item 10, RG 330, CD 122-2-2; memo Johnson for service secs et al, 20 Jun 49, Doc No V-6, OSD Directives Book, Johnson Papers, WNRC; notes, mtg War Council, 22 Jun 49, 1949 notebook (B-36 Hearings), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
 95. *B-36 Investigation*, 654, 659.
 96. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," 506-08; Hanson W Baldwin, "Crommelin Wins, But—," *NY Times*, 6 Oct 49.
 97. *Unification and Strategy*, 9.
 98. *Ibid*, 52.
 99. *Ibid*, 259.
 100. *Ibid*, 350-51.
 101. *Ibid*, 365-80.
 102. *Ibid*, 543-48.
 103. *Ibid*, 397-407.
 104. *Ibid*, 451-58, 472-73.
 105. *Ibid*, 515-41 (quotes on 516, 522, 525, 526, 533, 536).
 106. *Ibid*, 535.
 107. *Ibid*, 606-35 (quotes on 608 and 621).
 108. Memo Johnson for service secs, 24 Oct 49, OSD Hist; Tyler Abell, ed, *Drew Pearson Diaries, 1949-1959*, 86-87; ltr Matthews to Truman, 27 Oct 49, Box 11, Clifford Papers; *NY Times*, 28 Oct 49.
 109. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," 548; DoD PR No 340-50, 16 Mar 50, OSD Hist; memo to press, 3 Jun 50, *ibid*.

110. H Doc No 600, 81 Cong, 2 sess, 1 Mar 50, 54, 56, and passim; Henry M Dater, "The B-36 Investigation," (n d), OSD Hist.
111. H Doc No 600, 53, 57–59.
112. Dater, "B-36 Investigation," 4. See also Arthur O Sulzberger, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1941–1954*, 75–82.
113. Memo Johnson for service secs, 24 Oct 49, OSD Hist; memo Burns for Johnson, 31 Oct 49, Box 103, Johnson Papers.

XV. THE ATOMIC ARSENAL

1. See the collection of essays in Bernard Brodie, ed, *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*.
2. For a survey of service skepticism after the war about the strategic impact of atomic weapons, see Noel Francis Parrish, *Behind the Sheltering Bomb: Military Indecision from Alamogordo to Korea*, 103–39; Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950*, 195–217; Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*. Chapter VII of Little looks at Air Force attitudes. As pointed out in Chapter I of this volume, Air Force planners initially saw the atomic bomb as useful only against carefully selected military-industrial targets. For the Navy's point of view, see Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943–1946*, 240–50. Also see Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941–1945*, 205–13, which deals with, among other things, Army views, perhaps the most conservative of all. The problems arising from shortages of materials are discussed in Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 35–42, 147–49, 275–76. On the international control issue, see Joseph I Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945–1949*.
3. See Richard G Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Nuclear Navy, 1946–1962*.
4. Ltr Forrestal to Chan Gurney, 8 Dec 47, quoted in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 350–51.
5. Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, 482–530, covers the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Text of law is in Jt Cte on Atomic Energy, *Atomic Energy Legislation Through 88th Congress, 1 Session* (1964), 205–24.
6. PL 585, 79 Cong, Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
7. Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, pt 1:68.
8. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 240–41; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 48–53.
9. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 136–37; excerpt from mins jt AEC-MLC mtg, 13 Aug 47, RG 330, CD 11–1–9; MLC mins, 3 Sep 47, agenda item 2, cited in Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, pt 1:68.
10. Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, 87–93; memo Brereton for SecWar and SecNav, 4 Sep 47, memo Sullivan for Brereton, 18 Sep 47, memo Eisenhower for Brereton, 16 Oct 47, memo Spaatz for Brereton, 31 Oct 47, ltr Brereton to Lilienthal, 12 Nov 47, MLC memo of discussions on custody, 30 Jun 48, all in RG 330, CD 11–1–9.
11. Brereton memo, 16 Dec 47, RG 330, OSD Atomic Energy Records.
12. AEC 2/5, "Custody of Atomic Weapons," 1 Mar 48, *ibid*; extract of mins jt AEC-MLC mtg, 3 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 11–1–9.
13. Memo Brereton for SecDef, 4 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 16–1–6; memo Brereton for SecDef, 11 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–30.
14. Memo Royall, Sullivan, and Symington for SecDef, 13 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–30. The Joint Chiefs later added their concurrence to the service secretaries' recommendation. See memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 20 Mar 48, *ibid*. Memo Ohly for Capt Tom B Hill USN (AFSWP), 19 Mar 48, *ibid*. No copy of the draft letter to the President has been found in OSD files.

15. Spaatz's views and Forrestal's instructions to Ohly, handwritten by Ohly in the margin, from memo Ohly for Forrestal, 29 Mar 48, *ibid*.
16. Ltr Carpenter to Lilienthal, 23 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 11–1–9; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 165–67; memo Carpenter for Nichols, 2 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 11–1–9.
17. Carpenter, "Confidential Recollections," 32, Carpenter Papers.
18. Draft mins 29th AEC-MLC conf, 18 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 11–1–9; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 167–68.
19. Memo Leva for Forrestal, 18 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 11–1–9; draft of suggested jt state by AEC and NME on custody, 23 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 16–1–6 and CD 12–1–30; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 168–69.
20. Unsigned memo, 30 Jun 48, enc to memo Nichols for Ohly, 2 Jul 48, Box 2, Forrestal Papers, WNRC. Lilienthal's account of the meeting is in David E Lilienthal, *The Atomic Energy Years*, vol II in *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal*, 373–77 (hereafter cited as *Lilienthal Journals*, II).
21. *Lilienthal Journals*, II:377; ltr Lilienthal to Forrestal, 1 Jul 48, w/draft memo AEC for Truman, 1 Jul 48, RG 330, OSD Atomic Energy Records; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 458.
22. Ltr Forrestal to Truman, 21 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–30.
23. Memo Lilienthal for Truman, 21 Jul 48, PSF, Truman Papers; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 460–61; *Lilienthal Journals*, II:388–92. In this account of the 21 July meeting, Lilienthal gives a very critical description of the NME presentation to the President, especially the contributions of Carpenter and Symington. Lilienthal described the meeting as "one of the most important . . . I have ever attended."
24. Memo Webb for Truman, 22 Jul 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
25. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 461; Truman to Forrestal, 6 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 12–1–30; *Lilienthal Journals*, II:392. For the President's public statement, issued on 24 July 1949, see *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 414–16.
26. Carpenter, "Confidential Recollections," 33, Carpenter Papers; ltr Forrestal to service secs, 28 Jul 48, ltr Forrestal to Carpenter, 28 Jul 48, both in RG 330, CD 12–1–30.
27. Ltr Forrestal to Lilienthal, 4 Nov 48, enc, (n d), and ltr Lilienthal to Forrestal, 22 Nov 48, both in RG 330, OSD Atomic Energy Records. On the AEC initiation of this agreement, see memo Webster for Forrestal, 28 Sep 48, *ibid*.
28. Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, pt 1:107–08.
29. Memo service chiefs for Chief AFSWP, 7 Sep 48, quoted in Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, pt 1:73; memo Russell P Andrews for John Steelman, 14 Mar 49, CF, Truman Papers; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 354–55; AEC-AFSWP agreement on opn and maint of storage sites, 11 May 49, [MLC files], summarized in Dept of Defense, *History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons*, 169.
30. Dept of Defense, *History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons*, 13–14; memo LeBaron for Early, 22 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 12–1–30; memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 7 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 11–1–9.
31. Ltr Johnson to Truman, 11 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb). Also see memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 10 Jul 50, and memo service secs for Johnson, 10 Jul 50, *ibid*; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 521–22, 524–25; memo Johnson for Chm JCS, 11 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb).
32. "Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration Between the Authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the Matter of Tube Alloys," 19 Aug 43, *FRUS: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec*, 1943, 1117–19.
33. Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, 456–59, 477–81; Margaret Gowing, *Policy Making*, vol I in *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952*, 241–72; entry, 11 Sep 47, Forrestal Diary, 1812, Forrestal Papers.
34. Mins mtg of Secs of State, War, and Navy, 11 Sep 47, *FRUS 1947*, I:838–40; memo

- Kennan for Lovett, 24 Oct 47, *ibid*, 842–43 and 843, n2; mins mtg Amer mems CPC, 5 Nov 47, *ibid*, 852–60. Also see Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 275–79.
35. Memcon by Forrestal, 16 Nov 47, *FRUS* 1947, 1:864–66; mins mtg Amer mems CPC with Chm JCAE and Chm Sen For Rels Cte, 26 Nov 47, *ibid*, 870–79.
 36. Entry, 7 Jan 48, Forrestal Diary, 2015–16, Forrestal Papers. For the text of the *modus vivendi* and its appendices, see *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:683–87. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 279–84, surveys the course of the negotiations leading to the *modus vivendi*.
 37. PL 585, Sec 1(a), 79 Cong, Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
 38. Leahy Diary, 5–6 May 48, cited in Robert H Ferrell, *George C. Marshall*, vol XV in *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, 246.
 39. Notes, mtg Cte of Four, 30 Mar 48, 1948 notebook (Atom), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Royall for NSC, 19 May 48, *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:572–73.
 40. Memo for the President, 21 May 48, PSF, Truman Papers.
 41. Little, *Building an Atomic Air Force*, 90; NSC Action No 62–b, 3 Jun 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; notes, mtg War Council, 15 Jun 48, 1948 notebook (Atom), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Ohly for Carpenter, 17 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 23–1–19.
 42. Transc of conf of SecDef with JCS, 30 Jun 48, 19–24, RG 330, CD 9–3–13; memo for the President, 2 Jul 48, sub: Summary of Discussion at 14th NSC Mtg [1 Jul 48], PSF, Truman Papers.
 43. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 458; entry, 28 Jul 48, Forrestal Diary, 2393, Forrestal Papers.
 44. NSC, rpt on status of projects as of 30 Aug 48, 6, RG 330, CD 6–2–9; memo for Truman, (n d), summary of discussion at 21st Mtg NSC [16 Sep 48], PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
 45. NSC 30, w/attach, *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:625–28.
 46. Entry, 13 Sep 48, Forrestal Diary, 2494, Forrestal Papers (portions in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 487).
 47. Ohly memo for the record, 23 Aug 48, in Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 290; ltr MajGen DM Schlatter USAF mem MLC to Carpenter, 14 Sep 48, and draft memo Carpenter for SecDef, 4 Oct 48, RG 330, OSD Atomic Energy Records. Also see Little, *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force*, pt 1:62–64.
 48. Rpt Carpenter for SecDef, Organizational Structure of AE Activities within NME, 4 Oct 48, rev 7 Oct 48, RG 330, OSD Atomic Energy Records.
 49. For comments of MLC members, see memo BrigGen RC Wilson USAF for Carpenter, 20 Oct 48, memo RAdm RA Ofstie USN, 20 Oct 48, memo MajGen DM Schlatter for Carpenter, 21 Oct 48, memo Adm WS Parsons USN, 22 Oct 48, memo MajGen KD Nichols USA for Webster, 27 Oct 48, all in *ibid*.
 50. For a summary of developments, see MLC, “Annual Report of the Military Liaison Committee to the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 1950,” 1 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 319.1 (MLC).
 51. Remarks to a Group of New Democratic Senators and Representatives, 6 Apr 49, *Truman Public Papers*, 1949, 199–200; see enc, 1 Mar 50, to memo Webster for SecDef, 8 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 12–2–38.
 52. Memo Early for SecDef, 21 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 12–2–38.
 53. MLC, “Annual Report of the Military Liaison Committee to the Secretary of Defense for the Fiscal Year 1948,” 20 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 25–1–38. Weapons-yield figures from Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 672.
 54. JCAE Chron, 1–6; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 37–42, 66–79, 147; Leslie R Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project*, 373–80.
 55. Herken, *Winning Weapon*, 196–97; DoD PR No 227–82, 1 Jun 82; David Alan Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950,” 26; ltr DoE to author, 30 Jun 82.
 56. *Lilienthal Journals*, II:165–66; ltr Lilienthal, Forrestal, and Patterson to Truman, 1 Jan 47, with notation “2/5/47 Approved Harry Truman,” CF, Truman Papers. At the briefing

- Lilienthal delivered the stockpile numbers orally, leaving no written record. Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile," 27, cites evidence that the number was probably seven complete weapons, with partial assemblies of a few others. According to Department of Energy figures, cited in DoD Press Release No. 227–82, 1 June 1982, the United States had 13 weapons stockpiled at the end of fiscal year 1947. See also JCAE Chron, 2, for summary of Truman's directive (16 Apr 47) on production.
57. Draft memo, JCS for CAEC through CMLC, 17 Dec 47, enc to JCS 1745/5, 8 Dec 47, RG 218, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 8; Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," 67–68.
 58. Memo AG Noble BuOrd for CNO, 17 Mar 48, memo Denfeld CNO for Sullivan SecNav, 19 Mar 48, memo Sullivan for Chm MLC, 20 Mar 48, memo Sullivan for SecArmy and SecAF, 22 Mar 48, all in RG 330, CD 11–1–9; Lee Bowen, *The Development of Weapons*, vol IV in Bowen and Little, *A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943–1953*, pt 1:101–09.
 59. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 164–65, 175–78, 672; Herbert York, *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb*, 20.
 60. Memo Webster for JCS, 1 Oct 48, enc to JCS 1823/7, RG 218, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 12; memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 9 Dec 48, RG 330, CD 25–1–38; ltr Webster to AEC, 28 Jan 49, quoted in JCAE Chron, 8 (portions quoted in Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 178).
 61. Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1950, 10 Jan 49, *Truman Public Papers, 1949*, 82; mins exec mtg JCAE, 26 Apr 49, DoE Records. Also see Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 179–81, and *Lilienthal Journals*, II:510–11.
 62. Ltr Webster to AEC, 26 May 49, quoted in JCAE Chron, 9.
 63. JCS 1823/14, 14 Jun 49, RG 218, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 15.
 64. JCAE Chron, 10.
 65. Ltr McMahon to Johnson, 14 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 19–2–17; ltr Johnson to McMahon, 19 Jul 49, *ibid*.
 66. *Lilienthal Journals*, II:501–02, 508–11, 527–28; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 181–83; mins exec mtg JCAE, 10 Mar 49, DoE Records.
 67. Ltr Webster to SecDef, 24 Jun 49, RG 330, CD 11–1–9; ltr Truman to Souers, 26 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 19–2–17, and in *FRUS 1949*, I:501–03.
 68. Memo Kennan for SecState et al, 3 Aug 49, *FRUS 1949*, I:507–09; ltr Johnson to Truman, 5 Aug 49, PSF, Truman Papers.
 69. Memo Webster for SecDef, 2 Sep 49, enc to draft rpt, (n d), RG 330, CD 19–2–17; memo Ohly for SecDef, 30 Sep 49, *ibid* (Johnson's approval is indicated on this document).
 70. Ltr Souers to SecState, SecDef, and Chm AEC, 10 Oct 49, w/enc, 10 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 19–2–17; without financial appen in *FRUS 1949*, I:559–64.
 71. Ltr Truman to Lilienthal, 19 Oct 49, CF, Truman Papers; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 380; ltrs Truman to Albert Thomas, Brien McMahon, and Joseph C O'Mahoney, 17 Oct 49, CF, Truman Papers. Also see memo BrigGen AR Luedecke Exec Sec MLC for members MLC, 11 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 11–1–9; memo Ohly for LeBaron, 12 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 19–2–17.
 72. Ltr Truman to Johnson, 19 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 19–2–17, and CF, Truman Papers; ltr Johnson to Truman, 5 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 11–1–9, and PSF, Truman Papers; memo Truman for SecDef, 10 Oct 49, PSF, Truman Papers.
 73. Memo LeBaron for SecDef, 5 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 11–1–9; Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," 79.
 74. Responses by JCS to points raised in letter by President to SecDef, 19 Oct 49, (n d), enc to memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 2 Dec 49, RG 330, CD 11–1–9.
 75. Among the more useful published accounts on the subject are the following: Warner R

- Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide Without Actually Choosing," 24–46; Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," 62–87; York, *The Advisors*; R Gordon Arneson, "The H-Bomb Decision," 27–29, 24–27, 43; McGeorge Bundy, "The Missed Chance to Stop the H-Bomb," 13–14, 16–20, 22.
76. JCAE Chron, 1; Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, I:104, 235, 631–32; York, *The Advisors*, 20–28.
 77. Hillenkoetter memo (unaddressed), 9 Sep 49, PSF, Intl File, Truman Papers.
 78. Ltr Bush, Oppenheimer, Bacher and Parsons to Vandenberg, 20 Sep 49, and memo Vandenberg for Johnson, ca 21 Sep 49, both in PSF, Restricted Data Collection, Truman Papers; *Truman Public Papers*, 1949, 485. Truman did not say exactly when the Soviet detonation had taken place. At the time intelligence analysts could only estimate that it had occurred some time during the last week of August. The date was later pinpointed to be 29 August 1949.
 79. OSI SR 10–49, 1 Jul 49, PSF, Intl File, Truman Papers. The estimate of Soviet capabilities was compiled by the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee (JNEIC), comprised of technical experts representing the CIA, AEC, State Department, and the military services.
 80. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 375–77.
 81. Ltr McMahon to Lilienthal, 17 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 16–1–17.
 82. Strauss memo printed in Lewis I. Strauss, *Men and Decisions*, 216–17.
 83. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 381–85; ltr Oppenheimer to Lilienthal, 30 Oct 49, w/attachs, RG 330, CD 16–1–17 (portions printed in *FRUS* 1949, I:569–73).
 84. Strauss, *Men and Decisions*, 218–19.
 85. Ltr Lilienthal to Truman, 9 Nov 49, attach to memo with appens from AEC for the President, (n d), RG 330, CD 16–1–17, and *FRUS* 1949, I:576–85.
 86. Memo LeBaron for DepSecDef, (n d) [Nov 49], RG 330, CD 16–1–17.
 87. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 23 Nov 49, *ibid*, and *FRUS* 1949, I:595–96.
 88. Truman to Souers, 19 Nov 49, RG 330, CD 16–1–17, and *FRUS* 1949, I:587–88; memcon by Acheson, 21 Nov 49, Secretary's Memos Nov–Dec 1949 file, SDF Lot 53D444, State Dept; *FRUS* 1949, I:587, n2; memo LeBaron for Johnson through Early, 23 Nov 49, RG 330, CD 16–1–17; memo Webb for State mems Atomic Working Grp, 3 Dec 49, *FRUS* 1949, I:599–600.
 89. Ltr McMahon to Truman, 21 Nov 49, RG 330, CD 16–1–17; ltr Strauss to Truman, 25 Nov 49, w/enc, *ibid*; Strauss, *Men and Decisions*, 219; Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 395–96.
 90. This reconstruction of talks between Nitze and Lilienthal draws on the author's conversations with Nitze and two additional sources: Interv with Nitze, 5 Aug 75, 1–8, Truman Oral History Collection; interv Nitze, 15–18 Oct 77, 230–37, in Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
 91. Memo by Nitze, 19 Dec 49, *FRUS* 1949, I:610–11.
 92. *Lilienthal Journals*, II:613–14; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 348.
 93. McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years*, 177–78; *Lilienthal Journals*, II:615, 620–21; memo Exec Sec NSC to SecState, 19 Jun 50, w/enc, memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 13 Jan 50, *FRUS* 1950, I:503–11.
 94. Memo of telcon by Acheson, 19 Jan 50, *FRUS* 1950, I:511; Arneson, "The H-Bomb Decision," pt II:25.
 95. *Lilienthal Journals*, II:624.
 96. *Ibid*, 623–32; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 348–49; memo Lilienthal for Exec Sec NSC, 15 Feb 50, RG 330, CD 11–1–9.
 97. This account is from Arneson, "The H-Bomb Decision," pt I:27–28. Also see Truman, *Memoirs*, II:308–09, and Statement by the President on the Hydrogen Bomb, 31 Jan 50,

- Truman Public Papers*, 1950, 138. The recommendations as approved are filed in PSF, Truman Papers.
98. Appen B, AEC staff rpt, sub: "The Super," attach to Rpt to the Special Committee on Atomic Energy; "Development of Thermonuclear Weapons," 31 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 16-1-17.
 99. Ltr J Edgar Hoover to Johnson, 6 Feb 50, RG 330, CD 200-1-18; CIA OSI, 24 Mar 50, PSF, Truman Papers; memo Loper for LeBaron, 16 Feb 50, *ibid*.
 100. Ltr Johnson to Truman, 24 Feb 50, RG 330, CD 16-1-17, and *FRUS* 1950, I:538-39 (notation on OSD file copy of this letter indicates that original left with President on 28 Feb 50); memo Lay for SecState, SecDef, and Chm AEC, 1 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 11-1-9, and *FRUS* 1950, I:538.
 101. *Lilienthal Journals*, II:567-68, 584-85, 635-36; memo Lay for SecState and SecDef and Acting Chm AEC, 10 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 16-1-17.
 102. Special Cte of NSC on Development of Thermonuclear Wpns, "Report," 9 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 16-1-17 (sanitized version in *FRUS* 1950, I:541-42). Also, Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 417.
 103. Truman, *Memoirs*, II:311; Pike and Johnson to Truman, [25 May 50], RG 330, CD 16-1-17.
 104. Bundy, "The Missed Chance to Stop the H-Bomb," 13-14, 16-20, 22. On the development of the thermonuclear bomb, see Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, 529-31, 539-45, 590-93.
 105. David Holloway, "Soviet Thermonuclear Development," 192-97.

XVI. THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

1. The negotiation of the Rio Treaty is documented in *FRUS* 1946, XI:1-27, and *FRUS* 1947, VIII:1-93. J Lloyd Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960*, and Donald Marquand Dozer, *Are We Good Neighbors? Three Decades of Inter-American Relations, 1930-1960*, provide overviews of U.S.-Latin American relations.
2. Ismay, *NATO*, 7; Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950*, 397.
3. Ltr Lord Inverchapel UK Amb to US to Marshall, w/enc, 13 Jan 50, in *FRUS* 1948, III:3-6; ltr Marshall to Lord Inverchapel, 20 Jan 48, *ibid*, 8-9; ed note, *ibid*, 12; Ismay, *NATO*, 7-8, 168-70; Timothy P Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 61-74.
4. Alan K Henrikson, "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1952," 7-8. On conditions and capabilities in West European countries, see SWNCC 360, 21 Apr 47, *FRUS* 1947, I:725-33, and rpt by Jt Strat Survey Cte, 29 Apr 47, *ibid*, 736-50.
5. Lord Gladwyn [Jebb], *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn*, 214; *FRUS* 1948, III:46-48, 49-50, 52; Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949*, 42-43.
6. Memo John D Hickerson Dir of Eur Affairs for SecState, 19 Jan 48, *FRUS* 1948, III:6-7; memo Kennan Dir PPS for SecState, 20 Jan 48, *ibid*, 7-8; PPS 27, 23 Mar 48, *ibid*, 61-64; Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, 39-41; Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-50*, 399-404.
7. Memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 12 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 9-2-17; memo Gruenther Dir JS for JCS, 18 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 9-2-19; *FRUS* 1948, III:59; Truman, *Memoirs*, II:241.
8. Mins First Mtg US-UK-Canada Security Convs, 22 Mar 48, *FRUS* 1948, III:59-61 (emphasis in original); mins Second Mtg Security Convs, 23 Mar 48, *ibid*, 64-65.
9. Mins Second Mtg Security Convs, 23 Mar 48, *ibid*, 64-66; mins Third Mtg Security Convs, 24 Mar 48, *ibid*, 66-67; mins Fifth Mtg Security Convs, 31 Mar 48, *ibid*, 70-71.

10. Mins Fourth Mtg Security Convs, 29 Mar 48, *ibid*, 69–70.
11. Mins Sixth Mtg Security Convs, 1 Apr 48, w/enc, 1 Apr 48, *ibid*, 71–75.
12. Memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 12 Mar 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–17.
13. Ltr Marshall to Exec Sec NSC, 24 Mar 48, cited in *FRUS 1948*, III:61, n1; *ibid*, 85, n2.
14. NSC 9, 13 Apr 48, *ibid*, 85–88.
15. Entry, 23 Apr 48, Forrestal Diary, 2214–15, Forrestal Papers; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 425.
16. Memo Forrestal for NSC, 28 Apr 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49.
17. Memo Kennan for Lovett, 7 May 48, w/encs (NSC 9/2) and draft Senate res on UN, *FRUS 1948*, III:116–19.
18. JCS views quoted and summarized in memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, [20 May 48], RG 330, CD 6–2–49.
19. Memo for the President, 21 May 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; NSC Action No 46, 20 May 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records. Also see Truman, *Memoirs*, II:245–46.
20. S Res 239 (Vandenberg Resolution), 11 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, III:135–36.
21. NSC 14, 14 Jun 48, pubd with slight changes as NSC 14/1, 1 Jul 48, *ibid*, I:585–88.
22. NSC Action No 71, 1 Jul 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records. See NSC 9/3, 28 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, III:140–41; NSC Action No 72, 1 Jul 48, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records; Truman, *Memoirs*, II:246; *FRUS 1948*, I:585, n3.
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24. Condit, *JCS History*, II:288, 368.
25. *Ibid*, 368; Gruenther memcon between US CoS and Reps of Br CoS, 16 Jun 48, RG 218, CCS 092, W Eur (3–12–48) sec 2; memo by US CoS to Reps of Br CoS on Command Arrangements, 23 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–48.
26. Memo Gruenther for JCS, 11 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49; UK Aide-Mémoire on Command Arrangements, [13 Aug 48], RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48) sec 5; memo Lalor for JCS, 16 Aug 48, w/enc, (16 Aug 48), summarizing JCS-BSM (Br Service Mission) mtg, 13 Aug 48, *ibid*.
27. Agreed final version of mins of Newport mtg, 20–22 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–20; [Ohly] memo for record, 23 Aug 48, *ibid*.
28. Memo Marshall for Truman, 23 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49; memo S Marshall Carter Sp Asst to SecState for Gruenther, 24 Aug 48, *ibid*; *FRUS 1948*, III:221–22; Ohly memo for record, 23 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–20; memo Lalor for JCS, 24 Aug 48, w/enc, (n d), Leahy files, Western European Union 1948 folder, Modern Military Branch, NARS.
29. Joint msg Br and Fr For Mins to SecState, 17 Apr 48, *FRUS 1948*, III, 91; Condit, *JCS History*, II:362; cable Marshall to AmEmb in France, 23 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, III:139; ltr Lovett to Forrestal, 23 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49.
30. Memo Ohly for Forrestal, 24 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49; memo Forrestal for JCS, 25 Jun 48, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48), sec 3; memo Ohly for Forrestal, 26 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49; ltr Forrestal to Lovett, 30 Jun 48, *ibid*.
31. Ltr Forrestal to Marshall, 3 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49.
32. WARX 85969 to Eur Cmdrs, 14 Jul 48, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48) sec 4; NSC 9/4, 20 Jul 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers. Also see *FRUS 1948*, III:189.
33. *FRUS 1948*, III:190–92.
34. Cable Marshall to AmEmb in UK, 16 Jul 48, *ibid*, 188; Lemnitzer, DELWU 3 to Dept of Army, 23 Jul 48, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48) sec 4; *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, 17–24 Jul 48, 9399.
35. NSC 9/4, 20 Jul 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; memo Robert J Wood for SecDef, 2 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49; Ohly memo for record, 23 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 9–2–20.
36. Ohly memo for record, 23 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–43; Marshall memcon, 17 Aug 48,

- FRUS 1948*, III:643; aide-mémoire Fr Amb to SecState, 15 Sep 48, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48) sec 6; Ohly memo for record, 23 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–43.
37. Marshall memcon, 17 Aug 48, *FRUS 1948*, III:643–44; memo MS Carter for Marshall, 19 Aug 48, *ibid*, 644; cable Lovett to AmEmb France, 20 Sep 48, *ibid*, 253; memo Col Jerry D Page USAF (OSD) for SecDef, 29 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49; memo DCS P&O USA for SecState, 10 Oct 48, *FRUS 1948*, III:664–66.
 38. Condit, *JCS History*, II:371; Ismay, *NATO*, 9; Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1947–48*, 113n.
 39. Ltr Gladwyn Jebb to US Amb to UK, 14 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–43; ltrs Lovett to Forrestal, 12 Oct 48, 16 Nov 48, and 17 Nov 48, all in *ibid*.
 40. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 26 Oct 48, memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 13 Dec 48, ltr Forrestal to SecState, 18 Dec 48, all in *ibid*.
 41. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 31 Dec 48, *ibid*; ltr Forrestal to SecState, 4 Jan 49, *ibid*; cable Lovett to USEmb in UK, 5 Jan 49, *FRUS 1949*, IV:9; ltr Lovett to SecDef, 6 Jan 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–43; ltr Johnson to Dr JH Taggart, 12 Apr 49, *ibid*.
 42. For minutes of these meetings, see *FRUS 1948*, III:148ff; memo by participants in Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 6 Jul–9 Sep 48, *ibid*, 237–48; mins Seventh Mtg of Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 10 Sep 48, *ibid*, 249–50; memo Ambs of Belg, Fr, GrBr, and Nether and Min of Luxem to DeptState, 29 Oct 48, *ibid*, 270.
 43. Memo Forrestal for Exec Sec NSC, 27 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49; memo Ohly for JCS, 2 Nov 48, *ibid*.
 44. NSC 9/5, NSC Collection, Modern Military Branch, NARS.
 45. NSC 9/6, RG 330, CD 6–2–49, and in *FRUS 1948*, III:289–93.
 46. Memo NSC for the President, 3 Dec 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
 47. IWG D–5/1a, Rpt of Intl Working Grp to Ambs Cte, 24 Dec 48, *FRUS 1948*, III:333–43.
 48. Ltr Ohly to SecState, 6 Jan 49, *FRUS 1949*, IV:9–10; memo Denfeld for SecDef, 5 Jan 49, *ibid*, 10–13.
 49. For the record of both the international and senatorial group discussions, see *FRUS 1949*, IV:27ff, and Senate Cte on For Rel, *The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty*, in *Hearings Held in Executive Session*, 80 Cong, 2 sess, and 81 Cong, 1 sess (pub 1973), 85–178 (hereafter cited as *Vandenberg Resolution and NAT*).
 50. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 277–84; also see *FRUS 1949*, IV:64–65, 73–74, 108–10, 141–42. For release of the treaty text, see *ibid*, 237, 281–85.
 51. North Atlantic Treaty, 4 Apr 49, *FRUS 1949*, IV:281–85, and in Ismay, *NATO*, 17–19.
 52. Johnson test, 28 Apr 49, Senate Cte on For Rel, *Hearings: North Atlantic Treaty*, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), 146; *Congressional Record*, vol 95, pt 8:9916; *Truman Public Papers, 1949*, 187.
 53. Mins Conf For Mins at Washington, 2 Apr 49, *FRUS 1949*, IV:271–81; Ismay, *NATO*, 23; AGPO memo No 1, 18 Aug 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–18; notes, mtg AFPC, 16 Aug 49, 1949 notebook (North Atlantic Pact), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
 54. Memo Denfeld (for JCS) for Johnson, 23 Jun 49, w/enc, (n d), memo McNarney for Johnson, 6 Jul 49, ltr Acheson to Johnson, 22 Jul 49, memo Lalor (for JCS) for Johnson, 2 Aug 49, all in RG 330, CD 6–4–18.
 55. US Working Grp, study re US position on org under NAT, 22 Aug 49, *ibid*.
 56. Cable SecState to AmEmb UK, 31 Aug 49, *FRUS 1949*, IV:321–22; cable SecState to AmEmb Italy, 3 Sep 49, *ibid*, 323–24; memcon USec's mtg of 7 Sep 49, (n d), *ibid*, 324; SecState memcon, 14 Sep 49, *ibid*, 328; Condit, *JCS History*, II:393, 395–96.
 57. For the report of the international working group, see NSC 57, "NAT Organization," 13 Sep 49, w/enc IGPO D–5, 9 Sep 49, NSC Collection, Modern Military Branch, NARS; see also *FRUS 1949*, IV:329–37.

58. Mins First DC Mtg, 5 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–18; memo Johnson for Chm NAC, 13 Oct 49, *ibid*.
59. Memo Halaby for Johnson, 18 Nov 49, w/enc rpt to NAC on DFEC, 17 Nov 49, RG 330, CD 125–2–1; ed note, *FRUS 1949*, IV:352; Dept of State, *Bulletin*, 28 Nov 49, 819–21.
60. Acheson seminar, 13 Feb 54, reel 3, track 1, 2, Acheson Papers, HSTL.
61. Memo Johnson for Chm JCS, 14 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–18; memo for DepSecDef and ASecDefs, 9 Nov 49, ISA Notebook, OSD Hist; memo Johnson for service secs et al, 25 Nov 49, OSD Directives Book, 1949, No IB–24; memo Johnson for service secs et al, 13 Mar 50, ISA notebook, OSD Hist; memo Johnson for service secs et al, 15 May 50, *ibid*.
62. Johnson test, 21 Apr 49, *Vandenberg Resolution and NAT*, 217–19; Johnson test, 28 Apr 49, *North Atlantic Treaty*, 145–87. Also see the views of the Joint Chiefs in House Cte on Intl Rel, *Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943–50* (pub 1976), V, pt 1:18–45.
63. PL 329, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 6 Oct 49, in *U.S. Statutes at Large, 1949*, LXIII, pt 1.
64. Mins First DC Mtg, 5 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 6–4–18; ltr Halaby to George W Perkins, 12 Oct 49, *ibid*; Condit, *JCS History*, II:399–400; JCS 1868/130, 3 Oct 49, and JCS decision on 11 Oct 49, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48) sec 31.
65. MC 3/1, (n d), enc to memo Halaby for Johnson, 21 Nov 49, RG 330, CD 125–2–1; memcon Dep Dir Off of Eur Aff, 3 Dec 49, *FRUS 1949*, IV:356–58; Dept of State, *Bulletin*, 19 Dec 49, 948.
66. Memcon Dep Dir Off of Eur Aff, 3 Dec 49, *FRUS 1949*, IV:357–58; DC 6/1, 1 Dec 49, *ibid*, 352–56.
67. Memcon SecState, 16 Dec 49, *ibid*, 362–64; Halaby memo for the files, 10 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 6–4–18; memo Truman for Acheson, 27 Jan 50, CF, Truman Papers.
68. Standing Group (SG) 13/16, 4 Jan 50, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48) sec 40; Condit, *JCS History*, II:405–06.
69. NATO Medium Term Defense Plan for 1 Jul 54, (n d), enc to LtGen WD Crittenberger USA memo for Adm Davis Dir JS, Mar 50, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48) sec 42; Condit, *JCS History*, II:405–06.
70. JCS memo for NATO Standing Group, 22 Mar 50, pts I and III, derived from JCS 2073/8, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48) sec 43; Condit, *JCS History*, II:406.
71. Communiqué of Mil Cte of NATO, 28 Mar 50, *FRUS 1950*, III:35–36; draft communiqué of Def Cte, 1 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 6–4–18.
72. State Dept draft rpt, FMD B–2/1b, 27 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers) (see also *FRUS 1950*, III:72–75); Capt AC Murdaugh USN (OSD) memo for Gen Burns, 29 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 6–4–18.
73. Memo Halaby for Gen Edwards, Adm Struble, and Gen Gruenther, 24 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 9–4–29; FM D B–2/1b, 27 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers).
74. State Dept rpt, FM D B–1b, 30 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 9–4–29. An earlier version of this paper designated FM D B–1a, 25 Apr 50, is printed in *FRUS 1950*, III:65–69.
75. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 4 May 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers); ltr Johnson to Acheson, 6 May 50, RG 330, CD 9–4–29; memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 4 May 50, *ibid*; ltr Johnson to Acheson, 6 May 50, *ibid*.
76. See Laurence W Martin, “The American Decision to Rearm Germany,” in Stein, *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*, 645–49, and Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, 137–41, 169–71, and *passim*.
77. NSC 68, 14 Apr 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:275.
78. Memo Davis (for JCS) for Johnson, 28 Apr 50, memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 2 May 50, memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 17 May 50, all in RG 330, CD 9–4–29.
79. State Dept comments on JCS views, (n d [ca 13 May 50]), RG 330, CD 337 (Four

- Powers). Presumably this is a summary of State Department views on latest JCS memo of 2 May 1950 on German rearmament. Conolly cable to CNO, 10 May 50, *ibid*.
80. Martin, "Decision to Rearm Germany," 650; rpt Conolly to SecDef and JCS, 20 May 50, 3, RG 330, CD 9–4–29.
 81. Ltr Johnson to Acheson, 6 May 50, RG 330, CD 9–4–29.
 82. Memo Johnson for Bradley, 3 May 50, RG 330, CD 6–4–18.
 83. Cable SecState for President, 18 May 50, *FRUS* 1950, III:123–25; memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 16 May 50, RG 330, CD 6–4–18; ltr Leven C Allen OSD to Acheson, 19 May 50, *ibid*.
 84. Ismay, *NATO*, 28–29 (emphasis in original); cable SecState for President, 18 May 50, *FRUS* 1950, III:123–25.
 85. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 398–99.
 86. Conolly rpt to SecDef and JCS, 20 May 50, 7–8, RG 330, CD 9–4–29; Ismay, *NATO*, 28–29.
 87. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 399–400.

XVII. THE FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

1. Ltr Acheson to SecWar Patterson, 5 Mar 47, *FRUS* 1947, III:197–98.
2. Most of SWNCC 360, 21 Apr 47, is printed in *ibid*, 204–19; an additional excerpt is in *ibid*, I:725–33. See also memo Blum for Ohly, 21 Oct 47, RG 330, CD 3–1–7.
3. Memo Nathaniel H Goodrich for Leva, 19 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 19–1–14; memo Townsend Hoopes for Leva, w/attach, 3 Dec 48, RG 330, CD 19–2–10.
4. Notes, mtg Cte of Four, 9 Mar 48, 1948 notebook (North Atlantic), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; Condit, *JCS History*, II:410; Byron Fairchild, "History of Military Assistance Programs," ch IX, 23–25.
5. Memo Leva for Forrestal, 4 May 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; memo Lutes for Forrestal, 29 Apr 48, *ibid*; Kaplan, *A Community of Interests*, 19; Chester J Pach, Jr, "Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945–1949," 351–53.
6. Notes, mtg War Council, 4 May 48, 1948 notebook (North Atlantic), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
7. Memo Leva for SecDef, 4 May 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
8. Memo Leva for SecDef, 5 May 48, *ibid*.
9. Ltr Marshall and Forrestal to Webb, 7 May 48, Box 12, Clifford Papers; President's News Conference, 13 May 48, *Truman Public Papers*, 1948, 253. Also see *Vandenberg Resolution and NAT*, 40–41.
10. NSC 9/3, 28 Jun 48, *FRUS* 1948, III:141.
11. *Vandenberg Resolution and NAT*, 41, 66. Text of the Vandenberg Resolution (S Res 239), 11 Jun 48, is in *FRUS* 1948, III:135–36.
12. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 1 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; NSC 14/1, 1 Jul 48, *ibid*, and *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:585–88.
13. NSC 14/1, 1 Jul 48, CD 6–2–46, and *FRUS* 1948, I, pt 2:585–88.
14. Memo Leahy (for JCS) for SecDef, 1 Jul 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49; ltr Forrestal to SecState, 3 Jul 48, *ibid*; WARX 85969 to European cmdrs, 14 Jul 48, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48) sec 4. Also see cable Marshall to US Emb London, 16 Jul 48, *FRUS* 1948, III:188.
15. NSC 9/4, 20 Jul 48, PSF, Truman Papers, and *FRUS* 1948, III:188–93; memo Robert J Wood for Gruenther, 18 Oct 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–49.

16. Memo Ohly for Halaby, 28 Jun 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; memo Ohly for Lutes, 27 Jul 48, *ibid*.
17. SANACC 360/11, 18 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 6–4–3.
18. Memo Forrestal for Chm SANACC, 9 Nov 48, *ibid*.
19. Ltr Webb to Forrestal, 10 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 19–1–42; memo Leva for SecDef, 12 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 19–1–41; ltr Forrestal to Webb, 16 Aug 48, RG 330, CD 19–1–42.
20. Memo Royall for Forrestal, 15 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–46 (emphasis in original).
21. Ohly memo for the record, 23 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–43; memo Forrestal for Royall, 26 Sep 48, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
22. See remarks by W Averell Harriman in mtg War Council, 25 Jan 49, 1949 notebook (Military Assistance), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; entry, 3 Oct 48, Forrestal Diary, 2535, Forrestal Papers.
23. Notes, mtg War Council, 5 Oct 48, 1948 notebook (Foreign Aid), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Carpenter for SecDef, 13 Dec 48, RG 330, CD 19–2–9; ltr Forrestal to SecState, 18 Dec 48, *ibid*; Fairchild, "Military Assistance," ch IX, 37–38; NSC 31, 13 Sep 48, *FRUS 1948*, III:648–49.
24. Inaugural Address, 20 Jan 49, *Truman Public Papers, 1949*, 114.
25. Memo Forrestal for SecArmy et al, 6 Jan 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA)Records, Box 99. Also see *FRUS 1949*, I:250n; Fairchild, "Military Assistance," ch IX, 45; Kaplan, *A Community of Interests*, 23–24.
26. Memo Ohly for DCI, 31 Jan 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; CIA ORE 41–49 (tentative), 7 Feb 49, enc to memo Hillenkoetter for SecDef, 7 Feb 49, *ibid* (also see final version of this study, ORE 41–49, 24 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 103–7–21).
27. Memo Halaby for Ohly, 14 Mar 49, Ohly personal papers; Kaplan, *A Community of Interests*, 28–34.
28. JCS 1868/58, 11 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46. Also see Condit, *JCS History*, II:419–22, and Kaplan, *A Community of Interests*, 22–23.
29. Notes, mtg Cte of Four, 18 Jan 49, 1949 notebook (MDAP), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
30. FACC D–3, 7 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46, and in *FRUS 1949*, I:250–57.
31. FACC D–3/1, 7 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
32. Memo Ohly for SecArmy et al, 8 Feb 49, *ibid*; John Sherman Sec WC for SecArmy et al, 24 Feb 49, *ibid*; Halaby memo for the files, 25 Feb 49, *ibid*.
33. Memo FACC for FASC, 25 Mar 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA)Records, Box 10, N7–1(1)–F2; presentation by Lemnitzer on status of For Mil Assist Program before Cte of Four, 22 Mar 49, 1949 notebook (MDAP), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Lemnitzer for Gruenther, 12 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
34. Ltr Johnson to Acheson, 19 May 49, w/enc, JCS study, (n d), *FRUS 1949*, I:300–11.
35. MAP D–G/14, 20 May 49, *ibid*, 311–12.
36. Interv with Lemnitzer, 21 Mar 74, 15, OSD Hist; entry, 13 Jan 49, Forrestal Diary, 2729, Forrestal Papers; Lemnitzer memo, 7 Feb 49, Forrestal Diary, 2757–59, Forrestal Papers.
37. JCS 1868/58, 11 Feb 49, enc to memo Lalor (for JCS) for SecDef, 11 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
38. Memo Lemnitzer for SecDef, 17 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–49.
39. Memo Denfeld (for JCS) to SecDef, 14 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
40. Memo Forrestal for JCS, 17 Mar 49, *ibid*.
41. Memo John Sherman Sec WC for mems War Council, 1 Apr 49, w/attach [Lemnitzer], RG 330, CD 6–2–46 and CD 114–1–6; memo Lemnitzer for SecDef, 2 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
42. Notes, mtg War Council, 5 Apr 49, 1949 notebook (Foreign Military Assistance), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; BoB, "Director's Review Book: Military Assistance Program," (n d, but probably after 12 Apr 49), PSF, Truman Papers.

43. Memo Allen for service secs, 20 Apr 49, w/attach, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; memo Acheson for Truman, (n d), sub: Military Assistance Program, PSF, Truman Papers; [Johnson] for Lemnitzer, 19 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
44. Ltr Acheson for Truman, 20 Apr 49, PSF, Truman Papers; memo Lemnitzer for Gruenther, 27 Apr 49, RG 330, OASD(ISA)Records, Box 4, N7–1(1)–B.1.
45. Requests by the Brussels Treaty Powers Denmark, Norway, and Italy to US Govt for Military Aid, Dept of State, *Bulletin*, 20 (17 Apr 49), 494–97; state by SecState Acheson on requests for military aid, 8 Apr 49, *ibid*, 439–94. For a brief legislative history of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, see Kaplan, *A Community of Interests*, 35–49.
46. Halaby memo for the files, (n d), RG 330, CD 6–2–46; *Vandenberg Resolution and NAT*. 211–49; record of discussion at mtg of Sen For Rel Cte, 21 Apr 49, *FRUS 1949*, I:288–91; *NY Times*, 22 Apr 49.
47. Memo Lemnitzer for SecDef, 13 Mar 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, 502; PL 154, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), derived from HJ Res 284.
48. Special Message to the Congress on the Need for a Military Aid Program, 25 Jul 49, *Truman Public Papers, 1949*, 395–400. Also see HR 5748, as submitted, printed in House Cte on Intl Rel, *Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 in Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943–50* (pub 1976), V, pt 1:13–18 (hereafter cited as *MDAA 1949*).
49. See David N Farnsworth, *The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, 110–11.
50. For test by Johnson and other DoD witnesses, see House Cte on For Aff, *Hearings: Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949*, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), 45–72; Senate Cte on For Rel and Cte on Armed Services, *Joint Hearings: Military Assistance Program*, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), 47–71, 74–110 (hereafter cited as *MAP*); Senate Cte on For Rel and Cte on Armed Services, *Joint Hearings Held in Executive Session: Military Assistance Program, 1949*, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949); *MDAA 1949*, passim.
51. Interv with Lemnitzer, 4 Mar 76, 16, OSD Hist.
52. Vandenberg, *Vandenberg Private Papers*, 503–04; HR 5895, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), as introduced 5 Aug 49, in *MDAA 1949*, 147–51.
53. H Rpt No 1265, Pt I, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), reprinted in *MDAA 1949*, 506–13; *Congressional Record*, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), vol 95, pt 9:11808 (House debate covers 11751–808). See also *MDAA 1949*, 501–05, for HR 5895 as passed by the House.
54. *MAP*, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18 and 19 Aug 49 (open hearings on S 2388); Senate Ctes on For Rel and Armed Svcs, *Military Assistance Program*, 81 Cong, 1 sess, 29 Jul 49, and 2, 5, 10–12, 16, 23–26, 29–31 Aug 49, and 8, 9, 12 Sep 49 (exec sess hearings on S 2388); S Rpt No 1068, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), 13 Sep 49.
55. *Congressional Record*, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), vol 95, pt 10:13168 (Senate debate on 13130–68); conf rpt in *ibid*, 13463–468; Senate debate and vote, 13411–16, and House debate and vote, 13468–77, *ibid*.
56. PL 329, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 81 Cong, 1 sess. Text of the law is reprinted in Kaplan, *A Community of Interests*, 214–22.
57. Memo Allen for JCS, 16 Sep 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; memo Denfeld (for JCS) for SecDef, 23 Sep 49, *ibid*.
58. Memo Lawton for the President, 7 Oct 49, PSF, Truman Papers; memo Lemnitzer for Burns, 7 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; *Congressional Record*, 81 Cong, 1 sess (1949), vol 95, pt 11:15009, 15090.
59. Ltr Truman to SecState, 13 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 114–1–15. Also see House Cte on For Aff, *First Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 6 October 1949 to 6 April 1950*, H Doc No 613, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 23 (hereafter cited as *First MDAP Semiannual*).

60. Ltr Johnson to Truman, 16 Apr 49, CF, Truman Papers; ltr Truman to Johnson, 20 Apr 49, *ibid*.
61. MAP D–F, "Outline of Total Interim Organization of the Military Assistance Program (MAP)," 15 Jun 49, *FRUS* 1949, I:328–36. This policy paper, approved by the FACC, was derived from MAP D–Fa (FACC D–9/7), "Statement of Doctrine Underlying Organization and Administration of the Foreign Military Assistance Program," 26 May 49, RG 330, CD 114–1–15. See also Dept of State, *The Military Assistance Program*, Pub No 3563, Ser 13, Jul 49, 34–37.
62. Dept of State Announce No 194, [25 Oct 49], in *First MDAP Semiannual*, 64–65.
63. Memo Johnson for DepSecDef and ASecDefs, 9 Nov 49, ISA notebook, OSD Hist; memo Johnson for service secs et al, 25 Nov 49, w/attach dir, "Functions and Responsibilities within the Department of Defense for Military Assistance," OSD Directives Book, 1949, No IB–24, Johnson Collection, WNRC. The directive is reprinted in *First MDAP Semiannual*, 65–68.
64. *First MDAP Semiannual*, 31–32; ltr Johnson to Handy, 25 Nov 49, OSD Directives Book, 1949, No IB–24, Johnson Collection, WNRC.
65. Memo Col WL Bayer USA (for JCS) for Halaby, 25 Nov 49, w/attach extracts from JCS papers pertinent to relationship between NATO and organization for MDAP, (n d), RG 330, CD 6–4–18; *First MDAP Semiannual*, 32–33.
66. *First MDAP Semiannual*, 34; memo SecArmy Gray for SecDef, 11 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
67. Dept of Def, *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949*, 22; memo MajGen Charles L Bolte Dir P&O, USA, for SecDef, 20 Oct 49, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
68. Calvocoressi, *International Affairs, 1949–50*, 142; William Adams Brown, Jr, and Redvers Opie, *American Foreign Assistance*, 478–81.
69. Ltrs Truman to SecState, SecDef and Dir BoB, 27 Jan 50, CF, Truman Papers; EO 10099, 27 Jan 50. Summaries of the negotiations that preceded the signing of the bilateral agreements are in Kaplan, *A Community of Interests*, 60–65, and *First MDAP Semiannual*, 35–36. The text of the agreement concluded with Belgium, which is typical of all the agreements, is reproduced in *First MDAP Semiannual*, 68–72.
70. See Acheson test, 8 Aug 49, in *MAP*, 25; Kaplan, *A Community of Interests*, 57–60.
71. See Hooper, *The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict*, I:174–75.
72. Memo Lemnitzer for Burns, 6 Mar 50, 7, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; ltr Truman to Pace, 27 Jan 50, CF, Truman Papers; memo Johnson for service secs, 6 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1950*, 11, 189–90.
73. Notes, mtg AFPC, 20 Dec 49, 1949 notebook (Foreign Military Assistance), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; *First MDAP Semiannual*, 45; *Semiannual Rpt of SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1950*, 11.
74. *First MDAP Semiannual*, 41–44; memo Hubert E Howard Chm MB for SecDef, 14 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; memo Lemnitzer for Burns, 9 Jun 50, *ibid*.
75. Ltr Truman to Exec Sec NSC, 1 Jul 49, enc to NSC 52, 5 Jul 49, *FRUS* 1949, I:350–52; NSC 52/1, 8 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–50, and *FRUS* 1949, I:352–57.
76. Memo Johnson for SecArmy et al, 26 Jul 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–50; JCS 2032/3, 6 Aug 49, w/attach decision on 15 Aug 49, *ibid*; memo Ohly for Lay, 20 Aug 49, w/attach Tab E, *ibid*.
77. NSC 52/3, 29 Sep 49, para 11–a, RG 330, CD 5–1–50, and in *FRUS* 1949, I:389; "Views of Acting SecTreas," 29 Sep 49, Annex A to NSC 52/3, 29 Sep 49, RG 330, CD 5–1–50; *FRUS* 1949, I:393–94 and 385, n4.
78. Ohly memo for the files, 1 Dec 49, *FRUS* 1949, I:411–13; Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1951, 9 Jan 50, *Truman Public Papers*, 1950, 59–60.

79. FMACC D-4, 13 Feb 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:148–53; memo Johnson for Chm JCS and Chm MB, 30 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 6–4–18.
80. NSC 68, 14 Apr 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:285; NSRB memo, 29 May 50, *ibid*, 316; notes, mtg AFPC, 11 Apr 50, 1950 notebook (NATO), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist.
81. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 26 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 6–2–46.
82. Memo Lemnitzer for Burns, 14 Apr 50, *ibid*; FM D B-2, 26 Apr 50, 9, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers); memo Lawton for Truman, 17 May 50, CF, Truman Papers; JCS 2099/6, 6 Apr 50, and decision on 11 May 50, RG 330, CD 104–1–60; memo RAdm AC Davis Dir JS for SecDef, 19 May 50, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; memo Lemnitzer for Johnson, 7 Jun 50, *ibid*; memo Johnson for Chm JCS, 8 Jun 50, *ibid*.
83. Special Message to the Congress on Military Aid, 1 Jun 50, *Truman Public Papers, 1950*, 445–49.
84. See memo Francis T Greene OSD for Lemnitzer, 16 May 50, RG 330, CD 6–2–46; memos Greene for Lemnitzer, 9 and 20 Jun 50, *ibid*.
85. Ed note, *FRUS 1950*, I:322–23. See also Senate, Cte on For Rels and Cte on Armed Services, *Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 1950*, hearings, 2, 5, 6, and 15 Jun 50, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950); House Cte on For Aff, *To Amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949*, hearings, 5, 6, 7, and 26 Jun 50, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950); House Cte on Intl Rels, *Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943–50* (pub 1976), VI, pt 2:5–264.
86. Address in Miami at the Golden Jubilee Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 22 Aug 49, *Truman Public Papers, 1949*, 434.

XVIII. RENEWED PRESSURE FOR REARMAMENT: NSC 68

1. Hammond, "NSC 68: Prologue to Rearmament," is still the most detailed account of the origins of NSC 68, but it was written without the benefit of primary sources and relies mainly on interviews. Recent declassification of records has yielded a number of new studies. See Samuel F Wells, Jr, "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat"; Sam Postbrief, "Departure from Incrementalism in U.S. Strategic Planning: The Origins of NSC-68"; Joseph M Siracusa, "NSC 68: A Reappraisal." Also see the exchange of views between Paul H Nitze and John Lewis Gaddis under the title "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered."
2. NSC 20/4, 23 Nov 48, *FRUS 1948*, I, pt 2:662–69; Condit, *JCS History*, II:217–27. Forrestal also felt that obtaining political guidance for the Joint Chiefs should be a central purpose of the study. See his remarks in memo for the President, 6 Aug 48, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers; and David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1950," 14.
3. Memo Kennan for Webb, 14 Apr 49, *FRUS 1949*, I:282; record of SecState's staff mtg, 15 Apr 49, *ibid*, 283–84; Webb memcon, 4 May 49, *ibid*, 296–98.
4. Memo Webb for Souers, 24 May 49, *ibid*, 313–14; memo Johnson for Souers, 20 Jun 49, *ibid*, 345–46.
5. Memo Souers for NSC, 20 Dec 49, *ibid*, 416–18; NSC Action No 270, 5 Jan 50, RG 330, OASD(ISA) Records.
6. Ltr Truman to SecState, 31 Jan 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:141–42.
7. Memo Burns for Johnson, 13 Feb 50, RG 330, CD 16–1–17; record of mtg of State-Defense Policy Review Grp, 27 Feb 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:168–69.
8. See *FRUS 1950*, I:175; Wells, "Sounding the Tocsin," 124–25; memo Lay for the President, 31 Mar 50, PSF, Truman Papers; memo Leven C Allen for service secs, JCS, and Chm

- MLC, 31 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 16–1–17; memo Acheson for the President, 10 Apr 50, PSF, Truman Papers.
9. Memo Johnson for JCS, 3 Feb 50, RG 330, CD 16–1–17.
 10. Notes, mtg AFPC, 21 Feb 50, 1950 notebook (Armed Forces—1952 Budget), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Johnson for service secs et al, 22 Feb 50, RG 330, CD 5–2–5; ltr Pace to Keyserling, 28 Mar 50, OF, Truman Papers.
 11. Paul H Nitze, "The Development of NSC 68," 172; interv with Paul Nitze, 25–28 Oct 77, US Air Force Oral History (interview K239.0512–977, Off AF Hist, HQ USAF), 237–38.
 12. Study prepared by the Dir PPS (Nitze), 8 Feb 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:145–47.
 13. Army Briefing Paper, (n d), enc to memo Gruenther for DepSecDef, 31 Jan 50, RG 330, CD 22–2–2; memo for the President, 2 Feb 50, PSF, Truman Papers.
 14. CIA ORE 91–49, 10 Feb 50, 2, 7, 8, RG 330, CD 11–1–2.
 15. Memo LeBaron for SecDef, 16 Feb 50, *ibid*. See also memo LeBaron for SecDef, 20 Feb 50, *ibid*.
 16. Memo Burns for SecDef, 23 Feb 50, RG 330, CD 16–1–17.
 17. Memcon, 22 Mar 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:203–06; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 373–74; Hammond, "NSC–68: Prologue to Rearmament," 322–25.
 18. Memo Allen for SecArmy et al, 31 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 16–1–17; memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 5 Apr 50, *ibid*. Other internal DoD responses in this same file.
 19. Memo Gray for Johnson, 7 Apr 50, *ibid*.
 20. Memo Johnson for Truman, 11 Apr 50, *ibid*. For Acheson's reaction to Johnson's approval of NSC 68, see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 374.
 21. Memo for the President, 21 Apr 50, PSF/NSC, Truman Papers.
 22. Nitze test, 17 Jun 60, in Senate Cte on Govt Opns, Subcte on Natl Policy Machinery, *Hearings: Organizing for National Security*, I:879.
 23. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 374.
 24. References and quotations are from NSC 68, "Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of 31 January 1950," 7 Apr 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:235–92 (quotations are in 238–40). NSC 68 is also reprinted in *Naval War College Review* (May–June 1975), 51–108.
 25. *FRUS 1950*, I:244.
 26. *Ibid*, 251, 265–67.
 27. *Ibid*, 266–69.
 28. *Ibid*, 272, 277, 283–84.
 29. *Ibid*, 283, 285.
 30. *Ibid*, 291–92. A portion of this quotation is missing in the *FRUS* volume. See complete version in *Naval War College Review* (May–June 1975), 108.
 31. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 374.
 32. Interv with Nitze, 18 Jul 75, OSD Hist; Nitze, "The Development of NSC 68," 173. According to Hammond, "NSC–68: Prologue to Rearmament," 321, cost estimates ranged from lows of \$17–18 billion to highs in the \$35–50 billion range.
 33. *FRUS 1950*, I:285–86, 290; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 374.
 34. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for Johnson, 5 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 16–1–17. Other responses from within DoD are in same file.
 35. Memo Thompson for SecState, 3 Apr 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:213–14. Also see memo Perkins for SecState, 3 Apr 50, *ibid*, 214–16.
 36. Memo Thorp for SecState, 5 Apr 50, *ibid*, 218–20.
 37. Draft memo Kennan for SecState, 17 Feb 50, *ibid*, 160, 162, 164, 165.
 38. Memo Bohlen for Nitze, 5 Apr 50, *ibid*, 221–25.
 39. Memo Voorhees for SecDef, 21 Mar 50, RG 330, CD 16–1–20, and in *FRUS 1950*, III:43–48.

40. Ltr Truman to Lay, 12 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 16–1–17, and in *FRUS 1950*, 1:234–35.
41. Memo Lay for NSC, 17 Apr 50, PSF, Truman Papers, and RG 330, CD 114–1–44; memo Townsend Hoopes for mems AFPC, 21 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 114–1–44; memo Exec Sec NSC for ad hoc cte on NSC 68, 28 Apr 50, *FRUS 1950*, 1:293–96; Exec Sec NSC memcon, 2 May 50, *ibid*, 297–98.
42. Notes, mtg AFPC, 25 Apr 50, 1950 notebook (Grand Strategy, NSC), Ohly Collection, OSD Hist; memo Johnson for service secs et al, 25 May 50, RG 330, CD 16–1–17.
43. Memo Hoopes for mems AFPC, 7 Jun 50, RG 218, CCS 334 (AFPC) (12–2–47) sec 6.
44. Memo Lalor for program and budget advisers, 4 Jul 50, RG 218, CCS 381 U.S. (1–31–50) sec 4. Personnel figures were not included in the JCS estimate of 3 July 1950 but were added later. See JCS presentation for Lovett in response to paras 2a(3), (4), and (5)(a) of 5 Oct 50 memo, enc to memo Gibson for Lovett, 11 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).
45. OSD, Budget Div, table entitled “Projected Costs Under NSC 68—Tentative,” rev 4 Aug 50, OASD(C) files, DoD.
46. News Conferences, 4 May and 25 May 50, *Truman Public Papers, 1950*, 286, 440; Lawton memo for the record, 23 May 50, Frederick J Lawton Papers, HSTL.

XIX. CONCLUSION

1. Forrestal press conf, 28 Jul 47, *Forrestal Public Statements, 1947–1949*, 1:1.
2. Ferdinand Eberstadt, “The Historical Evolution of Our National Security Organization,” 5.
3. Walter Millis, “Our Defense Program: Master Plan or Makeshift?,” 393.
4. Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, 446.
5. Quoted in Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men*, 1.

Note on Sources and Selected Bibliography

Most of the documents used in the preparation of this volume are in the permanent custody of the Modern Military Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C. The bulk of the material came from Record Group (RG) 330, which encompasses the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its component offices and agencies, excluding the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The most useful part of this immense collection was its subject correspondence file of letters, memoranda, reports, and other correspondence between the Secretary of Defense and his senior aides and assistants, the service secretaries, other executive departments, the White House and National Security Council, and members of Congress. RG 330 also includes separately organized collections for the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, the Office of Civil Defense, the Office of Public Information, the Office of Military Assistance, the Military Liaison Committee, and other OSD offices. References in the subject correspondence file indicate the existence at one time of a collection for the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, but efforts to locate it were unsuccessful.

The Modern Military Division also houses record collections for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218), the Department of the Army, and the Department of the Air Force, which the author consulted on a selective basis where gaps appeared in the OSD files. Other useful collections at the National Archives were RG 59 (Department of State), RG 51 (Bureau of the Budget), RG 353 (State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee), and RG 273 (National Security Council). Records of the Department of the Navy, which were especially enlightening on the roles and missions controversy, are located in the Naval Historical Center at the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. At the Library of Congress the papers of General Carl Spaatz and the diary of Fleet

Admiral William D. Leahy provided helpful information on the early postwar development of military programs.

Indispensable in dealing with organizational, administrative, and fiscal matters were materials held by the OSD Historical Office in the Pentagon. Established in 1949, the OSD Historical Office has maintained an invaluable collection of internal OSD memoranda, press releases, newspaper clippings, and organizational materials dating to the beginnings of the Department of Defense. Two especially useful collections in the custody of the OSD Historical Office are the DoD Comptroller files, covering the tenure of Wilfred J. McNeil (1947–59), and the John H. Ohly collection of notebooks containing summaries of meetings of the War Council, the Armed Forces Policy Council, and the Committee of Four Secretaries for the period 1947–50 and documents relating to preparation of the FY 1950 budget. The author also obtained limited access to Mr. Ohly's personal papers, which remain in his custody.

Forrestal and Johnson both collected personal papers, though only the Forrestal collection was sufficiently intact to be of assistance. Forrestal's diary, housed with his personal papers at the Princeton University Library in Princeton, N.J., is a running commentary on people and events during his years as Secretary of the Navy (1944–47) and Secretary of Defense; Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), offers a condensation. No comparable work exists for Louis Johnson, and his personal papers, located at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, did not contribute significantly to the record. Johnson's papers are virtually devoid of matters bearing on his official duties as Secretary of Defense. Cross-references in the collection indicate the existence at one time of a file of correspondence with President Truman, but it was apparently removed or destroyed prior to receipt of the papers by the University of Virginia.

In addition to the material at Princeton and Charlottesville, the author located two smaller collections of Forrestal and Johnson papers at the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Md. The Forrestal collection, consisting of two boxes, contained notebooks on World War II air and naval operations, postwar air procurement, and defense organization; scattered memoranda on the flush-deck carrier, the Berlin crisis, and other national security matters; and early drafts by Millis of Forrestal's published diary. One box of Johnson papers included portions of his 1949 appointment calendar and copies of directives issued during his tenure.

The papers of President Truman at the Truman Library in Independence, Mo., also contain important documentation that is not available elsewhere. The Truman papers are organized in three categories—the Official File (OF), consisting mainly of public correspondence, news clippings, and press releases; the

Confidential File (CF), containing the President's more private correspondence; and the President's Secretary's File (PSF), divided into subsections on the National Security Council (with paraphrased minutes of meetings), intelligence matters, and U.S. Government agencies. Other personal papers consulted at the Truman Library included those of George M. Elsey, Clark M. Clifford, Eben A. Ayers, Dean G. Acheson, Frederick J. Lawton, Dan A. Kimball, and Donald F. Carpenter.

At the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kans., are the pre-presidential papers and diary of Dwight D. Eisenhower, both particularly useful in piecing together the story behind formulation of the FY 1951 budget. Published extracts from this collection appear in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), and Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and Louis Galambos (eds.), *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (9 volumes to date; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–78), which currently extend to early 1948, when Eisenhower retired as Army Chief of Staff.

Among other published primary sources, several deserve special mention. The U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, is an ongoing series that details the development of national security policy and contains a wealth of documentary materials on regional and country problems and atomic energy matters. The State Department biweekly *Bulletin* provides contemporary documents and information. The *Annual* and *Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense* provide an overview of Defense policy and programs. Alice C. Cole et al., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978), documents and comments on the evolution of DoD organization. An extremely valuable internal compilation prepared by the OSD Historical Office is the *Public Statements* series, a complete collection of public remarks, press conferences, and congressional testimony by each Secretary of Defense beginning with Forrestal. The *Public Papers of the Presidents*, available through the Government Printing Office, provides ready reference to presidential public comments; there are annual volumes for the Truman administration.

Congressional publications proved to be one of the richest sources of all. The *Congressional Record* is the standard source for floor debates. As a routine matter, each House and Senate committee publishes its open session hearings. Recently, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee have begun to publish historical series covering some of their executive session hearings on such matters as the legislative origins of the Truman Doctrine, the Vandenberg Resolution and origins of NATO, military assistance legislation, U.S.–Soviet relations, and administration briefings on general world conditions in the late 1940s.

Interviews helped fill out the documentary record. Since the mid-1970s the OSD Historical Office has maintained a growing oral history collection consisting of interviews with former officials who served in or were connected with the Department of Defense. Among the interviews consulted from this collection were those with John H. Ohly, Marx Leva, Wilfred J. McNeil, Robert A. Lovett, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Robert LeBaron, George M. Elsey, Donald F. Carpenter, and Stuart Symington. Transcripts of additional interviews with other public figures active in the late 1940s were obtained from the oral history collections of the Truman Library, Columbia University, the U.S. Naval Institute, and the U.S. Air Force.

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