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CASPAR WEINBERGER
and the U.S. Military Buildup
—— 1981–1985 ——

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SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE HISTORICAL SERIES

Volume X

CASPAR WEINBERGER
and the U.S. Military Buildup
—— 1981–1985 ——

Edward C. Keefer



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———— FOREWORD ————

THIS TENTH VOLUME IN THE Secretaries of Defense Historical Series focuses on President Ronald Reagan's first secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, who is remembered in the public mind for presiding over the largest and most expensive peacetime military expansion in American history. First and foremost, Weinberger was a self-proclaimed internationalist and anticommunist. Unlike his immediate predecessors, he was a people person who enjoyed being, as his memoirs declared, "in the arena." Always polite and courteous and never seeming aloof or overly cerebral, he enjoyed interacting with people and relished the rituals and ceremonies of state-to-state relations. This volume highlights those characteristics of the ever-affable "Cap" Weinberger but also provides a critical analysis of his many policy failures and successes. Like President Reagan, whom he faithfully served, Weinberger focused on the big picture and left the details to subordinates within the Pentagon. Nevertheless, he had some very definite ideas about national security. His views were often at odds with cabinet counterparts and eventually sometimes the president. In the often-chaotic national security decision-making process of the Reagan years, Weinberger won some battles and lost others, but he proved a determined, perhaps obstinate, opponent with a well-defined and consistent outlook.

In keeping with the thrust I envisioned when becoming general editor of this series, I asked the author to focus on Weinberger and the Office of the Secretary of Defense specifically rather than presenting a broad analysis of U.S. national security policy during the first Reagan administration. Given the already rich body of historical scholarship on the Reagan presidency, this volume thereby fills a much-needed niche. I believe that Dr. Edward Keefer has succeeded in providing an eminently readable and distinctive account of a secretary of defense whose tenure has had far-reaching effects on today's Department of Defense and the U.S. government as a whole. An exhaustive history of these four years is not possible in a one-volume study, especially for a period as eventful as Weinberger's first term. Given the scale and purpose of the book, it was necessary to be selective

and discriminating in choosing topics. Accordingly, important subjects such as intelligence, logistics, and research and development, though touched upon, did not receive the attention they undoubtedly would have merited in a larger work.

The author is eminently qualified. Dr. Keefer has written for this office for over a decade and wrote the ninth volume in this series. He previously served as general editor of the Foreign Relations of the United States series published by the U.S. Department of State and therefore brings invaluable understanding of historical records to this endeavor.

This volume and the series as a whole have value above and beyond their contributions to historical scholarship about the Defense Department. The Pentagon is the largest department with the largest discretionary budget in the United States government. An organization of this size requires an institutional memory. Transparency is essential for democratic accountability. The volumes in the Secretaries of Defense Historical Series examine the decisions and motivations of the Pentagon leadership some three decades after a secretary has left office. This delay allows for the release of previously classified information. It also permits the reader to assess a book's conclusions in conjunction with similarly timed releases of documents by the relevant presidential library and by the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Unfortunately, this particular volume was delayed even further, partly due to issues surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic but also to procedures related to declassification that are beyond the control of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office. For the first time in the history of this book series, I opted to move forward with publication rather than wait longer for release of classified material. Therefore, this volume is being published with visible redactions represented by black bars.

This volume has been peer reviewed by select DoD and State historians with requisite subject matter expertise and cleared for publication by Department of Defense declassification review officials and their counterparts in other interested agencies, but it remains the author's own assessment of Weinberger's first tenure; the opinions and assessments are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense.

Erin R. Mahan
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— P R E F A C E —

WHEN CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE on January 21, 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger took on a daunting task. In 1981 the Department of Defense was the largest federal department—with two million active-duty service members, a civilian workforce of almost a million, and over 900,000 reserve forces, of which 22,000 were on active duty. Weinberger and his assistants were also officially responsible for a cutting-edge research and development program, a notoriously inefficient procurement process, and thousands of bases, facilities, installations, and training facilities in the United States and abroad. Obviously, one person could not oversee such an immense department, even with a strong team of assistants. As Weinberger's predecessor, Harold Brown, had observed, the job is almost unmanageable. Furthermore, having to convince 535 legislators in Congress to pass authorization and defense spending bills every year required an inordinate amount of the secretary's time and focus. The job was one of the most challenging of the cabinet positions.

Writing an account of Weinberger's first four years at the Pentagon is also a challenge, albeit on a vastly different scale. How to document the myriad issues and decisions the secretary faced on a daily basis? Start by understanding Weinberger's own priorities. He made a conscious decision to focus his energies on relations with the president, the National Security Council (NSC), the heads of other national security departments and agencies, and Congress. He saw himself as Defense's outside man—its spokesman to Congress and the public—and its advocate within the Reagan administration's inner circles. Weinberger's paramount interests were America's relations with allies and friends, national security, and the challenge of the Soviet Union and communism. He delegated the administration of the department to others, especially his deputy secretary, and the oversight of procurement, research and development, and the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) to his under secretaries and assistant secretaries.

This book concentrates on the role Weinberger and the Pentagon played in

formulating and implementing U.S. national security and foreign policy decisions during Weinberger's first four years as secretary. It highlights Weinberger's impact on such issues as modernization of strategic weapons, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and related strategic and regional arms control initiatives. This book is not, however, a comprehensive history of the Cold War or national security policy during Reagan's first term. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate how Weinberger and the Pentagon interacted and affected the Reagan administration's policies toward multiple foreign, international, and national security issues. Weinberger was a major policy player not just because he was secretary of defense, but because of his longtime relationship with President Reagan. He could see the president almost as often as he wished and, if he really felt strongly, he could pass policy recommendations to Reagan on an informal basis. This immediate access to Reagan gave him an advantage over other members of the Reagan cabinet, whose recommendations mostly passed through the national security bureaucracy, a process that often required compromise and concession even when presenting options. As a veteran of California politics during Reagan's time as governor, Weinberger considered the president and First Lady Nancy Reagan to be close friends. The secretary also had a long-standing relationship with the president's White House inner circle. The president did not always take his advice, but Weinberger enjoyed special access to his boss.

Although Weinberger saw himself as the "outside man," this book is also a history of inner workings of the Pentagon, the purview of Weinberger's principal assistants. The book includes chapters on acquisition reform and department reorganization, the formation and passage of Defense budgets, the All-Volunteer Force, and the major military operations of the Reagan first term: Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada and the ill-fated Lebanon peacekeeping mission. In the case of these two military operations, the focus is on the role of Weinberger and his inner team as reflected in presidential, NSC, and secretary of defense records, rather than on the history of the ground operations. Official and academic histories provided the background, context, and combat narratives of those operations.

As an authorized historian—as opposed to an official one—the views expressed in this book are mine and not those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. I had access to still-classified records essentially to the level that Weinberger had during his time at the Pentagon. The Department of Defense reviewed this book for declassification and clearance. When information could

not be released, the reader will see black bars indicating how much was deleted. These redactions are few and concentrated in a few chapters. In addition, many of documents cited in the endnotes were submitted for mandatory declassification review, resulting in a large body of declassified defense-related documentation.

Secretary Weinberger was the man most responsible for the implementation of President Reagan's military buildup. Why Reagan chose him to reinvigorate America's defenses remains a mystery, as it was to Weinberger at the time of his appointment. Reagan never fully explained his reasoning. As Governor Reagan's state financial director in California, Weinberger performed a fiscal turnabout by cutting services and expenditures, raising taxes, and eliminating a large state deficit, much to the dismay of California Democrats. His reputation as a budget cutter earned him important fiscal positions during the Nixon administration. At the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and then as secretary of health and human services, Weinberger earned the moniker "Cap the Knife" for eliminating programs and cutting budgets. During the 1980 presidential election Reagan promised to revive America's defenses, which, he maintained, President Jimmy Carter had allowed to deteriorate to the point of imperiling America's security. Reagan realized that restoring U.S. defense superiority would cost money, but he hoped that Weinberger would be able to accomplish the mission through careful spending and by eliminating the chronic waste and cost overruns that plagued the Pentagon. Such was probably the president's reason for choosing his old colleague from Sacramento, whose connection to defense was limited to his service in World War II.

Weinberger accepted the position and succeeded in his objective of facilitating the modernization of strategic and conventional forces by convincing an amenable Congress to drastically increase the Defense budget during Reagan's first term. He obtained funding for the largest peacetime military expenditures to date. Weinberger's success caused one of his main bureaucratic opponents, the deficit hawk and OMB director Richard Stockman, to dub him "Cap the Shovel." As for his second goal—spending defense money efficiently and wisely—Cap kept his budget knife in its sheath. Notwithstanding well-publicized yet mostly ineffectual campaigns against "waste, fraud, and mismanagement," Weinberger failed to reign in Pentagon cost overruns and inefficiency. Like other big-budget Pentagon chiefs, he revived America's defense establishment by convincing Congress to provide lots of money and allocating it without much concern over

whether it was always well spent. The increasing Defense budget added to the growing U.S. federal deficit.

This book is of course an unfinished story. Weinberger served for almost three more years during the second Reagan term. That account, along with the tenure of Frank C. Carlucci as secretary, is treated in the next *Secretaries of Defense Historical Series* volume. Nevertheless, by the end of his first four years the trajectory of Weinberger's attitudes and policies were clearly delineated, allowing for my assessment of his impact as Pentagon chief.

Weinberger's first four years at the Pentagon raised a number of questions. How and why did he so abruptly transform from a budget cutter to a big spender? By what means did he maintain spending momentum for the first years of his term? Why did he fail during the later years of the Reagan presidency to convince the president and Congress to continue support for large real increases in the Defense budget, as he had done during his initial years as secretary?

Weinberger's motivation for increased defense spending sprang from his concern about the Soviet Union's threat to U.S. national security. Weinberger was a classic Republican anticommunist who saw a militarily resurgent Soviet Union as a dangerous rival and cunning adversary. He felt affinity with Reagan's characterization of the Soviets as the "Evil Empire" and reinforced the president's mistrust of the Kremlin leadership. The United States, he maintained, should sign no arms control agreement until it restored strategic and conventional superiority over the Soviet Union. Weinberger was aware of Reagan's dual sides. The president was a man who abhorred nuclear war and believed that if he found the right Soviet leader he could establish a mutually beneficial relationship and reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of avoiding a nuclear Armageddon. Could Weinberger work with these two sides of Reagan?

When he assumed the secretary of defense job, Weinberger had no experience with the advanced technology weapon systems under development in the late 1970s. As he admitted, his knowledge of military hardware was limited to the M1 tank and the 37mm antitank gun of his World War II service. Did Weinberger ever master the details of the new weapon systems the Department of Defense developed—mostly during the Brown years? How successfully did he and the Pentagon deploy them? Or was Cap Weinberger just a successful salesman? This book provides insight into these many questions.

While Harold Brown's Pentagon has earned kudos for its application of

America's technological prowess in high-technology weapons and systems, critics claimed it was underfunded and underemphasized training and readiness. Did Weinberger and his staff perceive this deficiency? And how did they address it? While Weinberger delegated policy decisions about the All-Volunteer Force to subordinates, during his tenure the armed services underwent a revolution in the deployment of advanced weapon systems and training and readiness improvements in both conventional and strategic forces. The Weinberger years at the Pentagon put to rest any lingering doubts about the All-Volunteer Force's ability to protect U.S. interests. What role did he play in this cementing of the AVF's success?

Weinberger had definitive ideas about the use of military forces and diplomacy. Foremost, he believed there should be no more Vietnams, no more drawn-out conflicts that weakened the U.S. military and diverted U.S. resources away from the primary challenge—the Soviet Union. Weinberger had no problem with combating communism in Southeast Asia, but he maintained that the limited and incremental strategy opting for a negotiated settlement prolonged the conflict and sapped public support for the war. As he reflected on the experience in Southeast Asia and witnessed the debacle of the Reagan's administration's peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon, Weinberger became innately cautious and adamantly opposed to deploying military force in support of diplomacy or international objectives without clear objectives, public support, and an exit strategy. The secretary felt so strongly about the issue that he formulated the so-called Weinberger doctrine, consisting of six specific prerequisites to the use of military force. How did Weinberger's approach to the use of military force fare during the first Reagan term?

Weinberger had hoped to be Reagan's secretary of state, but the president chose the more experienced Alexander Haig. Nonetheless, Weinberger perceived his role as not only a national security adviser and Pentagon advocate, but also a maker and implementer of foreign policy. A fast friend to America's European and Asian allies, Weinberger was a determined foe to U.S. adversaries. Atop the Weinberger enemies list was the Soviet Union. He never met one-on-one with any Soviet leader or with his Soviet defense counterpart or visited the Soviet Union. He opposed trade, technology transfer, and virtually all arms-control agreements with Moscow. He mistrusted the Kremlin's intentions and saw its motivations as self-serving and malevolent. He was also a staunch opponent of less-powerful enemies like Libya, Iran, or Cuba. On the other hand, Weinberger

defended America's allies, such as Japan, Korea, and NATO members, against congressional and public criticism that they were not contributing enough to their defense. In Middle East relations, Weinberger was friendlier to moderate Arab nations than anyone on the Reagan team, and his views clashed with other advisers. Did the static nature of Weinberger's views hamper his relations and effectiveness within the Reagan administration as it faced a changing world?

Not surprisingly Weinberger was a determined opponent of communism in Central America. Yet his doctrine on the use of force and the experience of Vietnam made him wary of direct U.S. military intervention against Marxists in Central America or against what he considered their sponsor, Cuba. Rather, he endorsed covert aid to the Contras in their opposition to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and supported the anticommunist government of El Salvador against an insurgency. On the other hand, Weinberger encouraged U.S. military training of and exercises with pro-American Honduran and Salvadoran armed forces, seeing such cooperation as the primary but limited role the Pentagon could play in Central America. However, when Congress ended funding for the Contras, Weinberger and most of the Reagan team sought ways to continue to fund and arm them. While Weinberger initially believed that non-U.S. third-party support was legal, it was contrary to Congress's will, if not its explicit prohibitions. Was Weinberger skirting the law during his first term in funding and arming the Contras?

What kind of a man was Weinberger? Small of stature, with a full head of dark hair, he had an impish smile and a gentlemanly demeanor. He was always courteous and considerate of others. He combined this outward gentleness with inner toughness and a stubborn streak. He was tenacious in opposing policies he thought wrong and exasperated his bureaucratic opponents at the Department of State and within the NSC staff. Did Weinberger's style and his special access to the president help or hinder his objectives?

A Harvard-educated lawyer who had served as in-house counsel to an international engineering firm, the Bechtel Corporation, Weinberger had also been a state legislator, newspaper columnist, and local radio and television commentator. While not as masterful a communicator as Reagan, Weinberger was confident enough in his abilities to manage Pentagon public relations and make the case to the media and the public for administration policies. Did his public relations campaigns and words of persuasion make a difference?

Weinberger has been identified rightly as one of the main opponents of U.S.-USSR nuclear arms reduction negotiations and agreements. Initially, a decrepit Soviet leadership—Leonid Brezhnev on his last legs and his ailing and soon-to-die successors—made the job easier. A weakened Soviet Politburo focused on leadership problems was unwilling to make meaningful arms concessions. In the long run, however, how did Weinberger’s mistrust of the Kremlin’s motives and leaders place him at odds with Reagan’s hope that the U.S.-Soviet hostility was neither inevitable nor eternal and the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers could be controlled? Did the president’s willingness to explore better relations with Moscow increase the gulf between Weinberger and Reagan?

A final question remains. Would the Cold War have ended and the Soviet Union collapsed during the succeeding George H. W. Bush administration had it not been for the Reagan-Weinberger military buildup? Triumphalist supporters of Reagan see the U.S. military buildup and strategic modernization, including the prospect of a Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars” to its opponents) as fundamental in convincing the Kremlin that it could not compete militarily with the United States and at the same time satisfy the rising demands of Soviet citizens for a better consumer society. Are the triumphalists correct in claiming that the military buildup brought the Soviets to the negotiating table and ultimately to collapse? Other scholars, analysts, and former diplomats suggest that massive U.S. military spending did not alone end the Cold War. This second group focuses on the successful interaction between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev as the key that unlocked decades of Cold War conflict. The two schools have one commonality: both see the Soviet Union as plagued by the internal contradictions of Marxism heightened by the disparity between the consumerism of Western capitalism and the growing expectations of Soviet people. Those who credit the collaboration of Gorbachev and Reagan for ending the Cold War invariably portray Weinberger as the dark force, discouraging the president’s better instincts. Is this depiction of Weinberger accurate?

If Weinberger’s achievements of the first term were not in themselves the sole reason for the successful U.S.-Soviet rapprochement of the second term, are they still a principal cause for the end of the Cold War? An answer may be found in the duality of Reagan’s ideological outlook. The president was both a hard-line anticommunist and an idealist who dreamed of abolishing all nuclear weapons. As he confided to his diary on a number of occasions, Reagan needed

both Weinberger and Shultz. These two cabinet officers did not fight for the president's mind, they sought to reinforce each of his seemingly contradictory instincts. Reagan needed both men as he supported the U.S. military buildup and negotiated with Moscow. Weinberger ensured that the president negotiated with the Soviets from a position of strength. In the end, was that edge in nuclear arms control talks Weinberger's lasting contribution?

Like most U.S. government histories, *Caspar Weinberger and the U.S. Military Buildup* is based in part on extensive research in files not yet publicly available. In that respect it is a preview, a guide to records that are being declassified and will be released. The files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its assistants, designated Record Group 330 by the National Archives and Records Administration, was the starting point. Citations in the endnotes provide signposts to understanding an arcane filing system of a massive amount of documentation. Equally important are the presidential records of Ronald Reagan at his library in Simi Valley, California. Not only do they contain National Security Council and National Security Planning Group meeting records, but they also contain the records of the National Security Staff, who were often at odds with the secretary. Weinberger attended NSC group meetings and was an active participant in their deliberations.

The papers of Weinberger are in the Library of Congress; many of them are not yet available to the public. While this superbly organized collection covers Weinberger's whole life, there are substantial portions on his time as secretary of defense. These records overlap to a fair extent with the Record Group 330 files, but they are better organized and have important documentation not included in Secretary of Defense collections. The records of the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, USAF, and General John W. Vessey, USA, are in National Archives Record Group 218. Weinberger's relations with both chairmen were good, but he and Vessey held similar views. Jones was a President Carter appointee who was never part of the Weinberger inner circle.

The Reagan presidency has been blessed with a large body of memoirs, biographies, oral histories, and academic monographs. From the "Evil Empire" to the beginning of the end of the Cold War, Reagan's White House continues to engage academics, former officials, and the public. Secretaries of State Alexander Haig and George Shultz pull few punches in their memoirs when discussing Weinberger and the Pentagon, evidence of a persistent bureaucratic and policy rivalry

between the two departments and their leaders. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane has little good to say about Weinberger. The former secretary's two memoirs, *Fighting for Peace* and *In the Arena*, are more gentlemanly—in keeping with his personality—but they leave no doubt where and why he differed with other members of the administration (but not the president). The extensive body of oral histories on the Reagan years also reflect these tensions. Speaking in front of a tape recorder, former Reagan officials are often more frank and willing to account for personality differences and quirks. I used oral histories extensively.

It is my hope that *The U.S. Military Buildup* adds to knowledge about the Reagan administration, especially the role that the secretary of defense and the Department of Defense played in the formulation and implementation of national security policy. A second hope is that I explain the reasons for Weinberger's policy successes and failures. Finally, I hope I present Weinberger as he was, a good man with strengths and flaws, who for better or worse held a belief system that remained consistent during his time at the Pentagon.

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As a postscript, I would like to commend the Reagan Library for their proactive efforts to obtain declassification and release of documentation on the Reagan presidency. The library is also a leader in posting Reagan documents online. These Reagan Library efforts, the initial publication of Reagan volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, and an extensive body of memoirs and oral histories have created the basis for an impressive body of scholarly research on the Reagan years. I hope that this volume's concentration on Secretary Weinberger, his OSD staff at the Pentagon, and the leadership of the military services adds a new dimension to a growing and vibrant discussion of national security policy and the administration of the Department of Defense in the years leading up to the end of the Cold War.

SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE HISTORICAL SERIES

CASPAR WEINBERGER

and the U.S. Military Buildup

———— 1981–1985 ————

Caspar Weinberger's Journey to the Pentagon

PRESIDENT-ELECT RONALD W. REAGAN chose Caspar W. Weinberger to orchestrate the largest peacetime defense buildup in American history, a centerpiece of Reagan's agenda as outlined during his presidential campaign and one of the most significant legacies of his administration. Weinberger was a curious choice. A lawyer with no background in defense issues other than military service during World War II, he had never served either officially or unofficially in a national-security or defense-related position until Reagan asked him to serve on a national-security transition task force in November 1980. Most of his experience was with budget issues. He had served as head of a commission on reforming state government for then-governor Reagan, as director of finances for California, as President Richard M. Nixon's deputy director and then as director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and as secretary of health, education, and welfare (HEW) during the Nixon and Ford administrations. In all of these jobs his focus was on reining in spending. He earned both his reputation as a budget cutter and his nickname, Cap the Knife.¹

Weinberger lacked experience with defense issues beyond his budget-focused interactions with President Nixon's Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, and other Department of Defense (DoD) officials. Weinberger admitted that he was "not as familiar" as he "should have been" with trends in defense management and organization, and his prior experience "didn't intersect very much with Defense issues." Nonetheless, president-elect Reagan called Weinberger on December 1, 1980, telling him, "You have a fine, rich, full life, and I want to spoil the whole thing for you." Weinberger admitted,

"I don't know why the President selected me as Secretary of Defense," although he knew he was in the running for a major position because of his work on the transition and his membership in the Kitchen Cabinet, a group of nongovernment advisers to the president-elect.²

Reagan himself remained silent on why he chose Weinberger, but one can make an educated guess. No doubt their prior working relationship from 1967 to 1969 in California state government loomed large. Weinberger was articulate, had worked in local television and radio in California, was a frequent contributor to newspapers and magazines, and had extensive budget management experience. Loyalty was important to the president-elect and Weinberger was an ultraloyal, staunch Reagan Republican. Weinberger modestly recalled, "I didn't regard myself as having qualifications.... The President seemed to want me to do it, and I've always had a great deal of difficulty saying no to Presidents."³

There was also an irony in putting a renowned budget cutter in charge of a record-setting budget expansion. As Weinberger himself noted, "I was not appointed to cut the Defense budget back." When asked about this apparent about-face from his parsimonious OMB days, Weinberger recalled that he "never felt that we should reduce all budgets, or that we should not do government spending on necessary things." The secretary saw expanded defense spending as necessary because he had fully accepted Reagan's warning during the presidential election campaign: the Carter administration had allowed the Soviet Union to surpass the United States in defense capabilities.⁴

Like much campaign rhetoric, there was some truth in Reagan's charges, but one could also make the case that after 1979 Jimmy Carter responded to the Soviet challenge. Reagan and his supporters criticized Carter for canceling the B-1 bomber and refusing to deploy the neutron bomb, but ignored the Carter administration's approval of MX missile deployment to offset the vulnerability of the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM); development of new weapons technologies, such as the stealth aircraft; promotion of cruise missiles and precision guided weapons; and production of newer conventional weapons to offset Soviet advantages in Central Europe. Harold Brown helped obtain approval for deployment of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries to counteract Soviet mobile SS-20 missiles. Carter's fiscal year (FY) 1981 and FY 1982 DoD budgets contained real increases over his previous requests. Never-

theless, the record of Carter and Brown suffered from the general perception of military unpreparedness and weakness, as engendered by the failed Iran hostage mission and Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer’s charge of a “hollow Army.” Reagan played to that perception. In reality, the decline in defense capabilities that Reagan and his campaign spokesmen attributed to Carter was a product of the times and started with Republican Presidents Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. It was directly related to inflation and the Vietnam War, which required enormous amounts of defense spending on combat and support of South Vietnam, and which siphoned off expenditures on research and development (R&D), new technology, and new weapons. Reagan and his foreign policy supporters rallied voters with dire warnings that the Soviet Union constituted a clear military threat. The message took hold. Reagan confidante Edwin Meese’s claim that Reagan “reversed the long-term decline in support of our military forces” is correct, yet it is only true when taken in the larger context of the entire 1970s and with the realization that the president and Weinberger built on the foundation of the last years of the Carter administration.⁵

However one qualifies the Reagan-Weinberger defense buildup, the simple numbers reveal its magnitude. Between 1981 and 1984, the Reagan administration spent almost \$1 trillion on defense, with the annual Defense budget rising from \$176 billion in fiscal year 1981 to \$288 billion in FY 1984. Each of those years saw remarkable growth after inflation over the previous year: an 11.5 percent increase for FY 1981 (this increase started with Carter, but Reagan added even more), 11.4 percent for FY 1982, 7.6 percent for FY 1983, and 5.1 percent for FY 1984. The Reagan-Weinberger budgets of 1981–1982 were the largest percentage increases in real dollars since the beginning of the Vietnam War in FY 1966. Even the leaner FY 1983 and FY 1984 budgets averaged more growth in inflation-adjusted dollars than any year since FY 1967. As Weinberger was always quick to point out, however, defense spending remained a relatively stable share of the total federal budget—growing from 23 percent in FY 1981 to 25.9 percent in FY 1984 and averaging only 6 percent of U.S. gross national product for his first four years. Nevertheless, the numbers were eye-catching.⁶

The Reagan-Weinberger buildup, with all its implications for both diplomacy and domestic politics, has been the subject of intense political dispute for decades. Was it a necessary and proper reaction to the Soviet threat? Or was it merely to satisfy the interests of the military-industrial complex? Or was it a little of both?

The buildup coincided with one of the longest peacetime economic expansions in U.S. history and an unprecedented expansion of American budget deficits. Although he had campaigned in 1980 on the need for fiscal responsibility, Reagan did not allow budgetary concerns to place limits on defense policy, at least not until near the end of his first term. The decision to pursue the buildup even as deficits widened reflected the deepest priorities of his administration and, for better or worse, became the hallmark of his years in office as the United States went from being the world's largest creditor to the world's largest debtor.⁷

Whether one believes that Reagan-Weinberger military spending led to victory in the Cold War or was simply a heavy anchor on the future U.S. economy, no one can doubt its significance. Any president coming into office in 1980 would probably have increased the Defense budget in some ways. Indeed, Jimmy Carter's budgets for FYs 1981 and 1982, which he would have pushed forward had he won in 1980, did precisely that. But the scope and speed of the Reagan buildup reflected the policy preferences and the ideological commitment of Reagan and his closest advisers, especially Weinberger. During Reagan's first term, the president and his secretary of defense left a stamp on the office and the country.

History's View of Weinberger

Caspar Weinberger did not suffer from doubts about his mission as secretary of defense. Relishing his time in the public eye and at the center of controversy, he presented himself as the stalwart champion of defense spending. Cap's answer to the proverbial question "How much defense spending is enough?" was that it was never enough. In the two decades between his departure from office and his death in 2006, Weinberger continued to cultivate his image as a defender of American security and a mentor of the political right through his work with *Forbes* magazine and publications such as his 1996 book, *The Next War*. That book, coauthored with Peter Schweizer (also a cheerleader for Reagan), criticized the budget cuts of the Bush and Clinton administrations and championed higher levels of defense spending to deal with the dangerous post-Cold War world. Such views pushed Weinberger out of the mainstream, though they became rather more fashionable after 9/11. His unreserved praise for Reagan's policies did not fully enter the mainstream until after Reagan's death in 2004. For strong Reaganites, Weinberger never ceased to be a valued defender of U.S. national security.⁸

Within the larger political and historical literature, however, Weinberger's

fate has been rather different. Even during his tenure Weinberger was, in the eyes of most political observers, the hard-line opponent of his longtime colleague in government and the private sector, Secretary of State George P. Shultz. Weinberger chose this role and relished it. His conservative fans praised him for it. Precisely for that reason, however, his standing with the academic community has been one-dimensional. He is the man Shultz had to overcome to convince the president to establish a dialogue with Moscow. Scholarship on Reagan has experienced a renaissance in the 21st century, offering a more nuanced understanding of his role in breaking the ice with the Soviets and hastening the end of the Cold War. Yet Weinberger has become even more marginalized. He is lumped together with other conservative and hawkish (the two terms appear both synonymous and interchangeable in the literature) *bêtes noires*—Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William J. “Bill” Casey, National Security Adviser William P. “Judge” Clark, Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Iklé, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Richard N. Perle. These men reinforced Reagan’s animosity toward Moscow. During the 1980s and for the first decades afterward, writers were content to dismiss Reagan as an unreconstructed cold warrior. Now that Reagan has been rehabilitated as a man of peace, scholars have charged Weinberger and his allies as obstructionists who sought to prevent the real Reagan from emerging.⁹

Weinberger saw both sides of Reagan, his animosity to communism and the Soviet empire and his long-held desire for a peaceful world. His role was to reinforce the president’s anti-Soviet side. Weinberger argued for an immediate strategic modernization and a conventional defense buildup. He consistently warned Reagan that the Kremlin leadership could not be trusted. Weinberger opposed transfers of Western technology to the Soviet Union and arms control deals with Moscow unless they could be verified and clearly benefited the United States. Eventually he did end up losing out to Shultz and the other “moderates” when it came to arms control and diplomacy. Congress reeled in defense spending in 1983 as the deficit ballooned. Weinberger saw himself as Reagan’s lawyer/advocate for the changes the president promised to bring to the Pentagon. He also tended to hold to his positions rather than seek negotiations, which made him a particularly tenacious defender of the buildup he had been brought in to oversee.¹⁰

Conservatives spoke of moderate White House and State Department officials as somehow threatening to obstruct the “real Reagan.”¹¹ Subsequent revisionists

want to believe that, having discovered that the real Reagan was a dove who signed the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty eliminating all such nuclear weapons and paved the way for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991, the hawks like Weinberger were impeding the president's better instincts. Such a view misunderstands Reagan's duality. The president had Weinberger and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. (who would be replaced by Shultz) on his team because he actually wanted opposing viewpoints. They represented two sides of his intentions. Weinberger was the hard-liner towards the Soviet Union but was hesitant to commit U.S. forces to support diplomacy. Haig and Shultz favored negotiations with Moscow but argued for the use of military power to back up their diplomacy. In late 1984 tensions between the secretaries of State and Defense were especially high. Shultz demanded that the president choose between him and Weinberger after the November elections. Reagan told National Security Adviser Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane that he trusted Shultz and Weinberger was his friend; he did not want either to leave. McFarlane would have to reconcile their positions. It would not be easy or pleasant, because the contrasting aspects of Reagan's vision were themselves hard to reconcile. After 1984 Weinberger won fewer bureaucratic battles and his influence with the president waned. Still, he was an active participant in every important debate within the administration, and in his first four years he often—though not always—carried the day. He represented the hard-line anti-Soviet hawk side of Reagan's duality. Shultz was the negotiator looking for peace with Moscow, a second aspect of the president's psyche. As secretary of defense for more than six and a half years, he departed in November 1987 as the second longest-serving Pentagon chief, surpassed only by Robert S. McNamara. Both his policies and his decentralized management style shaped the development of the Defense Department through his tenure in office and beyond. His importance as a historical figure therefore deserves closer examination than it has heretofore received.¹²

Weinberger's Early Life

Caspar Weinberger was a native Californian but the product of an Ivy League education. Born in 1917 as the son of Herman Weinberger, a San Francisco lawyer, Caspar and his older brother Peter grew up in comfortable circumstances, although the Weinbergers had only recently achieved success. His grandfather Nathan Weinberger had immigrated to the United States in the late 19th century

from Bohemia and had settled near Denver, where he ran a general store. Weinberger's father earned bachelor's and law degrees at the University of Colorado, working his way through school running a student boarding house; he then moved to San Francisco to begin his law career. Weinberger's surname has led to a great deal of speculation about his complicated relationship to Judaism, which he decided to lay to rest in his second memoir, *In the Arena*. According to his version of family history, the Weinbergers had been practicing Jews in Bohemia, but a disagreement within the local synagogue had led Nathan Weinberger to break with his ancestral faith. Weinberger disclaimed any knowledge of the cause for this break, noting only that it happened "two or three generations back, in Bohemia" and that the experience left his father "completely inactive in religion his entire life." Weinberger's mother, Cerise (*née* Hampson), was the daughter of a Denver mining engineer who had been brought up a Quaker but eventually gravitated to the Episcopal faith, one well suited to a family hoping to become part of San Francisco's professional bourgeoisie. Weinberger identified as an Episcopalian all his life, attending services regularly at Grace Cathedral while living in San Francisco and serving as an active member at historic St. John's Church in Washington, just across Lafayette Square from the White House.¹³

Weinberger was a sickly child and spent much of his early childhood at home and doted on by his mother. He attended a local progressive school and then Polytechnic High, graduating in 1933. By this time, Weinberger's father was successful enough to send both his sons east to college. With the help of a small scholarship from the Harvard Club of San Francisco, Caspar enrolled at Harvard in 1934 and roomed with his brother (who transferred from UC Berkeley). During his freshman year his mother lived across the street from her two sons. Despite being the shy product of a sheltered childhood, Weinberger became an active member of the Harvard campus community, participating in debates, joining the Signet Society (a literary society cum quasi fraternity and eating club), and rising to the position of president of the *Harvard Crimson*, the student newspaper, then as now one of the most prominent positions for any undergraduate.¹⁴

Harvard in the mid to late 1930s was a heady mix. During the height of Roosevelt's New Deal, politics were a foremost topic. Communists, socialists, liberals, and conservatives debated the political future of the country and the economy. Harvard was hardly just politics. Sons of the establishment, who trained at New England's elite preparatory schools and attended virtually as a birth-

right, gave the institution its particular blend of elitism and social ethos. Yet the university accepted promising students from all over the country. A westerner, but a son of the upper middle class, Weinberger soon found his footing in Cambridge. Harvard was the training ground of presidents, legislators, statesmen, super lawyers, scholars, and business leaders. It was a place to meet people who could help you in your career. Weinberger did not become personally acquainted with the most famous people who attended Harvard during his time there. He saw John F. Kennedy, a member of the *Crimson's* business board, a few times and remembered him as “a thin, gangly youth.” Weinberger was closer to older brother Joseph Kennedy, although they did not see eye-to-eye on the New Deal and President Roosevelt. Weinberger earned his reputation on the *Crimson* by securing an interview with actress Tallulah Bankhead after a tryout performance in Boston of Lillian Hellman’s play *Little Foxes*. He just asked for the interview and Bankhead agreed. With British Labour Party leader Harold Laski, who adamantly refused to give interviews, Weinberger attended his lecture and at the end managed to ask him three questions before Laski realized what he was doing. Weinberger then wrote it up as an interview.¹⁵

Weinberger’s most famous celebrity experience involves a story which has been wildly embellished. In 1936 he traveled with two classmates to Connecticut to stay with the family of one friend’s fiancé, Marion Hepburn. Feeling grimy after the long drive, Weinberger took a shower, not realizing that the shower he chose was solely for the use of one Howard Hughes, boyfriend of Marion’s older sister Katharine, who was also expected that same weekend. Actress Kate arrived after Weinberger and his friends, and upon hearing the water running and Weinberger singing in the shower, she stormed into the bathroom demanding to know who had violated the pristine precincts reserved for the germ-phobic Hughes. Weinberger was driven from the shower with only a towel around his waist by the furious Kate. Also in the telling, Weinberger clashed with Kate and her very liberal mother over the political questions of the day. Still waiting for Hughes to show, Kate supposedly grasped Cap’s hand for a palm reading. After careful study, she exclaimed in her tremulous accent, “I can see in your future something militaristic.... I simply can’t stand militarism.... Why are you going to do all this?” According to Weinberger’s later recollections, only part of this story was true. “I do not sing” in showers, he recalled, remembering also that Katherine’s mother read his palm without predicting his militaristic future.¹⁶



Lieutenant Weinberger (third from left) with Army buddies in New Guinea, 1943. *Weinberger Papers*

Weinberger flourished in Harvard's rarefied environment and in 1938 graduated magna cum laude in government studies. He turned down the chance to study at Emmanuel College, Cambridge University (a decision he later termed "one of the stupidest things I have ever done"). Instead he entered Harvard Law School. He earned extra money by acting as a freshman proctor in the Matthews Hall dormitory and survived a serious health crisis in his third year when his ear infections acted up. Weinberger acquitted himself well in law school and positioned himself for the law career that his father had encouraged him to pursue. Weinberger himself, however, was ambivalent about becoming a lawyer. He was more interested in world events.¹⁷

The Second World War had begun to rage in Asia and Europe. Weinberger followed the fighting closely. Already a strong Anglophile and a fan of Winston Churchill, he tried to volunteer for service with the Royal Air Force in the summer of 1940 but failed his eye examination. Upon graduation from law school, in the summer of 1941, his father arranged a position on the legal staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, but Weinberger opted instead to enlist in the Army and request an assignment to the infantry. After a few months of stateside service before Pearl Harbor, Weinberger entered Officer Candidate School and earned his

commission. His military experiences were not terribly dramatic. After a brief stint as a platoon commander in New Guinea, he served on the staff of General Douglas MacArthur in Australia, New Guinea, and the Philippines. The high point was his initial journey to Australia; en route he met an Army nurse, Lt. Rebecca Jane Dalton, whom he married quietly after arriving in Sydney. Weinberger's family was shocked that the shy and relatively inexperienced Caspar had made such a quick decision, but it was wartime. When Jane became pregnant with their first child—a daughter, Arlin Cerise—their marriage became public knowledge. Since Army regulations did not permit spouses to serve in the same combat zone, Jane returned home. After giving birth to Arlin in her native Maine in April 1943, Jane and the baby spent the rest of the war living with Weinberger's parents in San Francisco. Weinberger's father died unexpectedly in September 1944, so when the war ended Weinberger declined a chance to continue on MacArthur's staff in Japan and opted instead for demobilization. He returned home to San Francisco and to civilian life for good in September 1945.¹⁸

In his memoirs Weinberger claimed that the interwar era and his wartime experiences provided him with knowledge he used later as secretary of defense. As a Churchill admirer, he saw great significance in the 1938 Munich crisis, which resulted in Adolph Hitler slicing up Czechoslovakia with the acquiescence of the French and British governments on the expectation that this would be Germany's last demand. The lesson for Weinberger was that democracies must stand up to totalitarians, whose appetite for aggression and expansion cannot be satiated by concessions. Appeasement never works. Most important, he claimed that America's military unpreparedness in 1941 had left him determined to avoid such a situation in the future, and such a situation motivated his desire to increase defense spending as secretary of defense. That may be true, or it may be hindsight, but it is worth noting that Weinberger was the last secretary of defense to have served in World War II, and one of the few to have had any active combat experience. He certainly chose to draw on that experience when it served his purposes later.¹⁹

Weinberger's Early Political Life

Back in San Francisco, Weinberger was pulled in two directions—the traditional legal path and the local political scene. As he told Jane upon his demobilization, he “wanted to practice law, but not be ‘just a lawyer.’” He served as a law clerk for a federal judge in San Francisco, and after passing the bar in 1946 he joined

the San Francisco firm of Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe. In addition to his work as a junior associate, he taught evening law school classes, wrote book reviews for the *San Francisco Chronicle*, and became involved in local Republican politics. After watching the weak organization of the party during the 1948 presidential campaign, Weinberger and some friends decided to make a push to rebuild San Francisco's Republican Party. In 1952 Weinberger successfully ran for a seat in the California legislature. He won his party's nomination against a better-connected opponent with a slogan coined by his wife: "In a Republican year, elect a real Republican." While his law firm held a place open for him, he ran unopposed in both 1954 and 1956. Weinberger earned plaudits for his work as a legislator, including being named "Most Able Legislator" by the Sacramento press corps in 1955. He also earned a reputation as a relatively liberal Republican and a dealmaker, supporting legislation like the Fair Employment Practice Act, an early civil rights measure sponsored by his friend, Democratic African American Assemblyman W. Byron Rumford. His most important assignment was chairman of the Committee on Government Organization's Subcommittee on Alcoholic Beverage Control. Taking on a politically dangerous fight with the



Weinberger (right) files as a candidate for the California State Assembly, March 19, 1952.
Weinberger Papers

liquor lobby, Weinberger pushed through reforms of the scandal-ridden state licensing procedures. He also played a significant role in legislation creating a state water board to manage California's scarce water resources.²⁰

Weinberger showed himself to be an able legislator and a very hard worker. Nevertheless, he decided that three terms in the assembly was enough. Despite the pressure to go back to work with the law firm, he chose politics and decided in 1958 to run for California attorney general. That decision did not work out well for Weinberger. An internal shakeup within the California Republican Party led to a cascade of candidate shifting. Instead of the uncontested primary he had expected, Weinberger faced a challenge from conservative Southern California congressman Patrick Hillings, who held Richard Nixon's old House of Representatives seat. Vice President Nixon offered Hillings tacit support and conservative opinion rallied to the congressman. Weinberger found himself attacked by right-wing radio commentator Fulton Lewis Jr., who accused the San Franciscan of being too willing to work with the liberal Democrats, if not of being an actual communist. Weinberger could not overcome Hillings's advantages in his rapidly growing home region and lost the primary. He did, however, enjoy a small bit of *schadenfreude* when the 1958 elections proved disastrous for the California GOP—not only did Hillings lose the general election, but Democrat Pat Brown defeated Republican Senator William Knowland for governor.²¹

Weinberger never ran for elected office again. In 1959 he became a partner at Heller Ehrman and moved his family to the San Francisco suburb of Hillsborough. Still seeking ways to participate in public life, he took on the side job of moderating *Profile: Bay Area*, a public affairs program for San Francisco's public television station KQED. He also took to writing a weekly column on state affairs, syndicated to two dozen newspapers around California, as well as offering regular radio commentaries for the local NBC affiliate. Each of these activities kept him in the public eye.²²

Through it all Weinberger remained active in the Republican Party, serving as the Northern California campaign cochairman for Richard Nixon's 1960 presidential campaign and rising to become vice chairman of the state party by 1962. From that perch he encouraged Nixon to run for governor, though he declined to serve as his full-time campaign manager. Nixon's ambivalence about being governor led to a lackluster campaign and a defeat that many considered the end of his political career. Nixon's defeat left the California Republicans more

divided than ever. Weinberger eventually became chairman of the party, but faced continuous challenges from conservatives, who championed the nomination of Barry M. Goldwater in 1964. Weinberger admitted later that he preferred Nelson Rockefeller, whom he considered more electable. Even though Weinberger dutifully supported Goldwater after the conservative Arizonan was nominated at the GOP convention in San Francisco, he recalled, "His [Goldwater's] people still did not regard me as 'reliable.'" Weinberger had only tangential participation in the general election campaign.²³

Goldwater's crushing defeat, coming only two years after Nixon's gubernatorial debacle, only deepened the confusion and dissension within the California GOP. Conservatives blamed moderates for showing insufficient enthusiasm for their presidential nominee, while moderates complained that conservative extremism drove away swing voters. The party needed a unifying figure and found it in Ronald Reagan. Reagan's nationally televised speech on October 27, 1964, which supported Goldwater with a combination of enthusiastic conservatism, folksy anecdotes, and personal warmth, led a group of California businessmen to approach him with the idea that he should run for governor. Weinberger later wrote that, unlike Goldwater, who could be cold and hard in his public persona, Reagan offered "the kind of conservatism that could win elections."²⁴

Weinberger did not initially support Reagan in 1966, having committed to his patron George Christopher, the moderate former mayor of San Francisco, but Reagan recognized Weinberger's organizational and managerial skill. After cruising to victory in the primary and crushing Pat Brown in the general election, Reagan appointed Weinberger to his transition team. Weinberger had the unpleasant task of informing the governor-elect that the state was running a million-dollar-a-day deficit; spending cuts and a tax increase would be required.²⁵

Reagan considered Weinberger as a candidate for the crucial position of state finance director, but Republican conservatives shot the appointment down. Stuart Spencer, who became one of Reagan's closest political and personnel advisers, remembered years later, "I distinctly remember saying, 'The guy you want to get is Cappy Weinberger out of San Francisco.' You know what they said to me? 'Oh, he's too liberal.'" Instead, Reagan appointed Gordon Smith, a conservative accountant with limited political skills, who according to Spencer so "screwed up the first budget" that Reagan ended up firing him and replacing him with Weinberger after all. Securing another leave of absence from his law



Governor Reagan and Weinberger after his swearing in as California's director of finance, early 1968. *Weinberger Papers*

firm, Weinberger accepted the position and immediately made his mark as both a budget expert and a manager of the legislature. In short order (assisted by tax increases and the booming California economy) he helped Reagan turn the state budget deficit into a surplus and added to that the political coup of sending the surplus out to constituents in the form of rebate checks in 1968. Reagan recalled that Weinberger asked how it should be spent. Reagan replied, "Let's give it back to the people." When Weinberger noted this had never been done before, Reagan responded, "You have never had an actor up here either." Reagan's personal secretary Kathleen Osborne expressed the general view of the finance director: "Everybody thought Cap Weinberger was great."²⁶

Weinberger's skills cemented his relationship with Reagan and brought him into contact with other Reagan insiders who would be important partners in future work. The inner circle included William Clark, Reagan's staff director, and his assistant, Edwin Meese III, as well as Reagan assistant Michael K. Deaver and Verne Orr, who served as Weinberger's assistant and eventual successor as finance director and who later became secretary of the Air Force.²⁷

On to Washington

Weinberger's success in California also opened other doors. Although he had originally planned only a one-year leave from Heller Ehrman to work with Governor Reagan, he had attracted the attention of policymakers in Washington. Weinberger had supported Richard Nixon's campaign in 1968 (Reagan's half-hearted insurgency came long after Weinberger had committed himself), and Nixon wanted to reward loyalty. In late summer 1969 Nixon invited Weinberger to become head of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which needed a managerial overhaul. He made the move to Washington, and although he was not planning to stay in the position for more than a year or two, the potential for conflicts of interest led him to resign his partnership at his law firm.²⁸

At the FTC, Weinberger made the acquaintance of a recent Harvard Law School graduate, William Howard Taft IV, who was assigned as his clerk and would work with Weinberger for most of the next decade and a half, ultimately becoming his deputy secretary of defense. Taft hailed from the famous family of Ohio—his great-grandfather was president—and he had worked for Ralph Nader in producing a report on the FTC's shortcomings. Troubleshooting these shortcomings was one of the reasons Weinberger had been brought in to take over the commission; Taft and Weinberger quickly became both allies and friends.²⁹

Instead of one year, Weinberger spent the next five years in Washington, moving after less than six months from the FTC to the Office of Management and Budget, an agency created by Nixon as part of his general plan to streamline and centralize the executive branch. The president and his assistant H. R. "Bob" Haldeman had to press Weinberger to make the move, since Cap was enjoying being FTC head. Nixon, to use Haldeman's words, "made it clear that the budget was more important." Nixon wanted the OMB to act as an institutional check on all government agencies and saw in Weinberger the kind of focused manager who would enforce discipline in the budget process. As he told Weinberger upon his appointment, "I want you to do for me what you did for Governor Reagan." Weinberger started out as deputy to the first OMB director, George Shultz. When Shultz moved on to become treasury secretary in 1972, Nixon chose Weinberger to head the OMB. The association with Shultz was the first of many, as these two able and ambitious men often worked together—if not always in harmony. Weinberger also made the acquaintance of Donald H. Rumsfeld, a former congressman from Illinois who headed Nixon's Office of Economic Opportunity.³⁰



Director of the Office of Management and Budget Weinberger using a Government Printing Office waste bin for the FY 1974 budget publication to make a point, January 23, 1973. *Weinberger Papers*

Weinberger enjoyed moderate success within the Nixon administration. At the same time, he was never admitted to the inner circle, and considered himself “somewhat of an outsider”; fellow Californians Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman kept him at a distance, as did the president’s brooding personality. The feelings of exile were apparently shared by Weinberger’s aged mother. She accompanied her son to be sworn in as the deputy at OMB at the White House in January 1970, and when the president arrived, Weinberger recalled, “She loudly asked, ‘Why is *he* here?’” When Weinberger “explained as quietly as possible that he was the president and he *lived* here,” she pronounced, “I’ve never liked Nixon.” Weinberger found it could be a wild ride working for Nixon, who would bark out unreasonable and unenforceable orders in frustration. In July 1971 Nixon told OMB Deputy Director Weinberger “to cut the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] 25 percent in personnel, let the scientists go back to MIT and steal documents,” and to cut intelligence agencies 25 percent because “CIA wasn’t worth a damn.”

These draconian cuts were part of a planned 10 percent reduction cut in federal employees. Defense was to be cut only 5 percent. Weinberger dutifully jotted down these instructions and remarked as an aside to Haldeman: "This is the pleasantest morning I have had in years." But as Weinberger and Nixon found out, reducing government employees was not done just by presidential order; RIFs (reductions in force) in the federal government were time-consuming and expensive, as the bureaucracies did everything possible to delay the efforts and diminish their effects. Overall, Weinberger admitted to being disappointed by the White House staff's treatment of him. With uncharacteristic asperity, he wrote in his memoirs that he "lamented the way that Ehrlichman had changed" from "open and friendly" to "distant and buttoned up" once he came to Washington but added, "Haldeman, on the other hand, had not changed at all."³¹

Weinberger opposed Nixon's New Economic Policy of wage and price controls and deficit spending, announced in 1971. Despite his reservations, he remained in the administration, burnishing his reputation as a diligent manager, a man



Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Weinberger in the Oval Office with President Nixon, May 13, 1974. *Weinberger Papers*

capable of working with Congress and with both Democratic and Republican appointees, and especially as a budget hawk. His work at OMB led finally in 1973 to the post of secretary of health, education, and welfare, where Presidents Nixon and Ford relied on him to control the growth of spending. It was his two years as the head of the largest civilian bureaucracy in the country that earned him the famous moniker, Cap the Knife. He held that position through the end of the Nixon years and into the Ford administration, finally stepping down in 1975.³²

Tired of government work and eager to return to California, Weinberger and his wife relocated to the Bay Area, and he accepted a position as vice president and chief counsel for the international construction firm Bechtel Corporation. There he met many familiar faces, especially George Shultz, who had left Treasury to become president of the firm. Over the next five years they worked together as Bechtel extended its reach into the Middle East and Asia, and Weinberger was able to earn the large salaries that government work had denied him. Working for Bechtel deepened his interest in international affairs and kept him involved in the San Francisco business elite. A member of both the Bohemian Club and the Trilateral Commission, he traveled in the highest business circles and made several trips abroad. He also remained somewhat active in Republican politics, taking an interest in the 1976 Reagan campaign without becoming deeply involved. By the 1980 campaign, however, he had joined the Reagan team as an adviser. His work on the campaign led to his appointment to the Budget Commission, and a crucial role in the transition.³³

It was not immediately clear what permanent job Reagan would offer Weinberger after his victory. E. Pendleton James, who led the Presidential Personnel Office, had him penciled in as a possible returning head of OMB, but because of his general managerial expertise, secretary of the treasury or of state were also options: "I mean, this guy is eclectic. He could fill any one of those jobs." Like a few others who became his partners and rivals, such as Bill Casey and George Shultz, Weinberger especially wanted to be secretary of state, but that job went to Alexander Haig. Reagan's advisers praised Weinberger's skills and his versatility, and this led to the decision to send him to the Pentagon, where Reagan expected him to manage the defense buildup he had promised. Weinberger accepted with enthusiasm. Neither Reagan nor Weinberger have adequately explained the choice. Without any real experience in defense affairs, Weinberger was an unlikely secretary of defense, but the president recalled his budget success in

California and respected his abilities to get the best value for the defense dollar. Furthermore, like State, Defense was a prestige appointment.³⁴

As he carried out Reagan's directive, many saw a contradiction between Weinberger's budget-cutting persona at the OMB and his budget-expanding career at the DoD. At the OMB Weinberger was not afraid to cut Pentagon spending: In an August 1971 meeting of the Defense Program Review Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Admiral Thomas H. Moorer complained that the OMB proposal for defense cuts went beyond "rock bottom." It carried "very high risks and reduces the President's options." Seconded by Henry Kissinger and David Packard, Moorer expressed serious doubts that the United States could live up to its international commitments if the cuts went through. OMB Director Shultz departed after Moorer's outburst, leaving Weinberger to speak for the budget cutters. Referring to the president's commitment to budgetary control, he concluded, "72% of the budget is uncontrollable and 28% controllable, of which 70% is defense. No one is out to get Defense, but that is the only area we can look at without asking Congress to make laws that we can't realistically expect them to make." Faced with the perennial problem of cutting a budget with limited discretionary spending, Weinberger offered this blunt, pragmatic analysis in 1971. His views would change when he became Pentagon chief.³⁵

In large part because of Weinberger's reputation and past statements like these, Reagan's first OMB director, David A. Stockman, started out hopeful that Weinberger would be an ally in the struggle to cut spending and balance the budget, both out of general intellectual sympathy and because Weinberger knew the OMB job so well. As Stockman lost battle after battle over the size of the Defense budget, however, he ended up bitterly disappointed. He blamed Washington politics generally for the failure of conservatives to live up to their fiscal promises, but he reserved special criticism for those he felt should have known better all along, people like Cap Weinberger. In his highly critical memoirs, he could not avoid the comment that "Cap the Knife had become Cap the Shovel."³⁶

It is easy enough to chalk up such a change to expedience or a lack of defining principles. In Weinberger's case, however, to make such an assumption misses an important point in his character. The contrast between his actions at OMB and those at the Pentagon reflected the very different priorities of those agencies and of the people who put him there. Weinberger's defining characteristic was that he was a lawyer. To take that analysis a step further, a close look at his

career reveals he was not the kind of lawyer who viewed every conversation as a negotiation, but rather the kind of lawyer who identified his client's interest and defended it tenaciously. He was not at heart a litigator; he was, in the words of one Reagan biographer, at heart "the ultimate advocate—a shrewd, articulate, and extremely stubborn lawyer—who used his legal skills to champion whatever client he represented at the moment." Thus he recognized what Nixon wanted when he appointed him to head OMB and HEW, just as he knew what Reagan wanted when he installed him at the Pentagon. It certainly helped that Weinberger's outlook generally corresponded to that of Republican conservatives, who did not include the Pentagon when they railed against excessive government spending.³⁷

At least initially, the president suggested that "although the international situation dictates more defense spending," Weinberger could trim the fat from the Defense budget. The president reminded an audience shortly after his inauguration of Cap's nickname: "I can assure you that Cap is going to do a lot of trimming over there in Defense to make sure the American taxpayer is getting more bang for every buck that is spent. I've even heard that there was a sigh of relief in several other departments when it was learned that Cap-the-Knife was going to Defense, and not to those other departments." Whether Reagan's characterization was just for public consumption or if he really believed it, Weinberger himself was more circumspect. He claimed that he was not a budget cutter for its own sake, but rather was trying to "budget according to needs," while also recognizing "that not all government spending is of equal importance or necessity."³⁸


Weinberger displayed his priorities even before he was confirmed as secretary of defense. The president-elect named him to head a budget control task force to examine Carter's FY 1981 budget as it moved through Congress. Weinberger's task force was to identify areas where reductions could be made after Reagan took office. In the final report to the president-elect, Weinberger noted that the original plan to cut \$13 billion from the fiscal year 1981 federal budget, which Reagan's advisers had considered necessary to get the 1981 baseline down to \$620 billion, was no longer sufficient. Estimates of 1981 outlays had already risen from \$633 billion to \$661 billion, which meant that any plan to get down to \$620 billion would require more than \$40 billion in cuts to the FY 1981 budget. Weinberger and the commission nevertheless argued for more than doubling the amount of effective cuts and offered a list of proposals to get as close to the target as possible. These reductions would not be at the Pentagon's expense. Weinberger took for

granted that a defense supplemental increase of \$14 billion was necessary for their defense plans. Weinberger was as clear as possible in his argument:

As you know, our present plans include substantial increases in Defense spending over the previously set base line in the next five years. We will, of course, do everything possible to reduce the net effect of these increases by identifying and putting into effect as many savings as possible that will not reduce the growing and needed real strength of our Armed Forces. But unless we make clear that at the same time we are also planning, urging, and seriously intending to adopt massive reductions in planned non-Defense spending over a period of several years, the inflationary expectations for the future will continue unbroken and a generally resigned attitude that again it will be "business as usual in Washington" will, in my opinion, lead to more inflation and serious disillusionment of the public with the new Administration.

Instead, Weinberger called for an "electrifying signal" against such disillusion by putting into effect major cuts to the budget and proposing that all department heads except DoD's come up with plans for 10 percent cuts to their 1981 outlays. He admitted this might be politically difficult, but he concluded that "it is not just balance which is important; it is balance at substantially reduced expenditure levels that can help the most with inflation and, perhaps even more important, can reduce the size, power and intrusiveness of our government."³⁹

Weinberger's desire to limit the size of government ended at the Pentagon. Former president Richard Nixon weighed in favor of defense cuts but was not able to shake either Weinberger's or the president-elect's attitude. In the weeks between the election and the inauguration, Nixon wrote to both Reagan and Weinberger, urging that they consider the need to cut the Defense budget. To Reagan, Nixon argued that the Pentagon "should not be a sacred cow" and urged an immediate 10 percent cut in the Defense budget. Nixon also congratulated Weinberger on his appointment in a warm handwritten letter, assuring "Dear Cap" that "of all your important government positions I am sure you will find SecDef the most challenging and (despite inadequate pay) the most rewarding." At the same time, however, he urged Weinberger to "be generous on the hardware and tough on the software" when it came to his budget. Again urging that "the Defense Department



Nixon's warm letter of congratulations to Weinberger encouraged him to cut the Defense budget. *Weinberger Papers*

should not be a sacred cow," he concluded, "You will find more briefcase carriers and loafers in the Pentagon than you had even in H.E.W." Weinberger thanked Nixon for his "very thoughtful note" and promised that although he believed "we do need increased expenditures of a highly effective nature," he hoped to be able to "make some other savings by careful review of all of the other activities of the

department.” At the same time, though, the priority would be on the increased expenditures, with the savings coming second.⁴⁰

Transition and Confirmation

The transition from the Carter administration's secretary of defense to Weinberger was a study in contrasts. Carter's secretary, Harold Brown, and Weinberger had very different profiles. Brown was a physicist who had spent 12 years as a defense official under three Democratic administrations. Before coming to the Pentagon, Brown had an almost decade-long job as a government-supported scientist/administrator at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Brown was as knowledgeable about weapon systems, defense, and national security as the newly nominated Weinberger was unaware. In the tradition of democratic transfer of power, the outgoing secretary of defense is expected to brief the incoming secretary, provide him with informational and position papers, and set up an office in the Pentagon for him and his staff. Brown and Weinberger met in San Francisco in December 1980 for a two-hour conversation when Brown was returning from a trip to China. Brown described for his successor four highly classified programs, including cruise missile development, but Brown sensed that Weinberger was not interested in these weapon systems. They met again in Washington, DC, and Weinberger also met with Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor Jr. on two or three occasions. Brown remembered Weinberger as being polite, but not particularly interested in obtaining information from the outgoing administration. The secretary-designate admitted, “[Brown] had much more knowledge on weapon systems and capabilities than I did,” but Weinberger recalled that he had very good briefings from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and other Pentagon agencies and offices. Furthermore, Weinberger maintained that one did not have to be a weapons designer to assess weapon programs. “I don’t think it is an essential requirement,” Weinberger continued, “but I think it is a very helpful capability, and Secretary Brown certainly had it.”⁴¹

Weinberger faced a minor crisis even before he was sworn in as secretary. William Van Cleave, an academic defense specialist with expectations of a high-profile job in the Reagan national security establishment, headed the Defense Transition Team. Ensnared in the Pentagon, Van Cleave and his team made a nuisance of themselves, expressing far more interest in obtaining access to highly classified plans to counteract a military attack on the United States

than planning for Reagan's overall defense policy and Pentagon staffing needs. It was clear to Weinberger that the Van Cleave team had taken on an agenda and life of its own. After multiple complaints from permanent military and civilian personnel at the Pentagon, Weinberger asked Van Cleave when the team's work would be finished. "Oh, possibly by next June," Van Cleave laconically answered. Weinberger was not impressed with the advice and recommendations that Van Cleave had already offered. Determined not to have a competing element in the Pentagon during his first six months, Weinberger summarily fired Van Cleave. A surprised Van Cleave asked Taft if Weinberger was really serious about his firing. Taft answered, "Mr. Weinberger was more sure of that decision than about any other of his decisions."⁴²

Van Cleave was well regarded by members of the political right wing of the Republican Party, and his dismissal could have been misinterpreted as based on policy differences. When journalists speculated that Weinberger would have difficulty satisfying both those who supported larger defense spending and those



Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Management David "Doc" Cooke swearing in Weinberger as secretary of defense, January 21, 1981. *Weinberger Papers*

who wanted to keep expenditures down, the secretary-designate insisted in newspaper interviews that he was not going to cut the budget. Rather, he would embark on a major buildup of U.S. military capabilities as outlined by the president during his campaign.⁴³

This was the message that Weinberger took to his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Realizing he had a lot to learn, Weinberger spent many hours in feverish preparation for his hearing. The confirmation hearings proved noncontroversial. Republicans and most Democrats on the committee lobbed Weinberger softball questions and generally approved of his answers. Weinberger was quick to admit he was going to have to learn on the job and was reticent to make bold predictions about policy decisions, weapons procurement, or administrative and personnel decisions. For example, when Senator William S. Cohen (R-ME) asked him about plans for follow-up negotiations with the Soviets on SALT II (the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty), Weinberger reiterated that it was important to enter these negotiations from a position of military strength and suggested the administration would need about six months to review its position and prepare its strategy. The confirmation ended with an exchange of warm remarks between Chairman John G. Tower (R-TX) and the secretary-designate. Tower predicted Weinberger would be confirmed.⁴⁴

On January 20, 1981, Weinberger became, by a vote of 97–2, the first cabinet officer of the new administration to be confirmed by the full Senate, with only Senators John P. East and Jesse Helms (both R-NC) casting opposing votes and with defense specialist Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) abstaining. East and Helms remained unconvinced that Weinberger was strong enough on defense and still felt concern over his budget-cutting reputation. Nunn's abstention no doubt reflected some concern about his qualifications to be secretary of defense. Weinberger recalled with pride that both East and Helms subsequently told him they regretted voting against him after they viewed his performance as secretary.⁴⁵

Weinberger came into his Pentagon office as a blank slate with almost no background in defense and national security issues and no knowledge of weapon systems beyond the M1 rifle, hand grenade, and other infantry combat weapons he had been trained to use during World War II. Weinberger was not unique; others had assumed the top post at the Pentagon without much previous experience in the military or Defense Department. But Weinberger's *métier* was budget and what

is now called communications, not national security. Like many well-educated Anglophiles of his generation, he was deeply interested in international affairs and dreamed of being secretary of state but had no actual diplomatic experience. Broadly committed to Reagan's vision of restoring U.S. defenses, he admitted in retrospect that he did not know "a damn thing" about the details of defense policy, but he educated himself. He drew on the managerial skill he had demonstrated in his previous work in Sacramento and Washington, and on his legal training. In a revealing description, he continued, "I had to learn as much as I could as quickly as I could. I treated it roughly like a huge lawsuit and trial that I would have to conduct and simply immersed myself in it completely." Weinberger's biggest advantage was that he enjoyed the full confidence of a president who had ridden to office promising to build up U.S. defenses. In his first two years, Weinberger enjoyed smooth sailing as Congress readily approved DoD's budget requests. These were the good times for the military. Many veterans remember it as a golden era. For the two years following, obtaining all that Weinberger and DoD wanted for defense proved more problematic as the U.S. budget deficit rose alarmingly. Still, the Pentagon enjoyed real growth in those two years not seen for a decade and a half. Weinberger came to the Pentagon determined to accomplish what his client, the president, had hired him to do. His arrival signaled a new era in the size and scope of the American defense establishment, with wide-ranging repercussions for U.S. politics and for the world.⁴⁶

The Pentagon Team and Relationships within the Reagan Administration

CASPAR WEINBERGER TOOK CHARGE of the Pentagon as a veteran of Washington officialdom, having served in the Nixon administration as deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget and as secretary of health, education, and welfare for both Nixon and his successor Gerald Ford. The last years of the Nixon presidency were not a happy time. The Watergate scandal—the slowly unfolding exposure of a White House cover-up of a burglary of Democratic National Committee headquarters—plunged an already byzantine administration into chaos. Weinberger watched the scandal sap Nixon’s authority, and by extension his own initiatives at HEW. Questions about what the president knew about the illegal information-gathering operation, when he knew it, and whether he was personally involved in the cover-up dominated Washington politics. Weinberger could not believe that the president himself was involved in the break-in, and Nixon’s resignation came as a shock. Weinberger also witnessed how difficult it was for President Ford to place an independent stamp on his accidental administration, and how he spent more than a year with holdovers in key posts until embarking on a 1975 purge of Nixon appointees. Weinberger’s own departure from HEW in August 1975 was voluntary, but he still came away from his Washington experiences convinced that things could have been done differently, especially when he compared them to his memories of the well-run Reagan administration in Sacramento. The Watergate experience shaped his hopes for how the Reagan administration would function and made him more aware of problems to avoid. He returned to Washington in 1981 armed with

the conviction that government could work and determined to use his strong connections to the president to ensure that it did.¹

Cabinet Government in Theory and Practice

Weinberger's prescription for what had ailed the Nixon administration could be summarized in one phrase: cabinet government. In an op-ed piece published during the transition, he defined this concept. Admitting that "old Washington hands" usually snickered at the naiveté of incoming administrations that believed they could change Washington's ways, Weinberger nevertheless declared that Reagan intended for his appointees to take up their posts as "advocates of the administration's overall policies *to* their departments, rather than advocates *from* the departments of the policies that the special interests wish." Recognizing that "there is a place for informed, thorough and vigorous discussion within the Cabinet of any president," Weinberger praised Reagan's California record for encouraging "collegial discussion." Such discussion aimed to guarantee that after decisions had been made all secretaries would support them, even if they contradicted the interests of specific groups within their departments. In order to guarantee this kind of loyalty and coordination, Reagan, who was "well aware that many of the pressures that pull Cabinet appointees away from their true loyalty to their president and the administration come from within their own departments," intended for the White House to manage the selection and appointment of under secretaries and assistants down below the cabinet level. The Nixon administration, according to Reagan and Weinberger, had allowed individual cabinet members to select their own staffs, producing a bureaucracy that was sometimes unsympathetic to the administration's larger goals.²

Weinberger blamed past failures, "cited so facilely and so frequently by the old Washington hands," on either "the appointment of people who did not understand how quickly they might be seduced away from the path of support for the president who appointed them, or ... the appointment of people who felt that developing and cultivating their own constituency was far more important than supporting the president who appointed them." At the same time, no doubt with an eye toward his experiences under Nixon, he admitted the fault of "presidents who in effect did not trust the people they appointed to their Cabinet, and, hence, felt they had to rely on an ever-growing White House staff." These various perils could be avoided, Weinberger believed, by a president who takes care

that his appointees understand both his desires and the importance of carrying them out, “regardless of the blandishments of special interests or the threats of congressional committee staffs or the desire for individual prominence or the fun of being referred to as an ‘independent maverick’ who is ‘not afraid to fight with his president.’” Weinberger ended the piece on the cautious but optimistic note that the “old hands of Washington may be right again, but I think there are some significant differences that can well mean that this time we will have a far more effective, coordinated and useful executive branch than has been seen in Washington for many a term.”³

This was a sensible concept, which not surprisingly appealed to the president-elect. Weinberger reinforced these ideas to Reagan a week after the op-ed piece appeared. Weinberger urged him to remind officials that “Cabinet officers are advocates *of* the Administration to their departments, and not advocates of the departmental special interests *to* the Administration.” This was especially important in matters of budget and funding, since “administration policy may require that individual departments ask for far smaller appropriations in future budgets than many of the people in the departments feel is sufficient,” while “some departments, other than their own, may receive increased budgets at the same time.” No doubt Weinberger was already thinking that military spending would squeeze other cabinet agencies’ budgets. Cabinet officials should be expected to “take the lead,” both in identifying savings and advocating for the administration. Their first loyalty should be to the president. Their skills and support were most needed to defend policies “that may be strongly attacked by various special interests and congressional committees.” Reagan used Weinberger’s memorandum as the basis for his own remarks to a meeting of cabinet designees, where he emphasized the need both for vigorous debate within the cabinet and for avoiding being “captured” by the interests of their respective agency constituencies. Reagan painted a picture of an administration in opposition to the government, joined in a common purpose that required them to maintain that sense of distance from both Congress and the bureaucracy: “When we begin to talk about government as ‘we’ rather than ‘they,’ we have been here too long.” These were noble sentiments, but whether they would work remained the real question.⁴

The National Security Council in Theory and Practice

A cabinet council already existed in theory for national security policy through

the National Security Council (NSC), which provided a forum in the White House for the responsible departments to meet and coordinate policy. But if Weinberger had expected the NSC system to work as he had outlined in his opinion piece, he was likely disappointed. The NSC meetings were battlegrounds where the major foreign policy and national security agencies—State, Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament, and sometimes Treasury—jostled over policy positions in front of the president, who optimistically hoped that their differences could be worked out. The Reagan White House simplified the NSC system by creating only one permanent subcommittee, the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), a smaller forum composed of the president, secretaries of state and defense, and national security adviser to preview major issues in advance of larger NSC meetings. But with Reagan attending these meetings, they became in effect almost indistinguishable from full NSC meetings. As it was in previous administrations, the Reagan NSC used subordinate ad hoc senior and interagency groups to formulate policy recommendations for the council and accomplish much of its policy coordination. In addition, the president approved the creation of the NSC Crisis Management Group, under the chairmanship of Vice President George H. W. Bush, and later a Special Situations Group, also under Bush's direction. Neither of these groups met more than a few times. Rather, they were a rejection of Secretary of State Alexander Haig's attempt to be, in Haig's words, the Reagan-designated "vicar for the community of Departments having an interest in the several dimensions of foreign policy." In the formulation of studies and decisions, the Reagan administration followed the well-worn pattern of previous administrations but used different terminology: national security study directives (NSSDs) and national security decision directives (NSDDs). In reality, the NSC system got off to a very slow start. It produced no studies during the first year and those that followed in later years were often delayed or inadequate. Initially, decision directives were few as well. The NSC participants went to meetings where they talked and argued, and the president attended them until his next scheduled event interrupted, but little was accomplished. It was almost as if the system was nonexistent during the first year of the Reagan presidency.⁵

There were a number of reasons for the languid, one could even say dysfunctional, NSC system. The Reagan administration made a conscious decision to downgrade the function of assistant to the president for national security affairs (more commonly known as national security adviser). With the examples of

Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the dominating NSC advisers of the past two administrations, looming over the council, the president and his advisers sought a return to the Eisenhower years. NSC Assistant to the President Robert Cutler was their model. With his minuscule staff, Cutler kept the bureaucratic paper moving, provided the president unbiased preparatory studies drafted by the relevant departments, and produced clear and succinct NSC actions based on discussions at NSC meetings. It was all very orderly, in keeping with the experiences and preferences of Eisenhower, who had excelled as an organizational manager during his Army career. But NSC adviser Richard V. Allen was no Robert Cutler and Reagan was no Eisenhower. Reagan's strengths as a manager existed in an uneasily symbiotic relationship with his weaknesses. In Sacramento, Reagan had earned a reputation as a genial and largely hands-off executive. Although he had firm opinions on the broad outlines of policy, he left the details to his advisers. He relied on their intelligence and ability to work together, viewing his role as a kind of chairman of the board. Ironically, in light of his individualist economic philosophy, Reagan believed in the power of cooperative work to achieve common goals, as summarized by a small plaque on his Oval Office desk: "There is no limit to what a man can accomplish or how far he can go as long as he doesn't mind who gets the credit."⁶

Reagan's easygoing style earned him a great deal of respect and loyalty from his staff over the years, but also highlighted his dependence on key individuals. As biographers and former aides have recounted, Reagan was not unintelligent, but he was not terribly curious about the work done in his name as long as he believed his subordinates were working on what he wanted. The promise and peril of this approach has been saved for history in a famous *Fortune* magazine profile from 1986 on "executive tips from manager Reagan." In his interview with *Fortune*, he summed up his philosophy as: "Surround yourself with the best people you can find, delegate authority and don't interfere as long as the policy you've decided upon is being carried out." Such management bromides sounded brilliant when the administration functioned well; they rang hollow when it did not. Worst of all, they seemed toxic when the Iran-Contra scandal exposed the hazards of exempting White House and senior officials from executive oversight.⁷

As Weinberger had suggested in his op-ed on cabinet government, Reagan preferred that senior aides discuss and debate in his presence. In practice, this also meant that Reagan encouraged all participants in an NSC or NSPG meeting



The Reagan national security team sharing a laugh: (left to right) Alexander Haig, Richard Allen, Ronald Reagan, William Clark, Caspar Weinberger, and James Baker, May 28, 1981. *Reagan Library*

to contribute to discussions, even if the topic at hand was not officially part of the cabinet member's expertise. Unsurprisingly, that strategy produced sometimes unfocused and even acrimonious discussions, at the end of which Reagan rarely hinted at his decision. Often meetings would end abruptly when it was time for the next item on his schedule. The president would leave with a smile and an expression of gratitude, leaving participants wondering about the point of the exercise and what the president would decide. Kenneth L. Adelman, who eventually became the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), labeled such tendencies as a basic lack of discipline in the Reagan administration: "I think almost any administration is going to be more disciplined than the Reagan Administration on almost any issue ... it was really free flowing. In terms of foreign policy decision-making, the Reagan administration was the messiest I've ever seen."⁸

Reagan's personal style magnified the necessity for effective management structures, but it also reinforced the value of personal connections to the president, as he was more likely to give a sympathetic hearing to advisers who had already earned his confidence. Trust was especially important to Reagan. Despite

his preference for freewheeling discussion, Reagan disliked and avoided serious conflict with and between his advisers whenever he could. As one aid recalled, "He hated to see differences of opinion among his staff. His line was: 'Come on, boys. Go out and settle this and come back.'" Reagan had a naive faith in the ability of his advisers to harmonize their differences, and he expected close advisers to help make that happen. When they failed, Reagan had a very difficult time drawing consequences. The failure of the NSC system has been blamed on the conscious decision to downgrade the NSC adviser and his staff and elevate the influence of key cabinet officers like Weinberger, Haig, or Shultz. That these officers could not always agree put the president in a difficult place. The president was reluctant to choose between contradictory recommendations. As a result he would let the issues slide in the hopes that harmony would eventually prevail.⁹

Personal and Ideological Connections within the Administration

The president's personality traits made it difficult to manage a national security process, and the administration's ideological makeup added a further complication. Although his landslide victory earned him the abiding loyalty of Republicans who had feared the Watergate scandal would lead to permanent minority status, Reagan's deepest political roots lay not in the party per se, but in the conservative movement. By the time he ran in 1980 the movement had moved into the mainstream, but there were still complicated relationships between traditional Republicans (who dominated the Republican leadership in Congress as well as most of the states) and representatives of the conservative movement.

Such a schism was only the most obvious one in the Reagan team. Closer examination reveals at least four identifiable (though sometimes overlapping) clans within the Reagan administration. The first was made up of Californians who had worked with Reagan since his days in Sacramento. They enjoyed personal ties to Reagan and also claimed to understand both his strengths and weaknesses better than others. Prominent members of this group included Weinberger; Counselor to the President Edwin Meese; William Clark, who served first as deputy secretary of state and then as national security adviser; and presidential aides Lyn Nofziger and Michael Deaver. Also connected to this clan was the Kitchen Cabinet, an informal circle of wealthy advisers who had first recruited Reagan to run for governor and continued to influence policy and personnel decisions; this group included Walter Annenberg, William Wilson, Justin Dart, and William French

Smith. Many of them earned positions in the administration—Annenberg and Wilson as ambassadors to the United Kingdom and the Vatican, respectively, and Smith as Reagan's first attorney general. Even those who did not, such as Dart, continued to enjoy great influence with Reagan, to the occasional frustration of Washington insiders. In foreign and national security affairs, members of this group, if they had an interest in the issues, generally agreed with Weinberger that a military buildup was required to meet the Soviet military threat and arms control with Moscow must wait.¹⁰

Some of these Californians were also movement conservatives and made up the second clan. They came to Reagan either through his campaign or after the election thanks to the growing influence of conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and Hoover Institution and religious conservative organizations such as the Moral Majority. Some early members of this circle included National Security Adviser Richard Allen, Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt, economic advisers such as Martin Anderson and David Stockman, and a long list of second- and third-tier staff members. They brought a sharper ideological edge to the team, seasoning it with the true believer's characteristic irritation over the dealmaking and compromise of old-line politicians. They could be counted on to support a hard line against the Soviet Union.¹¹

The third clan included those more experienced politicians with deeper ties to the Republican establishment and the Nixon and Ford administrations. This included both the Republican congressional leadership and such key first-term executive branch figures as Alexander Haig, James A. Baker III, and Vice President George Bush. The leader of this group was undoubtedly George Shultz. These advisers had the most practical governing experience at the national level but were also viewed with no small suspicion by members of the first two clans. Often described as pragmatists in relations with Moscow and other foreign policy issues, they received either praise or blame for moderating the impulses of the conservative movement and also inspired the suspicion of those Californians who worried that their moderation would encourage Reagan's "capture" by Washington. Conservatives and Californians alike especially resented the strong influence of those establishment Republicans who, like Bush, Shultz, and Baker, had originally opposed Reagan and only signed up for the team after Reagan's victory but found important positions because of their connections and importance for the prosaic work of governing.¹²

The fourth group was made up of those former Democrats who had abandoned their party over foreign policy differences, and who found a new home under the hawkish wing of the most prominent ex-Democrat in the country, Ronald Reagan. Many had emerged from the orbit of Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA), whose aggressive lobbying for defense spending and critiques of détente raised his national profile even as they undermined his place in his party. Jackson had even been briefly considered as a possible secretary of defense before Reagan settled on Weinberger. These often-aggressive critics of détente received the title “neoconservatives” and became lightning rods for criticism, both from their former Democratic colleagues and even from some conservatives. Like most recent converts, these neocons were the hardest of the hard-liners towards Moscow and communist insurgencies.¹³

Not quite a member of any of these clans, Bill Casey earned Reagan’s trust and gratitude by taking over Reagan’s campaign for the Republican Party presidential nomination and seeing Reagan through to victory in November 1980. A former European division chief of the World War II-era Office of Strategic Services (a Central Intelligence Agency precursor) and a New York businessman who periodically served in high-level economic jobs in the Nixon and Ford administrations, Casey returned to his first love—intelligence and covert operations—as Reagan’s director of central intelligence. Not only was Casey a trusted adviser of the president, he was also a staunch supporter of Weinberger’s hard-line approach to the Soviet Union and Marxism.¹⁴

Thus when Reagan entered office in 1981 he presided over a sometimes-unruly blended family. The members of that family pursued idiosyncratic and sometimes competing agendas driven by shifting multilateral rivalries but were held together by common respect for Reagan and a sense that they were all part of a larger ideological project. The importance of ideology fed Reagan’s famous comment during a Gridiron Club speech that “our right hand sometimes doesn’t know what our far right hand is doing.” All self-deprecation aside, the subsequent history of the Reagan administration saw much jockeying between leading figures, whose policy differences turned on their respective abilities to use their positions in the different organizations of the administration to gain the favor of the rather distant patriarch in the White House.¹⁵

These tensions within the administration were initially more visible in domestic policy, but they could be glimpsed in foreign and national security policy as

well. The differences grew as the debate about the approach to the Soviets emerged in the run-up to the 1984 reelection campaign. Still, personalities played a role. As Lou Cannon and others have pointed out, Reagan came into office with clear ideas on domestic affairs; on foreign policy he had attitudes rather than policies. Those attitudes included a generalized anticommunism, desire to improve U.S. defenses, belief in presenting a more confident and forceful image to the world, and resistance to deals with the Soviet Union for their own sake. These feelings were shared by his advisers and much of the electorate. Putting flesh on those bones, however, required concrete decisions that Reagan himself was reluctant to make. Indeed, several times during his first months in office, when discussions of his tax and budget plans dominated the headlines, Reagan had to deal with criticism that his administration had not offered a clear statement of his foreign policy. Here especially it fell to his advisers to hash out their own power relationship within the administration before they could hope to make any concrete contribution to the larger vision.¹⁶

Weinberger occupied an unusual position within Reagan's unruly presidential family, which gave him an advantage over his colleagues at the start. Before 1980 he had spent much of his career in the service of the Republican establishment. He served both Nixon and Ford faithfully and maintained many traditional Republican friends and contacts from those days. At the same time, his service under Reagan led to fruitful collaboration and abiding friendships with some of the most conservative members of the new administration and deep ties to the Californians. His selection of conservatives for key Pentagon posts, combined with his aggressive championing of the defense buildup, deepened his connections with the conservative movement and neoconservatives in particular. Thus Weinberger was better positioned than anyone within the administration to reach across the various divides, even if his personality did not suit him well for the role of conciliator. He entered office buoyed by high hopes for smooth personal and institutional coordination. Subsequent personality and policy clashes dashed some of those hopes, as will become clear, but his initial position was strong.

The Weinberger Team at the Pentagon

Weinberger's lack of experience in national security and defense affairs meant that he lacked a coterie of national security colleagues and contacts within the Washington foreign policy and think tank establishments. Furthermore, the Rea-

gan White House team kept a tight rein on appointments, in keeping with their intention to fill second- and third-echelon positions with people loyal to the president. These two factors meant that the field of those who were both qualified for top Pentagon leadership roles and who had worked with Weinberger before was quite small. That narrow field, however, included some important hires. The most obvious one was the man Weinberger chose as his second in command, Frank Carlucci, Weinberger's former deputy director at OMB and deputy



Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, January 1981. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

secretary at HEW. Carlucci brought two important qualities to the post of deputy secretary of defense. First, with a 12-year diplomatic career including a stint as ambassador to Portugal, he had ample experience in foreign and national security policy. Second, he had proven himself elsewhere in the Washington bureaucracy, both alongside Weinberger and as deputy director and then director of the Office of Economic Opportunity (a short-lived Nixonian social program that became the unexpected cradle of defense secretaries Carlucci, Richard B. Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld). On the downside, Carlucci had served under Carter, making his appointment and confirmation hearings more difficult. Weinberger had to convince conservatives in the White House and the Senate that Carlucci was not a closet Carterite, but a solid Republican. According to one journalist, Weinberger passed a message to the president through the Kitchen Cabinet that Carlucci, despite his lack of military expertise, had to be deputy secretary or Weinberger would not take the Pentagon job. Whether Weinberger presented the White House with an ultimatum is questionable, but Weinberger clearly went to bat for his friend. Once the White House nominated and the Senate confirmed him, Carlucci quickly took charge of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.¹⁷

Weinberger and Carlucci established an early division of labor in which Carlucci mainly tended to the administrative details of the Pentagon while

Weinberger dealt with issues of policy and negotiations with the White House and Congress. Carlucci recalled, “A division of labor evolved, and it was rather curious given our respective background. Cap always enjoyed the foreign policy arena ... and I very quickly got involved on the budget and procurement side.” For the next two years, until Carlucci departed for the private sector, that relationship worked very smoothly. Even Carlucci’s departure provided a window onto the closeness of their relationship. Carlucci reports that his decision to leave government service in December 1982 was made for the most practical of reasons—he was over 50 years old and had a daughter whose expensive college education loomed. As he told an interviewer: “I got down to the last couple of hundred dollars in my bank account. I went into Cap’s office and said, ‘Cap, this is it. I can’t do justice to my family.’ Bless his heart, he offered to lend me the money.”¹⁸

Carlucci remembered that since their time at OMB he and Weinberger had established a managerial philosophy: “Cap was more than happy to delegate, but he expected me to keep him informed, and I always did.” They spoke several times every day, either in person when they were both in Washington or on the



Secretary Weinberger with service secretaries: (left to right) John Marsh (Army), John Lehman (Navy), and Verne Orr (Air Force), February 9, 1981. *OSD Records*

telephone when one or the other was traveling. The apparent seamlessness of their cooperation impressed many Washington observers, leading even conservative *New York Times* columnist and Nixon administration alumnus William Safire to refer approvingly to the two of them as “Fraspar Weinlucci,” arguing that they had “merged” into one reliably conservative team.¹⁹

To fill other important positions in the Pentagon leadership, Weinberger selected from various branches of the Republican family but always coordinated with the White House. He appointed Californian Verne Orr as secretary of the Air Force. Businessman Orr had been Weinberger’s deputy when he was director of Finances for California and succeeded him in that job. Able and affable, Orr served until November 1985 as a low-profile civilian head of the Air Force, maintaining good relationships with the service’s brass. The Office of the President-Elect noted that Orr was recommended by longtime Reagan assistant and soon-to-be director for presidential personnel, Helene Von Damm, but Weinberger and Reagan knew Orr well.²⁰

John F. Lehman Jr., Weinberger’s choice as secretary of the Navy, was a far cry from Orr. He was brash, cocky, and opinionated, and was a crafty and tenacious bureaucratic infighter. A Naval Reserve pilot, Lehman had worked for Nixon’s national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, where he promoted the 600-ship Navy and a forward strategy whereby the Navy would, in the event of a superpower conflict, take the fight to the Soviet Union in its home waters. He was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna and then deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for the last two years of the Ford presidency. The Office of the President-Elect recommended him as “a recognized expert who has both strategic expertise and experience in problems confronting the Navy.” It noted that Senators John Tower of Texas, John Warner of Virginia, Scoop Jackson of Washington, and Robert “Bob” Dole of Kansas, as well as Hoover Institution Director W. Glenn Campbell, all strongly recommended him. As a hawk and a conservative, Lehman was a natural for the job.²¹

For secretary of the Army, Weinberger chose John O. Marsh Jr., a Virginia lawyer and former Democratic member of the House of Representatives from the 7th District of the old dominion. He gravitated to the Republicans and served as assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs from 1973 to 1974. In 1974 he went to the White House as Vice President Ford’s national security adviser

and then became President Ford's counselor. The transition team's comments on Marsh were indicative of his strengths: "A seasoned veteran of the Washington scene with Defense and Congressional experience." The personnel office of the transition team, national security adviser-designate Richard Allen, and Senator Warner all endorsed him for the job. Part of the group of traditional Republicans who joined the Reagan cause, he served for almost all of Reagan's two terms.²²

For the policy jobs at DoD, Weinberger appointed men whom he expected to become part of his foreign and national security brain trust. Three were neoconservative hawks, one was an expert on counterinsurgency. The top job of under secretary of defense for policy went to Fred C. Iklé, who held a PhD in sociology from the University of Chicago. Originally from Switzerland, Iklé's career included stints at the RAND Corporation and the Harvard Center for International Affairs, and then a successful tenure as an academic at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Iklé took charge of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1973 after Nixon, with an eye to appeasing SALT I opponent Scoop Jackson, fired 13 high-level ACDA officials and appointed Iklé as the new director. Iklé brought his own people to ACDA, all of whom were much more skeptical of arms control than their predecessors. During 1976 Iklé served as the foreign policy adviser for

the Reagan presidential campaign. Richard Allen strongly endorsed him, and the Office of the President-Elect noted, "His experience at ACDA demonstrated his ability to successfully deal with a dubious Congress and a difficult bureaucracy in a complicated field."²³

The author of seminal books such as *How Nations Negotiate* and *Every War Must End*, Iklé had the intellectual heft Weinberger was apparently looking for in his policy adviser. Iklé's ideas on arms reduction, nuclear strategy, relations with the Soviet Union, Central America, and other issues



Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Iklé, May 1981. OSD/HO Photo Collection

often influenced Weinberger's thinking. Iklé drafted many of Weinberger's policy memorandums. Nevertheless, the under secretary was not an adept manager. According to one of Iklé's colleagues, he "never clicked with Frank [Carlucci] or Weinberger. They didn't dislike him ... [but] the Department needed someone who understood issues, not necessarily an intellectual but one who could run a railroad." Nevertheless, Iklé served over seven years in the job and oversaw what was generally considered to be a resurgence of the policy support function at the Pentagon.²⁴

Iklé and Weinberger split the job of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs into two supposedly coequal parts. In April 1981 they created the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, or ASD(ISP), responsible for NATO affairs, Europe, and relations with the Soviet Union. The assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, or ASD(ISA), retained authority for the rest of the world, not an insignificant job, but in reality less crucial to policy than the ASD(ISP). Both assistant secretaries reported to Iklé.²⁵

Iklé and Weinberger chose Richard N. Perle, who had been on the short list for Iklé's job, as ASD(ISP). As a longtime staff member for Senator Scoop Jackson,



Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Richard Perle conferring with President Reagan in the Oval Office, May 2, 1987. *Reagan Library*

Perle had provided the senator with many of his arguments opposing SALT I and SALT II. Perle, a classic example of a Democrat-turned-neoconservative hawk who rallied to Reagan, was offered a custom-made portfolio that allowed him to pursue his major interests—preventing what he considered ill-advised arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and managing the U.S.-NATO relationship. Strobe Talbott, a critic of Reagan's lackluster initial arms control effort, profiled Perle by contrasting his youthful appearance, mild demeanor, dedication to balancing work and family, and consideration for his subordinates with what Talbott called his "dark side." Perle had a reputation as a guerrilla bureaucratic fighter, capable of outbursts, bouts of depression, and threats to resign. To his critics, among them Talbott, on the other side of the arms control debate, he was known as "the Prince of Darkness." Perle was intellectually brilliant, capable of great charm, and well-connected to the Senate through Jackson. He was a first-class mind in a third-echelon job.²⁶

Perle was on the same wavelength as Weinberger and initially Reagan as well. He became the most influential adviser to the secretary on arms reduction negotiations and general relations with the Soviet Union, adding the experience



Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Richard Armitage (right) with the Australian defense minister, George Hayden, on July 21, 1983. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

and technical expertise that Weinberger lacked. Not surprisingly, given his earlier opposition to détente with the Soviet Union, Perle remained suspicious of Moscow's intentions in negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons. For virtually all of Weinberger's first four years, Perle dominated Defense Department policy towards its superpower rival. Within the national security establishment he was a major force.²⁷

The job of assistant secretary for the rest of the world, ISA, went to Francis J. "Bing" West. A former Marine Corps officer who had served several combat tours in Vietnam, West was an expert on counterinsurgency operations. He wrote numerous books on the topic, the best-known being *The Village*, an account of his platoon's 485 days defending a friendly village in Vietnam. His books became required reading at defense universities. Iklé recalls that West had worked on Reagan's transition and was "very knowledgeable about military affairs, with lots of contacts, and I suggested him for ISA." West's successor remembers him as a "brilliant professor ... very brash" and outgoing, but "less suited for this (ISA) kind of policy work" and not "Weinberger's cup of tea at all." His boss Iklé admitted, "With West things didn't work out," recalling, "he was more of a problems man than a management type."²⁸

The man who replaced West in early 1983 as head of ISA, Richard L. Armitage, placed his stamp on the job and transformed ISA from an operation that primarily provided the secretary with staff support to an active formulator of foreign and international policy. A graduate of the Naval Academy with combat and covert experience in Vietnam, Armitage was no academic, but he had a talent for management and was known as a straight shooter and straighter talker. A burly, lifelong weight lifter, Armitage had been deputy for East Asia in ISA under West.



William Taft IV as deputy secretary of defense, February 1984. OSD/HO Photo Collection

He impressed both Iklé and Weinberger, who offered him the ISA job when West resigned.²⁹

Two other appointments are worthy of note. The first was William Taft IV, scion of the Republican political Taft dynasty of Ohio and great-grandson of President William H. Taft. A native Washingtonian and a lawyer, Taft was Weinberger's law clerk at the Federal Trade Commission and his executive assistant at OMB and HEW. He was a protégé of Weinberger, who asked him to be counselor of the Department of Defense, the Pentagon's top lawyer. The job itself was an important one, but Taft's long relationship to Weinberger also made him a trusted adviser. When W. Paul Thayer, who replaced Carlucci, left the Pentagon after one year, Weinberger named Taft as deputy secretary. He served until the last day of the Reagan administration.³⁰

The second noteworthy appointment was Colin L. Powell, who had been military assistant to Frank Carlucci (and held a similar job in Harold Brown's Pentagon) but managed to escape for field duty at Fort Leavenworth. In June 1983 Brig. Gen. Carl Smith, Weinberger's first military assistant, left Pentagon duty. Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham Jr., but not Weinberger himself, pressed a reluctant Powell hard to replace Smith. An officer of unparalleled abilities and a deep knowledge of the Pentagon, Powell was also a close friend of Armitage. Together they made a formidable team.³¹

Weinberger's Relationship with Reagan

The nature of the job and the demands of the Cold War guaranteed that the defense chief would be an important and visible part of the president's team, but not all secretaries have arrived at the Pentagon already enjoying a strong relationship with the president, and not all have been taken deeply into a president's confidence. A secretary who can leverage the institutional advantages of his position with a previously existing professional and personal relationship with the president is in a very strong position to influence policy. Weinberger enjoyed precisely those advantages when he entered office in January 1981.

Weinberger's relationship with Reagan was unique. His connection to Reagan was especially strong because they both looked back on their time together in Sacramento as a great success. Even after he left California for Washington, Weinberger kept in touch with the Sacramento team, offering regular reports to Ed Meese and his colleagues on what one of them called the "latest scuttlebutt from

Washington.” Like most of Reagan’s California inner circle, Weinberger looked back on the years of his Golden State collaboration with the governor as “among the happiest in my life.” Weinberger’s long connection and friendship with the president meant that he could arrange a meeting or a telephone call with Reagan at short notice, which would prove a valuable source of strength in the bureaucratic infighting that followed his arrival at the Pentagon.³²

Weinberger held Reagan in the highest esteem. He expressed both professional respect and personal affection for Reagan, and argued that, contrary to the writings of critical liberal-leaning biographers and disgruntled former staff members, Reagan’s appeal was no mystery. Although in his own memoirs he could not avoid the usual banal and semi-mystical references to “the electric and electrifying nature of the President’s smile,” Weinberger claimed that working with Reagan had convinced him of both Reagan’s seriousness of purpose and his ability to interact with and motivate his staff on concrete issues. Declaring that the “various myths about President Reagan and his ‘detached, unengaged style’” and his supposed “lack of knowledge or direction” were “spawned mainly by people who did not know him and who had not worked with him,” Weinberger said these claims “differ grossly from the facts as I had long known them.” Reagan “had a well-formed philosophy, formed by a great deal of reading and a great deal of study” and “was really just like what you saw.” Weinberger especially praised Reagan’s optimism, which he considered a California trait. Weinberger told Lou Cannon that Reagan “was underestimated by ‘serious people’ in Washington because they were ‘totally unused to a president who is light-hearted, serene, secure within himself, a happy man who wants to have all the people in the room that he’s meeting with happy, too, and wants to have his countrymen happy and serene.’” That optimism was



Military Assistant to Secretary Weinberger Maj. Gen. Colin Powell, August 27, 1984. *OSD Records*

one source of Reagan's preference for "debate and discussion," because he "had an ultimate sort of sunny belief in the idea that people could be brought around to be convinced as he was."³³

Weinberger thus entered his job at the Pentagon with a sense of momentum, advanced by virtue of both his senior position and his personal relationship with the president based on a sense of shared principles and goals. Even when, in later years, Reagan's decisions began to tilt against his defense secretary and toward other members of the Reagan team, their relationship endured. At the end of the first term and into the second, this special relationship frustrated those who argued that Weinberger's rigidity unnecessarily slowed down necessary policy change. Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, for example, known for his loyalty to Reagan, complained that Weinberger was even more inflexible in his loyalty than he was, unwilling to cross the president even when urged to do it. Deaver recounted being sent by White House colleagues to ask Weinberger to recommend defense cuts to the president: "I remember Baker asked me to go over and see Cap, because if Cap told Reagan he could give it up, some of it, Reagan would have done it. But it was like talking to Reagan.... Cap said, 'If the President tells me to do this, I'll do it.' 'No, I'm asking you to tell the President.' 'Well, I can't.'" What Deaver apparently missed in this exchange was that Weinberger was hardly going to tell the president what he should do, especially if that meant cutting back on defense. Whether a source of admiration or envy, Weinberger's relationship with Reagan meant that his position in the administration was as secure as that of any secretary of war or defense since Henry Knox. He was determined to use that security to place his personal stamp on the Department of Defense.³⁴

Weinberger and the White House Staff

Weinberger's ties to Reagan and his experiences in Sacramento helped him deal with the rather unconventional arrangements in the Reagan White House, which were the source of much frustration and internecine conflict during the first term. Not all of the Reagan team hailed from the California band of brothers. Much to the surprise of many observers, both inside and outside the Reagan presidential campaign, Reagan named James Baker to the powerful position of White House chief of staff. Baker had never been a Reagan loyalist, having worked for Gerald Ford in 1976 and then George Bush in 1980 before moving over to the Reagan election team after the nomination. Baker had a reputation

for intelligence, industry, and organization that made him an appealing choice for those who worried about Reagan's ability to manage details. He was broadly seen as the pragmatic and organized counterweight to the shambolic Edwin Meese, who many thought would become chief of staff, but who became counselor to the president instead. Baker's smooth manners and easy style won him friends in the Washington press corps and with Nancy Reagan, though some of Reagan's longstanding aides remained bitter over how Meese had been passed over. Weinberger was not one of them, even though he was never as close to Baker as he was to Meese. Baker served as chief of staff for the entire first term before moving on to the Treasury Department in 1985.³⁵

Whatever faults he had, no one could ever charge Edwin Meese with lacking loyalty to Ronald Reagan. Meese had worked with Reagan since the 1960s, first as a legal adviser and then as his chief of staff in Sacramento. Enjoying strong ties to the conservative movement and its organizations, Meese was highly attuned to Reagan's ideology and enjoyed a strong personal friendship with the president. But he also had a reputation for disorganization. Even his ideological compatriots had their doubts about his ability to manage the paper flow and scheduling that can overwhelm even the most punctilious chief of staff. Stories abounded of Meese's bottomless briefcase where documents would disappear. Meese, however, had been too essential to the campaign, and was both far too loyal and far too important to Reagan to be left out of the organizational mix. As chief of staff was out of the question, Reagan agreed to create a special position—counselor to the President with cabinet rank. This senior position within the White House placed Meese at nearly the same level as Baker, with special responsibilities for overseeing policy formation and acting as a liaison between the administration and the larger conservative movement. Although it made sense for personal reasons, the arrangement was organizationally problematic and created tensions. Meese remained a controversial figure for observers who doubted that his abilities matched his influence, but Reagan was unwavering in his support, appointing Meese attorney general in 1985 and holding fast to him in the face of scandal.³⁶

The relationship between Baker and Meese was unusual enough in the annals of White House organization but was made even more complicated by a third figure, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver. A Californian and a public relations specialist, Deaver had been a loyal Reagan staffer since the 1960s. His



The Troika (left to right) of Chief of Staff James Baker, Counselor to the President Ed Meese, and Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, December 2, 1981. *Reagan Library*

public relations firm, Deaver and Hannaford, handled former governor Reagan's public speaking tours and his newspaper column and radio addresses, all of which were designed to keep Reagan in the public eye until the 1980 campaign. Although Deaver was sometimes derided by staffers jealous of his easy access to the president (speech writer Patrick Buchanan acidly referred to Deaver as the "Lord High Master of the Chamber Pot"), his close friendship with Reagan (and especially with Nancy Reagan) was legendary. Deaver assumed control over the scheduling and the presentation of a White House famous for its mastery of symbolism. Even though he claimed no particular policy expertise, he was a valued adviser and counselor to Reagan. Indeed it was Deaver who suggested that Reagan choose Baker over Meese as chief of staff. To soften that betrayal of a fellow Californian, Deaver also helped orchestrate the arrangement that saved Meese both face and influence. Through Reagan's first term, these three powerful individuals—Baker, Meese, and Deaver—were known to the press as the "troika"

or “triumvirate,” helping to pull the Reagan administration along. Weinberger’s relations with the troika were initially strong, based on his long association with Meese and Deaver, but as the first Reagan administration progressed he found himself at odds with Deaver (at the instigation of Nancy Reagan) and Baker over U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Weinberger found it difficult at times to advance his policy goals in the face of such strong forces within the White House.³⁷

Playing a subordinate role within the White House was Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard Allen. As suggested above, Allen’s reduced status and authority was a conscious decision, made with Allen’s consent, by the Reagan team. The Reagan administration relegated Allen to a staff role, making him responsible for coordinating the paper flow from State and Defense rather than being a source of new policy ideas. This new conception received structural reinforcement in three significant ways. First, Allen reported directly to Meese, rather than to the president, which sharply limited his Oval Office access. Meese’s inability to run an orderly operation meant that Allen’s national security initiatives often languished. Second, the NSC staff, which had grown with virtually every new presidency since its creation, was reduced from 75 staffers to 33. Third, the national security adviser’s office was moved from its Kissinger-era location close to the Oval Office (that office went to Meese) down to the White House basement. This was no small thing; in the White House, proximity to the president has always been more than symbolic. Allen’s NSC staff was a stripped-down model headed by a man who had neither personal connections to the California Reaganites nor a strong reputation as a national security expert. He had served as Nixon’s deputy national security adviser for 10 months before Kissinger fired him and replaced him with Haig.³⁸

Despite his initial willingness to accept his position, Allen quickly chafed under the subordinate role assigned to him and struggled with rivals in both the White House and State Department. Considered a lightweight by foreign policy professionals and too much of a conservative ideologue by White House pragmatists such as Baker and Deaver, he quickly lost out during one of the first major staffing shakeups of the administration. Outmaneuvered by his rivals, and victim of a minor scandal involving a misplaced honorarium for Nancy Reagan, he resigned in early 1982. He would not be the last; the Reagan administration’s eight years saw a total of six national security advisers.³⁹

Recognizing the mistake that he had made in the original setup, Reagan

agreed that Allen's successor, William Clark (another close Reagan and Weinberger friend from Sacramento), would have direct access to the president, in an effort to strengthen the organizational importance of the national security adviser. Reagan administration colleagues considered Clark an unsung member of the team. Weinberger recalled, "He was one of the most influential people in Washington, enormously important to Reagan's goals and success ... but you would never hear that from Bill [Clark] or even know it the way he acted." Clark had been Haig's deputy secretary of state for just over a year, but he was a newcomer to foreign and national security affairs. Although Clark enjoyed greater access, and others who came later, such as Frank Carlucci and Colin Powell, displayed considerable political and bureaucratic skill, the revolving door at the NSC adviser's office sometimes made its occupants uncertain players in the administration's foreign and security policy, with profound consequences for Reagan's effectiveness and his historical reputation. Even James Baker admitted that "President Reagan was an extraordinarily successful two-term president, ... but he was never really able to enjoy a smoothly functioning national security apparatus."⁴⁰

Broad access to the president initially worked in Weinberger's favor. Weinberger enjoyed good personal relations with Meese, even as he was aware of his shortcomings as an administrator, and was on good terms with both Allen and Deaver. Baker and Weinberger had a respectful relationship, though tensions emerged in later years as they tangled over the political implications of the Defense budget and the electoral significance of pursuing détente with the Soviets. Of all the first-term White House officials, Weinberger's closest ties were with Clark, whom he considered "a thoroughly decent, completely honest man, totally devoted to the cause of Mr. Reagan's success." Weinberger valued Clark as a personal friend and respected him as an administrator. The two men shared a generally conservative and hawkish view of defense and security questions and worked very closely during Clark's 18-month tenure at the NSC, which represented the apogee of Weinberger's influence within the administration.⁴¹

One other key member of the White House had a complicated relationship with Weinberger, and that was the director of the Office of Management and Budget, David Stockman. The budget-cutting wunderkind from Michigan was young enough to be Weinberger's son, and initially looked up to Cap the Knife as a potential ally in the struggle to rein in the budget. If their relationship ever could be described in familial terms, however, it was more like that between

Laius and Oedipus. Once they began disagreeing about the size and shape of the Defense budget, their policy disagreements quickly led to personal estrangement. Stockman accused Weinberger of betraying his principles and mocked him for his insistence on ever-increasing defense spending. Cap the Knife became Cap the Shovel in Stockman's mind. Weinberger for his part increasingly saw Stockman as an unreliable negotiating partner who never stopped trying to undermine the Defense budget. His references to Stockman in his memoirs betray both Weinberger's frustration and a whiff of condescension for his younger colleague. He describes Stockman as "very bright, basically quite knowledgeable about budgetary matters; a quick study with a rather glib and authoritative way of answering questions or making his points.... Particularly troubling was that he was most positive when he did not yet quite have his facts straight." Their disagreements centered on concrete issues (as will become clear in chapters 3 and 12), but the larger generational and personal tensions were never far from the surface and colored their relationship as they both vied for the attention and validation of the president.⁴²

Conflict and Cooperation with Cabinet-Level Officers

Weinberger's relationships with the other senior members of Reagan's cabinet were uneven, whether he was dealing with people he had just met or people he had known for years. Part of this was due to longstanding organizational politics within the U.S. government—for example, the perennial rivalry between the Defense and State Departments; their uneasy relationship within and to the National Security Council; and the inevitable fiscal tension between the Pentagon and the deficit hawks at the OMB. Some cabinet members, such as Attorney General William French Smith, Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan, and Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, were friendly with Weinberger personally. But they were also conservative businessmen who were more interested in making deals than holding the line on the Defense budget or weighing policy questions such as technology transfer to the communist bloc. Others, such as Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis or Secretary of the Interior James Watt, were reliably conservative but did not impinge on Weinberger's prerogatives one way or another. Weinberger enjoyed a positive relationship with Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, who had a similar political and international outlook and a strong connection with Ronald Reagan.⁴³

Weinberger's most important relationship was with the secretary of state, where a clash of strong personalities exacerbated the structural tensions. Reagan's chief of staff James Baker, who had a front-row seat during the first term, declared that "the intramural bickering and fighting between State and Defense was terrible right from the beginning" thanks to the intersection of policy differences and personalities. Weinberger himself had coveted the position of secretary of state and had been included on the short list of candidates. Reagan's first choice was Haig, an experienced member of the foreign policy establishment. Weinberger and Haig barely knew each other. Haig had worked in the Nixon administration, first as Henry Kissinger's deputy on the National Security Council and then as White House chief of staff during the last tumultuous year of Nixon's presidency. Those positions, combined with his subsequent experience as supreme allied commander in Europe, gave Haig an international profile far above those of Reagan's other foreign policy advisers. The clinching element for his selection was the strong endorsement of Richard Nixon himself, who convinced Reagan that Haig would be both experienced enough to manage the job and hard-line enough to fit with Reagan's own inclinations. Haig had political ambitions of his own, which worried some on Reagan's team, but a series of meetings with the Kitchen Cabinet cleared the way for his appointment.⁴⁴

Haig was an impressive and accomplished figure, known among his friends and his staff for his sense of humor and charm. But he could also be very prickly when it came to defending what he considered his position and privileges. Weinberger's assessment of his new colleague described him as "constitutionally unable to present an argument without an enormous amount of passion and intensity, heavily overlaid with a deep suspicion of the competence and motives of anyone who did not share his opinions." Martin Anderson, who had worked with Haig in the Nixon administration, and who had a balanced view of Haig's strengths and weaknesses, nevertheless argued that it was a mistake for Reagan to appoint a "stranger" to his cabinet, especially considering Reagan's preference for including a variety of advisers in the decision-making process. Haig, according to Anderson, "was incredulous that President Reagan might consult anyone else on any element of foreign policy, no matter how small."⁴⁵

Haig's 18 months at Foggy Bottom proved to be a trial for all concerned. Haig struck the wrong note on the very first day when he visited the White House after the inauguration with his draft of National Security Decision Directive 1, which

intended to delineate the responsibilities of all of the members of the president's foreign policy team and expressly gave the secretary of state the position of *primus sine pares*. Remembering no doubt how the White House and National Security Council under Henry Kissinger had undermined Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Haig was determined that his fate would be different. He thought he had an ally in this project in Allen, who had agreed that his role would be reduced to that of a staff coordinator rather than an independent policy adviser. Haig had also shown a preliminary draft to Weinberger, who offered some editorial suggestions. When Haig entered the White House on Inauguration Day to meet with Baker, Meese, Deaver, Weinberger, and Allen (all of them still in their formal attire from the inaugural festivities), he found that none of them were in any hurry to approve the document. Frank Carlucci remembers seeing a draft of the document and telling Weinberger, "Cap, that's a disaster. You can't do that.... Cap went back and said that, and the problems began." After a brief and, for Haig, frustrating discussion, Meese took Haig's draft and promised to take it under advisement. That document remained unratified for the better part of the next year, to Haig's mounting anger.⁴⁶

Haig's frustration with the rest of the administration was matched by the White House's frustration with Haig's increasingly imperious manner. Less than six months into the administration, press reports circulated about problems and rivalries within the national security establishment. Haig railed against the leakers in the White House who tried to make him look bad, and his memoir reserves special disdain for Baker, Deaver, and Richard G. Darman, White House staff secretary, whom he accuses of being especially guilty of undermining him. In such circumstances, a less proud man might have sought allies within the administration, but that was not Haig's way. Frank Carlucci noted, "The problem was Al became paranoid about the White House." Carlucci had suggested that Haig and Weinberger meet weekly for breakfast to iron out their issues, but "most of the breakfasts Al would spend complaining about the goddam bastards in the White House."⁴⁷

Haig had taken on Reagan confidante William Clark as his deputy secretary, despite Clark's manifest lack of experience or knowledge of foreign affairs, in the hopes that Clark would act as a back channel to Reagan. In practice, however, Clark acted more as a source of information for the Reaganites in the White House as they watched Haig with increased skepticism. By the time Clark moved

over to the White House to become NSC adviser in early 1982, he and Haig had become bitter rivals for the attention and favor of President Reagan. Haig was gone from office soon after.⁴⁸

Haig saw Weinberger as a rival and a threat, which inhibited their ability to make common cause against the White House. Haig knew, of course, that Weinberger had coveted his job, and Haig was envious of Weinberger's close relationship with Reagan. Their breakfast meetings continued, but personal rivalries and policy differences arose again and again. Haig noted that "Weinberger spoke with great force on questions that interested him, but not always with precision." Haig also expressed frustration that Weinberger and DoD officials made public statements that poached in his turf without consulting him, such as when Secretary of the Navy Lehman announced in January 1981 that the administration was considering a six-month pause before committing to any further arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, or when, in the following month, Weinberger announced in a press conference plans to push ahead with deployment of the neutron bomb. In frustrated tones that betrayed the depth of his annoyance, Haig later wrote,

It is not easy to convince other governments or the public that the minister of defense of a superpower is talking off the top of his head on issues of war and peace. Caspar Weinberger is a capable man, immensely likable and honest, a talented administrator, and a stubborn fighter for what he believes is right. The defense policy that he and President Reagan have devised for the United States is a long-needed corrective and will heighten the chances of keeping the peace in small ways and large. But his tendency to blurt out locker-room opinions in the guise of policy was one that I prayed he might overcome. If God heard me, he did not answer in any way understandable to me. The arduous duty of construing the meaning of Cap Weinberger's sayings was a steady drain on time and patience.

Both men were careful not to allow their disagreements to spill into public view, but Washington insiders all knew they were not getting along.⁴⁹

Haig wore out his welcome with the administration quickly but remained in office until June 1982. His replacement was a familiar face for Weinberger: George Shultz. Shultz had been Weinberger's boss at OMB and again at Bechtel, and the

two men had worked together successfully for more than a decade by the time they met again around Reagan's cabinet table. They had enjoyed a cordial and productive working relationship. Once Shultz joined the administration, however, he and Weinberger were almost continually at odds over policy questions. Part of this was due to fundamental disagreements over such knotty issues as arms control and the Middle East. But there was also a personal, even psychological dimension. Before 1982, Shultz had always been Weinberger's superior. In the Reagan cabinet, however, they were equals, and Weinberger even enjoyed a certain advantage of seniority of service and length of friendship with the president. There were also fundamental differences of outlook between Shultz, a labor economist and believer in discussion and negotiation, and the aggressive corporate lawyer Weinberger. In his memoirs, Weinberger notes that their approaches had clashed at Bechtel, where Shultz's inclination when faced with a class-action lawsuit had been to seek settlements. Weinberger, however, while noting that "arguments for settling them to avoid trial might be strong," worried about precedents and concessions to "legal blackmail." He explained, "So generally I would recommend that we fight rather than yield, but invariably George would want to settle." Even at OMB, Weinberger considered Shultz "hard to read" and was frustrated by his unwillingness to share his opinions, which left his deputy with the responsibility to represent the office at various meetings without clear guidance.⁵⁰

Shultz for his part described his former deputy as typically using a "technique he used on many issues," which was "take a position and never change":

He seemed to feel that the outcome, even if different from his position, would likely move further in his direction when he was difficult and intransigent. In many a battle, this technique served him well. But over time, as more and more people understood the technique, its effectiveness waned, and Cap's capacity to be part of final solutions declined.

For all their differences in personality and policy, George Shultz and Alexander Haig had one thing in common—a complicated and tumultuous relationship with Caspar Weinberger.⁵¹

The Assassination Attempt and the Reagan Inner Circle

The complexity of the relations within the Reagan inner circle all came into

focus early in the administration, on a fateful early spring afternoon in 1981. On March 30, after giving a routine speech to the AFL-CIO Building Trades Association at the Washington Hilton, President Reagan was shot while walking to his limousine in the hotel's front driveway. In the immediate confusion of the moment, it was not clear whether the president had been hit (his initial belief was that an overzealous secret service agent had broken his rib while hustling him into the limo), or how badly he was hurt. It was only when the president coughed up blood in the back seat that aides diverted the motorcade from the White House to George Washington University Hospital. Once there, Reagan calmly exited his car, buttoned his coat, and walked through the automatic doors to the emergency room. After the doors closed behind him, hiding him from public view, he collapsed to the floor. One of the shots from John Hinckley's .22-caliber "Saturday night special" pistol had ricocheted off the limo roof and entered Reagan's chest from the left side. Luckily for the president, the explosive round had not detonated, but the damage was severe enough to require urgent surgery to remove the fragments and stop internal bleeding.⁵²

Reagan's good humor in the face of mortal danger has become the stuff of legend for his admirers, a legend nurtured from the start by staff members such as Lyn Nofziger, who related the president's one-liners ("Honey, I forgot to duck" to Nancy and "I hope you are all Republicans" to the medical team about to operate on him) for a nervous press corps. Historians now credit Reagan's handling of his near-death experience with helping extend the new president's honeymoon with the American people, and with increasing his leverage over Congress in the passage of crucial tax and budget bills during the spring and summer.⁵³

Reagan's aides demonstrated rather less grace under pressure, but their actions highlighted the potential fault lines that already existed. The members of the troika, each concerned that the other would be too close to the center of the action, gathered at the president's bedside. Seeing their solemn faces, the president joked, "Who's minding the store?" That was the operative question. With Vice President Bush in Texas on a political tour, not able to return to Washington until early evening, Reagan's flippant question had deeper constitutional meaning. In the absence of a clear directive, senior aides gathered in the White House situation room. Allen initially chaired that group, and also recorded the subsequent conversations. Hard as it is to believe in our era of ubiquitous cell phones and other forms of electronic communication, the

flow of information between the hospital and the White House was spotty, a problem exacerbated by the sad fact that Reagan's press secretary James Brady was also gravely wounded in the attack. Ultimately, all agreed that it was not necessary to invoke the 25th Amendment, which would have transferred the president's full powers to Bush, but the problem of how to communicate calm and stability to the world at large remained. As the Situation Room became increasingly crowded, the question of what to say to the press and public, what to do to calm the fears of allies, and how to prepare for opportunism of adversaries dominated the conversation.⁵⁴

In the midst of this maelstrom, tensions between Haig and Weinberger threatened to boil over. Weinberger had just sat down to a meeting in his Pentagon office with Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, deputy director of central intelligence, when word arrived of the assassination attempt. Within moments, thanks to Inman's driver, Weinberger made it to the White House. His initial impulse was to place U.S. forces on alert as a precautionary measure, in case this attempt turned out to be part of a larger attack. He gave orders to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs that alert crews at Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases be restricted to their alert areas, a small but significant change. Once he reached the situation room, however, Weinberger faced an increasingly agitated Haig, who worried that the administration's vague responses to press questions were sending the wrong messages to friends and foes abroad. He was especially concerned that any military alerts would lead to international complications and engaged Weinberger in a heated exchange over whether the secretary of defense had increased the formal Defense Condition (DEFCON). Weinberger assured Haig that he had not, but had merely recommended higher alert status for SAC, leading the former general to imply strongly that the Pentagon chief was either ignorant of the nature of alert status or foolishly making the situation worse.⁵⁵

That tense exchange, however, largely faded from memory, thanks to Haig's more famous actions on that day. When he saw Assistant Press Secretary Larry M. Speakes, in the press room upstairs, give a distressingly vague answer to the question of who was actually running the country while the president was incapacitated and the vice president was airborne, Haig dashed from the situation room and sprinted up the stairs with a bemused Allen in tow. Reaching the press room, he strode to the podium without pausing to compose himself. Red-faced and short of breath, he assured the reporters that no special military alerts had

been given, then issued one of the most famous constitutional misstatements in American history:

Constitutionally, gentlemen, you have the president, the vice president, and the secretary of state, in that order, and should the president decide he wants to transfer the helm to the vice president, he will do so. As for now, I am in charge here, in the White House, pending the return of the Vice President and in close touch with him. If something came up, I would check with him, of course.⁵⁶

Haig's comments, while incorrect in constitutional detail, do not appear terribly dire in print. He neglected the positions of the speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate in the succession after the vice president. He was not announcing a coup, and indeed made clear that everyone in the Situation Room was waiting for the vice president to arrive so he could formally assume control. In his zeal to emphasize that everything was under control, however, Haig unintentionally fed existing stereotypes of his imperious nature and his ambition. Just two months into the administration, this self-inflicted wound began the slow-motion process that eventually led to his resignation in June 1982.

After Haig left the press room, he and Weinberger resumed their disagreement on the meaning of the alert status, and whether either of them was responsible for confusing the issue. Haig was especially annoyed that Weinberger's actions and discussions with JCS Chairman General David Jones, USAF, had contradicted his statements to the press about no alerts. Weinberger responded that he was too busy talking to military advisers to notice that Haig had decided to give an impromptu press conference. Weinberger later denied subsequent press statements of a violent quarrel, but it is apparent that the two men did engage in some jockeying for authority. Such a conflict was almost inevitable. Weinberger was a learning-on-the-job secretary of defense who had been at his post for less than three months. Haig was a four-star general who had been supreme commander of allied forces, Europe.⁵⁷

Some of the chaos within the administration during those first frantic hours was certainly understandable, but the experience left scars. For Weinberger, the dispute with Haig inspired a desire to reinforce his understanding of the formal legal basis of his powers as secretary of defense. Not coincidentally, after

Weinberger returned to the Pentagon the next day, he requested that General Counsel Taft make a copy of Department of Defense Directive 5100.30 and send it along to Meese at the White House. That directive describes the World Wide Military Command and Control System, and includes the crucial defining sentence that National Command Authority “consists only of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of Unified and Specified Commands.” Although the point was implied rather than asserted, Weinberger clearly wanted everyone to know, in the event of future similar crises, who was actually in charge.⁵⁸

Weinberger and the Military Leadership

Although Reagan and Weinberger came into office determined to spend generously on the military, their connection to the top Pentagon brass was not entirely positive from the beginning. The joint chiefs were all holdovers from the previous administration, which Reagan had accused of neglecting U.S. defenses. The JCS chairman, General David C. Jones, United States Air Force (USAF), and his colleagues may not have liked all of the budgetary and policy decisions made by the Carter administration in its initial years, but they became linked to those policies when they grudgingly supported them in congressional hearings. Jones was particularly suspect because of his support, not shared by the rest of the Air Force, for canceling the B-1 bomber when he was chief of staff of the Air Force. When Carter made him chairman of the JCS in June 1978, some in the Pentagon considered it a reward for his stance on the B-1. Hard-liners in Congress and the press suggested that Reagan consider replacing Jones before his term as chairman ended in 1982.⁵⁹

The debate over Jones’s tenure proceeded to become a potential distraction for the administration, leading to charges and countercharges of politicization of an ostensibly neutral professional military advisory position. Weinberger certainly heard the rumbles from Congress, but also received advice from other opinionated players. The ever-helpful Richard Nixon, for example, argued that whatever decision Weinberger made, he should frame it as a gesture against politicizing the JCS, which Carter had done when he appointed Jones. Firing Jones would have been unprecedented, however, and when Jones indicated that

he would not go quietly, Weinberger rejected the idea. He encouraged Reagan to keep Jones to avoid politicizing the chairman's role and stirring up unnecessary trouble at the start of the administration, but he later recalled, "I never felt that he [Jones] was quite as comfortable with me as his successors were." Meanwhile, Jones signaled his willingness to work with the new administration through congressional testimony that supported Reagan's and Weinberger's views of the nature of the Soviet threat. Nevertheless, the relationship between Jones and Weinberger never warmed, as JCS historian Steven L. Rearden recounted. They did not have regular one-on-one meetings as Weinberger would have with Jones's successor.⁶⁰

Weinberger's relationship with the next chairman, Army General John W. "Jack" Vessey Jr., was much better. Weinberger was effusive in his praise for the fellow WWII veteran in his memoirs, calling him a "delightful, warm human being and a great soldier," and adding, "I have rarely worked with anyone for whom I had greater respect and admiration." Weinberger had pushed for Vessey as JCS chairman, even over other senior candidates, which cemented their relationship. The general and Reagan also enjoyed an easy rapport, which helped to smooth over any problems. Weinberger met daily with Vessey and once a week with him and the chiefs in the Tank, the JCS's secure meeting room in the Pentagon. But all was not as rosy as Weinberger remembers. An official JCS historian suggests that the chiefs and officers on the Joint Staff would have preferred less supervision by Weinberger and his senior Office of the Secretary of Defense officials in the military planning process, especially on nuclear and conventional strategy, resource allocation, and the budget process. Obviously the chiefs appreciated the military buildup and the opportunities it provided, but they realized it came at the price of sometimes heavy-handed OSD oversight. Still, the combination of increased budgets and the administration's public support for the military went a long way toward keeping their relationship positive.⁶¹

Weinberger and Congress

Weinberger's relationship with Congress was complicated. Part of the problem was structural; the Reagan administration initially faced a divided Congress. A solidly Democratic House and a surprising Republican majority in the Senate (a product of Reagan's coattails in 1980 that allowed the GOP to pick up 15 seats) meant that the administration needed to build bridges to at least some Democrats

in order to make its ambitious plans a reality. In general Weinberger and Reagan successfully used the defense buildup to win over Southern Democrats—such as Gillespie V. “Sonny” Montgomery (D-MS) in the Senate and William Philip “Phil” Gramm (D-TX) in the House—to his larger political and economic program, helping to launch the gradual Republican takeover of southern politics over the decades to come. But that did not mean that Weinberger was necessarily popular on Capitol Hill. His tendency towards dogmatism, his resistance to adjustments to the Defense budget, and perhaps most of all his habit of sticking to his script in his testimony and not giving an inch until absolutely necessary all made him a difficult witness for the many committees he was required to testify before. Even a generally positive profile by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak referred to him as “decorous ... and adamant, dignified ... and implacable, quietly personable ... and maddeningly resolute.”⁶²

Weinberger did not have an easy time with Congress during his years at the Pentagon. When asked in a 2002 interview who were his opponents on Capitol Hill, he responded, “Oh, practically everybody.” As for his allies, Weinberger remembered members of the armed services committees (including some Democrats). He admitted that Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-TN) was “enormously helpful” if “somewhat personally skeptical,” but discounted Democratic defense hawks like Senator Sam Nunn as being “on the other side.” Weinberger complained that many Republicans in Congress “worried that too much was being spent on defense and other domestic priorities were being neglected. They basically adopted the Stockman view.” These are not the recollections of a man who compromised with Congress. Rather, Weinberger saw himself in a “historical” struggle in which he “had to work more or less constantly to overcome” Congress’s tendency to favor butter over guns.⁶³

Having to testify and then win a majority of the votes of senators and representatives for his budget, weapon systems, and other defense expenditures frayed Weinberger and his aides’ nerves. Weinberger mused in Senate testimony, “when we wanted to increase our defense budget, it took enormous effort ... but in the USSR when three or four men in the Kremlin were able to make that decision, it went into effect immediately.” This problematic and provocative statement led one senator to comment, “Mr. Secretary, you sound envious.” Weinberger hastened to add that he was “not the least envious,” but used the contrast to explain how the Soviets had managed to push through their rapid buildup through the 1970s.⁶⁴

On Capitol Hill, legislators were equally frustrated with the Pentagon chief. Weinberger's problems with Congress appeared early in the administration and continued through his tenure as secretary. By 1982, during the tortuous debates about plans for basing the mobile MX missile, even Senator William Cohen—himself a loyal Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee and a future defense secretary—had enough. After the failure of another attempt to gain congressional approval, Cohen called Deputy NSC Adviser Robert C. McFarlane to complain: "You know this is not beyond the wit of man to come up with a sensible idea for this [MX basing]. Republicans have contributed to the paralysis we're in by shooting down a pretty good idea that Jimmy Carter had. But let me tell you, if you come up here with the greatest idea in the world and it's presented by Cap Weinberger, it's not going to sell." McFarlane later recalled that Congress's turn against the defense buildup in 1985 was the product in part of long-simmering frustration in Congress, noting that "Bill Cohen and a dozen others had been complaining to me about Cap Weinberger for three years." More sympathetic members of the Reagan team, such as Frank Carlucci, recognized the difficulties that Weinberger's tenacity could cause with Congress, and did their best to ameliorate them, either by urging Weinberger himself to bend or by meeting behind the scenes with congressional leaders to soften their boss's stance.⁶⁵

Weinberger admitted that "the tolerance of the Congress for increasing defense spending was wearing thin the first month, and it kept wearing thinner and thinner as we went on." Expressing frustration that members often accused him of overstating threats that never materialized in order to gain increases, he sarcastically told an interviewer, "It was roughly the question of, 'You didn't have a fire, so why do you need fire insurance?'"⁶⁶

Weinberger was not the first secretary of defense to exasperate and be exasperated with Congress. But he faced a rather anomalous situation. Congress was initially positively disposed toward the buildup (as was the electorate as a whole) for its own reasons, but its willingness had an expiration date. Furthermore, support for the message did not necessarily equal affection for the messenger. As he pushed relentlessly for bigger budgets, Weinberger's positive qualities—tenacity, focus on detail, ability to stay on message—threatened to become significant political liabilities for the administration, especially as the political and budgetary climate gradually made it difficult to ask for more.

Ready to Launch

The Reagan administration promised fundamental changes in American politics. Defense policy was to be a centerpiece of that revolution, thrusting Secretary of Defense Weinberger into the limelight from the beginning. Riding an ideological wave, Reagan, Weinberger, and their colleagues aimed to reconfigure both the structures of government and the psyche of the American people to encourage them to “dream heroic dreams” and “begin an era of national renewal.” Such high-flown rhetoric served candidate Reagan well; whether it would help cushion the course of political action once he took office remained to be seen.⁶⁷

Weinberger embarked upon his new position with many advantages, beginning with his close ties to President Reagan and his generally positive reputation within the different clans in the administration and throughout the broader Washington community. Retaining that initial glow, however, also depended on how he performed in the policy disputes that were sure to emerge once he became the point man for the controversial and complicated defense buildup. The realities of budgetary decisions and the challenges of international crises threatened to complicate and dishevel the smooth rhetoric of strength and resolve. Weinberger could draw on the support of his circle of advisers. At the same, time he would have to navigate the complicated thicket of personalities and interests that made up the Reagan administration, and also contend with a Congress that viewed his decisions and his demeanor with increasing skepticism. The results would not always be what Reagan or Weinberger hoped for.

The Buildup Budgets: Fiscal Years 1981, 1982, and 1983

DURING THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN Ronald Reagan pledged to increase spending for defense. He claimed President Jimmy Carter had skimped on Pentagon funding to the point of allowing a resurgent Soviet Union to endanger U.S. national security. While the economy dominated the 1980 presidential campaign, national security also proved a defining and much-debated issue. Although Carter had accepted considerably more defense spending during 1980 and projected even more for his second term, he could not convince voters that he was not the antidefense president. Reagan's call for increased defense spending appealed to voters discouraged by the Carter administration's most glaring military failure, the Iran hostage rescue mission, which added to the perception that the administration was weak in the face of the hostage takers. Reagan interpreted his election victory as a mandate for more defense spending. As he recalled, he was asked frequently on the campaign trail to choose between a balanced budget and national security. He had a ready reply: "Every time, I answered: 'I have to come down on the side of national defense.' And every time I did, the audience roared."¹

Reagan chose Caspar Weinberger to oversee what would become the nation's largest-ever increase in peacetime military spending—both in terms of absolute costs and inflation-adjusted "real" dollars—but conservative defense hawks in Congress and the Washington think-tank establishment were initially skeptical. Weinberger's reputation, built up during his time as chief financial officer in Reagan's California government and director of the Office of Management and Budget for President Richard Nixon, was that of a dedicated budget cutter.

Weinberger had balanced the state budget by reducing expenditures and proved a keen reducer of federal spending at OMB. These hawks need not have worried. Weinberger shared Reagan's concern about defense spending in the 1970s and was equally committed to rectifying it. Weinberger saw himself not as a budget cutter or economizer; he believed that an important part of his job was to be the president's defense chief and his chief advocate, making the best possible case to Congress and the public for defense increases.²

Weinberger still had to make choices about how much to spend and what to spend it on. He was under pressure from defense hawk senators—Barry M. Goldwater (R-AZ), Strom Thurmond (R-MS), Scoop Jackson (D-WA), and John Tower (R-TX)—who argued for a fixed increase of 7 percent real growth after inflation in defense spending for the first five of Reagan's years. In addition, the former head of the Reagan transition defense team, William Van Cleave; military analysts at the Heritage Foundation; and conservative congressional staffers recommended that Weinberger drastically increase the two budgets inherited from the Carter administration, the fiscal year 1981 supplemental and the FY 1982 budget. These advocates estimated that the \$6.3 billion Carter supplemental request needed an additional \$20 billion to \$40 billion. For FY 1982, they recommended an additional \$30 billion to \$40 billion. This gush of money was to provide quick fixes for military pay, new weapons production, operating and maintenance costs, building up reserves of arms and ammunition for enhanced readiness, and improvements to U.S. strategic forces. Van Cleave orchestrated a campaign to counter the so-called window of vulnerability of the U.S. land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force to heavy and accurate Soviet ICBMs. He recommended applying Carter's mobile concept for deployment of the MX to existing U.S. Minuteman III missiles. By constructing more silos and moving the missiles around between them, the number of potential targets would be increased. It was the old pea-in-the-shell game. He recommended other strategic quick fixes like speeding up production of the MX missile to replace the Minuteman III and upgrading the B-52 bomber force until a revived, accelerated B-1B bomber program could replace it. The Reagan administration was prepared to increase defense spending but not by the vast amounts recommended by Van Cleave and the other proponents of quick fixes. Although the president promised to choose defense over deficit, these expenditures would balloon deficit spending to unprecedented peacetime levels.³

The FY 1981 Supplemental Budget

In his last days as president, Carter requested that Congress approve a \$6.3 billion FY 1981 supplemental budget designed to pay for increased military salaries, compensate for rising fuel costs, and continue extended U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. The supplement would be in addition to the \$160 billion in outlays for FY 1981 that Congress had already passed in early December 1980. Weinberger had every intention of raising the amount of the supplemental request, even if not to the extent other advocates demanded. After consultation with the Defense Resources Board (DRB), comprised of the Joint Chiefs, Deputy Secretary Carlucci, and the comptroller, Weinberger settled on \$12.7 billion for the FY 1981 supplemental, doubling Carter's figure. The new request would cover the so-called facts-of-life concerns cited by Carter—military salaries, fuel costs, and Persian Gulf naval operations—but in each case the Weinberger team asked for more money, specifically for readiness and sustainability of combat forces, recruiting improvements, and retention of personnel.⁴

The Weinberger request also went beyond addressing the facts-of-life costs. Weinberger asked for increases in two strategic programs that proved controversial. The first called for an additional \$71 million to the existing request of \$92 million for design and development of the MX missile. The second requested \$36.2 million for development of antimissile defenses for MX bases. Carter had approved the MX missile without finally deciding where and how to deploy it. Nevada and Utah opposed the Carter plan for 200 MX missiles to be shunted between 4,600 launch sites in their states. The Carter administration left the final decision to its successor.⁵


Weinberger also proposed a quick fix for the Navy. Between 1968 and 1978 the Navy shrank from more than 1,000 ships to just over 500—a direct consequence of decisions by the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations to invest in fewer new, costly, high-technology ships and at the same time retire older obsolescent ones. The result was a modern Navy, albeit a much smaller one. In early February 1981 Secretary of the Navy John Lehman asked Congress to double the Navy's budget for shipbuilding as a start toward his goal of a 600-ship Navy. In addition, Lehman set his sights on an aircraft carrier force of 15 carriers, 3 more than the 12 the Navy already had. As an interim measure, Lehman requested additional funds to recommission the mothballed conventional aircraft carrier *Oriskany* and two battleships, the *Iowa* and the *New Jersey*. The *Oriskany* would carry A-4

Skyhawk fighter-bombers and the two heavy armored battleships would serve as platforms for cruise missiles. Until the Navy completed its plan for three additional *Nimitz*-class nuclear carriers in the mid-1990s, these three ships and their escorts would fill the carrier gap.⁶

Two other spending requests also proved contentious. The first was \$20 million for a plant to produce two chemicals that were harmless until mixed; when combined they became lethal nerve gas. To conservatives in Congress the capability to produce nerve gas represented a deterrent to possible Soviet use. They also argued that existing stocks of U.S. chemical weapons were deteriorating and were so leaky that they posed more danger to U.S. troops than Soviet forces. To liberals the plant was unnecessary, the product inhumane, and the weapon unlikely to be accepted for deployment by European allies. Nevertheless, Congress approved money for the binary plant. The second contested request was for funding of ground-launched cruise missiles scheduled to be deployed in NATO countries in 1983 to counter the Soviet SS-20 missile threat. The House of Representatives attempted to reduce the Senate's funding for deployment, nearly \$60 million, to \$18 million. The Senate figure was accepted in conference and passed in the final bill.⁷

The 1981 FY supplemental bill passed both Houses of Congress in early June 1981. It appropriated \$11.8 billion, \$910 million less than requested. All requests for MX funding were denied on the grounds that the Reagan administration had not yet decided how to deploy the missiles. Congress funded the modernization of the battleship *New Jersey* (\$89 million) but reactivation of the *Oriskany* (\$139 million) and a small request for the *Iowa* (\$3 million) were not approved. The bill also reflected a disagreement between Congress and the administration over inflation. The Reagan administration projected 8 percent inflation. Both houses of Congress believed it would be higher, especially for research and development and for weapons procurement. As a result, legislators on Capitol Hill added \$512 million to the FY 1981 supplement to compensate for added inflation. In the end, the Pentagon obtained almost all of what it asked for in the supplemental. Weinberger summarized the success for the president: "Congress supported our program to increase readiness, improve our ability to recruit and retain personnel, and modernize forces." In addition to reactivation of the *New Jersey*, Weinberger noted other "wins": restoration of \$59.2 million for the ground-launched cruise missile program and modernization of the chemical warfare program.⁸

Defense Supplemental Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1981



Program	Administration Request	House-Passed Amount	Senate-Passed Amount	Final Appropriation
Military personnel	\$705,686,000	\$549,036,000	\$615,596,000	\$540,596,000
Transfers from other accounts	-----	\$47,800,000	\$47,800,000	\$47,800,000
Operations & maintainence	\$3,034,937,000	\$2,224,514,000	\$2,820,520,000	\$2,738,390,000
Liquidation of contract authority	\$620,053,000	\$620,053,000	\$620,053,000	\$620,053,000
Procurement	\$3,312,936,000	\$2,814,590,000	\$3,830,236,000	\$3,094,246,000
Research & development	\$589,300,000	\$434,704,000	\$837,721,000	\$507,948,000
Military construction	\$334,362,000	\$221,402,000	\$232,262,000	\$227,262,000
Pay raises	\$4,717,874,000	\$4,675,574,000	\$4,692,874,000	\$4,692,874,000
Total	\$12,704,095,000	\$10,919,820,000	\$13,029,191,000	\$11,801,316,000

OSD/HO, based on data from CQ Almanac, 1981

The FY 1982 Defense Budget

The Carter FY 1982 Defense budget request for Congress, which the Reagan administration inherited, was the largest to date, with some \$180 billion in outlays, and \$196.4 billion in budget authority (BA) for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1981. This was not a typical Carter budget. It allowed for over 5 percent real growth. It favored combat readiness, operations and maintenance, research and development, military construction, and higher pay for armed forces personnel over acquisition of new weapons. It was the kind of budget that a defense-minded Republican administration might have requested, but one wouldn't know that from the rhetoric of the 1980 presidential campaign. Weinberger agreed with the president that the voters had given a mandate for more defense allocations. The secretary and his team at the Pentagon were determined to respond to that mandate.⁹

A new administration always starts behind the eight ball with a Defense budget. The FY 1982 budget, with its FY 1982–FY 1986 defense plan outlining future budgets, was a massive and complex document. Normally most new secretaries of defense and their budget teams merely tweak the budget they inherit from a previous administration. They add a few programs, make some cuts, and/or stretch out some programs, but the budget stays basically the same. Such was the case when the Carter administration inherited the Ford FY 1978 budget. But the Reagan administration was determined to announce a new economic recovery program and to make major revisions to the Carter FY 1982 Defense budget as soon as possible.¹⁰

OMB Director David Stockman acknowledged that, with Reagan due to deliver a program for economic recovery on February 18, speed was of the essence: "With less than three weeks left before our self-imposed deadline a drastic shortcut had to be taken." This involved creating what Stockman called "budget plugs ... placeholders for decisions we would have to make ... after February 18." Essentially these were ballpark estimates, subject to change.¹¹

The first plug Stockman created was for the Defense budget, the largest discretionary component of the U.S. federal budget. Stockman and his deputy met with Weinberger and Carlucci in the secretary's Pentagon office at 7:30 p.m. on January 30. A 35-year-old former congressman from a Michigan political family, Stockman had been a Vietnam War protester, a Democrat, and a divinity student at Harvard before going into Republican politics. Stockman was brash,

self-assured, and confident of his expertise. The OMB director hoped that Secretary Weinberger, with his extensive experience in governmental budget matters, would be an ally in reducing the federal deficit. Although they began on relatively good terms, Stockman and Weinberger would grow to loathe each other. At this evening meeting the two men mapped out plugs or estimates for the FY 1982 Defense budget and the five-year defense plan beginning with FY 1982. Both men remembered this meeting, where apparently no formal written record was made, totally differently. Stockman recalled that Weinberger had no charts or graphs, just a blank piece of paper. Stockman himself carried only a pocket calculator. The issue, according to Stockman, was real growth of the budget, that is, how much to increase defense spending over inflation. Carlucci suggested that for weapons modernization, force structure additions, and sustainability requirements, DoD would need about 8 or 9 percent real growth per year. Stockman countered with 7 percent, which Weinberger grudgingly accepted.¹²

Later Stockman admitted that he had made a mistake. He agreed to 7 percent real growth after the Reagan administration revised the FY 1982 budget. Stockman failed to realize that the constant dollar figures, when translated into current dollars, amounted to \$1.46 trillion for the FY 1982–FY 1986 defense plan. Where



Director of the Office of Management and Budget David Stockman making a budget point to President Reagan, January 30, 1981. *Reagan Library*

Stockman had erred was in not realizing that the Carter 1982 FY budget already factored in 9 percent real growth and the Weinberger budget raised it another 7 percent annually to a total of 16 percent real growth. By the time Stockman had realized his error, the February 18 budget plan was out “and they were,” in his words, “squealing with delight throughout the military-industrial complex.”¹³

Weinberger remembered this meeting differently, even the details. The secretary said it lasted an hour; the director thought less than 30 minutes. Weinberger recalled that they basically discussed the FY 1981 supplemental request and the FY 1982 budget and did not recount any talk about the remaining years of the five-year plan. Weinberger recounted, “Stockman made a few notes, asked one or two questions” and agreed with DoD recommendations, stating, “OMB would pose no objections and that we should proceed.” Weinberger recalled that he and Carlucci hoped this meeting would be the start of a good working relationship between OMB and DoD to fulfill Reagan’s promise of a defense buildup, even if it meant budget deficits. As for Stockman’s account, Weinberger added in a footnote in his memoir that it could be “most politely described as fanciful.”¹⁴

Were these two accounts of the same meeting? The answer is yes. As Stockman admitted, he did not realize until much later that he had erred—although insinuated that he was bamboozled—into accepting Carlucci’s formula and starting point for real growth. There is no reason to doubt that Weinberger and Carlucci left the meeting feeling that Stockman had agreed to their recommendations and was on board with their plans for a massive defense buildup.

On March 4 Weinberger unveiled the DoD-revised FY 1982 budget request. He stated with pride that this was not a normal budget revision for a new administration. It did not have adjustments that were “routine, small in number and quickly arrived at.” Rather, “it was a total revision, all the way back to the beginning,” which would “normally have taken about eight months,” but which was completed “in roughly, four, four and a half weeks.” The FY 1982 budget requested budget authority of \$222.2 billion and outlays of \$184.4 billion, an increase of almost 17 percent over FY 1981. The budget was designed to increase readiness, improve recruitment and retention of personnel both military and civilian, modernize forces, and ensure naval superiority over the Soviet Union.¹⁵

To increase readiness, the budget requested \$8.7 billion to improve maintenance; reduce shortfalls in spare parts, supplies, and munitions; and to increase training and procure equipment. These expenditures were dubbed facts-of-life

costs. The budget also allowed for purchase of additional aircraft, missiles, torpedoes, and tanks. For quality-of-life costs to benefit military personnel there was \$2.8 billion for a combined 16 percent pay raise. The budget also provided improved working and living facilities, a cost-of-living allowance for single military personnel on overseas tours, and retention bonuses. Active military personnel would increase by 29,500 and civilian employees of DoD by 30,000 in FY 1982. \$13.7 billion was earmarked for modernization of weapon programs. The Army would receive additional Blackhawk helicopters, Roland Air Defense systems, more self-propelled DIVAD (division air defense) guns, more M1 (later to be named Abrams) tanks, and infantry fighting (Bradley) vehicles. The Navy would obtain more helicopters equipped with LAMPS (light airborne multipurpose system) data links, additional A-6E Intruder all-weather attack aircraft, EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft, F-14 Tomcat attack fighters, F-18 Hornet aircraft, P-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft, high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs), Tomahawk cruise missiles, and improved communications systems. The Marine Corps would receive more AV-8B vertical takeoff and landing Harrier jets, CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters, new weapons development, and facilities modernization. Finally, the Air Force was slated for more long-range combat aircraft, F-15 Eagle all-weather tactical fighters, A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, KC-10 aerial refueling aircraft, and E-3 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft, as well as electronic gear and simulator modification.¹⁶

Even with \$171.8 billion in DoD outlays for FY 1981 (including the supplemental) and \$184.4 billion for FY 1982, Weinberger and his budget team were under pressure to show that they were making some reductions to parts of the Carter budgets. In total they identified \$3.2 billion in savings for FY 1981 and FY 1982. These reductions fit into three broad categories. First were reductions in marginal weapon programs requested by Carter. Second were savings from efficiencies such as multiyear contracts and procurement in larger and therefore more economical quantities. Weinberger was well aware that Congress opposed multiyear contracts on the grounds it reduced “congressional flexibility,” which he defined as being able to block or amend programs on a yearly basis and as “about the most inefficient way to buy anything.” Nevertheless, he hoped to convince legislators to accept the logic of multiyear contracts. Third were reductions as a result of the president’s decision to cap civil service pay increases at 4.8 percent. DoD civilians would receive smaller cost of living increases than they were

due. Also slated for reductions were civilian travel, consultants, management assistance contracts, and reduced purchase of unneeded or marginally useful equipment. Joint use of facilities and contracting out functions better done by private industry were expected to result in substantial savings.¹⁷

Administration Negotiations for the September 1981 DoD Cuts

The real danger to Weinberger's FY 1982 budget arose from a delay in the expected economic recovery and a faster-than-anticipated rise in the federal deficit. Many in the Reagan administration considered themselves followers of pro-growth supply-side economics. The theoretical basis for this economic theory was the Laffer curve, popularized by University of Chicago economics professor Arthur Laffer. The curve itself was simply an attempt to illustrate a hypothetical tradeoff between tax rates and tax revenues. What made the curve attractive to Reagan and his advisers was Laffer's contention that cutting taxes could under certain conditions increase tax revenues by boosting economic growth, thereby creating a larger tax base in the form of higher profits and wages. The other theoretical basis for Reagan's economic policies came from Robert Mundell, a Columbia University economist, who argued that it was possible to have both stringent fiscal policies to curb inflation and tax reductions to stimulate the economy. The result, according to these theories, was that cutting taxes, curbing inflation, promoting economic growth, and balancing the budget could all be done simultaneously.¹⁸

Even if supply-side economics worked perfectly, which it hardly did, it was not going to have an effect immediately. Congress passed the first Reagan tax cut in July 1981, but the tax breaks went into effect in October. Even before Reagan signed the tax bill in early August, Stockman sounded the alarm about a \$60 to \$100 billion U.S. deficit each year for the next four years. The OMB director warned that the FY 1982–FY 1986 defense plan had to be cut by \$30 to \$50 billion to balance the federal budget by 1984, as the president had promised to do in his campaign. Weinberger, however, would not hear of defense cuts. On August 18 Stockman and two OMB colleagues joined the president, the Pentagon chief, Carlucci, Haig, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, and others for a meeting with the vacationing president in the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles. Secretary Regan questioned Stockman's deficit calculations and opposed any revenue enhancements. Haig bridled over how Stockman dared to suggest cutting DoD's budget. The president reminded the participants that John F. Kennedy's Defense

budget comprised 45 percent of the federal budget. Although nothing was decided at this meeting, Stockman realized his pleas for DoD reductions had fallen on deaf ears. Then, a week later, Stockman and Weinberger met with Ed Meese (the president did not attend) to continue the budget negotiations. Again Weinberger stonewalled. After the meeting, according to Stockman, Meese assured him that the president would like a compromise on defense spending and Weinberger could be convinced to accept it: "I'll work quietly with Cap through labor day. He'll come around."¹⁹

On September 9 Weinberger and Stockman met with Reagan in Washington, DC. Weinberger argued most effectively to a jury of one, the president. Instead of focusing on how much to cut his Defense budget to reduce the deficit, he gave the classic United States versus the Soviet Union military comparison. He pulled out all the stops, using charts from the soon-to-be-published *Soviet Military Power* and describing a Soviet tank factory large enough to overlay the entire National Mall in Washington, DC (see chapter 4). The secretary compared Soviet bombers—the Backfire and a new larger bomber in development—to the aging B-52s. Weinberger revealed to the president, "Sir, our planes are older than their pilots." Each man was supposed to speak for 15 minutes. Weinberger held the floor for almost an hour. Stockman's briefing fizzled as he attempted to convince the president that his smaller, deficit-reducing budget would not affect the Reagan-Weinberger defense buildup. Stockman realized that he had lost the president, who was, early in the meeting, already jotting down compromise figures on his briefing book. The gathering ended with Reagan's standard admonition: "Now why don't you fellas get together and see if you can work it out." In fact, the president had already made up his mind. As Reagan confided to his diary the day before the meeting: "Hi interest rates are going to force more budget cuts or we won't meet our 82, 83, & 84 targets.... We have to convince the money mkt. that we mean business & that means some cuts in defense. But we have to do it in a way that the world sees us as keeping our word to restore defense spending. It can be done."²⁰

It all came down to how much the president planned to cut the Defense budget request. The president's advisers huddled and split the difference between Weinberger's and Stockman's proposed cuts, settling on \$26 billion in defense cuts over FY 1982–FY 1984. The president called Weinberger, who agreed. But the president and his advisers were making cuts to the Pentagon's multiyear

budget authority, not to outlays. Congress typically grants the Pentagon the power (budget authority) to enter into spending agreements that stretch into future years. Outlays are what the Treasury actually pays for in a given year and can include the settlement of obligations incurred in previous years. To use Stockman's analogy, multiyear budget authority was what you bought on a credit card; outlays were what you paid in cash that year. Stockman was quick to point out that a cut of \$26 billion to the proposed BA would only amount to an \$11 billion cut in outlays for FYs 1982–1984. That would barely reduce the deficit. A second meeting with the president attended only by Weinberger and Stockman settled the issue. Stockman recalls that he made all the concessions; Weinberger did not budge. Eventually the president decided on \$13 billion less in outlays (\$2 billion in FY 1982, \$5 billion in FY 1983, and \$6 billion in FY 1984). Again Weinberger carried the day. Stockman recalled that he left the meeting dejected, “like somebody cut out of a rich uncle's will.”²¹

Next week Weinberger informed the president what the \$13 billion reduction would mean. For the Army it meant cuts in air defense systems (including the French-German produced Roland missile), fewer tanks and fighting vehicles, less military construction in the United States, one division reduced to cadre status, and one brigade in Europe eliminated over the next two years. The Navy would lose a submarine, a frigate, and the conversion of the *Oriskany*. Some older ships would be decommissioned, active ships would have less steaming time, Navy pilots would have less flight time, and Navy R&D would get minor reductions. The Air Force would have to cancel some aircraft procurement, including the KC-10 refueling tanker, and would retire older B-52s. Air Force R&D and manpower increase requests would be cut. Weinberger then met with Senator John Tower to discuss strategies for presenting this revised budget to Congress.²²

Congressional Consideration of the FY 1982 Budget

The FY 1982 revised request for a Defense budget of \$213 billion in budget authority was an 11 percent increase over Carter's FY 1982 budget. The DoD had reduced the original \$222.2 billion request by \$9 billion in BA in order to meet the president's new goal, set in September, for \$2 billion in outlays for FY 1982. Once this reduction had been made, the defense authorization and appropriation bills enjoyed relatively smooth sailing in Congress for three main reasons. First, the administration had already cut back on its initial requests of March 1981

in response to the growing federal deficit. Second, the smaller-than-original defense package gave the financial community hope for a more balanced budget. Third, Congress was still generally receptive to the administration's increases in the DoD budget, having encouraged the Carter administration to do so in 1980 and having accepted the election as a mandate for more defense spending. The revised DoD budget request met little legislative opposition.²³

Congress's favorable attitude was especially apparent in consideration of the defense authorization bill passed by both houses of Congress in November 1981. This bill authorized (but did not appropriate) money for weapon systems, procurement, research and development, operations and maintenance (a new addition to the authorization bill), and civil defense. In October the administration requested a \$130.3 billion revised authorization. Congress authorized \$130.7 billion, \$400 million more than requested. As Carlucci informed Weinberger, "We got virtually everything we wanted." In addition to the administration's October requests, Congress added authorization for an additional missile frigate, 120 more M1 tanks, more money for training and maintenance, four KC-10 refueling tanker aircraft, and money to design a new amphibious assault ship for the Marine Corps. Congress's major reduction was elimination of the Air Force's C-17 wide-body transport plane, one designed to carry tanks and heavy equipment long distances and land at primitive airports. Congress authorized \$100 million less than the Pentagon requested for the C-17 but did not rule out purchase of the aircraft if it gained approval by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.²⁴

The battles over the DoD budget that did occur were fought on the Senate and House floor during the passage of the DoD appropriation bill, the bill that actually funded the Pentagon. The controversies involved the administration's plan to produce the B-1B supersonic penetration bomber, a revised version of the B-1 that President Carter had canceled, and the administration's plan to deploy the MX missile in hardened silos rather than the mobile missiles on rail tracks that Carter approved but did not deploy. These two weapon systems represented important components of the Pentagon's strategic modernization plan (see chapter 13). Weinberger alerted Reagan to the problems ahead: "Both Armed Services Committee Chairmen, John Tower and Mel Price [D-IL], sharply questioned rejection of the [MX deployment] racetrack shelter plan, and remain skeptical of the hardened silo basing plan.... We anticipate a difficult time before

receiving Congressional endorsement of this part of our strategic program.” As for the B-1B, Weinberger reported that Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, “remains to be convinced” because of the B-1B’s costs and concerns about its ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses. Weinberger informed the president that House Appropriations Chairman Joseph Addabbo (D-NY), “a strong opponent of our plans for the B-1 and M-X and virtually everything else in Defense except the A-10 plane—the manufacturer of which is in his district—is leading the effort to cut funds for these two essential programs and force a big general Defense Cut.” Weinberger predicted, “We will have a major floor fight for at least the B-1 and M-X.”²⁵

During October and November 1981 Weinberger spent much of his time on Capitol Hill, either testifying before committees or meeting with key congressional leaders to elicit their support for the B-1B, MX, and DoD budget as a whole. If he was not on the Hill, he was often telephoning members of committees to elicit their support. By mid-November the budget struggle reached its climax as both appropriations committees sat poised to consider the DoD’s FY 1982 budget. Weinberger met privately with Senator Tower, who had publicly expressed reservations over the silo basing of the MX—although not the missile itself—and private doubts about the B-1B. Part of Tower’s concern was that producing the B-1B would slow the development of a new stealth bomber, the B-2, which would be almost invisible to radar. Weinberger promised Tower to further study deceptive basing for the MX and assured him that the B-1B would in no way delay the production of the B-2. Weinberger then informed the president that he now had Tower’s support. “To have gone to the Senate floor fight without John’s solid support would have been fatal to our strategic program,” he stated. As for the House, Weinberger remained optimistic that there was “a willingness to take up our cause in the full [Appropriations] Committee,” but he expected a robust debate on the House floor.²⁶

The fights on the Senate and House floors ran about as Weinberger anticipated. Senators Sam Nunn and William Cohen offered an amendment that prohibited the DoD from using \$334 million of the \$354 million requested for development of an interim basing mode of superhardened silos for the MX. Skeptical that hardened silos would protect the MX from a Soviet first strike, Nunn and Cohen argued that their amendment was designed to encourage DoD to explore other ways to protect the MX, such as antimissile defenses, restoring some mobility


features of the Carter racetrack plan, or possibly developing air-launched MXs. Weinberger claimed his negotiations with Senator Stevens deserved some credit for the earmark of \$20 billion for research and development of the silo-hardening concept. Yet as he told the president, "Adoption of the amendment reflects widespread Congressional concern over basing M-X in super-hardened silos, but it does not tie our hands for the future." The amendment passed overwhelmingly and was accepted by the conference committee as part of the final bill. The Senate easily rejected an amendment by Senator Ernest F. "Fritz" Hollings (D-SC) that would have eliminated \$2.4 billion for the B-1B and would have transferred most of the money to procurement. Weinberger attributed the success to support from Senators Edwin J. "Jake" Garn (R-UT) and John W. Warner (R-VA).²⁷

On the House floor, Representative Addabbo presented an amendment to remove \$1.8 billion for the B-1B, which he characterized as a "bummer of a bomber," and then introduced another amendment to cancel MX funding. Many House members saw the MX missile as a potential bargaining chip with the Soviet Union in arms reduction negotiations, as proposed in the president's November 18 speech (see chapter 5). Other defense hawks supported it in its own right. The House easily rejected Addabbo's amendments.²⁸

In conference the two chambers provided \$1.9 billion for development of the MX missile but included the Nunn-Cohen restrictions on the \$554 million earmarked for its basing mode. And for the B-1B Congress appropriated just over \$2 billion. In total, the defense appropriation bill provided \$199.7 billion in outlays for FY 1982, just \$979 million less than the administration's revised request of October 1981. As for budget authority, Congress funded \$211.6 billion, only \$1.4 billion short of the October request. Not only did the DoD receive nearly all the money it requested, it also received full funding for most of its weapon systems and programs. Weinberger told the president, "As passed, the bill represents a clear victory for our strengthened defense spending program including the B-1B bomber and the M-X missile." The Pentagon chief credited the White House and DoD legislative teams for the success and complemented the president on his efforts: "Your own personal involvement which was very effective at numerous critical points in the long battle was, of course, instrumental."²⁹

This FY 1982 appropriation, signed into law by the president on December 29, 1981, represented a high-water mark of Weinberger's relations with Congress over DoD budgets. While they had differed over a few specifics, both the secretary

Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1982



Program	Administration Request	House-Passed Amount	Senate-Passed Amount	Final Appropriation
Personnel	\$38,659,760,000	\$37,457,290,000	\$43,227,673,000	\$38,098,093,000
Retired personnel	\$14,981,815,000	\$14,931,815,000	\$14,944,815,000	\$14,938,315,000
Operations & maintenance	\$62,590,121,000	\$61,631,465,000	\$63,428,634,000	\$61,853,377,000
Procurement	\$64,225,904,000	\$63,960,269,000	\$66,126,988,000	\$64,841,585,000
Research & development	\$20,319,388,000	\$19,362,204,000	\$20,846,389,000	\$19,859,148,000
Special foreign currency	\$3,083,000	\$3,083,000	\$3,083,000	\$3,083,000
Related agencies	\$98,163,000	\$97,163,000	\$98,163,000	\$97,663,000
Total, new budget authority	\$200,878,234,000	\$197,443,289,000	\$208,675,745,000	\$199,691,264,000
Transfer from previous accounts	—	\$73,900,000	\$192,900,000	\$208,000,000
Total funding available	\$200,878,234,000	\$197,517,189,000	\$208,868,645,000	\$199,899,264,000

OSD/HO, based on data from CQ Almanac, 1981

and the leadership of Congress were of similar minds on the contours of defense spending. Passage of the FY 1982 Pentagon budget was relatively easy and the bumps in the road relatively minor. It was a rousing success for the Pentagon. Yet it proved a mixed blessing. Henceforth Weinberger always expected to recreate the success of the FY 1982 budget, yet as the federal government's deficit ballooned and Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign faded in memory, Weinberger's ability to obtain full funding from Congress diminished and his relations with congressional leaders deteriorated.³⁰

DoD Preparation of the FY 1983 Budget

None of those clouds were visible on the horizon when the Pentagon began to formulate the FY 1983 budget, its first budget not inherited from the Carter administration. Of course, the Reagan administration planned to spend more money on defense than its predecessor and promised to do so efficiently, but it also planned to do so with better input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commanders, the services, and the DoD civilian bureaucracy. An improved Defense Resources Board would spearhead the new effort. All of these reforms began with a study commissioned by Deputy Secretary Carlucci to assess the DoD's Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System (PPBS), which had first been instituted by President Kennedy's secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, and has been used, with minor modifications, ever since.³¹

The Carlucci study was completed and the new management system it recommended took effect at the end of March 1981. The new system placed control of policy decisions in the secretary of defense's office, but it decentralized policy execution to the services and the DoD staff agencies (see chapter 6). The innovation of the new system was that the service secretaries were allowed more responsibility and flexibility in shaping their own budgets; they also became accountable for resource management and executive policy decisions. To this end the service secretaries became full members of the Defense Resources Board, which now also included the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Carter administration had created the board in April 1979 to aid in budget decisions, specifically by supervising the OSD review of services' program objective memoranda (POMs) and the DoD budget submissions to OMB and Congress. Under the chairmanship of Carlucci, the board would now meet monthly to deal with major budget issues. Minor ones would be decided by consensus among the services and the appropriate

OSD staff. Carlucci expected the DRB members to take the broader view and be more than advocates of their particular areas of responsibility.³²

This new management system ostensibly encouraged the JCS to help shape the U.S. Defense budget, a role that had been mostly denied to them under the Carter administration. But two factors originally inhibited JCS influence. The first was that all the chiefs were holdovers from Carter. While they had argued privately and eventually in publicly in 1980 that more defense spending was required, they were tarred by their connections to an administration that Reagan claimed had endangered U.S. national security by spending too little on defense. Secondly, Reagan's civilian advisers, both unofficial and official, were in 1981 hell-bent on increasing the Defense budget by a massive amount. While the JCS invariably made the case in their strategic planning documents that protecting national security required more funding, the civilians were now way ahead of the Joint Chiefs, with double-digit percentage real growth built into the DoD budgets. The JCS were preaching to the choir, but the Weinberger civilian team had moved on to the next sermon.³³

Not long into the first year, however, inflation's reality impinged on the DoD's budget planning. In March 1981 the president expressed concern that defense program costs were rising significantly. Reagan asked Weinberger for a plan to reduce such growth to a minimum in the future. Weinberger responded that the chief culprit was inflation, which "the Carter administration consistently and consciously underestimated," especially in high-technology programs where inflation costs exceeded the general inflation rate. Carter's solution, according to the secretary, was to stretch out procurement, which then cut quantities of high-technology weapons and caused unit prices to rise. Weinberger expected the president's economic recovery program (tax cuts and cuts in domestic spending) to reduce inflation, but he suggested that DoD's inflation would remain higher than the consumer price index because of the high cost of advanced technology. Budget planners needed to realize this. In addition, Weinberger informed the president of a series of measures which he believed would hold down defense costs. They included improved management and long-term planning, acquisition reform (not just acquisition reform studies), and an assistant secretary of defense for review and oversight to attack fraud, waste, and abuse.³⁴

In June 1981 the military services presented to Weinberger their program objective memoranda—their estimates of what they needed to do their jobs. Their

figures were based on the FYs 1983–1987 defense plan total of \$1.46 trillion in defense spending for the five years, which Weinberger and Stockman had initially agreed upon. The Air Force POM identified its highest priorities as modernizing and enhancing the survivability of its strategic forces, improving readiness and sustainability of its general-purpose forces, modernizing and expanding its tactical air forces, and paying its personnel salaries conducive to attracting highly skilled people. The Air Force based its POM requests on DoD's initial fiscal guidance of an Air Force budget of \$75.8 billion for FY 1983.³⁵

The Navy's POM focused on achieving and sustaining naval superiority over the Soviet Union. Foremost among its long-term goals was its shipbuilding program, which called for a five-year, 145-hull shipbuilding program as part of a plan to achieve a 600-ship Navy by 1990. For FYs 1983–1987 the Navy planned to procure an additional 1,953 aircraft, an increase of 862 over the Carter plan. By 1987 it planned to support 14 modern carrier wings and 4 Marine aircraft wings. To increase the U.S. Marine Corps's ability to project power ashore, the Navy intended to increase its amphibious ability. As for quality-of-life personnel issues, the Navy sought to increase both the attractiveness of and compensation for naval service. The Navy's share of the FY 1983 budget was \$79.8 billion, the highest of the services.³⁶

The Army's POM recommended meeting three essential conditions: restore the military balance in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, contain Soviet power in other areas of vital interest, and maintain credible deterrence against Soviet nuclear attack and coercion. To accomplish these ends the Army needed 33 divisions and 7 theater defense brigades. Its current 24-division force was inadequate. The POM for FYs 1983–1987 would provide greater global focus and capability, increase strategic deployability, strengthen the reserve component, improve firepower, and heighten tactical mobility. The \$58.8 billion provided to the Army in FY 1983 would just begin a process that would not be completed by FY 1987.³⁷

Reagan's September 1981 decision to scale back the March FY 1983 DoD budget proposal by an additional \$5 billion in outlays barely required the services to refigure their POMs. As Weinberger assured the president in early 1982, "We have already reduced the FY 1983 Defense outlays alone by more than \$5 billion based on new economies and efficiencies." Of the \$6.5 billion that Weinberger estimated DoD would save for FY 1983, \$4 billion came from pay adjustments

based on a cost-of-living increase cap for all civil servants and from stretching out military pay proposed by Carter. Almost \$2 billion in reductions in acquisitions came from cancellation of “marginal programs approved by the Carter administration.” These “marginal programs” included, most significantly, the cancellation of Carter’s multiple protective shelter basing for the MX missile in favor of a cheaper deployment of 40 missiles in reconstructed Minuteman III or Titian silos (see chapter 13). Finally, the DoD would cut operations by nearly \$1 billion by reducing employee travel, consultants, contractor studies, equipment, supplies, and furniture. In addition, Weinberger promised capital investments to improve productivity. Commenting on the Weinberger claims, NSC staffer Robert W. Helm noted that Weinberger’s “points were correct as far as they go,” but lower inflation reduced that \$41 billion cut to only \$17 billion if it was measured in constant dollars for FYs 1982–1986. While Weinberger’s efficiencies were admirable, they were slow to take effect and often dependent on legislation that had not yet been passed. In addition, Helm felt that “some of the original estimates have been rather heroic.” Helm suggested Reagan might be “vulnerable” if he touted Weinberger’s examples too enthusiastically.³⁸

Congressional Consideration of the FY 1983 Defense Budget

In order to prepare Congress for the FY 1983 Defense budget, Weinberger met privately with congressional leaders before submission of the formal request. His first stop was lunch with Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Tower to provide the Pentagon’s most reliable and influential friend an overview of the budget and the five-year defense plan. In a follow-up private informal breakfast at the Pentagon with the entire committee, Weinberger assured the members that the DoD’s strong management initiatives would result in savings and elimination of waste, fraud, and abuse. Next, Weinberger testified in closed sessions with both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. As Weinberger assured the president, “We now have recruited some strong support for our Defense plans for FY 1983.”³⁹

To augment congressional support for the budget, Weinberger had a plan to win public support. In early February Weinberger released the Joint Chiefs’ military posture statement for FY 1983. This 122-page report, with its maps, graphs, pictures of weapons, and appendices, stated that the United States faced a challenge of “threats of unprecedented scope and urgency,” adding, “Those

threats derive from the sustained growth of Soviet military power and instabilities which confront the West in several regions of the underdeveloped world.” In virtually every comparison in the report, the United States was behind the Soviet Union—in weapons, ships, military funding, military investment, numbers of military personnel, and so on (see chapter 4). The separate *Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress*, released with the budget request, provided more of the same, with one major exception. The report included graphs indicating that for the last three decades total U.S. defense expenditures as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP) remained relatively constant, between about 8 and 6 percent. Furthermore, defense spending as a percentage of U.S. federal spending had dropped from about 35 percent in 1955 to 16 percent in 1981. The FY 1983 budget maintained the trend with only a slight rise. The message was that the Reagan buildup was nothing like defense spending during the Korean or Vietnam Wars.⁴⁰

On February 8, 1982, Carlucci—Weinberger was traveling in the Middle East—released an FY 1983 budget request for \$258 billion in budget authority and \$215.9 billion in outlays. During his initial budget testimony, Carlucci spent most of his time outlining the savings, management improvements, and elimination of waste and fraud in what one journalist called a “preemptive strike against critics.” Carlucci assured the Senate Armed Services Committee that this budget, which raised the percentage of military spending from 6 to 7 percent of the gross national product, was an honest one that revealed the true costs of national defense.⁴¹

Notwithstanding Weinberger’s earlier lobbying on the Hill, the extensive Pentagon reports for Congress, and Carlucci’s testimony, upon his return to Washington Weinberger noted in Congress “a rather hostile mood toward the whole budget, including Defense.... There appears to be an uninformed attitude growing in Congress, including critical parts of the Republican leadership, that Pentagon cuts will erase the federal deficit, and that it ‘is only fair that Defense be cut.’” The secretary told the president, “We must reverse this trend.” Weinberger mapped out his strategy: justifying the budget before five major congressional committees, more private breakfast meetings at the Pentagon with the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee and members of the Senate and House Budget Committees prior to their formal hearings. He also promised public appearances, speeches, television interviews, print interviews, and news confer-

ences in support of the budget. Weinberger lamented that the recently released *Soviet Military Power* had not raised the “low level of public awareness about Soviet capabilities.” Weinberger alerted the president that he might “need your personal involvement” in steering the DoD budget through Congress.⁴²

In April 1982 Weinberger was not pleased when he learned from allied legislators that members of the White House staff were discussing cuts of \$60 billion of budget authority and \$10 billion in outlays for the FY 1983 budget. The secretary prepared a rejoinder, which he sent to the president. Weinberger argued that such reductions would return the DoD budget to “the Carter level,” destroy momentum for rebuilding the military, and eliminate “realistic deterrence against the Soviet buildup.” Furthermore, such cuts undermined his strategy of arms reduction based on equality with the Soviet Union. Weinberger bridled at congressional criticisms that he either did not have a defense strategy or that his strategy outstripped U.S. resources. “I respond,” Weinberger wrote, “they should increase our resources to match our strategy, or they should tell us what we should give up—defense of the central front in Europe, or maintaining access to the oil fields, or defending South Korea against a much stronger North Korea?” Weinberger asked the president for “‘neutrality’ from the White House [staff]” and suggested that he meet with the Republican defense committees’ leadership to reiterate his support for the Defense budget.⁴³

Before appropriating money for the Department of Defense for FY 1983, Congress followed the usual practice of providing authorization for procurement of weapon systems, research and development, civil defense, and operations and maintenance. The administration submitted a total authorization budget of \$183.5 billion, but in mid-August 1982 Congress authorized only \$177.9 billion, \$5.6 billion less than requested. Nearly one-third of the cuts, \$1.6 billion, came from four large congressional reductions in strategic weapon programs.⁴⁴

By far the most controversial issue was how to deploy the MX missile, which continued to roil the Senate. The Pentagon requested authorization of \$4.3 billion in MX funds, including \$1.5 billion for the manufacture of the first nine missiles, \$1.7 billion to continue development of the missiles, \$715 million for research related to the proposed deployment in Minuteman silos, and \$310 million for research on long-term basing modes (other than Minuteman silos). The Senate denied all authorization to procure the first nine missiles and eliminated the \$715 million for research on deployment in existing silos, a clear statement of its

dissatisfaction with Reagan's silo deployment option. In conference the House and Senate restored \$830 for production of the first five MX missiles, \$158 million for support equipment for the missiles, and \$2.5 billion for MX development but with the \$715 million for silo deployment requiring a 30-day delay until Congress could review the permanent basing method chosen by the administration.⁴⁵

Also in conference, Congress agreed to authorize about half of the \$727 million requested for development of an antiballistic missile system to protect the MX on the theory that until a decision

was reached on the basing mode, spending that amount of money would be a mistake. The conferees also reduced funding for development of long wavelength lasers to shoot down Soviet missiles from \$122.3 million to \$81.7 million and short wavelength lasers from \$50 million to \$20 million. The other two major strategic reductions included funding for one Trident missile-launching submarine, rather than the two requested (saving \$699 million), and a \$100 million cut in the \$256 million requested for civil defense.⁴⁶

With the exception of the MX and the stretching out of production for Trident-carrying submarines, the services generally did well by Congress. The Air Force received \$3.9 billion to begin procurement of the B-1B bomber. Congress authorized funding for the wide-body air cargo transports, KC-10 tanker aircraft, and 39 F-15 advanced fighters. The Army received authorization for 855 M1 tanks (\$1.6 billion), but its funding for lightweight tanks was drastically cut. The Army did obtain authorization for 48 AH-64 Apache tank-hunting helicopters. Both houses had approved without change most of the DoD shipbuilding program: \$6.8 billion for two *Nimitz*-class nuclear aircraft carriers to replace older, World War II versions; \$1 billion for two attack submarines; \$3.1 billion for three Aegis-



DoD Comptroller Jack Borsting displays fiscal year 1983 Defense budget paperwork prepared for Congress, April 8, 1982. *OSD Records*

equipped cruisers; and \$323 million to modernize the battleship *Iowa*. The Navy's only setback was the above-mentioned cut of one Trident-carrying submarine.⁴⁷

Weinberger reported that after two weeks of DoD working closely with the conference committee, it "endorsed all our most important major programs, including the M-X missile, the C-5 aircraft, both of which had been turned down initially in the Senate and reversed in Conference. The bill also contains request for the Trident submarine, the AH-64 helicopter and two nuclear carriers." The "only disappointments," Weinberger noted, were "reductions in civil defense and the ballistic missile defense, and deferral without prejudice for more funds for the production of binary chemical munitions." At the White House, NSC staffer Helm informed National Security Adviser Clark that the DoD authorization process survived Congress in "good form." However, he added, "The appropriation process, which may not occur until well after the November elections, will present a new challenge."⁴⁸


The defense authorizations debate provided a preview of the issues that would arise later in 1982 when Congress met to consider the FY 1983 defense appropriation bill. Again the deployment of the MX missile was front and center, with many in Congress determined to force the administration to abandon, or at least rethink, its scheme to deploy the missiles in silos. Only this time the opposition came from the House, not the Senate. The House vote on the MX was preceded on November 22, 1982, by announcements from Weinberger and Reagan that the administration had decided on a "dense pack" system for deploying 100 MX missiles near Cheyenne, Wyoming. Under this scheme, MX missiles would be deployed closely together (1,800 feet apart) in superhardened silos. Dense pack was based on the "fratricide theory" that Soviet missiles attacking the dense pack would destroy each other as they exploded above the superhardened silo, thus leaving the MX missiles operable (see chapter 13). Of the \$3.5 billion the administration requested for the MX, \$988 million was to produce five MX missiles. The rest was for continued research and development on the missile and the basing mode.⁴⁹

On December 7, 1982, the House voted to eliminate the entire \$988 million for the production of five MX missiles while approving \$2.5 billion for continued research and development on the missile. What was significant about the vote was that 43 representatives (including 13 Republicans and 22 southern Democrats) who had supported production of the MX in the authorization bill

voted to kill procurement in the appropriation process. This defeat came despite strong lobbying by the Reagan administration that claimed the MX was crucial to convincing the Soviet Union to take the administration seriously in nuclear arms reduction talks. In addition there was widespread skepticism that dense pack would actually work. With Congress convinced that defense spending had to be cut, the MX deployment scheme was a symbol of DoD extravagance: buying the expensive missiles before deciding how to deploy them. To Weinberger, however, the House vote was a mistake. The House voted down production of the missiles when it should have voted down deployment of them if it opposed the dense pack mode. Weinberger promised “maximum effort to gain restoration of MX production funds in the Senate.” Unfortunately for the secretary, the Senate accepted in conference session the elimination of funding for production of the five MX (now dubbed Peacekeeper) missiles. Of the \$2.5 billion the conference committee approved for the MX, \$1.7 billion was for R&D on the missile itself, without restrictions. The remaining \$775 million was earmarked for basing, of which only \$215 million had no restrictions. The restricted \$560 million that was earmarked for full engineering and development of the basing system could not be spent until both houses agreed on a permanent basing system for the Peacekeeper. Under the terms of the authorization bill as passed, the administration had until March 1, 1983, to come up with a single mode for congressional approval. As Weinberger informed the president, this vote on the MX “will require an intensive effort in talking with the members of the new Congress and educating them as to the critical requirement for the system in a secure mode.”⁵⁰

For the rest of the FY 1983 defense appropriation bill process, Weinberger was upbeat. While Congress cut \$17.6 billion from the administration’s revised request for \$249.6 billion in BA, Weinberger had been expecting most of these reductions and had already negotiated them with the congressional leadership. Furthermore, \$2.3 billion of cuts resulted from DoD’s share of government-wide reduced federal pay adjustments. The \$232 billion appropriated in budget authority was, as described in the secretary’s report to the president, “a significant step forward in our defense rebuilding program. Major programs approved (after major fights) include the B-1B bomber, the C-5B air transport, the M-1 tank, two-nuclear powered aircraft carriers...” While the \$17.6 billion cut was the largest reduction to an administration’s defense request ever enacted by Congress, it came out of the largest administration request to date. The general consensus

Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1983



Program	Administration Request	House-Passed Amount	Senate-Passed Amount	Final Appropriation
Personnel	\$47,902,500,000	\$45,136,265,000	\$43,810,320,000	\$45,066,808,000
Retired personnel	\$16,510,800,000	\$16,154,800,000	\$16,228,800,000	\$16,154,800,000
Operations & maintenance	\$71,087,451,000	\$66,894,464,000	\$67,363,622,000	\$67,279,010,000
Procurement	\$89,616,914,000	\$79,820,133,000	\$83,012,879,000	\$80,287,703,000
Research & development	\$24,389,894,000	\$22,114,054,000	\$22,876,984,000	\$22,704,284,000
Special foreign currency	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000	\$3,800,000
Related agencies	\$92,050,000	\$106,976,000	\$106,700,000	\$107,156,000
Total, new budget authority	\$249,612,409,000	\$230,230,492,000	\$233,403,105,000	\$231,603,561,000
Transfer from previous appropriations	—	\$520,072,000	\$345,900,000	\$423,163,000
Total funding available	\$249,612,409,000	\$230,750,564,000	\$233,749,005,000	\$232,026,724,000

OSD/HO, based on data from CQ Almanac, 1982

was that the FY 1983 budget fared well in the authorization process, with DoD winning approval of the bulk of its military buildup.⁵¹

As for FY 1983 outlays, in May 1982 the president agreed with a Republican leadership proposal to reduce them from \$224.2 billion to \$215.3 billion and set aside \$7.5 billion for deficit reduction. The president stressed to Weinberger that while implementing these savings he must continue to maintain the readiness and sustainability of U.S. military forces. Achieving these outlay savings would require elimination of some military units from the force structure, but as the president assured Senator Tower, “We will not perpetuate a ‘hollow’ military force.”⁵²

In a year-end report to the president, Weinberger made the case that, far from being “intransigent” about making cuts to defense spending proposals as his critics charged, he had made substantial concessions. In terms of outlays, the Pentagon had given up one-third (\$41 billion of \$116 billion) of what it had initially projected as additions to the Carter defense program for FYs 1982–1986. Weinberger promoted the idea of more efficient multiyear procurements for large-scale programs, noting that while this innovation required more money up front, it resulted in substantial long-term efficiencies and thus savings. Weinberger reported that in FY 1983 the Pentagon presented Congress with 11 such candidates with potential payback of over \$1 billion. Finally, the secretary reminded the president that the DoD had canceled 48 of Carter’s “low-priority programs” to free up funds for programs of higher priority. He specifically mentioned the cancellation of the Roland missile system and multiple protective structures basing for the MX.⁵³

Weinberger used his last press conference of 1982, held on December 30, to sum up the accomplishments of the first two years of the Reagan defense buildup. He noted that production of the B-1B bomber was ahead of schedule, the first of the Trident-carrying submarines had joined the fleet, and the second was completing sea trials. He put the best light on the MX missile, suggesting that if Congress was satisfied with the administration’s future deployment mode, funds would be released to produce the actual missiles. DoD could then keep to the schedule for the MX’s planned initial operational capability. Weinberger touted military readiness improvements by claiming combat readiness had improved 32 percent since January 1981. The All-Volunteer Force exceeded its recruiting

quotas for the first time since 1976. High school graduates comprised 86 percent of the recruits, up from 68 percent in 1980. Reenlistment rates were the highest since 1964. Weinberger noted that all these improvements had been made with the administration itself cutting back \$41 billion in its initial five-year defense plan. The secretary declared, "I do not believe we can cut more from our defense programs for the next years without risk to our national security."⁵⁴

In describing his press conference to the president, Weinberger suggested that he had made some "headway" with the press in reversing their belief that "there had been no budget cuts for defense, and that we had refused to look at the Defense Budget; etc. etc." The problem, according to the secretary, was that the Pentagon "must spend more now to achieve efficiencies over time and we cannot have real, net reductions in the face of the Soviet threat. I will continue to try to carry the true gospel to the press and the public." Unfortunately for the Pentagon, the secretary was whistling in the dark. The fights for the remaining DoD budgets in the first Reagan term would make congressional passage of the FY 1981 supplement and the FY 1982 and FY 1983 budgets seem like a walk in the park.⁵⁵

Confronting the Soviets: Estimates of Military Power, Crisis in Poland, and Reassessments of Technology Transfer and Trade Embargoes

CASPAR WEINBERGER BELIEVED that the United States and the Soviet Union were in a struggle that would determine the fate of the world. The Soviets and communism represented not only a threat to capitalism and democracies but a danger to those nonaligned and developing states and Eastern European nations that he saw struggling under Moscow's yoke. He was determined to fight the Cold War on all fronts: increased U.S. defense spending, new weapons to offset Soviet military power, increased U.S. influence in the developing world, encouragement of Eastern European nations' efforts to distance themselves from Moscow, and, last but not least, economic warfare. Weinberger saw no reason for the West to provide any economic help to Moscow's military and sputtering civilian-based economy, especially when it came to trade in high technology.


Assessing and Publicizing the Soviet Threat

The passage of the Defense budgets for fiscal years 1981–1983 gave Weinberger satisfaction that he had accomplished the 1980 presidential election mandate for more defense spending. Reagan had campaigned on the issue and the people had spoken with their votes. During the Reagan campaign for the presidency, Weinberger was still at Bechtel Corporation. Until January 1981 Weinberger had neither the time, access, nor inclination to examine Soviet military capabilities in any depth. He did believe that the Soviet Union posed a dire threat to U.S.

national security. His view was based on the critiques of Republican conservatives and Democratic hawks who opposed Carter's defense policies and warned that Moscow's military power had outstripped that of the United States. Once in office as secretary of defense, Weinberger had access to intelligence estimates and analysis of Soviet defense spending, Moscow's foreign policy, and the nature of the Soviet challenge. Weinberger employed these to document and then publicize the Soviet threat. One of Weinberger's most thoughtful advisers on the Soviet Union was Andrew Marshall of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA), which since 1973 had been evaluating the net balance between the two superpowers. Biographers of Marshall have discounted Weinberger's willingness to listen to ONA, but early in the administration the secretary clearly engaged him.¹

In January 1981 Weinberger received from Marshall a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) research paper that concluded, "For the period 1971 to 1980 the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activities were 40 percent higher than comparable US outlays." Furthermore, the paper continued, from 1965 to 1980 Soviet defense spending grew at a steady rate of 3 percent a year, while U.S. spending rose with the Vietnam War, declined after 1973, and only after 1976, during the Carter years, grew at 2.5 percent per year. For the 1965–1980 period as a whole, the U.S. growth rate was negative. Although the picture the agency painted was distressing, Marshall was skeptical of CIA figures and of trying to convert Soviet military spending into U.S. dollar equivalents. Marshall considered the imbalance to be even worse. As he told Weinberger, "Dollar figures measure not what the Soviets pay but what they acquire (e.g., men and weapons), and measure that in terms of what it would cost the US to match." Marshall suggested that the CIA's dollar-cost estimate "really underestimates the size of the Soviet Program." For example, "because US living standards affect the size of U.S. ships, CIA estimates of Soviet ships ... do not reflect what it would cost the US to acquire a ship of the same capacity." U.S. sailors would not put up with the cramped living and poor conditions of the Red Navy.²

Furthermore, Soviet national security efforts extended beyond the military programs that the CIA estimate counted. Their industrial production lines were suited to rapid military conversion during mobilization. For example, the Soviet's civilian Baikal–Amur Mainline railroad added depth and provided infrastructure for Sino-Soviet forces along the border with China. At best, according to Marshall, the CIA estimate provided only a "crude measure of capabilities"



Adapted from Soviet Military Power, 1984

and in fact the balance tilted even more towards Moscow. David S. C. Chu, the DoD's director of program analysis and evaluation (PA&E), concurred that the data suggested greater Soviet expenditures than the CIA estimated, suggesting that the Soviet Union had "out-invested" the United States since the mid-1970s by a ratio of 1.82 to 1.³

Such assessments confirmed what Weinberger already believed and established a pattern of using ONA or PA&E to confirm his views, not challenge them. Marshall himself maintained that the best way for the United States to respond to Soviet actions was by projecting an image of strength and drawing a clear contrast between the Reagan administration and previous administrations, which had allowed the United States to be perceived as weak. With Reagan and Weinberger's commitment to more defense spending and modernization of conventional and strategic forces, Marshall noted that the administration "has made a very good start."⁴

In addition to the work of Marshall's ONA, the Pentagon also encouraged the CIA, headed by Weinberger's colleague William Casey, to join the Pentagon in exploring different perspectives on the nature of Soviet strategic nuclear

capabilities and intentions. One such new examination came from the Mission Capabilities Task Force, an interagency group chaired by Paul H. Nitze and supported by the CIA and DoD. The mission's report, produced during the summer and autumn of 1981, attempted to describe how the Soviets assessed the capabilities of their nuclear forces, and how those assessments affected their war planning. The study emphasized the Soviet desire for massive strategic superiority and their determination to wage and win a nuclear conflict if necessary. The Soviets were allegedly prepared both for an overwhelming first strike and a protracted conflict, with special protection for their leadership. The image of a Soviet Union seeking superiority and warfighting capability of course reinforced the inclination within the Pentagon to rapidly build up U.S. strategic forces to close any window of vulnerability.⁵


Weinberger had already embraced the notion that increasing Soviet military expenditures and American failure to match them had combined to make the defense buildup an urgent necessity. The questions and tentative conclusions raised by the Nitze group and Marshall required a clear message to congressional leaders, allied defense officials, and the public. Along those lines, Soviet analyst John T. Hughes in the Defense Intelligence Agency had developed a detailed classified briefing on Soviet defenses, which he presented to visiting dignitaries, NATO leaders, and U.S. officials. These classified briefings often resulted in grateful comments from those briefed. But their classified nature limited their audience, and the process of organizing such briefings was cumbersome. NATO defense ministers requested a more compact unclassified version that they could easily share and disseminate.⁶

Weinberger had already requested declassification of portions of a CIA report on the development of Soviet military power since 1965—for use “in speeches of mine and others,” he explained—so he appreciated the importance of having such information publicly available. He also agreed with advice from former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the administration needed to present more facts in support of its plans for further defense buildup, lest they “run the risk of seeing the present broad support for strong national defense dissipate in the next two to three years.” Weinberger decided in summer 1981 to sponsor a major effort to produce a declassified version of the Hughes briefing to give the public a detailed overview of Soviet defenses. Spearheaded by experts at the Defense Intelligence Agency and with help from other offices within the

Pentagon, analysts began work on a project code-named Mohawk River. Thus was born the publication that would eventually become known as *Soviet Military Power*, first published in September 1981. This slick, glossy booklet was published annually from 1983 to 1990 and produced in large numbers with a wide dissemination.⁷

By late summer 1981 the DIA had a final draft of the booklet and submitted it to the Department of State, the NSC staff, and the International Communication Agency (ICA was the renamed U.S. Information Agency) for comment. The internal reviews were mixed, but virtually everyone agreed that the first chapter, a description of historical and ideological forces behind the Soviet military buildup, was out of place and detracted from the message the pamphlet was meant to convey. The DIA presented Weinberger and Carlucci with the option of retaining the first chapter, substantially revising it, or replacing it with a brief summary of the ensuing chapters. The Pentagon leaders choose the third option in an effort to get the booklet published as soon as possible and relied on the secretary's preface to make an abridged case for the importance of Soviet history and ideology.⁸

Weinberger mobilized the upper management of the Pentagon—from the under secretaries to the assistant secretaries of defense for international security policy, legislative affairs, and public affairs—for a full-scale public relations rollout. Weinberger declared it “essential that we coordinate release of this document here and abroad to maximize its distribution and its impact.” After sending preliminary messages to allied ministers of defense and embassies, Weinberger ordered the preparation of detailed press kits (including photos and slides of all illustrations in the book) along with a general statement that summarized the booklet and emphasized its connection to the May 1981 NATO foreign ministers meeting. Weinberger's press conference releasing the book was broadcast via satellite to NATO headquarters so the Europeans could see it live. The Pentagon also planned background briefings for legislative leaders, publishers, and opinion leaders. Weinberger envisioned an initial print run of 40,000 copies, with 10,000 available for Pentagon distribution on the day of announcement, September 29, 1981, followed by a series of public and semipublic briefings. There was to be no doubt of the importance of the document and no effort or expense spared to get the message out. The legislative affairs office embargoed information on the booklet until the formal rollout, but also prepared cover letters and copies for all members of Congress as well as international leaders.⁹



Area of the Soviet Uralvagonzavod tank plant in Nizhniy Tagil superimposed over the National Mall in Washington, DC. *Soviet Military Power*, 1981

Weinberger was so pleased with the final product that he endorsed commendations for many of those responsible in the DIA and in various other agencies, including several Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Awards and Meritorious Service Medals. Weinberger especially praised DIA Director Lt. Gen. James A. Williams’s team for their “extraordinarily successful undertaking,” which made the book “a major achievement in informing free men and women worldwide of the threat we face.” Charles Z. Wick, director of the ICA, reported that his agency ensured wide distribution and “a dramatic multiplier effect” of

Soviet Military Power through interviews, print commentaries, news roundups, live commentaries, and feature series.¹⁰

Its combination of charts and graphs, combined with photographs and vivid artwork portraying the threatening high-tech Soviet arsenal, made *Soviet Military Power* a lightning rod for positive and negative comments. Weinberger set the tone in his preface, where he alarmingly described the size of the Soviet military buildup—50,000 tanks stationed in Eastern Europe, 7,000 nuclear warheads, 85,000 troops fighting in Afghanistan, and an enormous military production base. One startling image superimposed the outline of the tank plant in Nizhniy Tagil on a map of Washington, DC, showing how its 827,000 meters of floor space could contain not only both of the largest tank plants in the U.S. (in Lima, Ohio, and Warren, Michigan) but also the entire National Mall, including both the Capitol and the White House. As he concluded, “There is nothing hypothetical about the Soviet military machine. Its expansion, modernization, and contribution to projection of power beyond Soviet boundaries are obvious.” With that in mind, he turned to the essential takeaway:

A clear understanding of Soviet Armed Forces, their doctrine, their capabilities, their strengths and their weaknesses is essential to the shaping and maintenance of effective U.S. and Allied Armed Forces. The greatest defense forces in the world are those of free people in free nations well informed as to the challenge they face, firmly united in their resolve to provide fully for the common defense, thereby deterring aggression and safeguarding the security of the world’s democracies.¹¹

That last line, with its reference to the Reagan administration’s commitment to increased Defense budgets, gained reinforcement from the effort to put *Soviet Military Power* into the hands of as many opinion leaders and as much of the general public as possible. The 99-page booklet became a hot commodity. Batches were delivered to allied and friendly militaries, and to the U.S. service academies.¹²

Weinberger appeared before the press armed with his detailed talking points to emphasize the objectivity and timeliness of the work. In his press conference on September 29 announcing the publication, he deflected suggestions that the glossy book was timed to coincide with budget discussions or the president’s upcoming speech on arms control, arguing that it was inspired by NATO questions in the



Secretary Weinberger presents President Reagan with a copy of *Soviet Military Power*, March 8, 1983. *Reagan Library*

spring and had been published once it was ready. Weinberger attached the full text of *Soviet Military Power* to his fiscal year 1983 annual report to Congress, issued in February 1982. If those who were going to vote on the Defense budget were not aware of the Pentagon's view of the nature and extent of the Soviet threat, the fault would surely not lie with the DoD.¹³

This clear connection between the effort put into the book and the obvious significance of its message made *Soviet Military Power* an important bone of contention in the politics of the Defense budget though the last decade of the Cold War. The first edition in 1981 went into multiple printings. It was followed by an expanded edition in 1983 (300,000 copies), and then annual updates and revisions every year until 1990. In the 1988 edition, Carlucci, then secretary of defense, insisted that the book was a "realistic portrait of the Soviet Union's military capabilities and the threat they constitute to the free World."¹⁴

Soviet Military Power generated ample controversy. Washington national security correspondent and former official in the Johnson and Carter administrations Leslie Gelb dismissed it as devoid of "new information." Congressional critics, such as Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), an influential member of the Armed Services Committee, welcomed programs to educate both the American and

allied publics so that they would appreciate the nature of the threat and the proper responses, but worried that the failure of *Soviet Military Power* to compare Soviet policies to Western efforts made it “ineffective or self-defeating.” Levin called for a more balanced study that showed both sides because “incomplete disclosure of information about the military balance ... runs the serious risk of having exactly the opposite effect from that intended—primarily because it will lack credibility.” Responding for Weinberger while the secretary was traveling in Europe, Carlucci asserted that the purpose of *Soviet Military Power* was to “inform American and European publics about the nature and extent of the Soviet threat,” not to provide a “net assessment or balance study,” but he promised that the U.S. and NATO were working on such a study for later publication (this never happened).¹⁵

In his September 29 press conference, Weinberger dodged questions of comparisons of U.S. and USSR military strength. He emphasized that *Soviet Military Power* presented full information on the Soviet military and declassifying that was enough of a challenge. “We do have, of course, substantial strengths ourselves, and other countries have substantial strengths,” he admitted. “But the point here is that there is a very growing, rapidly growing Soviet threat on a wide number of fronts,” adding that “certain comparisons ... have been made” on relative tank production, for example, which showed clear Soviet advantages. He did not deny that the United States had lost whatever military superiority it had enjoyed in the 1950s, when it was “the greatest force for peace that the world has known for many, many years—many centuries, as a matter of fact.” He hastened to add, however, heading off potential questions, that he had no desire to reacquire such superiority. Nevertheless, he admitted that it had “been eroded for one reason or another—the Vietnam War and the revulsion of the American public and the near-isolationism feeling here.... We now have to move very rapidly to correct the imbalances in a number of areas.”¹⁶

Attempts to refute the data in *Soviet Military Power* began almost immediately upon its release. In an October 13, 1981, op-ed for the *New York Times*, defense analyst Andrew Cockburn decried the document’s “threat inflation,” and suggested that Soviet defense programs were declining. His piece inspired a detailed internal DIA response for Weinberger debunking such conclusions. Military analyst Fred Kaplan satirized the publication in the libertarian magazine *Inquiry*, published by the Reagan-friendly Cato Institute, claiming it was “the definitive statement regarding the heinous magnitude of the Soviet threat

to the Western world,” designed to stiffen the spines of weak-kneed NATO allies and “draft dodging punks like David Stockman.” Weinberger was not amused, noting, “We should not waste time on such nonsense. It isn’t even well written.”¹⁷

Weinberger preferred to read correspondence from friendly and defense-minded constituents both in the United States and abroad who wrote to him requesting copies and offering their own praise and warnings about the Soviets. The difference of opinion over *Soviet Military Power* reflected an intelligence schism. The Pentagon’s intelligence community, especially the DIA, had a more pessimistic view of the balance of military power. DoD analysts believed that the CIA had been underestimating Soviet military prowess for years. This view, shared by Reagan conservatives, held that Carter’s director of central intelligence, Stansfield Turner, had deliberately discounted Soviet military power because of liberal bias and to encourage the policy of détente with Moscow.¹⁸

In 2001 the CIA sponsored a scholarly conference—the papers of which were collected in an online book—which defended the agency’s intelligence assessments but not its ability to influence policymakers. Analyst Raymond Garthoff argued that in the late 1970s and early 1980s the CIA actually overestimated Soviet missile accuracy based on their successful missile tests and the numbers of reentry vehicles on their ICBMs. This resulted in an overly pessimistic timetable for the point at which the U.S. Minuteman missile force would be vulnerable to Soviet ICBMs. According to Garthoff, the CIA generally overestimated the rate of Soviet strategic modernization. Where the CIA and DoD differed was in the definition of the Soviet Backfire bomber. DoD intelligence viewed it as an inter-continental threat; the agency saw it as a peripheral Eurasian theater weapon. Still, the difference of opinion was a matter of degree. The CIA thought Soviet strategic modernization was a threat but noted that the United States still maintained a redundant deterrent in submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and bombers. The DIA and the services’ intelligence offices considered the entire U.S. strategic force vulnerable.¹⁹

Soviet Military Power was the public manifestation of the DoD view of the Soviet Union meant to educate—or win over—Americans and Western Europeans, and it omitted dissent from agencies like the CIA. It accomplished exactly what it was intended to: provide the necessary “facts” for conclusions that Weinberger and his staff had already reached. Only in Weinberger’s introduction did it speak directly to Soviet intentions. Its implied message was that Soviet military

superiority would lead to Soviet domination. *Soviet Military Power* was revised, enhanced, and reprinted from 1983 to 1988 with its theme remaining the same: the Soviets were a growing threat. Only in 1989 did it admit that there were prospects for change in the U.S.-USSR relationship. The publication's annual revisions ended after the 1990 edition, which was released without fanfare. For most of its life the booklet was a public relations success story. Yet *Soviet Military Power* reflected the larger paradox of the Reagan administration's public affairs policy, and indeed it was a paradox that haunted American policy toward the Soviets throughout the Cold War. The challenge for any administration has been to describe the nature of the threat in dire enough terms to maintain American vigilance—and support for Defense budgets—without so overstating the case that it would either undermine Pentagon credibility with Congress or the public. *Soviet Military Power*, foremost an advocacy publication, walked a fine line between exaggeration and fact.²⁰

The View from Moscow

Whether the Weinberger campaign to highlight the Soviet military threat convinced most Americans to share the administration's concern about the Soviet danger was a debatable point, but what is clear is that *Soviet Military Power* and the rhetoric of the 1980 campaign clearly scared the Soviet leadership. The men who ruled from the Kremlin were old, enfeebled, and saddled with a rapidly deteriorating centralized economy. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, who crafted a policy of détente with Richard Nixon, was no longer the bear of a man who liked fast cars and dominated the Politburo. By the early 1980s he was addicted to sleeping pills, a victim of multiple strokes, and a sickly figure who needed a small army of doctors and technicians to keep him alive. He could hardly give a speech without losing his place. In his meetings with foreign leaders, his handlers such as Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had to carry the load. When Brezhnev died of a heart attack in November 1982, Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB (Soviet state security) and hardly a paragon of health, succeeded him as general secretary. Kidney disease kept Andropov in the hospital for half of his short time as Soviet leader.²¹

A program instituted by then-KGB director Andropov in early 1981 indicated the nervousness of the Kremlin leadership. Like his close colleague, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, Andropov suspected that the United States

was preparing for a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Andropov ordered all KGB stations in NATO countries and Japan to closely observe U.S. and NATO members' political, military, and intelligence activities for indications of preparations for war. Code-named RYaN, the Russian acronym for "nuclear missile attack," the program had Soviet intelligence operatives scouring their sources for indications that the United States was planning a preemptive attack. Soviet intelligence chiefs responded by sending to Moscow alarmist reports of any evidence they could find. But it was not just Russian paranoia. Reagan, Weinberger, and other defense officials insisted publicly that Soviet ICBMs could wipe out the U.S. land-based missile force. The Kremlin leadership worried that perceptions of U.S. vulnerability would encourage the Reagan administration to consider a U.S. preemptive first nuclear strike, possibly initiated under cover of a military exercise. The exaggerated rhetoric and alarmist tone of *Soviet Military Power* could only have been interpreted in Moscow as a way to prepare the U.S. public for the possibility of such military action.²²

U.S.-Soviet tension jumped appreciably when Soviet air defenses shot down a South Korean airliner, flight KAL 007, on September 1, 1983. The U.S. government and public reaction was one of outrage at the death of hundreds of innocent civilians. U.S. intelligence assessments soon concluded that the Soviets mistook the airliner for a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, but Reagan officials, including Shultz and Weinberger, were loath to believe it was a mistake and determined that the incident could serve the larger purpose of depicting the Soviets as barbarians. For its part, the Kremlin leadership admitted no responsibility. As revealed by the post-Cold War release of an account of a secret Politburo meeting on KAL 007, Ustinov assured his colleagues the day after the incident that the Soviet air force had followed correct procedures. The view from the Kremlin was that the U.S. reaction was warmongering.²³

Against this backdrop of mistrust between Washington and Moscow, the Pentagon undertook two military exercises that alarmed the leaders in the Kremlin. The first, Operation Able Archer, was a NATO command-post exercise that took place from November 2 to 11, 1983. The exercise was a full-scale simulated release of nuclear weapons in a European conflict. What especially concerned Moscow was that Able Archer's procedures and messages for the move from conventional to nuclear war were different from those of the past. Equally worrying to the Soviets was that NATO simulated a move through all alert phases

to a general alert. The KGB believed that this alert status might presage an actual war. Weinberger and Vessey took part in the exercise, and even Reagan and Vice President Bush were scheduled to play token roles. If Soviet intelligence had learned of their potential participation, it might have confirmed their fears. Robert McFarlane recalls that he convinced the president and Bush not to attend any exercise sessions. To make matters worse, almost simultaneously the Pentagon initiated a second exercise, Pressure Point 84, which ran from November 9 to 15, 1983. As Weinberger explained to Reagan, Pressure Point was a "Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored worldwide exercise ... [that] concentrates on sustaining a war effort in Korea, and developing and approving options in the Caribbean, Central America, and Africa." It was "designed to exercise and evaluate command, control, and communications worldwide for conducting multi-theater land, sea, and air warfare operations and support functions." Not surprisingly, Able Archer and Pressure Point, two overlapping exercises, set off alarm bells in Moscow, causing the Soviet leadership to order their own readiness moves in response.²⁴

Able Archer was not the closest the two Cold War superpowers ever came to the brink of nuclear war; that distinction belongs to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. However, both sides were operating, if not in the dark, in very dim light. There was a general impression in Washington that the Soviet Union was genuinely concerned about the increased threat of war, but not that the Kremlin leaders believed the Reagan administration was about to push the nuclear button. U.S. intelligence analysts concluded that the alarming Soviet response to U.S. military exercises Able Archer and Pressure Point were merely part of a larger Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at encouraging the peace movement in Western Europe to bring public pressure on their governments to prevent stationing of U.S. intermediate nuclear-armed medium-range missiles in NATO countries (see chapters 5 and 7). In 1984 British intelligence reviewed reports of their Soviet agent, Oleg Gordievsky, the second-ranking KGB resident in London, and concluded that Moscow really did fear a U.S. attack. One year after the November 1983 exercise, U.S. intelligence experts analyzed the evidence. They did not agree with the British. The general conclusion in the CIA and the Pentagon was that while Moscow was somewhat worried, it used these exercises for political and propaganda ends. Few in Washington were prepared to concede that Soviet intelligence considered a U.S. first strike a real possibility. When the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, composed of nongovernment

high-level outside experts, revisited the issue in 1990, they concluded differently: the Soviets were not posturing. They were very concerned that these exercises could be a prelude to an attack by the Western alliance.²⁵

Strategy for Dealing with the Soviet Union

Reagan and Weinberger approved the military exercises Able Archer and Pressure Point to test the ability of the United States to respond to a potential crisis escalating into conflict with Moscow. If the Soviets saw the United States as an aggressor capable of a preemptive first strike, Reagan and Weinberger's views were similar, as was made clear by the publication of *Soviet Military Power*. What the administration initially had difficulty agreeing on was a statement in the form of a presidential directive on strategy for USSR-U.S. relations. Virtually nothing happened in 1981 to further this end. The lack of interagency examination of the relationship derived in part from the inability of the NSC bureaucracy and the national security adviser, Richard Allen, to force the agencies to agree on a policy statement. At the core of the problem was the difference of opinions between the president's two principal national security advisers, Weinberger and Haig. Although no proponent of détente with Moscow, Haig and his department did not rule out better relations in the hopes that eventually the two superpowers could coexist and Soviet society could be encouraged to shift its emphasis away from confrontation with the West to domestic reform. Until the United States revived its military capabilities, Weinberger saw no need for better relations with the Soviets. In early January 1982 Reagan brought in his old friend from California, William Clark, then deputy secretary of state, to replace NSC adviser Allen and enforce some discipline and order on the NSC staff. Although no national security expert, Clark energized the NSC system. The bureaucracy produced papers and studies for interagency consideration and presidential decisions. In August 1982 the president signed National Security Study Directive 11-82, "U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Union," which ordered a review with broad objectives and scope. Chaired by the Department of State, but with DoD and Joint Chiefs participation, an ad hoc interagency group would assess the short- and long-term threats posed by Moscow. The group was enjoined to enumerate Soviet strengths and weaknesses, identify elements supporting the status quo, and flag elements in the Soviet system conducive to possible change. The NSSD asked the group to recommend how the United

States could encourage those Soviet policies that represented a moderation of Soviet behavior.²⁶

The interagency response to NSSD 11-82 was a massive document, but its essence was encapsulated in its introduction. It recommended that the United States “within the limits of its capabilities” promote “(1) the decentralization and demilitarization of the Soviet economy; (2) the weakening of the power and privilege of the ruling Communist elite (*nomenklatura*); (3) gradual democratization of the USSR.” Admitting that these were long-term goals, the paper recommended steps to begin the process. First, compete effectively with Moscow in the geographic areas of priority concern to the United States and maintain an overall military balance with Moscow. Second, undertake a coordinated long-term effort to reduce the Soviet threat. Third, engage in a dialogue with Moscow to reach agreements based on reciprocity and mutual interests.²⁷

While Weinberger agreed with these general objectives, it became clear when the president and the NSC discussed the paper that there were still differences of opinion. The secretary of defense, along with hard-line anticommunist Harvard professor Richard Pipes, who was detailed to the NSC staff, believed that inducing the Soviets to shift capital and resources from defense to consumer goods and preventing the Soviet Union from developing its national resources and earning hard currency were important goals for U.S. policy. In drafting the response to NSSD 11-82, representatives of State, Commerce, and Treasury did not agree with Pipes and Weinberger. Before the NSC meetings to discuss the NSSD review, Reagan himself deleted these objectives from the draft presidential directive. He explained at the NSC meeting that the sentences were provocative, especially if they leaked to the press, which was likely. Nevertheless, Weinberger took the president’s follow-up statement, “We know what our policy is if the situation calls for its implementation,” to mean his acceptance of the two objectives. Weinberger noted, “If we are clear about our policy, it does not matter what is in the paper.” Under Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam, acting for Shultz, and Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige disagreed with Weinberger’s contention. Dam suggested that if the United States did not provide low-technology goods to the Soviet Union, Moscow would get them from U.S. allies in Western Europe and Japan, and U.S. business would suffer. The meeting concluded without a decision, with Reagan stating that “the discussion had cleared the air a little.”²⁸

As it emerged from NSC discussion, National Security Decision Directive

75 laid out requirements for economic policy towards the Soviet Union. No transfer of technology and equipment should take place “that would make a substantial contribution either directly or indirectly to Soviet military power.” Equally important, the United States should not subsidize the Soviet economy and thereby allow its leaders to ease the burden of resource allocation between consumer goods and defense. The directive called for minimizing potential for Soviet economic leverage on Western Europe. It allowed for a nonsubsidized East-West trade in nonstrategic materials. These guidelines were not as explicit as Weinberger wanted, but he trusted that if push came to shove the president would see it his way.²⁹

The Polish Crisis and Sanctions

Even before the Reagan administration crafted its policy directive towards the Soviet Union—outlined in NSDD 75, “U.S. Relations with the USSR”—it engaged in a confrontation with Moscow that echoed many of the issues that the document would raise. The crisis in Poland over the future of Solidarity, the noncommunist trade union workers’ party, and political reform in Polish society raised a number of questions. Was the Soviet Union capable of accepting changes in its relationship with its Eastern European client states or would Moscow revert to the iron-fist response of the 1956 Hungary and 1968 Czechoslovakia invasions. Could U.S. sanctions, especially economic ones, moderate the Kremlin’s behavior? How could the United States alleviate the economic stress of the Polish people without helping its repressive government? Should the United States treat Eastern European communist states differently than the Soviet Union? Finally, would trade with the Soviets and the Eastern European bloc affect U.S. national security?

The Reagan team inherited a Polish crisis from its predecessor. In December 1980 the Carter administration feared an imminent Soviet invasion of Poland along the lines of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia that crushed the Prague Spring reform movement. Intelligence reports indicated that Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev had polled the Warsaw Pact members, a majority of which favored sending “help” (the Red Army) to Poland to restore order and quash the Solidarity movement that threatened the Polish Communist government’s control of workers. Led by trade union leader Lech Walesa and initially concentrated in the Gdańsk shipyard, Solidarity engaged in strikes and demonstrations along with Polish students against the government. The Carter administration discussed



Lech Wałęsa, leader of the Polish Solidarity movement. *European Solidarity Center*; photographer: *Giedymin Jabłoński*; CC BY-SA 3.0 PL

contingency actions and military, economic, political, and diplomatic responses should the Soviets invade. In late December 1980 intelligence reports suggested that the invasion had been postponed for “the immediate future” because of the West’s threat of massive political and economic sanctions should Soviet troops march into Poland. However, the invasion forces remained at a “high state of readiness, and could move into Poland at any time.”³⁰

When Weinberger assumed office the Polish situation was tenuous. The new administration continued to consult with the allies on a joint policy towards Moscow’s repression in Poland, including economic and political countermeasures. Weinberger and Casey headed an effort to identify potential actions the United States could take in response to an invasion. They examined possible covert programs; military signals, such as sending AWACS to Europe or expanding U.S. forces in Europe; and working with China, Japan, and Southeast Asian countries to bolster the U.S. strategic posture in East Asia. With the appointment of Polish Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski as Polish prime minister in late February, the situation in Poland calmed and stayed calm through most of 1981. During this period the United States provided emergency food aid to Poland and negotiated new terms for Poland’s remaining debt to Western nations (essentially a four-year



General Wojciech Jaruzelski, premier of Poland, prepares to read a speech declaring martial law, December 12, 1981. *Military Photographic Agency Archives, Poland/Wikimedia Commons*

grace period). Weinberger's advisers favored both initiatives as long as it was clear these concessions directly aided the Polish people, not the government. In addition, the DoD refined potential military measures the United States and NATO could take should the Soviets invade Poland. None of these potential actions contemplated military action against Moscow.³¹

In December 1981 events in Poland deteriorated as demonstrating and striking workers and students clashed with Communist government security forces. Then on December 12 the Jaruzelski government declared martial law,

closed down Solidarity, and soon thereafter imprisoned Solidarity leaders, including Lech Walesa. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Richard Perle advised Weinberger that now was the time to take "some concrete action ... that (1) we ought to take anyway and (2) will underline our concern at the events now taking place in Poland." Perle also noted that the Soviets "were crushing Solidarity—through the use of Polish security forces without incurring the political costs that direct Soviet armed intervention would entail." Perle suggested that Weinberger convince the president to cancel the licenses for the sale of Caterpillar Industries and International Harvester equipment to the Soviet Union, prohibit sale of U.S. oil and gas technology (something the president could do with the "stroke of a pen"), and use the threat of Polish debt default—of great concern to the Western European allies who held much of it—to encourage them to join in sanctions against Moscow. Under no circumstances should the United States lend Poland any more money.³²

When Weinberger joined the president at an NSC meeting on December 21, 1981, he found Reagan to be even more adamant than Perle: "This is the first time in 60 years that we have had this kind of opportunity," Reagan stated. "There may

not be another in our lifetime.... I'm talking about total [economic] quarantine on the Soviet Union. No détente!" The president was prepared to cancel the Harvester and Caterpillar contracts, admitting "it may mean thousands of layoffs.... But can we do less now than [to] tell our allies, 'This is the big Casino!' There may never be another chance!" Weinberger could not agree more, noting that, "What Poland has now in Jaruzelski is a Russian general in a Polish uniform."³³

The NSC met again on December 22 and 23. By the 22nd Reagan had realized that his total quarantine was unrealistic. The president and his advisers discussed what they could do to the Soviets to encourage them to loosen their indirect grip on Poland. Weinberger consistently argued for more sanctions. His advice could be summed up by his statement at the meeting on December 22: "We should be taking stronger action than just wringing our hands—that's what the Soviets want.... We should have a list of nine things we can do. Each, in itself, a pinprick but they cause anguish and pain. They evidence our seriousness. They influence public and industrial movements. It is morally right to take a stand—a position of leadership."³⁴

On December 29, 1981, Reagan announced the sanctions: suspension of Aeroflot service to the United States; closure of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States; suspension of licenses for Soviet purchases of computer, electronic equipment, and other high technology; postponement of negotiations for a new grain purchase agreement; suspension of U.S.-USSR maritime agreement and port access; suspension of licenses for oil and gas equipment sales, and nonrenewal of U.S.-USSR exchange agreements. Less publicized were sanctions directed at the Polish government including withholding the remaining 10 percent of the \$71 million sale of U.S. dried milk and butter to Poland, suspension of renewal of export insurance for Poland by the Export-Import Bank, suspension of Polish civilian aviation privileges in the United States, and no allocation of U.S. fisheries stocks to Poland in 1982.³⁵

Weinberger and his team had been in the forefront of the campaign to fashion a tough sanctions policy towards the Soviet Union and the Polish martial law government for their crackdown on Solidarity. They had a powerful ally in the president, who initially thought that sanctions presented an opportunity to lessen Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Reagan's dreams of a "total quarantine" by the United States and its allies forcing Moscow to lift martial law, release Walesa and other political prisoners, and negotiate with Solidarity proved unattainable.

Still, the sanctions passed a clear message of U.S. concern. The United States was not content to use only sanctions as a tool. After the imposition of martial law, Washington increased covert efforts to support Solidarity. This secret support added to an already existing effective pro-Solidarity campaign by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and support from the Catholic Church and its Polish pope. These efforts kept the movement alive until 1989 when the Polish government agreed to free elections and a free press. Later in that year a non-Communist Polish coalition government led by Solidarity took power in Poland.³⁶

Poland was part of a larger Reagan administration effort to loosen Soviet control of Eastern Europe and increase Western influence and a free-market economy there without the Soviet Union feeling so threatened as to use force to reestablish its control. On September 2, 1982, Reagan signed NSDD 54, "United States Policy toward Eastern Europe." The directive encouraged liberalism, human and civil rights, private enterprise, and free trade-union activity in Eastern Europe. It sought to lessen Eastern Europe's political and economic dependence on the Soviet Union and undermine the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. This had been the goal of American administrations since Eisenhower, but during his second term Reagan had the good fortune to be in a position to contribute to relaxing Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, ending the Cold War, and witnessing the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union itself.³⁷

Technology Transfer and Trade

The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union were not even considered as possibilities by those who drafted the NSDD on U.S.-USSR relations or coped with the Polish crisis. Rather, they were thinking in terms of competing with the Soviet Union, containing Moscow's influence worldwide, and moderating the Kremlin's leadership. In addition, NSDD 75 allowed the administration to paper over a long series of disagreements about trade with the Soviet Union during the first years of the Reagan administration. The distinction between trade and technology that would help the militaries of the Soviet Union and its bloc and that which would merely improve the Soviet and Eastern European civilian economies had become increasingly blurred as the West's economic interaction with the Soviet bloc increased during the 1960s and 1970s. Weinberger remained one of the strongest advocates of a restrictive approach to trade and technology

transfers, even when it brought him into conflict with his colleagues in the State and Commerce Departments and demonstrably hurt U.S. domestic economic and political interests.

These differences within the administration became evident in its first two years whenever Reagan's team dealt with four specific and highly contentious specific trade questions. First was the question of drawing the line between military technologies whose export was clearly forbidden under U.S. law or by international agreement and "dual purpose" products that could be adapted to serve a military purpose. Next was whether to continue Carter's embargo on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union that had been enacted in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The grain sales embargo had obvious domestic political ramifications. During the campaign for the Republican nomination, Ronald Reagan promised midwestern farmers he would lift the embargo to help them with grain sales during a tough economic time. They voted for him overwhelmingly. A third was the NATO allies' willingness to purchase Soviet oil and natural gas for their energy needs. Could the Western Europeans be encouraged to find other energy sources and lessen their dependence on Soviet oil and gas? The final concern was the related question of whether U.S. companies should sell equipment, especially heavy construction and pipe-laying equipment that would help the Soviet Union build its pipeline to Western Europe.³⁸

These aspects of East-West trade defied easy solutions, especially since the Western industrialized world was suffering from the effects of a recession and high unemployment, resulting in stiff competition between Western firms for business. It was politically difficult to require a U.S. firm to turn down potential contracts with Moscow only to see them picked up by a European or Asian competitor. Indeed, it was hard to justify turning down any contracts if significant numbers of U.S. jobs were at stake. For instance, senators from Illinois, where Caterpillar pipelayers were made, implored Weinberger and Carlucci to reconsider their opposition to the sale of such equipment to the Soviet Union. Jobs would be lost, and the Japanese firm Komatsu would get the business.³⁹

The administration began to grapple with these issues in the summer of 1981. The least contentious was the effort to restrict the transfer of high technology to the Soviet bloc. Since 1949 the United States and its allies had coordinated export control policy through the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), a nontreaty organization that included all NATO allies (minus

Iceland) and Japan. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration placed more restrictions on high-technology computer sales to the Soviet bloc and strictly reviewed all industrial projects with the Soviets worth more than \$100 million with a view to possibly restricting them. The Carter administration asked other COCOM members to restrict computer sales and not “fill the gap” on industrial projects with Moscow that the United States had already suspended. COCOM countries had no plans to export advanced computers to the Soviet Union and they agreed not to fill the gap left by the U.S., but they were unwilling to prematurely abandon industrial projects at the \$100 million or more level, some of which they were considering.⁴⁰

Within the U.S. government COCOM controls were the subject of three-way negotiations between the Defense, State, and Commerce Departments. At the Pentagon, Weinberger and Carlucci agreed to centralize participation in COCOM in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy headed by Fred Iklé. This was a savvy move since technology transfer issues touched so closely on policy questions. Naming Iklé as coordinator also had a political advantage. He tended to agree with Weinberger on the need for tighter restrictions on sales to the communist states.⁴¹

At an NSC meeting in early July 1981 Reagan asked his advisers to develop a proposal that went beyond restricting technology and equipment critical to Soviet defense capabilities but did not go so far as to restrict all items for civilian industries. Weinberger, Haig, Secretary of Commerce Baldrige, and U.S. Trade Representative William E. Brock recommended strengthening COCOM controls of this critical equipment and technology—computers, communications, micro-electronics, aerospace, machine building, shipbuilding, metallurgy, chemicals, and heavy vehicles—without regard to whether the Soviet Union already had such technology or its specifications. The United States would enforce these guidelines in its own licensing policy and convince the other COCOM members to follow suit. While tightening these restrictions COCOM would, at the same time, loosen controls on industries and technology not critical to Soviet defense. “This would serve,” Weinberger and other officials told the president, his “objectives of predictability and consistency.” At the Ottawa Economic Summit in July 1981 Reagan suggested this proposal to the allies, to be considered at a later high-level COCOM meeting.⁴²

Obtaining COCOM agreement on new guidelines proved to be a long and

laborious process. There were specific things, however, that Weinberger could do in the meantime. The Soviet Union had made great advances in its micro-electronics industry and new, sophisticated microchip products were finding their way into advanced Soviet military hardware, such as smart bombs and laser range finders. At Iklé's recommendation, Weinberger asked Baldrige at Commerce to embargo all electronic-grade silicon, an essential building block for the semiconductor industry, which the Soviets were presently buying from the West. The trade itself was small, only \$5 million dollars, but the advantage it gave to the Soviet military was "truly staggering." Weinberger was convinced that the two other major suppliers, Japan and West Germany, would go along with the U.S. prohibition. Baldrige agreed to cooperate in the effort. Weinberger followed up this private *démarche* with an op-ed piece in the *Wall Street Journal* in early January 1982 describing how the Soviet Union obtained this technology and how to prevent it in the future. The article was timed to coincide with the COCOM's meeting to review its systems of control. U.S. efforts to increase the number of prohibited items on the COCOM international list generally met with resistance from the rest of COCOM members, but the silicon case clearly had logic behind it.⁴³

A second thorny issue of East-West economic relations, the grain embargo, was a more highly charged political issue than COCOM restrictions. Soon after taking office, Reagan met with a congressional delegation on February 17 to get their opinions. Many members of Congress, including midwestern conservatives, had been urging the end of the embargo, citing the major domestic political concern—opposition from U.S. farmers and agricultural industries. The president explained that while he was opposed to the embargo, "We had to worry about making a concession to the Soviets without some *Quid Pro Quo*. It might send the wrong signal." Democratic Majority Leader Tip O'Neill impressed the president at the meeting with arguments for lifting the embargo by suggesting it would be good for U.S. economy and even for national security.⁴⁴

O'Neill's advice was not seconded at the Pentagon. The initial assessment of officials at International Security Affairs was that the embargo worked well in its first year; it had denied the Soviets 8–9 million of the 36 million metric tons of grain they planned to import. Yet its effectiveness, despite another poor Soviet harvest in 1980, had been mitigated by Argentine, Canadian, Australian, and Western European grain exports. Nevertheless, the International Security

Affairs office warned that relaxing the embargo “could unravel the whole fabric of post-Afghanistan sanctions and prejudice the outcome of the Polish crisis.” Weinberger went even further, suggesting to Reagan that while as a presidential candidate he had promised to lift the embargo, times had changed. The Soviet Union, he charged, was suppressing a trade union movement in Poland and supporting terrorism and subversion in Central America. National security concerns outweighed domestic ones. End the embargo some time later, Weinberger recommended, but only after negotiations with the Soviets about moderating their behavior.⁴⁵

The secretary’s advice went unheeded. By summer, the president had decided to effectively lift the embargo—both by extending for one year the original five-year agreement on grain sales that had been scheduled to expire at the end of September and expressing openness to a new agreement, though without promising that there would be no more embargoes.⁴⁶

By far the most controversial and time-consuming set of East-West economic policy decisions revolved around the Soviet pipeline from Western Siberia and Western European dependence on Soviet-produced energy. Moscow was constructing an almost 3,500-mile pipeline, much of it above the Arctic Circle, from Western Siberia to consumers in Western Europe. For comparison, the Alaska oil pipeline, completed in 1977, was 800 miles long. Western industrial firms and financial institutions, including American ones, saw potential profit in assisting in the building and financing of this major natural gas pipeline. According to National Security Adviser Allen, the pipeline represented the largest East-West trade transaction yet conceived and potentially the greatest threat to Western security. Weinberger strongly agreed, noting that the potential hard-currency earnings from gas sales, which he estimated at \$20 billion per year (other estimates were in the \$10–\$12 billion range) would double Moscow’s hard-currency earnings. Weinberger asked how Moscow would use this windfall. It would allow the Soviets to buy technology from the West, increase their influence over Eastern Europe, prop up their domestic economy by providing money for more consumer goods, and weaken NATO’s resolve and support.⁴⁷

The Western Europeans, eager to obtain a reliable energy source outside the Middle East, did not share such concerns. At the July 1981 Ottawa summit of the G-7 nations, Reagan argued for a unified approach to the Soviet pipeline and East-West trade in general while encouraging the Western Europeans to

develop alternate sources of energy. The language agreed upon and issued at the conclusion of the meeting was tepid: the issue was a “complex balance of political and interests and risks,” and the G-7 nations would consult to make sure that “our economic policies continue to be compatible with our political and security objectives.” Part of the Western Europeans’ ambivalence, no doubt, stemmed from the appearance of hypocrisy surrounding Reagan’s decision to lift the grain embargo.⁴⁸

The NSC discussed technology transfer at its July 6, 1981, meeting, the first of many such gatherings on the issue. Haig and Weinberger expressed divergent views. The secretary of state favored a middle option, a compromise position that would add to the list of controlled items technology and equipment critical to Soviet military-related industries. To Weinberger this was an improvement over current policy, but it did not go far enough: “Almost everything aids their military and helps their economy. We know they will only be satisfied with world domination, and we cannot satisfy them by appeasing them.” Weinberger favored strengthening the middle option by an ad hoc examination of any technology that could aid Moscow. To Weinberger, U.S. pipelaying equipment, which was not controlled and would not be denied under Haig’s option, should not be sold to the Soviet Union. Realizing the “significant differences” between Haig and Weinberger, Allen asked both secretaries to provide more answers to questions about their positions before the next meeting on July 9.⁴⁹

Haig believed that it would be better for the Reagan administration not to oppose the pipeline. His position rested on his belief that the Europeans had “legitimate and urgent interests” regarding energy and were so committed to the project that any U.S. pressure would be both futile in the specific case and damaging to relations within the Atlantic alliance. While Haig’s executive secretary sent a memorandum to Allen specifically responding to the NSC questions, Haig sent a separate memorandum to the president without consulting his colleagues at the Pentagon, leading Weinberger’s special assistant Jay Rixse to note that Haig was “going around [the system] and you, again.”⁵⁰

The personal slight aside, Weinberger disagreed with Haig’s arguments. Indeed, Weinberger believed the Europeans were displaying serious strategic naivety in their desire for Soviet gas. Instead, he strenuously argued that the United States should devote its efforts toward hindering the construction of the pipeline and developing alternative sources of energy for the allies. He responded

to the worries of Haig about European attitudes with the acerbic comment, “In any event our foreign policy cannot be determined by the fear of offending Chancellor Schmidt.” Weinberger found strong support from DCI William Casey, who believed the United States “should dissuade the Europeans from consummating the agreement” and echoed DoD’s concerns about European energy security as well as the possibly of strengthening the Soviet technological base. At the very least, Casey recommended delaying a decision pending further study on the pipeline’s economic and strategic impact.⁵¹

At the July 9, 1981, NSC meeting on this topic, the president accepted Weinberger’s general solution to the allied technology control options: “Leaning a little toward Option III [i.e., restricting all technology that could help the Soviet defense priority industries] would be fine with me.” Current policy (option I) would restrict technology and equipment critical to military production and use; option II would add restrictions to technology and equipment critical to production in Soviet defense priority industries (metallurgy, chemicals, heavy transport, shipbuilding, etc.) that would significantly enhance Soviet military capabilities. Reagan asked Haig, Weinberger, and Allen to agree on his decision to lean toward option III, which they did. Nevertheless, the participants argued for the rest of the meeting about the pipeline, with neither Haig nor Weinberger changing their convictions. The only thing the two men agreed on was that the Western Europeans should be provided and encouraged to develop more sources of energy so they would not be dependent on Moscow. On the other hand, Baldrige and OMB Director Stockman contended that increasing world access to energy was a long-term positive. Iklé had prepared Weinberger to refute these arguments by concluding that “the contribution of Soviet natural gas to worldwide supplies is trivial but its impact on the heart of our security concerns in Europe is very large indeed.”⁵²

After the meeting Pentagon officials were optimistic that others in the administration were eventually coming around to embrace Weinberger’s harder line, although Iklé characterized the NSC “consensus position” as “a bit spongy.” At a minimum, the DoD wanted to freeze the pipeline project and use the time offered by a delay to develop greater “leverage” in encouraging the Europeans to accept alternative energy sources and ultimately reject the Soviet deal. Weinberger reinforced that message in a memorandum to Reagan where he urged a “clear and decisive statement of our policy” to win the allies over. He also suggested

to the president that U.S. “oil and gas-end equipment and technology be placed under national security controls.”⁵³

Denying U.S. equipment was not a hypothetical question. Caterpillar Industries of Peoria, Illinois, had a \$90 million order from Moscow for pipelaying equipment. When congressional representatives from Illinois lobbied Weinberger to support Caterpillar’s license to export the equipment to the Soviet Union, Weinberger was careful not to overstep his bounds as he awaited the formal decision of an interagency group (IG), but privately told his staff, “Let’s move this IG along and insist on having this license denied.” Carlucci also emphasized the department’s “serious qualms” about the licenses in June 1981. Although he agreed that further study was necessary, Carlucci echoed his boss by arguing that “if the DoD were pressed for a reaction at this time, we would feel compelled to object to the sale of the pipe layers on national security grounds.”⁵⁴

The search for a coherent policy on technology sales occupied the Reagan administration through the summer of 1981. Weinberger initially lost the argument on 100 Caterpillar pipelayers. The president decided to issue the necessary license in late July 1981. Then, in December, the president approved a license for 200 more pipelayers. Weinberger and DoD were not convinced the first decision was irreversible, but for the time being they sought to limit the damage.⁵⁵

Weinberger and the Pentagon were famous—opponents would say notorious—for their tenacity when a decision went against them. At the end of August 1981 Carlucci wrote to Reagan asking him to put oil, gas, and high-technology equipment under national security controls. Without these controls, Carlucci argued, “there will be substantial leakage of equipment and technology from other projects to the West Siberian pipeline which you oppose.” Furthermore, the allies could hardly be persuaded to oppose the pipeline should the United States itself sell such equipment to Moscow. A prohibition on sales would force the Soviets to divert resources from their military buildup to their civilian sector, Carlucci added. DCI Casey also weighed in heavily on the president and his advisers with an assessment that the Soviet economy was in trouble so now was not the time to help them.⁵⁶

The issue came to a head at an October 16, 1981, NSC meeting, attended by Carlucci as the DoD representative. Carrying the ball for the coalition opposed to the pipeline, Casey informed the participants that new intelligence indicated the benefit to the Soviet Union of its purchase of Western technology was “stag-

gering” and “greater than we have ever conceived.” Haig came to the meeting late and remained on the defensive throughout. United Nations Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick assured the president that Caterpillar could sell its equipment elsewhere. Reagan admitted he “was the most confused person as anyone,” and asked if he could get a clear options paper on the issue. What were we going to stop selling to the Soviet Union? Could it get the same equipment and technology elsewhere? How would such decisions affect the U.S. and Soviet economies? How could he, the president asked, make a difficult decision involving sacrifices for U.S. firms without knowing the answers to these questions?⁵⁷

The State Department prepared a long and convoluted background paper as a response to the president’s questions, which Pentagon officials bemoaned as “seriously flawed.” According to Richard Pearle, head of International Security Affairs, the paper failed to recognize the threat of Soviet energy development to the United States or to the NATO allies, and it did not emphasize that the central goal was impeding Soviet energy development. Perle encouraged Weinberger to write to the president to counter the failure of other agencies to appreciate the “disturbing implications” of issues such as the pipeline.⁵⁸

Weinberger and his allies carried the day, but they had a crucial assist from the Soviets who upped the pressure on the Polish government to declare martial law and repress the opposition workers’ Solidarity movement. Such action changed the ball game. At the end of December 1981 the president, in response to Soviet actions in Poland, included in sanctions a suspension of current licenses for export of oil and gas equipment (as well as electronic equipment, computers, and other advanced technology). Caterpillar lost its \$90 million contract, and General Electric saw \$175 million in orders disappear.⁵⁹

Weinberger told his friend and ally, the new national security adviser William Clark, “The events in Poland have created our best opportunity to derailing the ... gas pipeline since this Administration came to office.” Weinberger recommended moving quickly “before the lessons of Poland” faded from Western Europeans’ memories. Before an NSC meeting in early February 1982 Perle informed Weinberger that the “outstanding issue” at the meeting would be “extraterritoriality,” namely whether the United States could force foreign companies producing equipment under license from U.S. firms to conform to U.S. export law. Perle used the example of French turbines and compressors manufactured under U.S. license. State and Treasury, according to Perle, would oppose extraterritoriality

for supposed legal reasons, but their real motivation was pressure from the allies and banking interests.⁶⁰

At the NSC meeting of February 4, 1982, the attendees went right to the heart of the issue. Casey opened the discussion: "By taking extraterritoriality decisions, we can delay completion of the pipeline by close to 3 years" and could deny Moscow a significant amount of hard currency after 1986, just when their reserves of such currency would be running out. Weinberger argued for an even harder approach: cutting commercial credit to the Soviets. As he said, "Extraterritoriality is absolutely the minimum approach.... The pipeline is just as militarily significant as a plane. A total embargo would be effective—not a selective embargo." Haig and Treasury Secretary Regan opposed Weinberger's advice. At the end of the meeting the president and the participants merely agreed to send a high-level mission to Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy to convince the four allies to prevent exports of oil and gas equipment by U.S. subsidiaries and licensees in their countries and to negotiate restrictions on official credits to Moscow.⁶¹

The mission of Under Secretary of State William A. Buckley resulted in little progress, especially after Reagan realized that extraterritoriality was at the core of the issue. He limited Buckley's instructions to consultation on financial credits to the Soviet Union. Buckley returned without convincing the Germans and the French to pause on granting further credits and credit guarantees to Moscow. Before Buckley left, the president admitted to being "careless" in his belief that "the United States was the dominant factor in what went into production of the pipeline." British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, he continued, "made me realize that I was wrong.... The important factors are the subsidiaries and licensees of U.S. corporations." Reagan asked, "Can we avoid going all the way? Can we avoid telling Europe that our sanctions apply to subsidiaries and licenses?" Weinberger provided an answer: "Sanctions had a purpose, and to be effective have to be followed through. One cannot tell American corporations: 'You cannot, but your son can.'"⁶²

The decision on whether to extend extraterritoriality to the sanctions was delayed until the Versailles Economic Summit in early June 1982, where the president found little support for sanctions against European subsidiaries. A week after the president's return, the NSC met and Reagan suggested that even though the United States was in a recession, he "did not see how we can retain

any credibility if we fall back on this solution” of avoiding an extension of the sanctions. The president approved the extension of extraterritoriality to U.S. subsidiaries and licensees, writing in his diary, “There hadn’t been the slightest move on the Soviets part to end their evil ways.” Shultz later complained that Weinberger, Casey, and Clark used Haig’s absence from the meeting—he was in New York meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko—to ram this decision through.⁶³

The allies, especially Prime Minister Thatcher, were livid. Meeting at the White House during Thatcher’s visit just after the announcement, she complained to the president, “The latest decision would cause us serious problems in an area which already had heavy unemployment.... The damage caused to Britain by the American decision was proportionally much greater than [that] caused to the United States whose main exports were of grain rather than of manufactured goods.” The U.S. decision would force some European corporations to break existing contracts. One British company, John Brown Ltd., had \$400 million in contracts for U.S. licensed pipeline components to the Soviet Union. It faced bankruptcy if it was forbidden to sell this equipment to the Soviet Union. The French government threatened “requisition” of the French companies making compressors and turbines under license from a U.S. company if they did not honor their contracts with Moscow. When the French companies complied with their government’s orders, the U.S. Commerce Department denied them access to U.S. technology, material, and equipment. Weinberger assured the president that these were “transient protests” and “temporary disturbances in our economic relations with the Allies.” But this was not the case. Forcing extraterritoriality caused serious political, legal, and economic distress among allies. As Haig later pointed out, a policy meant to sanction the Soviet Union, in effect, hurt U.S. allies and U.S. corporations far more than it did Moscow.⁶⁴

This was the conundrum that faced George Shultz, who replaced Haig as secretary of state when Reagan fired Haig on June 25, 1982. The general stayed on at State until Shultz was confirmed in mid-July. Shultz had clear advantages over his predecessor on this issue. He was an economist, had been secretary of the treasury, had close ties with European leaders, and was not *persona non grata* at the White House like Haig. During the rest of 1982 Shultz consulted with the allies in bilateral meetings with German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, French prime minister François Mitterrand, and with the Japanese. The secretary

of state went to the NATO meeting in Quebec, Canada, where he convinced the European allied leaders to accept an agreement not to sign contracts for the further purchase of Soviet natural gas until NATO studied potential alternatives. The allies and the United States would strengthen controls on transfer of strategic equipment and technology to the Soviet Union. They would monitor their financial relations with Moscow and harmonize their export credit policies. The United States would agree to lift its prohibitions on members selling to Moscow as long as they agreed to a “quick agreement” (before May 1983) to extend oil and gas technology to the COCOM restricted list. Weinberger initially balked at the solution. Shultz countered that the president had approved his strategy for the NATO meeting. Did Weinberger really want to go back to square one? After Shultz outlined the plan, Weinberger reluctantly agreed it “had good potential,” but it “was basically an agreement to consider an agreement, with the exception not to sign new gas contracts.” Weinberger feared the United States would lose its leverage with the allies once sanctions were lifted. Shultz was not pleased, and recalled telling an aide, “Cap loves those sanctions. He thinks the allies are like air traffic controllers. But we can’t fire the allies. We need them.”⁶⁵

Weinberger had fought hard and long for tough restrictions on trade with Moscow and the Soviet bloc. On November 16, 1982, the president canceled sanctions on oil and gas equipment and technology sales to the Soviet Union and later did the same for the extension of these controls to U.S. subsidiaries and licensees abroad. For a time Weinberger had won the president to his point of view, but sanctions were a wasting effort. The longer they remained in place the more likely they were to be circumvented and the more likely it was that new suppliers would take over from U.S. businesses. Furthermore, they caused serious rifts with the allies. Western Europe was determined to obtain Soviet natural gas and provide Moscow the equipment and money to build the pipeline to bring it to them. Weinberger’s hopes that alternative oil for Western Europe from the North Sea, Nigeria, or Alaska could fill the gap proved overoptimistic. For better or worse, Western Europe became increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union, and then Russia, for natural gas.⁶⁶

Looking at U.S. economic relations with Moscow during the Reagan first term, the grain embargo fell victim to two realities. U.S. farmers wanted to sell their

surplus grain to the Soviet Union and other nations were more than ready to fulfill Soviet needs. After the Reagan administration completed the last year of the grain deal, the Soviets did not purchase U.S. grain for two years. When they did buy, they insisted and received a promise that the agreement would not be subjected to any further embargoes.

Sanctions against the Soviet Union in the field of gas and oil equipment were only temporarily successful. They caused political blowback from U.S. companies hoping to supply Soviet needs. Equally ineffective were U.S. efforts, especially by Weinberger and his advisers, to convince the Western European allies to resist the temptation of cheap Soviet natural gas. The extension of sanctions against European subsidiaries and licensees of American companies did more to hurt the Atlantic alliance than it did to impair the Soviet pipeline.

The U.S. response to Poland in 1981–1982 illustrated the divisions within the administration. Weinberger seconded Reagan's initial exuberant view that Poland represented an opportunity to detach a Soviet satellite from the Eastern Bloc through a total economic blockade of the Soviet Union. This was not the conclusion of the rest of the U.S. government. State, Commerce, and Treasury all saw problems and convinced the president to initiate a less drastic economic sanctions response. Treasury worried about holders of Polish debt and the possibility of default. Commerce opposed sanctions that adversely affected the U.S. economy. State worried about the effect of sanctions on allies and lack of any accommodation with Moscow.

The Soviet Union decided not to invade Poland. Rather, it used the threat of the Red Army to force the Polish government to suppress Solidarity. By creating a Soviet invasion as a red line that Moscow must not cross, the United States found it difficult to arouse the West if the Soviets did not invade. So the administration was forced to walk a fine line. Too much encouragement of workers' reform could result in an armed insurrection in Poland along the lines of the 1956 Hungarian uprising and an inevitable Soviet invasion. Too little could extinguish the Solidarity movement. The real importance of the Polish crisis was that it allowed the Reagan administration to impose sanctions on the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent the martial-law government of Poland, which at least gave pause to the Kremlin and Warsaw.

In the public relations campaign to highlight the Soviet military threat, the administration enjoyed success and it was directly attributable to Weinberger's

Pentagon. Its publication of *Soviet Military Power* represented a breakthrough. The book's combination of fact, charts, photographs, and artists' renderings, along with a factual text shorn of its tendentious aspects, proved effective to many people. The publication was read seriously in Moscow. Of course, it was not without its detractors. U.S. critics from the left discounted *Soviet Military Power* as exaggeration, distortion, and without the context of a comparison to U.S. military capability. In effect, they deemed it crude propaganda, a blatant play to convince Congress and the American public to accept more defense spending. Notwithstanding Weinberger's denials, that was exactly what the publication was meant to do. At least for the initial years of the administration the booklet succeeded.

Finally, after some initial delay, the Reagan team crafted a policy toward the Soviet Union, NSDD 75, which tied together the various factions within the administration. It sought to contain Soviet expansion through confrontation and a U.S. military buildup. This was music to Weinberger's ears. NSDD 75 also reflected the administration's belief that they could moderate Soviet behavior and liberalize Soviet society, long-term goals with which Weinberger and his staff had no problems as long as this process did not include transfer and trade of high-technology items that could help the Soviet military establishment. The NSDD's call for negotiations of agreements with Moscow, especially on nuclear arms reductions, concerned Weinberger, but the directive required that any agreements be in the U.S. national security interest and the timing of these potential negotiations would be left to further administration discussion. Weinberger was hopeful that the DoD would have enough time to build up U.S. strategic forces before the arms control advocates won the day. If the Pentagon was successful, Weinberger believed the United States could enter nuclear arms reduction talks from a position of strength.

Weinberger and Soviet-American Nuclear Arms Reduction Negotiations

THROUGHOUT THE 1970s RONALD REAGAN publicly opposed nuclear arms control agreements. As the Carter administration inched closer to signing the SALT II Treaty, the outcome of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, Reagan used many of his five-day-a-week nationally syndicated radio broadcasts to attack the negotiations and the potential deal. Although not as influential as Reagan, Weinberger shared then-former governor Reagan's skepticism about nuclear arms control. The opposition of Reagan and Weinberger put them squarely at odds with three presidents—Nixon, Ford, and Carter—who all sought a negotiated SALT II agreement that would place limits on the aggregate number of strategic nuclear delivery systems of the two nuclear superpowers. The ideal goal of SALT II was to limit the number of Soviet heavy missiles, Moscow's strategic strength, with similar limitations on Washington's strong suit, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers. The result would be a rough parity. Of course, the devil was in the details and here there was great disagreement.

After years of laborious negotiations by arms control experts, Carter and Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT II agreement in June 1979. Reagan opposed the treaty on the grounds it was one-sided in Moscow's favor. As he stated in his broadcast taped on October 2, 1979, "Why should our Senate waste even five minutes debating the SALT II agreement? It meets none of the five specifics we listed as essential to protect our national interest." Reagan's five conditions were equal nuclear capabilities, significant Soviet reductions,

stabilization of the nuclear balance, reduction of the effect of nuclear weapons on world politics, and enforcement of verifiable limitations to which both sides must adhere. After October 1979, when Reagan entered the race for president, he discontinued the radio broadcasts, but he continued his attacks on the signed SALT II Treaty in his campaign. He warned SALT II should not be verified. The Soviets were sure to cheat, just as they were cheating, he believed, on the 1972 SALT I agreement and its related Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited each superpower to a maximum of two ABM systems. Most important, Reagan believed that SALT II was not a real arms control initiative because it did not actually reduce the number of nuclear weapons. Only by reducing the number of nuclear weapons, Reagan believed, would the world enjoy a lasting peace.¹

This last concern was significant because it revealed another aspect of Reagan's attitude toward arms control: his abhorrence of nuclear weapons. During much of his pre-presidential public career, this side of Reagan never got much public attention. After he became president members of his national security team began to understand the duality of Reagan's approach to nuclear arms control. Weinberger admitted in a private conversation to Clare Boothe Luce, "Everybody believes that our Ron is a big time enthusiast for nuclear weapons.... Ronald Reagan detests that thing—the nuclear bomb—more than anyone I've ever dealt with."²

Weinberger never challenged Reagan's hostility to nuclear weapons, and often echoed his boss's revulsion toward them. But he was also adamant that successful strategic nuclear arms control negotiations could come only after the United States restored its military strength—as he and Reagan defined it. Weinberger maintained that until the United States corrected the inequality in strategic weapons, whether in numbers or sophistication of delivery, any arms control would benefit only the Soviet Union. In fact, unequal arms reduction would make nuclear war more likely. But Reagan was not just interested in controlling nuclear weapons; he wanted to eliminate them. As Kenneth L. Adelman, who became the director of Reagan's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1983, recalled, "All of us who were conservative thought that when Carter said, 'I want to eliminate nuclear weapons,' that was the stupidest thing we'd ever heard. We all made fun of it, and then we have our hero [Reagan] who says things really more extreme than Carter ever does, and he was unstoppable doing it, he was just antinuclear." While not as idealistic about a nuclear-weapons-free

world as the president, Weinberger also envisioned substantial reductions of delivery systems and warheads once the United States had achieved a strategic balance with Moscow.³

Appreciating the arms control policies of Reagan and Weinberger requires embracing the paradoxical. Reagan and Weinberger entered office committed to a hard line against communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. Both the president and his secretary of defense were determined to augment and modernize U.S. strategic defense capabilities, while also remaining open to the possibility of eventual negotiations with the Soviets to significantly reduce the number and destructive power of nuclear weapons. Balancing those apparently contradictory impulses was never easy.

Assessing Arms Control Possibilities with the Soviet Union

When Weinberger took over at the Pentagon, nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviet Union were on pause. It seemed unlikely that the SALT II Treaty would gain approval of the two-thirds of the Senate necessary for ratification. Carter had withdrawn the treaty from Senate consideration in early January 1980, citing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the reason. SALT III, the follow-on negotiations, had yet to begin. Negotiations with Moscow for eliminating longer-range theater nuclear weapons in Europe, known as the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) talks, began in Geneva in the fall of 1980 but were on hold with the arrival of the new administration.

If Reagan and Weinberger were to revive the SALT and INF negotiations, they had to be convinced of the Soviet Union's willingness to negotiate acceptable agreements in good faith. Neither Reagan nor Weinberger trusted the Kremlin's intentions. Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Franklin D. Kramer warned that it "was not imprudent to assume that the Soviets view arms control not as an inherently good and peaceable activity ... but rather as a calculating means to reach acceptable understandings ... which permit reallocation of resources ... to other military and non-military problems."⁴

Weinberger agreed fully with this assessment. Reagan's past history and his campaigns against détente with the Soviets in the 1970s indicated he was also suspicious of Soviet motives. As the standard bearer of the conservative wing of the Republican Party, he drew many hawkish Democrats into his coalition by playing on their frustrations with the early Carter administration's supposed

softness towards Moscow. One of the most influential neoconservative Democrats to join the new administration was Weinberger's assistant secretary for international security affairs, Richard Perle, a former aide to longtime SALT opponent Senator Scoop Jackson. Weinberger created a new position for Perle by dividing the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs into two jobs. Perle took over the portfolio for the Soviet Union, Europe, NATO, and arms control. This reorganization made Perle the Pentagon's preeminent adviser on nuclear arms negotiations. Perle's opposition to any nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviet Union reinforced Weinberger's, and his advice dominated. Not only was Perle a master bureaucratic player, he also knew the intricacies of the previous SALT and INF negotiations from his years of opposing them while acting as Senator Jackson's anti-SALT point man.⁵

Weinberger's and Reagan's inclination to be wary of the Soviets, reinforced by Perle's hostility, retarded any real movement towards arms control with the Soviet Union during 1981. At State, however, Haig worried that unwillingness to at least talk with Moscow was sending the wrong signal abroad. Soviet propaganda branding the president and his administration as aggressive cold warriors was tarnishing the U.S. international image, especially in Western Europe, where an antinuclear peace movement was in full swing. For his part, Reagan always believed that if he could just talk with Soviet leaders he could make headway toward better relations. As he prepared to address the United Nations (UN) General Assembly for the first time in September of 1981, the Department of State drafted a letter for the president to send to Brezhnev and requested comments from the DoD. Fred Iklé agreed on the need to counter Soviet peace propaganda but rejected the "apologetic tone" of State's draft and argued for sharper distinctions to "prevent easy Soviet denial." The letter approved by the president included changes reflecting DoD's concerns. Although classified, the letter's contents were briefed to news reporters. It managed both to criticize Soviet efforts to destabilize the international situation and at the same time to announce U.S. openness to dialogue. The president claimed to be "vitally interested in a peaceful resolution of international tensions in a more stable and constructive relationship with your country." Then he charged that "a great deal of the present tension in the world is due to actions by the Soviet Government." The letter continued in this vein. Such a mixed message was not well received in the Kremlin. In mid-October Brezhnev replied that better U.S.-USSR relations

should not be dependent on “some sort of modifications in the Soviet Union’s ‘behavior.’” Rather they were an end unto themselves. Reagan responded with a letter in mid-November, which he had subjected to what he described as an editorial “slashing” to make it shorter and give “it something of the tone of my first letter.” These efforts led to a positive response from establishment journals, newspapers, and media pundits, although progress on better U.S.-Soviet negotiations remained at a standstill.⁶

Weinberger believed arms control negotiations should stay suspended until the United States revived its strategic force posture. He also thought inaction would be a good tactic. As he told Haig, “It would be a mistake for the Administration to open talks with the Soviets on SALT, CTB [comprehensive test ban], and other arms control.” Weinberger wanted to wait six months before resuming arms control talks lest the administration appear “too eager,” asserting that “this weakens our position.”⁷

The INF Zero Option

The INF talks, initially proposed during the Carter administration, were the first arms control negotiations to resume under the Reagan administration. Under Carter two forces had coalesced to encourage the United States to agree to these talks with Moscow. The first was the Soviet deployment of a new and dangerous theater nuclear missile. In 1976 the Soviets began deploying the SS-20 in the western Soviet Union. The SS-20, with its payload of three multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and its mobile launchers, had sufficient range to strike all major cities in Western Europe, though not the United States. By mid-1981, the Reagan administration estimated that the Soviet Union had deployed 250 SS-20s with 750 warheads (175 with 525 warheads directed against NATO countries). NATO’s own intermediate-range nuclear forces were obsolete by 1981. The alliance’s short-range Pershing I missiles and tactical nuclear weapons were no match for the Soviet SS-20s. If the Soviets threatened to launch intermediate-range missiles against Western Europe, the U.S. defense planners feared the United States would face either capitulation in Europe or the prospect of a counterstrike by U.S.-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and SLBMs against the Warsaw Pact, which would inevitably lead to an all-out strategic nuclear exchange. Thus the Soviet deployments raised anew the perennial specter of the Soviet Union’s ability to decouple the security of Western Europe from that of the United States.

In October 1977 West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt called for reducing the Soviet nuclear threat to Western Europe by undertaking INF negotiations.⁸

The second impetus for negotiation came from pressure by the NATO allies, especially West Germany, to improve NATO's theater nuclear security and at the same time appease the antinuclear movement in Western Europe. The Carter administration had agreed to a two-track strategy. The United States, on behalf of the alliance, began talks with the Soviet Union over the appropriate limits on such intermediate ballistic missiles while at the same time preparing to modernize its nuclear forces through the deployment of 108 Pershing II intermediate-range missiles (single-warhead missiles whose accuracy and range made them a useful deterrent) and 464 Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe. With their ability to hug the ground and avoid radar detection, cruise missiles represented a threat to Warsaw Pact air defenses. Both of these weapons were able to hit the Eastern Bloc and western Soviet Union, especially second-echelon targets that could support a Soviet attack on Europe, but not Moscow. The Western Europeans had made it clear that without an effort to negotiate limits on intermediate nuclear forces in Europe—popularly known as Euro missiles—their domestic antinuclear peace movements would make deploying Pershing IIs and GLCMs by 1983 a virtual political impossibility. With negotiations ongoing, European NATO allies agreed in principle to deploy unless the INF talks succeeded. The Carter administration, especially the Pentagon, did not hold out much hope for these talks, but saw them as a way to obtain agreement from skittish NATO allies to deploy the new nuclear weapons in Western Europe.⁹

The stalled INF negotiations presented the new administration with a difficult choice. Reagan could perhaps argue that the INF talks were not his idea. He could draw on growing suspicion of Soviet policy to dismiss Moscow's claims that they desired to limit theater nuclear weapons in Europe and not start the INF negotiations. But he also had to deal with the reality that nuclear weapons legitimately frightened the public both in Western Europe and the United States, just as they worried him. Antinuclear opponents were not just wild-eyed leftists, or the peaceniks that Soviet intelligence tried hard to manipulate, but included many middle-class voters on both sides of the Atlantic. If the Western European allies were to accept Pershing IIs and GLCMs on their soil, they needed the cover of INF negotiations.¹⁰

Weinberger, alone in the Reagan national security team, devised a way to demonstrate willingness to reduce nuclear weapons while at the same time paving the way for deployment of Euro missiles to counter the SS-20s. As the Reagan administration prepared to resume the INF talks in November 1981, Weinberger offered a bold solution. He promoted the so-called zero option (also characterized as zero/zero to make absolutely clear that it was mutual), which called for the elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles possessed by Moscow and Washington. The Soviets would dismantle their existing SS-20s and older SS-4s and SS-5s. The United States would forgo the deployment in Western Europe of Pershing IIs and GLCMs. Weinberger recalled that he was introduced to the zero option by his European colleagues during NATO defense ministers meetings in the spring and summer of 1981. He eventually embraced the idea as a strategy, arguing that it would allow the West to test Soviet sincerity. Virtually no one in Washington believed the Soviets would accept the zero option. Moscow would be trading missiles in place for those to be



Test firing of a U.S. ground-launched cruise missile, November 1, 1982. *OSD Records*



Pershing II missile test firing, July 22, 1982. *OSD Records*

deployed in the future in the face of considerable domestic political and public opposition among Western European NATO countries.¹¹

Within the Reagan administration, the path to the zero option was bumpy, requiring concerted efforts from Weinberger to win over the president and convince the skeptical officials of the arms control community in the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At a National Security Council meeting on October 13, 1981, to discuss preparations for INF negotiations scheduled to start on November 30, Haig described the general U.S. strategy as “a phased, comprehensive approach that seeks reductions to the lowest possible levels,” with equal global limits for like systems and strict verification. Weinberger responded that the DoD agreed in general but argued that the U.S. needed to consider what it ultimately wanted to accomplish in the talks. “If we are perceived as not engaging in serious negotiations,” he began, “our modernization [of Pershing IIs and GLCMs] will not go through.” But a “cosmetic agreement” or a lack of progress in talks would endanger modernization. “In this light,” he concluded, “we might need to consider a bold plan, sweeping in nature, to capture world opinion.” That would be the zero option, which should be proposed by the president in a “spectacular” announcement. If the Soviets refused, then “they would take the blame” for the lack of progress in the negotiations. Weinberger believed that since the Europeans had already endorsed the zero option, they would not be able to object to the U.S. proposal, and they would also “have no alternative to modernization” if the talks broke down.¹²

The ensuing NSC discussions centered on tactical considerations. Haig argued that the European proposal of the zero option meant that it would not be considered original if Reagan presented it. Haig noted that it was still controversial even in Western Europe. Haig also feared that suggesting zero would encourage the Western Europeans to reject deployment of the new weapon systems when they were ready to be deployed if the INF negotiations were not concluded. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Acting Director Norman C. Terrell seconded Haig, arguing that zero could be considered, and that, after all, “lowest possible levels” did include zero. Weinberger did not budge, however, arguing that the Soviets “will certainly reject an American ‘zero option’ proposal,” but “whether they reject it or they accept it, they would be set back on their heels.... We would be shown as the White Hats.”¹³

In a White House meeting in early November 1981 Weinberger again empha-

sized his support for zero. He told the president, "The great advantage of the zero option is the surprise effect of your recommending it." Weinberger rejected the idea that the zero option was a "gimmick or a propaganda play," and argued that it had both practical and idealistic advantages. The Soviets had hoped to separate the United States and Europe, but the zero option "is designed to keep U.S. and Europe together." The United States could, with this proposal, "seize [the] high ground at [the] beginning." The most important thing was: "We must decide soon."¹⁴

Weinberger struck a responsive chord with Reagan, who soon saw the benefits of the zero option. The president admitted that he "was intrigued by the idea because you start at perfection." Furthermore it appealed to Reagan's preference for simple solutions and distaste of details. Most important, it would actually eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles, not just place a ceiling on or reduce them. At an NSC meeting on November 12, 1981, the members reprised the arguments of the October 13 session. Haig strenuously opposed the zero option as an opening move in the negotiations. Weinberger just as vigorously defended it. "Cap, we're just talking around each other," an exasperated Haig complained. "We both agree we want zero." Weinberger responded, "Then we should say so." But Haig wanted to negotiate down to zero in stages from the NATO-agreed starting point of 572 missiles. Weinberger again recommended starting with the zero option.¹⁵

Reagan accepted Weinberger's all-or-nothing approach. At the National Press Club on November 18, 1981, Reagan publicly endorsed the zero option as the U.S. starting point in the talks at Geneva. The Soviets dismissed U.S. negotiating proposals out of hand as a mere propaganda ploy. Reagan's advisers assured him that his November 18 proposal "had been wonderfully received worldwide, except for Russia." The zero option also found a receptive audience in British prime minister Margaret Thatcher who told Reagan she was "absolutely delighted with your zero-option proposal."¹⁶

INF Negotiations

The INF negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union began in earnest on January 12, 1982, in Geneva. Longtime national security expert and former SALT I negotiator Paul Nitze headed the U.S. delegation. Silver-haired and chisel-jawed, Nitze was the first choice of neither the Pentagon nor the State



Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Chief Negotiator Paul Nitze with President Reagan, November 7, 1985. *Reagan Library*

Department. He had resigned from the SALT II team in the early 1970s, fearing that the Nixon administration was conceding too much to Moscow. He joined the Committee on the Present Danger, which sounded alarms about the supposedly Soviet-leaning military imbalance. According to arms control officials in State, Nitze was too hawkish, too anti-arms control. For Perle and Weinberger's purposes his instincts were good, but he was part of the arms-control establishment, which was often beguiled by desire for an agreement even if a deal was disadvantageous to the United States. But the White House wanted a man of presence and experience at Geneva. Nitze had the stature.¹⁷

The first task of policymakers in Washington was to submit a draft treaty based on the president's November 18, 1981, statement at the National Press Club. Reagan proposed that the "United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles." This zero option, Reagan stated, would "be a giant step for mankind." In the INF negotiations the U.S. delegation would focus on the zero option, keep the Soviets on the defensive with a serious and detailed treaty proposal outlining it, and assure NATO allies that the negotiations would result in enhanced security for them. Initially the Reagan team discussed whether to include in the treaty a ban on all intermediate land-based missiles, including conventional cruise missiles, within the 1,800-kilometer to 5,500-kilometer range limit. ACDA favored a ban on conventional forces within that range to allow for easier verification—it was impossible to distinguish between a conventional and a nuclear warhead on an intermediate-range missile with existing verification methods. State suggested postponing the issue for fear of complicating the negotiations. Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that it would be a mistake to preclude the deployment of nonnuclear armed missiles with ranges over 1,800 kilometers. It might establish a precedent for the expected Strategic Arms Reduction Talks—this was Reagan's version of SALT, renamed so as to emphasize his concern for actually decreasing, not just limiting, nuclear weapons. While the Pentagon had no plans for production of land-launched cruise missiles with a range over 1,800 kilometers, Defense planners wanted to reserve the option. Defense agreed with State that the issue should be postponed to the negotiation's later stages. President Reagan approved the delay.¹⁸

In the first round of the INF negotiations, beginning in December 1981, the U.S. delegation made a sustained and detailed case for its zero-option draft treaty. It critiqued the Soviet position, which called for unequal limitations on intermediate-range missiles and insisted that NATO nuclear-capable aircraft and French and British strategic forces be included in the deal. The Soviet delegation claimed that when French and British strategic forces and nuclear-capable aircraft were taken into account, the SS-20s only equalized the theater balance of nuclear weapons. Perle disagreed: "The central issue is the Soviet goal of preponderance.... The Soviet approach would provide for zero on the U.S. side only." Perle asserted that Moscow wanted the United States to make all the concessions, leaving the Soviets with their SS-20s and therefore an advantage in theater nuclear forces

(TNFs) in Europe. Other differences between the two delegations included the disagreement over the geographic scope of the agreement—the United States wanted a global one, the USSR contended it should be limited to Europe and its adjacent waters—and the actual count of each side's INF systems.¹⁹

The first round of INF talks ended in April 1982 with each side staking out its positions but reaching no agreement. As the second round of the talks proceeded there was still little progress towards any agreement, let alone Weinberger's zero option. Then Nitze engaged in a dramatic and unauthorized initiative. With his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, Nitze mapped out a potential agreement for INF negotiations in mid-July 1982. Dubbed the "Walk in the Woods" from the fact that the two men sketched out the understanding while walking in a forest near Geneva, the deal limited the United States to 75 GLCM launchers (each containing four single-warhead GLCMs for a total of 300) in Western Europe and the Soviets to 75 SS-20s with 225 warheads west of the Urals.²⁰

Weinberger and most of his Pentagon advisers were aghast. Even Reagan was skeptical, asking his defense secretary, "Why would we be satisfied with a package limiting NATO/US to cruise missiles while the Soviets are permitted to have ballistic missiles?" Perle prepared an uncharacteristic answer that tentatively concluded: "Given the current allied political environment of uncertain TNF deployments [GLCMs and Pershing IIs] and weak negotiating leverage, an agreement which provided a relatively smaller number of SS-20 warheads might be acceptable even if the cost were a ban on Pershing II." Iklé reacted negatively to Perle's suggested advice to the president: "No—I disagree completely with this—the Soviets will give up or should give up a great deal more to get rid of Pershing II—225 [warheads on] SS-20s is no concession at all." In separate memorandum to Weinberger, Perle suggested that Nitze's unauthorized gambit had placed the president in a "political quandary" as the United States could only negotiate downward from the Nitze-Kvitsinsky proposal unless Nitze withdrew it. Furthermore, any public release of the proposal could seriously limit the president's options.²¹

The recommendations that Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs separately sent to the president opposed making any deal along the lines of the Nitze-Kvitsinsky understanding. Weinberger suggested that if the Soviets reduced their SS-20s to 75 with 225 warheads, the Western European allies might not even accept deployment of 75 cruise missiles and 300 warheads on their soil, assuming that 75 SS-20s

were an acceptable risk. Second, the Soviets planned to keep 90 SS-20 launchers (with 270 warheads) east of the Urals, some of which could already reach Western Europe as deployed and the rest of which could be easily redeployed to do so. The Nitze-Kvitsinsky trade would leave the United States with 300 GLCM warheads with a range of 2,500 kilometers and the Soviets with 495 SS-20s warheads with a range of 5,000 kilometers. Furthermore, ballistic missiles such as the Pershing IIs were fast and hard to defend against and could reach targets in the western Soviet Union (but not Moscow) within seven to eight minutes. The cruise missile was slow. If NATO deployed only cruise missiles, the Soviets could focus their formidable air defenses on them. Weinberger concluded, "In sum we will be at a significant military disadvantage"; he urged the president not to "rush now to a bad compromise" without further study. Nitze should withdraw his proposal.²²

The Department of State and ACDA disagreed with Weinberger. They saw the Nitze-Kvitsinsky formula as a step towards an agreement. Carlucci sent an account of the State and ACDA argument to Weinberger, who was visiting U.S. troops in Lebanon. The deputy secretary suggested that State and ACDA thought that "any agreement, regardless of its military implications, is better than the risk of no agreement at all." Carlucci again raised the fear that deploying only 75 GLCMs in Western Europe might cause Western European governments to ask why they should deploy them at all. State and ACDA representatives pointed out that no one believed the Soviets would ever accept the zero option. They came to the opposite conclusion from the DoD: they suggested to the president that the Nitze-Kvitsinsky package "would dramatically shift the debate in Europe and help overcome opposition to U.S. deployments [of Pershing IIs and GLCMs]." State and ACDA told the president this was the best deal he could hope to get.²³

In mid-September 1982 the president sided with Weinberger and the Pentagon by rejecting the Nitze-Kvitsinsky package, noting that the "U.S. cannot accept a position in which the Soviets retain short-time-of-flight SS-20 ballistic missiles while the U.S. foregoes Pershing II ballistic missiles (and retains only the slower, air breathing GLCM)." It became a moot decision, however, because the Kremlin also refused to consider the deal. With INF talks at an impasse and zero option looking less likely, Reagan considered a fallback position: "strict equality" on limits on INF forces that must include deployment of some Pershing IIs, resulting in quotas "substantially below those of the present Soviet arsenal" and extension of the agreement to East Asia with the right of the United States to offset Soviet


missiles there. This was a move away from the zero option but was not included in any proposals at Geneva.²⁴

The United States was scheduled to deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe in late 1983, making that a year of decisions for the INF negotiators. The U.S. Intelligence Community and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey predicted that the Soviets would expand their strategy of inducements and threats designed to influence NATO governments to delay or even deny deployment of Euro missiles. The Kremlin would continue to stress that the Soviets were being flexible in their proposal to set an initial reduction for INF missiles, while the United States was being intractable in clinging to the zero option. Moscow hinted they would make more concessions if the United States became more flexible. Conversely, if the United States was not forthcoming, the Soviets would deploy even more SS-20s and develop cruise missiles and other new ways to bolster their nuclear arsenal targeted at Europe. Although they did not acknowledge the strategy at the time, they would continue to actively encourage the European peace movement through propaganda and covert means.²⁵

In early January 1983 Reagan met with his national security team to review INF negotiating options. Shultz began the discussion by reaffirming that the zero option was the ultimate objective. He stated that the United States must deploy intermediate missiles in the five NATO Western European countries that had agreed to accept them (West Germany for the Pershing IIs, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands for cruise missiles). However, he suggested as an interim step a proposal that both sides reduce their INF arsenals to 300 warheads. Weinberger countered that the interim proposal “would infer abandonment of 0/0.... We should not show flexibility. The Soviets have far more SS-20s than when the talks started. They did not freeze. Proposals to move East of the Urals are not serious proposals.” The president asked a series of questions: How many SS-20s did the Soviet actually have? Weinberger answered 333 then and 342 by May 1983. What was the mix of the 572 U.S. warheads planned for deployment? Several participants answered 108 Pershing IIs and 464 cruise missiles. Where did that 572 number come from, the president wondered. Lt. Gen. Paul F. Gorman responded “out of the air,” but in fact it was the number agreed upon by NATO members during the Carter administration. Like Shultz, the president saw the zero option as an ideal solution, but given Soviet opposition he again began to

consider compromise. As the meeting progressed, the president leaned towards an interim proposal, suggesting, “We could lose support [in Western Europe] because we look too inflexible”; nevertheless he insisted that the United States deploy its INF forces on schedule. Reagan summed up the discussion: “Well, I think we all agreed that we want equality, 0/0, and at some point [we will] talk about reduced numbers as an interim step.” As the meeting ended, Reagan observed, “I have gotten so interested in the negotiating position that perhaps I should trade jobs with Nitze.”²⁶

After another National Security Planning Group meeting in mid-March, Reagan approved the Shultz interim proposal and announced publicly in the East Room of the White House in front of NATO ambassadors that Nitze was proposing as an interim measure to “substantially reduce”—no figure was given—its planned deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles if the Soviet



Adapted from Soviet Military Power, 1983

Union agreed to reduce the number of warheads on its INF missiles to an equal number on a global basis.²⁷

The Soviet Union responded as expected. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko proclaimed the Soviet Union's insistence that any agreement on INF must count British and French nuclear systems and dual-capable aircraft. Furthermore, Gromyko insisted that the agreement could only relate to Europe. Once again Soviet negotiating ploys proved reliable allies to Weinberger and the Pentagon.²⁸

The Soviet dismissal of the interim proposal did not prevent consideration of further steps by the NSC's Senior Arms Control Group—which had been established by the president in July 1983 and staffed at the under secretary level of State, Defense, ACDA, with participation by relevant officials from the Central Intelligence Agency and the JCS. In fall 1983, before the last round of negotiations prior to deployment of NATO missiles, Weinberger fought a dogged campaign against efforts by State and ACDA to introduce new negotiating positions at Geneva. The Pentagon chief rejected the assertion that new proposals would demonstrate U.S. sincerity or have an appreciable effect on public opinion in Europe. He argued, "The battle will be waged far removed from the subtleties and nuances of the negotiating record.... [It] will be won by bold public relations initiatives and effective use of the facts (which are on our side)." Concessions would not move the Kremlin, but they could increase the European peace movement's demands that there be a moratorium on U.S. deployment of INF missiles.²⁹

Weinberger's advice did not carry the day. The president agreed to allow Nitze to "explore in general terms" equal limitations on aircraft and to tell the Soviets that the United States was prepared to consider not offsetting the Soviet's global INF missile deployments with U.S. deployments in Europe. At the same time, Reagan reiterated his ultimate commitment to eliminate an entire class of land-based long-range INF missiles. The Soviets were unresponsive to his hints of additional concessions.³⁰

The Soviet leaders had pledged that if the United States deployed Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in NATO countries, they would walk out of the INF negotiations. Weinberger found himself making one last effort to prevent any last-minute concessions in Geneva to prevent such a walkout. State, Nitze, ACDA, and even the Joint Chiefs suggested placing a "last offer on the table," but as Perle argued to Weinberger the United States could not "out-manuever the Soviets in that way." Rather, such a move might prompt last-minute wobbling

by allies and delay deployments of the NATO missiles. The United States had already shipped cruise missiles to the United Kingdom and Italy and Pershing IIs to Germany but had not sent warheads. Weinberger then told the president, "We are in a strong position now, here and in Europe, and if the Soviets choose to walk out ... that will not weaken us in the so-called public opinion battle.... It would only hurt them."³¹

On November 23, 1983, the Soviets walked out and the INF talks were suspended. Among arms control professionals and in the media there were murmurings that an inexperienced president had allowed Weinberger and Perle to hijack the arms control process. Among the experts and journalists following the negotiation, Perle was cast as the *éminence grise*, the man behind Weinberger's opposition to anything but the impractical and self-serving zero option. In fact, Perle, who provided the technical knowledge to Weinberger for INF meetings, was usually on the same wavelength as Weinberger: no interim INF agreement until the United States modernized its theater nuclear weapons and deployed its missiles on NATO soil. Then the United States could negotiate an equal and verifiable INF agreement from strength. This view clashed with that of Nitze and other arms control experts who envisioned a step-by-step negotiation, gradually reducing in equal increments INF missiles and eventual resolving outstanding issues. Weinberger had defended the zero option with his usual tenacity, but the rest of the arms control establishment convinced the president to offer some interim proposals that compromised the zero option. Moscow's unwillingness to consider Washington's interim proposals rescued Weinberger and the Pentagon.

START Negotiations, 1982–1983

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, the Reagan administration's reset of the SALT II talks announced in May 1982, were the prime focus of the administration's arms control effort. Reagan officials hoped START would put to rest all the deficiencies they saw in the SALT II Treaty: unequal limitations on missiles that favored Moscow's heavy ICBMs, failure to count the new Soviet Backfire bombers as strategic weapons, not taking into account the Soviet missiles' higher throw weight, inadequate verification procedures, and the Soviet's ability to cheat.³²

Reagan had campaigned against the SALT II Treaty from the moment it was signed, asserting, "The plain truth is we cannot verify if the Soviets are carrying out the terms of SALT II and it is a falsehood to suggest we can." An

added complication was that Reagan and Weinberger had also already committed themselves to the general modernization of U.S. strategic forces, which meant deploying the MX missile, producing more *Ohio*-class nuclear-powered submarines with Trident II missiles (both programs were under development during the Carter years), and going ahead with the B-1 bomber, which Carter had rejected in favor of cruise missiles on B-52s and development of the stealthy B-2. Weinberger and other opponents of nuclear arms control feared that the Soviet Union would use START negotiations to impede U.S. strategic modernization. Other members of the administration, such as Richard Perle, were hostile to the very idea of strategic nuclear arms control negotiations with an aggressive Soviet Union that was unlikely to abide by the terms of any treaty. Secretary of State Haig, however, saw both political and strategic reasons for some kind of negotiation process. The administration had no intention of seeking ratification of SALT II as it stood. Instead it planned a formal review of arms-control policy before resuming negotiations. In the meantime it would accept the existing limitations of SALT as long as the Soviets exercised similar restraint. The question therefore was how to pursue negotiations, and to what end.³³

Weinberger's response was to reject SALT II and start afresh. He later wrote to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) in response to the senator's speech advocating adoption of an amended SALT II by executive order as a positive gesture for future talks: "I have always felt any agreement that permits the kind of increases the Soviets have been undertaking ever since SALT II was completed is not very useful." Weinberger continued, "The esoteric formulae that resulted from SALT II strike me as an example of what happens when the technicians and the experts take over: the central idea of securing genuine arms reductions is completely submerged in the desire to secure some agreement, and the only agreement that seemed to be possible was the number of formulae, which did not in any way interfere with the enormous addition the Soviets wanted to make, and did make, to their military strength."³⁴

In early March 1981 the brash and ambitious Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, a longtime opponent of SALT since his days at ACDA under the Ford administration, told reporters he believed the United States need not comply with SALT I because the agreement had expired in 1977, nor with SALT II because it had not been ratified. At State, Haig disavowed Lehman's view and stated, "We will take no action," while the administration was reviewing SALT policy, "that

would undercut existing agreements so long as the Soviet Union exercises the same restraint.”³⁵

This Lehman-Haig disagreement was merely the opening salvo as State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense battled over SALT compliance. At an NSC meeting in May 1981 the issue came up for discussion. Referring to plans for modernization of U.S. strategic forces, Reagan asked, “Why should we preserve the illusion of SALT, if we are going to slide around it and do what we accuse the Soviets of doing, i.e., violating it?” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones told the president that if Moscow did not continue to abide by SALT II, “the Soviets could deploy more missiles, warheads, and Backfire bombers and there is little, if anything we could do to prevent or match it.” To drive home this point, Jones observed that the leaders in Moscow could “increase their SS-18 Reentry Vehicles from 10 [the SALT II ceiling for MIRVs] to 20 or even 30.” For that reason, Jones argued against a proposal suggested by Perle in an earlier sub-NSC meeting that the United States publicly accept SALT II’s provisions but break them should national security require it. Weinberger had supported the Perle proposal, noting his concerns about Soviet compliance with SALT II. Reagan asked, “But the Soviets are not being restrained by SALT II, are they?” Jones answered that they were playing by the rules so far. Furthermore, most of the weapons required to modernize the U.S. strategic force—the MX, Trident II missile, and B-1 bomber—would not be deployed until 1983, after the SALT II Treaty had expired. Jones’s view prevailed. The president agreed with National Security Adviser Richard Allen’s suggestion that, pending an NSC review, the administration would continue to follow SALT II’s provisions.³⁶

While the president was prepared to abide by the provisions of SALT II for the time being, he faced essentially three options: reject SALT II and seek a new treaty entirely, negotiate a significantly modified treaty within the SALT II framework, or try for a slightly modified treaty. During the summer of 1981 the administration made little headway on refining options but did come up with the acronym “START.” NSC adviser Allen adopted the name change suggested by Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard, who was serving as the NSC staffer for Soviet Union affairs. Allen believed that reductions instead of limitations was a better description and would be easier to sell as it would appeal to hard-liners and arms control advocates alike.³⁷

The name change appealed greatly to the president, as it reinforced his

long-held hope that nuclear weapons could actually be reduced and eventually eliminated. In his November 18, 1981, speech introducing the zero option for INF Reagan also called for new negotiations to achieve “substantial reductions” in strategic weapons. He publicly unveiled his new terminology. While reductions were not a new concept, the name change was both a symbolic and practical way to differentiate his policy from Carter’s. While the president’s speech held out the prospect of fewer nuclear weapons, many in the administration opposed serious START negotiations with Moscow until the United States could modernize its nuclear strategic arsenal, thus eliminating the “window of vulnerability” that Soviet heavy ICBMs posed to U.S. land-based Minuteman ICBMs. Weinberger, aided by Perle, headed this coalition of opponents to immediate START negotiations, which included DCI William Casey, NSC advisers Allen and his successor William Clark, and presidential counselor Ed Meese. Equally important, this alliance had supporters within the arms control community, including the head of the START delegation, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny and the ACDA’s directors, Eugene V. Rostow and later Kenneth Adelman. While not all of these men always saw eye-to-eye with Weinberger on all issues of arms control, they could be counted as being in his camp.³⁸

The new acronym was very nearly the only achievement in strategic arms negotiations in the administration’s first 15 months in office. The primary reason for this lack of progress was the initial focus on the INF negotiations. Only in March 1982 did the president task his national security team with preparing U.S. policy for the prospective START talks. Under the joint chairmanship of Richard Perle for DoD and Richard R. Burt, director of the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, the START Interagency Group sought a comprehensive U.S. proposal. Perle and Burt, the “Two Richards” as Rowny called them, reflected in spades their bosses’ differences over nuclear arms reduction strategy. The Washington press corps, which had enjoyed closer connections to Burt than Perle, dubbed them the “Prince of Light” and the “Prince of Darkness,” respectively. Both men were clever and ambitious, could be charming or blunt, and were skilled bureaucratic players. Neither was prepared to give ground. Not surprisingly, in early April Iklé informed Weinberger that the interagency process “has not led to a single position or convergence of recommendations, except in a few subsidiary areas.” According to Iklé, there were three or four different recommendations. OSD’s and Rowny’s were “fairly close.” State’s and DoD’s were

not: "While we stress limits on throw-weight and missile warheads," Iklé noted, "State emphasizes limits on delivery vehicles and warheads, with a special limitation on heavy ICBMs in exchange for cancellation of the MX." The Joint Chiefs, made up of Carter appointees, tentatively favored a plan close to State's, but their position remained in flux. These differences went to the basic problem of how to measure and therefore limit so-called units of account in the negotiations. For SALT II, the unit of account had been strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) which included ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers. Weinberger's staff and Rowny considered an SNDV count to be inadequate, since they did not address the 2.5 to 1 advantage that Moscow enjoyed in missile throw weight (defined as the weight that a missile's boost or main propulsion stages could carry and which included the warheads, reentry vehicles, and other targeting devices). The various formulas for number of warheads and delivery systems recommended to the president as an opening proposal for the START talks did not, in Iklé and Weinberger's view, adequately limit Soviet ICBM throw weight.³⁹

On April 21, 1982, the president met with his National Security Council to review the proposals for the START talks. Weinberger suggested, "We should not hesitate to ask the Soviets to reduce more than we do, since to do otherwise, would be to freeze their superiority." To the secretary's mind, warheads were not a proper "unit of account" because they varied greatly in accuracy, yield, and hard-target capacity. For START to work and to achieve real results, Weinberger believed, throw weight had to be reduced unequally by both sides, thus eliminating the current Soviet advantage. The secretary failed to convince the president, who was struggling to learn the intricacies of START issues. Reagan was focused on land-based ICBMs; he reasoned that bombers took 12 hours to arrive at their targets, and submarines and bombers could be attacked before they "shoot their missiles." On the other hand: "The ICBM is different. The great psychological factor has to be an emphasis on land-based missiles and their special threat." No decision emerged from the April 21 meeting, which amounted to a review of agency arguments in front of the president. Nevertheless, the issue over throw-weight measurement was not gaining traction with Reagan.⁴⁰

The next NSC meeting was supposed to set the stage for a presidential decision. At the May 3 NSC meeting, Haig stated that a 5,000-warhead limit, with no more than half the number of warheads on ICBMs, should be the U.S. position. Weinberger disagreed, suggesting again that "yield was the real measure, and one

gets at yield through TW [throw weight].” Haig worried that the Soviets would never negotiate on throw weight given their 2.5 to 1 advantage. Furthermore, throw weight was difficult to verify. While these differences still existed, all NSC participants agreed it was important for the president to make a statement on START. Weinberger suggested it be as specific as possible. ACDA chief Eugene Rostow recommended a more general exposition. During the meeting Deputy NSC Adviser Robert McFarlane unveiled a consensus option, originated by Burt and endorsed by Haig, which kicked the differences over units of measure down the road. Under this plan the START delegation would negotiate reductions in missiles, warheads, bombers, and MIRV subceilings in the first phase. In the second phase the negotiators would tackle additional reductions in warheads and a limit on throw weight. Agreeing with Weinberger’s recommendation on timing but not the substance of the proposal, Haig noted that the president should make a simple and clear statement of his position before he departed for Europe in early June for an economic summit and a NATO meeting.⁴¹

Weinberger felt so strongly about the issue of throw weight that he sent the president an end-run message after the May 3 NSC meeting stating, “I am convinced that the most comprehensive and enduring way of limiting ballistic missiles is through direct reductions in missile throw-weight.” Weinberger worried that the president might be considering that by limiting launchers he could indirectly limit throw weight. To Weinberger’s mind this approach would create “dangerous loopholes which the Soviets would exploit.” Without the switch to an emphasis on throw weight, Weinberger asserted, “Essentially, all we would be proposing, is to insert lower numbers in his treaty. It would be hard to explain why we took over a year to come up with the same philosophy where the Carter administration left off.”⁴²

Weinberger’s plea failed to convince the president. Reagan unveiled his policy on strategic arms reduction at a commencement address at his alma mater, Eureka College, on May 9, 1982. The president declared that START “really means we’ve given up on SALT,” and stated that he was asking the START negotiating team “to propose to their Soviet counterparts a practical, phased reduction plan.” The first phase, the president continued, would focus “on the most destabilizing system, ballistic missiles, the number of warheads they carry, and the overall destructive potential.” He expected warheads to be reduced in equal levels by a third and no more than half of these warheads would be deployed on land-based ICBMs. The

second phase, the president continued, “would seek to achieve an equal ceiling on the other elements of our strategic nuclear forces, including ballistic missile throw-weight at less than the current American levels.”⁴³

Reagan did not lay out a detailed negotiating strategy in the November speech, but he approved an explicit directive to the START negotiators. The directive suggested as a first phase a target of 5,000 total warheads for each side, with 2,500 of them on land-based and sea-based ICBMs, and a limit of 850 ballistic missiles for each side. Those numbers, of course, would require significant reductions for the Soviets, who relied much more heavily than the United States on land-based ICBMs, and would indirectly limit Soviet throw weight. As an “internal” goal not shared with Moscow or the public, the directive called for ensuring that these indirect limits would reduce total Soviet throw weight from 5 million kilograms to 2.5 million kilograms. Arms control expert Strobe Talbott suggested this internal and very tightly held second goal was a result of Weinberger’s entreaties with the president as well as an attempt by McFarlane to bridge the gap between State and Defense. For the second phase of START negotiations the president’s instructions envisioned further reducing the total Soviet throw weight below the U.S. level of two million kilograms and placing sharp limits on bombers and cruise missiles. Neither of these proposals was likely to appeal to Moscow since it would be required to reduce its warheads and throw weight by about two-thirds while the United States could continue with modernization of its nuclear arsenal basically unimpeded. Nevertheless it was the U.S. starting proposal.⁴⁴

The first round of START talks in Geneva focused mainly on presenting the two sides’ opening positions. According to Michael H. Mobbs, Weinberger’s representative at the START talks, the Soviet proposal “was essentially a reformulation of the SALT II agreement, with alterations and omissions unfavorable to the United States.” Nevertheless, Mobbs and Rowny argued that Soviet responses suggested that the administration’s plans for strategic modernization could push the Soviets to make concessions.⁴⁵

Such optimism proved premature. The second round of talks, which wrapped up in December 1982, offered only incremental progress at best. The Soviet delegation continued to condition their proposed reduction, to 1,800 ballistic missiles and heavy bombers for each side, on freezing the number of U.S. forward-based systems, that is, Pershing IIs and GLCMs in NATO countries. The Soviets denied the U.S. contention that ICBMs were more destabilizing than

other strategic systems and called for a ban on all long-range cruise missiles. In informal sessions, the Soviet delegation suggested that throw weight could possibly be considered as a unit of measure, but only if heavy bomber throw weights were taken into account.⁴⁶

In early January 1983 the Reagan team met again to provide additional instructions for the third round of the START negotiations. All agreed that Rowny should present a basic elements paper when the time was right during the session, thus undercutting Soviet claims that U.S. proposals were not comprehensive and were too one-sided. The paper would not introduce specific reductions but would remain general to protect the future U.S. negotiating position and options. Like he did in the INF talks when the issue was zero option, Weinberger went to the heart of the matter. He argued, "The only way to achieve the basic U.S. goal ... is to get a handle on throw-weight.... The two phases of the negotiations should be collapsed." To Weinberger, limiting throw weight was the best way to achieve strategic parity. Shultz favored continuing with the two-phase approach, with the first phase focusing on ballistic missiles and especially ICBMs, and the second phase on throw weight postponed until real progress on the first had been achieved. The president authorized the START negotiators "to discuss, but not to negotiate phase II issues [throw weight, bombers, cruise missiles]," making sure that such discussion did not divert or delay the focus on phase I limits. Nor should the START delegation allow their Soviet counterparts to isolate discussion on some phase two issues, such as cruise missiles, which Shultz characterized as "our strong suit."⁴⁷

The third session of the talks ended in late March 1983 and was, in Mobbs's words, "the least productive to date. We saw no progress, however defined." Mobbs attributed this to Soviet "stonewalling" and offered an explanation: they were waiting until the INF negotiations became clearer; they hoped the nuclear freeze movement, the defense budget debate in Congress, and the beginning of the 1984 election campaign would pressure the U.S. side into making START concessions. The Kremlin also believed it held "the negotiating high ground," given that Carter and Brezhnev had signed SALT II. Mobbs suggested that Brezhnev's successor, former KGB chief Yuri Andropov, might not have a strong enough hold on power to take significant steps in the negotiations. Looking at the round from Moscow's view, the U.S. proposals seem dedicated to reducing the Soviet's strong suit, heavy ballistic missiles; providing the United States with the strategic

advantage; and forcing the Soviet Union to restructure their strategic forces. The Kremlin leadership could hardly consider this a good deal.⁴⁸

Before the final two sessions of 1983 Defense and State debated whether to present a more flexible START position. State proposed dropping the aggregate throw-weight limit provisions of phase two and instead revising downward sub-limits on ICBM warheads and the numbers of heavy and medium ICBMs, which only indirectly served to lower throw weight. To the OSD this was the wrong concession at the wrong time. Soviet intransigence at Geneva did not justify such a move. As Iklé noted, failure to constrain ICBM throw weight had been the main criticism of SALT II in Congress and among public critics. Instead, Defense proposed retaining the current 5,000-warhead limit on ballistic missiles and 350 on heavy bombers while raising the limit on ICBMs from 850 to 1,250. The DoD recommended keeping those collateral restraints, which served to indirectly limit ICBM throw weight: limits of 2,500 ICBM warheads, 110 heavy ICBMs, and 100 medium ICBMs. In addition, DoD recommended including throw-weight limits in the agreement and excluding limits on submarine-launched cruise missiles. The Pentagon envisioned this proposal as “a single-phase position,” that is, a single package, as the opening position at the negotiations. The increase to the 1,250-ICBM level was in keeping with the recommendations of a bipartisan commission, headed by former NSC adviser Brent Scowcroft and created by the president to assess the strategic modernization plan (see chapter 13). As part of its assessment, the commission recommended that START should seek to limit multiple independent reentry vehicle expansion by promoting smaller, single warhead ICBMs. The new 1,250 limit would allow for these single-warhead missiles, which on the U.S. side would become the road-mobile Midgetman. The president approved this change.⁴⁹

The Soviets did not accept the new U.S. position as “flexibility,” suggesting rightly that it was a way to accommodate the Midgetman. According to Mobbs, the fundamental issues were three. First was whether to recognize distinctions between ballistic systems and slow-flying systems (heavy bombers and cruise missiles) by putting them under separate ceilings—the U.S. position—or whether to aggregate all nuclear delivery systems, as the Soviets insisted. Second was the question of how to address the Soviet advantage in ballistic missile throw weight. Third, would the Soviets permit progress on START or insist that START could not be resolved until INF issues were resolved? As part of its flexibility campaign,

undertaken with an eye to congressional support for the MX missile, the U.S. delegation informally offered the Soviets a choice at Geneva: they could accept the indirect collateral sublimits on throw weight—2,500 warheads on 110 heavy and 100 medium ICBMs—or, if they preferred, a direct aggregate limit on throw weight. The Soviets rejected the choice, charging that the focus on throw weight was merely a U.S. ploy to weaken Soviet ICBM forces. While this new U.S. flexibility gave the appearance of progress, according to Mobbs, it was illusionary and not reciprocated by Moscow.⁵⁰

As 1983 came to a close, domestic pressure for progress at Geneva increased. The U.S. delegation proposed in START's round five, the final session before deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Western Europe, a build-down proposal. Originally conceived by Senators Sam Nunn, William Cohen, Charles H. Percy (R-IL), and Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), the proposal obligated each country to eliminate two nuclear warheads from its operational inventory for each new warhead deployed. Starting from current levels, this would afford the Soviets an advantage because of their larger number of warheads. To counter this, the guaranteed mutual build-down would be linked to an eventual equal warhead ceiling established in future START negotiations and subject to verification. The result would be about a reduction of 5 percent of each side's warhead inventory per year, which in eight years would bring both sides to 5,000 warheads each. This plan received impetus from Scowcroft's testimony to Congress, in which he stated that his commission believed existing U.S. START proposals would increase rather than decrease the warhead-to-launcher ratio, given the fact that both sides were placing MIRVs on their launchers. The Reagan administration saw the build-down proposal as a means of accommodating Scowcroft's concerns and shoring up support in Congress for the strategic weapons modernization plan, especially passage of funding for the MX missile.⁵¹

Both General Jack Vessey, who became chairman of the Joint Chiefs in June 1982, and the director of OSD's Program Analysis and Evaluation Office, David Chu, considered the build-down proposal disadvantageous to the United States because the Soviet Union had already modernized much of its strategic force while the United States was only embarking on the process. For that reason the build-down would constrain the U.S. strategic force to a much greater extent than that of the Soviets. Furthermore, Perle argued, and Weinberger no doubt agreed, that such changes in the U.S. position would "encourage the Soviets to

remain intransigent in the belief that, in the absence of negotiations on their part, we will continue to ‘negotiate with ourselves.’”⁵²

Nevertheless, Reagan endorsed exploring the build-down concept. State then proposed to exchange reductions in areas of U.S. strength— heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)—for those of the Soviets— ballistic missiles and throw weight. DoD arms control officials argued that such an exchange, if accepted by Moscow, could limit the Pentagon’s planned strategic modernization program. Weinberger and his allies need not have feared. The Soviet delegation rejected the build-down proposal and the tradeoff idea. When the United States deployed its intermediate Pershing II missiles and ALCMs in Western Europe, the Soviets did not technically walk out of the negotiations, but they refused to set a date for the next session.⁵³

There was little possibility that the START negotiations at Geneva could have made real progress. For the Kremlin the timing was wrong. The Soviet air defense forces’ shootdown of Korean Air Lines flight 007 put the Soviet leadership on the defensive, seeming to confirm the view of hawks like Weinberger that Moscow was not to be trusted. Andropov was in poor health and would soon die. The Soviet leadership realized the United States was determined to modernize its



Antinuclear demonstrators in Central Park, New York City, June 12, 1982. *New York Daily News* Archive via Getty Images

strategic forces and Congress looked ready to fund it. Pershing IIs and ALCMs were being deployed in Western Europe despite antinuclear demonstrations. Reagan had announced his intention to develop a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which, if it worked (a big if), would destroy Soviet ICBMs as they traveled through space, thus negating Moscow's strategic trump card. While SDI had nuclear arms control implications, it was viewed primarily by the Pentagon as part of its strategic modernization plan (see chapter 13 for a discussion of SDI). In Washington, differences between the various agencies were still unresolved. U.S. proposals at Geneva sought to either paper over them or find compromises, neither of which interested the Soviet Union.

Weinberger and the Peace Movement

The internal debate within the Reagan administration over the best course for nuclear arms control was paralleled by a public debate in the United States and Europe. Substantial portions of the U.S. and Western European public remained alarmed and suspicious that the Reagan administration was not interested in arms control. According to the U.S. International Communication Agency's reading of opinion polls, when antinuclear advocates were polled about the zero option for INF and reductions to equal numbers of strategic weapons in the START talks, they thought such ideas would promote peace. Ironically, few realized that the U.S. delegation had proposed precisely those things at Geneva.⁵⁴

START and INF negotiations were complex and arcane, the preserve of experts. The public had difficulty understanding them. By 1982 a much simpler response emerged: an amorphous peace movement in both the United States and Western Europe, characterized by large public demonstrations, formal resolutions by the U.S. Congress, state and local governments, private groups, churches, and other nongovernment organizations calling for a "nuclear freeze" agreement between Moscow and Washington. Under a freeze the United States and the Soviet Union would announce their intention to cease adding to their nuclear arsenals. In the November elections of 1982, eight U.S. states included nuclear-freeze resolutions on their ballots, and many organizations and localities voted on their own versions.⁵⁵

Weinberger had argued during internal policy debates on INF and START that support for arms control through military strength had to be supported by the American public before it could achieve success at Geneva. He was prepared to take

the message to the administration's opponents, knowing full well that he would be at a great disadvantage. Since churches were a hotbed of the nuclear freeze movement, Weinberger—a lifelong member of the Episcopal Church—welcomed the chance to be part of a high-level public debate about nuclear weapons and peace. Weinberger's early experiences as a radio/television host and columnist in California served him well in the dialogue with opponents of nuclear weapons. For example, he accepted an invitation to speak at Grace Cathedral in San Francisco in the autumn of 1982—joining Episcopalian luminaries from the other side of the aisle, such as former National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy—as part of a strategy to “persuade as many groups and individuals as possible that regaining our strength is the most surely tested way to peace.” It was hard to determine how well the secretary succeeded in this forum sympathetic to the antinuclear movement.⁵⁶

Weinberger personally oversaw responses to many letters to him from church representatives and other citizens who challenged him to square his defense policies with his religious and moral beliefs. His response was that he wanted peace, but it was only attainable after the United States achieved strategic parity with the Soviet Union. Weinberger heeded DoD public relations officials who warned that “most of what gets attention in the media today is emotional in nature and should be responded to accordingly. Rational responses will not always work and can even inflame the public. We, therefore, agree ... that the Administration should ‘share the public’s concern’ and stress ‘that we all have the same goal—peace.’”⁵⁷

Notwithstanding this advice, the DoD was losing the public opinion battle. Pentagon public affairs officials, such as senior speechwriter Kathleen Troia, suggested that it was not enough to ask concerned citizens and opinion leaders to trust the Pentagon's promise that arms control would come after rearmament. She urged the secretary and other Reagan officials “to speak out about arms control” and stress that the administration is: “(a) serious about arms control, (b) does not view nuclear war lightly, (c) recognizes arms control movement members as both sincere and well-intentioned.” The nuclear arms control supporters, to Troia, were neither “‘communists,’ or even necessarily liberal democrats.... Nor do they see the Soviets as peace-loving guys.” They were “just plain scared of nuclear war and see the arms control movement as a way of doing something about it.” Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Benjamin Welles agreed,

telling Weinberger the administration had come “dangerously close to painting ourselves into a corner as (a) nuclear warriors and (b) resistant to arms control. While this is not the truth—it is increasingly the perception—even among those well-intentioned toward us and our program.”⁵⁸

Weinberger took this advice to heart. He oversaw letters to those who wrote him about their fear of nuclear war or urged him to support nuclear arms reduction or disarmament. Weinberger had a staff of trained letter writers, but what was unique was his personal involvement in the process. He often drafted or revised letters to influential political and religious figures as well as to ordinary citizens.

One of Weinberger’s most successful public relations achievements took place at Oxford University in England. After a couple of postponements at the request of the British government, Weinberger accepted an invitation by Oxford Union Society President Andrew Sullivan to take part in a debate against one of the leading intellectual leaders of the nuclear disarmament movement, Professor E. P. Thompson. The topic for the Oxford Union debate: “Resolved: there is no moral difference between the policies of the United States and Soviet Union.” The U.S. Embassy staff, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, British defense minister Michael Heseltine, and many Pentagon advisers had urged Weinberger not to debate, believing it could only end in embarrassment. Oxford students were mostly left-leaning, unruly, and not impressed by authority figures. The debate was the first of the Oxford Union Society’s to be televised. During the debate Weinberger applied all his skills as a radio and television host and lawyer. Although heckled, booed, and hissed on occasion, Weinberger gave as well as he received. He ended his argument with this observation for students living under British democracy: “When you leave here tonight, there will be no midnight knock at your door.” Weinberger won the debate by a vote of 271 to 232. His military assistant Colin Powell considered his performance “masterful,” but did note that members of his security detail, Embassy personnel, and Weinberger’s aides in attendance had been instructed to leave by the “con” exit, and not the “pro” exit (the debate was decided by the number of listeners leaving by each exit). When he learned that he had won, Weinberger was genuinely pleased. It had been one of his finest hours.⁵⁹

Weinberger engaged the public in support of his and his president’s policies. He took his case into hostile territories, like Oxford University and activist churches. He engaged establishment icons such as McGeorge Bundy. He made himself available to journalists, and not just ones who already supported him. It

would be easy to dismiss Weinberger's efforts as a government public relations campaign, but they were more than that. This was a secretary who believed strongly in his principles and was prepared to defend them in all arenas.

The Resumption of Nuclear Arms Reduction Talks

Weinberger entered the last year of Reagan's first term satisfied that nuclear arms reduction talks would not limit the U.S. strategic weapons modernization program. By January 1984 that program was well under way with intermediate-range missiles deployed on NATO soil, MX missiles and the revived B-1 bomber in final stages of testing, and the Trident II (D-5) missile for *Ohio*-class submarines authorized for full-scale engineering development. The president articulated a vision of the Strategic Defense Initiative and Congress began funding research by 1984. Soviet intransigence and their delegations' late 1983 walkouts at the INF and START talks at Geneva had helped Weinberger postpone any potential concessions in these talks. The poor health of the Kremlin leadership also proved a boon. Ailing General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev died in November 1982 to be succeeded by former KGB head Yuri Andropov, who then died in February 1984. Andropov was replaced by the hard-line, but infirm, Konstantin Chernenko. All these leadership changes required the Kremlin to focus on succession. Under these circumstances, the Soviets had little inclination to negotiate nuclear arms reduction.⁶⁰

Throughout the first three years of the administration, Weinberger had argued that the Soviets could not be trusted, as evidenced by their lack of compliance with already-ratified arms control agreements and their cheating on the provisions of the unratified SALT II agreement. On January 9, 1984, the NSC participants agreed with the president's recommendation to initiate a low-key public relations campaign on Soviet cheating. The campaign included press backgrounders, fact sheets, answers to relevant press questions, classified briefings with congressional leaders and allies, classified formal reports to Congress, and plans for a brief mention in a presidential speech. Reagan resisted efforts to confront the Soviets more directly on their cheating for fear it would, in his words, "kill arms control."⁶¹

Two days later Perle warned Weinberger that the interagency START group was attempting "to move the negotiations forward." Defense must, Perle recommended, "resist the pressure to choose the option most acceptable to the Soviets."

Commenting on Perle's warning, Mobbs argued that "now is not the time to make fundamental changes to our START position." He noted that over the last year and a half, the United States had made 11 major revisions to its original position while the Soviets made only 2. Weinberger fully agreed: "I think our present START position is adequate. I worry about changing our position so often because the Soviets won't change theirs."⁶²

In late March, the president presided over a National Security Planning Group meeting on nuclear arms control strategy for 1984. Prior to the meeting, Weinberger sent Reagan a long memorandum to frame the discussion. The secretary described the paper as "deliberately straightforward," expected it to "elicit a spirited exchange," and added that "I believe it is important that this issue not be obscured by the tendency to produce a watered down consensus." Weinberger and Perle, who clearly helped in the drafting, had their eyes on the 1984 election. They used the example of Jimmy Carter's last year, 1980, when he changed his policy towards the Soviet Union by withdrawing SALT II from Senate ratification, imposed sanctions on the Soviets after their invasion of Afghanistan, and proposed 5 percent real growth in defense spending. In Weinberger's view, "the change came too late to regain the confidence of the American people; the voters in larger numbers ignored the new policy by voting against the old." The Reagan administration should not change its course on East-West relations and arms reduction in the last year of the administration. Weinberger argued that to negotiate "with one eye on the ballot box" would only embolden Soviets to insist on unreasonable concessions. When the U.S. negotiators refused to concede, Moscow would engage in propaganda that the Reagan administration failed to achieve arms reduction in the hopes of damaging his reelection chances. Weinberger urged continuing the strategy of the first three years: insistence on sharp reductions of nuclear weapons, full verification, and stressing U.S. flexibility as evidenced by the U.S. build-down and tradeoff proposals at the 1983 START negotiations.⁶³

The March Planning Group discussion that Weinberger anticipated would frame START policy produced lot of talk but not the results he had hoped for. At the meeting the secretary summarized his advice to the president starkly: the Soviets were not interested in a START agreement, unless it was one for which Reagan would not want to take credit, one in which the United States made major concessions. To produce a new framework for START—based on a limit of 5,000

ICBM reentry vehicles—was “going back to SALT II and ½” and disregarding the imbalance in throw weight. Shultz did not respond to Weinberger, but instead tried to broaden the discussion by listing his 10 “dos and don’ts” of negotiating with the Soviets. Rowny expressed some optimism: “They [the Soviets] may come back if we show a little ankle, maybe a little thigh, then you can get movement,” but not in 1984. The best one could hope for this year, according to Rowny, was an aide memoire, outlining areas of agreement. Nitze agreed that there was a “90% chance” that there would be no START deal this year and noted that “it is dangerous to be solidly engaged in START or INF in an election year.” ACDA Director Adelman considered how INF negotiations could be moved forward and suggested that other arms control and disarmament issues, such as non-proliferation, weapons in space, and no first use of nuclear weapons, should be advanced “slowly and cautiously.” Characteristically, Reagan summed up the meeting with his usual optimism, “We are not that far apart.” The president assured his advisers, “I don’t want to fall into the trap of SALT II, but if there are some things that are good, then we shouldn’t ignore them simply because they are a part of SALT II.” Having a launcher limit “isn’t wrong, so long as it is matched by throw-weight limits.” The president stated he would send a letter to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko suggesting resumption of START and INF negotiations. The president instructed Rowny and Nitze to talk privately with their Soviet counterparts and have the Senior Arms Control Group present new options for START/INF positions. This was exactly what Weinberger had argued against. He took no consolation from the meeting and the resulting directive on nuclear arms control strategy for 1984. The Pentagon chief worried that the press would soon be reporting that the administration was preparing new nuclear arms reduction proposals.⁶⁴

The tide was turning against the arms-negotiation hard-liners at DoD. Slowly yet inexorably Shultz and McFarlane convinced the president that the Kremlin leadership had legitimate fears about the United States, which in part explained their intransigent behavior in arms reduction negotiations. In mid-September 1984 Weinberger warned McFarlane that now was not the time to make specific proposals to Moscow since the U.S. elections were a month and a half away and given the “turmoil and uncertainty at the top of the Soviet government.” Weinberger suggested a broad-brush approach for the arms control component of the president’s UN speech: he called for a “fresh start” that created a “common

road map ... for a long journey towards a safe peace at the beginning of the next century.” The guide would be based on cumulative arms reduction measures, reduced secrecy, and full verifiability of agreements.⁶⁵

Shultz had engineered a meeting between Reagan and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in February 1983. The meeting between the president and the urbane and cosmopolitan Dobrynin went well but had little impact on U.S.-USSR relations. Shultz then arranged for the president to meet in late September 1984 with the stolid and doctrinaire Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Shultz hoped that the Reagan charm could thaw the ice in the U.S.-Soviet relationship and the START and INF talks could be resumed.⁶⁶

Shultz, Weinberger, and McFarlane met with the president before his 28 September meeting with Gromyko. Weinberger again suggested a “fresh approach to arms control,” but asked that the president remind Gromyko that Soviet intransigence and walkouts had stymied the START and INF negotiations. The Kremlin needed to realize, Weinberger argued, that U.S. strategic modernization was a response to the Soviet strategic buildup of the 1970s. The Pentagon chief insisted that arms control required effective verification, not something the Soviets were prepared to accept. These were not new ideas, but Weinberger also recommended that the president suggest a “fundamental discussion” of all arms control issues: accidental nuclear incidents, chemical weapons, biological weapons, SDI and the role of offensive and defensive nuclear forces, and reductions in the number of nuclear weapons “as we look to the next century.” In effect, the secretary was hoping to divert pressure to resume START and INF negotiations, with a time-consuming general review of all arms control issues between Washington and Moscow.⁶⁷

The Reagan-Gromyko meeting in the Oval Office lasted for two hours, but the two men never connected. Gromyko was his usual doctrinaire self and the president reverted back to his old anticommunism. At the post-meeting press conference, First Lady Nancy Reagan provided some levity when asked by Gromyko to whisper “peace” in the president’s ear each bedtime; she whispered it in the abashed Soviet foreign minister’s ear instead.⁶⁸

While the Gromyko-Reagan conversation had not made much headway, it did not diminish the president’s interest in accommodation with the Soviet leadership. In late October Reagan directed his arms reduction negotiators to meet with their Soviet counterparts for “Umbrella Talks,” designed to bundle

antisatellite capabilities, demilitarization of space, and reduction of offensive nuclear arsenals. Although willing to allow discussion of SDI with Moscow, the directive drew a sharp distinction between offensive capabilities, Soviet ICBMs, and the defensive nature of the anticipated Strategic Defense Initiative.⁶⁹

Weinberger and Shultz disagreed fundamentally on negotiations with Moscow. Reagan recalled their rivalry vividly: "Cap was not as interested as George in opening negotiations with the Russians, and some of his advisers at the Pentagon strongly objected to my ideas on arms control ... including my hope for eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons...." Reagan then recalled, "Cap had allies among my more conservative political supporters, who let me know they thought Shultz had gone soft on the Russians and wanted me to fire him—an idea, I told them, that was utter nonsense." After his landslide election in early November, Reagan wrote in his diary: "Cap & Bill [Casey] have views contrary to George's [Shultz] on S. Am, the Middle East & our arms negotiations. It's so out of hand George sounds like he wants out. I cant let this happen. Actually George is carrying out my policy. I'm going to have to meet with Cap & Bill & lay it out to them. Wont be fun." Notoriously averse to personal confrontation, the president never laid it out to Weinberger and Casey, who continued to advocate their hard line to Moscow. The president needed both men; they reinforced his duality—anti-Soviet and anti-nuclear weapons.⁷⁰

On November 17, 1984, Soviet General Secretary Chernenko sent a letter to Reagan congratulating him on his election win and suggesting new arms control talks on INF, START, and nonmilitarization of space—a Soviet way to potentially limit SDI. In early January 1985 the president issued extensive instructions for a Shultz-Gromkyo meeting in Geneva to try to reenergize the defunct START and INF negotiations while launching antisatellite talks. Weinberger and Perle (the latter accompanied Shultz on the trip but not to the meeting with the Soviet foreign minister) had tried to limit Shultz's negotiating room on strategic arms negotiations. The president authorized flexibility for Shultz. With his vote of confidence from the president, Shultz brushed aside Weinberger's efforts to limit his negotiating position.⁷¹

After Shultz and Gromyko met in Geneva for a six-hour meeting, they agreed to resume arms reduction talks at Geneva. The Reagan administration held four National Security Planning Group meetings to discuss objectives, format, and substantive issues for renewed negotiations. Reagan attended all four sessions. At

the first meeting, Weinberger stressed that SDI “gives the United States leverage on the Soviet Union and may prove our best response.” In subsequent meetings, Weinberger reiterated his belief in SDI and warned that limitations on antisatellite weapons provisions, demilitarization of space talks, and especially Soviet proposals for mutual moratoria, all of which were to be included in the discussion at Geneva, might be employed by the Soviets to retard SDI. Weinberger maintained that while the United States did not yet have the technology for SDI, he predicted it would be less expensive—he suggested one tenth as much—than upgrading all offensive systems to compensate for canceling SDI. The president’s comments and asides at these meetings indicated he very much wanted these talks to result in real reductions of nuclear weapons. However, at the last meeting on December 17, Reagan stated, “Whatever we do, we must be resolved among ourselves that SDI is not the price for reductions.” The stage was set for the Reagan second-term nuclear arms reduction negotiations.⁷²

During the course of nuclear arms control negotiations in Reagan’s first term the two sides did not make much progress, allowing the Pentagon to embark on the strategic weapons modernization that Weinberger and his advisers believed was required. The second term would be a different story. In 1987 Washington and Moscow signed an INF treaty that eliminated all intermediate-range nuclear missiles. From the moment Reagan publicly embraced the zero option in his November 1981 speech at the National Press Club, debate has raged over whether Weinberger’s promotion of the idea was initially a sincerely held belief and legitimate negotiating strategy, or merely a dodge to avoid meaningful negotiations. Viewed from a safe historical distance, it appears that it was all of the above: a bold rhetorical stroke and a firm negotiating position as well as a ploy calculated both to put the Soviets off guard and manage the U.S. arms control process. Yet it was also a goal that appealed to the president’s abhorrence of nuclear weapons.

Weinberger considered the 1987 INF Treaty, signed just after he left the Pentagon, as proof of the correctness of his all-or-nothing strategy. The treaty eliminated all INF missiles on a global basis without the concessions that the Soviets had claimed they required—inclusion of British and French forces and dual-capable aircraft in the treaty. To Weinberger the INF treaty was the best example of negotiating from strength. He rightly credited the Western European allies for accepting deployments of GLCM and Pershing IIs in the face of domestic opposition and Soviet threats, and yet he undervalued the role played by the new

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Most of all Weinberger cited Reagan's support of the zero option and his determination to deploy the NATO missiles as the main reason for the agreement's eventual success.

The 1987 INF treaty represented the first strategic arms control agreement to actually reduce the number of nuclear missiles, eliminating almost 3,000 of them. It provided encouragement to those who hoped that strategic arms negotiations could work and lessen the threat to the planet. While the INF process had been anything but easy, the challenge of reducing ICBMs and other strategic delivery systems was even more daunting.

In contrast, the START negotiations offered Weinberger no "spectacular move" like the zero option. Instead he pushed for a simple solution: an aggregate limit on throw weight. To Moscow, throw weight limits were merely a way to demolish its advantage in heavy missiles, which the Soviets had made the focal point of their strategic force structure at great expense. Not surprisingly, the Soviet delegation was unwilling to address the issue at Geneva. In addition, START became embroiled with Reagan's vision of the Strategic Defense Initiative and the Kremlin's hostility to "Star Wars." Unlike the INF, where Weinberger's recommended zero option became the basis for the treaty, there was no direct link between Weinberger's views on throw weight and the START treaty. Weinberger believed that no START agreement was better than a bad agreement so he was not dismayed when the two sides could not reach an agreement on SDI. When the administration of President George H. W. Bush signed the START I treaty in 1991, it limited warheads and launchers, thus only indirectly limiting throw weight.

Reagan's arms control record provided results very different from those predicted by most analysts during his first term. His eventual success in reducing nuclear weapons was due to the surprising way that he and his trusted advisers balanced principles and process. Reagan's dislike of nuclear weapons and his abhorrence of nuclear war offered an important long-term idealism to what would become a difficult and complex series of negotiations with the Soviet Union. Those members of the administration who were able to appreciate that paradox and work within it were ultimately more successful than those who could not. Weinberger fully understood his boss's duality, and it served him well in the INF negotiations. The secretary, however, underestimated Reagan's desire for better relations with

the Soviet Union and the increasing appeal of the reductions in strategic nuclear weapons on the president.

Throughout his first term, Weinberger offered the image of an unbending defender of the hard line, an uncompromising foe of compromise, promising that strategic arms reductions would come only after the United States was fully rearmed. The Pentagon chief also realized that arms talks were not just limited to esoteric negotiations among U.S. and Soviet experts. The battle for public opinion had to be won. Weinberger threw himself into the public fray, knowing full well that he was in an uphill fight, in which he would be a target of the administration's opponents.

History has not been kind to Weinberger. Given Shultz's increasingly favorable reputation, helped by his detailed and persuasive memoir, Weinberger has been cast as the villain in the nuclear arms reduction narrative. He is the naysayer, the obstructionist, the cheerleader for the military-industrial complex, and the big defense spender who feared that reducing nuclear weapons would lower the Pentagon's budget. This is an exaggeration and it's unfair to a secretary who saw himself as an advocate for his agency but did not rule out arms reductions. Weinberger was a product of the Cold War who had great difficulty believing that the Soviet Union wanted to end the nuclear arms race to concentrate on domestic reform. This was not a unique view at the time. It was held by most Republican conservatives and a number of Democrat neoconservatives. Weinberger was true to his beliefs, but he lacked the vision and flexibility that Reagan ultimately displayed.

Defense Acquisition Reform and Pentagon Reorganization

RONALD REAGAN'S AND CASPAR WEINBERGER'S basic ideas about government had been put into practice during their years together in California politics. Governor Reagan and his state financial director Weinberger preferred smaller government with fewer regulations since it ostensibly interfered less in Californians' social and economic lives. They maintained that large bureaucracies were inefficient and susceptible to waste, fraud, and mismanagement. Their philosophy was a direct descendant of the principles of Jeffersonian democracy: the government that governs the least governs the best. Such had been the mantra of conservative Republicans for generations, and it proved a powerful political tool. Reagan never lost an election campaigning on this message. But Reagan and Weinberger also believed that it was the duty of government to keep its citizens safe not just from liberal social engineering, red tape regulations, and high taxes, but also from foreign threats. Therein lay the dilemma: How to keep America secure from a resurgent and aggressive Soviet Union without spending tax money and growing government in order to provide an effective defense? It could not be done. During the presidential campaign of 1980 Reagan realized that his calls for increased defense spending always received a better response than his promises to reduce the deficit. Reagan decided he could have it both ways: a balanced budget and modernized conventional and strategic forces. Reagan charged Weinberger with increasing the Defense budget and placing into production new weapons based on improved technology, most of which had been developed during the Carter administration. The only stipulation of the

new president to his secretary of defense was that the military buildup be done efficiently with the elimination of waste and fraud.¹

Acquisition Reform

There was one segment of the Pentagon's operations that virtually everyone, from defense specialists to ordinary voters, agreed needed to be managed more efficiently: the acquisition of weapons and other systems, from their development to their production. Virtually every administration since Dwight D. Eisenhower studied the process, either in-house, through outside experts, or in cooperation with Congress. Since 1960 there had been six major studies on how to improve the acquisition process. While these studies defined the problem well and offered multiple, reasonable—and usually similar—recommendations to improve acquisition, most major weapon systems routinely took 10 to 15 years from conception to operation. Furthermore, the deployed weapons often proved less capable than originally touted and cost two or three times the initial price estimate. Acquisition proved a sinkhole for defense spending. Everyone realized this problem, but pressure from defense contractors and the military services, which needed the sophisticated weaponry, conspired to allow the acquisition process to grind along with large cost overruns and long delays. Members of Congress talked a good game about combating cost overruns and excesses, except when their constituents' jobs were threatened. If the DoD wanted to discontinue a weapon system produced either in whole or part in their district, no matter whether the legislator was a Republican or Democrat, pro- or anti-defense spending, he or she almost always argued that the weapon system was essential. Reform was fine, but not in their district. Defense contractors understood this tendency and made sure that the major parts of weapon systems were produced in as many congressional districts as possible. Furthermore, acquisition problems did not spring from a lack of communication with Congress. DoD civilians, industry representatives, and military officers testified in great detail before congressional committees on the acquisition process, but when legislators acted it was usually to micromanage individual weapon systems; rarely did they consider systemic improvements. As one critic quipped, it was like “chopping down trees with nary a pause to consider the forest.”²

Traditionally the deputy secretary assumed responsibility overseeing and implementing acquisition and budget process reforms. The Reagan-Weinberger

team at the Pentagon was no exception. In early March 1981 Weinberger charged Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci with establishing a steering group drawn from the OSD and representatives of all the military services to examine the DoD's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, which had been used by the Pentagon since its introduction by Secretary Robert McNamara for the fiscal year 1963 Defense budget. The Carlucci group also had responsibility for making recommendations to improve the acquisition process. Carlucci tapped Vincent Puritano, then his executive assistant but who later became the Pentagon's comptroller in February 1983, to spearhead both efforts. Carlucci told Puritano he was not interested in another study; he wanted options and recommendations that he could implement quickly. Carlucci first tasked the group with making the PPBS run more smoothly by streamlining what had become over the years a complicated process. The ultimate goal of the effort was to better match military strategy to the budget process and ultimately to the acquisition system.³

At the end of March 1981 the Puritano group made some unanimous recommendations on the PPBS and presented Carlucci and Weinberger with options to improve the budget process. Most importantly, the group recommended termination of the zero-based budgeting (ZBB) system, an innovation that Carter



Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Vincent Puritano, December 1983. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

had used as governor of Georgia and which he applied across the board to the U.S. government during his administration. ZBB required that yearly budget requests start from zero, thus forcing officials to defend anew longstanding programs each year. ZBB was supposed to fight the tendency to take last year's budget and programs and just add more money to it for the current year. This system did not work well for the Pentagon, especially in acquisition of weapons that extended over many years and even decades. The result was extra paperwork and no visible savings.⁴

Carlucci also asked the Puritano group to focus on the roles of the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs, and the military services in the budget planning process and its implementation. The Puritano group suggested two approaches. Under the first option the secretary could free up more of his time for long-term budget planning through management and organizational changes. This retained the centralized approach, originally implemented by McNamara and continued by Brown, whereby planning of the DoD budget centered on the secretary, deputy secretary, and their immediate staffs. The second option was decentralization of the process, which granted more responsibility to the service secretaries for their segments of the Defense Department budgets. The JCS and the under secretary of defense for policy would provide additional assistance to the secretary for strategic planning of objectives, priorities, and strategies. Weinberger accepted the decentralized option. He later explained, "I determined that the individual service secretaries should have greater authority for making recommendations ... for future budgets." Weinberger based his decision on his overall management philosophy, which he described as a "basic idea that is quite simple. It is that the people with responsibility for a particular activity should have the authority to participate in the budget process, as well as allocation of funds ... for which they were responsible." With increased policy support from the JCS and the under secretary for policy, Fred Iklé, Weinberger recalled that "my purpose was to ensure *centralized* control of policy formulation direction, but move toward more *decentralized execution* of policies."⁵

By placing the service secretaries, whose role had been diminished under the Carter administration, on a reinvigorated Defense Resources Board (see chapter 3) Weinberger increased their responsibilities. Weinberger also invited the service chiefs to participate, and they eventually took their place at the DRB table. Yet the decision was controversial, leading to criticism that the secretary was abrogating

his responsibilities and permitting services to carve up their respective allotments of the budget, roughly a third each, and do what they wished with the money. Weinberger railed at the sloppy journalism that he believed perpetuated these charges: “one of the myths to be repeated many times during my tenure.” But it was clear that the new status of the service secretaries and chiefs meant that they had more say in what their departments received from the budget pie. At least in the first two years of the administration, there was little friction among the services and other Defense agencies within Weinberger’s decentralized budget system because of the magnitude of the Reagan-Weinberger military buildup. There was money for all.⁶

At the same time that Carlucci asked Puritano’s steering group to examine the PPBS, he also enjoined it to look at the acquisition process and come up with an acquisition improvement program (AIP). Puritano assembled specialists from the OSD, the military services, and industry and divided them into five working groups to tackle specific issues: cost, acquisition time and schedules, support and planning, the effectiveness of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), and multiyear procurement. Again, Carlucci directed that “the Steering Group should not conduct or recommend a study of the acquisition process; it has been studied many times.” Rather, the Puritano group should review these studies to identify options for the AIP. Carlucci’s “priority objectives” were ambitious, even daunting:

Reduce costs by looking for substantial and real savings in the acquisition of major weapons systems; improve the acquisition process and make it more efficient and more effective; increase stability in our programs so that long-range Service program funding is more predictable; assure that the acquisition system decisions are closely coordinated and in consonance with PPBS decisions; require that appropriate long-range business strategies and planning tools are put into place to reduce unit costs; and increase the quality of military hardware and civilian services.⁷

This extensive review was to be completed within the month. To Puritano’s advantage, there was no shortage of experts on the acquisition process since the issue had been studied so thoroughly over the years. A similar abundance of expertise existed for recommended solutions from previous studies of the problem.⁸

Puritano submitted his recommendations to Carlucci at the end of March 1981. They comprised 31 actions or initiatives (a 32nd, “increasing competition” in contracts, was added in July 1981). They were simple statements of intent, such as methods for making “pre-planned product improvements,” and “ensuring program stability,” or the conscious decision to delay insertion of advanced technology until its feasibility was determined. One of the key initiatives was “multiyear procurement” where DoD requested Congress to appropriate funding for weapon systems for more than a single year, thus reducing per-unit production costs and improving quality. Other initiatives called for “realistic budgeting” by not purposely underestimating costs to fit the available money, by not ignoring program uncertainties, by better assessment of potential technological problems, and by not underestimating inflation rates. The DSARC group recommended administrative reform, such as overhauling the DSARC and integrating it more fully into the PPBS, delegating more responsibility and accountability to project managers, and simplifying administrative procedures.⁹

Weinberger and Carlucci unveiled the AIP at the end of April 1981. The press release noted that Carlucci was instructing DoD officials to make these initiatives reality. Carlucci stated: “The Secretary and I are determined to reduce substantially cost overruns, deploy adequate quantities of needed systems that are operationally effective and ready, and do this in the shortest time possible.” The deputy continued, “While DoD should be tough in contract negotiations as part of the buyer-seller relationship, this does not mean that the relationship between management and industry should necessarily be adversarial. Industry and government have a shared responsibility to assume a new spirit of cooperation.”¹⁰

The AIP was announced with high expectations, but it did not inaugurate an Age of Aquarius for acquisition. The Pentagon made a good faith effort, but acquisition problems had existed for decades and had proven remarkably resistant to reform. In late 1981 Carlucci reported to Ed Meese at the White House that the DoD had established the Council on Integrity and Management Improvement to sustain the acquisition reform initiatives. “In general,” Carlucci reported, “comments from industry and Congress have been favorable, with some healthy skepticism on our ultimate success.” The critics’ doubts proved well founded when deficit problems intervened. The Reagan administration realized that it was not going to keep its promise to balance the federal budget by 1985. Deficits were soaring. Real growth in defense spending, which had roared into double

digits in the first two years of the Reagan presidency, slowed after 1982. At first glance, this might have seemed an incentive for acquisition reform. Less money for systems would put a premium on economizing. Yet in the face of budget cuts, the decentralized system allowed the military services more latitude to stretch out existing weapon programs rather than prioritize and eliminate marginal ones. The result was that the services kept their cherished systems, but they were more expensive because the longer production schedule resulted in increased unit costs.¹¹

The Pentagon produced reports and articles that put the best light on the implementation of the Carlucci initiatives. In a summer 1982 issue of *Defense*, an in-house DoD publication, the deputy secretary wrote, "I am pleased to report significant progress toward our objective of improving the acquisition process." He noted that "major multi-year procurements are in place" and "selected programs have been restored to economic production rates." The DoD had begun making "the defense market place more attractive to industry" through more flexible payments and increased investments in manufacturing technology. For existing systems, Carlucci noted a new emphasis on "supportability and maintainability."¹²

Puritano added his own assessment: "To those who do not believe we can implement the 32 acquisition system decisions, I say simply: 'read the FY 83 Defense Budget.'" Puritano reported that program managers were now budgeting to the most likely cost and accounting for technological uncertainty. He cited a new emphasis on front-end funding for testing hardware. He noted 15 FY 1983 multiyear procurements that, while costing \$545.9 million, would save \$815.4 million over the next five years. By adding \$3.4 billion to 14 programs to raise more economical production rates, Puritano foresaw \$2.3 billion in savings over the next five years. Productivity investments in modernized tools, equipment, and facilities for 72 DoD in-house production operations were expected to produce \$588.3 million in savings over the next five years at additional cost of only \$121 million. The list of optimistic potential savings and improvements continued along these lines. Puritano stressed better use of manufacturing technology, more production surge capability, better program support funding for new systems, and a preplanned evolutionary approach to system development that accounted for future upgrades while proceeding with lower-risk alternatives for the short term.¹³

Puritano and Carlucci looked forward to a bright future for DoD acquisition, but they did not make it to that promised land. Both left the Pentagon for private industry in 1983 and 1984, respectively. With these two men gone, the steam hissed

out of the 32 initiatives by late 1984. In July and September 1986, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued two reports on the Pentagon's implementation of the Carlucci initiatives that looked back to the 1981 to mid-1985 period. The GAO gave the Pentagon mixed marks: "We found that although the initiatives have not fully achieved their intended results, there have been improvements in the acquisition process." The GAO concluded that only four of the initiatives had been fully implemented: reducing formal milestone program reviews requiring the secretary's decision, increasing monetary thresholds in DSARC review, expanding DSARC membership, and retaining the under secretary of defense for research and engineering as the secretary's principal adviser on defense acquisition. The GAO gave the Pentagon partial credit for seven initiatives: multiyear procurements; assuring appropriate contract types and the risks involved; decentralization of acquisition decision-making; statutory approval for funding flexibility to transfer or reprogram funds from procurement to research and development; linking acquisition with the PPBS; decreasing DSARC briefing and data requirements; and integrating acquisition decision-making with the budget process.¹⁴

Reasonable people could disagree on the success of the 32 initiatives. As the GAO noted in July 1986, their sample of 54 experienced program managers indicated that the 32 initiatives made little difference in the acquisition process. The managers just carried on with business as usual. The Pentagon looked forward to vast savings as long as Congress agreed to fund the initiatives they proposed, such as multiyear funding, front-end testing, and productivity improvements in DoD in-house production operations. But support for defense spending's growth on Capitol Hill diminished in 1983 and 1984. Congress was less sympathetic to appropriating up-front money for long-term improvements. In the Pentagon itself, the spotlight on better acquisition oversight dimmed. As of June 1984 the Pentagon did not provide status reports to Congress on acquisition reform goals.¹⁵

As the Reagan first term reached its conclusion, Congress and the media increasingly charged that the Pentagon was paying exorbitant prices for certain spare parts and defense contractors were involved in excessive, if not criminal, pricing of weapons and services. This criticism found its way into the October 1984 presidential debate. The president characterized Democratic candidate Walter F. Mondale's commitment to defense as "a record of weakness ... that is second to none." Mondale responded that his commitment was "to make certain that a dollar spent buys us a dollar's worth of defense.... A President must manage

that [DoD] budget ... you'll not do that unless you command that budget and make certain we get the strength we need. You pay \$500 for a \$5 hammer, you are not buying strength."¹⁶

Waste, Fraud, and Mismanagement

That the federal government, particularly the Pentagon, was rife with waste, fraud, and mismanagement was a universally held belief among Congress, the public, and even the president himself. To prove the point all one had to do was hold up a spare part for which the DoD had paid an excessive price, \$436 for a \$7 hammer (not quite as Mondale claimed), \$112 for a 4-cent diode, \$1,118 for a 17-cent plastic cap for stool legs. The drumbeat of unflattering media reports about the Pentagon overpaying for spare parts undermined the integrity of the entire acquisition process. The White House enjoined the DoD to root out this pernicious largesse and thus save millions of dollars. Of course, eliminating waste, fraud, and mismanagement was not that easy, especially for the Pentagon, which spent hundreds of billions on acquisition of systems, services, and spare parts with an internal auditing system that was stretched thin.¹⁷

One obvious bureaucratic solution was to create an official and give him a staff to oversee the Pentagon's efforts to detect waste, fraud, and mismanagement. Weinberger did this in April 1981, creating an assistant to the secretary of defense for review and oversight. The new assistant, Joseph H. Sherick, and his staff of six had the formidable task of developing policy, overseeing its progress, evaluating its effectiveness, and providing guidance to DoD components for criminal investigations. Sherick's staff also monitored responses to audits and kept the secretary aware of fraud, waste, and abuse in DoD operations. This turned out to be too much work for such a small unit; Sherick soon assumed more responsibility and a larger staff. In 1978 Congress had enacted a law requiring 12 federal departments, agencies, and administrations to create inspectors general. The DoD had successfully convinced Congress that with its existing audit and investigation functions such an officer was not appropriate or necessary. In September 1982 Congress insisted on creating a DoD inspector general and the president signed the legislation. Sherick assumed the new expanded post.

In September 1984 the DoD provided a status report on the work of Sherick and his staff of 1,000 criminal investigators, inspectors, and other specialists responsible for oversight of the 17,800 auditors, inspectors, and investigators

throughout the DoD. The Pentagon announced that during their first three years on the job (both with Sherick as special assistant and then as inspector general), the office ensured that audit recommendations were not ignored or merely given lip service. Their vigilance had resulted in 123,000 corrective actions from 41,000 DoD internal audits. Total savings were announced as \$2.8 billion. For the same period, Sherick's team followed up on 1,000 GAO audits resulting in 2,400 corrective actions and \$3.6 billion in savings. To combat criminal activity by unscrupulous contractors, the Pentagon created a white-collar crime unit and improved coordination with the Department of Justice through a joint DoD–Justice Department procurement fraud unit. From the beginning of 1982 to September 1984 Pentagon officials investigated 39,000 cases and referred 17,000 to prosecution or administrative action, while Justice obtained 1,300 convictions.¹⁸

A part of this campaign was the creation, in June 1981 under Sherick's direction, of a Defense fraud and inefficiency reporting hotline that promised to protect the caller's identity. Weinberger reported in November 1984 that the line had received 23,400 contacts, resulting in 7,635 inquiries, of which 6,491 were closed after investigation. But while the hotline and other efforts had some success, the

scandal over spare parts continued to roil the acquisition process.¹⁹

In July 1983 Weinberger had initiated a multipoint program for reform of spare parts procurement, including bonuses for employees who obtained costs savings and disciplinary action for those who allowed excessive costs. The program also created "competitive advocates" in the services to root out waste. It allowed for nonpayment of unjustified prices, the recovery of excessive costs and refunds for overcharges, suspension or barring of contractors who charged excessive prices, and



Joseph H. Sherick, the Department of Defense's first inspector general, May 1983. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

more audits and investigations for spare parts purchases. On paper, at least, the program seemed to attack the problem.²⁰

Sherick released an audit in June 1984 indicating that of 2,300 spare parts purchased at a cost of \$291 million, the Pentagon had paid too much for 36 percent of them and another 17 percent were potentially unreasonably overpriced. Deputy Secretary Taft noted that Sherick's audit took place before the implementation of Weinberger's June 1983 plan to reduce excessive costs for spare parts really got going. But the audit still called for a response; Sherick announced that the Pentagon would order relevant spare items for all the services and units jointly and in larger lots to keep the price down. The DoD would require prices competitive with those paid by a contractor's best customers.²¹

There was a disconnection between the spare parts scandal and the larger question of waste, fraud, and mismanagement. The public knew that a \$7 hammer should not cost \$436, so they often assumed incorrectly that DoD was being gouged in a similar fashion for the spare parts of major weapon systems. While there were, of course, cost overruns for these parts, they were not of the same magnitude as the \$436 hammer. Another disconnect was that efforts to recover monies resulting from fraud were not strictly economical. Out of an FY 1983 acquisition budget of \$170 billion, the Pentagon and Department of Justice recovered \$14.8 million in penalties, restitutions, and recoveries. While \$14.8 million is not spare change, it represented less than .001 percent of the total FY 1983 procurements and its total return did not cover the salaries of those at Defense and Justice whose job it was to recover the money. Nonetheless, the DoD-Justice campaign was not a question of economics, but rather of deterrence, ethics, and symbolism.²²

Although the efforts of the DoD and Sherick were impressive, they did little to combat the perception that the Pentagon was still wasting taxpayer money. Evidence of the public skepticism emerged in a joint *Business Week*/Harris Poll in March 1985 that asked whether Weinberger was doing a good job combating wasteful defense spending. The results were not what the secretary would have hoped for: 56 percent responded that he was doing a fair to poor job, 40 percent rated him good, while only 4 percent gave him excellent marks.²³

The Grace Commission

Reagan and the conservative wing of the Republican Party always maintained

that if the federal government could be run as a business, the problems of waste, fraud, and mismanagement would be greatly reduced. During its first term the administration introduced a series of government-wide initiatives to this effect. The most notable was the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control. Known as the Grace Commission (it was headed by J. Peter Grace, chairman of W. R. Grace and Company, a chemical and materials producer), the commission focused on the Department of Defense as the largest spender of nondiscretionary federal tax money. By the end of 1982 the commission had completed draft reports that contained 150 recommendations on how the Pentagon could save money through changes in operations, personnel policies, and acquisition procedures. The commission estimated \$22 billion in savings for FY 1983 and \$77 billion in three years if its advice was implemented. The secretary and his OSD staff reviewed the Grace Commission draft reports. Weinberger told NSC adviser Clark that they agreed with two-thirds of the recommendations for the DoD but considered that the other third would have a negative effect on the president and his defense program. Weinberger also informed Clark that the DoD had already implemented 36 of the commission's recommendations, especially in acquisition. The secretary considered the Grace Commission estimates of savings to be "problematic" and "arbitrary," since such results were almost always theoretical and did not pan out in the real world. Furthermore, many of the savings depended on congressional action. More importantly, some recommendations would come at the expense of warfighting capabilities. For example, the commission's advice to eliminate the distinction between pre-positioned equipment and war reserves would seriously degrade the weapons and equipment that U.S. troops would take into combat. Pre-positioned equipment was designed to be used immediately in combat upon arrival of troops from the United States. It had to be in working order and ready to go. Another recommendation, reduction of inventories, worked well for business but would also adversely affect combat readiness. Troops could not wait for shipments to fill out their combat inventory in a conflict. Weinberger warned Clark that political minefields lurked in the Grace reports. The potential bombshells were the repeal of the 1931 Davis-Bacon Act that required paying workers prevailing local wages for public works projects (such as military construction); repeal of the 1965 McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act extending the same prevailing pay rights to service contractors; elimination of preference for small businesses; elimination of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) staff;



President Reagan thanking the Grace Commission chairman, J. Peter Grace (left of president) after receiving the group's final report, October 28, 1984. *Reagan Library*

and reduction of EEO and affirmative action requirements for procurement. As Weinberger told Clark, “These proposals would stir vociferous reactions among labor unions, small businesses and minorities.” Weinberger suggested that the Grace Commission’s recommendations to scale back military retirement benefits “would surely be opposed by millions of retired service personnel” and “could lead to a breaking of faith” with active-duty service members. The commission’s recommendations to fully tax military compensation, increase the length of oversea tours, close commissaries (PXs), and reduce reenlistment bonuses would harm recruitment into the All-Volunteer Force.²⁴

By the beginning of 1984 the Grace Commission had almost completed its work and had combined its findings with a staggering 374 recommendations for the Pentagon. The Office of Management and Budget also did an analysis of the recommendations, which generally agreed with the DoD’s. The OMB suggested that 37 of the commission’s DoD recommendations should be addressed and if implemented would save \$17 billion over five years. The OMB agreed that certain recommendations were legislatively unfeasible, specifically military base closings, shutting down commissaries, repeal of the Davis-Bacon and Service Contract Acts, and revision of the Small Business Act. The administration moved slowly

on the commission's advice. At the beginning of 1984 the Grace Commission reports were still being reviewed at the White House.²⁵

In September 1984 the president told farmers in Norway, Iowa, that a team was still studying the commission's 2,478 government-wide recommendations: "Now, we don't know how many of these we will find practical to—some will take legislation." The president continued, "We've already implemented 17 percent of them that we could do administratively." Like most such private-sector studies, the Grace Commission's impact faded as the Reagan administration moved into a second term. Within six months it would be eclipsed by yet another such exercise. In the face of vociferous congressional and public criticism of Pentagon spending during the first half of 1985, Reagan appointed in June the blue-ribbon Packard Commission, which took up the mantle of making the Pentagon work more efficiently. Many of the Grace Commission's criticisms of and recommendations for the DoD's acquisition process were reprised.²⁶

Organizational Changes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Weinberger was not an advocate of organizational and bureaucratic change. Nevertheless, when he first came to the Pentagon, he made two organizational changes that were in keeping with his philosophy of not expanding the bureaucracy. First, he downgraded the assistant secretary of defense for program analysis and evaluation to a director. Second, the assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) became a deputy under secretary of defense. These actions allowed Weinberger to create a new position, the assistant secretary for international security policy, and raise the director for legislative affairs to assistant secretary for legislative affairs. These changes did not require congressional authorization since the number of Pentagon executive positions remained the same. Weinberger maintained that these changes reflected the administration's new priorities, and this was partly true. The demotion of the assistant secretary for PA&E was a rejection of the centralized philosophy for acquisition and budget policy. The former head of PA&E under the previous administration, Russell Murray, had been the scourge of the military services, heaping scorn on many of their budget requests for new weapon systems. While Secretary Harold Brown did not always accept Murray's recommendations, which were couched in well-written if sometimes sarcastic memoranda, he did use Murray and his office as a filter through which the services had to pass.

Murray helped maintain Brown's central control of the budget and acquisition processes. Weinberger had no need of such a gatekeeper given his commitment to the military buildup and his revitalization of the role of service secretaries in budget planning and implementation. The logic behind upgrading the person in charge of legislative affairs was simple. If you wanted Congress to finance the military buildup, this new priority was enhanced by raising the profile of the person in the Pentagon responsible for relations with Congress.²⁷

Weinberger's creation of an assistant secretary of defense for international security policy had the effect of halving the responsibilities of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. This new position was a pragmatic one. The new assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, Richard Perle, was a protégé of Senator Scoop Jackson and an outspoken opponent of SALT II. He was an expert on, albeit an opponent of, strategic arms reductions. Weinberger gave Perle responsibility for NATO and arms reduction negotiations. Weinberger recalled that deciding Perle's responsibilities was "the closest call," but he justified the decision on the grounds that strategic arms control "loomed so largely in NATO at the time." Such a justification was only partly true. Weinberger needed Perle to cement support from Jackson and, especially after Jackson died in September 1983, other Senate hawks to ensure that strategic arms reductions did not precede and therefore impair the OSD's plans for strategic weapons modernization as part of its overall military buildup. Fortunately for Perle, Richard Armitage, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, was a team player. With crises or wars in Middle East, Libya, Afghanistan, the Caribbean, and Central America, Armitage found himself and his office with plenty to do. Friends from their days as congressional staffers, Perle and Armitage had very different styles, but both later recalled that they worked well together as each tended to his own bailiwick.²⁸

In May 1981 Weinberger decided that the Pentagon needed more assistant secretaries. He proposed to House Speaker Tip O'Neill restoration of the number of assistant secretaries (ASDs) to 12 from the 1978 downsized number of 7. In politic language to the Democratic House Speaker, Weinberger stated, "The eliminations were part of an effort to reduce the size of Departmental headquarters organizations and the number of executive positions in the Department of Defense; and it coincided with what at the time was a de-emphasis on military programs by the incumbent Administration." That was then, but times had

changed, Weinberger wrote, “Since 1978, dramatic changes in the world situation and the recognition of potential disparities in world military balances have placed new and urgent demands upon the Department of Defense.” Weinberger needed new “top-level managerial resources” and more flexibility. He asked for two ASDs for OSD and one for each of the military services. O’Neill and Congress cast a wary eye on this request, especially the military service ASDs, as evidence of the OSD headquarters expansion. It was not until September 24, 1983, that Congress authorized some of the new positions. The legislators did not give Weinberger exactly what he asked for. The legislation provided four—rather than five—new ASDs and none could serve as ASD for the military services. Congress instead insisted on establishing an assistant secretary for reserve affairs, which the OSD had opposed, and reestablishing an assistant secretary responsible for command, control, communications, and intelligence. Weinberger had transferred this latter function to a deputy under secretary. Congress left Weinberger with two new ASD portfolios to fill. He chose to create one for research and technology and one for or development and support. Both reflected the new emphasis on an improved acquisition process.²⁹

At the same time they expanded the number of ASDs, Congress created a new position and office in the Pentagon in an effort to improve the acquisition process. Senator David H. Pryor (D-AR) and 17 of his fellow senators introduced in early 1983 a bill to create in the Pentagon a separate director and Office of Operational Test and Evaluation. The bill proposed to change the current system in which the military services performed tests and evaluation of the systems being developed under their control. A director of operational test and evaluation, reporting to the under secretary of defense for research and engineering (R&E), would oversee the services’ tests and evaluations. Pryor and his fellow senators believed an independent office in the DoD to test and evaluate would be a better way to combat cost overruns and prevent deployment of weapons without adequate testing. Having the services doing the testing themselves struck legislators on Capitol Hill as a conflict of interest since the services were testing and evaluating weapons they wanted to deploy. Not surprisingly, Under Secretary of Defense (R&E) Richard D. DeLauer argued that his office was doing a satisfactory job, but he was willing to make improvements within the existing system. Weinberger backed him up; the position was not needed. Congress disregarded their recommendation and passed the legislation, which the president signed as part of the FY 1984 National

Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 98-94) in September 1983. In November 1983, the DoD created the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. The director was to be the principal staff assistant and adviser to the secretary on testing and evaluation, ensuring the effectiveness and suitability of U.S. weapon systems and equipment. Indicative of Weinberger and DeLauer's opposition, the position remained vacant until April 1985. Critics claimed DeLauer and Weinberger intentionally failed to find a suitable candidate to thwart Congress's intent. When pressed by Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) to find a candidate, Weinberger reportedly responded: "I can't find anyone who is willing to take the job. You are asking me to find someone who will wear a black hat and bring mostly bad news to the table. No one wants to do that."³⁰

Reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The role of the post-World War II Joint Chiefs of Staff as military advisers to the secretary of defense and the president had been under critical scrutiny virtually since the organization was created in 1947. Members of Congress, defense specialists at Washington think tanks, and even a JCS chairman suggested that the JCS had somehow failed to perform its advisory role. Critics claimed, somewhat unfairly, that the chiefs had accepted too supinely the strategy of fighting a limited war in Vietnam, thus leading to U.S. failure and withdrawal. Post-Vietnam operations did not do much to allay these concerns. The seat-of-the-pants 1975 *Mayaguez* rescue of sailors held by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was a success, but one that came with unacceptable casualties. The Iran hostage rescue operation of 1980 was a total failure. During Brown's tenure at the Pentagon, he commissioned a study of the policymaking process that criticized the JCS and recommended changes that foreshadowed reforms that would be mandated by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. The impression held by many critics over the years was that the Joint Chiefs did not adequately stress "jointness"—that the individual members of the JCS were more concerned with making sure their services got the lion's share of any military action rather than with operating jointly. Furthermore, the chairman's role seemed to be little more than spokesman for an organization of virtually autonomous members beholden to their services. Finally, critics claimed the JCS advice to the secretary of defense and the president was essentially the least common denominator—watered down to the point where all the chiefs could agree.³¹



Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones, May 1, 1982. *OSD Records*


A turning point in the debate occurred in early February 1982 when Weinberger and Chairman of the JCS General David Jones testified in closed session before the House Armed Services Committee. Without forewarning the secretary, Jones used this opportunity to air his doubts about the effectiveness of the JCS. He told the committee that DoD organization structure, while improving, was in need of reform. Jones specifically cited the JCS as the major problem, noting that it suffered from its tradition of only proffering unanimous advice, that any of the chiefs could veto all or any sections of JCS papers, that chiefs were loath

to recommend more resources to another service, and that working for the Joint Staff was not a plum assignment that could attract the best personnel. Jones proposed reforms that had been advocated for years: strengthening the role of the chairman; limiting debates in the Joint Staff based on service rivalries; having the Joint Staff provide recommendations to the JCS rather than the members of individual service staffs; giving more authority to unified field commanders; and providing more rewards for those who served on the Joint Staff. In February 1982 Jones went public with his criticism in an article in an obscure business publication, and the article was reprinted in March in the *Armed Forces Journal International* under the title, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change."³²

Jones had crossed the Rubicon. He had not endeared himself to Weinberger, who was opposed to drastic reform of the JCS. As the secretary reported to the president in late February, "There is little new in the proposal [Jones's], it is receiving emphasis at a much higher level than before. Past blue ribbon panels have made similar recommendations, and while most agree that change is overdue, it has been slow in coming." In late July 1982 the secretary again reiterated

to Reagan his evolutionary approach to JCS reform. Weinberger suggested that since 1981 the Pentagon had already made considerable efforts to strengthen the JCS by placing unified commanders (along with the service chiefs) on the Defense Resources Board. Weinberger outlined his intention to use the JCS chairman as link between himself and the unified commanders, to upgrade the Joint Staff with better training, incentives, and rewards, and to assure the chiefs that he and the president did not require unanimous advice. As for other more drastic proposals, such as stipulating that command or military advice to the president would be exercised through the chairman and not the corporate body of the JCS, Weinberger told Reagan these would require legislative action.³³

In mid-1982 the composition of the JCS changed. Jones retired as chairman and was replaced by Army General John Vessey Jr., while Admiral James D. Watkins succeeded Admiral Thomas B. Hayward as chief of naval operations. Weinberger suggested to the president that “this new JCS” present recommendations for JCS reorganization by October 1982. The deadline slipped a month, but in November Vessey sent Weinberger unanimous JCS recommendations for a better working relationship with the secretary of defense. The chiefs recommended that Weinberger “look to the JCS, supported by the Joint Staff, as the principal providers of military analyses and plans”; realign the JCS “to equip to act as your advisers on major decisions on strategy, policy and force requirements”; and “assure open channels of military advice and decentralized execution of policy by the JCS and the commanders of the Unified and specific commands.” Little new legislation was required, according to Vessey’s summary. Nor was it necessary to specify the chairman as the



Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey Jr., July 23, 1984. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

secretary's principal military adviser, appoint a vice chairman, subordinate the Joint Staff to the chairman, or create a second "Council of Advisers composed of senior officers other than Chiefs of Service." The only two legislative changes the JCS recommended were increasing the limit on the size of the Joint Staff and the tenure of its officers and inserting the chairman in the chain of command between the secretary and the unified and specified commanders. Vessey considered that the real secret to success of a JCS chairman was his relationship with the secretary of defense and president. Weinberger summarized these JCS recommendations for the president, noting, "this is a serious proposal and should, and will be, carefully considered."³⁴

Weinberger's approach was minimalist, hardly the sweeping reform that Jones, congressional critics, or defense analysts had recommended. Weinberger and the Pentagon opposed anything but the most gradual reform of the JCS. In August 1982 proponents in the House of Representatives had managed to pass, over opposition from the Navy, a bill that authorized limited JCS reorganization. Weinberger assured the president that this "watered down version" was a "courtesy to out-going Subcommittee Chairman Dick White of Texas." It allowed dissenting JCS views to be forwarded to the secretary and president, created a vice-chairman, limited the Joint Staff to 400 personnel, and established a 10-member Senior Strategy Board of retired chiefs and unified and specified commanders. Weinberger considered the latter recommendation "unnecessary and potentially difficult." To the secretary, personal relationships were the key to better military advice, not organizational changes. Still, the secretary was not unduly alarmed about this House bill because he knew that the Senate was unlikely to pass it. Senator John Tower (D-TX), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a staunch supporter of the Navy, opposed it. For the time being the bill was going nowhere.³⁵

In late 1983 the campaign to reform the JCS gained momentum. A series of events coalesced. The October 1983 Grenada invasion seemed to bear out the charge that the Joint Chiefs had not overcome their interservice rivalries and that the chain of command was confused (see chapter 14). The almost simultaneous bombing of the barracks at the Beirut airport that killed 241 U.S. military peacekeepers—almost all marines—also called into question the complexity of the chain of authority and soundness of the JCS's military advice (see chapter 9). It did not matter that the bombing was a terrorist action and that Weinberger

and the JCS had opposed the peacekeeping mission; its failure gave the whole Pentagon system a black eye and tilted the balance towards reform. Senator Tower, who had been a bulwark against the reform campaign, announced his intention to retire in 1984 (he wanted to earn money in the private sector in anticipation of being named secretary of defense in the next Republican administration). Tower agreed that the Senate Armed Services Committee should hold hearings on JCS reorganization, but the extended hearings did not result in any legislation. The committee staff continued to study the issue. Proponents of reform suspected Tower of drawing out the hearings to delay legislative action while still giving the impression that he was not opposed to reform. When Senator Goldwater became chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 1985 things changed drastically. Goldwater was a proponent of JCS reform and his support eventually resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.³⁶

Proponents of JCS reform won a small victory when they attached to the \$219 billion FY 1985 defense authorization bill in September 1984 provisions for very modest reform of the JCS. The House version of the bill, championed by Representative William F. “Bill” Nichols (D-AL), the new chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, contained multiple provisions meant to increase the authority of the JCS chairman, but



The Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1, 1983. From left to right: General John A. Wickham, USA; General Charles A. Gabriel, USAF; General John W. Vessey, USA; Admiral James D. Watkins, USN; General Paul X. Kelley, USMC. *OSD Records*

Tower whittled them down during the final hours of the bill's conference session to two innocuous changes. The authorization bill, which the president signed, allowed the chairman to select officers to serve on the Joint Staff and gave him the authority to decide when the chiefs would decide issues. While this was the first JCS reform passed by Congress since 1958, it was small potatoes. The only bright spot for JCS reformers was the statement in the bill, insisted upon by Senator Nunn, that the armed services committees of the 1985 session of Congress would make JCS reform a high priority.³⁷

In an effort to head off JCS reform dictated by Congress, in June 1984 Weinberger instructed his new deputy secretary, William Taft, to create an OSD committee, the Ad Hoc Task Group on Defense Organization. Taft, like his mentor Weinberger, thought reform of the Joint Chiefs was unnecessary. The ad hoc group, known as the Cox Committee after its chairman, Chapman B. Cox, DoD general counsel, was composed of two assistant secretaries, Armitage and Russell A. Rourke, assistant secretary for legislative affairs; three senior officials from the services (two deputy under secretaries and an assistant secretary); and Vessey's special assistant representing the JCS. This was not a committee committed to reorganization of the JCS. Rather, they saw their job as protecting the status quo, in keeping with Weinberger's and Vessey's own views.³⁸

Weinberger and the OSD continued to seek to limit JCS reform. The secretary had assured the president that the JCS would come up with proposals, but the proposals they presented in November 1982 represented only minor changes. In 1983–1984 there was substantial bipartisan support in Congress for JCS reform, almost unanimous belief among defense intellectuals in think tanks that it was needed, and support for it from two former JCS members, General Jones and Army Chief of Staff General Shy Meyer. Admittedly Jones and Meyer were Carter appointees, but Meyer was no Carter loyalist; while testifying before Congress, he had stuck a dagger in the 1980 reelection campaign by describing the Army as "hollow." Weinberger's idea of reform was minimal and on the Pentagon's terms. He, and the Pentagon for that matter, were traditional and conservative. If change was needed it should be evolutionary and self-initiated. Furthermore, reform of the JCS implied criticism of Weinberger's tenure as secretary. The secretary's instincts were to not bend to critics, but to fight them with all his resources. Although he would not acknowledge it publicly or in private, Weinberger was no doubt concerned that strengthening the JCS chairman as the principal military

adviser with a direct line to the president would diminish the influence of the secretary of defense and could undermine the time-honored tradition of civilian control of the military.³⁹

Creation of Central Command and Approval for Space Command

One uncontroversial organizational change during Weinberger's first four years at the Pentagon was the elevation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) to Central Command (CENTCOM), one of six unified combatant commands. This change had the full support of Congress, the civilian Pentagon leadership, and the president. The Carter administration had created the RDJTF in March 1980 with the encouragement of the national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Commanded by Marine Maj. Gen. Paul X. Kelley, the RDJTF was subordinate to the United States Readiness Command. It was originally conceived as a strike force able to go anywhere on short notice. With the emergence of a militant and revolutionary Islamic government in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the RDJTF changed its orientation towards the Middle East and Southwest Asia. In response to these new threats in the region, the Carter administration began to build a framework for security in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean littoral of East Africa, comprised of access agreements for the dispatch of U.S. forces in an emergency, the pre-positioning of military supplies, and increased naval presence. The RDJTF had the responsibility for maintaining and expanding this framework.⁴⁰

In April 1981 Weinberger alerted the president to the DoD's intention to gradually transform the RDJTF into a separate unified command. One of the weaknesses of the RDJTF was that in the event of military deployments in its area of responsibility it would have to rely on units from the European or Pacific commands. Weinberger assigned the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps (including the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions) to the RDJTF in the event of an emergency deployment and promised assignment of additional forces in the near future. As he told the president, "The Command would have its own geographic responsibilities, Service components, forces and necessary support elements." Weinberger anticipated the establishment of Central Command within a few years, but for the time being the RDJTF would remain under Readiness Command.⁴¹

The president was unwilling to wait that long. The JCS prepared an accelerated schedule for transforming the RDJTF into CENTCOM. Until October



Central Command's area of responsibility, 1983. Bahrain, just west of Qatar, not shown. OSD/HO.

1981 the RDJTF would remain under the Readiness Command, but with Army, Navy, and Air Force component headquarters under operational control of the commander of the RDJTF. After October 1981 the RDJTF became a separate task force reporting through the Joint Chiefs directly to Weinberger and the president. During a third stage, from October 1981 to December 31, 1982, the JCS and Weinberger worked out command arrangements with the other unified commanders and assigned forces to the RDJTF. On New Year's Day 1983, the RDJTF became CENTCOM, a new unified command.⁴²

The birth was not without its trauma. One of the issues to be decided was what geographic areas would fall under CENTCOM's responsibility. The proposed countries included in the commander of CENTCOM's responsibilities—planning, joint training, joint exercises, and if necessary deployment of forces—included those in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia,

Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and ultimately Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan, plus the waters of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Reagan and the White House favored including all countries of the Middle East, which would place the so-called confrontational states of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, which were essentially in a war over the fate of the Palestinians, within CENTCOM's responsibility. Weinberger tried to convince the JCS to agree to the president's suggestion, but the chiefs held firm. Weinberger then persuaded the White House to accept that responsibility for Israel, Lebanon, and Syria should remain with U.S. European Command on the grounds that these states were most easily accessed by the Mediterranean and responsibility for Israel was not a good fit in a command so focused on Muslim-majority countries. Furthermore, ongoing low-level warfare among the confrontational states would dominate CENTCOM to the detriment of its other responsibilities.⁴³

When the president officially approved the creation of CENTCOM in December 1982, he asked for a report on the possibilities of establishing a headquarters in the region, like the other unified commands. CENTCOM under its first commander, Lt. Gen. Robert C. Kingston, USA, remained at the RDJTF's old headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. As Weinberger and Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam informed Reagan, the best place for a headquarters would be on the Arabian peninsula, either Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or Oman. Unfortunately none of these countries were prepared to accept the stationing of 850 personnel of CENTCOM on their soil, but the president instructed the DoD to assess the possibility of establishing a forward base with a smaller staff. Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain again turned down a proposal for a forward base headquarters of approximately 75 personnel. NSC adviser Clark still held out hope for a forward headquarters element afloat in Bahrain's waters (between Qatar and Saudi Arabia), where the Navy's Middle East Force of five ships had a naval support facility. The headquarters afloat arrangement never materialized. During the 1990–1991 Gulf War, CENTCOM established a forward headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The forward headquarters then moved to Qatar in 2002. After the defeat of Saddam Hussein CENTCOM deployed to its forward headquarters in Qatar only periodically for training purposes.⁴⁴

The creation of a second new unified command, U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), on September 23, 1985, was the next of the Reagan-Weinberger organizational changes in the Unified Command Plan, which assigned area

responsibilities to the individual unified commands. While SPACECOM was not established until the president's second term, the planning and Reagan's approval occurred in 1983–1984. Much like CENTCOM, Space Command was a noncontroversial decision within the Pentagon. What, of course, drove its establishment was the president's Strategic Defense Initiative, which sought to create a space-based defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles (see chapter 13).⁴⁵

The Air Force, which already had its own Aerospace Command, proposed to the JCS in April 1983 the creation of a unified command for space. Officials from the Joint Staff and services formed a group to study the issue. On October 4, 1983, NSC adviser Clark asked the Joint Chiefs how to best plan and exercise operational control of space systems to support U.S. national objectives and for their recommendations on a unified space command. The chiefs recommended establishing one in October 1985. In the meantime they would review existing systems, command and control elements, and emerging technology related to a possible unified command. The space commands of the Air Force and Navy could provide the initial structure. JCS created a joint planning staff to develop a transition plan. They asked Weinberger to send their recommendation to the president.⁴⁶

When recommending the idea to the president, Weinberger stressed that the command was in support of SDI: "This organization would serve to develop and coordinate military arrangements in support of the President's initiative." On November 20, 1984, Reagan approved the establishment of a Unified Space Command and instructed the JCS to move forward on planning for it. SPACECOM would be responsible for space systems that provided communications, weather forecasting, navigation aids, and warning systems. It would work parallel to the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), established earlier in 1984 under the supervision of Weinberger. Space Command would have responsibility for operational control of military space systems but would not direct or manage SDIO.⁴⁷

The principal organizational issue faced with the creation of space command was whether the commander of the U.S.-Canadian North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) should also be in SPACECOM. The Air Force and Army chiefs of staff as well as Chairman Vessey agreed that at least for the first year that should be the plan. The chief of naval operations and commandant of the Marine Corps recommended separating the two positions as the duties of the

commanders were different and would continue to diverge. They argued that SPACECOM alone would be more focused and supportive of SDI in the public mind. Nevertheless, the president approved a single commander responsible for both SPACECOM and NORAD.⁴⁸

The Pentagon's limited success in enacting acquisition and budget process reform during 1981–1984 followed a well-worn trajectory. It started with initial enthusiasm with the Carlucci initiatives and recommendations, then a slow slide as the systemic problems that these reforms were supposed to rectify continued to plague both processes. It did not help that Weinberger and his OSD staff were quick to claim success and exaggerated savings that could only happen if Congress acted and everything worked as anticipated. For example, Congress was usually unwilling to fund multiyear procurements for fear of losing control of Pentagon acquisition funding. Despite the Pentagon's efforts, weapon systems still cost too much. With the Defense budget increasing rapidly, the DoD didn't have to make hard choices about weapons. As for the campaign against waste, fraud, and mismanagement, Weinberger's instincts were good, but the problem was too vast. The successes touted by the secretary to the president, Congress, and the public paled into insignificance when compared with the overall Pentagon acquisition price tag. Waste, fraud, and mismanagement, the three ravaging horsemen of vast bureaucratic government institutions, continued their ride virtually undeterred. As for Pentagon reorganization, Weinberger made only minor adjustments in his OSD staff and succeeded in obtaining approval from Congress for most of what he wanted. Congress did insist on two changes over the objections of the DoD: the inspector general and the director of operational testing and evaluation, both designed in legislators' minds to make the Pentagon more efficient. The secretary was not a supporter of efforts to reorganize the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He thought the system worked well and any changes should be minor and evolutionary. With the creation of CENTCOM and SPACECOM, The OSD and JCS created two new unified commands without much controversy because of the general recognition that their time had arrived.

Weinberger remained true to his belief that the solutions to the problems of government were not radical reorganizations, but incremental and evolutionary changes. With the exception of his highly publicized campaign against waste, fraud, and mismanagement, Weinberger realized that these three usual suspects

of bad government comprised a potential political hot rail, not just with Congress and the public, but with Reagan himself. Asking for a major military buildup required evidence that the money appropriated for it was not being wasted. Unfortunately, acquisition delay and waste had defied solutions for decades. Weinberger's approach and efforts were not without some success, but systemic problems remained. Weinberger was definitely cool to reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Recommendations to improve their military advice to the secretary and the president, as well as their Joint Staff, found no traction with the secretary or in the Pentagon.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY WEINBERGER inherited from the Carter administration multiple problems and challenges in relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization members. During the Carter years NATO members struggled to meet their 1977 pledge to increase defense spending by 3 percent real growth each year. Carter's plans to revive NATO conventional forces through a long-term defense plan lost momentum by the end of his term. The U.S. offset strategy, based on the idea that advanced technological weapon systems could offset Soviet numerical advantages in conventional weapons and troop numbers, had to be implemented in concert with NATO allies, who faced challenges maintaining domestic political support for alliance objectives. Burden-sharing initiatives languished while Congress demanded that NATO allies assume more responsibility for alliance defense. NATO's short-range and tactical nuclear weapons were no longer superior to those of the Warsaw Pact and required an upgrade. The balance of intermediate nuclear forces was also out of kilter. West Germany, Italy, and Great Britain had agreed to accept U.S. Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles to offset the Soviet's mobile SS-20 missile. In Western Europe domestic antinuclear sentiment opposed such deployment. The Reagan administration had to ensure that Rome, London, and Bonn would overcome antinuclear opposition and allow the missiles on their soil. Finally, on NATO's flanks, Spain and Portugal were undergoing transitions to democracy and reassessing their relationships to NATO, while animosity between Greece and Turkey further complicated the alliance.¹

Enhanced Radiation Warheads and Short-Range Nuclear Systems

The first NATO decision Reagan and Weinberger encountered concerned deployment of enhanced radiation/reduced blast warheads—so-called neutron bombs—for artillery and short-range missiles. This had been proposed as a way to modernize the alliance's nuclear tactical forces. Carter had tied his advisers into knots over this controversial weapon, which was universally denounced by the peace movement as immoral and a blatant escalation of the nuclear arms race. From a military point of view, enhanced radiation warheads (ERWs) offered clear advantages over older nuclear artillery shells or warheads on short-range missiles: with their reduced blast zone and higher radiation output, they could kill people while minimizing damage to infrastructure. Secretary Harold Brown and his Pentagon experts saw ERWs as the perfect weapon to stop Warsaw Pact armor in Central Europe or hit enemy rear-echelon combat support units. But the neutron bomb, demonized by antinuclear advocates, was a public relations disaster. Neutron bombs killed people but saved buildings—some felt they were evidence that leaders were more concerned with property than human lives. After allowing his secretaries of state and defense to prepare the groundwork with the NATO allies for deployment of ERWs, Carter ultimately refused to produce them on moral grounds. Carter did, however, allow construction of warheads that could easily be converted to enhanced radiation weapons if such a change was deemed necessary.²

On January 24, 1981, Weinberger and General Bernard W. Rogers, commander of the European Command, met with Reagan. After the session, Weinberger asked Rogers to provide “further thoughts” on the timing for deployment of ERWs to Europe. Rogers wanted ERWs to be produced, but because of “political sensitivities related to this matter among West European Allies as a result of the previous administration's handling of it,” he believed the timing was wrong. Deployment of ERWs to Europe could “unravel” the Western European NATO members' shaky commitment to accepting Pershing IIs and GLCMs. Rogers recommended producing Lance missiles and eight-inch artillery warheads compatible with enhanced radiation (ER) components, manufacturing the ER components, and then storing them in the United States. Rogers advised consulting with the European allies about deploying ERWs only after they seemed firm on deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs.³

Weinberger muddied the waters in early February 1981 when he responded to


a reporter's question by implying that the administration was prepared to deploy the warheads: "So I think the opportunity that this weapon gives to strengthening theater nuclear forces is one that we very probably would want to make use of." The secretary admitted that additional consultations with the European NATO members would be needed, but stated, "We will try to persuade them." Secretary of State Alexander Haig was livid. Weinberger's statement would alarm the NATO allies already nervous about the administration's nuclear policy and the INF deployment, Haig recalled, and he characterized Weinberger's remarks as "foolish." Haig later lamented, "It is not easy to convince other governments or the public that the minister of defense of a superpower is talking off the top of his head on issues of war and peace.... His [Weinberger's] tendency to blurt out locker-room opinions in the guise of policy was one that I prayed he might overcome." Haig then noted that his prayers went unanswered.⁴

The tension between Haig and Weinberger over this issue resurfaced in May 1981. Weinberger believed Haig had agreed to recommend to Reagan that the United States begin production of warheads with ER components but restrict deployment to U.S. territory. Haig wasn't ready to make this suggestion; he supported eventual ERW deployment but opposed production and deployment, even in the United States, so early in the administration. He argued that Europeans would assume (rightly) that they were also scheduled for ERW deployment. Production and U.S. deployment would also arouse their domestic antinuclear opponents and provide grist for Soviet propaganda. Weinberger's advisers were not pleased with Haig's arguments. Frank Carlucci called Haig's position "outrageous," adding, "The decision was made!" Special Assistant Jay Rixse commented, "We are being held up by the 'European lobby' at State again." Haig and Weinberger discussed their differences at two breakfast meetings in late July and early August but could not agree on joint recommendation. At an NSC meeting in early August 1981, Reagan approved the option of producing ERWs and stockpiling them in the United States. Haig had lost the battle, but the ERWs were never deployed to Europe.⁵

ERWs were only one potential addition to a number of short-range tactical nuclear weapons already in the NATO arsenal. These tactical delivery systems included atomic artillery shells on shorter-range 155mm and 203mm howitzers, short-range (100 km) missiles such as the Lance and the Honest John, the intermediate-range (750 km) nuclear Pershing I missile, and dual-capable aircraft.

Virtually all of these weapon systems were introduced into the NATO theater in the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1970s the Soviet Union upgraded their short- and shorter-range intermediate forces with a new generation of tactical weapons capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or conventional warheads. NATO had relied on the technological superiority of its tactical weapons to offset Soviet superiority in numbers of short-range nuclear weapons. That edge had eroded.⁶

Weinberger and the Pentagon favored modernization of U.S. short- and shorter-range intermediate tactical weapons, but during the first Reagan term these weapon systems took a back seat to INF. Initially, the Office of the Secretary of Defense suggested including short- and shorter-range intermediate systems in the INF negotiations. State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and even the Joint Chiefs believed that their inclusion would unduly complicate the talks and raise the profile of NATO's dual-capable theater aircraft, which the United States was unprepared to discuss with Moscow in INF talks. The issue came to a head at the end of a mid-November 1981 NSC meeting. The president



Adapted from Soviet Military Power, 1984

decided to exclude short-range nuclear weapon systems from the INF talks. Reagan also turned down Weinberger's suggestion that he mention them in his presidential address on arms reduction and nuclear weapons scheduled for November 18, 1981.⁷

In mid-1983, the JCS sent Weinberger an important alert: "The Soviets are continuing an aggressive expansion of their SNF [short-range nuclear forces]. They have deployed into Eastern Europe three nuclear capable cannons, more accurate nuclear missiles, more than doubling their short-range capabilities over the last 10 years." The Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that 5,000 warheads could be made available for these systems. By contrast, the chiefs characterized the U.S.-NATO SNF arsenal as "increasingly questionable, partly because of age." Weinberger asked Richard Perle to prepare a report on the alliance's defense efforts and push for improvements in SNFs.⁸

At Montabello, Quebec, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) met in late October 1983 to consider Perle's report, which recommended eliminating 1,400 obsolete nuclear weapons from Europe in view of the impending deployment of 572 Pershing IIs and GLCMs. Perle and Weinberger hoped that decommissioning older weapons would encourage NATO to modernize its short-range nuclear weapons. The NPG members agreed on the need for modernization in principle but delayed deciding the issue until the next NPG meeting in spring 1985. Modernization of short-range tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would have to wait.⁹

NATO's Conventional Forces

Weinberger inherited NATO's Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP), the brain-child of former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Robert W. Komer. The LTDP created NATO working groups to tackle alliance problems such as rapid reinforcement from the United States; improvements in readiness, reserve forces, and mobilization; integrated air defenses; communications interoperability; electronic warfare; armaments cooperation; and improved logistics.¹⁰

The Weinberger Pentagon team endorsed the LTDP's remedies, but they did not give them priority and the program ran out of steam. Expected to last until 1988, the LTDP was terminated as a discrete program in 1982 because of insufficient allied support owing to disagreements over the nature of the Warsaw Pact threat, alliance members' spending priorities, burden sharing, and the

U.S.-European imbalance of trade in defense equipment. After 1982 the LTDP was subsumed into NATO's regular force planning process.¹¹

Another major initiative inherited was the pledge by each NATO member to increase real defense spending (after inflation) annually by 3 percent. In 1981 eight NATO members met their commitment. The other six members failed to reach the 3 percent level. Early in 1981 Carlucci modified the 3 percent policy by emphasizing force goals and performance, not just budget figures, as a better yardstick for commitment to NATO. As Weinberger later recalled, the NATO allies' contributions could and should not be measured merely in percentages of real growth. Nor should members be berated for not pulling their weight. As he later reflected, "We are not in Europe only for altruistic purposes. We are there to help our national interests and interests of our own security ... the best place to defend the United States is as far forward as possible." In truth, there was little that Weinberger and his colleagues at OSD could do beyond persuasion to bring about the 3 percent pledge. Threatening to reduce U.S. troops in Europe,

Real Percent Change in Defense Expenditures, 1977-1982

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Belgium	2.5	6.7	2.2	2.0	0.2	-2.7
Canada	3.8	-0.2	-0.9	5.1	3.0	3.0
Denmark	2.4	4.4	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.6
France	4.9	5.0	2.5	3.9	3.5	3.5
Germany	-0.5	3.1	1.8	1.9	3.4	0.7
Greece	19.8	4.9	-2.9	-8.8	5.6	-3.0
Italy	4.5	1.4	2.6	4.9	-1.2	1.2
Luxembourg	-2.4	7.9	3.5	16.3	7.1	4.1
Netherlands	11.0	-4.8	3.9	-1.5	3.4	2.2
Norway	1.5	7.7	1.9	1.8	2.5	3.3
Portugal	-7.1	2.4	2.9	10.0	2.8	0.0
Turkey	2.5	0.0	2.6	2.0	3.1	2.4
United Kingdom	-2.3	-0.6	3.0	2.7	2.1	3.4
United States	0.9	1.5	3.4	4.9	5.4	6.6
Non-U.S. NATO	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.1
Total NATO	1.4	1.8	2.9	3.8	4.1	4.6

Constant 1980 prices and exchange rates. U.S. fiscal year basis. *OSD Records*

as some in Congress insisted on, would be counterproductive. In the end, it was economic and financial strength or weakness that determined defense spending in most NATO countries.¹²


By 1982 there were rumblings in Congress and among defense experts that Weinberger's Pentagon was more interested in improving NATO's nuclear posture than in its conventional forces. This impression derived in part from the emphasis on deploying Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Europe. In January 1981 Senator Sam Nunn traveled to Europe to examine the state of the alliance. In March he submitted a report to the Senate Armed Forces Committee entitled *NATO: Can the Alliance Be Saved?* Nunn's principal conclusion was that NATO's military strategy had become inoperable. The 1960s policy of flexible response and forward defense was adopted when NATO possessed strategic and theater nuclear advantages over the Warsaw Pact to offset its conventional inferiority. By 1981, Nunn maintained, NATO had lost its nuclear superiority and the Soviet Union had expanded its lead in conventional weapons. NATO was confronting, Nunn stated, "a military environment characterized by strategic nuclear parity, growing theater nuclear inferiority, and a continuing lack of a credible conventional capability."¹³

The Advanced Technology Strategy

One solution to the imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces was to compensate for numerical Soviet conventional military advantages with qualitative improvements in U.S. advanced weapons and information systems. The U.S.-Soviet numerical balance in conventional weapons was heavily tilted in the Warsaw Pact's favor, by almost always more than two to one. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Brown's under secretary of defense for research and engineering, William J. Perry, promoted an advanced technology strategy that employed computers for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to identify targets on the battlefield; used the global positioning system, computers, and lasers to guide precision weapons to attack them from standoff positions; and developed stealth aircraft virtually invisible to radar to take out air defenses. These sophisticated weapons and surveillance systems were designed to act in concert to allow military forces to rapidly plan, efficiently coordinate, and accurately attack. They promised to change the conventional balance and allow NATO to defend against a Soviet conventional attack. The basic underpinnings

of what later came to be known as the offset strategy were the revolutions in microelectronics, computing, networking, and other information technologies that started with a heavy research investment by the Defense Department in the 1950s and was carried forward by advanced technology companies in the 1960s. Significantly, Brown's point man for the effort, Perry, came directly from Silicon Valley. Developed as a high priority during 1977–1980, the weapons and systems of the new strategy were produced during Reagan's first term and deployed in the field in the Weinberger-Carlucci DoD of Reagan's second term. As Secretary of Navy John Lehman recalled, "In [January] 1981 ... I found that the full suite of weapons systems and sensors necessary to defeat the Soviet Navy had been developed and were ready for equipping the fleet. All that was needed was the funding to buy them."¹⁴

Weinberger enthusiastically embraced Brown and Perry's new strategy. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Iklé and Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Richard DeLauer predicted that precision weapons, guidance systems, and other modern terminal delivery systems could increase conventional weapons capability. However, they noted that "the actual deployment of improved munitions, ordnance, etc. has been disappointingly slow." They recommended and Carlucci approved a renewed Pentagon effort to encourage and monitor "front



Adapted from Soviet Military Power, 1984

end' improvements." Weinberger had hoped that United States could not only increase its technology advantage, but also match the Soviet Union quantitatively in conventional weapons. However, during his first term he concluded such a goal was impossible. In July 1984 he told Secretary of State Shultz, "As for our own need to make use of emerging technologies, I continue to feel that Soviet conventional preponderance as it currently exists warrants new initiatives.... I am sure the Soviets will seek to modernize their military technologies too. It is for these reasons ... we must continue our [technology] efforts."¹⁵

Lacking a scientific or technical background, Weinberger did not enjoy the same rapport with DeLauer as Brown had with Perry. Weinberger relied on the expertise of DeLauer's team. A PhD in aeronautical engineering from Cal Tech, DeLauer had been director of the Titan missile program in the 1960s and then executive vice president and a director of TRW Inc., a company predominantly focused on aerospace and specializing in electronic components, computers, integrated circuits, software, and systems engineering. He was direct and blunt, virtually the only high-level official in the Pentagon who answered his own telephone. His frankness to his OSD colleagues and Congress sometimes caused tension. Despite their eventual differences, Weinberger and DeLauer shared a common commitment to moving the latest technology to the battlefield.¹⁶

The technology strategy Weinberger and his team promoted was not without its critics. In 1981 members of Congress created the bipartisan Military Reform Caucus (MRC). Senator Gary W. Hart (D-CO) and Representative G. William Whitehurst (R-VA) founded the bipartisan group, which originally numbered 16 legislators. While the MRC initially advocated flexible maneuver tactics and aggressive military leadership, it remained skeptical of too much reliance on expensive high-technology weaponry and systems. As the MRC grew during the 1980s in Congress, a small group of military men and civilian reformers aligned themselves with it. The MRC and its Pentagon allies received intellectual heft from James Fallows's 1981 book, *National Defense*, the latest in a series of works supporting reform of military doctrine, procurement, and force structure. Fallows and the MRC argued that expensive and complicated high-technology weapons and systems would lead to unacceptable defense costs and more delays in defense procurement. Furthermore, they held that while the latest advanced technologies might succeed in the laboratory or in carefully calibrated tests, on the battlefield they would fail. In particular weapons based on integrated circuits

would not be robust enough to perform in the chaos of war. An added concern was the claim that members of the All-Volunteer Force (see chapter 17) would not have the technical competence to use these new sophisticated weapons. Among their recommendations for improving acquisition, the reformers called for procuring cheaper and more basic weapons.¹⁷

Perry publicly countered Fallows in 1982, arguing that the real disparity between the U.S. and Soviet militaries was the cost of manpower. The Soviets built twice as many weapons, some of them complex and technologically advanced, because they had lower personnel costs and therefore could spend more on hardware. As Perry saw it, “The Soviets do not have to trade off between quantity and quality; because of their cheap manpower, they can choose *both*.” He recommended using the U.S. “technological advantage selectively to offset Soviet numerical advantages by *finessing* them whenever that is possible.” For example, do not match Soviet tank production; instead build effective antitank weapons based on microelectronics, employ stealth technology to overcome formidable Soviet air defenses, or develop extremely sensitive detection systems to locate Soviet submarines while building quieter U.S. subs to avoid Soviet detection.¹⁸

One of the major developers of these weapons was the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon agency created in 1958, after the Sputnik shock, to think outside the box about weapon systems and applying technology to war. DARPA funded and tested promising technology projects; if it found any to be feasible, it would present them to the services for possible acquisition. DeLauer and his handpicked head of DARPA, Robert S. Cooper, built on the Brown-Perry legacy. In early 1981 the Pentagon deployed the first stealth aircraft virtually invisible to radar, the F-117 fighter. Fifty-nine of these aircraft, developed in an accelerated program during the Brown years, were in service by 1990. Weinberger’s Pentagon continued to apply stealth technology to the B-2 bomber program and cruise missiles.¹⁹

The ultimate objective of the new strategy was to defeat a Warsaw Pact conventional invasion without resort to nuclear weapons. The primary challenge was Soviet armor, which enjoyed a more than a two-to-one advantage over NATO forces. Weinberger’s Pentagon deployed in significant numbers the so-called big five conventional weapon systems developed in the 1970s: the M1 Abrams main battle tank, the M2 Bradley armored fighting vehicle, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopter, and the Patriot missile

defense. The core concept behind the advanced technology strategy was to use information and command-and-control systems to link these and other weapons together and produce a multiplier effect.²⁰

In 1978 DARPA initiated such a program by combining computers, sensors, new delivery systems, and advanced precision-guided munitions designed to defeat successive waves of Soviet armor. Known as Assault Breaker, this “system of systems” sought to destroy tanks and other hard, fast-moving targets. In late 1982 DARPA tested five self-guided submunitions dropped from a missile and directed by a standoff “missile bus” controlled by ground-based radar (standing in for airborne radar). Using an infrared imaging seeker, the submunitions identified and successfully hit five stationary tanks. If Assault Breaker could locate high-value targets on the battlefield no matter the conditions, make direct hits, and destroy them, it promised a sea change in U.S. strategy. No longer would tactical nuclear weapons be required to stop a Soviet conventional attack in Central Europe, thus lessening the chance that a conflict in Europe would escalate to all-out nuclear war.²¹

DARPA considered the 1982 test, the culmination of a series of tests, as proof of the concept and recommended that the Army and the Air Force adopt Assault Breaker. That did not happen, in the view of DARPA historians, for a number of reasons. Adoption would have required the two services to radically change their operational doctrine. The Army would have to rely on Air Force targeting and the Air Force would be required to accept that more limited role, rather than seeking out and attacking targets itself. Adoption of the joint program would necessitate changes in resource allocation by both services. The Army would have to shift to acquisition of more long-range missiles, calling into question its emphasis on M1 Abrams tanks. The program would require the Air Force to rethink its acquisition of F-16 aircraft. The services raised a fair question: While Assault Breaker might be technically possible, could it be operational? It had only destroyed stationary targets. Tanks move. Finally, the services were already developing programs either in conjunction with Assault Breaker or similar to it. The Army and Air Force choose to develop the concept separately, thus maintaining control of funding and technological development. There was an even more basic reason for the services’ reluctance. The uniformed military was understandably resistant to a technological agency, staffed by PhD eggheads, instructing them how to fight the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe.²²



NATO's "Big Five" conventional weapons: the M1 Abrams tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter (this page); the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, and the Patriot missile (opposite page). *OSD Records*



Following their initial resistance, the services realized the advantages that the new weapons and systems offered and embraced them. The concept of Assault Breaker gained momentum when the services adopted the MRC's emphasis on maneuver and innovation in the early 1980s to combat the threat to Central Europe from the Soviet operational maneuver groups (OMGs). Soviet strategy envisioned a three-echelon attack on NATO with enough speed and combat power to break through NATO main lines. Once NATO defenses were penetrated, the rear-echelon OMGs would exploit the salient by capturing NATO territory, disrupting the alliance's command and control, and lessening the possibility that NATO would respond with nuclear weapons. The initial breakthrough would be followed with massive armored attacks. The U.S. counterdoctrine envisioned better use of sophisticated intelligence, sensors, precision weapons, training, and air support for deep interdiction, with more flexibility and initiative by commanders, as the way to defeat the Soviet OMGs. In August 1982 the Army adopted an interdiction strategy called AirLand Battle. It was based on the assumption that carefully scripted, rigidly controlled, and well-rehearsed Soviet war planning for the OMGs would allow the Army and the Air Force to strike both forward areas and rear echelon targets in Warsaw Pact territory as they moved along predetermined corridors. Rather than just defend an attack on the main line of battle, NATO would carry the fight to the rear echelons. AirLand Battle strategy depended on technological advances in reconnaissance, target identification, and precision guided weapons. With the support of Army Chief of Staff General John Wickham and Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles A. Gabriel, the Army and the Air Force agreed on 31 initiatives to allow for cooperation in interdiction missions against the Warsaw Pact. This joint AirLand Battle program encouraged the Army and Air Force to join together to develop the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), an airborne battle management and command and control platform permitting commanders to see the battlefield and support attack operation and targeting. In his report to Congress in February 1984, Weinberger extolled JSTARS and promised that computer-based "new technologies are providing our land forces with radically new techniques for defeating armored attacks."²³

AirLand Battle doctrine for NATO's defense of Central Europe was based on flexibility, aggressive decentralized command, and mobility, ideas espoused by the Military Reform Caucus and military and civilian reformers within the

Pentagon, as well as journalists and military analysts. The secretary of defense's contribution was to accept and support this new thinking. Both AirLand Battle and what was later called the offset strategy used technology and doctrine to counter Soviet conventional military strength. Weinberger was a true convert to both concepts. As he stated in February 1985, "The United States continues to rely on its superior military technology to offset the numerically superior numbers.... We and our allies have never advocated a conventional military buildup that matches the Soviet bloc's numbers soldier for soldier, tank for tank, or aircraft for aircraft. Instead we have depended on superior military technology, and on better readiness, training, leadership, and better educated people ... to compensate for qualitative disadvantages."²⁴

Encouraging NATO and Congress to Accept Emerging Technology

Weinberger was determined to convince the NATO allies to adopt his approach to advanced technology. At the NATO defense ministers meeting in May 1982, he promised his alliance colleagues that by their next meeting the DoD would present a study on how to use new technologies to improve NATO's conventional defenses. In November 1982 Perle unveiled the DoD paper that Weinberger had promised. Entitled "Taking Advantage of Emerging Technologies to Improve Conventional Defense," it became known as the ET (emerging technologies) paper. In keeping with the AirLand Battle doctrine, the Perle group proposed holding the line against initial Warsaw Pact attacks, disrupting Pact follow-on-force attacks, generating numerous and effective tactical air stories, and reducing the Pact's tactical air and missile forces.²⁵

Key to the strategy was applying new technology to see the battlefield in depth, communicate with NATO forces, and provide command and control, all in real time. In describing the ET paper, Weinberger stated, "The concepts explored here combine intelligence/target acquisition/command and control technology with weapons delivery system for land and air operations. NATO forces must be able to see in depth into the area of operations of attacking Warsaw Pact Forces and attack quickly, accurately, and in depth." Weinberger called upon NATO members to act together to exploit emerging technologies to achieve these goals. At the NATO meeting in December 1982, defense ministers agreed to explore these new technologies in "a co-operation defense planning process" and "to look for economical and efficient application" of them. As they were with so

many NATO policies, the defense ministers were long on intentions and short on actions. The challenge was to move the ET report beyond the study phase to concrete action that would allow the deployment of high-technology equipment to NATO forces. This process would take time and money. Eventually NATO adopted the Follow-on-Forces-Attack strategy; like AirLand Battle, it sought to carry the fight with advanced technology weapon systems to Warsaw Pact soil by disrupting the first and second Pact echelons.²⁶

Naturally Congress was interested in the application of new technology to NATO defense planning. In April 1983 Weinberger submitted to Congress a study on conventional improvements for NATO. Pressed for time, Weinberger sent a report prepared by Under Secretary of Defense (R&E) Richard DeLauer that mirrored the assumptions and recommendations of the ET paper. DeLauer put special emphasis on the strategy of "Counterair 90," which would use aircraft and ballistic missiles to interdict Soviet forces before they could attack NATO assets in force and establish air superiority over the Warsaw Pact.²⁷

This was a good first start, but not the overall strategy review that MRC members in Congress wanted the administration to undertake. In 1983 Congress insisted on a definitive study to be submitted by mid-1984 that would revise NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence against a Soviet attack on Western Europe and replace it with an improved conventional defense. Over the next eight months Perle and his office drafted a report, released as "Improving NATO's Conventional Capabilities." While the report concluded that advanced technology offered "great promise," it did "not obviate the need for balanced programs to meet the requirements of readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure." It was, as Perle explained to Weinberger, a compromise between those who favored continuation of flexible response as is and those who wanted to upgrade the role of conventional forces within a strategy using technological solutions. The report insisted that NATO's security rested upon "a balanced triad of conventional, non-strategic, and strategic nuclear forces whose first objective is to deter an attack by persuading a potential aggressor that his military objectives cannot be attained at acceptable risk or cost." Perle suggested that, as a compromise, the report would not satisfy proponents of enhanced conventional defense in Congress. It was, however, music to the ears of the Joint Chiefs and the Western European NATO members. The Europeans feared that advances in conventional warfare might encourage the United States to no longer

protect them with a nuclear umbrella, choosing instead to fight a conventional war in Europe. The chiefs feared that too much emphasis on conventional defense might undermine flexible response and strategic modernization and encourage peace advocates' demands for a no-first-strike nuclear policy.²⁸

In September 1984 Weinberger and Reagan met with the new NATO general secretary, Peter Carrington. Their discussion highlighted the main problems in NATO. Carrington conceded that "Secretary Weinberger has gone out of his way to galvanize a greater NATO conventional effort, but Europe thus far has not made the necessary resources available." Reagan responded, "The lack of an adequate European conventional defense effort is giving us real problems with Congress." The president recalled how, at the height of congressional pressure to force withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, he had interceded with Senator Nunn. European improvements in their conventional forces would go a long way to blunting further congressional demands for withdrawals. Carrington thought Nunn's objectives were correct, but "one does not threaten to brandish one's Allies." Weinberger agreed that Nunn's threats to force withdrawal "was not how the U.S. Government treats its Allies," but "Europe could do more." Carrington observed that the imbalance in arms sales between the United States and its NATO allies was at a seven-to-one ratio. He suggested that it would help if there were more U.S. purchases of weapons produced by European NATO members, creating more of a "two-way street." Weinberger agreed but noted that Congress made it very difficult to buy NATO weapons and equipment not produced in America. The result was that European NATO members held back on improvements to their own conventional forces because such upgrades mostly required the purchase of expensive U.S. weapon systems.²⁹

Deployment of Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles

NATO's acceptance of Weinberger's ET initiative was gradual and circumscribed by NATO defense budgets. During the early 1980s, however, NATO achieved a very visible upgrade of its theater nuclear forces. In late December 1983 NATO deployed Pershing II missiles in West Germany and GLCMs in the United Kingdom; in 1984 GLCMs arrived in Italy. The NATO allies had agreed to accept these weapons in late 1979 as part of a dual-track approach: the United States would negotiate with the Soviets for the elimination of intermediate nuclear forces but would deploy if Moscow and Washington failed to reach an agreement. The

possibility of more intermediate-range nuclear weapons in NATO countries had provoked intense and large-scale antinuclear demonstrations, a furious Soviet propaganda effort, and considerable risk to the participating European NATO governments' parliamentary majorities. The key to INF modernization in NATO was West Germany. With their range of 1,800 kilometers, the 464 Pershing II nuclear missiles to be stationed in Germany could reach all of Eastern Europe and much of western Russia, but not Moscow. German chancellor Helmut Schmidt was unwilling to be the only NATO country to deploy these weapons. He insisted that at least one other NATO European country also accept missiles, and he excluded the United Kingdom since it was already a nuclear power and not part of the European continent. The Italians agreed to accept GLCMs, and the requirement was met. The NATO missiles slated for deployment did not, however, even the East-West INF balance. The Soviet Union retained numerical theater missile superiority (although, as Moscow claimed, NATO's dual-capable aircraft, submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the Mediterranean, and French and British nuclear forces mitigated the advantage). Nevertheless, the value of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs was symbolic of NATO solidarity and determination. And they eventually became bargaining chips when the INF negotiations successfully eliminated all such intermediate-range weapons in 1987.³⁰

The NATO member that wavered most on deployment of GLCMs was the Netherlands, which was anxious to see U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms reduction negotiations succeed. As Dutch foreign minister Pieter de Geus told Weinberger in March 1981, the decision to accept the missiles "was based on the supposition that SALT [II] would be ratified" and he hoped that the dual-track INF negotiations would eliminate the need for deployment. In May 1981 Iklé informed Weinberger that the upcoming election in the Netherlands would probably result in a coalition government unlikely to accept the GLCMs. Belgium was more solid, but it was unwilling to announce publicly that it was preparing a site for GLCMs.³¹

The reason for this hesitancy was the large and vocal European antinuclear peace movement. It was not uncommon for NATO meetings to be picketed by tens of thousands of demonstrators. Weinberger recalled seeing an antinuclear demonstration of 100,000 in Hyde Park, London. The Netherlands also had a strong antinuclear movement. In West Germany, the roots of the peace movement went deep. According to an intelligence estimate based on a 1982 West German public survey, 3 percent of West German adults were active in the antinuclear



Antinuclear protesters in the rain, West Germany, December 12, 1983. *OSD Records*

movement, 7 percent were considering becoming active, and 1.5 to 5 million Germans were open to participation. More Germans viewed the demonstrators, who were mostly young, well educated, and politically left leaning, positively rather than negatively. The result was that the Western European politicians who accepted intermediate nuclear missiles did so at political risk.³²

Deploying the missiles was not just a matter of plunking them down. Sites had to be negotiated with the host country, physical security of the site facilities needed upgrades, and personnel had to be trained. The missiles, warheads, and related equipment had to be shipped from the United States and assembled before the missiles could become operational. The British were proceeding as scheduled for deployment of their 10 GLCM flights at the Royal Air Force Base at Greenham Common, where demonstrators were encamped outside the base in protest. The Germans were also on track until the Bundestag passed a resolution on June 23, 1983, that prohibited deployment until after the conclusion of the debate scheduled to begin on November 15, 1983. The Western German Free Democratic coalition government of Kohl insisted that no missiles, parts of missiles, or dummy missiles for testing be brought into Germany before the end of the Bundestag debate. Kohl pushed the debate back to November 21, creating

a very compressed schedule if Pershing IIs were to be deployed in Germany by the end of December 1983. British defense secretary Michael Heseltine told Weinberger in late October that the U.S. invasion of Grenada without consultation of his government had riled Parliament and called into question the special relationship. Parliament insisted on a GLCM debate beginning on October 31, so the missiles could not arrive on 1 November as scheduled. The Italians, not scheduled to deploy their seven GLCM flights (112 missiles) in Comiso, Sicily, until March 1984 at an austere and abandoned World War II air base, were way behind schedule. The Belgians were two years behind and unlikely to meet their initial operational capability date of March 1985. The Dutch had put off a final decision on accepting the GLCMs until autumn 1983.³³

While the West German and British parliaments insisted on additional debate, their governments agreed to accept the missiles. After what were essentially pro forma debates in the Bundestag and the British Parliament, the Kohl and Thatcher governments gave the go-ahead for final deployment. The Germans announced that the Pershing II missiles were operational on December 31 and the British deployed GLCMs at the same time. The rest of the NATO allies lagged behind. The Italians stated that they would only have one flight of GLCMs operational by March 1984 and a second a year later. Belgium and the Netherlands eventually accepted the missiles. Three flights (48 GLCMs) were operational in 1985 at Florennes Air Base, Belgium. Three more flights of cruise missiles became operational at Woensdrecht Air Base in the Netherlands. These Dutch-based missiles were the last to activate in 1987 and the first to be deactivated in 1988 under the INF treaty of 1987.³⁴

The successful deployment of intermediate-range missiles in these five NATO states had significance for the NATO alliance, nuclear arms control, and the Cold War. For NATO the deployment signaled that the alliance could respond positively to the Soviet challenge of the SS-20 missiles that threatened to dominate Western Europe. With their covert and overt support of the antinuclear movement in Western Europe and attempts in the INF negotiations to paint the United States as inflexible cold warriors, the Soviet Union hoped to break NATO solidarity. They failed, and NATO remained solid. As for arms control, although the Soviets walked out of the INF and START II negotiations in protest of NATO's INF deployment in December 1983, they returned to the negotiating table and in 1987 and signed with the United States a treaty outlawing all INF worldwide (see chapter 5).



Secretary Weinberger and Chancellor Helmut Kohl with NATO troops in Grafenwoehr, West Germany, March 1986. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

Burden Sharing and the Two-Way Street

Intermediate-range nuclear forces dominated U.S.-NATO member relations during the first Weinberger term, but there were also lower-profile issues. Since the 1960s Congress had expressed concern that the United States had too many troops in Western Europe and that the NATO allies were not shouldering their part of the alliance defense burden. In the 1960s Congress passed two nonbinding resolutions calling for substantial reduction in U.S. troops in Europe. The sponsor of the resolutions, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT), claimed that improvements in warfare and transportation allowed the United States to defend NATO with fewer troops stationed in Europe. In the 1970s Mansfield introduced amendments to DoD legislation mandating actual troop cuts. Although these amendments failed to pass, they represented a strong belief in Congress that the U.S. troop commitment to NATO was too large and the Western European alliance members' contribution too small.³⁵

Weinberger rejected congressional arguments that the NATO allies were not

pulling their weight. It was not just a matter of how many troops and weapons that NATO members contributed or how much they allocated to defense spending. There were, Weinberger argued, nonquantifiable contributions made by the European members. West Germany paid for U.S. troops in West Berlin. NATO members provided the United States host nation combat support. European NATO members conscripted military manpower at a cost to their labor markets. The allies provided civil infrastructure with military applications. Dedication of real estate to NATO facilities and bases meant lost taxes and lost opportunity for commercial application. Some NATO members gave economic assistance to others. Weinberger maintained that critics of NATO burden sharing usually overlooked these indirect contributions. He reported to Congress in 1981 that non-U.S. financial contributions to NATO represented 45 percent of the total outlay of NATO. Alliance members other than the United States contributed 60 percent of the military manpower, just fewer than 60 percent of ground combat capability, 52 percent of tactical aircraft, and 47 percent of tonnage of naval combatants and submarines. Admitting these measurements were “crude” and that NATO allies could always do more, the secretary observed, “To come up with an equitable burdensharing formula would be almost as impossible as devising an income tax formula which was equitable to everyone.”³⁶

While burden sharing was a NATO-wide issue, most U.S. troops were stationed in West Germany. Weinberger inherited three initiatives from previous administrations: first, an agreement from West Germany for increased combat support forces in the event of a war with the Warsaw Pact; second, a promise from West Germany to pay a larger share of planned NATO infrastructure improvements; third, financial support from Bonn to move U.S. troops and their bases closer to the potential battlefield on the border with East Germany.³⁷

Host nation support was an important pillar of NATO military strategy. In the event of a conventional conflict with the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, the United States planned a rapid reinforcement. Rather than having to include the usual proportion of combat support troops in the U.S. reinforcement, which would double U.S. forces in Germany, the United States planned to send a higher percentage of combat troops. West Germany would provide most of the reserve troops for combat support. Bonn agreed on April 15, 1982, to train and equip an additional 93,000 Bundeswehr reservists who would provide transportation, supply, airfield repair, rear echelon security, medical services,

and other logistical support to the U.S. troops. These additional West German reservists would come from the general reserve pool, would not detract from the current or proposed Bundeswehr military structure, and thus would not diminish its combat effectiveness. The anticipated cost of the wartime host support program was \$570 million to be shared approximately equally by the United States and West Germany. Weinberger told a NATO critic in Congress who wanted Germany to pay the full tab for the agreement that these 93,000 German reservists would cost one-tenth what it would cost to send a similar number of U.S. reservists to provide combat support. If he had to ask the Germans to pay the full cost, Weinberger stated, "The program is *dead*—a program we urgently need ... at a bargain price in relation to the capability it affords." Congress approved funding.³⁸

The second initiative of the Pentagon was to increase West Germany's share of the NATO infrastructure program. Begun in 1950, the program was designed to expand a NATO country's military infrastructure. Such facilities included military bases, military storage sites, training installations, communications and navigational facilities, air defense facilities, and headquarters. Each five-year period of the program—later changed to six years—was called a slice. The size and cost-sharing formula of each slice was negotiated by unanimous agreement of all NATO members based on the assumption that the infrastructure would serve NATO's common interests and would be available to all in wartime. Such a multiyear arrangement precluded the need for annual agreements. The most recent agreement, reached in May 1979, allocated West Germany 26.5 percent, as compared to 27.4 percent for the United States, of a total \$3.4 billion estimated cost for FYs 1979–1982.³⁹

Weinberger and the Pentagon suggested in 1981 that West Germany increase its contribution to the infrastructure program based on a mid-slice review. The Germans were paying 130 million IAUs (international accounting units determined by NATO every six months based on its member countries exchange rates) per year for the next three years of the slice. When Chancellor Schmidt visited Washington in January 1982, Weinberger lobbied him for increases in Germany's contribution. Otherwise, he claimed, U.S. troop reinforcements in case of war would have to be reduced for lack of adequate infrastructure facilities. The secretary encouraged the president to make the same case when he met the chancellor. Schmidt countered that Europeans were having serious budgetary

and economic difficulties due in good part to high U.S. interest rates. He would not ask the Bundestag for more infrastructure money. The prospects improved for greater German contributions with the election in March 1983 of the more conservative and pro-American government of Helmut Kohl. In December 1984, NATO reversed the trend of inadequate infrastructure funding with an agreement by Kohl's government to spend 3.8 billion IAU's (\$8 billion), with the Germans agreeing to fund 2 billion IAU's over the next six-year slice.⁴⁰

The final burden-sharing initiative was an attempt to revive the Master Restationing Plan (MRP) for U.S. troops in Germany initiated during the last year of the Carter administration. Under this proposed 30-year plan, 18 German-based U.S. brigades would move closer to battlefield positions near the East German border. This naturally required construction of new facilities and bases. The Schmidt government was taken aback by the cost and scope of the program and was only willing to relocate three U.S. brigades to its eastern border. Spurred on by congressional criticism, the administration asked West Germany to provide administrative costs and a share of the estimated \$1.3 billion needed to relocate the three brigades. Schmidt countered that this proposal was just another offset whereby West Germany contributed financial support to defray the U.S. cost of troops in Germany.⁴¹

With the election of Kohl, prospects for the MRP seemed to improve. The Germans agreed to pay the cost of related infrastructure (utility hook-ups, road and rail connections, etc.), estimated to be worth \$100 million. The Pentagon suggested that West Germany also pay for construction of facilities required for headquarters, maintenance and supply, and troop billets and mess, for a total of \$950 million—40 percent—of the now-estimated cost of \$2.36 billion to restation the three brigades. At the urging of Weinberger, the president asked Kohl at the Williamsburg economic summit to consider paying such a share. Reagan noted that critics in Congress still hoped to reduce U.S. troops in Europe and had focused on German contributions to the Master Restationing Plan as a symbolic target. Kohl told Reagan that because of fewer draft-age German men, his government was extending the term of conscription from 15 to 18 months at additional costs. Furthermore, INF deployments of Pershing II missiles were still very controversial. The Germans admitted they had no additional funds for the MRP. The Weinberger team recommended pushing the Germans, but General Bernard Rogers, the supreme allied commander, Europe, and his staff believed

that MRP was “dead.” Rogers’s assessment proved correct; the plan remained in limbo without adequate funding.⁴²

In one respect, the European allies believed the United States was not pulling its weight in burden sharing. They maintained that the United States was not committed to the two-way street and cooperation in armaments production. The U.S. defense industry and the Pentagon’s research and development budget dwarfed those of the NATO allies. U.S. systems used higher technology and were cheaper, and Congress had passed amendments forcing the DoD to “buy American,” making transatlantic arms production cooperation difficult. The Europeans generally produced limited quantities of weapon systems and hardware that were both lower cost and less technologically advanced. NATO members requested that the United States lessen their burden by either buying NATO allies’ weapon systems and equipment or cooperating with the allies in developing and coproducing them. Perle suggested to Deputy Secretary Taft that “improving the two-way street through better armaments cooperation needs a strong consensus with Service support, consistent apolitical help from Congress, and understanding and cooperation by US defense industry.” These were necessary requirements but difficult to obtain.⁴³

In late November 1983, NATO Ambassador David M. Abshire proposed creating a presidential commission or a high-level ad hoc panel of members from government, Congress, the defense industry, and labor to find a solution to the two-way-street problem. The suggestion was not well received by Weinberger and his staff. Such a high-profile approach was bound to lead, if the past was any indication, to lots of talk, raised expectations, and few actual solutions. Weinberger and his team preferred a DoD in-house effort to identify promising cooperative projects. After “scrubbing” (assessing) them, and consulting with Congress, the services, and the U.S. defense industry, the civilians at the Pentagon would undertake a few of the best projects. Then the Abshire high-profile approach would have something to build on. The president approved Weinberger’s recommendation and the secretary enjoined his team at the Pentagon to identify likely candidates for the two-way street or at least development and production cooperation.⁴⁴

This initiative seemed in danger of going the way of its predecessors, which saw the secretary instruct his OSD staff and the services to initiate a program, only to have nothing much happen. As it turned out, there was already an

example of joint cooperation and burden sharing. It grew out of a realization that specific NATO air bases were vulnerable. Over the years the integrated air defenses of German air bases and U.S. bases on German soil had deteriorated while Warsaw Pact air and missile capability had improved substantially. Even before Weinberger suggested his initiative for transatlantic cooperation to the president, U.S. and German defense officials had explored the possibility of the Germans obtaining Patriot missile defense systems, the cost of which would be offset by Europeans providing Roland short-range surface-to-air missile defenses to protect U.S. and German bases. After months of negotiations, the two sides' experts reached an agreement.⁴⁵

In August 1984 Weinberger informed Congress that on December 6 the United States would transfer 12 Patriot fire units to Germany, plus a Patriot training unit and a maintenance unit in return for goods and services Germany provided the United States. These goods and services included the Germans manning U.S. Patriot fire units for 10 years and providing 27 Roland air-defense systems to defend 3 U.S. air bases in Germany, also for 10 years. The remaining 88 Rolands would be deployed in the late 1980s to defend German bases, 6 of which were co-located with U.S. bases. In addition, the Germans would purchase from Raytheon Corporation 14 Patriot units through the foreign military sales (FMS) program, but with a waiver of payment for the \$350 million cost of research and development, and would contribute \$50 million for common U.S.-German improvements in air defenses. The crux of the deal was that the United States would benefit in manpower and support costs for its 12 Patriot fire units. The German government obtained 28 Patriot fire units without exceeding its approved budget. Commenting on the deal, Weinberger noted that this "model agreement" upgraded NATO air defenses against improved Warsaw Pact tactical airpower: "It represents a combination of American and other [European] equipment and burden sharing." To the secretary it was an "example of the way NATO differs from the Warsaw Pact. Instead of forcing orders from one country by threats and intimidation, NATO is an association of sovereign independent states."⁴⁶

Throughout the first Reagan term Weinberger and his OSD staff continued to argue that the NATO allies were doing their fair share, but Congress remained skeptical. Legislators on Capitol Hill included in the DoD FY 1983 appropriation act a provision limiting by the end of FY 1983 the number of military personnel in Europe to 315,600 the number authorized for FY 1982. The Pentagon had planned

to raise the troop level by 3,700 before the end of FY 1983 and add an additional 5,200 personnel by the end of FY 1984, in good part to man the GLCM facilities associated with INF modernization. This number would grow in subsequent years as additional European allies deployed cruise missiles.⁴⁷

Weinberger asked the Joint Chiefs for their opinion of the consequences of Congress's troop limitations. The Chiefs suggested that "troop reduction at this time would send the wrong signal to friend, foe, and nonaligned alike" and such "a unilateral withdrawal of even a token force" would encourage the Soviet Union to continue to stall in U.S.-Soviet negotiations for mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe (see below). The JCS recommended using the authorization act's presidential waiver of "overriding national security requirements" to increase the FY 1983 troop level by the 1,380 personnel for GLCMs.⁴⁸

Weinberger recommended this solution to the president. Reagan agreed and explained to Congress that the GLCM program was critical to the defense of NATO and such a show of NATO solidarity would enhance the U.S. position in INF reduction talks. Weinberger asked the JCS for the minimum troop levels necessary for FY 1984 to meet essential NATO defense needs and objectives. The Joint Chiefs responded that after consultation with the Military Departments and U.S. European Command, the figure required was 322,450 including an additional 2,600 to man GLCMs. The FY 1984 defense authorization act recommended a level of 315,600 but would accept 320,000 if certain conditions were met.⁴⁹

In late June 1984 Weinberger assured Vice President George Bush, in his dual role as president of the Senate, and Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill that, as required in the FY 1984 authorization act, the NATO allies would not reduce their troops in West Germany, but rather would increase them by 3,500. Weinberger also reported that the Pentagon was giving priority to programs to improve NATO's conventional forces, especially its capability for deep interdiction. Third, 322,378 U.S. troops (including 2,600 for GLCM) were "absolutely essential" to meet the U.S. commitment to NATO and were 3,950 below the level set out in the president's FY 1984 budget request. Finally, the DoD study required by the relevant sections of the FY 1984 authorization act on the issue had been conducted and reported to Congress. Congress accepted the new limit.⁵⁰

Such haggling with Congress over a small number of personnel in Europe took on significance beyond the numbers involved. To Congress, the force level limits demonstrated its concern over burden sharing and the alliance partners'

contributions. In June 1984 Senator Nunn introduced an amendment, which failed in the Senate, that would have reduced U.S. troop levels by 90,000 each year unless the allies met their 3 percent pledge or achieved NATO goals for ammunition stockpiles and maintenance facilities. To Weinberger and the Pentagon, embarked on an unprecedented military buildup and modernization program, such congressional limitations were bad precedents that reduced their flexibility and weakened NATO defense.⁵¹

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks

Since October 1973 NATO and Warsaw Pact nations had failed to agree on reductions in conventional armed forces in Central Europe in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. These Vienna-based negotiations held out both danger and promise for the incoming Reagan administration. The possibility of reducing NATO's conventional forces appealed to the European members, but the United States insisted force-level cuts could not be equal, as the Soviet side had proposed. Graduated equal reductions would only perpetuate the conventional forces advantage enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact, the American negotiators insisted, so reductions had to be asymmetrical at first, though they would eventually reach parity. As an added complication, the United States required verification of data on the actual forces that the Warsaw Pact had in Eastern Europe before it would agree to any reductions. The Soviet Union could easily reinforce its Eastern European satellites along the long contiguous border, so opportunities to cheat on force levels abounded. Without verifying actual Warsaw Pact troop levels and locations, Washington was unprepared to agree to MBFR. The Soviets refused to allow verification, considering it a demand for backdoor intelligence gathering. In 1979 the Soviets adjourned the negotiations when the Carter administration announced its intention to introduce INF missiles into Western Europe.⁵²

In January 1982 the Soviet side introduced into resumed MBFR negotiations a new draft treaty that inched closer to the NATO position. The Reagan administration offered its own counterproposal, which amounted to a restatement of the Carter position calling for "a single comprehensive agreement" whereby both sides would gradually reduce ground and air personnel to 900,000 in Central Europe, with the Soviets making an initial cut of 30,000 ground troops to the United States 13,000. Before the agreement could be signed, both sides had to agree on current data, counting criteria, and verification procedures.⁵³

Moscow remained unimpressed with the U.S. proposals. Pressures mounted on the U.S. side to be more forthcoming and flexible. Congressional efforts to unilaterally reduce U.S. troop levels in Western Europe threatened to undercut the whole MBFR process. Furthermore, lack of progress in both the INF and START talks worried the European NATO allies. They considered that progress in the MBFR talks could break the disarmament log jam. In March 1983 Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov exchanged messages, trying to reach an agreement on MBFR. The president authorized exploring a concession on data verification with Moscow. If the Soviets accepted verifiable asymmetrical reductions leading to parity, the United States would postpone its insistence on a prior agreement of data verification. The Soviet response was unenthusiastic.⁵⁴

On September 6, 1983, the president and the NSC explored further concessions on the data issue. Reagan agreed that a comprehensive data and verification package were essential to an MBFR treaty. He seemed to rule out any further concessions. Later in the month, when Weinberger was in China, Perle warned the issue had “come to a head again.” Perle informed Weinberger, “Although our substantive reasons for holding fast on the data issue are good ... they are not strongly supported by other agencies.” Perle drafted a back-channel message from Weinberger to NSC Adviser William Clark arguing against reconsidering the September 6 decision. The argument that an MBFR agreement could sway public opinion in Western Europe seemed unlikely to Perle: “Never an exciting public issue, it will not make a ripple in the flow of public opinion. The costs of an MBFR concession ... far outweigh the putative benefits.” The Soviets indirectly helped the DoD when they suspended the MBFR talks in November 1983 over NATO’s impending INF deployments in West Germany and the United Kingdom.⁵⁵

At the urging of Shultz, the president ordered the NSC team to take a fresh look at the U.S. MBFR position. In a mid-January 1984 NSC meeting, Shultz argued for initial asymmetrical reductions, followed by an 18-month freeze on further cuts, and then a comprehensive data agreement before proceeding to parity of force levels in Europe. Shultz suggested that “the optimal course would be to implement—first—small, token reductions; this would place the onus on the Eastern bloc; provide impetus for forward movement to a full agreement; and it would help us considerably in our dealings with the Allies.” Both Weinberger and General John Vessey vigorously opposed this course of action. To the Pentagon chief, “preciseness on data and a clear definition of the types of forces we are

discussing” were essential before making reductions. Weinberger received help from Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates, speaking for DCI Bill Casey, and from Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth Adelman. MBFR negotiator Morton I. Abramowitz and White House Counselor Edwin Meese backed up Shultz. The president agreed to let Shultz inform Andrei Gromyko that if the Soviets returned to the MBFR negotiations and demonstrated flexibility about effective verification, they would find the United States flexible on data. Weinberger warned the president that “a mutually-agreed standard for measuring compliance is absolutely essential. In MBFR the force-level data provide the standard. An interim agreement without such a standard is unverifiable.” After further interagency study, the president disregarded Weinberger’s advice and authorized discussions with Germany and the United Kingdom on dropping the insistence on prior agreement on data and seeking only an exchange of data on combat and combat support forces prior to the treaty signature. In return, the Soviet Union would demonstrate flexibility on verification.⁵⁶

The MBFR negotiations resumed in mid-March 1984 and the NATO side tabled their new proposal as worked out with the British and Germans. Initial small asymmetrical reductions would be based on exchange of data on combat and combat support units and enhanced observation and verification. The Soviet side turned down the proposal. Moscow countered later in 1984 with a proposal that did not meet NATO requirements for verification. From the U.S. point of view, this Reagan initiative of March 1984 was the last chance for MBFR negotiations. Strategic arms reduction negotiations including INF and START resumed with Moscow in 1985, pushing MBFR to the back burner. The new Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev eventually provided the kind of flexibility Reagan had demanded. During the second Reagan administration interest grew in folding the almost moribund MBFR talks into newly designated negotiations for conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE). As the Soviet empire unraveled and the Cold War came to an end, NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the CFE treaty in 1990, which resulted in substantial reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact troops and conventional weapons in Central Europe.⁵⁷

NATO’s Western Flank: Spain and Portugal

In the Iberian Peninsula NATO’s posture was in transition. A democratic Spain joined the alliance in 1982, but a change in the Spanish government delayed

the military's integration into NATO. Renegotiation of the 1976 agreement for U.S. military access to Spanish bases dominated relations between Washington and Madrid from 1981 to 1982. In Portugal similar negotiations for access to Portuguese military facilities provided the primary focus for the Pentagon. A secondary concern was upgrading Portuguese military capabilities to allow it to play a larger role in NATO defense.⁵⁸

In 1975 Spain began its transition to democracy after the death of longtime dictator Francisco Franco. The centrist Spanish government of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo undertook negotiations with the United States to renew the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The Pentagon's objective was to retain military access to Spanish air bases at Torrejón, Zaragoza, and Morón as well as the Rota naval facility near the strategic port of Cádiz. In the event of an emergency, particularly in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, or Southwest Asia, these bases would provide important transit rights for the dispatch of U.S. forces. The negotiations, under the direction of U.S. Ambassador to Spain Terence A. Todman, began in May 1981, but it became clear that agreement would not be reached by the time the treaty expired in September 1981. In August 1981 the negotiators extended the deadline until May 1982. The primary issues that divided the two sides were Spanish unwillingness to allow the United States to use the bases for operations outside NATO and the expectation by the government in Madrid that the United States would provide almost \$4 billion in military assistance—half in equipment grants, loans, and leases—over the next five years as the price for the agreement. Since Congress controlled military assistance funding, all that U.S. negotiators could promise were “best efforts” to obtain from Congress what the Spanish needed.⁵⁹

In mid-October 1981 Spain's king, Juan Carlos I, visited Washington and met with Reagan and other U.S. officials. The king admitted that the political situation in Madrid was shaky and appealed for help in strengthening the U.S.-Spanish military relationship and supporting the democratic process. Weinberger reported that Defense and State were doing their parts. They were the driving force behind Spain's entry into NATO and they had more than doubled military assistance to Spain from FY 1982 to FY 1983, making Madrid the fourth-largest recipient of such aid. Weinberger admitted the United States could not provide Spain \$3.8 billion in military equipment over the next five years because of legal restraints and a dearth of surplus equipment in the inventory. Realistically, Weinberger

stated, Spain's military requirements would have to come through foreign military sales.⁶⁰

Haig believed that the administration needed to move more quickly on the access to bases agreement than did the DoD. The king had telephoned the president to express his concern with delays. The political situation in Spain remained uncertain. Haig asked Reagan to allow the U.S. negotiators to concede on the two issues holding up the agreement. First, accept Spanish restrictions on transit of U.S. aircraft based outside of Spain to bilateral or NATO missions only. This request raised red flags in the Pentagon because it would allow Spain to prohibit transit from its bases to "out-of-area" operations, most importantly those in support of Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force missions in the Middle East. As for the second issue, the Spanish government insisted on public statements by both countries that flights over its territory by U.S. nuclear-armed aircraft would not take place. The issue was touchy; in 1966 a U.S. Air Force plane accidentally dropped a nuclear weapon in southern Spain, which fortunately did not detonate. Haig warned that if the negotiations dragged on, the upcoming elections in Spain would result in a socialist government.⁶¹

Weinberger opposed conceding on either of these points because doing so would limit U.S. flexibility and create bad precedents. The limitation of transit on aircraft for operations outside of Spain would allow the government in Madrid to deny even routine flights. Public prohibition of overflights of nuclear-armed planes would encourage other NATO allies to demand the same treatment and would further encourage the European antinuclear movement. Weinberger suggested that Spanish demands, especially regarding the transit issue, were in reality an attempt by the Spanish military to force the Reagan administration to request increased U.S. security assistance from Congress.⁶²

Weinberger won the argument over the nuclear prohibition but not the transit qualifications. The U.S.-Spanish document signed on July 2, 1982, became an executive agreement lasting five years. The U.S. retained access to all four Spanish bases, but it agreed to a clause that limited its operational and transit rights. If the United States wanted to use access and transit for out-of-area operations, it would require prior authorization by Spain. The Spanish military did not receive the \$3.8 billion to modernize its armed forces but did receive a promise of U.S. "best efforts." The administration subsequently requested support for Spain from Congress in FY 1983: \$400 million in FMS, \$3 million in military education and

training, and \$12 million from the Economic Support Fund (ESF was a program of loans and grants designed to help nations ease the economic burdens of their defense budgets). The agreement became a Spanish campaign issue in October 1982 when the opposition socialists pushed back against U.S.-Spanish military cooperation. Spain elected Felipe González of the Socialist Workers' Party as prime minister, who formed the first socialist government in Spain since the civil war in 1936. Buoyed by an election mandate that opposed the U.S.-Spanish access agreement, the U.S. military presence in Spain, and entry in NATO, González froze Spanish integration into the alliance and negotiated with Washington a protocol to the July 1982 agreement that allowed revision if Spain choose not to remain in NATO. González promised a national referendum on entry into NATO in the future, but in 1983 he was in no hurry. In effect, González was content to let the Spanish public become accustomed to NATO and the U.S. military relationship with a policy of low-key engagement. The strategy worked. When the referendum was held in 1986, almost 57 percent of Spanish voters approved remaining in NATO.⁶³

Spain's immediate neighbor, Portugal, had been a charter member of NATO. In 1974 a progressive military coup overthrew Portugal's long-term dictatorship and heralded in a democracy. While the change in government was dramatic, Portugal's contribution to NATO remained the same. Portugal's value resided not in its military forces, but in its geographic location. Above all, NATO valued its air base at Lajes in the Azores. The JCS considered the United States' virtually unrestricted access to Lajes to be "a vital asset" that allowed U.S. forces to counter the Soviet submarine threat in the central Atlantic. In the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war or a major conflict in Southwest Asia, Lajes would also act as a transit point for thousands of airlifts and tanker sorties. The Joint Chiefs noted that the Beja Air Base on the Portuguese mainland was also a potentially valuable transit point for force projection into the Persian Gulf or Southwest Asia and suggested the United States seek access rights to it.⁶⁴

The Portuguese were aware of the value of these assets and the inability of their own armed forces to fulfil their NATO missions. In conversation with Weinberger during his visit to Lisbon, Portuguese officials proposed settling all U.S.-Portuguese military relations in one negotiation. Weinberger agreed and preliminary discussions began in April 1982. As the talks dragged on, the Portuguese denied a routine U.S. request for a refueling stop at Lajes. Reagan

expressed his concern and asked what could be done to help a “faithful ally” lest the pro-American government be weakened and the NATO defense posture in the North Atlantic damaged.⁶⁵

Responding for the Pentagon, Carlucci said, “What has the Portuguese most distressed is our intention to eliminate grant military assistance for them in the future, requiring them to purchase military equipment with FMS loans.” In effect, Carlucci argued that unless the United States provided inexpensive military assistance, unrestricted U.S. access to the Azores would be over. He proposed major increases to requests in FY 1983 and FY 1984 for the Portuguese Military Assistance Program and Economic Support Fund instead of FMS credits. Adding to the urgency of the matter, the U.S.-Portugal agreement for access to the Azores was to expire in February 1983.⁶⁶

Formal negotiations began in April 1982 for a renewal of the Lajes base agreement and possible U.S. use of mainland Portuguese bases, including Beja. These talks were interrupted by the Portuguese election of April 1983, which brought to power a coalition of the Socialist Party and the Social Democrats. When Congress failed to pass the FY 1983 foreign aid bill, the continuing resolution provided Portugal \$112 million in security assistance—\$37.5 million in monetary award program (MAP) grants, \$52.5 in FMS credits, \$2 million in International Military Education and Training, and \$20 million from the Economic Support Fund. In late December 1984 Portugal agreed to extend the Lajes agreement for seven years, based on informal assurances that the administration’s “best efforts” with Congress would result in \$125 million of U.S. military assistance per year. Given U.S. deficit and budgetary shortfalls, Congress appropriated only \$90 million for FY 1984 (\$37.5 million in FMS grants and \$52.5 million in loans) and \$105 million for FY 1985 (\$60 million in grants and \$45 million in loans). This shortfall disappointed the Portuguese military and government and required renewed attention in the second Reagan term.⁶⁷

NATO’s Southern Flank: Greece and Turkey

With Greece and Turkey, the old and intractable issue of their dispute over Cyprus complicated the Pentagon’s relations with NATO’s southern flank members. Weinberger and his team attempted to build on the 1980 defense and economic cooperation agreement (DECA) with Turkey by providing military assistance. With Greece, the United States had the difficult task of extending the 1953 defense

and cooperation agreement with a socialist government ostensibly intent on ending the U.S. military presence in Greece.

Maintaining good military relations with Greece and Turkey, NATO's two southern flank members, had proven difficult for prior U.S. administrations ever since Turkey invaded and partitioned Cyprus in 1974 to separate Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots. In Congress a small but influential Greek American lobby pressed U.S. administrations to provide Greece with diplomatic, military, and economic support while further seeking to punish Turkey by eliminating security and economic assistance. Although Turkish weapons and equipment were obsolete and in dire need of modernization, its large military forces were considered crucial to the southern defense of NATO, and Turkish governments were ready to work with the United States. On the other hand, Greek governments often proved uncooperative and even anti-American. In December 1980 the Carter administration successfully negotiated a renewed defense and economic cooperation agreement with Turkey, but left negotiation of a similar agreement with Greece to the new administration.⁶⁸

The U.S.-Greece DECA negotiations began in January 1981 and continued almost nonstop until mid-June 1981, when the pro-American New Democracy Party government of Georgios Rallis broke them off. With an eye on the upcoming elections in October 1981, Rallis held out for unrealistic concessions in the hopes of presenting the voters with a diplomatic triumph. When the U.S. side did not budge, Rallis considered no agreement better than one that would be viewed unfavorably by the voters. Greek voters gave the Panhellenic Socialist Movement under Andreas Papandreou a large majority, leaving the DECA to be negotiated with a leftist government that seemed anti-American. But when Weinberger met Papandreou in Brussels in December 1981 he reported that their discussion produced "a very good atmosphere." Carlucci visited Athens in October 1982 and Papandreou assured him that he had a "positive attitude and an intention to be as forthcoming and flexible as possible." At the Pentagon there was an expectation that several U.S. installations—Hellenikon Air Base near Athens, Nea Makri Naval Communications Station near Marathon Bay, Iraklion Air Force Communications Station, and on Crete the naval detachment plus 12 secondary U.S. defense installations—could be retained in resumed negotiations.⁶⁹

As a complicating factor, Greek workers at Hellenikon Air Base went on strike for better wages. The labor action escalated into harassment of U.S. personnel

even after the U.S. Air Force agreed to award the strikers large pay increases. In May 1983 the Department of State asked the president to approve a pledge of \$500 million security assistance to Greece annually for the five-year duration of the agreement. Perle told Weinberger that the total \$2.5 billion was a sum “that Greece cannot properly absorb and we cannot afford.” Weinberger agreed and informed NSC adviser Clark that such a total could “diminish our resources and our flexibility in the security assistance field.” The president had already requested \$220 million in FMS credits for Greece and \$220 million in FMS sales per year, but only if the U.S.-Greece DECA was successfully completed and his request for security aid to Turkey passed by Congress undiminished. Congress failed to pass foreign aid bills for FY 1984 and FY 1985, so the appropriations committees of the House and Senate resolved the issues by protecting aid for Greece based on receiving its traditional \$7 for every \$10 allotted to Turkey. Congress provided Greece with \$500 million in FMS loans for FY 1984.⁷⁰

The remaining major issues included preservation of “balance” in the region, a reference to the \$7 to \$10 ratio, a policy the DoD wanted to discard in favor of an even larger ratio for Turkey. Congress refused and the question became moot. Greece also demanded the right to take restrictive measures to safeguard its national security interests in a national emergency and a “verification” role for Greek representatives at U.S. facilities. None of these demands proved insurmountable. On September 8, 1983, the U.S. and Greek negotiators signed an agreement. A minor flap occurred just before signing. Papandreou had assured the Greek public that the agreement would end the U.S. military presence in Greece at the end of the five years. The Greek phrase in the agreement was “is terminated” while the English was “is terminable.” While both phrases were conditional and allowed for a new or amended DECA, for political reasons Papandreou wished to give the impression that the United States was being expelled in five years, thus easing its ratification in the Greek Parliament. The Pentagon asked for a change in the Greek language, but State considered it not significant enough to endanger the signing after long and laborious negotiations. As the first Reagan term came to an end, the Pentagon was mildly optimistic that, despite Papandreou’s often erratic behavior, U.S.-Greek military relations were relatively sound.⁷¹

At the Pentagon there was a definite bias in favor of Turkey, a staunch and supportive member of NATO with the second largest army in the alliance. But the DoD’s support did not automatically carry over to Congress. In the late 1980s

there were 3.5 million Greek Americans and only 20,000 Turkish Americans. There were no Turkish American legislators on Capitol Hill and certainly no Turkish lobby. As the Turkish Minister of Defense Haluk Bayulken told Carlucci, the DoD had to “sell” the U.S.-Turkish military relationship to Congress. It was a tough sell since the Turkish government was a military dictatorship and still occupied part of Cyprus. On the positive side, in November 1982, the military drafted a new constitution with broad powers for an elected executive and in November 1982 submitted it to the voters, who overwhelmingly approved it.⁷²

Turkey’s military forces were in dire need of modernization. Its Army was equipped with 1950s weapons. The Turkish Air Force possessed in 1981 only 78 modern fighter-bombers (F-4E Phantom IIs) in its total force of 450 aircraft. The Turks wanted F-16s and F-18s. Turkey’s 4,300 M48A1 tanks were in need of upgrades; Ankara wanted them converted to M48A5s and additionally asked for M60s. The Turkish government drafted a five-year armed forces modernization plan to be funded at the level of \$600 million per year by U.S. security assistance. Weinberger suggested that this request offered a “singularly excellent choice” for a multiyear security commitment. The president approved and the administration eventually requested \$755 million in military assistance (\$525 million in FMS credits and \$230 million in MAP grants) to Turkey for FY 1984. The administration hoped this would be the beginning of a multiyear commitment at approximately this level of assistance, but Congress reduced the FY 1984 security assistance to \$715 million (\$585 million FMS credits and \$130 million in MAP grants).⁷³

The Pentagon modernized Turkey’s armed forces while staying within congressionally mandated security assistance appropriations parameters in part by offering weapons and communication systems for the four new German-built Turkish navy frigates. The DoD provided kits to upgrade Turkey’s M48 tanks, 15 F-4E aircraft in addition to 5 purchased from Egypt, and offers of AH-1 helicopters and 160 F-16 aircraft. Until Congress decided the FY 1984 level of military assistance to Turkey, most of these offers remained tentative. With Congress’s decision to provide \$615.3 million in military assistance for FY 1985 (\$409.5 million in FMS credits and \$205.8 in MAP) and \$490 million for FY 1986 (\$177.9 in FMS credits and \$312.1 million in MAP), the modernization process began in earnest. For the rest of the 1980s, U.S.-Turkish military relations ran smoothly, with only minor bumps. The United States upgraded Turkish eastern airfields for

potential use by the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in a regional emergency. As it transitioned to democracy in the 1980s Turkey proved a supportive NATO member and key U.S. ally.⁷⁴

Looking at his first four years, Weinberger could claim a number of NATO accomplishments. Foremost was the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, which the secretary believed set the table for significant nuclear weapons reductions with Moscow. Weinberger's failure to convince the president to deploy enhanced radiation warheads to Europe was soon overshadowed by the successful deployment of these U.S. missiles. His championing of an advanced-technology strategy both for U.S. conventional weapon systems and those of the NATO forces proved a success. As for burden sharing, Weinberger failed to convince Congress that the allies were doing their fair share. His Pentagon burden-sharing achievements were modest, circumscribed by Bonn's unwillingness to assume more financial responsibilities. NATO's Long-Term Defense Program, which the Weinberger DoD team inherited, continued to lose momentum until it expired. Similarly, the effort to convince all the NATO allies to provide 3 percent real growth in defense spending per year proved unattainable. Nevertheless Weinberger made the point that burden sharing was more than just the amount a NATO country spent on defense. There were intangibles which the secretary used to try to convince critics that NATO members were doing their fair share. The two-way street of weapons purchases with European members of NATO, except for the deal on air defenses of NATO bases in Germany, remained a one-way street from the United States to Europe. MBFR proved a nonstarter, even with concessions the Reagan administration offered over the objections of Weinberger and the Pentagon. With Spain and Portugal, Weinberger and the Reagan administration walked a fine line. They convinced Congress to provide enough military assistance to obtain important base and access agreements. They accepted delay in Spanish integration into NATO until the electorate was prepared to accept it. As for Greece, the signing of the 1983 DECA with the Papandreou government was a successful tightwire act of convincing a leftist, anti-American government to accept a renewal of the base agreements. The Pentagon played a major role in expanding security assistance for Turkey and modernizing the Turkish armed forces, but it was unable to convince Congress to rebalance the 10-to-7 ratio more in Ankara's favor.

The ultimate question remained. After four years of the Reagan administration was NATO a stronger and more reliable organization than the one it inherited? The answer is “yes it was.” The primary reason was the deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe, which sent a message to Moscow that it could not use theater nuclear superiority to dominate Western Europe or drive a wedge into NATO. Other Reagan-Weinberger NATO initiatives were less dramatic and less successful. Still, the alliance, which began in 1949, outlived the Cold War and the Soviet Union. For that success the Weinberger Pentagon shared the credit with every previous Cold War administration whose commitment to NATO as a central pillar of U.S. national security remained steadfast.

The Middle East: Israel, Egypt, and Jordan

WHILE ALWAYS PROFESSING HIS SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was the most pro-Arab high-level member of the Reagan administration. This orientation often placed Weinberger at odds with other Reagan senior officials and even the president over U.S. policy towards Israel and the moderate Arab states, such as Egypt or Jordan, or the more conservative kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the emirates of the Persian Gulf. Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan came into office determined to strengthen the U.S. relationship with Israel. He knew that ever since the United States recognized Israel in 1948 American support of the Jewish state had been a tenet of U.S. foreign policy. Such support also made good domestic political sense. During the 1980 presidential campaign, Reagan's criticism of President Jimmy Carter's alleged hostility to Israel had proved an effective rhetorical tool for wooing an important segment of the traditionally Democratic Jewish vote to the Republican presidential ticket. Many prominent neoconservatives strongly supported a closer alliance with Israel, equating a strong relationship with a more robust U.S. Middle East defense posture. During the 1980 campaign Reagan emphasized his commitment to peace and stability in the Middle East but downplayed the significance of President Carter's 1978 Camp David peace accords. Reagan suggested that the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel had required too much pressure on the Israelis. As he told one audience, "While we can help the nations of that area move toward peace, we should not try to force a settlement upon them." Such statements helped convince both Jewish voters and Israeli officials that Reagan would be more sympathetic to Israeli security concerns than

Carter had been. Weinberger's pro-Arab orientation made him the odd man out in the administration and caused tension with Israel and its supporters.¹

The idea that Weinberger favored Arab states over Israel derived mainly from his work for the international construction firm Bechtel, which had won sizable contracts for construction projects in the Arab world—including oil fields, other large complexes, and the entire Saudi cities of Jubail and Yanbu. In the minds of 1980s liberal political commentators, Bechtel epitomized how corporations often served as willing enablers of authoritarian Arab states. The secretary received numerous letters from Americans charging that his Bechtel connection made him “inappropriately hostile to” or “a threat to Israel.” Weinberger stoutly defended his record at Bechtel, arguing that only a fraction of its global business (6 percent) concerned the Middle East. He also repeatedly noted that he had divested himself of his shares when he took office, and thus could not profit from their rising value even if relations with the Arab world promoted it. In response to a memorandum that suggested he not reply to insulting letters, he wryly scribbled, “I have *no* connections with Bechtel, sadly!”²

Nevertheless, once in office Weinberger did little to diminish his reputation as an Arab sympathizer. He consistently took positions with the administration's Middle East policy deliberations that could be interpreted as pro-Arab, if not anti-Israel. Weinberger endured vitriolic personal attacks from the public because of his Jewish heritage, a subject that tended to shake his otherwise calm and courtly demeanor. When one letter writer pushed him hard on his lack of support for Israel and his “typically Jewish” name, Weinberger responded, “I fail to see the relevance of my religion or that of my ancestors.... I am perfectly willing to tell you I was brought up in the Episcopal Church, my mother and her family were Episcopalians although she had some relatives who were Quakers. My father essentially was areligious, but notwithstanding was one of the finest gentlemen I have ever known. He had some Jewish ancestors. I am very proud of all sides of my family. I still feel, however, that such matters are essentially personal and irrelevant to public debate.”³

Of course, Weinberger rejected the charge that his Middle East policies were influenced by his religious background, psychology, or pocketbook. He summarized his conception of Israel's place in U.S. foreign policy with an oft-repeated sentiment: the United States needed “more than one friend in the Middle East.” In many respects it was a restatement of the Carter policy that saw moderate Arab

states as an essential part of peace and security in a strife-torn region. Cultivating more friends in the region was a sensible strategy for Washington but was also good for Israel. When later asked if he was an Arabist, Weinberger replied that the best the United States could do for Israel was “not to give them money or arms, but to give them friendly neighbors.” Thus Weinberger continued the close relationship with Israel but emphasized the need to add to that relationship by cultivating deeper ties with the Arab states as well. Nevertheless, he admitted, with retrospective understatement, that in light of his actions to encourage Israel to have better relations with friendly Arab countries, “strong Israeli supporters felt [his actions] weren’t sufficiently supportive.”⁴

Unfortunately, Weinberger’s contention that Washington needed more friends in the Middle East soured his personal relations with Israeli leaders and Israeli public opinion. It also exacerbated tensions between Defense and State, especially in the first year of the administration. Secretary of State Alexander Haig recalled Weinberger as one of “Israel’s critics within the administration.” Robert McFarlane, Department of State counselor under Haig before he moved to the National Security Council in 1982, charged that the defense secretary harbored an “animus toward Israel” that created problems with the bilateral relationship. One longtime Pentagon official with Middle East experience recalled that Israel characterized U.S. officials as either white hats (sympathetic to Israel) or black hats (hostile); Weinberger “was most definite viewed in the latter category.” A more sympathetic observer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Richard Armitage, recalled that Weinberger was frustrated by people in State and at the National Security Council who “thought that the interests of the government of Israel and the interests of the United States were compatible across the board.” He suggested that Weinberger, by contrast, valued Israel’s friendship and partnership but believed “that Israel, living in the neighborhood, had different interests that weren’t always the same as ours.” This was a “neuralgic” point for Weinberger, who often pushed back against assumptions that U.S. support for Israeli positions had to be automatic.⁵

Weinberger endeavored to shape U.S. Middle East policy toward a more balanced approach between Israel and the Arabs, pushing beyond the limits imposed on and accepted by previous secretaries of defense. He traveled extensively within the region and spoke within Washington’s corridors of power for the moderate Arab nations. The Pentagon chief exercised great influence in the

Middle East, where military ties were often as important as diplomatic ones. These bonds were important because U.S. military assistance and military sales to Middle East nations could theoretically change the regional balance of power.

United States–Israel Strategic Cooperation

Prior to 1981 the United States and Israel developed a special military relationship that consisted of arrangements, programs, informal bilateral discussions, and intelligence sharing. This informal connection waxed and waned, but in its totality constituted ongoing military cooperation. Foremost among these connections was a series of intermittent informal strategic consultations. Ever since 1976 a select group of Department of Defense officials had met informally with a few counterparts in the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MoD) to discuss strategic issues, joint contingency planning, and problems of mutual concern. Within the U.S. government, only the participants in the talks, the secretaries of defense and state, the national security adviser, and the president knew of the existence of these consultations. During Secretary Harold Brown's years at the Pentagon, Director of Net Assessment Andrew Marshall headed the U.S. side in these discussions. Marshall was selected because of his expertise in strategic analysis and his institutional separation from mundane questions of arms sales and military assistance. By the end of 1980, these U.S.-Israel strategic talks came to, in Marshall's words, "represent a kind of joint military research program on emerging political-military problems and on methods of doing military analysis and assessing strategic trends."⁶

Notwithstanding his openness to Arab concerns, Weinberger agreed with Haig in March 1981 on the need to reinvigorate strategic cooperation with Israel. State and Defense would conduct separate security-related dialogues with the Israelis. This meant not only State and Israeli Foreign Ministry contacts but also continuation of Marshall's staff-level strategic consultations with Israeli Ministry of Defense officials. Weinberger saw the focus of these talks as "the military balance in the region; long term trends ... that affect military planning; the impact of technology trends on future battlefield operations; exchanges of views of Soviet military doctrine; [and] force projection capabilities in the Middle East..." Haig insisted, however, that he have a State Department representative present at these military discussions. Weinberger agreed with the expectation that Haig would extend the same arrangement to the Pentagon in its consultations.⁷

The Israelis wanted these OSD-MoD talks to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Weinberger and Haig had anticipated Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's request. Neither of them wanted to be tied down in such a formal agreement, so they prepared a memorandum for the president outlining some concrete steps the United States could offer in lieu of an MOU. They raised the possibility that the president might want to move the sensitive Marshall consultations "from talk to action," but recommended not committing irrevocably to specific agreements. Instead they suggested some minor measures, such as sending a medical survey team to Israel to explore the possibility of pre-positioning U.S. medical supplies there, more U.S. Navy calls at Israeli ports, low-profile U.S.-Israeli naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, and providing Israeli defense contractors with \$200 million in Pentagon contracts.⁸

When Reagan and Weinberger met with Sharon and Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the Israelis asked for a formal MOU, as expected. During their subsequent meeting at the Pentagon, Sharon handed Weinberger a draft of the memo. The secretary described Sharon's draft MOU as "placing our tanks there [in Israel] & providing [an] air umbrella, etc." The secretary responded that the administration would consider it, but only if the actions were directed against the Soviet Union and not an Israeli neighbor. Furthermore, it would be difficult for the president to consider strategic cooperation, Weinberger told Sharon, as long as Israel was using its U.S. congressional contacts to defeat the sale of airborne warning and control system aircraft to Saudi Arabia (see chapter 10).⁹

After the Senate voted in favor of the AWACS sale on October 28, 1981, Weinberger approved Iklé's suggestion for a DoD-MoD working group to develop an agenda for strategic cooperation. The working group would also remove Sharon's unsuitable recommendations, such as pre-positioning U.S. armor in Israel or extensive new U.S. equipment for Israel's armed forces, that could be construed as directed against Israel's Arab neighbors. The U.S. working group met with its Israeli counterparts and the two sides fashioned some compromises. Still the Israelis pushed for a more robust MOU than the Pentagon officials were prepared to accept. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. These were Sharon's demands when he met with Weinberger in Washington at the end of November 1981. Weinberger, however, remained cautious and noncommittal, commenting, "I think we should tell them there is no agreement nor certainty that an MOU will come out of this.... We'll see at end of meeting—but no guarantees. If he doesn't want to come, so be it." Weinberger and his staff accepted the risk that Sharon might cancel his meeting. Such a development was preferable, in Weinberger's view, to acceding to Israeli MOU requests.¹⁰

Weinberger's tough stance was not appreciated in the White House and the Department of State, both of which wanted a U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation understanding for both policy and political reasons. Haig and Weinberger discussed Israeli expectations in their weekly breakfast meetings in early November. Haig followed up with a letter to Weinberger emphasizing the utility of the MOU and especially the sensitive nature of Israeli expectations. Claiming the Israeli government felt "beleaguered and unsure of the American commitment" after the AWACS fracas, Haig argued that an MOU was necessary, even though he also recognized "how sensitive this relationship is with respect to our moderate Arab friends." National Security Adviser Richard Allen stated that not only the Israelis but also U.S. senators who had voted with the administration on AWACS expected an MOU. He concluded, "We must work hard to ensure that the Sharon visit is a success," because there were "strong indications that if Sharon goes away empty-handed and the Israelis feel they have been duped by us, the prospects are for a very stormy period in the Middle East."¹¹

Weinberger's personal ambivalence reflected broader uncertainty about the MOU in most defense circles. No one in the Pentagon was as enthusiastic about the MOU as were the leaders at State or the NSC. To DoD officials the idea of a formal document was unnecessary because U.S. support of Israel was self-evident and longstanding. As the Joint Chiefs suggested, and Weinberger's OSD team agreed, robust strategic cooperation with Israel could cause trouble with moderate Arab friends of the United States. On the other hand, Iklé warned that if the DoD was too negative on the MOU, U.S.-Israel relations and Washington's ability to influence Israel could be damaged.¹²

Iklé alerted Weinberger that he was playing for "high stakes" in the MOU negotiations. "We want to encourage the Israelis to work with the United States

on the delicate and protracted search for peace,” Iklé stated. “We have to use the strategic cooperation talks as a leash, to hold back irresponsible Israeli behavior.” Iklé cautioned that the MOU should not become “a wedge between us and the moderate Arabs, or be misperceived by the Arabs as directed against them.” The under secretary for policy recommended “a *brief* and ‘harmless’ partial agreement,” signed by Weinberger and Sharon, that could be released publicly. It could include secret initialed or unsigned memoranda. Iklé framed the choice as an opportunity for Weinberger, declaring that the MOU gave the secretary a “pivotal” role in U.S.-Israel relations, both because “our relationship with Israel is, at core, a military relationship” and because of the preeminence of the defense minister over the foreign minister: “It is *your* counterpart (not Al Haig’s) ... who is the big bull in the pasture.” The resulting “heavy responsibility” was also a “major opportunity.... You [Weinberger] have the lead role in shaping the conditions for success or failure of the President’s Mid-East policy.”¹³

Weinberger endorsed the “brief and harmless” document—without secret codicils—which could be presented to the public and satisfy Israeli desire for a written agreement without overcommitting Washington. It would encourage



Secretary Weinberger and Israeli defense minister Sharon sign a memorandum of understanding at the National Geographic Museum in Washington, DC, November 30, 1981. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

regional stability without damaging relations elsewhere. At their meeting on 30 November, Sharon made a last-ditch attempt to strengthen the terms of the MOU. Weinberger refused to budge. After consulting with Haig, William Clark, and others, Weinberger convinced the Israeli defense minister to accept the final text in time for their joint press conference that afternoon. As Weinberger told the press, the MOU's "sole purpose" was to deter the Soviet Union in the Middle East and was limited to Soviet forces from outside the region. The MOU mentioned only naval and air exercises with Israel in the eastern Mediterranean, but not land force military exercises—these had been the subject of tough negotiations with the Israelis—on the grounds that the Arabs would interpret land exercises as directed against them. In discussions with the press the secretary asserted that the MOU "[did] not involve anything that would be incompatible with or contradictory to any of the arrangements, discussions, agreements, [or] plans we have with any of the moderate Arab countries." He viewed the talks solely "in the context of strengthening the entire Mideast region against aggression from the Soviet side."¹⁴

The final text was four pages long with five articles, reaffirmed "the common bonds of friendship between the United States and Israel" as well as their "mutual security relationship," and recognized "the need to enhance Strategic Cooperation to deter all threats from the Soviet Union to the region." The framework for "continued consultation and cooperation" was designed to enhance both bilateral and regional security. Emphasizing that it was intended as a defensive arrangement, the MOU envisioned military cooperation through a coordinating council established by DoD and MoD, with joint working groups holding regular meetings. The general fields of activity would include military cooperation and joint exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, the maintenance of joint readiness facilities, cooperation in research and development, defense trade, and the pre-positioning of resources.¹⁵

Even after the MOU had been signed, Weinberger continued to downplay its importance and exclusivity. Naturally the Israeli defense minister touted its significance. At a meeting with King Hussein during a visit to Washington in early November 1981, Weinberger dismissed Sharon's public comments as a "public relations gimmick which inaccurately inflated the talks." The MOU only aimed to improve regional security with "nothing to the detriment of others." Hussein and his prime minister, Weinberger stated, "were free to set the record straight with their Arab friends."¹⁶

As the Pentagon prepared to gear up the machinery of the MOU—the coordinating council and the joint working groups—the Begin government formally annexed the Golan Heights. During the 1967 War, Israeli forces had taken these strategic Syrian highlands, from which northern Israel had been repeatedly shelled. The United States had made it clear to Israel that it would not recognize the annexation since the status of the Golan Heights could only be resolved by Israel-Syria negotiations. Haig and Weinberger recommended to the president, who agreed, that while the administration should do nothing to interfere with the normal U.S.-Israel security assistance relationship, “there will be no further work with the Israelis on implementing the MOU on strategic cooperation.” Haig suggested, “We should treat this door as closed, but not locked, in order to preserve some leverage over Israeli behavior.” Weinberger completely agreed.¹⁷

Ironically, the MOU that Weinberger had sought to limit was suspended in response to Israeli action. Such a result, however, did not detract from the secretary’s efforts. Against considerable pressure from the White House and the Department of State to accede to Israeli requests for a robust MOU on strategic cooperation, Weinberger shaped the agreement to his requirements. Weinberger and the Pentagon fashioned an MOU that was general, harmless, public, and directed against the Soviet Union in the Middle East, not against Arab threats to Israel. Weinberger’s goal was to emphasize its connection to global U.S. interests and preempt Arab concerns that such a MOU implied support for Israel military action against them. Weinberger may have believed in the centrality of the U.S.-Israel relationship in U.S. Middle East policy, but he was not prepared to allow the MOU to sabotage his campaign for “more friends” in the Middle East.

The Israeli Attack on Osirak and Results

On June 7, 1981, during the ongoing discussions on the MOU, Israel launched a unilateral air attack demolishing the Iraqi’s Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad. With U.S.-made F-16 and F-15 fighter/bombers, the Israeli Air Force caught the Iraqis and the world by surprise. Reagan was at Camp David preparing for a visit from the Mexican president when he received the news, and his first comment in his diary was: “I swear I believe Armageddon is near.” His second: “Begin informed us after the fact.”¹⁸

The strike came after a long period of growing Israeli concern about Iraq’s nuclear program. Since Saddam Hussein had seized power in Iraq, Baghdad

had been ratcheting up both its plans to become a major regional power and its anti-Israel rhetoric. The war between Iraq and Iran, which began less than a year before (see chapter 10), further increased the regional stakes, as the Israelis worried that a victorious Iraq could become the leader of a new offensive against Israel. The Reagan administration was torn between the hostility to Iran shared by moderate Arabs and the U.S. on the one hand, and the general fear that the Iran-Iraq War would destabilize the region on the other. The Israelis recognized that neither side would be friendly to them. They nevertheless argued that Iran, being farther away and a non-Arab state, was less of an immediate threat. Israel tilted toward Tehran in the conflict.¹⁹

The Israelis claimed that their action against Iraq's nuclear facilities was measured and limited. To reduce civilian casualties they attacked on a Sunday. Israel's intelligence chief maintained that the bombing delayed the Iraqi nuclear program for "three to four years," allowing "the free world time to wake up to the Iraqi program and perhaps do something about it." Reagan instinctively sided with the Israelis, though he was not pleased by their decision to act unilaterally without prior warning. He faulted Begin for not consulting the United States (or France) and suggested that either nation might have removed the threat, but he also stated, "We are not turning on Israel—that would be an invitation for the Arabs to attack." Rather, he said it was "time to raise H—I [Hell] worldwide for a settlement of the 'Middle East' problem." U.S. law required a formal investigation into whether the Israelis used U.S.-produced weapons for offensive purposes contrary to the prohibition that they could only be employed for defense. But Reagan was unconcerned and intended to grant Israel a waiver because, he noted in his diary, "Iraq is technically still at war with Israel & I believe they were preparing to build an atom bomb." He denounced "Arab indignation on behalf of Iraq," referred to Saddam Hussein as a "no good nut" and concluded, "I think he was trying to build a nuclear weapon. He has called for the destruction of Israel & he wants to be the leader of the Arab World—that's why he invaded Iran."²⁰

Recognizing that a strong reaction either condemning or defending Israel promised nothing but trouble, Reagan and Haig carefully downplayed their responses. Haig, who had expressed relief and no small amount of pleasure that the surgical strike had resolved the Iraqi nuclear problem with minor casualties, informed Congress that the administration was examining whether "a substantial violation may have occurred" in the Israeli use of U.S.-made weapons for

offensive rather than defensive purposes. Nevertheless, at Reagan's instruction Acting Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel Jr. met with Israeli ambassador to the United States Ephraim Evron to assure him: "Nothing that has happened has altered our friendship for Israel and our commitment to it."²¹

The Israelis claimed that they had discussed the Iraq nuclear threat with previous administrations, especially in 1980, stressing the looming threat of the Iraqi nuclear program and referencing an imminent shipment of enriched uranium from France to Iraq. In mid-June 1981 Evron met privately with Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Eugene Rostow, an old friend. Evron provided Rostow with a memorandum, which Rostow read and forwarded to Weinberger. The memorandum claimed that on December 17, 1980, Evron had informed State Department officials of the danger of the Iraqi nuclear program. Prime Minister Begin made the same point to Carter's U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis. According to the Israelis, U.S. officials shared their concern. To Evron's mind this constituted virtual prior notice of the attack and suggested a tentative U.S. green light from previous administrations for Israeli military action. Rostow found what he learned "very disturbing" and warned Weinberger that it was "a time bomb." There was no indication that Weinberger and Carlucci, who both saw the document, considered it as potentially controversial as did Rostow.²²

Whether or not the Israelis cleared the attack with the Carter administration, Reagan's and Haig's sympathies primarily lay with Israel. Such was not true of the secretary of defense. Weinberger urged Deputy Secretary of State William Clark, Counselor to the President Ed Meese, and others to issue a "strong statement condemning [the] Israeli raid" and expressed his conviction that "we should be tougher in our reactions to such Israeli conduct." Haig recalled that unnamed members of the cabinet (i.e., Weinberger) wanted to take "strong, even punitive measures against Israel." The president did agree with Weinberger's recommendation to suspend delivery of four F-16s scheduled to be shipped to Israeli on June 12 and to charge the Israeli government storage costs. All other defense articles and services to Israel continued to flow according to normal schedules.²³

Weinberger then took the unusual step of announcing the F-16 decision publicly before the Israelis had been officially informed, earning a rebuke from Haig, who said, "Cap, you have an obligation to tell us about your concerns, but not to go public." In private, Weinberger and Carlucci took comfort from mounting public criticism of Israel, even from Israel's friends in the media. Carlucci sent

Weinberger a clipping of a *New York Times* editorial of June 9, which denounced the Iraq raid as “an act of inexcusable and short-sighted aggression.” Carlucci added a marginal note: “Cap, Note the *New York Times*—even the *New York Times*—criticizes reliance on military action.”²⁴

Weinberger feared that U.S. reluctance to condemn the Israeli action threatened American standing in the Arab world. When Haig circulated a draft report on the attack to Senator Charles Percy, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Weinberger urged striking out references to Israel’s need for self-defense, or any ameliorative language suggesting the Israelis might provide further information on their motivations. His edits left the letter focused on Israeli violations, the decision to suspend the F-16 delivery, and “the seriousness with which we view the obligations of foreign countries to observe scrupulously the terms and conditions under which the United States furnishes defense articles and defense services.” The final letter was not all that Weinberger wanted, but it was tougher than Haig’s original draft.²⁵

The Israelis were well aware that Weinberger was one of their harshest critics in Washington, but he was not alone. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis made an oral *démarche* criticizing the raid and its use of F-16s. Lewis described his talk with Begin when delivering the oral *démarche* as “ninety minutes of cold fury, alternating with aggrieved defiance.” Begin rejected the note, which he said “now precipitated the worst crisis in U.S.-Israel relations since Golda Meir rejected the Rogers Plan.” (Referring to Secretary of State William Roger’s 1969 Middle East peace plan.) Begin was “deeply hurt and insulted.” The raid was a “supreme act of legitimate self-defense’ for which he had no intention of apologizing.”²⁶

Ambassador Evron delivered an emotional letter from Begin to Weinberger in a tense meeting with the secretary on June 11, 1981. Evron claimed to be “personally taken aback” by the decision to suspend delivery of future F-16s to Israel. Weinberger responded that the administration “could not condone” an “apparent breach of the contract under which U.S. manufactured aircraft were sold to Israel.” The Americans did not consider the attack necessary because “the Iraqis weren’t anywhere near ready to begin production.” Brushing aside Evron’s assertion that the U.S. was acting too severely, Weinberger retorted, “If we didn’t take this action, it would appear to others as though we had no concern about this apparent violation of the law.” When Evron said he wished the Americans treated all their customers the same way, Weinberger bluntly responded, “We have

no evidence of violations by others.” The coldly polite exchange concluded with assurances of continued friendship, but there was no mistaking the secretary’s views. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]²⁷

The president’s decision to suspend delivery of the four F-16s raised a question about six more scheduled for mid-July. Officials at State and the White House expressed a strong desire to make that second delivery. The Pentagon argued for holding the line on the F-16s until the Israelis offered a public act of contrition. As Iklé saw it, “the delay of the four F-16s is entirely symbolic. All other deliveries continue openly.... What we need now is an explicit statement ... that it [Israel] respects US law concerning the use of weapons.” Without this admission by Israel, Iklé foresaw a “cycle of preemptive attack without strong grounds for self-defense by Israel.”²⁸

In mid-August Haig and Weinberger met to develop a joint memorandum for Reagan on lifting the F-16 suspension. In the end, however, Weinberger balked at a draft that did not explicitly link lifting the suspension to Israeli support for sale of U.S. AWACS to Saudi Arabia. Eager to get a decision before the president left for his California vacation, Haig decided to redraft the memorandum with himself as sole signatory and without the explicit linkage.²⁹

A week later the president agreed to resume the shipment of the F-16s to Israel. The lifting of the suspension on the four F-16 scheduled to be shipped in June opened the gate for additional deliveries. Four F-16s that had been scheduled for August and six that had been scheduled for July would be on their way. In addition the United States delivered two F-15 aircraft that had been on hold since August 11. The suspension was over; U.S. aircraft were once again flowing to Israel.³⁰

Weinberger had failed to convince his colleagues in the Reagan administration to react to the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor with the kind of sanctions he wanted. All he could achieve was a temporary, symbolic gesture. Nevertheless, his efforts to achieve tougher sanctions had made it abundantly clear to the Begin government that he was the harshest critic of their use of preemptive military action. Having the secretary of defense generally suspicious, if not ill-disposed to them, presented Israel with a major problem. The tension and mistrust between Weinberger and Israel would continue to complicate relations with the U.S.

Military Sales and Security Assistance to Israel


The Israeli reaction to the symbolic suspension of F-16s was a clear indication of how significant a role military assistance and military sales played in the Middle East. Israel would not have enjoyed a substantial military advantage over its Arab neighbors had it not been for U.S. military weapons and equipment, sold on favorable terms. In 1959 the United States began extending foreign military sales credits to Israel for the purchase of U.S. defense articles and services. These credits were guaranteed by the U.S. government at interest rates based on what the federal government paid to borrow money. In addition, Congress often subsequently released Israel from repaying a portion of these credits, effectively making them partial grants. In fiscal year 1982, for example, the U.S. gave Israel \$1.4 billion in credits for U.S. military sales and guaranteed \$850 million. Congress then almost immediately forgave interest and principal repayment of the remaining \$550 million. From 1959 to summer 1982 Israel received \$14.9 billion in credits from the United States, \$5.5 billion of which had been forgiven, and \$1.5 billion that Israel paid back with interest, either early or on time. The remaining \$7.9 billion was on a repayment schedule.³¹

The debate over how much aid to offer, and what forms assistance should take, consumed many meetings between Americans and Israelis. Reaching a mutually agreed-upon level of funding was a tender subject, as budgetary concerns collided with domestic politics on both sides to push Israel to ask for more and to make it difficult for Washington to say no. For FY 1983, Israel requested \$1.9 billion in FMS credits, half of them to be forgiven, and a further \$1.1 billion in economic assistance, with a further request to allow Israel to spend \$150 million of the credits on purchases from its own domestic defense industries. That was a 36 percent increase in FMS from FY 1982's \$1.4 billion, and also \$200 million more than the \$1.7 billion (\$500 million forgiven) in FMS credits and \$785 million Economic Support Fund aid proposed in initial Defense and State estimates.³²

The Israeli requests for financial and military aid continued upward during the first Reagan administration because of economic pressures on Israel and a sympathetic Congress. Israeli officials pointed to the growing gap in their balance-of-payments account, their shortage of foreign currency, and their heavy debt-to-service ratio, which they believed adversely affected their credit rating. The return of the Sinai to Egypt meant the loss of oil fields and the need to purchase

oil on the world market. The war in Lebanon (see chapter 9), according to Israeli estimates, cost \$1 billion in direct expenses and \$200 million in indirect costs. For these reasons, the Israelis requested for FY 1984 \$3.2 billion in assistance, of which \$1.97 billion was to be FMS credits, and \$1.25 billion in economic support funds. The Israelis requested that half of their FMS credits be forgiven and all their ESF aid be grants. Israeli arguments did not impress State and DoD officials, who submitted to the Office of Management and Budget an FY 1984 request for military assistance to Israel equal to that of FY 1983.³³

In reality, it mattered less what DoD and State recommended to OMB and



OSD/HO, based on data from *CQ Almanac*, 1982–1986

more what Congress appropriated. Israel had sufficient friends in Congress to assure that they would get the lion's share of U.S. military assistance. For FY 1983 Congress appropriated \$1.7 billion in FMS credits, of which \$750 would be in grants (the administration had requested that only \$500 million be forgiven) and \$750 million in ESF aid. In the next fiscal year, Israel received the same \$1.7 billion in FMS credits, of which \$850 million was forgiven. The administration had requested that \$785 million be in grants. For ESF for FY 1984, Congress appropriated \$910 million, \$125 million more than the administration requested. In FY 1985 Israel received \$1.4 billion in FMS credits (all of which was forgiven) and \$1.95 billion in ESF aid, although the administration requested only \$850 million. As Iklé confided to Weinberger, "Clearly, on Security Assistance *levels* [to Israel] Congress makes its own decisions which tend to be imposed on the Administration. But on the *rate of disbursement*, the Administration has far more control."³⁴

The complex U.S.-Israel security assistance relationship is best understood through example. A case in point was the Israeli desire to use U.S. foreign military sales credits and U.S. technology to produce in Israel a workhorse aircraft, the Lavi (Hebrew for *lion*), which would gradually phase out their mix of French Mirages, U.S. F-4 Phantoms, and the Israeli-built Kfir (Hebrew for *lion cub*) aircraft over the next 20 years. The Israelis planned to produce 400–425 Lavis to supplement their 200 advanced fighter aircraft force, which was composed of F-16s and F-15s. The Carter administration had agreed to coproduce an engine for the Lavi. What other U.S. high-level technology would be transferred to Israel for use in the Lavi and how the aircraft would be funded remained open questions.³⁵

The Begin government wanted the Lavi for a variety of stated reasons: to assist their industrial base, to support jobs for their aircraft engineers, to update their force structure, and as evidence of U.S. support for Israel. The DoD had doubts about the Lavi. It would not meet Israeli military requirements for the 1990s. Other aircraft, such as additional U.S.-built F-16s or F-18 Hornets, were better choices. The Lavi would require a large transfer of U.S. technology, which would eventually allow the Israelis to upgrade the Lavi to F-16 or F-18 capabilities. FMS credits for research and development phases of the Lavi would be against U.S. policy, which allowed FMS only for purchases of components manufactured in the United States. The Israelis also would probably request U.S. permission for

third-country sales once the Lavi was in production, thus competing with U.S. aircraft industries.³⁶

Yet the Lavi was a major objective of Begin's Likud government, a litmus test of U.S. support. While the Israelis were embroiled in the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and then the fighting in Beirut in 1983, the administration placed decisions on the Lavi on hold. In July 1983 Weinberger and Shultz provided competing advice to the president about the Lavi. Realizing its importance to Israel, Shultz recommended approving FMS credits for financing of R&D projects in the United States for the Lavi. Weinberger argued that for the money the Israelis would do better buying U.S. aircraft. Even if the United States limited its support to R&D projects in the United States, Weinberger suggested that "the ultimate result would be a major improvement in Israeli industrial capabilities," which would "compete with our own industry."³⁷

In late November 1983, the newly elected Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir of the Likud Party, and his defense minister, Moshe Arens, visited Washington for what Secretary of State Shultz described as "a crucial point in U.S.-Israeli relations and a crucial moment for US policy in the Middle East." After meeting with Shamir, the president went beyond Shultz's advice on the Lavi by making available \$300 million for R&D in the United States and \$250 million for procurement of defense articles and services in Israel for the aircraft program. The problem was that the Israelis never built the Lavi; they canceled it in 1987. Shultz recalled that while the Lavi "helped keep some high tech jobs in Israel.... In the long run it proved too expensive for the Israelis." Shultz admitted, "My advocacy was a costly mistake in terms of wasted U.S. security assistance funds. I was wrong, and Cap Weinberger, who had opposed the project from the beginning, was right."³⁸

The Lavi was just one of a myriad of security assistance decisions that the Reagan administration faced. It was, however, representative of the dichotomy between the Pentagon and its chief on the one hand and the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the White House on the other. Weinberger argued that decisions on assistance to Israel should not be made only on a cost-basis rationale or as a reward for good behavior. There were larger policy and political considerations to be factored in; yet Weinberger saw his role as providing a counterweight to these other considerations as he consistently argued to limit security assistance and technology transfer to Israel.

Security Relations with Egypt

Before President Jimmy Carter began his quest for peace in the Middle East, which resulted in the Camp David Accords in 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, U.S. relations with Egypt were cool. Egypt had been a Soviet ally that received all its weapons and equipment from Moscow. Soviet advisers trained and counseled the Egyptian armed forces. In 1972 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat ousted Soviet advisers from Egypt and fought the 1973 war with Israel without Soviet support and without access to additional Soviet military equipment or spare parts. As National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger successfully negotiated a step-by-step disengagement by Israel and Egypt after the 1973 war, relations between Washington and Cairo began to thaw. After 1973 Sadat cast his lot with the United States, but only during the Carter administration did Egypt receive substantial U.S. security assistance. As Sadat became invested in the peace process, the Carter administration increased military assistance to Egypt. In 1980 it was 80 percent of Israel's total, \$800 million versus \$1 billion;



Egyptian Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons in flight over the pyramids of Giza, June 1, 1983. *OSD Records*

combined security assistance to Israeli and Egypt accounted for half of all such assistance granted by the United States worldwide. As part of the Carter security assistance programs, the United States granted Cairo FMS credits to purchase U.S. weapons and equipment to rebuild and modernize the Egyptian armed forces. During this process of modernizing the Egyptian armed forces with U.S. weapons, equipment, and joint training, military and civilian defense officials forged relationships with their Egyptian counterparts.³⁹

The Egyptian military prized its Pentagon connections, and often emphasized Egypt's crucial role in preserving Middle East stability while citing threats from Soviet clients such as Libya and Ethiopia. The Egyptians believed they had received a commitment from the Carter administration that their FMS would keep pace with the Israeli's. Egyptian officials maintained that their government's decision to make peace with Israel had reduced Israel's security problems while magnifying Egypt's, and that they should not be left behind when it came to arms sales.⁴⁰

Reagan was committed to peace in the Middle East, even if he did not bring his predecessor's level of personal commitment. Certainly his results were less substantial than Carter's. However, the ties that the Pentagon established with the Egyptian military and Ministry of Defense during the Carter years proved durable. Weinberger and his deputy, Frank Carlucci, had every intention of continuing that relationship. They were fully committed to modernizing the Egyptian armed forces with U.S. weapons and equipment.⁴¹

As the administration prepared for President Sadat's first meeting with Reagan in Washington in early August 1981, the question was how much to offer. Weinberger and Haig proposed a substantial increase in FMS credits—to \$1.3 billion for FY 1983—as the first installment on a five-year program to modernize Egypt's armed forces. Under this plan, Egypt would initially receive 40 F-16 fighter aircraft, 4 E-2C AWACS aircraft, 500 M60A3 tanks, 750 armored personnel carriers, 8 HAWK antiaircraft missile batteries, and other support and equipment. In the National Security Council meeting on July 31, Weinberger argued for the increase by citing both the need to help Egypt modernize its forces and also to “prove that we treat our partners in the region—Israel and Egypt—on a relatively even-handed basis.” Carlucci seconded his boss by noting the “incongruity” when American officials visit Egypt and meet “officers very friendly to the U.S. who must rely on Soviet-provided tanks and MiGs for defense.” Haig



Presidents Sadat and Reagan on the South Lawn of the White House, August 5, 1981. *Reagan Library*

backtracked by expressing concern that such an increase in security assistance for Egypt would require drastic reductions in arms assistance to other U.S. allies. Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman expressed fiscal concerns. Weinberger, however, was unmoved, arguing that a public and formal commitment to increased aid to Egypt, presented to Sadat during his visit, would increase American security and its credibility in the region. The president concluded the conversation by noting that the NSC discussion had convinced him that security assistance to Egypt was really about “improving our own defense.”⁴²

Sadat arrived in Washington in early August 1981. In his meeting at the White House Reagan focused on the threat of Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya, but the president and Weinberger, who also attended, assured the Egyptian president that his requests for FMS credits for modern weapons and equipment would be sympathetically received. Egypt would receive \$1 billion in economic assistance, as it had for the last six years, and an increase in military assistance for FY 1983 to \$1.3 billion, with concessional terms similar to those enjoyed by Israel. The Egyptian president was pleased. He had hit it off with his equally affable American counterpart.⁴³

On October 6, 1981, Egyptian Islamic fundamentalists assassinated Sadat.

In Washington, the initial conclusion—wrong as it turned out—was that this killing was probably carried out in conjunction with a foreign government, most probably Libya. Sadat's tragic death mobilized Washington and ironically proved to be the Egyptian military's gain. Reagan ordered Haig and Weinberger to take steps to strengthen Egypt and the Sudan, also considered a target of Libyan subversion (see chapter 16). At the request of Sadat's successor, President Hosni Mubarak, the United States and Egypt agreed to undertake joint contingency planning. Most significantly, Egypt's FY 1982 security assistance program of \$900 million in FMS credits (virtually all of which had already been committed to pay for earlier orders of U.S. military equipment to be delivered within the next two years) was raised to the requested FY 1983 level of \$400 million. With this additional money the Egyptians could order more M60A3 tanks, F-16 aircraft, armored personnel carriers, and other urgently needed equipment. For the Sudan, FYs 1982 and 1983 security assistance, originally \$100 million, would be increased to \$150 million to allow for the purchase of F-5 aircraft, armor, artillery, and air defense equipment. Since Sudan teetered on the edge of defaulting on its external debt, the FMS credits would have to be on highly concessional terms or



President and Mrs. Mubarak leaving Washington on January 28, 1983, after their visit. *OSD Records*

forgiven. Carlucci ordered that deliveries of military equipment for Egypt and Sudan be accelerated.⁴⁴

While Weinberger had only known Sadat through their meeting in August 1981, he got to know Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, quite well. The secretary and the new Egyptian president held face-to-face meetings six times in either Egypt or Washington during Reagan's first term. Mubarak did not have Sadat's outgoing personality, nor did he have the bold commitment to peace that Sadat displayed. Nevertheless, Egypt under Mubarak proved a reliable U.S. ally in the Middle East and Weinberger came to appreciate him and his instincts.⁴⁵

Whenever Weinberger and his deputy secretaries met with either Mubarak or Defense Minister Abdul Halim Abu Ghazala, the level of U.S. military assistance to Egypt was always a prime topic. The Pentagon did not control specific levels of security assistance. The program was run by the Department of State in coordination with the DoD, which was in charge of its implementation. Furthermore, the actual level of assistance was decided by Congress when it appropriated funds for the programs. A reservoir of goodwill existed in Congress toward Egypt, based on the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which meant that as long as Israel received its funding, Egypt would get the next largest share. As Haig suggested at an NSC meeting, "supporters of Israel were generally sympathetic on Egypt arms issues."⁴⁶

During Weinberger's meeting with Mubarak in Alexandria, Egypt, on September 3, 1982—part of a Middle East trip to promote Reagan's peace plan announced on September 1—Mubarak "made an impassioned plea that we [the United States] do not reduce our contribution [of FMS credits] to Egypt." Weinberger assured the Egyptian president that the administration would do its best to secure congressional approval. Earlier in the year the secretary had told Reagan, "I am absolutely convinced that we must obtain the increases in our security assistance budget in amounts you requested for FY 83 and the FMS supplemental for 82.... A key example is the commitment to Egypt for an additional \$400 million in credits, \$200 million of which could be forgiven." When Weinberger met with Ghazala during a September 1982 visit to Egypt, the defense minister reinforced Mubarak's plea. "The \$1.3 billion level for FY 83 was a minimum.... Any lesser level," Ghazala claimed, would create a "critical situation" for the United States' "only true friend in the region."⁴⁷

Weinberger could not initially assure Egyptian officials on the level of mil-

itary aid; in 1982 Congress failed to pass FY 1983 foreign aid authorization and appropriation bills. Instead it funded economic aid, including military assistance, by continuing resolution. Although it took time, under the continuing resolution passed by Congress on December 21, 1982, Egypt received \$1.32 billion in FMS credits, \$425 million of which was forgiven, and \$750 million in ESF aid. Weinberger and the administration, with the help of Congress, had done well for Egypt.⁴⁸

For the rest of Reagan's first term this pattern continued. Congress passed continuing resolutions that earmarked military aid for Egypt in amounts slightly more generous than the administration had requested. In FY 1983 Egypt received \$1.37 billion in FMS credits, \$465 million of which was forgiven. In addition Egypt received \$750 million in ESF aid (the same as FY 1982). For the next fiscal year Egypt received the same amounts of military aid as the year before, with a small concession allowing Egypt to use \$100 million of its ESF as a no-strings-attached cash payment for programs, which did not have to be approved by the United States.⁴⁹

While military assistance was a good part of the glue that held the U.S.-Egyptian relationship together, there were other issues that the Pentagon wanted to resolve with Cairo. Two were left over from the Carter administration. Sadat had promised Secretary of Defense Brown that the United States could upgrade a military base at Ras Banas, pre-position supplies there, and use it in an emergency. The main attraction of Ras Banas was that it was in the easternmost part of Egypt, closer than the Sinai to the strategic Persian Gulf, the oil-rich desert kingdoms of the Arabian Peninsula, and Iran. The base was only 800 nautical miles from Iran's Abadan oil refinery, outside the range of Iranian tactical aircraft, and within the range needed to support combat operations in the Persian Gulf, provide a staging area for troops, and host pre-positioned supplies. It had ample space to accommodate B-52 operations. Developing this base to U.S. requirements would be costly—the estimate of \$350 million in 1980 was sure to rise. While Sadat had suggested the arrangement, he was unprepared to sign an agreement with Washington. Congress was unwilling to appropriate military construction money for the base without such an agreement.⁵⁰

Sadat had been leery about ceding the Egyptian territory for U.S. use because of domestic conservative and nationalist concerns about Egyptian sovereignty. Nevertheless in 1981 he informed Reagan by letter that the base would be available

to U.S. forces on a temporary basis in response to a request for assistance from a friendly Arab or Muslim country. Mubarak was even more dubious than his predecessor. Pentagon and State officials spent three and a half frustrating years, from 1981 to 1984, in intermittent negotiations and discussions trying to work out a deal to build the base and at the same time to convince a skeptical Congress to fund it. The Egyptians demanded control of the construction of the base and suggested limitations on its use, such as no permanent U.S. military or civilian presence, no cost to Egypt for permanent structures, Egyptian ownership of them, and full Egyptian control of administration. Pentagon ISA chief Armitage suggested that some in the U.S. government believed that these conditions on use and insistence on using Egyptians for construction of an extended runway, docks, barracks, and other buildings were merely a ploy to discourage the United States from building the base without having to directly refuse. The American embassy in Cairo saw Egypt's insistence on Egyptian builders as a difficult, if not insurmountable, problem. U.S. funding could not be used if the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers were not involved, and the Egyptian Corps of Engineers insisted on handling Ras Banas construction projects alone.⁵¹

Congress appropriated \$91 million in FY 1983 to begin construction, only to later rescind the money. Congressional critics found the cost of the project, which had now ballooned to over \$440 million, to be excessive and asked why the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula were not paying a share. After all, the base was to protect these Persian Gulf allies. Furthermore, Congress was unprepared to spend that kind of money with nothing more than a letter from the late Egyptian president. It wanted written assurances from his successor that the base would be there for U.S. forces to use.⁵²

Pentagon leaders became increasingly frustrated over the Ras Banas negotiations. In May 1983, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Iklé confided to Weinberger his "doubts about Ras Banas from the beginning when we inherited the idea from my predecessor, Bob Komer." He feared that a "viable Ras Banas" base "may burden Mubarak too much politically." Weinberger commented, "Let's give up Ras Banas and find a good real estate agent in Turkey to look for another place."⁵³

In July 1983 the Department of State sent National Security Adviser Clark a memorandum arguing that the impasse over Ras Banas could adversely impact overall strategic and military cooperation with Egypt. There were two possible

negative outcomes of Ras Banas. If Congress rejected Egyptian terms and cut funding for the base, the rejection could raise questions in Cairo about U.S. intentions in the Middle East. If the Egyptians were unwilling to accept U.S. compromises on their concerns about construction and U.S. use of the base, the Egyptian action would sour the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship. Against these two negatives was the prospect of agreement on Ras Banas. Without explicitly saying it, State suggested the odds favored the negative outcome. As for the rest of the strategic relationship with Egypt, State argued it was good. In August 1983 the planned month-long Bright Star joint U.S.-Egyptian military exercise would begin. An exercise involving F-16s was already underway. In addition to ongoing military contingency planning talks with Egypt, the Pentagon was already pre-positioning military equipment in Egypt at Site Mike (Wadi Qena). State's conclusion was that Ras Banas was not a necessity for a successful U.S.-Egyptian military relationship, and by implication it could be a negative factor.⁵⁴

Weinberger and his team had already given up on the base when the secretary met Mubarak in Cairo in October 1984. Weinberger expressed disappointment that the United States and Egypt could not agree on joint construction of the base. While U.S. law prohibited the use of U.S. military construction funds without direct participation of the Army Corps of Engineers, the secretary suggested the law might be changed. Mubarak bluntly told Weinberger that American participation in constructing Ras Banas would result in strong Egyptian public opposition that he was not prepared to accept. Mubarak stated that "all Egyptian facilities" were open to the United States if a friendly Arab or Muslim country requested military support, but a U.S./Egyptian-built base at Ras Banas was, to use the embassy's characterization, "on the shelf."⁵⁵

The second issue left over from the Carter years was transit of U.S. nuclear-powered warships through the Suez Canal. Increasingly, U.S. Navy vessels were nuclear powered; an Egyptian prohibition meant that these ships and their escorts sailing from the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, or Persian Gulf were required go around Africa to transit to the Mediterranean. Notwithstanding considerable efforts, the Carter administration failed to convince Sadat to allow transit. The Reagan administration initially had no better luck. The Egyptians always claimed it was not a political issue, but a technical one. They stated that they were unprepared for the possibility of an accident in the canal that would release nuclear radiation. They needed to be persuaded that

U.S. safety procedures were adequate. No matter how convincing the teams of U.S. technicians sent to Egypt were, and even though the United States agreed to pay for monitoring equipment, the Egyptians remained unpersuaded. The Pentagon convinced an Egyptian major general to tour the Panama Canal Zone and transit the canal on the nuclear-powered cruiser USS *Arkansas*, but to no avail. Although Mubarak assured Weinberger that transit “was not a political issue,” Pentagon officials suspected that politics was at the heart of the Egyptian decision. Mubarak walked a tightrope between his increasing relations with the United States and Egyptian conservative and fundamentalist opposition to closer ties with the West.⁵⁶

The situation changed in mid-1984 when mines began appearing [REDACTED]. The mines caused occasional and limited damage to shipping. The Egyptians were convinced that Iran and or Libya had deployed the mines and discounted the theory they were the remnants of previous conflicts. Egypt requested that the Pentagon deploy minesweeping helicopters to aid the Egyptian navy in clearing the mines. As a first step the U.S. Navy sent a mine countermeasure team to Egypt to consult and assess the situation. The United States then agreed to send a sea-based support ship, the USS *Shreveport*, with four helicopters to be joined by the minesweeper USS *Harkness*, already off Egyptian waters, to aid in the minesweeping operation.⁵⁷

Given this assistance, the JCS considered it an opportune time to request that Egypt allow a nuclear-powered U.S. warship to transit the canal. Weinberger agreed. The nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser USS *Arkansas* was currently surveilling the diesel-powered Soviet *Leningrad* and its support ships. When these Soviet diesel vessels transited the canal, the Egyptians reluctantly allowed the *Arkansas* to transit the canal [REDACTED]. The Pentagon hoped this would set a precedent, but Egypt still remained leery about such transits.⁵⁸

The difficulties over Ras Banas and the reluctance to allow transit of the canal by nuclear-powered warships did not unduly detract from the steady improvement in overall U.S.-Egyptian military relations during the first Reagan term. In early January the U.S.-Egyptian Military Coordinating Committee, the bureaucratic mechanism for growing defense cooperation, held its first meeting. As the secretary reported to the president, the United States had “already provided massive amounts of funds, hardware, and training to improve Egyptian

security” and was meeting their desire to replace their Soviet-made arms, which were “aging fast.” U.S.-Egyptian military exercises continued each year, especially in light of increasing saber-rattling and subversion from Libya’s leader Qaddafi (see chapter 16). At the Weinberger-Ghazala level, the Egyptians asked for high-technology weapons. While the Pentagon could not always accede to these requests, it usually found a less high-tech weapon equivalent. For example, the Egyptians pressed hard for the purchase of AIM-7M Sparrow missiles for use in both their surface-to-air Sky Guard air defense system and for their F-16 aircraft. The AIM-7M was available only to NATO allies, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The Pentagon was able to provide less technologically advanced AIM-7F missiles for Sky Guard, which were considered sufficient to protect Egypt against the threat from the Libyan air force. Of course, as noted above, security assistance to Egypt continued to grow during 1981–1984. By the end of 1984 the Egyptian armed forces were by no means fully modernized, but with generous U.S. FMS credits and cooperation from the Pentagon, they had made progress towards that goal.⁵⁹



Secretary Weinberger welcomes Jordan’s King Hussein in the Pentagon, December 21, 1982. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

Security Relations with Jordan

King Hussein bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was a man on a tightrope. Jordan had the longest border with Israel, which had occupied the formerly Jordanian-administered West Bank of the Jordan River since 1967. Since 1973 the Jordan-Israel border had been remarkably peaceful because of Jordanian efforts to prevent terrorist infiltration into Israel. Hussein had opposed the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which won him no friends in the United States. Most Jordanians were anti-Israel and anti-American, yet Hussein maintained secret contacts with Israel and [REDACTED] the United States. Hussein had fought a war against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to expel its leaders and fighters in 1970, but an estimated one-third to one-half of the population of Jordan were Palestinian refugees. Defense Minister Sharon and Foreign Minister Shamir of Israel promoted the idea that Jordan was the “Palestinian state,” not the West Bank. To make matters worse, Jordan had no oil and very little money. The Jordanian army, the famed Arab Legion, was high on spit and polish, but it required more modern weapons and better equipment. Jordan’s air force and air defenses were so antiquated that Hussein was getting ready to purchase Soviet surface-to-air-missile defense systems. Jordan was no match for its Soviet-supplied neighbor Syria, and even less of a military rival to Israel. Although no democracy, Jordan was the model of a moderate and responsible Arab monarchy. Many thought Hussein deserved help.⁶⁰

An early pivotal point for U.S.-Jordanian relations occurred when Hussein visited Washington in early November 1981 for his first meeting with Reagan. Prior to this visit, Jordan’s chief of staff, General Zayd bin Shaker, the king’s most trusted adviser and his second cousin, met with Weinberger as part of the U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission dialogue. The secretary informed the president after their meeting, “Your offer of special funding for Jordan, plus DoD standard equipment, and continuing military exchanges and exercises create a basis for trust and confidence which Hussein never had for Carter.” Weinberger informed the president that he told Shaker of the offer. Weinberger also maintained that “Hussein and the Arab Legion are security assets to the United States in a regional context.”⁶¹

Jordan’s armed forces had large military requirements and Hussein had larger expectations for U.S. military assistance in his meeting with Reagan and other U.S. officials. As a fighter pilot himself, Hussein wanted U.S. FMS credits so he

could obtain F-16s—"the world's second best fighter (after the F-15)"—according to Weinberger. The secretary suggested that the president would have to decide about the sale of F-16s to Jordan and make a commitment to Hussein to sell within the next few years. Israeli opposition would be hostile and well-directed. Haig opposed the idea based on the expected opposition from Congress and suggested promising Hussein only a "first-line air-defense aircraft."⁶²

A reportedly nervous Hussein met with Reagan on November 2. The president assured the king that he would receive "defensive weapons," noting, "It's going to be touchy with Israel.... If we don't they'll [the Jordanians] turn to the Soviets for them because of their fear of Syria." The next day, the king met privately with Weinberger and Carlucci, and they got down to defense issues. The secretary warned the king of the dangers of purchasing Soviet anti-aircraft weapons. Weinberger promised he would make "a personal effort" to meet Jordan's defense needs with I-HAWK, a mobile, medium-range surface-to-air guided missile; Roland mobile SAMs; and shoulder-held Stinger SAMs. Weinberger "would make every effort to guarantee early delivery." When Carlucci mentioned that any Jordanian purchase of Soviet SAMs "would necessarily complicate our efforts in Congress to get funding" for logistical support for Jordan's mobile force, Hussein smiled and asked if the deputy secretary would like a list of his complaints about Congress, especially its unwillingness to provide him mobile I-HAWKs. The deal had been signed with the Soviets and could not be reversed, the king maintained.⁶³

Weinberger remained true to his promises to Hussein in the face of Jordan's purchase of Soviet SAM systems and other equipment. In February 1982 he visited Jordan. He also visited Saudi Arabia and Oman, but not Israel. Weinberger stayed in Jordan for three days and spent 12 hours in conversation with Hussein. His report to the president was no less than a brief for U.S. military, political, and diplomatic support for the Hashemite kingdom. Hussein provided Jordan with "*internal stability ... maintaining tight control over the Palestinians.*" Jordan had received a raw deal from Carter, who reduced U.S. military assistance from \$136 million in 1976 to \$35 million in 1982 because of Hussein's public opposition to the Camp David Accords. Congress placed "severe (really absurd) restrictions of equipment for Jordan ... a mobile HAWK air defense battery was fixed in concrete and made immobile by Congressional act!" Why was the United States driving Jordan toward greater dependency on Iraqi and Soviet military assistance and equipment instead of providing them with a combination of F-5G and F-16

aircraft, air defense, and adequate military assistance? Weinberger returned to his Middle East theme: "The Jordanian case is a microcosm of the Mideast challenge to your Administration. The problem is how to develop an evenhanded policy in the face of powerful domestic lobbies whose goal seems to be to ensure that Israel can be our only friend in the Middle East." Finally, Weinberger made a plea for [REDACTED] to enable a battalion or brigade of the Arab Legion to act as a rapid deployment force to respond upon request to a coup or radical uprising against a moderate Arab government on the Arabian Peninsula.⁶⁴

As later refined, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To provide this assistance, Congress would have to approve.⁶⁵

Weinberger's visit to Jordan became controversial, not because of any formal agreements, but because of Weinberger's strong rhetorical support for upgrading the Hashemite Kingdom's status and his plea for more U.S. friends in the Middle East. While he followed State Department admonitions to avoid firm commitments, Weinberger's sentiments were obvious. He did little to hide his feelings when he publicly stated that F-16s and I-HAWK missiles were a possibility for Jordan. Press reports about his trip to Amman sowed confusion and friction with the Israelis. Begin complained to Reagan that he "did not understand why it was necessary for the Secretary of Defense to make worrying statements ... while he was visiting Arab countries that, but for one, are in a state of war with us." Haig later added, "Neither did I."⁶⁶

In the weeks to come, Weinberger continued to lobby for military cooperation with Jordan, eventually bringing State along with him. He and Haig recommended that at the upcoming Joint Military Commission with Jordan they propose sales of F-5Gs (later designated F-20s), a low-cost light fighter aircraft made by the Northrup Corporation for export, to upgrade the Royal Jordanian Air Force. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. In addition to the F-5Gs, the U.S. delegation would propose that Jordan purchase Stingers and laser-guided bombs. This trio would be in lieu of F-16s and I-HAWK air defense systems, whose sale would be deferred without prejudice for future consideration. Of course, these initial projected sales, except for the bombs, would require U.S. congressional approval, which Haig and Weinberger expected would be forthcoming after the 1982 congressional elections. The president approved the plan.⁶⁷

Congress, however, was not willing to allow such sales to Jordan as long as the kingdom refused to join the Middle East peace process. In November 1982, Acting Secretary Shultz and Carlucci informed the president that Hussein should be assured that the administration would notify Congress of its intention to sell 36 F-5G fighters in January 1983, but pushing the sale through Congress would be “difficult without positive movement toward peace,” and subsequent sales of F-16s and I-HAWKs would be “almost impossible absent Jordan’s participation in the peace process.”⁶⁸

The sale of F-5Gs, F-16s, I-HAWKs, and Stingers to Jordan were at an impasse. In May 1982 Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) offered a resolution urging that the United States “not sell advanced fighter aircraft, mobile anti-aircraft missiles, or any other advanced arms to Jordan under present conditions, in which Jordan continues to oppose the Camp David peace process.” Hussein could not make that leap given his Palestinian and Arab allegiances. Neither Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat nor the Saudis, who bankrolled Jordan, supported the idea. The sale of Stingers, which the administration had assured Jordan would obtain congressional approval, fell through in March 1984 because of Congress’s continuing anger with the failure of Jordan and Saudi Arabia to join the peace effort. Hussein did not help the cause when he publicly stated that the Reagan administration could no longer mediate between Israel and the Arabs: “You obviously have made your choice and your choice is Israel.... That being the case, there is no hope of achieving anything.” The inability of the Reagan administration to obtain approval for sale of any major weapon systems continued to drag U.S.-Jordanian relations downward for the rest of the Reagan first term.⁶⁹

There were very few positives in the relationship during this time. While Congress stubbornly resisted the Reagan administration’s plans to shift money between agencies to support the equipping of a Jordanian mobile deployment

force, in November 1983 it authorized, but did not appropriate, money for the program (now renamed the Joint Logistics Program). The Pentagon hoped it would be included in the FY 1984 supplemental appropriation. But when the Stinger sales fell through, Hussein asked that the program be placed on hold and the administration stood down the campaign to win congressional funding for the Jordan rapid deployment force.⁷⁰

The Pentagon did what it could to shore up its crumbling Joint Logistics Program by offering to pre-position limited supplies and equipment there for use by either U.S. Central Command or Jordan. In December 1983 the United States and Jordan signed an agreement to resupply Jordan in the event of the threat or actual outbreak of hostilities with Syria. While Jordan did not receive the weapons it needed, military assistance from the United States rose from the low levels of the Carter era. In FY 1984 Congress appropriated \$115 million in FMS credits and \$20 million in ESF aid for Jordan, although ISA chief Bing West, still trusting that Jordan would receive U.S. aircraft, thought \$300 million in FMS credits a must. Pentagon officials knew that FMS credits of \$115 million could hardly pay for the weaponry Jordan needed. To make matter worse, Congress passed a ban on the sale of sophisticated weaponry—defined as advanced aircraft, new air-defense weapons, or other new high-technology weapons—to Jordan. The president threatened to veto the entire foreign aid bill, forcing Congress to reduce the ban to a watered-down and nonbinding sense-of-Congress resolution.⁷¹

Weinberger and the Pentagon had tried to give Jordan, one of the secretary's "friends" in the Middle East, the security and weaponry they believed it needed. The effort fell between two stools: the steadfast opposition of Israel and its allies in Congress to advanced weapons for Jordan and Hussein's unwillingness to join the peace process. It was a frustrating experience that Weinberger would rather have forgotten. The evidence is his single wistful reference to Hussein in his memoirs as "one of the wisest and most courageous leaders in the Middle East."⁷²

Middle East Peace Efforts

Weinberger was never the point man of the Reagan administration's efforts to find a Middle East peace. That task was fulfilled by Haig and then Shultz after he took over at Foggy Bottom. Weinberger played a supplemental role, as was usual for a secretary of defense. When meeting with Arab or Israeli leaders he usually plugged the administration's efforts for peace. He was not a peace

negotiator. Usually, his role was to encourage, often by using arms assistance and sales, or at least the promise of them, to assure Israel or the moderate Arabs of U.S. support and nudge them towards peace. After the completion of Israel's scheduled withdrawal from the Sinai on April 25, 1982, Reagan's Middle East team got down to serious peace business. The successful withdrawal completed the territorial transfers agreed upon at Camp David. The president sent Haig and Weinberger a strategy on how to relate to Israel over the coming months. Above all, Reagan suggested, the United States must restore Israel's confidence. Notwithstanding short-term disagreements, the United States had a strategy for regional peace that acknowledged and respected Israel's security. The president enjoined Weinberger to use defense cooperation with Israel to reinforce the message. Haig responded to the president that the United States must be the sole outside power able to move the Middle East to peace and must convince its friends, Israel and the moderate Arabs, that it could protect their interests in the peace negotiations and an eventual settlement.⁷³

The immediate threat to this peace policy was Lebanon, where a complex civil war raged. Palestine Liberation Organization forces, Syrian units stationed in Lebanon, and their Lebanese Muslim allies fought Christian militias and the Lebanese National Army. In early June 1982 the Israel Defense Forces invaded Lebanon, ostensibly to create a buffer zone against terrorism; soon the military action blossomed into a full-scale invasion that led to the western gates of Beirut (see chapter 9). In the midst of the Lebanon crisis, Reagan fired Haig and replaced him with George Shultz. Always a difficult and prickly colleague, Haig had ruffled too many feathers among the Reagan inner circle. At the urging of his wife, Nancy, and his longtime aid and virtual surrogate son, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, Reagan finally acted. As Shultz waited to assume his new job and then during his first six weeks as secretary, he talked to experts and thought long and hard about peace in the Middle East. He worked with the president to fashion a Middle East peace initiative that would be unveiled to coincide with what was hoped to be an end to the conflict in Lebanon, allowing the PLO to depart.⁷⁴

On September 1, 1982, the PLO successfully and peacefully departed Beirut under the eyes of a multinational peacekeeping force of U.S. Marines and French and Italian soldiers. On the same day the president announced his peace initiative, which endorsed the idea of a five-year test period of Palestinian autonomy over their own affairs in the West Bank and Gaza and an immediate freeze on

Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. Rather than supporting an independent Palestinian state or Israeli annexation of the territories, Reagan called for negotiations between the parties that would result in self-government by the Palestinians in association with Jordan. The Reagan plan reinvigorated the concept of return of occupied lands in return for peace and security for Israel and left the thorny question of an undivided Jerusalem for further negotiations.⁷⁵

The Israelis soon got wind of Shultz's plan. A few days before the president made his announcement, the State Department formally alerted the Begin government. The response from Israel was completely negative, with the Israeli cabinet rejecting the initiative before it was made public. Weinberger had convinced the White House to allow him to travel to Beirut to congratulate the marines as they left after their successful mission. Weinberger became the first U.S. cabinet member to visit Israel after the peace initiative was made public. It was a thankless task. In Jerusalem, Begin harangued him. Foreign Minister Shamir tried to focus the process on a formal treaty of peace between Israel and Lebanon. The Israelis lamented that the Reagan initiative had prejudiced the outcome of the peace process. Reagan was asking Israel to yield territory, thus threatening its security. Defense Minister Sharon spent an hour and a half briefing Weinberger on security threats to Israel—terrorism, the confrontational Arab States, and the Soviet Union—and then took him for a two-hour tour of Israeli defense plants. For the rest of a long day, Sharon flew the secretary by helicopter to overview and land at Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Golan Heights. When the secretary asked him if it was a “coincidence” that the settlements were on the high ground, often overlooking major roads, Sharon answered directly that it was for military reasons. In a late report to the president, Weinberger suggested that the Begin reaction to Reagan's peace proposal was negative, “a reaction which is strongly criticized by some in Israel and several here in Egypt.” Weinberger assured the president that the regional reaction to his peace initiative was “excellent,” and the Israelis would come to recognize that it offered them the best hope for future security and peace in the Middle East.⁷⁶

Weinberger next traveled to Egypt to meet with Mubarak and Egyptian leaders, all of whom were sympathetic to the Reagan initiative. He ended his trip in London with a meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In his reports to Washington, Weinberger was clearly overoptimistic, either seeing more support for the peace initiative than there actually was or trying to encourage

his boss that the effort had not been in vain. What Weinberger could not foresee was that the Lebanon situation, which seemed so hopeful as the U.S. Marines left Beirut after the departure of the PLO, would quickly degenerate into more fighting, a return of the multinational peacekeeping force, and eventual tragedy.

The Revival of Strategic Planning with Israel

By early 1984 the Lebanese National Army, under pressure from Syrian-backed Muslims and Druse militias, had virtually disintegrated as a fighting force. The U.S. and other members of the multinational peacekeeping force withdrew from Beirut in late February and March 1. The mission had failed. Even before the dénouement of the Lebanese peacekeeping debacle, the Reagan administration began to revisit its relationship with Israel. In late November 1983, in anticipation of a visit by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, Reagan directed immediate “expanded political-military consultations with the GOI [government of Israel],” stating, “Our objective is to undertake combined military planning” to protect against “Soviet-Syrian threats.” Consultation should produce operational plans, access and support agreements for U.S. forces and equipment that could be deployed to Israel, and military exercises to prepare for such deployment. While the directive did include an expectation that Israel support U.S. military cooperation and assistance to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it insisted that Israel not impede them.⁷⁷

As a result of the Shamir visit and the Reagan directive, Israel and the United States formed the Joint Political Military Group (JPMG), a requirement of the U.S.-Israel MOU which had been placed in abeyance after the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. Weinberger remained dubious of the JPMG, fearing that its parameters were too broad, and suggested that the next Israeli government, expected to be led by the Labor Party, might be more forthcoming. The secretary asked what the United States was getting from the Likud government in return for this cooperation. At least, Weinberger suggested, Israel should support in the U.S. Congress the Joint Logistics Program with Jordan. The JCS agreed that the JPMG was in danger of expanding beyond the goal of deterring Soviet expansionism in the Near East and South Asia by going “much deeper into military-to-military cooperation” than was appropriate for the first meeting.⁷⁸

The JPMG held its initial meeting in Washington in late January 1984 and then met in Tel Aviv in March. The two sides discussed a number of possible military scenarios related to a U.S.-Soviet conflict in the Eastern Mediterra-

nean and potential Syrian attacks on Israel, Lebanon, or Jordan. The reaction of friendly Arab states was predictable. Egypt threatened to boycott the annual U.S.-Egyptian military exercise Bright Star. The Saudis strongly criticized such cooperation with Israel. As suggested by the president, the U.S. delegation to the military group reiterated the U.S. commitment to security relationships with moderate Arab states [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁷⁹

In October 1984 Weinberger visited Israel to meet with members of the new national unity government headed by Labor Party leader Shimon Peres. Weinberger had been eagerly anticipating Peres becoming prime minister because of his more moderate views on relations with the Palestinians and Arab states. Weinberger's report to the president on his trip was upbeat about U.S.-Israel military cooperation and the prospects for peace. Peres warned Weinberger that Syria had to be part of the solution in Lebanon. Weinberger told Peres that "Jordan holds the key to the solution on the West Bank." Peres agreed that Jordan's participation in the peace process "was absolutely crucial." Negotiations with Hussein and Jordan were far preferable to talks with Arafat and the PLO. Weinberger assured Reagan that Israel was ready to withdraw from Lebanon, provided it could secure its northern border. Weinberger judged that Israel was primed for an overall Middle East peace. "We need to capitalize on this opportunity quickly," Weinberger told the president.⁸⁰

The JPMG talks were part of an overall strategy to assure Israel of U.S. support and allow it to make peace. Yet the talks moved slowly. At the end of 1984 they were on the verge of producing a host nation support and pre-positioning agreement—it was signed on January 30, 1985—but there were no DoD funds to implement it. The two sides had begun limited noncombat combined military exercises. The revival of strategic cooperation with Israel was more than symbolic, but it resulted only in a limited number of exercises, exchanges, and agreements. While Weinberger trusted that such cooperation would provide a sense of security to Israel, especially the Peres government, he still believed that the best hope for a better future for U.S. policy in the Middle East remained with his policy of "more friends."⁸¹

Looking back on his first four years in office, Weinberger could take some comfort that his "more friends" policies had enjoyed partial success. The relationship

with Egypt remained strong and prospered, bolstered by U.S. military assistance and arms sales, but Mubarak was more cautious than Sadat. Had Sadat not been assassinated, would peace between Israelis and Palestinians been more likely? This is one of those historical conjectures that can never be answered. Having made its peace with Israel, Mubarak's Egypt was unwilling to provide the kind of leadership Sadat had displayed during the last years of his life. Jordan was another story that was even more frustrating for Weinberger. No matter how he and the administration tried, they could not obtain from Congress approval for the kinds of arms and military support Jordan needed to give it the confidence required to meet the Syrian threat and to make peace with Israel. As a result, Hussein, Weinberger's key to peace between Palestinians and Israelis on the West Bank, remained dubious about U.S. intentions and on the sidelines during the peace process.

As for Israel, Weinberger had proven over and over again that he was no friend to the Begin government, but neither was he a foe. He believed he was recommending a more evenhanded Middle East policy. That outlook, not shared by others in the Reagan team, limited his impact on U.S.-Israeli policy. His attempts to place real sanctions on Israel for bombing Iraqi nuclear facilities or annexing the Golan Heights resulted in only slaps on the wrists of the Begin government. Any attempt to use the level of military assistance, especially FMS credits, was out of the question, given Israel's friends in Congress. Weinberger incurred a lot of criticism, some of it personal and hurtful, for his approach to Israel, yet he bore it stoically. Only when Shimon Peres took over did Weinberger see any glimmer of a chance for peace in the Middle East, but that goal was not to be realized any time soon.

Lebanon: Into the Cauldron

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DEPLOYED ARMED FORCES into combat situations on four occasions during its first term. Once in Grenada as a liberating force, twice in Lebanon as part of multinational peacekeeping operations, and once into the Gulf of Sidra to contest Libyan claims to territorial waters beyond the 12-mile international territorial limit. The operations in Grenada, the first deployment to Lebanon, and the brief air combat with Libya, although not without problems, proved successful. During the second Lebanon deployment, on October 23, 1983, terrorist suicide bombers killed 241 U.S. marines, sailors, and soldiers assigned to the peacekeeping force and 58 French soldiers of the contingent force. The U.S. peacekeepers then remained in Lebanon until February 1984. While taking an increasingly active role in guarding the airport environs and responding to attacks on them from antigovernment forces, the U.S. Marine contingent of the Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF) suffered additional deaths and casualties after October 23. In the end, their mission failed and the Reagan administration ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

From the beginning, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, his Pentagon staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed dispatching U.S. forces to Lebanon in a peacekeeping role. This resistance stemmed from the conviction that the insertion of U.S. forces without a clear mission into the fragile state of Lebanon was a mistake. Lebanon was hardly a nation, but a conglomeration of rival warring factions: Maronite Catholic Christians, Shi'a and Sunni Muslims, Druze, Syrians, and Palestinians. Along Lebanon's southern border Israel supported a Christian regime in order to establish a buffer zone to protect against Palestinian

attacks. When Palestinians shelled northern Israel, Israelis responded by bombing Palestinian targets. The Syrian Armed Forces occupied the Beqaa Valley of Lebanon and parts of the north and played a dominant role in Lebanon's tangled factional politics. Within the Lebanese government, the Christian president, Elias Sarkis, was a nonentity, his writ extending at best to the presidential palace and a few ministries in Beirut, a city dominated by the fighters of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Shi'a militias. The Lebanese government suffered from a basic flaw: it had been cast in stone in 1943 and had not changed since. Its political structure, the so-called confessional system, was based on the census of 1932 and gave six seats in parliament to the then-majority Christians for every five seats granted to Muslims. The president had to be Christian, and the prime minister Muslim. By 1981 Christians were only 28 percent of the population, while Muslims comprised 44 percent. The unrepresented Palestinian refugees and their descendants formed another major group, totaling 15 percent of Lebanon's population. The remaining 13 percent were Druze (7 percent) and non-Arab Christians and Jews (6 percent). The disconnection between the mandates of 1932 and the realities of 1981 was a recipe for disaster. The Lebanese Army was a shell, a bystander in an ongoing civil war among Lebanon's multiple sectarian groups. Such was the situation the Reagan administration inherited when it took office in January 1981.¹

Lebanese factions had been at odds for decades. In 1958 the Eisenhower administration sent troops ashore in Beirut to prop up the government against what was then perceived to be Arab radicalism. The U.S. troops met no resistance as they stormed the beach, and they found few radicals. Lebanon remained relatively calm for almost two decades, but the Jordanian civil war of 1970 that drove Palestinians into Lebanon and the rise of local Muslim militias changed the situation. In 1975 Lebanon invited Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad to restore order and end the fighting between Palestinians and Christians. Once in Lebanon, however, Syrian forces remained and became yet another faction in the ongoing conflict within Lebanon. In July 1981 the U.S. Department of State, with the help of Saudi Arabia, arranged a cease-fire in Lebanon that temporarily eased the fighting, but it was not a solution, only a respite.²

First Deployment of the Multinational Force and Evacuation of the PLO

The situation in Lebanon deteriorated in the spring of 1981. Israel shot down


a Syrian helicopter that had been supporting Syrian forces fighting Maronite Christians. Syria responded by deploying Soviet-made SA-6 antiaircraft units in Lebanon's Beqaa Valley. In summer 1981 Israeli aircraft attacked Palestinian forces that had been shelling northern Israel with rockets and artillery, killing more than 500 fighters. Fearing that such continued violence would endanger the mission of the newly created U.S. Central Command, responsible for the Middle East (see chapter 6), Weinberger and Haig encouraged Reagan to find a diplomatic settlement. In autumn 1981 Reagan tapped Ambassador Philip C. Habib, himself of Lebanese Christian heritage, to travel to Lebanon as the U.S. negotiator. Habib shuttled from Israel to Lebanon to Syria hoping to resolve the conflict. Habib's efforts resulted in the temporary cease-fire of July 1981, but the expectation in the Pentagon was that it would not last. By early 1982 all parties expected a major Israeli attack against the Palestinians in Lebanon, but with a PLO provocation that Israel would use to justify its action.³

In spring 1982 the Reagan team began to consider how to respond to an Israeli invasion. Weinberger and his policy team took a hard stance against Israel's Lebanon operations. The head of the DoD's Office of International Security Affairs, Bing West, warned Weinberger that Palestinian nationalism could not be snuffed out by destroying the Palestinian Liberation Organization's infrastructure. Weinberger recommended to Reagan that Israel be warned: U.S. arms deliveries would be stopped if the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon. Such toughness did not appeal to Haig and his colleagues in State, who preferred to issue "stern but non-specific warnings," lest the Israelis "spin out of control." Furthermore, State believed Israel incapable of mounting an invasion for some time without U.S. support. While not able to obtain the promise of an arms embargo within the NSC policy process, ISA reported that it convinced the State and NSC staffs to accept the idea of negative as well as positive incentives to convince Israel not to invade.⁴

Before the president could approve this policy, IDF armor and infantry invaded southern Lebanon on June 6, 1982, pushing back PLO and Syrian forces. Israel's justification for the invasion was the shooting and wounding of their ambassador to Great Britain, Shlomo Argov. The Israeli ambassador's attackers were members of a Palestinian group opposed to Yasser Arafat's leadership of the PLO, which suggested to Weinberger that this was an anti-Arafat provocation. As he made clear in his memoirs, Weinberger believed the Israelis had an ulterior motive for

their invasion: to destroy the PLO organization and its army in Lebanon in order to deflate the national aspirations of Palestinians living under Israeli control on the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip.⁵

On June 9 the Department of State prepared a draft paper on how to proceed. The paper's basic approach was that the United States should seek Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in a way that protected Israel's northern border by interposing a peacekeeping force, preferably by expanding the existing UN presence



Religious and ethnic groups in Lebanon, 1982. OSD/HO, based on a CIA report

augmented by U.S. forces. Weinberger's policy staff roundly criticized the strategy paper as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Furthermore, the paper's recommendation to commit U.S. forces as peacekeepers in Lebanon was anathema within the Pentagon. Assistant Secretary West, Under Secretary for Policy Fred Iklé, and the Joint Chiefs all agreed that it would be a mistake to dispatch U.S. troops in a peacekeeping role into a volatile country like Lebanon. Defense Department opposition headed off consideration of sending U.S. troops to Lebanon for the time being. The draft State Department paper went to the White House as a "preliminary think piece" produced through the interagency process but not approved by the interagency Special Situation Group. Still, Weinberger and the DoD insisted on an addendum, which was written as a dissent. The addendum stated that U.S. objectives were not always aligned with Israel's, the paper was too optimistic about the U.S. ability to control the situation in Lebanon, and its drafters had discounted the role of the PLO ("the heart of the problem"). Most importantly, the DoD stated it could not endorse a role for U.S. forces as peacekeepers. Lebanon was too chaotic.⁶

The IDF moved north along the Lebanese coast towards Beirut, rolling back the PLO and destroying Syrian tanks and infantry. The Israeli Air Force then attacked and destroyed 26 Syrian SAM batteries in the Beqaa Valley and shot down 86 Syrian aircraft without Israeli losses; journalists dubbed it the "Beqaa Valley Turkey Shoot." The Israelis used F-15s, F-16s, F-4s, Hawkeye AWACS, and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles—all weapons provided by the United States with the stipulation that they only be deployed for defense—to great effect. In early July Habib asked Haig, who had been fired as secretary of state but was still running the department until his successor could be confirmed, to insist that Israel's prime minister, Menachem Begin, promise to not send troops into Beirut and to allow diplomacy to continue. If Begin refused, Habib recommended stopping U.S. military supplies to Israel. According to Shultz, Haig turned Habib down. Weinberger had made the same recommendation as Habib on June 6. As he wrote in his diary, "I urged that Habib tell Israelis that there would be sanctions on them unless they withdrew and agreed to a conference." Haig maintained that diplomacy still had a chance and that he was on the verge of a breakthrough. He also explored with the French a plan to send a U.S. and French peacekeeping force into Beirut.⁷

There was little doubt where the Pentagon chief stood on Israeli action in Lebanon. He publicly compared the Israeli invasion to Argentina's just-defeated invasion of the Falklands. Begin later complained about the comparison when he met with the president in Washington on June 21. Weinberger worried, as he told Haig, that "the Israelis will enter Beirut and massacre [the] Palestinians." Clark briefed the president on the differences between DoD and State: "Cap and his advisers, including the JCS, want to use U.S. Military assistance as a lever to extract concessions from Begin on Israeli withdrawal." State was "not inclined to use the denial of U.S. arms as leverage against Begin." The DoD had "strong criticism of the [State] suggestion that the United States provide military forces for peacekeeping in Lebanon." The chairman of the JCS, General John Vessey, speaking for himself and the other chiefs, warned the secretary of defense "that the dangers and potential cost to the US far outweigh the advantages of using US forces in a peace keeping role ... we might be pouring burning gasoline ... rather than putting oil on troubled waters." Vessey asked Weinberger to pass this advice to the president. The secretary did so, but the president was inclined to allow a U.S. peacekeeping role.⁸

Reagan's inclination stemmed in part from the deteriorating situation in Beirut. The IDF stood just outside the western part of the city and had shut off the water and electricity. The Israeli siege had pounded West Beirut for weeks. In Washington the president was having second thoughts about the Israeli siege. As he asked a visiting Begin on June 21, did the "savage assassination attempt [of Ambassador Argov] ... warrant the retaliation which had taken so many lives in Lebanon." While Reagan deplored the Israeli "overkill," he still hoped, as he wrote in his diary, that the invasion "may turn out to be the best opportunity we've had to reconcile the warring factions and bring along peace after 7 years." The PLO realized that time was running out. On July 2 Arafat agreed in principle to leave Lebanon. The government of Lebanon asked for a multinational force to oversee the withdrawal. Since the Israelis would not accept a UN force, which they believed would be biased against them, it would have to be Europeans and Americans. Haig agreed to U.S. participation but recommended keeping the decision quiet. Notwithstanding opposition from Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs, the president agreed in principle in the hopes that this would defuse the situation and lead to the elusive peace the president had hoped for.⁹

Weinberger was not happy with Reagan's decision. As he told NSC adviser Clark, if the PLO exited Lebanon by the Beirut-Damascus road (one of the many exit options being considered), there was "no real need for US forces." The French and Italians could handle it. If the president still insisted on U.S. participation, Weinberger thought it "should be very limited role, around the airport to get PLO leadership out—a 3 day job." Clark promised to pass this recommendation to the president, then vacationing in Santa Barbara. Hopeful that U.S. participation in a multinational force could ease the situation, Reagan was not willing to limit the U.S. role that sharply.¹⁰

Getting the Israelis and Palestinians to agree on the mechanics for a withdrawal proved difficult. Few nations wanted to give sanctuary to the PLO leaders and fighters. A number of uncertainties remained. Who would arrange and pay for the evacuation? Could the PLO take its heavy weapons and other equipment? The Begin government initially maintained that the multinational force could not be deployed until the PLO left. U.S. officials dismissed this demand as ridiculous. The multinational force would be there to protect the PLO evacuation. Israel maintained pressure by shelling PLO positions and advancing tanks on the southern suburbs of Beirut.¹¹

On August 2 Weinberger met with Israel's foreign minister, Yitzhak Shamir, who was in Washington to talk with the president. During the earlier discussion with Reagan, the president was, in his own words, "rather severe regarding Israel's continuing shelling and bombing of W. Beirut and in effect delivered an ultimatum." Reagan had a penchant for commiserating with the suffering of victims when he could visualize them as individuals and not as abstract groups. The Israeli shelling hit PLO fighters, their families, and non-PLO innocent civilian bystanders, including women and children. In his talk with Shamir later in the day, Weinberger warned the Israeli foreign minister of his concern "with the lack of seeming progress in establishing a lasting ceasefire" that would allow the PLO to leave Beirut. Shamir responded he was not sure the PLO planned to leave. Weinberger countered they had no choice and that was why they had agreed on "the basic concept of the withdrawal." It was now time to work out the details of the evacuation from Beirut.¹²

Two days later at a White House meeting with Shultz (now confirmed as secretary of state), Weinberger, as Shultz recalled, "seemed almost ready to sever relations [with Israel] ... and cut off the arms pipeline." After the meeting, the

president made a mild public statement criticizing Israel, but in a private stronger message to Begin insisted on a cease-fire until the PLO left Beirut.¹³

Habib next unveiled an action plan for the departure of the PLO leadership, its combatants, their dependents, and the organization's administrative staff. The PLO accepted most of the plan. The Lebanese government also soon approved. Now Habib had to sell it to Israel. While Iklé considered the plan good, he worried that Habib might expect the MNF, including U.S. troops, to do more than either Weinberger or the JCS could accept. Iklé suggested detailed policy guidance. According to the DoD, the U.S. objective would be to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in evacuating the PLO. The operation should be limited to no more than 30 days and U.S. forces would not participate in the assembly or withdrawal of the PLO and its weapons. Rather, once the PLO was unarmed and ready to leave, U.S. troops would facilitate and administer the evacuations from the port of Lebanon. U.S. offensive combat operations—highly unlikely—could not be undertaken; combat would only be authorized if required for direct self-defense. These became the rules of engagement for the U.S. peacekeepers. Defense officials hoped to withdraw U.S. forces soon after the PLO left, but the president decided there would be some value in U.S. forces holding their positions for up to 30 days as a way to bolster the weak Lebanese Armed Forces.¹⁴

During the first weeks of August, Habib tried to hammer out the details of the evacuation. The Saudis agreed to support it financially. Tunisia would accept the PLO leadership and administrative offices. Then Syria, Algeria, and Iraq followed suit with offers of sanctuary for the PLO fighters. Minor irritations roiled the negotiations. Israeli fighter jets buzzed a helicopter carrying U.S. liaison officers back to a U.S. aircraft carrier stationed off the coast of Lebanon, enraging the U.S. military command and Weinberger. State protested and Begin apologized for the pilots. Begin remained opposed to the MNF going in before the PLO withdrawal, still insisting that the Lebanese Army should oversee its departure.¹⁵

On August 12, when Weinberger was in California to give a speech and take a vacation, the IDF initiated a 14-hour offensive in Beirut. An angry Reagan called Begin and told him that the entire U.S.-Israeli relationship was in jeopardy. Reagan pointedly used the term “holocaust” against the Palestinians. A chagrined Begin called back within 20 minutes to assure Reagan that the bombing and shelling had ended. A week later the Israelis agreed to the PLO evacuation plan but insisted on a prisoner swap: one Syrian-held Israeli pilot for 300 Syrian prisoners of war.¹⁶

As the Reagan team worked out final preparations for the U.S. participation in the MNF, gaping differences of opinion between Weinberger and Shultz, and their respective departments, emerged. Weinberger insisted that the U.S. members of the MNF “be encapsulated in the port area of Beirut.” Shultz and Habib envisioned a more active role: U.S. forces patrolling and manning a cease-fire line. When the president sided with Weinberger, Shultz felt that “we were sending just the wrong message—a message of weakness—throughout the Middle East.” Two days later Shultz proposed plans to move the marines beyond the port. Weinberger wrote in his diary, “I opposed it.” To make sure his opposition stuck, Weinberger called NSC adviser William Clark to inform him of his “great worries about proposed changes in the plan” and noted that the JCS were also opposed. When Habib cabled from Beirut protesting Weinberger’s decision, the secretary immediately cabled him back to say that the marines would stay in the port.¹⁷

Four hundred French legionnaires, the first contingent of the MNF, landed in the port area of Beirut on August 21 to oversee the first evacuations of the PLO. Four hundred Italian bersagliere soon joined them. The two European peacekeepers encountered initial problems. Israeli military officials refused to allow the PLO to take their vehicles, mostly Jeeps and Land Rovers, and threatened



Secretary Weinberger and Col. James M. Meade, commander, 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit, in Beirut port area, September 1, 1982. *OSD Records*

to stop the ferry carrying them. Shultz asked Weinberger to allow U.S. Navy destroyers to escort the ferry. Weinberger agreed and instructed the Navy to do so. The Joint Chiefs also agreed that if the destroyers or the ferry were attacked, they could return fire. The PLO vehicles left Lebanon without incident (only to be impounded in Cyprus where they landed). To Shultz, this was a flash point averted thanks to DoD support.¹⁸

This brief cooperation between the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom did not last. Weinberger and Shultz and their respective staffs remained at odds over the objectives of the U.S. forces once they joined the MNF. Habib still hoped for an activist role. He wanted the Palestinian forces under Syrian command to turn their positions over to the MNF, not the Lebanese Army, which he believed could not or would not protect the Palestinians from Christian militia attack. Habib also recommended that the MNF, including U.S. marines, patrol along with the Lebanese Army. Weinberger and DoD leadership opposed both suggestions. Habib was furious and cabled Washington: "The U.S. Marines can't just sit on their ass all the time." Shultz made another try at convincing Weinberger to allow an expanded role by asking for deployments along the Green Line dividing Christians in East Beirut and Muslims in the west of the city. Weinberger stood firm, responding that the marines must stay in the port area. A former marine himself, Shultz later characterized the U.S. role in the MNF as a "non-deployment" providing a "humiliating" impression of leathernecks "cowering" in the docks. Shultz asked Reagan to overrule Weinberger, but the president backed his old friend's decision. Instead, legionnaires of the French MNF patrolled the Green Line.¹⁹

A contingent of 800 marines from the U.S. 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) landed in the early morning of August 25 and took possession of Beirut's port area from the French, who moved onto other checkpoints and patrols. The Italian members of the MNF escorted Palestinians and some of the Syrian-dominated Arab Deterrent Force, authorized as a peacekeeping force for Lebanon by the Arab League in 1976, overland to the Syrian border—to the taunts of the IDF. Restricted to the port area and carrying unloaded weapons (but with ammunition magazines on their persons), the marines oversaw the evacuation of the PLO fighters and their dependents by ship. Their role consisted of maintaining security in the port area. Their processing of evacuees amounted to taking the names of those leaving by ship. No shots were fired against them. The greatest



President Amin Gemayel of Lebanon, December 5, 1983. *DoD photographs*

danger came from the “victory” shots fired in the air by departing PLO fighters who were allowed to retain their AK-47s and other small arms.²⁰

A symbolic point in the MNF’s mission was PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s departure from Beirut on August 30. The PLO leader was to be escorted by a Greek navy warship with U.S. air cover. Although his departure was supposed to remain secret, a crowd of well-wishers and supporters gathered outside the marines’ port perimeter gate to witness the PLO chairman’s departure. French ambassador Paul Henri and units of the French MNF provided Arafat an escort that seemed to the U.S. Marine Corps colonel in charge of the check point to be a guard of honor. The French wanted to escort Arafat all the way to the ship. After calls to the embassy to confirm that the mission there had not agreed to the French scheme, the U.S. marines took over escorting the PLO chairman, physically preventing his 25 bodyguards from entering the port area. Arafat and his immediate entourage proceeded to the ship *Atlantis* on their own.²¹

On September 1, Weinberger flew from Cyprus to the USS *Guam*, an *Iwo Jima*-class amphibious assault ship carrying helicopters and stationed off Beirut, to meet with the troops. From this flagship of the U.S. peacekeeping force he helicoptered ashore to visit the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit. Dressed casually



Deputy Secretary Carlucci on the high ground above Beirut, October 7, 1982. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

without helmet or body armor, the secretary dined on C-rations with the troops and thanked them for their service. The marines had been in Beirut for just over two weeks. By September 10 their evacuation duty was over. In all, 8,500 PLO members left via the port and 7,100 evacuees (including 3,100 Syrians) traveled overland to Syria.²²

At Weinberger's instruction, the marines began returning to their ships offshore on September 10, much to the dismay of Deputy NSC adviser Robert McFarlane and Habib, who expected that the agreed-upon "up to 30 days" meant they would remain in Beirut for 30 days. Weinberger had a different time frame. The PLO had gone; it was time for the MNF to follow suit. Weinberger ordered the troops offshore on the understanding that he had the president's approval. McFarlane was dismayed and later accused Weinberger of acting without presidential authority. Weinberger maintained he had the president's approval, although his order to the marines backed Reagan into a corner. The president had announced the planned withdrawal earlier on September 1 and said it would be complete within two weeks. The marines were on their ships returning to Italy within two days, not two weeks and certainly not after 30 days. Weinberger was delighted and, in his mind, vindicated. The French and Italian contingents of the

MNF left soon after the marines. The PLO evacuation had been a success, with the French and the Italians doing the heavy lifting. Although the U.S. role was limited to port security and processing evacuees, the United States did intervene militarily in the form of naval and air support at key times. No casualties, no shots fired, mission accomplished, and exit plan carried off without incident.²³

While in Beirut on September 1, Weinberger had met with outgoing Lebanese president Elias Sarkis and the newly elected president, Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the major Christian militia, the Lebanese Forces (the military arm of the Phalange Party), and a scion of one of Lebanon's leading Christian families. In response to the president-elect's request for military aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces, the secretary agreed to send a defense survey team. As evidence of how desperate Gemayel considered the situation in Lebanon, he offered his country as a staging ground for U.S. forces in the Middle East. Although impressed by Gemayel's youthfulness and vigor, Weinberger knew his offer for the United States to jump into the morass that was Lebanon would not be taken up. Two weeks later Gemayel was assassinated, reportedly by the Syrians, and was succeeded as president by his older brother Amin.²⁴

The Second Deployment of the MNF

The goals of the Reagan administration after the evacuation of the PLO were to obtain the withdrawal of the remaining Israeli and Syrian forces from Lebanon, rebuild Lebanon's infrastructure, and revitalize its armed forces and police. Admitting that some international peacekeeping force would be required to oversee the hoped-for withdrawals of foreign forces, the NSC planning group tasked with the job noted, "Any further peacekeeping deployment of U.S. troops is not an option."²⁵

While 15,500 PLO personnel had left Beirut, there were still 300,000 Palestinian civilians in Lebanon and some 6,000 to 12,000 (estimates varied) Palestinian combatants in central and northern Lebanon who were armed and capable of fighting the LAF, although they were no match for the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon. In Beirut the Israelis consolidated control of the city and circled the Palestinian refugee camps of Shatila and Sabra. Two days after the last U.S. forces exited Beirut, Christian Phalange militiamen entered the refugee camps and massacred an estimated 700 to 800 unarmed Palestinian men, women, and children. Reagan was livid, writing in his diary that the "Israelis did nothing to

prevent or halt it.” Weinberger noted in his diary, “Slaughter in Palestinian camps in Beirut.” The president publicly expressed his horror at the killings in a White House statement. Weinberger made no public comment.²⁶

McFarlane recalled that of Reagan’s team, Meese, Clark, Shultz, and himself were prepared to recommend a return of the MNF to Beirut. Weinberger and Vessey were opposed. Both Shultz and McFarlane expected strong opposition from Weinberger and the DoD. At the September 19 morning White House meeting with the president, Weinberger did not disappoint them. He stated, to use Shultz’s recollection, “Israel has gotten itself into a swamp, we should leave them to it.” The president thought otherwise: “I told our group we should go for broke. Let’s tell the people we are going in at the request of the Lebanese—sending the multinational force back in.” The president then noted that the United States would “persuade the Syrians to leave Lebanon at which time we’ll ask the Israelis to likewise.” Weinberger and Shultz took different messages from this meeting. The Pentagon chief recalled that he and the JCS had convinced the president not to reactivate an enlarged multidivision MNF until Israel and Syria withdrew their forces. Shultz remembers most vividly the more definitive “let’s go for broke” and Reagan instructing Weinberger to prepare a plan for the return of the MNF.²⁷

On the afternoon of September 19, Weinberger, Shultz, Casey, and their staffs met at the Department of State Operations Center. Weinberger accepted the president’s injunction to prepare a plan for reentry of the MNF, but he demanded an “impossible set of conditions”—in Shultz’s opinion—before the MNF could return. Weinberger insisted, in keeping with Reagan’s earlier statement, that he wanted foreign troops out of Lebanon. Therefore the MNF could not go in until a withdrawal occurred. Once all foreign armies were gone, Weinberger stated that the U.S., French, and Italian forces could seal off the border and coastline, paving the way for control of the interior by the Lebanese Army. It was up to State to negotiate a withdrawal of foreign troops. Shultz responded with increasing annoyance to Weinberger’s continued reiteration of these conditions, suggesting that it would take months, if not years, to pull off such withdrawal negotiations. Look how long it took Habib to negotiate the PLO withdrawal, he added. Weinberger responded that “it was too uncertain to put the MNF in Beirut and simply hope for the best.” Then he asked the fundamental question: What is the mission? Shultz suggested it was to help the Lebanese Army regain control and stabilize the situation, at least in Beirut. McFarlane suggested the return of the MNF was

a political signal, not a military one. When Acting Chairman of the JCS Admiral James Watkins suggested sending in a force of 5,000, Weinberger objected: the MNF would need at least a division (16,000 to 20,000 men), a figure that no one in the administration was contemplating or would consider.²⁸

Weinberger and Shultz were talking at cross purposes. The Pentagon chief thought McFarlane's and Shultz's demands for a return of the MNF were increasingly "petulant"; the objective of the force was defined "in the fuzziest terms possible" and was "demonstrably unobtainable." Weinberger noted that the Joint Chiefs supported him. When the two secretaries met with the president that evening, Reagan confirmed what he had indicated in the morning meeting: he opted for a return of the MNF. Briefly recording the meeting in his diary, Weinberger wrote that Reagan "wants to urge full withdrawal and offer MNF."²⁹

The die was cast, and Weinberger was now part of the plan. On the next day the National Security Council met in official session. Shultz briefed the members of the council on the willingness of the French and Italians to return their forces to Beirut. The secretary of state described the MNF mission: "to provide a presence until Leb[anon] gov't capable of providing security." Reagan himself emphatically noted that the situation had changed, and he was prepared to "put action up front." The question on all the participants' minds was the Israelis' reaction to the return of the MNF, an issue to be decided when the Israeli cabinet met to discuss it on Tuesday, September 21. When Clark asked what the administration would do if Israel said no to the MNF, both Habib and Weinberger said the MNF should go in anyway. Later Weinberger suggested that the mission should be limited to 90 days and assured the group U.S. troops could be in place off the coast of Beirut in three days.³⁰


One of the issues raised at the NSC meeting was the requirement under the War Powers Act of 1973 to issue within 48 hours a report to Congress, as had been done with the first MNF. Shultz and Weinberger sent recommended language to the president, who issued the report on September 29. The president publicly stated in his report to Congress that their mission was "to provide an interposition force at agreed locations" and to assist Lebanon and its armed forces. He defined their rules of engagement as "exercising the right of self-defense" but stated they were not expected to engage in hostilities.³¹

Only days after returning to Naples and Taormina, Italy, the marines of the 32nd MAU were ordered back to Beirut. During the last week of September, the

DoD prepared to land 1,200 of them in Beirut's port, with 600 offshore in reserve. Already onshore were 2,200 Italian and French troops, who were establishing their positions in West Beirut. During this second peacekeeping operation, known as Phase II, U.S. marines would be stationed at Beirut International Airport, 1.6 miles south of central Beirut, in the midst of a Shi'a neighborhood where Iran enjoyed great influence. The marines' initial job was to secure the airport and its perimeter and keep it open and running, a task that the Lebanese Army was unable to perform. Before the landing, Weinberger met on a number of occasions with the Joint Chiefs to discuss planning details. Both the secretary and the chiefs agreed that except for a small number of lightly armed troops, the Israel Defense Force must withdraw from the airport before the MNF arrived. On September 29 and into the next day marines landed, clearing mines on the beach fronting the airport—the same site where the marines landed in 1958. Navy tank-landing ships, the *Manitowoc* and *Saginaw*, off-loaded troops and heavy equipment at the port of Beirut, and helicopters lifted two companies of marines to the airport to be joined by others convoyed from the port. On September 30 the U.S. force suffered its first casualties. One marine, Corporal David Reagan (no relation to the president), was killed and three others injured when one of the many unexploded bombs littering the airport accidentally detonated.³²

Modernizing the Lebanese Armed Forces

With the MNF reestablished in Beirut, the Reagan administration sought ways to achieve the goals the president articulated: withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and reestablishment of the authority of the Lebanese government and its armed forces. Shultz, Habib, and the diplomats tackled the withdrawal objective, trying to negotiate a pullout of the Israelis, Syrians, and remaining PLO forces. The DoD focused on the Lebanese Armed Forces. The supposedly 23,000-strong Lebanese Army was not a potent fighting force; it really numbered only about 18,000 effectives, of which half were politically biased towards one Lebanese faction or another. Even with 23,000 troops, Lebanon could neither control its borders nor act as a deterrent to neighbors' incursions. It was outmanned and outgunned by both 39,900 Syrian forces that still controlled the Beqaa Valley and much of the north as well as the 17,000-plus troops of the IDF, which occupied southern Lebanon up to Beirut. While much of the PLO leadership and forces had withdrawn, Palestinian fighters remained in Lebanon outside of



Zones of the Multinational Force in Beirut, September 1982. OSD/HO, based on map in *U.S. Marines in Lebanon* by Benis M. Frank

Beirut. The Lebanese Army was no match for the Christian militias controlling a coastal area north of Beirut. Conscription was supposed to create a Lebanese Army composed of equal numbers of Christians and Muslims, but the draft was never implemented. Relying on volunteers, the army had no trouble obtaining recruits from poor Muslim areas (especially Shi'a) into Muslim battalions, but found it difficult to recruit Christians, who opted for their own better-equipped and organized militias.³³

During Deputy Secretary Carlucci's trip to Beirut in early October 1982, President Gemayel asked for security assistance to greatly expand the Lebanese Army; enlist U.S. training and equipment; and obtain weapons from a prioritized list. Weinberger characterized the program as "how we might best assist the Lebanese government to meet its legitimate defense needs," which included the ability to maintain order, deter its neighbors, and control its borders. When Gemayel visited Washington in mid-October, both Carlucci and Weinberger assured him the DoD would honor his immediate requests but wanted to wait for decisions on further security assistance until a 13-man survey team under Brig. Gen. Gerald T. Bartlett completed its work in Lebanon. Weinberger assured Reagan that Bartlett's team "was the vital first step in the process of dismantling all the private armies and militias and getting them integrated into the Lebanese Armed Forces." After two weeks in Lebanon, Bartlett provided preliminary conclusions. Within the Lebanese Army officer corps, the general consensus was that autumn 1982 was "the LAF's 'last chance' to create a credible army" or it would be relegated to the sidelines, as it had been throughout the civil war. Of the eight LAF battalions stationed in Beirut, only three (plus a partial battalion then working with the sidelined UN International Force) were needed. That left about four workable battalions at 50 percent personnel and equipment strength available for other potential operations in Lebanon. Bartlett recommended upgrading these existing four to 70 percent strength and adding three more battalions over the next few years—thus reaching the goal of a 45,000-person army—with an eventual long-term aim of 12 brigades (about 60,000 troops). Bartlett's final report in November 1982 was more pessimistic. The presence of Israeli and Syrian troops in Lebanon provided protection for their allied militias. Lebanon's air force and navy were almost nonfunctional, and the army was unprepared to undertake any operations to resume control of northern or southern Lebanon. The first priority must be to reinvigorate the army.³⁴

The Lebanese Army was not Weinberger and the OSD staff's only concern. They still worried about the MNF. In preparing the secretary for his meeting with Gemayel, Iklé warned of the "lack of realism regarding the role and potential" of the MNF. He noted that Weinberger had "been successful in cooling the ardor for an extensive MNF role that our ambassadors in the field had developed." In fact, Iklé noted, should Syria and Israel actually agree to withdraw rapidly, the Lebanese Army and police could not maintain security or prevent the PLO from re-infiltration. What worried the JCS even more was the idea that the MNF would be asked to act as a "moving buffer" to pave the way for the Lebanese government's resumption of control of its territory. Defense feared the MNF's mission would creep into active interposition between withdrawing Syrian, Israeli, and PLO forces that had not evacuated from Beirut. The competing factions had repeatedly broken cease-fires in the past. The MNF would find itself in the middle.³⁵

The OSD and JCS tried but failed to convince the president and his national security team that their use of the MNF would be dangerous and provocative. On October 28 the president outlined what he described as "bold and timely initiatives to obtain early withdrawal of all military forces by the end of the year." In addition to the disengagement of Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian forces, the president called for a "systematic program to rebuild the Lebanese security force." Worse of all from Weinberger's point of view, Reagan stated he was "prepared to contribute additional U.S. forces to a multinational force."³⁶

Having lost the battle with the White House over the role and the size of the MNF, Weinberger and the Pentagon put their shoulder to the wheel on the president's injunction to assist the Lebanese Army. The program went by the acronym LAMP (Lebanese Army Modernization Plan). By the end of November 1982, West advised Weinberger in the first of his weekly reports on LAMP that it was "beginning to pick up momentum." LAMP began to morph into a very ambitious plan to increase the army to 16 battalions. Sale of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and howitzers to Lebanon went relatively smoothly, but M48 tanks were another matter. Initially tanks for Lebanon were to be former Israeli M48s repainted with U.S. insignia, but Lebanon refused to accept them. In late December 1982 Weinberger offered Lebanon 34 tanks from Army war reserves stocks over the objections of Secretary of the Army John Marsh, who argued that diversion would adversely affect the U.S. Army's combat readiness.

Nevertheless in January 1983 LAMP began to deliver arms and equipment for the Lebanese Army.³⁷

The Changing Role of the MNF and the Embassy Bombing

As the MNF settled in and secured their respective sectors in Beirut at the end of 1982, the Pentagon relieved the 32nd MAU with the 24th MAU and augmented its firepower by moving six 155mm howitzers ashore. President Gemayel requested that the MNF, including the U.S. contingent, undertake mobile patrols in East Beirut. State recommended agreeing to Gemayel's request and Reagan approved. The OSD insisted that the patrols should not serve as a "backdrop for LAF military operations" and that the Gemayel government obtain approval from the Christian militia's leadership for the patrols. The U.S. intelligence community concluded that the marines would be unlikely to come under hostile fire under these conditions. On November 4, 1982, 15 marines in four jeeps patrolled for two and a half hours without incident. Henceforth these forays became daily events and their routes expanded. As the Marine Corps historian of the Lebanon operation observed, these patrols gave "the Marines a feeling they were doing something historic, that ... they contributed to the stability of the Beirut area." In addition, the MAU began training 75 Lebanese soldiers as a rapid deployment force, providing them with training in basic infantry skills and helicopter assault and extraction. In effect, a peacekeeping mission was also training one of the factions, the Lebanese Army, in the conflict it was trying to resolve.³⁸

In January 1983 two developments complicated the situation in Lebanon. The first was the introduction of SA-5 surface-to-air missiles into Syria, the first time the Soviets had deployed this advanced system outside of the USSR. During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 the Israeli Air Force had neutralized Syrian air defenses and gained total command of the skies. The new SAM missiles had a range of 150 miles and could take down high-flying aircraft. The second complication was when U.S. marine patrols came into contact with Israeli forces. There emerged a clear pattern of IDF harassment of U.S. members of the MNF. The marines were fired upon by the IDF, stopped at checkpoints and detained for periods of time, and prohibited from continuing their patrols. In addition, IDF tanks often entered areas under U.S. control. West told Weinberger, "There can be no doubt that the recent series of incidents between the USMC and the

IDF were deliberate provocations.” West suggested the IDF wished to discredit the MNF as they had done to the UN International Force in Lebanon, weaken U.S. congressional support for expanded U.S. peacekeeping in Lebanon, and complicate U.S. efforts to find solutions in Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Middle East in general. Weinberger’s reaction was to clearly delineate MNF and IDF boundaries and “insist that the IDF Lt Col who has been involved in these episodes be relocated to the West Bank or somewhere.”³⁹

The Israelis suggested creating liaison officers, and the OSD insisted on more clearly delineating lines of responsibilities. Once these changes occurred incidents initially lessened. By March 1983, however, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Robert H. Barrow lodged a formal complaint to the secretary, stating, “It is time for firm and strong action, to demonstrate to the Israelis that a role of peacekeeper does not presume weakness.” The JCS sent a similar recommendation to Weinberger, noting, “It is difficult to understand the recent unprofessional behavior of the usually well-disciplined IDF ... the most recent incidents appear to be a deliberate effort to discredit the U.S. component of the MNF.” With assurances by Israeli foreign minister Shamir to Shultz that the Israeli leadership had ordered the IDF to cease this harassment and the creation a formal liaison relationship, these incidents again lessened.⁴⁰

Although it was not fully recognized at the time, Iranian-inspired Shi’a terrorists posed a far greater threat to Americans in Lebanon than any harassment by the IDF. On April 18, 1983, a car bomb exploded in front of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people including 17 Americans, some of whom were military personnel assigned to the embassy. In a report to the secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Noel C. Koch stated that the bombing was “an instructive example of how far we are from dealing with terrorism.... Beirut [embassy bombing] represents a failure of intelligence, and of security.” Ironically, Koch noted, embassy security officials thought that by billeting U.S. non-MNF military personnel in a Beirut hotel they were making the embassy safe since the hotel would be the terrorists’ prime target. Koch recommended immediately dispersing all U.S. military forces in Beirut that were not part of the marine peacekeeping contingent.⁴¹

Diplomacy and Supporting the Lebanese Army


The U.S. diplomats, Shultz, Habib, and Habib’s deputy Morris Draper had been

making headway towards an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon during the first months of 1983. In late April 1983 Shultz's shuttle diplomacy between Beirut and Jerusalem resulted in a promise from Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in principle. In mid-May the governments of Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement for an Israeli withdrawal and an end to the state of war. But the Israeli pullout was contingent on Syrian withdrawal. Resupplied with SAM missiles, Soviet M72 antitank rocket systems, and new Soviet advisers and technicians, President Assad of Syria was not prepared to order his troops to leave Lebanon. Neither Shultz nor Habib could convince him. To demonstrate Syrian opposition to withdrawal, Assad declared Habib *persona non grata* in Syria, ending the U.S. negotiator's Middle East mission. Deputy National Security Adviser Bud McFarlane took over the chief negotiator role.⁴²

Syria's lack of cooperation stymied the diplomatic solution. Nonetheless, the DoD continued to upgrade Lebanese security forces. When Gemayel visited Washington in late July 1983, his visit coincided with an assessment of the U.S. policy in Lebanon. Gemayel requested additional military assistance. He cited the multiple pressures on his government, foremost of which was the need to occupy and control the Shuf and Alayh districts near Beirut, from which the Israelis were planning to withdraw unilaterally to south of the Awali River. While the IDF controlled most of the Shuf and Alayh, the Syrian-supported Druze militia there, under Walid Jumblatt, were making life difficult for the Israelis and shelling the U.S. MNF contingent from the highlands overlooking the Beirut airport. While the Druze were not technically Muslim, they were longtime bitter enemies of Lebanon's Christians and opponents of the Lebanese Army. If the Lebanese Army was to reoccupy these Druze-held key areas, it needed a resupply of weapons. Weinberger assured Gemayel that M16 rifles, ammunition, and armed personnel carriers would soon be on their way, but Lebanon's request for 68 additional M48A5 tanks was problematic given that the initial shipment had depleted U.S. stocks. The OSD concluded that the LAF lacked the trained personnel to maintain a second battalion of M48 tanks, let alone the sophisticated weaponry such as fighter aircraft, air-defense missiles, or helicopters that the Lebanese president requested. Gemayel also asked for counterbattery/countermortar radar systems to contest the shelling of his capital, but the best the Pentagon chief could offer was a terse noncommittal response: "We are working on that." General Vessey, also at the meeting with Gemayel, expressed the generally held belief that the

Bartlett report on the LAF was obsolete and a new assessment of the needs of the LAF was in order.⁴³

After Gemayel left Washington, Weinberger and Shultz met to discuss what to do next in Lebanon. At the heart of their discussions was the role and size of the U.S. portion of the MNF. Would the marines continue to patrol around the airport, or would they engage more actively in supporting the Lebanese Army? U.S. negotiator for Lebanon McFarlane recommended an international military



South and Central Lebanon. OSD/HO

presence to support the Lebanese Army in reestablishing its control of the Shuf and Alayh areas as the IDF withdrew. With the Israeli departure, Christian, Druze, and Shi'a militias moved into the high ground above Beirut and fought for control. With the aid of Syrian artillery, Jumblatt's Druze militia emerged victorious. The LAF readied its best unit, the 8th Brigade, to take the Shuf from the Druze. Shultz and Weinberger, who according to Shultz had "turned sour" on McFarlane's recommendations, agreed that U.S. forces should not have a role in supporting the Lebanese retaking of the Shuf. They opposed McFarlane's idea of having U.S. trainers making periodic trips into the area as well as his recommendation for U.S. MNF patrols of strategic roads in and around the Shuf. Without cooperation among the Druze, Lebanese, and Israelis, both State and Defense considered it too dangerous to send U.S. forces into the contested highlands. Instead they recommended no action until the three parties reached a political understanding on the mechanics of the withdrawal and reoccupation. The president agreed that there should be no military role for the MNF in the Shuf or elsewhere but did agree to augment the MNF with additional marines (the 31st MAU) offshore.⁴⁴

Not authorized to go into the Shuf, the marines remained at the airport where they had been subjected to periodic artillery shelling and rifle fire from Druze and Muslim militias engaged in battles with the Lebanese Army. On August 29 the LAF and Druze exchanged intense mortar fire; some of the shells landed either accidentally or by direction on the marines, who suffered their first combat casualties: 2 killed, 11 wounded. After illumination rounds fired by the marines and from the U.S. guided-missile destroyer *Belknap* offshore failed to stop the Druze attack on the airport, the marines for the first time returned fire using radar that could detect the location of opposing artillery and mortar fire. Their return fire silenced the attacker.⁴⁵

The U.S. casualties and the increased action by the LAF focused the Reagan team on Lebanon, even after the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines flight 007 on September 1. The NSC Planning Group met on September 3 to discuss Lebanon. Three days later the National Security Council met without Weinberger, who was visiting Central America. The participants at the council meeting concluded that the firepower of the MNF's U.S. contingent should be augmented by either the World War II-vintage battleship *New Jersey* or an aircraft carrier. Shultz and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer argued for the carrier option because

its aircraft allowed for more precise bombing and thus fewer civilian deaths than a battleship's big guns. Shultz recommended military action against the Syrians in Lebanon that would "rough them up" and thus send a message to Damascus. Either take out a Druze artillery unit in an underpopulated area or hit a Syrian military target in Lebanon, Shultz suggested. Chief of Staff James A. Baker warned that this would draw the United States more deeply into the conflict. What was the end objective of this escalation, Baker queried. Baker's doubts carried the day. The United States would maintain a cool but correct diplomatic relationship with Syria. McFarlane would try to convince Assad to withdraw his forces.⁴⁶

Over the next few days, the NSC staff, with input from the DoD, drafted a national security decision directive, which the president signed on September 10. NSDD 103 instructed the U.S. contingent of the MNF and its supporting naval and air forces to engage in "aggressive self-defense against any hostile or provocative acts from any quarter." It authorized the MNF to assist in humanitarian efforts and called for accelerated and expanded training of and material support to the LAF, including intelligence and reconnaissance. The *New Jersey* was deployed to the Atlantic, ready to enter the Mediterranean and move on to Lebanon at short notice. The NSDD delayed for further study action against Syrian forces and whether the U.S. part of the MNF should extend its security perimeter beyond its current position.⁴⁷

During early September 1983, the LAF held the strategic hamlet of Suq al-Gharb against determined Druze and other militia attacks. This market village, on the ridge commanding the airport, overlooked U.S. marine positions. McFarlane believed that the town was about to fall and that the entire fate of Beirut and the government of Lebanon hung in the balance. He sent an alarmist cable to Washington on September 11 making a case for U.S. support of the LAF defenders. Weinberger was unconvinced. He called the National Military Command Center to get an independent intelligence update. The officer in charge told the secretary that the Defense Intelligence Agency concluded the LAF 8th Brigade was holding its own. On the evening of September 11, Reagan met with his advisers, including Weinberger and Shultz. The president summed up his thinking in his diary: "Troops obviously PLO and Syrian [*sic*, the attacks were by Syrian-supported Druze] have launched new attack against the Lebanese army. Our problem is do we expand our mission to aid the army with artillery & air support. This could be seen as putting us in the war." As a result of the meeting,

the president signed an addendum to the NSDD, which authorized U.S. naval gunfire and if necessary, tactical air support should the LAF campaign to defend the village of Suq al-Gharb falter. The decision was left to the local U.S. Marine Corps commander, Colonel Timothy Geraghty. The president's addendum specifically denied McFarlane's request for U.S. ground forces support of the LAF.⁴⁸

The battle to consolidate LAF control of the Suq al-Gharb against attacks from Druze, Muslim, and Palestinian forces began in earnest on September 11 and continued until a cease-fire on the 26th of that month. The fighting was intense, with the Lebanese Army, mostly the Christian 8th Brigade, taking casualties but performing well despite some LAF soldiers simply deserting their units. Under heavy attack from Palestinian fighters on September 19, the Lebanese Ministry of Defense requested naval gunfire support for the LAF at Suq al-Gharb. Three U.S. cruisers and destroyers fired their five-inch guns for five hours on the attackers, apparently stopping the assault and allowing the LAF to reinforce the village. All during this battle, the marines at the airport came under fire. When the cease-fire was declared the LAF still held the strategic village, having suffered 8 killed and 12 wounded. Nevertheless, the kind of U.S. support envisioned in the addendum to NSDD 103 was only minimally required. Colonel Geraghty, who earlier had resisted attempts to aid the LAF at Suq al-Gharb, asked himself if U.S. naval fire had actually saved the day. He decided the Lebanese Army had won that victory.⁴⁹

If there was any doubt that the U.S. forces in Lebanon and offshore, or for that matter, the French MNF contingent, were acting merely as peacekeepers, the battle for Suq al-Gharb erased it. In addition to the extensive material and training support for the LAF, U.S. forces provided reconnaissance support as well as radar tactical intelligence on positions of Druze artillery and mortar fire. The French were similarly active in support of the LAF. A U.S. warship had bombarded the attackers of Suq al-Gharb in support of the LAF. Geraghty recalled that henceforth, "The rules of the game had changed forever with that decision [to support the defenders of Suq al-Gharb], with its consequences unknown."⁵⁰

The successful defense of Suq al-Gharb did nothing to change Weinberger's conviction that the marines were caught in the wrong fight in the wrong place. While Weinberger had reluctantly supported the president's decision to send the U.S. into Lebanon as part of the MNF in September 1982, he worried that a lightly

armed small force, originally designed to interpose itself between factions as a presence, was increasingly being drawn into the Lebanese civil war. Given that Shultz and the diplomats were unable to obtain Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and achieved only a partial Israeli pullback, Weinberger argued unsuccessfully that it was time to bring the U.S. troops of the MNF home. A basic disagreement on the use of force and diplomacy emerged. Shultz, State, and the NSC staff (especially former marine McFarlane) held that military force should augment diplomacy. In effect, the MNF and the naval forces offshore were pieces on the diplomatic chess board. They represented a presence that provided the United States larger influence in the game and gave the Gemayel government comfort and confidence. Weinberger and the Pentagon, including the JCS, thought U.S. forces should be used only in situations where they were safe, enjoyed the superior firepower and numbers to defeat potential opponents, had a clear objective, and had a predetermined exit plan.⁵¹

With a shaky cease-fire in place after the fighting in the Shuf, the Reagan administration looked again at its policy in Lebanon. Shultz made the case to the president that “the struggle in Lebanon now shifts to the political arena” and outlined a series of possible decisions and scenarios. The crux of his advice was to maintain the balance of forces in Lebanon, keep the *New Jersey* offshore and offer no hints that the U.S. MNF contingent would be withdrawn or gradually reduced. Shultz still held out hope for the May 17, 1983, peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel that included the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. But the Israelis would only withdraw fully if the Syrians did likewise. Syrian president Assad was unwilling to do so. Still, Shultz believed a war-weary Israel could be convinced to use its influence in Lebanon to support the Gemayel government.⁵²

Weinberger agreed that the United States, in conjunction with Israel, should attempt to draw Druze support away from Syria and towards the central Lebanese government and to convince Israel to encourage the Christian militias to do the same. While he did not rule out a future change in the status of the MNF, the Pentagon chief believed that the “fragility” of the current government and the “static position of the Marines ashore presents an extremely difficult situation.” Weinberger raised the possibility of eliminating the U.S. MNF deployment and relying on additional naval gunfire. In no uncertain terms, Weinberger stated, “Any expansion in the employment of the MNF or their rules of engagement at

this stage would be premature, could undermine the cease-fire and reconciliation process,” and could encourage Gemayel to be inflexible in national reconciliation discussions.⁵³

The Marine Headquarters/Barracks Bombing

At the Beirut airport the marine contingent faced small arms sniper fire from adjoining Muslim neighborhoods and Druze artillery and mortar fire from the highlands even after the cease-fire of September 27, 1983. This continued harassment worried both Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs. In mid-October, when they met with the president, they recommended moving the marines offshore. Weinberger vividly remembers that he “begged the President to at least pull them back and put them on transports [offshore] as a more defensible position.” To the secretary they were “sitting in the bullseye.” While this seems prescient, neither the secretary nor the chiefs knew that Iranian-inspired terrorism posed



Memorial flowers in front of destroyed U.S. marine barracks, April 1, 1993. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

the real danger to the MNF. They were still thinking that marines were vulnerable because of hostile fire from Muslim and Druze militias. But of course, their advice, if followed, would have averted the tragedy.⁵⁴

In the early morning of October 23, the driver of a five-ton Mercedes truck entered the parking lot adjacent to the headquarters and barracks of a battalion landing team (BLT) with the U.S. MNF contingent. After making a circle in the lot to build up his speed, the driver crashed through a barbed wire emplacement, a sandbagged sentry post, and an iron gate, swerved around one sewer pipe placed as an obstacle and hopped over another, and finally plowed through a sandbagged entry to the lobby of the headquarters of the BLT. The suicide bomber detonated a huge bomb estimated at 12,000 pounds of TNT that collapsed the steel-reinforced building like a house of cards. The bombing killed 241 marines, sailors, and soldiers assigned to the MNF. At almost the same time another suicide truck bomber attacked the French MNF headquarters, killing 58 members of their peacekeeping contingent. Lebanese factions had used car bombs against each other multiple times in 1983 and once against the U.S. Embassy, but these suicide truck bombings on the MNF were powerful terror weapons. It was the worst loss of American troops in a single day since the start of the 1968 Tet offensive during the Vietnam War.⁵⁵

Among the policymakers in Washington, reactions to this tragedy fell into three different camps. To the president and McFarlane, the attack was a provocation that needed to be answered. Bud McFarlane remembers the president's words at an NSC Planning Group meeting on October 23: "This is an obvious attempt to run us out of Lebanon.... The first thing I want to do is find out who did this and go after them with everything we've got." To McFarlane the president's call for military action was an absolute requirement lest the United States be branded a paper tiger. The diplomats comprised the second camp. To Shultz and the soon-to-be-selected new U.S. Lebanon negotiator, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the bombing was a setback to their negotiations for withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. Shultz and the diplomats agreed with calls for a stronger military response by the United States, but their eyes were on the diplomatic game and staying the course in Lebanon until their negotiations succeeded. To Weinberger and most of the Joint Chiefs, the third group, the bombing confirmed that the peacekeeping mission had been a terrible mistake. Weinberger himself was shaken by the news. Maj. Gen. Colin Powell,

Weinberger's military assistant, remembered telephoning the secretary multiple times during night to update him as the death toll increased. "Each time, I had to convey the mounting horror to a Defense Secretary I knew was squeamish about death." Nevertheless, the killing of 241 Americans and 58 Frenchmen convinced Weinberger of the need for an immediate withdrawal of the U.S. MNF contingent. As for retaliation against Iranians in Lebanon, Weinberger and the Chiefs argued against it on the grounds that there was no clear evidence at the time as to who was responsible for the bombing. As a former lawyer, Weinberger needed evidence.⁵⁶

Two other complications made the policy deliberations and decisions after the bombing difficult. The first was that the United States had begun its invasion of Grenada at the same time the bombing occurred. Such timing convinced one critic of the Reagan administration's handling of Lebanon to conclude that the Grenada invasion was designed to divert attention from Beirut. But such a charge discounts that the island crisis was a long time developing and had its own momentum (see chapter 14). Nevertheless, two crises at the same time stretched the Reagan NSC system, and the Grenada operation meant Washington policy-makers could not give Lebanon their full attention. The second was the president's tendency at NSC meetings and in smaller gatherings with his closest advisers to listen so sympathetically to each adviser's point of view as to sometimes give the impression that he agreed with their recommendations. Furthermore, Reagan ran very tight meetings, deciding beforehand how long they would last. When the predetermined time had elapsed, Reagan left the meetings often without a clear indication of his decisions. It was difficult for his team to discern exactly what the president wanted to do. Such a state of affairs placed a premium on being the last person to see the president before he made a decision after the meeting. All Reagan advisers, Weinberger included, used this tactic. Not a details person, Reagan followed his instinct and his strong principles, leaving the paperwork to the bureaucracy. The NSC staff codified the president's instructions in NSDDs, which the president signed. But NSDDs were usually drafted by negotiation among the national security agencies and tended towards consensus language that all could agree on. Some NSDDs verged on vagueness.⁵⁷

The first directive following the bombing, NSDD 109, emerged from meetings on October 23 and was straightforward and anticipatory. The president wanted to know who was responsible for the bombing and how to respond. He ordered

Director of Central Intelligence Bill Casey to collect all available evidence, especially the extent of Syrian involvement. Based on the CIA's assessments, the DoD was to prepare options for overt military retaliation "against identifiable sources of terrorist activity against our forces." Reagan instructed State to provide a review of the costs and benefits of such retaliation and to encourage Lebanon to speed up the delayed talks of national reconciliation to be held in Geneva. Finally, the president dispatched General Paul Kelley, commandant of the Marine Corps, to Beirut to review the security situation and make recommendations on how to improve it. Kelly reported in early November, proposing a series of immediate measures to improve security, which the president approved.⁵⁸

A week after the bombing, the diplomats arranged another cease-fire in Beirut in anticipation of the reconciliation talks among the Lebanese factions to begin in November. Without consultation with Weinberger or the JCS, the NSC staff drafted and Reagan signed NSDD 111 on October 28. What made this directive controversial at the Pentagon was the statement: "The rules of engagement governing the use of use ground, naval, and air support for the defense of the strategic high ground which controls the approaches to Beirut will be changed." NSDD 111 authorized the use of force in support of the Lebanese Army generally, as it had been authorized locally for the defense of Suq al-Gharb in September. To Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs, NSDD 111 was a major escalation. NSDD 103, which had authorized support for attacks in the Shuf, was a one-time-only change in the rules of engagement. Authorizing the U.S. ground commander to use this type of force at any time at his discretion would, in their view, fully embroil the United States in the Lebanese civil war. As Weinberger had argued for months, the MNF and its offshore support was not designed to support the Lebanese Armed Forces. They were an interposition force, as Shultz often described them, designed to act as a presence. Weinberger passed a JCS memorandum to McFarlane, noting that he concurred with the Joint Chiefs' views. In their memorandum the JCS argued that NSDD 111 "would broaden the mission of the MNF and might risk war with Syria as a result of tactical judgments made in Lebanon." They believed those types of decisions should be made in Washington, not on the ground in Lebanon. The Joint Chiefs added that the change could endanger the MNF and might impact the national reconciliation talks by making Gemayel and his Christian allies less willing to compromise in Geneva.⁵⁹

McFarlane's recollections suggest that he was utterly exasperated upon reading



Battleship *New Jersey* off the coast of Lebanon firing her guns against Syrian-backed Muslim militias, September 1, 1984. *OSD Records*

the JCS advice. He recalled, “The Joint Chiefs’ reaction to NSDD 111 was quite extraordinary. In essence, they refused to implement the President’s decision.” McFarlane found it difficult to understand why the Pentagon felt “no obligation to find and destroy those who had killed 241 of their own.” McFarlane and Weinberger held opposing views. The national security adviser headed the interventionist forces, the Pentagon chief and the JCS wanted the U.S. out of Lebanon.⁶⁰

In early November, McFarlane seemed to backtrack: NSDD 111 was merely “a precautionary measure should heavy fighting resume” and should the hostile forces gain control of key arteries into Beirut. “Let me reassure you that his [the president’s] intention was not to modify the governing mission of the MNF—deterrence by active presence in greater Beirut. It is rather an extension of the concept of aggressive self-defense to include support for the LAF, if positions comparable to Suk-al-Gharb are in danger of being overrun.”⁶¹

To the JCS and Weinberger, McFarlane’s assurances that this was not a change in the rules of engagement rang hollow: NSDD 111 did just that. The thrust of the directive moved from protecting the MNF to protecting the LAF. Both the JCS and the secretary recommended that if supporting firepower, either offshore

naval gunfire or tactical air support, was required to support the LAF, then the mission of the U.S. MNF contingent should be changed definitively by the president. NSDD 111 with McFarlane's qualification was too vague for Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs.⁶²

To make matters worse, serious fighting resumed in Lebanon and engulfed the marine contingent at the airport. Shi'a, Druze, and Palestinian militias now considered the marines and the whole MNF to be supporters of the Gemayel government and thus targets. Also by mid-November, most in the Reagan administration had concluded that Iran was at least complicit in the bombing. Weinberger was not convinced, but his was a minority view. Iranian Revolutionary Guard advisers to Muslim antigovernment factions were headquartered in the eastern Beqaa Valley at Baalbek, an area firmly under Syrian control. On November 16 Reagan met with his advisers in an NSC Planning Group meeting. There is no official record of the discussion at this meeting, but according to an official military historian with access to excellent sources, Casey and Weinberger sparred over whether to attack barracks in Baalbek suspected to house Iranian advisers. The DCI believed he had the proof of Iran's Revolutionary Guards' complicity and knew that the barracks housed only combatants, not civilians. Weinberger was less sure of who perpetrated the bombing. McFarlane and Casey believed the president had ordered a joint attack on the barracks with the French. Weinberger did not agree, writing in his diary for that day, "[We] concluded we should get more intelligence." Reagan noted in his diary on the same day: "We've contacted the French about a joint operation in Beirut re the car [truck] bombings." Was contacting the French equivalent to approving a joint operation? It was apparently a case of the president sending vague signals about his decision, which Weinberger and McFarlane interpreted in their own ways.⁶³

When McFarlane talked with Weinberger on morning of November 16, he discovered that Weinberger had not approved U.S. participation in the strike. An outraged national security adviser believed the Pentagon chief had violated a direct presidential order. Weinberger maintained that French defense minister Charles Hernu informed him of French plans to strike the barracks on the morning of November 16 within an hour of the start of the operation. Weinberger told Hernu he had not received an order from Reagan to join the attack. The secretary recalled wishing the French good luck, telling Hernu, "This is a bit too late for us to join you in this one." Weinberger told McFarlane he would talk to

the president about the strike. When McFarlane next saw the president, he complained that Weinberger had countermanded a presidential order. According to McFarlane, the president replied, "Gosh that's really disappointing.... We could have blown the daylight out of them. I just don't understand." In his diary for that day, the president wrote, "Surprise call from the France—they were going ahead without us & and bombing our other target in Lebanon [Baalbek]. They took it out completely." Nothing was clear about this episode or the president and his advisers' understanding of it. Contrary to Reagan's assessment, the French raid missed its targets, and they blamed the United States for failing to join them. McFarlane and Weinberger drew diametrically opposed conclusions from their discussion with the president. McFarlane suspected that Weinberger had played upon his friendship with the president to explain DoD's decision on the grounds there was no time to join the retaliatory attack. Weinberger considered McFarlane a reckless interventionist sure to embroil the United States in the Lebanese conflict. Either by ignoring or, more likely, by hearing what he wanted from the president, Weinberger had successfully averted U.S. participation in the raid.⁶⁴

Nevertheless, more possibilities for retaliation were soon at hand. Weinberger found himself in a losing battle. On the morning of December 3, 1983, two U.S. Navy F-14s conducting reconnaissance over the northern Shuf and Metn regions encountered Syrian anti-aircraft artillery and SA-7 SAM missile fire but were not hit. The Joint Chiefs recommended a military response and a stiff *démarche* to Damascus. On December 4 Weinberger, who was in Paris, received authority from the president at Camp David to retaliate. The secretary sent the execute order and 28 bombers from the aircraft carriers *Kennedy* and *Independence* attacked Syrian anti-aircraft units, losing two aircraft with one pilot killed and one captured. The next day, a marine observation post at the Beirut airport came under heavy mortar and small arms fire that killed eight and wounded eight others. As was so often the case for the U.S. MNF deployment in Beirut, the marines could not identify their attackers and they could only speculate as to whether the action was in retaliation for the U.S. air strikes of the previous day.⁶⁵

Even before this action, the Reagan team had met to reexamine the status of the rules of engagement. On December 5 the president issued another directive, NSDD 117, which stated that the MNF and its offshore support units could "undertake an effective self-defense against a range of foreseeable threats." The

NSDD reiterated that this self-defense would be “vigorous” against “any hostile quarter” but should minimize collateral damage. What this NSDD implied was the United States was in a virtual war with Syrian-backed militias and Syrian forces in Lebanon. During the next weeks, the MNF continued to take mortar and small arms fire while strengthening their defenses. The battleship *New Jersey* responded with its 16-inch guns against Druze positions in the Shuf.⁶⁶

Withdrawal

The situation in Beirut had reached the point that Weinberger had dreaded: the U.S. marines were no longer peacekeepers but combatants. During the final months of 1983, Weinberger pressed the JCS to come up with a plan to withdraw the marines, or at least, to move them to U.S. ships offshore. After Weinberger insisted on more specificity and timetables, the JCS formally recommended the withdrawal of U.S. forces to ships offshore. Weinberger passed their advice with his concurrence to the president on December 20, 1983. Shultz, McFarlane, and Rumsfeld argued that such a withdrawal would undercut their diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, after all the presidential promises to support Lebanon and the extensive LAMP deliveries of U.S. weapons, materiel, and training assistance, the United States would be perceived to be abandoning Gemayel and his army. McFarlane fought a rearguard action against this plan, using an NSC interagency group to create an unofficial “non-paper” that called for an expanded role for the MNF, an aggressive campaign against Syria, and a continuance of the diplomatic efforts to obtain Israeli and Syrian withdrawal. To Richard Armitage, head of ISA, such an expanded role for the MNF was unrealistic. Anything the United States could do to harass the Syrians would merely be a bluff since the United States did not enjoy military superiority over Syria in the region. Furthermore, a diplomatic solution was also unlikely as Syria and Israel were unwilling to disengage from Lebanon.⁶⁷

While Weinberger worked to end the MNF mission, he did not give up on the Lebanese Armed Forces. In early December 1983 he met with Gemayel at the Pentagon during the Lebanese president’s visit to Washington. Gemayel asked for tanks and artillery. Weinberger promised an additional tank battalion and 44 howitzers. In January 1984 the secretary asked the JCS to assess the viability of expanding the LAF to a mechanized force of 10 brigades. Chairman Vessey agreed with the plan and with additional military equipment deliveries in accordance

with LAF capacity to absorb them. Armitage was not as sanguine. He believed that the transfers “could adversely impact US Armed Forces,” were beyond the LAF’s capacity, and that even with 10 brigades the LAF would still suffer from problems with logistics, maintenance, and leadership. In addition, Congress would be unlikely to support more money for Lebanon. Armitage warned Weinberger that the plan was “not a ‘ticket home’ for the USMNF.” Nevertheless, Weinberger

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁶⁸

The Lebanese Security Assistance Program had been a major investment. Since November 1982, the total cost of the program totaled \$600 million. The Pentagon delivered 102 tanks, 275 tracked vehicles, 30 155mm howitzers, 1,400 wheeled vehicles, 9,000 tons of ammunition, and large quantities of communication equipment, uniforms, tents, spare parts, and support equipment. While the Lebanese committed \$108 million of their available FMS credits to pay for the equipment on time, they were running out of money and would probably request increased credits, forgiven credits, or grant aid.

Reagan and his advisers discussed Lebanon in a series of meetings in January 1984. Some of these were designated NSC Planning Group meetings, others were informal meetings attended by the same participants. According to Shultz, the vice president was hell-bent on withdrawal of the MNF. Shultz saw the handwriting on the wall, later instructing his political-military affairs bureau director, Admiral Jonathan Trumbull Howe, to convince the JCS to at least stay engaged in Lebanon while the U.S. troops were withdrawn gradually. The result was yet another presidential directive on Lebanon, NSDD 123 of February 1, 1984, which called for improving LAF counterbattery operations, U.S. naval and air support against any units in Syrian-controlled territory firing on the MNF or U.S. personnel and facilities, a company-sized unit of U.S. special operations forces to train the LAF in counterterrorism/counterinsurgency, a plan to phase down the U.S. MNF contingent gradually to a small residual force guarding the airport and the embassy, and continued naval and offshore support of the LAF after withdrawal.⁶⁹

After NSDD 123 was signed, the deterioration of the Lebanese Army undermined it. Syrian-backed Muslim militias attacked the LAF in Beirut and its southern suburbs near the airport, with spillover fire hitting marine positions at the airport. Two Muslim brigades of the LAF defected en masse, while a third brigade, guarding the southern approaches to the airport, mutinied. Weinberger informed the president that since unfriendly Druze militia had taken positions previously controlled by the friendly Lebanese Army “within a few hundred yards” of the airport, the marines were in danger. The Lebanese Army’s combat capacity was shattered due to defections, desertions, and heavy fighting. Shultz recalled how the collapse of the Lebanese Army set in motion a “virtual stampede” to immediately withdraw the marines from Beirut, with Bush and Weinberger leading the charge. Reagan shelved the plan for a 60-day gradual withdrawal. By February 26 the U.S. MNF contingent had pulled out of Beirut, leaving only 250 U.S. personnel, mostly trainers, intelligence officers, and marine embassy guards. The Italian contingent of the MNF left at the same time, while the French stayed until March 1. The peacekeeping mission ended.⁷⁰

Postmortem

Weinberger traveled to Lebanon on February 29, 1984. From the USS *Guam* he addressed the U.S. military personnel who had been involved in the peacekeeping operation. The secretary commended them for doing “a very dirty, very disagreeable and miserable job and frankly a job that simply cannot be done unless people working out the political and diplomatic ... side are able to work out or bring about those agreements. They tried and it was not possible.” He continued, “You couldn’t do the things you were trained for. You couldn’t move out and take the high ground.... And your colleagues suffered a terrible tragedy.” Weinberger expressed his, the president’s, and the American people’s respect and gratitude for their effort. He presented commendations. Weinberger then ventured into Beirut, this time with a helmet and flak jacket. As Gemayel was in Damascus, Weinberger met with no Lebanese officials. He peered over sandbags and talked with marine guards. The secretary made the rounds of the diplomats and local military commanders. While the secretary did not come under fire, he recalled the sound of not-too-distant mortars and small arms.⁷¹

No amount of genuine gratitude and respect for marines and the other service personnel who served in Lebanon could erase the fact that they were ill-

served by the Reagan administration. There was a reckoning. An independent commission established by Weinberger under the direction of retired Admiral Robert L. J. Long examined the whole peacekeeping operation and the terrorist attack, releasing its report to the public in late December 1983. One of the central criticisms from the five-member panel's report held that the marines of the MNF were used as part of a diplomatic strategy and became targets in an increasingly violent sectarian war. It was a classic case of mission creep. Although they were originally sent as a peacekeeping force to provide airport security, their mission was expanded as the situation in Beirut deteriorated. The Long Commission also found fault with security against potential terrorism for the marines at virtually every level of command and recommended disciplinary action against some U.S. commanders. The president took responsibility for the bombing, avoiding disciplinary actions against local commanders. But the Long Commission report represented a scathing critique of the MNF operation.⁷²

Weinberger sent the report to the president with commentary. He stressed the commission's conclusion that "it is not possible to carry out the assigned mission we have for Lebanon and simultaneously to eliminate attrition on the forces positioned at the airport." To drive his long-held view, the secretary stated, "I believe this means that the mission itself contributed to the loss and will continue to cause losses." Concluding his discussion on Lebanon in his memoirs, Weinberger noted that it took months for "Washington to face the unhappy truth that the second MNF was a sad and grievous error." This was not the view held by Shultz, who later reflected, "the Pentagon restricted our marines to a passive, tentative, and dangerous inward looking in Beirut," which he believed sent the wrong signal to Assad. "While American policy had a diplomatic arm, our military arm was tied behind our back, by our own leaders." Shultz's strong words directly blamed the Pentagon and Weinberger. In retrospect, Weinberger's belief that the mission was flawed from the start rang true.⁷³

The Long Commission report also exonerated Weinberger from charges that he had denied wounded marines evacuation and medical attention that Israel offered immediately after the bombing. The secretary received an avalanche of letters from concerned citizens demanding to know why he did not accept Israel's offer. Some accused Weinberger of rejecting the offer because he was pro-Arab and anti-Israel. "It seems quite obvious your priorities were warped when you choose to give our U.S. Marines second consideration to your concern over hostile Arab

feelings,” one citizen complained. Weinberger was deeply hurt by this campaign and spent considerable time and effort writing letters to citizens refuting the charges. The commission highlighted that the local commanders determined that Israeli and French medical assistance was not required. Medical capabilities on U.S. units offshore and transportation to a hospital on Cyprus were sufficient.⁷⁴

With the U.S. military presence ashore in Beirut down to 250 personnel, and with the disestablishment of the MNF, the steam went out of the LAMP. The JCS and Weinberger recommended returning most of the yet-to-be-delivered tanks, APCs, and howitzers to U.S. Army control, providing only nonlethal heavy equipment on a case-by-case basis. McFarlane agreed that any future transfer of major equipment should be delayed until Lebanon had a reconstituted and effective government, which didn’t happen during the Reagan years.⁷⁵

With hindsight, Weinberger’s and the JCS’s doubts about the MNF’s mission were well-founded. The operation’s cost was high in lives and money. In total, 264 Americans, including 4 non-MNF DoD personnel, died in the April 1983 embassy bombing and 137 sustained serious wounds. The estimated total cost of the operation was \$99.7 million (\$14.6 million for the Marine Corps participation in the MNF, \$44.9 million for Navy support and \$243,000 for Army support). In 2021 dollars that cost was the equivalent of \$261 million. Admittedly, the first mission to help evacuate the PLO organization enjoyed temporary success, but it hardly changed the dynamics of the Lebanese civil war. The LAMP program transferred equipment and weapons to the LAF, but it could not prevent its virtual disintegration in February 1983. Weinberger and the JCS fought all efforts against the interventionists, who wished to engage the small U.S. deployment in support of the Gemayel government in Lebanon’s civil war. Still, the U.S. members of the MNF became embroiled in the fighting and wound up in the unenviable position of taking hostile fire with only limited authority to respond. As Weinberger recalled, Shultz and the diplomats were loath to abandon their diplomatic campaign to convince Israel and Syria to withdraw from Lebanon long after it was obvious that the strategy would not succeed. Shultz and the diplomats held an abiding faith that with more time and continued U.S. military presence in the area, the logjam would break, and the Syrians and Israelis would agree to leave.⁷⁶

Reducing the Lebanon experience to its most basic, Shultz’s plea for diplomacy backed by military presence was an established tenet of international relations, but as applied in Lebanon in 1982–1983 it was ill-suited. Stationary peacekeepers with

only minimal ability to defend themselves hardly constituted a military presence. Even the more aggressive members of the MNF, like the French, failed to keep all warring factions apart. Given the subsequent history of Lebanon, it seems likely that if the United States increased its military role it could have found itself in the same cycle of strike and counterstrike, invasion and pullback that has plagued Israel's policy towards Lebanon for decades. Furthermore, as constituted, the U.S. MNF contingent was not a viable military force even within the factional warfare of Lebanon. It would have required many more U.S. military personnel, weapons, and combat support to convince Assad to withdraw Syrian forces and influence from Lebanon. The Israel Defense Forces' destruction of Syria's SA-6 SAM missiles and much of its air force did not convince the Syrian leader, and the Soviet Union simply resupplied him with better weapons. Even with offshore naval firepower, U.S. military force did not make a major difference.

Weinberger and the JCS fought a long and not-always-successful campaign to prevent expansion of the rules of engagement and therefore the mission of the MNF. They continued to recommend the withdrawal of the marines as soon as possible. McFarlane and Shultz have charged that Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs went beyond arguing against the president's policy during the discussion phase; they actively obstructed it after the president made decisions. Such a view is indicative of the intensity of the policy battle, the stubbornness of Weinberger in opposing a scheme he considered fatally flawed, and the president's tendency to avoid confrontation with advisers. Weinberger used all his bureaucratic skills as well as his friendship with the president to try to limit the threat to the MNF. If there was any doubt about the president's instruction, Weinberger usually interpreted it his way. Once a clear decision was made, he and the Joint Chiefs supported the policy, although that did not preclude Weinberger from continuing to argue for withdrawal with the White House and at the Department of State at virtually every relevant occasion. As a lawyer making his case, Weinberger proved persistent and consistent. He drove his opponents, especially Shultz and McFarlane, to distraction. In the end, however, Weinberger failed to convince the president and his other advisers to withdraw the U.S. peacekeepers until after the tragic bombing of October 23, 1983, and the collapse of the Lebanese Army. The policymakers argued for months about the proper role for the U.S. MNF contingent. The U.S. marines and other service personnel killed and wounded in Lebanon paid the price.

The Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia

THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY differences between President Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, which Republicans emphasized during the presidential campaign, became considerably blurred after Reagan took office. The Reagan administration continued nearly every foreign policy initiative started during the Carter years. Such continuity was especially apparent in the Reagan team's approach to the Persian Gulf and the Southwest Asia.

During his last two years, two events focused Carter and his national security team on the two regions. The first was the overthrow of the shah of Iran's government in early 1979 and the rise of the anti-American Islamic Republic of Iran. When Ayatollah Khomeini consolidated his control over Iran, he toppled one of the two pillars of the U.S. Persian Gulf strategy. Iran ceased to be the U.S. policeman for the Gulf. The remaining pillar, Saudi Arabia, used its great financial clout, based on oil revenues, to counteract Iran's influence and shore up other Arab moderates, but the desert kingdom was a military lightweight. The Persian Gulf was vulnerable, and the United States had limited ability to project its military power there.

The second transformational event of the Carter years was the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which gave urgency to concerns about the Soviet Union's threat to the region, including the Persian Gulf. The Carter team feared that the Soviets would take advantage of potential chaos in Iran to invade, and they envisioned possible Soviet interventions in the Arabian Peninsula. Reagan and Weinberger inherited these potential threats.¹

The Carter administration had agreed to help upgrade the Saudi military,

especially its air force, by selling the Saudis 60 F-15 Eagles as part of a Middle East aircraft package that included sales to Israel and Egypt. Carter and his secretary of defense, Harold Brown, also promised to consider providing enhancements to F-15s that would extend their range, increase their firepower, and expand their bomb capacity. In addition, Carter agreed to sell Riyadh AWACS surveillance aircraft. These decisions coincided with the presidential election of 1980 and faced fierce opposition from Israel and its supporters in the U.S. Congress. Carter left office without obtaining congressional approval for the AWACS and F-15 enhancement sales. The Reagan team inherited this political hot potato.²

AWACS, F-15 Enhancements, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Congress

Both the Carter and Reagan administrations agreed that Saudi Arabia's air defense system needed a serious upgrade. Without airpower, the sparsely populated desert kingdom could not protect its borders. One example of this vulnerability was the periodic Israeli reconnaissance overflight of Saudi military facilities. When the United States protested that these flights were unnecessary because Saudi Arabia was not a threat, Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon responded that Israel would overfly "as seldom as possible and as often as necessary." To shore up its air defense, the Saudis asked the Reagan administration for the enhancement package for the 60 F-15s already purchased and slated for delivery in 1982. The package included conformal fuel tanks and aerial refueling aircraft to extend range and flying time, AIM-9L air-to-air missiles for a more decisive edge over enemy aircraft, multiple bomb racks for more damaging attacks on ground targets, and AWACS to support the enhanced F-15s with radar coverage.³

In Israel's view such an improved Saudi air force posed a serious threat. The Israelis argued that although Saudi Arabia was not directly confrontational, it remained implacably hostile, a solid part of the anti-Israel bloc internationally, and a major source of funding for Palestinian organizations. Weinberger countered it was possible for the United States to support both Israel and Saudi Arabia militarily. He maintained that moderate and U.S.-friendly Arab States ultimately made Israel safer. His argument did not carry much weight in Israeli government circles. Israel's trump card was the requirement for Congress to approve the AWACS and F-15 enhancement sales. Israeli leaders focused their opposition and resources on preventing approval. The resulting political struggle proved an unwanted complication since the Reagan team's initial plan had been

to spend the first year in office focusing on domestic budget and tax policies while avoiding any divisive debates on foreign relations. The White House's point man on legislative affairs, Max L. Friedersdorf, who called the legislative battle over AWACS "the most debilitating" of his career, claimed that the problem had blown up because leading officials were "asleep at the switch." The State Department, Friedersdorf claimed, was "ambivalent" about the sale all along, while Defense was "gung ho" in favor, reflecting their differing priorities.⁴

Weinberger was strongly committed to deepening American ties with Saudi Arabia. In at least one sense, the popular perception of coziness between the Saudis and the Bechtel Corporation, of which Weinberger was a former vice president, director, and general counsel, was true. Because of his work at Bechtel, Weinberger had established friendly contacts with influential Saudis and members of the extended ruling family. Once at the Pentagon, Weinberger enjoyed frequent and friendly relations with Saudi royals, including Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi air attaché officer who soon became ambassador and was the son of the Saudi defense minister. A former Saudi fighter pilot with a personality and an outlook that appealed to Americans, Bandar was the unofficial link to Saudi King Khalid and then his successor King Fahd. These monarchs and their government's oil wealth, strong anticommunism, and anti-Iranian attitudes made Saudi Arabia a logical regional partner for the United States.⁵

Haig and the Department of State realized Saudi Arabia's importance, yet they worried about Israeli sensibilities, resulting in a more cautious approach to the sale. The conflicting positions within the administration became clear during a meeting of the NSC on April 1, 1981, chaired by Vice President Bush. Haig, about to leave for his first official trip to the Middle East, hoped to avoid conflict over the sale during his trip. No one wanted more controversy than necessary. National Security Adviser Richard Allen warned that the sale was "a very important issue and a very sensitive one." The package for the Saudis now approved by the Reagan team included conformal fuel tanks, air-to-air missiles, five AWACS planes, 12 ground radar arrays, and 6 KC-135 tanker aircraft for in-flight refueling, but the administration delayed the decision on the F-15 bomb racks. Allen, according to the minutes of the meeting, "feared that if the issue was not handled carefully it could result in the first-ever Congressional veto of a U.S. arms transfer agreement." Haig agreed, noting that Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin "had decided to make an all-out effort against AWACS for

political reasons,” which would lead to a “very tough fight on the Hill.” Although impressed by Weinberger’s arguments in favor of fast action, Haig warned that it would require “a major lobbying effort ... and we had to face the fact that we might face defeat.” Haig preferred to defer formal presentation of the package as long as possible.⁶

Weinberger claimed the benefits of closer cooperation with the Saudis outweighed any short-term problems with Israel and would be lost if they did not follow through on the deal: “We have to face the fact that we need extra friends. We need more friends than Israel.” He wanted to present the package to Congress within the week. Citing the president’s approval, given at a previous NSC meeting on February 27, Weinberger argued that enhanced financial and military aid to Israel could smooth ruffled feathers. The summary of conclusions from that meeting had indeed noted the president’s “final approval” of the sale as “the basis for an improved dialogue with the Saudis on a broad range of security issues of mutual concern,” and combined it with plans to help the Israelis with their weapon programs. It also suggested working out common talking points to convince “key leaders of the American Jewish community” that the administration “would take no actions in this area that would be harmful to Israel’s security interests.”⁷

Vice President Bush was not so sure that they had made any binding decisions at the February 27 meeting; his uncertainty was indicative of the problems caused by Reagan’s tendency not to provide clear indications of his decisions at NSC meetings. Bush joined Allen and Haig in counseling caution. Weinberger was adamant that the decision had already been made and brushed aside concerns about opposition on the Hill. He claimed no more than 25 senators would vote against the package. He emphasized the defensive nature of AWACS and its value to American surveillance of the Gulf and saw no threat to regional security. Ultimately, the sale did more for U.S. security than it did for the Saudis and did nothing to weaken Israel. Bush asked, “But what if Saudi Arabia attacked Israel?” Frank Carlucci sprang to his boss’s aid. “We’ve seen what happens in the past,” he remarked dryly. “The Saudi air force wouldn’t last 45 minutes in a war with Israel.”⁸

Weinberger left little doubt about his position. Conflict in the NSC was muted, as even Haig admitted the logic in Weinberger’s position, but lines were drawn for conflicts to come. Weinberger failed to prevent a delay in the formal announce-



E-3A Sentry aircraft equipped with an airborne warning and control system. *OSD Records*

ment of the AWACS package, but when he talked to the Saudis he assured them that the deal was moving forward and, after consultation with Congress, that there would be a successful conclusion. Weinberger continued to employ Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord, USAF, who had been Harold Brown's point man with the Saudis on the AWACS and F-15 enhancements sale, making him a deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs. A former nonconventional warfare specialist, Secord worked closely with Bandar to fashion safeguards for the AWACS sale that would require sharing the data obtained from the aircraft with the United States, exclude the Saudis from providing intelligence derived from AWACS to other countries, and establish security procedures for Saudi AWACS operations. Still, as Iklé warned Weinberger, "the stakes were high" and "the battle in Congress will be long and prolonged." To Iklé's mind, the AWACS sale required four interlocking campaigns: with Congress, the public, the Saudis, and the Israelis.⁹

The Israelis made no secret of their opposition. The only question was how far they would go to in order to stop the sale. In mid-April 1981, a Senate delegation led by Majority Leader Howard Baker and escorted by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs Russell Rourke traveled to Israel to gauge Israeli attitudes. Rourke attended a meeting of the delegation with Defense Minister

Moshe Dayan and his eventual successor Ariel Sharon, as well as Labor Party leader Shimon Peres, and Prime Minister Begin. Rourke reported that all the Israeli leaders were “vehemently opposed” to the sale. After Begin’s “particularly persuasive” performance, Rourke detected “a noticeable shift in attitude in our delegation.” Rourke expected an “all-out campaign against the sale,” and concluded, “If [the] proposal has any chance of success, concessions will have to be obtained from the Saudis and a total administration effort undertaken with Congress.”¹⁰

The chances that Congress would approve the sale looked bleak. On June 24, 1981, Senator Robert W. “Bob” Packwood (R-OR) sent a letter signed by an additional 53 senators (34 Democrats and 19 Republicans) to the president opposing the Saudi sale and recommending that it not be sent Congress for approval. In an informal “personal thoughts” memorandum to NSC adviser Allen, Iklé worried it didn’t matter that the Saudis were ready to accept limitations and conditions on AWACS and F-15 enhancements; no matter how restrictive, they would “not be seen as a dramatic enough change in the Senate to overcome the mood of opposition” and would be unlikely to alter the minds of many who signed the letter of April 24. Iklé saw “a strong confrontational atmosphere in the Senate and opposing resolutions in the House that will pass with large majorities.”¹¹

Concerns about congressional opposition again delayed the administration’s formal submission of the AWACS and F-15 enhancements sale to Congress. At an NSC meeting, Allen looked at the latest headcount of senators, for, against, and undecided. Allen claimed there were not enough yes votes for approval of the sales. Still, he thought the vote “winnable” because the president believed he could persuade some of the 54 who signed the opposing letter. He noted, “The sale will quite clearly contribute to peace and security in the region. We should sell it on its merits.” On August 24 the administration formally submitted its proposal to sell the Saudis five AWACS planes, six KC-707 tankers, 101 conformal fuel tanks for F-15s, and 1,177 AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles. The total price tag for the package was \$8.5 billion. The background paper provided by Weinberger’s policy staff noted Israeli concerns but asserted the package would have “minimal impact on the Arab-Israeli balance.” Also declaring that the security of Israel “has been and will continue to be a *paramount interest of the U.S.*,” the unsigned paper, which Weinberger used in subsequent meetings with Begin and Sharon, further emphasized Saudi assurances on security, data sharing, and areas of

operation. Formal presentation of the proposal came in advance of the 20-day informal notification period, scheduled to begin when Congress returned from recess on September 9. The informal period would be followed by a 30-day formal notification period, during which both houses would have to pass resolutions disapproving the sale to block it. A Halloween deadline loomed.¹²

Begin arrived in Washington just as Congress returned to session on September 9, 1981. The clock was ticking, and each side knew the stakes. Iklé recommended to Weinberger that the president link the AWACS issue to a larger discussion of U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation (described in chapter 8). Weinberger would make the point when he met with Sharon at the Pentagon. Assistant Secretary Bing West claimed that Sharon was “less ideological than Begin and somewhat more flexible” as long as he felt Israel’s basic security needs were met. Haig and Weinberger also advised Reagan on the need “to emphasize that we still desire a strategic partnership, but that this requires that both sides take each other’s interests into account.”¹³

In a meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House, Begin informed Reagan of his objections to the AWACS and enhancements sale. The president told the Israeli prime minister that the sale “could help bring the Saudis into the peace making process,” and explained that a strong Israel was in the United States’ interest: “I assured him we (Israel & U.S.) were allies. That the partnership benefited us as much as it did Israel & that we would not let a risk to Israel be created.” Reagan admitted that Begin was not convinced but believed that “he mellowed.” Weinberger and Carlucci met with Sharon on September 11. The Pentagon chief was blunter than the president: if Sharon wanted strategic consultations, cooperation, and agreements, he had to appreciate that “it would be very hard for the President to do any of these things if AWACS sale lost.” Sharon responded that he understood.¹⁴

Such understanding was not reflected in Begin’s subsequent actions. After leaving the White House, Begin met with congressional leaders and appeared on American television shows to denounce the sale. He traveled to New York to address the meeting of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the foremost organization in the so-called Israel lobby. When it came to the AWACS, pro-Israel groups and Israeli officials placed the Reagan administration in a precarious position. During the presidential campaign Reagan had drawn significant segments of the Jewish vote to the GOP. Now those same groups

were in conflict with the administration only months into his term over military support to one of Israel's rivals.¹⁵

Reagan was "annoyed" by the Israeli prime minister's lobbying efforts on the Hill and in the media, confiding in his diary that Begin promised him he would do no such thing. Begin's public hard line highlighted the administration's need to develop a stronger congressional counterstrategy. National Security Adviser Allen, who had the job of coordinating the campaign to sell the AWACS and F-15 enhancements deal to Congress, proved ineffectual. He later complained he had been given the task because no one else wanted it, and it's certainly true he was up against an extremely effective lobbying effort taking place on several fronts. Soon it became clear that the administration was facing a significant and embarrassing political defeat. On October 14 the House passed a resolution rejecting the sale by a wide margin of 301 to 111. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee narrowly rejected the plan the next day, 9–8, things looked bad indeed. Reagan took the issue in hand personally, lobbying individual senators hard, emphasizing American interests, credibility, and the need to give his administration a win. The typically mild-mannered Reagan was not above forceful rhetoric. When Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) tried to justify his opposition and insisted that the Israel lobby did not control his vote, Reagan reportedly retorted, "That may be so, Senator, but the world will perceive that they do."¹⁶

Howard Baker later called Reagan "our chief negotiator" for his tireless efforts. Weinberger was also deeply involved, providing support for the president's campaign. The secretary testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, both in open and executive sessions. In two full days of testimony he hammered home the administration's key talking points: the sales enhanced regional stability and did not diminish the commitment to Israeli security; the aircraft would be used under American oversight, which would eliminate leakage of technology and intelligence to other states in the region; a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia was in the interests of all concerned; and Congress's rejection would seriously harm ties with Riyadh. He added that if the Saudis were rebuffed, they could buy the Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft system from the British, giving them the same surveillance capability without the close American oversight the AWACS deal provided. It was vintage Weinberger, a combination of endurance, patience, politeness, and sticking to the message, with a threat thrown in.¹⁷

Along with this testimony, Weinberger gave a slew of interviews to the media. He defended the Saudis' demand that the United States complete the agreed-upon deal, sometimes in terms that included subtle digs at Israel. When questioners on *Face the Nation* wondered whether Saudi Arabia was exerting as much pressure on the United States as Israel, Weinberger commented acidly: Saudi Arabia was a "sovereign country, one of the few in the world, I might add, that pays cash for these things, as opposed to simply being given them." It was entitled to lobby for a deal that enhanced its security.¹⁸

Voting went down to the wire, but the full Senate narrowly approved the sale, 52–48, on October 28. Reagan gushed to his diary, "What a victory this is—and what it means worldwide." To the press he declared the vote would strengthen relations with the Saudis, "win favor among moderate Arab nations, and most importantly continue the difficult but steady progress toward peace and stability in the Middle East," adding that the commitment to Israeli security was "undiminished." Weinberger was equally euphoric. In a meeting with King Hussein of Jordan, Weinberger accepted Hussein's praise that the vote meant "the U.S. is able to look after its own interests" with the comment, "Yes, and it answered a broader question, that the President could conduct foreign policy, not 100 senators."¹⁹

The struggle to consummate the AWACS deal highlighted just how difficult it was for the administration to gain new friends in the Middle East without losing the ones it already had. Weinberger never left any doubt about where he stood, even as he struggled to deflect charges that his positions reflected hostility to Israel. The Pentagon's arguments had convinced the president that the deal was in the best interests of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Middle East peace. Having accepted this advice, Reagan used his considerable persuasive powers on senators to carry the day. The AWACS and F-15 enhancement vote was a victory not only for the president, but for the secretary of defense as well.

U.S.-Saudi Military Cooperation and the Persian Gulf Tanker War

Having gone to the mat with Congress over arms sales, Weinberger and the Pentagon expected that a closer military and regional strategic relationship with the desert kingdom would follow. In one sense, the United States and Saudi Arabia already had a close military relationship. As the world's major oil producer, the Saudis had a large reserve of U.S. dollars, which made it easy for Saudi Arabia to become the world's largest purchaser of U.S. defense articles and services and to

account for 30 percent of all U.S. arms sales. However, the figure was misleading. Even counting the \$8.5 billion in AWACS and F-15 enhancements, a sale yet to be finalized as of mid-1982, more than half of the \$44.4 billion in total foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia since the inception of its FMS program had been for construction and design services, repair and rehabilitation of equipment, supply operations, training, and publications. Counting AWACS and F-15 enhancements, only \$16.1 billion of the total \$44 billion in FMS purchased by Saudi Arabia was for military hardware.²⁰

One of the reasons that the Saudis now wanted to purchase more weapons and military equipment was the uneven and generally poor state of the Saudi armed forces. The Royal Saudi Land Force (RSLF) had 35,000 soldiers and controlled the kingdom's air defenses, including surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery assets. In the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency's view, the RSLF could not defend the kingdom against an attack by Jordan, Israel, or Iraq. The Saudi National Guard, an additional ground force of 25,000 men, protected oil and government facilities while serving as a counterbalance to the RSLF and a hedge against a military coup. But if the guard was expected to reinforce the RSLF during a conflict, the DIA felt, it would need better training, firepower, and combat effectiveness.²¹

While the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), with its six fighter squadrons and 17,000 airmen, could respond to an outside threat, it could do so for only a limited amount of time. Manpower shortages, poor indigenous technical services, and faulty coordination with the RSLF air defenses lessened the RSAF's effectiveness. The Royal Saudi Navy of 2,500 sailors and 25 combatant and service craft was only capable of coastal patrol and basic minesweeping operations. The overriding characteristics of the leadership of the Saudi armed forces were conservatism, longevity in one job, and personal loyalty to the royal family. Many senior commanders came from families with strong ties to the house of Saud or were members of the royal family itself. Mid-level officers often came from families and tribes traditionally loyal to the monarchy, leaving little room for merit-based promotions. There was plenty of room for improvement for the kingdom's armed forces.²²

Weinberger traveled twice to Saudi Arabia in the first six months of 1982. The first time was in February to complete the details of the AWACS and F-15 enhancements sale. The second took place in June for the funeral of King Khalid.

While the secretary succeeded during his first trip in obtaining from Saudi defense minister Sultan Abd al-Aziz an agreement in principle to form a U.S.-Saudi joint military committee, after his second visit the committee was still very much a concept without implementation. The Saudis were reluctant to move forward with it because they were “fearful of criticism by radical Arabs,” in Weinberger’s view. The Saudis were all for buying more military hardware—such as M1 tanks, Lance missiles “or something like it,” and bomb racks for F-15s, which had not been included in the deal Congress approved—but remained leery of joint planning with the United States for contingencies that might arise in their region.²³

In late July, however, Weinberger reported a breakthrough to the president. The Saudis had agreed to allow a seven-man U.S. Coordinating Planning Group to work with the Royal Saudi Armed Forces in Riyadh on improving the kingdom’s air defenses. George Shultz, recently confirmed as secretary of state, agreed with the plan. He noted that the renewed fighting between Iran and Iraq and the fear that Iran could attack Saudi oil facilities in reprisal for Saudi support of Iraq was probably the cause for the Saudi’s decision. Nevertheless, Shultz warned that the Saudis should not interpret U.S. interest in contingency planning as a guarantee of support for the kingdom should a conflict arise.²⁴

Weinberger believed that the “Saudi role, both diplomatically and financially, may be crucial to [the] success” of peace efforts in the Middle East. If the United States wanted Saudi Arabia to play such a positive role, it would have to meet their security needs, specifically the long-standing Saudi requests for Lance missiles, multiple ejector bomb racks (MER-200s) for their F-15s, and the multiple launch rocket system. Shultz disagreed, echoing U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Richard W. Murphy’s view that “the Saudi leadership is quite pleased with our security cooperation” and telling Weinberger it was one that “you have so carefully and successfully nurtured.” The Saudi requests were just part of a “wish list,” he insisted. In addition, he added, of the three systems Weinberger mentioned, all would meet with opposition in Congress, but the bomb racks would generate “another bruising Congressional debate” that could damage U.S.-Saudi relations.²⁵

A similar pattern continued into 1983. The Saudis requested sales of additional advanced U.S. weapons. Weinberger remained sympathetic to these requests, but also urged Riyadh to focus on the Coordinating Planning Group and allow it to move beyond its air defense advice role to joint military planning. State continued to be “concerned” with selling additional arms to the Saudis, especially the

portable Stinger ground-to-air missile. An annoyed Weinberger commented, “We are concerned too that we’ll lose all leverage with Saudis if State does not move and just sits around being concerned.” Unfortunately for Weinberger, it was not just State. The Joint Chiefs opposed granting the Saudi request for purchase of the MIM-72C Improved Chaparral, the latest state-of-the-art surface-to-air missile system, which was able to distinguish between enemy aircraft and enemy countermeasures and had night capability and a forward-looking infrared imaging system. The missile was too advanced, the Joint Chiefs believed, and would likely cause an “AWACS type” political confrontation with the Israelis. The less-sophisticated MIM-72F Chaparral, then being supplied to the Israelis, could be offered to the Saudis even though it exceeded any need the kingdom might have, in the JCS’s view. The issue became a nonstarter when Prince Bandar learned that the MIM 72C Improved Chaparral was not available. He responded that his government would rely instead on the French Shahine missile to do the job.²⁶

In late 1983 and 1984 the escalating Iran-Iraq War spilled into the Persian Gulf with attacks by both sides on oil tankers and other vessels. The war had degenerated into stalemate with both sides looking for ways to gain an advantage



Persian Gulf region. *Opposite page:* The bottleneck through which Persian Gulf oil tankers have to pass. OSD/HO

other than engaging in costly land battles. Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, which was also a threat to Iraq's main financial supporters, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The Reagan administration decided that if Iran should attempt such an action, the United States would "undertake whatever measures necessary to keep the Strait of Hormuz open." For its part,



Iraq used its air force to attack Iranian shipping. From February to April 1984 Iraqi aircraft damaged or sank 15 Iranian ships and one Saudi tanker, a case of Iraqi pilots mistakenly attacking a vessel of its unofficial ally. The Iranians, who never made good on the threat to close the strait, responded in mid-May 1984 with attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers by their F-4 aircraft, which had been purchased from the United States by the former government and still served as the backbone of their air force. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided more than financial support for Iraq's war effort: the Saudis also secretly allowed Iraqi planes to refuel at its bases as they returned from operations against Iranian shipping. In addition, Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers were Iran's only viable oil targets since most Iraqi oil left the country by pipeline through Turkey.²⁷

This escalation in the tanker war and earlier Iranian threats to close the Strait of Hormuz and cut off Persian Gulf oil rattled Washington. The Reagan administration made two decisions. The first was to respond immediately should Iran attack U.S. merchant ships and to reiterate U.S. resolve to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to international shipping. The United States would consult with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States on how to respond, improve the defense of U.S. personnel and facilities in the Gulf, and enhance antiterrorism measures in the region. In addition, the United States would approach Egypt, France, and Jordan to encourage military and intelligence support to Iraq. The second presidential directive allowed for the Saudis to purchase 400 Stingers on an emergency basis, which meant the sale did not require approval by Congress.



Guided-missile destroyer USS *Robinson* anchored near tanker *Polyanthus* off the coast of Oman, October 1, 1983. *OSD Records*

Subsequent Saudi arms requests should be forwarded to the president for review. Finally, the president instructed the DoD to flesh out plans on how to respond to attacks on U.S. military forces, warships, facilities, AWACS, and U.S.-flagged tankers in the region.²⁸

Weinberger's team felt these directives were overreactions. Shultz and National Security Adviser McFarlane, still furious about the Iranian role in the bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut (see chapter 9), were itching for a way to respond to Iranian terrorism and attacks on neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf. These tensions surfaced at an NSC Planning Group meeting in mid-May attended by the president. Deputy Secretary Taft filled in for Weinberger who was in Brussels for a NATO meeting. Shultz claimed that public statements of support for the Saudis were not enough; it was time for concrete steps to safeguard their shipping, such as gaining access to Saudi military facilities, engaging in combined U.S.-Saudi military planning, providing Saudis with additional refueling tankers and anti-aircraft weapons, and speeding up delivery of their AWACS. Taft said very little, but when he spoke he was quickly contradicted by Shultz. When the secretary of state outlined the diplomatic efforts against Iran, Taft commented,

“That is right. We need to exhaust diplomatic effort to solve the crisis before we get involved militarily.” Shultz shot back, “This is the same old story—military power and diplomacy are not separate categories. We need both.... Successful diplomacy must have a military dimension.” The NSC met for a briefing on the Gulf conflict a week later, with Reagan, Bush, and Weinberger attending. The secretary agreed with the consensus view at the meeting that the Saudis should receive emergency shoulder-held antiaircraft Stinger missiles and suggested 200. The president opted for 400 and did not rule out more. Weinberger also agreed that the Saudis needed an additional KC-10 refueling tanker for AWACS coverage of the Gulf. When Shultz raised the possibility of a terrorist attack on U.S. facilities, Weinberger also thought it a real possibility. McFarlane proposed that if there was such an attack, the U.S. would retaliate against an Iranian target. Bush worried such a decision would “get us into an automatic war.” Weinberger responded that it would not be “automatic approval.” The president would still make the decision to retaliate.²⁹

Weinberger realized which way the wind was blowing. His advisers, especially Iklé, had initially argued that military actions against Tehran would not limit its support of terrorism, would draw the United States into the Iran-Iraq War, would make it easier for the Soviets to increase their influence in Iran, and would preclude better relations with a post-Khomeini government. While the United States had not engaged Iran militarily, it was already providing AWACS radar coverage and refueling Saudi jets in the air. Although he was loath to commit U.S. forces to military action even in principle, Weinberger fell in line with the rest of the administration that should Iran attack U.S. facilities, the United States would reply in kind.³⁰

Iran never attacked a U.S. target, but the Gulf conflict came to a head in early June 1984. The Saudis had declared a no-fly zone in the northern Gulf, the so-called Fahd Line that encompassed almost all its offshore oil fields and facilities. When the U.S. AWACS stationed in Saudi Arabia—the Saudis had not yet received delivery of the AWACS they purchased—detected two Iranian F-4s entering the zone, Saudi aircraft intercepted them and shot one down. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia scrambled almost 60 aircraft, but the Iranians backed down and their planes returned to base. The Iranians never again flew beyond the Fahd Line. As Bander reportedly told Weinberger, “Resolution prevailed against the Iranian bully.” The tanker war would continue in a low key into the second

Reagan term and flare up again in 1987. Nevertheless, the tanker war brought the United States and Saudi Arabia into closer military cooperation. It was not the organized, joint contingency planning by U.S. and Saudi military officers against the Soviet Union and other threats that Weinberger had hoped to achieve, but it was military cooperation nonetheless.³¹

The Oman Access Agreement

In the last years of his presidency, Jimmy Carter's administration sought to create a "Framework for Security in the Persian Gulf." It was an ambitious plan, based on the concept that the U.S. ability to project power into the Persian Gulf required cooperation with nations of the Indian Ocean littoral: Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and five other Persian Gulf monarchies. While none of these states were willing to accept U.S. troops on a permanent basis or host United States military bases, the Carter team hoped to arrange access for pre-positioning U.S. military supplies, helping construct military facilities that the United States could use in an emergency, and creating military cooperation through joint exercises and planning. The main permanent U.S. base for the framework for security was the British island of Diego Garcia, leased by the United States. The DoD spent \$600 million upgrading the airfield there and pre-positioned equipment, oil, petroleum, lubricants, and water that could be dispatched to the Gulf to support a force of up to 12,000. In addition, the Carter administration increased the size of the small naval presence in the Gulf and deployed two aircraft carriers and escorts from Pacific Command to the Indian Ocean. Administratively, Carter approved the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, with primary responsibility for the Persian Gulf and Africa's Indian Ocean littoral. The task force became Central Command in 1983 (see chapter 6).³²

The framework's implementation met with modest results. The Egyptians and the United States could not agree on how to upgrade the base at Ras Banas for U.S. use in an emergency (see chapter 8). Egypt allowed only limited pre-positioning at Wadi Kena and participated with U.S. Forces in what became the annual Bright Star joint exercises. U.S. negotiations with Kenya led to limited use of its airfield and port facilities at Mombasa. The Mombasa port facilities were important for refueling and maintaining U.S. vessels in the Indian Ocean and providing rest and recreation for their crews. Somalia provided use of airfields and ports at Mogadishu and Berbera. But Saudi Arabia resisted efforts to engage in joint

planning with the United States, ruled out pre-positioning of U.S. military equipment, and refused any permanent U.S. presence in the kingdom. However, the Saudis agreed to overbuild their airfields with the tacit understanding that in a real emergency they would accommodate U.S. aircraft. Of the other Gulf monarchies—Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman—only Oman was receptive to allowing the United States to use its territory to support both peacetime and crisis operations in the Gulf.³³

Weinberger could rightly claim credit for nurturing the relationship with Oman. He was the first secretary of defense, in fact, the first U.S. cabinet officer, to visit Oman. Nevertheless, the Carter administration paved the way in 1980 by successfully negotiating an agreement with Oman for U.S. access to Omani military facilities in return for upgrading them and providing Oman military aid. The airfield upgrades included extending and improving runways, constructing support facilities for personnel and maintenance, and preparing locations to hold pre-positioned supplies. One air base proved a gem; the former British Royal Air Force base at Masirah Island, 15 miles off the Oman coast in the Gulf of Oman, was within easy striking distance of the Strait of Hormuz and, due to its obscure location, was very discreet. The Carter administration used Masirah as a staging area for the ill-fated Iran hostage rescue mission in 1980.

One of the reasons Oman was cooperative with the DoD was its pro-Western orientation. Its head of state, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, was a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and relied on seconded British officers to leaven his



President Reagan, Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman, and First Lady Nancy Reagan, April 12, 1983. *Reagan Library*

officer corps. A British general was chief of the Omani Defense Staff and all three Omani armed services had Britons as commanders. Qaboos was anticommunist, an economic modernizer, and a visible supporter of Middle East peace efforts. He was a man with whom Weinberger and the Pentagon believed they could do business.³⁴

In early February 1982 Weinberger made his historic visit to Oman, meeting with the sultan and his foreign and defense ministers. As the Pentagon chief stressed to the president, "Oman is, of course, very important in our strategic plans for a Persian Gulf contingency. Of our planned expenditures through 1986 for facilities in the Middle East and Persian Gulf area of \$1.5B, \$300M will be for facilities in Oman." Weinberger noted that Oman would be the principal staging and operational base for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and P-3 reconnaissance aircraft operating from Oman bases, while U.S. Indian Ocean carrier aircraft could make emergency landings at the four Oman air bases. The U.S. Military Airlift Command had access to these air bases for replenishment of Indian Ocean battle groups. The one challenge, according to Weinberger, was that the sultan was far more concerned about localized threats or insurgencies sponsored by Iran than by Soviet aggression. Weinberger tried to emphasize the Soviet danger.³⁵

The secretary proposed creation of a joint military commission, and the Omanis agreed, but it never came to pass; they were more successful, however, in creating a joint commission on economic aid. The Omanis did not have an extensive wish list of military equipment they needed from the United States, a pleasant surprise to Weinberger. They did want Reagan to provide an assurance letter, as Carter had, stating that if attacked the United States would come to their aid. They also asked that Washington purchase some of their oil for the U.S. strategic oil reserve. Both of these requests seemed to Weinberger to be reasonable *quid pro quos*.³⁶

Weinberger's rosy report to Reagan failed to note the difficulties of joint cost sharing and maintenance of Omani military facilities for use by the United States in emergencies. As ISA noted, in late December 1982, the United States and Oman were "miles apart with Oman holding out for \$40M [annually] or about two-thirds of their Air Force operations and management expenses starting in FY 83, and our offer to pay about \$10M [annually]." The Omanis argued that these bases were to be built for U.S. use and were designed for military equipment

that Oman did not possess. The United States countered that construction of the bases would not be finished until FY 1985 or 1986, so asking for \$40 million now was “unrealistic.”³⁷

When Sultan Qaboos visited Washington in April 1983, he assured Shultz that the “technical” difficulty over the cost-sharing agreement should not upset the larger and successful military relationship. State and Defense negotiators had made progress on the implementation details of the agreement for U.S. access to Oman in the event of a Middle East emergency. The Omanis agreed that the Pentagon could begin pre-positioning military stores later in the year once storage facilities and contract maintenance services were in place. However, the impasse over operations and maintenance costs for the bases remained. In August an interagency group chaired by ISA chief Richard Armitage proposed providing Oman \$10 million per year for lease of the Omani bases beginning in fiscal year 1985. The \$10 million figure was broken down as \$3 million for maintenance of existing Omani air force facilities, \$3 million towards Omani air force maintenance costs, and \$4 million for a proportion of Oman’s operating costs. In addition, the United States would pay for maintenance of U.S. constructed facilities and for consumables related to U.S. military activities in Oman. Weinberger approved but commented, “We need Oman & shouldn’t fiddle about too much with this.”³⁸

In autumn 1983 the two sides moved closer to agreement. The Pentagon offered to pay Oman \$12 million annually for a five-year lease of the Omani military facilities, which would be an amendment to the U.S.-Omani access agreement. During 1984 negotiations continued and with additional minor concessions the cost-sharing arrangement was resolved. This long wrangle helped to slow construction work on the upgrades for Omani air bases, resulting in the U.S. having to rely on aircraft carriers during the 1984 Iran-Iraq tanker war. By the time of the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations in 1990–1991, the completed Omani bases proved their value.³⁹

Afghanistan

As it had done for its Persian Gulf policies, Weinberger and Reagan largely built on the Carter administration’s foundations in Southwest Asia. Even before the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter had signed the first of a series of intelligence findings authorizing humanitarian and nonlethal aid to noncommunist Afghans opposed to the Soviet-dominated communist

government in Kabul. When the Soviets invaded to support the faltering Afghan communists, Carter escalated his support of fundamentalist Islamic forces fighting the Soviet invaders by channeling weapons and military equipment to them through Pakistan. For reasons of deniability, these weapons had to be of Soviet or Eastern European manufacture. Then they could credibly be claimed to have been captured from the invaders. The Reagan team was content to use the Carter program's intelligence finding to continue secretly supporting the Afghan resistance. In effect, the Reagan administration's effort consisted of more of the same: funds and weapons to help the Afghans. Nevertheless, Reagan had a higher priority: secret funding for the Contras fighting the Sandinista regime of Nicaragua. Much closer to the United States, the Sandinistas seemed the greater threat and certainly congressional opposition to supporting the Contras proved the greater challenge. Reagan and his team were content to allow Afghanistan to simmer for fear of complicating their effort in Central America.⁴⁰

Only after a sustained effort by a flamboyant Texas congressman and his ally, a Republican socialite and fundraiser, did the Reagan team, especially Weinberger, come to realize that if they upgraded support of the Afghan mujahideen (holy warriors) the Soviets could be defeated. Charles N. "Charlie" Wilson was a Democratic representative to Congress from the highly conservative and evangelical Second District in Texas. A staunch anticommunist, his personal life was the antithesis of his district. His ally was a Houston socialite from an old-line Texas family, Joanne Herring, who established social contacts with Pakistani leaders, becoming an honorary consul of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and a confidante of President Zia ul-Haq. Wilson and Herring sought to energize Republican conservative circles to support the Afghan freedom fighters.⁴¹

They lobbied for more and better arms for the mujahideen, especially weapons able to shoot down Soviet Hind helicopters, the workhorses of the Soviet campaign against the insurgency. The Pentagon and Wilson clashed in early 1984 when the congressman convinced the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee to take \$40 million from the Defense budget and apply it toward covert aid for the mujahideen for winter clothing, consumables, and Swiss-manufactured Oerlikon antiaircraft cannons. This provision passed in the FY 1984 defense appropriation act. The problem for the Pentagon was that this \$40 million was not offset by a \$40 million addition to the Pentagon's budget ceiling. Richard G. Stilwell, a retired Army general and deputy under secretary of defense for policy, reportedly went

to Wilson's office on Capitol Hill while the congressman was in Texas to set his legislative assistant straight on the Afghan covert program and get a message to his boss to stop meddling in operational details. On January 19, 1984, Wilson and Stilwell talked on the telephone. The general assured the congressman that the Pentagon wanted to support the Afghan resistance, but until there was a major review of the policy they did not want to spend the \$40 million. As Stilwell told Weinberger, "Mr. Wilson was not mollified. He said that my reply meant we were to continue to ignore the intent of Congress and instead study the problem." Wilson hinted that Clarence D. "Doc" Long (D-MD), chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, agreed with him and would punish the Pentagon in the FY 1985 appropriation if they did not act. Wilson vowed to take the issue up with Weinberger and Deputy Secretary of Defense William Taft.⁴²

Wilson's intercession proved successful. A month later Weinberger asked for Afghanistan to be placed on the agenda for a regular breakfast meeting with Shultz and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane. The secretary noted that the Pentagon favored an expanded and sustained program of political, military, and psychological actions that posed higher risks to Moscow and greater costs for their war in Afghanistan. The fundamental issue for discussion was where



President Reagan, translator, and Afghan resistance leaders, February 2, 1983. *Reagan Library*

the United States was heading in Afghanistan. Was the Reagan administration merely trying to be a nuisance to Moscow or, given the growing cohesiveness of the Afghan resistance movement under young leaders, should the United States provide resources to more seriously stress the Soviet war effort? To Weinberger's way of thinking, the mujahideen were stuck in a classic guerrilla stalemate. They could not defeat the Soviets, but the invaders could not defeat them. How long could the Afghan resistance continue without a prospect of success?⁴³

The DoD's view was that additional U.S. weapons and equipment support for the Afghan resistance could seriously impair the Soviet military. It was not a view widely held by the rest of the U.S. government, which believed that the resistance would continue indefinitely no matter what the United States did. CIA analysts and the NSC staff did not believe that the fight required more U.S. funds and weapons. With Chinese support they considered it sustainable. Nevertheless, the insurgency had not unduly stressed the Soviet Union. The CIA estimated that Afghanistan was costing the Soviets only 1 percent of their total defense spending. However, since Soviet military growth was increasing at only 2 percent per year, the agency admitted that a ramped-up Afghan war could have an impact. At this point, the NSC staff suggested that the administration might decide to increase support of the mujahideen with "some measure like the Red Eye [a shoulder-held antiaircraft missile] that demonstrates to the Soviets our willingness to run the risks of being associated with the resistance effort." Such support could send a signal to both Moscow and Beijing.⁴⁴

The ensuing internal Washington debate eventually went the Pentagon's way. According to the CIA's deputy director for intelligence, Robert Gates, DCI William Casey agreed to make a dramatic shift in the program of covert support for the Afghan resistance. Gates recalled that the program had poked along at "about several millions of dollars" during 1980–1983. In February 1984 Casey met with President Zia of Pakistan to review its participation. In the past, Zia and the Pakistan intelligence agency were concerned about challenging the Soviets too aggressively in Afghanistan for fear of retaliation, especially in the form of cross-border raids into Pakistan. The United States had consistently tried to keep the program discreet and deniable. Casey, Weinberger, Wilson, and Wilson's allies all agreed it was time to up the ante. According to Gates, Casey increased support for the program dramatically for the rest of fiscal year 1984 and committed to spending \$250 million dollars in fiscal year 1985. The DCI asked the

Saudis to match that figure. The DoD-initiated review paved the way for a Reagan finding in March 1985 that formalized the new expanded clandestine program in Afghanistan. The 1986 decision to provide shoulder-held Stinger missiles to the mujahideen was the conclusion of the review process that Weinberger and Defense started in 1984. The Stinger, more than any other weapon provided, helped win the war for the Afghan resistance.⁴⁵

Pakistan and India

Pakistan's willingness to train and channel arms to the Afghan resistance and to provide sanctuary for Afghan refugees earned Washington's gratitude. On the front lines of Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia, Pakistan represented a potential bulwark against future Soviet incursions. Pakistan maintained a large, well-led and well-trained army with a sizable garrison of troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. It also provided military training and support to other Gulf States. The Reagan administration quickly embraced Pakistan and its president, Zia ul-Haq. Carter had not been so keen to dance with Zia, a dictator whose human rights record was poor and whose nuclear weapons development program ran against Carter's deeply held aversion to nuclear proliferation. Still, by 1980 Carter realized that the United States needed Zia and Pakistan, so U.S. military assistance started to flow. In the Carter administration's view, Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was five years away from testing a bomb. There was still time to dissuade them and, therefore, the congressional prohibition against U.S. economic and military aid to states which were developing nuclear bombs need not apply. Unfortunately, Carter's offer of a \$400 million security and economic assistance program was too little and too late. Zia rejected it as "peanuts." The two presidents met for the first time in late 1980; Zia impressed Carter although it was not clear that the feeling was mutual.⁴⁶

Weinberger and the other members of the Reagan national security team came to office determined to forge a new and better relationship with Pakistan. In March 1981 Reagan informed Zia of his intentions: "Our relations in the past have fluctuated too widely and have often lacked consistency.... With Soviet forces on your very borders, it is essential that we make a new beginning." Within two months of the inauguration, the NSC bureaucracy, with uncharacteristic efficiency, fashioned a policy for the president's consideration. It recommended a major effort to improve the U.S. security relationship with Pakistan through the

offer of a multiyear security package beginning in fiscal year 1982 with \$500.6 million for the first year. Such an offer would require an additional \$350.6 million be added to the total FY 1982 security assistance budget. In addition, the president would have to deal with the Symington Amendment, which prohibited economic or security aid to any nonnuclear country receiving nuclear equipment and technology to build a nuclear weapon.⁴⁷

At an NSC meeting in mid-March Haig made the case for Pakistan, claiming it was a “vital strategic bastion, but it was on the skids.” Pakistan had a “large army that was well trained and well led,” but its equipment “was in shambles.” Haig estimated that it would take \$2 billion over the next five years to get the Pakistan armed force “back in shape.” He noted that the Carter administration had discussed selling F-16s to Pakistan, but he preferred that Pakistan purchase cheaper aircraft so that U.S. military assistance would go further. The immediate problem, according to Haig, was how to pay for this expanded military assistance program.⁴⁸

That question raised a protest by Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman that the fiscal year 1982 federal budget was already overdrawn because the administration had rescheduled \$600 million in Polish debt and \$900 million from a contingency fund for assistance to Egypt; both deferred plans would now take effect in the same fiscal year. Some other agency would have to take a hit for Pakistan to receive additional aid. Weinberger stated that since they had told Congress the DoD budget was “bare bones,” the Pentagon should not suddenly appear flush. Haig claimed the State fiscal cupboard was also dry because of “ongoing programs.” The participants concluded that the offer should be made to Pakistan and the money would have to be found. The president’s silence on the issue was taken as his consent, but he did jokingly ask at the end of the meeting, “How much we could get if we sold off Rhode Island?”⁴⁹

The administration made the offer of \$500 million to Pakistan but required an answer in one week because of the deadlines for submitting fiscal year 1982 budget proposals to Congress. Zia would not be rushed, but his government made it very clear that what Pakistan needed most was 40 F-16 aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed to the difficulty of finding enough F-16s within U.S. inventory without adversely affecting U.S. readiness. They also noted that it could take 30 to 42 months to train Pakistani pilots to fly F-16s and deliver the planes.⁵⁰

The Department of State sent its under secretary for security assistance, sci-

ence, and technology, James L. Buckley, to Karachi to negotiate the F-16 deal in June 1981. Zia made it clear to Buckley that Pakistan could not wait 42 months for the F-16s. In July a Pakistani military delegation met in Washington with Carlucci, Bing West, and Lt. Gen. Ernest Graves Jr., USA, director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. These DoD officials offered to provide 6 of the F-16s within 27 months, then 3 every two months thereafter until 20 had been delivered. For the second 20 aircraft, delivery would begin after 42 months. Pakistan would also receive tanks, howitzers, and armored personal equipment on a similar split schedule, as well as additional weapons and equipment requested by Pakistan as they became available. The meeting resulted in an agreement in principle, but no final deal.⁵¹

Zia expressed his impatience to Reagan in a letter in August 1981. Then the United States received intelligence reports that Pakistan might buy French Mirage fighters if the F-16s could not be delivered promptly. Haig commented to McFarlane, “Bud, This is a disaster. What can we do?” Haig and Weinberger recommended delivering six F-16s by October 1982 (in 15 months as opposed to the previously proposed 27) and then maintaining the schedule as discussed at the Pentagon with the Pakistan delegation. The F-16s would be the first installment



Secretary Weinberger and President Zia of Pakistan. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

of a \$3 billion security and economic assistance program for Pakistan over the next five years. To expedite congressional approval of such assistance, Pakistan had to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency to dispel doubts that Pakistan was seeking a nuclear bomb. Buckley took the offer to Karachi and Zia accepted.⁵²

Washington officials and insiders were well aware that Pakistan was developing the capability to produce a nuclear bomb to offset India's nuclear development program. The U.S. Intelligence Community stated, in September 1981, "Pakistan is approaching capability to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in a nuclear explosives development program." The community estimated that if India sought a nuclear bomb, Pakistan would follow suit and both countries could begin nuclear testing by 1982 or 1983.⁵³

The initial years of the U.S. security assistance program to Pakistan were also marked by the usual tensions over Pakistani requests for advanced weapons—such as E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft, Harpoon missiles, AIM-9L missiles, and advanced AN/ALR-69 radar for its F-16s—and the U.S. concern about release of such advanced technology. In addition, Pakistan was always short on money for foreign military purchases, which Saudi Arabia generally financed on a long-term basis.⁵⁴

Some in the Reagan administration feared that congressional approval of the sale of F-16s to Pakistan could set off a mini-reprisal of the bruising debate over the sale of the AWACS and F-15 enhancements to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan's nuclear aspirations proved a concern to legislators, but again there was enough ambiguity to allow for congressional action. Congress also worried about the sale of advanced technology to the unreliable Pakistan, especially the sophisticated radar for the F-16. When Congress took up the issue in April 1983 these fears proved groundless. Richard Secord, whom Weinberger entrusted with shepherding the sale through Congress, testified that the AN/ALR-69 radar warning receivers included with the F-16 contained the same microprocessor that already had been sold to Pakistan with congressional approval as part of a ground-based radar system. This information reassured Congress, which approved the F-16 sale.⁵⁵

Generally, Weinberger was prepared to give the Pakistani government the benefit of the doubt, overruling JCS objections to providing advanced-technology weapons. In April 1984 the JCS again raised the possibility that Pakistan would transfer such technology to its ally, the People's Republic of China, or to other

Islamic states. The DIA and the armed services' intelligence organizations sided with the JCS while the CIA and the Department of State's Bureau of Research and Intelligence disagreed, concluding that as long as the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was strong, Karachi would not engage in illicit transfers. ISA head Armitage was not fully convinced that Pakistan could be trusted with U.S. high technology, but he recommended viewing Pakistan's requests for Stingers, Copperhead laser-guided artillery shells, more advanced radar, multiple launch missiles, and the Lance surface-to-surface missile, with "open eyes."⁵⁶

While the Reagan administration continued to expand its relationship with Pakistan, it also sought better relations with India. India was the world's largest democracy but received most of its arms from the Soviet Union. Without lessening its commitment to Karachi, the administration undertook an effort to improve U.S.-Indian relations by moving forward on an understanding with New Delhi on the transfer of advanced technology, especially computers, as a means of increasing trade and possible military sales. In addition, the administration sought more military exchanges.⁵⁷

In autumn 1984 U.S. intelligence began to receive evidence that India could be preparing for a possible preemptive war on Pakistan in order to destroy its nuclear facilities and prevent Karachi from obtaining a nuclear bomb. At an NSC meeting in late August 1984, the participants discussed this possibility. DCI Casey suggested that the Soviets were the most imminent threat Pakistan faced, according to the Intelligence Community, as evidenced by their incursions on the Afghanistan-Pakistan northwest frontier. Nevertheless, CIA analysts concluded, "India will probably feel compelled, at some point, to take military action to preempt Pakistan's nuclear program," possibly within the next eight months. Casey reported that State intelligence disagreed, suggesting, "It was just as likely that India will resume its own weapons program rather than try to pre-empt Pakistan's." Casey suggested Pakistan's nuclear program was the core issue.⁵⁸

Weinberger agreed with Shultz's recommendation that the administration continue to press Pakistan to formally commit to not enrich uranium above the 5 percent level. The Pentagon chief thought that the best argument to make with Karachi was that U.S. public and congressional fears of nuclear proliferation would endanger the required approval from Congress for military assistance. Outlining to Zia what additional assistance the United States was prepared to provide would provide an incentive. Weinberger reported the Pentagon could

accelerate the delivery of M48 tanks, commit to selling Pakistan 30 AIM-9L missiles within two weeks, demonstrate AWACS aircraft to show what it could do for Pakistan's air defenses, and increase the number of ranking U.S. military visitors to Pakistan. Shultz cautioned that while he approved of Weinberger's program, he did not want to provide any weapons or equipment that would require approval by Congress. Weinberger assured him that the 30 AIM-9L missiles fell under the threshold for congressional approval. However, most of these initiatives by Weinberger would take place in Reagan's second term because the five-year military assistance agreement with Pakistan, signed late in the Carter administration, was up for renewal in 1985.⁵⁹

The U.S.-Pakistan security relationship had clearly been reestablished during the first Reagan term, but there remained the basic problem of perceived threat. While willing to provide military assistance to reassure Pakistan and reward its cooperation in Afghanistan, Washington planners hoped to encourage U.S.-Pakistan cooperation, consultation, and military exercises in anticipation of further Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. Zia and Pakistan were interested in obtaining military hardware, but resistant to any permanent stationing of U.S. troops or pre-positioning of supplies on its soil. The ongoing military relationship was limited to military sales.

Planning for Contingencies in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia

The oil embargo imposed by Middle East producers in response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War had demonstrated how dependent the West was on their crude oil. After the embargo and the rise in crude oil prices in the late 1970s, U.S. military planners looked again at how best to defend the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia from the Soviet Union. The fall of the shah in 1979 made the task even harder. To defend Iran, the Soviet Union's most likely target, the United States could no longer count on the support of the Iranian government. U.S. forces could possibly find themselves fighting through Iranians to engage invading Soviets. The occupation of Afghanistan put Soviet aircraft and manpower that much closer to the region's oil centers. Furthermore, having had only limited success in convincing regional states to allow the U.S. pre-positioning of equipment and in defining the use of their facilities during an emergency, the United States faced a logistical problem of how to project its power in the defense of the Persian Gulf or Southwest Asia.⁶⁰

Reagan's national security bureaucracy, under the downgraded and sometimes ineffectual national security adviser, Richard Allen, was slow to take up the issue. The Joint Chiefs took the initiative, and Weinberger soon joined in. The Joint Chiefs sent Weinberger a strategy that recommended a two-tier approach. First it would prevent a Soviet blitzkrieg in the region by using the assets of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to blunt the Soviet attack. Second it would at the same time threaten the Soviet Union with a larger, wider war as an added deterrent to regional aggression. In addition, the JCS recommended more attention to planning for lesser contingencies such as those arising from internal political and social conflict or economic instabilities that would enhance Soviet prospects for intervention or meddling. The obvious example was Iran, now controlled by an Islamic fundamentalist leadership. Much weaker militarily than under the heyday of the shah, Iran was vulnerable. Another possibility was an interregional war, like the conflict between Iran and Iraq, which could provide opportunities for Soviet involvement and opportunism. How should the United States respond? Weinberger agreed to use this JCS strategy as a basis for a formulation of an administration-approved policy guidance for the defense of Southwest Asia, including the Persian Gulf.⁶¹

In late July 1981 Carlucci provided more guidance to the Joint Chiefs. In addition to planning for a Soviet attack on Iran, he envisioned three contingencies that he deemed worthy of JCS consideration. The first was the deployment of a battalion-sized U.S. force for a situation requiring only limited combat capacity. The example Carlucci cited was the hypothetical seizure of Mecca in Saudi Arabia by 1,000 armed fundamentalists. The second was a response to a regional war that extended to the Persian Gulf and threatened U.S. and its allies' access to Gulf oil. The Iran-Iraq War was the obvious inspiration. The third was to protect vital U.S. interests in the region in the event of the gradual disintegration of Iran, but with no Soviet military involvement.⁶²

This was a tall order for the JCS. The Soviet Union had many advantages, such as proximity to Iran and the rest of the region. U.S. defense of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia faced not only the obstacle of distance, but the lack of regional facilities. U.S. support of Israel allowed Moscow opportunities to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli tension with Lebanon—Israel would invade in June 1982—drew Syria even closer to Moscow. The only assured access to the region was the U.S. base at Diego Garcia, some 2,700 nautical miles from the

Gulf. Neither the JCS nor OSD alone could fashion a strategy for defending the region. This was a job for the whole Reagan national security team. In March 1982 the NSC bureaucracy finally focused on the task with National Security Study Directive 4-82, a request for an interagency study entitled "US Strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia."⁶³

The interagency study moved slowly. Finally, in mid-July 1983, Reagan received the response to NSSD 4-82. The study listed two overriding U.S. interests: preventing Soviet hegemony by deterring Soviet expansion and supporting friendly countries in the region. The second was to ensure continued access to Gulf oil. To achieve these objectives, the study called for a comprehensive political strategy premised on mutually reinforcing diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives. The goal was to mount a sustained defense of the region as far forward as possible, including a defense of Iran. That was the goal, but the study and the presidential directive derived from it, NSDD 99, "U.S. Strategy for Near East and South Asia," dated June 13, 1983, emphasized the limitations facing the United States. The directive noted, "Until we have procured the requisite strategic mobility, supporting force structure and we have assured access to base facilities necessary to undertake a robust forward defense of the Gulf region, our plans should be based on existing and programed capabilities of our forces and those of our friends and allies which are not 'assigned' to NATO or their essential support." In plain terms, this meant a limited defense of the oil fields and the Strait of Hormuz.⁶⁴

In April 1984 the president signed another national security directive that instructed the Pentagon to accomplish five tasks to bolster U.S. ability to defend the Persian Gulf in light of the Iran-Iraq War. NSDD 139, "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War," recommended improved intelligence on the Gulf region, enhancement of U.S. deterrence and reduction of vulnerabilities, increased near-term U.S. readiness, an enhanced antiterrorism posture, and expansion of counterterrorism measures and training. Weinberger reported to the president on what the DoD was doing to implement the directive. He suggested that it was essential to continue a dialogue with Arab states and U.S. allies in an effort to respond to possible escalation should deterrence fail. He considered it equally, if not more, important to ensure that Iran did not defeat Iraq. While most moderate Arabs were prepared to discuss contingency planning and access agreements, they remained noncommittal

about actual cooperation with the United States and opposed to the permanent deployment of U.S. troops or even pre-positioned supplies or troops on their soil. As for the taskings of NSDD 139, the secretary reported that Central Command had surveyed the counterterrorism security for its personnel in Jordan, Bahrain, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and that the United States had enhanced its intelligence sharing, indirect security assistance, and technical advice to Iraq.⁶⁵

In late December 1984, Weinberger and Shultz sent the president a year-end memorandum on the progress made in implementing a strategy for the Middle East and South Asia in accordance with NSDD 99. They admitted that, as expected, “progress has been slow.” Nevertheless, they cited modest achievements including initial defense surveys with Pakistan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. They reported the pre-positioning of limited amounts of military material in Oman, Egypt, and Sudan. The secretaries also highlighted U.S. efforts to improve air defense of Gulf States and emerging bilateral security relationships with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, especially cooperation with the Egyptians on minesweeping in the Red Sea. The two secretaries warned, “Until the US responds to Saudi requests for additional military equipment, further joint contingency planning will be limited.” Their report put the best light on U.S. efforts, but there was no hiding the fact that State and Defense had yet to convince their allies to join them in a coherent strategy. Should the United States have to go to war in the Persian Gulf or Southwest Asia, it would prove a difficult undertaking.⁶⁶

Slow and limited progress was an accurate characterization for U.S. efforts in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. The one clear success was the winning of congressional approval for the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. Yet despite this success, for which the Reagan administration expended considerable political capital on the Hill, the expected military contingency planning with Saudi Arabia never fully materialized, let alone the pre-positioning of U.S. military supplies in the desert kingdom for use in an emergency. Only with Oman, Egypt, and the Sudan was the United States able to pre-position limited supplies. The Iran-Iraq War and its extension to attacks on oil tankers and shipping in the Persian Gulf did result in closer U.S. Saudi military cooperation, but it was not the formal joint planning that Weinberger and the Pentagon had expected. In Afghanistan, the Reagan administration seemed content to allow the war between the Soviet and Afghan resistance to continue as a stalemate, with limited draining of Soviet

military assets, until Representative Charlie Wilson and Weinberger helped convinced DCI Casey and President Reagan that with more assistance from the United States the mujahideen could actually win and force the Soviet Union to pay a price for its invasion. As for Pakistan, the Reagan administration successfully forged a security relationship. Like Saudi Arabia, however, the connection was based on sale of military equipment, especially F-16s, and not on joint contingency planning. As for military planning to defend the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, the Pentagon, especially the Joint Chiefs, and the NSC bureaucracy churned out strategy papers, work plans, and reports, but at the end of 1984 the United States was only marginally better positioned to defend the region.

The Falklands/Malvinas War and Weinberger as “Assistant Quartermaster”

IN THE EARLY HOURS OF APRIL 2, 1982, Argentine naval and marine units invaded the Falkland Islands, a sparsely populated British archipelago almost 8,000 miles from the United Kingdom yet only some 400 hundred miles from Argentina. The invasion came at the end of a long-simmering period of tension between Buenos Aires and London, which ignited a war that lasted 74 days. By the time Argentine troops on the islands surrendered on June 14 to the British counterinvasion force, the war had claimed 907 lives (649 Argentine troops, 255 British, and 3 Falkland Island civilians). The economic and human cost of the fighting between two economically hobbled middling world powers was out of all proportion to the economic value of the sheep-rearing islands. Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges called the war “a struggle between two bald men over a comb.” Nevertheless, the Falklands War sparked a major international crisis that tumbled into a modern war, and which ended up consuming the attention of the international community, the United Nations, and most of all, the United States, which viewed both Argentina and Great Britain as important regional allies.¹

Argentines regarded their military action not as an invasion, but rather as the restoration of their sovereign territory that had been occupied by a foreign power. In 1833 two Royal Navy ships arrived in the Falklands to cement the British claim. The navy cleared out the few Argentines living on the windswept islands and for the next 149 years a few hardy Britons farmed the Falklands. Argentines had long considered British possession of Las Islas Malvinas (as they called the archipelago) an affront to their national honor. The military regime in Buenos

Aires, in power since 1976 but mired in political and economic malaise, sought to bolster domestic support through an appeal to nationalist sentiment and defended its action as an effort to right a historic wrong. The regime imagined that quick conquest with overwhelming forces would bring political and propaganda benefits at a low cost. Moreover, the military leaders in Buenos Aires did not expect that the British government, beset by its own profound domestic social and economic problems, would be willing or able to restore its control of the islands.²

The junta made a fundamental and politically fatal miscalculation. The generals, unaccustomed to electoral politics in a free society, failed to take into account that nationalism had value for democratic politicians as well. They certainly underestimated the fighting spirit of Margaret Thatcher, the first female prime minister in British history. Either way, their plans quickly unraveled. The Thatcher government did indeed face serious domestic problems, some directly related to its austerity policies, and looked nervously toward a general election looming in the future. Despite, or perhaps because of, her domestic troubles, Prime Minister Thatcher decided to fight for the Falklands, overruling timorous colleagues, an anti-imperialist Labour opposition, and an initially hostile press with an imperious bon mot borrowed from Queen Victoria: "Failure? The possibilities do not exist."³

Assembling an armada to sail the length of the Atlantic, British forces arrived in the area by May. After a few fierce naval and air battles and the largest British amphibious landing in a generation, they forcibly retook the Falklands. Thatcher's reward for her audacity was a landslide reelection in 1983 and an indelible reputation as the Iron Lady. Argentina's President General Leopoldo Galtieri and his colleagues, meanwhile, found themselves driven from office by an Argentine public that had had enough of a regime that combined the murderous oppression of a dirty war against domestic dissidents with staggering economic and military incompetence.⁴

Taken by itself, the South Atlantic crisis was, as Borges suggested, little more than a postimperial footnote, a conflict in which inept dictators fell to a better-organized middle-sized power. But that depiction tells only part of the story. The crisis has historical significance as a reflection of the tension among the United States' long-standing alliances with South America, its NATO commitment, and its special relationship with the United Kingdom. The U.S. response to the conflict also offers an object lesson in the direction of U.S. defense and security

policy under Ronald Reagan and Caspar Weinberger. U.S. support markedly contributed to British success, which helped further forge a relationship among Thatcher, Reagan, and Weinberger. There were other repercussions. The failed attempt by Secretary of State Alexander Haig to find a diplomatic solution to avoid the war dimmed his already waning star within Reagan's inner circle. United Nations ambassador and neoconservative hero Jeane Kirkpatrick was Argentina's most vocal and persistent supporter within the administration. She found herself outflanked by Weinberger. The path taken by American policymakers to provide support offers a fascinating glimpse into the international and domestic alliance politics of the administration. The Reagan team not only had to choose between the special relationship with the United Kingdom and inter-American solidarity with Argentina, it also had to choose between differing visions of the long-term interests of the United States.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger ultimately defined and directed the U.S. response to the conflict. Weinberger believed from the start that U.S. interests were best served by supporting the British. He directed the Pentagon's role as conduit for practical military logistic and materiel aid to the British. In so doing, he asserted the role of the Pentagon in shaping broader security policy, allowing him to play the kind of active international role he envisioned for himself as Pentagon chief. This brought him into conflict with some of his ideological compatriots within the administration, such as Kirkpatrick, who argued for the importance of Latin America over Europe. More significantly for the secretary of defense's standing within the administration, Weinberger's strong support for the British challenged the efforts at mediation by Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

Weinberger's statements and actions stemmed from his personal convictions but also from his developing ideas about the nature of U.S. alliances and the use of U.S. military power. Weinberger believed in a hierarchy of alliances. He placed the Atlantic, and especially the Anglo-American alliance, above others. He also believed the United States should use its military hardware to support the policies of important allies, and in turn use that support to bind U.S. allies into closer support for American policy objectives.

To appreciate Weinberger's specific role in the Falklands crisis and its relationship to his broader vision of American security policy, it is necessary to understand the attitude toward the special relationship that motivated Weinberger and Reagan in their policy toward Thatcher and Great Britain.

Weinberger, Reagan, Thatcher, and the Special Relationship

Weinberger's attitude during the South Atlantic crisis came as no surprise to anyone who knew him. A lifelong Anglophile who had tried to enlist in the British forces during the days of American neutrality in World War II, there should have been no doubt that he would tilt toward London in a crisis. Combining that cultural preference with the political affinity between the conservative Weinberger and the Thatcher government in London only reinforced the connection. Decades later, Weinberger presented the choice on the Falklands in the starkest terms. Noting that colleagues such as Haig and Kirkpatrick advocated cautious neutrality, Weinberger concluded, "I said to them: 'We have no interest whatever in supporting a corrupt military dictatorship that has invaded this island without any provocation whatever, and if we give substance to it and support it, we will encourage this kind of aggression all over the world. And we will cast aside our NATO obligations—to say nothing of the basic relationship that we have had with Great Britain for longer than anybody can remember.'"⁵

Weinberger revealed his position on Anglo-American relations from the earliest moments in his tenure at the Pentagon. When Margaret Thatcher made her first official visit to Washington in early 1981, a visit full of effusive sentiment highlighted by a gala dinner at the British Embassy, Weinberger began their first discussion at the Pentagon by declaring himself "a strong believer in the special relationship." Such assertions proved *de rigueur* at official Anglo-American gatherings, but Weinberger sincerely meant it. The secretary saw possibilities of cooperation with the British in arms production and for strategic cooperation in areas outside of Europe, such as the Middle East.⁶

Weinberger also enjoyed warm relations with his British counterpart, Secretary of State for Defence John Nott. The United Kingdom was financially strapped and had just undergone a budget review, resulting in defense reductions. Although Weinberger worried about Nott's defense budget cuts, the Pentagon chief put the best light on them. As Weinberger explained to the president in mid-1981, the cuts were mostly to Britain's allegedly uneconomical shipyards (which were strongholds of Labour's union supporters and a target for Thatcher). More worrying to Weinberger were planned British reductions in naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and English Channel by one antisubmarine cruiser and 9 of 59 destroyers and frigates committed to NATO. Still, the secretary assured the president that the British were prepared to meet the NATO pledge to increase

their defense spending by 3 percent, hold the line on the Army of the Rhine, buy Trident missiles from the United States, and improve their home defenses. Both Weinberger and Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci sought ways to stretch British defense purchasing power. For example, they paid the British in advance for goods and services provided to U.S. troops in the United Kingdom in an effort to ease the Ministry of Defence's cash flow problem, a practice that alarmed the U.S. Treasury.⁷

Weinberger's admiration and support for Thatcher echoed the sentiments of the commander in chief. The close relationship between Reagan and Thatcher has taken on mythic proportions in historical scholarship, even if recent works have also identified significant areas of disagreement between the two leaders. Although their ideological affinity did not guarantee agreement on everything, it certainly helped that Thatcher and Reagan had met before either had entered into high office and also that they shared a particularly Anglo-American conservative enthusiasm for lower taxes and decreased government regulation. They also shared a generally skeptical view toward détente and a desire for stronger responses to Soviet policy. During Thatcher's first state visit in February 1981,



Reagans and Thatchers at a state dinner, February 26, 1981. *Reagan Library*

she and Reagan reaffirmed their mutual commitment to strong defense and budgetary austerity. Reagan particularly remarked on the “warm and beautiful occasion” of dinner at the British embassy and the “real friendship” between the Reagans and the Thatchers.⁸

Close Anglo-American relations were crucial for Reagan in the early years of his administration. Reagan needed Thatcher’s support in facing more skeptical European leaders such as Helmut Schmidt and François Mitterrand, not to mention Reagan’s prickly neighbor to the north, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, each of whom criticized Reagan’s economic and security policies. Thatcher was a strong and vocal ally in Ottawa in July 1981 during Reagan’s first G-7 summit of the major industrialized nations, and helped bolster the President against criticism from Paris, Bonn, and Ottawa.⁹

As a sign of the deep security cooperation between Washington and London, British and U.S. officials from Defense and State discussed with their British counterparts the terms for purchase of Trident II missiles for the Royal Navy’s submarine fleet. The president had agreed to sell the missiles to the British in August 1981. The negotiations boiled down to how much the United Kingdom would pay for pro-rata research and development costs of the new missiles (as required by U.S. law), how much of this price could be offset by British actions that could save the Pentagon money, and whether the United States would write off some of Britain’s share of the R&D costs. In mid-March 1982 the negotiations were far enough along to allow Reagan and Thatcher to exchange public letters committing the United States to provide the Royal Navy with Trident II missiles. The announcement of this cooperation, which eventually resulted in a significant upgrade of British strategic forces, took place just weeks before the Argentine invasion of the Falklands.¹⁰

Argentina and the Significance of the Southern Cone

Such examples of close relations between London and Washington might have given the Argentine junta pause about invading the islands, but countervailing trends led them to believe that the United States would likely remain neutral in their dispute with Britain over the Malvinas. The Reagan administration had been deepening ties to the regime in Buenos Aires. This rapprochement had both ideological and geopolitical roots. Ideologically, support for the junta in Argentina flowed from an attitude among Reagan’s supporters that the Carter

administration had been too eager to criticize friendly dictatorships in its zeal to defend human rights and had unnecessarily alienated potential allies against the communist threat in Latin America. The success of Marxist Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua, who enjoyed support from Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba and in turn provided support for Marxist rebels against the government of El Salvador, helped create an atmosphere within the administration that viewed Latin America as a central front in the Cold War. The Reagan team had a significant proportion of individuals who believed that the struggle against communist influence in the region and the support of anticommunist allies should be paramount foreign policy goals.¹¹

The foremost exponent of this critique was Georgetown professor Jeane Kirkpatrick, who had made a name for herself in conservative foreign policy circles with a famous 1979 article in *Commentary* entitled "Dictatorships and Double Standards." Kirkpatrick believed the United States should not lump all dictatorships together; it should instead oppose totalitarian regimes but engage with authoritarian regimes. This approach, she claimed, would better serve U.S. interests and opened the possibility of encouraging Western-style development in authoritarian states.

Along with colleagues such as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Richard Perle, Kirkpatrick was a former Democrat who had joined Reagan because of his more muscular approach to foreign policy. Her reward for her work was the position of U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. She quickly established herself as a favorite among the more conservative members of the administration, including both Director of Central Intelligence William Casey and even Weinberger.¹²

Kirkpatrick was important in the history of the Falklands crisis because her support for authoritarian regimes found concrete expression in her advocacy for the Argentine generals. She was the most prominent of several voices—which included (both to a lesser extent) Secretary Haig and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders—within the Department of State that were calling for greater U.S. cooperation with the states of the "southern cone" (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) in the geostrategic struggle against communism. Not only were these regimes reliable bulwarks against leftist radicalism in their own states, the argument went, they were also partners in stemming the tide against radical incursions in the larger region. Such was the case with Argentina,



President Reagan and UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick conferring in the Oval Office, December 11, 1984. *Reagan Library*

which trained anticommunist military forces in El Salvador and Contra guerrillas fighting the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.¹³

Reagan's rapprochement with Argentina reflected the broader change in American diplomacy as it reversed Carter's policies. In 1976 the military regime in Buenos Aires toppled the elected government of Isabel Perón, who as vice president succeeded her husband Juan after he died in office in 1974. Congress then passed the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act imposing strict limits on military sales, which significantly reduced aid to Argentina. In 1981, however, the Reagan administration convinced Congress to lift some of those restrictions and also supported Argentina's requests for credits from the Export-Import Bank, and with other multilateral lending institutions. On March 17 of that year, Reagan welcomed Argentine president-designate General Roberto Viola at the White House and expressed his enthusiasm for "efforts by both governments to further improve our relations." Reagan sent Viola home with "best wishes for his tenure as President."¹⁴

That tenure proved to be short, as Viola was overthrown by his junta colleague General Leopoldo Galtieri in December. That shakeup at the top, however, did nothing to diminish relations between Washington and Buenos Aires. Indeed,

in March 1982, a year after Reagan's embrace of Viola, Argentine ambassador to Washington Esteban Takacs proclaimed that the bilateral relationship was at "an optimum level."¹⁵

Pentagon officials echoed the desire to tighten relations with Argentina and its neighbors. Congressional restrictions on military sales and military training for South American dictatorships with poor human rights records hampered the United States' ability to provide rewards for good intentions or anti-Marxists' cooperation. In March 1982 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Hayward warned Weinberger of "waning US influence with Latin American naval officers" and growing influence of Western European nations that were providing the maritime nations of the continent equipment, ships, and aircraft. Frank Carlucci seconded Hayward's concern and outlined efforts to increase military sales and cooperation with Argentina, Chile, and Brazil.¹⁶

As part of a trip to Latin America, Hayward was in Buenos Aires on the day of the Falklands invasion. In his discussion with his Argentine naval counterparts Hayward received no forewarning of the attack. The Argentine naval chief of staff, Admiral Jorge Anaya (already known to be the strongest advocate for action against the Falklands), specifically mentioned "direct Argentine support for U.S. policies in Central America... [and] Argentina being the only country to lend actual military support for our objectives [support of the Contras]." Hayward stuck to his instructions, informing the Argentinians that their support, though welcome, did not place any reciprocal obligations on Washington. Whether that message got through to Anaya and his colleagues is another matter entirely.¹⁷

When the Argentine assault on the islands began in the early hours of April 2, Hayward was still in Buenos Aires. He immediately hurried to meet with Anaya, who offered a general briefing on Argentine actions and "with considerable ingenuousness ... attempted to link their actions with the potential Soviet threat in the South Atlantic." Notwithstanding his support of better U.S. relations with his hosts, Hayward recognized both the implications of Anaya's "ingenuousness" and the potential perception of his visit. Refusing to be drawn into endorsing military action, he concluded the conversation by explaining "that my presence in Argentina during this situation was both a personal and public embarrassment for the United States, and that I would be departing the country as soon as possible."¹⁸

The Argentine invasion confronted the Reagan administration with a series

of dilemmas. Would it be possible to remain neutral after the invasion without fatally damaging relations with Argentina? Would the so-called “down the middle road” policy destroy the “special relationship,” which Washington and London had so laboriously repaired since the Eisenhower administration supported Egypt against the British, French, and Israeli attack in 1956? Washington would need all its political and diplomatic leverage to defuse this conflict between allies.

Diplomatic Efforts to Prevent War

Caspar Weinberger did not play a major role in the diplomatic campaign to find a peaceful solution to the South Atlantic crisis. That task fell to his colleague and sometime rival, Haig, and Haig’s diplomatic team at State and the United Nations. The Pentagon chief was content to let Haig and Kirkpatrick play out their hands, but he never wavered from his belief that the United Kingdom was in the right and should be supported. Weinberger asserted, contrary to Kirkpatrick’s warnings, that South American countries would neither support Argentina nor resent U.S. support of the British. Events proved Weinberger right.¹⁹

The war had a long fuse. The Argentine junta hinted at its plans long before acting. General Galtieri had asserted Argentina’s claim to the islands when he ascended to the presidency in December 1981. Washington viewed these claims as rhetoric for Argentine domestic consumption. Malvinas irredentism had been voiced sporadically by Argentine leaders ever since their country’s independence in 1816. So in one sense this surge of nationalism was not new or surprising, and the Reagan administration also had other more immediate concerns at home. In those first weeks of spring 1982, the focus in Washington was mainly on budget negotiations and the debate over possible cuts to the defense buildup.²⁰

Even after the invasion, there was time for a settlement before America’s two allies came to further blows. The vast distances between British naval bases and the islands meant that even after Thatcher made the decision in principle to seek a military solution, it would take weeks for the British task force to be assembled and arrive at the battlefield. The British government in Whitehall debated its course of action in the House of Commons. It informed NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns of its intention to remove some naval vessels from NATO patrols to take part in the Falklands campaign. Still Whitehall proclaimed its intention “to use the time before the task force reaches the area to do everything possible to solve the problem without further fighting.”²¹

The initial response from Washington to the capture of the islands reflected both awareness of the complexity of the problem and the desire to play for time. President Reagan spent 40 minutes on the phone with General Galtieri in the early hours of the invasion in an effort to dissuade him. In his diary, Reagan wrote, "I got nowhere." The president also noted, incorrectly, that the Falklands had been the "property of U.K. since 1540 or so," and that Argentina had "been trying to claim them for 149 years." Although the president's initial view of the prospects of a negotiated settlement was pessimistic after his discussion with Galtieri, most senior officials in Washington, with the exception of Weinberger and the president himself, believed that a solution to this long-standing controversy certainly could be found before the British initiated military action to retake the islands.²²

The first response was to advance a UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate end to all hostilities and emphasizing the need for negotiations. Reagan and Haig grasped at a possible UN solution. Haig offered his services as honest broker, prepared to help London and Buenos Aires avoid full-scale war. Reagan departed Washington for a previously scheduled Easter week visit to the Caribbean, combining a state visit to Jamaica with a few days of vacation at the island retreat of his old Hollywood friend Claudette Colbert, while "leaving Al Haig home" to "cope" with the crisis. Reagan increasingly considered the chances of a settlement of the dispute "very dim." Haig traveled to London, but reported to the president that he was also pessimistic.²³

Haig embraced the opportunity to act the peacemaker and reprised Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, which he had witnessed when he was in the Nixon administration, to head off a military confrontation. As he told the president, "my objective is ... to listen to both sides and look for opportunities for diplomacy." Haig warned that he had to move quickly "while each [side] is having second thoughts" lest the United States be "placed in the untenable position of having to compromise our impartiality if we are to be responsive to escalating British requests for assistance." He quickly instructed Kirkpatrick at the UN to "assure Lord Carrington of our strong support for the UK position," rejecting the Argentine military action, though also to "not comment in any way on the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands."²⁴

At this juncture in the crisis Weinberger's sympathies with London were well known. What is surprising is that Haig, while publicly playing the neutral broker, also secretly leaned towards the United Kingdom. In notes of an April 6

conversation, Haig informed Weinberger that he had told the British ambassador, Nicholas Henderson, “to assemble [a] package of requests—don’t nickel and dime.” Haig had assured the ambassador, “Publicly, [we will] say they’re both our friends. But let Maggie [Thatcher] know it’s not another Suez.” Also part of the conversation, National Security Adviser William Clark noted, “Need best clandestine transfer of equip. to UK.”²⁵

These officials felt that the United States had to aid the British without seeming to contradict its public stance of neutrality. U.S. communications support was one way, especially since cooperation with the British was built into an arrangement that existed prior to the Argentine invasion. London and Washington had signed an agreement on January 1, 1978, whereby the United States provided limited satellite communications support between the Royal Navy and its shore establishments on a worldwide basis. As part of the agreement, the United States promised to provide more expansive satellite communications during an emergency so long as it did not have an adverse impact on U.S. requirements. Starting on April 12, 1982, the U.S. Navy made a satellite channel available to the Royal Navy for a month even though it potentially would come at the expense of U.S. Atlantic and Mediterranean fleet requirements. Weinberger approved the arrangement and instructed that action be initiated to renew the 1978 agreement that was due to expire on January 1, 1983. While Reagan officials defended this communications support as routine when Carl Bernstein of the *Washington Post* broke the story, in fact, the agreement did require lessening of U.S. communications capabilities.²⁶

The Thatcher government wanted more than just communications support. On April 11 and 13, 1982, it requested from U.S. stocks 12 Stinger shoulder-held antiaircraft missiles. The Reagan advisers deliberated over the British request. Even though the weapon had been approved for transfer to NATO allies, this transfer would be the first. The Joint Chiefs worried that if the shipment was discovered and made public it would link the United States too closely with the British operation to retake the Falklands and undercut U.S. influence in Latin America. Nevertheless, both Haig and Weinberger favored the request. On April 19 the Stingers were airdropped so they could accompany the first British naval contingent leaving Ascension Island. On April 30 Weinberger approved 20 conversion kits, with accompanying data and training, to convert British Navy Harpoon missiles for air launch on Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft.²⁷

Parallel to this initial U.S. secret support of the British, Haig continued his shuttle diplomacy between London and Buenos Aires. Even after three weeks of hectic travel and virtually nonstop talks, his negotiations came to naught. The British continued to move forward with their military action. This march to war placed the Americans in precisely the position they had hoped to avoid. Haig was doubly frustrated, both by the failure of the talks in themselves and because of the bad press he received for his alleged “grandstanding” and ultimate failure. By late



Stinger portable antiaircraft missile. *OSD Records*

April, members of the administration, including Reagan himself, tilted even more strongly toward the British. Blaming the collapse of negotiations on the Argentine junta's inability to settle on a policy, Reagan at last confided in his diary, “I don't think Margaret Thatcher should be asked to concede anymore.” By the end of the week, the president wrote despairingly that an unnecessary war was at hand “mainly because an Argentine General, President (result of a coup) needed to lift his sagging [political] fortunes.”²⁸

As the British fleet approached the Falklands and the moment of direct conflict approached, fears of a wider regional conflagration ebbed. Chile, choosing historical national interest over interdictatorial solidarity, offered no support for Argentina, and even mobilized forces along its borders, forcing the Argentines to leave a substantial part of their army on the mainland. By April 26 Carlucci reported from Brasilia that the Brazilian government “won't mind if we help UK.” On that same day, Clark reported that the Argentines would not take a

phone call from President Reagan, and that the British fleet would arrive at the Falklands the next day. Time had apparently run out.²⁹

The tone during discussions at the NSC meeting on the morning of April 30 was one of disappointment. Haig lamented that the situation was “tragic,” that the Argentinians were like “a demented man on a ledge ready to jump, reaching for help but unable to grab our hand.” He described “the great deal” for Argentina that he had tried to work out: ultimate sovereignty to Argentina but under evolutionary conditions. Buenos Aires rejected it, Haig continued, because of its navy’s opposition, especially after British marines retook the outlying island of South Georgia without firing a shot on April 25. Weinberger raised the possibility of evacuation of official Americans from Argentina when it became clear in Buenos Aires that the United States was supporting Britain. As for the embassy in the Argentine capital, Weinberger stated that sensitive material had been removed, but if U.S. diplomatic personnel were endangered there was little the United States could do short of a full-scale invasion. Unspoken, but feared by all, was any semblance of the Iran hostage crisis, which had crippled the Carter administration. The only optimist, Kirkpatrick, affirmed her belief that the Argentinians still would make a deal through the United Nations to avoid war. Reagan interjected that “he had no objection to giving materiel support” to Great Britain, but worried that it would “undercut any future role for the U.S. as mediator.”³⁰

The one person at the meeting who seemed neither surprised nor perturbed by the course of events was Weinberger. Calmly responding to a question about the steps that could be taken to preserve American interests in the region, he remained committed to his belief that support for Britain was the only sensible policy. He also could not resist offering a dig at the secretary of state’s failed negotiations, suggesting, “We need to come out of this getting credit for something,” he concluded. “We need to get credit for our support of the British.”³¹

Although no one at the meeting was prepared to go quite as far as Weinberger in trumpeting aid to Britain, the meeting resulted in the approval of National Security Decision Directive 34, which outlined a policy of targeted economic sanctions against Argentina and a suspension of U.S. or third-party arms sales to Buenos Aires as part of a series of “concrete steps underscoring U.S. determination not to condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes.”³²


After the NSC meeting, Haig publicly announced the final collapse of nego-

tiations and the U.S. decision to come down firmly on the British side. In a press conference primarily devoted to discussion of budget negotiations that afternoon, Reagan expressed continued hope for a diplomatic settlement. Although he hastened to add that the United States had no intention of direct military intervention, he nevertheless denounced Argentine "aggression." Concluding that "armed aggression of that kind must not be allowed to succeed," he affirmed support for the British. The president maintained that there had not been any specific British requests for aid. The offer of the satellite communications channel could be considered a routine sharing of communications capabilities, but the Stingers and the Harpoon conversion kits were clearly specific requests. Either the president was in the dark on these military-to-military cooperation efforts or he was dissembling. Diplomacy had run its course. The administration shifted its attention to those who were best positioned to aid the British, and the leading figure in that group was Weinberger.³³

Weinberger and the Tilt toward London

As the Reagan administration announced its open support for the British, Weinberger moved out in front of the effort to establish a special wartime relationship. His memoirs emphasize his clarity of thought on the crisis, and his consistent support for the British, while expressing bemusement at the ambivalent fumbling and laborious shuttle diplomacy of Haig and other unnamed colleagues who worried about the damage that supporting Britain would do to U.S.-Latin American relations. His official records confirm this viewpoint. Weinberger had little faith in a negotiated settlement, and even less interest. He did not believe that support for Great Britain would seriously impair U.S. relations with the rest of Latin America. He was also convinced that his position enjoyed the support of the president, even if Reagan was not able to say that overtly until well along in the crisis. In his memoirs, Haig offers a contradictory assessment of Weinberger's role in the South Atlantic crisis. On the one hand, he says correctly that he and Weinberger agreed on their support for Britain, in contrast to the Argentine sympathies of Jeane Kirkpatrick. At the same time, however, he complained that Weinberger's "Anglophilia" made peace efforts more difficult.³⁴

Weinberger worked behind the scenes almost from the start of the crisis. He met on April 6, 1982, with Deputy Secretary Carlucci and JCS Chairman General David Jones to explore potential aid to the British. After a same-day



Long distances made for logistical challenges in the Falklands/Malvinas War and made Ascension Island's air base essential. OSD/HO, based on data from *Logistics in the Falklands War* by Kenneth L. Privratsky

meeting with Haig at the Department of State, Weinberger wrote in his diary, “We *will* help [the] British on Falklands.” He then called Ambassador Nicholas (“Nicco,” as Weinberger called him) Henderson to offer whatever material or logistical support they required. Weinberger rejected the idea that anyone in Latin America would be pleased at U.S. acquiescence in aggression or support for a military dictatorship, and worried instead about the “serious loss of confidence” that would result among U.S. allies there and around the world “if we supinely accepted aggression, and stood wringing our hands as we talked ‘negotiations’ and ‘settlements.’” In public Weinberger was only slightly less circumspect. His first public comment on Argentina’s invasion was in an interview with the *Today* show, in which he took a legalistic tone. White House Correspondent Chris Wallace asked about the tension between U.S. treaty commitments to Britain and Argentina. Under a 1962 U.S.-UK agreement the British had joint use of the U.S. air base on Ascension Island in the South Atlantic and expected to use this base to support their campaign to retake South Georgia and the Falklands. But under the Rio Pact Argentina might expect hemispheric solidarity against an external attack. Weinberger came down on the side of the British but based his conclusions on technicalities. He noted that even if the air base on Ascension was American, the island itself was a British possession, so there was no question of not “carry[ing] out our treaty commitments” for British use of the airfield. At the same time, he argued that the UN resolution condemning Argentine aggression against the Falklands negated any appeal to the Rio Pact. Weinberger’s leanings were apparent, but neither host nor guest pushed the issue further at that time.³⁵

Behind the scenes, Weinberger had prepared for the breakdown in Haig’s negotiations, and sought to distance the Pentagon from Argentina. A week after the initial Argentine invasion, he tried to veto a plan by Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen Jr. to travel to Buenos Aires for a previously scheduled meeting of air force chiefs of the Western Hemisphere. After resisting counterarguments from Allen and JCS Chairman General David Jones, he only relented after his friend, National Security Adviser William Clark, argued that it would be politically dangerous to stop a visit already scheduled in the absence of any further provocation. Still, Weinberger made no attempt to hide his friendship with the British. He attended a dinner with Nicco Henderson at the British Embassy on the night before Easter and then joined him at the Kennedy Center for a play, *The West Side Waltz*, starring Katharine Hepburn.³⁶

As the British successfully retook South Georgia Island, Weinberger consulted General Jones on additional plans to aid the British. When Henderson called about rumors of Israeli military assistance to Argentina, Weinberger checked and reported back to Henderson that it was possible that Israel had shipped previously ordered spare parts for Mirage fighters, but nothing more. He promised to keep an eye out for any evidence of additional assistance.³⁷

On May 2 Weinberger met with British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym and Henderson on the porch of the British Embassy. Weinberger had brushed aside Haig's worries "that I'll be too forthcoming in talks with Pym" and discounted his belief "that a diplomatic settlement [was] still possible." To use Weinberger's words, Pym and Henderson made "no requests for aid now—hope for one more big victory—possibly at sea and then they can discuss how to settle it permanently." Apparently the British diplomats were referring to the sinking of the Argentine light cruiser *General Belgrano* by a British nuclear submarine on that day as the initial "big victory." Pym and Henderson also raised the possibility of a loan of a U.S. aircraft carrier, but no decision was made.³⁸



Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *Eisenhower* at anchor, June 1, 1983. OSD Records

This mention of a carrier is amplified in the Thatcher Foundation's document collection. Henderson reported a conversation he had with Weinberger on May 3 while Pym was called away to talk to Haig. Weinberger assured Henderson of his "eagerness to give us maximum support." Henderson continued, "He was waiting to hear whether he could help by sending down a carrier." The carrier Weinberger had in mind was the *Eisenhower*, then 15 days away from the conflict just off Gibraltar. The secretary envisioned the *Eisenhower* as a "mobile runway" for British aircraft. Weinberger thought this would not mean that "U.S. forces were going to be engaged against the Argentinians." Henderson apparently was a little taken back, but thought, "US reconnaissance planes could fly off the carrier and provide information for us." The ambassador reported to Whitehall, "a carrier ... would be far more effective than anything they [the Americans] could do in the realm [of cutting Argentine] imports." Clearly thinking aloud, Weinberger had vaulted ahead of the rest of the administration. A carrier would be operational support. As Reagan was later to decree, U.S. support could only include logistics and materiel. The carrier plan never came to fruition.³⁹

The British succeeded without recourse to U.S. operational support. But would the United States have given it if the war had turned against London? A revelation in 2012 by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, suggested it might. In a spirited defense of Reagan and Pentagon policy during the Falklands, he remembers that in May 1982 he was authorized to prepare a helicopter carrier, the USS *Iwo Jima*, for potential use by the Royal Navy if the Argentinians sank either of the British helicopter carriers involved in the campaign. The chances of such a loss were not unthinkable. In addition to the HMS *Sheffield*, sunk on May 5, Argentinian air attacks or Exocet missiles sank two other Royal Navy combat ships (HMS *Ardent* and HMS *Coventry*) and a container vessel. As an interesting sidelight, Lehman stressed the secrecy of Weinberger and the Pentagon's campaign to aid the British, noting that even senior British officials in the Ministry of Defence were unaware.⁴⁰

At the NATO defense ministers planning meeting in Brussels, May 6–7, Weinberger continued in public his campaign in support of the Thatcher government. He successfully pushed hard for a NATO communique that sided openly with the British and condemned Argentine aggression. In his arrival press conference, he seriously downplayed the extent of the contemplated direct American aid for Britain, commenting that "it doesn't appear that they need very much" outside

of logistical assistance, but he left no doubt that Washington would provide what was requested.⁴¹

On May 6 Weinberger met with British counterpart John Nott in Brussels. Nott thanked the secretary for his promise of aid and stated he would prepare a list of weapons, intelligence, logistics, and equipment needs. Nott suggested that the United Kingdom would only pay for what it used or as an alternative purchase on a “sale and return” basis. He also stated the first major weapons requests would be for 300 AIM-9L Sidewinders, a short-range air-to-air missile with radar homing capability, and two Phalanx close-in weapon systems (a request for six more followed later), consisting of radar-guided Vulcan Gatling guns on swivel bases for use against antiship missiles. Weinberger saw “no problem” with the requests, asserting “our aim was to be helpful and make that assistance available as quickly as possible.”⁴²

The Pentagon chief lived up to his promise. Even before his meeting with Nott, Weinberger ordered that British requests for material assistance should receive rush priority from the services. Those requests that did not fall to the services or could not be honored by them would be referred to Dov Zakheim of International Security Affairs. Weinberger streamlined the process by which requests would be analyzed and approved. He demanded daily accounts by Under Secretary for Policy Iklé of the status of these requests—what was delivered, what was approved, and what was outstanding within 24 hours of receipt from Whitehall.⁴³

On the May 6–7 status report, listing 18 requests and two deliveries (the latter being 10 crypto support kits and 16 60mm mortars with 1,600 rounds), Weinberger wrote, “We should not require more than 36 hours to act on any UK request.” The British requests were, with some exceptions, modest but extensive. In effect, they represented the sinews of war that the financially strapped British government needed to assure success in its Falklands campaign. For example, the May 6–7 requests included 12 secure voice encryption devices, one chaff dispenser for trial use on a Harrier aircraft, 15 magnetic anomaly detectors, 15 infrared flares, a loan of three to four U.S. shipwrights to help refit Royal Navy ships, weather information, communications equipment, 2,000 sonobuoys, 10 night vision goggles, 50 maritime limpet mines, two Vulcan-Phalanx systems, 200 torpedoes, 66,667 square yards of airfield matting, and scale maps of the Argentine coast produced in a U.S.-Argentina joint effort (these were ultimately

denied on the grounds that it would require Argentina's permission and they were not needed for the Falklands campaign).⁴⁴

That represented just two days of requests. As the British prepared to retake the Falklands the lists expanded. When the DoD bureaucracy dragged its feet, Weinberger shot back. Taking a hard line on one of his status reports regarding a British request for 15 magnetic anomaly sets, cable maintenance fixtures, 1 magnetic noise kit, and 24 shipping containers he wrote, "We should have acted on it: This request was sent on May 8.... 3 weeks is far too long in a wartime situation."⁴⁵

It was not only the military services and DoD bureaucracy that slowed action on requests. Some in the Pentagon and elsewhere thought that the British were asking for too much and the secretary was too prepared to give it to them. The request for 300 Sidewinder missiles met with opposition from the Joint Chiefs and the Air Force, both of which argued that the U.S. inventory of the missiles was already below requirements and that storage facilities at Ascension Island (where much of the U.S. equipment was handed over) were inadequate. Iklé thought that of the 9,000 Sidewinders the services possessed, they could spare an additional 100. Weinberger agreed and the first 100 were delivered to the British on Ascension Island on May 15. To free up enough to meet the request, the secretary approved the release of an additional 200 Sidewinders positioned in Europe for British use in a NATO contingency, thus allowing London to transfer 200 from Europe to the Falklands.⁴⁶

When the British government asked for two U.S. oilers and one combat-stores ship to join their task force, the White House, Navy, and Joint Chiefs opposed it. While the ships were predominately civilian manned, they had small but essential U.S. Navy complements. This request received Defense scrutiny as it appeared to be very close to the line between material support and operational support. Reagan had authorized logistical and material support, but not operational assistance. Iklé told Weinberger that it was "unlikely such support could remain out of the public eye." As an alternative, the under secretary for policy suggested using U.S. warships to support the British in the NATO zone, freeing up Royal Navy equivalents for the Falklands. Weinberger agreed to make the offer, but without denying the original request. Iklé argued against agreeing to a request for maritime limpet mines, noting that since the Argentine Navy had returned to its mainland bases, mines were not needed in the Falklands. Furthermore,

like the Department of State, he thought public knowledge of the delivery would create a perception problem, indicating the British might consider attacking Argentina's navy in its home waters. Iklé confessed to Carlucci, "I expect Cap will overrule my recommendation, but I feel nevertheless I should convey it to him." But Weinberger did not overrule.⁴⁷

A far less controversial, but still crucial, request from Nott to Weinberger was for 50,000 square yards of AM-2 airfield matting from U.S. Marine Corps reserve stocks; the British intended to use this for extension of the airfield at Port Stanley, the Falklands' largest city, once it had been recaptured; this would allow British military transport aircraft to use the runway and thus equip and defend the Falklands more efficiently. Weinberger agreed to the request with an insistence to the Pentagon that "*speed* in providing the equipment is essential." Weinberger himself made multiple calls to ensure prompt fulfillment.⁴⁸

As the war was winding down and the Falklands appeared destined to return to British control, Weinberger agreed to lease for 90 days two KC-10 refueling aircraft to the United Kingdom over the objections of the Joint Chiefs. The JCS argued such a move would seriously degrade U.S. capabilities. Even after the Argentine forces on the islands surrendered on June 14, Weinberger responded to a request for 20 Harpoon missiles with an initial transfer of 8, notwithstanding that the U.S. inventory of Harpoons was only at 75 percent of requirements.⁴⁹

The British effort to retake the Falklands was a highly successful campaign, but how much did U.S. support add to that achievement? Weinberger was always careful to publicly downplay U.S. help, giving the lion's share of credit to the British. Still, U.S. support cannot be underestimated. Testimony to the extent and value of U.S. intelligence, materiel, and logistical support comes from Nicco Henderson, the key conduit between the Pentagon and Whitehall. On June 1, 1982, Henderson reported to Nott, "Its value to us is very great. I do not need to go into detail about the value of the intelligence cooperation." Henderson stated generously that the satellite communication channel was provided "at considerable cost to their own operations" and noted that British special forces retaking the Falklands carried U.S. communication sets. Secure U.S. speech facilities and satellite weather reports greatly aided the British fleet, Henderson maintained. He estimated the monetary value of equipment provided at \$120 million and included in this total Sidewinders for use by British Harrier jets, a Vulcan-Phalanx antimissile system for the HMS *Illustrious*, 470 tons of airstrip matting for the Port Stanley airport,



One of the two Vulcan-Phalanx six-barreled 20mm Gatling guns on HMS *Illustrious*, December 1, 1983. *OSD Records*

Shrike missiles, helicopter engines, submarine detection devices for Sea King helicopters, and Stinger ground-to-air missiles that had already been used successfully against Argentine aircraft. The steel matting proved so significant that Margaret Thatcher made a point of mentioning it to Weinberger in a meeting a year later. Weinberger himself recalled that the Sidewinders “wreaked havoc” on Argentina’s air force.⁵⁰

Weinberger had also acceded to a British request that materials and equipment would be available on a pay-

as-used basis. The United States would position agreed-upon items at U.S. facilities at Ascension Island or in the United Kingdom for drawdown by the British, who would only pay for the items they used, plus their transportation costs. To cash-strapped London, these easy terms were a godsend. Nevertheless, Weinberger had some regrets. While he was pleased with the sale of a Vulcan-Phalanx radar-guided Gatling gun system for the MHS *Illustrious* to provide a last-ditch, close-in protection of ships from missiles and aircraft, Weinberger wanted the Royal Navy to get six more. Since each system cost \$9.3 million, the total cost would put the sale over the limit requiring congressional notification. Iklé pointed out that notification would take at least 15 days and, although classified, the action would undoubtedly leak to the press. Weinberger suggested selling the systems one at a time to avoid congressional oversight, but Iklé talked the secretary out of that dubious idea. Weinberger later lamented these restraints. Such weapons might have saved British lives and prevented the loss of two British destroyers—including most notably the HMS *Sheffield*—and two frigates sunk by Argentine aircraft using Exocet missiles.⁵¹

In his memoirs Weinberger characterized his role in the Falklands War as an “assistant supply sergeant” or “assistant quartermaster” for the British. As usual, the Pentagon chief was exhibiting his modesty. He was far more than that. He was a super procurement officer operating at the highest level with full support of his commander in chief. He was the driving force behind the considerable and extensive U.S. military support provided on favorable terms.⁵²

Not everyone in the U.S. government was as bullish in supporting Great Britain. Haig worried that leaks to the press would give the impression of an administration giving the British “too much” aid, thus making it difficult for the United States to act as an honest broker in subsequent post-hostilities peace talks. Weinberger responded to Haig, “We’d already received criticism in Latin America—we shouldn’t stop now [and] get criticism from the UK.” The Joint Chiefs became uneasy with the extent of U.S. aid to London, suggesting to the secretary that it might encourage South American countries to seek military assistance from the Soviet Union, thus lessening U.S. influence.⁵³

Buenos Aires was certainly aware of Weinberger’s advocacy for Great Britain and attempted to undermine him politically. In a clumsy attempt to embarrass the secretary, the Argentine embassy in Washington circulated a forged Pentagon document that purported to contain a statement from the defense secretary justifying aid to the United Kingdom. In nine poorly written and confusing paragraphs, the statement suggested that U.S. support for the British reflected both a desire to forestall a Labour victory in future British elections and a larger plan to establish an American “military presence on the Falklands which will assert our control of the whole of Latin American continent [*sic*].” The May 2 sinking of the cruiser *General Belgrano* by the British submarine *Conquer* prompted the Argentinians to spread the false rumor that the Americans had sold the British a “nuclear torpedo” that “pulverized” the vessel.⁵⁴

The Falklands war shifted the dynamics of and caused tensions within the Reagan foreign policy team. Kirkpatrick remained the most faithful supporter of Argentina to the bitter end. Although she and Weinberger were at different ends of the spectrum, there was little overt tension between them. She remained the champion of Argentina, attempting to cushion the blow of their military defeat, but without much success. Weinberger was the acknowledged leader of the pro-British faction. The two knew where they stood. But Kirkpatrick’s full-throated support for Argentina severely damaged her already shaky relationship

with Haig. She could count on the sympathy or at least forbearance of National Security Adviser Clark and the president. The same could not be said for Haig. Both the president and his national security adviser became increasingly impatient with the imperious former general at Foggy Bottom. With his fixation on status within the administration and his legendary temper, Haig was in the process of wearing out his welcome in the administration.⁵⁵

Haig's demise was to the advantage of Weinberger, whose clear positions and steady work in aiding the British earned him praise from London and respect within the Reagan inner circle. These advantages were real but not easy to measure, however, and Weinberger and his colleagues at the Pentagon were careful not to overplay their hand by taking an ostentatious victory lap. Carlucci informed British friends that the administration was "glad to help and to be able to respond rapidly," but also noted that they could "do without public plaudits" that would create unnecessary political problems.⁵⁶

Circumstances quickly pushed the Falklands war off the front page. Budget negotiations did their part as hostilities rose between the administration and Congress. The White House decided to downplay the secretary's public role by declining Weinberger's suggestion that he accompany the president on his June visit to the United Kingdom. The minor snub reflected continuing tensions between Weinberger and White House Chief of Staff James Baker over defense spending. By June 6, just as the British were celebrating the results of their successful campaign, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon took over international headlines and pushed the Falklands War aftermath onto the back pages.⁵⁷

Conclusions and Implications

Britain's invasion of the Falklands was quick and resulted in minimal casualties on the ground, but the Royal Navy did not avoid losses. Having retaken South Georgia Island in late April 1982, British forces landed on the Falklands on May 21 and by mid-June surrounded Port Stanley. On June 14 the Argentinians surrendered. The victory was a triumph for Margaret Thatcher, and also for the special relationship; the transatlantic tie between Washington and London proved stronger than ever. Those members of the administration who recognized and embraced this reality earliest, Weinberger chief among them, earned the biggest plaudits. Haig's dreams of triumph through a diplomatic shuttle came to naught. By the time the British replanted the Union Jack in Port Stanley, Haig was on

his way to retirement. For better or worse, any hopes for cooperation with the Argentine generals in a broad project for anticommunist solidarity in the Western Hemisphere also came to naught, with unforeseen consequences in Central America (see chapter 15). Reagan and Thatcher went on to build a relationship that has become the stuff of legend. Even though they disagreed on specific issues in the following years, from the invasion of Grenada to the Strategic Defense Initiative, their cooperation on the Falklands remained one of the powerful bonds that held the special relationship together.

On a more practical level, both Americans and British hoped to learn strategic and tactical lessons from the Falklands conflict, especially the threat that air-launched missiles like the low-flying Exocet posed to combat ships. Navy Secretary Lehman suggested, and Weinberger agreed to, a joint U.S.-UK study of the lessons learned from the Falklands conflict. When informed of the study, the president approved, but added the study should also include lessons learned from the May 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its conflict with Syrian forces there.⁵⁸

While promising a full report in two months, Weinberger apprised the president of some preliminary conclusions in July 1982. The first, the secretary stated, was not to jump to conclusions. A case in point was the sinking of the *Sheffield*, which observers attributed to the flammability of its aluminum superstructure. Preliminary results suggested that the Exocet missile actually hit a fuel tank in the *Sheffield's* engineering plant. A second conclusion was that a flexible and skilled military force able to improvise in different situations had been crucial to the British victory over an enemy force of greater numbers. Another obvious lesson for such operations was the need for projection of naval power and amphibious operations with air superiority. The British relied on small carriers with Sea Harriers (a vertical-takeoff-and-landing aircraft), but they lacked long-range air defense warning systems and attack aircraft. Weinberger described the British victory despite these deficiencies with a phrase borrowed from the Duke of Wellington's view of his victory at Waterloo: it was "a close run thing." Weinberger highlighted how the British were hampered by their lack of large carriers and had to rely on small ones capable of launching only a few vertical-takeoff Sea Harriers. The result limited their air offense and defense. Weinberger suggested that "one of the first lessons seems to be the inestimable value of large carriers, with their air defense provided by ships of the carrier groups." Another lesson

was that British logistical inadequacies were due to NATO's skimping on reserves and backup supplies. Weinberger suggested that while British success owed much to superior training, leadership, and equipment, luck played a significant role—Argentine bombs often failed to explode. Finally, the British would not have fared as well without U.S. help.⁵⁹

Opponents of U.S. support of the British in the conflict predicted dire consequences from America's neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. Such was not the case. U.S. relations with Argentina were strained, but the emergence of a civilian government in the wake of the failure to hold Las Malvinas, to use Buenos Aires's term for the Falklands, meant that for the foreseeable future Argentina would be preoccupied with internal political problems. Pentagon analysts predicted that Moscow would have scant success in expanding its influence in South America because of Latin American governments' preference for Western military equipment and strong historical ties with Washington. Also on the plus side, there was very little chance that other territorial disputes in Latin America—Chile versus Argentina over the Beagle Channel, Venezuela versus Guyana, and Guatemala versus Belize over territorial borders— would descend into war after the Falklands.⁶⁰

Just because that worst-case scenario was unlikely did not mean that U.S. policy could continue as before. In late June 1982 Reagan ordered a review of future policy toward Latin America (National Security Study Directive 10-82) and established an interagency group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Enders to reassess U.S. policy in the region. By early fall 1982 the Joint Chiefs and Carlucci worried about the lack of any comprehensive strategy for the region as the interagency group focused on specific problems but failed to create an overall regional policy.⁶¹

The fall of Argentina's military junta had consequences for Central America, where the Reagan administration was looking for ways to combat the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Argentina trained, financed, and supported anti-Sandinista guerrillas, known as the Contras. With the fall of the military government this support ceased. The CIA scrambled to assume support of the 2,000 Contras but managed to help increase the anti-Sandinista guerrilla force to 3,500.⁶²

Within the JCS there was hope that a resolution of the conflict could allow for a smooth return to the status quo ante in relations with Argentina. The Joint Chiefs recommended that the new civilian government of Argentina receive

U.S. military assistance as a way of bolstering U.S. influence in South America and preventing Moscow from establishing better relations with Buenos Aires. Secretary of State George Shultz agreed, citing democratic elections and improvements in human rights in Argentina. Weinberger opposed certification, noting that Margaret Thatcher had insisted it would be “the single most difficult thing for me.” Ever the Anglophile, Weinberger passed along Thatcher’s request that a “short delay of a few months after the new civilian government takes control in Argentina would be helpful in gaining UK public acceptance of Argentine certification.” Weinberger failed to convince NSC adviser Robert McFarlane, who successfully advised the president to approve certification.⁶³

Although he failed to delay the resumption of U.S. military assistance to Argentina, Weinberger found his position strengthened both at home and abroad in the immediate aftermath of the Falklands War. His ability to carry the day within the administration was by no means a forgone conclusion. It required him to use not only the power of his arguments about the importance of the special relationship and the primacy of the transatlantic alliance over inter-American solidarity but also the leverage of his strong personal relationships with key actors. That leverage was especially strong in spring 1982, with the arrival of William Clark at the National Security Council and the increasingly inevitable departure of Alexander Haig from Foggy Bottom. Even though Weinberger and Clark did not immediately agree on the strong tilt to Britain, their shared experience in California made them close friends. This cordial relationship with the new national security adviser aided Weinberger’s efforts.⁶⁴

Weinberger’s activities during the Falklands War were the source of a great deal of transatlantic mutual admiration. Ambassador Henderson reported that Thatcher was “very grateful” for the Pentagon’s help. When he wrote a friendly letter to Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, chief of the defence staff, upon Lewin’s announced retirement, Weinberger added a handwritten codicil: “The results of the Falklands War were most gratifying [and] reflect great credit on you.” Lewin was no less effusive, concluding his reply with his “gratitude for the personal help and assistance you provided during the Falklands Island conflict.” Lewin declared himself “very touched by the spirit of cooperation and generosity which we met in all our dealings with the Department of Defense,” and how impressed he was “by the urgency and open handedness which met our every request. I know that we owe much to your ‘magic wand.’”⁶⁵

Weinberger stopped off in London at the end of a Middle East trip in September 1982. His meeting with Thatcher at 10 Downing Street focused primarily on the immediate problems of the day, such as the defense budget, the lagging economy, the Siberian pipeline, and especially Lebanon, where the two of them shared their antipathy to the Israeli government of Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon. When at one point Weinberger “complimented Mrs. Thatcher on the performance of British troops in the Falklands,” she responded with praise for Weinberger’s material and political support, declaring, “You were absolutely marvelous.” The warmth of the nearly hour-long conversation even made an impression on the note taker, Military Assistant to the Secretary General Carl Smith, who concluded his memorandum, “Mrs. Thatcher appeared genuinely pleased to have seen the Secretary, having kept the discussion going on several occasions when the Secretary was prepared to depart. When the Secretary thanked her for seeing him, she stated that she wanted to see him whenever he visited in London.”⁶⁶

The Falklands had been a turning point for the Thatcher government and a confirmation of the special relationship, but its larger significance for the Cold War is difficult to discern. It confirmed the principle that territorial disputes should not be settled by force. The United Kingdom took back its rocky outpost, perhaps setting a marker that those British citizens in Gibraltar, Hong Kong (until 1999), and even conceivably Guernsey and Jersey were safe from irredentism. The impact on the inter-American system, which so worried Kirkpatrick, proved minimal. No other Latin Americans cried for Argentina. The junta did not last long after its defeat. Argentina returned to its own form of sometimes-chaotic democracy. In the broad sweep of the Cold War, the Falklands proved a blip.

Weinberger himself publicly downplayed his role in the war, but those in Whitehall and Buckingham Palace were well aware of it. In 1988, after his resignation in the wake of the Iran-Contra investigation, Weinberger traveled to London to receive from the Queen the honor of becoming an honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire, the first and only U.S. secretary of defense to be knighted. The festivities included dinners at both 10 Downing Street and Buckingham Palace. “We’re very grateful for all that you have done for us,” Queen Elizabeth told Weinberger in a private audience at the palace as she reached across the sofa to hand him the insignia and badge, “and we’d like

you to have this.” Constitutional restrictions and his own patriotism forbade officially accepting his knighthood at bended knee or calling himself Sir Caspar, but he was as proud as any subject of the Queen who received a knighthood.⁶⁷

Defending the Defense Budget: Fiscal Years 1984–1986

SECRETARY WEINBERGER COULD TAKE SATISFACTION that the Defense budgets for fiscal years 1981 through 1983 represented a strong start to the defense resurgence that President Reagan had promised to the voters during the 1980 presidential campaign. Real growth (after inflation) in budget authority for Defense rose to double digits (12.5 and 12.1 percent) for FYs 1981 and 1982 and 7.5 percent for fiscal year 1983. Yet in the process of formulation and passage of the FY 1983 budget during 1982, much of the rest of the Reagan administration and many in Congress concluded that the growth in defense spending needed to be slowed. The reason was simple. While the Reagan tax cuts had begun to stimulate economic growth and the American economy was preparing to emerge out of recession, the deficit was still soaring, even after domestic spending cuts. Within the Office of Management and Budget and Congress there was a consensus that it was time for the Pentagon to assume its share of the pain of deficit reduction. Weinberger did not welcome this prescription. For the remaining two years of the first Reagan term he fought losing battles in defense of DoD budgets both within the administration and with Congress. Weinberger's unyielding opposition to reductions and his unwillingness to compromise, which had served him reasonably well in budget battles during his first two years in office, failed him during the following two. Weinberger ultimately wore out his welcome on Capitol Hill, and even though this would never happen with the president, due to their close friendship, during 1983–1984 Reagan became more likely to split the difference between OMB and DoD recommendations and accept congressional reductions to defense spending.¹

Formulation of the FY 1984 Defense Budget

For the Office of the Secretary of Defense the first step in the FY 1984 budget process was the production of the defense guidance (DG). Begun in late 1981, the FY 1984–1988 DG was the first one prepared by the Weinberger team. Under the supervision of Under Secretary for Policy Fred Iklé and his staff, the DG was a program for the development of the necessary military capabilities to assure U.S. national security. Over 130 single-spaced pages and painstakingly detailed, it represented the views of the Defense Resources Board, the professional advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the recommendations of the unified and specified commanders. As such, it contained something for everyone. It was taken seriously and debated intensely. As described by Weinberger, the DG of March 1982 sought to ensure an optimal balance between readiness of forces and investments required for their reinvigoration. It also strove to improve the flexibility of military forces so that they were better prepared to cope with an increasing number of missions.²

The guidance document was a statement of basic defense objectives: to attain and maintain a military posture to deter war against the United States, to defeat the enemy if attacked, and to support foreign policy objectives including peaceful competition with the Soviet Union. As for maritime strategy, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman had revised the DG language to provide for “clear maritime superiority ... to keep open lines of supply, resupply, and communications needed in peace and war.” Weinberger overruled Lehman and changed the phrase back to the original: to provide “requisite air and maritime capability to keep open all the long lines of supply, resupply, and communications in peace or war.” These language differences highlighted Weinberger’s unwillingness to accept, at least for the time being, Lehman’s goal of clear naval superiority over the Soviet Union.³

While the DG was an important statement of policy objectives, the real heart of the matter was how much money the administration would request from Congress for defense spending, the so-called top-line figure in the fiscal guidance. Of equal importance was how the top line would be distributed among the services and Defense agencies. The top-line fiscal guidance anticipated spending \$281.6 billion for FY 1984 with subsequent budgets rising each year for a total of \$1.8 trillion for the FY 1984 to FY 1988 period. In May 1982 the services submitted their program objective memoranda based on the DG and the fiscal guidance. Lehman’s response to Weinberger was predictable: the Navy’s “efforts to achieve

maritime superiority based on your new definition, and attainment of President Reagan's goal of a 600-ship Navy are being sorely tested by reduction in our fiscal guidance." Lehman noted that the Navy was allotted \$5 billion less than it had been in FY 1983, resulting in the unraveling of programs begun in the first two Reagan budgets. Lehman's response to this shortfall was twofold. First, build a more powerful, modern, and better-equipped Navy and Marine Corps, but modernize it at a slower pace. Second, accelerate the decommissioning of older ships. The Navy could then adequately support research, development, testing, and engineering; introduce the Trident II (D-5) missile into its submarine fleet; upgrade the Marine Corps; and sustain and enhance readiness and sustainability. Lehman lamented that the Navy's "POM total is much too low because the DOD total is much too low.... We should not relent in pressing the White House to increase the DOD total budget for [FY] 1984." Lehman was overly optimistic. Frank Carlucci responded that the Navy POM exceeded the fiscal guidance and Lehman would have to adjust it downward.⁴

In response to its fiscal guidance, the Army proposed a smaller force by shelving plans to add two divisions, thus maintaining readiness and sustainability, continuing to modernize at the minimum acceptable level, and prioritizing forward and early deployment, especially for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Production of M1 tanks and Patriot and Stinger missiles would be slowed. As for the Air Force's strategic programs, their POM funded 90 B-1B bombers and the MX (Peacekeeper) missile, both still slated to be operational by 1986. Nevertheless, production and deployment of the MX missile, aerial refueling capability of B-52s, and hardening of B-52s against electronic damage from nuclear blasts would be stretched out. The tactical aircraft fleet would be expanded to six wings by 1988, but they would be procured at a reduced rate.⁵

In April 1982 it became clear that Weinberger and Director of the Office of Management and Budget David Stockman were operating on two different assumptions for the FY 1984 top-line budget. Stockman believed that since the administration had accepted the figures of Congress's first Concurrent Budget Resolution passed in June 1982 for FY 1983, the amounts for FY 1984 and FY 1985 budgets should proceed from that lower FY 1983 figure. While the president had agreed to the lower figure for FY 1983, he had not committed to accepting lower figures for the next two budgets. Weinberger argued that the top line should be based on the figures for FY 1984 and FY 1985 as projected in the original FY

1983 budget, not the one reduced by agreement between Congress and the White House. There was a considerable difference. The OMB's budget targets were \$271.1 billion in budget authority and \$235.4 billion in outlays; for FY 1984 they were \$314.6 billion in BA and \$270.5 billion in outlays for the next fiscal year. Weinberger's amounts were \$284.7 billion in BA and \$247 billion in outlays for FY 1984 and \$330.9 billion in BA and \$285.5 billion for FY 1985.⁶

At a meeting with the president on July 20, 1982, Stockman and Weinberger made their cases as part of the midseason budget review. The OMB director argued that Congress would expect the president to follow their budget resolution targets, especially since looming deficits made cuts in defense spending inevitable. Furthermore, such reductions were the only way to significantly reduce the deficit since cuts in domestic spending and the federal bureaucracy had already been undertaken. Without defense reductions, the OMB director expected deficits of \$100 billion a year, which he believed would destroy the confidence of both the American public and financial markets in the administration's commitment to balancing the budget. Weinberger countered that the budget resolution was merely a target, the Pentagon had already suffered two deficit-imposed reductions for FY 1982 (see chapter 3), and the cuts proposed by Congress and Stockman would reverse the Reagan defense buildup. If anything, Weinberger told the president, the Pentagon needed a budget even larger than the one he was proposing. Weinberger recounted to the president that after meeting with the Joint Chiefs and the commanders of the unified and specified commands, they had given their "candid assessment" that the DoD FY 1984–1988 program would result in critical shortfalls. The president was torn, as he admitted in his diary the next day. Weinberger and Stockman presented him with "a really tough problem.... Cutting defense sends a message I don't like to allies & enemies alike. But Dave's report, if deficits are too high, sends a shock wave to the world just when we seem to be gaining ground." It came down to defense versus deficit reduction.⁷

Secretary of State George Shultz weighed in on Weinberger's side with a memorandum to the president. Failure to maintain the original Defense budget could, in Shultz's view, invite Soviet miscalculation over U.S. resolve, weaken allies' ability to resist Soviet political and military intimidation, harm the ability of allies to increase their own defense spending, and undercut arms control. Reagan met with his advisers on July 26 to resolve the budget issue. The president pondered that there "had to be a third choice that will foreclose either message

[deficit reduction or military strength],” thus banishing a “problem that has been haunting me for a week.” For the time being, however, Reagan agreed with Weinberger. For the DoD this meant that Weinberger could use the budget figures for FY 1984: \$284.7 billion in BA and \$247 billion in outlays as projected in February 1981. At least temporarily, Weinberger had won the battle of defense over deficit reduction.⁸

Stockman and Carlucci revisited the issue in December 1982 as the Pentagon was preparing the FY 1984 submission of its budget request to Congress. While starting from Weinberger’s top-line figures as approved by the president, Stockman suggested that lower inflation figures, lower military pay increases, and congressional cuts in the FY 1983 budget had created a climate where such reductions could be explained as “facts of life” changes and not defense cuts. Furthermore, the FY 1983 budget projection was 13.5 percent higher than the actual FY 1983 budget since Congress had cut \$16 billion from the latter. Such a large percentage jump for FY 1984, in the OMB’s view, was out of line with the original projections and would be seized upon by Congress as excessive and unjustified. Carlucci and Weinberger argued that the DoD needed these full FY 1984 top-line figures and had already factored them into their programs. To cut



The Reagan team discussing the fiscal year 1984 budget, January 10, 1983 (David Stockman, gesticulating, in middle foreground). *Reagan Library*

them would cause painful reductions and would invite further congressional cuts. For its part, the OMB stuck to a \$22 billion reduction figure.⁹

In early January 1983 Weinberger countered the OMB cut of \$22 billion with an offer to reduce the FY 1984 top line by \$6.5 billion, thus avoiding the OMB reductions that Weinberger believed “would cut far too deeply into our efforts to regain sufficient deterrent strength in 1984.” Within the NSC staff, the secretary’s offer was seen as “a small bone to throw to Congress” and not a “painful reduction for DOD. Half of it is attributable solely to changes in inflation” and cuts in “marginal” programs. “Essentially, DoD is giving up in advance, the bulk of its budget cushion,” said NSC staffer Robert W. Helm.¹⁰

As was his tendency, the president halved the original difference between DoD and OMB by approving a \$11.3 billion cut to the FY 1984 DoD budget request. Now the secretary had to sell the budget to Congress and the public. Weinberger prepared the groundwork by granting interviews to the news media in early January 1983 to place the \$11.3 billion budget reduction in context. As announced by Weinberger at the end of January, the Pentagon request was for \$273.4 billion in BA and \$238.6 billion in outlays. The Pentagon put the best light on the request, organizing a long press conference by Weinberger with questions and answers, providing an extensive news release detailing the budget with multiple charts and graphs, and producing for a general audience a booklet entitled *Your Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 1984*. On the next day, February 1, Weinberger sent his annual report for FY 1984 to Congress.¹¹

Congress and the FY 1984 Budget Resolution

Even though the president reduced the FY 1984 Defense budget request by \$11.3 billion rather than the \$22 billion that the OMB director recommended, the FY 1984 combined budget still represented 10 percent real growth over the FY 1983 budget. The Democratic-controlled House of Representatives was in no mood to appropriate such an increase and many Republican and Democratic senators were also skeptical of high defense spending. In late January 1983, just before Weinberger officially unveiled the budget on Capitol Hill, the NSC met to discuss defense programs. Weinberger provided the participants with a 30-minute briefing on national security and hit his usual themes: Carter had left the U.S. strategic forces vulnerable and the three legs of the triad required modernization, the success that the Reagan administration achieved in readiness of conventional

forces must continue, and the “charge that the Defense budget has been immune to cuts is absolutely wrong.” The secretary pointed out that the Pentagon had already accepted \$66 billion in cuts to its original Five-Year Defense Program, the combined projected total defense spending for the fiscal years 1981–1986. When Treasury Secretary Don Regan asked if the Pentagon had a fallback plan, Weinberger answered it did not. The president stated that “the defense program is already in fallback position” and that “we need to stand where we are ... to dig our heels in and stand fast and together.” Reagan suggested it was not just a matter of convincing Congress; the American public had to realize the need for defense spending. “It is not necessary to have them [members of Congress] see the light,” the president observed, “only make them feel the heat.”¹²

During the month of February 1983 Weinberger spent 35 hours testifying on the DoD budget before seven House and Senate committees and met informally on many occasions with small groups of congressional leaders and the 57 House Democratic freshmen members. Even with this lobbying effort, the prospects for 10 percent real growth in the Defense budget looked bleak.¹³

Weinberger had a particularly caustic exchange with Senator Donald W. Riegle Jr. (D-MI). After sitting through Weinberger’s testimony on the Defense budget on February 3, 1983, an admittedly “frustrated” Riegle lashed out:

I think we have a Secretary of Defense whose basic judgement is dangerous to the country. You give every appearance of being an inflexible ideologue who has lost any sense of proportion when it comes to assessing the defense needs of the country. By your really fanatical insistence on defense increases that are larger than needed, larger than we can afford, I believe you are damaging our national security.

Riegle then accused Weinberger of “distorting the economy,” “bloating the deficit,” “adding to unemployment,” and causing high interest rates. Weinberger responded, “Senator, I think you have accomplished your principal purpose, which was to launch a demagogic attack on me for the afternoon and evening editions.... Everything you have said is both insulting and wrong....” While Riegle’s vitriolic language was not typical of the tone of most members of Congress in their exchanges with the Pentagon chief, Congress was not buying Weinberger’s story.¹⁴

Congressional reluctance to accept the Weinberger Defense budget request

became even clearer when budget committees began to vote on targets for spending. On March 17, 1983, the House Budget Committee set a target of only 4 percent growth in defense spending over the previous fiscal year. Weinberger informed the president: "Our request would be slashed by \$103.7 billion in budget authority and \$77.6 billion in outlays over the three-year period, 1984–1986..., below the Carter levels." Weinberger enlisted Reagan's aid in the budget campaign. The president sent talking points for use by his cabinet and key officials in support of the DoD budget. NSC adviser Clark convinced Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-NM), chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, to hold off a vote on the budget resolution until the president made a speech on defense and national security. On March 23 Reagan addressed the nation live on radio and television in an effort to go directly to the American people in support of his Defense budget. The president also used the opportunity to introduce his Strategic Defense Initiative (soon dubbed "Star Wars"), a proposal that had nothing to do with the budget issue at hand and which promised more spending on defense down the line to develop the capability to shoot down nuclear-armed ICBMs in space. According to Stockman's recollections, Domenici and the Senate Budget Committee "were livid." The great communicator had asked for time to make his budget case to the public and then changed the conversation with his SDI proposal.¹⁵

Senator Howard Baker Jr. promoted the idea of a 7.5 percent increase in defense spending. Domenici insisted that unless the president endorsed the Baker compromise of 7.5 percent, his committee would vote for a 5 percent increase. On April 7 the president told Baker he would endorse the 7.5 percent compromise if Weinberger was agreeable. The White House put in calls to the Pentagon to obtain the secretary's opinion, but Weinberger could not be found. Stockman suggested that Weinberger's absence was "deliberate." In effect, he was ducking the responsibility of making the decision in the hopes that the full increase would be accepted by the Senate Budget Committee. Stockman recalled that the Pentagon chief was eventually found by a White House secretary sitting outside the Oval Office waiting for a presidential photo session with military academy cadets, "right next to the jelly bean jar," a dig at Weinberger's well-known sweet tooth. Reagan called Domenici and asked for a delay to get the Republican committee members in line for the full 10 percent increase. The chairman, who had been waiting hours for the president to call, replied that time was up for the Baker compromise. Reagan reportedly raised the prospect



President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger discuss the FY 1984 Defense budget, January 10, 1983. *Reagan Library*

of a final offer of 7.9 percent, but the senator was apparently not interested. “I got mad,” Reagan recalled, and he slammed the phone down. At the end of the day the Senate Budget Committee on a bipartisan vote of 17–4 (8 Republicans and 9 Democrats for and 4 Republicans opposed) limited defense spending to 5 percent real growth. “These supposed to be Republicans went ahead and cut in half the increase we’d asked for,” the president fumed in his diary, “the Russians must be happy tonite.” The Senate vote was significant because the House Budget Committee had reduced its target to 3 percent real growth and the administration hoped to go into conference with a larger Senate figure to increase its leverage with the joint conferees. In the end the conference committee set a target of 4 percent growth. This conference decision reduced the administration’s request for defense spending from \$273.4 in January 1983 to just under \$261 billion, a stunning initial defeat for Weinberger.¹⁶

To Domenici, others in Congress, and Stockman, Weinberger had overplayed his hand. He had tried to use the decrease in the inflation rate in 1983 and an expected continued decrease for the next two years to reap a windfall for the Defense budget. The budget assumptions on inflation made in 1981 gave Weinberger and the Pentagon a large cushion. The secretary doggedly fought

reductions and, when forced to defend his demands, claimed billions in savings without explaining that they were mainly due to lower inflation. By 1983 the mood of the country had shifted. Weinberger sent Clark results of a Gallup poll of foreign policy experts that found 24 percent favored less defense spending, 52 percent thought the current level was “about right,” and 21 percent wanted more defense spending. Weinberger interpreted these results as 73 percent favoring his defense program, though one could just as easily believe that 86 percent favored no increases in Pentagon spending. As one observer claimed, “Weinberger had lost more than money [in the Senate Budget Committee foul-up]. He lost credibility—the White House staff knew that—and he lost control of the defense debate.”¹⁷

The FY 1984 Defense Authorization and Appropriation Bills

Congress’s consideration of the administration’s defense request—almost \$198 billion for weapons, research and development, operations, and civil defense—did not dramatically indicate that Weinberger had lost his old budget magic, but it revealed trouble ahead. The request, like the full DoD appropriation bill that would follow it, was based on the joint budget resolution target of 4 percent real growth. While DoD received less than it asked for, its major weapon programs were relatively unscathed. Of the \$198 billion the Pentagon requested, \$94.1 billion was for procurement of weapon systems, \$29.6 billion for research and development, \$74 billion for operations and maintenance, and \$253.5 million for civil defense. Only two programs occasioned much congressional debate: the perennial issues of funding the MX/Peacekeeper missile and production of new binary chemical weapons.¹⁸


Senator Gary Hart led a group of 15 senators, including Republican Mark O. Hatfield (R-OR), who attempted to delete funding for procurement of 27 MX missiles. The MX opponents engaged in a nearly two-week filibuster in July 1983, arguing that placing MX missiles in existing hardened Minuteman silos made the nuclear balance more dangerous since it would force the United States to adopt a “launch-on-warning” policy, one that would have the U.S. respond with a launch of strategic forces upon confirmation of a Soviet attack in preparation or in progress. Hart’s “mini-filibuster,” as Weinberger called it, was broken with a decisive 58–41 vote in the Senate. “In the end,” the secretary informed the president, “Gary Hart failed to kill the MX-PEACEKEEPER missile and to boost his presidential aspirations.”¹⁹

The House of Representatives narrowly authorized the production of MX missiles, but with two amendments. The first ensured that MX production would not outrun the production of the Midgetman, a small single-warhead ICBM, which would be easier to deploy in a mobile mode and which was considered more conducive to nuclear arms reduction agreements than large ICBMs with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles. The second House amendment reduced production of MX missiles from 27 to 21 for FY 1984. In conference, House and Senate conferees accepted both these conditions. As for chemical weapons, the House eliminated the administration's entire \$114.6 million request for binary chemical weapons. In conference, supporters of producing 155mm binary artillery shells that could launch lethal nerve gas argued for approval of production, as the Senate had done. House opponents of nerve gas vowed to fight on when the conference returned after its August recess to finalize the defense authorization bill. The Pentagon and its supporters in Congress received timely support from events when the Soviet Union shot down the Korean civilian airliner flight KAL 007 in Soviet airspace, with Representative Larry P. McDonald (D-GA) and 50 Americans among the 269 passengers and crew who perished. After a near-unanimous House and Senate resolution condemning this Soviet action, the conference accepted binary nerve agent production when Vice President George Bush broke the tie with his vote.²⁰

In September 1983 Senate passage of the DoD final authorization bill was not close. It passed by 83 to 8 in the Senate and 266 to 152 in the House. In conference, the House and Senate conferees agreed on a \$187.5 billion authorization, \$10.5 billion less than the administration requested. Nevertheless, Weinberger considered the bill a "strong endorsement of our strengthened U.S. defense program" that "keeps intact every major modernization and rebuilding program including the PEACEKEEPER missile, the B-1B bomber, PERSHING II missile, and chemical weapons." The authorization process was one step, but the appropriation bill was crucial in funding the entire DoD budget including the weapons, R&D, operations, and civil defense in the authorization act. Weinberger agreed that the Korean airliner shoot down had tilted Congress in the Pentagon's favor but warned the president that Congress would undoubtedly try to trim defense spending and cut programs in the appropriation process. Weinberger vowed, "We will be ready."²¹

Congress did not disappoint the secretary. On November 18, 1983, more

Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1984



Program	Administration Request	House-Passed Amount	Senate-Passed Amount	Final Appropriation
Personnel	\$47,997,800,000	\$47,396,850,000	\$48,607,935,000	\$47,360,103,000
Retired personnel	\$16,772,800,000	\$16,592,600,000	\$16,592,600,000	\$16,592,600,000
Operations & maintenance	\$74,972,674,000	\$71,396,066,000	\$73,800,953,000	\$72,539,625,000
Procurement	\$92,594,655,000	\$84,650,827,000	\$86,335,012,000	\$85,617,505,000
Research & development	\$24,498,840,000	\$26,465,715,000	\$26,761,747,000	\$26,739,269,000
Special foreign currency	\$3,050,000	\$3,050,000	\$3,050,000	\$3,050,000
Related agencies	\$86,300,000	\$103,383,000	\$104,740,000	\$103,623,000
Total, new budget authority	\$260,926,119,000	\$246,608,491,000	\$252,206,037,000	\$248,955,755,000
Transfer from previous appropriations	—	\$454,300,000	\$839,100,000	\$865,100,000
Total funding available	\$260,926,119,000	\$247,062,791,000	\$253,045,137,000	\$249,820,875,000

OSD/HO, based on data from CQ Almanac, 1983

than a month and a half after the end of FY 1984—timing which forced the Pentagon to operate on a continuing resolution—Congress appropriated \$255.5 billion for the DoD budget including personnel costs and \$7.1 billion for military construction, which was passed as a separate bill. Weinberger noted that the total was \$5.9 billion less than the target set by the first budget resolution, which the secretary had found so difficult to accept. To Weinberger the system had “completely broken down. The dollar figures established by the conference committee [for FY 1984 appropriations] do not meet the source requirements of our security.” Instead of a 5 percent raise, the FY 1984 was under 4 percent. After adjustment for inflation Weinberger pegged it at 3.2 percent. The acting DoD comptroller, John R. Quetsch, believed that “the effect of such severe reduction to our military ... is unconscionable.”²²

Accustomed to the generous DoD budgets of the first two Reagan years, neither Weinberger nor Quetsch were ready to accept that the good times were over. What they failed to recognize, or chose to ignore, was that most of the DoD’s programs were adequately funded in FY 1984. Part of the reason was that the congressionally imposed reductions ranged across the board and resulted in virtually no programs being eliminated. Congress appropriated \$2.1 billion for 21 Peacekeeper missiles, \$5.6 billion to purchase 10 B-1B bombers, \$407 million for 240 long-range cruise missiles to be launched by bombers beyond the reach of Soviet air defenses, and \$1.4 billion for the 11th Trident-launching submarine, along with \$555.3 million for procurement of Trident missiles, and \$1.5 billion for development of the Trident II missile. The bill funded \$407.7 million for 95 Pershing II missiles for deployment in Germany. The Army received more M1 tanks than it requested—840 as opposed to 720—because \$149 million that was appropriated but not spent in earlier years was added to the purchase. The bill funded 600 Bradley armored infantry vehicles with improved TOW 2 (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) antitank guided missiles that were more accurate than earlier versions. The Air Force and Navy received all the tactical aircraft they requested. Notwithstanding Lehman’s complaints, the Navy received \$57 million to modernize a third battleship and \$95.9 million to upgrade the 25-year-old aircraft carrier *Independence*. The bill funded three cruisers with Aegis antiship missile defenses, \$1.68 billion for three *Los Angeles*-class attack submarines, and \$379.9 million for 21 light airborne multipurpose system III antisubmarine helicopters. Congress also appropriated money for one large guided-missile escort frigate not requested by the administration.²³

Funding for Major Defense Programs, Fiscal 1984

Final column compares administration request to enacted appropriation.
Amounts given in millions of dollars.

	Program	Reagan Request		Enacted Authorization		Enacted Appropriation		Change
		Number	Amount	Number	Amount	Number	Amount	
Strategic & Intermediate-Range	MX missile	27	\$2,770	21	\$2,102	21	\$2,102	-24%
	Small ICBM R&D				\$354		\$354	—
	B-1 bomber	10	\$3,762	10	\$3,762	10	\$3,762	0%
	Air-launched cruise missile			240	\$422	240	\$407	—
	Trident submarine	1	\$1,526	1	\$1,452	1	\$1,398	-8%
	Trident I missile	52	\$587	52	\$587	52	\$555	-5%
	Pershing II missile	95	\$408	95	\$408	95	\$408	0%
	Ground-launched cruise missile	120	\$582	120	\$564	120	\$564	-3%
Ground Combat	M1 tank	720	\$1,361	840	\$1,463	840	\$1,463	7%
	Bradley troop carrier	600	\$766	600	\$799	600	\$793	4%
	Apache antitank helicopter	112	\$1,219	112	\$1,189	112	\$1,141	-6%
	"Deep strike": JTACMS & JSTARS		\$224		\$203		\$183	-18%
	Sgt. York antiaircraft tank	130	\$542	130	\$542	130	\$542	0%
	Patriot antiaircraft missile	525	\$992	440	\$885	440	\$885	-11%
Naval Warfare	Aegis cruiser	3	\$3,431	3	\$3,394	3	\$3,281	-4%
	Sub-hunting submarine	3	\$1,706	3	\$1,706	3	\$1,682	-1%
	LAMPS II antisub helicopter	21	\$447	21	\$447	21	\$398	-11%
	New-design destroyer parts		\$100		\$79		\$79	-21%
Tactical Air Combat	F-15 fighter	48	\$1,529	36	\$1,282	36	\$1,282	-16%
	F-16 fighter	120	\$1,618	144	\$1,997	144	\$1,997	23%
	F-14 carrier fighter	24	\$886	24	\$792	24	\$792	-11%
	F-18 carrier fighter	84	\$2,151	84	\$2,136	84	\$2,100	-2%
	A-6E carrier bomber	6	\$205	6	\$205	6	\$205	0%
Airlift and Sealift	LHD helicopter carrier	1	\$1,380	1	\$1,380	1	\$1,366	-1%
	LSD amphibious ship	1	\$327	1	\$327	1	\$326	-0%
	SL-7 cargo ship conversion	4	\$246	4	\$246	4	\$230	-7%
	C-5 transport plane	4	\$1,076	4	\$1,076	4	\$1,076	0%
	KC-10 tanker-cargo plane	8	\$334	8	\$334	8	\$317	-5%

Omitted: funds for spare parts and components to be purchased in future years. Included: funds appropriated but not spent in previous years. Source: *CQ Almanac*, 1984

The only casualty of the legislative budget process was the binary chemical weapons program, which was eliminated in conference on the insistence of a majority of the House. As Weinberger told the president, "With the Senate having approved this program on a tie-breaking vote of the Vice President, our conference effort was very much up hill." The Pentagon took a 3 percent hit in its operations and maintenance (O&M) budget, \$2.2 billion less than the requested \$72.2 billion, which affected its readiness and sustainability goals. Although Congress purported to support such goals, it adjusted downward over 200 O&M items. The \$7 billion cut in the administration's request in procurement (\$92.6 billion to \$85.6 billion) did not hit major weapon programs, but would result in cutbacks in spare parts, modernization, modification of existing weapons, and delays in procuring support equipment. As for research, development, and test and evaluation, Congress cut funding from a requested \$28.5 billion to \$26.7 billion, causing Quetsch to note that real growth over the previous year was less than 10 percent. Nine hundred R&D programs were adjusted downward by Congress. "Our recognized lead in technology should not be allowed to erode by congressional micromanagement," Quetsch complained, "which tends to substitute constituency interest for military judgment."²⁴

On November 22 Weinberger gave a news conference at the Pentagon. He prefaced the session with a short statement on the budget, acknowledging that "we have endorsement and approval, appropriations for all of the President's major program and weapons systems except chemical warfare." On the effect of the reductions, Weinberger stated, "We will have all the weapons systems the President feels is essential but we will take a little longer to get them and they will cost quite a bit more...." Weinberger estimated the added cost at \$1.3 billion mainly because of denial by Congress of 8 of 14 DoD requests for multiyear procurement authority, which he considered the most economical method of procuring weapons. Senator Ted Stevens, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, agreed with the tenor of Weinberger's remarks, but noted that all but one of the eight multiyear procurements were rejected in the authorization act, not the appropriation bill. If the secretary had a problem, Stevens implied, he should have raised it in August and September 1983 when the authorization bill was being marked up. Furthermore, Stevens noted that a large part of the procurement reductions were based on savings, contract repricing, inflation adjustments, and other nonprogrammatic changes. For example, he cited that

of the \$2.6 billion reduction in procurement, \$1 billion came from repricing and savings and \$500 million from inflation adjustment. He agreed that “no major program aside from chemical weapons was denied or substantially reduced.”²⁵

For all the private handwringing and gnashing of teeth by Weinberger and his colleagues at the Pentagon about the reduction imposed on them by the FY 1984 budget, they fared reasonably well. Senator Stevens could not agree more. As he told Weinberger, the budget, although short of the administration’s growth targets, was a “good product.” He continued, “That was the President’s feeling, too, when he called me directly to express his appreciation after the bill was passed.”²⁶

Preparing the FY 1985 Defense Budget

The budget process at the Pentagon approximated walking on a constant treadmill. Well before Congress passed the FY 1984 DoD appropriation bill, Weinberger and his budget team were planning and programing the next fiscal year budget. They began in fall 1982 with a draft of the defense guidance for FYs 1985–1989, with inputs from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the regional and specific commanders, and the Defense Resources Board. The president—in reality his NSC staff—insisted on reviewing the DG before its release. At the end of 1982, the DG was sufficiently far along for NSC review.²⁷

NSC adviser William Clark and his staff had two concerns with the DG. Was there specific guidance in the paper for sending the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to the Persian Gulf in the event of an emergency and should the DG explicitly underscore the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel in its Middle East section? The DoD countered that the DG was a programming doctrine and a statement in support of Israel was inappropriate because it would not affect programming. While the DG did not provide specific guidance for the RDJTF, it stressed upgrading U.S. capabilities to project, operate, and sustain forces in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. In neither case did the NSC staff suggestions find their way into the DG. The last concern of the NSC staff was fiscal. There was a huge shortfall, roughly estimated to be \$80 billion to \$120 billion for the FYs 1985–1989 program, between the cost of what the DG recommended and what the administration would likely request from Congress.²⁸

On February 25, 1983, Weinberger provided a 20-minute briefing to the president and the National Security Council on the DG for fiscal years 1985–1989. The secretary identified the key issues of the guidance: the strategic modernization

program; enhanced effectiveness of conventional forces including readiness, sustainability, and modernization; the goal of a 600-ship Navy with 14 aircraft carriers; improved Marine Corps response in Southwest Asia; and enhanced special operations forces. Weinberger used this opportunity to drive home his message that he had been promoting virtually since his swearing-in. Given Soviet military procurement trends, if the defense guidance was not fully funded the asymmetries between U.S. and Soviet military forces would increase rapidly, to the United States' detriment. Led by the president, the NSC participants bemoaned the difficulty of convincing the public and Congress of the requirements for U.S. security. The president concluded the meeting with one of his off-the-cuff observations: "He wondered if people appreciated how many men in our armed forces had died unnecessarily in conflict because of our underfunding of training and equipment modernization." On March 1 the DoD finalized the defense guidance, which soon became subsumed in what the services wanted and what OSD could expect to give them based on the fiscal guidance.²⁹

In mid-May 1983 the services submitted their program objective memoranda. The goals of all three submissions were similar: each military department claimed to be tirelessly striving to meet the goals of the administration's defense buildup, but they could be so much more effective if they had more resources. They all claimed to have made the hard choices. The Army deferred expansion of combat force structure in favor of improved readiness and sustainability, the latter two improvements coming at a more modest rate than originally envisioned. Improving the quality of life of soldiers, applying better technology to weapon systems, improving special forces to counter low-intensity threats, converting to light divisions, and improvements in the Guard and reserves were all goals on which progress had been made, but at a decreased rate. As Secretary of the Army Marsh concluded, "The overall impact of fiscal constraints is a smaller Army, still on our course to excellence, but at a slower pace." If Weinberger provided more money for the "Total Army" for FYs 1985–1989, the increase would "restore much of our momentum."³⁰

The Air Force POM had a similar message. It focused on "quality of life for our people and quality of our operating forces." The Air Force priorities as outlined in the POM were strategic modernization that included funding for deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles and development of the Midgetman missile. Strategic modernization continued with funding of B1-B bombers, advanced cruise

missiles, and development of an “advanced technology bomber” (i.e., the B-2 stealth bomber). Nevertheless, the Air Force faced difficult choices because of reductions in its FY 1985 baseline of \$4 billion and almost \$9.5 billion through FY 1988 as compared to a January 1983 baseline. In response the Air Force chose to minimize manpower growth.³¹

The Navy presented similar arguments in its POM. Lehman noted that the Navy had \$3.9 billion less than expected from the fiscal guidance of January 1983 even though the readiness requirement and the magnitude of the Soviet threat had not lessened. The Navy secretary reported, “Very difficult choices resulted. Many important programs were impacted; some were eliminated, and others were significantly reduced.” Seventy-five RDT&E (research, development, and test and evaluation) programs were deferred or canceled and four major procurement programs eliminated. Still the Navy maintained momentum of its highest priority, strategic modernization in the form of procurement of one Trident missile-equipped submarine per year and funding for the Trident II missile program to come on line in 1989. Mobility was another priority. The Navy POM funded all fast sealift vessels and maritime pre-positioning ships and increased its dry cargo lift capability. Aircraft procurement had been reconfigured to achieve more efficient production rates and allow for upgrades of older noncompatible aircraft to bring them up to fleet configuration. The Marine Corps continued its modernization, especially procurement of helicopters, Harrier vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, and landing craft. Over FYs 1985–1989, the Navy would procure 135 ships, 15 less than anticipated in January 1983. Lehman assured Weinberger that the Navy’s POM was “balanced, priced properly, and internally consistent” but he added, “Although it involves more risk than I consider advisable..., it is a plan for maritime superiority.”³²

The Joint Chiefs assessed the services’ POMs in mid-June 1983 and identified four major areas that they believed needed special attention. First, given the shift in the balance of strategic nuclear power to Moscow, the U.S. strategic modernization plan’s improvements required full support. Second, complex political, economic, and military worldwide threats necessitated a global military response capacity. The POMs had cut one carrier battle group and failed to meet all amphibious lift requirements. Third, the POMs funded crucial military space activities at only a minimum level, meaning they were unlikely to keep pace with the Soviet Union’s stepped-up military space program. Finally, without

production of binary chemical weapons, the United States could not deter the more advanced Soviet chemical weapons program or negotiate from strength a treaty to outlaw such weapons. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs still found the POMs, with the above exceptions, as the basis for a good overall military balance of readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure.³³

The FY 1985 Defense budget that the Joint Chiefs and the services recommended was not necessarily what Congress would appropriate or even what the administration would request from Congress in early 1984, the start of an election year. In July 1983 Weinberger and Clark explored how to increase the Defense budget in light of the FY 1984 congressional budget resolution limitation of 5 percent real growth. The DoD's top-line figure for FY 1985 was \$321.6 billion, a 16 percent real growth increase over the FY 1984 level. Extrapolating another congressionally imposed 5 percent growth limitation, the budget would be \$289.1 billion, some \$32 billion less than Weinberger proposed. Given the fact that the administration could no longer count on Republican congressional leaders, Weinberger's \$321.6 top-line figure would be regarded by Congress as provocative and confrontational. NSC adviser Clark suggested, "Rather than pitting ourselves against Congressional unwillingness to fund large increases in the defense program, we should consider a strategy of working with Republican Congressional leaders to agree on a defense increase in the 7 to 10 percent range." Clark believed this was a figure "Republicans could rally around."³⁴

At the end of 1983 Weinberger met with the Republican leadership—Senators Howard Baker, Ted Stevens, John Tower, Pete Domenici, and Mark Hatfield—to discuss an increased FY 1985 budget. Weinberger steered away from mentioning percentages of growth and focused on specific responsibilities and programs. As he reported to Reagan, "Although there was no solid consensus among this group, there appeared to be support for some real growth, but not enough to make up for the FY 1984 cuts or enable us to carry out your planned improvements for the armed forces."³⁵

On December 5, 1983, the president met with Weinberger and budget officials for a review of the FY 1985 Defense budget. Weinberger reduced his top-line figure from \$321 to \$305 billion in budget authority. Reagan noted in his diary, "I have a hunch it will come out around \$295 bil. because the Dems. will cut whatever we come in with." After an unsatisfactory meeting with House Speaker Tip O'Neill, who in Reagan's words, "ranted" that to solve the deficit problem "all we need to

do is tax the rich more and cut the fat out of the mil. Budget,” the president again met on January 23, 1984, with Weinberger on the Defense budget. On February 1, Weinberger officially requested that Congress appropriate \$305 billion in budget authority and \$264 billion in outlays, respectively 13 and 9.3 percent real growth over the amounts appropriated for FY 1984. The unveiling of the budget was accompanied by the usual media and public relations campaigns, extensive congressional testimony by the secretary, and Weinberger’s informal meetings with both Democratic and Republican congressional leaders. The secretary had convinced the president and the reluctant (and soon to resign) OMB director, David Stockman, to request from Congress these increases in real growth to make up for FY 1984 under 4 percent real growth.³⁶

Congress and the FY 1985 Authorization and Appropriation Bills

Congress was unlikely to accept 13 percent real growth in budget authority and 9.3 in outlays for the Pentagon for FY 1985. Most legislators on Capitol Hill, in both parties, were in deficit-reduction mode. In order to reduce deficits, which were then expected to average \$200 billion a year through 1989, three things had to happen. Taxes had to be increased, domestic spending had to be curtailed, and the Defense budget had to be reduced. The president was in a partisan mood, suggesting in his diary that Democrats were trying use the deficit as a campaign tactic in the upcoming presidential election. According to Reagan, the Democrats had created the current deficit, but were only willing to provide half the domestic spending cuts he wanted, opting instead to attack the deficit through increased taxes and reduced defense spending. The president was in a bind over deficits given his campaign promise to eliminate them by 1985. During the second week in March 1984, Reagan met with Republican congressional leaders and hammered out a deficit reduction package designed to lower spending for the next three fiscal years by \$149 billion roughly divided equally between tax increases, cuts in domestic spending, and reductions in the Pentagon’s budget. On March 15 Reagan announced his plan in the White House Rose Garden with the Republican congressional leaders in attendance. For the Pentagon for FY 1985 this Rose Garden agreement, as it was dubbed, signaled a \$14 billion cut in budget authority in the president’s DoD request for FY 1985. There was no assurance that Congress would accept this figure. Senator Domenici was touting an almost \$20 billion cut that reduced the administration’s top-line DoD budget

authority to \$286 billion from the \$305 billion requested. Pentagon Comptroller Vincent Puritano suggested such a cut “will cause real hurt” because the Pentagon did not have “the ‘inflation premium’ of last two years to cushion a cut, all of which will come out of programs.” Rather than terminate or stretch out programs, Puritano recommended the “1000 cuts of \$20 million” model of last year’s budget as the best solution for FY 1985.³⁷

As Congress continued to deliberate how much to cut defense spending as part of the deficit reduction package, it began markup of the defense authorization bill. This bill authorized, but did not appropriate, funds for DoD procurement, operations and maintenance, research and development, and civil defense. Authorization allowed Congress a first shot at the Pentagon program, thus increasing its ability to micromanage defense spending. Progress on the bill became deadlocked over the Peacekeeper/MX missiles, the cornerstone of the Reagan strategic modernization program. Having obtained authorization and funding for an initial 21 missiles in the FY 1984 budget, the administration requested authorization for 40 additional missiles. In August 1984, after meeting with senior Republican members of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Weinberger reported to the president, “In the House, there are increasing signs that the Speaker and the entire Democratic leadership are committed to achieving some kind of symbolic victory to kill or damage the MX program.” Congressional opponents of the MX presented two somewhat contradictory arguments: deployment of the missile in hardened silos in dense-pack mode would not work, and the MX would impair progress nuclear arms control negotiations. In September 1984, with the October congressional recess looming, Speaker O’Neill and Senate Majority Leader Baker fashioned a deal on funding for the MX/Peacekeeper. Congress would authorize \$2.5 billion for MX procurement including \$148 million for spare parts. After the funding for spare parts, \$2.35 billion could be used to deploy the 21 missiles approved in FY 1984 and to produce another 21 in FY 1985. There was a catch. Only \$1 billion of the \$2.5 billion could be used for deployment of the initial 21 missiles plus procurement of spare parts. The remaining \$1.5 billion could not be spent for the production of the additional 21 Peacekeepers until after Congress passed two resolutions in March 1985, the first releasing the \$1.5 billion authorization and the second releasing the funding. The compromise worked because the required two resolutions gave opponents of the MX two chances to defeat it. MX supporters saw the resolutions, which

Funding for Major Defense Programs, Fiscal 1985

Final column compares administration request to enacted appropriation.

Amounts given in millions of dollars.

	Program	Reagan Request		Enacted Authorization		Enacted Appropriation		Change
		Number	Amount	Number	Amount	Number	Amount	
Strategic and Intermediate-Range	MX missile	40	\$2,939	21	\$2,352	21	\$2,352	-20%
	B-1 bomber	34	\$7,103	34	\$7,103	34	\$7,071	-0.5%
	Trident submarine	1	\$1,755	1	\$1,706	1	\$1,748	-0.4%
	Trident II missile R&D		\$2,091		\$2,075		\$2,063	-1.3%
	Strategic Defense Initiative		\$1,777		\$1,527		\$1,400	-21%
	Pershing II missile	93	\$456	70	\$375	70	\$370	-19%
	Ground-launched cruise missile	120	\$571	120	\$571	120	\$569	-0.4%
Ground Combat	M1 tank	720	\$1,759	840	\$1,702	840	\$1,859	6%
	Bradley troop carrier	710	\$1,056	680	\$992	680	\$962	9%
	Apache antitank helicopter	144	\$1,290	144	\$1,290	144	\$1,247	-3%
	"Deep strike": JTACMS & JSTARS		\$318		\$234		\$113	-64%
	Sgt. York antiaircraft tank	132	\$529	117	\$449	0	\$100	-81%
	Patriot antiaircraft missile	585	\$1,096	440	\$976	440	\$976	-11%
Naval Warfare	Aircraft carrier rebuilding	1	\$764	1	\$764	1	\$714	-7%
	Battleship modernization	1	\$423	1	\$0	1	\$0	—
	Aegis cruiser	3	\$3,150	3	\$3,150	3	\$2,985	-5%
	Aegis destroyer	1	\$1,173	1	\$1,174	1	\$1,050	-8%
	Sub-hunting submarine	4	\$2,880	4	\$2,880	4	\$2,665	-7%
	Anti-sub helicopters (LAMPS)	24	\$452	30	\$524	30	\$499	10%
Tactical Air Combat	F-15 fighter	48	\$2,053	42	\$1,953	42	\$1,955	-5%
	F-16 fighter	150	\$3,748	150	\$3,119	150	\$3,033	-19%
	F-14 carrier fighter	24	\$977	24	\$968	24	\$956	-2%
	F-18 carrier fighter	84	\$2,686	84	\$2,262	84	\$2,501	-7%
	A-6E carrier bomber	6	\$215	6	\$215	6	\$214	-0.5%
	AV-8B vertical takeoff bomber	32	\$823	32	\$807	32	\$797	-3%
Airlift and Sealift	LSD amphibious ship	2	\$490	2	\$490	2	\$490	—
	Reserve cargo ships		\$31		\$31		\$31	—
	C-5 transport plane	10	\$2,099	8	\$1,782	8	\$1,682	-20%
	KC-10 tanker-cargo plane	8	\$647	8	\$566	8	\$565	13%
	C-17 cargo plane R&D		\$129		\$129		\$123	-5%


Includes funds for components to be bought in future. MX production included \$852 million in new appropriations and \$1.5 billion in unspent funds from earlier years. Renovation of the battleship *Missouri* entirely from defense funds appropriated in earlier years but not spent. *Source: CQ Almanac, 1985*

had to occur close together, as their best chance to win support for the missile. Weinberger explained to Reagan, "By doing this [accepting the compromise] we will avoid near certain defeat for the MX during this Congressional session and we will avoid having to submit a new supplement budget request for the FY 1985 production funds, which would face an even greater burden for approval than the resolution mechanism."³⁸

The MX/Peacekeeper deal paved the way for the approval of the defense authorization bill by both the House and Senate in late September 1984. Much as Comptroller Puritano had hoped, most cuts in authorization were made over many hundreds of programs. Virtually all DoD major programs survived in good shape. The conferees authorized \$701.8 million to develop the Midgetman missile, only \$24 million less than the administration originally requested; \$1.63 billion of an original request of \$1.78 billion for development of SDI; 70 Pershing II missiles at \$375 million of an original request for 93 at a cost of \$456 million; and almost \$2 billion for the 12th Trident missile-carrying submarine. Production of B-1B bombers was authorized virtually as requested (\$7.1 billion), as was \$1 billion in secret funding for development of a stealth bomber and stealth cruise missiles. The Army received authorization for 840 M1 tanks (\$1.7 billion) and 144 Apache attack helicopters (\$1.3 billion). The Navy's request for \$13 billion was trimmed by almost \$1 billion, but without dropping any major warships from the budget. Congress authorized the plans of the Air Force and the Navy to accelerate production of tactical aircraft—primarily F-15 Eagles, F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-18A Hornets, and F-14 Tomcats. Hundreds of other requests, many of them for development of high-technology weapons and equipment, received congressional authorization.³⁹

The compromise over the MX funding and the deficit reduction measures made the passage of the defense appropriation bill anticlimactic. The only remaining question was whether Congress would do its job before the end of the fiscal year and avoid the prospect of the Pentagon operating on a continuing resolution. Congress missed the deadline by 11 days but included a defense appropriation for FY 1985 of \$274.4 billion in an omnibus spending resolution. With passage of a military construction bill, funding of Department of Energy military activities, and 4 percent pay raises for the military and 3.5 for civilian employees of the DoD, the total appropriated for FY 1985 amounted to \$292.9 billion, just over 5 percent real growth.⁴⁰

Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1985



Program	Administration Request	House-Passed Amount	Senate-Passed Amount	Final Appropriation
Military personnel	\$67,831,600,000	\$66,989,691,000	\$67,015,104,000	\$66,895,639,000
Operations & maintenance	\$80,927,042,000	\$76,599,129,999	\$78,201,727,000	\$77,521,356,000
Procurement	\$107,586,341,000	\$93,167,871,000	\$99,314,304,000	\$97,111,404,000
Research & development	\$33,985,037,000	\$29,779,538,000	\$31,897,567,000	\$31,187,071,000
Revolving funds	\$1,762,056,000	\$1,627,156,000	\$1,553,656,000	\$1,553,956,000
Other programs	\$129,747,000	\$128,247,000	\$129,747,000	\$128,747,000
Total, new budget authority	\$292,221,823,000	\$268,291,632,000	\$278,112,105,000	\$274,398,173,000
Transfer from previous appropriations	—	\$1,771,800,000	\$1,280,000,000	—
Total funding available	\$292,221,823,000	\$270,063,432,000	\$279,392,105,000	\$274,398,173,000

OSD/HO, based on data from CQ Almanac, 1984

Congress agreed to the Pentagon's request to fund procurement of 34 B-1B bombers with only minimal cuts in funding. The Pentagon received all the tactical aircraft it requested. Congress funded the DoD's reduced request for 70 Pershing II missiles. The Army received funding for 840 M1 tanks, 144 Apache attack helicopters, and 655 Bradley fighting vehicles. The Navy funding was slightly reduced, but it received the ships it requested: 1 Trident missile-carrying submarine, 1 rebuilt aircraft carrier, a modernized battleship (using prior year funds), 3 Aegis cruisers and 1 Aegis destroyer, 4 *Los Angeles*-class sub-hunting submarines, and 24 LAMPS antisubmarine helicopters. For sea and airlift capacity, the conferees appropriated money for 2 LSD (landing ship, dock) for amphibious warfare, 10 C-5 transport planes, 8 KC-10 tanker-cargo aircraft, and funding for R&D for the C-17 cargo plane.⁴¹

There were items where the congressional conferees went beyond the usual trimming of price tags for weapon programs. Weinberger had hoped that his initial request for almost \$1.8 billion for the president's Strategic Defense Initiative would be reduced by only \$150 million, as agreed upon by the Senate. In conference, however, Congress appropriated only \$1.4 billion. The secretary blamed House Speaker O'Neill, who "was either unwilling or unable to keep his promise to Senator Baker" to fund SDI at \$1.6 billion. The MX compromise resulted in a delayed \$1.5 billion until Congress voted in spring 1985 to spend it. Such a delay was only a minor setback for MX deployment. Weinberger thought it would not have "any long term impact on the ICBM modernization program." He noted that 1984 congressional races could well determine the fate of the MX and "next year's votes on the MX could become crucial." While Congress approved funding for antisatellite missiles, it limited testing to only three tests during FY 1985 in the hopes of encouraging a possible negotiated international ban on antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. The secretary deemed this "acceptable," but lamented that highly financed Soviet ASAT research, development, and deployment was proceeding without such limitations. Weinberger himself had taken procurement of 132 division air defense anti-aircraft guns off the table because of the gun's test failures. While appropriating \$100 million to keep the DIVAD production line intact, Congress required proof that the gun could pass its tests. The conferees cut \$3.4 billion from the \$98.6 request for operations and maintenance, but the cuts were based on decreased prices (mostly because of less inflation) rather than program reductions. Congress reduced DoD weapons

procurement by \$10.5 billion from the original \$107.6 billion request, but the reductions were spread over many programs, thus dissipating damage to major weapon systems. Weinberger grudgingly admitted, “The measure [the appropriation bill] provides a major boost toward our defense rebuilding and modernization and is significantly above levels previously thought possible in an election year, although below the amounts necessary to sustain our rearming program at the most economic and efficient rates.”⁴²

Formulation of the FY 1986 Defense Budget


The formulation of the FY 1986 budget request in the Pentagon followed the same pattern as the previous two years. The Defense Resources Board, which played an increasingly significant role in budget planning, recommended that the defense guidance need not be rewritten every year. Therefore, the FY 1986 guidance was almost a carbon copy of the previous DG. The POMs of the services had very similar justifications as in previous years. Each service professed to be striving for efficiencies in the face of resource reductions caused by deficit readjustments. The military departments claimed they had made hard choices by reducing programs and adjusting procurement schedules, while still focusing on sustainability, modernization, and readiness. Navy Secretary Lehman’s response was typical of all the services when he warned that the reductions that had to be made came at “considerable higher risk and ultimately, higher cost.”⁴³

The service secretaries were well aware that 1984 was an election year and the public and Congress’s enthusiasm for defense spending had waned. As the presidential campaign heated up, Reagan deemphasized his commitment to defense spending and stressed his willingness to consider arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union (see chapter 7). With the end of the recession and the economic recovery underway, the president breezed through the presidential campaign against his lackluster opponent, Walter Mondale, Jimmy Carter’s former vice president. Reagan’s 1980 campaign promise to balance the federal budget by 1985 proved a forlorn hope, but the electorate had grown so comfortable with “the Gipper” that his reelection was a forgone conclusion.⁴⁴

In September 1984 Weinberger summarized for Reagan the DoD’s review of the FY 1986 budget and FYs 1986–1990 defense program as derived from the POMs. The review was conducted by the Defense Resources Board, chaired by Deputy Secretary Taft and included senior members of the military and civilian

leadership of the Pentagon, with advice from the commanders of the specified and unified commands. The board focused on the 50 or 60 major issues in the defense program, meeting twice a day for almost a month. Weinberger described the discussion as “free-wheeling and candid” with the goal of meeting the nation’s military requirements through efficient use of taxpayer dollars. Weinberger suggested that a pattern emerged in modifying the proposed programs of the military departments. The review protected the strategic modernization program, provided proper compensation and benefits for military personnel, promoted a higher level of readiness, supported technology and modernization, maintained sustainability, and made a few changes in force structure.⁴⁵

Weinberger reported that for nuclear forces, the DoD-DRB review had restored a Trident-missile submarine eliminated by the Navy for FY 1986; inaugurated the development of a program that would increase the penetration capability of Trident II missiles; maintained the rate of production of 48 Peacekeeper missiles in FY 1986; supported initial operational capacity for ASAT by FY 1988; and improved electronics support for AWACS. As for conventional forces, most service proposals were approved, such as continuing production of M1 tanks, F-15s, F-16s, and Aegis-equipped cruisers, while increasing production rates for AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, CH-47D Chinook transport helicopters, and CH-53D Sea Stallion heavy lift helicopters. In the technology field, the proposed budget funded an aggressive program for development and deployment of relocatable over-the-horizon radar, remotely piloted vehicles (drones), improved tactical cruise missiles, and very high-speed integrated circuits. Weinberger highlighted a series of measures to improve readiness and sustainability, such as better depot maintenance, increased helicopter training flying hours, replacing Army facilities on a 50-year cycle,



OSD/HO, based on data from CQ Almanac, 1981–1984

and an improved procurement for military hospitals. As for personnel, the budget retained a reserve fund for a potential pay raise for FY 1986 of 7.1 percent, thus providing military personnel some catch-up from lesser raises in previous years. In conclusion, Weinberger assured the president that “we are making good progress on your commitment to the American people for a stronger defense,” with the clear implication that the job was not yet done.⁴⁶

In December 1984 the president met Weinberger with his White House advisers to finalize the DoD budget request to Congress, resulting in a classic confrontation between the Pentagon chief and the OMB director. The president had agreed to \$34 billion cuts in domestic spending, but OMB insisted that DoD would have to cut its \$330 billion budget authority request by \$8 billion to achieve a \$42 billion total spending reduction so as to lessen the anticipated \$200 billion deficit for FY 1986. Not only was Weinberger opposed to the FY 1986 cut, he also took exception to Stockman’s recommendation to the president that the FY 1987 and FY 1988 DoD budgets be cut by \$25 billion and \$30 billion respectively to reduce future deficits. Weinberger used his trump card of presidential access and friendship, meeting with Reagan on December 10 and two days later offering to slash \$6 billion in outlays and \$8 billion in BA for FY 1986. The president’s White House advisers were not impressed, noting that part of the \$6 million would come from freezing military pay for FY 1986 after pushing through Congress a special pay increase during FY 1985. National Security Adviser Bud McFarlane responded that the Pentagon needed to make a much larger cut: \$20.5 billion for FY 1986. McFarlane noted that even with this larger reduction, the president’s strategic modernization program, including production of 48 MX missiles, 48 B-1 bombers, and a \$3.8 billion SDI program, would be preserved. Weinberger disagreed. Not only would such a large cut “reverse the progress we have made in the past four years to improve the quality of our manpower and upgrade the readiness and sustainability of our conventional forces,” but it would “lead Congress ... to look for larger cuts, starting with the President’s strategic program.”⁴⁷

Weinberger offered a \$7.6 billion cut in outlays and \$10 billion in BA for FY 1986 by limiting military catch-up pay in July 1985 to 4.8 percent and increasing program cuts by \$1.8 billion. Notwithstanding a campaign of press leaks by unnamed White House sources taking Weinberger to task for stubbornness, pettiness, and financial sleight of hand, the president and the secretary agreed that the Pentagon would cut \$8.7 billion in outlays and \$11.1 billion in budget

authority, amounting to a real growth of 5.6 percent for the next fiscal year. As for the later years in the Five-Year Defense Program, the two men settled upon total planned cuts of \$17.5 billion for the FY 1987 and FY 1988 DoD budget authority, far less than the \$45 billion Stockman recommended.⁴⁸

Such a decision by Reagan ran against the almost-uniform recommendations of his OMB director and the White House staff. Reagan's tilt in favor of the DoD rather than the OMB testified to the close relationship between Weinberger and the president. Reagan's decision favoring Weinberger was a victory for the secretary. But as he and Weinberger knew full well, Congress would not necessarily accept the administration FY 1986 request at face value. There would be serious budget wrangling with Congress, which would result in defense spending that would deeply disappoint Weinberger, but that was for the second Reagan term and will be discussed in the next volume in this series.

Most Cold War budget buildups enjoyed only a short lifespan. In response to a perceived emergency—such as the beginning of the Korean War; the successful Soviet launch of the first earth orbital satellite, Sputnik; or the 1966–1967 early years of U.S. combat in Vietnam—defense funding jumped but usually leveled off within a year or two. The Weinberger-Reagan military buildup was more sustained, lasting from 1981 to 1984. It was in response to a perceived Soviet threat, but there was no one dramatic event that encapsulated the Soviet Union's military challenge. Justification for the buildup came from assertions by the president, the secretary of defense, and military experts. They all claimed the trajectory of Soviet military spending and weapons procurement had caused the United States to fall dangerously behind the Soviet Union. Reagan, Weinberger, and the military initially argued a compelling case to Congress, the public, and to the media, but their case could not retain its urgency indefinitely.

When did support for the military buildup start to wane? Certainly with the FY 1983 Defense budget the signs of slippage were visible in the increasing pressure from OMB and Congress for deficit reduction (see chapter 3). Weinberger fought a rearguard action with the FY 1984, 1985, and 1986 DoD budgets against Stockman, his OMB officials, and Reagan's White House advisers who insisted that the Pentagon had to do its share of cutting to balance the budget. Weinberger enjoyed the support of the president, who, although aware of the need for cuts, usually split the baby in half when asked to choose between OMB-recommended

cuts and DoD bottom lines. Reagan made these decisions in part in deference to his old friend Weinberger, but also because he was still committed to his defense program. But as president he had other competing commitments and increasingly was prepared to cut deals with Republican Senate leaders to reduce defense spending for deficit reduction.

In contrast to his boss, Weinberger's relations with Congress became strained and then ossified. The secretary overplayed his hand. He had testified so stubbornly and so repetitively that any cuts in the administration's requested Defense budgets would endanger national security and unravel all that had been accomplished that his message lost its impact. Many legislators in Congress ceased to listen to Weinberger because they knew he would deliver the same arguments they had heard multiple times before. They had appropriated hundreds of billions for defense and raised the Pentagon budget in real growth terms by substantial percentages each year, yet still the Pentagon needed more money. Many in Congress asked when the buildup would end, when would America be safe. Weinberger could not, or would not, provide a satisfactory answer. The secretary had lost his credibility on Capitol Hill. He would never get it back.

National Security and Strategic Forces Modernization

DURING THE COLD WAR almost every U.S. presidential administration, as a priority, formulated a basic statement of national security policy. The resulting directive helped define strategic concepts, establish goals, develop programs, focus acquisition and procurement policies, and allot resources. Basic national security guidelines provided a blueprint for how the United States would compete with its Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration, however, was woefully slow to define its national security policy. The economy, inflation, and the 1981 tax cut provided the focus of Reagan's initial year in office. It was not that the Reagan team did not know what they wanted to accomplish. During the 1980 presidential campaign, Reagan and his surrogates promised a stronger defense posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, including modernization of U.S. strategic forces. Yet translating election promises into national strategy policy guidance proved difficult.¹

The administration's conscious decision to downgrade the influence of the National Security Council staff and particularly the role of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard Allen was one reason for the slowdown (see chapter 2). With his diminished status, Allen had less access to the president and was at a disadvantage in dealing with Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Allen was also no match for Weinberger, whose longstanding working relationship and friendship with the president gave him a special status. Worse still, Allen was a poor manager. It was not until William Clark, a former deputy secretary of state and longtime Reagan friend and political confidante,

became national security adviser in January 1982 that the NSC staff functioned with any modicum of efficiency.²

Review of National Security

Within a month of taking charge at the NSC in early January 1982, Clark initiated the first national security study directive: NSSD 1-82, "U.S. National Security Policy." He chose NSC staff member Thomas C. Reed, a former secretary of the Air Force who had served in the Nixon and Ford administrations, to head the Interagency Review Group (IRG) that would produce the study. The NSSD called for an extensive review of U.S. national security objectives, regional objectives, the challenge of the Soviet Union's military power and international behavior, the role of the allies, force application and development strategy for U.S. strategic forces, strategy for general purpose forces, and security assistance.³

The interagency group drafting the study with Under Secretary for Policy Fred Iklé, who represented the Office of the Secretary of Defense, set mid-April as the date for completion of the study. The defense representatives came to the task with an advantage. As part of the budget process, the OSD had produced defense guidances for 1981 and 1982, and the JCS had drafted the Joint Strategic Planning Document that went to the White House in March 1981. These documents assessed many of the issues to be raised in the NSSD 1-82 study. As Iklé assured Weinberger, "We are, of course, well ahead of the game. Thus for the 'military tools' of National Strategy, we can largely distill those extant documents."⁴

The NSSD 1-82 study proceeded quickly, with the IRG agreeing that the politico-military threats of the Soviet Union dominated the international environment and posed the major threat to U.S. national security objectives. The study acknowledged that "despite increasing pressures on its economy and growing vulnerabilities of its empire, the Soviet Union continues to expand and modernize its military forces. Soviet leaders, moreover, are probably prepared to accept sacrifices to sustain this expansion." The IRG concluded that without more support from allies, the United States would be hard-pressed to meet the Soviet challenge.⁵

There was one issue of disagreement on regional objectives. Defense and State representatives explored different approaches to defending Southwest Asia—including the Persian Gulf—against Soviet intervention. Defense representatives recommended relying on the existing Rapid Deployment Joint Task

Force and U.S. nuclear deterrence to protect the area, especially its oil fields. State wanted the possibility of a more robust response: seven divisions plus air and naval support to defend the area in the event of a Soviet attack. At the NSC meeting of April 16, 1982, State argued that “Southwest Asia is our second most important region [Europe was first] for strategic and economic reasons” as the justification for its recommendations. Weinberger did not disagree that the oil fields of Southwest Asia were crucial to U.S. national security but admitted that the United States did not have the budget, force structure, friends, or bases in the area to defend the oil-producing states. Weinberger suggested encouraging NATO members, many of whose economies depended on Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia oil, to join in the defense of the region. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones explained that those seven divisions, if required, would have to come from Europe, thus increasing NATO’s vulnerability. Even defending Southwest Asia alone with such forces was problematic. A recent war game indicated that U.S. forces could hold Iran for a while against a Soviet attack, but they would eventually lose. The solution proposed by Jones was a more flexible but credible in-theater defense for Southwest Asia and the “the threat of escalation” against the Soviet Union should they attack the region. The NSC participants, including the president, agreed to this language. As Reagan saw it, “You look at Russian history, protecting the homeland has always been of paramount importance. If they know that we might respond to them by hitting them anywhere in the world, that’s a strong deterrent.” The State representative, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger, noted that his department could live with Jones’s language as long as the seven divisions remained the ultimate objective. Weinberger countered that you could only stretch the existing total 16 U.S. divisions so far. Nevertheless, Jones’s language became the compromise with an explanatory footnote that “in-theater assets” referred to the seven divisions and their support.⁶

Other than this disagreement on defending Southwest Asia, the NSC participants approved without controversy the rest of the first part of the NSSD 1-82 study. The U.S. national objective was to achieve an active but prudent program that encouraged the dissolution of the Soviet empire by a series of interlocking economic, political, diplomatic, informational, and military strategies. Once again the study acknowledged such an objective required the support of U.S. allies.⁷

At the April 27 NSC meeting, the participants examined the major issue

of the NSSD 1-82 study, strategic modernization. Both Haig and Weinberger emphasized the importance of the land-based Minuteman ICBM force as a deterrent. Haig considered the Minuteman critical to managing crises and establishing arms-control incentives with the Soviet Union. Weinberger stressed the vulnerability of the Minuteman force to Soviet ICBMs (an 80–82 percent projected loss to a Soviet first strike). The answer was the missile experimental (MX), according to the Pentagon chief, but, he explained, “We must get it off the production line. We must put it somewhere; anywhere is better than in a warehouse.” Stockman raised the issue of cost: “It is clear that the resources are not satisfactory to execute the strategy.” Weinberger acknowledged that it would be a long, hard process to surmount the current Soviet military lead, given that the Defense budget would never be more than 30 percent of the federal budget. By the end of the decade the United States would be in a better posture to deter Soviet aggression, but it would still not be risk free.⁸

Weinberger arranged a working lunch on May 18 for the Joint Chiefs to meet with Clark and the president. The gathering allowed the president’s military advisers to reinforce the discussion at the NSC meetings on NSSD 1-82 and encourage him to focus on defense issues. The secretary and the JCS emphasized strategic modernization as the foundation for any nuclear arms talks with Moscow, the need to improve general-purpose forces, and the obligation of U.S. allies to contribute to defense efforts. Reagan recorded in his diary, “It was a good meeting with a sound discussion of strategic problems.”⁹

Two days later, the president issued National Security Decision Directive 32: “U.S. National Security Policy.” The directive required the United States to deter the Soviet Union “across the spectrum of conflict,” strengthen U.S. alliances, contain Soviet military presence and influence, exacerbate Soviet “economic shortcomings,” and encourage liberalization and nationalism in the Eastern Bloc. Access to energy, natural resources, space, and the oceans, and a well-functioning international economic system remained national security goals. The NSDD gave a nod to “equitable and well-verified arms control,” nuclear nonproliferation, and denying technology with military value to the Soviet Bloc. To achieve these objectives the United States required a strong NATO willing to contribute to out-of-area missions, forward-deployed and rapidly deployable general-purpose forces backed up by a strong reserve force, and a modernized strategic nuclear force. A last section on force integration was a product of JCS concerns about the

limitations of U.S. policy. It suggested that the United States might not be able to honor its commitments to allies and defend all regional interests. Instead, the choice might be to resort to nuclear weapons early in a conflict with the Soviet Union. The solution outlined in NSDD 32 was to “imaginatively and comprehensively” integrate resources for survivable nuclear forces, ensure that the U.S. government could survive a nuclear attack and maintain communication with itself during and after such an attack, and maintain as its base an enhanced mobilization and industrial capability.¹⁰

The Strategic Forces Modernization Plan

The modernization of U.S. strategic forces represented a principal goal of NSDD 32. Before the president approved this policy statement, his advisers had already decided on the need for more modern strategic forces, as presidential candidate Reagan had promised in 1980. Reagan had hammered home the message that national security was in danger as he campaigned across the country. Ironically, Carter had come to a similar conclusion during his last years in office. At the Pentagon’s urging, Carter agreed to produce and deploy the MX, a larger and more accurate intercontinental ballistic missile with more warheads than the Minuteman and Titan missiles that comprised the U.S. ICBM force. Carter also authorized arming B-52 bombers with nuclear-armed cruise missiles able to strike targets in the Soviet Union from beyond its borders. In addition, the Carter administration continued the development of more accurate and deadly Trident missiles on a new class of submarines, convinced the Western European allies to agree to Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles on their soil, and developed, on a rush basis, stealth technology with the goal of developing a penetration strategic bomber virtually invisible to radar. During the 1980 presidential election, Carter and his secretary of defense, Harold Brown, found themselves in the unenviable position of arguing that the security situation was not as bad as Republicans had portrayed. Because of Carter’s initial reputation as an antidefense president and the failure of his administration’s most high-profile military operation, the Iran hostage rescue mission, Reagan’s view of the dire nature of the imbalance of strategic power between Washington and Moscow struck a responsive chord with the voters. In a time of economic uncertainty and international tension, Carter’s message of “trust us as we are making progress” could not compete with Reagan’s clarion call for a rearming of America.¹¹

In reality, the assessments of Carter and Reagan of the U.S.-USSR strategic balance were quite close. Reaganites saw the glass as half empty and draining while Carterites viewed it as half full and rising. Both agreed that the U.S. silo-based Minuteman missile force was vulnerable and would become more so as Soviet missile technology improved. Thus Carter agreed to deploy 200 MX missiles on mobile racetracks, more formally known as multiple protective shelter (MPS) systems, with 4,600 different launching points. With that many potential targets, the Soviets could not destroy all the MXs with their existing U.S.-facing ICBM force. Reagan's advisers worried about the cost of the mobile MX/MPS system and the political fallout from placing such extensive facilities in Utah and Nevada. They rejected the land-based mobile system, but they could not agree on how to deploy the MX missiles in a secure way.


Another difference between the two administrations was the need for new strategic bombers. Carter canceled the supersonic B-1 penetration strategic bomber in favor of nuclear-armed cruise missiles fired from existing B-52 bombers. The Reagan defense establishment did not accept that cruise missiles would be effective. Fired from B-52s outside Soviet borders, the missiles were slow and would have to surmount extensive Soviet air defenses. Carter and Brown believed that low-flying cruise missiles could overwhelm Soviet defenses. Reagan defense officials did not. They argued that since the stealth bomber would not be in the U.S. arsenal for a decade, the B-1 was needed for the interim. Weinberger's Pentagon officials also viewed the new Soviet medium-range supersonic bomber, the Backfire (NATO's name for the Tupolev Tu-22M), as a strategic weapon able to attack the United States. The Carter administration had reluctantly accepted Soviet assurances that the Backfire was a theater bomber and would be produced in limited numbers. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations agreed that the United States was not in a position to withstand a protracted nuclear war. Furthermore, both agreed that the U.S. command, control, and communications system of the so-called National Command Authority (the president or his successor) would degenerate within minutes of a nuclear attack. The system had to be upgraded. Both Carter and Reagan officials realized that the Soviet Union had an active civil defense program and a robust air defense, both of which the United States lacked; this suggested that the Soviets would retain an advantage in a first strike for some time. Such was the situation the Reagan administration believed it had to redress.¹²

The MX Missile

The MX was to be the cornerstone of the Reagan administration's strategic modernization program, but there was no consensus on how and where to deploy the missiles. Reagan painted himself into a corner by rejecting Carter's MX basing plan of multiple protective shelters because of its cost estimate—\$30 to \$40 billion—and its environmental and social impact. The proposed location for the MPS system and its security perimeter in Utah and Nevada, then both staunchly Republican states, would require extensive use of public lands. Utahans and Nevadans balked at the idea of the federal government closing off so much of their wide-open spaces. According to National Security Adviser McFarlane, the system had to be “survivable, politically tolerable, and affordable.” This was a tall order for the Pentagon. Weinberger's solution was a time-honored one: create a commission of outside experts to review the issue and recommend a solution. On March 16, 1981, Weinberger announced a panel of distinguished Americans under the chairmanship of Dr. Charles Townes, professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, to review the issue and make recommendations. The group included six scientists and engineers, four retired military officers, and two generalists.¹³

The Townes panel reviewed multiple deployment options but failed to endorse any. The group narrowed the choices to two options. A deployment of densely packed MXs in hardened deep underground silos that might force a “fratricide effect,” whereby the explosions of the first attacking Soviet ICBMs might destroy the next incoming wave, allowing more MX missiles to survive. But the panel pointed out that this solution was highly problematic. A second option would place MXs on continuously patrolling aircraft flying over the oceans, which the panel considered the most “promising approach.” Weinberger had been a booster of the airborne concept, but he found little support from the Air Force or Congress. Both considered it overly costly and impractical. As an interim measure, the Townes panel suggested placing 100 MX missiles in Minuteman or Titan silos until a final basing mode could be decided.¹⁴


On October 1, 1981, Reagan outlined his strategic forces modernization program based on the Townes panel's recommendations. All work on Carter's MX racetrack/MPS system was stopped. The Pentagon would continue to develop the MX with the aim of producing 100 operational missiles, a portion of which would be deployed as soon as possible in hardened Titan or Minuteman silos. The



ICBM deployment, 1982. OSD/HO, based on map in OSD Records

directive reduced the examination of potential permanent deployment options of the MX to three: airmobile basing, deep underground basing, or a ballistic missile defense (BMD). The last option, which contemplated shooting down incoming missiles and warheads with antimissile missiles, could potentially violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed by the Nixon administration and ratified by Congress, which limited each superpower to two ABM sites of 100 antiballistic missiles each. In 1974 Washington and Moscow agreed to limit ABM sites to one. The rest of Reagan's strategic forces modernization plan included making strategic communications and the command system survivable after a nuclear attack; increasing the accuracy of SLBMs by deploying Trident missiles in *Ohio*-class submarines to be constructed at the rate of one per year; improving air defenses; establishing a research and development program for a ballistic missile defense; and modernizing the bomber force with B-1 and stealth B-2 bombers.¹⁵

The MX deployment issue engaged defense experts and the interested public alike. Weinberger and Carlucci were bombarded by advice from many quarters. The president of the Church of Latter-Day Saints opposed MX deployment in Utah on moral, ecological, social, and cultural grounds. Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Tower, expressed strong support for the MX/MPS, convinced that over the long term—with more shelters, more missiles,



OSD/HO, based on a diagram in OSD Records

more warheads on missiles, and eventually a ballistic missile defense—the MX/MPS could counter increases in Soviet ICBM technology. A former chairman of the JCS, Admiral Thomas Moorer, opposed “creating such a large and vulnerable target as the MX launching system in the center of the United States.” He recommended deployment of MX missiles aboard surface ships as an interim measure until enough *Ohio*-class submarines with Trident missiles could be built. Not surprisingly, the head of the Strategic Air Command, General B. L. Davis, strongly supported a land-based MX system. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld urged Weinberger and Reagan to not “close the door on the ‘deceptive basing mode’” provided by land-based MPS. A large portion of Congress, mostly Democrats, opposed the MX as a waste of money that undermined nuclear arms limitations. Weinberger’s old friend, Ann Landers (real name Eppie Lederer) added her opinion: “The MX is a dog.... [It] will be obsolete by the time it is built. Also the cost may be triple. The concept is loony, self-defeating and it is lousing up your chances to balance the budget by 1984.”¹⁶

[REDACTED]

The Air Force's plan hardly resolved the ongoing debate. In early 1982, research and engineering officials in the Pentagon suggested dense pack as a temporary solution. Weinberger informed the president, "After consideration of the Townes Commission Report, we concluded that there was no fully developed ground-based system which would assure survivability." Weinberger continued, "The most promising option thus far is the so-called Close Based Spacing or Dense Pack," and he based his recommendation on DoD engineering studies of superhardened silos and research on the fratricide effects of warheads attacking closely positioned hardened shelters. Under dense pack, the MX missiles would be placed in permanent, superhardened silos spaced 2,000 feet apart in a column of approximately 10 square miles on existing DoD land. The crucial element of dense pack was the theory that if the Soviets attacked the column in a single raid, many Soviet warheads would destroy each other, sparing many of the MX missiles. To compensate for fratricide, Soviet ICBM warheads would have to be accurately targeted and their attack precisely timed.¹⁷

In mid-May 1982, the president tentatively approved the dense-pack basing mode for 100 MX missiles to be made operational by 1986. He directed the Pentagon to recommend a permanent basing mode by November 1982 and suggested that dense pack "with growth potential for defendable/deceptive basing appears to be the most promising route to pursue." He also instructed that research and development on deep underground basing continue because it seemed to be a promising solution for a reserve ICBM force and because of its potential for survival of command, control, and communication facilities during a nuclear attack. R&D on ballistic missile defense was also to continue as a "hedge against



Weinberger announces the closely spaced basing concept for the MX (Peacekeeper) missile, November 22, 1982. *OSD Records*

a Soviet ABM breakout and as an option for increasing MX survivability.” The president ruled out MXs on aircraft in continuous air patrol.¹⁹


Unfortunately for Weinberger, few legislators on Capitol Hill believed dense pack would work and Congress seemed unlikely to fund the estimated \$23 to \$26 billion to pay for the temporary system. Weinberger’s scientific experts also raised doubts. Townes and the Defense Science Board cautioned that the Soviets could modify the reentry vehicles on their ICBMs to lessen the effectiveness of dense pack almost as soon as it could be deployed. Townes and the director of PA&E, David Chu, doubted that dense-pack missile silos could be hardened enough to withstand a Soviet attack in the late 1980s. All of Weinberger’s technical and scientific advisers concluded that more research was needed on the effectiveness of fratricide. Weinberger admitted to Reagan that “some additional very sophisticated technical work will be needed before anyone can assure you that CSB [closely based spacing] is the best or a truly survivable mode.” With Reagan’s approval, Weinberger tasked experts at the DoD and the Department of Energy’s national nuclear laboratories to collaborate with a Defense Science Board panel, again chaired by Townes, to review CSB. Until this review was completed in October 1982, the DoD would work on deploying MXs in existing Minuteman silos.²⁰

On November 18, 1982, Reagan called an NSC meeting to discuss MX basing. Weinberger acknowledged the concerns about dense pack, but on balance recommended it. He raised the possibility of defending the MX with existing antiballistic missiles or using deception techniques, such as adding 200 empty silos. The chairman of the JCS, Jack Vessey, acknowledged the need for MX dense pack in Minuteman silos, but stated that the Joint Chiefs were split. The Air Force chief strongly supported dense pack while the Army and Navy chiefs and the commandant of the Marines argued that it would only work with the addition of ballistic missile defense. Four days after the NSC meeting, Reagan decided to deploy 100 MX missiles (now renamed Peacekeepers) in dense pack in superhardened silos at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. Initial operational capability was scheduled for 1986 with full operational capability by 1989. Reagan directed that the deployment be designed to allow for the addition of ballistic missile defense and deceptive measures.²¹

The Reagan administration could initiate these programs, but without congressional funding they would not be realized. Skepticism of MX/CSB in Congress increased to the point where legislators cut off funds for the MX until the administration could produce a viable, permanent basing plan. To convince Congress, the president appointed a bipartisan commission under retired USAF Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, a former national security adviser, to conduct what was billed as an independent assessment. The president directed the Pentagon to assist the commission in its work.²²

The *Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces* (known informally as the Scowcroft Commission report) proved a mixed blessing for Reagan's plans. While it recommended deploying 100 MX missiles in hardened Minuteman silos as replacements for decommissioned Minuteman and Titan missiles, it also recommended the development of a single-warhead ICBM weighing about 15 tons, as opposed to the 100-ton weight of the MX. This smaller missile, later dubbed Midgetman, could offer greater flexibility in deployment in either hardened silos, shelters, or hardened mobile launchers and would cost \$1 billion per year less than MXs in CSB mode for the next four years. While the Scowcroft report did not rule out closely spaced basing, it noted that, "the effectiveness of a CSB deployment ... would depend on the advances in hardening of silos; the effectiveness of this is yet to be demonstrated and the cost is uncertain. It would also depend on fratricide effects that are not fully understood."²³

Missile Alternatives, April 1983



OSD/HO, recreated from diagram in OSD Records

As a result of the tepid endorsement of the Scowcroft report, dense pack was relegated to life support. The Reagan administration decided to initiate production of 100 MX/Peacekeeper missiles to be deployed in existing missile silos in Wyoming and Nebraska. Initially 50 missiles would be deployed, followed by another 50. The initial operating capability of the first 50 was to be 1986 and the rest were to be operational by 1989. In addition, the administration agreed to engineer the design of a small, single-warhead ICBM, as the Scowcroft report recommended. If successfully produced, the Midgetman could be deployed in the early 1990s. Weinberger recalled that the Midgetman was a “silly idea ... accepted only because of what were called political realities ... perceived as the only way to get the missiles [MXs] we really need.” Also in keeping with the Scowcroft recommendations, the Pentagon would resolve the uncertainties regarding silo hardening and would continue to study fratricide effects. Notwithstanding this commitment to work on fratricide, dense pack was dead and never to be revived. Congress did its part by approving resolutions in late May 1983 to fund MX deployment without hardened silos, but with the understanding that the administration would be more flexible in its START negotiations (see chapter 5). In 1986, 50 Peacekeepers were deployed in Minuteman silos in Wyoming; the second 50 were never deployed.²⁴

Even before the Scowcroft Commission published its report, the president had expressed interest in the development of both endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric ABM defenses. The Scowcroft group did not share the president’s enthusiasm for the latter space-based system, noting that “the applications of current technology offer no real promise of being able to defend the United States against massive nuclear attack in this century.” While a scaled-down ABM defense against a small-scale attack could be provided for fixed targets such as ICBM silos, the report concluded that defending against ICBMs “will be a difficult feat if an attacker can use a large number of warheads against each defended target.”²⁵

The Strategic Defense Initiative

The president was hardly dissuaded by doubts of the Scowcroft Commission over strategic missile defenses. Reagan had been intrigued with the idea for years. As governor of California he had several meetings with physicist Edward Teller, then director of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Teller briefed the governor on the possibilities of destroying ICBM missiles or their warheads with such devices as

nuclear-pumped x-ray lasers. According to Teller, the first generation of strategic weapons was the atomic bomb, the second was the hydrogen bomb, and the third was the x-ray laser. During the late 1970s ballistic missile research laboratories explored the possibility of using kinetic-energy kill vehicles, high-energy lasers, and particle beams operating from platforms on land, at sea, and in space to destroy ICBMs in flight. A group of influential defense thinkers, including Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) and retired Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA, promoted the idea of jettisoning the concept of mutual assured destruction in favor of mutual assured survival through ballistic missile defense. A former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Graham headed a private group called High Frontier which espoused the development of space-based missile defense systems using existing and future technologies.²⁶

As a candidate for president in July 1979, Reagan visited the North American Air Defense Command headquarters under Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, Colorado. After he received multiple briefings and saw the command post's display screen, where NORAD would track a nuclear attack, Reagan asked NORAD Commander General James E. Hill, USAF, if the warheads could be prevented from reaching their U.S. targets. Hill replied they could not; his command center would be destroyed by powerful SS-18 missiles. It was a sobering meeting for the Republican presidential candidate. Reagan considered emphasizing strategic missile defense during his campaign but was dissuaded by his political advisers. They believed that highlighting missile defense might confuse voters. Instead, Reagan campaign aides chose a less high-profile approach by inserting in the 1980 Republican Party platform the following language: "We reject the mutual-assured-destruction (MAD) of the Carter Administration which limits the President during crisis to a Hobson's choice between mass mutual suicide and surrender.... We will proceed with vigorous research and development of an effective anti-ballistic missile system."²⁷

Initially Reagan and Weinberger placed strategic missile defense on the back burner. Continued development of the B-1 and B-2 bombers, deployment of Trident I missiles on new larger and quieter *Ohio*-class submarines, and making the command-and-control system better able to withstand a nuclear attack took up much of the administration's attention and defense funding requests. These greater strategic priorities left little time and money for yet-to-be-developed technologies. However, the ongoing problem of how to deploy the MX missile remained

intransigent. The failure to base the MX in anything but a temporary mode and congressional skepticism about paying for such a makeshift system encouraged the president and the secretary to reexamine strategic ballistic missile defense.²⁸

Weinberger had never closed the door on BMD. In October 1981 he included in the president's strategic modernization plan a call for "a vigorous research and development program on ballistic missile defense." The general consensus in the Pentagon was that with current technology a BMD could not destroy all incoming missiles and could not be depended upon. More ambitious schemes, such as destroying ICBMs with x-ray lasers in space, were considered "blue sky" research projects that were unlikely to produce functioning weapons any time soon. As NSC staffer James W. Nance described it, "no work has been done on weaponizing the [x-ray] laser device or on developing the systems technologies. We are still some years off in our ability to weaponize other types of laser devices which are more fully developed." In late 1981 exotic space weapons were still in the theoretical stage.²⁹

As difficulties with permanent deployment of the MX increased, the Reagan administration took a second look at ballistic missile defense. Deputy National Security Adviser McFarlane took the lead on the civilian side and Admiral James D. Watkins, chief of naval operations, provided the impetus for the military. The two men met informally for lunch in early January 1983. Watkins opposed dense pack for the MX as flawed and believed that the offensive strategic arms race with Moscow represented a "strategic valley of death." The money spent on modernization of the U.S. ICBM force could be better put towards a defensive system. During their discussion, Watkins assured McFarlane that improvements in computation speed and directed energy systems allowed for a missile defense that could operate from platforms floating in space and use lasers and microwaves to destroy ICBMs before they reentered the atmosphere. McFarlane recalls he left the lunch with Watkins "heartened and believing we had a pretty solid basis for confidence, at least in technical terms."³⁰

At McFarlane's suggestion, Watkins obtained JCS support for a space-based defensive missile system. Weinberger was initially skeptical about the concept, in part because of its tremendous potential cost, its unproven technical effectiveness, and his role as a leading advocate of dense pack for the MX. Still, the secretary agreed that the JCS should meet with the president to give their advice. The meeting took place on February 11, 1982, during a Washington, DC, snow-

storm that required the participants to take four-wheel drive vehicles to get to the White House. Weinberger began the meeting with a briefing on the MX and its attendant problems. He then asked Chairman Vessey to present the JCS views. The chairman talked for 30 minutes on the concept of a strategic ballistic missile defense. The president asked each chief if they supported the idea, and they all agreed they did. McFarlane used the opportunity to emphasize to Reagan that what the chiefs were recommending was “the possibility of enabling us to deal with a Soviet missile attack by defensive means.” The president replied, “I understand, this is what I have been hoping.” Vessey sealed the deal by repeating an earlier Watkins observation: “Wouldn’t it be better to protect the American people rather than avenge them?” This phrase was music to the ears of Reagan, a nuclear abolitionist (see chapter 5). The great communicator responded, “Don’t lose those words.” That night the president wrote in his diary that during the two-hour lunch meeting with the chiefs, “a super idea” emerged: “So far the only policy worldwide on nuclear weapons is to have a deterrent. What if we tell the world we want to protect our people, not avenge them: that we’re going to embark on a program of research that will make nuclear weapons obsolete?” Weinberger became a convert to the idea when he realized the depth of the president’s commitment.³¹

The president wanted to publicly announce his new strategic policy, but he feared that if he took key congressional leaders, European allies, and even the Defense Department into his confidence the idea would leak. Opponents could denigrate the concept even before he introduced it. Reagan forbade his NSC staff from discussing the speech with anyone. McFarlane and a small team worked in utmost secrecy on the draft of the president’s address, scheduled for March 23, 1983. The president had insisted that Weinberger, who was attending a NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting, and Secretary of State George Shultz would be informed of the speech just before it was given. The allies, at Reagan’s insistence, would not have any prior notification. Weinberger claimed he was already aware of the initiative and speech because National Security Adviser Clark and White House Counselor Ed Meese, his old California friends, had tipped him off beforehand. Still, it was unorthodox that a major defense initiative be kept from the secretary of defense, whose agency would be responsible for spearheading the research on what came to be known as the Strategic Defense Initiative.³²

Reagan began his televised speech, delivered from the Oval Office, with an

assertion that the Soviet Union enjoyed superiority in strategic forces, which was the main reason for his strategic modernization program, followed by an exhortation to Congress to provide the money to fund it. At the end of the address, the president launched his new strategic idea. While Reagan cautioned that it might take until the 21st century to deploy the kind of ballistic missile defense he was contemplating, he maintained “current technology has maintained a level of sophistication where it’s reasonable for us to begin this effort.” Afterwards Reagan confided to his diary, “I guess it went O.K.... I felt good.”³³

Transforming SDI from an idea into a research and development program presented a formidable challenge. Two days after his speech, the president issued National Security Decision Directive 85 authorizing “an intensive effort to define a long term research and development program,” calling for a priority study of ballistic missile defense in future strategy, and directing the NSC adviser to formulate instructions, assign responsibilities, create organizational structure, and set deadlines for the study. In mid-April, the president expanded the terms of NSDD 85 by directing a two-part study be drafted under the auspices of the NSC’s Senior Interdepartmental Group–Defense Policy (SIG–DP). In addition to the strategy study called for by NSDD 85, the president directed, in NSSD 6-83, a study of the effectiveness of ballistic missile defense to identify the most promising technologies. The choice of the Senior Interdepartmental Group–Defense Policy pleased Weinberger, since the Pentagon chaired the group.³⁴

Defense organized two panels of outside experts to undertake these studies, which were to be submitted to the president by October 1983. The first was the Defense Technologies Study Team, headed by former NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher and reporting to Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Richard DeLauer. The second, the Future Security Strategy Study group, was chaired by former RAND analyst Fred S. Hoffman and worked under the supervision of Iklé. The Department of Defense eventually published the two reports in summary form.³⁵

Both studies concluded that antiballistic missile defenses were attainable and necessary. The Fletcher study detailed a multilayered missile defense relying on both space- and ground-based interceptors designed to destroy ballistic missile warheads at all three levels of trajectory: the launch/boost phase, midcourse in space, and reentry into the atmosphere. In space an ABMD (antiballistic missile defense, a new acronym replacing BMD) could include both orbiting x-ray lasers

powered by nuclear explosions and nonnuclear kill-vehicle interceptors. The study envisioned sensors and computerized battle management systems hundreds of times more capable than those in existence in 1983. Like most scientific appraisals, the Fletcher study was qualified and cautious, especially about the feasibility of a missile shield in space. Furthermore, it based its assumptions on a system that would be 99 percent effective, which critics believed was an impossible standard. It provided both proponents and opponents of SDI ammunition for their viewpoints.³⁶

The more general, less technical Hoffman study concluded that the ABMD could make important security and arms control contributions, whether it was deployed in phases or all at once. It recommended beginning with a ground-based ABMD in Europe against Soviet theater nuclear missiles. Since U.S. intelligence had concluded that the Soviet Union had been working on ABMD as long as the United States, the panel argued that U.S. research and development in both intermediate and advanced stages could act as a hedge against a Soviet breakout in missile defense. In summarizing both panels' conclusions, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].³⁷

The obvious question facing Reagan officials was the cost. The SIG–Defense Policy was tasked with assessing the Fletcher and Hoffman studies and providing internal recommendations, including cost estimates, to policymakers. The report of the SIG–DP relied primarily on the Fletcher report. The SIG–DP recommended four “generic options.” [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].³⁸

Although The Joint Chiefs had been early advocates of ABMD, they expressed caution. [REDACTED]

While Weinberger agreed more study was needed, he assured the president that the JCS was behind the plan that would result in a full-scale ABMD by the first five years of the 21st century. When the National Security Council met to discuss SDI at the end of November 1982, Weinberger briefed the participants on how few defensive resources the United States had against nuclear attack: "We have no BDM system, very little air defense, and essentially no civil defense. But instead [we] base deterrence entirely on M.A.D. with offensive forces." For comparison, the secretary outlined the extensive Soviet defense system: 2,400 interceptor aircraft and 9,400 deployed SAMs, a deployed BMD system under continual improvement, and probably a radar installation that was prohibited under the ABM Treaty. Weinberger maintained that advances in technology made a multilayered defense against ballistic missiles more reliable, but the U.S. program would need strong bipartisan support on Capitol Hill. He reiterated his support for the \$26 billion in funding for the next five years that would proceed as fast as technology would allow but would hold open for a year any commitment to deploy. He assured the participants that because of DoD reprogramming, "DABM [defense against ballistic missiles, a variant of ABMD] will not shake the FY 1985 budget badly." Weinberger concluded his presentation by appealing to both hope and fear: "There will be doubters who will say a DABM program will frighten Europe, or not be technically do-able, or unwise for lots of other reasons. But it must be done, because it offers hope, and because it would be disastrous if the Soviets were to develop effective missile defense and we did not." The secretary was fully on board the SDI bandwagon.⁴⁰

All of the other NSC participants, Shultz, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth Adelman, Science Adviser George A. Keyworth, UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, and DCI William Casey supported SDI with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The president summed up his expectations, "If the United States is first to have both offensive and defensive, we could put the nuclear genie back in the bottle by volunteering to eliminate offensive weapons." If the Soviet got ABMD first, the president noted, "We can expect nuclear blackmail. Therefore, we need to handle this initiative as carefully and sensibly as possible, but hope and pray we get there first and can make the offer the Soviets would never make."⁴¹

Reagan signed two directives after this meeting. NSDD 116, "Strategic Defense Initiative: Congressional and Allied Consultation," directed the Pentagon to make a presentation to key members of Congress in support of SDI. The Department of State would brief the allies with the hope of winning their cooperation. In early January 1984 in another directive, NSDD 119, "The Strategic Defense Initiative," the president reiterated his support for the SDI concept but added words of caution. The program was to be focused on nonnuclear kill technologies and would be "presented in the FY 1985 defense budget proposal as a prudent implementation of the recommendations of the Defensive Technologies Study [Fletcher] report." Thirdly, in NSDD 119, the president authorized the Department of Defense to manage SDI. Weinberger was to hire a high-profile program manager, reporting directly to him, and chose Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson, USAF. His credentials were impressive: former fighter pilot and astronaut, manager of the F-16 fighter program, and then NASA's director for the space shuttle. Finally, under the terms of NSDD 119, Weinberger would recommend the level of funding for SDI for each year and report directly to the president on progress in achieving ABMD. It was the kind of control that Weinberger had suggested. It was all he had hoped for.⁴²

The president did not approve Weinberger's recommendation to include in the FY 1985 DoD budget an additional \$500 million for SDI research, which would have brought the total SDI request to just over \$2 billion. Some additional FY 1985 money for SDI would come from DoD reprogramming of existing funds instead. McFarlane told Weinberger, "The full DOD funding recommendation would have been appropriate in a normal year. However, the President was very concerned that, given the debate which will doubtless surround the defense budget during an election year, such a larger increase ... would subject SDI to attack and misrepresentation." Reagan approved a \$250 million increase in the SDI research and development request to Congress.⁴³

Many legislators on Capitol Hill were skeptical of or opposed to SDI. They were not sure that the technology could be developed to make the system work, and they believed the Defense budget as a whole needed paring because of its impact on existing and looming federal deficits. The scientific and defense community was at odds about SDI. Teller assured the president that an antimissile defense would work. Former Secretaries of Defense Robert McNamara, James Schlesinger, and Harold Brown, and former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering William Perry all attested to Congress that SDI weapons would have



Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, USAF, director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Department of Defense. *OSD Records*

to destroy ICBMs in the boost stage. Once in space, the use of MIRVs, decoys, and penetration aids meant there would not be enough time to destroy all the targets. To hit an ICBM during a boost phase that lasted merely five minutes was impossible with current and even emerging technologies. Even if the technology was developed, the Soviets could readily produce countermeasures. Weinberger and Abrahamson brushed aside these doubts, at least in public, with the bromide that America could accomplish anything with its can-do attitude. Nevertheless, the chances

of obtaining congressional approval of even the new pared-down figure for SDI research, \$1.8 billion, looked slim. Weinberger convinced Reagan to send a letter to Senator Sam Nunn to try to hold the Senate's reduction to \$150 million. The administration believed Senator Howard Baker had a deal with House Speaker Tip O'Neill to reduce SDI funding to \$1.6 billion, but the agreement fell through when O'Neill disclaimed knowledge of it. Congress appropriated only \$1.4 billion for SDI research in FY 1985 (see chapter 12).⁴⁴

It was all not bad news. In mid-June 1984 the Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Program conducted a successful experiment on the ability of a non-nuclear kill vehicle to hit and destroy an incoming warhead using sensors and computer software. The kill vehicle struck the dummy warhead at a closing speed of over 15,000 mph. This test succeeded on the fourth try. It was helped by the fact that the dummy missile was heated and turned sideways to make it easier for the interceptor to hit the target. Nevertheless, it was a milestone. As an NSC staffer put it, "This is the first time any country has actually succeeded in hitting a bullet with a bullet." In October 1984, however, after assessing the damage that Congress's \$400 million cut to SDI funding for FY 1985 had done

to the program, Abrahamson was pessimistic: "If there are three or more years of this ratcheting down [of funding], I believe the effort will soon be tagged a laboratory 'welfare' program and we will lose both our congressional and public supporters." Abrahamson's solution was to accelerate the program and come up with some "beacons." As he explained, "By beacons, I mean something that is easily understandable and has an 'awe-inspiring' aspect (similar to going to the moon) and is reasonably near term." As possibilities, Abrahamson suggested an extremely high-brightness ground-based laser or a space-based conventional rocket interceptor able to destroy ICBMs in boost and midcourse flight and capable of defending other space-based assets.⁴⁵

Such beacons proved difficult to accomplish. For the rest of 1984 the Reagan administration concentrated on selling SDI to the European allies, American public, and scientific community. One of the DoD's most enthusiastic proponents of SDI, Iklé, informed Weinberger that "*European views* on SDI are in flux, but seem to be moving towards a more positive position." McFarlane provided the president a less-reassuring assessment: "The British Government has been quietly hostile toward your strategic defense initiative. Mrs. Thatcher herself has reportedly been the main restraint on her government's activities which undercut SDI. However there has been erosion in her position." Britain and West Germany remained skeptical, but eventually started considering if not supporting the concept. The British sought U.S. SDI research and development money; the Germans saw the potential for missile defense against tactical nuclear missiles. As for the U.S. public, the White House inaugurated a public diplomacy campaign to bolster support for SDI. To help win over the scientific community, Weinberger created an SDI advisory committee, similar to the Defense Science Board and composed of scientists and industrialists, to provide independent technical advice and to "validate" the SDI program and funding for it.⁴⁶

These campaigns would continue during Reagan's second term with only limited success. While DoD's request for SDI research funding rose dramatically each year after FY 1985, Congress never gave the Pentagon the full amount that it requested. The scientific community failed to coalesce behind SDI; rather, it remained divided. The allies were skeptical, especially as Soviet leadership drove home the message that SDI was the main obstacle to U.S.-Soviet agreement on strategic nuclear arms reductions. The American public also remained divided. Weinberger extolled the potentialities of SDI. Like Reagan, he saw the chance

to free the world from the tyranny of nuclear holocaust if deterrence for some reason failed. Equally if not more important to Weinberger was the fear that the Soviet Union would develop a comprehensive ballistic missile defense before the United States. For the secretary, SDI was both a goal and an insurance policy. Unfortunately for the Reagan administration, it was never able to convince Congress, the scientific community, and the public that what was characterized pejoratively as “Star Wars” would work and was worth the expense.

Strategic Bombers and Submarines

While MX missile deployment and SDI remained controversial defense issues without a clear consensus, the other main pillars of the Weinberger-Reagan strategic forces modernization program—strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines—enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress. While some skeptical Democratic legislators fought losing battles against funding the swing-wing B-1B supersonic low-altitude penetration bomber, which Carter had killed and Reagan had revived, Congress funded it every year of the first Reagan administration. The first squadron was scheduled for operational capability in 1986. By 1988, 100 B-1B bombers had been built.⁴⁷

The stealth B-2 bomber, virtually invisible to radar, also received consistent congressional support although the cost was secret and hidden in the DoD’s budget, so there was virtually no public and little congressional debate on the program. Initially Reagan was not convinced that stealth was worth the money, but he consulted with his science adviser George Keyworth who looked into the concept. After some study, Keyworth recommended that the president move forward on stealth technology and the B-2. In May 1981 the Pentagon asked two corporations, Lockheed (the manufacturer of the F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter) and Northrup, to engage in a fly-before-you-buy contest so that the Air Force could determine which prototype B-2 model was the best. Lockheed went with a smaller and less expensive (\$200 million per unit) design. Northrup produced a larger and more expensive flying-wing aircraft (\$480 million per unit) with larger control surfaces and no tail. Northrup’s prototype had better fuel efficiency and thus better range. Its size also allowed for higher payload. The Air Force chose Northrup’s aircraft even though it was more expensive and not as stealthy. Lockheed’s Chief Executive Officer Roy Anderson angrily complained to Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr that his company’s aircraft was demonstrably better. Orr



B-1 bomber during testing and evaluation, March 27, 1981. *OSD Records*

reportedly responded, “Goddam it, not only was Northrup better than you, they were *much better* than you.” Lockheed CEO Roy Anderson icily replied, “Well, Mr. Secretary, time will tell.” Northrup was supposed to build 132 B-2s, but the cost soon escalated. The number to be acquired dropped to 75 and then to 20, making the B-2 the most expensive aircraft produced at the time.⁴⁸

Notwithstanding doubts expressed by Reagan and his team during the 1980 presidential campaign about the effectiveness of air-launched cruise missiles and the obsolescence of 1950s-era B-52 bombers, the Pentagon continued the Carter program of deploying advanced cruise missiles on upgraded B-52 bombers. The bombers could fire their nuclear-armed missiles from well outside the Soviet borders. With their ground-hugging radar guidance, cruise missiles were designed to fly under Soviet air defenses. By the end of 1984 the Pentagon had cruise missiles on 90 operational B-52G aircraft and in 1985 would begin to modify the more advanced B-52H bombers to carry them. With the B-52s and cruise missiles, B-1B bomber, and B-2 bomber, the Reagan administration envisioned a three-pronged strategic bomber force.⁴⁹

Weinberger and Reagan also inherited a program, initiated during the Nixon years and continued by Carter, to build eight new larger and quieter *Ohio*-class



B-2 bomber during training exercise, March 23, 2001. *OSD Records*

submarines able to carry 24 Trident I missiles. These new boats would replace older Poseidon missile submarines that had been refitted to carry 16 Trident missiles. The first new submarine, the USS *Ohio*, originally scheduled for initial operational capacity during Carter's last year, was commissioned in November 1981. The nuclear strategic-missile submarine program had been plagued by delays, cost overruns, and contract issues with the builder, Electric Boat of Groton, Connecticut, and Quonset Point, Rhode Island. Electric Boat was also the sole builder of the *Los Angeles*-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, which was also behind schedule. As Weinberger explained to the president, during the Eisenhower military buildup the Polaris/Poseidon missile submarines were built at seven different shipyards. By 1977 the low bidder, Electric Boat, had won the contracts to build all *Ohio*- and *Los Angeles*-class submarines, and had a virtual monopoly. The only other potential builder, Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia, had no contracts and was beginning to lay off its skilled workers. Electric Boat had 25 submarines under construction, but they were a combined 21 years behind schedule, mostly as a result of required reworking due to welding defects and the use of nonconforming steel. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman canceled the ongoing solicitation for the next *Los Angeles* submarines and directed that Newport News build three of them on a

sole-source contact. Lehman did not exercise the contract for the ninth *Ohio*-class submarine until existing disputes with Electric Boat were resolved. Such action encouraged the Navy and Electric Boat to settle their outstanding differences on the eight *Ohio*-class submarines. Weinberger assured the president that the Navy had overhauled its relationship with Electric Boat, which placed the Pentagon in a much stronger position in negotiating new contracts for additional submarine construction. By the end of 1984 the Navy had four *Ohio*-class submarines at sea and a fifth one had been delivered. The remaining four were on schedule to launch at the rate of one per year.⁵⁰

National Security and Space

Since its creation in 1958 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense had been entwined in a symbiotic relationship. NASA implemented U.S. civilian space policy through its program of space flights and exploration, but it also launched U.S. military and intelligence satellites. By the late 1970s military and intelligence satellites were playing a crucial role in U.S. national security. Furthermore, the United States was far more dependent on satellites for its defense than was the Soviet Union. During the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, NASA developed the Space Transportation System (STS), more commonly known as the space shuttle, in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force. In April 1981 the first space shuttle, *Columbia*, launched into space and demonstrated the program's technical feasibility, but its operational reliability still needed to be determined. The concern at the Pentagon during the late 1970s and the first year of the Reagan presidency was whether the space shuttle would be able to fulfill both its civilian and military functions. The president met with his NSC advisers to discuss the shuttle in August 1981 and then issued a directive in November that confirmed the STS would "be the primary space launch system for both United States military and civilian government missions." Reagan directed that the transition to the STS "should occur as expeditiously as practical."⁵¹

On July 4, 1982, the Reagan administration elaborated its space program with a national policy statement on its goals and principles, which also delineated civilian, military, and intelligence roles for space operations. This directive, NSDD 42, "National Space Policy," reconfirmed the importance of operations in space to national defense functions such as command and control, communications,

navigation, environmental monitoring, warning of attack, tactical targeting, ocean and battlefield surveillance, and countering Soviet space-based weapons.⁵²

The next step in the policy process was to use the guidelines of NSDD 42 to create a broad strategy for space operations. In late 1983 the NSC initiated such a study with the relevant departments and agencies providing their inputs. There were differences of opinion about space operations. The Joint Chiefs favored an evolutionary approach to establishing a space command. DoD officials worried that the manned space station (see below) would prove too costly. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].⁵³

DoD skepticism about NASA's programs derived from concern about funding and capability. To fly a shuttle was extraordinarily expensive both in terms of money and manpower. The Pentagon official in charge of launching DoD satellites, Under Secretary of the Air Force Edward "Pete" Aldridge, doubted that the shuttle would be able to launch 24 flights per year as the agency had promised. Aldridge considered that the best NASA could do would be 18 launches, but more likely only 12. Since the DoD required 12 yearly launches for its satellites, Aldridge argued for maintaining USAF missiles as complementary expendable launch vehicles (CELVs). A second issue also worried Aldridge. The two operational shuttles, *Columbia* and *Challenger*, could not carry the heaviest DoD payloads. The next two shuttles due to come on line in 1985—*Discovery* and *Atlantis*—had the capability, but if one or both of them went out of service, the Pentagon would be unable to maintain its launch schedule.⁵⁴

In late December 1983 Aldridge convinced Weinberger that what he characterized as a "shuttle only" policy was a mistake. The secretary wrote Reagan, arguing that national security could be imperiled if the administration relied on NASA's optimistic projections for the STS capability, especially because at least two heavy-lift CELVs were needed as backups. The president approved and Weinberger issued a defense launch plan with a limited number of CELVs to supplement the shuttle, but with the proviso that the DoD was still committed to the STS. The NASA administrator, James M. Beggs, was reportedly furious, believing the Air Force was out to scuttle the shuttle.⁵⁵

Weinberger and Frank Carlucci also crossed swords with NASA officials over their long-term goal of a manned space station serviced by the STS. NASA saw potential in scientific experiments in space, and of course a space station would generate public and congressional support for other NASA programs. From their point of view, however, the secretary and his deputy saw no military justification for men in space and objected to having to contribute to it. In early August 1983 Weinberger met with the president, the White House senior staff, DCI Casey, Admiral James Watkins for the JCS, and DIA director Lt. Gen. James Williams. Weinberger made a convincing case to the president that the time was not right for a space station, given the more important military requirements of the space program. Hans Mark, deputy NASA administrator and a fervent proponent of the space station, recalled that he was “clearly outgunned.” Most of the national security agencies agreed with the DoD view.⁵⁶

Mark and Beggs did not abandon their dream of a permanent manned presence in space. At a meeting on December 1, 1983, with virtually all the administration's space policy officials present, Beggs showed the president a model of the space station and 12 view charts emphasizing the scientific possibilities of the space station and how meeting the challenge of keeping men in space would enhance American greatness. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer, attending for DoD, reiterated Weinberger's concerns about timing and funding. Mark recalled that he thought the consensus of the meeting, seemingly affirmed by the president, was that while the space station would eventually be built, it must be delayed for financial reasons in favor of more pressing national security priorities. Beggs thought otherwise, telling Mark that the president winked at him a couple of times as other participants argued against the station.⁵⁷

As a follow up to the meeting, Weinberger summarized the DoD's arguments against the station for Counselor to the President Ed Meese. NASA's cost estimate of \$8 billion was “suspect”; \$30 billion or more was more realistic. The space station was an impressive engineering effort but not a “bold new space initiative.” Weinberger maintained that the station had little support in the government, scientific community, or private sector. It would divert resources from the STS by requiring shuttle deliveries and its cost would impact other national security programs. Weinberger thought his arguments had carried the day, but a visionary president with a penchant for bold pronouncements was of a different mind. As Reagan wrote in his diary just after the December 1 meeting, “I'm for

it as I think most everyone is but the question is funding such a new course in face of our deficits.” Four days later, the president had decided: “I think we are OK there & and can still start to plan a space station.” Reagan used the State of the Union message in January 1984 to announce his plan: “America has always been greatest when we dare to be great. We can reach for greatness again.... Tonight, I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space station and to do so within the decade.” Reagan’s time frame was overly optimistic; not until 1998, long after the Cold War had ended, did the United States and Russia, in partnership, launch the first components of the International Space Station.⁵⁸

Another of the Pentagon’s concerns in space was U.S. antisatellite capability. The Soviet Union could destroy low-orbit satellites using a co-orbital interceptor launched from an SS-9 ICBM. Once close to its target, the interceptor could fire an explosive charge and destroy the target with shrapnel. The United States had no antisatellite capability.⁵⁹

The Carter administration began negotiations with the Soviets to ban antisatellite weapons. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1980, Carter suspended the ASAT negotiations. There was little interest in Weinberger’s OSD for further ASAT talks with Moscow and much concern that a U.S. antisatellite capability be established as soon as possible. Moscow was anxious to resume ASAT negotiations, not just to slow down the Pentagon’s ASAT program, but also to impede the SDI, which would depend on effective antisatellite weapons. In 1983 the Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium on ASAT development to encourage negotiations. The DoD argued that any U.S. ban on ASAT weapons would adversely impact the SDI program. Many of the technologies, such as miniature homing devices or lasers, were common to ASAT and SDI. Any test of SDI weapons would at some point involve firing at an object in space; they would, in effect, be ASAT weapons. Finally, a ban on ASAT capabilities would leak over to SDI, fed by the popular belief that weapons in space were immoral. To make matters worse, in 1984 the Senate had passed an amendment prohibiting funding of antisatellite or space weapons unless the Reagan administration was negotiating in good faith with Moscow on ASAT.⁶⁰

In August 1984 Weinberger made his case to president: “Soviet manipulation of the space issue is aimed primarily at blocking your Strategic Defense Initiative and, only secondarily, at halting our anti-satellite development program.” Bans to outlaw the “militarization of space” were hard to negotiate and impossible to

verify. As for the concept of a partial rather than a comprehensive ASAT ban, Weinberger thought it was “rather like building half a dam. It may be a good jobs program, but it is bad flood control.” Any partial agreement not to attack objects in space could hinder U.S. development of electronic countermeasures to space weapons, which Weinberger considered to be one of “the fragile advantages we currently hold in this field.” Weinberger and DoD arguments won out. It was not until 1985 that Reagan certified that he was “endeavoring to negotiate in good faith” on an ASAT agreement. That admission freed up funding so that the DoD could test an ASAT weapon; an F-15 fired a small rocket that used infrared guidance to hit a U.S. low-orbit satellite. In late 1985 Congress imposed a moratorium on further U.S. tests of ASAT weapons as long as the Soviet Union maintained its moratorium.⁶¹

Continuity of Government

After the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons and the delivery systems to launch them during the early years of the Cold War, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations built mountain redoubts [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to act as command posts for the executive branch of the federal government during a nuclear war. At the Greenbrier, a resort in West Virginia, a congressional redoubt was constructed. These underground installations were within a few hours’ drive and an even shorter helicopter flight from Washington. In the event of a nuclear war with Soviets in the 1950s, Soviet bombers with nuclear weapons would take hours to reach their targets, making it possible to evacuate the essential elements of the federal government to these redoubts. By the late 1960s and early 1970s two developments called this redoubt strategy into question. The first was the Soviet development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Soviet submarines with SLBMs stationed off the eastern seaboard of the United States drastically reduced the warning time and raised the possibility of decapitation of the entire federal government. It seemed conceivable that virtually no members of the official line of succession—the vice president, the speaker of the House, president pro temp of the Senate, and cabinet members in order of their department’s establishment—would make it to the redoubts. Even if some of the elements of the government reached the redoubts, advances in Soviet ICBM technology produced more accurate ICBMs with larger nuclear payloads and multiple independent reentry vehicles, which meant that the

1950s redoubts could be destroyed in a nuclear attack. It was also questionable whether the president could be evacuated to a National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base. A related worry was that if even some portion of the government survived, a Soviet nuclear attack would destroy the survivors' strategic connectivity—their ability to communicate with the military and the military's ability to communicate with itself. The existing telecommunications systems connecting the White House, Pentagon, Strategic Air Command in Nebraska, North American Air Defense Command in Colorado, and other military installations would not survive nuclear blast because of electromagnetic pulse (EMP). All the nation's communications systems were based on transistors. EMP fried transistors.⁶²


In late June 1980 the Carter administration issued Presidential Directive 58, which sought to improve continuity of government and strengthen command, control, and communications in the event of a nuclear war. The secretary of defense was instructed to establish the Joint Program Office (JPO) to meet the needs for continuity of government and the National Military Command System. The JPO would create the system engineering to enhance the survivability, operational capability, and continuity of the presidency and create a presidential successor support system. The JPO would supervise an expanded program of training exercises to validate the system. In early 1977 National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski ordered a snap test evacuation of the president from the White House to the command aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base to see if the system worked. It did not. In fact, the stand-in president theoretically died when the evacuation passed the time limit for Soviet SLBMs to hit Washington.⁶³

The Reagan administration inherited Carter's nascent program to improve the government's chances to survive a nuclear war and plan for a successor government. In late January 1981 the acting under secretary of defense for policy informed Weinberger, "Over the past several years, the fragility of the President's command and control of the armed forces in the event of a nuclear attack has become increasing clear." As a result of JCS studies during the previous years, the Joint Chiefs recommended a program of enhancements for support of the president's ability to direct the government during a nuclear attack. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]. These measures would reduce the president's vulnerability at a small cost (\$10 million through FY 1986) and demonstrate readiness and deterrence against nuclear attack.⁶⁴

In August 1981, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering James P. Wade Jr., who chaired an executive review board composed of senior representatives from the OSD, the services, and the defense agencies, submitted a strategic connectivity review to Weinberger. The study reiterated the concern



E-B4 "Nightwatch" National Emergency Command Post aircraft being refueled in flight, May 1, 1988. *OSD Records*

that the effects of nuclear detonations could seriously disrupt or even destroy the command-and-control facilities and communications links that the president or his successor would need to communicate with the military and the surviving elements of the government.⁶⁵

The cost of upgrading communications able to withstand a nuclear attack was high. The most critical procedural and programmatic changes would add about an additional \$700 million to the command, control, and communications (C3) budget for FY 1983. The cost of creating a system that would improve C3 to acceptable levels would be \$5 billion from FY 1983 to FY 1987 and as much as \$15 billion in years after 1987.⁶⁶

Realizing the nature of the problem and how the prescription to correct it would take extensive time and money, the Reagan White House created its own emergency system to ensure the survival of the presidency. Reagan refused to fly to safety in the event of a nuclear war. He reportedly told NSC official Thomas Reed, "I want to sit here in the Office.... Getting into the helicopter is George's [Vice President Bush's] job." In conjunction with the Pentagon, the NSC created teams of government officials, each including a person—usually a former high official—who had national security experience to act as a chief of staff to a "designated survivor" cabinet member. Upon warning of a nuclear attack, each team with its cabinet member would fly out of Washington to undisclosed sites, and then rendezvous with communications equipment. Evacuating multiple cabinet officers created a better chance that one would survive. If any team's cabinet official became president he would assume control of the country with the help of his chief of staff and the skeleton staff of government officials. These teams undertook periodic training exercises designed to replicate a nuclear attack on Washington with officials such as Representative Dick Cheney sitting in for the president. Reagan approved this program on September 14, 1982, as NSDD 55, "Enduring National Leadership."⁶⁷

The program required Defense support including convoys of trucks used to transport the equipment to the undisclosed location, deception convoys of trucks going to false locations, aircraft transport, and DoD officials to join the national security team supporting the designated president during the exercises and in the event of actual attack. A two-star general headed the National Program Office (NPO) responsible for running these exercises. A direct descendant of Carter's Joint Program Office, the NPO recruited teams of former government officials,

usually former cabinet members, who could be called in to advise a successor president after a decapitation attack. Elaborate plans were instituted for the evacuation of these advisers, known officially as the Presidential Successor Support System. The NPO reportedly spent the lion's share of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's budget on its contingency plans.⁶⁸

While the Reagan administration closely held the details and specifics of most continuity-of-government programs, improvements in communications in anticipation and during a nuclear attack were highlighted. In June 1983 the president signed NSDD 97, "National Communications Policy," calling for a national communications infrastructure able to support the national security leadership during and after a nuclear war. Weinberger publicly urged that better communications systems were needed. In his annual report to Congress in January 1984, the secretary stated, "Strategic C3 systems must be able to operate reliably under the extremely stressful conditions of a nuclear conflict.... They could easily be rendered ineffective through direct or collateral effects of nuclear attack, or by electronic jamming and other disruptive measures." Weinberger outlined improvements in sensors, command centers, and communications that upgraded their capabilities, increased their mobility, protected them against nuclear effects, and provided redundancy. These improvements were expensive: tens of billions of dollars in the first Reagan term. Yet without them, early warning sensors and survivable command posts were without value. The information from warning sensors had to be safely relayed to the command post, which in turn had to be able to communicate with strategic weapons commands. This array of communications systems sought to defeat a Soviet surgical strike on U.S. command posts and communications links.⁶⁹

This DoD effort to ensure improved C3 and the continuity-of-government teams were responses to the very real threat of decapitation of the U.S. government by the Soviet Union. One critic said Reagan's system amounted to designating presidents and characterized it as extralegal and unconstitutional. If the Soviet Union timed an attack when Congress was in session and all executive branch successors were in Washington, it could eliminate all constitutional and statutory successors and potentially any "designated survivor." The Reagan administration provided an insurance policy against this dire eventuality. With the end of the Cold War and the lessening of the threat of nuclear Armageddon, the need for continuity of government programs seemed less critical. The Clinton adminis-

tration reportedly ended them, but the al-Qaeda attack of September 11, 2011, raised the specter of a decapitating terrorist attack on the federal government, such as during the State of the Union address, and the programs for continuity of government were revived.⁷⁰

Telecommunications and Computer Security

Since at least the early 1960s the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community had been concerned that commercial, private, and government telecommunications were vulnerable to interception by foreign intelligence agencies. The danger expanded as telephone calls in the 1970s were increasingly transmitted by easy-to-intercept microwaves. In 1977 President Carter approved a new directive that updated telecommunications security. Carter's PD-24, "Telecommunications Policy," mandated secure classified telecommunications between government agencies and government contractors, but it also required the same protection for "unclassified but sensitive" telecommunications traffic. Furthermore, PD-24 required that nongovernmental unclassified telecommunications that could be useful to an adversary be identified and private-sector entities encouraged to protect them. The secretary of defense remained the executive agent for protection of all information relating to national security—governmental and private, classified or unclassified. The secretary of commerce directed the security of government-derived unclassified telecommunications not related to national security. PD-24 did not mention computers per se, but in the 1970s digital information was increasingly carried by microwave transmission to and from telephone modems.⁷¹

In late 1983 a series of events drove home the message that computers were vulnerable. Computers, which were then described in the federal government as automated information systems or automated data processing, increasingly communicated with each other. Large and expensive, computers were shared among many users for reasons of economics and convenience. In the 1960s and 1970s experts warned that digital data could remain latent in computers' memories and be exploited by foreign enemies or possibly even by terrorist groups. Computer-savvy individuals with great determination could obtain unauthorized entry through what was commonly known as hacking. In 1983 the president and top Reagan officials, including Weinberger, became aware of this vulnerability.⁷²

Reagan learned of this threat quite by chance in June 1983. After watching

the movie *WarGames*, a thriller starring Matthew Broderick as a high school student who hacked into a NORAD computer program thinking it was a video game and almost started World War III, the president asked soon-to-be JCS Chairman Vessey if U.S. computers were that vulnerable. After looking into it, Vessey reported that they were, and the situation was dire. Soon after, inspired no doubt by *WarGames*, a group of computer-wizard high school students calling themselves the 414s (after their area code) breached at least 60 business and government computer systems, including DoD unclassified systems. In the face of what one official described as “media hype” (he mentioned *WarGames* and a U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* article by two Navy lieutenants on the hacking danger, “The Eagle’s Own Plume”), Weinberger sought in September 1983 a Pentagon review of DoD computer security.⁷³

In early January 1984 Weinberger asked Iklé and Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering DeLauer to undertake this extensive review of the issue in collaboration with National Security Agency Director Lincoln Faurer. Weinberger noted that the Pentagon’s use of “classified defense data and other sensitive DOD information that is stored, processed, or transmitted by automated handling systems [computers]” was growing faster than technical measures required to protect it. He explicitly enjoined Iklé, DeLauer, and Faurer to examine “the integration and interface between communications security and automated information systems security policies and programs.”⁷⁴

As was usually the case in government, the actual drafting of the review fell to subordinate officials. Kenneth E. deGraffenreid, the senior director for intelligence on the NSC staff, took the lead in drafting the potential presidential directive. The DoD point man was Donald C. Latham, deputy under secretary of defense for command, control, communications, and intelligence. The draft national security decision directive that emerged sought to combine national policy on telecommunications and computer systems security and centralize control of both. Early drafts of what would become NSDD 145 set off turf battles within the Pentagon, created tension with the Central Intelligence Agency, and eventually generated concern in Congress and among the public. A former NSA employee, Latham supported naming the director of NSA as the national manager responsible for telecommunications security (COMSEC) and computer security (COMPUSEC) under the jurisdiction of the secretary of defense as the executive agent. The DIA, the Joint Chiefs, and the deputy under secretary of defense for

policy, General Richard Stilwell, all opposed giving NSA that authority, believing it impinged on their security responsibilities. The CIA was unprepared to have the NSA poking around in its computer security programs. The draft NSDD also introduced the idea of a national budget for COMSEC and COMPUSEC. This proposal was anathema to all the relevant agencies and offices on the grounds that none of them wanted another entity controlling their security budgets or security systems. There was also a general feeling that telecommunications and computer security should be separate. Opponents of the draft of NSDD 145 either opposed it outright or asked for time to study the relationship between COMPUSEC and COMSEC.⁷⁵

The bureaucratic infighting dragged on, with the NSA's deputy director of communications security, Walter G. Deely, complaining that "the turf battles have to stop or the national defense will suffer." In August 1983 Weinberger proposed retaining NSA as the national manager but making it clear that the NSA director's authority derived from the secretary of defense as executive agent. Second, Weinberger recommended that all monitoring of computer security require prior notification and coordination with the department or agency concerned. The same prior requirements would apply in security agreements with foreign governments and international or private organizations.⁷⁶

On September 17 the president approved NSDD 145, "National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security." The directive created the System Security Steering Group comprised of the secretaries of state, defense, and the treasury; the attorney general; the director of OMB; and the national security adviser as chair. The directive also formed the National Telecommunication and Information Security Committee, chaired by the assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communications, and intelligence with heavy Pentagon representation. For all practical purposes, however, the NSA and Weinberger ran the show by setting standards, providing guidance, undertaking research, and monitoring government telecommunications and computer systems. However, departments and agency still retained control of their own computer systems. The CIA's COMSEC and COMPUSEC for foreign intelligence relations was excluded from NSA oversight and the DCI remained the executive agent for technical security countermeasures. Weinberger's promise of coordination with agencies was written into the directive. There was no mention of a national security COMSEC and COMPUSEC budget.⁷⁷

Congress and some members of the public pushed back against what they considered NSDD 145's grant of too much authority for NSA over government and private computer networks and the potential threat to civil liberties from such oversight by this secretive intelligence agency. In 1987 Congress passed the Computer Security Act, which limited NSA's oversight to national security computer networks and gave the Department of Commerce's National Bureau of Standards the responsibility of protecting non-Defense and non-Intelligence Community federal networks, including those containing sensitive but unclassified information. The effort of the NSC staff and Pentagon to secure computers during the Reagan administration was only an early step in what would later become a major national security concern: not only the protection of computers and their networks, but also the threat of cyberwar.⁷⁸

Nuclear Warfare Strategy and Targeting Policy

Weinberger took office shortly after an evolution of U.S. nuclear war strategy started during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. Strategy was beginning to shift from a concentration on Soviet and Warsaw Pact industrial-economic targets to political and military ones. In an era of nuclear parity this strategy would allow the United States to use its nuclear resources where they would hurt the leaders in Moscow the most: the Communist Party leadership and government installations, military command and control posts, Soviet military bases, conventional forces, retaliatory forces, and nuclear weapons stockpiles. The new strategy was outlined in Carter's Presidential Directive 59, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy," adopted on July 25, 1980. This directive anticipated a more flexible targeting policy, which could allow for limited nuclear strikes and thus the possibility of de-escalation or, conversely, lead to a prolonged nuclear conflict with sporadic attacks. Either scenario was in contrast to the strategy of an all-out exchange. In fall 1980 Secretary Brown translated PD 59 into actual targeting guidance, presented in Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) 80.⁷⁹

The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), directed by General Richard H. Ellis, USAF (also the SAC commander), was responsible for transforming NUWEP into a revised single integrated operational plan (SIOP), the predetermined targeting plan for coordinating strategic attacks in the Soviet Union and its allies in all possible nuclear war contingencies. The SIOP was usually produced annually. At Ellis and JCS's request in April 1981, Weinberger agreed

to a one-year moratorium on revising the SIOP, allowing more time to formulate the DoD's nuclear strategy to replace PD 59 and NUWEP 80.⁸⁰

By September 1981 the DoD had drafted a new targeting policy. It continued to include the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations' shift towards the Soviet military, command and control, and political leadership as primary targets. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. It placed emphasis on U.S. warfighting capability, including in a protracted nuclear conflict. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Weinberger informed the president, "We must effect substantial improvements in our forces and their supporting command/control and intelligence systems to ensure requisite flexibility, endurance, and effectiveness in a nuclear war of indefinite duration." The president approved this new strategy as NSDD 13, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy," on October 19, 1981.⁸¹

As president-elect and during his first year in office, Reagan received briefings on various aspects of nuclear options, but his advisers, including Weinberger, believed he needed a broader understanding of the ramifications of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The planned Pentagon exercises on command during a nuclear war, Operation Ivy League, and the continuity of the presidency and government exercise scheduled for early March 1982, provided an opportunity to bring the president up to speed. Reagan agreed to attend the first session of the exercise on simulated nuclear war on March 1.⁸²

On February 26 Pentagon officials briefed Reagan for over an hour in the afternoon on the SIOP. The president, a longtime skeptic of nuclear war strategy, heard what could only have been disquieting news. A Soviet first strike would destroy three-quarters of U.S. strategic forces (mostly land-based ICBMs) and kill 80 million Americans. The briefers outlined major and selective attack options and explained the concept of launch-on-warning—firing U.S. ballistic missiles

before they could be destroyed by incoming Soviet warheads. According to one account, they ignored the limited war options highlighted in PD 59 because they considered the concepts of holdback and de-escalation impractical. Should the Soviets attack first, the only outcome the JSTPS foresaw was all-out nuclear war.⁸³

During the weekend of February 27–28, Clark, NSC staffer Thomas Reed, and other White House officials continued to brief the president. According to Reed, they explained how the president would be protected during a nuclear attack, and how he would communicate with U.S. forces. They raised the concept of “withhold” during a U.S. retaliatory attack to allow for either negotiations or follow-up attacks.⁸⁴

On March 1 Reagan attended the first session of Operation Ivy League along with the exercise’s “president,” former Secretary of State William Rogers. They watched a big screen in the White House Situation Room indicating with red dots which targets the Soviets would destroy. The first to go was Washington, DC, the “president” having been evacuated to an airborne control center. As the simulation continued, a sea of red dots covered the map of the United States. By the time the simulation exercise was over, most U.S. forces were destroyed, and millions of Americans had been “killed.”⁸⁵

With the president fully briefed, the next task of the OSD was to turn NSDD 13 into a nuclear weapons employment policy that would allow the JSTPS to create SIOP 6. The JCS and OSD, especially Iklé, found themselves at cross-purposes. The OSD favored moving rapidly away from industrial-economic targets to attacking nuclear forces, supporting C3I structures, and political leadership targets. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The JCS believed that an expanded role for the SRF required an assessment of C3I’s ability to support them. They also cautioned Weinberger that changing plans for the employment of nuclear weapons would take time and could not be enacted “in the foreseeable future” given limitations in current forces and C3 systems. Weinberger assured the Joint Chiefs that he understood the difficulties they faced, especially the “extensive computer changes required.” He reminded them, however, “A credible deterrent requires sufficient nuclear force capabilities and plans for their employment to be able to attack effectively and selectively the full range of Warsaw Pact military, leadership, and industrial-economic target structure.”⁸⁶

This tension between the OSD and JCS continued for the rest of Reagan’s

first term. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Affairs Frank Miller recalled, the JSTPS and SAC had routinely rebuffed OSD requests for detailed information on the SIOP target base. As far as the JSTPS was concerned, the target list was their responsibility and the Pentagon civilians had “no need to know.” OSD officials suspected that the implementation SIOP was not reflecting the changes of the presidential directives of the past three administrations. Worse, they believed the target lists included great redundancy, resulting in U.S. bombers targeting Soviet forces and facilities already marked for destruction by ICBMs.⁸⁷

As a concession to the JCS, Weinberger and the OSD did not attempt to micromanage the SIOP but instead provided very general guidance. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Iklé informed Weinberger, “In general, the plans proposed by the JCS are consistent with the policy objectives contained in NSDD 13 and the NUWEP. There are however, several issues related to SIOP development and to employment of the Secure Reserve Force (SRF) which require further action by the JCS.”⁸⁸

In mid-October 1983 Weinberger and Vessey briefed Reagan on the progress of the new NUWEP and SIOP 6. The president described the briefing in his diary: “A most sobering experience with Cap W[einberger] & Gen. Vessey in the situation room—a briefing on our complete plan in the event of a nuclear war. The Chiefs have been working on it for 2 yrs. in reply to my request in October 1981.” On later reflection the president suggested that the briefing “was a scenario for a sequence of events that could lead to the end of civilization.” The president noted the parallels of the briefing to the events that befell Lawrence, Kansas, during and

after a nuclear exchange in the movie *The Day After*, broadcast in November 1982. Reagan remarked, “There were still some people in the Pentagon who claimed a nuclear war was ‘winnable.’ I thought they were crazy. Worse it appears there were Soviet generals who thought in terms of winning a nuclear war.”⁸⁹

Even with the president’s doubts, nuclear war planning contingencies had to proceed at the Pentagon, no matter how devastating and terrifying their results. Iklé and the OSD sought more control over the details of nuclear targeting, a move still resisted by the Joint Chiefs on the grounds that it was their responsibility to design military strategy and plans. Weinberger engineered a compromise when he promulgated NUWEP 84 on June 29, 1984. He reiterated,

A credible deterrent requires sufficient nuclear force capability and plans for their employment to be able to attack selectively and effectively the full range of Warsaw Pact military, leadership, and industrial-economic target structure. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will ensure that the guidance contained herein is followed in developing the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and all other nuclear weapons employment plans.

Weinberger’s language allowed the Joint Chiefs targeting flexibility based on the secretary’s and the OSD staff’s general guidelines for a range of options. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. NUWEP 84 required “that our nuclear

forces be sufficiently survivable to deny the Soviet Union a victory even if subjected to a surprise Soviet attack. Further, our forces and their supporting C3I and logistics systems must possess sufficient endurance to provide the National Command Authority with sustained capability of employing nuclear weapons in a controlled manner throughout the conflict.”⁹⁰

The nuclear strategy that the Pentagon was asking the Joint Chiefs to plan in their new SIOP was flexible and had to anticipate different scenarios: surprise attack, all-out nuclear exchange, and limited and protracted nuclear war. It was

a prescription for fighting different nuclear conflicts so that the United States could endure in all cases. It held out the possibility that the conflict could be limited and de-escalated. Far from revolutionary, it was an evolutionary plan that owed its inspiration to previous administrations' thinking on nuclear war. When some details of the new plan inevitably leaked, critics wrongly charged that Weinberger and Reagan were planning for a first strike on the Soviet Union or a U.S. victory in a nuclear conflict.⁹¹

The Reagan administration and OSD faced formidable challenges in defining national security policy, modernizing strategic forces, securing telecommunications and computer security, and planning for potential nuclear war. After a late start because of bureaucratic ineptitude at the NSC staff and an initial concentration on domestic economic issues, the Reagan administration fashioned a statement of basic national security policy. An important requirement of this policy was strategic forces modernization. The modernization plan was not a total success. Weinberger and the Pentagon never found an effective way to base the new MX/Peacekeeper missile. In the face of congressional and public opposition, they were reduced to deploying only 50 Peacekeepers in Minuteman silos. These missiles in Minuteman silos did little to make the U.S. land-based missile force less vulnerable to Soviet ICBMs. Not surprisingly, in 1991 President George H. W. Bush agreed to eliminate them as part of the START Treaty. Reagan's dream of SDI, to which Weinberger became an avid convert, remained only a theoretical possibility buoyed up by vast research funding which rarely seemed to produce convincing demonstrations that it could actually live up to its promise. As a result the administration focused on limited antiballistic missile defense. In a less-than-lofty realm, the Reagan-Weinberger first term saw the introduction of new *Ohio*-class submarines with Trident missiles, a major enhancement of the U.S. strategic punch. Although controversial, the B-1B bomber added heft to the Air Force's strategic bomber force. The Weinberger-Reagan team placed nuclear-armed cruise missiles on B-52 aircraft. They also continued development of the stealth B-2 bomber. Following Carter's lead, the DoD made good progress in ensuring the continuity of government and safeguarding command, control, and communications during a nuclear attack. They combined telecommunications and computer security into one directive, realizing the close relationship between the two, and highlighted the need for better protection of computer data.

Weinberger's OSD built upon predecessors in rethinking and refining nuclear strategy and targeting policy. While the differences were small, the Carter policy was most attracted to the possibility that limited war could result in de-escalation of the exchange before a nuclear holocaust. While Weinberger's thinking included this possibility, it also contemplated prevailing in a nuclear war, in effect carrying the Carter strategy to its logical conclusion. Nuclear strategy and targeting were a case of thinking the unthinkable, but the Reagan national security team required that the Pentagon make plans and confront the worst-case scenario, as had previous Cold War presidential administrations.

Grenada: Operation Urgent Fury

IN OCTOBER 1983 THE U.S. MILITARY undertook an operation on the small Caribbean Island of Grenada to rescue U.S. medical students and depose a rogue Marxist regime. The operation underscored the complexity of the Reagan administration's decision-making when faced with simultaneous international crises. Historians generally treat crises separately and sequentially, extracting the various threads of day-to-day policymaking into separate topics or themes in an effort to provide clarity and insight. But in the real world critical events sometimes occur at the same time. Such was the case in Grenada. As it prepared to mount the Grenada operation, the Reagan administration was also heavily involved in a controversial peacekeeping operation in Lebanon (see chapter 9). The U.S. military was poised to invade Grenada when, on October 23, terrorists bombed the barracks of the U.S. Marine Corps detachment of the multinational peacekeeping force at Beirut airport, killing 241 U.S. service personnel (and 58 French soldiers in a second attack on their quarters). Lebanon proved considerably more costly in lives lost than Grenada, where 19 U.S. service personnel died and 144 suffered injuries. The success of Operation Urgent Fury, as the Grenada invasion was code-named, and the failure of the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon provided the catalyst for Weinberger's major contribution to U.S. military thinking. In late November 1984 he outlined six criteria for the use of military power, a test to apply before committing U.S. troops to combat. These criteria became known collectively as the Weinberger doctrine and proved a lasting contribution, but one not always applied by Weinberger's successors.¹

The president and the advisers who planned and executed Operation Urgent

Fury did so with recent events firmly in their minds. The most salient was the Iran hostage crisis, in which radical Islamic factions in a chaotic post-shah Iran took U.S. Embassy personnel in Tehran hostage and held them for over a year. That crisis enervated the Carter presidency and helped ensure Reagan's victory in the presidential election of 1980. The new administration worried that U.S. medical students in Grenada could become hostages of a Marxist, anti-American regime and it acted to prevent that possibility. The second specter overshadowing Grenada was the legacy of the Vietnam War. The name Operation Urgent Fury attested to Vietnam's influence. It was the largest combat operation since the war in South-east Asia, and the Pentagon leadership insisted that the U.S. military intervene with overwhelming force and swiftness. No gradual escalation or mission creep would be tolerated in this operation. The invasion force would overwhelm the Grenadian armed forces and the Cuban engineers and military advisers on the island. They would then ensure that any enemy combatants, including Cubans, did not head for Grenada's interior to engage in guerrilla operations. Grenada was not going to be another Vietnam. The third defining historical precedent was the Cuban revolution under Fidel Castro, which resulted in a communist bastion 90 miles from the United States, determined to export communist revolution wherever it could. In Nicaragua a Marxist Sandinista government had overthrown the pro-American Somoza regime in 1979 and embarked on a campaign of subversion of other countries in Central America (see chapter 15). The Reagan administration was not going to accept yet another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere no matter how small and insignificant it might be.²

Caspar Weinberger's role in the invasion served as a model for what a secretary of defense should do during a combat operation. In keeping with his innate caution, he was less enthusiastic about deploying U.S. forces to Grenada than either Secretary of State George Shultz or the president. Once he received the "go" order from Reagan, however, Weinberger stepped aside and let the military do its job. Operation Urgent Fury was a joint ground operation between the Marine Corps–Navy and Army, with the Air Force providing both combat and logistical support. While Weinberger retained overall approval authority in regard to the planning and execution of the invasion, it was ultimately directed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John Vessey. Weinberger granted Vessey the authority to increase the invasion force and give direction to the U.S. commander in chief, Atlantic Command, and the supporting unified commands. Weinberger

maintained a low profile during the 10-day operation. His role increased during the postcombat phase of the Grenada operation, when the United States returned captured Cubans, helped establish a Caribbean transition security force, created a Grenadian police force, restored democratic government, and revived the economy of the island.³

Background to the Invasion

The southernmost island in the Windward chain of the Lesser Antilles, Grenada was a pawn in the 17th- and 18th-century conflict between Great Britain and France for control of the Caribbean and its valuable sugar plantation economy. Once Great Britain abolished slavery in its empire in 1832 and sugar production—including beet sugar—became available worldwide, Grenada, like the rest of the sugar-producing islands, became economic backwaters. After World War II the winds of change transformed the empire into the British Commonwealth. Grenada moved through stages of self-government, reaching independence in 1974. The leading proponent of independence, Eric Gairy, a former labor union organizer, became prime minister of a country of just under 100,000 inhabitants. Westerners discounted Gairy; the U.S. ambassador accredited to Grenada considered him a “buffoon and a bully ... detached from reality.” They especially derided his interest in unidentified flying objects.⁴

One of Gairy’s major accomplishments, however, was the establishment, with American investors, of an offshore medical school, St. George’s University School of Medicine, which grew to 1,200 students by 1983. Most of the medical students were American. They comprised the largest group of foreign nationals on Grenada and acted as a powerful economic stimulus to an island that tourists had bypassed. In March 1979 the New Jewel Movement, headed by Maurice Bishop, overthrew Gairy in a virtually bloodless coup. The movement (“Jewel” was an acronym for Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation) had been founded by middle-class reformers disenchanted with Gairy’s firm control of politics and the ballot box. In the lead-up to the coup, the movement became dominated by Marxists. They looked to Cuba for inspiration and to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for economic assistance. Soviet Bloc aid proved disappointingly minimal. The most visible symbol of communist aid was Cuban support for the Point Salines airport project, an expanded facility with a long runway able to accommodate large modern jet aircraft and act as an



Reconnaissance photograph of Port Salines airfield, May 1, 1983. *OSD Records*

encouragement to tourism. Cuban workers were finishing construction of the runway and airport as the crisis in Grenada unfolded. The Reagan administration insisted the airport was for other purposes because it exceeded civilian needs. It was a Trojan horse for potential use by Cuban military aircraft to dominate the sea lanes to Central and South America. In addition, the administration claimed, Cuba sent military advisers to work with the Grenadian armed forces. Cuba was establishing a beachhead in Grenada.⁵

After the Bishop coup in March 1979, the Carter administration placed the island on its watch list. According to Robert Gates, then on the staff of the National Security Council, when the Carter White House witnessed Cuban weapons and advisers appearing in Grenada it asked Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner to institute a program to focus international attention on the Cuban presence in Grenada. Turner responded with a political action program that publicized growing Cuban influence on the island, but also sought to directly

counter it. The president signed a finding that, in Gates's words, "authorized a covert effort to promote democracy on Grenada and also to support resistance to the Marxist government there." When the Senate Intelligence Committee was briefed on the program, its members objected vehemently to an action that diverged so dramatically from Carter's human rights and noninterference policies. Both the White House and CIA agreed to call off the action.⁶

On October 12, 1983, a faction in the revolutionary government led by the deputy prime minister, Bernard Coard, with the support of the chief of the Grenadian armed forces, arrested Prime Minister Bishop. His supporters temporarily rescued him, but the army recaptured him and then murdered him on October 19. Within the movement, Bishop had been the charismatic leader, the people person. Coard was an administrator and technician, and a much purer Marxist-Leninist. Coard branded Bishop and his supporters as counterrevolutionaries who had betrayed the masses. On the same day that Grenadian soldiers murdered Bishop and seven of his closest followers, the Grenadian People's Army, estimated to consist of 1,500 lightly armed troops backed up by 2,000 inefficient militiamen, assumed control of the country and imposed a four-day, round-the-clock curfew. Those violating the curfew would be shot on sight. Concerned relatives and friends of the medical students trapped in Grenada swamped the Department of State and the White House with calls to save their loved ones. As Grenada spiraled into murderous chaos the Reagan administration had a crisis on its hands.⁷

Lead-Up to the Decision to Invade

Before the crisis, Grenada had not been a priority for the Reagan national security team. During 1981 and 1982 the Reagan administration focused on the threats of the Sandinista Marxists in Nicaragua and the insurgents in El Salvador. In 1981 the nations of the Antilles (including Gairy's Grenada) formed the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in response to Cuban and Soviet support for communist revolutions in Central America. As it became clearer that Grenada was on the road to a Marxist dictatorship, the Reagan administration responded. It prepared briefings for congressional leaders on the nature of the Bishop regime, made plans to bolster democratic elements on the island opposed to Bishop, and as a precaution began a search for alternative locations for St. George's University School of Medicine outside Grenada.⁸

To support this new effort, in early October 1983 the administration authorized the Department of Defense to increase U.S. military forces in the eastern Caribbean to deter aggression or respond to it as necessary. Defense was tasked with reviewing contingency plans for the region, making preparations to provide emergency airlift or sealift as required, and identifying funding and military assets required to accomplish these tasks. In addition, the Pentagon was instructed to maintain U.S. military exercises in the region at a high level.⁹

During the week of Bishop's arrest, escape, recapture, and murder, officials from the DoD and Department of State discussed plans to evacuate the 1,000 U.S. medical students from Grenada. Contingencies for the evacuation ranged from a peaceful departure on charter flights to use of military force against the Grenadian army and the Cubans, depending on the situation. At a meeting of the Crisis Pre-Planning Group, an NSC-led interagency group dedicated to anticipating potential threats and emergencies, NSC staffer Lt. Col. Oliver North suggested that Marine Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) 1-84, which had just left Norfolk, Virginia, for peacekeeping duty in Lebanon, could be diverted south for possible use in a rescue evacuation. The JCS representative at the meeting countered that without a direct order from the president this reassignment was impossible. The new national security adviser, Bud McFarlane, quickly drafted such an order and the president signed it.¹⁰

At 4:45 p.m. on October 20 Weinberger attended his first meeting on Grenada with the NSC's newly formed Special Situation Group, headed by Vice President George H. W. Bush. Other attendees included Shultz, Casey, Chief of Staff James Baker, his deputy Michael Deaver, Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, McFarlane, and General Vessey. The group assessed the JCS contingency plans. Peaceful evacuation of the students required a diplomatic agreement with the revolutionary government for exfiltration of the students by commercial aircraft. If military force had to be used, the planners recommended overwhelming the Grenadians and Cubans using the marine amphibious ready group, which was by then steaming south. While diplomacy and peaceful evacuation was the hope, Shultz considered it more likely that U.S. military force would be required to protect the students and disarm Grenadian and Cuban forces. The Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that Cuba would not and could not intervene with additional forces to help Grenada and its nationals working there. Weinberger and Vessey pointed out that the diversion of the marines meant those already

serving in Lebanon would have to extend their tours. The general consensus of the meeting was that some form of military intervention was likely, if not inevitable. The Special Group decided that the JCS should provide a plan to not only rescue the students, but to neutralize hostile forces on Grenada and reconstruct the political institutions on the island. MARG 1-84 was ordered to wait east of Puerto Rico and the USS *Independence* carrier battle group received orders to station off Dominica, placing both within striking distance of Grenada.¹¹

The president traveled to Augusta, Georgia, for a weekend of golf with Senator Nicholas F. Brady (R-NJ), Shultz, and Treasury Secretary Donald Regan. McFarlane accompanied him along with the communications technicians and equipment that made up the traveling White House. McFarlane expected a quiet weekend but continued to monitor events in Grenada. On Friday October 21, news arrived that Dominica's prime minister Eugenia Charles, as head of the OECS, had asked the United States to intervene in Grenada to prevent the Marxist government from consolidating power. At 3:00 a.m. McFarlane woke the president; he and Shultz then met with Reagan and connected securely with Washington to teleconference with Bush, Weinberger, Baker, Meese, Deputy DCI John N. McMahon, Deputy National Security Adviser Admiral John Poindexter, and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne A. "Tony" Motley. Shultz, Poindexter, and McMahon urged intervention. Weinberger urged caution, since events in Grenada were not clear and intelligence on the Cuban presence and the size and capability of the Grenadian forces was hardly definitive. Furthermore, the Pentagon chief argued, the invasion force as anticipated was too lightly armed and too small for the mission; he recommended reinforcing it. Nevertheless, Reagan seemed ready to approve the operation. The next day McFarlane again woke the president in the middle of the night to inform him of the Beirut marine barracks bombing. It was not a peaceful vacation weekend for Reagan.¹²

By Saturday morning, October 22, 1983, planning for Grenada was well underway. Vessey instructed those commands likely to be involved—the Atlantic Command, Readiness Command, Military Airlift Command, and Joint Special Operations Command—to anticipate either a rescue of the students in the face of hostile fire or an invasion to disarm Grenadian and Cuban forces. Peaceful evacuation was no longer considered a possibility. MARG 1-84 and the *Independence* battle group were ordered to the vicinity of Grenada. The Military Airlift Command was instructed to reduce time for possible airlift of Army Rangers,



Eugenia Charles, Dominica's prime minister and president of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, meets with President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and NSC adviser McFarlane, October 10, 1983. *Reagan Library*

Special Forces, and one or more battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division, if needed. At 9:00 a.m. on October 22, the National Security Planning Group met at the White House with Bush presiding and with the president, still in Augusta, connected by secure telephone. Weinberger recommended that Navy SEAL (sea, air, land) special forces make preinvasion landings to obtain intelligence. The president approved, and he also extended the rescue operation to include restoring democratic government on Grenada. Weinberger returned to the Pentagon to meet with the Joint Chiefs in the Tank to review planning. At this meeting, the secretary suggested the planners double the forces that the CINCLANT (commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet), Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, had requested.¹³

On the next day, October 23, 1983, Reagan returned to Washington to deal with the two crises—the Grenada invasion and the marine barracks bombing in Lebanon. He convened another NSC Planning Group meeting at 4:00 p.m. As he entered the room, Reagan remarked to Weinberger, “Remind me never to go away again. Look what happens.” At the Planning Group meeting Vessey briefed the president on plans to send reconnaissance missions to Point Salines and Pearls airports as a prelude to a planned October 25 invasion. Vessey told

the president, "The decision was primarily a political issue." The chairman then asked the president if he was still committed to the Grenada operation in light of the Lebanon bombing. Reagan thought about the question and then asked Vessey, "Would it be a success?" Vessey replied it depended on the objectives. The chairman responded positively to Reagan's queries. Yes, the U.S. forces could take the airfield and its other objectives, and U.S. casualties would be minimal. Vessey warned that there was a dearth of intelligence and little time for more planning. Things could go wrong. There could be aircraft or helicopter crashes; TV journalists' cameras could "expose us doing something which is not warranted," or it could turn out to be a "tough fight" that could inflict "sizable casualties" on either side, or both. Reagan then went around the room asking each of the Planning Group members if they objected to the invasion. None did, and the president approved the invasion plan.¹⁴

The next day, October 24, Reagan met with the Joint Chiefs for a regularly scheduled session in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The first hour of the meeting concerned Grenada. The discussion reprised much of what was said at the NSC Planning Group meeting of the previous day. However, Vessey told the president that the marine barracks bombing upped the stakes in Grenada if the U.S. or Grenadians suffered substantial casualties. Vessey warned that the revolutionary government had called up the militia, and probably had more antiaircraft guns than originally thought, which needed to be taken out by AC-130 gunships. Weinberger asked each of the chiefs to give their opinion. All agreed that the job could be done, but lamented again the lack of intelligence, prior training, and planning time. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Watkins was the most pessimistic, suggesting that "it was a very close decision [to invade]—probably a 51% to 49% decision."¹⁵

Intelligence reports confirmed that the Grenadians were mobilizing 2,000 reservists to join 1,500 regular Grenadian troops and that 600 armed Cuban workers and advisers were on alert. These reports, it was later determined, greatly overestimated the actual numbers. Nevertheless, the president and secretary of defense remained committed to the operation in the face of their military advisers' concerns and estimates that U.S. forces would face over 3,000 combatants. Military operations always carry risks, and the Grenada invasion in light of the intelligence available at the time was a gamble.¹⁶

Late in the afternoon of October 24, the president signed NSDD 110A

instructing Weinberger and Vessey to land U.S. and allied forces from contributing Caribbean nations on Grenada no later than dawn October 25. Intelligence teams were to collect information prior to the invasion. The operation's objectives were to assure the safety of American citizens on the island, restore democracy there, eliminate Cuban intervention, and prevent future Cuban forays into Grenada. Operation Urgent Fury, as it was code-named, was a go. Weinberger gave Chairman Vessey full power to conduct the operation, with authority to call up additional forces, deploy them, and issue guidance to unified and specified commanders without obtaining the secretary of defense's approval.¹⁷

The Invasion and Weinberger's Oversight Role

At this point Weinberger's role was one of oversight of a hastily planned and assembled military operation. The details of Operation Urgent Fury, which are beyond the scope of this chapter, have been examined in both official and unofficial accounts. Suffice it to say that the operation, in the words of one official historian, "was marred by inadequate time for planning, lack of tactical intelligence, and problems with joint command and control." It took a week for over 7,000 U.S. soldiers, marines, and airmen to defeat the Grenadian army and the real core of enemy resistance, the Cuban workers. The cost to the U.S. military services in




U.S. marines in Grenville, Grenada, October 25, 1983. *OSD Records*

casualties was high: 19 personnel killed and 144 wounded. General Colin Powell, then Weinberger's military assistant, later described the operation as "hardly a model of service cooperation.... The invasion of Grenada succeeded, but it was a sloppy success."¹⁸

At the beginning of the invasion, Weinberger approved a decision that would come back to haunt the Pentagon. At the request of the joint task force commander, Vice Adm. Joseph Metcalf III, who had Admiral McDonald's support, Weinberger agreed that no print or broadcast correspondents would be allowed to accompany U.S. forces landing on the island. The press was furious. In Weinberger and the admirals' defense, CBS News had learned about and, in an October 21 broadcast, reported on the diversion of MARG 1-84 and the *Independence* battle group towards Grenada. Pentagon officials believed it gave the Grenadians and Cubans a warning that an attack was imminent and forced the operation to speed up its timetable without sufficient intelligence and planning. On the eve of the landings, Weinberger was not prepared to risk another leak. He expected that Metcalf would allow press coverage by the second day of the operation. When the admiral did not, the secretary and JCS chairman insisted that he do so on day three. Weinberger did himself no favors when on October 26 he told news correspondents at the Pentagon that the reason the press was denied access during the first two days was for their own safety, which at best was a half-truth. Some reporters clearly resented the exclusion, and some in the Pentagon believed this led to negative coverage. Critical articles and media reports would continue into 1984. General Vessey later observed, "The huge mistake at the National level was failing to find a way to take some press along."¹⁹

Weinberger had recommended to the president that Navy SEALs provide tactical intelligence prior to the landings at the Point Salines runway, on the southwestern tip of Grenada, and at Pearls Airport, on the east coast of the island. The operations initially proved only half successful. On the early morning of October 24, C-130 aircraft dropped two teams of four SEALs in two small, open, outboard-motored Boston Whaler boats. One boat was to reconnoiter Point Salines and the other Pearls. The Pearls team successfully landed only to discover that it was not a good place for an amphibious landing; they recommended a helicopter assault. The Point Salines four-man SEAL team disappeared in rough seas, becoming the first deaths in the operation. A second team was assembled and reconnoitered Point Salines. When the president was informed of the loss,



according to Vessey, “He expressed great concern about the missing seal team members.” It was not an auspicious start to the operation. Weinberger’s other decision, in keeping with his earlier advice to Reagan, was that the operation should not skimp on force numbers. On October 25 he approved a request from Metcalf through McDonald that two of the battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, be dispatched to Grenada to reinforce the assault on Point Salines.²⁰

An issue that engaged the DoD’s top lawyer, William Taft, was the legal basis for the deployment of U.S. troops to Grenada. This legality was sensitive since British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, a close friend and ally of Reagan, was highly displeased with the U.S. decision to intervene in a British Commonwealth nation. “I must tell you at once that the decision you describe causes us great concern,” she told the president when he informed her on October 25 of his decision to invade. “This action will be seen as intervention by a western democratic country in the internal affairs of a small independent nation however unattractive its regime.” Taft joined a State, DoD, and Justice ad hoc group to develop “a polished analysis of the legal justification for our activities in Grenada.” The principal justifications, in the legal group’s view, were the authority of the president to protect U.S. citizens and the obligation to respond to a request from the OECS to reestablish security in Grenada. Documentation of the third justification became available after U.S. forces freed the governor-general of Grenada and representative of Head of State Queen Elizabeth II, Sir Paul Scoon, from house arrest. Scoon repeated in writing an earlier oral request that the OECS reestablish order on the island, meaning that a representative of the British crown had in effect requested help, despite Thatcher’s misgivings.²¹

On October 28, as the fighting ebbed, Weinberger briefed the



Sir Paul Scoon, governor-general of Grenada, November 9, 1983. *OSD Records*



Some of the rescued medical students of St. George's Medical School before returning to the United States, October 26, 1983. *OSD Records*

president on the operation. All the students were rescued without suffering any injuries. He noted that "all branches of the military performed in superb fashion ... and the morale of U.S. troops was splendid." The Grenada operation, in Weinberger's view, confirmed the success of the DoD's efforts since January 20, 1981, to improve readiness. When asked about Grenada in 2002, Weinberger recalled, "There was a lot of criticism of it: We didn't have enough maps, and we didn't have this and that, and we didn't have good communications between the various units. But it was very hastily put together, and we won. So it would be hard to say, from my point of view, that it was not successful." Weinberger's first characterization, in the afterglow of victory, was far too optimistic; his later reflection was more realistic. Nevertheless, as the first major military operation after Vietnam, albeit against an extremely small and lightly armed force, it is not surprising that Reagan officials saw it in the best light. The U.S. subdued the island and freed the students.²²

Postconflict Issues

Once the fighting ended in Grenada the Reagan administration, DoD, and Depart-

ment of State faced a host of decisions. These included the disposition of captured Cubans and how to expedite evacuation of the surprisingly large number of Soviet Bloc, North Korean, and Libyan diplomatic personnel in Grenada. Other issues included what to do with captured Soviet weapons, and how to utilize captured Grenadian documents related to the overthrow of the Gairy government, the murder of Bishop, and the workings of the revolutionary regime. To the DoD the most important question was when U.S. forces could withdraw from the island and what kind of a police force could be established to maintain law and order after they left. The question of physical damage to Grenada and the problem of establishing democracy also loomed large.²³

U.S. armed forces captured 602 Cuban nationals, some of them wounded, in Grenada. The Cuban wounded were evacuated immediately under the auspices of the International Red Cross. Cubans not wounded and detained represented a potential intelligence asset, but they proved uncooperative when questioned. Furthermore, there were not enough Spanish-speaking interpreters to interrogate them. The administration decided upon early repatriation of these POWs. Once the detainees became aware of plans for their early release, they were even less willing to cooperate with interrogators. On November 3, 1983, the first hundred



Wounded Cuban POWs being returned to Cuba, November 4, 1983. *OSD Records*

Cuban detainees boarded U.S. Air Force C-130s to fly to Barbados for transfer to Air Cubana passenger planes for the final leg to Cuba. By November 9 all Cuban detainees were home. Governor-General Scoon suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Soviet Bloc nations. Bona fide Cuban, Libyan, North Korean, Palestinian, Kampuchean, Vietnamese, and Soviet Bloc diplomats and their dependents were ordered to leave on U.S. aircraft for other Caribbean islands of their choice. This included Cuban diplomats who had engaged in combat.²⁴

U.S. forces discovered large caches of Soviet Bloc weapons and equipment in warehouses in Grenada, most still in crates. Obviously such numbers of weapons and equipment were far beyond the needs of the Grenadian army. The weapons cache size, according to Weinberger, was enough to equip an 18-battalion force of between 7,200 and 10,000 personnel. If the revolutionary government could have raised enough troops to use these weapons, an unlikely possibility, Marxist Grenada would have become a military powerhouse, with one of the largest armies in the Caribbean. Four hundred and forty tons of these captured weapons went on public display at Andrews Air Force Base and were viewed by 17,000 people. Eventually, all of the captured Eastern Bloc weapons were stockpiled for potential use by armed liberation and democratic movements friendly to the United States.²⁵

Most useful from a propaganda and intelligence angle were the extensive documents captured during the operation. Like all good Marxist-Leninists, the Grenadian government kept excellent records, including correspondence with Havana and Moscow. U.S. forces collected 35,000 pounds of material including official government treaties, orders, minutes of meetings, correspondence, personal diaries, telexes to and from foreign governments, and government and New Jewel Movement financial records. All the documents were sent to the Defense Intelligence Agency for intelligence assessment. It did not take long for intelligence analysts to recognize that they had a valuable insight into how the Soviet Union and Cuba helped undermine a legitimate government, created a communist proxy, and used Grenada as a base for support of communist insurgencies. As Weinberger later told the president, "The evidence [obtained from the documents] does indeed confirm our initial fears that the USSR and Cuba were turning Grenada into a center for further subversion in the region." The Department of Defense copied, indexed, cataloged, and controlled each of the documents. A selection of the best and most representative documents was col-

lected in a facsimile documentary collection, *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection*, released by State and Defense in September 1984.²⁶

For the Department of Defense, the most pressing issue after Operation Urgent Fury was the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Grenada and the creation of a police force to provide security once they left. Soon after the fighting stopped, the president requested that Weinberger provide recommendations for these two requirements. Weinberger responded immediately that by November 13 the Pentagon had drawn down its forces from a peak of 7,400 to 4,700 troops on the island. Although Urgent Fury had technically been a multilateral operation, OECS forces played only a token role and did not engage in combat. While those forces could now provide personnel for a temporary security force, Weinberger was unable to provide Reagan with immediate and specific recommendations for training a Grenadian police force, humanitarian assistance, civic action, and construction and repair of facilities damaged during the operation. Such tasks required more time and study.²⁷

On December 9, 1983, Weinberger informed McFarlane of CINCLANT's plan to withdraw most U.S. troops from Grenada. After December 14 the U.S. military presence would be reduced to between 273 and 350 personnel and



Members of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force, October 25, 1983. *OSD Records*

the primary security force would consist of a company of U.S. military police. Maritime surveillance of the island would be provided by CINCLANT and U.S. Coast Guard assets. As U.S. combat forces were withdrawn, Weinberger noted, the DoD's emphasis should shift to training the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF)—originally to be composed of members from all the OECS's armed forces, but in the end manned mostly by members of the Jamaica Defense Force and residual U.S. forces in Grenada.²⁸

The CPF had two missions: to provide security for Grenada, thus allowing U.S. forces to withdraw, and to provide time for the training of a Grenadian police force. Almost none of the OECS members had the manpower or the financial resources to do the jobs. As a result, the Jamaica Defence Force, the best armed force in the Caribbean, provided the bulk of the non-U.S. CPF. Furthermore, all OECS forces were equipped with British weapons, some of them obsolete. Only Jamaica and Barbados had contributed troops to Operation Urgent Fury; the remaining Caribbean states sent police personnel. U.S. troops had to equip the CPF with U.S. weapons and train them for internal security functions. As of the end of December 1983, the CPF consisted of 275 U.S. Army personnel, 94 U.S. Coast Guard personnel, and 450 personnel from Caribbean nations (mostly Jamaica).²⁹

The existing Grenadian police force was a shambles. The People's Revolutionary Army had usurped their role after the revolution and before U.S. intervention. Some of the police had been supporters of the revolutionary government, and some were thought to have connections to the New Jewel Movement or previously deposed Prime Minister Gairy. Whatever their previous allegiances, the remaining 307 Grenadian police had little in the way of training, discipline, equipment, or morale.³⁰

It took much longer than expected to train the Grenadian police, and therefore the CPF tours had to be extended until February 1985. At the rate it was going, the Department of State estimated it would take two years from mid-1984 to produce enough competent Grenadian police. An interagency group recommended speeding up the process. But under Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, U.S. armed forces were prohibited from training foreign police forces. This complication required that other countries provide such training. The administration settled on an accelerated 17-week course which would provide 300 police personnel in addition to the 130 already in training. After

consultation with Congress, U.S. troops were allowed to conduct a three-week course of physical and basic military training with screening and background checks to identify potential candidates for the police force. The next phase, six weeks of police training, was done by the British and the West Indian nations. The third and last phase consisted of special security training for eight weeks by U.S. Army mobile training teams. Such training had previously been provided to the special service units of eastern Caribbean nations and therefore passed muster with Congress's prohibition under section 660. The objective of this last phase of training was to create a 125-person Grenadian Special Services Unit, an elite police unit for Grenada.³¹

By mid-1985 the Reagan administration had withdrawn all U.S. personnel from Grenada with the exception of temporary-duty trainers and U.S. Coast Guard trainers, who remained until 1986 to finish their training of the Grenada Coast Guard. As for the CPF, 72 non-U.S. personnel remained as a residual peace-keeping force until September 1985. In December 1983 Governor-General Scoon appointed an interim prime minister to run the government until parliamentary elections were held a year later and a democratic prime minister and his party assumed the reins of government.³²

The president had asked the Pentagon to help undertake the economic reconstruction of Grenada. While war damage had been light, Grenada's economy wasn't very strong to begin with. Foremost was the damaged and unfinished runway and airport at Point Salines. Without a strong economy, based in good part on tourism, Grenada's economic and democratic future was questionable. A modern airport was essential to tourism. The Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and international lending organizations provided most of the funding support to revive Grenada's economic infrastructure. In October 1984 the Point Salines airport opened, allowing transoceanic commercial jet aircraft to land. Just after the fighting ended, the DoD's contribution to economic reconstructions included initial repairs to water and electrical systems, public building, roads, and bridges. In November 1983, 30 volunteers from the Army Reserve's 345th Public Affairs Detachment and 358th Civil Affairs Brigade of Pennsylvania went to Grenada to assist in assessments and repair of war damage, restoration of public facilities and services, and resettlement of displaced persons. The Army Claims Service established an office in Grenada and processed several hundred claims from Grenadians for compensation for war damage.

Larger claims—estimated to be \$10 million—included damage to a hospital, a telephone exchange, and some equipment of foreign contractors at Point Salines and were processed later.³³

As mentioned above, the Pentagon's decision to not allow the print and broadcast media to accompany troops on the first two days of the invasion proved contentious. The press was also unsatisfied with the scant information military spokespersons provided during the operation. In November 1983 General Vessey asked retired Army Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle to convene a panel and make recommendations for press coverage for future military operations. Vessey and Sidle attempted to recruit members from major press organizations to serve on the panel along with DoD representatives. The press organizations declined but agreed to give testimony. The Sidle panel relied instead on retired print journalists, retired broadcast correspondents, and academics for its outside expert members. During early February 1984 the Sidle panel heard testimony from major news outlets, all of which argued that the U.S. media should be allowed to cover military operations to the maximum extent consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S. forces.³⁴

As the military assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs suggested to Weinberger, "Our challenge is to find a responsible compromise between a complete blackout and a dangerous free-for-all." The Sidle panel recommended that DoD establish a pool of reporters to accompany U.S. forces in future military operations. The pool would make their reportage available to other interested media outlets. In October 1984 the DoD established such a pool, consisting of one reporter each from the Associated Press, United Press International, the three broadcast networks (CBS, NBC, and ABC), and the Cable News Network, along with a radio reporter, a news magazine reporter, and a newspaper journalist.³⁵

One of the most persistent claims about Operation Urgent Fury, mentioned often by news accounts, was that military communications were so ineffectual that soldiers and marines had to make telephone calls from Grenada with their personal phone credit cards on land lines (cellular phones were not yet affordable or all that portable) to contact their commanders during combat operations. In late October 1985 the Joint Staff examined the charge. The staff could not verify that any calls were made from U.S. units in Grenada to the United States. They based this claim in part on the fact that the commercial international telephone

links out of Grenada were destroyed during the invasion and were not restored for three weeks. However, this interruption of service would not preclude calls to the United States from other parts of the Caribbean. For example, members of the 82nd Airborne aviation unit made calls from Barbados to Fort Bragg to request spare parts for their Blackhawk helicopters. The most significant communications incident occurred in Grenada when Navy SEALs sent to rescue Governor-General Scoon could not establish contact with the Special Operations Command's assault command post because their radio was inoperative. The command post called the governor's mansion on a Grenadian land line to reestablish contact with the SEAL team so as to arrange fire support from an AC-130 gunship. The Special Operations Command had obtained commercial telephone numbers of key Grenadian government buildings and facilities for just such a possibility. While these incidents indicated problems with communications, they were not the norm, but rather the exception.³⁶

These sporadic communications failures were part of a larger critique of Operation Urgent Fury. Foremost among the critics was William S. Lind, Senator Gary Hart's staff aide, who wrote a report on the operation for the Military Reform Caucus of which Hart was a member. Lind charged that the Joint Chiefs required seven battalions plus elements of two other battalions to defeat 700 Cubans and a Grenadian army force of about 800 effectives. The Grenadian soldiers surrendered or deserted almost immediately; the Cubans did the fighting. Lind compared this ratio to the British defeat of 11,000 Argentinian troops in the Falklands with only eight infantry battalions. Lind also criticized U.S. tactics, suggesting that U.S. commanders should have executed a *coup de main*—a sudden forceful attack—instead of what he considered to be the overuse of unconventional forces to seize various objectives piecemeal, thus giving Cuban defenders time to organize an effective defense. In Lind's mind, the Army was overly anxious to give its Rangers a piece of the action. He also criticized the SEAL operations, claiming all but one was a failure. Lind's larger criticism was that Operation Urgent Fury was not a joint operation; he called it "pie dividing operation," one undertaken to ensure all the services could claim their part. Lind also found helicopter losses—9 out of 107 helicopters in three days of fighting—to be surprising. He criticized the Rangers and later the 82nd Airborne's assault on Point Salines as a costly linear frontal assault.³⁷

General Vessey authorized a point-by-point analysis of the Lind report

that sought to refute most of his charges. It was later made public. As to the most important claims by Lind, the JCS analysis countered that the Falklands conflict was a protracted fight lasting weeks and including submarine, air, and anti-aircraft warfare; special operations; and a conventional amphibious assault. The eight British battalions were part of larger forces that did not have the constraints imposed on U.S. forces in Grenada. The two scenarios were not comparable. The Grenada invasion was in fact a coup de main focusing on the capture of two airfields and the rescue of U.S. citizens. The Joint Chiefs' analysis rejected the claim that there was "pie dividing" among the services, asserting that the marines, special forces, and 82nd Airborne were chosen because of their availability, proximity to Grenada, and combat capabilities. SEAL operations, notwithstanding casualties, were successful. The rangers and 82nd Airborne engaged in numerous flanking operations against the Cubans at Point Salines. Army and Marine helicopter losses were as expected, and some helicopters survived heavy anti-aircraft and ground fire.³⁸

Nevertheless, subsequent official after-action reports and lessons-learned studies compiled by analysts from the Army and Navy concluded that joint planning for the operation had been less than perfect. A general theme running through these reports was that command relations were sometimes confused and misunderstood, coordination of fire support was sometimes lacking, and airspace management, medical arrangements, and logistical support often proved problematic. They noted that U.S. troops landed on Grenada without adequate military maps.³⁹

Even in the face of these later criticisms, Weinberger remained convinced that the Grenada operation was an overwhelming success. This conclusion was driven home to him when he witnessed the sorry denouement of the Lebanon peacekeeping operation in 1984. After the U.S. marine and French army barracks bombing, Reagan and Shultz kept the peacekeeping force in Beirut almost to prove a point, but eventually Reagan ordered a withdrawal, leaving Lebanon to its fate. On his own initiative, Weinberger and his immediate staff drafted a document providing six guidelines to be followed before U.S. forces were committed to operations abroad in the future. Weinberger asked his military assistant, General Colin Powell, to review it and circulate it among Reagan's national security team. In clear and precise lawyerly terms free of military jargon, Weinberger presented the case. First, the United States should not commit to combat troops abroad

unless that commitment supported U.S. and/or U.S. allies' vital interests. Second, once the commitment was agreed on, it should be wholeheartedly provided with the necessary resources to succeed. Third, such a commitment must have clearly defined political and military objectives and be undertaken with the knowledge of how U.S. forces could accomplish these objectives. Fourth, the relationship between objectives and forces must remain flexible and subject to continual reassessment and adjustment, if necessary. Fifth, such combat operations must have the support of the American people and Congress. Sixth, commitment of U.S. forces should be a last resort.⁴⁰

Not only did Weinberger want the Reagan administration to apply his guidelines in future decisions, but he wanted to make his doctrine public. The White House staff refused until after the 1984 elections, fearing that such a statement could be used against the administration in criticizing the Lebanon disaster. After the elections, Weinberger outlined his six guidelines in a speech at the National Press Club. At the time Powell, who had reviewed the guidelines for the secretary, worried that such an explicit statement might allow U.S. adversaries to calibrate their action to avoid the six tests. Yet, after he successfully directed the first Gulf War as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Powell enunciated what observers dubbed the Powell doctrine, eight guidelines that were inspired by and which included Weinberger's six-point doctrine.⁴¹

Operation Urgent Fury was Weinberger's first experience with a large combat operation as secretary of defense. The Lebanon peacekeeping operations, which degenerated into armed conflict with Muslim militias, were much smaller in scope. In Grenada Weinberger initially advocated caution, citing a lack of intelligence about the enemy and a lack of time to plan the operation. In this case, Shultz and Reagan pushed for an immediate operation. The result was an operation hastily planned in a matter of days, assembled from the available military assets. Problems were to be expected. Operation Urgent Fury fulfilled its objectives. It rescued American medical students from potential danger, overturned a hostile Marxist regime, eliminated Cuban influence on the island, reestablished security and parliamentary government, and ultimately helped revive the economic prospects of Grenada. Weinberger's major accomplishment was to let the military do its job without second guessing or undue interference from the Pentagon's civilian leadership. His insistence on adequate forces to accomplish the operation was good

advice, in keeping with the later Weinberger doctrine. Weinberger played a role in the successful postconflict stage in Grenada. The Pentagon and Department of State repatriated Cuban POWs and Soviet Bloc diplomats, armed and trained the Caribbean Peace Force, rebuilt Grenada's infrastructure with funding from the Agency for International Development, and reconstituted the island's police force. These substantial achievements paved the way for a return of democracy.

Nevertheless, Operation Urgent Fury was not without its problems and many of the criticisms of it were valid. Perhaps most telling was the realization that the services still did not operate well jointly. The Atlantic Command, the Military Airlift Command, the Special Operations Command, the joint task force under Vice Admiral Metcalf, and the 82nd Airborne Division were, in the words of one military historian, "not integrated into an efficient organization for combat." This was a problem that had troubled the U.S. military for decades and would not be fully solved by Weinberger during his tenure. On the positive side, the inadequacies of joint control in Operation Urgent Fury provided ammunition for proponents of reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see chapter 6). Grenada played a part in convincing Congress to pass the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which strengthened the JCS chairman's authority, improved the workings of the Joint Staff, and encouraged more cooperation among the military services in future military operations.⁴²

Central America, Cuba, and South America

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MARXIST SANDINISTA government in Nicaragua during the final years of the Carter presidency and that regime's support for a home-grown leftist guerrilla insurgency in nearby El Salvador presented Reagan officials with what they considered to be a security threat on America's doorstep. Ever since Fidel Castro's 1959 triumph in Cuba, each U.S. president had sought to prevent another communist government in the Western Hemisphere. In 1979 the dam burst in Nicaragua. In the view of Reagan's team, the resulting flood threatened the rest of Central America. A consensus existed among Reagan, his major national security advisers including Weinberger, the intelligence agencies, and most members of Congress regarding the ultimate goals of the Sandinistas. With Cuban and Soviet Bloc support, the Nicaraguan revolutionaries planned to overthrow the oligarchies and military juntas of Central America and establish communist states. Although united on the nature of the Sandinista threat, the Reagan administration failed to agree on how to combat it. Reagan's policy advisers—such as Weinberger, Secretaries of State Haig and then Shultz, Director of Central Intelligence Bill Casey, and National Security Advisers Clark and then McFarlane—recommended multiple solutions. They promoted either regional diplomacy, direct talks with the Sandinistas, military assistance and training for threatened U.S. Central American allies, covert action programs or overt military action against the Sandinistas, or striking Cuba, the supposed wellhead of the trouble. Reagan's advisers failed to combine these strategies effectively. The result was an effort that lurched from one often-competing stratagem to another.¹

Central America. *OSD/HO*

After the Sandinistas overthrew the long-established dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in 1979, a government of National Reconstruction composed of Sandinistas and middle-class business leaders took power. Initially the Carter administration hoped that this unlikely coalition would create a pluralistic and representative society in Nicaragua. On that assumption, Carter continued U.S. economic assistance to the country. But as the revolutionaries in Managua consolidated their control of society and supported guerrillas in El Salvador, Carter reduced economic aid and instituted a program of covert support of anti-Sandinista elements. At the Pentagon's urging Carter increased nonlethal military aid to El Salvador's beleaguered armed forces, by then reeling from an insurgency supported in large part by Nicaragua and Cuba.²

Weinberger and the Pentagon inherited a Central America in crisis. At Reagan's second National Security Council meeting on February 11, 1981, the participants discussed the emergency. The ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence A. Pezzullo, a holdover from the Carter administration, told the gathering, "The

Sandinistas have the guns, but they don't have complete control." He reported that the United States had channeled aid to the private sector and the free press, specifically the leading newspaper, *La Prensa*. In addition, Pezzullo reported, the Catholic Church represented another viable democratic element in Nicaragua. The ambassador suggested using existing diplomatic and intelligence assets, the prospect of U.S. economic assistance, and pressure from regional allies to convince Managua that support of the insurgency in El Salvador was not in its best interest. Even at this early meeting, the lines of division on Central America emerged. Alexander Haig recommended to "go to the source of the problem ... Cuba" and employ military pressure on Castro to discourage Cuban support of the Sandinistas and the guerrillas in El Salvador. Bill Casey stressed clandestine solutions. Weinberger opposed U.S. military action either in Central America or against Cuba. Weinberger's prescription for preventing a Nicaraguan-Cuban dominated Central America was U.S. military assistance, training, and joint military exercises with U.S. allies there. He remained cautious of using U.S. military force against the Sandinistas or Cubans. "The problem with military action," the Pentagon chief stated, "is that as it escalates, Congressional checks come into play." However, the president warned, "If the Junta falls in El Salvador, it will be seen as an American defeat.... We must not let Central America become another Cuba on the mainland. It cannot happen."³

El Salvador

The Nicaraguan Sandinistas and Castro's Cuba supported the insurgency in El Salvador as the next step in a Marxist revolution in Central America. They increased their military support for what they hoped would be a final guerrilla offensive in January 1981, one that threatened to topple the U.S.-backed military government in San Salvador. In its final days the Carter administration freed up military aid and allowed, on a temporary-duty basis, three small training teams totaling 19 personnel to help El Salvadoran security forces guard the harvest against guerrilla attack, maintain the six UH-1H helicopters that the Carter administration provided on a grant basis, and train Salvadoran helicopter pilots. Soon after Weinberger took office, the DoD recommended sending five additional military training teams comprising 23 personnel to assist regional security forces and the Salvadoran navy, train small units, and create a psychological operations capability and a civic-action program to help create a better, more responsive government.⁴

With the Vietnam experience much on his mind, Reagan asked at an NSC meeting in late February whether the U.S. trainers would remain in garrison or go on patrol. Weinberger responded that they would not patrol or accompany Salvadoran helicopter pilots on combat missions. They would use their weapons only in self-defense and would be stationed in the more secure areas of the country. Vice President George Bush worried about the consequences if one of these trainers were killed. Both Weinberger and Haig agreed they should be in uniform. "Avoid the Laos approach," Haig suggested, "don't sneak them in." By early March 1981 the president had approved the dispatch of these additional training teams—bringing their total to 55 servicemen—and \$20 million in defense supplies and education and training funds for El Salvador. In addition, Reagan also approved an intelligence finding allowing further covert political and propaganda support of the civilian-military junta of El Salvador, beyond that approved by the previous administration.⁵

During the remainder of 1981 U.S. military officers and civilians visited El Salvador to assess the progress of the war against the guerrillas and the work of the 55 trainers. By an unofficial agreement with Congress, the Pentagon limited in-country military trainers to 55, although Weinberger's team increasingly looked for ways to train national guard and national police outside of El Salvador. Although Salvadoran security forces had blunted the January 1981 guerrilla offensive, official U.S. visitors' assessments of their abilities ranged from pessimistic to cautiously optimistic. At best the fighting had stalemated, with the 4,500 full-time and 4,000 part-time guerrillas comprising the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) still able to mount campaigns of 100 to 200 fighters. The Salvadoran armed forces, with 16,000 personnel, usually rebuffed these attacks, but they were only reacting, not taking the battle to the guerrilla enemy. Some of the methods of the Salvadoran security forces, which often included indiscriminate killings of civilian FMLN supporters, did not help the case on Capitol Hill for U.S. aid to the Salvadoran military. The toll of the war on the Salvadoran economy was high. Weinberger told DCI Casey that real income was down 25 percent in El Salvador from 1979, capital was flying out of the country, and disinvestment and brain drain were on the rise.⁶

For the Reagan administration, the legacy of Vietnam loomed over El Salvador. Congress, the U.S. media, and the State Department considered 55 trainers (they often acted as combat advisers) to be a hard-and-fast limit. Any more trainers

or advisers in El Salvador would indicate that the Reagan administration was on the road to escalation, wading deeper into the big muddy quagmire that had characterized war in Southeast Asia. An added consideration was that additional advisers would trigger calls for official notification to Congress of U.S. combat engagement under the War Powers Act, which the administration hoped to avoid.⁷

Without the ability to send more trainers or advisers to El Salvador, the administration compensated by providing the Salvadoran armed forces more military assistance, increased intelligence sharing, enhancement of its own intelligence capabilities, and clandestine U.S. efforts to prevent the flow of arms from Nicaragua and Cuba to the FMLN. The DoD worked to convince the junta to fight the war more efficiently and aggressively. In fall 1981 Brig. Gen. Frederick F. Woerner Jr., USA, the Southern Command's brigade commander, visited El Salvador to determine what it would take to win. Woerner's military strategy assistance team recommended a strategy that it said would destroy the insurgents' will and capacity to fight, establish public order, and enable El Salvador to defend its territory from internal and external aggression. It envisioned a 25-battalion armed force (40,000 personnel) with some quick-reaction battalions; extensive new material and equipment, including a modernized rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft inventory; increased Navy patrol boats; improved command, control, communications, and intelligence; a combat support system; and a training base. Such a strategy would cost approximately \$300 million in U.S. security assistance for a five-year program. The JCS added that the strategy had to be accompanied by economic and political reform and assumed that external support for the FMLN did not dramatically increase.⁸

The Woerner team recommendations were far more ambitious and expensive than Reagan and Weinberger were prepared to accept. As a result, progress in combating El Salvador's insurgency proved painfully slow. The lack of progress became evident when, on January 27, 1982, FMLN guerrillas attacked Ilopango Air Base, destroying or damaging almost half of El Salvador's air force. The Pentagon rushed replacements and upgrades, increasing the number of UH-1H helicopters for El Salvador to 18 and upgrading its jet fighter and transport aircraft.⁹

Echoes of Vietnam-type involvement continued to complicate policy. The press photographed five U.S. military personnel during a training exercise carrying M16 rifles. It was Congress' understanding that U.S. trainers would only carry sidearms for self-defense. In fact, the embassy and Pentagon had allowed

trainers to keep M16s in their houses and vehicles when traveling outside of San Salvador. Weinberger argued trainers needed M16s for self-defense. The president agreed, and trainers were allowed to carry M16s.¹⁰

After what the Reagan administration considered fair legislative elections in March 1982, El Salvador formed the representative Constituent Assembly, a potential first step on the road to democracy. Presidential elections would follow in 1984. While the United States increased its financial and material support of El Salvador's security forces, by the end of 1982 progress in the fight against the insurgency was slow, if not moribund, with the morale of El Salvador's forces low. Even with the legislative elections, the political situation saw little unity of purpose, but rather infighting and jockeying for power among the civilian-military junta. The economy continued its nosedive. As the new deputy secretary of defense, Paul Thayer, learned from International Security Affairs head Bing West in February 1983, poor leadership in five of the six Salvadoran Army brigades meant that "large-unit sweeps are conducted infrequently and the guerrillas roam freely in the interim.... At best, the outlook is for little or no military progress in 1983, while [U.S.] Congressional opposition mounts and Congressional appropriations drop."¹¹

At the end of February 1983 the Reagan administration resolved anew to tackle the deteriorating situation in El Salvador. An interagency group recommended that the visit of Pope John Paul II in early March was an opportunity, notwithstanding the elections of the National Assembly, to encourage the junta that still dominated El Salvador to get its political house in order and convince the U.S. Congress that El Salvador was worth supporting. As for the Salvadoran security forces, the group suggested that they had to "overcome their garrison mentality," invigorate its officer corps with new younger leadership, and terminate its "sweep and scoot" strategy in favor of a real counterinsurgency program. More U.S. military trainers, more military resources for El Salvador, and better interdiction of supplies for the guerrillas were needed to accomplish these goals. At a National Security Planning Group meeting on February 24, 1983, the president's advisers made the case to him. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John Vessey outlined a major expansion of U.S. military support for El Salvador: raise the ceiling of U.S. trainers from 55 to 200, spend \$60 million more on military assistance, use AWACS and AC-130 aircraft to detect incoming arms-smuggling aircraft, and deploy sophisticated intelligence collection methods to inhibit

resupply of the guerrillas from Nicaragua. Although sympathetic, the president was not prepared to go as far as Vessey recommended. He approved a "military presence in El Salvador ... sufficiently augmented to permit the U.S. to better influence the prosecution of the war," but sending 200 U.S. trainers was out of the question. The president ordered the CIA and DoD to develop improved intelligence collection and dissemination capability to assist Salvadoran and Honduran forces to interdict arms shipments from Nicaragua. The president also approved U.S. support for tactical improvements to the Salvadoran security forces to allow them to initiate a full-scale countrywide counterinsurgency program that included psychological operations and a civic-action program. He would inform Congress of a plan to reprogram \$60 million in additional military resources for the Salvadoran Army.¹²

Congress was deeply divided about increased military assistance to El Salvador. Some legislators on Capitol Hill, especially Democrats, worried about the regime's human rights violations, such as its imprisonment of political opponents and its continued reliance on right-wing paramilitary groups, commonly referred to as "death squads." There was considerable skepticism on Capitol Hill about the junta's commitment to a free and fair presidential election and its willingness to bring to justice those involved in the rape and murder of American missionaries in El Salvador in December 1980. In addition, legislators insisted that the number of U.S. military trainers and advisers not exceed 55. The result was that Congress kept a tight leash on military aid to El Salvador, doling it out in six-month increments of limited funding—never as much as the administration requested—only after being assured by the administration that the junta was making progress. U.S. military assistance to El Salvador became a catch-as-catch-can operation.¹³

Weinberger was convinced that "the situation in El Salvador was not beyond help." Faced with the twin tasks of defending its economic structure and going on the offensive against the insurgents, El Salvador required \$110 million in military assistance in FY 1983 for a comprehensive plan (\$60 million in reprogramming to fund critical consumables such as ammunition and spare parts plus a \$50 million supplemental appropriation for training and upgrades for the Salvadoran national guard). This funding would allow El Salvador to station a 320-man light infantry battalion capable of responding to emergencies in each of its 14 geographical military departments. In addition, the \$110 million would fund improvements in mobility, intelligence, and communications that would let

El Salvador take the fight to the guerrillas. In effect, the \$110 million was designed as the first major step to transforming the El Salvadoran military from a reactive, hold-the-line operation to a real counterinsurgency force. Unfortunately for the DoD and El Salvador, Congress was not about to fund military assistance on such a scale. Congress appropriated only \$30 million in reprogrammed funds, with the additional supplemental request for \$50 million still pending.¹⁴

In the mid-May 1984 presidential elections, former junta leader and Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte defeated right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance candidate Roberto D'Aubuisson in the presidential election. Later in the month five Salvadoran guardsmen were found guilty of murdering the American missionaries in December 1980. During the first four months of 1984 the Salvadoran military deployed over 70 percent of its troops in the field. All these developments might have convinced Congress that the situation was improving. Yet the killings of civilians opposed to the government continued on a large scale. Congressional funding for military aid to El Salvador remained problematic. The administration asked for a \$179 million supplemental for military assistance to El Salvador for fiscal year 1984, but received funding of \$62 million, of which almost \$30 million had already been spent under the president's discretionary power. By



President José Napoleón Duarte and Captain Gerald E. Gneckow on the deck of the battleship USS Iowa, August 1, 1984. *OSD Records*

1984 the focus of Congress shifted to the Reagan administration's support of the Contra insurgents fighting the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. With escalating concern and debate over funding the Contras, El Salvador slipped to the back burner and the insurgency ground on. Increasingly, Weinberger, the Joint Chiefs, and the White House sought a regional solution for Central America that focused on Nicaragua. It would prove a difficult task with far-reaching consequences.¹⁵

Nicaragua

The FMLN was a threat to the right-wing government in El Salvador, but the Sandinistas of Nicaragua threatened to export communism to the entire region. The Reagan administration warned that Nicaragua was the dreaded second Marxist regime in Latin America—the second domino in a chain started by Castro. Reagan was determined to not let this communist regime in the Western Hemisphere stand and spread its ideas and influence.¹⁶

During 1981 the Reagan administration struggled to forge a regional policy for Central America that would inhibit Nicaraguan and Cuban support of the insurgency in El Salvador, hamper the Sandinistas from further consolidating their control in Nicaragua, and shore up—politically, militarily, and economically—the other nations of Central America and the Caribbean basin so they could withstand the Marxist threat. Weinberger, Haig, and their respective departments initially held different views about accomplishing these goals. Haig's focus was on Cuba. He argued that unless Castro was dissuaded from exporting arms and revolution, Central America could not be saved. The secretary of state recommended increased political pressure on Havana, expanded military exercises near Cuba, and, if necessary, a quarantine on Cuba to cut off the flow of arms to Central America. Haig's ultimate goal was a diplomatic agreement with Cuba to curtail its subversive efforts in Central America. Weinberger and the Pentagon acknowledged that Cuba was the ultimate source of much of the trouble in Central America, but they shied away from Haig's recommendations for direct confrontation. As Iklé told Weinberger, "Our view here (which, I believe, is shared in CIA) is that we should not expect much from a deal with Castro, but should focus directly on the Central American problems, particularly Nicaragua." To Iklé, Nicaragua had the potential to "become the 'North Vietnam' of the region, both militarily and politically," which could ultimately subvert all of Central America and even Mexico. The DoD's strategy for Nicaragua, Iklé

maintained, should include overt and covert encouragement of the remaining democratic institutions there, support for political moderates, using U.S. military forces to impede Cuban assistance to El Salvador via Nicaragua, and, if necessary, overthrowing the regime in Managua.¹⁷

At the NSC meeting on November 10, 1981, Haig and Weinberger explained their strategies to the president. Haig argued that the Cubans were rattled, noting, "They have made countless overtures to talk." With a little military pressure, Haig believed, he could make a deal with Castro. True to his basic philosophy of applying military force only under limited conditions with clear objectives and domestic support, Weinberger suggested to Reagan, "DoD cannot accept the decision to use unilateral force now. We must go step by step. We must prepare public opinion, and we must work on getting a coalition of Latin American countries to work with us." The president asked a series of questions: Would the United States be accused "of getting into another Vietnam?" Were there other options, such as Vice President Bush's suggestion that the United States mine Nicaragua's Caribbean ports? And "could other covert action be taken that would be truly disabling and not just flea bites?" Reagan ultimately asked for more information.¹⁸

At the NSC meeting on November 16 the discussion continued without a clear policy decision. Haig again made his case for "vigorous action" and for accepting "conceptually the possible need to use force." Weinberger reiterated that "Defense's problem has been the prior commitment to use force without approval of the American people and the U.S. Congress." Weinberger was not prepared to allow Haig to drag the U.S. military into hostilities with Cuba without a clear domestic consensus, although he did agree to extend U.S. naval exercises near Cuba as a signal to Havana. Weinberger enjoyed strong support from Reagan's domestic advisers for his aversion to military solutions. With the economy as their first priority, the last thing Counselor Edwin Meese and Assistant to the President Michael Deaver wanted was a military confrontation with Havana. There was one area, however, where Weinberger and Haig were in agreement: both supported DCI Casey's plan to create an anti-Sandinista guerrilla force. Weinberger observed, using the Spanish abbreviation for the Sandinista National Liberation Front, that "1,500 guerrillas won't overthrow the FSLN but could do a lot of damage." The discussion concluded with an agreement between Haig, Weinberger, and Reagan that overt military contingency plans were required to counter overt Cuban moves, such as blatant Cuban intervention in Nicaragua.

Weinberger stressed that “contingency planning is one thing but a previous commitment to use force is another.”¹⁹

Although not explicitly stated at this NSC meeting, the Reagan administration had made the decision, at DCI Casey’s insistence, to spend \$19 million to secretly fund 500 Contras, as the anti-Sandinista guerrillas came to be known. The backbone of this force was recruited from Somoza-era national guard members who had been training in Argentina. Such a small number of Contras operating out of Honduras could hardly overthrow the revolutionaries in Managua. What Casey initially sought was a counterforce to make the Sandinistas rethink their support for the insurgency in El Salvador. That was how intelligence officials explained this “presidential finding,” as approvals of covert programs were officially called, to members of the intelligence oversight committees in Congress. If Managua continued to support an insurgency in El Salvador, they would have to deal with one in their own backyard. The idea that the Contras could induce the Sandinistas to accept a regional peace agreement, as later suggested by Shultz, was remote. For his part, Weinberger was fully on board with the Casey plan. It was a middle ground between Haig’s potential use of force and doing virtually nothing.²⁰

Notwithstanding the limited start of the Contra program, Casey had great expectations. He envisioned it growing into an insurgency in both Nicaragua’s



Anti-Sandinista Contras on patrol. *Bill Gentile/Image Bank Unreleased via Getty Images*

Spanish- and English-speaking sections (English was spoken on Nicaragua's eastern Caribbean coast). The Contras could thwart the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador and other regional insurgencies, attack the Cuban presence in Nicaragua, and destroy Sandinista military equipment. In addition, the program included overt and covert support to opposition political elements in Nicaragua, the Catholic Church, the free press and radio stations, labor unions not dominated by communists, and private-sector organizations. In commenting on the plan, Iklé told Weinberger and Carlucci that it was his preferred option, although he described it as "a recommendation without wild enthusiasm because this option, as well, has serious risks and will require a most strenuous (and successful) effort to obtain Congressional support."²¹

In 1982 the Contra program began to take off. According to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates, the CIA had by fall of 1982 "wrought a bureaucratic wonder" by assembling a force of 3,700 Contras comprised of 2,300 Spanish speakers, 900 Miskito Indians, and 500 men under the command of former Sandinista leader Eden Pastora, whose group operated out of Costa Rica. When the Argentine military government fell after its defeat in the Falklands War in June 1982 and was replaced by a civilian government, the CIA inherited another 2,000 Contras supported by Argentina. As Gates admitted, the CIA struggled to pay and equip this expanded force. In July 1983 the CIA sought from the U.S. Army sensitive logistical support on a nonreimbursable basis. Secretary of the Army John Marsh remained wary of the reported CIA request for \$28 million. He queried whether such support should first be properly authorized by an intelligence finding, if congressional intelligence oversight committees should be informed, and whether DoD assistance should be part of a plan to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. As Pentagon General Counsel William Taft informed Weinberger, "DoD has no separate appropriations or any other legal authority under which such support could be provided on a non-reimbursable basis, as CIA has requested." Transferring money without congressional authority would be "most unwise" because funding the CIA through the Defense budget was designed to conceal CIA spending, not augment it.²²

In July 1983 the president instructed the Pentagon to give the Contras operation as much assistance as possible. Weinberger wished to be helpful, and Casey increased pressure on the DoD to cooperate. The result was Operation Elephant Herd. Under this operation the Pentagon provided the CIA with surplus weapons

and equipment at the lowest possible price under the Economy Act. The act (Pub. L. 31 U.S.C. 1535) allowed one agency of the government to sell goods or services to another so long as they could not be obtained as cheaply or conveniently from a commercial enterprise or if the sale was deemed to be in the national interest. Elephant Herd permitted the CIA to provide to the Nicaraguan insurgents DoD surplus weapons and create a stockpile of them in case Congress prohibited such assistance in the future. For example, in September 1984 the *Washington Post* charged that the DoD had provided the CIA with three “surplus” Cessna O-2 observation planes, which the newspaper traced back to the New York National Guard. The agency modified the Cessnas to carry rockets. In all, \$12 million in weapons passed from the Pentagon to the agency under this program, reportedly either free of charge or at nominal cost. Operation Elephant Herd continued even after Congress prohibited all U.S. aid to the Contras in October 1984, under the justification that as surplus items the weapons shipped had no value. Elephant Herd thus became a workaround to the congressional prohibition. Many in Congress saw the Contras not as the freedom fighters described in the Reagan administration’s rhetoric, but as a rogue and violent paramilitary force bent on overthrowing the Nicaraguan government.²³

While Weinberger was aware of the Pentagon’s covert role in assisting the Contras and hindering Nicaraguan support for the insurgency in El Salvador, he delegated oversight of these operations to Under Secretary Iklé. The instrument for such “black operations” in the DoD was the Army’s Special Operations Division. Increasingly, the line between CIA operations and those of the Special Operations Division blurred. At Casey’s request, the division’s first commander was reassigned as liaison between the agency and the division. Army personnel were “sheep dipped,” that is, temporarily “retired” and then hired by CIA to engage in logistical, technological, and transport support for the Contras. Within the Pentagon’s vast budget there were ample ways to divert funding to special operations without much notice. Special operations personnel prided themselves on circumventing bureaucratic regulations and requirements and operated without Army oversight. Eventually, however, members of the division alerted the Army leadership to some of their colleagues’ freewheeling ways and apparent lack of fiscal integrity. The Army came down hard on the unit’s personnel. After a lengthy and exhaustive criminal investigation, two members of the division were court-martialed and served prison sentences while 36 members received

disciplinary action. As of 1984 the Special Operations Division was out of the business of covert operations.²⁴

Arming the Contras: The Israeli Connection

Operation Elephant Herd and the activities of the Special Operations Division allowed the Pentagon to equip the Contras without congressional authorization or oversight. Another scheme was equally evasive. In November 1982 DCI Casey asked Weinberger to obtain from the Israelis man-portable weapons captured by the Israel Defense Forces from the Palestine Liberation Organization during its 1982 invasion of Lebanon (see chapter 9). These weapons, mostly of Soviet or Eastern European manufacture, would prove useful for special activities and for use by pro-American unconventional forces. Such forces were often dependent on battlefield recovery for arms supply. What was never officially mentioned in the request was that these weapons would be used to arm the Contras. In late 1982 Maj. Gen. Richard Secord, then in ISA but also one of the Pentagon's experts on unconventional warfare, met with Maj. Gen. Menachem Meron, an Israeli military attaché in Washington, and obtained a promise of 300 metric tons of the desired weapons worth \$10 million for the cost of packing and handling. A DoD team went to Israel in January 1983 to assess the inventory of weapons available. The shipment of 20,000 rifles, 1,000 machine guns, 90 recoilless rifles, 110 mortars, 1,000 hand grenades, and a large supply of ammunition was packed in 34 sea-land shipping containers. The Israeli government was anxious to transfer these weapons quickly and with the lowest possible profile. Weinberger approved transportation by the U.S. Navy to the United States. This transfer of PLO weapons, code-named Tipped Kettle, was especially valuable as it further augmented the Contras' weapon supply at a time when the U.S. Congress was cracking down on funding such assistance. Furthermore, the weapons were virtually free. As Secord recalled, the Central Intelligence Agency usually paid two to three times as much for such weapons and had to go through multiple transactions in order to disguise that it was the buyer. Operation Tipped Kettle was a bargain.²⁵

In February 1984 the CIA asked the DoD to obtain from Israel a second shipment of captured PLO arms, but the Israeli government was not willing to provide the weapons at the previous minimal price. In July 1984 Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Richard Armitage contacted Meron, who had by then been promoted to director general of the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Meron told

Armitage that after the Israeli election a DoD team could come to Israel to discuss pricing. The chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Lt. Gen. Moshe Levi wished to reserve the light weapons to equip militia units in southern Lebanon. Israel's defense minister, Moshe Arens, overruled Levi and agreed to provide the weapons to the DoD for \$36 million in cash, which the DoD team was not authorized to pay. After a few days Meron returned with a better offer. Israel would provide the weapons if Meron, in the words of an ISA report, "could receive a verbal assurance that a matching amount of FMS [foreign military sales] money could be found in ongoing FMS transactions and returned to the Israel FMS account." Pentagon officials at ISA and the Defense Security Assistance Agency were puzzled by this suggested arrangement. They were already being as flexible as possible in meeting Israel's economic and security needs. The only room for maneuver might be in "savings in FMS loans based on a lower cost contract than originally estimated." The DoD team was authorized to present Meron with a "non-paper" to this effect. Meron accepted the non-paper understanding as "sufficient assurances that Israel would receive 'within the constraints of the law of the U.S. policy' funds to cover the cost of Tipped Kettle II." A second shipment of 100 sea-land containers of PLO weapons—about three times as much as Tipped Kettle I with some heavier weapons included—went to the United States for use by the Central Intelligence Agency in Central America. Tipped Kettle I and II allowed the Reagan administration to supply the Contras under the congressional radar and were revealed later only by the Iran-Contra investigations.²⁶

Honduras

Obtaining arms for the Contras was only a small part of the DoD's role in Central America. Weinberger and his colleagues at the Pentagon focused much more of their attention on cultivating Honduras as a potential ally against the Sandinistas. In January 1982 Honduras returned to civilian rule after a decade of military dictatorship, which had virtually bankrupted what was already the poorest country in Central America. Concerned about the threat from Nicaragua, the new civilian Honduran government was willing to open up its facilities to U.S. military access. Honduras had two air bases capable of handling U.S. military aircraft; a steady stream of military personnel and aircraft was soon flying in and out of these bases. Honduras allowed U.S. intelligence-gathering planes operating in-country to monitor insurgent activity in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The government in



Honduran troops arriving at the Regional Military Training Center for training by U.S. special forces, May 22, 1984. *OSD Records*

Tegucigalpa agreed to undertake joint military exercises with the United States; accepted 700 U.S. military advisers, trainers, and support personnel; and provided safe bases for many of the Contras. U.S. military assistance to Honduras in the form of equipment and training jumped appreciably. Honduran officers attended the U.S. officer candidate school in Panama and Honduran Army companies received jungle warfare training there. The Pentagon established the Regional Military Training Center at Trujillo, Honduras, where U.S. special forces trained both Honduran and Salvadoran troops. Using foreign military sales grants, the DoD provided the Honduran Air Force, the most elite of its services, with radar upgrades and six A-37 aircraft. Weinberger flew to Honduras in September 1983 to attend the graduation of the first Salvadoran battalion to complete its training at the Regional Military Training Center.²⁷

The most visible symbols of U.S.-Honduran cooperation, however, were a series of joint military exercises, begun in February 1982. The most conspicuous of these exercises, named Big Pine, commenced in August 1983 and lasted until March 1984. It involved 5,000 U.S. and 4,700 Central American military personnel (mostly Honduran) practicing ground, air, and naval maneuvers, including parachute drops, air assaults, and an amphibious landing. Many of



Over 12,000 American troops trained with Honduran troops in combined exercises during Big Pine II. Air base construction throughout the country supported the exercises and the Honduran Air Force while paving the way for a continued American presence. *OSD/HO*

the exercises took place near the Honduran-Nicaraguan border in an attempt to send a message to Managua.²⁸

The new military relationship with Honduras and the increased U.S. support for the Contras, one of the most open secrets in Washington, convinced many in Congress that the Reagan administration was secretly trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime. In December 1982 the House of Representatives passed by a vote of 411–0 an amendment to the Defense Appropriation Act of 1983—introduced by the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Representative Edward Boland (D-MA)—that ended financial support of the Contras. The president signed the act. The amendment forbade the Pentagon and CIA from providing military equipment, training, or military advice for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government but allowed for other assistance. Elimination of the Sandinistas was exactly what the Reagan administration had hoped for, but its intelligence findings and presidential directives were vague enough to allow administration officials to claim that was not their purpose. Rather, Reagan officials stressed that they sought to moderate Sandinista behavior and hinder Cuban-Nicaraguan support of leftist insurgencies in Central America. The House did not buy the argument. On July

28, 1983, it voted 228 to 195 to cut off covert funding of the Contras. If the Senate had followed suit, the Contras would have been without U.S. support. Casey briefed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and proposed a new finding in September 1983 whereby the United States would not direct the Contras or provide leadership, but just support them. With Senator Barry Goldwater's help, the Senate committee accepted Casey's assurance. On November 17, 1983, Congress, in conference, agreed to fund the paramilitary program against Nicaragua at up to \$24 million for FY 1984, but this was considerably less than the administration had requested. If the administration required more funding, it would have to return to Congress to request it.²⁹

Shultz charged that the House vote cutting off Contra funding in July 1983 was a direct result of the ill-timed Big Pine II military exercises in Honduras. Shultz recalled in no uncertain terms that he believed Weinberger and DoD officials were providing the president with faulty intelligence about Soviet troops in Cuba so as to encourage him to approve the Honduras military exercises.



Secretary Weinberger greets a soldier of the 41st Combat Support Hospital during Big Pine II joint military exercises. September 7, 1983. *OSD Records*

Shultz suggested that Weinberger and Casey deliberately kept him in the dark about Big Pine II, knowing that he would advise the president against it. On July 25, 1983, Shultz had a meeting with the president and his close advisers—but not Weinberger. Shultz insisted that if he was not actually in charge of international policy he would resign. The president did not want to find another secretary of state. Reagan soothed Shultz's hurt feelings, assuring him that he could not get along without him and things would be better in the future.³⁰

Weinberger was not guilty as charged by Shultz. Big Pine

II was one of a regular series, albeit the largest and most conspicuous, of Central American military exercises undertaken by the DoD with the approval of the president. It was discussed with State officials, including Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, at a Senior Interdepartmental Group meeting on July 16, 1983. The president did not approve the exercise until three days after his meeting with Shultz, giving the secretary of state time to voice his concern. To be fair to Shultz, this event took place during a time when he and Weinberger were at odds over the use of U.S. troops in Lebanon. Resentment over that conflict may have bled over into Shultz's resentment over Big Pine. Nevertheless, Shultz's claim that State was left out of the decision to undertake the exercise at an inopportune time is unjustified given the notification to Kenneth Dam at the Senior Interdepartmental Group meeting. His contention that it caused the House to reject funding for the Contras is questionable. While the House was already opposed to the president's Central America policy, their vote to ban Contra funding occurred on the day that Reagan approved the exercise. Big Pine II did not begin until August 5, 1983. It was not as if House members voted while thousands of U.S. and Honduran combat troops were engaged in military exercises on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. Still, Big Pine II was out of proportion to previous joint exercises, implying to many in Congress that the administration was increasing its military involvement in Central America; their opposition to Reagan's Central America policy therefore seemed justified.³¹

Review of Central American Policy

By mid-1983, U.S. policy on Central America was in serious trouble. Congress was close to forbidding all financial support for the Contras because opponents in Congress doubted that there could be a military solution to Nicaragua. Many held out hope that negotiations with the Sandinistas could solve the problem. As for El Salvador, funding for the military was never as much as the Pentagon considered adequate, and the insurgency continued. Operation Big Pine II failed to inhibit the Cubans and Sandinistas. Instead it convinced many in the U.S. Congress and the American public that the United States was preparing to invade Nicaragua, or at least seriously increase its military intervention in Central America, repeating the mistakes of Vietnam. Reagan's advisers all pushed their solutions. Shultz argued for a negotiated settlement with the Sandinistas. If they held free elections, ceased supporting insurgencies, and weened themselves

off Cuban assistance, Washington would end its support for the Contras. The secretary of state also worked for a regional solution, the Contradora Process, named for the island off the Pacific coast of Panama where, in 1983, the first meetings that led to this proposal took place. Mexico had led the effort with a diplomatic core of Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia and worked with the other five nations of Central America to find a negotiated end to the strife in Central America. The United States and Cuba were not at the negotiating table, but they remained engaged through their friends in the region. Meanwhile, at the White House, Casey pushed relentlessly for more covert operations, not only to support the Contras and oppose the Sandinistas, but to interdict supplies to the guerrillas



Secretary Weinberger meets with Henry Kissinger, soon to be head of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, on March 8, 1983. *OSD Records*

in El Salvador. Weinberger called for caution and for finding a consensus with Congress and the public for a Central American policy.³²

At the end of 1983 the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, the brainchild of the new national security adviser, Bud McFarlane (Clark became secretary of the interior after he had been removed from the NSC job), made its recommendations. Chaired by former national security adviser and secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the commission was an attempt to generate consensus on Central America within the administration, with Congress, and among the public at large. The commission's message was that Central America mattered because the United States had fundamental interests there. Because of poverty, repressive political systems, and Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan intervention, the region was in crisis. The commission called for more economic and military assistance to U.S. friends in the region. A majority of the commission's members supported continued aid to the Contras. The commission had some specific recommendations for the Pentagon. The DoD should assure that U.S. Military Group personnel (those assigned to the embassies) should stay for two years at their posts. The commission also suggested that the Pentagon ensure that military trainers-advisers serving in Central America have greater expertise and knowledge of the area. It also recommended that Southern Command and Atlantic Command coordinate more effectively on military exercises in Central America and that the chain of command between the Pentagon and the field be clarified.³³

The commission's recommendations prompted an NSC interagency internal review, "Where Next in Central America," an attempt by the Department of State to right the policy ship. The Pentagon found the review paper overly optimistic. It cited the administration's achievements in Central America but ignored the setbacks, such as congressional limitations on Contra funding and the inability of Salvadoran forces to make any headway against the insurgency. Most important, the paper failed to include specific military activities, such as future joint exercises, U.S. presence at Central American bases, and U.S. military support for humanitarian relief, as part of an overall strategy.³⁴

Weinberger and his Pentagon team filled the gaps in the State paper by providing military options for 1984. They recommended continued military exercises after Big Pine II, but on a smaller scale and with clearly defined intervals between them. Regular small naval exercises should continue as a means

of emphasizing the U.S. presence. The president's emphasis on humanitarian aid to Central America to alleviate poverty, oppression, and refugee problems provided the opportunity for U.S. military personnel in Central America to engage in humanitarian work. Such civic action would help convince Congress to provide more traditional U.S. military assistance, training, and exercises for Central America. As for the U.S. military presence in Honduras, the DoD argued it should be related to military exercises and not give the impression of being permanent. Nevertheless, Honduras still had many hundreds of U.S. personnel involved in intelligence collection operations and 170 military trainers at the Regional Military Training Center.³⁵

Reagan and his advisers met in early January 1984 and resolved to forge a unified administration policy. As explained in National Security Decision Directive 124, approved February 7, 1984, State would take the lead in assuring that Nicaragua would hold free elections, cease support of the Marxist insurgencies in El Salvador, reduce the number of Soviet Bloc and Cuban personnel in the country, and pare down its military. State would make it clear to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua that the United States would not tolerate the introduction of advanced fighter aircraft or Cuban troops in Nicaragua. The CIA would intensify its help for the Contras and ensure that Congress funded the effort. The administration would promote voter turnout in El Salvador's presidential election, and strengthen and assist its democratic parties, trade unions, and civic organizations. The Pentagon's responsibility was to conduct military activities that would reassure U.S. allies and reinforce diplomatic efforts in Central America. Specifically, the DoD would plan new naval exercises to keep the pressure on the Sandinistas. U.S. military personnel would continue civic-action programs and humanitarian assistance. They would undertake emergency-deployment exercises in Honduras; keep the regional training center there working efficiently and at full staff; and encourage military-to-military cooperation among Central American countries.³⁶

NSDD 124 outlined an extensive program, but it did not set the region on a path to ending the crisis, nor did it win congressional approval of funding for the Contras. The Democratic majority in the House was adamantly opposed to covert aid for the Nicaraguan resistance. Only the Senate Intelligence Committee and especially the influence of Senator Goldwater stood in the way of a full ban on support for the Contras. At a National Security Planning Group meeting on

February 7, 1984, McFarlane reported that by March funding for the Contras would be exhausted. What was required, according to Weinberger and Deputy Secretary of State Dam, was a supplemental appropriation so that the “only real source of pressure” against the Sandinistas could continue. As Weinberger saw it, “the program has to go on—the only issue is what mechanism we use to get the money.” The result was a decision to get a “fast-track supplemental” as part of an unrelated low-income energy assistance supplemental and essentially sneak Contra funding through Congress.³⁷

The Fight over Contra Funding

The administration’s plan to squeeze Contra funding from Congress as part of an unrelated supplemental bill came to naught because the CIA mined Nicaraguan ports and placed limpet mines on ships in port in an attempt to hamper Cuban and Soviet shipments to the Sandinistas. The approval for this operation came from Vice President Bush’s Crisis Pre-Planning Group, which, Shultz recalled, did not have the authority to make such decisions. In early April 1984 a number of ships, including one under a Soviet flag, hit mines in Nicaraguan waters. The CIA operation had sought a veneer of the plausible deniability by claiming that the mining operation was the work of the Contras. This story soon unraveled under media scrutiny. Earlier in the year DCI Casey had briefed the House Intelligence Committee on the operation but had only mentioned it in passing when briefing the Senate’s counterpart. After ships hit the mines, leaks from Congress exposed the role of the agency. The resulting outcry from Congress, the media, and the public threatened to doom the administration’s request for supplemental Contra funding. As Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Gates recalled, the fiasco turned Senator Patrick Moynihan from a reasonable skeptic of the CIA’s Central American operations into a hard-line foe. The CIA mining also alienated Senator Goldwater, who had been a rock-solid supporter of Casey and the CIA. Goldwater took umbrage at the DCI’s failure to properly alert the Senate Intelligence Committee. No longer in the CIA’s camp, the senator was unwilling to ensure that Contra funding was restored when the House and Senate met in conference to iron out conflicting bills on Central America.³⁸

When the National Security Planning Group met on June 25, 1984, to review Central America programs, congressional funding of the Contras seemed bleak. As McFarlane reported, “there seems to be no prospect that the Democratic lead-

ership will provide for any vote on the Nicaraguan program. During the last vote of the House, we lost by 64 votes, and that means we need to change 32 votes in order to continue funding the anti-Sandinista program.” The consensus of the participants was that failure to fund the Contras would unravel the entire U.S. position in Central America. The discussion then turned to alternative means of financing the program. Shultz noted that Chief of Staff Jim Baker had maintained that “if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense.” Casey qualified Baker’s opinion, observing that Baker did not believe it was “an impeachable offense” if the administration notified the oversight congressional committees and the third countries participated and cooperated with the United States in the resistance effort. Weinberger faced the problem directly: “I am another lawyer who isn’t practicing law, but Jim Baker should realize that the United States would not be spending money for the Sandinista program; it is merely helping the anti-Sandinistas obtain the money from other sources.” Later in the meeting Weinberger reiterated his position: he supported third-country aid and a greater effort to convince Congress to fund the Contras. The Pentagon chief’s distinction was a fine one. Shultz suggested that the attorney general rule on it. Weinberger again reiterated his support for one more try with Congress for Contra funding as well as facilitation of third-country support. Subsequently the attorney general agreed that if the United States discussed aid with respective third-country donors and made it clear U.S. officials would not be directing the use of the funds, there would be no legal problem. As long as the United States did not exercise control over the receipts and expenditures provided by the third country, in the attorney general’s view, the solicitation of funds was not illegal.³⁹

The idea for third-country funding had been percolating among the NSC staff since February 1984. In May 1984, according to the subsequent Iran-Contra congressional report, McFarlane approached an anticommunist foreign country with very deep pockets and obtained a pledge of \$1 million a month for the Contras. Gates later recalled that this country was Saudi Arabia. NSC staffer Oliver North gave McFarlane the Contra’s bank account number, which McFarlane passed on to the ambassador of the donor country. The campaign to provide outside funding was underway. The Contras had money in the bank.⁴⁰

The administration had not yet given up on Congress approving funds. On June 20, 1984, Weinberger, Shultz, Casey, Kirkpatrick, McFarlane, and Deputy NSC adviser Admiral John Poindexter met to plan for a request to Congress for

\$21 million for the Contras. Casey stated this should be a fight to the death. If Congress failed to act, the administration could blame it for the ensuing debacle. At the recommendation of Weinberger and others, the Reagan administration made a final attempt to convince Congress to fund the anti-Sandinista resistance. They used the tried-and-true bureaucratic mechanism of creating a special interagency task force comprised of representatives from State, the Agency for International Development, DoD, CIA, NSC staff, Office of Management and Budget, and the White House Office of Legislative Affairs. The task force's job was to convince Congress to fund military and economic assistance for Central America and to provide covert money for the Contras. The task force failed. On October 10, Congress passed a third Boland amendment, finally cutting off all aid for the Contras and prohibiting solicitation of funding from other countries.⁴¹

During the last three months of 1984, prospects for U.S. operations in Central America, in the DoD's view, continued to deteriorate. Iklé informed Weinberger (who was in South Korea) that Shultz was close to obtaining a solution from the regional Contradora negotiations. The emerging Contradora agreement would limit foreign advisers in Central America to 100 in each country. It would force the Pentagon to close its bases and the regional training center in Honduras, provide prior notification of joint military exercises of more than 1,500 troops that took place within 30 kilometers of Nicaragua's borders, and prevent Honduras and Costa Rica from allowing the Contras to use their territory. Iklé warned, "We would be ill-advised to rush forward a Contradora Agreement. After the [U.S. mid-term] election we can forge a more solid front among the Core Four [Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama] and hopefully begin to overcome the Congressional restrictions of aid to the Contras. The chance that a Contradora agreement will make the Sandinistas change their colors and turn Nicaragua into a democratic country is near zero." Weinberger could not agree more. He sent the president a message as he was returning to Washington: "Forty years of experience with Communist regimes—in Eastern Europe, Korea, Indochina—tells us that the Communist side will bend every effort to maintain, or if possible expand, their power base, while ingeniously concealing their violations." Weinberger urged not signing a Contradora treaty until it could be strengthened.⁴²

Shultz remembers that "Kirkpatrick, Casey, and Weinberger were in a lather" that he was about to "give it all away" in Central America. Shultz was not close to accepting a Contradora agreement, believing he needed another three months to

work out outstanding issues. Negotiations were still in play. The Reagan administration was split: hard-liners versus negotiators. Shultz recalls that he could count on McFarlane, Baker, and Bush on his side and faced fierce opposition from Weinberger, Casey, and UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. At an NSC meeting on October 30, 1984, these differences became obvious. Weinberger led the argument against a negotiated settlement: "From every point of view, it seems to me we ought to be staying out, keeping out, so we won't be bound by it." The president had the ultimate decision. At the end of the meeting, he observed that the Sandinistas were "as solidly doctrinaire as the Politburo in Moscow. There is no way that they can change or relinquish their power in a power-sharing agreement. The Contras make them uncomfortable. There may not be another way out for them." Reagan was clearly leaning towards Weinberger's hard line.⁴³

The year ended with three setbacks in Central America for the administration. The first was the revelation that the CIA had contracted to produce a Spanish-language counterinsurgency manual for use in Central America. This how-to book was the result of Casey's conviction that U.S. allies in the region needed to pay more attention to political and psychological operations. The problem was that the manual was never vetted by the CIA leadership. It advocated "neutralizing" opponents, kidnapping, employing terror tactics, using blackmail, and making alliances with criminals to oppose communist insurgencies or overthrow the Sandinistas. The manual transgressed the Boland Amendments and Reagan's own executive order prohibiting assassination, and its exposure to Congress and the public was a public relations disaster. In an effort to shift the blame, the CIA reported to four congressional committees—House and Senate Intelligence and Appropriations—that the manual was based on lesson plans drawn up in 1968 by the Army's Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg. The agency provided copies of the lesson plans to the committees without informing the Pentagon. The CIA admitted that this so-called murder manual was a product of their incompetence, not their policy, and stated that the more offensive passages were omitted before copies went to the Contras. Nevertheless, both the CIA and DoD were criticized for apparently running amok in Central America.⁴⁴

The second misstep by the Reagan administration was its charge in early November that Cuba and the Soviet Union were sending MiG-21 fighter aircraft to Nicaragua. The Crisis Pre-Planning Group met on November 7 to discuss options. Never keen on military action, Weinberger rolled out his tried-and-true tactic

of opposing any U.S. military action by insisting on creating contingency plans in case the issue escalated into an obviously unacceptable U.S.-USSR military confrontation. Shultz characterized the Pentagon chief's planning advice as the "bomb Moscow option." When the suspect shipment arrived in Nicaragua the 12 crates were opened to reveal they contained high-performance helicopters, not MiG-21s. Ironically, in Shultz's view, the helicopters were far more dangerous weapons than MiG-21s. But the administration had drawn a line in the sand over MiG-21s, so by inference any weapons under that line were permissible.⁴⁵

The final indignity of 1984 was the International Court of Justice's (ICJ's) verdict in late November that it had jurisdiction over a suit filed by Nicaragua in April 1984 asserting that the United States' mining of its harbors and support for the Contras constituted a violation of the UN Charter and international law. The United States responded that Nicaragua had committed aggression against its neighbors and the actions cited by Nicaragua were permissible under the right of individual and collective self-defense. Furthermore, U.S. international lawyers claimed, this was a political case, not for the ICJ, but rather the UN Security Council. Shultz recommended walking out of the court because the case would take two years to settle—two years of bad publicity—and would probably go against the United States. Weinberger did not agree, recommending, "We stay and fight the case in the ICJ, deferring our options to walk out, which we can exercise later if we so desire." To Weinberger a walkout was an "implicit admission of guilt." Reagan chose the walkout, eliciting charges that the United States was flouting international law. Shultz made an impassioned defense of this action in his memoirs, but the immediate effect of the action was another setback for U.S. Central American policy.⁴⁶

Looking back on the first four years of Reagan administration policy towards Central America, it was difficult to conclude that it was a well-devised or managed process. By the end of 1984 the administration had split into two opposing camps. The first was comprised of Weinberger and his OSD staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Casey, and the CIA Operations Directorate, which wanted a larger and more proactive military presence in the region and a robust covert anti-Sandinista resistance. The second group included Shultz and State, McFarlane and most of the NSC staffers, and the CIA's analysts, all of whom favored accommodation through a negotiated settlement.

The JCS fell clearly within the Weinberger-Casey camp. In a carefully argued

memorandum to Weinberger, the Joint Chiefs assessed the state of affairs in Central America. They admitted that since 1982 they saw some positive signs, such as some congressional and public support for U.S. military and economic assistance, the potential for a negotiated settlement with the Sandinistas, and the election of the administration's preferred candidate, José Napoleón Duarte, in El Salvador. In the Joint Chiefs' view, Duarte was moving toward democracy, paying more heed to human rights, and improving his country's armed forces. Against this positive ledger, they noted the failure to slow down in any way Nicaragua's military growth. Managua's armed forces were larger than the sum total of all other Central American nations. The Sandinistas had 70,000 ground forces, 50,000 reserves, 150 tanks, 200 armored support vehicles, 80 large field artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, modern Soviet attack helicopters, and a radar-directed air defense system of over 200 guns. To offset this staggering military advantage, the Joint Chiefs argued that the United States had to do more, including insisting that Moscow and Havana cap deliveries of military hardware to Nicaragua. If the *démarche* failed, the Joint Chiefs suggested a quarantine of Nicaragua or selected strikes on its military. These recommendations worried Weinberger, but he reluctantly agreed to send the advice to the NSC. As his military aide Colin Powell noted and highlighted for him, some of the recommendations were "far reaching."⁴⁷

The Reagan team did not follow the Joint Chiefs' advice. In the second Reagan term the president and White House chose to focus policy on funding the Contras in violation of Congress. They continued third-party funding from countries, organizations, and individuals. Their most egregious effort involved using secret U.S. arms sales to Iran to fund the Contras and free hostages held by Iranian-backed terrorists in Lebanon. After public exposure of the deal in October 1985, the Iran-Contra scandal led to an independent prosecutor's investigation. The findings of the investigation seriously weakened the Reagan presidency and tarnished its efforts in Central America. Reagan officials, including Weinberger, were indicted, and some were prosecuted and convicted. They were all either pardoned, given probation, or released on technicalities. The effort to unseat the Sandinistas failed. Instead, a regional peace effort spearheaded by Costa Rican president Oscar Arias resulted in a 1990 election in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas lost and power transferred peacefully in Nicaragua to a noncommunist government.⁴⁸

Cuba

When dealing with the dangers to Central America, Cuba was always on the minds of Reagan policymakers. Weinberger recounted a transition discussion with the president and Secretary Haig, who first suggested that Cuba was the cause of all trouble in Central America. Weinberger recalled that when he interrupted to ask what the endgame was, Haig responded with “one of his withering command stares in my direction and said it was quite clear we would have to invade Cuba and, one way or another, put an end to the Castro regime.” Weinberger told Reagan that Kennedy had already tried that. If Reagan wanted to try again he had better prepare Congress and the American public. For starters it would mean discarding the no-invasion-of-Cuba pledge that John F. Kennedy gave Nikita Khrushchev as part of the Cuban Missile Crisis resolution. Haig’s view was that Cuban support of insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere and Africa negated the deal, but the Cuban Missile Crisis agreement did not prohibit such activities.⁴⁹

At the end of January 1981, at the president’s request, Haig sent an analysis of the 1962 agreement, which acknowledged that Cuban subversion was not part of the 1962 understanding; the agreement focused on strategic weapons in Cuba and the no-invasion pledge. Still, Haig suggested laying “down a clear marker” that the United States would interpret the 1962 understanding more broadly and if Cuba continued to support subversion, the administration would denounce the agreement. While Haig’s specific idea did not win general support, he and Weinberger were in agreement that a strategy to counter Cuban subversion was needed.⁵⁰

In May 1981 an NSC Senior Interagency Group (SIG) study outlined a plan for dealing with Cuba. It suggested increasing U.S. military readiness in the Caribbean; preventing repetition of the 1980 Mariel boat lift, the result of Castro allowing 110,000 Cuban refugees to flee to Florida; placing potential economic and diplomatic pressure on Castro; and inaugurating a publicity campaign to highlight his subversive activities in Central America and Africa. The SIG also recommended against normalization of relations with Havana, minimal direct contacts with Cuban officials, making only credible threats, and only negotiating deals with Cuba that were to the United States’ advantage. The SIG recommended and the DoD approved of actions to upgrade intelligence capabilities against Cuba, make improvements to Guantánamo and military installations in the southern United States, increase naval activity in the Caribbean, and scramble fighters

when Cuban aircraft closed in on U.S. airspace. The Pentagon was not prepared to accept the other SIG military suggestions: shadowing Cuban freighters to Central America, transferring U.S. air squadrons to Florida, and increasing the naval presence in the Straits of Florida. The DoD considered them too costly for the limited benefits they would bring.⁵¹

In early June 1981 the president met with the NSC participants to discuss the SIG study and fashion an interim policy towards Cuba. As a result of the meeting, the president ordered that in U.S. public and private interactions with Cuba the United States maintain a “cool and distant” posture. He approved economic and military pressure on Cuba and a campaign to publicize its subversive international activities. Finally, he authorized the first steps to create Radio Free Cuba by the end of the year. The president also addressed the political and social consequences of criminal elements and other so-called undesirables included in the Mariel boat lift of 1980. The president ordered a *démarche* to Havana insisting that Cuba accept the return of the criminals and ordered State, Defense, Justice, and the Coast Guard to prevent a future Cuban refugee boat lift. The administration expected to accomplish the two final presidential directives: the return the so-called “Mariel excludables” and establishment of a Radio Free Cuba (later renamed Radio Martí), during late 1981.⁵²

The implementation of these presidential instructions met with varying degrees of success. There were few additional economic sanctions the administration could impose on Cuba, given that there was already a broad U.S. economic blockade. The best that could be done was to work at the edges with actions such as limiting hard currency to Cuba or deflating its price for its sugar. Previous efforts to convince U.S. allies not to trade with Cuba had usually fallen on deaf ears. Furthermore, massive Soviet economic assistance made the island invulnerable to embargos. The intelligence community publicized Cuban subversive activities, but the campaign drew little public or international traction. Cuba made no secret of the fact that it was in the business of exporting revolution. As for military pressure, apart from military exercises, intelligence improvements, and the upgrading of regional military facilities, Weinberger was extremely wary of any military confrontation with Havana. Over the first Reagan term, the DoD produced thousands of pages of contingency plans on Cuba. Haig never gave in on plans for an invasion, but Weinberger made sure that plans to use military force against Havana remained just contingencies.⁵³

The one place where the United States and Cuba eventually came to agreement was on the 1984 return of Cuban criminals who had entered the United States as part of the Mariel boat lift of 1980. The Carter administration had successfully integrated over 110,000 Cuban refugees into U.S. society but had been unable to return the small percentage of refugee criminals, the so-called excludables. Carter had considered a number of clandestine schemes to sneak the excludables back into Cuba, some of them quite harebrained, but realized they carried too high a risk of Cuban detection, too much danger to the returnees themselves, and a good possibility that such action would abrogate the traditional U.S. position on human rights and its commitment to safety at sea. The almost 1,900 excludables the Reagan administration inherited included 1,021 criminals processed for deportation and held in federal prisons, another 700 criminals in state prisons, and 147 Cubans in federally supported mental institutions. Castro had no intention of allowing these Cubans to return to their homeland without some concessions.⁵⁴

After the successful invasion of Grenada, the United States captured 642 Cuban nationals (see chapter 11). Before the United States returned these Cuban detainees, the president directed the JCS to explore options, in concert with State and the CIA, for including the excludables in this repatriation. A JCS-CIA-State group considered two alternatives. The first involved secretly mixing the excludables with the detainees and sending both groups in one ship to Cuba. The other options included return of the excludables independently to Guantánamo Bay where they would cross into Cuba and an overt return in an expendable ship into a Cuban port. While Weinberger was not opposed in principle to including Mariel criminals in the Grenada detainee operation, he believed it was an inopportune time to do so—the president was just about to embark on a trip to Asia. The Pentagon chief maintained that the scheme would subject the administration to criticism from the International Red Cross and the media. Furthermore, officials at State, Justice, and Defense were so opposed to the idea that it would be impossible to obtain interagency agreement on the plan in a timely manner, thus contravening the Geneva Convention's requirement for prompt repatriation of Cuban prisoners after the conclusion of hostilities in Grenada. Weinberger recommended the president approve the option of allowing State, Defense, and Justice to develop a sound plan for returning the excludables in the future.⁵⁵

Reagan agreed that returning the excludables with the Grenada detainees

was not feasible. He opted for a new plan to be accomplished by November 1983. The solution that emerged was to negotiate an agreement with Castro. Weinberger expressed concern that such a course of action would prove “sterile” and by this time regretted not using the Cuban Grenada detainees as a cover for return of the excludables. Weinberger’s fears proved unfounded. In December 1984 the Department of State successfully negotiated an agreement with Cuba to accept the return of the excludables. As part of the agreement the United States would also process 20,000 Cuban immigrant visas per year and accept 3,000 Cuban former political prisoners and their families in 1984–1985. The key breakthrough in the negotiations was the Cuban government’s acceptance that it did not have the right to veto any excludable. Under this agreement, however, only 201 excludables returned to Cuba because in May 1985, when Radio Martí was finally on the air, Castro suspended the understanding. It was reactivated by mutual consent in November 1987.⁵⁶

The Voice of America’s Radio Martí was a propaganda and public diplomacy initiative; the Pentagon was a secondary participant. Even before it was on the air, Castro threatened to retaliate by using powerful commercial transmitters obtained from the Soviet Bloc to interfere with commercial U.S. radio broadcasts in the United States. The president and his officials had called for more active radio-based broadcasting efforts against communist countries even before he was elected. The Reagan administration created an interagency group to provide options to deter Castro from creating such radio interference once Radio Martí was operational. As part of this effort, the Pentagon explored options to jam Havana television and Cuban microwave relays, which would disrupt television reception throughout the island. Both were technically feasible. The issue, as Iklé reported to Weinberger, was what would the United States do if Castro could not be dissuaded from interfering with U.S. AM commercial radio stations. To Iklé’s point of view, failing to put Radio Martí on the air for fear of Cuban interference would be to “surrender to an illegal Cuban invasion of our sovereignty.” He suggested such a failure would imperil Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and possibly lead to blackmail on more important U.S.-Cuban differences. Iklé suggested informing Havana that the United States might take military action against Cuba should Castro interfere with U.S. radio stations.⁵⁷

In mid-December 1984 the president and the National Security Planning Group discussed Radio Martí without reference to the threat of military action.

Kenneth Dam, now acting secretary of state following Haig's departure, reported that Castro had to be convinced that the United States would react strongly to radio interference. Dam reported that the Federal Communications Commission believed it could "keep the lid on US broadcasters, should Castro launch a massive counter broadcasting, for 7 to 10 days." Dam noted that \$5 million would compensate radio operators for any week-to-10-day loss. Weinberger reported on the DoD's ability to jam Cuban television from outside Cuban territorial waters, but the operation would not be totally effective since Cuba had an extensive transmitter network throughout the island.⁵⁸

The Reagan administration was determined to put Radio Martí on the airwaves, realizing that either not initiating it or closing it down because of Cuban countermeasures would be a costly propaganda defeat. In May 1985 Radio Martí began broadcasting. Cuba made good on its threat and disrupted U.S. AM stations, but the disruption was short-lived. Instead, Havana placed its priority on jamming Radio Martí.

South America

Reagan's national security team considered Carter's policy towards South America a disaster. Carter, his idealistic aides in the White House, and liberals in Congress saw the military dictatorships of Chile, Argentina, and Brazil as test cases for policies driven by human rights. Congress had prohibited Chile and Argentina from receiving U.S. security assistance and arms sales unless the president certified that they had made substantial progress in human rights and political reform, and Carter was unconvinced that they had done so. As for Brazil, the least offensive dictatorship in the southern cone, the Carter administration considered improved military relations but failed to achieve them. In all of these cases, Pentagon International Security Affairs officials urged Carter to use carrots as well as sticks. The Pentagon had long-standing and close relationships with South American military leaders, and these officials argued that by offering positive incentives, such as military assistance and training, the United States could nudge South American military juntas toward democracy and respect for human rights. To the Pentagon, Carter's no-concessions policy was counterproductive.⁵⁹

The Reagan administration thought along similar lines. During the 1980 campaign Reagan criticized Carter's Latin American policy for punishing traditional U.S. allies. Reagan's soon-to-be UN ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick,

made the case in two influential journal articles, one published in 1979 and the other in 1981. She maintained that Carter's obsession with human rights alienated anticommunist military governments and only aided communists and terrorists. The criteria for U.S. support of South American governments should be their willingness to cooperate with the United States, not their commitment to democracy or human rights (see chapter 11).⁶⁰

Reagan's political appointees, especially in the Pentagon, uniformly agreed with this new direction for policy toward South America. Early in 1981 the JCS recommended that legislation prohibiting security assistance to Argentina and Chile should be repealed to stop the deterioration of military relations with those longtime friends of the United States. Weinberger agreed totally. The JCS and other DoD officials were apparently unaware that the legislation did not need to be repealed. Rather, the president only had to certify substantial progress in human rights had occurred. Carlucci informed the Joint Chiefs that the administration would first work with Congress to overcome the restrictions on Argentina and then move on to Chile. Carlucci informed Army Chief of Staff Edward "Shy" Meyer that "DoD is quietly pursuing several initiatives with the Department of State to improve our overall military relationship with Chile," including high-level military visits and military personnel exchange programs.⁶¹

In April 1982 Argentina and the United Kingdom went to war over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Although officially neutral, the Reagan administration, especially Weinberger, sided with Britain and made available to them crucial military supplies and other assistance. When the war ended in defeat for Argentina in June 1982, U.S. relations with the military junta were at a low ebb and those with the rest of South America were strained. As a result of the conflict the Reagan administration initiated a review of U.S. policy towards the Western Hemisphere. At an NSC meeting in late November 1982, prior to the president's trip to Brazil, Costa Rica, and Colombia, Shultz suggested that "democracy had taken hold" in much of Latin America and the president's trip could "bring the post-Falklands period to an end." Kirkpatrick spoke for the group when she observed that the United States "once had a special relationship w/ Latin America—we've systematically humiliated Latins for a long time—need to reassure them of our fundamental friendship and concern." Chairman of the JCS Vessey agreed: "We have treated them as clients, not partners." Weinberger chimed in, claiming, "All of these countries need more mil assistance."⁶²

In December 1982 the president approved NSDD 71, "U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Wake of the Falklands Crisis." The directive outlined a new policy of building closer relationships with Brazil and seeking certification for military assistance for Argentina and Chile on the basis of improved human rights and progress toward democracy. For all U.S. allies in Latin America, the directive called for more military training and operational doctrine, expanded military-to-military exchanges, and further participation in International Military Education and Training, a small but influential program that brought Latin American military leaders to the United States. This program especially helped forge lasting relationships among participants and with U.S. personnel.⁶³

In Argentina the military junta that lost the war was replaced by another that promised elections by the end of 1983. In November 1983 the Reagan administration was prepared to certify that Argentina had complied with human rights principles and deserved security assistance and defense services. As the most pro-British member of the cabinet, Weinberger opposed certification for fear it would compromise the U.S. relationship with the United Kingdom. Already annoyed about Washington's failure to consult her on the U.S. invasion of British Commonwealth nation Grenada (see chapter 14), Prime Minister Thatcher was opposed new U.S. arms sales to Argentina and urged not granting military assistance for the time being. Weinberger recommended that certification be delayed for a few months, thus acceding to Thatcher's request. Weinberger suggested that no decision be made until a few months after the new elected government took power in Buenos Aires in December 1983, allowing time for its position on human rights and the Falklands to be assessed. Weinberger, who held a minority view with the Reagan administration, felt that Chile had a far greater claim to certification than Argentina. The president did not agree. He certified Argentina two weeks later and held off on Chile. While Reagan had been pro-British during the Falklands war, he did not accept Weinberger's argument that Britain was more valuable to the United States than Argentina. The president knew his relationship with Thatcher would survive the certification decision.⁶⁴

The Department of State's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs officials were also far less convinced that Chile was ready to receive U.S. military assistance. State concluded "that the political situation in Chile was too clouded with uncertainty to permit elaboration of a long-range strategy to advance U.S. interests." Two issues shaped this advice. First, Chile still refused to extradite to the United

States for trial the Chileans who had assassinated, in Washington, DC, the former Chilean ambassador and outspoken Pinochet critic Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffet, his assistant and a U.S. citizen. Second, the timetable for Chile's transition to democratic rule seemed to be on a very slow track. If anything, the Chilean political situation had deteriorated. Weinberger and the Pentagon disagreed. They shared the CIA's view that "chances are slightly better than even that the orderly shift to democratic rule can be achieved." The NSC staff did not favor certification, but argued for a policy that used strong, but private, diplomatic persuasion to encourage the Pinochet government to establish a schedule for transition to democracy and to observe human rights in its fight against what it considered terrorism. In effect, the NSC staffers had, at least in part, come around to Weinberger's view, but it would take almost six years before Chile enjoyed a real democratic government.⁶⁵

Reagan's first-term policies toward the Western Hemisphere met with mixed success. This was particularly true in Central America. El Salvador saw some limited political reform and the potential for a transition to democracy but made less progress in blunting its insurgency. The Pentagon successfully drew Honduras into the campaign against Nicaraguan support of the El Salvador insurgency, making it the most reliable U.S. partner in the region. Nicaragua, however, remained defiant and unrepentant. Elaborate efforts to interdict Nicaraguan supplies to the insurgency in El Salvador did not turn the tide in that civil war. Extensive covert efforts to support non-Marxist political institutions in Nicaragua did not immediately bear fruit. The effort to create an armed resistance to the Sandinistas succeeded on one level, but then the administration failed to convince Congress to fund the Contras. From this stalemate with Capitol Hill, the seeds of an illegal funding operation took root among the Reagan NSC staff. During the second Reagan term this operation led to the most damaging scandal of the Reagan years (which will be covered in the next volume of this series). Weinberger's role in the scandal was examined in detail during subsequent congressional investigations, but during the first term he was unconcerned over the potential legal questions about accepting third-country aid for the Contras.

In Central America Weinberger won some battles and lost others. Foremost, he led the successful opposition to the use of overt military force against Nicaragua. His caution proved a crucial brake on more impetuous members of the Reagan

administration. While the DoD was most instrumental in creating the military relationship with Honduras, Weinberger's advocacy of Big Pine II created unease in Congress but should not be blamed for causing Congress to deny support for the Contras. The Pentagon took that unease to heart and downplayed future joint exercises in Central America. Not for lack of trying, Weinberger and the Pentagon failed to induce El Salvador's armed forces to conduct a viable counterinsurgency. Congress's reluctance to provide military assistance did not help.

In Cuba and South America, Weinberger found himself on the losing side of policy issues. On certification of Argentina and Chile, Weinberger was out of step with the rest of the administration. He opposed certification of Argentina and supported it for Chile. The president and the rest of the administration saw it the other way. Weinberger was virtually alone among Reagan's advisers in supporting in principle the return of Cuban excludables with the Grenada Cuban detainees. Against these setbacks, Weinberger had one major accomplishment. He successfully curbed tendencies, especially from Haig and subsequently from the Joint Chiefs, to use military action to force Castro to desist in supporting subversion in Central America. It was not that Weinberger believed the Castro regime was not complicit, but he made his decision with Vietnam and the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation very much on his cautious mind.

During its first term the Reagan team's approach to the Western Hemisphere was marked by disagreement among the president's advisers—Shultz, Casey, and Weinberger—over how to best achieve U.S. objectives. Weinberger enthusiastically supported the Contras. He believed that if Congress refused to fund them, then third-party money was permissible. While Weinberger opposed direct military confrontation with Nicaragua, he supported military exercises, training of Central American armed forces, and other indirect pressure on the Sandinistas. During the second Reagan term, Weinberger consistently opposed selling arms to Iran to fund the Contras. After Reagan left office, Weinberger was indicted for failing to admit his knowledge of the Iran-Contra deal. It was a blow to a man who held himself to high standards and believed he had done the right thing by opposing the scheme. A pardon in 1990 from President George H. W. Bush allowed Weinberger to continue his life without legal complications, but it did not totally soften the sting.

Libya, Worldwide Terrorism, and Africa

AFRICA DID NOT LOOM LARGE as a major U.S. concern to Caspar Weinberger and his advisers in the Pentagon but for one exception: Libya and its leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. They viewed the Libyan dictator as a disruptive force in North Africa and an enabler of anti-Western terrorism. The terrorist threat was much larger than just Qaddafi's sponsorship, but his reputation as a leader who delighted in flaunting the rules of international relations focused the Reagan administration's ire on him. As for terrorism at large, the Pentagon and the Reagan administration sought to promote more proactive responses to the threat rather than just reacting to incidents.

In the Horn of Africa the Reagan administration followed the pro-Somalia lead of the previous administration but without the intensity that Carter and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski had displayed. In West and Central Africa, Weinberger and his team were content to support pro-American leaders in Liberia and Zaire, making only modest efforts to encourage reform. Weinberger and the administration sought to restore a relationship with Morocco's King Hassan, which had frayed during the previous four years. Towards South Africa, Namibia, and Angola, the Reagan Department of State introduced a policy called constructive engagement in the hopes of resolving the fighting in Angola, enabling independence for Namibia, and ending white-only rule in South Africa. The Pentagon played a secondary role in that effort.

Libya and the Gulf of Sidra Confrontation

The mercurial Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, strongman of Libya, lodged as a

thorn in the side of the United States long before the Reagan administration took office. After seizing control of Libya by a military coup in 1969, Qaddafi increasingly saw himself as the leader of the Arab world, an anti-Western statesman, and a supporter of oppressed peoples. His *Green Book* on popular revolution was a pale imitation of Mao Zedong's *Little Red Book*. What made the Libyan dictator dangerous were his nation's oil reserves, which Libya exported primarily to Western Europe. As a result, Libya had hard currency to purchase more advanced Soviet weaponry and finance anticolonial and liberation organizations. Qaddafi charted an anti-American foreign policy, funded and directed terrorist organizations, organized covert Libyan operations including assassination attempts, and interfered in the more pro-Western neighboring states—Tunisia, Sudan, and Chad. Qaddafi was so notorious a popular cultural figure that *Saturday Night Live* did a skit on selling Qaddafi-designed blue jeans: "Drilling, killing, invading Chad, Qaddafi's got the look that's ba-ad!"¹

President Ronald Reagan and Secretary Caspar Weinberger disliked Qaddafi's policies and the man himself. It was only a matter of time before the administration and Qaddafi's Libya came to blows. Reagan characterized Qaddafi as a "mad-




Muammar al-Qaddafi. Bettmann via Getty Images

man." Weinberger remembers him as "a theatrically posturing, fake mystic with a considerable dollop of madness thrown in." In early March 1981 the Senior Interagency Group, with Bing West attending for the DoD, met and recommended 16 actions and contingencies to moderate Qaddafi's behavior. The cautious actions, which were designed to be "below the threshold of serious retaliation by Qaddafi," included closing the People's Bureau (Libya's embassy) in Washington and isolating Libya internationally. Anything more aggressive, the SIG maintained, might place the 2,000 to 2,500

Americans living and working in Libya, mostly oil technicians and their families, in danger of Libyan harassment or even hostage taking. Another consideration was that Libya exported 10 percent of its low-sulfur, light-density oil to U.S. East Coast refineries. A Libyan cutoff could seriously affect U.S. gasoline prices in the east. Finally, with purchases of Soviet and French aircraft, Libya had a formidable regional air force. Nevertheless, of the SIG recommendations, the most aggressive was to challenge Libya's 1973 declaration that the Gulf of Sidra, which included waters well beyond the internationally recognized 12-mile territorial limit, was Libyan territorial water. Qaddafi threatened to attack any aircraft or vessel that crossed the "Line of Death," (32°30' N. latitude).²

Planning for a challenge of Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra moved slowly through Pentagon channels. From the Navy's point of view, the Gulf of Sidra was an area free of shipping lanes and air routes and provided a convenient area for free-fire naval training exercises. In late March 1981, [REDACTED]



Gulf of Sidra, "Line of Death," and flight information region. OSD/HO, based on a map in OSD Records

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].³

Weinberger's advisers at the Pentagon had second thoughts about scheduling such an exercise for April 1981. As Carlucci told Deputy Secretary of State Clark, the Sixth Fleet's exercise and reconnaissance should be postponed until June, after "a precise feasibility response from USCINCEUR"; he was suggesting, in effect, more planning and preparations. Carlucci further recommended an assessment of U.S. vulnerability to terrorist activity triggered by such a crisis with Libya. Contingency planning should also consider the possibility that in response Soviet or Eastern Bloc personnel would man Libyan-based Soviet equipment. Carlucci also worried that the Department of State's proposed actions and contingencies towards Libya would "only serve to pinprick Qaddafi and we were likely the ones to suffer from that proposed approach." The DoD redrafted the strategy for Reagan in light of Carlucci's reservations. By mid-May, the department had approved a revised State-drafted paper for the president on potential actions against Libya with two reservations: DoD planners reiterated their recommendation that the naval demonstration should be postponed from June to August, so as to have a second aircraft carrier with F-14s on station, and warned that a Libyan oil embargo against the United States in reaction to the maneuvers was a "distinct possibility." The Department of Energy should continue to plan for gasoline shortages.⁴

After State and Defense agreed on a final paper and submitted it to the NSC, the president approved a strategy against Libya in early June 1981. It included a media campaign to focus on Libya's misdeeds; obtaining European and North African nations' cooperation in pressing Tripoli for better behavior; convincing European countries not to sell arms and military equipment to Libya; more U.S. foreign military sales for Tunisia and Sudan; contingency studies for evacuation of Americans and for countering Soviet initiatives in support of Libyan aggression against its neighbors; and a plan to prevent Libya from obtaining nuclear weapons. Also included in this strategy was a Sixth Fleet naval exercise to take place in the Gulf of Sidra in August. For the last initiative, the many American citizens in Libya remained a problem. The United States had earlier warned

U.S. companies to pull their employees out of Libya. Another warning before the exercise could be used by Libyan propagandists to claim the United States and Egypt were planning to invade. Two options seemed possible: a generalized notice to U.S. citizens to leave Libya or a standard international notice eight days before the event to mariners, aircraft, and ships at sea, which would make the exercise seem like a normal event.⁵

At a Carlucci-convened SIG meeting in late July, the group decided to recommend to the president that the Gulf of Sidra exercise should be considered routine and a maritime notice be the only warning. U.S. citizens (now numbering 2,600 to 3,000 because of U.S. students returning to their families during school summer vacations) would not get advance notice. Both State and Defense agreed that the War Powers Act did not apply and Congress need not be notified. The plan was for the two aircraft carrier battle groups to conduct missile exercises outside the Gulf of Sidra, but a destroyer, two frigates, and tactical carrier-based aircraft would conduct operations in the waters claimed by Libya, some 50 miles offshore. The U.S. Navy units in the Gulf of Sidra would take no hostile action and the rules of engagement for peacetime would apply: only return fire after being fired upon.⁶

When the NSC formally met to discuss the exercise, the president was fully on board. He was even thinking out loud about how to respond should the Libyans retaliate. The United States would “respond instantly, should we be shot at,” and if Libya downed a U.S. aircraft, Reagan continued, “We would chase them right into the hangar.” Weinberger stressed to the president the low-key nature of the notification, but once the warning was given there was no turning back without a serious loss of confidence among U.S. regional allies. Earlier the U.S. Intelligence Community had assessed that the naval exercise was not without risks. A “hostile tactical reaction resulting in a skirmish” was a real possibility. Tripoli could boycott oil shipments, nationalize petroleum facilities, harass U.S. citizens, and adopt a clandestine terrorist reprisal program. Nevertheless, the president was not dissuaded from his showdown with Qaddafi.⁷

On the first day of the exercise, August 18, 1981, the Libyan Air Force flew 122 sorties of MiGs or Mirages, but their aircraft turned away when confronted by F-14s from the USS *Nimitz* and F-4s from the USS *Forrestal*. U.S. planners had not anticipated such a large number of Libyan aircraft. On the early morning of the next day, two F-14 pilots encountered two Libyan Su-22 Soviet-built

ground-attack planes closing in on the center of the maneuver area in the Gulf. One of the Su-22s opened fire on a U.S. plane with an Atoll heat-seeking missile, which missed its target. The American pilots returned fire with AIM-9L heat-seeking missiles and in the ensuing dogfight downed both Libyan aircraft; their pilots parachuted into the sea.⁸

Both Weinberger and Reagan were well pleased with the result. In triumphalist rhetoric, both men claimed they had banished the ghost of the Carter Iran hostage rescue fiasco. The Pentagon chief recalled, "We had demonstrated not only increased American resolve, but a greatly increased American capability for dealing with an enemy quickly and decisively." The president insisted, "We'd sent Qaddafi a message: we weren't going to let him claim squatters' rights to a huge area of the Mediterranean in defiance of international law." Reagan also believed he had passed a message to the world that there was a new sheriff in the White House who "wasn't going to hesitate any longer to act when its [U.S.] legitimate interests were at stake." If the president or the secretary had hoped that the incident would moderate Qaddafi's behavior, however, they were disappointed.⁹

After the confrontation the Libyan dictator increased his support of terrorism, renewed his intervention in Chad, interfered in Sudan, and intensified his anti-American propaganda and policies. Qaddafi's actions made Reagan officials and the president himself pay a personal price. The Central Intelligence Agency obtained credible evidence of planned Libyan-supported assassination plots against the president, Weinberger, Haig, and Bush. Whenever Reagan went out in public after the Gulf of Sidra incident, he wore a bulletproof vest. His Marine One helicopter did not reveal flight plans for fear that Libyan-sponsored terrorists might shoot it and the president down with a shoulder-held heat-seeking missile. Security around Weinberger and other members of the national security team increased dramatically, and ugly temporary barricades began to surround important U.S. government installations.¹⁰

Reinforcing Policy toward Libya and the Stair-Step Program

The Reagan team decided that more pressure was needed on Libya if there was to be any hope of moderating Qaddafi's behavior. In early December 1981 Reagan convened two NSC meetings to discuss how to apply pressure. At the first meeting the participants discussed sending a diplomatic *démarche* to Qaddafi to cease terrorist planning against the United States or face U.S. punitive action.

Complicating any military effort against Libya were the Americans living there. Attending for the Pentagon, Carlucci tried to step back by asking what the goal of U.S. policy towards Libya was: deterrence, retribution, or “disposing of Colonel Qadhafi?” The president cut him short by replying that was a topic for the NSC meeting the next day, this first discussion was on the *démarche*. At the meeting’s end the participants agreed on the *démarche*. The second NSC meeting focused on economic sanctions that could be levied on Libya, including phased reductions of U.S. oil imports from Libya and a ban on U.S. exports to Libya. Carlucci, again attending for Weinberger who was on a European trip, complained that “the goals regarding Libya were unclear.” Haig shot back by asking how Carlucci could have a problem with the options paper that the Pentagon helped to prepare and had approved. The deputy secretary replied that it would take “more than economic measures in order to deter or coerce Colonel Qadhafi.” Noting that a government’s first priority was to protect citizens anywhere, the president approved the plan for graduated economic and military actions against Libya. The meeting ended with the participants discussing with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Hayward possible targets should the president decide to take punitive action.¹¹

A national security directive formalized the president’s decisions, which had been discussed at the two NSC meetings. State would send a warning *démarche* to Libya. Haig would press U.S. oil companies and other corporations to enact a “voluntarily withdrawal” of their employees and minimize trade with Libya. Americans would no longer be allowed to travel to Libya. Treasury would plan for the embargoes on oil imports from Libya and U.S. exports to it. The president instructed Defense and the JCS to prepare military plans in response to various scenarios: an unsuccessful Libyan assassination attempt, a successful assassination of a high-profile Reagan official during the withdrawal of Americans from Libya, or a terrorist attack on U.S. interests while Americans were withdrawing or after their departure.¹²

Carlucci had argued for more robust action during the two NSC meetings. Weinberger’s other Pentagon advisers were not so sure that another freedom-of-navigation exercise was a good idea. While the Sixth Fleet was in the area and U.S. citizens in Libya had trickled down to 100–300, there were mitigating factors. Unilateral action without consultation with Arab moderates might strain relationships with U.S. Arab friends in the Middle East. The gains from the August exercise were small. Would a similar exercise be worthwhile,

especially if the Libyans managed to shoot down a U.S. aircraft or kill a U.S. pilot? Defense had indications that U.S. anti-Qaddafi actions were actually promoting him to hero status among many Arab nations and Third World countries. Another high-profile confrontation might well increase his stature further. At an NSC meeting in January 1982 to update the president, Weinberger made these points. Nevertheless, Reagan stated that he “now leaned toward sterner measures to address the Libyan threat.”¹³

During the next month the Reagan administration discussed additional measures against Qaddafi. In early March the president officially prohibited the import of Libyan oil; required licenses for export of U.S. goods and technology to Libya with the exceptions of medicine, medical supplies, food, and other agricultural commodities; denied licenses for export of goods and technology already controlled for national security purposes; and prohibited export of oil and gas technology and equipment not readily available outside the United States. As for third-country imports to Libya, the United States would remain flexible on products derived from U.S. technical data or products already purchased under existing contracts. Weinberger and his staff believed this flexibility was so ambiguous that it might not preclude exports to Libya at all. Nor was the secretary pleased with the export of U.S. food and agricultural products, suggesting that only medicine and medical supplies be allowed. None of Weinberger’s concerns were reflected in the approved directive.¹⁴

The Pentagon examined the possibility of reprising the previous Gulf of Sidra freedom-of-navigation exercise, but with the uncertainty in Lebanon (see chapter 9), the administration decided the timing was bad and the exercise should be postponed. Instead, the DoD proposed and obtained approval for a “stair-step approach,” small incremental steps to reestablish the right of navigation in the Gulf of Sidra. The first step occurred in July 1982 when an aircraft from the *Forrestal* operated in Libya’s flight information region (FIR)—outside Qaddafi’s Line of Death but in an area where aviation regulations required prenotification. The *Forrestal* gave no notification. On August 1, four aircraft from the USS *Independence* flew in the same area without FIR notification. The Libyans did not react. The stair-step program anticipated increasing these gradually escalating actions until, at some point in the future, the Navy would undertake a large-scale missile exercise north of Libya, including operations within the Gulf of Sidra.¹⁵

The third stairstep occurred on October 24. After a notice of intent of air and

surface operations from the *Independence* battle group, the exercise took place within the FIR north of 32°30'. The next step, [REDACTED] anticipated sending aircraft into the Gulf of Sidra for 12 minutes. Step four would be followed by step five, with extended air operations south of the Line of Death at dusk. Military planners deemed the risk of a Libyan interception for step four [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Steps four and five took place with Libyan reconnaissance of U.S. planes, but without hostile reactions. At the end of 1982 the president extended the stair-step program into a general policy. He signed NSDD 72, directing that the "Department of Defense will routinely assert U.S. rights against territorial sea claims and other claims to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of 12 miles."¹⁶

By the end of 1983, the U.S. Navy had conducted 17 different operations under steps one through five of the stair-step plan. The first was the most direct confrontation of Libya's claim to the Gulf. Of the next 16 others, 6 included operations by U.S. aircraft alone below the 32°30' line. During 1984 the Pentagon proposed concentrating on stair-step operations south of Qaddafi's illegal line. In late July the U.S. Navy conducted both surface and aircraft operations there. The upshot of the stair-step program was that it fulfilled the requirement of NSDD 72 to contest Libya's illegal claim that the Gulf of Sidra (beyond the 12-mile limit to 32°30' N) constituted territorial waters. The lack of hostile Libyan reaction since August 1981 to subsequent stair-step operations crossing the Line of Death demonstrated that Qaddafi was unprepared or unwilling to enforce his illegal claim. By 1983, however, the Reagan administration had become concerned about Libyan interference in the Sudan and a revival of its intervention in Chad, placing the stair-step plan on the back burner.¹⁷

Countering Libya in Sudan and Chad

In addition to his claims to the Gulf of Sidra and his support for terrorism, Qaddafi also meddled in the affairs of his neighbors. In February 1983 Sudanese officials learned of a plot by Libya to support a coup against President Jaafar Muhammed Nimeiri of Sudan. Libya planned to send bombers to attack targets in Khartoum. Egyptian defense minister Abu-Ghazala requested that U.S. AWACS and refueling tanker aircraft be stationed at Wadi Qena in Egypt to support six Egyptian F-4 aircraft to intercept the bombers. He stated that President Mubarak

of Egypt had approved the plan. The State Department prepared contingency plans to counter the coup for interagency discussion and presidential decision. Reagan recalled that at the NSC's National Security Planning Group meeting on February 14 he learned Qaddafi was going to "send bombers to help a coup in Sudan.... We are sending AWACS to aid Egypt fighters (planes) who will intercept the Libyan planes."¹⁸

At that February 14 National Security Planning Group meeting, the Reagan administration faced a number of difficult decisions. Having deployed four AWACS and two tanker planes to Cairo, should the operation continue? There was a high probability that Soviets knew of the U.S. moves, but the Libyan bomber attack could still occur. Reagan was inclined to continue. The Joint Chiefs dissented; they considered Egypt's chances of intercepting the bombers to be "marginal." Two days before the anticipated coup, Reagan noted in his diary: "Khadafy [Qaddafi], we've been tipped, is planning an air attack on the Sudan as part of a coup to overthrow Pres. Neimieri [Nimeiri]. We've flown AWAC's into Egypt ostensibly to engage in a training mission. They are there to direct Egyptian fighter planes if he tries."¹⁹



President Nimeiri of Sudan (far right in white shirt) observing joint military exercises during Operation Bright Star. *OSD Records*

The plan to intercept the Libyan attack never materialized. In addition to AWACS support, the Pentagon moved the *Nimitz* battle group off the Gulf of Sidra to 100 miles off Cairo. The DoD's spokesman stated that the *Nimitz* battle group was engaged in a routine move not approved by the president. This denial did not hold water. On February 16 reporters began piecing together the operation. Bing West noted, "ABC and the *Wall Street Journal* have major parts of the story. We will try to keep our fingers in the dike and not comment for as long as possible." On February 17 the dike burst, unleashing press stories that revealed the general nature of the operation.²⁰

Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was angered by the press leaks; Nimeiri was resigned to them, but they both agreed that the operation should continue. Given that Sudan controlled a Libyan agent in Khartoum, Qaddafi's intelligence operatives could be fed information that the plot was still a "go." Once he sent his bombers, the Egyptians could catch them in Sudanese airspace. After conferring on February 17, Reagan's advisers agreed the operation should continue. On the evening of February 17, the Sudanese lost their nerve and sent a message to Qaddafi through their double agent that discouraged the attack. Then Sudan broadcast that the coup was thwarted. Qaddafi called off the bombers. U.S. experts speculated that the Sudanese feared that the Egyptian F-4s would not intercept the Libyan bombers, or that the Sudanese faction opposed to the operation had won Nimeiri over.²¹

Even though it failed to come off, the Egyptians deemed the operation a success from a technical point of view. The initial coordination between U.S. and Egyptian air forces had succeeded. From a geopolitical viewpoint they believed U.S.-Egyptian cooperation sent a clear message of U.S. willingness to support its Arab friends. Nevertheless, any hope in Cairo and Khartoum that Qaddafi would be caught red-handed meddling in Sudan and his bombers destroyed disappeared because of press leaks and the Sudanese government's last-minute change of mind.²⁵

Libyan Intervention in Chad and Sanctions

Failure to overthrow Nimeiri in Sudan hardly discouraged Qaddafi. The Libyan dictator was persistent. He had ample opportunity for mischief in neighboring Chad. One of the poorest countries in Africa and a former French colony until 1965, Chad had been coveted by Libya since 1980 when 6,000 Libyan troops with

heavy equipment intervened in Chad's long simmering civil war in favor of a political faction representing the Muslim north against a faction whose support came from the mostly Christian and animist south. After Libyan troops with Soviet advisers swept into the N'djamena, the capital, Qaddafi announced that Libya and Chad had joined together in a union, although Chadian allies of Qaddafi were decidedly cool on the merger. When the Reagan administration took office it joined the call for a diplomatic settlement through an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) peacekeeping force. This time, diplomacy worked, aided by Qaddafi's belief that if Libya withdrew from Chad he could be named president of the OAU. In the face of this carrot and diplomatic pressure, Qaddafi withdrew his forces from most of Chad in November 1981. He did not subsequently get the OAU presidency. Qaddafi's dream of a forced union with Chad disappeared, but Libya retained control of Chad's uranium-rich 100-kilometer-long Aouzou strip on the Libya-Chad border.²²

During 1982 the two warring military factions in Chad, the *Forces Armées du Nord* (FAN, renamed FANT, *Forces Armées Nationales Tchadienne*) under Western-supported leader Hissène Habré, and the *Gouvernement d'Union Nationale en Transition* (GUNT) under its Libyan-backed leader Goukouni Oueddei, maintained an uneasy cease-fire that was often breached. France retained a strong interest in Chad. With French and secret U.S. support, Habré ousted Oueddei and his followers, who fled northern Chad to Libya.²³

It was only a matter of time before Qaddafi rebuilt GUNT. In June 1983 GUNT, with support from Libyan volunteers, airpower, and armor, retook half of Chad. Weinberger was disinclined to have the U.S. military openly involved in combating Libyan aggression against Chad, but he was prepared to cooperate in passing discreet military aid to FANT. With secret financial support and emergency military aid from France and the United States, as well 1,800 combat troops and three Mirage jets from Zaire, FANT counterattacked. Included in the U.S. aid was the dispatch, with presidential and DoD approval, of 30 Redeye and 10 Stinger shoulder-held antiaircraft missiles to N'djamena, with the Stingers remaining under French control. It was a symbolic gesture for the time being because Libyan aircraft never attacked the capital. More important to the immediate fight were the jeeps, trucks, radios, medical supplies, personnel gear, and lethal weapons that the Pentagon flew into Chad for FANT and Zairian forces. Habré's troops planned to retake the strategic oasis town of Faya-Largeau in

northern Chad, strategically placed on the main road to the capital in the south. Armitage warned Weinberger that an attack on Faya-Largeau “is a very risky undertaking, and both we and the French have argued against it, at least until Habré has built up his logistics.” Armitage noted that even if successful, the occupation of Faya-Largeau would be vulnerable to Libyan fighter bombers and Hind helicopter gunships stationed in southern Libya. Habré was not dissuaded, and the attack succeeded for the time being.²⁴

Qaddafi hit back hard using Tu-22 bombers stationed at an Aouzou air base in northern Chad to pound Habré’s forces in Faya-Largeau. On August 9, 1983, Libya launched a ground attack led by a mechanized Libyan battalion with heavy artillery support. On August 10 the town fell, its defenders retreating 200 miles to the south. Instead of pursuing them, the attackers dug in at Faya-Largeau. As the crisis unfolded, tensions between the Pentagon and the French began to emerge. The chairman of the JCS, General John Vessey, commented, “Chad is a French problem; I’m sure they would like to sell it to us. We ought to help them if they need it, but not take the lead.” Weinberger wholeheartedly agreed. Reagan himself expressed reservations about France’s role in Chad, noting in his diary that, after Faya-Largeau fell, “Still no French air power leaving the air to the Libyans. They [the French] may be talking a ‘deal’ with Quadafi—Libya is a big customer of France.” French President François Mitterrand took umbrage at such criticism when Reagan hinted at it publicly. At what was assumed to be a French invitation, the Pentagon deployed two E-3A AWACS, two KC-10 tankers, and eight F-15 Eagles to Khartoum for possible use in Chad. The French were loath to use them in defending Chad. In fact, French officials claimed France never asked for the aircraft in the first place. Aptly named Arid Farmer, the operation to deploy the AWACS, F-15s, tankers, and 650 USAF personnel to Khartoum lasted only two weeks. The planes and personnel returned to their bases having accomplished little beyond sending a symbolic message.²⁵

It was becoming increasingly clear that there would be no early resolution to the Libyan invasion of Chad. After the fall of Faya-Largeau, the Libyans and GUNT controlled the northern third of the country while Habré and FANT, with French support, controlled the remaining two-thirds in the south. A *de facto* cease-fire metamorphosed into a low-level stalemate with neither side engaged in much fighting.²⁶

In Washington the focus shifted to implementing more economic sanctions



Chad, 1984. OSD/HO

against Libya for its efforts to destabilize Chad and other North Africa countries. To make matters worse from the Reagan administration's point of view, it received indications that Qaddafi was aiding insurgent forces in Central America. Should the United States continue its temporary suspension of export licenses to Libya, or should it grant licenses to U.S. businesses to sell to Libya? Weinberger proposed a solution: "My present inclination is for a full trade boycott of Libya and certainly a very strong presumption against granting any licenses." However, a boycott was not feasible because it would require a declaration of national emergency

under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a move the rest of the administration was unprepared to make. As an alternative, Shultz, Weinberger, and Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige then recommended to the president denial of all licenses for U.S. sales to Libya worth over \$1 million or destined for development of Libya's strategic infrastructure. While these restrictions would not put much pressure on Qaddafi, they would demonstrate U.S. willingness to accept economic pain to demonstrate its opposition to Libyan adventurism and support of terrorism.²⁷

As became evident at the NSC meeting of December 2, 1983, while the Reagan national security team all favored the denial of million-dollar plus sales to Libya, they realized over the long run it would cause the United States real economic pain. Lost sales and contracts would become particularly significant because Libya was embarking on an irrigation project that would generate over \$10 billion in contracts. Another consideration was the unwillingness of U.S. allies to impose similar sanctions on Libya. The NSC participants doubted the allies would be as willing to extend sanctions, and Qaddafi could purchase much of what he need from them. The president decided to lift the temporary suspension on licensing U.S. exports to Libya, but at the same time he declared that "the current presumption of denial of all items controlled for the reasons of national security is emphatically reaffirmed." Reagan also disapproved the application for U.S. licenses for the development and construction of a Libyan petrochemical processing complex. In his diary, Reagan explained his reasoning: "The exports were things that the Libyans can get virtually anywhere so the action wouldn't hurt them at all. I said we should see if we could persuade our friends to join the boycott—otherwise we'd sell." To that end Reagan instructed State to prepare "a strategy for developing a sophisticated, discriminating, and serious multilateral export control approach to Libya."²⁸

The idea of sanctions had little deterrent effect on Qaddafi. In March 1984 he sent his Tu-22 bombers to destroy a Sudanese radio and television station. In response the United States, at Egypt's request, sent two AWACS to Egypt to augment its regional air defense capacity. The Pentagon found itself in a reactive posture, sending aircraft to North African allies in response to Libya's transgressions. These shows of air defense support for Egypt or the Sudan, the naval exercises in and around the Gulf of Sidra, and the diplomatic and economic campaign against Qaddafi failed to have the desired effect. Clearly stronger

measures had to be considered, but the Reagan administration was unwilling and unable to implement this policy until its second term.²⁹

Worldwide Terrorism

Qaddafi's Libya was a major supporter of terrorism, not just against his pro-Western neighboring Arab states, but against the West in general. However, the problem of terrorism was not restricted to Libya's sponsorships. There were many nonstate terrorist organizations that would take money and support from nations like Libya, but which operated on their own. They ranged from Palestinian groups to European anarchist terrorists such as the Red Brigade of Italy. From 1968 to 1980, according to U.S. statistics, there were 7,300 terrorist incidents worldwide; of these 2,700 were directed at U.S. citizens or installations, resulting in the deaths of 173 Americans and the wounding of 970 more. During 1977–1980, the Carter administration increased priority for collection of intelligence on terrorist activities; obtained from Congress in FY 1981 \$40 million for additional security at U.S. diplomatic posts abroad; undertook antiterrorist training exercises and simulations; created the Joint Special Operations Command to conduct antiterrorist and rescue operations; signed an international agreement suspending air service with states that harbored aircraft hijackers; and ratified a UN convention against hostage taking. The Reagan administration planned to do more.³⁰

The Pentagon's interest in antiterrorism was strong because the armed forces represented the largest number of U.S. personnel abroad. Military personnel served at overseas bases, often living among the locals. The military services had attachés at most U.S. embassies, sent representatives to military organizations like NATO, and maintained a security force, largely U.S. marines, that guarded embassies. Protecting DoD personnel worldwide was a daunting challenge. U.S. military serving abroad provided high-profile targets and were easily identified as Americans, even out of uniform. In 1981 after the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the taking of American hostages, the Pentagon reviewed the role of the U.S. marine embassy guards. In 1981 there were 119 marine security detachments assigned to protect classified material, personnel, and property at U.S. embassies should they come under attack. The role of these U.S. Marine Corps units, usually small in number and lightly armed, was essentially defensive. In the event of a large-scale riot or demonstration against a U.S. facility abroad, their job was to delay entry of hostile groups to allow for the destruction of clas-

sified material and to aid in safeguarding the lives of American personnel and foreign nationals employed by the embassy. The marine guards would hold off the intruders as best they could until the host government's security services, which had the ultimate responsibility for protection of U.S. diplomats and installations, arrived. The marines had authority to use lethal force to save their lives or the lives of embassy personnel, but they required the permission of the chief of mission or the senior U.S. official designated by the chief of mission to discharge their weapons to prevent hostile elements from entering the embassy. Most embassies had additional local contract guards, but their deterrent value was deemed marginal. The Department of Defense desired to modify the guidelines for lethal force to allow marine guards to deal more aggressively with mob or demonstration threats to embassies.³¹

State officials were unprepared to accept the Pentagon's suggestions, believing that no single set of rules of engagement could apply to every diplomatic post. All that State was prepared to consider was a post-by-post assessment of whether a "more aggressive posture" was appropriate. State also agreed to consider whether a public statement that the marines would use force could act as a deterrent. While the marines were not given an appreciably expanded role in embassy defense, State embarked on a long-term program to fortify embassies physically.³²

In April 1982 the Reagan administration regularized the management of its response to potential terrorist incidents by adopting NSDD 30, "Managing Terrorist Incidents." The national security adviser, at the direction of the vice president, convened the Special Situation Group to advise the president. State was designated the lead agency for international terrorist incidents that took place outside the United States. Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation would respond to domestic terrorism. The Federal Aviation Administration assumed responsibility for hijackings within the jurisdiction of the United States. With the exception of its role on interagency groups, such as the Terrorist Incident Working Group or the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, the Pentagon had a limited crisis management responsibility. The DoD's main objection to the new policy was over the lead agency concept, which meant that command and control of counterterrorism action drifted until the incident occurred and was defined. When multiple agencies were potentially responsible, Pentagon leaders believed that it was unlikely that the immediate actions required to respond to an incident would occur. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], the Pentagon believed more definitive command and control was required. Defense recommended that terrorist attacks fall under the National Command Authority, that is, the president and the National Security Council. State and the NSC staff opposed this advice and endorsed the existing ad hoc approach. The president sided with the Defense Department and approved NSDD 30 as drafted.³³

To make matters worse from the Pentagon's point of view, overseas U.S. military personnel were increasingly targets of terrorists. Of the 56 major terrorist attacks between 1981 and 1984—including hijackings, attacks on U.S. installations, and attacks on U.S. personnel—13 were directed at DoD personnel or facilities overseas. In Europe terrorists targeted Defense personnel. In 1982 Lt. Col. Charles R. Ray, the assistant Army attaché in Paris, was shot and killed by an unknown terrorist assailant. Navy Captain George Tsantes met a similar fate at the

hands of two armed terrorists on a motorbike in Athens in 1983. One of the most high-profile incidents was the kidnapping of Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier, deputy chief of staff of NATO Southern European Forces, by the Italian Red Brigade. For 42 days Italian police hunted for Dozier, finally rescuing him unharmed. During the manhunt, the Special Situation Group failed to adequately coordinate between State and Defense, causing the Pentagon to recommend again, unsuccessfully, better command and control during antiterrorist operations. Throughout early 1980s multiple bombing attacks at U.S. military installations and against vehicles occurred in West Germany; they would continue



Secretary Weinberger comforting the wife of Col. Charles Ray, slain by terrorists in Paris, upon the return of his body to Andrews Air Force Base, January 22, 1982. *OSD Records*

worldwide for the rest of the decade. The Defense Intelligence Agency reorganized its effort to support the counterterrorism effort. Nevertheless, identifying and then preventing terrorism was both costly and only partially successful. Better intelligence, more counterterrorism training, a less conspicuous profile for service personnel abroad, and more attack-resistant installations were all potential remedies, but they could not be accomplished overnight. Military personnel abroad continued to face terrorist dangers.³⁴

Another issue that kept DoD officials up at night was the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear weapons abroad to a terrorist attack with potential nightmare consequences if such attacks were successful and the terrorists obtained a nuclear weapon. In mid-June 1983 Weinberger asked Richard L. Wagner, his assistant for atomic energy, to outline the problem to the president at an NSC meeting. Wagner reported that at worldwide sites where U.S. nuclear weapons were stored, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. In most cases the host nation provided these forces. Most weapons storage sites were built in an era when terrorism was not a concern. A 1972 survey of the sites indicated that most sites were “in alarming disrepair” and the host country security forces were not always reliable. In 1974 an upgrade program began; however, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. A series of measures, known as the weapons access delay system, was developed, and by 1983 it was installed at a dozen sites. The new system sought to delay entry to a large group of terrorists for [REDACTED], enough time for reinforcements to arrive. The upgrade program continued quietly so as not to publicize the issue and thus increase the terrorist risk to the facilities.³⁵


The event that most energized the Reagan administration’s antiterrorism campaign was the truck bombing of the marine barracks in Lebanon (see chapter 9). Iranian-backed Lebanese terrorists attacked the barracks of the U.S. contingent of the multinational peacekeeping force while the marines slept, killing 241—mostly marines but also sailors and soldiers assigned to the force. The terrorists also bombed the headquarters of the French contingent to the peacekeeping force, killing 57. Weinberger established a commission under the direction of retired Admiral Robert Long to examine the Beirut bombings. The Long Commission examined the failures that led to the bombing. In addition,

it proposed that Weinberger direct the Joint Chiefs to devise a broad range of appropriate military responses as part of the diplomatic and political actions to combat terrorism and develop doctrine, planning, organization, force structure, and training necessary to defend against and counter terrorism. The Long Commission initiated a new look at the problem of terrorism, which eventually engaged the entire Reagan national security team.³⁶

Prior to and even during the immediate aftermath of the Lebanon bombing, Weinberger viewed the nature of terrorism differently from much of the rest of the administration. Weinberger took the legalist approach and held that terrorism was essentially a crime, albeit an appalling one. In his view, military retaliation against terrorists should not be undertaken unless there was definite proof that the targets were responsible for the acts. As he later recalled, "Successful terrorist activities always produce ... fury and frustration ... succeeded by an unswerving desire for vengeance. That cycle is what makes it so difficult to pursue ... terrorists themselves and not yield to temptation to launch indiscriminate bombing in revenge."³⁷

Others in the administration, like Director of Central Intelligence Bill Casey, viewed terrorist attacks not as crimes, but as acts of war against the United States and Western civilization. Shultz came around to the terrorism-as-war point of view. Reagan's compassion for individual victims of terrorism and their families drew him towards Casey's argument. The president's initial reaction was to strike back at terrorists or find some way to resolve a hostage situation.³⁸

Within the Pentagon itself, terrorism was increasingly seen as requiring a more robust response. In early January 1984 Armitage sent Weinberger an assessment of the current state-of-play



39.

Those DoD officials who wanted a more proactive response to terrorism got their wish in spring 1984. In early March the president and the NSC discussed guiding principles and goals for agencies involved in the counterterrorism effort. The NSC participants sought an improvement in intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination to better predict terrorist attacks (human intelligence was earmarked as crucially important); better security and protection; preemptive actions to foil potential terrorist attacks; and improved response capability. On April 4 the president signed NSDD 138, “Combatting Terrorism,” which codified the NSC discussion. The president specifically directed Weinberger to continue to improve U.S. counterterrorism military operations; establish an active military strategy to prevent state-sponsored terrorism before the terrorists could act; develop a “full range of military operations to combat terrorism throughout the entire terrorist spectrum”; and promote a broad range of defensive measures to protect military forces and their dependents worldwide.⁴⁰

Weinberger could easily accept the goals as articulated in “Combating Terrorism” and the recommendations of the Long Commission—better military response and combating terrorism rather than countering. As a result, Weinberger and his advisers approved new and more proactive terms of reference [REDACTED]

⁴¹ *See* e.g., *United States v. Gurnea*, 199 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000).

Soon after the bombing in Lebanon, DoD officials realized that the Pentagon itself was vulnerable to a car bomb attack, especially at the two main entrances. The Pentagon had not been built with this vulnerability in mind. Its bus and Metro stations were major transfer points, and commuters drove on roads in close proximity to the building. At the time, Pentagon security was the responsibility of the General Services Administration (GSA), an agency which provided security for all federal facilities but was not always adequately funded to meet its myriad responsibilities. When Weinberger was apprised of these vulnerabilities, he asked, “Is anyone working on some plans? I’d like to see suggestions but we don’t want to make it impossible to get around the Building.” The deputy assistant secretary for administration, D. O. “Doc” Cooke, reported on measures to increase Pentagon security. He recommended a series of security upgrades including careful GSA inspection of building passes worn on outer garments, metal detectors for visitors at entrances, closing low-traffic vehicle entry points after working hours,

randomly inspecting incoming packages and briefcases, and increasing GSA patrols of the Pentagon grounds. Cooke attached additional security measures. As the terrorism threat increased, virtually all of Cooke's measures, and a few additional ones, were enacted. Eventually the Pentagon became more resistant to terrorist attack.⁴²

The DoD's fight against terrorism was not a battle that would end in a conclusive victory. Even with all the extra precautions, training, exercises, and new intelligence methods, military service members overseas remained terrorist targets. Unfortunately, as Pentagon security officials planned to counter the existing terrorist tactics, the terrorists themselves invented new ones. The use of hijacked passenger jets on 9/11 is the most obvious example.

Somalia and the Horn of Africa

With the exception of Libyan sponsorship of international terrorist groups, Africa was relatively free of terrorism in the 1980s. However, the continent suffered from different problems: underdevelopment, lack of capital, investment, ethnic rivalries, reliance on a few export commodities, one-party rule and dictatorship, corruption, poor education and health care, and a white minority government in South Africa. The Reagan administration held different views of Africa from its predecessor. Carter hoped to encourage human rights and democracy; Reagan stressed long-standing ties and economic relations. What the two administrations held in common was the fear that conditions in Africa had allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence there and create Cold War tensions in yet another continent.⁴³

In a brief report on Africa in late 1984 to the president, Weinberger included an overview of prospects and DoD goals. The secretary's view was not optimistic.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

.⁴⁴

In the Horn of Africa, the Reagan administration backed away from the urgent engagement that had guided the Carter team. To Carter, and especially national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Soviet military support of Ethiopia against its neighbor Somalia, which had recently converted to a pro-United States stance, presented a direct Cold War challenge that had to be confronted. It fell to the DoD to supply Somalia with arms to defend itself from its Marxist neighbor. The Ethiopian-Somali War of 1977–1978, fought to gain control of a disputed border territory, assumed aspects of an East-West proxy conflict. The Reagan administration also supported Somalia, but not with the fervor of Brzezinski. While not unmindful of Soviet adventurism in the Horn of Africa, the Reagan team viewed Somalia as important for the access and potential support it could provide to the defense of the Persian Gulf rather than as a key theater of the Cold War.⁴⁵

In May 1981 Somalia's strongman president, Siad Barre, visited Washington for meetings with President Reagan and members of his administration. In his discussion with Weinberger and Carlucci, Barre requested U.S. military assistance in light of the aggressive Soviet support of Ethiopia, which was then engaged in sporadic border skirmishes and incursions into Somalia. Barre assured the Pentagon leaders that "Somalia could be instrumental in helping to rid the region of Soviets and Soviet influence." The point of contention between the two rivals in the Horn of Africa was the Ogaden, a sparsely inhabited area that provided pastures to livestock during the rainy season. The Ogaden was delineated by European colonial powers as Ethiopian, but it was used by Somalis for grazing their herds. Somalia considered it part of its territory. The Somalis were engaged in sporadic border raids into the Ogaden and supported Somali guerrillas who were resisting what they considered Ethiopian occupation. The Ethiopians periodically counterattacked Somalia. In July 1981, Ethiopian MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft raided Somali forces near the border, destroying their air defenses. Both State and Defense agreed that Somalia should receive diplomatic and military support. Carlucci proposed a "package" that he considered "meaningful" within the security assistance funding parameters and that would not raise concern

on Capitol Hill or in Kenya, Somalia's wary neighbor to the south. Carlucci proposed sending a mobile training team to repair Somalia's Soviet-built radar and antiaircraft gun systems, having U.S. Navy ships make periodic port calls, and including Somalia in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force's Bright Star 1982 regional exercise.⁴⁶

U.S.-Somalia relations fell into a pattern. When Ethiopia pressured Somalia militarily, Pentagon and State officials met to discuss providing Somalia with U.S. weapons and equipment. Few weapons seemed appropriate. The Somalis had ordered Vulcan 20mm antiaircraft guns, but they were not effective against MiG-21s or MiG-23s. Pentagon officials believed the money could be better spent; State thought the Vulcans were an important symbol of U.S. support for Barre. The issue was bumped to the NSC Senior Interagency Group staff, which sided with DoD. The Somalis were persuaded to cancel the order for Vulcans. Defense suggested Redeye shoulder-held surface-to-air missiles, but State feared there was a high probability that Redeyes would find their way into the Ogaden where they would be used by Somali guerrillas, thus tying the United States to Somalia's violation of Ethiopia's borders. M47 tanks from Italy were a possibility, but the cost of restoring these "junk" tanks seemed an unwise investment given that Somalia had only \$20 million in U.S. foreign military sales grants for fiscal year 1982. Instead, the Reagan administration decided to provide the Somalis with a ground-force package of \$17 to \$20 million that emphasized transport, communications, and engineering items. In addition, a U.S. military team would repair two Somali radars and its 25 air-defense guns.⁴⁷

In August 1982 Ethiopian forces moved to within 150 miles of Mogadishu, the Somali capital. While U.S. officials did not believe this was a prelude to an all-out Ethiopian invasion, they responded with a DoD airlift of \$5 million in small arms and ammunition to Somalia. A Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force observer recommended that Somalis be provided antiarmor weapons in the form of tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles (TOWs) mounted on 24 armored personnel carriers (APCs), but that would exhaust all of Somalia's FMS grants and credits yet unappropriated in the FY 1982 supplemental. "Compared to Ethiopian inventories, the APCs are a band aid applied too late," Office of International Security Affairs head Bing West told Weinberger. Somalia had little support from the U.S. Congress or the international community. On Capitol Hill, Somalia and the Horn of Africa were abstractions at best. Congress was

unlikely to appropriate the \$100 million in FMS grants that the DoD believed Somalia needed to defend itself.⁴⁸

In early August 1982 the Reagan administration ordered a general review of U.S. strategy toward the Horn of Africa, placing responsibility for the preparation of the study under State's Bureau of African Affairs, but with Defense, CIA, JCS, Treasury, OMB, and the Office of the Vice President also contributing. The ensuing review recommended that Somalia be given the ability to deter Ethiopian air and ground incursions by Ethiopian and Libyan guerrillas. This would require more security assistance to Mogadishu and a gradual increase in the frequency and level of U.S. joint exercises in Somalia while avoiding direct involvement or commitment of U.S. combat forces in any insurgency or minor border conflict. However, the newly designated commander of Central Command (formerly the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force) was tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin, "for planning purposes only," devising contingencies for U.S. forces to defend Somalia in the event of a full-scale Ethiopian invasion.⁴⁹

During the last two years of the Reagan first term, military assistance to Somalia increased marginally. Congress appropriated \$32 million and \$33 million in military assistance for FYs 1984 and 1985 and provided an accompanying \$35 million and \$30 million in emergency economic support respectively. Given the small size of Somalia's troubled economy, this U.S. assistance was significant. Barre faced armed domestic opposition to his authoritarian rule, and U.S. security assistance and economic funds went a long way toward propping up his government in Mogadishu. U.S. military planners recommended a defense of Somalia in the event of an Ethiopian invasion that relied on U.S. air and naval forces and considered U.S. ground intervention to be a last resort. The plans never had to be implemented; 1982 marked the highest point of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict since the war over the Ogaden in 1977 and 1978. Somalia remained within the Pentagon's focus because of the construction of access facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu to facilitate a potential defense of the Persian Gulf's oil-producing states and the oil tanker shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. In the late 1980s and early 1990s these bases lost their value to the United States after Somalia descended into civil war and chaos.⁵⁰

Morocco

Towards America's oldest ally in Africa, Morocco, the Carter and Reagan admin-



Competing claims to Western Sahara. OSD/HO

istrations' approaches differed subtly. Morocco and neighboring Mauritania had carved up (formerly Spanish) Western Sahara. The Polisario Front, a nationalist movement, led an insurgency against their occupation and received Algerian materiel and financial support. In 1979 Mauritania renounced its claim to Western Sahara and signed a peace with the Polisario, but Morocco continued its war against the local guerrilla front fighting for Western Saharan independence. There was always certain ambivalence among the Carter team toward Morocco because of its extralegal occupation of Western Sahara and the unwillingness of its leader, King Hassan II, to hold a plebiscite in Western Sahara to determine the local

inhabitants' preference for independence or union with Morocco. State officials convinced Carter to suspend U.S. arms sales, which the Pentagon had planned and approved, because Morocco was not seriously seeking a negotiated settlement with Polisario guerrillas. The Carter team left the final policy decisions on arms sales for Morocco to the Reagan administration. The new president and Weinberger showed none of the Carter administration's hesitancy. They unequivocally sought to reinvigorate U.S. relations with Morocco.⁵¹

Reagan appointees at the Pentagon considered that U.S. policy towards Morocco was an example of Carter's overactive concern for human rights and international law, which harmed U.S. national interests. Morocco was a longtime friend of the United States. Hassan was a valuable link to moderate Arabs; and the kingdom was a potential important access point for military flights to the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. In January 1981 the new administration began delivery of six OV-10s—light attack/surveillance turboprop planes designed for counterinsurgency—that the Carter administration had held up, and approved the sale of 108 M60A3 tanks, similarly postponed by the previous administration. Most of all, however, the Pentagon needed access to Morocco's air bases. As the United States had discovered during the resupply of Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Western European allies could not be counted on to allow U.S. military transit access to their air facilities. In February 1981 the Joint Chiefs told Weinberger that "Morocco's geographic location and air facilities offer great potential to contribute to force projection capability of the United States in a Southwest Asia contingency." Next month, Weinberger asked Haig to begin negotiations with Morocco for access to air facilities. Haig agreed that "the time is ripe" and prospects were good, given the new arms sales



King Hassan of Morocco presenting Secretary Weinberger a ceremonial sword in the secretary's office, May 20, 1982. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

and the delinking of such sales from Moroccan participation in the Western Saharan peace process.⁵²

U.S.-Moroccan relations improved. Carlucci visited Rabat, Morocco's capital, in June 1981, resulting in the creation of a special private channel of communications between the king and Weinberger. The Pentagon agreed to provide Morocco with 1,000 cluster bombs to attack the Polisario's fast-moving land rovers, which were hard to hit with conventional bombs, but only after Congress approved the AWACS and F-15 enhancement sales to Saudi Arabia (see chapter 10) would the bombs be sold to Rabat.⁵³

In October 1981, 3,000 Polisario forces supported by Soviet-built armor and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles overran the 1,500-man Moroccan garrison at the strategic town of Guelta Zemmour. During the counterattack and in subsequent fighting, Morocco lost two Mirage F1 aircraft, one C-130 cargo plane, two F-5E jets, and one Puma helicopter to SA-6 fire. As the Moroccan ambassador noted, "Morocco has no counter to the SA-6 missile system and faced the prospect of losing air superiority and ground support for its forces." He requested a long list of weapons and military equipment from the United States to counter the SAMs. The Pentagon responded immediately with a package of countermeasures and contractor support to upgrade Moroccan F-5E aircraft defenses against SA-6s and provide U.S. Air Force tactical expertise. To counter Polisario armor, the Pentagon offered antiarmor cluster bombs. To locate guerrilla units, the DoD promised increased intelligence coverage.⁵⁴

It was not just a matter of airpower, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Bing West suggested after a trip to Morocco to accompany an advance USAF team to brief the Royal Moroccan Air Force on the use of anti-SAM measures. According to West, the 60,000 Moroccan troops in Western Sahara operated under a "search and avoid" doctrine against the 5,000 Polisario fighters. West offered as evidence the fact that the Polisario had captured 200–400 Moroccan soldiers, while Moroccan armed forces had not captured a single guerrilla in four years of combat. To remedy Morocco's lackluster military strategy, West suggested that U.S. support and training must extend to the Royal Moroccan Army and raised the possibility of a joint military commission between Rabat and Washington.⁵⁵

At the end of 1981, Weinberger followed up on the West trip by stopping off in Fez on his way to Turkey. He spent 90 minutes with King Hassan. They

agreed to establish a joint military commission, which henceforth met annually to coordinate military relations. Hassan suggested possible Moroccan locations for U.S. transit sites to the Persian Gulf—too remote for the Pentagon's liking and too expensive (\$150 million) to upgrade—so Weinberger suggested that the president would have to decide if the cost was warranted. Hassan insisted that Reagan promise not to use the transit sites to resupply Israel.⁵⁶

In February 1982 Haig traveled to Morocco and obtained from Hassan access to Sidi Slimane Air Base, a former U.S. Strategic Command post then being used by the Moroccan Air Force. The base enjoyed a central location and was in good physical shape. Nonetheless, it would cost \$100 million (of which \$82 million would be for a petroleum, oil, and lubricants pipeline) to raise the base to U.S. standards. Access to Sidi Slimane would mean that U.S. cargo aircraft en route to Southwest Asia would require only one stop. Weinberger agreed with Haig that negotiations for the base at Sidi Slimane should begin without delay but also wanted to hold open the possibility of using the Mohammed V civilian airport near Casablanca. Weinberger hoped that negotiations could be concluded before Hassan met Reagan later in the spring. In April 1982, West attended the first joint military commission meeting in Morocco, where the two sides agreed to joint military exercises, map and intelligence sharing, and the preparation of a five-year force structure plan for Morocco.⁵⁷

When Hassan visited Washington in May 1982, he and the president signed an agreement for U.S. access to Sidi Slimane Air Base and the Mohammed V civilian airport, but only during emergencies or for training purposes. There would be no permanent U.S. presence in Morocco. In exchange, the United States committed \$90 million in construction costs for upgrades of the two air facilities over the next four years. In his meeting with Hassan at the Pentagon, Weinberger assured the king that in Washington there was "full understanding that Morocco [should] prevail" in its war with the Polisario Front. In addition, State proposed increasing military and economic assistance to Morocco. For FY 1983 it projected a rise in FMS from FY 1982's \$30 million to \$100 million, half of which would be at concessional rates, but State was not convinced that Congress would appropriate that level. Congress subsequently cut Moroccan FMS to \$75 million, still two and a half times the previous year's figure.⁵⁸

Hassan's visit to Washington in May 1982 was the high-water mark of U.S.-Moroccan relations. While the fighting in Western Sahara stabilized into a

low-level guerrilla conflict, Morocco faced financial difficulties. The government in Rabat was well in arrears in paying off its previous FMS loans and in danger of a congressional ban on further military assistance due to lack of payments. The Reagan administration reprogrammed \$52 million of Morocco FY 1983 FMS credits for military sales to El Salvador. The U.S. Army was initially unwilling to provide M48A5 tanks, which was the tank Hassan was convinced he needed. At Weinberger's urging, 17 reconditioned M48A5 tanks were sold to Morocco for delivery in January 1985.⁵⁹

Indicative of the deterioration in U.S.-Moroccan relations was Hassan's decision in August 1984 to sign the Oudja Accord with Libya, which called for close cooperation and looked to eventual union between the two countries. In Washington the accord was greeted with disbelief and a sense of betrayal. As Weinberger told the president, the problem was Congress's inability to fulfill the military needs of moderate states like Morocco: "King Hassan has said he turned to Libya because he felt we could not or would not meet his major military needs. Even more disturbing is the fact that it was the King Hassan himself who initiated the union with Qadhafi [Qaddafi]." To the secretary, the "dimensions of the Oudja Accord" were "unclear" but could be "ominous."⁶⁰

Hassan seemed to be sending Washington a signal. The U.S. ambassador in Rabat, Joseph V. Reed, tried to explain the king's motives to Weinberger. The pact would put pressure on Algeria, the main supporter of the Polisario. It would preclude Libya from supporting the guerrilla insurgency in Western Sahara; it would provide debt-ridden Morocco access to Libyan financial resources; and it would expedite Moroccan control over the half million of its citizens working in Libya. Apparently surprised by the negative reaction to the accord, Hassan assured the Reagan administration that Morocco would stand by its military relationship with Washington including the access/transit agreement. Weinberger recommended business as usual with Morocco, avoiding public positions that forced Hassan to distance himself from Washington. Still, according to Weinberger, it was time for some tough talk with the Moroccan monarch: ask him if there any secret codicils to the Oudja Accord; obtain assurances that Libyan military or intelligence officers would not be stationed in Morocco; encourage Morocco to sign a general security of military information agreement to restore confidence that U.S. technology provided to Morocco would not leak to Libya or terrorists; and recommend a Washington public-relations campaign by official Moroccans to restore their image.⁶¹

Hassan personally assured Weinberger that he intended “to continue his close personal relationship with the U.S. [and] ... he will safeguard U.S. interests and concerns.” Hassan asked for patience, stating he believed the accord would act as “a moderating impact on Qaddafi’s conduct.” Within the Arab world, these publicly announced quasi-unions were common but usually short-lived. Morocco had previously entered into six such unions and the one with Libya would last less than two years. Nevertheless, in late 1984 the NSC instituted a study on the impact of the Libya-Morocco union on the rest of North Africa. This study never resulted in a high-level discussion or presidential directive. The Reagan administration instead accepted Hassan’s assurances that the military relationship would continue and, in a crisis, the United States would have access to the Sidi Slimane and Mohammad V airports.⁶²

Sub-Saharan Africa: Liberia

With the exception of South Africa, which gained independence in 1910 as the larger Union of South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa was a patchwork of recently independent countries, some enjoying stability, if not prosperity. Most were ruled by authoritarians. Unfortunately, many African states were wracked by political and ethnic rivalries that often degenerated into conflict or low-level civil war. The major threat to most African nations was poor management of their economies, which were usually based on a single resource or a small number of commodities. As the world prices for natural resources dropped, African states often faced chronic debts, lack of economic opportunity for their citizens, popular discontent, and insurgencies. Where there was danger of pro-Western African nations falling to pro-Soviet dissident forces, the Reagan administration usually supported the beleaguered government with economic and military aid. Where the pro-American nation tottered on the edge of economic collapse, the Reagan administration also sought to ameliorate the situation.

Liberia was a friendly African nation whose economy was based on the export of natural rubber and iron, and on providing the international shipping industry a maritime registry of convenience. Given this lack of economic diversity, Liberia often faced debt crises as worldwide prices for its commodities fluctuated. Liberia had a special place in U.S. relations with Africa because of the two nations’ long interrelated history. Founded in the early 1800s as home for freed American slaves, the United States recognized Liberia as an independent nation

in 1862 and sent an African American diplomat to Liberia's capital, Monrovia, which was named in honor of President James Monroe. For the next century, Americo-Liberians, the descendants of American free blacks, dominated the political and economic life of the republic at the expense of the indigenous population in the rural interior. In April 1980 Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe and 17 other enlisted men overthrew the Americo-Liberian government of President William R. Tolbert Jr. Doe represented the first time indigenous Liberians controlled their government. He released political prisoners, welcomed Liberian dissident exiles home, campaigned against corruption, and complied with the International Monetary Fund's economic stabilization program. He promised a return to democratic elections in 1985. Before Doe seized power, the United States enjoyed close relations with Liberia, which resulted in strategic benefits to Washington: a satellite tracking station (one of seven worldwide), the Voice of America transmitter station for all of Africa, a telecommunications station for all diplomatic cables from Africa, and a half a billion dollars in U.S. private investment in Liberia. Although Liberian military bases were of limited use, Liberia allowed U.S. forces access in the event of an emergency.⁶³

[REDACTED]

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The Reagan administration gave Doe a warm welcome when he visited Washington in August 1982. He was hailed as a young (he was only 30 years old) and progressive African leader. When he met with Weinberger during his visit, Doe reiterated his requests for additional military aid, hinting that if no more was forthcoming, he might have to go elsewhere and break Liberia's practice of soliciting military aid exclusively from Washington. Doe and Weinberger agreed



Secretary Weinberger welcomes President Samuel Doe of Liberia to the Pentagon. *OSD Records*

that U.S. aid should provide the Armed Forces of Liberia with troop transport trucks, small arms, ammunition, and communications equipment. Doe then asked for helicopters, but Weinberger diverted him back to communications equipment by asking what the Liberian military's communication capability was. The response from the minister of information was that they had none.⁶⁵

In September 1983 the Reagan administration reaffirmed its policy towards Liberia: to promote political and economic stability through development of democracy and free enterprise, protect facilities and military access rights, prevent Soviet or Libyan subversion, and avoid Liberian political or economic disintegration. These were formidable goals given the worsening political and economic situation in Liberia. The DoD's specific responsibilities were to improve the discipline and professionalism of the Armed Forces of Liberia and to use military assistance funds to pay for the construction of military housing for Liberian soldiers and their families. As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for ISA Noel Koch reported after an early 1983 trip to Africa that included a stop in Liberia, "The Liberian Army is a semi-organized mob ... its military utility is virtually nil which is fine because the threat to Liberia is nil.... Our security assistance to Liberia is directed to buying off the mob."⁶⁶

By the end of 1983 the Doe government confronted growing domestic unrest and political opposition as the deadline for elections in 1985 approached. Doe complained in a letter to Reagan that U.S. support of the Liberian armed forces was inadequate, especially in the areas of air defense and rapid troop deployment. The obvious question asked in the Pentagon was who was planning to attack Liberia. Doe raised again the possibility of seeking military aid from other countries. Armitage told Weinberger, "I see no reason to let Doe's latest emotional broadside drive us off our basic political or assistance strategies." Armitage considered the U.S. military assistance program "sound and practical," stressing Liberian priorities like housing for its military, training, technical assistance, and spare parts. He "saw no reason whatsoever ... to give Doe helicopters, new troop lift aircraft, air defense, or whatever." The undisciplined army was not making effective use of what they already had. As the elections drew nearer, Armitage anticipated more requests, but, as he stated, internal disorders and political opposition did not lend themselves to a military response.⁶⁷

Armitage's unease about the elections and Liberian political stability proved correct. Faced with multiple coup attempts during his first five years, Doe became increasingly authoritarian. As the elections approached, he limited political opposition, restricted freedom of speech and the press, and purged the government of those who opposed him, replacing them with trustworthy members of his own ethnic group. The election, held in October 1985, was marked by violence and saw the banning of six of the nine opposition political parties. Doe won by 51 percent of the vote, but independent observers considered the election to have been rigged.⁶⁸

The Pentagon had acted responsibly in trying to limit military assistance to Liberia to what it could actually use. While Doe initially seemed a progressive leader in 1981, Weinberger and his advisers did not foresee that the ethnic and political rivalries in Liberia precluded an easy transition to democracy. They assumed that because Doe was pro-Western, he was worthy of support.

Zaire

The tendency to support anticommunist leaders no matter their policies was most pronounced in Zaire, the resource-rich former Belgian Congo. Since 1965 Zaire had been ruled with disastrous results by the pro-Western dictator Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. As Weinberger admitted, "Zaire is an economic, moral, and military



Secretary Weinberger and President Mobutu of Zaire at the Pentagon, November 11, 1981. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

disaster, especially in the critically important Shaba Region. Corruption is rife. However, President Mobutu remains a staunch supporter of the West.” Weinberger noted that Mobutu was the first African leader to send troops, a French-trained battalion, to Chad and to implement the OAU peacekeeping operation against Libyan aggression. Weinberger realized that Mobutu was a rolling disaster, but he was the United States’ disaster. He had his uses.⁶⁹

The Pentagon and State Department were reduced to pressuring Mobutu for political, economic, and military reforms, while at the same time propping up his regime. A DoD delegation that visited the country in late 1981, according to ISA head Armitage, “was brutally frank with Mobutu about the lack of readiness and the grossly inept leadership of his military forces.” The delegation recommended supplying Zaire with nonlethal military supplies, increasing training of Zaire’s military officers, and augmenting Zairian military logistics and maintenance (the worst in the world, according to the DoD delegation).⁷⁰

The situation in Zaire had not improved almost two years later. A joint

embassy/defense attaché assessment from Kinshasa in mid-1983 reported that, with the exception of two brigades dedicated to protecting the president, Zaire's armed forces were "weak and disorganized" and getting worse. As an example of how difficult it was to support the Zairian military, Koch reported after his trip to Africa in 1983 on the seven C-130 aircraft Zaire had purchased from the United States. Of the seven, one was the presidential aircraft. Koch noted it was "a minor miracle" that it was still flying. Two other C-130s were impounded in Italy for nonpayment of a debt; two were hangered for lack of spare parts; and two crashed due to pilot error. Koch noted that over the last 10 years, through FY 1982, the United States had given Zaire almost \$127 million in FMS, of which \$115 million were credits; provided \$3 million in free military assistance; and trained 455 of Zaire's military officers at a cost of more than \$8 million. According to Koch, Zaire "has little to show for this in terms of military capacity. Net to us: Zaire remains in the Western camp." Koch had hit upon the essential point. Mobutu was too useful to the United States to fail. In Chad, Zaire had provided peacekeepers and in Angola it supported the insurgents against Soviet- and Cuban-supplied Marxist governments.⁷¹

When Mobutu returned to Washington in July 1983 for another meeting with Reagan, the president's advisers, including UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, made the case that as "the most consistent African supporter for twenty years," he should be allowed to air his grievances and be provided positive encouragement in the form of more military aid and U.S. economic support. There was only so much the president could promise. Congress was loath to grant military aid to Zaire until Mobutu agreed to long-standing International Monetary Fund demands that he reform his economy and reduce his government expenditures. Economic aid would have to wait.⁷²

Only after the end of the Cold War, given the absence of a Soviet-Cuban threat, did the United States no longer feel the need to prop up Mobutu. In 1997, Mobutu lost his increasingly tenuous grip on power and was overthrown.

Southern Africa

The Republic of South Africa was the economic and military powerhouse of sub-Saharan Africa. Its long-standing apartheid government was racist and reserved the resources and most of the land of South Africa to the white minority, leaving the black majority in inadequate homelands and without political power.

To the Carter administration, South Africa was a pariah and was treated as such. The Reagan administration did a 180-degree turnaround from the Carter policy of isolating the Afrikaner government in Pretoria. Carter imposed extensive sanctions and cut off not only military assistance but also military contacts. The Reagan team sought to engage South Africa with a new policy called “constructive engagement,” which also represented a different strategy to solve the regional problems of Namibian independence, the civil war in Angola, and the insurgency in Mozambique, as well as transitioning the Republic of South Africa toward political and racial reform. The Carter administration had focused on Namibia first, placed sanctions on Pretoria, and sought to encourage South African political reform by isolating the whites-only government. The Reagan alternative was the brainchild of a 39-year-old academic, Chester A. Crocker, who became assistant secretary of state for African affairs in 1981 and served in that job for both Reagan terms. Successive secretaries of state, Alexander Haig and George Shultz, along with the Reagan NSC team, gave Crocker full control. They allowed him to direct policy and negotiate with the numerous political-military factions in Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique; the so-called anti-apartheid frontline states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe); and other interested nations. The goal of Crocker’s initiative was to end Soviet and Cuban intervention in Southern Africa (Cuba had 50,000 troops in Angola) and thereby ease South African concerns. Cuban withdrawal would allow Pretoria to disengage from its fight against the Marxist Angolan government and its Cuban allies, grant Namibia independence, and move in an evolutionary fashion to political reform. In the first Reagan term, Crocker’s policy resulted in little success, but he believed he was building the foundation for a new Southern Africa. Crocker’s policy had its doubters, who claimed it amounted to appeasement of South Africa and suggested that his evolutionary approach would not work. To these critics, apartheid was an evil that must be overcome, much like the civil rights movement of the 1960s overcame the political disenfranchisement of African Americans. The Afrikaner government in Pretoria would only respond to resistance and isolation. The settlement of the Namibia question in 1988, the emergence of representative government for Namibians in 1990, and the end of apartheid in 1994 confirmed in the minds of Crocker and his boss Shultz the success of his strategy. Others disagreed, citing African National Congress-led popular demonstrations, international

pressure, and UN support for Namibia as the real cause of democratic gains in Southern Africa.⁷³

The Pentagon was essentially a bystander in the policy of constructive engagement, but there were aspects of the policy that appealed to Weinberger and his DoD team. The South African military and intelligence establishments had in the past cooperated with the United States in patrolling and surveilling shipping lanes around the Cape of Good Hope. Under Carter, the Pentagon had reluctantly severed military ties with South Africa, a decision that ended the long-standing military and intelligence relationship with Pretoria. Under Crocker's engagement, some of those ties could be reestablished. While the arms embargo against South Africa remained, the United States could sell security services and nonmilitary items that could have military applications to the South African armed forces. The Pentagon returned four military attachés to Pretoria and resumed the intelligence coverage of Southern Africa.⁷⁴

The Pentagon was also interested in Crocker's and State's negotiations to introduce the UN Transition Advisory Group (UNTAG), consisting of 5,000 to 10,000 international peacekeepers, which allowed for all but 1,500 South African troops to depart Namibia. The UN group would organize national elections, which undoubtedly would bring the insurgent South West Africa People's Organization to power. The settlement would include an informal linkage to a drawdown of Cuban troops in Angola. South Africa would insist on Cuban withdrawal from Angola in return for its withdrawal from Namibia. As Iklé told Weinberger, "The continued Cuban presence in Angola is harmful for US security interests (Soviet base in South Atlantic, Cuban bridge to Horn of Africa, etc.). Hence we will have to take a keen interest in how the Namibia negotiations unfold." Under the projected plan, Defense would not contribute troops to UNTAG, but it would be responsible for transporting them and their equipment to Namibia at an estimated cost of \$80 million. As it turned out, Crocker and State were not yet able to uncouple Cuban withdrawal from Angola from South African departure from Namibia, so the DoD's logistical support was not yet required. In the last year of the Reagan presidency, the Cubans and South Africans agreed to withdraw. Then in 1990 Namibia held elections and became an independent nation. The fighting in Angola ceased, ending decades of civil war, insurgency, and intervention. In South Africa the African National Congress party of Nelson Mandela came to power in 1994, ending centuries of white rule.⁷⁵

Looking at Africa as a whole during the Reagan administration, no obvious policy pattern emerged. Instead, Weinberger and the Pentagon viewed the problems of each nation on the continent as a series of unrelated, or at least only marginally related, issues. The threat of Qaddafi to his neighbors and as a sponsor of terrorism dominated policy to North Africa. As had previous Cold War administrations, Reagan and his advisers at the Pentagon saw interventions by the Soviets and their Cuban proxies in the Horn of Africa, Angola, and Mozambique as an extension of the Cold War confrontation. If the Soviets and Cubans were there, the United States needed a counterstrategy. Missing from the Reagan and Weinberger approach to Africa was Carter's pressure on pro-Western African leaders, such as Mobutu in Zaire or King Hassan in Morocco, to adhere to democratic principles, peaceful diplomatic solution of international disagreements, and human rights. To Weinberger, pro-American African leaders need not be harassed to make political reforms or negotiate with Marxist insurgencies. Reform was evolutionary; the threat of Soviet-Cuban intervention was immediate. Pro-American Samuel Doe of Liberia continued to receive modest U.S. support even after OSD officials realized he was no African progressive and the main threat to his increasingly authoritarian regime was his domestic opponents. In Southern Africa the Reagan administration developed the strategy of constructive engagement, but it failed to solve the impasse, and Defense's role in this policy was minimal.

During the first Reagan term, terrorism struck Pentagon peacekeepers in Beirut and military personnel at overseas bases. Defense concluded that better physical security, training, and intelligence provided the best means of combating terrorism, but the strategy would only succeed in the long term. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Weinberger and his advisers maintained that the command structure for the force was flawed, but their concerns fell on deaf ears. The administration agreed upon a policy that elevated counterterrorism to at least low-level war status. The Pentagon itself started to grapple with its own vulnerabilities to terrorists, beginning a long process of upgrading its security procedures. Terrorism proved a determined foe, outlasting the Cold War and evolving and mutating as internet technology provided terrorists with a means of spreading their messages. As antiterrorist procedures were instituted, terrorists devised new tactics. The fight continued without an end in sight.

The All-Volunteer Force

AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY IN ANNAPOLIS in early November 1983, 275 scholars, government officials, and defense experts attended a conference to examine the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) 10 years after its creation. Caspar Weinberger set the tone for the conference: “The experiment is over. We know now that an All-Volunteer Force can succeed, and we know what it takes to make it succeed. We need only the will, the perseverance and the commitments to quality.” In order to emphasize the general acceptance by the military and the public of volunteer armed forces, Weinberger stated that the DoD would no longer use the term All-Volunteer Force; instead it would refer to “simply the armed forces, the finest armed forces the country has ever known.” Despite this promise, the term proved impossible to shake during the 1980s.¹

While most presenters at the conference agreed with Weinberger, some still wondered if the AVF would succeed even after 10 years. Charles C. Moskos of Northwestern University, the leading sociologist of the armed forces, pointed out in his presentation that the AVF was meeting its manpower goals and requirements for quality of recruits for now. But how would it fare as the economy rebounded and potential recruits had more career options? More fundamentally, Moskos contended, the AVF had shifted military service from a patriotic obligation to a job; like other jobs, the primary inducement was monetary compensation. To use Moskos’s phrases, the “citizen soldier” was being replaced by the “economic man,” and that meant challenges for how the armed forces were recruited and compensated. There were other undercurrents of concern with the AVF: Was it representative of American society? African American service members were

overrepresented, and Latinos were joining in increasing numbers. Would the AVF at some point bear almost no resemblance to an America that was predominately white and middle class? How would the AVF recruit, utilize, and expand the role of women, a process that the OSD agreed was crucial for its success? How would a larger proportion of female personnel affect combat readiness? Could the under-strength reserves and National Guard replicate the recruitment successes of the active services under the AVF?²

Such fears expressed by critics of the AVF proved unfounded. During the Weinberger years the AVF blossomed into a highly trained, superbly educated, and well-compensated professional force. This was a necessary and urgent transformation; the widespread adoption of advanced technology required an AVF capable of operating the new complex weapon systems. Weinberger's Pentagon emphasized training and readiness and encouraged the services to improve on acting jointly. The result, as one historian of U.S. strategy noted, was a "synergy of advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, automated target identification systems, information-enabled weapons, superior education, and joint warfighting capabilities." This synergy created an effective deterrent against the Soviets and proved devastating against Iraq's Soviet military hardware during the 1991 war. After 1991 many military analysts saw clearly how decisions made in the late 1970s and 1980s became the wellsprings for a revolution in warfighting and military affairs. The combination of the maturation of the AVF, increased emphasis on training, and the technological revolution in weapon and information systems of the late 1970s and early 1980s shaped the way the U.S. armed forces would fight for decades to come.³

Stabilizing the All-Volunteer Force

As a Republican Party candidate for president, Ronald Reagan had stated that the AVF under the Carter administration had failed to meet its recruitment goals and the individuals that it managed to enlist earned poor scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) sections of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, the aptitude test given to all recruits. To put it frankly, Reagan's charge was that the AVF attracted too few recruits and those they did enlist were mostly of below-average intelligence. Reagan's contention was based on the problems that the services encountered recruiting during the 1970s. By the end of 1980 the AVF was meeting its recruitment quotas, primarily because of the onset of

an economic recession and the 11.7 percent pay increase for enlisted personnel mandated by Congress and reluctantly supported by Carter that went into effect in October 1980. What was accurate in Reagan's criticism was that the recruits were not performing well on the AFQT. The Pentagon considered quality recruits as those with high school diplomas and those who scored within categories III, II, and I of the AFQT, that is, from the 31st to 99th percentiles relative to a national sample of 18- to 23-year-old youth who took the test. The upshot was that the AVF was attracting sufficient recruits after October 1980, but not enough recruits with high school diplomas or those scoring in categories III and above on the AFQT. The proposed Reagan military buildup anticipated large increases in armed forces enlisted personnel, many of whom would employ technologically advanced weapon systems. The Pentagon needed to attract quality recruits. To make the challenge greater, in the early 1980s the number of enlistment-age men in the general population was declining.⁴

The Department of Defense traditionally had a variety of tools to encourage enlistment or retain personnel: pay, bonuses, advertising, educational benefits, and (prior to 1973) the draft. As for pay, the Pentagon proposed, and Congress approved, an additional 5.3 percent pay raise proposal for FY 1982. When combined with the already approved raise of 9.1 percent for the same fiscal year, plus the 11.7 percent for FY 1981, enlisted personnel would receive on October 1981 a paycheck 26 percent higher than in FY 1980. With this anticipated pay increase and the ongoing economic recession, it was not surprising that as early as February 1981 the Pentagon reported that it had met 101 percent of its recruiting goals during the first quarter of FY 1981 (October to December 1980) as compared to 96 percent for the same period in the previous fiscal year. All other quality recruiting indicators were up for the same period. Male high school graduates enlisting went from 50 to 75 percent of total male enlistments, female from 87 to 91. Of the enlistees (both men and women) 78 percent scored in the top three categories of the AFQT (but overwhelmingly the middle category III) as opposed to 69 percent in the first quarter of FY 1980. Reenlistments also rose. The Reagan administration inherited an AVF that was on the rise, but it would continue its ascent during Weinberger's tenure.⁵

The Pentagon believed that the AVF was on the right track, but that view was not necessarily shared among the White House staff. In early May 1981 when Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics)

Lawrence J. Korb attended a meeting at the White House with NSC staffers and members of the president's and vice president's staff, he found them unaware of the recent improvements in AVF recruiting. Korb recommended that Weinberger raise the issue of the AVF with Reagan. Weinberger obtained the president's permission to form a task force to, in Reagan's words, "review all aspects of manpower requirements and conditions in the Armed Forces." The president included in the task force's purview military compensation and incentives; educational benefits; current readiness; training effectiveness; leadership and discipline; enlistment standards; recruiting and retention efforts; and selective service registration. The task force would "evaluate the entire military manpower situation and provide recommendations to the President to increase the effectiveness of the active and reserve all-volunteer force." The members of the task force chaired by Weinberger included Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman, the service secretaries, NSC adviser Richard Allen, Chairman of the JCS General David Jones, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Murray L. Weidenbaum, and Assistant to the President Martin Anderson. As was usually the case, most of the real policy work would be done by an interagency working group under Korb.⁶

Draft Registration

The first issue the task force tackled was draft registration. All 18-year-old males were required to register by mail with the Selective Service System. Reinstated by the Carter administration, draft registration was thought to be needed for mobilization in a potential wartime emergency. Carter also saw the reestablishment as a message to the Soviet Union of U.S. resolve after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. With campaign adviser Martin Anderson's encouragement, candidate Reagan opposed draft registration because it gave the impression that the United States had solved its defense problems—and also because, no doubt, Carter had approved it. Furthermore, Reagan claimed it was morally wrong to ask young men to register unless there was a severe national emergency.⁷

Upon taking office, Reagan discovered that most of his advisers favored continuation of draft registration. Weinberger and Frank Carlucci, the Joint Chiefs, Ed Meese, and the new director of the Selective Service System were for it. Only Anderson and Weidenbaum agreed with the president. Weinberger's manpower task force provided four draft registration options for the president: retaining the

current peacetime registration; postmobilization day registration (which started registration after the decision to ready the reserves and National Guard, assemble materials for war, and focus industrial efforts on national security objectives); accelerated postmobilization day registration; and premobilization registration in an emergency. The report weighed the pros and cons of each option without conclusions, but their subtext suggested that premobilization draft registration during an international crisis would be almost as effective as retaining existing draft registration.⁸

Three days after submission of the report, the president met with the NSC to discuss the issue. Reagan admitted that his election campaign opposition had been a result of faulty information. While he was still opposed to the draft, he was now open to selective service registration. Furthermore, the president noted that the Weinberger task force had reduced the original options to two: continuing with draft registration or premobilization registration in an emergency. After touting Pentagon success in recruiting, Weinberger argued that this latter option assumed an “unambiguous warning” of an emergency, something that is not always the case in real life. If the administration evoked premobilization registration and then the crisis subsided, would draft registration then be canceled? Weinberger pointed out that there was already 70–80 percent compliance with the existing registration program amid uncertainty about its future. With a Reagan administration decision to continue the program supported by a publicity campaign, the secretary expected 90 percent compliance. Haig also strongly supported continuing draft registration, as did Admiral Thomas Hayward, speaking for the JCS. Anderson, with Weidenbaum’s support, argued for canceling the current program and reinstituting it in an emergency. Anderson suggested that emergency registration would only take three to four additional weeks to register potential enlistees, not a significant time savings in a mobilization process that would take months. Furthermore, peacetime draft registration sent the wrong message, namely, that the administration was lessening its commitment to the All-Volunteer Force. The continuation of draft registration could be viewed as a first step to eventually reinstituting the draft.⁹

Reagan judged the risk of emergency registration as “always having to make a decision about what constitutes an emergency. What if we reinstate registration and the emergency blows over?” How many times could the president cancel emergency draft registration without undermining the concept? The decision

was obvious to the president. After the 1981 Christmas and New Year holidays, Reagan announced that he was continuing selective service registration but was not returning to the draft.¹⁰

Recruitment and Educational Benefits

Ever since the end of World War II, the U.S. armed services had used educational benefits to reward veterans and to encourage future enlistment. The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, more commonly known as the GI Bill, offered World War II veterans generous benefits for college or vocational training, including tuition and cost of living stipends for student veterans. The 1966 Veterans Readjustment Benefits Act continued this obligation on a lesser scale with a maximum college benefit of \$13,500. With the end the draft and the Vietnam War, Congress in 1976 replaced the act with the Veterans' Educational Assistance Program (VEAP). Under VEAP enlistees could contribute \$2,700 over their service time to a personal educational fund. The DoD would match their contributions two for one, resulting in maximum benefit of \$8,100. The VEAP could not compare in benefits with previous GI bills, but it was based on the theory that the all-volunteer service members did not need additional compensation since their pay was comparable to the civilian sector. That was the theory, but in practice service pay sometimes lagged behind the civilian market. Furthermore, educational benefits provided an incentive to obtaining quality recruits, i.e., those who wanted to obtain or continue their college education after their service.¹¹

Lt. Gen. Maxwell Thurman, the Army's deputy chief of staff for personnel, and Secretary of the Army John Marsh believed that educational benefits could increase recruitment of quality enlistees, thus solving one of their service's nagging problems. The Army's recruits had the lowest scores on the AFQT, and the Army always had the most trouble meeting its recruitment and retention goals, especially for hard-to-fill skilled positions in combat arms. The Army began in 1980 and continued into 1981 to test a program of so-called kickers for educational benefits for high-quality enlistees—those who scored high on the AFQT, had a high school diploma, and qualified for high-skill positions. The program of supplemental kickers provided at its top "Ultra" level \$12,000 in educational benefits for a veteran. Regular enlistees who did not qualify did not participate in the program. In 1982 the Army dropped all kicker levels except Ultra; it then

renamed this program the Army College Fund in 1985. The other services, which had less difficulty in recruiting quality personnel, retained the basic VEAP.¹²

When Weinberger's task force examined educational benefits in late 1982, it split into two camps. One favored retaining the old VEAP for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and the Ultra kickers for the Army. The other wanted to ask Congress to pass a new GI Bill. The defenders of the existing system argued that the new GI Bill would not be cost effective. They suggested that with the VEAP and the kickers for the Army, plus enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, the DoD could achieve the same enlistment and retention results at far less cost than a new GI Bill. The task force estimated annual accrued costs of a new GI Bill at between \$600 million and \$1.5 billion, while the VEAP plus the Army kickers would be in the order of \$200 million per year. However, proponents of a new GI Bill saw educational benefits as more than just an incentive for recruitment and retention; they were an entitlement earned as a reward for honorable military service. They noted that active-duty members were eligible for education courses and believed efforts should be made to extend the benefits to veterans. The members of the task force could not reach a consensus, so they recommended continuing the current VEAP and the Army kickers. If recruiting and retention problems returned, they recommended revisiting the choice.¹³

The report did not say where Weinberger himself stood, but in 1981 he outlined the issue for the president. He noted that the DoD was testing the VEAP as well as the kickers program for the Army, but added, "This approach is unpopular in some quarters of the military and with many members of both Armed Services Committees, particularly those who are pressing for a 'G.I. Bill' now." Weinberger told Reagan he preferred to delay a new GI Bill, at least until the Army completed its test on the impact of its VEAP



Lt. Gen. Maxwell Thurman, Army deputy chief of staff for personnel, January 18, 1982. *OSD Records*

and kickers programs. Another indication of the views of Weinberger and his OSD staff was a recollection by Moskos that in the early 1980s Marsh told him he favored a new GI Bill, but “he could not oppose the OSD party line.” Later in March 1982 the DoD announced it was retaining the VEAP.¹⁴

Nevertheless, support for better educational benefits gained momentum not only in Congress but also in the Army. In the early 1980s researchers for the Recruiting Command told Thurman and Marsh that placing the word “college” in their iconic “Be All You Can Be” advertising slogan resulted in better recruitment numbers. The explanation at the time was that mothers were the most important influence on whether or not their children would enlist. Mothers typically wanted their sons and daughters to attend college, the perceived pathway to economic success. They were more accepting of the Army if it was presented not as a hiatus, a path to maturity, or a road to vocational skills, but as a way to pay for a college degree. The truth was that the majority of veterans, including those with service educational benefits, did not graduate from college, but the cobranding of the Army and college proved a powerful recruiting magnet.¹⁵

Recruiting success for all services during 1981–1984 reinforced skepticism in the OSD about the need for a new GI Bill. Reporting to the president in January 1984, Weinberger extolled the figures: “Now 91 percent of all new recruits are high school graduates, up from 68 percent in 1980.” The secretary added that only 75 percent of all American youth received high school diplomas. “The Army,” Weinberger continued, “which usually has the most difficult recruiting job, had its best recruiting year in history. These recruiting successes are happening at a time when the economy is also improving, at a time when skeptics said young Americans would turn their back on the military.” Weinberger reported similar gains in retention and the reserves. Nevertheless, in October 1984 Congress passed a new GI Bill, officially the Veterans Educational Assistance Act, known more informally as the Montgomery GI Bill after its sponsor, Representative Gillespie Montgomery. Under the bill, enlistees contributed \$100 a month from their salaries for the first year. In return they received a \$7,800 contribution for a two-year enlistment and \$9,600 after three years of service. Enlistees could opt out of the program, which came into effect in June 1985. In 1988 the General Accounting Office estimated that the Montgomery Bill attracted 4 to 5 percent more quality personnel, predominantly high school graduates with aspirations for college after their service. Supporters held that educational benefits would

become even more important as the economy continued to improve in the 1980s, when the gap between civilian and military pay would widen, and as the youth population continued to drop. In the early 1990s they were proven correct as successful quality enlistment continued. By any standard of measurement, Weinberger, the Pentagon, and Congress had not just stabilized high-quality recruiting for the All-Volunteer Force but had optimized it.¹⁶

Women in the Military

Faced with a shortage of male recruits and lower percentile scores on the AFQT of enlisted men, Harold Brown's Pentagon had chosen to recruit more women. Carter had supported the policy and approved of a plan to have over 264,500 women in uniform by FY 1986, at which point they would comprise 12.5 percent of the active-duty service members. A factor discouraging women from joining the services was the prohibition from combat-related duty, which the services applied broadly, relegating women to mostly administrative jobs. Between 1977 and 1980 the Pentagon gradually rolled back some of these restrictions, allowing some female service members to serve in a few combat-related roles.¹⁷

To many in the Pentagon the election of Ronald Reagan was a disavowal of Carter and his stance on women's liberation. According to one of the highest-ranking former women officers in the U.S. military, "Just below the surface of the military ranks at all levels, there persisted a deep well of resistance and even resentment toward women.... Many military leaders, even some senior women, believed that military policies were being made by well-meaning amateurs ... motivated by political expediency and misguided desires for social equality." Reagan's election offered the critics of such "social engineering" an opportunity to halt the trend and take another look at the role of women in the military. The Army took the lead. In what could only be interpreted as an end run around the newly appointed Weinberger and his OSD staff, William D. Clark, the acting assistant secretary of the Army for manpower and reserve affairs, hinted to Congress about plans to reduce the number of future women soldiers. Then Clark informed Robert A. Stone, the acting assistant secretary of defense for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics (MRA&L), "The Army plans to level out the number of enlisted women in the Active Army at 65,000." His justification was that field commanders indicated readiness was being adversely affected by too many women.¹⁸

Weinberger's staff scrambled to make sense of the Army's move and the issue of women in the military. Carlucci's senior military assistant, Brig. Gen. Colin Powell, noted, "The misdemeanor the Army is guilty of is objecting to Congress before objecting to the Secretary about the OSD goal of 85,000 [women in the Army by FY 1986]." To Powell's mind, women were indispensable to the Army, but given the prohibition against assignment to combat units, there was a legitimate question of how many there should be. He also noted that as a result of the Army's limit, more-qualified women could be turned away and less-qualified men permitted to enlist. In mid-March 1981 Carlucci ordered a joint assessment by the military services and the acting assistant secretary of defense (MRA&L) of female officer and enlisted accession and retention policies, with a deadline for the final study of May 15, 1981. Until then, the number of women in the Army would remain at 65,000. As Stone made clear to the services' assistant secretaries for manpower, the study would be based on hard data, with the unspoken implication that anecdotal evidence from commanders was insufficient.¹⁹

Carlucci's directive initiated what came to be known by its critics as "Womanpause." The services and Korb (who took over from Stone in early May) did not make the May deadline but brought the review to completion in October 1981. While it presented a good account of the history of women in the military since the early 1970s, it fell back on the assertion that the issue was too complicated to be resolved with just one study or by a small group in the OSD. The services should take the lead. The study asserted, "The rationale for pressuring the Services to meet annual increased female goals [during the Carter years] appears to be based on equal opportunity considerations and, for the Army, the availability of women in the recruiting market to offset potential male non-service ... shortfalls." The study recommended that the Army cap its number of women at 65,000, but if it failed to meet its recruitment goals for FYs 1981 and 1982 it would have to demonstrate why it was not taking more women.²⁰

Advocates of women in the military, especially the long-established Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), were not pleased with the report. They saw it as a move by the services to regain control of their recruiting from the OSD and an Army ploy to delay recruitment of more women by doing yet another Army study, a standard bureaucratic delaying tactic. Until an additional study was completed, female strength in the service would remain frozen. This state of affairs might have continued for some time, but the Army

and opponents of the AVF overplayed their hand. Someone in the DoD leaked to the *Washington Post* that the Army was asking for 100,000 more soldiers for FYs 1983–1987 to carry out the Reagan-Weinberger military buildup. The source suggested that such an expansion might not be possible “under the volunteer concept.” Without using the words draft or conscription, the leaker was hinting that the draft might be needed to reach this manpower goal. Weinberger was livid, according to one Defense official. The secretary opposed the draft, and he knew the president was dead set against it. Weinberger had his spokesman state that “the draft is not anything anybody is considering.”²¹

If some traditionalists in the Army hoped the womanpause might be a way to generate support for a return to conscription, they were disappointed. Weinberger’s official response was swift and explicit. In a short blistering memorandum to the services, he stated, “Women in the military are a very important part of our total force capability. Qualified women are essential to obtaining the numbers of quality people required to maintain the readiness of our forces.” Weinberger then stated, “This Administration desires to increase the role of women in the military, and I expect the Service Secretaries actively to support that policy.” Furthermore, Weinberger instructed the services to review “institutional barriers” that discriminated against women in the military. In effect, Weinberger was asking for a review of laws and definitions of combat that prevented women from assignment to combat-related duty.²²


Weinberger made it clear that the Army was going to have to accept more women and the pause was over. Korb suggested making this decision public by increasing the number of women in the Army from 65,000 to 70,000 in FY 1983 to, in his words, “dispel the widespread belief that the Review was ‘rigged’ to justify reducing the role of women in the Army.” Korb recalled, “We allowed the Army to pause at 65,000 on the condition that their study [a separate follow-up study of the issue by the Army] would be completed on 1 December 1981. Nine months later no end is in sight.” Raising the ceiling by 5,000 additional women would prevent the impression that the “Army is stalling.” Korb and the deputy secretary agreed to announce that the projected end strength of women in the Army would be 70,000. Weinberger approved.²³

Weinberger and Carlucci had blunted the Army’s effort to limit the number of women. By September 1984 there were 76,796 active-duty women, both enlisted and officers, in the Army and 200,827 in the U.S. armed forces as a whole. The


Army's womanpause had been only a blip. The trend of more women in the military was going up and would continue that way.²⁴

Weinberger, Carlucci, and Korb next focused on enlistment standards and the military occupational specialties (MOS) that were closed to women. Entry standards were similar to men, except in the Navy and Marine Corps, where women had to score higher on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test because the supply of women applicants exceeded demand. The Air Force administered a strength test to women, and the Army planned to follow suit. Beyond physical strength, the institutional barriers that excluded women from certain MOS had been based on a law prohibiting women from combat. In 1948 Congress prohibited women from flying aircraft in combat or serving on Navy combat ships. This law remained on the books and all the services used it as justification prohibiting women from entering MOS that could involve combat. The Air Force excluded women not only from flying combat aircraft but also from working in combat air crews. Female sailors could only go to sea in hospital ships, transports, and other vessels not designed to engage in combat. Female marines and Army soldiers could not join combat units.²⁵

In November 1982 the Army finally produced its long-awaited study, "Women



OSD/HO, based on data from *Military Women in the Department of Defense*



OSD/HO, based on data from Military Women in the Department of Defense

in the Army, Policy Review,” outlining a new methodology for assessing and assigning women soldiers. The Army recommended a gender-neutral test to both men and women to determine their physical capacity to perform skills based on upper-body strength. Of the 351 Army MOS, 132 (or 37.6 percent) were designated as very heavy (lifting over 100 pounds with frequent lifting of 50 pounds), 48 characterized as heavy (80 pounds and frequently 40 pounds) and down the line through moderately heavy (64 categories), medium (64), and light (42). Depending on whether a recruit could meet the lift standards, he or she could serve in these categories. But women were still to be denied access to MOS designated as combat.²⁶

The most controversial aspect of the Army study was the recommendation to add an additional 23 combat closures to the existing 38 combat MOS, bringing

the total to 61 MOS that could be involved in direct forward combat, and thus closed to women. The study defined direct combat as “engaging the enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy’s personnel, and a substantial risk of capture.” The Army cast a broad net in applying this definition. When it listed battalion-sized and company-sized units closed to women because of the high probability of combat exposure in the main battle area, Korb noted, “We found units whose composition and mission made their closure based on individual position classification suspect.”²⁷

Criticism of the Army review also came from outside the Pentagon. DACOWITS, comprised of nongovernment, professional women advisers to the secretary, expressed their concern over the study. They believed the definition of combat to be outdated and the prohibition of women in military occupations based on calculations of potential involvement in “forward” battle areas to be flawed, overly restrictive, and harmful to career development for women. They advised Weinberger that the effect of the study on “national security and the utilization of *all* personnel is seriously negative.” They would be remiss in their duty if they did not urge the secretary “to act upon our warnings.”²⁸

The issue was complex because in the 1980s the potential battlefield was becoming increasingly fluid. A rear area could become a combat zone. Noncombat positions could be exposed to direct combat. Weinberger did not make the issue any clearer when at a July 14, 1983, cabinet meeting attended by the press, an open microphone picked up a comment he made to the president. Weinberger mentioned as an aside to Reagan, “There will be no women in combat, and all that criticism was that we are closing off too many jobs associated with combat units. And so what we’ve done is say that until there is an actual imminence of war, there will be women grease monkeys and things like that. But when it gets to combat, they will be substituted.”²⁹

The comment resulted in charges that Weinberger was demeaning women as “grease monkeys” and ignoring the criticism from DACOWITS. In an awkward press statement, Weinberger claimed that his “grease monkey” characterization was not derogatory and applied to a position involving heavy maintenance which had been traditionally open only to men. He claimed he was trying to inform the president that the DoD was opening up as many positions to women as possible. To further reinforce his case, Weinberger reiterated his policy to the services:



Ensign Mary Crawford and her parents upon graduation from Interservice Undergraduate Navigator Training, January 1, 1982. Ensign Crawford was the first woman naval flight officer and was assigned to the Antarctic Development Squadron. *OSD Records*

“Military women can and should be utilized in all roles except those explicitly prohibited by combat exclusion statutes and related policy. This does *not* mean that combat exclusion policy can be used to justify closing career opportunities to women.” He concluded that “artificial barriers” should not be constructed and would not be tolerated. The Army backtracked and reopened 13 of the 23 MOS they had closed to women, thus reducing the total closed MOS to 48. The Army also decided that the physical standards (heavy lifting and the like) would only be used as a counseling tool during enlistment.³⁰

Notwithstanding his embarrassing aside to the president, Weinberger was insistent that the services should look for ways to open noncombat and combat-related MOS to women. For example, the Air Force opened the KC-10 Extender, its newest tanker aircraft, to qualified women pilots on the revised grounds that it was not a combat aircraft. Women could now pilot four different types of tanker and cargo aircraft. The Navy found a challenging noncombat operation where women could fly: logistics support to the National Science Foundation (NSF) in Antarctica. Soon 4 of its 23 pilots and 14 of its naval flight officers (NFOs) supplying the NSF stations were women. In the Navy as a whole there were 66 pilots

and 26 NFOs who were female. The Army faced the issue of women in combat directly in October 1983 with the U.S. invasion of Grenada (see chapter 14). One hundred and seventy women took part in the operation, serving as military police patrolling the island and guarding POWs and detainees. They also flew and maintained helicopters, interrogated prisoners, maintained communications, served as mobile army surgical hospital personnel, and worked as stevedores. While this gender-integrated force worked well, most female soldiers came to the island after the fighting with the Cubans was over. There was an initial problem when some military policewomen were returned to Fort Bragg because of the high risk of exposure to combat. Nevertheless, Grenada demonstrated that the armed forces' definition of combat on the forward battlefield and rear echelons was becoming increasingly fuzzy, if not obsolete. The Gulf War's Operation Desert Storm in 1991 would drive this lesson home with alacrity.³¹


African Americans in the All-Volunteer Force

While Weinberger could see how women did not yet have equal opportunity in the military, when it came to African Americans in the armed services he believed the issue of equal opportunity was moot. It was a new era, according to the secretary. The racial tensions of the Vietnam War and the mid-1970s had faded considerably by 1981. Many who had resented the influx of blacks into the armed forces during the turbulent 1960s and early 1970s had either left or retired from the services by 1980. The secretary rejected the old "tipping point" arguments, which claimed too many minorities would weaken the military by discouraging white enlistment. Nor did the DoD agree that most African American enlistees came from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. Pentagon-sponsored studies on the educations and occupations of black enlistees' parents revealed that they were similar to parents of white enlistees. The data refuted the canard that the AVF was a "poverty draft" of the economically disadvantaged, especially African Americans, who chose military service because they had few other choices. In 1982 blacks comprised 22 percent of the armed forces (and 33 percent of the Army) while representing only 12 percent of the U.S. population. Weinberger and his team did not see these ratios as a problem, but rather as a positive. Nevertheless, sporadic reports of white supremacist groups operating within the military in 1981 rekindled fears that race relations might return to the turbulent Vietnam War years. Weinberger was unconcerned. As he told the president in


1982, “The fact that many blacks volunteer is a tribute to their patriotism. Black service members have served the nation ably and honorably. It would be both unnecessary and unfair to move to a racial quota-based recruitment system to achieve some arbitrary notion of a proper racial balance.”³²

The recession of the early 1980s and the increased pay for service members allowed the armed forces to recruit more educated and quality enlistees, both black and white. The least-educated youth and usually the poorest potential recruits of both races were not making the grade. Still, the ratios were changing. In the Army the percentage of blacks among first-time enlistments declined to 36.7 percent in 1979, 29.7 percent in 1980, 27.4 percent in 1981, and 24.6 percent in 1982. For the services as a whole during the same period African American first-time enlistees dropped from 26 to 19 percent of the total. With an economic recession and good military pay the armed forces obtained better recruits, but they also attracted more whites than before the economic hard times. There was another reason. Equal opportunity employment became more accepted in civilian industry and new opportunities for African Americans began to open up in the civilian sector.³³

At the same time, the number of black officers in all the services were on the



OSD/HO, based on data from *Population Representation in the Military Services*, a report by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness



OSD/HO, based on data from Population Representation in the Military Services, a report by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

rise, from minuscule numbers in 1972 to more representative figures in 1981. In the Army black officers comprised 3.9 percent of the officer corps in 1972 and rose to 7 percent in 1981, in the Navy they rose from 1 to 2.7 percent, in the U.S. Marine Corps 1.5 to 4 percent, and in the Air Force from 1.7 percent to 4.8 percent. In the early 1970s the DoD realized there was a cultural bias against black officers in the services' evaluation processes for promotion and took steps to rectify it. There were more informal solutions as well. Weinberger's military assistant, Brig. Gen. Colin Powell, recalled how as a colonel in the Army he was recruited into an informal group of high-ranking black officers, "the Rocks," who worked together to assist young black officers in their careers. Taking a leaf out of the white "old boys" power structure, the Rocks created similar black networks.³⁴

During the early 1980s the lives of black enlisted members also improved as

they moved up in the ranks. The exception was the continuing disproportionate numbers of blacks incarcerated by military justice (one-half of the Army's prisoners were African Americans). Nevertheless, during Weinberger's first term, one of the experts on blacks in the military suggested that "the vestiges of racial discrimination in the armed services formed a minor issue. Now manned solely by volunteers, the military tended to assume a social insularity." As a result, black military personnel and their families, like their white counterparts, lived apart from the rest of the American community. A leading military sociologist credited the Army as a model for race relations. He argued that "although not immune to the demons that haunt race relations in America," racial integration in the Army was unequaled in American society and was possibly "the only place [he was writing in 1996] where whites are routinely bossed around by blacks." Another sociologist noted, "Racial discrimination has been reduced, but not eliminated in the all-volunteer force of the 1980s ... [but] it has achieved virtual invisibility in the policy arena in the Reagan years."³⁵

By the early 1980s Weinberger and the military leadership had come to believe that the AVF provided equal opportunities regardless of race or ethnicity and had eliminated racial tensions in the services. The heightened racial tensions of Vietnam—with inequality in combat duty, racial turbulence and unrest in the Navy, and the emergence of black-power consciousness—had subsided. By the 1980s the civil rights movement had accomplished some, although not all, of its goals. African Americans, despite continuing obstacles, were accessing better and higher education, more civilian job opportunities, and political power at all levels of government. The battle for African American opportunity in the military had led the way.³⁶

Weinberger's Push for Joint Advertising

With the exception of insisting that the Army accept more women and encouraging the services to open more MOS to them, Weinberger generally allowed the military departments to decide their own personnel and manpower policies. Such a stance was in keeping with his view that service secretaries should be more involved in policymaking and the implementation of DoD decisions (see chapter 6). But the OSD did have a stake in personnel policy. The advertising budget for recruitment was an area where Weinberger felt obligated to impose an OSD preference on the uniformed services. Weinberger and Carlucci believed that it

would be more cost-effective for the Pentagon to increase its program of joint advertising—that is, a campaign to promote military service without reference to a specific service—and decrease the amount of advertising money allocated to each service. The OSD's rationale was that by competing for recruits the services were creating unnecessary and duplicative costs. Since service advertising did not normally produce recruits, but rather created an awareness of military opportunities and benefits, Weinberger thought that joint advertising could do the job more efficiently at a lower cost than the service-specific ad campaigns. For fiscal year 1982, Carlucci and Weinberger reduced the portion of the DoD budget request to Congress allocated to the services' advertising to below FY 1981 levels, with the exception of the Army, which received a slight increase (not even enough to keep up with inflation) over the previous fiscal year. Meanwhile, the joint advertising budget request was doubled to \$16 million (and later raised to \$18.5 million) out of a total advertising budget of \$114.6 million.³⁷

Secretary of the Navy John Lehman led the services' counterattack on joint advertising. He asked for a return to the fiscal year 1981 levels for the FY 1982 allotments for the services. To Lehman, joint advertising's advocates had not made the case for cost efficiency, and to increase it at the expense of the services would lead to manpower shortages in the Navy and Marine Corps. While he admitted the need for a joint advertising campaign—the Navy was the executive agent for the program—Lehman maintained it should not be expanded at the expense of the services.³⁸

Korb suggested to Weinberger that he be allowed to test the effectiveness of a mix of joint versus service-specific advertising, but the test would take time. Still keen on joint advertising, Weinberger commented, "Why don't we get some advice and competitive bids in on a big, major increase in joint advertising—I really think there are big savings.... I think 18½ [million] is too little and our progress is too slow." Weinberger approved the test and Korb persevered in the face of criticism from the services, who were opposed on the grounds it would come out in favor of more joint advertising, as had previous studies on the issue. The DoD's assistant secretary of defense (comptroller), Vincent Puritano, asked why the department planned to continue the test into FY 1985 when FY 1984 recruiting was so successful. Weinberger agreed, noting, "Joint advertising is better for the most part and saves money. Certain unmet needs can be met by specific ads, but they should be few and far between. Besides I don't think we need to test

advertisement now.” The test ended in September 1984. While it took time to analyze the data, its preliminary indications reiterated that joint advertising was superior to the specific service approach. When the final results were announced in March 1986, the services’ worst fears were realized. The test suggested that total advertising costs could be reduced, large increases in advertising did not produce more recruits, and the best method to recruit was to increase joint advertising. The new assistant secretary for MRA&L, Chapman Cox, suggested reducing the total DoD advertising budget by 18 percent but raising joint advertising from 9 to 23 percent of the total. Nevertheless, the services fought a rearguard action during the remainder of the Weinberger-Carlucci second term to restore at least in part their lost advertising budgets.³⁹

Military Pensions

A more substantial issue, at least in terms of the amount of funding, was the contention of some members of Congress and the 1983 Grace Commission on cost control that military pensions were far superior to even the best pensions in the private sector and needed to be trimmed. The president’s commission proposed a raft of recommendations to reduce military pensions, including reduced benefits for those with less than 30 years of service, pensions based on the five highest yearly salaries rather than the highest three, and reductions in cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for those retiring before age 62 and for those receiving social security benefits. The commission estimated that military pensions would be reduced by \$42.5 billion five years after their recommendations were enacted.⁴⁰

The JCS and Secretary Weinberger opposed such changes on the grounds that they were merely cost-cutting initiatives that did not consider the impact they would have on the morale, recruitment, and readiness of the armed forces. As the JCS told Weinberger, the promise of undiluted retirement pensions kept skilled, experienced personnel in the military services, offset the sacrifices of such service, and encouraged the young and vigorous to remain. The Joint Chiefs asked Weinberger to take the case to the White House. After a frank discussion with four noncommissioned officers, Weinberger told the president, “They [the non-commissioned officers] report a growing skepticism about the nation’s continued commitment to their welfare. It is my firm conviction we should not fuel these doubts further and should not submit legislation to make permanent a one half cost of living adjustment mechanism.” In some cases, the secretary maintained,

a permanent decrease to one-half of the prevailing full COLA for retirees under 62 could reduce “the life stream value” of their retirement pay by 46 percent.⁴¹

The JCS could not agree more. In a recommendation to Weinberger, they made the argument for the existing DoD-funded lifetime annuity after 20 years of service. Military service was not like a civilian job. Service members routinely worked long and irregular hours without overtime pay. They were often separated from their families, exposed to risk, and frequently relocated. The military manpower system was closed. If the military services lacked noncommissioned officers, or midgrade commissioned officers, they could not go out to the civilian market and hire them. Replacements had to rise through the ranks, which required recruiting, training, and retention programs. Finally, the JCS noted that currently only 12 percent of service members made it to or beyond the 20-year vesting point. What they did not state was that with the better pay and benefits of the AVF the expectation was that many more military personnel would stay for 20 years or more.⁴²

Weinberger’s solution was to use the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC), which was currently underway and expected to report its findings in late 1983. The president charged the QRMC to focus on the retirement system and its relationship to U.S. national defense. When the fifth QRMC reported in January 1984 it broke with nine previous studies over the past 35 years by advising against reducing pensions. The logic behind previous recommendations was that a noncontributory system with full inflation adjustments based on the consumer price index (CPI) had become too expensive. The fifth QRMC maintained that changes to the retirement system would cause recruitment and retention disincentives and degrade the quality and quantity of the services’ middle and senior management. If the system was to be reformed, the QRMC concluded that “no modification of the current system be undertaken that will degrade the mission readiness and sustainability of our Uniformed Services.” Weinberger and the JCS could not have asked for a more ringing endorsement of the status quo.⁴³

The sad truth, however, was that the pension system was expensive and would only continue to be more so. In 1986 Congress passed the Military Reform Act, which tinkered with the pension system but did not substantially alter its structure. The new law lowered pensions slightly for those serving 20 years, provided a premium for service between 21 and 30 years, and by a complex formula partially

reduced COLAs to 1 percent less than the CPI each year. By the mid-1990s this new pension system substantially reduced DoD pension costs and provided a stronger incentive to remain in service beyond the 20-year point.⁴⁴

The Reserves and the National Guard

After the Vietnam War and the shift to the All-Volunteer Force, the National Guard, reserves, and Individual Ready Reserve (or IRR, comprised of former active-duty service members who do not drill or belong to a Guard or reserve unit but retain a service obligation) fell on hard times. Under the DoD's Total Force concept, emphasized by Secretaries of Defense Melvin Laird and James Schlesinger, the National Guard, reserves, and Individual Ready Reserve were to have a central role in U.S. defense capabilities. In a national mobilization for war they would be called to active duty to augment the reduced-sized AVF. Yet the 1970s saw precipitous declines in numbers for these components. The Army was hit the hardest. The Army National Guard lost 62,000 soldiers—15 percent of its force—from 1971 to 1978. The Army Reserve suffered a 30 percent decline in its force, dropping from 263,000 to 185,000 during the same period. The Individual Ready Reserve declined from 1 million in 1972 to 144,000 in 1978. The drop in the IRR was significant because its members were expected to fill active and reserve services' (mostly the Army's) needs in a general mobilization. Just when the AVF required increased reserve personnel to take on new responsibilities, reserve strength plummeted. Not only did the Guard and reserves lack personnel, they had also received worn-out and hand-me-down equipment and weapons from active-duty units.⁴⁵

There were reasons for the decline in Guard and reserve numbers. As the number of active forces declined after Vietnam and the AVF required longer enlistments than the two-year draft term, there was a reduced stream of personnel departing active service with a reserve commitment. Without the draft obligation, there was no incentive for young men join the reserves to avoid conscription. The general perception held that a conflict with the Soviet Union in Central Europe would quickly descend to a short and devastating nuclear war. In a nuclear exchange, many among the public and some within the Pentagon questioned the need to mobilize more manpower to fight a conventional war.⁴⁶

Weinberger and his team's focus on better pay, benefits, training, weapons, and equipment also applied to Guard and reserve components. In June 1982

Weinberger assured the president that the DoD was solving the Guard and reserve equipment problems it inherited from the previous administration. The secretary cited equipment deficiencies such as shortages, obsolescence, incompatibility with active force equipment, and nondeployability. During the past year, Weinberger noted, Guard and reserve units received front-line equipment, such as AH-1S attack helicopters, new fast antisubmarine frigates, and A-10 close air support aircraft. These upgrades were not just window dressing. As Weinberger outlined later in 1982, it was the DoD's policy that "units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component."⁴⁷

Congress, which included many members who were reservists or Guard members, supported and encouraged Weinberger's efforts. In FY 1982 they appropriated more money than the Pentagon requested for reserve component equipment, eventually resulting in Army Reserve units equipped with M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. Naval Reserve squadrons began flying F-18A Hornets, the same as active-duty Navy pilots. The Air National Guard received 70 C-130 Hercules military transports. In October 1983, over Pentagon objections, Congress created a new assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, removing that function from the assistant secretary for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics on the grounds that the latter's expanded portfolio was too much responsibility for one person. James H. "Jim" Webb, an outspoken and decorated Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War, assumed the position of assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs in May 1984.⁴⁸

Better pay, equipment, and training—including trips overseas—along with changing attitudes to military service as the memories of the Vietnam War faded, helped reverse the decline in reserve strength. In January 1984 Weinberger told the president that the Selected Reserve (IRR personnel assigned to reserve or active units) now numbered over a million. Reserve units provided crucial combat support and would be fully integrated into their respective services during a conflict. The Army Reserve provided virtually all of the Army's civil affairs and psychological warfare operations. The U.S. Marine Corps Reserves provided all of the Marines' civilian-affairs groups, almost two-thirds of its bulk-fuel companies, and one-half its force-reconnaissance and air/naval gunfire liaison companies. In the Air Force, reserve units began to win performance competitions of pilots, aircrews, and maintenance teams against active-duty units. It was not a question of whether the United States should go to war with-

out calling up the reserves, rather it was a realization that America could not fight without them.⁴⁹

Training and Readiness

Perhaps Weinberger's principal contribution to strengthening the AVF was to emphasize readiness and training, which critics charged the previous administration had slighted in favor of development and acquisition of expensive high-technology weapon systems. Carter and Brown's priority on high-tech weaponry caused Colin Powell to later characterize the Carter-era armed forces and defense establishment as a "tumbledown house with a BMW parked in the driveway." Weinberger instead highlighted improvements in readiness: "When this administration took office, we found ... a cumulative underfunding of those elements that determine readiness of our armed forces—adequate manning, training, maintenance, supplies of spare parts, and ammunition." Weinberger continued, "We immediately recommended to Congress, and received, substantial increases in the funds devoted to readiness.... \$3 billion in FY 1981 and \$9 billion in FY 1982."⁵⁰

Weinberger's contribution was in obtaining more funding for readiness, especially for training. He left the details and initiatives to the military services, which had long realized the need for more realistic training experiences. The so-called revolution in training began in the late 1960s and 1970s. After the experiences of the Vietnam War, the services concluded that their training had been inadequate and resulted in less-than-optimal air-to-air combat performance during the conflict in Southeast Asia. The Navy and Air Force moved toward a training system based on realistic combat training situations. In 1968 the Navy created the Navy Fighter Weapons School ("Top Gun") whereby pilots engaged in force-on-force training, resulting in dramatically improved performance during the latter stages of the Vietnam War. The Air Force's Tactical Air Command created a similar training program in 1975 at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada called Operation Red Flag. At Nellis aircrews faced an opposing training squadron schooled in Soviet-style tactics, an active electromagnetic environment, extensive ground-based air defenses, and a replica of a section of East Germany with realistic interdiction targets. Their training was monitored by instrumentation that allowed for pilot evaluation. With such training the Air Force hoped their pilots would learn from a realistic simulated war experience

before they went into combat against Soviet forces. After Vietnam, the Army realized that the World War II model of massive mobilization of conscripts with a minimum of training was no longer possible or appropriate. Instead, in July 1973, it created the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), predicated on the theory that better-trained volunteer soldiers armed with technologically advanced weapons was the best way to counter Soviet numerical advantages in personnel and conventional weapons.⁵¹

The Pentagon continued and built on new training initiatives already developed by the services. In January 1984 Weinberger reported that pilots engaged in more training missions (19 hours per month for tactical and attack aircraft pilots in FY 1984 as opposed to 13 in 1978), sailors spent more time training at sea (50.5 steaming days per quarter for deployed fleets and 29 days for nondeployed units), and soldiers had more realistic training time. It was not just the time spent training, but the quality of the experience. Advances in instrumentation, such as computers and lasers, allowed trainees to engage in more realistic exercises and trainers to more accurately evaluate their performance.⁵²

This new commitment to training during the early 1980s is best illustrated by the establishment of the Army's National Training Center (NTC) in the high



Secretary Weinberger with soldiers during his visit to the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, November 7, 1984. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

desert of California in the summer of 1981. While the origins of the NTC go back to 1976, this unique training facility began training soldiers during Weinberger's first term. A number of factors contributed to the success of the training at Fort Irwin. First it was large—1,000 square miles with a varied terrain of mountain ranges, valleys with gullies, small hills, and soil composed of sand and volcanic rock—making it suited to heavy armor, mechanized infantry, and foot soldiers. However, it was hot—often over a 100 degrees Fahrenheit—and well below freezing in winter. Some complained that it was totally unlike the Central European battlefield it was substituting for. It was more like a Middle East desert.⁵³

The second reason the NTC was so effective was that it was similar to the Air Force model of maintaining a permanent opposition force trained in Warsaw Pact tactics and doctrine. The NTC opposition force, or Red Force, which dubbed itself the “32d Guards,” was a motorized infantry regiment armed with tanks modified to resemble the Soviet T-72 main battle tank and other equipment resembling Soviet armored infantry vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and air-defense vehicles. The Red Force wore dark green fatigues and black berets with a red star and carried Soviet small arms, including the AK-47 rifle. They proved a formidable force that usually defeated the trainees.⁵⁴

The last factor that made the NTC effective were the advances in computer technology and the development of a sophisticated “laser tag” system. The multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) was attached to the barrel of every weapon and calibrated so that it reflected that weapon's range and lethality. MILES computers assured that a rifle could not take out a tank. Once the detector on the soldier or vehicle was hit, a blinking light indicated a kill. In the words of a TRADOC historian, MILES “proved to be, along with command-and-control battle simulations, one of the twin technological foundations of the post-Vietnam training revolution.” In addition, the observer-controllers, who increasingly saw themselves as not just critics but also mentors, had a core instrumentation system, which was tied to remote video cameras, monitoring and recording devices to pick up communications, and real-time inputs by field controllers. The system collected, analyzed, and integrated information that produced data for after-action reports and take-home information packages for battalions participating in the training. As Weinberger's first term ended, the Air Force integrated forward air-controller aircraft and fighter close air support into training exercises at Fort Irwin.⁵⁵

The training experience at Fort Irwin and similar training by the other services was based on interrelated developments and new directions. As Weinberger reported to Congress, "If peacetime training is to be effective, we must simulate a realistic combat environment based on modern instrumentation and support equipment at our training bases." The secretary extolled the NTC "as one example of a much-needed capability for conducting realistic, large scale, two-sided combat exercises." The technological revolution allowed computers and lasers to simulate war with the Warsaw Pact. Based on the premise that U.S. forces would always be outnumbered because of their higher personnel costs relative to the Soviet forces, the AVF had to fight smarter and better than their opponents, and their weapons had to be technologically superior. Combat operational training emphasized flexibility, dynamism, innovation, and speed in decision-making. Command-and-control training looked to prepare for simultaneous and joint operations throughout the whole battlefield. Better training, high-quality personnel, and more advanced weapons were considered the keys to potential victory. But in the final analysis it came down to money. The NTC would not have been established and developed, as a TRADOC historian observed, "had it not been for the favorable defense budgets of the late Carter and early Reagan administration. In a more austere financial climate, it is unlikely that the most costly training venture would have survived."⁵⁶

Money was at the root of another prerequisite for the AVF: precombat readiness, which required available trained personnel to meet wartime objectives with adequate equipment and supplies ready for their use. As for personnel, between FY 1980 and FY 1984 there were 20 percent more enlisted personnel with four or more years of service in the armed forces. The percentage of new recruits with high school diplomas rose during the same period from 68 to 92 percent. These service members had more and better equipment. The Navy's deployable battle-force ships increased from 479 to 525. Since FY 1980 the U.S. Marine Corps had added 430 light armored vehicles, 1,000 armored amphibious vehicles, and 3,000 Stinger missiles. The Air Force added two new wing equivalents, modernized its strategic force, and increased tactical aircraft by 75 percent. The Army had almost 3,000 M1 Abrams tanks to add to the 34 in the FY 1980 inventory, 2,200 new Bradley fighting vehicles, 171 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and 64,000 M-270 multiple launch rocket systems, all of which were introduced after FY 1980. These rapid increases put a strain on the Army, which lacked logistical

equipment to support these new weapons, and on the Air Force, which lacked spare parts due to its modernization and increased peacetime flying program. Nevertheless, there was a 25 percent rise in the composite number of all the services' combat units that were deemed "marginally ready" (C-3 on the DoD's strict measurement scale) to fight. The rise to C-2 ("substantially ready") was 39 percent. The only downside was force sustainability—the ability of U.S. armed forces to remain in the fight. Stockpiles of war reserve consumables and potential combat attrition replacement equipment remained a nagging problem. Because of long procurement lead times (18 to 36 months for munitions and 24 months for secondary items) there was little growth in munitions and spare parts inventories. The Reagan administration blamed these shortages on the Carter administration's inability to obtain enough funding for sustainability. The Pentagon projected significant improvements in procurement by 1985 after the buildup budgets of 1981 to 1983 kicked in. Overall, the "hollow Army," which Army Chief of Staff General Edward "Shy" Meyer had complained about in 1980, had filled out and readiness had improved.⁵⁷

The armed forces during Weinberger's first term as secretary were larger, more modernized, better trained, and more ready to fight than they had been before he came to office. That was the essence of the Weinberger-Reagan military buildup. The All-Volunteer Force had evolved from January 1981 to January 1985. Taken as a whole, recruiting during the period had achieved substantial success. For most of the four years all the services met their recruiting goals and attracted high-quality recruits. In late 1984, 92 percent of the enlistees entering the services had high school diplomas and scored average or above in the enlistment test. Yet there were signs of trouble. By the end of 1984 all services except the Marine Corps began to experience some difficulty meeting their accession goals. The Youth Attitude Tracking Study, which the Pentagon followed closely as a sign of future recruiting prospects, indicated that the "propensity to enlist" among the young was lower than in the three previous years. The improving economy and reduced youth unemployment were the most obvious explanations. In addition, the pay raises of 1981 and 1982, which had made military service a competitive alternative to civilian work, did not continue at the same levels in 1983 and 1984 because of concern in Congress and the administration about federal deficits. As pay raises decreased, the gap between military and civilian pay increased

and military service lost its competitive edge. Still, defense leaders believed that, with some tinkering and future adequate cost of living adjustments for military personnel from Congress, the AVF would meet its manpower goals.⁵⁸

Taken as a whole, the All-Volunteer Force prospered during the first Reagan term. The OSD countered the initial pushback by the Army to limit its number of women and Weinberger encouraged the opening of more noncombat jobs to females. The Weinberger years were by no means a golden age for women in the military. Old attitudes remained, women could still be patronized, and the pervasive problem of sexual harassment remained mostly under the radar screen. The combat exclusion for women meant that the jobs that often helped ensure advancement were still closed. Weinberger and the OSD pushed to increase opportunities for women. It is debatable whether the secretary's goal was permanent gender equality or a mechanism to make the AVF more efficient by accepting higher quality women enlistees. In retrospect, it was probably both. Weinberger had fully accepted the value of black service members. Taking the long view from Executive Order 9981, which desegregated the armed services in 1948, African Americans had progressed slowly but surely within the services, especially the Army. This is not to say that the military in the 1980s was free of racial tension. But no official barriers applied to black service members. America's volunteer armed forces generally lived and worked apart from American society as a whole, but some who joined brought with them their prejudices from civilian life. What was important was that the AVF was open to all races, based on competitive examination. Weinberger and the OSD believed that the AVF allowed African Americans to "be all they could be."

The potential personnel costs of the AVF were a concern. Prior to the AVF in 1973 only 3 to 4 percent of enlisted personnel reached retirement eligibility. Under the AVF a projected 18 percent would serve for 20 years or more. While this would produce an upper layer of experienced senior enlisted personnel, their pay and pensions would also be expensive. In the late 1980s and 1990s the DoD and Congress would have to come to terms with this problem. There was also a major social shift with social implications. With better pay and benefits, volunteers were older and more likely to be married and have children. Gone was the predominately single short-term enlistee of the draft era. Such a change placed a premium on providing better quality-of-life support to the AVF, such as better housing or better schools for children of the AVF.⁵⁹

After Reagan left the White House, the AVF met its first tests on the battlefield, initially in a small, ad hoc invasion of Panama in 1989 and then in a major war in the Persian Gulf in 1990–1991. Much has been written about these campaigns—some of it is critical. But the general consensus was that the AVF was ready for combat and performed with skill, commitment, and maturity. Weinberger and the Pentagon during his tenure can claim part of the credit for the AVF's success on the field of battle. Their emphasis on quality recruits, training and readiness, and new high-technology weaponry and equipment prepared the All-Volunteer Force for the liberation of Kuwait during Desert Storm. In those heady triumphal days, few realized that after 2001 the All-Volunteer Force would find itself engaged in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the better part of two decades. Although handicapped by shifting strategies devised by the civilian and military leadership in Washington, the AVF has met this challenging test.

East Asia and Southeast Asia

SINCE THE 19th CENTURY, America has been an active Pacific power and events in East Asia have played a large role in its history. The United States fought four wars there: against Philippine insurgents, the Japanese Empire, North Korea and Chinese volunteers, and North Vietnam. China held a special place in U.S. public perception because of contacts that had been established decades before Reagan took office. The “loss” of China to Mao Zedong’s communists and the withdrawal of the Nationalist government to Taiwan traumatized U.S. politics in the early 1950s. The problem of which China to support lingered into the early 1980s. Neither the president nor Weinberger were fully reconciled to the Nixon-Carter policies of casting America’s lot with the People’s Republic of China and abandoning the Republic of China on Taiwan. Weinberger’s long-term allegiance to anticommunist Taipei conflicted with the imperative of establishing a strategic anti-Soviet association with Beijing. He never completely gave up his support for Taiwan, but he eventually came to appreciate the need for a new military relationship with China. As for the rest of the region, Weinberger followed the time-honored pattern of engagement, military presence, and mutual security. Like his predecessors, he encouraged Japan to assume more responsibility for its own defense and play a larger role in East Asia. Regarding South Korea and the Philippines, Weinberger saw both allies as important to U.S. regional security, notwithstanding their authoritarian leaders. As for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, accounting for the U.S. service members missing in action during the Vietnam War dominated the Pentagon’s emerging and tentative relations with Hanoi.

Balancing Taiwan and the People's Republic of China

The Republic of China, a government-in-exile on the island of Taiwan, was one of America's longtime allies in East Asia. From the 1950s until 1979 U.S. China policy was complicated by two governments claiming legitimacy. During World War II the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt supported the Nationalist Party, or Koumintang, rather than the Communist Party under Mao Zedong. Both were ostensibly fighting the Japanese invaders, but they were also positioning themselves to control postwar China. After a brief U.S. effort to reconcile the two sides, a civil war began in earnest. In 1949 the Nationalists fled to the island of Taiwan after their military defeat by the Communists. The American political system underwent a spasm of retribution and recrimination for "losing China," which metastasized into the witch hunts of the 1950s Red Scare. During the 1950s and 1960s U.S. administrations steadfastly maintained that the Republic of China on Taiwan was the sole legitimate government of China and that the mainland communist People's Republic of China (PRC) was an outlaw regime. In a dramatic reversal of traditional U.S. policy, President Richard Nixon undertook an opening to China that ensured the future of U.S. policy would focus on the PRC. For the time being, however, the United States maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan as well.¹

On January 1, 1979, President Jimmy Carter formally established full diplomatic relations with the PRC and recognized it as the sole government of China. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, the real power in Beijing, made a triumphal visit to Washington in late January 1979. Symbolic of the new relationship, Deng and Carter walked hand in hand across the stage at the Kennedy Center while the band played "Getting to Know You." Yet normalization of relations with Beijing had a bittersweet side. It meant termination of the security treaty and official relations with Taiwan. After the Carter administration established full diplomatic relations with China, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979, establishing an unofficial relationship between Washington and Taipei through the American Institute in Taiwan, staffed by Department of State foreign service officers on temporary leave. Taiwan's corresponding unofficial embassy in the U.S. was the Coordination Council for North American Affairs. Yet Congress went beyond Carter's recommendations for the legislation by including in the bill the "expectation" that U.S. relations with China required that the future of Taiwan be decided by peaceful means. Although assured by

DoD officials that Taiwan had enough military force to maintain its security and territorial integrity, legislators on Capitol Hill insisted that the United States retain the right to sell Taipei defensive weapons, allowing it to defend itself from a potential attack by China. Carter considered a veto, but the Taiwan Relations Act passed by such large margins in the House and Senate that it was sure to be overridden. Carter signed it.²

Like Reagan, his political mentor, Weinberger believed Carter had badly mistreated a faithful, anticommunist ally. All the Chinese Americans Weinberger knew personally were supporters of the late Nationalist president, Chang Kai-shek, and his son who replaced him, Chiang Ching-kuo. Weinberger had forged close relations with anticommunist Chinese Americans who were a financial force in California Republican politics. Reagan announced during the 1980 presidential campaign that he would reestablish full diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but later backtracked somewhat to promise he instead would raise the American Institute in Taiwan to an official liaison office. Weinberger approved of Reagan's promises, knowing they would lead to a *de facto* two-China policy. Fearing a voter backlash at such an ideological stance by candidate Reagan and knowing that most Americans favored continuing relations with the PRC, the Reagan campaign team sent his vice-presidential pick, George H. W. Bush, to Beijing to assure the Chinese leadership that Reagan's statements were only campaign rhetoric. Upon Bush's return, Reagan's political advisers insisted that he read a prepared statement acknowledging acceptance of Carter's agreements with China. Reagan could not resist the temptation to add, "I would not pretend, as Carter does, that our relationship with Taiwan, enacted by our Congress, is not official." Bush's bridge-mending seemed to be for naught. Exasperated Beijing leaders considered Reagan's campaign statements and the Taiwan Relations Act an affront to their sovereignty. When Weinberger took over as secretary of defense he was faced with a China policy torn apart by conflicting impulses.³

Weinberger and the DoD represented Taiwan's best hope. While the secretary and his advisers recognized the need for a closer strategic relationship with China as a counter to the Soviet Union, they took seriously the requirement to provide arms to Taipei. After a one-year moratorium on sales to Taiwan, the Carter administration in 1980 had agreed to sell weapon systems to Taiwan as required by the Taiwan Relations Act. When Weinberger assumed leadership of the Pentagon, there remained \$900 million worth of pending arms sales to

Taiwan that required congressional notification. These sales were mostly weapons that Taipei already had in its arsenal, but they also included new systems such as Harpoon missiles and launchers, sure to cause objections from Beijing. Furthermore, the Taiwanese still hoped to buy from the U.S. modern fighter aircraft to upgrade their aging air force of F-100s and F-104s. China opposed all arms sales to Taiwan, but a modern fighter aircraft went well beyond its tolerance level.⁴

At an NSC meeting on June 4, 1981, Weinberger argued that Beijing need not be told about plans for arms sales to Taiwan, nor should the administration accept any indication that such sales required consultations with the PRC. "They can read about it in the papers after we decide," Weinberger suggested. Secretary of State Haig objected, "We cannot live in a dream world on this.... We don't need to rub dirt in their [Beijing's] face.... Deng sits on a shaky throne and we do not want to contribute to his demise. What are we doing to try to prove our manhood here?" The president was not convinced by Haig, noting, "I don't see where we have to consult with the PRC on this issue." After the meeting the president directed that if the Chinese asked about arms sales to Taiwan, they should be told that sales "would go forward on a prudent and restrained basis." The president agreed with the NSC participants' advice that no decision on advanced aircraft was needed until the end of 1981 but asserted that Taiwan would require fighter aircraft to replace their obsolete planes by the end of 1982.⁵

In July 1981 the NSC staffer in charge of China, James R. Lilley, conferred with working-level officials at State and Defense and devised a strategy to examine Taiwan's defense needs in "an orderly way at our own pace" and "remove the issue from the front burner." They presented a two-phase solution. First, the U.S. intelligence community would assess Taiwan's defense requirements. Then, if the assessment suggested that Taiwan needed U.S. aircraft, the DoD would develop options for which aircraft to sell. Models considered were Northrop Corporation's F-5G (an export-only plane that featured a GE F404 engine and was superior to the F-5s that the Nationalists already had) and the F-16/79 (General Dynamics' version of the F-16 with a General Electric J79 turbojet engine that was slightly less capable than the standard F-16 F100 turbofan engine). The NSC, the DoD, and State officials all hoped for a presidential decision on their recommendations by the end of 1981.⁶

Weinberger supported military sales to Taiwan but remained skeptical of the sale of advanced U.S. weapons to China. His main adversary was Haig, who

maintained that such sales would cement what he called a strategic association based on both countries' need to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, sales of high-technology systems to China, in Haig's view, would mitigate Beijing's opposition to arms sales to Taipei. In June 1981 Haig went to Beijing with the authority to tell the Chinese leadership that the U.S. was prepared to sell them advanced weapons. In a meeting with Deng, Haig dangled the prospect of a U.S.-PRC security relationship based on such arms sales. The discussion turned to arms sales to Taiwan. In mild terms that belied his convictions, the diminutive Chinese leader told Haig, "We have been tolerant, but there is a limit to our tolerance." He further warned against "too much internal interference." Haig took this to mean "too high a level of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan," and reported that Deng said, "Our relations may mark time, 'or even backtrack'" if such "interference" continued. Deng assured the secretary that this was not "diplomatic jargon" but was "straight talk." Haig promised Deng that the administration would handle arms sales to Taiwan "with the greatest care" so that they would not conflict with the U.S. recognition of the PRC as the only China. Haig then publicly touted the agreements arising from his mission to Beijing as a success, contrary to the president's instructions.⁷

The self-described vicar of foreign policy had gotten too far ahead of the rest of the administration and, even more importantly, of the president himself. Reagan still held a torch for Taipei and was not yet comfortable with the idea of casting the U.S. lot with the PRC alone. When he learned of Haig's discussions and his public announcement, Reagan told press correspondents, "I have not changed my feelings about Taiwan." The Taiwan Relations Act allowed for arms sales to Taipei and, he continued, "I intend to live up to the Taiwan Relations Act."⁸

Upon returning to Washington, Haig backtracked. At the end of July he obtained the president's approval on guidelines for a Taiwan policy that gave personnel with the Coordination Council for North American Affairs easier access to high-level officials in the U.S. government. More importantly, the United States would approve "appropriate defense arms for Taiwan" including replacing its worn-out aircraft by the end of 1982 at the latest. The United States would "consider positively pending requests" for Sea Chaparral missiles, search-and-rescue helicopters, Standard missiles, and armored personnel carriers over the next few months with additional sales in 1982. A U.S. delegation, headed by NSC adviser Allen and including Richard Armitage of the DoD's Office of

International Security Affairs, delivered the news to President Chiang Ching-kuo in early September 1981.⁹

There was a U.S. domestic side to the Taiwan aircraft modernization issue as well. Defense contractor Northrup Corporation had invested heavily in developing the F-5G for export, only to find that no nation was interested in buying the aircraft. After the Reagan administration reversed Carter's prohibition on the export of F-16s, America's allies started demanding that plane instead. Northrup had put substantial funds into production facilities for the F-5 and needed sales to Taiwan to salvage its investment.¹⁰

Having initially failed to convince the Reagan administration that they were seriously opposed to arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese upped their demands in October 1981. During Haig's June 1981 visit to Beijing, the Chinese had insisted that those sales never go beyond the final Carter-proposed total (\$500 million per year in 1979 dollars) and that they decrease each year until they reached zero. When meeting with Haig in late October 1981 in Cancun, Mexico, Foreign Minister Huang Hua reiterated these conditions and asked for a guarantee that sales would end after a specific time frame. Huang met with Reagan and insisted that no further sales be allowed until the Reagan administration concluded an agreement with Beijing on a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan. Otherwise, Huang threatened to suspend peaceful efforts to resolve differences with Taiwan. Reagan noted in his diary, "China is virtually delivering an ultimatum re arms to Taiwan. I don't like ultimatums. We have a moral obligation & until a peaceful settlement is reached between the mainland & Taiwan we are going to meet that obligation."¹¹

The president had reached a standoff with the Chinese over Taiwan. Weinberger and the Pentagon came to the rescue in mid-November 1981. The Defense Intelligence Agency's study concluded, with the Joint Chiefs concurrence, that Taiwan's air force could only be overwhelmed by China at a heavy, probably unacceptable, cost of PRC aircraft. As long as Taiwan was able to replace its older aircraft as they reached their end of service with new F-5E/F planes—a plane that was already in its inventory—its air force would be more than a match for the most modern Chinese J-7 fighter (based on the Soviet MiG-21) and the J-8 interceptor. There was no military need to provide Taiwan with an F-16 fighter, especially since, as the JCS noted, it would adversely affect the strategic relationship with China. Weinberger passed this assessment to Reagan.¹²



F-5E Tiger II fighter aircraft. *OSD Records*

This judgment offered Haig a solution, which he outlined to the president at the end of November 1981. No new-model aircraft needed to be sold to Taipei since additional F-5E/F fighters would suffice for Taiwan's defense. Furthermore, the total value of all arms to Taiwan need not go above Carter's generous last-year ceiling of \$500 million. While not acceding to a time-certain date to end to sales, the president could announce publicly that given Beijing's nine-point program for a peaceful reunification, unveiled on September 30, 1981, there was hope that the issue could be ultimately resolved. As a sweetener, Haig recommended liberalizing technology transfers to China, especially for energy development and industrial growth. Reagan approved all three recommendations, but commented in writing, "And we will deliver the planes [F-5E/Fs to Taiwan]," while further noting how he had assured senators, "We wouldn't go back on the promise of planes."¹³

In early January 1982 Reagan gathered with his principal advisers at a National Security Planning Group meeting and continued the discussion during a weekend session at Camp David. Weinberger presented the specific plan to solve the aircraft problem. He recommended selling Taiwan 120 F-5E/Fs and acting as an

intermediary for West Germany's offer to sell Taiwan 60 F-104s being retired from service. The F-104 was Taiwan's second-most advanced aircraft. The sale of the 120 F-5E/Fs would keep the Northrup coproduction line with Taiwan going and compensate for the lack of export sales of the F-5G, a single-engine version of the F-5E that was eventually rebranded as the F-20. Weinberger also recommended selling Taiwan the aircraft spare parts already promised, Chaparral missiles, search-and-rescue helicopters, and armored personnel carriers. In Weinberger's opinion, these were explicit commitments made to Taipei and were nonnegotiable. Reagan's diary summarized the decision at the NSPG and Camp David meetings: "A team is off to Peking to tell them 1st hand we're going to sell F5E's & some F104's to Taiwan. We are softening things a little. Taiwan really wants the more advanced F-5G's—they'll come later." Four days later, the president provided William Clark with instructions for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs John Holdridge, who was to deliver the news to Beijing. Reagan was unprepared to accept that there would be a lag time between the end of arms sales to Taiwan and a peaceful resolution of the status of Taiwan, but he did agree that arms sales to Taipei would not go on indefinitely and would diminish as progress towards a peaceful resolution continued.¹⁴

If Holdridge had hoped for a warm welcome in Beijing, he was disappointed. The Chinese complained that the sale of F-5E/Fs and F-104s to Taiwan violated Huang's ultimatum. They even objected to the proposed sale of spare airplane parts and raised again their demand for an end date for all arms sales. Holdridge conveyed to Chinese vice foreign minister Zhang Wenjin that abandoning sales of the newer F-16s was a concession. As he reportedly said, "You'll have to understand, this is not a decision to sell, this is a decision *not* to sell." For the next six months the Reagan administration engaged the Chinese, trying to gain acceptance for the arms sales package. As part of the campaign, Vice President Bush made a visit to China in May 1982. Bush carried a letter from Reagan assuring the Chinese that the United States recognized only one China and unofficial relations including military sales with Taiwan would not undercut that commitment. Deng countered that if the United States would "privately assure China that arms sales to Taiwan will gradually decline" and would end "with a certain period of time," then Beijing and Washington could make a deal.¹⁵

At the Pentagon, Weinberger, his China advisers, and the Defense Intelligence Agency worried about the state of Taiwan's defenses if the deal didn't go

through. They feared the pro-PRC forces in the administration would convince the president to succumb to Beijing's pressure. The Chinese were quick to apply such pressure. When the administration announced its intention to Congress to sell Taiwan \$79 million in aircraft spare parts in mid-April 1982, the Chinese canceled a planned Weinberger trip to Beijing. The situation with Taipei was also deteriorating. Armitage warned Weinberger, "Taiwan is losing patience with the lack of movement on items we promised to sell them last August. Nine months later ... the only sale we have concluded was for aircraft spare parts." In July 1982 Weinberger sent Clark, the new NSC adviser, and Shultz (who had just replaced Haig) an assessment by the DIA indicating that without U.S. spare parts and critical items, Taiwan's air force and navy "would cease to exist as a credible force in about a year." The study suggested that it was still possible to meet Taiwan's military needs by U.S. foreign military sales and commercial sales on a reduced basis. China would probably accept diminished sales, "if it gained what it considered to be irrevocable U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over Taiwan."¹⁶

The Pentagon's view approximated the second of two options that Haig gave Reagan as his parting advice on China policy. Haig warned the president that China would downgrade its relations with the United States unless Reagan agreed to language acknowledging the end of arms sales to Taiwan. He recommended that the president either agree to end sales immediately or, failing that, make a general commitment that the United States anticipated ending sales some date in the future as long as China sought peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Furthermore, Washington would not exceed in quantitative or qualitative terms the levels supplied by the Carter administration. Reagan rejected the first option, but as Haig recalled, the president "made some subtle editing in his own hand" to the second. Reagan made clear in an oral message transmitted to Deng that this was the bottom-line offer.¹⁷

On August 17, 1982, the Chinese accepted the arrangement and agreed to sign a joint communiqué. The U.S.-PRC statement acknowledged there was but one China, and Taiwan was a part of China, although unofficial U.S. relations with Taiwan would continue. The United States agreed that it "does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its sales to Taiwan would not exceed, either qualitative or in qualitative terms, the level supplied in the recent years." The communiqué also indicated that the United States "intends

to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution” based on the assumption of a peaceful outcome.¹⁸

Even before signing the communiqué, the Reagan administration accepted Taiwan’s suggestions for six assurances: there was no date for ending arms sales; Beijing would not be consulted prior to those arms sales; the U.S. position on the sovereignty of Taiwan had not changed; Washington would not mediate between Beijing and Taipei; it would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act; and it would not pressure Taiwan into negotiations with the PRC. These six assurances were passed to Congress to placate conservative Republican supporters of Taiwan. One historian has asserted that Reagan wrote a one-page, hold-close memorandum soon after issuing the communiqué that indicated the United States would only restrict arms sales so long as the military balance between Taiwan and the PRC remained the same. Should it tilt in Beijing’s favor, arms sales to the Taiwanese would be increased.¹⁹

Almost before the ink dried on the communiqué with the PRC, a DoD group led by Armitage met with Taiwan’s minister of defense, Admiral Yeh Chang-tung, to examine Taiwan’s defense needs. The Taiwanese were formally informed of the notification of Weinberger’s decision to extend F-5E/F coproduction with Taiwan. Yeh signed a letter of offer and acceptance for the first 23 of the 66 F-104G fighter aircraft the United States repurchased from Germany for sale to Taiwan. A few days later, staffers agreed on 6 of Taiwan’s 40 requests for arms to be delivered over the next 10 years: \$72 million for four fixed three-dimensional air defense radars; 60 Mk-46 antisubmarine torpedoes; 54 antisubmarine rockets; a Vulcan-Phalanx radar-controlled gun (total value \$36 million); two long-range oblique photography aerial cameras (\$11 million); and nine 5”/54 caliber gun mounts for ships (cost and timing of sale to be determined later).²⁰

The joint U.S.-PRC communiqué laid out the ground rules for sales of arms to Taiwan in principle but left to both sides the freedom to determine if prospective sales fit within the communiqué’s parameters. The DoD and the Reagan White House walked a fine line between supplying Taiwan’s defensive needs and not unduly jeopardizing the developing strategic relationship with China. Information about sales to Taiwan was purposely kept low-key. In May 1983 the administration assessed the remaining 31 arms requests from Taiwan. Shultz and Weinberger recommended to the president that he approve 10 weapons requests for a total of \$800 million. Armitage at ISA had successfully argued

that if the value of arms sold in 1979 was the limit, the limit should be adjusted for inflation. It generously pegged \$800 million in 1983 as the equivalent of \$500 million in 1979. Included in the approved sales were 100 J79-19 aircraft engines for F-5E/Fs; 300 Sparrow missiles and 24 launchers for airfield air defense; 384 Chaparral missiles and 25 launchers for mobile air defense; 10 antisubmarine warfare helicopters; 18 antisubmarine aircraft; and various laser and fire control systems, computers, and direction finders.²¹

When the Chinese learned of the Sparrow missiles through the required congressional notification of sales, they complained that the missiles were qualitatively more advanced than those already in Taiwan's inventory. Beijing leveled the same objections to the Standard ship-to-ship missiles, even though these had been promised before the August 17, 1982, communiqué. Armitage suggested to Weinberger that he not respond to Chinese protests, but merely reiterate that the sales fell within the qualitative and quantitative guidelines of the communiqué. Armitage correctly asserted that the Chinese protests were merely pro forma. This DoD strategy of nonengagement became the pattern for U.S. sales to Taiwan during the remainder of Reagan's first term. The Chinese continued to protest, but they were judged in Washington to be just going through the motions, especially after the United States began selling advanced systems and technology to Beijing. In late 1984 Weinberger and the DoD changed the strategy. Instead of selling U.S. arms directly to Taiwan, they provided U.S. technology and weapons blueprints to Taiwan to bolster its own indigenous research and development capabilities and military production. In the second Reagan term, Taiwan embarked on an ambitious, although not always successful, program to produce, with discreet U.S. help, its own advanced weapon systems.²²

Transfer of Military Technology to the People's Republic of China

Within the Reagan administration, Haig was the primary promoter of better relations with the People's Republic of China. He had a long history with the communist government, dating back to the Nixon administration, and believed a strategic relationship with the PRC would reap benefits in U.S. dealings with the Soviet Union and would usher in an era of triangular diplomacy with room for Washington to maneuver.²³

Haig soon found that Reagan only reluctantly shared his vision of the potential for a strategic anti-Soviet association with China, especially when it came

to greasing the wheels with the sale of advanced weapons and technology. Haig recalled, "The President himself was slow if not unable to see the merit of my views.... He simply did not agree with me." Other initial skeptics of Haig's strategic alliance included NSC adviser Allen, Lilley, Armitage, and Weinberger himself.²⁴

In late March 1981 Haig made his case to Weinberger for liberalizing the existing trade restrictions on the sale of nonlethal military and dual-use (civilian equipment that could have military applications) high-technology items to the PRC. Haig hoped to convert the skeptics. As he told Weinberger, "As we conduct our relations with China, it is imperative that we keep in mind the strategic importance of the People's Republic of China to our global concerns. A strong and secure China that looks to American business for key contributions is obviously to our national interest."²⁵

At an NSC meeting in early June 1981, before he traveled to China, Haig complained that the bureaucracy, including the DoD, had been too slow to approve technology sales to Beijing. A backlog of 450 cases was piling up. As examples Haig cited an 18-month delay on a computer for a Chinese census and a two-year delay on a CAT-scan machine for a hospital in Beijing. Haig suggested that the Department of Commerce resolve outstanding sales cases in 60 days. Weinberger agreed that China should be treated "on the same basis as the USSR," even though "this is a major irritant to China to be treated this way." He believed "we should have a review on a case-by-case, the same as any other friendly nation." As for dual-use items, Weinberger did not want guidelines that would allow for automatic transfers to China. He recalled that dual-use technology sold to Moscow in the past had become a "rattlesnake" as Soviets adapted their purchases to military use. A case-by-case review was required, even if it delayed sales to the PRC.²⁶

The president agreed with the consensus of the NSC meeting. He authorized Haig to tell the Chinese during his trip in early June 1981 that U.S. exports on dual-use technology would be liberalized and that the result would be about twice the level exported to the Soviet Union before its invasion of Afghanistan. China would be removed from the list of embargoed destinations for arms transfers, but they would be reviewed on Weinberger's suggested case-by-case basis, as with other friendly nations. During the final day of his visit to Beijing in June, Haig announced at a press conference the new trade liberalization, arms transfers, and strategic policies for China, which the president had wanted to keep secret for the next few months.²⁷

Lilley and Armitage thought Haig and State were forcing the issue of strategic association with the PRC by offering arms and technology sales. In Lilley's view, the State Department was "ramming this one [arms sales to the PRC] like they did the initial announcement on China arms sales to Peking." Lilley told Allen, "Rich Armitage and I are trying to put the brakes on." Their brake of choice was the tried-and-true mechanism of a DoD study examining the options for overall military and strategic relations with China. Lilley suggested that the study would provide "some hard thinking and writing before we proceed further on what we should sell them, or if we should sell them anything."²⁸

The DoD study did not act as an abrupt brake on Haig's plans; it merely slowed them down. It presented four options. First, a Sino-American entente with only modest defensive arms sales to Beijing. Second, a U.S.-PRC security relationship linked to deterring a preemptive Soviet attack on China, based on the admittedly questionable assumption that the Soviet Union was considering taking China out before it was able to modernize militarily. Third, extensive U.S. help in the modernization of China's defenses, with the expectation that bulking up PRC military capabilities would force Moscow to divert more of its forces to the Sino-Soviet border. Finally, a full-blown Sino-American alliance, with combined military planning, exercises, training, security assistance, and active U.S. support for China's defensive and offensive capabilities. As Lilley and Armitage may have hoped, the study concluded that the last three options were dangerous and provocative and would not benefit the United States over the next 10 to 15 years. Chinese military modernization, even with substantial U.S. help, would take decades. The only viable option was the first, entente.²⁹

The DoD study was an exercise in setting up straw men—the last three options were clearly not viable—merely to knock them down and leave only the most cautious option standing. Haig received a copy of the study and apparently got the message. He made it clear to the president that he would "approach this sensitive area of arms transfers in a *gradual and careful way*." China would be able to purchase arms from U.S. defense industries, with export licenses granted after a case-by-case review. Haig informed the president that DoD supported this approach. Reagan approved with the comment that transfers to China "should be handled in a careful and gradual way," and that "particular attention should be paid to reaction of allies and friendly nations" (read Taiwan).³⁰

This presidential decision was formalized in National Security Decision

Directive 11, "Munitions/Technology Transfer to the People's Republic of China," dated September 22, 1981. Requests would be reviewed based on four principles. Transfers should minimize risks to U.S. national security in the areas of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, antisubmarine warfare, electronic warfare capabilities, and intelligence gathering. Furthermore, transfers should not increase the PRC's offensive and power-projection capabilities. The United States would consider transfer of defensive weapons, systems, components, technical assistance, and weapons technology. If the Chinese requested items that might have offensive applications, the transfer should be a selective one of components and technical assistance rather than complete weapon systems or their production technology.³¹

The guidelines of NSDD 11 were general. They could hardly cover all eventualities, especially when the U.S. bureaucracy had to decide if advanced weapons or technology were dual-capable, offensive, defensive, or a threat to U.S. national security. In 1982 problems emerged between Defense on one side and State and Commerce on the other. For example, should the United States sell a communications ground station capable of receiving Landsat D satellite photo reconnaissance? Should it fill a request for Hyshare 700 advanced hybrid computers for China's Harbin Polytechnic Institute? Landsat D photos could detect potential oil and gas deposits or assess agricultural production, but also had obvious military reconnaissance applications. The Hyshare 700 could be used for missile design and testing. Defense opposed both sales while Commerce and State supported them.³²

In May 1982 NSC adviser Clark attempted to clarify export policy to China and speed up the interagency review process. He outlined the policy of "pre-disposition for approval" unless such transfers risked U.S. national security as defined as "a direct and demonstrable contribution to Chinese capabilities" in the four areas outlined in NSDD 11. If a department recommended denial, lower risk substitutes should be suggested. Clark reiterated the need to abide by the 180-day maximum time for processing Chinese export requests.³³

Clark's restatement of general policy did not solve the problem. Defense had basic philosophical differences with State and Commerce. The latter two departments saw China as a "friendly, non-aligned" country. The Pentagon did not believe China should be treated as such, as if it were Yugoslavia or India. Export policy to China, Pentagon officials claimed, had to maintain a "prudent hedge against national security risks." The DoD continued to resist export of

technology to Beijing that could in any way endanger U.S. national security. With export policy still entangled in bureaucratic infighting, with both Shultz and Weinberger planning trips to China, and with PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang's expected to visit Washington in early 1984, the president directed a review of China technology export policy.³⁴

From this review emerged a revised export policy in late summer 1983. The administration moved China within the structure of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls from the status of communist opponent to that of a friendly nonaligned nation. "Green lines" were established for the Department of Commerce review; items and technologies within these lines would not require DoD review before export to China. "Red lines" were reserved for a few narrowly prescribed areas: nuclear weapons and delivery systems, antisubmarine warfare, intelligence collection, power projection, electronic warfare, and a new addition, air superiority. These items would not be sold. This clarification came just before Weinberger visited China.³⁵

An ancient culture and country convulsed by political upheaval and recovering from the Cultural Revolution, China was an exotic place to visit in the early 1980s. Only a handful of U.S. officials and few private U.S. citizens had visited the Middle Kingdom since the establishment of relations in 1979. Tiananmen Square, the Forbidden City, the Great Wall, or the Terracotta Army at Xi'an had not yet become accessible to Western tourists. As Weinberger prepared for his trip in September 1983, U.S. relations with China experienced an upswing. The Taiwan question had been ostensibly settled and liberalization of exports to China loomed in the future. The Joint Chiefs laid out their expectations for the trip in terms of an emerging U.S.-PRC military relationship. They recommended a modest increase in working-level military contacts, possible U.S. naval visits to Chinese ports, emergency crisis cooperation (overflight and refueling permissions, ship provisioning, and landing rights), and cooperation in blunting Soviet influence in the Third World.³⁶

Weinberger's delegation to China included his wife, Jane, and some of the other member's wives, Armitage, General Counsel William Taft, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Richard DeLauer, Weinberger's military assistant Maj. Gen. Colin Powell, and China experts from State and the NSC staff. This large delegation descended on Beijing, where Weinberger conferred with most of the PRC leadership. When the secretary met Chinese defense minister

Zhang Aiping on the morning of September 26, Zhang followed the usual Chinese negotiation tactic of allowing the visitor to do most of the talking. Weinberger filled three hours of the three-and-a-half hour meeting, diligently working through his extensive talking points. A quiet Zhang thanked the secretary for his “concise briefing.” Zhang promised “further study” of cooperation against Moscow. Zhang urged more U.S. support for “resistance efforts” in Afghanistan and Kampuchea (Cambodia). The issue the defense minister was most interested in, according to Weinberger, was which weapons and technology the United States would be prepared to sell China. Still, Zhang was unwilling to concede that Beijing could not develop its own technology if denied U.S. help, suggesting that without U.S. sales, China’s military modernization would be only “a bit slower.” What the Chinese defense minister really wanted was for China to deal directly with the U.S. defense industry, which Weinberger ruled out. Instead, the two sides issued anodyne minutes that indicated their willingness to explore cooperation based on agreed principles. Weinberger took this to mean export of defensive technologies, especially antiarmor and air defense.³⁷

Weinberger met the next day with Premier Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping on his final day in Beijing. Deng hit Weinberger hard on Taiwan. While he reiterated



Secretary Weinberger and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping conferring in Beijing, September 28, 1983. *Liu Heung Shing/AP/Shutterstock*

China's pledge to settle its conflict with Taiwan peacefully, he asked rhetorically what the United States would do if peaceful efforts failed and China blockaded the Taiwan Strait. Weinberger declined to answer a hypothetical question. Deng quickly added it was not really a question, just an indication of China's concern. In all, Weinberger's visit resulted in few concrete accomplishments, and the extensive military relations the JCS had outlined was not one of them. The trip did however expose the secretary to Chinese leaders, induce in him an enthusiasm for the potential of Chinese military capabilities, and mitigate somewhat his opposition to high-technology exports.³⁸

After Weinberger's return from China, a healthy concern about transferring high-technology weapon systems and equipment to Beijing continued to thrive at the Pentagon, especially within the Air Force and Navy. China did not help its cause by submitting requests for the highest-level technology and weapons. The services, with the exception of the Army, still viewed China as a potential enemy. The Army valued China's ability to siphon off Soviet military resources from Europe to the Sino-Soviet border. The Navy and Air Force worried that U.S. technology provided to Beijing would make its way to Moscow in the event of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Notwithstanding these concerns, military-to-military cooperation, including high-level and technical exchange visits, began in late 1983 and increased markedly in 1984.³⁹

Weinberger, many of his civilian advisers, and some of the leadership of the military services had been reluctant to abandon Taiwan and were suspicious of the new relationship with China. They had successfully reinforced the president's determination to sell defensive arms to Taiwan and avoided being pinned down by Beijing on a date to end those sales. The DoD's insistence on case-by-case review of the sale to China of weapons technology that could affect U.S. national security slowed down the export process, much to the chagrin of Commerce and State. Weinberger and his advisers considered it a necessary brake. In August 1982 the PRC and the United States signed a communiqué that ostensibly resolved the Taiwan issue. In fact, each side interpreted the language very differently. In the next year Weinberger and other DoD officials visited China and met with their Chinese counterparts. During these encounters, they got to know Chinese leaders firsthand, developed trust in Chinese intentions, and appreciated the Chinese potential as a counter to the Soviet Union. The "strategic association" touted by Haig never came to full fruition, but military exchanges, high-level visits, and

especially sales of advanced weapons and technology to China increased during the second Reagan term. So much, in fact, that from the mid-1980s until Tian-anmen in 1989, one historian characterized the period as the “Golden Age” and the “apogee relations” between Beijing and Washington.⁴⁰

Japan

In contrast to the debates over China and Taiwan policy, the Reagan administration enjoyed a consensus over the importance of the U.S.-Japan security relationship for the overall defense of East Asia. Weinberger, Allen, and Reagan saw an economically vibrant Japan as a crucial regional ally. Even Haig, the most outspoken proponent of strategic association with China, did not deny the importance of the relationship with Japan. When Shultz replaced Haig, the new secretary of state promoted the idea that Japan rather than China should be the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the region.⁴¹

At the end of January 1981, the ambassador to Japan, former senator Mike Mansfield, who was appointed by Carter and served throughout the Reagan years, sent an assessment of U.S.-Japanese relations. Mansfield maintained that “our successful bilateral relationship with Japan not only ensures stability in Asia and the Pacific but is a major element in maintaining the viability of the alliance of industrialized democracies.” In the area of military cooperation, Mansfield noted that although progress towards a more equal partnership might seem “glacial,” during the last 10 years “the Japanese have come a long way indeed down the road towards full-fledged and significant participation in the Western alliance.” NSC adviser Allen was so impressed with Mansfield’s message that he sent it to Reagan.⁴²

All agreed that Japan was important and had made some progress in improving its defense capabilities, but how to convince Japanese governments to assume a larger burden for Japan’s defense in the future? In part, the United States had created the problem. In writing the Japanese constitution after the war, the American drafters ensured that Japanese militarism would never rise again. They mandated a weak self-defense force unable to protect the homeland. Instead, Washington provided a nuclear security umbrella that deterred an attack and obligated the United States to come to Japan’s rescue if deterrence failed. The constitution also remade Japan as a democracy, albeit as it turned out one dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The Japanese public and their

democratic representatives were almost uniformly against large military budgets. By tradition defense spending was limited to no more than 1 percent of GNP, a figure which the powerful Japanese Ministry of Finance almost always made sure Japan just fell short of in its defense budgets. Such a state of affairs became increasingly troublesome to Washington after the Japanese economic miracle of the late 1960s and 1970s. Japan was exporting cars, electronics, and other high-technology items to the United States while at the same time limiting access of U.S. goods to Japan's markets. The balance of trade kept tilting in Tokyo's favor. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had made a sustained effort to convince the Japanese to accept more responsibility for defense, but left office discouraged.⁴³

Weinberger was convinced he and the president could do a better job. As he told Reagan on the eve of the visit of the Japanese prime minister, Zenko Suzuki, in early May 1981, previous attempts had failed because "no President has ever stated flatly that Japan must become a full partner in defending their country—a full partner in the sense of sharing some of the costly burden we have borne since 1945." Since the United States was increasing its defense spending by 15 percent, Weinberger suggested Japan should pass a supplemental defense budget for FY 1981 to procure critical items such as ammunition, missiles, mines, torpedoes, and hardened aircraft shelters. Most significantly, Japan should be encouraged to double its maritime capacity to protect shipping lanes to the north of the Philippines and west of Guam and accept full responsibility for defending Japan's airspace.⁴⁴

Reagan and Suzuki met alone in the Oval Office for a half an hour on May 7 and then with a larger group the next day. In their one-on-one meeting the two men hit it off personally. Reagan wrote in his diary that, regarding defense spending, he told the prime minister, "There would be no pressure or arm twisting by us—just frank discussion on how we could help each other." DoD officials were concerned that neither Reagan nor Haig really convinced Suzuki on the need for more defense spending. It fell to Weinberger in his meeting with Suzuki on May 8 to make the case. He did so gingerly, and Suzuki promised, as he had told the president, that Japan would increase its defense effort and cooperate more effectively with the United States in defense spending, but he needed time to overcome domestic opposition. Weinberger then began a campaign that would continue throughout the first Reagan term to persuade and cajole Japanese officials to spend more on defense.⁴⁵

The next opportunity to reinforce the DoD's message came when the Japanese defense agency director, Joji Omura, visited Washington in late June. Omura was under the impression that only the Pentagon was pushing for more defense spending, and that State and the White House had less concern. Rather, the difference between the departments was merely a matter of tone and tactics. NSC staffer Donald Gregg told Allen, "Bing West [the ISA head] seems set on rubbing Japanese noses in the fact that they are not doing enough on defense." State and the White House favored a gentler approach. For several days prior to the Omura visit, State, NSC, and Defense negotiated joint messages to the Japanese defense chief in his meetings with U.S. officials. Armitage described Weinberger's meeting with Omura: "Weinberger kept up the pressure on the Japanese but did so in a gentlemanly fashion that did not offend sensibilities." In Haig's meeting the secretary of state framed the message within the historical context of U.S.-Japanese cooperation, yet in Gregg's phrase, "the pressure was there but less open." Gregg recommended that when Allen met Omura he assured him that the United States understood Japanese restraints, did not want to force Japan to contravene its constitution, and would not criticize Japan in public. But the administration hoped and expected Japan to do more.⁴⁶

Weinberger took some satisfaction that the administration "spoke with one voice," but warned, "We need to maintain this posture on the occasion of every high-level meeting with responsible GOJ [government of Japan] officials." Weinberger was "completely comfortable" with Japanese promises to defend its territory, airspace, and territorial waters plus the sea-lanes lying within 1,000 miles, but the Suzuki government had presented a defense program for these goals to be accomplished by the early 1990s. Weinberger considered this too leisurely a pace.⁴⁷

The April 1982 announcement of Japan's defense budget for 1983 reinforced Weinberger's view. Japan increased its defense spending by 7.8 percent (4.8 percent after inflation), but in U.S. dollars the increase was only a modest \$800 million. The defense budget was now 0.93 percent of Japan's GNP. Weinberger told Clark, "Many in Congress consider the Japanese efforts miserly despite this year's increase." What was needed, according to the secretary, was a real increase of 10 to 12 percent after inflation if Japan was to keep its promises on defense goals.⁴⁸

Japan's new defense budget proved that all was not well with the U.S.-Japan relationship. In summer 1982 the Reagan national security bureaucracy drafted a

study, under the direction of State, to review the whole spectrum of the relationship. From the Pentagon's point of view, the study had to emphasize the need for more defense spending. Weinberger told NSC adviser Clark that neither Haig, Vice President Bush, nor the president himself had adequately raised the issue in their meetings with Japanese officials during the previous year and a half. Weinberger had always been required to play the heavy. Japanese promises of gradual progress were not enough. The secretary recommended that the study emphasize the need for Japan to obtain the capability to defend its territory, the surrounding seas and skies, and sea-lanes within 1,000 miles at least by the end of the decade. The president should drive home this message in meetings with Japanese leaders. Weinberger added a postscript: "P.S., Of course the persuasion has to be done quietly, privately with Japanese officials, but firmly!"⁴⁹

The study and the resulting presidential directive, NSDD 62, "National Security Decision Directive on United States–Japan Relations," approved October 25, 1982, fully reflected DoD concerns by including the goal of Japanese self-defense of territory, skies, seas, and sea-lanes to 1,000 miles by the decade's end. Furthermore, while the directive "accepted the validity of Japan's 'comprehensive security'" policy of granting foreign aid and other economic assistance to strategically important countries in the region, this was "not a substitute for defense." Also, Japan should be encouraged to procure defense items from the United States. Washington would offer to cooperate on weapons production to discourage Tokyo from developing independent systems. As Weinberger pointed out at the NSC meeting to approve NSDD 62, the Japanese spent over \$1 billion annually supporting U.S. forces in Japan and had the eighth largest military in the world. Nevertheless, he insisted, "We must continue to put on Japan the pressure to do more.... We cannot simply pick up our marbles and come home if the Japanese do not do exactly what we want."⁵⁰

It looked as if Weinberger's task would be made easier when Yasuhiro Nakasone replaced Suzuki as Japan's prime minister in November 1982. Nakasone was a pro-defense politician who had once advocated greater autonomy from the United States in security matters. By the time he took the reins of the LDP government, Nakasone had converted to Weinberger and Reagan's vision of Japan as the proactive major ally of the United States in East Asia. Nakasone was not a typical Japanese prime minister. In photo ops at multilateral meetings he stood next to Reagan instead of lingering at the end of the line as had previous Japanese



Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and Mrs. Nakasone arriving in Washington, January 18, 1983. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

leaders. It helped that Nakasone was tall and robust with a discernible swagger. U.S. officials viewed Nakasone as the man able and willing to break the old taboos about Japanese defense spending. During his January 1983 visit to Washington he and Reagan immediately connected. After their amicable meetings, Reagan invited Nakasone, his wife, and daughter to breakfast the next morning. For Ron and Yasu it was the beginning of a friendship. Weinberger would also soon count Nakasone as a political friend.⁵¹

When Nakasone returned to the United States for an economic summit in Williamsburg, Virginia, in late May 1983, he was reticent to publicize defense issues. He had told his LDP colleagues that he planned to exceed the 1 percent GNP limit for defense, increase Japanese force levels, cooperate with the United States on transfer of technology by providing Japanese electronics and expertise (especially semiconductors for missile guidance), and subsidize most of the cost of a U.S. deployment of a wing of F-16s to Hokkaido. Facing an election in late 1983, the prime minister wanted no public touting of these planned defense initiatives. He had an election to win. When Reagan visited Japan in November 1983, the same restrictions applied. Reagan accepted Nakasone's private assurance that after the elections he would address the defense issue, and he did not publicly

confront the Japanese leader on the topic. After Japan voted in December 1983, the LDP maintained control of the government, but with a reduced majority. Trade concessions to the United States and Nakasone's defense policies were considered the reason for the LDP's weak showing.⁵²

Nakasone gradually recouped his political fortunes, and in 1984 he returned to his defense initiatives. While Japan's defense budget never topped the 1 percent limit during the Reagan first term, the Japanese Defense Agency was usually the only Japanese department to have positive growth, averaging about 5 percent per year. This was especially notable because the Japanese Finance Ministry, burdened by the high cost of imported oil and a large deficit, had reined in spending in all other areas. During the secretary's visit to Japan in May 1984, Nakasone promised a new five-year defense plan that would beef up Japan's army, navy, and air force. In December 1984 Nakasone promised to break the 1 percent barrier in the 1986 budget. In the draft 1985 budget outlined in late 1984, Japanese defense spending was 0.997 percent of GNP and the total budget increased nominally over the previous year by 6.9 percent (amounting to 5.4 percent real growth). Japanese purchases of U.S. weapon systems, such as CH-47 heavy lift helicopters, 155mm howitzers, naval destroyers, F-15 fighters, P-3C reconnaissance aircraft, and Patriot surface-to-air missiles increased in 1984 and 1985. Tokyo and Washington also agreed on an operational plan to defend Japan against attack by the Soviet Union, and U.S.-Japanese defense planners continued to work on more ambitious plans for Japanese assistance to U.S. forces engaged in operations outside Japan (most likely Korea) and a joint sea-lane defense.⁵³

Looking back on his years as secretary, Weinberger took pride in the U.S.-Japan defense relationship. While there would be problems and setbacks in the second Reagan term, to Weinberger's mind the trajectory was upwards and the course was charted. Ever so slowly, Japanese politicians began to assume more responsibility for their own defense, played a larger geopolitical role in East Asia, and in later decades and the new century even contributed financial and logistical support to military operations outside the region.

Korea

The Carter administration bequeathed to its predecessor a political-military relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK) that was in tatters. Against the recommendations of his military advisers and the wishes of Congress, and to the

dismay of the South Korean leadership, Carter had unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw all U.S. ground-combat troops from Korea. Carter's efforts failed to appreciably reduce U.S. forces on the peninsula and served only to undermine his relationship with South Korea. The best that could be said for the episode was that the strategic partnership between the United States and the ROK survived a rocky four years.

Conversely, the Reagan administration hit the deck running with South Korea. Before Reagan and Weinberger assumed office, the Reagan transition team brokered a commutation of the death sentence for Kim Dae Jung, the leading democracy advocate in South Korea, who had been convicted on trumped-up charges of encouraging an antigovernment student and worker revolt in Kwangju city. Reagan's team offered South Korean president Chun Doo Hwan a visit to Washington in January 1981 if he spared Kim. Having just been elected president by a small, handpicked electoral college, Chun jumped at the chance for the new administration's imprimatur on his rule.⁵⁴

Weinberger suggested a simple message for Reagan to impart during his meeting with the Korean president. First, he should assure the Korean leader that the administration had no intention of withdrawing any ground-combat troops. Second, inform him that the annual U.S.-ROK security consultative meetings between respective defense chiefs or their deputies would be resumed. In 1980 the Carter administration had canceled the meeting to protest Chun's human rights and antidemocracy policies. Reagan passed these messages to Chun.⁵⁵

The atmosphere of the renewed U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting in San Francisco in April 1981 was all positive. There was however one difference. Running a large budget deficit and just emerging from a recession, South Korea was struggling to modernize its military forces. The ROK defense minister, Choo Young-bok, asked for 20 years to repay South Korean foreign military sales from the United States. Weinberger suggested that a 12-year period would be more appropriate. Other issues were readily resolved. Weinberger approved in principle ROK third-country sales of military equipment of U.S. design manufactured in Korea, and agreed to place the U.S. Army 2nd Infantry Division—the main combat force in South Korea—under peacetime combined operational control of the U.S.-ROK command. Choo argued this move would send a signal of U.S. support for Korea. In turn, the ROK defense minister agreed to continue to fund his defense budget at 6 percent of GNP, raise the ROK's host-nation support to

the United States to \$730 million over the next five years, and provide \$18 billion in future ROK force improvements. An NSC staffer attending the meetings told Allen, who relayed to Reagan, that he “was struck by the gracious and professional manner in which Secretary Weinberger conducted all the meetings. The Koreans were extremely pleased.”⁵⁶

While U.S.-ROK relations were back on track, the threat from North Korea remained constant. On August 26, 1981, a newly deployed North Korean surface-to-air missile site fired on a U.S. SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. The missile missed and the SR-71 returned to base unharmed. The United States had been flying routine SR-71 reconnaissance missions along the North Korean coast just outside the 12-nautical-mile limit claimed by North Korea. However, this particular flight passed with six miles of the SAM base, and it was later determined that at one point the SR-71 came within three miles of a low-tide elevation off the North Korean coast—well within what most countries, including the United States, would consider territorial waters. Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci and Deputy Secretary of State Clark told the president, “We cannot accept this kind of intimidation by North Korea, a nation prone to violent anti-U.S./anti-free world military actions.” They presented two realistic options. If North Korea fired on future SR-71 flights flying six miles off the coast, eight U.S. aircraft would attack the SAM site within 40 minutes. The second option would launch the U.S. sortie only if the SR-71 was hit (estimates of this happening were pegged at less than 1 percent). Still, USAF aircraft would be maintained on strip alert—a posture of high readiness—during SR-71 flights. Carlucci and Clark recommended the second option, which the president approved. Although denying they had fired on the SR-71, North Korea completely dismantled the SAM site, the only one within SR-71 flight paths. The threat passed and the reconnaissance flights continued. In late December 1981 USAF aircraft stood down from their alerts.⁵⁷

During 1982 the ROK continued its campaign to extend grace periods for interest payments on U.S. foreign military sales and obtain longer repayment times. The International Security Assistance Act of 1979 set the interest on FMS loans at the cost of money to the U.S. government; at the time this meant a 10 percent interest rate. The ROK government requested special treatment, noting that it was then paying \$271 million in total interest on the \$858 million it owed for previous FMS—more than the \$210 million in proposed credits it expected for FY 1983. Weinberger asked Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan to offer

the ROK a five-year grace period of interest-only payments and then seven years repayment for FY 1983 and FY 1984 FMS. Regan was not keen to offer South Korea more liberal repayment terms, noting, "Korea's sharp rebound in economic growth since 1980 makes even continuation of present liberal repayment terms unjustified." If anything, Regan wanted to return to shorter grace periods and repayment terms.⁵⁸

During the security consultative meeting in Korea in April 1982, Weinberger received an earful from Korean officials about the need for more liberal FMS terms, which they claimed were especially needed because their own defense industries were on the verge of bankruptcies. Upon returning to Washington, Weinberger told NSC adviser Clark he was persuaded by Korean arguments. Weinberger suggested that the administration request that Congress authorize a five-year grace period before principal payments against FY 1983 and FY 1984 loans. Regan stood firm on his assertion that there was no need for more repayment time for Korean FMS loans given the overall recovery of the ROK economy and the growing U.S. budget deficit. Weinberger asked Clark to use his influence to bring Regan around. Weinberger's campaign eventually succeeded. In late January 1983 the president approved a request to Congress for five years grace and seven years repayment for FY 1983, and for FY 1984 the even more generous terms of 10 years grace and 20 years repayment.⁵⁹

Unfortunately for Weinberger and the ROK, Congress leaned towards Regan's position. South Korea was becoming an economic rival to the United States and enjoyed a trade surplus with it. Congress eventually reduced FMS totals for FY 1983 to \$180 million, some \$40 million less than the administration request and with no assurance that it would approve the FY 1984 request for \$230 million or the extended repayment terms. Looking to Reagan's visit to East Asia and Korea in November 1983, an interdepartmental group on Korea discussed attempting "to lower Korean expectations regarding future levels, and de-emphasize FMS as a symbol of U.S. commitments."⁶⁰

In the second half of 1983 two incidents highlighted the potential for danger in the Korean peninsula. The first was the Soviet downing of civilian flight KAL 007, which inadvertently strayed into Soviet territory, during the evening of September 1, 1983 (August 31 in Washington, DC). The fact that the aircraft was South Korean increased tensions in South Korea, but the incident played out as a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The second more significant event from the Korean

perspective was the October 9, 1983, assassination attempt by North Korean agents against ROK president Chun during a visit to Burma. Chun survived the attempt but four ROK ministers; 14 South Korean presidential advisers, journalists, and security personnel; and four Burmese nationals died in the bombing. In addition, 46 people were injured, many of them South Koreans. In the immediate aftermath, the DoD provided AWACS and fighter coverage for the South Korean aircraft returning Chun to Seoul and evacuated the ROK chief of the Joint General Staff and the finance minister to Clark Air Force Base for medical treatment. Prior to the bombing, the Department of State had undertaken what was described as a “modest initiative” to engage Pyongyang on a very limited basis. The assassination attempt ended that for the time being.⁶¹

The attack outraged South Koreans. Some elements in the ROK argued for military retaliation, such as an artillery attack on the North or an assault on a North Korean guard post in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). These were just two of a number of ROK contingencies for reciprocal military retaliation. The ROK senior military and political leadership rejected these calls for retribution. Reagan sent Weinberger to Seoul to represent the United States at the memorial services for the victims of the bombing. More than a million stood in a light rain for two hours during the combined Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant memorial service. In addition to condolences and assurances of continued U.S. support, Weinberger reinforced the U.S. appreciation of the restraint exhibited by the ROK over the Burma bombing. As Weinberger told Chun, “We were impressed with the remarkable restraint and character of Korea’s response. I noted that acts of retribution would only make matters worse by inviting further North Korean barbarism and that Korea was now receiving the full support of world opinion.” Retribution might jeopardize that support.⁶²

In mid-November 1983 Reagan visited South Korea as part of an East Asian trip. After a long briefing during the 17-hour trip to East Asia, Reagan wondered if “my mind can hold all they are trying to pour into it.” He was to assure the South Koreans of U.S. commitment to their defense, urge Chun to continue progress towards political liberalization, promote freer access by U.S. businesses to South Korean markets and investment, and encourage more purchases of U.S. civilian aircraft and nuclear power plants. The president performed all the ceremonial and symbolic actions expected during a presidential trip: a formal welcoming ceremony, a public motorcade with Chun viewed by a huge crowd, an address to



Presidents Reagan and Chun Doo Hwan toasting at a reception at the Blue House, South Korea, November 13, 1983. *Reagan Library*

the National Assembly, meetings with Chun and other officials, a state dinner, a visit to the DMZ, lunch with the troops there, and First Lady Nancy Reagan returning on Air Force One with two Korean orphans to receive open heart surgery in America. While Reagan's visit was short on specific accomplishments, it reiterated U.S. sympathy for the Burma bombing and reassured South Korea of American steadiness as an ally.⁶³

When Weinberger traveled to Seoul in May 1984 for the annual Security Consultative Meeting, he reported to Reagan that Chun and the ROK government "were still basking in the afterglow of your visit." These security meetings followed a ritual, and their impact was in good part symbolic. Chun expressed confidence that the ROK would be able to deter a North Korean attack. Chun and Weinberger agreed to extend and expand their annual joint military exercise, Team Spirit, to send a message to Pyongyang. During the late 1980s South Korea emerged on the world stage by hosting the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics. In 1988 they held presidential and National Assembly elections. Still, the Burma bombing and hostility of the North cast a pall over ROK successes of the next five years.⁶⁴

The other disquieting development on the Korean peninsula was intelligence that North Korea was constructing a large nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, which

was of primitive design and probably constructed with North Korean skills and resources. In 1985 U.S. intelligence characterized North Korea as “a proliferation concern because of evidence it is building a reactor that will be capable of producing significant quantities of plutonium by 1990. There is no evidence they are building a reprocessing facility, however, nor that they are working on the development of a nuclear device.” Both the United States and South Korea agreed to watch the development of this reactor for potential military applications.⁶⁵

The disparity on Korean policy between Carter and Brown during 1979–1980, on the one hand, and Reagan and Weinberger during 1981–1984, on the other, was striking. Carter and his secretary of defense held President Park Chung Hee, and even more his successor Chun Doo Hwan, at arm’s length because of their violations of human rights and lack of democratic values. Carter remained committed to ROK security but did not see the need for U.S. combat troops on the peninsula. The ROK could be defended from offshore. The Carter administration was less committed to the ROK leadership. Reagan and Weinberger, by contrast, embraced Chun and his colleagues. The Reagan administration’s promises to defend the ROK against the North rang truer in Seoul because of it.

There is a postscript to the story. The prodemocracy leader whose life the Reagan team saved, Kim Dae Jung, became South Korea’s first truly democratically elected president in 1998.

The Philippines

The United States and the Philippines shared a long history. The United States annexed the Philippines, its first colony in Asia, after the Spanish-American War of 1898. It was not an easy transition to U.S. rule. During 1899–1902 the United States fought a costly war against Filipino guerrillas seeking independence. In 1934 President Franklin Roosevelt made good on the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 by shepherding through Congress a bill for Philippine independence and constitutional democracy, but independence was not fully realized until 1946. In 1947 the United States obtained two bases in the Philippines, Naval Base Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. They proved crucial during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the bases were still important during the 1980s. These outposts of the U.S. military allowed for power projection into Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. In 1979 the Carter administration and the Philippines amended the 1947 base agreement to provide the Philippine government with

more control over the bases and a promise of military assistance—\$500 million over the next five years—as compensation. It was a bruising negotiation, only resolved by high-level meetings with President Ferdinand E. Marcos by the Carter team and a key member of Congress.⁶⁶

Marcos had become increasingly authoritarian and corrupt. His human rights record was poor. Faced with a communist insurgency, known as the New People's Army, and an armed opposition in the south by Muslim Filipinos, Marcos declared martial law in 1972. Almost 10 years of martial law did not end the insurgencies. The communists gained ground and the Muslims of the south maintained their guerrilla movement. Nevertheless, in January 1981 Marcos lifted martial law and allowed elections in June 1981. The major democratic opposition parties boycotted the elections on the grounds that they would not be fair. Marcos's lopsided victory with 80 percent of the vote against a token opposition provided only a veneer of democratic legitimacy. But Marcos was a staunch anticommunist. Previous regime changes in Iran and Nicaragua had ended badly from the Reagan administration's viewpoint. No one on the Reagan team was inclined to encourage regime change for fear that Marcos's successor might be worse (i.e., a communist) or that the country would descend into civil war.⁶⁷

In late April 1982 Weinberger traveled to Manila for meetings with Marcos and Defense Minister Juan Ponce "Johnny" Enrile. In a draft memorandum to Reagan, which he never sent, Weinberger described his warm welcome in Manila as "tied to one theme." Given past history, "the United States should treat the Philippines as a special friend and ally." The secretary was not unaware of Marcos's problems: "I cannot judge if, in the Marcos clique, absolute power has corrupted absolutely. I can say that Embassy and military personnel attest that at all levels the Filipino people generally like us." Weinberger suggested that Marcos's plea for closer relations "was not a come-on for higher aid—that may come later!—or for tougher terms for our base rights. It seemed to be a plea from the heart." One issue required Reagan's attention: Marcos desired to deal with the president on a one-to-one basis, as he had with Presidents Ford and Carter, regarding the entry of nuclear-armed U.S. Navy ships into Philippine ports. It was not a complicated issue, Weinberger assured the president: "We neither deny nor confirm the existence of nuclear weapons at any site on any warships (primarily so the Soviets could not use for potential targeting)." Marcos was not opposed to such transits, but he wanted to deal with the issue on a personal



President Reagan with President Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos outside the Oval Office, September 16, 1982. *Reagan Library*

basis with the president. Reagan agreed to raise the issue when he met Marcos in Washington later in the year.⁶⁸

In September 1982 Marcos made his first official visit to Washington since 1966, a clear indication that he was back in the fold. The visit was short, with a warm White House welcome, a state dinner in the Rose Garden, entertainment on the South Lawn of the White House, and the usual official meetings with the president and his key cabinet officials. Reagan believed Marcos returned to Manila “reassured and confident of our friendship.” But U.S. support was only one of Marcos’s needs. According to U.S. intelligence analysts, Marcos had to contain the communist insurgency, allow a moderate opposition to develop, and solve his economic crisis, which was spiraling due to a worsening recession, balance of payment deficits, and few new jobs for a growing labor force. If he failed to solve any of these problems, the analysts predicted, “the mid-1980s could be turbulent.”⁶⁹

This prediction seemed far in the future as 1983 began. The 1947 U.S.-Philippine base agreement required a review every five years. The previous renegotiation of the 1947 agreement, signed in 1979 by the Carter administration, had roiled U.S.-Philippine relations. The 1983 review took a smoother course since neither side wanted to relive the drama of the Carter years and the outstanding

issues were simpler. The negotiations took place at the diplomatic level with a JCS representative on the U.S. delegation. One of the main issues was whether the United States would agree to maintain as part of the revised base agreement a large war-reserve stockpile of material including ships, aircraft, artillery, ammunition, spare parts, and military training teams in the Philippines, as it did in South Korea. The Philippines requested a staggering total of \$4.8 billion to fund this war reserve. The JCS asked who was planning to attack the Philippines. They realized that Marcos hoped to use this bonanza to fight his insurgencies. The Joint Chiefs convinced Weinberger to keep the issue separate from the base negotiations, with the promise that after the two sides agreed on the base review the United States would assist in the training and upgrading the Philippine armed forces.⁷⁰

The key to resolving the base negotiation was in determining how much the Philippines would be compensated for the use of the bases during the next five years. The administration pared down the Marcos negotiators' initial demand for \$1.5 billion to a promise to ask Congress for \$900 million in assistance (a \$125 million military assistance program, \$300 million in FMS, and \$475 million in economic support funds) over the next five years. The final significant issue was the Philippine desire for a continuation of the process, begun by Carter in 1979, of allowing the Philippines to extend its sovereignty over the bases and their operations without unduly hindering U.S. use of the facilities. Under the terms of the June 1983 agreement, the Philippines government would be consulted on operational use of the bases for combat operations other than those conducted under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty. The 1983 agreement granted the Philippine base commander access to all U.S. base facilities and informed him of the units and forces stationed and the equipment on the base. A joint committee was established to deal with implementation of the agreement including criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel, which the 1979 agreement had not addressed. Signed on June 1, 1983, the memorandum revising the base agreement had been a mostly noncontroversial negotiation with an outcome acceptable to both sides.⁷¹

The Pentagon's informal promise to modernize the Philippines' armed forces helped the U.S. position in the base agreement negotiations. This commitment was tested in August 1983 when Enrile asked to purchase 12 F-16A/B multirole aircraft. As Iklé informed Weinberger, the only Asian nation receiving F-16s was Pakistan and it was not U.S. policy to sell F-16s to other states in the region. "Even

if the policy permitted the sale," Iklé continued, the Philippines "is in such severe economic straits and simply does not have the resources for such a purchase." The first priority for Manila should be modernization and improvements for the army in its counterinsurgency campaign.⁷²

This was not the answer Marcos and Enrile had hoped for, but a singular event in 1983 temporarily overshadowed the issue. Philippine security forces hustled the leading democratic opponent of Marcos, Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr., off an aircraft arriving in Manila after his return from exile. Aquino was then assassinated. The murder occurred in August 1983, when Reagan and most of official Washington was on vacation, leaving Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam to assess the ramifications of the assassination. How would it affect the prospects for the future of the Marcos government? Should Reagan cancel his Philippines stop on his trip to Asia in November 1983? The consensus was that the short-term likelihood of Marcos's government unraveling was low, but the assassination was a major blow to the moderate opposition and would imperil congressional support for the \$900 million military and economic support assistance request. The long-term capacity for the armed forces to combat the New People's Army was not encouraging.⁷³

As a signal of concern about the Aquino assassination, Reagan skipped Manila during his Asia trip in late 1983. Shultz and his East Asian advisers had concluded that Marcos was a liability long before the Pentagon. Still, Pacific Command Commander Admiral William J. Crowe recalled with frustration his efforts in 1983 and 1984, before the assassination of Aquino, to convince Marcos to focus on and improve his armed forces. When Crowe finally joined the "Marcos must go group," he recalled Weinberger asking him, "Who will replace him? At least Marcos is ours. Before I espouse anything like what you are suggesting I want to know who will replace him." Crowe had no answer but responded that the longer the United States stayed with Marcos, the more traumatic the eventual change of power would be. Weinberger disregarded Crowe's advice.⁷⁴

Weinberger and most of his advisers reluctantly stuck with Marcos through 1984. As the year ended the national security bureaucracy was preparing a presidential directive on the Philippines, the first policy statement of the administration on the Marcos problem. Approved in February 1985, NSDD 163, "United States Policy towards the Philippines," looked to avoid what had happened on Carter's watch: the chaotic revolution against the Somoza regime by the Marxist

Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Instead of forcing Marcos to go, the directive encouraged promotion of moderate elements and a revitalization of democracy in the Philippines. As for the Philippine armed forces, which were rife with Marcos's cronies, full of corrupt officers, and engaged in a faltering counterinsurgency campaign, the directive called for restoring the military to apolitical status and professional leadership. To do this more economic and security assistance would be required.⁷⁵

In January 1985 ISA chief Armitage reported on a visit he made to Manila: "The climate here is one of suspicion and frustration.... The problems of the NPA [New Peoples' Army] insurgency are not able to be solved by military efforts alone but require coordinated comprehensive social, economic, and political reform along with military action." Armitage reported to Weinberger that "Marcos is increasingly isolated and hearing almost exclusively the voices of Imelda [his wife] and Amb Kokoy Romualdez [Imelda's brother]." Never one to pull his punches, Armitage took the advice of Philippine officials who urged him to lay it on the line to the Philippine president. Armitage spoke frankly to Marcos on his problems and what he must do to remedy them. It would take more than another year before Weinberger, and then Reagan, disturbed by Marcos's fraudulent election antics against his opponent, Aquino's widow Corazon, agreed to pull the plug on Marcos and arrange for his dignified retirement to Hawaii.⁷⁶

Vietnam: POWs and MIAs

U.S. military tradition had long held that no comrade killed on the battlefield should be left behind, but after the Vietnam War the tradition became infused with a new urgency. In previous 20th-century wars thousands of military personnel had gone missing and remained unaccounted for. In the First World War the figure was 3,350; in the Second, 78,751; and in Korea, 8,177. Families of those missing in action had always hoped for the return of loved one's remains, but in Vietnam the families of the 2,249 missing in action (MIA) expected it and demanded it. Weinberger's Pentagon, armed with new technologies for identifying remains, tried to support their wishes, but the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was a roadblock. In return for providing physical evidence that would help resolve questions about the missing, Vietnam sought concessions from the United States, such as diplomatic recognition and, especially, economic aid (which Hanoi unwisely dubbed war reparations). The Carter administration had insisted that

any talks with Hanoi must first account for those missing in action before other relations could be discussed. Hanoi agreed to POW/MIA negotiations, but the talks moved at a glacial pace with disappointing results. Only 11 families were able to put to rest their sons, brothers, or husbands during the Carter years.⁷⁷

Republican presidential candidate Reagan and his campaign advisers did not immediately recognize the significance or popular appeal of the POW/MIA issue. But Reagan did understand that Americans were still conflicted about the war in Southeast Asia. In an August 1980 address in Chicago to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Reagan called the Vietnam War a “noble cause.” He stated, “We dishonor the memory of 50,000 young Americans who died in that cause when we give way to feelings of guilt as if we were doing something shameful.” The 1980 Republican Party platform addressed the POW/MIA issue more directly, pledging to press the SRV “for a full accounting for Americans still missing in action.” Once in office, the new administration found itself circumscribed. The National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia and their congressional supporters pressed for progress, but without the cooperation of Vietnam there was little the new administration could do. During the campaign Reagan had excoriated “Communist Vietnam” for “brutal expansionism and genocide” in Cambodia and Laos. He vowed no contacts with Hanoi until it stopped its aggression against its neighbors. Not surprisingly, the leaders in Hanoi viewed the new administration warily and Hanoi ceased U.S.-SRV negotiations for the return of MIA remains.⁷⁸

Realizing that Vietnam’s cooperation was the only way to account for the missing, the Reagan administration began to make tentative contacts with Hanoi. In November 1981 a State/Defense team met with the Vietnamese ambassador to the United Nations, Ha Van Lau, to request joint high-level discussions on POW/MIA accounting. The discussion with the ambassador was described as “cordial and friendly,” although Ha Van Lau claimed the United States and China were “colluding” against Vietnam and assured the Americans there were no prisoners in Vietnam. Almost six months later, Vietnam accepted an U.S. invitation to send a five-man delegation to the U.S. Joint Casualty Resolution Center/Central Identification Laboratory (JCRC/CIL) in Hawaii. Weinberger took encouragement from this development because this was the first time during his tenure that the Vietnamese had agreed to work with what it described as a “hostile U.S. Administration.” Previously during 1981 the Vietnamese dealt only with private

U.S. citizens and organizations. The visit to Hawaii in early August 1982 consisted of tours, briefings, and technical discussions. The U.S.-SRV dialogue resumed.⁷⁹

The White House began to engage with the MIA issue. In late July 1982, National Security Adviser Clark urged Weinberger and Shultz to improve contacts with the next of kin of MIAs, exploit intelligence from refugees from Southeast Asia about possible missing servicemen, and make diplomatic approaches to the Soviet Union and countries with diplomatic or economic aid relationships with Hanoi to press for resolution of the MIA issue. Clark also encouraged the secretaries of state and defense to establish contact with the Lao government, which previously had been unwilling to allow talks on the issue. Clark reminded the two secretaries, "POW/MIA affairs remains a personal and institutional priority with the President."⁸⁰

A week later Weinberger reported to Clark that the Department of Defense had contacted the MIAs' next of kin to report on plans and progress with accounting. He assured Clark that he would update him on the other NSC requests. In December 1982 DoD technical experts met with the Vietnamese in Hanoi and agreed to four gatherings each year. In addition, a delegation made up of the National League of Families accompanied by U.S. officials visited the location



Secretary Weinberger dedicates the POW-MIA Corridor in the Pentagon, January 27, 1984. OSD/HO Photo Collection

of two aircraft crashes in Laos. Defense and State hoped to establish the same relations with Laos as it had with Vietnam.⁸¹

Finally, in 1983, U.S. efforts paid off. In spring the Vietnamese turned over remains of eight individuals. In June U.S. recovery teams visiting Hanoi received the remains of nine unaccounted-for personnel and material evidence, including dog tags and photostats of identification documents, on the fates of three additional service members. The Vietnamese had asked for dental and medical records for the nine so that they could identify them and avoid the embarrassment of sending remains of Vietnamese, as they had in the past. Follow up identification continued at the JCRC/CIL. All the remains were returned on a government-to-government basis, which Weinberger considered a sign that a workable joint U.S.-SRV system for accounting and return had been established.⁸²

Laos was harder. The communist Pathet Lao government was not as well organized as Vietnam. Nor did it completely control all of the country, especially the mountainous areas that contained the Ho Chi Minh Trail where most U.S. airmen had been shot down. Laos had no central storage area for remains (as the Vietnamese were reputed to have), Lao record keeping was poor or nonexistent, and technical capabilities were limited. In December 1983 the Lao government



President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger laying the Vietnam Unknown Soldier to rest at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington Cemetery, May 24, 1984. *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

allowed members of the JCRC/CIL to make a preliminary survey of the crash site of a U.S. C-130 aircraft with a crew of 13 near Pakse. The team spent two days surveying the site, but the Lao government did not approve a recovery effort. While talks continued, no remains were returned during the first Weinberger term.⁸³

Pentagon efforts to obtain accounting for Vietnam MIAs were accompanied by a public campaign to celebrate and honor their sacrifice. On January 27, 1984, Weinberger officially opened the POW/MIA display on the third floor of the Pentagon. One other symbolic gesture resulted in blowback. The Pentagon announced plans to inter the remains of an unknown soldier from the Vietnam War at Arlington National Cemetery in the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The National League of Families opposed the decision on the grounds that such action would dilute efforts to account for all the missing and threatened legal action. A chagrined Weinberger told the president, "I had hoped this long delayed symbolic act honoring our dead unknown could have gone forward without another lawsuit.... Someone will probably try to enjoin Christmas next." With legal hurdles surmounted, on May 28, 1984, Memorial Day, Weinberger joined the president at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier to lay to rest the Vietnam War unknown. Accompanied by a U.S. military chorus, bands, and honor guards, Reagan conferred upon the Vietnam War unknown soldier a Congressional Medal of Honor. The president stated, "Today, we pause to embrace him and all those who served in a war whose end offered no parades, no flags, and so little thanks." When the president called upon the SRV—"Heal the sorest wound of this conflict. Return our sons to America. End the grief of those who are undeserving of any retribution"—he received a standing ovation.⁸⁴

The establishment of U.S. relations with the SRV during the Clinton presidency and the opening of Vietnam to tourism, including Vietnam veterans wishing to return, did much to heal the wounds of the war. Still, the search for remains and identification of MIAs remains a continuing goal and obligation of the Pentagon to this day. In its overall strategy for East Asia and Southeast Asia the Reagan administration successfully set a framework for future policy. After some initial difficulties in balancing Taiwan and China, the administration worked out a relationship with Beijing which did not preclude selling defensive weapons to Taipei. That is not to say that either Chinese side was satisfied, but they accepted the arrangement. Once the Taiwan issue was placed on the back burner, the

Pentagon and the administration could sell technology and weapons to Beijing, but always with Weinberger's proviso that such sales be vetted so their transfer did not endanger U.S. security. After the PRC cracked down on prodemocracy demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in 1989, U.S. arms sales ceased, but China continued its rise as a regional and then world economic and military power.

Weinberger continued the U.S. policy of pressing Japan to spend more on defense. During his first term the Japanese never reached the elusive goal of 1 percent of GNP for defense, missing it by only .003 percent in late 1984. Weinberger's broader vision of Japan as a more proactive U.S. ally on the world stage required more time. With growing economic strength the Japanese slowly accepted more worldwide responsibilities. As for Korea, Weinberger was instrumental in repairing what had been a flawed and self-destructive policy under Carter. It helped that the Reagan administration accepted the view that allies and friends should be judged by their anticommunism and support of the United States, not by the political systems adherence to democracy or human rights policies. Transition to democracy should be evolutionary. In the Philippines this policy was tested as Weinberger and Reagan supported Marcos while most in the U.S. government concluded he needed to go. The Reagan-Weinberger policy applied pressure privately on the United States' East Asia friends and promised that authoritarians, such as Chun or Marcos, would never be forced to flee like the shah of Iran or Somoza of Nicaragua. Marcos eventually agreed to exile in 1986 and President Corazon Aquino reestablished democracy in the Philippines. In South Korea, Chun agreed after much hesitation to step down in 1987 and allow democratic elections. Secure in its relationship with the United States, Taiwan moved in the mid-1980s toward political liberalization and eventually to democracy. In the long run the Reagan-Weinberger approach to East and Southeast Asia helped plant the seeds for a transformation of the region.⁸⁵

Weinberger's Legacy

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER was an odd choice to be secretary of defense. A man known for trimming the fat from government spending oversaw the largest peacetime military buildup in American history. There was a cost—federal budget deficits not seen since World War II. A Harvard-trained lawyer, Weinberger was at heart an advocate for his clients. In this case his most important one was Ronald Reagan, who had promised more spending for defense in his election campaign of 1980. As a lawyer, former newspaper columnist, and television presenter, Weinberger also viewed his job as convincing the two institutions that mattered—the court of public opinion and the U.S. Congress—to support an expanded Defense budget. Weinberger, of course, agreed with Reagan's diagnosis that the U.S. defense posture had suffered during the previous decade and that the Soviet Union had overtaken U.S. conventional and strategic military superiority. Still, in his previous Washington jobs, Weinberger had followed the standard Republican line that big government was a problem. To Weinberger, however, the Department of Defense was the exception. The DoD was not too expensive. Nor were the armed forces too big and their weapons too costly. The threat of the Soviet Union required a robust defense and Congress should fully fund it. He believed that the All-Volunteer Force—those who chose to serve—were owed the best weapons, training, and compensation.

Advocate for Defense

Weinberger's first four years at the Pentagon resulted in massive increases in funding for the military establishment. From 1981 to January 1985 the Defense

budget rose by almost \$100 billion—helped in part by inflation—and enjoyed double digit real growth for the first two years. Hereafter, spending after inflation averaged 6 percent growth through 1985. Weinberger worked persistently in promoting the interests of the Department of Defense and its armed forces, his other important clients. His brief never changed. He always wanted more money and believed that the Soviet threat never waned.

After 1984 Congress began sequestering DoD spending under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act of 1985. Democrats in Congress wanted to fund domestic programs; many Republican legislators worried about the ballooning deficit. Weinberger's efforts to win continued real increases in spending faltered. In part because of the static nature of his message, Weinberger's influence on Capitol Hill lessened. In addition, public support for continued large increases for defense diminished. Even when the economy, stagnant for the first two years of the decade, began to recover, federal deficits continued to grow. Congressional support for ever-increasing defense spending weakened and real growth in defense appropriations ceased. Reagan increasingly sided with his domestic advisers and Congress, who called for scaled-back defense spending lest the deficit get out of hand.

Weapon Systems, NATO, the All-Volunteer Force, and Readiness

Weinberger, as the former California fiscal manager and Office of Management and Budget leader, had extensive experience in government budgeting but was a novice when it came to weapon systems and force structure. Nevertheless, during his first tenure the United States produced an expanded military arsenal, much of it based on advanced technology that improved the combat capabilities of U.S. forces. Although Republican politicians campaigning in 1980 never acknowledged it, Carter's defense leadership had built the foundation for a revolution in military affairs. Weinberger and his staff continued the strategy of Secretary Harold Brown and his under secretary for research and engineering, William Perry. Rather than matching the Soviet quantitative advantages in troops, equipment, conventional weapons, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, the United States would use its ace in the hole—innovative technology. While the Pentagon under Brown developed high-technology weapons and systems, Weinberger and his team obtained the money from Congress to build and deploy them. As a result, by the end of the Reagan presidency the Pentagon had changed the balance of military power with the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, progress during Weinberger's first four years was not as rapid as the Pentagon had hoped. The Reagan administration rejected Carter's racetrack deployment plan for the MX missile but failed to develop workable plans beyond basing the MX missiles, then dubbed Peacekeepers, in hardened Minuteman silos. At the end of 1984 the Peacekeeper was still not deployed and the B-1 bomber was still in production. Advanced air-launched cruise missiles, one of the previous administration's major initiatives that was supported by the Reagan team, were not deployed in meaningful numbers until FY 1987. Navy projects made somewhat better progress; the DoD continued its modernization of the ballistic missile submarine fleet and increased the number of improved attack submarines. By January 1985 the DoD had begun to undertake real improvements in command, control, and communications, and the Navy had expanded its fleet to 525 deployable battle-force ships. Nevertheless, the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan's signature innovation and one avidly supported by Weinberger, was still in very early stages of research.

Within NATO, Weinberger focused on stationing Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles on the soil of Western European members to counter the threat of Soviet SS-20 mobile missiles. While Carter and Brown had obtained agreement from NATO members to accept U.S. missiles, the task of actually deploying the weapons fell to Weinberger's team. They succeeded against a strong antinuclear popular movement, in both Western Europe and the United States, and robust efforts by the Kremlin to derail the deployments. Weinberger rightly concluded that the battle to install these missiles in Europe required an active public relations strategy. West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom were the first to receive deployments. Other NATO members followed suit. Weinberger believed that the NATO members that accepted these U.S. weapons had done their part for the alliance. He therefore downplayed U.S. pressure for NATO members to meet the pledge made during the Carter administration to increase their annual Defense budgets by 3 percent (after inflation) each year. In Weinberger's view, defense spending increases did not represent the total contribution of the allies, who had resisted domestic political flak for the Euro-missiles deployment. Their firm stand, along with their burden sharing, host-nation services efforts, and intangibles such as the loss of revenue for the land allotted to U.S. forces in Europe, also counted.

NATO's military strength against the Warsaw Pact improved during

Weinberger's first four years, but the Soviets and their allies had over the previous decades strengthened their conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic forces and developed operational war plans. NATO had not matched these Warsaw Pact improvements, but it was definitely heading in that direction. The disparity between NATO and Pact conventional forces in Europe remained significant. The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact likely would have won a conventional weapons war in Europe. The modernization efforts of Weinberger's first four years would start to pay off in the second term, but by 1984, the Reagan-Weinberger team had only begun to address the disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact military capabilities in Europe.

While the NATO–Warsaw Pact balance of power remained hard to quantify, the Weinberger Pentagon succeeded in accomplishing a distinct contribution to U.S. national security: providing the All-Volunteer Force with better training and increasing its readiness. The Carter administration's emphasis on new high-technology systems had come at the expense of training budgets and force readiness. Weinberger's military assistant, Colin Powell, characterized the Carter-era armed forces and defense establishment as a “tumbledown house with a BMW parked in the driveway.” With the real funding growth increases that Weinberger obtained from Congress during the first Reagan term, military pay jumped by over 25 percent, the services met their recruiting goals of quality candidates and improved retention rates, and recruits received more and better training. The “hollow Army” of which Army Chief of Staff General Edward “Shy” Meyers had complained about in 1980 had filled out and improved its readiness.¹

Management Style

The Pentagon has long been the largest federal agency with the biggest share of the discretionary federal budget. With its competing military services, massive research and development and acquisition budgets, contracts with defense industries employing over two million workers, and intense congressional scrutiny, the Defense Department has had a major impact on the American economy and political system. Many have held that the Pentagon is so big and pervasive that it defies management. Since 1947 two main managerial approaches have emerged. The centralizing secretaries, such as Robert McNamara or Harold Brown, sought with varying degrees of success to direct the Defense Department with the help of a small coterie of OSD officials. They kept a firm rein on the budget and the

acquisition process while relegating the service secretaries to virtual figureheads and mouthpieces for their services. On the other end of the spectrum were secretaries such as Nixon's Melvin Laird and James R. Schlesinger, who more readily delegated responsibility. Weinberger fell squarely within the second category. In fact, he was a prime example of a delegating secretary, formally bringing the service secretaries and the unified commanders into the budget-defining process and allowing the services the freedom to plan, adjust, and spend their budgets essentially as they wished. That is not to say that Weinberger did not rely heavily on his OSD staff. Assistant Secretaries Perle and Armitage, Under Secretary Iklé, Deputy Secretaries Carlucci and later Taft, and Senior Military Assistant Colin Powell provided key support and advice, but Weinberger did not use them to dominate the Pentagon. Furthermore, the secretary relied much less on the Pentagon analytical organizations, such as the Office of Program Evaluation and the Office of Net Assessment, than most of his predecessors. Instead, he deferred to the military services, Joint Chiefs, DoD agencies, and unified commands, giving them a major role in policy formulation, acquisition decisions, and management.²

In his administration of the vast defense establishment, Weinberger followed the time-honored pattern at the Pentagon of dividing the job between himself and his deputy secretary on an outside-inside basis. Weinberger handled relations with the president and White House, attended the NSC meetings, and spoke for Defense on foreign and national security issues in administration policy deliberations and public forums. He was front and center on the Pentagon's efforts to convince Congress to increase defense spending. He delegated to the deputy secretary the work inside the Pentagon, such as preparation of DoD budget requests, supervision of the acquisition process including attempts to reform it, and oversight of the All-Volunteer Force.

Rather than making difficult decisions about which programs to fund and which to cancel, Weinberger succeeded in the Reagan first term in funding virtually all of them. Inevitably, with so much money sloshing around in the Pentagon, spending scandals emerged. The media uncovered \$600 hammers bought by the services or \$6,000 coffee makers on Air Force aircraft. Weinberger realized this kind of publicity was toxic. He and his deputy Carlucci created bureaucratic mechanisms to root out waste and mismanagement and reported regularly to the president and Congress on "savings." In conjunction with the Department of Justice, the Pentagon instituted legal proceedings against unscrupulous con-

tractors. Unfortunately they were rarely found guilty. These campaigns against waste, fraud, and mismanagement amounted to little more than window dressing; supporting the development and production of advanced weapons, often on the cutting edges of scientific and technological knowledge, absorbed a large share of the DoD's budget.

Weinberger was a people person who enjoyed engaging with others. He was formal, polite, and courteous. He never bellowed at subordinates or used foul language with them. A cultured Californian educated at Harvard in the late 1930s, he retained that persona through the turbulent 1960s, the early 1970s, and until the end of his life. Although not as well scripted and reassuring a public speaker as Reagan, Weinberger was an effective communicator able to speak extemporaneously. As secretary of defense, he threw himself into social Washington, often briefly attending three diplomatic or political receptions a night. He never drank at these functions, preferring an occasional glass of wine when he was at home. Weinberger enjoyed pomp and circumstance. He took seriously the diplomatic side of his job. He was always willing to meet and talk with foreign officials, especially heads of state and defense and foreign ministers, but also ambassadors and leading members of foreign opposition parties. His conversations were often general and even tended towards the banal, but they provided the lubrication that produced smooth social and diplomatic relations.

National Policy Issues

Weinberger fell within the mainstream of Reagan's foreign policies with one exception. Weinberger was the most pro-Arab member of Reagan's inner circle. He believed the United States needed more friends in the region and saw the moderate Arab states—Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf kingdoms, Jordan, and Egypt—as worthy of U.S. military support and cooperation. An added incentive was the oil-rich Arabs' willingness to buy U.S. weapons, military equipment, and training. No matter how much he tried to deny it, Weinberger was not always a friend of Israel. His relations with Israeli leaders were strained over their policies in Lebanon, their demands for U.S. military assistance, and their ability to circumvent the Pentagon and the Reagan administration through their allies in Congress.

In the other major foreign policy issues he faced—relations with the Soviet Union, the related issue of nuclear arms reduction, and the Marxist threat to

Central America—Weinberger was consistently conservative and anticommunist. He opposed both of Reagan's secretaries of state, Haig and Shultz, in their efforts to promote rapprochement with Moscow. He argued against nuclear arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union until the United States had modernized its strategic nuclear forces. He insisted that arms control agreements be verifiable and equal. He avidly encouraged efforts to combat communism in Central America, including secret support for the Contras and visible U.S. military cooperation with Honduras and El Salvador.

Weinberger's conviction that the arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union were mistaken was based on his suspicion of the Kremlin and his concern about the balance of power between Washington and Moscow. In fact there was little prospect for either serious *détente* or much progress on nuclear arms reductions. The Kremlin's hidebound leadership kept dying on Reagan. The president remained conflicted by his anticommunism and his hope to engage Soviet leaders in a useful dialogue to lessen the possibility of nuclear war. Weinberger's hard-line stance against the Kremlin put him at odds with Reagan's second secretary of state and earned him a reputation among later observers of the Reagan years as a foil for the more nuanced and flexible Shultz. To his later critics Weinberger represented the forces of darkness and Shultz those of light. Nevertheless in 1984 Reagan turned towards Shultz's policy of arms control and better relations with Moscow. Weinberger's influence began to diminish. Only with the rise in 1985 of a new type of Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, were better U.S.-Soviet relations possible.

The Use of Force and Relations with the Joint Chiefs

Weinberger was an uncharacteristic secretary of defense in many respects. He worked to improve and expand the armed forces, but he was totally resistant to using military power except under certain limited circumstances. He actively opposed, unsuccessfully as it turned out, the deployment of marines as peacekeepers in Lebanon. Initially skeptical of the plan to invade Grenada to free U.S. medical students and restore legitimate government there, he approved increasing the number of troops involved to ensure success and widen the margin for victory. The deaths of armed forces personnel in Grenada and Lebanon deeply affected this former platoon commander, who had lost a man to friendly fire during training in Australia in 1942. After the disastrous second peacekeeping mission in

Lebanon resulted in the tragic bombing of the marine barracks and 241 service member deaths, Weinberger fashioned his doctrine of six requirements for the use of force, which came to be mirrored in the better-known Powell doctrine. This was not the prescription of an interventionist secretary. Ironically, Shultz was far more willing to employ military power in support of diplomacy. The two men had their sharpest disagreements over this issue.

In his first year as secretary, Weinberger had respectful but distant relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of whom were Carter appointees. This coolness was particularly true of Chairman General David Jones, who remained suspect in the Reaganites' eyes because of his support for Carter's cancellation of the B-1 bomber. In March 1982 Weinberger and Reagan named their own chairman, General John Vessey Jr.; picked Admiral James Watkins as chief of naval operations; and selected General Charles Gabriel as chief of staff of the Air Force. Within a year the remaining two chiefs were Reagan-Weinberger appointees. Weinberger's relations with the new JCS became close. Vessey and Weinberger had an excellent rapport, meeting daily one-on-one and then weekly with the rest of the JCS in their conference room, the Tank. Vessey became a trusted adviser to the president at NSC meetings and almost always an unwavering supporter of Weinberger at these gatherings. Only one issue caused real friction between the OSD and the JCS: the strategic nuclear planning process. The Joint Chiefs considered such planning their preserve and resented OSD staff intrusions. As for the future, Weinberger opposed congressional efforts to reorganize the JCS and make the chairman a more powerful presidential adviser. To Weinberger the system was fine as it was, and the chairman's role did not need to be upgraded. During 1981–1985 Vessey and the chiefs agreed with the secretary.

Although he is considered one of the more successful defense secretaries, Weinberger was not an innovator. He was tenacious and persistent, which in his early years allowed him to have his way with the White House and Congress, but his message never changed with the times and circumstances. By the end of the first Reagan term his relations with Congress had soured and Capitol Hill legislators often discounted his constant and invariable warnings about the Soviet threat. He always retained Reagan's friendship, but increasingly when he met privately with his old friend, he failed to win him over.

Nevertheless, the legacy of Weinberger's first four years is secure. After the end of the Cold War, he convinced Congress to fund new high-technology weapon

systems and revitalize the AVF. These initiatives came to fruition in the Gulf War of 1991. To armed forces personnel the first Weinberger years were a golden age, with generous compensation, extended training, good living conditions, sensitivity to military families, and the introduction of new and awesome weapons. To Weinberger's detractors he was a prodigious spender. His bloated Defense budgets ballooned federal deficits. His critics from the left lament that domestic social ills could have been alleviated if less money went for defense and more for domestic programs. To Reagan supporters, Weinberger was a major pillar of Reagan's effort to win the Cold War by militarily outspending the Soviet Union during 1981–1985, which forced the Kremlin to choose between economic reform of its communist system and defense spending. Others see the end of the Cold War as also a victory of the bipartisan containment policies of the seven Cold War presidents who preceded Reagan, the logical outcome of internal contradictions in Marxism as practiced by the Kremlin's leaders, and the result of Gorbachev's decision to reform the tottering Soviet empire and then to accept its dissolution.³

Looking back from the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Weinberger's impact becomes clearer. He was the mainstay, the most visible supporter within the administration for Reagan's promise to increase U.S. conventional and strategic military power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This was his first priority and during his first four years he accomplished what he and the president set out to do. Weinberger was completely comfortable with Reagan's anticommunist "Evil Empire" side. He also realized that the president abhorred nuclear war, so the Strategic Defense Initiative seemed to Weinberger the ideal solution to reconciling the contradictory sides of Reagan. Banish nuclear war to space, eventually eliminate the need for expensive offensive strategic weapons, and save humanity from nuclear Armageddon. To the leadership in Moscow, which had based their nuclear strategy on land-based missiles, SDI seemed a one-sided ploy for U.S. strategic superiority through negating Moscow's trump card of large and increasingly accurate MIRVed ICBMs.

The arms control initiatives of the first Reagan-Weinberger term pale in comparison with the successes of the second, especially the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 and improvised engagement between Reagan and the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, which paved the way for strategic arms reduction agreements in following years. Weinberger argued that success in negotiations with Moscow only came from strength, not military weakness. During Weinberger's

first tenure at the Pentagon the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union shifted in America's favor and the Kremlin leadership had to choose between continuing the arms race and meeting consumer demands of the Soviet people. Weinberger can justly claim partial credit for pushing the Soviets to make that fateful choice.

Unfortunately for Cap Weinberger the successes of the first four years were not replicated during his brief service (less than two years) in the second Reagan term. Defense spending merely kept up with inflation as Congress no longer took much notice of Weinberger's pleas for real increases. Nevertheless, the DoD continued to deploy high-technology weapon systems, albeit at a slower pace. The All-Volunteer Force, including the reserves, underwent better training and received better equipment. After his retirement, Weinberger became entangled in the Iran-Contra scandal that deflated Reagan's second term, tarnishing his reputation for a time. Still, his legacy is secure. While the Reagan-Weinberger military buildup of 1981–1985 was only one part of the combination of events, developments, and interactions of leaders that led to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was nevertheless a significant one.

— A B B R E V I A T I O N S —

ABM	Antiballistic missile
ABMD	Antiballistic missile defense
Acc	Accession number
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFQT	Armed Forces Qualification Test
AIP	Acquisition Improvement Program
AIPAC	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
ALCM	Air-launched cruise missile
APC	Armored personnel carrier
ASAT	Antisatellite
ASD	Assistant secretary of defense
ASD(ISA)	Assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs
ASD(ISP)	Assistant secretary of defense for international security policy
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
AWACS	Airborne warning and control system
BA	Budget authority
BLT	Battalion landing team
BMD	Ballistic missile defense
C3	Command, control, and communications
C3I	Command, control, communications and intelligence
CELV	Complementary expendable launch vehicles
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CFE	Conventional forces in Europe
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCLANT	Commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet

CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
COLA	Cost-of-living adjustment
COMPUSEC	Computer security
COMSEC	Communications security
CPF	Caribbean Peacekeeping Force
CPI	Consumer price index
CSB	Closely spaced basing (or close-spaced basing)
CTB	Comprehensive test ban
DABM	Defense against ballistic missiles
DACOWITS	Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCI	Director of central intelligence
DECA	Defense and economic cooperation agreement
DEFCON	Defense condition
DG	Defense guidance
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIVAD	Division air defense
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone (Korea)
DoD	Department of Defense
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
EMP	Electromagnetic pulse
ER	Enhanced radiation
ERW	Enhanced radiation warheads
ESF	Economic Support Fund
ET	Emerging technologies
FAN	Forces Armées du Nord
FANT	Forces Armées Nationales Tchadienne
FIR	Flight information region
FMLN	[Farabundo] Martí National Liberation Front
FMS	Foreign military sales
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
FSLN	Sandinista National Liberation Front

FTC	Federal Trade Commission
FY	Fiscal year
GAO	General Accounting Office
GLCM	Ground-launched cruise missile
GNP	Gross national product
GPO	Government Printing (now Publishing) Office
GSA	General Services Administration
GUNT	Gouvernement d'Union Nationale en Transition
HARM	High-speed anti-radiation missile
HEW	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HR	House of Representatives
IAU	International accounting unit
ICA	International Communication Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IG	Interagency group
IMET	International military education and training
INF	Intermediate nuclear forces
IRG	Interagency Review Group
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
ISR	Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JCRC/CIL	Joint Casualty Resolution Center/Central Identification Laboratory
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPMG	Joint Political Military Group
JPO	Joint Program Office
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
KAL	Korean Air Lines
KGB	Committee for State Security (Soviet Union)
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LAMP	Lebanese Army Modernization Plan
LAMPS	Light airborne multipurpose system
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (Republic of Korea)

LSD	Landing ship, dock
LTDP	Long-Term Defense Program (NATO)
MAD	Mutual assured destruction
MAP	Monetary award program
MARG	Marine amphibious ready group
MAU	Marine amphibious unit
MBFR	Mutual balanced force reduction
MER	Multiple ejector bomb rack
MIA	Missing in action
MILES	Multiple integrated laser engagement system
MIRV	Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles
MLRS	Multiple launch rocket system
MMT	Military training team
MNF	Multinational Force (Lebanon)
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MOS	Military occupational specialties
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
MPS	Multiple protective shelter
MRA&L	Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics
MRC	Military Reform Caucus
MRP	Master restationing plan
MX	Missile experimental
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFO	Naval flight officers
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NPA	New People's Army
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group (NATO)
NPO	National Program Office
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National security decision directive
NSF	National Science Foundation
NSPG	National Security Planning Group
NSSD	National security study directive
NTC	National Training Center

NUWEP	Nuclear weapons employment policy
O&M	Operations and maintenance
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OMG	Operational maneuver group
ONA	Office of Net Assessment
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/HO	Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
POM	Program objective memorandum
POW	Prisoner of war
PPBS	Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System
PRC	People's Republic of China
Pub. L.	Public law
QRMC	Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
R&E	Research and engineering
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
RDT&E	Research, development, test, and evaluation
REDCOM	U.S. Readiness Command
RIF	Reductions in force
ROK	Republic of Korea
RSAF	Royal Saudi Air Force
RSLF	Royal Saudi Land Force
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SAM	Surface-to-air missile
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SDIO	Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
SEAL	Sea, air, land (Navy special forces)
SIG	Senior Interagency Group (or Senior Interdepartmental Group)
SLBM	Submarine-launched ballistic missile

SNDV	Strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
SNF	Short-range nuclear forces
SPACECOM	U.S. Space Command
SRF	Strategic Reserve Forces
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
STS	Space transportation system
TNF	Theater nuclear forces
TOW	Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (missile)
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UN	United Nations
UNTAG	UN Transition Advisory Group
USA	U.S. Army
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USCINCEUR	U.S. commander in chief, Europe
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VEAP	Veterans' Educational Assistance Program
WNRC	Washington National Records Center
ZBB	Zero-based budgeting

— NOTES —

1. Caspar Weinberger's Journey to the Pentagon

1. For Weinberger's own account of his life, see Caspar W. Weinberger, *In the Arena: A Memoir of the 20th Century*, with Gretchen Roberts (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2001). "Cap the Knife" was a play on "Mack the Knife" from *The Threepenny Opera*, popularized by Louis Armstrong in 1955 and Bobby Darin in 1959.

2. Caspar W. Weinberger, interview by Alfred Goldberg, Maurice Matloff, and Stuart Rochester, Washington, DC, 12 Jan 1988, Oral History Collection, Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office (OSD/HO), 1–3, 7–8 (quotes on 7 and 8).

3. Ibid., 9 (quotes); Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 271. When asked if he had "any sense of why he wanted you in the Defense [Department]," Weinberger responded: "No, we never went into that in any detail." Caspar W. Weinberger, interview by Stephen F. Knott and Russell L. Riley, Washington, DC, 19 Nov 2002, Ronald Reagan Oral History Project, Miller Center Oral History Program, University of Virginia (hereafter Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories), 7.

4. Weinberger interview, 12 Jan 1988, 8 (quotes).

5. Edward Keefer, *Harold Brown: Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge, 1977–1980* (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 2017), 504; Edwin Meese III, *With Reagan: The Inside Story* (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 17. The best book on the 1980 election remains Jack W. Germond and Jules Witcover, *Blue Smoke and Mirrors: How Reagan Won and Why Carter Lost the Election of 1980* (New York: Viking, 1981).

6. Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, *The Department of Defense, 1947–1997: Organization and Leaders* (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 1997), appendix IV, "Financial and Manpower Data"; Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1987), 329.

7. Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 6–7.

8. Michael Deaver admits that he had warned Reagan that Weinberger, with a moderate Republican pedigree and a Jewish last name, might spark a right-wing backlash, only to conclude with praise: "Here he is today [1987], the secretary of defense, unyielding hawk, guardian of the Pentagon purse, sweetheart of the far right." Michael K. Deaver, *Behind the Scenes: In Which the Author Talks about Ronald and Nancy Reagan... and Himself*, with Mickey Herskowitz (New York: Morrow, 1987), 45; Caspar W. Weinberger and Peter Schweizer, *The Next War* (New York: Regnery, 1996).

9. Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), 16–17; James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York, Viking, 2009), 32, 38; James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014) 5, 19–21, 84–86, 129–131.

10. Part of the problem for Weinberger is that books on the end of the Cold War are usually based on interviews with Shultz, his detailed memoirs, and the tendency of historians and journalists to focus on the White House and Department of State rather than the sprawling Defense Department.

11. Reagan speechwriter Aram Bakshian Jr. commented that whenever people said, “Let Reagan be Reagan ... what they really meant was ‘Let me be Reagan,’” as many conservatives in particular felt frustrated by their inability to influence policy as much as they thought they would. Aram Bakshian, interview by Stephen F. Knott and Russell Riley, Washington, DC, 14 Jan 2002, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 31, 42 (quote on 31).

12. Robert C. McFarlane, *Special Trust*, with Zofia Smardz (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), 286–287. After a November 1984 meeting with Shultz, who threatened to resign, Reagan noted that Weinberger's and Casey's differences with Shultz spelled “trouble.” The president reluctantly felt he had to do something, saying, “Actually George is carrying out my policies. I am going to meet with Cap & Bill and lay it out to them. It won't be fun, but it has to be done.” It is unclear whether the president followed through on this intention, but after this point Weinberger's influence began to wane appreciably. Ronald Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 277; Ronald J. Granieri, “Beyond Cap the Foil: Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Era Defense Buildup,” in *Reagan and the World: Leadership and National Security, 1981–1989*, ed. Bradley Lynn Coleman and Kyle Longley (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2017), 51–56.

13. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 13–16 (quotes on 16).

14. *Ibid.*, 32–52.

15. *Ibid.*, 40–42, 46.

16. Weinberger's friend and traveling companion Tom Calhoun turned the reminiscence into a magazine article, “Caspar and Kate,” in *Northeast Magazine*, which eventually found its way into *Reader's Digest*. Weinberger corrected the embellishments in a letter: Weinberger to John Cabitor, letter responding to Cabitor's letter, 17 May 1982 (quote); Cabitor to Weinberger, letter with clipping from *Northeast Magazine*, 3 May 1982 (quote): all in folder 020 SD (Jan–30 Jun, 1982), box 21, Acc 330-84-0002, Record Group 330: Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (hereafter OSD Records); Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 45.

17. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 49–52 (quote on 49).

18. *Ibid.*, 54–77.

19. *Ibid.*, 54, 76–77.

20. Ibid., 80, 93–94, 97, 99–112 (quotes on 80, 94, and 97).

21. Ibid., 119–124.

22. Ibid., 137–145.

23. Ibid., 132–135 (quote on 132).

24. Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011), 139–143; Edmund Morris, *Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan* (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 329–330; Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 135 (quote).

25. Reagan, *An American Life*, 157–158; Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 151–153.

26. Stuart Spencer, interview by Paul B. Freeman, Stephen F. Knott, Russell L. Riley, and James Sterling Young, Charlottesville, VA, 15–16 Nov 2001, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 18–19 (quotes on 18); Reagan, *An American Life*, 175 (quote); Kathleen Osborne, interview by Stephen F. Knott and James Sterling Young, Los Angeles, CA, 26 Apr 2003, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 9, 16; Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 154–155. Weinberger, according to Reagan's official biographer, had to "wait in the wings until the conservatives had forgiven him" for his opposition to Goldwater. Morris, *Dutch*, 347.

27. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 177.

28. Ibid., 169–177.

29. Ibid., 182.

30. The problem, according to Haldeman, was that Weinberger wanted to keep the chauffeur of his government-provided limousine as a perk. H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: Putnam, 1994), 171–173 (quote on 171). Weinberger claimed that his motivation was to make sure that the driver, who had run into legal trouble because of a bar fight in Turkey as an enlisted man, would be able to keep his job and obtain a security clearance to drive for OMB. The driver went with Weinberger to OMB. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, footnote on 192–193, 191–195 (quotes on 192, 195).

31. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 179, 196 (quotes); Haldeman, *Haldeman Diaries*, 330 (quote).

32. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 204–208. Weinberger entitled the chapter on his experiences at Health, Education, and Welfare "A First Lesson in Really Big Government."

33. Ibid., 254–265.

34. Pendleton James, interview by Stephen F. Knott, Karen M. Hult, and Charles E. Walcot, Charlottesville, VA, 3 Nov 2004, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 31 (quote).

35. Minutes of DPRC meeting, 5 Aug 1971, in Davis to Kissinger, memo, 10 Aug 1971, Digital National Security Archive, NSA Kissinger Transcripts, Document 00319, 10–11 (quotes on 10 and 11).

36. David Stockman, *The Triumph of Politics: The Inside Story of the Reagan Revolution* (New York: Avon, 1987), 301 (quote).

37. Cannon, *President Reagan*, 132 (quote).

38. Ronald Reagan, Remarks to the Mid-Winter Congressional City Conference of the National League of Cities, 1 Mar 1981, *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), 180 (quotes); Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 40 (quote).

39. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 7 Jan 1981, folder 5 OMB position paper, box I:573, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress (quote from pages 4–6).

40. Nixon to Reagan, memo, 17 Nov 1980, quoted in Cannon, *President Reagan*, 70; Nixon to Weinberger, 15 Dec 1980; Weinberger to Nixon, 31 Dec 1980 (quote): both in folder 2, Ideas/Suggestions 3, box I:573, Weinberger Papers.

41. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 608–610; Weinberger interview, 12 Jan 1988, 10 (quotes).

42. Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, footnote on 41 (quote).

43. Charles W. Coddry, “Reagan’s Defense Choice Is a Known Budget Cutter,” *Baltimore Sun*, 12 Dec 1980, 12; Walter S. Mossberg, “Pentagon Choice: Weinberger May Have Hard Time Satisfying Both the Spenders and Budget Cutters,” *Wall Street Journal*, 12 Dec 1980, 1; Stephen Webbe, “‘Cap the Knife’ Faces New Kind of Challenge at the Pentagon,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 Dec 1980, 6.

44. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing: Nomination of Caspar W. Weinberger to Be Secretary of Defense* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981), 1–51, for the exchange with Cohen, see 15–16.

45. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 272.

46. Weinberger interview, 12 Jan 1988, 11; Weinberger interview, 19 Nov 2002, 11. The secretaries with limited defense-related experience include former businessmen Charles E. Wilson and Neil H. McElroy chosen by President Eisenhower; Robert S. McNamara, President Kennedy’s secretary of defense; lawyer and former chief of staff of the Truman White House Clark M. Clifford, who served under LBJ; and Melvin R. Laird, Elliot L. Richardson, James R. Schlesinger, and Donald H. Rumsfeld, all of whom served as secretaries of defense during either the Nixon or Ford administration. Admittedly, Laird had experience in Congress with defense issues, and Schlesinger had briefly been director of CIA and had an academic background in economics and strategic studies. See the profiles in Trask and Goldberg, *Department of Defense*, 57–99.

2. The Pentagon Team and Relationships within the Reagan Administration

1. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 245–251.

2. Caspar W. Weinberger, “Yes, Washington, We *Can* Have Cabinet Government,” *Washington Post*, 1 Dec 1980, reprinted in *Public Statements of Caspar Weinberger, 1981*, OSD Historical Office, 1:1–2 (quotes on 1).

3. *Ibid.* (quotes on 1 and 2).

4. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 10 Dec 1980, subj: Briefing for cabinet appointees, folder 7, Foreign Policy Advisory Group, Transition Papers, box I:572 (quotes); Weinberger,

memorandum of conversation, 8 Jan 1981, subj: Meeting of the cabinet designees and others from the State Department, folder 5 OMB position paper, box I:573, (quotes): both in Caspar Weinberger Papers.

5. John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York: Morrow, 1991), 449–461; Haig quoted in David Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 210–221. Haig provided slightly different language at a news conference on January 28, 1981: “I was assured by President Reagan personally that I will be his chief administrator, if you will, and I use the term ‘vicar’... for the formulation, the conduct and the articulation of American foreign policy.” Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, Current Documents 1981* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 75.

6. Rothkopf, *Running the World*, 65–68; Richard V. Allen, interview by Stephen K. Knott, Russell L. Riley, and James Sterling Young, 28 May 2002, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 77 (quote). Allen added, “Some people read it [the sign] and some people didn’t.... It was just there to be read.... Guys like Al Haig never did. Guys like Cap Weinberger did. Made a difference.” On Reagan’s management style in general, see Cannon, *President Reagan*, 149–154, with reference to the sign on 154.

7. Reagan’s *Fortune* interview quoted in Cannon, *President Reagan*, 150.

8. Kenneth Adelman, interview by Jeff Chidester, Stephen F. Knott, and Robert Strong, Arlington, VA, 30 Sep 2003, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 18 (quote).

9. Stuart Spencer, interview by Paul B. Freeman, Stephen F. Knott, Russell L. Riley, and James Sterling Young, 15–16 Nov 2001, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 12 (quote); Cannon, *President Reagan*, 293–296.

10. The exception was Mike Deaver, whose views for more accommodation with Moscow reflected those of First Lady Nancy Reagan. Deaver, *Behind the Scenes*, 39, 111, 129; Weinberger interview, 19 Nov 2002, 33.

11. Cannon, *President Reagan*, 263–265.

12. Ibid.

13. For a discussion of the 1980s neocons, see Justin Vaïsse, *Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2011); Jesús Velasco, *Neoconservatives in U.S. Foreign Policy under Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush: Voices Behind the Throne* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2010); Len Colodny and Tom Shachtman, *The Forty Years War: The Rise and Fall of the Neocons, from Nixon to Obama* (New York, HarperPerennial, 2009); James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004).

14. For the best biography of Casey, see Joseph E. Persico, *Casey: From the OSS to the CIA* (New York: Penguin, 1990).

15. Reagan quoted in Richard Reeves, *President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 33.

16. Cannon, *President Reagan*, 263; *Reagan Public Papers 1981*, 520–521.

17. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 291–292; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 42; Richard Halloran, “Weinberger Is Said to Insist On Picking His Deputy,” *Washington Post*, 9 Jan 1981, 14.

18. Frank Carlucci, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, Washington, DC, 12 Apr 1989, OSD/HO, 7 (quote); Frank Carlucci, interview by Stephen Knott, Phillip Zelikow, and Don Oberborfer, Charlottesville, VA, 28 Aug 2001, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 18 (quotes).

19. Carlucci interview, 12 Apr 1989, 10 (quote); William Safire, “Hello, Mr. Deeds,” *New York Times*, 24 Jun 1982 (quote).

20. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 177. Résumé and comments on Orr, Office of the President-Elect, no folder designation, box 2, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records.

21. Hedrich Smith, *The Power Game: How Washington Works* (New York: Random House, 1988), 187–189; résumé and comments on Lehman (quote), Office of the President-Elect, no folder designation, box 2, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records. For Lehman’s account of how he got the job, see John F. Lehman Jr., *Command of the Seas* (New York, Scribner, 1988), 103–112.

22. Résumé and comments on Marsh, Office of the President-Elect, no folder designation, box 2, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records.

23. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 35; résumé and comments on Iklé (quote), Office of the President-Elect, no folder designation, box 2, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records; Fred C. Iklé, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, Washington, DC, 6 Mar 1995, OSD/HO, 1–8. Allen was so high on Iklé that he recommend him as deputy secretary of state or defense to Reagan; Allen to Reagan, memo, n.d. [7 Jan 1981], folder OMB position paper, box I:575, Transition Papers, 1980–1981, Weinberger Papers.

24. Richard Armitage, interview by Ronald Granieri and Joel Christenson, Arlington, VA, 25 Feb 2014, OSD/HO, 10 (quote); Joel C. Christenson, *ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs: A Brief History* (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 2014), 33–37.

25. Roger R. Trask and John P. Glennon, eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Organization and Mission, 1978–2003* (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 2008), 1; Christenson, *ISA*, 34.

26. Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control* (New York: Knopf, 1984), 15–16 (quotes on 15); résumé and comments on Perle, Office of the President-Elect, no folder designation, box 2, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records.

27. Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 17.

28. Armitage interview, 25 Feb 2014, 7–8 (quotes); Iklé interview, 6 Mar 1995, 9, 11, (quotes).

29. Christenson, *ISA*, 34–37; Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 37–38, 44–52, 54–55, 106, 108–109.

30. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 291–293. Thayer resigned when he was indicted for insider trading before becoming deputy secretary. He was found guilty of obstruction of justice and served a prison sentence.

31. Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey*, with Joseph E. Persico (New York: Random House, 1995), 279–281.

32. Peter Hannaford, interview by Stephen Knott and Russell Riley, Charlottesville, VA, 10 Jan 2003, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 33; Weinberger to Reagan, letter, 16 Dec 1980, folder 3, Inauguration Matters, box I:573, Weinberger Papers (quote).

33. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 10–11 (quote); Caspar Weinberger, interview by Stephen Knott and Russel Riley, Washington, DC, 19 Nov 2002, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 38, 32–33, 36 (quotes); Lou Cannon, *President Reagan*, 148 (quotes).

34. Michael Deaver, interview by James Sterling Young, Stephen Knott, Russell Riley, Charles O. Jones, and Edwin Hargrove, Washington, DC, 12 Sep 2002, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 53–54 (quotes).

35. Smith, *Power Game*, 313–320; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 49–51.

36. For critical contemporary assessments of Meese's place in the administration, see Laurence I. Barrett, *Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1983), 94–106 and Smith, *Power Game*, 313–320. Meese's own rosy account is in Edwin Meese III, *With Reagan: The Inside Story* (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 79–81. Meese also noted that he and his friend and fellow Reaganite Weinberger were on the same wavelength on defense spending and found themselves victims of administration leaks by those who wanted the president to be more "realistic" and "effective" and less conservative. Meese, *With Reagan*, 66, 107.

37. Rothkopf, *Running the World*, 215; Buchanan quoted in Cannon, *President Reagan*, 503–504.

38. Among the many descriptions of this arrangement, and its significance, see Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 144–153. Pipes especially describes Allen's insecurity vis-à-vis both his superiors and his staff, and its impact on the work of the NSC. Haig notes in his memoirs that people, including him, viewed Allen as "irrelevant" in policymaking. Alexander M. Haig Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 85.

39. For the details, see "Allen, Richard Vincent," in Peter B. Levy, *Encyclopedia of the Reagan-Bush Years* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996), 16–17.

40. Weinberger quoted in Paul Kengor and Patricia Clark Doerner, *The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan's Top Hand* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2007), 17; James A. Baker III, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, Washington, DC, 4 Nov 1999, OSD/HO, 4 (quote).

41. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 149 (quote).

42. Stockman, *Triumph of Politics*, 301; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 48–49 (quotes).

43. On the broad relationship between State and Defense, see most recently Stephen

Glain, *State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America's Empire* (New York: Broadway, 2011). On DCI Casey, of particular importance for this study is Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987). See also Persico, *Casey*.

44. Baker interview, 4 Nov 1999, 4–5 (quote on 4). Lou Cannon describes Nixon's memorandum dated November 17, 1980, the role of the Kitchen Cabinet, and Reagan's own preferences for Haig in *President Reagan*, 56–60.

45. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 29 (quote); Martin Anderson, *Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 307. Emphasis in original (quote).

46. Weinberger, memo for the record, subj: Meeting held on January 20, 1981, Ed Meese's office, folder 5 OMB position paper, box I:573, Weinberger Papers; Carlucci interview, 28 Aug 2001, 13 (quote); Haig, *Caveat*, 75–76; 83–84.

47. Carlucci interview, 28 Aug 2001, 13–14 (quotes).

48. Haig, *Caveat*, 65–67, 92, 206–307; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 165–170.

49. Haig, *Caveat*, 77 (quote), 86–88 (quote on 87).

50. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 259 (quote), 197 (quote).

51. George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 144 (quotes).

52. For detailed discussions of the assassination attempt, see Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 81–99 (based on his official memorandum on the events of the day); as well as Deaver, *Behind the Scenes*, 15–34; Anderson, *Revolution*, 314–315; and Barret, *Gambling with History*, 107–125. Morris, *Dutch*, 427–433.

53. Deaver interview, 12 Sep 2002, 51–52 (quotes); Barret, *Gambling with History*, 124–125; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 90–91.

54. Allen has not published memoirs, but he did publish an article based on his recordings of discussions in the Situation Room. See Richard V. Allen, "The Day Reagan Was Shot," *Atlantic* (Apr 2001), 64.

55. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 82–83, 85–92. Weinberger recounts in his diary for March 30, 1981: "Ed Meese at hospital—President about to go undergo surgery. National Command Authority devolves on me. Called General Jones—raising alert on SAC bomber crews to restrict [them] to their Alert Bldgs. No need to get NEACAP [sic. Weinberger means NEACP, the National Emergency Airborne Command Post] in air yet. Good to go [?] within 11 minutes or less. Haig: he didn't want any alert declared—I told him I had ordered SAC crews to higher state of readiness under NCA (National Command Authority. H[aig] said better read the constitution." Weinberger diary, folder 1, box 1, Appointment Files and Diary Notes, Dec 80–Jun 1981, Weinberger Papers. For Haig's account of their exchanges on alert status that day, see Haig, *Caveat*, 155–157, 160–161.

56. Haig, *Caveat*, 160 (quote).

57. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 97.

58. DoD Directive 5100.30 was attached to Taft to Weinberger, memo, 1 Apr 1981, Folder 2, Correspondence Personal 1981, box I:595, Weinberger Papers.

59. Steven L. Rearden, *Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991* (Washington, DC: NDU Press for the Joint History Office, 2012), 422–423; Richard Halloran, “Reagan’s Choice: To Keep or Dismiss Top General,” *New York Times*, 26 Jan 1981, A20.

60. Nixon to Weinberger, letter, 8 Jan 1981; Weinberger to Nixon, letter, 15 Jan 1981: both in folder 2, Correspondence Personal 1981, box I:595, Weinberger Papers; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 27 Jan 1981, folder Joint Chiefs of Staff (01/23/1981–03/09/1981), RAC box 4, Agency File, Executive Secretariat NSC, Records 1981–1985, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter Reagan Library); Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 293 (quote); Steven L. Rearden, *Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1981–1984* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of CJCS, 2007), 6–8; Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 293.

61. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 293 (quote); Rearden, *Council of War*, 423–425.

62. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “He Makes America Strong,” *Readers Digest*, Jun 1985, 131).

63. Weinberger interview, 19 Nov 2002, 24 (quotes).

64. *Ibid.*, 30 (quotes).

65. Robert C. McFarlane, interview by Donald Oberdorfer, folder 22, I-7 and IV-15, box 2, Don Oberdorfer Papers, Princeton University Library, I-7, I-8 (McFarlane quoting Cohen on I-7, McFarlane quote on I-8); Carlucci interview, 28 Aug 2001, 15.

66. Weinberger interview, 19 Nov 2002 (quotes).

67. Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, 20 Jan 1981, *Reagan Public Papers 1981*, 2 (quotes).

3. The Buildup Budgets: Fiscal Years 1981, 1982, and 1983

1. Reagan, *An American Life*, 235 (quote).

2. Weinberger interview, 19 Nov 2002, 7.

3. Walter S. Mossberg, “Hard Choices on Defense Spending Begin Now,” *Wall Street Journal*, 21 Jan 1981, 26; Donald B. Holt, “A Defense Budget for the 1980s,” 26 Jan 1981, *Fortune*, 52–56. The congressional staffer’s plan, “A Program for Military Independence,” envisioned by 1985 doubling production of certain combat aircraft, armored vehicles, and warships while expanding U.S. ground forces by five ground divisions, four combat wings, and nine tactical air wings. The additional cost of the program for the FY 1981 alone would be just over \$37 billion. *CQ Almanac* 37 (1981):192.

4. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 44–47; *CQ Almanac* 37 (1981):352–353; DoD paper, [Feb 1981?], “The Need for a 7% Annual Real growth in the Defense Program,” folder 1981 Budget, Set A, box I:CL 625, Subject File, Weinberger Papers.

5. *CQ Almanac* 37 (1981):352–353. For Carter’s MX decisions, see Keefer, *Harold Brown*, chapter 8, MX decision section.

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10. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, chapter 2, 1st two sections.

11. Stockman, *Triumph of Politics*, 114 (quotes).

12. *Ibid.*, 112–118

13. *Ibid.*, 114–119 (quote on 119).

14. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 49 (quotes).

15. *Ibid.*, 50; Caspar Weinberger, news briefing, 4 Mar 1981, *Weinberger Public Statements* 1981, 2:717–718 (quotes); DoD News Release 77–81, 4 Mar 1981, *ibid.*, 2:742–744.

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17. DoD Press Release 80–81, 6 Mar 1981, *Weinberger Public Statements* 1981, 2:755–758; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 56–57 (quote).

18. Smith, *Power Game*, 347–348.

19. Stockman, *Triumph of Politics*, 306–312; Meese, *With Reagan*, 178 (quote).

20. Stockman, *Triumph of Politics*, 312–318 (quote); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 37 (quote); Meese, *With Reagan*, 178.

21. Stockman, *Triumph of Politics*, 318–324 (quote); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 38.

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28. Addabbo quoted in *CQ Almanac* 37 (1981):317.
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34. Reagan to Weinberger, memo, 17 Mar 1981 (quote), folder Department of Defense (2/4/1981–4/20/1981), Executive Secretariat, NSC, Agency Files, RAC box 2, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 24 Mar 1981, folder 160.1 (100.00-999.99), 1981, box 27, Acc 330-84-0002, OSD Records.
35. Orr to Weinberger, memo transmitting Air Force 1983–1987 POM, folder 15 Jun 1981, 100.54 (15 Jun) 1981 POMs, box 28; Weinberger to service secretaries et al., memo transmitting the FY 1983–1987 Defense Planning Guidance and the Fiscal Guidance of 18 May 1981, 10 Jun 1981, folder 100.54 (Jun) 1981, box 29: both in Acc 330-83-0102, OSD Records.
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37. Marsh to Weinberger, memo, 15 Jun 1981, transmitting the Army POM, 15 Apr 1981, folder 100.54 (15 Jun) 1981 POMs, box 28, Acc 330-83-0102, OSD Records; Weinberger to service secretaries et al., 10 Jun 1981.
38. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 25 Jan 1982, folder Department of Defense (2/1/1982–2/11/1982) (quotes); Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 16 Dec 1982, folder Department of Defense (12/6/1982–1/6/1983): both in box RAC 2, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Agency File, Reagan Library; “NSDD 12: Strategic Forces Modernization Program,” 1 Oct 1981, folder NSDD 12, RAC box 1, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Agency File, Reagan Library; Helms through Boverie to Clark, memo, 17 Dec 1982, folder

Budget, Defense (7/29/1982–12/28/1982), box 20, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library (quotes).

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40. Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1983, n.d., in Weinberger *Public Statements* 1982, 1:208–331 (quote); Caspar W. Weinberger, Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress, 8 Feb 1982, *ibid.*, 415–742 (see especially the charts at 424 and 425).

41. Charles W. Corddry, “Defense Tries to Defuse Critics, but Flak Comes from Right, Left,” *Baltimore Sun*, 9 Feb 1982, 10 (quote); Charles Mohr, “Carlucci Calls Military Budget More ‘Honest,’” *New York Times*, 9 Feb 1982, B-13.

42. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 19 Feb 1982, folder 02/19/1982, RAC box 2, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library (quotes).

43. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 5 Apr 1982, folder Budget, Defense (11/20/1981–04/09/1982), box 20, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Records, 1981–1985, Reagan Library (quotes).

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45. *Ibid.*, 77–78.

46. *Ibid.*, 78

47. *Ibid.*, 78–81.

48. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 20 Aug 1982, folder 08/20/1982, RAC box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library (quotes); Helm through Boverie to Clark, memo, 18 Aug 1982, folder Budget, Defense (07/29/1982–12/28/1982), box 20, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Records, 1981–1985, Reagan Library (quotes).

49. Weinberger press conference, 22 Nov 1982, *Weinberger Public Statements* 1982, 4:2787–2790; Ronald Reagan, “Statement on Deployment of the MX Missile,” 22 Nov 1982, *Reagan Public Papers* 1982, 2:1502–1503; “Dense Pack,” *Weapons and Warfare*, 24 Nov 2015, <https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2015/11/24/dense-pack>.

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51. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 23 Dec 1982, folder 12/23/1982, RAC box 4, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library (quote); *CQ Almanac* 38 (1982):277.

52. *Ibid.*

53. Reagan to Tower, letter, 9 May 1982, folder 1982 Budget, DoD, box I:CL 673, Subject File, Weinberger Papers (quote); Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 16 Dec 1982 (quote).

54. Weinberger News Conference, 30 Dec 1982, *Weinberger Public Statements 1982*, 4:3055–3056 (quote).

55. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 30 Dec 1982, folder 020 USP, Acc 330-84-0002, OSD Records (quotes).

4. Confronting the Soviets: Estimates of Military Power, Crisis in Poland, and Reassessments of Technology Transfer and Trade Embargoes

1. Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, *The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 156–158.

2. “Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities, 1971–1980: A Dollar Cost Comparison,” Research Paper SR 81-1005, Jan 1981, (quotes); Maj. Lance W. Lord to Weinberger, memo, 19 Feb 1981; Marshall to Weinberger, 6 Mar 1981 (quotes): both in folder USSR 000.1-USSR 299, 1981, box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

3. Marshall to Weinberger, memo, 6 Mar 1981; Chu to Weinberger, memo, 23 Oct 1981: both in folder USSR 000.1-USSR 299, 1981, box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

4. Marshall to Carlucci, note, 9 Feb 1981 (quote), with attached letter from Herbert Goldhamer to Marshall, Jul 1977, folder USSR 092 (Jan–Apr), 1981, box 29, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

5. Paul Nitze, memo, 4 May 1981, “Introduction: Defining the Problem,” attached to Casey to Weinberger, letter, 8 May 1981; Stillwell to Weinberger, memo, 15 May 1981; Nitze to Casey, letter, 30 Nov 1981; Casey to Weinberger, letter, 21 Dec 1981: all in folder USSR 300-399, 1981, box 29, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

6. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 22 Sep 1981, folder USSR 320.2 (1 Sep–23 Sep) 1981, box 30; Weinberger to Haig, letter, 27 Aug 1981, folder USSR 320.2 (Jan–Aug) 1981, box 30: both in Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Bobby Inman objected to the release of satellite imagery in the unclassified presentation to European official audiences on the grounds that DoD would not be providing such photography to U.S. media. The CIA offered schematic illustrations of sensitive weapon systems. This practice continued in the publication of *Soviet Military Power*. Stillwell to Carlucci, memo, 10 Jul 1981; Carlucci to Iman, letter, 13 Jul 1981: both in folder USSR 453, 1981, box 31, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

7. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 11 Jun 1981, with Weinberger comment, folder USSR 320.2 (Jan–Aug), 1981, box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quote); Rumsfeld to Weinberger, letter, 23 Jul 1981 (quote); Weinberger to Rumsfeld, 4 Aug 1981: both in folder USSR 320.2 (Jan–Aug), 1981, box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records. *Soviet Military Power* has been dismissed as one-sided propaganda that did not acknowledge past errors in estimates of Soviet military strength. See Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994),

48, 507 fn 10. What has not been assessed is the impact the annual publications had on public opinion.

8. Richard X. Larkin to Jay Rixse, memos, 1 and 2 Sep 1981; Rixse to Larkin, 3 Sep 1981: all in folder USSR 320.2 (Jan–Aug), 1981, box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981).

9. Weinberger to Carlucci, Perle, et al., memo, 14 Aug 1981, folder USSR 320.2 (Jan–Aug) 1981, box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Rixse to James Williams, memos, 1 Sep 1981; Rixse to Weinberger and Carlucci, 2 Sep 1981; question and answer press kit for Weinberger, 29 Sep 1981: all in folder USSR 320.2 (1 Sep–23 Sep) 1981, box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

10. Michael Hughes to Weinberger, memo, 24 Nov 1981; Weinberger to Williams, letter, 30 Nov 1981 (quote): both in folder USSR 320.2 (Nov–Dec) 1981, box 29, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Wick to Weinberger, letter, 13 Oct 1981; Weinberger to Wick, letter, 23 Oct 1981 (quote); Wick to Weinberger, letter, 27 Oct 1981 (quote): all in box 30, folder USSR (Oct) 1981, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

11. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 11; Caspar Weinberger, “Preface,” in *Soviet Military Power* 1981, 2–3.

12. Bernard Gwertzman, “Pentagon Plans to Publish Study Describing Soviet Armed Strength,” 1; Leslie H. Gleb, “Soviet Might: A U.S. View,” 1: both in *New York Times*, 27 Sep 1981.

13. Questions and answers press kit on *Soviet Military Power*, seen by Weinberger on 19 Sep 1981, folder USSR 320.2, box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Weinberger Press Conference with Henry B. Catto, 29 Sep 1981, *Weinberger Public Statements* 1981, 4:2831–2839; Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1983* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982).

14. Frank Carlucci, “Preface” in *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), 5.

15. Leslie Gelb, “Soviet Might: A U.S. View”; Levin to Weinberger, letter, 30 Sep 1981, folder USSR 320.2 (24 Sep–31 Sep) 1981 (quotes); Carlucci to Levin, letter, 21 Oct 1981, folder USSR 320.2 (Oct) 1981 (quote): both in box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

16. Weinberger press conference, 29 Sep 1981, *Weinberger Public Statements* 1981, 4:2836 (quotes).

17. Andrew Cockburn, “Weinberger Statistics,” *New York Times*, 26 Oct 1981, 23 (quote); Williams to Weinberger, memo enclosing a DIA analysis of Cockburn article, 26 Oct 1981, folder USSR 320.2 (Oct) 1981, box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Fred Kaplan, “Inside the Soviet Threat,” *Inquiry*, 23 Nov 1981, 8–11 (quotes), with comment by Weinberger (quote). In 1987, one of the Pentagon’s most determined and well-informed critics, Tom Gervasi, published a book that highlighted what he considered every exaggeration and misrepresentation of *Soviet Military Power*. Tom Gervasi, *Soviet Military Power: The Pentagon’s Propaganda Document Annotated and Corrected* (New York: Vintage, 1988).

18. Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 191.

19. Raymond L. Garthoff, “Estimating Soviet Military Intentions,” in Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, *Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union* (Langley, VA: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003), 13–14, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/article05.html>.

20. Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 504, 543, 538.

21. Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, 43, 73, 79–80; David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy* (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 62–63.

22. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 270–272; Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, 52–53; Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 54–56, 98–100.

23. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 266–270.

24. Gates, 270–271; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 18 Nov 1983, folder 11/23/1983, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, Reagan Library (quotes); Hoffman, *Dead Hand*, 95–96; Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, 52–53.

25. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 271–273; Hoffman, *The Dead Hand*, 54–56, 98–100.

26. Kengor and Doerner, *Judge*, 141–151; “NSSD 11-82: U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Union,” 21 Aug 1982, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988*, vol. 3, *Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983*, ed. James Graham Wilson (Washington, DC: GPO, 2016), 670–673 (doc 204).

27. “Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interagency Group on U.S.-Soviet Relations,” 6 Dec 1982, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:820–822 (doc 249).

28. Minutes of 16 Dec 1982 NSC meeting, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:833–837 (doc 253), (quotes).

29. “NSDD 75: U.S. Relations with the USSR,” 17 Jan 1982, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:861–869 (doc 260).

30. Minutes of Special Coordinating Committee Meeting, 23 Oct 1980, document 110506; Brzezinski to Carter, memos, 12 Dec and 19 Dec 1980, documents 110495 and 100496 (quotes): all in Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive, <http://www.margaret-thatcher.org/document/110506>, document/110496, and document/110496, respectively.

31. Haig to Reagan, memo, 17 Feb 1981, folder Poland (Jan–Mar) 1981; Kramer to Weinberger, memo, 24 Feb 1981, folder Poland (Jan–Mar) 1981; Kramer to Weinberger, memo, 17 Feb 1981, folder Poland (Apr–11 Dec) 1981; DoD Talking Paper for Carlucci, 10 Dec 1981, folder Poland (Apr–11 Dec) 1981; all in box 22, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Schweitzer to Nance, memo, 28 Mar 1981, folder Poland (3/28/1981–4/2/1981), box 16, Country File, Poland, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Reagan Library; Haig, *Caveat*, 45–46.

32. Perle to Weinberger, memo, 18 Dec 1981, folder Poland (12 Dec–31 Dec) 1981, box 22, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

33. Minutes of NSC meeting, 21 Dec 1981, in Jason Saltoun-Ebin, ed., *The Reagan Files*, vol. 2, *Inside the National Security Council* (Lexington, KY: 2012), 85–86 (Reagan quote on 85, Weinberger's on 86).

34. Minutes of NSC meetings, 22 and 23 Dec 1981, in Saltoun-Ebin, *Reagan Files*, 2:91–106 (Weinberger's quote is on 94).

35. "Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union," 29 Dec 1981, *Reagan Public Papers 1981*, 1209; Nance to Haig, Regan, Weinberger, et al., memo, 29 Dec 1981, folder Poland (12 Dec–31 Dec) 1981, box 22, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Nance to Reagan, memo, 19 Dec 1981, folder Poland (12/21/1981), box 17, Country File, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Reagan Library.

36. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 237–239, 465–466. For an examination of the United States, Soviet Union, and Poland during the first Reagan term, see Robert Service, *The End of the Cold War, 1985–1991* (New York: Public Affairs, 2015), 65–76.

37. "NSDD 54: United States Policy toward Eastern Europe," 2 Sep 1981, folder NSDD 54, RAC box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library. For explanations of the end of the Cold War, see Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*; Service, *End of the Cold War*; James Mann, *Rebellion of Ronald Reagan*; Jack F. Matlock Jr, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2005); and Gordon S. Barrass, *The Great Cold War: A Journey through the Hall of Mirrors* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

38. Germond and Witcover, *Blue Smoke and Mirrors*, 230. All of these issues fell under the Reagan administration's study of East-West trade, which limped its way through the bureaucracy during 1981. Iklé to Carlucci, memo, 20 May 1981; Bremer to Allen, memo, 26 Jun 1981: both in folder USSR 092 (May–Jun) 1981, box 29, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

39. Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) to Carlucci, letter, 9 Jun 1981; Charles H. Percy (R-IL) to Carlucci, letter, 26 May 1981: both in folder USSR 091.31 (Jan–Aug) 1981, box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

40. Kramer to Weinberger, memo, 17 Feb 1981, folder USSR 091.31 Jan–Aug 1981, box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

41. D. O. Cooke to Carlucci, memo, 14 Jul 6 1981, *ibid.*

42. Haig, Weinberger, Baldrige, and Brock to Reagan, memo, 18 Jul 1981; Talking Points for the President at the Ottawa Summit, n.d.: both in folder USSR 091.31 (Jan–Aug) 1981, box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records. Not until October 1982 did COCOM begin its first major review of strategic items. Iklé reported that COCOM had agreed to control technology related to printed circuit boards. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 9 Oct 1982, folder 091.31 (Oct–Nov) 1982, box 25, Acc 330-84-0002, OSD Records.

43. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 28 Jul 1981, folder USSR 091.31 (Jan–Aug) 1981 (quote); Baldrige to Weinberger, letter, [10 Dec 1981], folder USSR 091.31 (Sep–Dec) 1981: both in

Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Caspar Weinberger, “Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union,” *Wall Street Journal*, 12 Jan 1982, 32; Cropsey to Weinberger, memo, 21 Dec 1981, folder USSR 091.31 (Sep–Dec) 1981, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Major Rand C. Lewis, “COCOM: An International Attempt to Control Technology,” *DISAM Journal* 13, no. 1 (Fall 1990):66–73. In October 1982 COCOM—with the exception of Japan—agreed to control electronic grade silicon. See Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 9 Oct 1982.

44. Fuller to Haig, Weinberger, Secretary of Agriculture John Block, and Baldrige, memo, 16 Feb 1981, folder USSR 430 1981, box 31, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 4–5 (quote on 5).

45. Kramer to Weinberger, memo, 3 Feb 1981; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 1 Apr 1981: both in folder USSR 430 1981, box 31, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

46. Allen to Bush, Haig, Regan, Weinberger et al., memo, 23 Jul 1981, *ibid*.

47. Allen to Weinberger, memo, 29 May 1981; Weinberger to Allen, memo, 18 Jun 1981: both in folder USSR 091.31 (Jan–Aug) 1981, box 28, *ibid*; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 135.

48. Talking Points for the President at the Ottawa Summit, n.d., folder USSR 430, box 31, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Declaration Issued at the Conclusion of the Ottawa Economic Summit Conference, 21 Jul 1981, *Reagan Public Papers 1981*, 649 (quotes).

49. Minutes of 6 Jul 1981 NSC meeting, in Saltoun-Ebin, *Reagan Files*, 2:25, 27 (quote); Allen to Haig and Weinberger, memo, 6 Jul 1981, folder USSR 091.31 (Jan–Aug) 1981, box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quote).

50. Haig to Reagan, memo, 8 Jul 1981 (quotes); Bremer to Allen, memo, 8 Jul 1981; Rixse to Weinberger, note, 8 Jul 1981: all in folder USSR 091.31 (Jan–Aug) 1981, box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

51. Weinberger to Allen, memo with attachment “U.S. Policy on the West Siberian Pipeline,” 8 Jul 1981, (quote); Casey to NSC participants, memo, 9 Jul 1981; both *ibid*.

52. Minutes of 9 Jul 1981 NSC meeting, folder NSC 00016, box SR-99, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

53. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 13 Jul 1981; Weinberger to Reagan, 14 Jul 1981: both in folder USSR 091.31 (Jan–Aug) 1981, box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

54. Weinberger comment on Smith note to Iklé and DeLauer, 23 Apr 1981 (quote); Carlucci to Baldrige, 12 Jun 1981 (quotes): both *ibid*.

55. Meese to Baldrige, memo, 28 Jul 1981; Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 28 Jul 1981: both *ibid*; Nance to Baldrige, memo, 11 Dec 1982, folder USSR 091.31 (Sep–Dec) 1981, box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

56. Carlucci to Reagan, memo, 28 Aug 1981, folder USSR 091.31 (Jan–Aug) 1981 (quote); Casey to Reagan, Bush, Haig, Weinberger et al., memo, 29 Oct 1981, folder USSR 091.31 (Sep–Dec) 1981: both in box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

57. Minutes of NSC Meeting, 16 Oct 1981, folder NSC 00023, box SR-100, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

58. Stephen D. Bryen to Rixse, memo with attachment draft State paper on controls

on exports to the USSR of oil and gas equipment and technology, 9 Nov 1981; Perle to Weinberger through Iklé with draft letter from Weinberger to Reagan, 31 Oct 1981 (quotes); Perle to Weinberger through Iklé, memo with draft letter from Weinberger to Reagan, 31 Oct 1981: all in folder USSR 091.31 (Sep–Dec) 1981, box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

59. “Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union Concerning Its Involvement in Poland,” 29 Dec 1981.

60. Weinberger to Clark, memo, 27 Jan 1982, folder USSR 091.31 (Jan–Mar) 1982, box 26, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Perle to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 3 Feb 1982, folder 334 NSC, box 2, Acc 330-86-0042, OSD Records.

61. Minutes of National Security Council meeting, 4 Feb 1982, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:482 (doc 141).

62. Minutes of NSC meeting, 26 Feb 1981, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:490–495 (doc 145); memorandum of conversation with Reagan, 25 Mar 1981, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:504–510 (doc 152).

63. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 136; Reagan quoted in summary of 18 Jun 1982 NSC meeting, Saltoun-Ebin, *Reagan Files*, 2:155–156 (quote); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entry 18 Jun 1982, 89 (quote); Statement on the Extension of U.S. Sanctions on the Export of Oil and Gas Equipment to the Soviet Union, 18 Jun 1982, *Reagan Public Papers 1982*, 1:798.

64. Reagan, Thatcher, et al., memorandum of conversation, 23 Jun 1982, Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/145054> (quote); Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 21 Jul 1982 (quotes), folder Department of Defense, (7/1/82–7/20/82), Agency File, box RAC 2; Clark to Shultz, Regan, Weinberger et al., memo, 1 Sep 1982, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:679–681 (doc 208); Haig, *Caveat*, 241–256; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 138–139.

65. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 136–145 (quote on 141); minutes of NSC meeting, 9 Nov 1982 (quotes), *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:779 (doc 232).

66. “NSDD 66: East-West Relations and Poland-Related Sanctions,” 29 Nov 1982, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:812–814 (doc 246).

5. Weinberger and Soviet-American Nuclear Arms Reduction Negotiations

1. Reagan’s radio essays, called *Viewpoint*, were virtually all written by him. They were syndicated to 286 radio stations. In addition, Reagan published biweekly columns, which were mostly drafted for him, in 226 newspapers. Reagan estimated he reached 20 million Americans a week. Ronald Reagan, *Reagan, In His Own Hand*, ed. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Graebner Anderson, and Martin Anderson (New York: Free Press, 2001), xiv–xv, 91 (quote). For the selection of SALT II–related radio essays, see 62–63, 73–99.

2. Weinberger comment in conversation with Clare Boothe Luce, quoted in William F. Buckley Jr., *The Reagan I Knew* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 190.

3. Kenneth Adelman, interview by Jeff Chidester, Stephen F. Knott, and Robert Strong, Arlington, VA, 30 Sep 2003, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 38 (quote).

4. Kramer to Weinberger, memo, 26 Jan 1981, folder USSR 092 (Jan–Apr 1981), box 29, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

5. Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 16–17; Christenson, *ISA*, 34.

6. Iklé to Rixse, memo of 15 Sep 1981 with attached memo from Eagleburger to Blair, Wolfowitz, and Burt dated 10 Sep 1981 and attached draft of the letter, folder USSR 092 (Jan–Apr 1981), box 29, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Haig to Reagan, memo with revised draft letter approved by Reagan, 18 Sep 1981, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:252–255 (doc 85); Brezhnev to Reagan, letter, 15 Oct 1981, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:316–319 (doc 93); Allen to Reagan, memo attaching draft letter to Brezhnev, with the president’s marginalia and extensive revisions, 16 Nov 1981, folder USSR 092 (Sep–Dec 1981), box 28, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records. The revised letter as sent on 17 Nov is in *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:353–356 (doc 103).

7. Minutes of 6 Feb 1981 NSC meeting, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:37–41 (doc 15).

8. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* 1981, 27; Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 466–471; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 940–942.

9. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 473–475.

10. Perle to Weinberger, memo, 23 Nov 1981, attaching a précis of a memorandum from Rostow for Reagan, 16 Oct 1981, folder USSR 388.3 (8 Oct–Dec), box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

11. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 336–338. According to the former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, “Soviet specialists believed their [Pershing IIs’] range was greater than the United States claimed—that it was closer to 2,500 kilometers rather than the 1,500 kilometers the U.S. (accurately) claimed.” Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 39.

12. Minutes of NSC meeting, 13 Oct 1981, folder NSC 00023, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Meeting Files, Reagan Library.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Weinberger’s handwritten notes on meeting in White House, 5 Nov 1981, folder USSR 388.3 (8 Oct) 1981, box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records. Weinberger reinforced this advice in a memorandum to the president: Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 20 Oct 1981, folder Arms Control: 1981–1983 (3), box 1, Iklé Papers, Reagan Library.

15. *Ibid.*; minutes of NSC meeting, 12 Nov 1981, folder NSC 00025, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Meeting Files, Reagan Library (quotes).

16. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 18 Nov 1981 entry, 50 (quote); Nance to Reagan, memo, 11 Dec 1981, reprinted by Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110635> (quote).

17. Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 52–55.

18. Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear

Weapons, 18 Nov 1981, *Reagan Public Papers 1981*, 1065 (quote); Bremer to Sanford et al., memo, 19 Jan 1982; Clark to Haig, memo, Weinberger, and Rostow, 23 Jan 1982: both in folder NATO 471.61 (Jan–Mar 1982), box 17, Sec Def Files. Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

19. Perle to Weinberger, memo attaching Jon A. Woodworth's 6 Apr 1982 memo to Perle, 26 Apr 1982, folder NATO 471.61 (Jan–Mar 1982), box 17, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

20. Paul H. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost, At the Center of Decision: A Memoir*, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 376–385.

21. Perle to Weinberger, memo with Iklé's marginal comments attaching a draft memo for the president, 12 Aug 1982 (quote in marginal comments); Perle to Weinberger, memo, 20 Aug 1982: both in folder NATO 471.61 (Apr–Dec 1982), box 17, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

22. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 20 Aug 1982; JCS to Clark through Weinberger, memo, 13 Aug 1982: both *ibid*.

23. Carlucci to Weinberger in Egypt, msg A-21, 3 Sep 1982, folder NATO 471.61, box 2, Acc 330-86-0041, OSD Records.

24. "NSDD 56: Private INF Exchange," 15 Sep 1982, folder NSC00056, RAC box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Reagan Library (quotes); Rostow to Shultz, Weinberger, et al., memo, 5 Oct 1982, folder NATO 471.61 (Apr–Dec 1982), box 17, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

25. "Soviet Strategy to Derail US INF Deployment," intelligence assessment, Feb 1983, folder NATO 471.61 (Jan–Mar 1983), box 20, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Casey to Reagan, memo, 22 Nov 1982, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 3:801–804 (doc 242).

26. Minutes of NSPG Meeting, 13 Jan 1983, folder NSPG 0050, box 91306, Executive Secretariat, NSC Files, NSPG Meetings, Reagan Library (quotes).

27. "NSDD 86: U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations," 23 Mar 1983, folder NSC00086, RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Reagan Library (quote); Remarks Announcing a Proposed Interim Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reduction Agreement, 30 Mar 1983, *Reagan Public Papers 1983*, 1:473–474.

28. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 271.

29. Clark to Reagan, undated memo, [mid-Jul 1983], folder Arms Control (7/7/1983–7/20/1983) box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 18 Aug 1983, folder NATO 471.61 (Jul–Oct 1983), Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

30. "NSDD 104: U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations—II," 21 Sep 1983, folder NSC00104, RAC box 6, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Reagan Library (quote).

31. Perle to Weinberger, memo, 7 Nov 1983 (quote); Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 7 Nov 1983 (quote): both in folder NATO 461.61 (Nov–Dec 1981), box 20, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

32. These SALT II deficiencies were highlighted by Reagan in his “Viewpoint” radio address, see Ronald Reagan, ed. Skinner et al., *Reagan, In His Own Hand*, 62–63, 73–99.

33. Reagan, ed. Skinner et al., *Reagan, In His Own Hand*, 63 (quote); Qs and As on USG SALT Review, attached to Burt memo of 23 Mar 1981 to Perle et al., folder USSR 388.3 (Jan–Mar 1981); JCSM-365-81 to Sec Def, 4 Nov 1981, folder USSR 388.3 (8 Oct–Dec 1981): both in box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

34. Weinberger to Moynihan, letter, 21 Jun 1982, folder USSR 388.3 (May 1982), box 28, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

35. Smith, *Power Game*, 557–558.

36. Minutes of NSC Meeting, 22 May 1981, box SR-99, NSC 00090, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council (quotes).

37. Taft to Rixse, memo, 30 May 1981, folder USSR 388.3 (7 Apr–Oct) 1981, box 30, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 222–223.

38. Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reductions and Nuclear Weapons, 18 Nov 1981, *Reagan Public Papers 1981*, 1066 (quotes); Haig, *Caveat*, 222; Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 223; Smith, *Power Game*, 585.

39. “NSSD 3-83: U.S. Policy and Negotiating Position for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks,” 3 Mar 1982, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988*, vol. 11, *START I, July 1981–January 1985* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2021), 14–16 (doc 6); Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 5 Apr 1982, folder USSR 388.3 (Jan–20 Apr 1982), box 28, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quotes); Edward L. Rowny, *It Takes One to Tango* (New York: Brassey’s US, 1992), 152–153.

40. Minutes, NSC Meeting, 21 Apr 1982, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 11:27–34 (doc 8).

41. Handwritten minutes of NSC Meeting, 3 May 1982, *ibid* (quote), 41–43 (doc 13); Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 263–266.

42. Weinberger to White House, msg 05945Z, May 1982, folder USSR 388.3, box 1, Acc 330-86-0042, OSD Records (quotes).

43. *Reagan Public Papers 1982*, 1:585.

44. “NSDD 33: U.S. Approach to START Negotiations,” 14 May 1982, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 11:63–65 (doc 19); Wheeler to Bremer et al., memo, 29 Jun 1982, folder USSR 388.3 (22–30 June, 1982), box 27; Michael O. Wheeler to Rowny et al., memo, 8 Jun 1982, folder USSR 388.3 9 (1–21 Jun 1982), box 28: both in Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1988), 165, Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 268–271.

45. Mobbs to Weinberger, memos, 18 Aug and 25 Aug 1982; Rowny to State 1433, message, 21 Aug 1982: all in folder USSR 388.3 (Aug 1982), box 27, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

46. Mobbs to Weinberger, memo, 9 Dec 1982, folder USSR 388.3 (3 Nov 1982), *ibid*.

47. Talking points for Weinberger for 25 January NSC meeting, folder 334 NSC (Jan–Mar 1983), box 38, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records; minutes of NSC meeting, 25 Jan

1983, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 11:163–173 (doc 49) (quote), “NSDD 78: U.S. Approach to START Negotiations–V,” 1 Feb 1983, *FRUS, 1981–1988*, 11:196–200 (doc 53) (quote).

48. Mobbs to Weinberger through Iklé and Perle, memo, 7 Apr 1983, folder USSR 388.3 (1–12 Apr 1983), box 28, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

49. Robert M. Kimmitt, NSC executive secretary, to Gregg et al., memo with attached undated papers “OSD Position on START” and “OSD Approach to the START Negotiations,” 6 Jun 1983; Iklé to Clark, memo, 4 Jun 1982: both in folder 334 NSC, (Jun 1983), box 38, *ibid.*; “NSDD 98: U.S. Approach to START Negotiations,” 14 Jun 1983, *FRUS, 1981–1988*, 11:250–253 (doc 71).

50. Mobbs to Weinberger through Iklé and Perle, memo, 11 Aug 1983, folder USSR 388.3 (Aug–Oct 1983), box 28, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

51. Perle to Weinberger, memo, 9 Sep 1983, with attached START discussion paper, folder 334 NSC, box 1, Acc 330-86-0069; Perle to Carlucci, memo, 28 Sep 1983, folder 334 NSPG (Aug–Nov 1983), box 39, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records; Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 302–305.

52. Perle to Weinberger, memo, 9 Sep 1983 (quote); CM-276-83 to Sec Def, memo, 4 May 1983; Cindy Williams to Abram N. Shulsky, memo, n.d.; both in folder USSR 388.3 (May 1983), box 28, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 305–307

53. Clark to Reagan, memo, 9 Sep 1983, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 11:273–283 (doc 78); “NSDD 106: U.S. Approach to START Negotiations—VII,” 4 Oct 1983, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 11:290–294 (doc 82); Shulsky to Iklé, memo, 6 Oct 1983, folder USSR 388.3 (Aug–Oct 1983), box 28; Mobbs to Weinberger through Iklé and Perle, memo, 21 Dec 1983, folder USSR 388.3 (Nov–Dec 1983), box 27: both in Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

54. Gilbert A. Robinson to Weinberger, memo with attached USICA research memorandum dated 29 and 30 Nov 1982, 9 Dec 1982, folder USSR 388.3 (Nov–Dec) 1982, box 27, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

55. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Arms Control and the Nuclear Freeze Proposal,” Public Information Series, April 1982, folder USSR 388.3 (13–30 Apr 1982), box 28, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

56. Weinberger to Arlene Vannier, letter, 15 Oct 1982; Vannier to Weinberger, letter with attachment, 5 Oct 1982; Bishop William E. Swing to Weinberger, letter, 11 Oct 1982: all in folder USSR 388.3 (3 Sep–Oct 1982), box 27, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records. Another example was Weinberger’s interview by Charlayne Hunter-Gault of WETA on the Public Broadcasting Service, then the voice of American liberalism on the radio. Weinberger interview on PBS, 12 Jun 1982, transcript in *Weinberger Public Statements 1982*, 3:2152–2153.

57. Weinberger to Clark, draft memo enclosed in Catto memo to Weinberger dated 19 May 1982 with draft State Department Public Affairs plan, folder USSR 388.3 (1 May–5 May 1982), box 28, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quote).

58. Welles to Weinberger and Carlucci, memo, 5 Apr 1982 (quotes); Troia to Weinberger and Carlucci, 5 Apr 1982 (quotes): both in folder USSR 388.3 (3 Jan–20 Apr) 1982, box 28, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

59. Powell, *My American Journey*, 301–302; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 169–170; Barton Gellman, “Weinberger Victorious in Oxford Debate,” *Washington Post*, 28 Feb 1984, 1; Ray Moseley, “Weinberger Wins Oxford Debate on U.S. Policy,” *Chicago Tribune*, 29 Feb 1984, 9.

60. Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 49–51, 87–88.

61. The list included violations of the Biological Weapons Convention, the exercise notification procedures of the Helsinki Final Act, the Krasnoyarsk radar of the ABM treaty, the SALT II using encryption that impeded verification of missile tests, and the requirement that the SS-X-25 have a reentry vehicle to throw-weight ratio of at least 50 percent. Probable violations included deployment of the SS-16 ICBM and the testing of the SS-X-25, which contravened SALT II’s requirement that only one new ICBM be tested, and that the Soviets were testing nuclear weapons above the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit of 150 kilotons. Frank J. Gaffney to Powell, memo, 6 Jan 1984, folder USSR 388.3 1985, box 2 (Reagan quoted by Gaffney); Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 9 Jan 1984 folder 334 NSC, box 1: both in Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records.

62. Perle to Weinberger, memo, 11 Jan 1984 (quote); Mobbs to Weinberger, memo with attached note, 12 Jan 1984 (quotes); Powell to Mobbs, memo with Weinberger’s comments, 13 Jan 1984 (quote): all in folder USSR 388.3 (Jan–Feb), box 12, Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records.

63. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 23 Mar 1984, folder USSR 388.3 (Mar) 1984, box 12, Acc 330-86-0048 (quotes); Perle to Weinberger, memo, 26 Mar 1984, folder 334 NSC, box 1, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records; McFarlane to Reagan, memo, 26 Mar 1984, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 11:304–318 (doc 87).

64. Minutes of National Security Planning Group meeting, 27 Mar 1984, *FRUS, 1981–1988*, 11:332–337 (doc 90) (quotes. Note: this is an NSPG meeting apparently misfiled as an NSC meeting); “NSDM 137: U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984,” 31 Mar 1984, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 11:338–342 (doc 92).

65. Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, 83–84; Weinberger to McFarlane, memo, 14 Sep 1984, folder USSR 388.3 (Jul–Dec, 1984), box 12, Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records (quotes).

66. Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, 69–70, 85–86; Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 100–101.

67. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 22 Sep 1984, folder USSR 091.112, box 11, Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records (quotes); also printed in *FRUS 1981–1988*, vol. 4, *Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985*, ed. Elizabeth C. Charles (Washington, DC: GPO, 2021), 996–997 (doc 282).

68. Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, 85; Reagan and Gromyko, memorandum of conversation, 28 Sep 1984, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 4:1021–1033 (doc 286).

69. “NSDD 148: The U.S. Umbrella Talks Proposal,” 26 Oct 1984, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 4:1077–1078 (doc 298).

70. Reagan, *An American Life*, 605 (quote); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 277 (quote); Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, 86. The Weinberger-Shultz relationship

had been deteriorating for months. In March 1984 *Washington Post* columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported that Weinberger suggested that Shultz be asked to resign because the secretary of state was so bent upon a preelection arms reduction deal that he was prepared to give up major concessions to Moscow. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “The Pentagon’s Shultz Bashing,” *Washington Post*, 21 Mar 1984.

71. “NSDD 153: Instructions for the Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva,” 1 Jan 1985, *FRUS, 1981–1988*, 4:1247–1261 (doc 348); Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 510–513.

72. Minutes of NSPG meetings, 30 Nov (quote), 5 Dec, 10 Dec, and 17 Dec 1984 (quote), *FRUS 1981–1988*, 11:1151–1158 (doc 323), 1164–1168 (doc 326), 1174–1180 (doc 331), and 1186–1185 (doc 335); Wilson, *Triumph of Improvisation*, 87.

6. Defense Acquisition Reform and Pentagon Reorganization

1. Reagan, *An American Life*, 119–120; Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 147–148, 275–276; Reagan to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, memos, 22 Jan 1981 and 26 Mar 1981, folder Administration, 1981–1983, box 624, IV E. OSD Administration, 1977–1984, Subject Files, OSD/HO.

2. J. Ronald Fox, *Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009: An Elusive Goal* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2011), xi–xii; C. W. Borklund, “The Carlucci Initiatives and Congress,” *Government Executive*, Oct 1981, 6 (quote).

3. Carlucci to service secretaries et al., memo, 2 Mar 1981, folder 1981 Defense Spending, 4 Feb–7 Mar, box I:CL 631, DoD, Subject File, Weinberger Papers; Fox, *Defense Acquisition Reform*, 102–103. By the 1980s the term acquisition, as describing the process of obtaining weapons and equipment, was defined as conceptualization, initiation, design, development, production, deployment, and logistic support of weapons and other systems.

4. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 226–227.

5. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 43 (emphasis in original).

6. Weinberger, 43–44 (quote on 44).

7. Carlucci to service secretaries, 2 Mar 1981.

8. Fox, *Defense Acquisition Reform*, 108. The DSARC was established in 1969. It required four milestones before receiving council approval of major weapon systems: concept exploration, demonstration and validation, full-scale development, and production. The Carlucci initiatives reduced formal DSARC milestones that required the involvement of the Secretary of Defense from four to two: requirements validation and program authorization to proceed to full-scale development. The changes simplified the system, reduced the secretary’s involvement, and increased the responsibility of the services, especially for systems under the new higher thresholds (\$200 million for RDT&E and \$1 billion for production). Fox, *Defense Acquisition Reform*, 113.

9. For a complete list and discussion of the 32 initiatives, see David C. Acker, *Acquiring Defense Systems: A Quest for the Best* (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College, Jul 1993), 233–243.

10. News Release No. 172-81, 30 Apr 1981, *Weinberger Public Statements 1981*, 3:2072–2074 (quote on 2072).
11. Carlucci to Meese, memo, 20 Nov 1981, folder 1981 Defense Spending, Nov 13–20, box I:CL633, Subject File, DoD, Weinberger Papers (quote); Fox, *Defense Acquisition Reform*, 116.
12. Frank Carlucci, “Forward to Special Edition,” *Concepts: The Journal of Defense Systems Management* 5 (Summer 1982).
13. Vince Puritano, “The Weinberger-Carlucci Initiatives,” *Defense*, Jun 1982, 8.
14. General Accounting Office, *Acquisition: DOD’s Defense Acquisition Improvement Program, A Status Report*, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Affairs, United States Senate, GAO/NSIAD-86-148, Jul 1986, 1; General Accounting Office, *Acquisition: DOD’s Defense Acquisition Improvement Program’s 33 Initiatives*, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO/NSIAD-86-178BR, Sep 1986, 2, 5–57.
15. GAO, *Acquisition: DOD’s Defense Acquisition Improvement Program, A Status Report*, 14; Fox, *Defense Acquisition Reform*, 120.
16. Debate between the President and Former Vice President Walter F. Mondale in Kansas City, Missouri, 21 Oct 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/102184b>.
17. Fred Hiatt, “Pentagon Concedes Routine Overpaying for Its Spare Parts,” *Washington Post*, 2 Jun 1984, 1.
18. DoD News Release No.156-81, 23 Apr 1981, folder OSD/DoD, 1978–1985, box 561, Organization 1981, VI, Organization B, OSD, Subject File, OSD/HO; DoD News Release No. 509-84, 26 Sep 1984, folder Waste and Fraud, 1984, box 1002, VII Installations and Logistics (1969–2000), Waste and Fraud, 1984, Subject File, OSD/HO; Trask and Glennon, *Department of Defense*, 2–9.
19. Weinberger to Service Secretaries et al., and for All DoD Personnel, memos, 5 Jun 1981, folder Administration 1981–1982, box 624, IV E OSD Administration, 1977–1984, Subject File, OSD/HO. DoD News Release No. 575-84, 7 Nov 1984, folder 000.1 (Nov) 1984, box 1, Acc 330-86-0046, OSD Records.
20. Weinberger to Service Secretaries et al., memo, 25 Jul 1983, *Weinberger Public Statements 1983*, 4:2784–2786.
21. Gerald F. Sieb, “Military Services Ordered to Start Buying Parts Jointly in Big Lots in Wake of Audit,” *Wall Street Journal*, 4 Jun 1984, 6; “Pentagon Is Retooling Its Buying,” *New York News*, 2 Jun 1984, 12. For a serious discussion on the spare parts issue, see Jacques S. Gansler, *Affording Defense* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 195–207.
22. Gansler, *Affording Defense*, 195–197.
23. Poll cited in Fox, *Defense Acquisition Reform*, 126.
24. Weinberger to Clark, memo, 30 Dec 1982, folder 093 (Oct–Dec) 1982, box 2, Acc 330-84-0002, OSD Records.

25. Helms to McFarlane, memo, 31 Jan 1984, folder Department of Defense (1/25/1984–2/28/1984), RAC box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Agency File, Reagan Library.

26. Remarks and Question-and-Answer Session with Farmers in Norway, Iowa, 20 Sep 1984, *Reagan Public Papers 1984*, 2:1331 (quotes); Fox, *Defense Acquisition Reform*, 126–127.

27. For Murray's role under Brown, see Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 19; Trask and Glennon, *Department of Defense*, 1.

28. Trask and Glennon, *Department of Defense*, 1; Weinberger interview, 12 Jan 1988; Richard Armitage, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, Arlington, VA, 16 May 1997, OSD/HO, 22; Richard Perle, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 12 Jun 1997, 41, OSD/HO; Armitage interview, 7 May 2014, 9.

29. Weinberger to O'Neill, letter, 9 May 1981, folder Organization 1981, box 561, IV Organization B, DOD, OSD/DoD, 1978–1985, Subject Files, OSD/HO (quotes); Trask and Glennon, *Department of Defense*, 12–13.

30. Trask and Glennon, *Department of Defense*, 9–10; *Department of Defense Key Officials, 1947–2004* (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 2004), 47; James G. Burton, *The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 122–124 (quote on 124).

31. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 112–113; Rearden, *Council of War*, 450.

32. James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), 31–40; General David C. Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," *Armed Forces Journal International* 119, no. 7 (Mar 1982): 62–68, 78.

33. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 26 Feb 1982 (quote), folder Weekly Reports, 02/26/1982, RAC box 002, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 19 Jul 1982, folder JCS Reorganization, binder 103, Papers of Gen. John W. Vessey, USA (Ret.), National Defense University Library, National Defense University.

34. Weinberger to Reagan, 19 Jul 1982 (quote); CM 143–182 to Sec Def, 22 Nov 1982 (quotes); Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 26 Nov 1982 (quote): all in folder JCS Reorganization, binder 103, Vessey Papers.

35. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 30 Aug 1982, folder Weekly Reports, 08/20/1982, RAC box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library (quotes).

36. James R. Locher III, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, Washington, DC, 15 Sep 1998, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO, 5–6; Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 124–130; Rearden, *Council of War*, 451.

37. *CQ Almanac* 38 (1982):23; Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 190–194.

38. Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 249–251; William H. Taft IV, interview by Edward Keefer and Steven Phillips, Washington, DC, 13 Dec 2018, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO, 22–23.

39. Caspar Weinberger, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, Washington, DC, 20 Jan 1988, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO, 1–5.

40. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 342–349.

41. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 24 Apr 1981, folder 020 DoD, box 2, Acc 330-83-0143, OSD Records.

42. Ronald H. Cole et al., *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946–1993* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 74–76.

43. *Ibid.*, 77.

44. Weinberger and Dam to Reagan, memo, 3 Mar 1983; Clark to Weinberger and Shultz, memo, 1 Apr 1983; Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 15 Aug 1983: all in folder CENTCOM, 1983, box 5, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; U.S. Central Command, “CENTCOM Exercises New Forward Headquarters in Qatar,” press release, 14 Oct 2009, <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/903774/centcom-exercises-new-forward-headquarters-in-qatar>.

45. Cole et al., *Unified Command Plan*, 95.

46. *Ibid.*, 96; JCSM-296-83, 12 Nov 1983, folder 471.96 (Jul–Dec), 1983, box 18, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records.

47. Weinberger to McFarlane, memo, 26 Nov 1983, folder 471.96 (Jul–Dec), 1983, box 18, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records; Weinberger to Vessey, memo with undated paper “Formation of United States Space Command,” 3 Dec 1984, folder SPACECOM, 1984, box 8, Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records (quote).

48. Cole et al., *Unified Command Plan*, 97.

7. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1. For Carter and Brown’s NATO policies, see Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 417–476.

2. *Ibid.*, 458–466.

3. Rogers to Weinberger, letter, 27 Jan 1981, folder Lance 1981, box 12, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

4. Caspar Weinberger, News Conference, 3 Feb 1981, *Weinberger Public Statements 1981*, 1:697 (quotes); Haig, *Caveat*, 86–88 (quotes on 87).

5. Weinberger (signed) and Haig (unsigned) to Reagan, draft memo, n.d. (15 May 1981?); Haig to Weinberger and Haig to Reagan, memos, 28 Jul and 4 Aug 1981: all in folder Lance 1981, box 12, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Jay Rixse, memos for the record, 30 Jul and 5 Aug 1981, box 3, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 3 Aug 1981 entry, 34–35; “NSDD 7: Enhanced Radiation Weapons,” 6 Aug 1981, folder Lance 1981, box 12, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

6. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1981*, 30–31.

7. Minutes NSC meeting of 12 Nov 1981, folder NSC 00025, box SR-100, NSC

Institutional Files, National Security Council; Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reductions and Nuclear Weapons, 18 Nov 1981, *Reagan Public Papers 1981*, 1062–1067.

8. JCSM-192-83 to SecDef, 27 Jun 1983, folder NATO 411.61 (Apr–Jun) 1983, box 20, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Weinberger to Vessey, memo, 20 Jul 1983, folder NATO 471.61 1983, box 2, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records.

9. Perle to Weinberger, memo, 13 Oct 1982; Perle to Luns, undated letter attaching HLG Report: NATO Nuclear Force Requirements dated 13 Oct 1982: both in folder NATO 334 NPG 1983, box 2, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records; Final Communique and Annex issued by Defense Ministers of North Atlantic Council, Montabello, Canada, 28 Oct 1983, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1985), 447–449 (document 163).

10. Meyer to Weinberger, memo, 27 Jan 1981, folder NATO 400, 1981, box 19, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983* (Washington, DC: GPO, 8 Feb 1982), III-112 to III-113.

11. Sherick to Weinberger and Taft, memo, 16 Apr 1984, folder NATO 092, 1984, box 2, Acc 330-86-0045, OSD Records.

12. Kramer to Weinberger and Carlucci, 13 Mar 1981, folder NATO 092 (13 Mar) 1981, box 16, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; chart data from Total Defense Expenditures (CY) as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (Market Prices), Comparative Statistics, folder NATO 320.2 DPQ (19 May 1982) box 16, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Caspar Weinberger, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, Washington, DC, 21 Jun 1988, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO, 21.

13. Report of Senator Sam Nunn to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 15 May 1982, folder NATO 092 (Jan–Jul) 1982, box 15, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

14. William J. Perry, *My Journey at the Nuclear Brink* (Stanford, CA: Sanford University Press, 2015), 35–42; John Lehman: *Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2018), 59 (quote).

15. Iklé and DeLauer to Weinberger, memo, 3 Dec 1982; Carlucci to Service Secretaries, et al., memo, 3 Dec 1982, folder Chron: [Dec] 1982, box 7, Iklé Papers: both in Reagan Library; Weinberger to Shultz memo, 23 Jul 1984, folder USSR 320.2 (May–December) 1984, box 11, Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records.

16. Perry, *My Journey*, 42; Kathleen Day, “Quits Pentagon but Not Arms Arena: Richard DeLauer: New Job, Same Bluntness,” *Los Angeles Times*, 25 Mar 1985, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-03-25-fi-21443-story.html>; Burton, *Pentagon Wars*, 118–120 (first quote on 120, second on 118). Weinberger and DeLauer eventually clashed and DeLauer resigned over the secretary’s unwillingness to continue funding in 1985 for the much-delayed and overpriced M247 Sergeant York division air defense self-propelled antiaircraft gun.

17. Daniel Wirls, *Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 81–87; James M. Fallows, *National Defense* (New York:

Random House, 1981); Maj. Peter W. Chiarelli, USA, and Maj. Raymond C. Gagnon, USA, *The Politics of Military Reform* (Newport, RI: Center for Advanced Naval Warfare Studies, Center for Advanced Research, 1985), 7–10; Perry, *Nuclear Brink*, 42–43. For an account of the Pentagon insider reformers, see Burton, *Pentagon Wars*, 75–81, 93–94, 133–147.

18. William Perry, “Fallows’ Fallacies: A Review Essay,” *International Security* 6, no. 4 (Spring 1982): 174–198 (quotes on 179 and 181 respectively, emphasis in original).

19. Sharon Weinberger, *Imagineers of War: The Untold Story of DARPA, the Pentagon Agency that Changed the World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2017), 266–268.

20. Robert R. Tomes, *U.S. Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 93–94.

21. Tomes, *U.S. Defense Strategy*, 68–69; Richard H. Van Atta et al., *Transformation and Transition, DARPA’s Role in Fostering an Emergent Revolution in Military Affairs* (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA Paper P-3698, Nov 2003), 2: section IV-1 to IV-2, IV-10 to IV-19.

22. Van Atta et al., *Transformation and Transition*, 2:VI-19 to IV-20; Sharon Weinberger, *Imagineers of War*, 216–218.

23. Tomes, *U.S. Defense Strategy*, 107–117; Van Atta et al., *Transformation and Transition*, 2:VI-19 to IV-22; Caspar Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1986* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 Feb 1984), 128 (quote).

24. Tomes, *U.S. Defense Strategy*, 111–113; Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, FY 1986*, 29 (quote).

25. Carlucci to Service Secretaries et al., 29 Jul 1982, folder NATO 334 (Apr–Dec) 1982, box 16, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Weinberger to Luns, letter with attached executive summary of DoD study, Taking Advantage of Emerging Technologies to Improve Conventional Defenses, 24 Nov 1982, folder NATO 320.2 (Jan–Jul) 1983, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

26. Weinberger to Luns, letter with attachment, 24 Nov 1982 (quote); Department of Defense, Final Communiqué, 2 Dec 1982, in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1985), 508 (quote); Tomes, *U.S. Defense Strategy*, 115–116.

27. Weinberger to Tower, letter with attachment: NATO Conventional Capability Improvement, A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense, February 1983, 21 Apr 1983, folder NATO 320.2 (Apr–Jul) 1983, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

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29. Reagan, Weinberger, Carrington, et al., memo of conversation, 11 Sep 1984, folder NATO 091.112, 1984, box 2, Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records.

30. Schmidt reiterated these conditions to Weinberger in May 1981. Schmidt, Weinberger, et al., memorandum of conversation, 21 May 1981, no folder box 3, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records; Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 551–553; Perle to Weinberger, memo, [Nov 1981], folder NATO 334 NPG (May–Dec) 1981, box 18, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

31. Weinberger and de Geus, memo for the record, meeting of 26 Mar 1981, folder Netherlands, 1981; Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 8 May 1981, folder NATO 471.61 (Mar–Sep) 1981: both in box 20, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

32. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 336–338; CIA memo, 17 Jun 1982, “West Germany: Public Attitudes toward the Peace Movement,” folder Germany (Apr–Jun) 1982, box 4, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

33. Weinberger to Orr, memo, 25 Apr 1983, folder 471.94 (Mar–Apr) 1983, box 17, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records; Perle to Weinberger, memo, 7 Jul 1983, folder Germany (Jul) 1983, box 8; Weinberger, Heseltine, and Woerner, memo of conversation, 27 Oct 1983, folder NATO 334 NPG, 1983; “Deployment of PII to Germany,” background paper, n.d., folder Germany (Oct–Dec), 1983, box 8: all in Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

34. Perle to Weinberger, memo, 10 Jan 1984, folder UK (Jan–Feb) 1984, box 10, Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records; Garthoff, *Great Transition*, 552; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), 161–162.

35. Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO’s First Fifty Years* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 151–153; Péter Lázár, *The Mansfield Amendments and the U.S. Commitment in Europe, 1966–1975* (thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Jun 2003).

36. Kramer to Weinberger, memo, 27 Feb 1981; Weinberger to Bailey, letter, 17 Jul 1981 (quote): both in folder NATO 110.01, 1981, box 17, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

37. For example, of the 219,792 U.S. Army personnel stationed in Europe in 1981, 208,000 were in West Germany and 4,400 in West Berlin. *The Military Balance, 1981–1982* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), 9.

38. Joint United States–Federal Republic of Germany statement, 15 Apr 1983, in *American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1982* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1985), 562; Weinberger to Addabbo, letter, 13 Mar 1982 folder Germany (Feb–Mar) 1982, box 4, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quote, emphasis in original).

39. James R. Golden, *NATO Burden-Sharing: Risks and Opportunities* (Washington, DC: Praeger, 1983), 43–45; Harold Brown, *Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1982* (Washington, DC: GPO, 19 Jan 1981), 214–217.

40. Weinberger and Apel, memo for record of meeting, 8 Dec 1981, folder Germany (Nov–Dec) 1981, box 5, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Weinberger and Schmidt, memo of conversation, 5 Jan 1982; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 4 Jan 1982: both in folder Germany (Jan) 1983, box 5, Sec Def Files, Acc 330-84-0004; Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1986*, 226; Weinberger and Woerner, memorandum of conversation, 2 Apr 1984, folder Germany (Apr–Jun) 1984, box 44, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

41. Korb to Carlucci, memo with attached undated background paper “Master Restationing Plan,” 10 Nov 1982, folder Germany (Nov–Dec) 1982, box 4, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

42. Weinberger to Clark, memo with attached paper “Proposed Funding Profile [for MSP],” 13 Apr 1983; Weinberger to Clark, memo, 27 May 1983; White House to Embassy Bonn for Burns and Weinberger, msg WHO3511, 1 Jun 1983: all in folder Germany (May–Jun) 1983, box 8, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 13 Mar 1984, folder Germany (Jan–Mar) 1984, box 44, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

43. Carlucci to Service Secretaries et al., memo, 3 Jun 1981, folder NATO 400, 1981, box 19, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Perle to Taft through Iklé, memo, 24 Apr 1984, folder NATO 400, 1984, box 5, Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records (quote).

44. Perle to Iklé, memo, 28 Nov 1983, folder NATO 334, 1983, box 19, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Weinberger to McFarlane, memo, 10 Jan 1984, folder NATO 091.112, 1984, box 2; Weinberger to Service Secretaries et al., memo 4 Jun 1984, folder NATO 400, 1984, box 5: both in Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records.

45. DeLauer to Weinberger and Thayer, memo, 18 Jul 1983, folder Germany (Jul), 1983; Perle to Weinberger, memo, 15 Nov 1983, folder Germany (Oct–Dec) 1983: both in box 8, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

46. Weinberger to Tower, letter, 6 Aug 1984, folder Germany (Aug–Nov), 1984, box 44, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records; News Release No. 390-84, 12 Jul 1984, with attached statements by Woerner and Weinberger, *Weinberger Public Statements 1984*, 2195–2197 (quote on 2197). A Patriot fire unit consisted of a command post, radar, and eight launchers capable of engaging eight targets simultaneously.

47. Korb to Weinberger, memo, 7 Jan 1983, folder NATO 320.2 (Jan–Mar) 1983, box 18, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

48. Weinberger to Korb, memo 20 Jan 1983; JCSM-31-83 to Sec Def, 22 Feb 1983 (quotes): both in folder NATO 320.2 (Jan–Mar) 1983, box 18, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

49. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 23 May 1983; Reagan to Bush (as president of Senate), letter, 23 Jun 1983: both in folder Department of Defense (5/23/1983–6/6/1983), RAC box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Agency File, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Service Secretaries and Vessey, memo, 22 Apr 1983; JCSM-187-83 to Sec Def, 22 Jun 1983: both in folder NATO 320.2 (Apr–Jul) 1983, box 18, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

50. Weinberger to Bush (as president of the Senate) and O’Neill, letters with attached DoD report “United States Force and Support Structure in Europe: Justification for Higher Troop Ceiling in FY 1984,” 25 Sep 1984, folder NATO 320.2 (Sep–Dec) 1984, box 3, Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records.

51. CQ *Almanac* 40 (1984): 49–50.

52. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 443–448.

53. “NSDD 31: United States Policy on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions,”

16 Apr 1982, folder NSDD 31, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

54. Bremer to Clark, memo with attached 23 Mar 1983 message Andropov to Reagan, 23 Mar 1983; Stanford to Kimmit, memo, 31 May 1983: both in folder NATO MBFR, box 18, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

55. Perle to Weinberger in China, msg 290145Z, Sep 1983, folder NATO 320.2 MBFR, box 18, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records (quotes).

56. Minutes of 13 Jan 1984 NSC meeting, folder NSC 00100, box SR-104, NSC Institutional Files, National Security (quotes); “NSDD 122: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions,” 13 Jan 1984, folder NSDD 122; NSDD 126, 20 Feb 1984, folder NSDD 126: both in Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 6 Feb 1984 (quote), folder 1984, President, memos to, box I:CL788, Subject File, Weinberger Papers.

57. Arms Control Association, *Arms Control and National Security: An Introduction* (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 1989); 134–137; Rearden, *Council of War*, 493–495.

58. For background to these issues, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Lawson, and Raimundo Luragi, eds., *NATO and the Mediterranean* (Wilmington, DE: 1985), 97–113, 207–213, 233–237.

59. Stilwell to Carlucci, memo, 16 Oct 1981, folder Spain, 1981, box 24, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

60. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 13 Oct 1981, 43; Weinberger and Haig to Clark, Weinberger-signed copy of memo, 19 Apr 1982, folder Spain (Jan–Mar) 1982, box 23, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

61. Haig to Reagan, memo, 16 Jun 1982, folder Spain (Jun–Dec) 1982, box 22, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

62. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 18 Jun 1982, *ibid*.

63. Agreement on Friendship, Defense and Cooperation, U.S.-Spain, 2 Jul 1982, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 34, 1981–1982 (Washington, DC: Department of State), 3889–3896; Protocol to the Treaty of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation, U.S.-Spain, 24 Feb 1983, UST 34, 4224–4225 (see especially the sovereignty clause in Article 2, sec. 2.2); Request for Security Assistance for Spain, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1983 (Washington, DC: Department of State), 593–594; Bremer to Clark, memo, 30 Oct 1982, folder Spain (Jan–Dec) 1982, box 22, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

64. JCSM-11-83 to Sec Def, 31 Jan 1983, folder Portugal, box 22, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; “Portugal: Armed Forces in Search of a Role,” CIA research paper, EUR 83-10107, Apr 1983, iv, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom>.

65. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 14 May 1981, folder Portugal (Jan–May) 1981, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Clark to Haig, Weinberger, and Stockman, memo, 18 Jun 1982, folder Portugal (Jan–Jul) 1982, box 20, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

66. Bader to Howe, memo, 6 Apr 1982; Carlucci to Clark, memo, 30 Jun 1982: both in folder Portugal (Jan–Jul) 1982, box 20, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

67. Briefing Paper for Weinberger, Issues/Talking Points for meeting with Holmes, 3 Jun 1982, folder Portugal 1983, box 22, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Notes on Defense Bases and Economic and Military Assistance, U.S.–Portugal, 13 Dec 1983, *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 35, 1983–1984 (Washington, DC: Department of State), 4365–4367, 4369–4373; “Portugal: Bilateral Relations with Other Countries,” country-data.com, Jan 1993, <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-11004.html>.

68. See Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 448–452.

69. Background Paper, U.S. Military Presence in Greece, [May 1982], folder Greece 1982, box 5, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Majors to Acting Director, European and NATO Affairs, ISA, memo, 6 Jul 1981; msg 080939Z from Weinberger (in Brussels) to Haig, Dec 1981 (quote) 1, both folder Greece, 1981, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Embassy Athens to State, msg 16941, 15 Oct 1982, folder October 1982, box 68, Secretary of Defense Cables, OSD/HO (quote).

70. Orr to Weinberger, memo, 6 Jun 1983; Perle to Weinberger, memo, 17 May 1983; Weinberger to Clark, memo, undated [after 17 May 1983]; Clark to Shultz, memo, 10 Mar 1983: all in folder Greece, 1983, box 9, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; *CQ Almanac* 39 (1983):141–143.

71. Perle to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 4 Apr 1983; Talking Paper for Weinberger/Shultz breakfast meeting, [25 Aug 1983]: both in folder Greece, 1983, box 9, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Agreement on Defense and Economic Cooperation, U.S.–Greece 8 Sep 1983, *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 35, 1983–1984, 2642–2648.

72. George Crews McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 161; memo for record of Carlucci-Bayulken meeting, 10 Jun 1981, folder TSA File, box 3, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey: America’s Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990), 57–60.

73. McGhee, *US-Turkey-NATO Middle East Connection*, 172–173; Iklé to Weinberger and Carlucci, memo, 10 Jun 1981, folder Turkey (Jun–Dec), 1981, box 26, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Weinberger to Reagan and Clark to Weinberger, memos, 5 Oct 1983: both in folder Turkey, 1982, box 23, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; *CQ Almanac* 40 (1984):397.

74. Carlucci to Bayulken, letter, 29 Nov 1982, folder Turkey, 1982, box 24, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Weinberger to Bayulken, letter, 31 Oct 1983, folder Turkey, 1983, box 24, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Weinberger to Bayulken, text of letter repeated in msg 211925Z, State to Embassy Ankara, folder September 1983, Secretary of Defense Cables, box 73, OSD/HO; *CQ Almanac* 61 (1985):375, and *CQ Almanac* 62 (1986):169.

8. The Middle East: Israel, Egypt, and Jordan

1. Reagan quoted in Laurence L. Barrett, *Gambling with History: Reagan in the White House*, paperback ed. (New York: Penguin, 1984), 265.

2. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 258; Theodore Cohen to Weinberger, letter, 22 Jun 1982, folder 020 SD (Jan–Jun) 1982, box 21, Acc 330-84-0002, OSD Records (quote); Philip Mass to Weinberger, letter, 19 Dec 1981, folder Israel (18 Dec–) 1981, box 7, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quote); Weinberger to Theodore Cohen, letter, 7 Jul 1982, folder 020 SD (Jul–Dec) 1982, box 21, Acc 330-84-0002, OSD Records. Weinberger decided not to respond but made the “sadly” comment in the margin of a memorandum (quote), Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 4 Jan 1982, folder Israel (Jan–Apr) 1982, box 6, Acc 330-04-0004, OSD Records.

3. Weinberger to Cohen, 7 Jul 1982.

4. Weinberger interview, 19 Nov 2002, 24–25 (quotes).

5. Haig, *Caveat*, 328; McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, 187 (quote); Dov S. Zakheim, *Flight of the Lavi: Inside a U.S.-Israeli Crisis* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996), 121 (quotes); Richard Armitage, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, Arlington, VA, 8 Jan 1997, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO, 14 (quotes).

6. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 251–258; Marshall to Carlucci, memo with undated attachment “Background History of the OSD-Israeli MOD Talks,” 26 Feb 1982 (quote); Iklé to Weinberger, memo with attached undated background paper, “The Strategic Dialogue with the Israelis,” 23 Mar 1981: both in folder Israel (Jan–Apr) 1982, box 6, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

7. Weinberger to Haig, undated memo attached to memo in Iklé to Carlucci, 20 Mar 1981, *ibid*.

8. [REDACTED]; Haig and Weinberger to Reagan, memo, folder Israel (Sep–Oct), 1981, box 6, Acc 330-04-0004, OSD Records.

9. Weinberger diary, 11 Sep 1981, folder 1, Notes, set B, 1981, Appointment and Diary File, box 9, Weinberger Papers (quote). The MOU was signed and released on Nov 30, 1981, and the text appears in “Text of American-Israeli Agreement,” *New York Times*, 1 Dec 1981, A14.

10. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 30 Oct 1981, folder Israel (Sep–Oct) 1981, box 8, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]; “Talking Points: Meeting with MOD Sharon,” OSD/ISA paper, 30 Nov 1981, folder Israel (30 Nov–17 Dec) 1981; Weinberger comment on Iklé to Cormack, memo, 5 Nov 1981, folder Israel (1 Nov–29 Nov) 1981: both in box 7, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quote).

11. Haig to Weinberger, letter, 11 Nov 1981 (quotes); Allen to Bush et al., memo, 20 Nov 1981 (quotes): both in folder Israel (1 Nov–29 Nov) 1981, box 8, *ibid*.

12. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 16 Nov 1981, box 8, *ibid*.

13. Iklé to Weinberger, memos, 16 Nov 1981 (quotes) and 23 Nov 1981, folder Israel (30 Nov–17 Dec) 1981, box 7, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

14. Weinberger diary, 30 Nov 1981, folder 3, “Diary Notes October–December 1981,” box 2, Weinberger Papers; text of MOU between the United States and Israel on Strategic Cooperation, signed by Weinberger and Sharon, 30 Nov 1981, folder Israel (30 Nov–17

Dec) 1981, box 7, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (the text was subsequently released and published); Weinberger, interview with foreign journalists, Pentagon, 24 Nov 1981, in *Weinberger Public Statements 1981*, 5:3441–3450 (quotes on 3445–3446). See also his comments on *Meet the Press*, 22 Nov 1981, *ibid.*, 3423–3430, especially 3428.

15. MOU between the United States and Israel on Strategic Cooperation, 30 Nov 1981.

16. Memorandum for the Record, 2 Nov 1981, folder Jordan (12 Feb) 1982, box 9, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

17. Haig to Weinberger, letter with attached text of Department of State statement condemning the annexation, 18 Dec 1981, folder Israel (1 Nov–29 Nov) 1981, box 8, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quote). In addition, the administration would not move ahead on promoting DoD purchases up to \$200 million of Israeli goods and services, allow Israel to use up \$100 million in U.S. foreign military sales to purchase its own defense items, nor allow third countries to use U.S. subsidies to purchase Israeli defense items.

18. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 7 Jun 1981, 24.

19. Eban and Carlucci, memorandum of conversation, 29 Apr 1982, folder Israel (May) 1982, box 6, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

20. Department of State Operations Center, Situation Report No. 1, 8 Jun 1981, folder Israel (Jun) 1981, box 8, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quote); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 9–11 Jun 1981, 24–25 (quotes on 25).

21. Stoessel to Reagan, memo, 15 Jun 1981, folder Israel (Jun) 1981 (quote); Stoessel to Reagan, memo, 19 Jun 1981 (quote): both in Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Haig, *Caveat*, 182–184.

22. Rostow to Weinberger, letter attaching a Jun 19 memorandum of conversation between Eron and Rostow, 19 Jun 1981, folder Israel (Jun) 1981, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quote).

23. Weinberger diary, 8 Jun 1981, folder 1, box 2, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress (quotes); Haig, *Caveat*, 184 (quote); Carlucci to Reagan, memo, 25 Jun 1981, folder Israel (Jul–Aug) 1981, box 8, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

24. Haig, *Caveat*, 184 (quote); copy of *New York Times* editorial, “Israel’s Illusion,” 9 Jun, A14, with handwritten note from Carlucci, folder Israel (Jun 1981), box 8, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quote).

25. Haig to Allen, Weinberger, Casey, and Meese, memo with Haig draft and Weinberger edits attached, 10 Jun 1981, folder Israel (Jun 1981), box 8, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quote from Weinberger edits). The final letter was released by the White House Press office on 10 June.

26. Embassy Tel Aviv to State, message, 6 Jul 1981, folder Israel (Jul–Aug) 1981, *ibid.* (quotes).

27. Weinberger and Evron, memorandum of conversation, 11 Jun 1981, folder Israel (Jun) 1981, *ibid.* (quotes).

28. Iklé to Carlucci, memo, 2 Jul 1981, folder Israel (Jul–Aug) 1981, box 8, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

29. McFarlane to Kemp, letter with undated memorandum from Haig alone to Reagan President, 6 Aug 1981, *ibid.*

30. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 19 Aug 1981, *ibid.*

31. Ligon to Leonard, letter, 15 Jun 1982, folder Israel (May) 1982, box 6, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

32. West to Weinberger and Carlucci, memo, 5 Oct 1981, folder Israel (Sep–Oct) 1981, *ibid.*

33. West to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 23 Oct 1982, folder Israel (Sep–Dec) 1982, box 6, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

34. *CQ Almanac* 38 (1982): 239; *CQ Almanac* 39 (1983): 525; *CQ Almanac* 40 (1984): 395–396; Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 9 Dec 1982, folder Israel (Sep–Dec) 1982, box 6, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quote, emphasis in original).

35. West to Weinberger through Carlucci, memo, 30 Dec 1982, folder Israel (Sep–Dec) 1983, *ibid.*; for an extensive account of the Lavi, see Zakheim, *Flight of the Lavi*.

36. Zakheim, *Flight of the Lavi*.

37. Shultz to Reagan, memo, 26 Jul 1983; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 27 Jul 1983: both in folder Israel (Jun–Jul), 1983, box 11, Acc 330-85-0023 OSD Records (quote).

38. Shultz to Reagan, undated draft memo, folder Israel, box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records (quote); “List of a Number of Operational Issues Discussed During the Course of the Visit of Prime Minister Shamir to Washington, November 27–30, 1983,” folder Israel (Oct–Dec) 1983, box 45, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 443.

39. See Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 247–251.

40. *Ibid.*

41. Weinberger, Carlucci, Ghazala, et al., memorandum of conversation, 23 Apr 1981; Carlucci to Ghazala, letter, 29 Apr 1981: both in folder Egypt (1 Apr–10 Aug) 1981, *ibid.*

42. Haig and Weinberger to Reagan, undated draft memo, *ibid.*; Haig to Reagan, 31 Jul 1981, folder Egypt (Jul) 1981: both in box 3, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; minutes of the 31 Jul 1981 NSC meeting, folder NSC00018, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC meeting Files, Records, 1981–1988, Reagan Library (quotes).

43. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 6 Aug 1981, 35; Reagan, *An American Life*, 290; West to Weinberger and Carlucci, memo, 3 Aug 1981, folder Egypt (1 Aug–10 Aug) 1981, box 3, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

44. “NSDD 14: Security Considerations in Egypt and Sudan,” 8 Oct 1981, folder NSDD 14, RAC box 1, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Haig and Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 8 Oct 1981; Haig to Reagan, undated draft memo (seen by Weinberger on 12 Oct); Carlucci to Jones and Ser Secs, memo, 19 Oct

1981; Weinberger to Ghazal, letter, 18 Nov 1981: all in folder Egypt (10 Oct–Dec) 1981, box 3, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

45. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 201.

46. Minutes of the 31 Jul 1981 NSC meeting.

47. Weinberger and Mubarak, memorandum of conversation, 3 Sep 1982, folder Egypt (Jul–Sep) 1982, box 2, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quote); Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 1 Jun 1982 (quote), folder Memos to President, DoD, Subject File, 1982, box I: CL706, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress; Weinberger and Ghazala, memorandum of conversation, 5 Sep 1982, folder Egypt (Oct–Dec) 1984, box 42, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records (quote). For Reagan’s Peace Plan, see *Reagan Public Papers*, 1983, 2:1093–1097.

48. *CQ Almanac* 38 (1982):239.

49. *CQ Almanac* 39 (1984):525 and 40 (1985):396.

50. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 336, 341.

51. Koch to Weinberger, memo, 19 Apr 1983; Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 5 May 1983; Weinberger to Towner, letter, 9 Jun 1983; Embassy Cairo to State, message 11260, 14 Apr 1983: all in folder Egypt (Feb–Jun) 1983, box 7, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Embassy Cairo to State, msg 06477, 2 Mar 1983, folder March 1983, box 71, Secretary Weinberger Cables File, OSD/HO.

52. *CQ Almanac*, 38 (1982):216–217 and 39 (1983):470–472.

53. Iklé to Weinberger, handwritten memo, 7 May 1983 (quote); Smith to Iklé, memo containing copy of a comment by Weinberger 16 May 1983, (quote): both in folder Egypt (Feb–Jun) 1983, box 7, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

54. Hill to Clark, undated memo attaching paper “U.S. Egyptian Strategic Cooperation: Ras Banas and Beyond,” [Jul 1983], folder Egypt (Jul–Aug) 1983, *ibid*.

55. Cairo Embassy to State, msg 31620, 18 Oct 1984, folder Oct 1984, box 79, Secretary Weinberger’s Cable File, OSD/HO.

56. Hayward to Weinberger, memo, 8 May 1981, folder Egypt (Apr–May) 1981, box 4, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Murray to Carlucci, memo, 17 Sep 1981, folder Egypt (11 August–Sep) 1981, box 3, *ibid*; Weinberger and Mubarak, memorandum of conversation, 31 Jan 1983 (quote), folder Egypt (Jan–Feb) 1983, box 42, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records; Weinberger to Ghazala, letter, 2 Oct 1982, folder Egypt (Sep–Oct) 1983, box 6, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

57. Cairo Embassy to State, messages 22559, 22769, and 23239, 29 Jul, 30 Jul, and 4 Aug 1984; JCS to USCINCENT et. al, msg 310256Z, Jul 1984; USCINCENT to JCS, msg 0410442Z, Aug 1984: all in folder July and August 1984, box 79, Secretary Weinberger’s Cable File, OSD/HO.

58. JCSM-275-85 to Sec Def, 12 Sep 1984, folder Egypt (Mar–Sep) 1984; Weinberger to JCS, memo, 1 Oct 1984, folder Egypt (Oct–Dec) 1984: both in box 42, Acc 330-86-0047,

OSD Records; UPI, “U.S. Nuclear Warship Uses Suez Canal for First Time,” *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, 7 Nov 1984, 5.

59. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 15 Jan 1982, folder 01/15/1982, RAC box 2, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Repots, 1981–1984, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Ghazala, letter, 17 Dec 1984, folder Egypt (Oct–Dec) 1984, box 42, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

60. Allen to Reagan, memos, 29 Oct 1981 and n.d. [29 Oct 1981], folder Jordan (21 Oct–Dec) 1981; West to Carlucci, memo, 10 Sep 1981, folder Jordan (Jan–20 Oct) 1981: both in box 10, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

61. Weinberger to Reagan, undated draft memo, (quote); Weinberger to Reagan, final memo, 31 Oct 1981 (quote): both in folder Jordan (21 Oct–Dec) 1981, *ibid.*

62. Weinberger to Reagan, undated draft memo (quote); Haig to Weinberger, memo, 27 Oct 1981 (quote), folder Jordan (21 Oct to Dec) 1981, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records. Haig opposed selling Jordan Stinger shoulder-held antiaircraft missiles for similar reasons and because it would generate requests for Stingers from Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern and African countries.

63. Weinberger, Carlucci, and Hussein, memorandum of conversation, 2 Nov 1981, folder Jordan (21 Oct–Dec) 1981, box 10, Acc. 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quotes); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 2 Nov 1981, 47 (quotes).

64. Weinberger to Reagan, Clark, Carlucci, and Haig, unnumbered transcript copy sent from SecDef’s aircraft after 13 Feb 1982 (quotes); West, memo for the record, 13 Feb 1982: both in folder Jordan (Jan–Mar) 1982, box 8, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

65. Talking points for Carlucci for testimony before the HPSCI, 22 Jul 1982, folder Jordan (Nov–Dec) 1982, *ibid.*

66. Stoessel to Weinberger, letter, 29 Jan 1982, *ibid.* (quote); Haig, *Caveat*, 333 (quote); George Wilson, “Weinberger May Offer Jordan Missiles to Thwart Deal With Soviets,” *Washington Post*, 11 Feb 1982, 13; Richard Halloran, “Weinberger, in Jordan, Discusses Sale of U.S. Antiaircraft Missiles,” *New York Times*, 11 Feb 1982, 5.

67. Respective Air Force numbers from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance: 1983–1984* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), 57, 62; Haig and Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 6 Apr 1982; Clark to Haig and Weinberger, memo, 19 Apr 1982: both in folder Jordan (Apr–Jun) 1982, box 8, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

68. Shultz and Carlucci to Reagan, memo, 16 Nov 1982, folder Jordan (Nov–Dec) 1982, *ibid.*

69. West to Weinberger, undated memo, [21 Dec 1982], *ibid.*; Hussein quoted in David Ignatius, “Hussein’s Criticism of U.S. May Weaken Congressional Support for Sale of Missiles,” *Wall Street Journal*, 16 Mar 1982, 58; *CQ Almanac* 40 (1984):116–117. On May 27, 1982, Senator Edward Kennedy submitted A Resolution to Assure Israel’s Security, to Oppose Advanced Arms Sales to Jordan, and to Further Peace in the Middle East, S. 406, 97th Cong. (1982).

70. Shultz to Reagan, memo, 8 Nov 1983; Reagan to Hussein, letter in msg 337189 from State to Amman Embassy, 26 Nov 1983, folder Jordan, box 12, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Armitage to bin Shaker, letter, 7 Jun 1984, folder Jordan, box 47, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

71. CM 580-84 to Sec Def, 27 Feb 1984; Weinberger to Vessey, memo, 27 Feb 1984: both in folder Jordan, box 47, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records; *CQ Almanac* 40 (1984):396–397; West to Weinberger, memo, 27 Oct 1982, folder Jordan (Jul–Oct), box 8, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

72. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 145.

73. Reagan to Haig and Weinberger, memo, 19 May 1982, folder Israel (May) 1982, box 6, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Haig to Reagan, memo, 21 May 1982, folder Middle East (Apr–Jul) 1982, box 12, *ibid*.

74. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 12, 85–95.

75. “Address to the Nation on United States Policy in the Middle East,” *Reagan Public Papers* 1982, 2:1093–1097.

76. Consulate Jerusalem to State, message (unnumbered copy), 2 Sep 1982; Tel Aviv Embassy to State, msg 13407, 4 Sep 1982: both in folder Israel (Sep–Dec) 1982, box 6, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 147–149 (quotes on 148 and 149); Memo, Weinberger for Reagan, 3 Sep 1982 (quote), 1982, folder 09/03/1982 RAC box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library.

77. “NSDD 115: Visit of Prime Minister Shamir,” 26 Nov 1983, folder NSDDs, RAC box 6, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDD, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

78. Weinberger, comments on memo by McFarlane to Shultz, Weinberger, and Vessey, 26 Mar 1984; Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 18 Jan 1984; JCSM-23-4 to Sec Def, 19 Jan 1984 (quote): all in folder Israel, box 2, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records.

79. Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 23 Jul 1984, folder Israel, 1984, box 2, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records.

80. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 24 Oct 1984, folder Israel (Oct–Dec) 1984, box 45, Acc 330-86-0046, OSD Records.

81. Armitage to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 10 Sep 1984, folder Israel (Apr–Sep) 1984, box 46, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records; Armitage to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 1 Dec 1984, folder Israel 1984, box 2, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records.

9. Lebanon: Into the Cauldron

1. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 135–140, makes a good effort at explaining Lebanon’s difficult political and religious situation. A much more exhaustive account, from which the 1981 percentages are taken, is in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence’s *Lebanon: Confessionalism—A Potent Force*, Aug 1982, folder Lebanon (1–15 Oct, 1982), box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

2. Charles F. Brower IV, “Stranger in a Dangerous Land: Reagan and Lebanon,

1981–1984,” in Bradley L. Coleman and Kyle Longley, eds., *Reagan and the World* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2017), 257–259; David Crist, *The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran* (New York: Penguin Press, 2002), 106–107. One of the best general history of Lebanon is David Hirst, *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (New York: Nation Books, 2010). Agnes G. Korbani, *U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 and 1982: Presidential Decisionmaking* (New York: Praeger, 1991) examines the U.S. role during two interventions. For the Lebanese civil war see Dilip Hiro, *Lebanon Fire and Ember: A History of the Lebanese Civil War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992) and Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon, 1970–1985*, rev. ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). The Israeli perspective is covered in Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, *Israeli’s Lebanon War*, trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1984). A more recent study is John Boykin, *Cursed Is the Peacemaker: The American Diplomat versus the Israeli General, 1982* (Belmont, CA: Applegate Press, 2002).

3. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 140; Haig, *Caveat*, 180; Brower, “Stranger in a Dangerous Land,” in Coleman and Longley, eds., *Reagan and the World*, 260–263; Crist, *Twilight War*, 107–108.

4. Bremer to Stanford et al., memo, 10 Apr 1982, folder Lebanon (Jan–May, 1982), box 11, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; West to Iklé, memo, 3 Jun 1982, folder Lebanon (1982), box 1, Acc 330-86-0041, OSD Records; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 46.

5. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 140–141; Crist, *Twilight War*, 109.

6. [REDACTED]; Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 10 Jun 1982, with attached State Executive Secretary Paul Bremer to Clark, draft copy of memo, 9 Jun 1982; Joint Staff to Weinberger, memo, [10 Jun 1982]; Poindexter to Smith, note with attached executive summary of the paper including the DoD addendum, 11 Jun 1982 (quote): all in folder Lebanon (1–15 Jun 1982), box 11, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

7. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 14; Weinberger Diary, 6 Jun 1982, folder 5, April–June 1982, box 2, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress; Haig, *Caveat*, 348–350; Patrick J. Sloyan, *When Reagan Sent in the Marines: The Invasion of Lebanon* (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2019), 56–59.

8. Weinberger Diary, 21 Jun and 24 Jun 1982, folder 1, July–Sept 1982, box 3, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress. Weinberger’s words were: “I don’t think we can ever be in a position, as a government, of condoning or supporting or blinking at the idea that you can or should change the status quo by unilateral resort to force. It [the Israeli invasion] is the same thing we condemned in the Argentine.” Weinberger interview on ABC’s *This Week with David Brinkley*, 20 Jun 1982, in *Public Statements of Secretary Weinberger, 1982*, 3:2181; Clark to Reagan, memo, 14 Jun 1982, document CK2349700457, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, Gale Research; Vessey to Weinberger, memo, 9 Jun 1982, folder Lebanon (16–30 Jun 1982), Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

9. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 46; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 21 Jun 1982, 89–90; Sloyan, *When Reagan Sent in the Marines*, 61–63.

10. Weinberger Diary, 9 Jul 1982, folder 1, July–Sept 1982, box 3, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress

11. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 52.

12. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 2 Aug 1982, 95 (quote). Begin and Reagan held a private meeting, with only two notetakers present, Jun 21, 1982, 11:05 to 11:50 a.m. See unattributed memorandum of conversation, document CK2349468760; Reagan's Plenary discussion with Begin, attended by 23 U.S. and Israeli officials including Weinberger, who did not speak, is in Charles Hill, memorandum of conversation, 21 Jun 1982, document CK2349477221: both in U.S. Declassified Documents Online, Gale Research; West to Weinberger, memo with attached message on the 2 Aug 1982 Weinberger-Shamir discussion, 4 Aug 1982, folder Israel (Jul–Aug 1982), box 6, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quotes).

13. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 59–60 (quote on 60).

14. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 7 Aug 1982; West to Weinberger, memo, 9 Aug 1982; West to Weinberger, memo, 18 Aug 1982: all in folder Lebanon (Aug 1982), box 11, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

15. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 62–69.

16. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Dairies*, 97–98; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 70–71, 74.

17. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 77 (quotes); Weinberger Diary, 23 Aug 1982, folder 1, July–Sept 1982, box 3, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress (quotes).

18. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 78–79.

19. *Ibid.*, 80.

20. Benis M. Frank, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982–1984* (Washington DC: History and Museum Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1987) 13–15; Eric Hammel, *The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982–February 1984* (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), 21–26; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 82–83.

21. Frank, *Marines in Lebanon*, 18–19; Hammel, *The Root*, 27–29; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 82.

22. Weinberger to Reagan and Clark, Msg. USDAO Tel Aviv 13290, 1 Sep 1982, folder Lebanon (1–22 Sep 1982), box 11, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 146; Frank, *Marines in Lebanon*, 18–19. The figure of 15,500 PLO fighters evacuated from Lebanon is generally accepted, but it is not definitive. The number of PLO passing through the marines' checkpoint at the port was 6,436 (Frank, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon*, 15). Some Palestinians left before the marines landed, and the figures of those going overland to Syria are inexact. According to a later U.S. count, Syria took 4,000 PLO fighters and 6,100 of its own forces overland. See NSC Steering Group paper, "Destination for the PLO," attached to Bremer to Gregg et al., memo, 9 Oct 1982, folder Lebanon (1–15 Oct 1982), box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

23. McFarlane later wrote, "Weinberger issued a fateful—and treacherous order ... that as soon as the last fighter had left Beirut, Weinberger, without consultation or notification,

ordered the marines back aboard ship. The French and Italians followed suit.” Robert C. McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, *Special Trust* (New York: Cadell & Davie, 1994), 209–210; *Reagan Public Papers 1982*, 2:1093. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 311.

24. Weinberger and Sarkis, memorandum of conversation, 1 Sep 1982, folder Lebanon (1–22 Sep 1982), box 11, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Weinberger to Reagan and Clark, 1 Sep 1982; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* 146–147.

25. “Next Steps in Lebanon,” undated NSC Steering group paper attached to Bremer for Gregg et al., memo, 1 Sep 1982, folder Lebanon (1–22 Sep 1982), box 11, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quote).

26. State Department Executive Secretary L. Paul Bremer to Col John Stanford, member of Lebanon interagency group, et. al, memo, 9 Oct 1982, folder Lebanon, box 10 (1–15 Oct 1982), Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Richard A. Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984) 47–52; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Dairies*, 101 (quote); Weinberger Diary, 18 Sep 1982, folder 1, July–Sept 1982, box 3, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress (quote); *Reagan Public Papers 1982*, 2:1181.

27. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 106–107 (quoting Weinberger and Reagan on 107); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 101 (quote); McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 211–212; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 151. At this meeting of the principal advisers, according to an NSC staffer, there was no notetaker. Kornani, *U.S. Intervention in Lebanon*, 89–90

28. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 107–108 (first quote on 107, second on 108).

29. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 151–152 (quotes); Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 108–109; Weinberger Diary, 19 Sep 1982, folder 1, July–Sept 1982, box 3, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress (quote).

30. Notes of NSC mtg, 20 Sep 1982, folder NSC 00060, box SR-102, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

31. Shultz and Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 23 Sep 1982, folder Lebanon (23–30 Sep 1982), box 11, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Reagan letters to Speaker of House O’Neill and President Pro Tempore of the Senate Thurmond, 29 Sep 1982, in *Reagan Public Papers 1982*, 2:1238 (quotes).

32. West, memorandum for the record, 27 Sep 1982; Dillingham, memorandum for the record, 28 Sep 1982: both in folder Lebanon (23–30 Sep 1982), box 11, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; National Command Center report, 1 Oct 1982, folder Lebanon (1–15 Oct), box 10, *ibid.*; Frank, *Marines in Lebanon*, 26–31; Hammel, *The Root*, 41.

33. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 196–197; “Lebanon: Problems Facing President Jumayyil, [Gemayel],” intelligence memorandum, 15 Oct 1982, folder Lebanon (14–30 Oct 1982), box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Hiro, *Lebanon*, 61, 66; Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee*, 53, 75–76.

34. Embassy Beirut 7135 to State, message, 12 Oct 1982; Lisbon 0659 from Carlucci to Weinberger, message, 14 Oct 1982: both in folder Lebanon (1–15 Oct 1982), box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 1 Oct 1982, folder 10/02/1982 RAC box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, Reagan Library (quote);

memo for Record by West, Oct 20, 1982 (quote); Lt. Gen. James Dalton, Director, Joint Staff, to Weinberger, memo JCSM-256-82 with attachment, 17 Nov 1982; Bartlett to Vessey, memo attached to Dalton to Weinberger, 16 Nov 1982: all in folder Lebanon (14–30 Oct), box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

35. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 18 Nov 1982, folder Lebanon (Nov–Dec 1982), *ibid*; West to Jones, memo, 5 Oct 1984, folder Lebanon (1–15 Oct 1982), box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 152.

36. “NSDD 64: Next Steps in Lebanon,” 28 Oct 1982, Reagan Library, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov>.

37. Carlucci to Marsh, memo, 18 Oct 1982; Carlucci to Reagan, memo, 3 Nov 1982; West to Weinberger, memos, 22 Nov 1982 (quote) and 30 Nov 1982; Carlucci to Marsh and Meyer, memo, 4 Nov 1982; Weinberger to Marsh, 27 Dec 1982: all in folder Lebanon (Nov–Dec 1982), folder Lebanon (14–30 Oct 1982), box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

38. Shultz to Reagan, undated draft memo with DoD revisions [1 Nov 1982], folder Lebanon (Nov–Dec 1983), box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Frank, *Marines in Lebanon*, 38–41 (quote on 39); Crist, *Twilight War*, 116.

39. Secord to Weinberger, memo, 5 Jan 1983, folder Syria (1983), box 24, Acc 300-85-0023, OSD Records; “Harassment of U.S. UNMO’s by IDF in Beirut,” undated paper, [2 Feb 1983?]; West to Smith, memo with a note by Weinberger, 3 Feb 1983 (quote); West to Carlucci, memo, 4 Feb 1983 (quote): all in folder Lebanon, (Jan–Feb 1983), box 15, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

40. Barrow to Weinberger, letter, 14 Mar 1983 (quote); Vessey to Weinberger, memo, 14 Mar 1983 (quote); Thayer to Weinberger, undated message, [Mar 21, 1983]; State to Embassy Beirut, et al., message 070729, 15 Mar 1983: all in folder Lebanon (Mar 1983), box 15, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 8 Apr 1983 and Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 21 Apr 1983: both in folder Lebanon (Apr), *ibid*.

41. Koch to Weinberger, memo, 27 Apr 1983, folder Lebanon (Apr 1983), box 15, 1983, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

42. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 196–199, 201–221; McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 244–245.

43. Bloomfield, memo for record of Weinberger-Gemayel meeting, 22 Jul 1983, folder Lebanon, box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records (quote); Armitage to Weinberger, memo with attached talking paper, “Briefing for NSPG Meeting—Lebanese Requests for More Aid, Role of MNF,” 20 Jul 1983, folder 334 NSPG (Jan–Jul 1983), box 39, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records.

44. Shultz and Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 25 Aug 1983, folder Lebanon (Aug 1983), box 14, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 222 (quote); McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 248–249; Crist, *Twilight War*, 118–119.

45. Frank, *Marines in Lebanon*, 78; Hammel, *The Root*, 123–138.

46. Thayer and Iklé to Weinberger, message 072007Z, 7 Sep 1983, folder 334 NSC (1983), box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records.

47. NSDD 103, 10 Sep 1983, folder NSDD 103, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library (quote). Returning from Latin America, Weinberger reported on material assistance to the LAF: 34 tanks, 18 howitzers, 124 APCs, 145 machine guns, 25 recoilless rifles, 1,250 trucks, 1,500 radios, 2,200 tents, 115,000 uniforms, 29 million rounds of small-arms ammunition, 15,000 artillery rounds, and 154 tank rounds. In September DoD planned to ship to the LAF an additional 68 tanks, 52 APC, and 12 M-198 155mm howitzers. Weinberger to Clark, memo, 12 Sep 1983, folder Lebanon (Sep 1983), box 14, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

48. Addendum to NSDD 103, 11 Sep 1983, folder Lebanon (Sep 1983), box 14, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 11 Sep 1983, 78–79 (quote); McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 250–251; Crist, *Twilight War*, 119–120.

49. Frank, *Marines in Lebanon*, 81–90; Col. Timothy J. Geraghty, *Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983—The Marine Commander Tells His Story* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009), 72.

50. *Ibid.*, 72–73; Crist, *Twilight War*, 121; Geraghty, *Peacekeepers at War*, 73 (quote).

51. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 159–160.

52. Shultz to Reagan, memo, 13 Oct 1983, folder 334 NSPG (1983), box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records.

53. Weinberger to McFarlane, 21 Oct 1983, folder Middle East, box 16, Acc 330-86-0023, OSD Records.

54. Weinberger interview, 19 Nov 2002, 16–17.

55. Frank, *Marines in Lebanon*, 1–3; Chronology of Significant Events in Beirut, September 1982–October 1983, n.d., folder Lebanon (Oct 1983), box 14, Acc 330-86-0023, OSD Records. The embassy bomber, who killed 17 Americans, used a three-quarter ton Chevrolet pickup truck and fewer explosives. Facing only minimal security, the driver was able to park the truck 20 yards from the embassy. See: Navy Intelligence Division Comments, 28 Oct 1983, *ibid.*

56. McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 267; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 227–229; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 172–173; Wills, *The First War on Terrorism*, 63–64; Powell, *My American Journey*, 290 (quote). According to an official historian, the NSA had picked up evidence of Iran's approval of "a spectacular action against the U.S. Marines" on September 27, but it never left close-hold intelligence channels until two days after the bombing. Crist, *Twilight War*, 135 (quote).

57. Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, 481–482; Sloyan, *When Reagan Sent In the Marines*, 140–141.

58. NSDD 109, Oct 23, 1983; CM-470-83 for Sec Def attaching Kelley report, 2 Nov 1983; McFarlane to Weinberger, undated memo, [17 Nov 1983]: all in folder Lebanon (1983), box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records. Kelley's approved measures included improved intelligence coordination with the other MNF contingents and the LAF; improved physical security and limits on traffic flow around the airport; more LAF security around the airport perimeter; passive defensive measures; dispersal of forces ashore; and movement

of logistical and support forces back to ships offshore. This last measure worried McFarlane, who convinced the president to instruct Weinberger that the MNF presence on the ground should never fall below four rifle companies with appropriate command, control, and critical support personnel.

59. “NSDD 111: Next Steps Toward Progress in Lebanon and the Middle East,” 28 Oct 1983, folder NSDD 111, RAC box 6, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library (quotes); Weinberger to McFarlane, memo attaching CM-477-83 to Weinberger memo of Nov 4, 1983, 7 Nov 1983, folder Middle East (1983), box 2, Acc 330-86-0089, OSD Records (quote).

60. McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 268.

61. McFarlane to Weinberger, memo, 8 Nov 1983, folder Lebanon (1983), box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records.

62. JCSM-290-83 to Sec Def, memo, 19 Nov 1983; Weinberger to McFarlane, 22 Nov 1983: both in folder Lebanon (1983), box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records.

63. Crist, *Twilight War*, 140–146 (Weinberger diary statement quoted on 146); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 16 Nov 1983, 198 (quote). In 1990, in his memoirs, Weinberger stated that “suicide terrorists of some faction, to this day still unknown, blew up the building in which the Marines were housed” (*Fighting for Peace*, 161).

64. McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 270–271 (quote on 271); Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 161–162 (quote); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 17 Nov 1983, 198.

65. CM-522-83 to Sec Def, memo, 3 Dec 1983, folder Lebanon (1983), box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records; Frank, *Marines in Lebanon*, 122–123.

66. “NSDD 117: Lebanon,” 5 Dec 1983, folder NSDD 117, RAC box 6, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library (quotes); Frank, *Marines in Lebanon*, 124–125.

67. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 168–169; Armitage to Weinberger, undated memo (seen by secretary on 27 Dec 1983) attaching NSC nonpaper dated 20 Dec 1983, folder Lebanon (Dec 1983), box 14, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

68. Weinberger to Vessey, memo, 9 Dec 1983; CM-548-84 to Sec Def, memo, 6 Jan 1984; Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 12 Jan 1984 (quotes): all in folder Lebanon (1–15 Jan 1984), box 48, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

69. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 229–230; summary of NSC meeting of 26 Jan 1984, document number CK2349663137, U.S. Declassified Documents Online; “NSDD 123, Next Steps In Lebanon,” 1 Feb 1984, Reagan Library, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov>; Wills, *First War on Terrorism*, 80–81. Most memoir writers assumed all high-level meetings were official NSC or NSPG meetings, making for some confusion.

70. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 10 Feb 1984, folder Lebanon (1984), box 2, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records; NSDD 128, 26 Feb 1984, document number PD01791, Digital National Security Archives; Frank, *Marines in Lebanon*, 132–137; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 230–231 (quote on 231).

71. *Public Statements of Secretary Weinberger, 1984*, 2:1066–1067 (quotes 1066); Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 171–172.

72. “Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983,” 20 Dec 1983, Federation of American Scientists (website), <http://fas.org/irp.threat/Beirut-1983.pdf>.

73. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 23 Dec 1983, folder Lebanon, box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 174; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 233.

74. “Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Terrorist Act.” The letters, mailgrams, and telegrams as well as Weinberger’s multiple responses can be found in folders Israel for November and December, box 10, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records. The letter quoted above was on 30 Nov 1983 from a citizen who will remain anonymous.

75. CM-685-84 to SecDef, memo, 1 May 1984; McFarlane to Weinberger, memo, 19 Jun 1984; both in folder Lebanon (Apr–Sep 1984), box 48, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Files.

76. Armitage to Weinberger, memo attaching final report to Congress announcing the termination of U.S. participation in the MNF, 29 Mar 1984, folder Lebanon (16 Feb–Mar 1984), Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 155–158.

10. The Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia

1. David Crist, *The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year War with Iran* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 9–10; Rachel Bronson, *Thicker than Oil: America’s Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 110, 152; Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 185–186, 332–342.

2. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 274–283.

3. Carlucci to Clark, memo, 11 Dec 1981, folder Israel (30 Nov–17 Dec) 1981, box 7, (Carlucci quotes Sharon); Haig and Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 9 Feb 1981, folder Saudi Arabia (Jan–Feb) 1981, box 24; both in Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records. For an exhaustive survey of the issues, see Nicholas Laham, *Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of America’s Competing Interests in the Middle East* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).

4. Max Friedersdorf, interview by Stephen Knott and Russell L. Riley, Charlottesville, VA, 24–25 Oct 2002, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 66–68.

5. For more on Bandar, see William Simpson, *The Prince: The Secret Story of the World’s Most Intriguing Royal, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan* (New York: William Morrow, 2008) and David B. Ottoway, *The King’s Messenger: Prince Bandar Bin Sultan and America’s Tangled Relationship with Saudi Arabia* (London: Walker Books, 2010).

6. Minutes of NSC meeting, 1 Apr 1981, folder NSC 00007, box SR-99, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

7. *Ibid.* (quotes). A copy of Richard Allen’s summary of conclusions of the 27 February 1981 meeting is in Jason Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files*, 2:10–11 (quote).

8. Minutes of NSC meeting, 1 Apr 1981 (quotes). Weinberger later claimed that the primary purpose of the sale was to give the United States “a longer eye” in the Middle East, that is, advance warning of any actions against Saudi oil fields, which expanded American as well as Saudi capabilities in the region. Weinberger interview, 19 Nov 2002, 23.

9. Weinberger and Al-Hammad, memorandum of conversation, 9 Jun 1981, folder Saudi Arabia (May–June) 1981, box 23, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records. When informing the president of this meeting, Weinberger reported that he reaffirmed “the Administration’s commitment to move forward with the AWACS sale.” Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 12 Jun 1981, folder 06/12/1981, box RAC 001, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library; Secord, memo for the record, 2 Jun 1981, folder Saudi Arabia (May–Jun) 1981, box 23, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Richard Secord, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and The Secret War in Laos*, with Jay Wurts (New York: Wiley, 1992), 170–173; Iklé for Weinberger, memo, 1 Jun 1981, folder Saudi Arabia (May–Jun) 1981, box 23, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

10. Poe to Weinberger and Carlucci, memo summarizing a telephone call from Rourke in Israel, 14 Apr 1981, folder Israel (Jan–May) 1981, box 8, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

11. Packwood et al. to Reagan, letter, 24 Jun 1981, folder Saudi Arabia (May–Jun) 1981; Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 10 Sep 1981, folder Saudi Arabia (Sep–Oct) 1981: both in box 23, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

12. Minutes of NSC meeting, 2 Jul 1981, folder NSC 00015, box SR-99, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council (quotes); a summary of conclusions of the 27 February 1981 NSC meeting is printed in Saltoun-Ebin, *Reagan Files*, 2:11; background paper, “Status of Saudi AWACS Proposal,” undated, in briefing book for Weinberger’s meeting with Sharon on 11 Sep 1981, folder Israel (Sep–Oct) 1981, box 8, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (emphasis in original).

13. Iklé to Weinberger, memos, 8 Sep and 10 Sep 1981; West to Weinberger, memo, 10 Sep 1981, (quotes); Haig and Weinberger to Reagan, 1 Sep 1981: all in folder Israel (Sep–Oct) 1981, box 8, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

14. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 9 Sep 1981 entry, 37; Weinberger Diary, 11 Sep 1981, folder 2, Diary Notes, July to Sept, 1981, box 3, Weinberger Papers (quote); memo, Weinberger to Reagan, 11 Sep 1981, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 9/2/1981–9/10/1981, box RAC 001, Records, 1981–1984, Reagan Library.

15. Barrett, *Gambling with History*, 273; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 342; Laham, *Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia*, 119–150.

16. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entries 14 and 15 Sep 1981, 38; Allen interview, 28 May 2002, 55; John M. Goshko, “Saudi AWACS Sale Defeated in House by 301–111 Vote,” and “Senate Unit Votes No AWACS,” both *Washington Post*, 15 and 16 Oct 1981, both 1; Cannon, *President Reagan*, 342.

17. Baker Comment Exchange with Reporters after Press Briefing by Reagan, 28 Oct 1981, *Reagan Public Papers 1981*, 995–996 (quote); Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military and Technical Implications of the Proposed Sale to Saudi Arabia of Airborne*

Warning and Control System (AWACS) and F-15 Enhancements: Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 28 Sep 1981, 1–8, 19–82; Committee on Foreign Relations, *Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia: Hearings*, 97th Cong. 1st sess., 1 Oct 1981, 51–53, 61–95; DoD Paper, “AWACS Talking Points for Use in Executive Session Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 1, 1981,” folder Saudi Arabia (Oct) 1981, box 23, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

18. Weinberger Comments on *Face the Nation*, *Weinberger Public Statements 1981*, 5:3010–3011.

19. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entry 28 Oct 1981, 46 (quotes); *Reagan Public Papers 1981*, 995 (quote); memo for record, 2 Nov 1981, folder Jordan (Jan–Feb) 1982, box 9, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quote).

20. Koch to Weinberger, memo attaching undated info paper, “Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia,” 23 Jun 1982, folder Saudi Arabia (May–Jun) 1982, box 21, Acc 330-84-0004 OSD Records.

21. DIA background paper for Weinberger, 19 Jan 1982, folder Saudi Arabia (9 Feb) 1982, *ibid*.

22. *Ibid*; Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, *National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005), 157–158.

23. Weinberger to Reagan et al., msg 101800Z, 10 Feb 1982, folder Saudi Arabia (Jan–Feb) 1982; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 21 Jun 1982, folder Saudi Arabia (May–Jun) 1981: both in box 21, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

24. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 26 Jul 1982 (quote); Shultz to Reagan, memo, 28 Jul 1982 (quote): both in folder Saudi Arabia (Jul–Dec) 1982, *ibid*.

25. Weinberger to Shultz, memo, 25 Oct 1982 (quote); Shultz to Weinberger, 28 Oct 1982 (quote): both *ibid*.

26. Armitage to Weinberger, memo with comment by Weinberger, 3 Sep 1983 (quote); JCSM-265-83 to SecDef, 24 Oct 1983 (quote); Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 27 Oct 1983; Koch to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 31 Oct 1983: all in folder Saudi Arabia (Aug–Dec) 1983, box 23, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

27. “NSDD 114: U.S. Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War,” 26 Nov 1983 (quote), folder NSDD 114, RAC box 6, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Crist, *The Twilight War*, 97, 160–161; Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil*, 164–165.

28. “NSDD 139: Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness To Respond To Developments in the Iran-Iraq War,” 5 Apr 1984, folder NSDD 139; NSDD 141: Responding to Escalation in the Iran-Iraq War, 25 May 1984, folder NSDD 141: both in RAC box 7, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

29. Minutes of NSPG Meeting, 17 May 1984, folder NSPG 0089, box 91307, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSPG, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library (quotes); Minutes of NSPG [*sic*. NSC] Briefing, 25 May 1984 (quotes), folder NSPG 0090, box SR-109, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

30. There was a U.S. pilot instructor in the backseat of one of the Saudi interceptors. He reportedly encouraged the Saudi pilots to shoot. Crist, *Twilight War*, 162.

31. Ibid.

32. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 336–349.

33. Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1985* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 214; Crist, *Twilight War*, 40.

34. Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Gulf and the West: Strategic Relations and Military Realities* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 181–187.

35. Weinberger to Reagan, Clark, Haig, Casey, and Carlucci, message, 15 Feb 1982, folder Oman 1982, box 18, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

36. Ibid.

37. Armitage to Carlucci, memo, 1 Dec 1982, *ibid.*

38. West to Weinberger, memo, 6 Oct 1982, folder Oman 1982, box 18, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Eagleburger to Reagan, memo, 8 Apr 1983; Weinberger and Qaboos, memorandum of conversation, 14 Apr 1983; Armitage to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 9 Aug 1983: all in folder Oman 1983, box 21, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

39. Weinberger to Service Secretaries and Cox, memo, 19 Aug 1983; Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 18 Aug 1983; Weinberger to Al-Alawi, letter, 21 Sep 1983: all in folder Oman 1982, box 21, Acc 330-83-0023, OSD Records; Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1986* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 234; Secord, *Honored and Betrayed*, 174.

40. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 143–149.

41. For the congressman and his allies, see George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War* (New York: Grove Press, 2003).

42. Stilwell to Weinberger, memo, 19 Jan 1984, folder Afghanistan 1984, box 1, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records; Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War*, 242–243.

43. Fortier to McFarlane, memo, 21 Feb 1984, folder Afghanistan (11/14/83–3/14/84), box 34, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Reagan Library.

44. Fortier to McFarlane, memo, 5 Mar 1984, *ibid.*

45. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 319–321, Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1087.

46. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 327–332.

47. Reagan to Zia, letter, 9 Mar 1981 (quote); memo for the record by Pelletreau, 11 Mar 1981: both in folder Pakistan (Jan–Jun) 1981, box 21, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

48. Minutes of NSC meeting, 19 Mar 1981, folder NSC 00005, box SR-99, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

49. Ibid.

50. West to Weinberger, memo, 20 Apr 1981; CM-946-81 to Sec Def, 29 May 1981: both in folder Pakistan (Jan–Jun) 1981, box 21, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

51. “Results of US-Pakistan Military Talks in Washington,” unnumbered and unattributed message to Weinberger et al., [16 July 1981], folder Pakistan (Jul–Dec) 1981, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

52. Zia to Reagan, letter, 20 Aug 1981; CIA Information report, 24 Aug 1981, with comment by Haig (quote); McFarlane to Carlucci, letter, 2 Sep 1981; Haig and Weinberger to Reagan, undated memo: all *ibid*.

53. SNIE 31/32-81: India’s Reactions to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan, 8 Sep 1981, CIA Freedom of Information Electronic Reading Room, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0005403744>; Jack Anderson, “Pakistan Near Entry into Atomic Club,” *Washington Post*, 11 Apr 1980, B9.

54. West to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 15 Sep 1981, folder Pakistan (Jul–Dec) 1981, box 21, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Files.

55. Secord, *Honored and Betrayed*, 194–195.

56. JCSM-67-84 to Sec Def, memo, 7 Mar 1984; Armitage to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 20 Apr 1984: both in folder Pakistan, 1984, box 2, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records.

57. “NSSD 3-84: U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan,” 23 Jul 1983, folder NSSD 3-84, box 91279, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSSD, Records 1981–1987; “NSDD 147: U.S. Policy towards India and Pakistan,” 11 Oct 1984, folder NSDD, RAC box 7, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987: both in Reagan Library.

58. Minutes of NSPG meeting, 31 Aug 1984, folder NSPG 0094, box SR-109, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

59. *Ibid*.

60. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 332–342; Michael A. Palmer, *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 112–114.

61. JCSM-65-81 and JCSM-66-81, both 12 Mar 1981, folder Saudi Arabia (9 February) 1982, box 22, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Weinberger to Service Secretaries, Jones, et al., memo, 15 Jun 1981, folder Persian Gulf (May–Dec) 1981, box 21, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

62. Carlucci to JCS, memo, 27 Jul 1981, folder Persian Gulf (May–Dec) 1981, box 21, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

63. “NSSD 4-82: U.S. Strategy for the Near East and Southeast West Asia,” 19 Mar 1982, folder NSSD 4-82, box 91277, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSSDs; “NSDD 99: United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia,” 12 Jul 1983, folder NSDD 99 RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs: both in Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

64. “NSDD 99: United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia,” 12 Jul 1983, folder NSDD 99, RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSSDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

65. “NSDD 139: Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War,” 5 Apr 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

and Museum, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd139.pdf>.

66. Shultz and Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 27 Dec 1984, folder Asia, box 38, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

11. The Falklands/Malvinas War and Weinberger as “Assistant Quartermaster”

1. Borges quoted in “Falkland Islands: Imperial Pride,” *Guardian*, 18 Feb 2010, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/feb/19/falkland-islands-editorial/print>. For the official British history of the war, see Lawrence Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign*, vol. 2, *War and Diplomacy*, new ed. (London: Routledge, 2007). Other good accounts include Martin Middlebrook, *The Falklands War, 1982* (New York: Penguin, 2001) and *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2009); Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (New York, Norton, 1984); Patrick Bishop and John Witherow, *Battle for the Falklands: The Winter War* (New York: HarperPress, 2012). The name of the islands continues to be contested more than 40 years after the war between Great Britain and Argentina. This chapter uses “Malvinas” when addressing Argentine views and references to the islands, and “Falklands” in British references. Weinberger and the Department of Defense used “Falklands” as the prevailing term during the war.

2. For the origins of the dispute, see Lawrence Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign*, vol. 1, *The Origins of the Falklands War*, rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 2005).

3. Charles Moore, “Margaret Thatcher: The Patriot Who Vanquished Failure,” *Telegraph*, 11 Apr 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/features/3636234/Margaret-Thatcher-the-Patriot-Who-Vanquished-failure.html>. For Weinberger’s assessment of Thatcher, see Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 215.

4. See Jimmy Burns, *The Land That Lost Its Heroes: How Argentina Lost the Falklands War* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012); Paul H. Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals: The Dirty War in Argentina* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).

5. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 53–54; Weinberger interview, 19 Nov 2002, 22–23 (quote on 22).

6. Weinberger, Thatcher, et al., memorandum of conversation, 27 Feb 1981, folder Nuclear Planning Group Backup Book, Box 19, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quote).

7. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 22 Jun 1981, folder DoD (06/21/198–09/06/1981), box 91373, Agency File, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Records, 1981–1985, Reagan Library; Perle to Weinberger, memo, 19 Jan 1982; Borsting to Service Secretaries, memo, 24 Dec 1981: both in folder UK (Jan–Feb), 1982, box 25, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; R. T. McNamara to Carlucci, memo, 15 Mar 1982, folder UK (Mar–Apr), box 25, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

8. On the mythic positive side, see Nicholas Wapshott, *Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: A Political Marriage* (New York: Sentinel, 2007). For a differing view, see Richard Aldous, *Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012). Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entries 26 and 27 Feb 1981, 5 (quotes).

9. Cannon, *President Reagan*, 408–409.

10. Perle to Weinberger, memo, 22 Jan 1982, folder UK (Jan–Feb), 1982, box 25, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Thatcher-Reagan exchange of letters included in State to all posts, msg 065076, 12 Mar 1982, folder UK (Mar–Apr), box 25, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records. The cost of the Trident II was \$3.7 billion and the pro-rated R&D costs would be \$700 to \$900 million. The U.S. team was prepared to accept 50 percent of the U.K.’s R&D costs in offsets, 25 percent in cash, and 25 percent forgiven. Haig to Reagan, memo, [5 Feb 1982], folder UK 1982, box 1, Acc 330-86-0042, OSD Records.

11. For the perspective of one strong advocate of anticommunist efforts in Latin America, see Constantine C. Menges, *Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan’s Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 93–130.

12. Jean Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships & Double Standards,” *Commentary*, 1 Nov 1979, <https://www.comentarymagazine.com/article/dictatorships-double-standards>; Colodny and Shachtman, *Forty Years War*, 285–286; Woodward, *Veil*, 253–255; Menges, *Inside the National Security Council*, 379–381.

13. Woodward, *Veil*, 172–177.

14. Adam Garfinkle, *The Devil and Uncle Sam: A User’s Guide to the Friendly Tyrants Dilemma* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), 123; *Reagan Public Papers 1981*, 264–265 (quotes on 264–265).

15. Quoted in Garfinkle, *Devil and Uncle Sam*, 123.

16. Hayward to Weinberger, memo, 8 Mar 1982 (quote); Carlucci to Hayward, memo, 2 Apr 1982: both in folder Latin America (Jan), 1982, box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

17. Hayward to Weinberger, memo, 16 Apr 1982, folder Latin America (Jan), 1982, box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

18. *Ibid.* (quotes).

19. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 207.

20. Weinberger first mentioned the Falklands in his diary on April 4, 1982. He called Carlucci on the subject the afternoon after his return from the Far East, but subsequent entries for that day and the next deal primarily with the budget. Weinberger Diary, folder 5 (Apr–Jun 1982), box 3, Weinberger Papers.

21. Text of British NATO Ambassador Graham’s note to Luns is in U.S. Mission (NATO) to State and Defense, msg 57417, 8 Apr 1982, folder UK (Mar–Apr) 1982, box 25, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quote).

22. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entry 2 Apr 1982, 77 (quotes); Reagan’s history, or at least his recollection of it based on the briefing he no doubt received, was

inaccurate. The British charted and named the Falklands in 1690. The first British ship to anchor and disembark on the Falklands did so in 1765 and it was not until 1833 that London made good on its claim by sending a naval force that chased away Argentinians working on the islands. Argentina based its claim on periodic Spanish and Argentinian occupations of the islands before 1833. Freedman, *Origins of the Falklands War*, 1:3–8.

23. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entries 6, 7, 11, 12, and 13 Apr 1982, 78–79 (quotes).

24. Haig to Reagan, memo, 6 Apr 1982, folder Apr 6, 1982, Falklands, Department of State, Day File, box 73, Haig Papers, Library of Congress (quotes); State to USUN New York, msg 87649, 2 Apr 1982, *FRUS 1981–1988*, vol. 13, *Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015), 68–69 (doc 38) (quotes). See also pages 75–430 (docs 43–198) for extensive documentation on U.S. attempts to mediate the conflict.

25. Notes of a conversation between Weinberger, Haig, and Clark, 6 Apr 1982, Notes Set B, 1982, 1, #1–20, box 9, Appt. and Diary File, Weinberger Papers.

26. West to Weinberger, memo, 6 Apr 1982; Laymen to Weinberger, memo with comments by Weinberger, 9 Apr 1982: both in *FRUS 1981–1988*, 13:115–117 (doc 65), 177–178 (doc 86). Reagan characterized Bernstein's story as "a most irresponsible act." Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entry 14 Apr 1982, 79.

27. Burt to Haig, msg 50206/99019, 13 Apr 1983; Jones to Weinberger, memo, 30 Apr 1982: both in *FRUS 1981–1988*, 13:23–233 (doc 111), 430 (doc 198).

28. Haig, *Caveat*, 261–302, offers a Haig's detailed account of the Falklands negotiations. For his response to the critique of his "grandstanding," see especially 299–302. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entries 19 and 23 Apr 1982, 80, 81 (quotes).

29. Weinberger Diary, 26 Apr 1982, folder 5 (Apr–Jun 1982), box 2, Weinberger Papers.

30. Minutes of 30 Apr 1982 NSC meeting, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 13:422–427 (doc 195) (quotes).

31. Minutes of 30 Apr 1982 NSC meeting (quotes).

32. "NSDD-34: U.S. Actions in the South Atlantic Crisis," 14 May 1982, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 13:552–553 (doc 263) (quote).

33. Statement by Haig, 30 Apr 1982, Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents* (Washington, DC: Department of State publication 9415, 1985), 1309–1310; *Reagan Public Papers 1982*, 1:539–540 (quote on 540).

34. Weinberger's discussion of the Falklands crisis is chapter VII in Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 203–217; Weinberger interview, 19 Nov 2002, 23; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 207; Haig, *Caveat*, 268–270, 301.

35. Weinberger Diary, 6 Apr 1982, folder 5 (April–June 1982), box 2, Weinberger Papers (quote, emphasis in original); Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 207–208 (quotes on 207); Weinberger interviewed on *The Today Show*, 7 Apr 1982, Department of Defense, *Weinberger Public Statements 1982*, 3:1665 (quote).

36. Weinberger Diary, 8–10 Apr 1982, folder 5 (April–June 1982), box 2, Weinberger Papers.

37. Weinberger Diary, 25, 27, 28 Apr 1982, folder 5 (April–June 1982), box 2, Weinberger Papers.

38. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 209; Weinberger Diary, 2 May 1982 (quotes), folder 5 (Apr–Jun 1982), box 2, Weinberger Papers; Editorial note, *FRUS 1981–1988*, 13:442–443 (doc 205).

39. Henderson to Foreign Office private secretary, British Embassy Washington msg 1572, 3 May 1982, Prime Minister's Records, PREM 19/624 f204, reproduced by the Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive, <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/123958> (quotes).

40. John L. Lehman Jr., "Reflections on the Special Relationship," *Naval History Magazine* 26, no. 5 (Oct 2012), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/naulhistoty/2012-09/reflections-spreial-relationship>.

41. Final Communiqué of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, 6–7 May 1982, NATO Online Library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c820506a.htm> (quote); *Weinberger Public Statements 1982*, 3:1845.

42. Weinberger and Nott, memo of conversation, 6 May 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:484–486 (doc 233) (quotes on 484 and 485).

43. Carlucci to service secretaries et al., memo, 4 May 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:457–458 (doc 216); Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 214–216.

44. Iklé to Weinberger, memo with Weinberger's comment and with attached list, undated (seen by secretary on 10 May 1982), *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:502–504 (doc 241) (quote in footnote 1, 502); Iklé to Weinberger, memo, [10 May 1982?], folder UK, box 1, Acc 30-86-0042, OSD Records.

45. Weinberger to Hayward, memo with Weinberger's comments, 1 Jun 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:658 (doc 317) (quote in footnote 1).

46. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 14 May 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:554–557 (doc 264).

47. Iklé to Weinberger, memos, 20 and 27 May 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:685, 636 (docs 278 and 306); Iklé, comment on attached note from Iklé to Carlucci, undated, folder UK 1982, box 1, Acc 330-86-0042, OSD Records.

48. Tobin, memo for record, 24 May 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:603–604 (doc 287) (quote, emphasis in original).

49. Iklé to Weinberger, memos with Weinberger's approval, 11 and 24 Jun 1982, folder UK 1982, box 1, Acc 330-86-0042, OSD Records.

50. British Embassy Washington to Foreign Office, msg 1977, 1 Jun 1982, Prime Minister's Files, PREM 19/723 f33, reproduced by the Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive, <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/137523>; Weinberger and Thatcher, memorandum of conversation, 21 Jun 1983, attached to note, Weinberger to Clark, 24 Jun 1983, folder DoD (06/12/1983–06/29/1983), box 91374, NSC Agency Files, Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 215 (quote).

51. Iklé to Weinberger, memo 10 May 1982, 13:509–510 (doc 245); Weinberger to Nott, letter, 24 May 1982, 13:605 (doc 288); Iklé to Weinberger, memo 9 Jun 1982, 13:679–680 (doc 328): all in *FRUS, 1981–1989*; British Embassy Washington to Foreign Office, msg 1977, 1 Jun 1982, Prime Minister's Files, PREM 19/137523 f33, reproduced by the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <http://www.margraetthatcher.org/document/137523>, accessed 6 Aug 2015; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 215.

52. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 216.

53. Weinberger Diary, 28 May 1982, folder 5 (April–June 1982), box 2, Weinberger Papers (quotes); JCSM-108-82 to Sec Def, 15 May 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:559–560 (doc 266).

54. Forged Pentagon “press release,” 5 May 1982, attached to a note from Middendorf to Catto, undated, folder UK (21 Jun 1982), box 24, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quote); Weinberger Diary, 3 May 1982, folder 5 (April–June 1982), box 2, Weinberger Papers.

55. Cannon, *President Reagan*, 167–171; Haig, *Caveat*, 300–316; Barret, *Gambling with History*, 241–251.

56. Memorandum for the Record, 21 Jun 1982, folder UK (Jun 1982), box 24, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

57. Weinberger Diary, 2 Jun 1982, folder 5 (April–June 1982), box 2, Weinberger Papers. Weinberger noted that Mike Deaver said there was “no chance” of him going to Windsor.

58. Lehman to Weinberger, memo, 18 Jun 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:723–726 (doc 354); Clark to Weinberger, 29 Jun 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:751 (doc 368).

59. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 19 Jul 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:766–769 (doc 378).

60. Williams to Weinberger, memo, 20 Aug 1982, folder Latin America (Jan 1982), box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

61. “NSDD 10-82: U.S. Policy Toward the Americas as a Result of the Falklands Crisis,” 23 Jun 1982, folder NSSD 10-82, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSSDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Carlucci to Schultz, memo, 2 Sep 1982, folder Latin America, box 10, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

62. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 297; Woodward, *Veil*, 212.

63. JCSM-213-82 to Sec Def, 22 Sep 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:797–798 (doc 395); McFarlane to Reagan, memo, 2 Dec 1982, with attached memos from Shultz to Reagan, 28 Nov 1982 and Weinberger to Reagan, 28 Nov 1982, *FRUS 1981–1989*, 13:891–896 (doc 437) (quote on 895).

64. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 173; Kengor and Doerner, *Judge*, 353–353.

65. Weinberger Diary, 2 Jun 1982, folder 5 (April–June 1982) box 2, Weinberger Papers; Weinberger to Lewin, letter, 14 Jul 1982 (quote); Lewin to Weinberger, letter, 28 Jul 1982 (quotes): both in folder UK (13 Sept 1982), box 24, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

66. Weinberger and Thatcher, memorandum of conversation, 8 Sep 1982, folder UK (13 Sep 1982), box 24, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quotes).

67. Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 374–377 (quote).

12. Defending the Defense Budget: Fiscal Years 1984–1986

1. For outlays (what could be spent in each fiscal year), the percentages of real growth were 4.7 for FY 1981, 7.8 for FY 1982, and 7.1 for FY 1983. Percentages for BA and outlays from News Release No. 31-84, “FY 1985 Department of State Budget,” *Weinberger Public Statements* 1984, 1:110.

2. Weinberger to Service Secretaries et al., memo, 22 Mar 1982, folder 100.54 (March) 1983, box 28, Acc 330-84-0002, OSD Records.

3. Draft DoD Defense Guidance, FY 1984–1988, with Lehman’s handwritten revision and Weinberger injunction to return to the original language, 1 Feb 1982, *ibid.*, 7.

4. Lehman to Weinberger, memo, 12 May 1982, folder 100.54 (12 May) 1982 (quotes); Carlucci to Lehman, memo, 14 May 1982, folder 100.54 (May) 1982: both in box 28, Acc 330-84-0002, OSD Records; Puritano to Smith and Stanford, memo attaching undated DoD program review, FY 1984–88, 2 Jul 1982, folder 100.54 (Jul) 1982, box 29, Acc 330-84-0002, OSD Records.

5. Puritano to Weinberger, memo with attached summary of key features of the Army, Navy, and Air Force POMs, n.d., folder (May) 1982, box 28; Puritano to Weinberger and the members of DRB, memo attaching FY 84–88, Policy and Risk Assessment, Issue Book One, 28 Jun 1982, folder 100.54 (Jun) 1982, box 29: all in Acc 330-84-0002, OSD Records.

6. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 16 Jul 1982; Helm through Boverie to Clark, memo, 19 Jul 1982: both in folder Budget, Defense (04/28/1982–07/28/1982), box 20, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Records, 1981–1985, Reagan Library.

7. Helm through Boverie for Clark, memos, 19 and 20 Jul 1982, and n.d., all *ibid.*; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entry 21 Jul 1982, 94 (quote).

8. Shultz to Reagan, memo, 23 Jul 1982; Reagan to Regan, Weinberger, and Stockman, memo, 26 Jul 1982: both in folder Budget, Defense (04/10/1982–07/28/1982), box 20, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Records, 1981–1985, Reagan Library; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entry 26 Jul 1982, 94 (quote).

9. Helm through Boverie to Clark, memo, 3 Dec 1982 (quote); Clark to Reagan, memo, 18 Dec 1982; Helm through Boverie to Clark, memos, 23 Dec 1980 [*sic* 1982] and 27 Dec 1982: all in folder Budget, Defense (07/29/1982–12/28/1982), box 20, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Records, 1981–1985, Reagan Library.

10. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 5 Jan 1983 (quote), folder 110.01 (1–15 Jan) 1983, box 12, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records; Helm through Boverie to Clark, memo, 6 Jan 1983 (quotes), box 20, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Defense, Budget (12/29/1982–01/07/1983), Records, 1981–1985, Reagan Library.

11. Clark to Weinberger, Washfax 113 [a White House facsimile transmittal], 10 Jan

1983; Weinberger to Stockman, memo, 13 Jan 1983: both in folder Defense Spending, 1983, Subject File, box CL:723, Weinberger Papers; *Weinberger Public Statements* 1983, 1:1–421.

12. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 28 Jan 1983, folder 01/21/1983, Weekly Reports, box RAC 004, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library; Minutes of 28 January 1983 NSC meeting, folder NSC 00073, box SR-103, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council (quotes).

13. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 25 Feb 1983, folder 02/25/1983, Weekly Reports, box RAC 004, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library.

14. Senate Committee on the Budget, *First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget—Fiscal Year 1984: Hearings*, 3 Feb 1983 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983), 78–79.

15. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 18 Mar 1983, folder 03/18/1983–03/25/1983, RAC box 004, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1983, Reagan Library (quote); Reagan to Bush, Shultz, Regan, et al., memo with attached talking paper, Meeting the Defense Challenge of the 1980s, 22 Feb 1983, folder 110.01 (15–30 Feb) 1983, box 11, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records; Stockman, *Triumph of Politics*, 397–399; “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security,” 23 Mar 1983, *Reagan Public Papers* 1983, 1:437–443.

16. Stockman, *Triumph of Politics*, 400–402 (quote on 401); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entry 7 Apr 1983 (quotes), 143; Smith, *Power Game*, 210–212; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 8 Apr 1983, folder 04/8/1983, RAC box 004, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1983, Reagan Library. According to Hedrick Smith, the president’s aides recalled holding up signs that suggested to Reagan to compromise on the 7.9 percent during his conversation with Domenici, but Domenici did not recall the president making such an offer nor would he have accepted it (Smith, *Power Game*, 211–212).

17. Weinberger to Clark, memo, 8 Mar 1983, folder 110.01 (1–15 Mar) 1983, box 11, Acc 330-5-0024, OSD Records; Smith, *Power Game*, 212, (quote).

18. *CQ Almanac* 39 (1983):175–176.

19. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 29 Jul 1983, folder 07/29/1983, box RAC, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1983, Reagan Library (quote); *CQ Almanac* 39 (1983): 186.

20. *CQ Almanac* 39 (1983):36–137, 180–181, 189–190.

21. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 16 Sep 1983, folder 09/16/1983, box RAC 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1983, Reagan Library.

22. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 18 Nov 1983, folder 11/18/1983, *ibid.* (quote); Quetsch to Weinberger, memo, 18 Nov 1983, folder 110.01 (Nov) 1983, box 9, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records.

23. *CQ Almanac* 39 (1983):491–494.

24. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 18 Nov 1983 (quote) folder 09/16/1983, box RAC 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1983, Reagan Library; Quetsch to Weinberger, memo, 18 Nov 1983 (quote).

25. Weinberger News Conference, 22 Nov 1983, *Weinberger Public Statements 1983*, 4:3174 (quotes); Stevens to Weinberger, letter, 7 Dec 1983, folder 110.01 (Dec) 1983, box 9, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records (quote).

26. Stevens to Weinberger, letter, 7 Dec 1983, folder 110.01 (Dec) 1983, box 9, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records (quote).

27. Reagan to Weinberger, memo, 15 Oct 1982, folder Budget, Defense (07/29/1982–12/28/1982), box 20, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library.

28. Myer through Boverie to Clark, memos, 7 Jan and 11 Jan 1983; Clark to Weinberger, memo, 10 Jan 1983: all in folder Budget, Defense (01/8/1983–01/12/1983), *ibid*.

29. Minutes of 25 February 1983 NSC meeting, folder 00073, box SR-103, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council (quotes); Weinberger to Service Secretaries et al., memo attaching FY 1985–1989 Defense Guidance, 1 Mar 1983, folder 100.54 (Jan–Apr) 1983, box 8, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records.

30. Marsh to Weinberger, memo, 12 May 1983, folder 100.54 (May) 1983, box 7, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records.

31. Orr to Weinberger, memo, 10 May 1983, *ibid*.

32. Lehman to Weinberger, memo, 16 May 1983, *ibid*.

33. JCSM-174-83 to Sec Def, 16 Jun 1983, folder 100.54 (Jun–Jul) 1983, box 7, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records.

34. Clark to Reagan, unsigned undated memo (copy sent to Weinberger by Clark on 18 Jul 1983), folder 1983, box I:CL 723, DoD Subject File, Weinberger Papers (quotes); “How to achieve Congressional support for more than 5 percent real growth in the FY85 defense budget,” unattributed undated issue paper, folder 110.01 (Aug) 1983, box 10, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records.

35. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 2 Dec 1983, folder 11/29/1983–12/02/1983, RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1983, Reagan Library.

36. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Dairies*, 9 Dec 1983 and 25 Jan 1984, 204, 215 (quotes); DoD News Release No. 31-84: FY 1985 Department of Defense Budget, 1 Feb 1984, *Weinberger Public Statements 1984*, 1:97–11; Weinberger to Reagan, memos, 27 Jan 1983, 10 Feb and 24 Feb 1984, folders 12/27/83, 02/10/1984, and 02/24/1984 respectively, RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1983, Reagan Library.

37. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entries 7, 8, and 12 Mar 1984, 224–225; *Reagan Public Papers 1984*, 1:352–353; VP [Vincent Puritano] comments on White House Briefing: memo for the President, [23 Mar 1984], folder 110.01 (23 Mar) 1984, box 27, Acc 330-86-0046, OSD Records.

38. *CQ Almanac* 40 (1984):53–54, 61–62; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 21 Sep 1984, folder 020 DoD (Sep) 1984, box 15, Acc 330-86-0046, Sec Def Files (quote).

39. *CQ Almanac* 40 (1984):54–59.

40. *Ibid.*, 399.

41. Ibid., 403, 405–407.

42. Ibid., 402, 403; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 12 Oct 1984, folder 10/12/1984, RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Weekly Reports, 1981–1983, Reagan Library.

43. DoD Defense Guidance, FY 1986–1990, 2 Mar 1984, folder 100.54 (Jan–May) 1984; Lehman to Weinberger, memo, 18 May 1984, folder 100.54 (18 May) 1984 (quote): both in box 24, Acc 330-86-0046, OSD Records.

44. Cannon, *President Reagan*, 434–438.

45. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 26 Sep 1984, folder President, Memos to, Subject File 1984, box I:CL 788, Weinberger Papers.

46. Ibid.

47. Jeremiah O’Leary, “Defense on Chopping Block for \$8 Billion in Budget Cuts,” *Washington Times*, 10 Dec 1984, 1; “Weinberger Resists Proposal to Cut Back ’86 Defense Budget,” *Wall Street Journal*, 1 Dec 1984, 2; Jeremiah O’Leary, “Weinberger Digging in Heels on Proposed Defense Budget,” *Washington Times*, 11 Dec 1984, 1; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 12 Dec 1984; Weinberger to McFarlane, memo, 17 Dec 1984: both in folder 110.01 (Dec) 1984, box 25, Acc 330-86-0046, OSD Records.

48. Weinberger to Reagan, memo with attached table, “Defense FY 1986 Reduction Plan,” 17 Dec 1984, *ibid.*; Ann Devroy, “Post-’86 Cuts for Pentagon Raise Hackles,” *USA Today*, 12 Dec 1984, 2; David Hoffman and George Wilson, “Budget-Cutting Deadlocked, Total Paralysis Blamed on Defense Secretary’s Resistance,” *Washington Post*, 14 Dec 1984, 1; Lou Cannon, “Weinberger Agrees to Slightly Larger Budget Cut,” *Washington Post*, 18 Dec 1984, 1; Brad Knickerbocker, “Weinberger wins budget skirmish at White House,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 Dec 1984, 1.

13. National Security and Strategic Forces Modernization

1. For example the Carter administration began its formulation of basic national security on 18 February 1977, and produced Presidential Directive 18, “U.S. National Security Policy,” on 24 August 1977; Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 120–133. Most previous U.S. administrations also defined their national security policy during their first year in office.

2. For more analysis of the reasons for the decision to downgrade the national security adviser and his staff, see chapter 2.

3. “NSSD 1-82: U.S. National Security Strategy,” 5 Feb 1982, folder NSSD 1-82, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSSDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Clark to Haig, Weinberger, et al., memo, 5 Feb 1982, folder 381, 1982, box 1, Acc 330-86-0043, OSD Records.

4. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 20 Feb 1982, *ibid.*

5. Executive Summary of “U.S. National Security Strategy,” Apr 1982, *ibid.*

6. Minutes of NSC meeting, 16 Apr 1982, reprinted in Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files*, 126–133.

7. Ibid.

8. Minutes of NSC meeting, 27 Apr 1982, folder NSC 00047, box SR-101, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

9. Weinberger to Clark, memo, 10 May 1982, folder President, memos to, box I:CL 706, Subject File, 1982, Weinberger Papers; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 18 May 1982, 85.

10. “NSDD 32: U.S. National Security Strategy,” 20 May 1982, folder NSDD 32, RAC box 2, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

11. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 169–181, 601–608.

12. For the debates and Carter’s decisions on the MX, B-1, and the Backfire, see *ibid.*, 169–181, 48–57, and 150–152, 163, respectively; Steven A. Pomeroy, *An Untaken Road: Strategy, Technology, and the Hidden History of America’s Mobile ICBMs* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), 187–188.

13. DoD News Release No. 96-81, 16 Mar 1981, *Public Statements of Secretary Weinberger*, 2:1109–1110.

14. Report of the Committee on M-X Basing [Townes Panel Report], Jul 1981, unaccessioned, unclassified collections, box B-125, Ballistic Missile Office, Air Force History and Research Agency; Pomeroy, *An Untaken Road*, 188–190.

15. “NSDD 12: Strategic Forces Modernization Program,” 1 Oct 1981, folder NSDD 12, RAC box 1, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDD, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

16. Statement of the First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, [May 1981], folder MX (May) 1981; Tower to Weinberger, letter, 25 Jun 1981, folder MX (Jun) 1981; Moorer to Weinberger, letter, 19 May 1981, folder MX (May) 1981 (quote); Davis to Weinberger, letter, 1 Aug 1981, folder MX (Aug) 1981; Rumsfeld to Carlucci, letter, 7 Oct 1981 (quote); Landers to Reagan with copy to Weinberger, letter, 28 Sep 1981 (quote): both in folder MX (1 Sep–23 Oct), 1981: all in box 15, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

17. [REDACTED] folder MX (23 Oct) 1981, box 14, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; [REDACTED] folder MX (Jan–Feb) 1982, box 14, Acc 300-84-0004, OSD Records.

18. DeLauer to Weinberger, memo, 14 Apr 1982, folder MX (Jan–Apr), 1982; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, undated [circa 12 May 1982] folder MX (May–Jun), 1982 (quotes): both in box 14, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

19. “NSDD 35: The M-X Program,” 17 May 1982, folder NSDD 35, RAC box 2, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDD, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

20. Garcia and Barry to Carlucci, memo, 9 Apr 1982; Chu to Weinberger and Carlucci, memo, 22 Apr 1982: both in folder MX (Mar–Apr), 1982, box 14, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; Townes to Weinberger, letter, 22 Sep 1983, folder Missiles (1982), box 4, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 12 Jun 1982, folder President, memos to, box I:CL 706, DoD, Subject File 1982, Weinberger Papers (quote).

21. Vessey to Weinberger, memo, 9 Nov 1982, attaching views of JCS on MX/CSB, folder MX (1982), box 2, Acc 330-86-0041, OSD Records; minutes of NSC meeting, 18 Nov

1982, folder NSC 00066, box SR-102, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council; “NSDD 69: The M-X Program,” 22 Nov 1982, folder NSDD 69, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

22. Statement Announcing the Establishment and Membership of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, and Designation of Chairman and Vice Chairman, 3 Jan 1983, *Reagan Public Papers* 1982, 1:4–5.

23. *Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces* (Washington, DC: Apr 1983), 15, 19 (quote), 20–21, 23.

24. “NSDD 91: Strategic Forces Modernization Program Changes,” 19 Apr 1983, folder NSDD 91, RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 305; Frances FitzGerald, *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 226; Caspar Weinberger, “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: Missile Experimental,” interview, 4 Dec 1987, WGBH Media Library & Archives, 6 (quote), <http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog>.

25. *Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces*, 9.

26. Donald R. Baucom, *The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 122–130, 141–149; Janne E. Nolan, *Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: Basic Books, 1989) 155, 159–164; Ronald B. Frankum, “Continuity of Government and the Strategic Defense Initiative,” in Douglas E. Streusand, ed., *The Grand Strategy that Won the Cold War: Architecture of Triumph* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 186.

27. Anderson, *Revolution*, 80–83, 86–88 (quote on 87); Nolan, *Guardians of the Arsenal*, 156–157.

28. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 301–303; Daniel Wirls, *Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 141–144.

29. “NSDD 12: Strategic Forces Modernization Program”; Lee Lescaze and George C. Wilson, “Reagan Asks for 100 MXs, 100 B-1 Bombers,” *Washington Post*, 3 Oct 1981, 1; Nance to Meese, undated memo, [after 23 Oct 1981], folder ASAT, 1981–1983, box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Reagan Library (quote).

30. Baucom, *Origins of SDI*, 184–190 (quote on 184); McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 226–228 (quote on 227).

31. McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 229–230 (quote on 229); Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 304 (citing Vessey quote); Baucom, *Origins of SDI*, 191–192 (also citing same Vessey quote and Reagan quote on 192); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 11 Feb 1983, 130 (quotes).

32. McFarlane, *Special Trust*, 232–233; Weinberger, *Fighting For Peace*, 305.

33. *Reagan Public Papers* 1983, 1:237–243; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 23 Mar 1983, 139–140 (quotes on 140).

34. “NSDD 85: Eliminating the Threat from Ballistic Missiles,” 25 Mar 1983, folder NSDD 85, RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library; “NSSD 6-83: Study on Eliminating the Threat Posed by Ballistic Missiles,” 18 Apr

1983, folder NSSD, box 91279, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSSDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Smith to Weinberger, note, 5 Apr 1982, folder 373.24 (Jan–Apr), 1983, box 7, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records.

35. For the public versions of the studies as released see “The Strategic Defense Initiative, Defensive Technologies Study” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Apr 1984) and “Ballistic Missile Defenses and U.S. National Security: A Summary Report” (Washington, DC, Future Security Strategy Study, Oct 1983); Nolan, *Guardians of the Arsenal*, 175.

36. “The Strategic Defense Initiative, Defensive Technologies Study” and “Ballistic Missile Defenses and U.S. National Security”; Nolan, *Guardians of the Arsenal*, 177–178.

37. “Ballistic Missile Defenses and US National Security”; Nolan, *Guardians of the Arsenal*, 178–179; [REDACTED] folder SDI, Subject File, 1983, box 1: SRD2, Weinberger Papers.

38. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] folder 373.24 (Oct–Nov), 1983, box 6, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records.

39. [REDACTED] folder 373.24 (Jun–Sep), 1983, box 21, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records.

40. Minutes of NSC meeting, 30 Nov 1983, folder NSC 00096, box SR-104, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council

41. Ibid.

42. “NSDD 116: Strategic Defense Initiative: Congressional and Allied Consultation,” 2 Dec 1984, folder NSDD 116, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDD, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library; McFarlane to Reagan et al., memo attaching NSDD 119: Strategic Defense Initiative, 6 Jan 1984, folder 373.24 (Jan–Mar), 1984, box 21, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records (quote); FitzGerald, *Way Out in the Blue*, 244. DoD considered assigning responsibility for SDI to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Fearing that DARPA would become an SDI agency with its budget consumed by Star Wars research, DARPA officials recommended not taking up the assignment so DARPA could concentrate on stealth technology and drones; Sharon Weinberger, *Imagineers of War: The Untold Story of DARPA, the Pentagon Agency That Changed the World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2018), 259–268.

43. McFarlane to Weinberger, memo, 6 Jan 1984, folder 373.24 (Jan–Mar), 1984, box 21, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

44. Helm to McFarlane, memo, 16 May 1984, folder Strategic Defense Initiative (5/16/1984–6/12/1984), box 106; Reagan to Nunn, letter, 1 Jun 1984, folder ASAT (2/10/1984–6/12/1984), box 3; Lehman to McFarlane, memo, 22 Sep 1984, folder Strategic Defense Initiative (8/1/1984–11/14/1984), box 106: all in Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Records, 1981–1985, Reagan Library; FitzGerald, *Way Out There in the Blue*, 144–145, 247–248.

45. Lehman to McFarlane, memo, 12 Jun 1984 (quote), folder Space Policy (6/1/1984–9/30/1984) box 99, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Records, 1981–1985, Reagan

Library; Hoffman, *The Dead Hand*, 162; Abrahamson to Weinberger, memo, 29 Oct 1984, folder 373.24 (Oct–Nov), 1984, box 21, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

46. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 3 Oct 1983, *ibid.* (quote); McFarlane to Reagan, memo, 21 Dec 1984, folder Strategic Defense Initiative (12/17/1984), box 107 (quote); Linhard to McFarlane, memo, 1 Dec 1985, folder Strategic Defense Initiative (12/1/1984), box 106; Abrahamson to McFarlane, memo, 14 Dec 1984, folder Strategic Defense Initiative (12/17/1984), box 107: all in Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library (quote).

47. See chapters 3 and 12.

48. Frankum, “Continuity of Government,” 183; Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, *Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed* (Boston: Little Brown, 1994), 309–313 (quote on 311).

49. Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, FY 1986*, 210–211.

50. Lehman to Weinberger, memo, 1 Oct 1981; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 9 Nov 1981: both in folder Trident, 1981, box 25, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, FY 1986*, 209; Lehman, *Command of the Seas*, 196–223.

51. Minutes of NSC meeting, 3 Aug 1981, folder NSC 00019, box SR-100, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council; “NSDD 8, Space Transporter System,” 13 Nov 1982, folder NSDD 8, Executive Secretariat, NSC, RAC box 1, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library (quotes); Stockman to Reagan, memo, 28 Dec 1981, folder Space Policy, 07/01/1981–12/31/1984, box 58, Executive Secretariat, Subject File, Records, 1981–1985, Reagan Library.

52. “NSDD 42: National Space Policy,” 4 Jul 1982, folder NSDD 42, Executive Secretariat, NSC, RAC box 2, folder NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Executive Secretariat, NSDD, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

53. “NSSM 13-82: National Space Strategy,” 25 Dec 1982, box 91278, Executive Secretariat NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Stilwell to Weinberger through Thayer, memo, 7 Jul 1983 (not sent), folder 471.96 (Jul–Dec), 1983, box 18, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records; [REDACTED] folder 471.96 (Jul–Dec), 1983, box 18, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records.

54. Beggs to Thayer, letter, 27 Jul 1983; Thayer to Beggs, letter, 11 Aug 1983: both in folder 471.96 (Jul–Dec), 1983, box 18, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records; Hans Mark, *The Space Station; A Personal Journey* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 171–172; John M. Logsdon, *Ronald Reagan and the Space Frontier* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 216–219.

55. Logsdon, *Reagan and the Space Frontier*, 218–219.

56. Beggs to Thayer, letter, 27 Jul 1983; Thayer to Beggs, letter, 11 Aug 1983; Mark, *The Space Station*, 176–177 (quote on 177); Logsdon, *Reagan and the Space Frontier*, 113–117.

57. Keyworth to Weinberger, memo, 28 Nov 1983, folder 471.96 (Jul–Dec), 1983, box

18, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records; Mark, *The Space Station*, 184–187; Logsdon, *Reagan and the Space Frontier*, 121–132.

58. Weinberger to Meese, memo, 8 Dec 1983, box 18, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 1 Dec and 8 Dec 1983, 201 and 203 (quotes); *Reagan Public Papers 1984*, 1:90 (quote).

59. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 188–191.

60. Adelman to McFarlane, memo with undated paper “Study of Space and Arms Control Options,” 11 Jan 1984; Kramer and Gilbert to McFarlane, memo, 1 Feb 1984; both in folder ASAT (01/01/1984–02/01/1983), box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Subject File, Reagan Library.

61. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 1 Aug 1984, folder 471.96 (May–Aug), 1984, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records (quote); Arms Control Association, *Arms Control and National Security: An Introduction* (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 1989), 88–90.

62. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 139–140; Frankum, “Continuity of Government,” 179; Peter Pringle and William Arkin, *S.I.O.P.: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War* (New York; W. W. Norton, 1983), 215–218.

63. Garret M. Graff, *Raven Rock: The Story of the U.S. Government’s Secret Plan to Save Itself—While the Rest of Us Die* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2017), 239–241; Pringle and Akin, *S.I.O.P.*, 216–217.

64. Stivers to Weinberger, memo, 30 Jan 1981, folder 311 CCC, 1981, box 1, Acc 330-83-0144, OSD Records.

65. Wade to Weinberger and Carlucci, memo attaching undated Strategic Connectivity Review Summary, 6 Aug 1981, folder 311 ELF, 1981, *ibid*.

66. Pringle and Arkin, *S.I.O.P.*, 231–232; Graff, *Raven Rock*, 318–319.

67. Reagan quoted in Hoffman, *The Dead Hand*, 44; Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 140–144; Frankum, “Continuity of Government,” 181; Graff, *Raven Rock*, 297–298; Dick Cheney, *In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir*, with Liz Cheney (New York, Threshold Editions, 2011), 129.

68. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 142; Graff, *Raven Rock*, 318–319.

69. “NSDD 97: National Security Telecommunications Policy,” 13 Jun 1983, folder NSDD 97, RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1985* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 195 (quote); Pringle and Arkin, *S.I.O.P.*, 223–225.

70. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 141–142. The Constitution and the 25th Amendment named the vice president as successor if the president dies or is incapacitated; the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 created the additional successors. Tim Weiner, “Pentagon Book for Doomsday Is to Be Closed,” *New York Times*, 18 Apr 1994, 1.

71. “Presidential Directive 24: Telecommunications Protection Policy,” 16 Nov 1977, revised 9 Feb 1979, <https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/directives/pd24.pdf>.

72. Michael Warner, “Cybersecurity: A Pre-History,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 27, no. 5 (Oct 2012), 785–787; Michael Warner, “Notes on the Evaluation of Computer Security Policy in the US Government, 1965–2003,” *IEEE Annals of the History of Computing* 37, no. 2 (April–June 2015), 10; Fred Kaplan, *Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2016) 7–11.

73. Kaplan, *Dark Territory*, 1–2; Warner, *Cybersecurity*. 787; Peter Grant and Robert Riche, “The Eagles Own Plume,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 109, no. 7 (Jul 1983), 965; William D. Marbach et al., “Beware: Hackers At Play,” *Newsweek*, 5 Sep 1983, 42–48.

74. Weinberger to secretaries of military departments et al., memo, 12 Jan 1984, folder 311 (Jan–Mar) 1984, box 44, Acc 330-86-0046, OSD Records.

75. Extensive documentation on this “turf battle” is in folders 311 (Jan–Mar) 1984 and 311 (Apr–Jul) 1984, box 44, Acc 330-86-0046, OSD Records. A summary of the positions is in Williams to Weinberger, memo, 10 Apr 1984, folder 311 (Apr–Jul) 1984, box 44, Acc 330-86-0046, OSD Records.

76. Deely to Taft, letter, 16 Apr 1984 (quote); Weinberger to McFarlane, memo, 15 Aug 1984: both in folder 311 (Apr–Jul) 1984, box 44, Acc 330-86-0046, OSD Records.

77. “NSDD 145: National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security,” 17 Sep 1984, Regan Library, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd145.pdf>.

78. Donald Goldberg, “The National Guards,” *Omni*, May 1987, 45–50, 132; Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724 (1987), <http://csrc.nist.gov>.

79. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 137–145; Harold Brown, *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983) 81–83.

80. Weinberger to Jones, memo, 20 Apr 1981, folder A-381, 1981, box 1, Acc 330-83-0143, OSD Records.

81. Talking Paper for Weinberger for meeting with Haig, 13 Aug 1981, folder 334 State, 1981, box 1, Acc 330-83-0144, OSD Records; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 8 Sep 1981, folder A-381, 1981, box 1, Acc 330-83-0143, OSD Records; “NSDD 13: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” 19 Oct 1981, folder NSDD 13, RAC box 1, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1981, Reagan Library.

82. “Reagan’s Nuclear War Briefing Declassified,” 22 Dec 2016; Carlucci to Reagan, memo, 8 Feb 1982, document 10: both at National Security Archive, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2016-12-22/reagans-nuclear-war-briefing-declassified>.

83. Clark to Weinberger, memo attaching presidential briefing for Feb 26, 1982, document 12, *ibid.*; Fred Kaplan, *The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), 150–151.

84. Thomas C. Reed, *At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2004), 243.

85. *Ibid.*, 244–245.

86. JCSM-92-82 to Sec Def, 10 May 1982; [REDACTED]; Weinberger to Jones, memo, 4 Jun 1982: all in folder A-381, 1982, box 1, Acc 330-86-0041, OSD Records; Weinberger to distribution, memo, 21 Jun 1982, folder 470.02, 1981, box 1, *ibid.* (quote).

87. [REDACTED]; Frank Miller's narrative in George Lee Butler, *Uncommon Cause: A Life at Odds with Convention* (Denver: Outskirt Press, 2016), 2:8–10.

88. Weinberger to Vessey, memo, 9 Sep 1982, folder A-381, 1982, box 1, Acc 330-86-0041, OSD Files (quotes); Iklé to Weinberger and Carlucci, 17 Dec 1982, folder A-381, 1982, box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records; [REDACTED].

89. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 18 Oct 1983, 199 (quote); Reagan, *An American Life*, 585–586, (quotes).

90. Weinberger to distribution, memo attaching NUWEP 84, 29 Jun 1984, folder A-381, 1984, box 1, Acc 330-86-0023, OSD Records (quotes).

91. Nolan, *Guardians of the Arsenal*, 148.

14. Grenada: Operation Urgent Fury

1. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 441–442.

2. Grenada was the subject of a number of official monographs. They include Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada, 12 October–2 November 1983* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the JCS, 1997); Ronald H. Spector, *U.S. Marines in Grenada, 1983* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1987); Bruce R. Pirnie, *Operation Urgent Fury: The United States Army in Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Analysis Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986); Dean C. Kallander and James K. Matthews, *Urgent Fury: The United States Air Force and the Grenada Operation* (Scott Air Force Base, IL: Military Airlift Command, U.S. Air Force, 1988); Charles R. Bishop and E. Kathleen O'Brien, *FORSCOM/ARLANT Participation in Operation Urgent Fury—Grenada, 1983* (Fort McPherson, GA: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces Command, 1985); Edgar F. Raines Jr., *The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010).

3. Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 2–3.

4. U.S. Ambassador to Barbados Milan D. Bish (also accredited to Grenada) as quoted in Pirnie, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 6.

5. All of the official histories cited in endnote 2 provide background on Grenada's history and politics. The most extensive is Pirnie, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 1–30.

6. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 143.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Clark to Shultz, memo, 15 Jun 1983, folder Grenada, box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records.

9. “NSDD 105: Eastern Caribbean Regional Security Policy,” 4 Oct 1983, folder NSDD 105, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

10. Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 10–14; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 326–327.

11. Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 16–18.

12. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 328–329; Robert C. McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, *Special Trust* (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), 260–262; Caspar Weinberger, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, Washington, DC, 21 Jun 1988, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO, 21. In addition to the late-night wake ups of the president, a gunman held hostages in the Augusta clubhouse for two hours, demanding to see the president. The Secret Service whisked the president from the 16th hole to safety. The hostages managed to escape and the man was arrested. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 21 Oct 1983, 189.

13. Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 19–21; Weinberger, *Fighting For Peace*, 112.

14. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 113 (quote); Vessey, memorandum for the record, 23 Oct 1983, binder 129, Grenada, Vessey Papers, National Defense University (quotes).

15. Vessey, memorandum for the record, 24 Oct 1983, binder 129, Grenada, Vessey Papers, National Defense University.

16. Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 26. The People’s Revolutionary Army actually numbered on the eve of the invasion 463 permanent troops, 257 reserves and militiamen, and 58 armed party comrades. Cuban construction workers were slightly underestimated. They included 700 workers who were also reservists in the Cuban armed forces. Raines, *Rucksack War*, 23, 168.

17. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 113; “NSDD 100A: Response to Caribbean Governments Request to Restore Democracy on Grenada,” 23 Oct 1983, folder NSDD 110A, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 33.

18. Ibid., 5 (quote); Powell *My American Journey*, 292 (quote). The number of killed and wounded is from Raines, *Rucksack War*, 532.

19. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 114–115; Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 5 (quote), 20, 65; Weinberger *Public Statements* 1983, 4:3339. For a discussion of the press issue with opinions of major news organizations, columnists, and correspondents (most of it negative), see “Should the Government Have Barred the Media From Grenada?” *Common Cause Magazine*, Nov/Dec 1983, 21–25.

20. Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 34–35; Vessey, memorandum for the record, 24 Oct 1983; Raines, *Rucksack War*, 311.

21. Taft to Weinberger, memos, 25 Oct and 1 Nov 1983, folder Grenada (Jan–Oct) 1983 and (Nov) 1983: both in box 9, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records (quote); Thatcher to Reagan, message, 25 Oct 1983, document 131572, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/131572> (quotes).

22. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 28 Oct 1983, folder 10/28/1983, Weekly Reports, RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library; Caspar Weinberger, interview by Stephen Knott and Russel L. Riley, Washington, DC, 19 Nov 2002, Miller Center Reagan Oral Histories, 18.

23. The best account of these post-conflict issues, from the U.S. Army's point of view, is in Raines, *Rucksack War*, 479–486, 496–501, and 505–513.

24. Pirnie, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 176; JCS to CINCLANT, msg 300153Z Oct 83, 30 Oct 1983, folder October 83, box 74, Secretary of Defense Cables, OSD/HO; Raines, *Rucksack War*, 480–481, 486.

25. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 132–133; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 16 Nov 1983, folder Grenada (November) 1983, box 9, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

26. Hill to McFarlane, memo, 5 Nov 1983, folder Grenada (11/1/1983–2/29/1984), box 30, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 21 May 1984 (quote), folder Grenada, box 45, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records; Departments of State and Defense, *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection* (Washington, DC: Sep. 1982), 1.

27. Reagan to Weinberger, memo, 12 Nov 1983, folder Grenada (11/1/1983–2/29/1985), box 30, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 13 Nov 1983, folder Grenada (November) 1983, box 9, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

28. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 9 Dec 1983, folder Grenada (December) 1983, box 9, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

29. Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 27 Dec 1983, folder Grenada (December) 1983, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Raines, *Rucksack War*, 510–511.

30. Hill to McFarlane, memo, 23 May 1984, folder Grenada, (3/9/1984–10/31/1984), Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Reagan Library.

31. Koch to Taft, memo, 10 May 1984, folder Grenada, box 45, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records; Hill to McFarlane, memo, 23 May 1984; JCSM-209-84 to Sec Def, 19 Jun 1984, folder Grenada, box 45, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

32. North to Poindexter, memo, 9 Jan 1985; Kimmitt to Platt, memo, 10 Jan 1985: both in folder Grenada (1/11/1984–1/21/1985), box 30, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Reagan Library.

33. Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 8 Nov 1983, folder Grenada (November 1983) box 9, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Weinberger to Reagan, memos, 16 Dec 1983 and 6 Jan 1984, folders 12/16/1984–13/30/184 and 01/02/1984–01/13/1984 respectively, RAC box 5, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, 1981–1984, Reagan Library; Eagleberger to Taft, letter, 23 Feb 1984, folder Grenada, box 45, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

34. Pirnie, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 184–185; Burch to Weinberger, memo, 22 Dec 1983, folder Grenada (December) 1983, box 9, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

35. Burch to Weinberger, memo, 19 Dec 1983, *ibid.*; Pirnie, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 185.

36. Hardisty to Director for Command, Control, and Communications Systems, memo, 22 Oct 1983, folder 2, box 2, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records.

37. Rick Atkinson, “Study Faults U.S. Military Tactics in Grenada Invasion,” *Washington Post*, 6 Apr 1984, 3; Vessey to Price, letter with enclosed Analysis of the Lind Report, 1 May 1984, folder Grenada, box 45, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

38. Analysis of the Lind Report; Benjamin F. Schemmer, “JCS Reply to Congressional Reform Caucus Critique of the Grenada Rescue Operation,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, Jul 1984, 12–14, 18, 99.

39. Pirnie, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 189–190.

40. Powell, *My American Journey*, 302–303; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 441–442.

41. Powell, *My American Journey*, 303, 434; *Weinberger Public Statements 1984*, 4:2459–2464.

42. Pirnie, *Operation Urgent Fury*, 194.

15. Central America, Cuba, and South America

1. Even before the Cuban revolution, Eisenhower overthrew a leftist government in Guatemala. After the Cuban revolution he planned to overthrow Castro. Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs invasion failed to unseat Castro. Johnson sent U.S. marines to the Dominican Republic to prevent a potential communist takeover. In Chile Nixon helped overthrow an elected leftist president, Salvador Allende, considered by Washington to be a Marxist. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 242–249, highlights the consensus on the nature of the problem and the disagreements on how to resolve it.

2. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 91–100.

3. Summary on Conclusions of the 11 February NSC meeting, Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive, <http://www.maragretthatcher.org/document/136579>.

4. Kramer to Weinberger, memos, 3 Feb, 5 Feb, and 9 Feb 1981, folder El Salvador (Jan–Feb) 1981, box 4, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

5. Summary on Conclusions of the 27 February NSC meeting, Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive, <http://www.maragretthatcher.org/document/1365819> (quotes); Allen to Weinberger et al., memo, 28 Feb 1981; Reagan to Weinberger and Haig, memo, 5 Mar 1981: both in folder El Salvador (Mar–Jul) 1981, box 4, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Woodward, *Veil*, 117.

6. West to Weinberger, memo, 13 Jul 1981, folder El Salvador (Mar–Jul) 1981; Carlucci to Casey, undated letter, [1 Sep 1981], folder El Salvador (Aug–Dec) 1981: both in box 4, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; Haig to Reagan, memo, 11 Aug 1981, no folder box 3, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records.

7. The War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541–1548), also known as the War Powers Act, passed on November 7, 1973, over President Nixon’s veto. It required the president to consult with Congress “before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into [a] situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by

circumstances.” In addition, the president was obligated to report to Congress should he “substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces located in a foreign nation.”

8. Executive Summary of the El Salvador Military Assistance report (Woerner Report), [18 Dec 1981], attached to West to Weinberger, memo, 18 Mar 1982, folder El Salvador (Mar–May) 1982, box 3, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; JCSM-403-81 to Sec Def, 22 Dec 1981, folder El Salvador (Aug–Dec) 1981, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

9. Sanchez to Carlucci, memo, 3 Feb 1982, folder El Salvador (Jan–Feb) 1982, box 3, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

10. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 17 Feb 1982; Clark to Reagan, memo with Reagan’s approval, [18 Feb 1982], folder El Salvador, (1/1/82–12/31/84) (4), box 30, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, El Salvador, Reagan Library.

11. Memo for Record by West, seen by Thayer, 2 Feb 1983, folder El Salvador (Jan–Aug) 1983, box 7, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

12. Wheeler to Gregg et al., memo, 22 Feb 1983 (quote); minutes of NSPG meeting, 24 Feb 1983, folder NSPG 005, box 91306, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSPG, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Clark to Weinberger et al., memo attaching “NSDD 82: U.S. Policy Initiatives to Improve Prospects for Victory in El Salvador,” 24 Feb 1983, folder El Salvador, 1983, box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records (quote).

13. Iklé to Weinberger, msg 240214Z, Mar 1983; Hill to Clark, memo, 20 Apr 1983: both in folder El Salvador (Jan–Aug) 1983, box 7, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 290–291.

14. Iklé to Weinberger, memo with attached talking points for Weinberger meeting with Shultz, 7 Mar 1983 (quote); Increase in Security Assistance, undated paper: both in folder El Salvador (Jan–Aug) 1983, box 7, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; U.S. Military Assistance to El Salvador, Department of State briefing paper, 10 Jun 1983, folder El Salvador (1/1/83–1/31/83) (3), box 30, Country File, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library.

15. McFarlane to Shultz, Weinberger, and Vessey, memo, 26 May 1984, folder El Salvador (4/1/84–5/31/8) (3), Country File, box 30, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library; Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 1 Jun 1984, folder El Salvador (Jan–Jun) 1984, box 42, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

16. For Reagan’s determination to prevent another Cuba, see Reagan, *An American Life*, 238–239.

17. Haig, *Caveat*, 123–137; Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 22 Sep 1981, folder Central America (May–23 Oct) 1981, box 1, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records (quotes).

18. Minutes, NSC meeting, 10 Nov 1981, folder NSC 00024, box SR-100, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

19. Minutes, NSC meeting, 16 Nov 1981, folder NSC 00026, *ibid*.

20. Woodward, *Veil*, 173–177; Gates, *From the Shadows*, 245; Steven Emerson, *Secret*

Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era (New York: Putnam, 1988), 121.

21. Talking Points for NSPG meeting, 16 Oct 1981, with attached undated paper and memo; Iklé to Weinberger and Carlucci, 24 Oct 1981: both in folder 334 NSPG, 1981, box 2, Acc 330-83-0144, OSD Records.

22. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 297; Marsh to Weinberger, memo, 9 May 1983, Acc NI01695; Taft to Weinberger, memo, 2 Sep 1983, Acc NI01809 (quotes): both in Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dnsa-collections>, collection “Nicaragua: the making of U.S. Policy, 1978–1990.”

23. *The United States v. Oliver North*, Criminal No. 88-0080-02-GAC, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, circa 6 Apr 1989, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dnsa-collections>, collection “The Iran Contra Affair: The Making of a Scandal, 1983–1988,” Acc IC04305; William M. LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 382–383; Emerson, *Secret Warriors*, 133–135.

24. Emerson, *Secret Warriors*, 136–142, 167–182; LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 384–387.

25. Unsigned and undated memo to Weinberger attaching memo [redacted ISA Israeli Desk Officer] to Armitage, 23 May 1984, 09-F-1077, doc 10; Weinberger to Casey, memo, 30 Mar 1983, 09-F-1077, doc 4; Weinberger to Lehman, memo, 30 Mar 1983, 09-F-1077, doc 5; Weinberger to Casey, memo, 6 May and 8 May 1983, 09-F-1077, doc 6; Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 7 Aug 1984, 09-F-1077, doc 9: all at Executive Services Division FOIA Reading Room, https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOIA/Reading-Room/Reading-Room-List_2/International_Security_Affairs; Secord, *Honored and Betrayed*, 205.

26. [Redacted ISA Israeli Desk Officer], memo for the record, n.d. [after Jul 1984]; [name redacted] to DIA, msg 271545Z, Jul 1984; msg 272203Z, 27 Jul 84; [name redacted] to Armitage, msg 301010A, Jul 84: all in 09-F-1077, doc 12, Executive Services Division FOIA Reading Room, https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOIA/Reading-Room/Reading-Room-List_2/International_Security_Affairs. In November 1986, the Israelis informed the DoD that they were still awaiting payment for Tipped Kettle II. ISA responded that when the U.S. NUMAX Company was purchased by an Israeli Defense Company its employees retained their U.S. security clearances, thus allowing NUMAX to continue to do business with the DoD. According to the ISA, Meron approved this arrangement as payment for Tipped Kettle II weapons. Memo for the record, 3 Nov 1986, *ibid*.

27. Weinberger to Clark, memo, 15 Jan 1982, attached to Childress to Clark, memo, 18 Jan 1982, folder Honduras (11/30/1981–6/15/1982), box 30, Country Files, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Haig, letter, 15 Apr 1982; Security Assistance for Honduras, undated talking paper seen by Carlucci on 14 May 1982: both in folder Honduras, 1982, box 5, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; US/Honduran Cooperation in the Regional Military Training Center, undated information paper;

Embassy Tegucigalpa to State, msg 10104, 16 Sep 1983: both in folder Honduras, 1983, box 9, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Emerson, *Secret Warriors*, 83–97.

28. Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 13 Jul 1983, folder Central America, 1983, box 1, Acc 330-86,-0069, OSD Records; Richard Halloran, “Pentagon Details Honduran Acton,” *New York Times*, 26 Jul 1983, 10; Gerald F. Seib and Walter S. Mossberg, “Reagan’s Rational: U.S. Latin Maneuvers Are Called Bid to Avert Cuban Military Moves,” *Wall Street Journal*, 26 Jul 1983, 1.

29. *CQ Almanac* 39 (1983):132.

30. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 310–318; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, entry 25 Jul 1983, 169.

31. Hill to Stanford et al., memo attaching discussion paper for SIG meeting on 16 Jul 1983, 5 Jul 1983, folder 334 SIG (Jul–Oct) 1983, Acc 330-85-0024, OSD Records; “NSDD 100: Enhanced U.S. Military Activity and Assistance for the Central American Region,” 28 Jul 1983, folder NSDD 100, RAC box 6, Executive Secretariat, NSC NSDD, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

32. Hill to McFarlane, memo with undated attachment “Where Next in Central America,” 20 Dec 1983; McFarlane to Shultz, memo, 27 Dec 1983: both in folder Central America, 1983, box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records.

33. Summary of Kissinger Commission Report, undated briefing paper for Weinberger for meeting with Reagan and the Kissinger Commission seen by Weinberger on 11 Jan 1984; Iklé to Weinberger, memo attaching undated ISA/IA Preliminary Assessment of the Kissinger Commission Report seen by Weinberger on 12 Jan 1984, 11 Jan 1984; Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 1 Feb 1984: all in folder Central America (Jan–Feb) 1984, box 41, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

34. Hill to McFarlane, memo with undated attachment “Where Next in Central America,” 20 Dec 1983.

35. Weinberger to Vessey, memo, 30 Dec 1983, folder Central America (Jan–Feb), 1984, box 41, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records; Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 5 Jan 1984, folder 334 NSPG (Jan–Mar) 1984, box 1, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records; Weinberger to Vessey et al., memo, 12 Jan 1984; McFarlane to Weinberger, memo, 23 Jan 1984: both in folder Latin America-General (12/22/1983–1/24/1984), box 28, Country File, Executive Secretariat, NSC Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library.

36. “NSDD 124: Central America: Promoting Democracy, Economic Improvement, and Peace,” folder NSDD 124, 7 Feb 1984, RAC box 6, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

37. Summary of NSPG meeting, 17 Feb 1984, folder NSPG 0085, box SR-109, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council (quotes); McFarlane for Weinberger, et al., memo, 27 Feb 1984, folder Nicaragua, 1984, box 2, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records.

38. Schultz, *Triumph and Turmoil*, 306–309; Gates, *From the Shadows*, 306–313.

39. Minutes of the NSPG meeting, 25 Jun 1984, folder NSPG 0091, box SR-109, NSC

Institutional Files, National Security Council (quotes); Menges, *Inside the National Security Council*, 351–352.

40. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affairs*, House Report No. 100-433, Senate Report No. 100-216 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987), 38–39; Gates, *From the Shadows*, 311.

41. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 312; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 413; McFarlane to Weinberger, et al., memo, 21 Jul 1984, folder Latin America-General (7/19/1984), box 28, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library.

42. Iklé to Weinberger in South Korea, unnumbered and undated message, [13 Oct 1983?]; Weinberger to Reagan, msg 131405Z, Oct 1984: both in folder Central America (Sep–Dec) 1983, box 40, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

43. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 422–423 (quote on 422); minutes of 30 October 1984 NSC meeting, folder NSC 00110, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Mtgs, Records 1981–1988, Reagan Library (quotes).

44. Gates, *From the Shadows*, 310–311 (quote on 310); Hess, memo for the record, 25 Oct 1984, folder 337 (1984), box 11, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

45. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 424–425 (quote on 424).

46. *Ibid.*, 425–425; Weinberger to McFarlane, memo, 28 Dec 1984, folder Nicaragua (12/27/1984–12/28/1984), box 33, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Reagan Library.

47. JCSM-324-84 to Sec Def, 27 Nov 1984, with attached note: Powell to Weinberger, 24 Dec 1984 (quote), folder Nicaragua, 1984, box 2, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records.

48. Kyle Longley, “An Obsession: The Central American Policy of the Reagan Administration,” in Coleman and Longley, *Reagan and the World*, 223–231. Pardoned were Weinberger, Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, and CIA officials Clair George, Duane Clarridge, and Alan Fiers. Former Deputy National Security Adviser John Poindexter and NSC staffer Oliver North had their convictions vacated on the grounds that the prosecutors used information given to Congress under the promise of immunity.

49. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 30–32 (quote on 31).

50. Allen to Reagan, memo with attached undated memo Haig to Reagan, 30 Jan 1981, folder Cuba (1/4/1981–2/21/1981), box 29, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Haig, letter, 13 Mar 1981 folder Cuba (Jan–8 May) 1981, box 2, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

51. Iklé to Weinberger, memo with undated paper “An Initial Approach for Dealing With Cuba,” 27 May 1981; Talking Paper for Weinberger and Jones for NSC meeting, 4 Jun 1981: both in folder Cuba (May–Dec) 1981, box 2, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

52. Minutes of 4 June 1981 NSC meeting, folder NSC 00012, box SR-99, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council; Allen to Bush, Haig, Weinberger et al., memo, 6 Jun 1981, folder Cuba (9 May–Dec) 1981, box 2, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

53. According to the head of the U.S. interest section in Havana, Wayne Smith, Cubans interpreted Haig’s belligerent statements as evidence of a U.S. intention to invade Cuba.

Cuban officials were unaware of Weinberger's internal opposition. In late October 1981, Castro mobilized Cuban armed forces to repel any potential U.S. invasion. Smith claimed Castro called the Haig bluff and the U.S. backed down. Smith is among the critics who maintained that Castro was willing to make concessions and there was a possibility for better U.S.-Cuban relations and an end to the conflict in El Salvador. According to these critics, Washington spurned Havana's overtures. Wayne S. Smith, *The Closet of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 244–251; Esteban Morales Dominguez and Gary Prevost, *U.S.-Cuban Relations: A Critical History* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 92–94.

54. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 88–91; McFarlane to Reagan, memo, 11 Dec 1984, folder Cuba (12/7/1984–1/16/1985), box 30, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Records 1981–1985, Reagan Library.

55. McFarlane to Reagan, memo with attached undated statement of Weinberger's view, 5 Nov 1983, folder Cuba (11/15/1983), box 29, *ibid*.

56. McFarlane to Reagan, memo, 6 Nov 1982, folder Cuba (11/25/1983), box 29; McFarlane to Reagan, memo, 11 Dec 1984, folder Cuba (12/7/1984–1/16/1985), box 30: both *ibid*; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 29 Nov 1983, folder Cuba, 1983, box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records; Times Wire Services, "Havana to Take Back 2,700 Marielitos U.S. Wants Out," *Los Angeles Times*, 20 Nov 1987, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-11-20-mn-15450-story.html>; "Reinstated '84 Plan Provided For Return of 2,700 to Cuba," *New York Times*, 23 Nov 1987, <https://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/23/us/reinstated-84-plan-provided-for-return-of-2700-to-cuba.html>.

57. Iklé to Weinberger, memo, 13 Dec 1984, folder 000.77, 1984, box 1, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records (quote). For a history of Radio Martí, see Howard H. Frederick, *Cuban-American Radio Wars: Ideology in International Telecommunications* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1986), 25–41.

58. Minutes of 14 Dec 1984 National Security Planning Group Meeting, folder NSPG 0103, box SR-109, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

59. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 75–82.

60. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "U.S. Security in Latin America," *Commentary*, Jan 1981; Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary*, Nov 1979. Robert A. Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001) 67, 82.

61. MJCS 30-81 to Sec Def, 19 Feb 1981, folder Latin America, 1981, box 11; Carlucci to Meyer, memo, 5 May 1981, folder Chile, 1981, box 1: both in Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

62. "NSSD 10-82: U.S. Policy Toward the Americas as a Result of the Falklands Crisis," 23 Jun 1982, folder NSSD 10-82, box 91278, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSSD, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library; handwritten notes of NSC meeting of 23 Nov 1982, folder NSC 00067, SR-102, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

63. "NSDD 71: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America In the Wake of the Falklands Crisis,"

30 Nov 1982, folder NSDD 71, RAC box 4, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

64. Weinberger to McFarlane, memo, 28 Nov 1983; Presidential Determination No. 84-3, 10 Dec 1983: both in folder Argentina (Apr–Dec) 1983, box 1, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Reagan, *An American Life*, 357–360.

65. Hill to McFarlane, memo, 25 Nov 1982; Kimmit to Hill, memo, 24 Dec 1984: both in folder Chile (11/19/1984–12/29/1984), box 29, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Records, 1981–1985, Reagan Library.

16. Libya, Worldwide Terrorism, and Africa

1. Brian L. Davis, *Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 1–22; see also P. Edward Haley, *Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969* (New York: Praeger, 1984). For the full lyrics of the 1981 fake jeans commercial, see <https://snltranscripts.jt.org/81/81akhaddaffi.phtml>, accessed 3 Mar 2023.

2. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 1 Jun 1981, 22 (quote); Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 175 (quote); “NIE 36-5.8: Libya: Aims and Vulnerabilities,” n.d. [after 25 Jan 1981], folder Libya. 1981, box 1, Acc 330-83-0143, OSD Records; memo for the record with attachment “Proposed 16-Step Basic Action Plan,” 19 Mar 1981, folder Libya (Jan–Jun) 1981, box 12, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

3. [REDACTED] folder 020 DOD, box 2, Acc. 330-83-0143, OSD Records; John F. Lehman Jr., *Command of the Seas: Building the 600 Ship Navy* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), 361–362.

4. Carlucci to Clark, letter, 1 Apr 1981, folder Libya (Jan–Jun) 1981, box 12, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records; memo for the record, 16 Apr 1981, folder meetings, box 3, Acc 330-90-0033, OSD Records; Koch to Weinberger through Iklé, memo with attached State paper “U.S. Policy Towards Libya,” 14 May 1981, folder Libya (Jan–Jun) 1981, box 12, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

5. Allen to Bush, Haig, Weinberger, et al., memo, 4 [sic 6] Jun 1981, GALE/CK2349554861, Declassified Documents Online; record of meeting of Ad Hoc Group on Special Naval Exercise off Libya, 7 Jul 1981, folder Libya-Confrontation over Gulf (1), box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Libya, Reagan Library.

6. Memos for record, 20 and 22 Jul 1981; Burt to West et al., memo with attached Issue Paper “Advance Notice of US Naval Exercise off Libya, 10 Jul 1981; Carlucci to Allen, undated memo; Shoemaker through Schweitzer to Allen, memo, 27 Jul 1981, all *ibid*.

7. Minutes of NSC meeting, 31 Jul 1981, folder NSC 00018, box SR-99, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council (quotes); Allen to Reagan, memo, 30 Jul 1981; Inter-agency Intelligence Assessment, “Ramifications of Planned US Naval Exercise in the Gulf of Sidra, 18–20 1981”: both in folder Libya-Confrontation over Gulf (1), box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Libya, Reagan Library.

8. News briefing by Weinberger, 19 Aug 1981; Questions and Answers, n.d. [19 Nov

1981]: both in folder Libya (Jul–5 Sep) 1981, box 12, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records. For an account of the exercise and confrontation, see Daniel P. Bolger, *Americans at War, 1975–1986, An Era of Violent Peace* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988), 169–187.

9. Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 177–178 (quote); Reagan, *An American Life*, 289–291 (quotes).

10. Reagan, *An American Life*, 290–291; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 18 Nov 1981 and 24–30 Nov 1981, 50–51; Gates, *From the Shadows*, 253–254.

11. Minutes of 7 Dec 1981 NSC meetings, folder NSC 00028, box SR-100, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council (quote); minutes of 8 Dec 1981 NSC meeting (quotes), folder NSC 00029, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSC Meetings, Records 1981–1988, Reagan Library.

12. “NSDD 16: Economic and Security Decisions for Libya,” 10 Dec 1981, folder NSDD 16, RAC box 1, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

13. Unattributed undated memo from ISA to Weinberger, [before 21 Jan 1982], folder 334 NSC (1982), box 1, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records; minutes of 21 Jan 1982 NSC meeting, folder NSC 00033, box SR-100, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council.

14. Minutes of 25 Feb 1982 NSC Meeting, folder NSC 00042, box SR-101; “NSDD 27: NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council; Economic Decisions for Libya,” 9 Mar 1982, folder NSDD 0027, RAC box 2, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

15. Clark to Weinberger, memo, 26 Jul 1982; Carlucci to Clark, memo, 6 Aug 1982: both in folder Libya (1982), Acc 300-86-0041, OSD Records.

16. Carlucci to Clark, memo, 6 Aug 1982; West to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 20 Oct 1982; Weinberger, memo for the record, 22 Oct 1983; “NSDD 72: United States Program for the Exercise of Navigation and Overflight Rights at Sea,” 13 Dec 1992, folder NSDD 72, RAC box 4, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

17. Merritt to Weinberger, memo, 5 Dec 1983, folder Libya (1983), box 2, Acc 330-86-0069, OSD Records; Weinberger to Shultz, memo, 28 Mar 1984; Weinberger to McFarlane, memo attached to Weinberger to Shultz, 28 Mar 1984; Powell to Poindexter, memo, 20 Jul 1984: all in folder Libya (1984), box 2, Acc 330-87-0023, OSD Records.

18. Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 14 Feb 1983, 131 (quote); Bremer to Clark, memo attaching paper “Contingency Planning for Possible Libyan attack on Khartoum,” 11 Feb 1983; summary notes for NSPG meeting, 14 Feb 1983: both in folder Sudan (Jan–Jul) 1983, box 24, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

19. West, memo for the record, 16 Feb 1983, folder Sudan (Jan–Jul) 1983, box 24, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 17 Feb 1981, 131 (quote).

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21. Embassy Khartoum to State, msgs 01533 and 01565, 17 and 18 Feb 1983, folder February 1983, box 70, Secretary of Defense Cables, OSD/HO.

22. Davis, *Qaddafi*, 39–40, 49–50; Haley, *Qaddafi and the United States*, 198–218.

23. Davis, *Qaddafi*, 41.

24. Armitage to Weinberger through Iklé, memo, 14 Jul 1983; Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 23 Jul 1983; Clark to Shultz, Weinberger, et al., memo, 1 Aug 1984: all in folder Chad, 1983, box 5, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

25. Vessey comment on Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 2 Aug 1983 (quote); Clark to Reagan, memo, 18 Aug 1983: both in folder Chad, box 5, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Files; Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Diaries*, 11 Aug 1983, 174–175 (quote).

26. Haley, *Qaddafi and the United States*, 320–321.

27. Clark to Shultz, Weinberger, and Baldrige, memo with comment by Weinberger, 9 Sep 1983, folder Libya 1982, box 48, Acc 330-86-0048, OSD Records (quote); Clark to Shultz, Weinberger, and Baldrige, memo, 9 Sep 1983, GALE/CK2349674752, Declassified Documents Online; Armitage to Weinberger, memo, 7 Oct 1983, folder Libya, box 15, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records; Weinberger to Baldrige, letter, 1 Nov 1983, folder Libya, box 15, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records.

28. Minutes of December 1983 NSC Meeting, folder NSC 00097, box SR-104, folder NSC 00028, box SR-100, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council (quotes); Reagan to Shultz, Weinberger, and Baldrige, memo, 9 Dec 1983, folder Libya, 1984, box 15, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records (quote); Reagan, ed. Brinkley, *Reagan Dairies*, 2 Dec 1983, 202 (quote).

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31. Sheridan to Rixse, memo, 26 Feb 1981, folder 000.5 (Jan–Apr) 1981, box 1, Acc 330-83-0102, OSD Records.

32. Sheridan to Rixse, memo with undated Interdepartmental Group/Terrorism approved draft circular msg to all diplomatic posts, 12 Mar 1981, *ibid.* (quotes).

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34. Gary, memo for the record, 18 Jan 1982, folder Jan 1982, box 64; National Military Command Center Significant Event Report, 1 Jun 1982, folder May 1982, box 65: both in Secretary of Defense Cables, OSD/HO; Koch to Weinberger, memo, 15 Dec 1982, folder Germany (Nov–Dec) 1982, box 4, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records; DIA Director Gen.

James Williams to DIA Offices, memo, 30 Jul 1982, GALE/JYONEQ323906939, Declassified Documents Online; David C. Wills, *The First War on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy During the Reagan Administration* (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003), 7–9, 19.

35. Minutes of 10 Jun 1983 NSC Meeting, folder NSC 00082, SR-104, folder NSC 00028, box SR-100, NSC Institutional Files, National Security Council Executive Secretariat, NSC, Institutional Files, National Security Council.

36. *Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act* [Long Commission Report], 20 Dec 1983, 127–133, <https://irp.fas.org/threat/beirut-1983.pdf>.

37. Wills, *The First War on Terrorism*, 30; Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace*, 154–155 (quote).

38. Wills, *The First War on Terrorism*, 24, 27–28, 33–34.

39. [REDACTED] folder Lebanon (1–15 Jan) 1984, box 48, Acc 330-86-0047, OSD Records.

40. Summary of 2 Mar 1983 NSPG Meeting, folder NSC 0086, box 91307, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSPG Meetings, Records, 1981–1987; “NSDD 138: Combating Terrorism,” 3 Apr, 1984 (quotes), folder NSDD 138, RAC box 7, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987: both at Reagan Library; Long Commission Report, section: Recommendations.

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42. Cooke to Weinberger, memo, 7 Nov 1984; Orr to Weinberger, memo with comment by Weinberger, 21 Nov 1984 (quote); Cooke to Weinberger, memo, 9 Dec 1984: all in folder 390.1, box 7, Acc 330-85-0025, OSD Records; Alfred Goldberg, *The Pentagon: The First Fifty Years* (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 1992), 149.

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48. West to Carlucci, memo, 11 Aug 1982, folder Somalia (Feb–Dec) 1982, box 22, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

49. “NSSM 8-82: U.S. Strategy Towards the Horn of Africa,” 12 Apr 1982, folder NSSM 8-82, box 91277; “NSDD 57: United States Policy Towards the Horn of Africa,” 17 Sep 1982, folder NSDD 57, RAC box 3 (quote): both in Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library.

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51. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 498–502.

52. JCSCM-47-81 to Sec Def, 17 Feb 1981 (quote); Weinberger to Haig, letter, 24 Mar 1981; Haig to Weinberger, letter, 9 May 1981 (quote): all in folder Morocco (Jan–Jun) 1981, box 13, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

53. West to Carlucci through Iklé, memo, 21 Jul 1981; Bremer to Rixse, memo, 3 Aug 1981; Carlucci to Hassan, letter, 25 Aug 1981: all in folder Morocco (Jul–Dec) 1981, box 13, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

54. Bengelloum to Haig, letter, 16 Oct 1981, folder Morocco (10/29/81–11/21/81), box 3, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File, Reagan Library (quote); Weinberger to Hassan, letter, 3 Nov 1981; “Morocco–Political Overview,” undated briefing paper for Weinberger’s 3 Dec 1981 stop off in Fez: all in folder Morocco (Jul–Dec) 1981, box 12, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

55. West in Nairobi to Weinberger, msg 122210Z, Nov 1981, *ibid*.

56. Nance to Reagan, memo enclosing Weinberger’s report to the president on Morocco stopover, 7 Dec 1981, *ibid*.

57. West (in Amman) to Weinberger, msg 272220Z, Apr 82, folder April 1982, box 65, Secretary of Defense Cables, OSD/HO.

58. Hassan and Weinberger, memorandum of conversation, 20 May 1982 (quote); Buckley for Shultz, undated memo, [8 May 1982]: both in folder Morocco, 1982, box 12, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

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61. Reed to Weinberger, letter, 21 Sep 1984; Weinberger to McFarlane, memo, 21 Sep 1984: both in folder Morocco (Sep–Dec) 1984, *ibid*.

62. Koch to Weinberger through Iklé, 15 Oct 1984, *ibid*; Mansour O. El-Kikhia, *Libya’s*

Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1998), 122; Harold D. Nelson, ed., *Morocco: A Country Study*, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1985), 288.

63. Office of the Historian, Department of State, “Milestones: 1830–1860, Founding of Liberia,” <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/liberia>, accessed 26 Oct 2016; West to Weinberger, 17 Aug 1982, folder Liberia, 1982, box 12, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

64. [REDACTED] folder Liberia, 1981, box 11, Acc 330-83-0104, OSD Records.

65. Weinberger and Doe, memorandum of conversation, 18 Aug 1982, folder Liberia, 1982, box 12, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records.

66. “NSDD 101: United States Strategy Towards Liberia,” 2 Sep 1983, folder NSDD 101, RAC box 6, Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs, Records, 1981–1987, Reagan Library; Koch to Weinberger through Iklé, memo with attached trip report to Africa, 16 Feb–11 Mar 1983, folder Sudan (Jan–Jul) 1983, box 24, Acc 330-85-0023, OSD Records (quotes).

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68. John-Peter Pham, *Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State* (New York: Reed Press, 2004), 81–91; Jeremy I. Levitt, *The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia: From “Paternalitarianism” to State Collapse* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005), 197–204.

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70. Weinberger to Reagan, unsigned and undated memo, [1 Dec 1981].

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72. Kirkpatrick to Clark, memo, 15 Jul 1983, GALE/CK23494475051; briefing paper for Reagan for Mobutu meeting, 4 Aug 1983, GALE/CK23449557951: both in Declassified Documents Online

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74. Schraeder, *United States Policy toward Africa*, 223.

75. Iklé for Weinberger, memo, 7 Aug 1982, folder Namibia, 1982, box 14, Acc 330-84-0004, OSD Records (quote); Bremer to Stanford et al., memo attaching summary of

conclusions on 2 Sep 1982 IG meeting, 2 Sep 1982, GALE/CK23449061011, Declassified Documents Online.

17. The All-Volunteer Force

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2. Charles C. Moskos Jr., “The Marketplace All-Volunteer Force: A Critique,” 15–16 (quote on 16); Martin Anderson, “The All-Volunteer Force: Decision, History, and Prospects,” 12: both in Bowman, Little, and Sicilia, *All-Volunteer Force*.

3. Robert R. Tomes, *U.S. Defense Strategy*, 3; Perry, *My Journey at the Nuclear Brink*, 35–44; Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 575–592; Richard Van Atta et al., *Transformation and Tradition*, S-1 to S-2.

4. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 508–512; Gary R. Nelson, “The Supply and Quality of First-Term Enlistees Under the All-Volunteer Force,” in Bowman, Little, and Sicilia, *All-Volunteer Force after a Decade*, 29–32. To make matters worse, the Pentagon since 1976 had mistakenly calibrated the AFQT to over grade test takers by placing them in category III (the 31st to 64th percentiles, dubbed average) when they were really in category IV (10th to 30th percentiles, below average). AVF quality was defined as either having a high school diploma or testing in categories I to III of the AFQT.

5. “Military Manpower Strength Assessment, Recruiting and Reenlistment Results for October-December 1980,” News Release No. 48-81, 11 Feb 1981, in chapter 14, DVD documentary annex to Bernard Rostker, *I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006). The documentary annex is an accompanying DVD and includes copies of over 2,300 primary documents arranged by chapters (chapters 14–16 cover the Reagan and Bush years). Documents identified henceforth as “Rostker documents” with the relevant chapter.

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7. Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 522–526; Rostker, *I Want You*, 505–506; Reagan to Hatfield, letter, 5 May 1980, Rostker documents, chapter 14.

8. Military Manpower Task Force, *A Report to the President on Selective Service Registration*, 15 Dec 1981, Rostker documents, chapter 14, 1.

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79. Weinberger to Reagan, memos, 20 Nov 1981 and 4 Jun 1982, folders 11/ 20/1981 and 06/04/1982, RAC box 002; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 20 Aug 1982, folder 08/20/1982, RAC box 003: all in Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, Reagan Library.

80. Clark to Shultz and Weinberger, memo, 23 Jul 1982, folder 105-A (Military Personnel) (18 Jun 1982–2 April 1983), box 18, Acc 218-92-0031, JCS Records.

81. Weinberger to Clark, memo, 2 Aug 1982, folder President, memos to, box I:CL706, Subject Files, 1982, Weinberger Papers; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 3 Dec 1982, folder 03/12/1982, RAC box 003, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, Reagan Library.

82. Weinberger to Reagan, memos, 18 Mar 1983, and 10 Jun 1983, folders 03/18/1983–03/25/1983, and 06/03/1983–06/10/1983, RAC box 004; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 13 Apr 1984, RAC box 005, folder Weekly Reports, 04/13/1984–04/27/1984: all in Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, Reagan Library.

83. “Hanoi’s Objectives viz the POW/MIA Issue,” NSC Concept Paper, [1985], folder POW/MIA Policy, 1976–1985 [1 of 3], box 15, White House Staff and Offices Collections, Childress, Richard T., Files 1981–1985, Reagan Library; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 30 Dec 1983, folder 12/16/1983–12/30/1983, RAC box 005, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, Reagan Library.

84. Remarks by Weinberger at the dedication of the POW/MIA Corridor, 27 Jan 1984, *Weinberger Public Statements 1984*, 1:19–20; Weinberger to Reagan, memo, 11 May 1984, folder 05/11/1984, RAC box 005, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Weekly Reports, Reagan Library (quote); “Remarks at the Memorial Day Ceremonies Honoring an Unknown Serviceman of the Vietnam Conflict,” 28 May 1984, *Reagan Public Papers 1984*, 1:748–750 (quotes on 749 and 750); Ken Ringle, “Honored Symbol: Vietnam War’s Unknown Buried in Arlington Tomb,” *Washington Post*, 29 May 1984, A1. In 1998 the remains of the Vietnam unknown were exhumed. Based on mitochondrial DNA testing he was identified as USAF Lt. Michael J. Blassie, shot down over An Loc, Vietnam, in 1972. His remains were returned to his family and the crypt remained vacant with a plaque honoring the Vietnam MIAs. “Tomb of the Unknown Soldier,” Arlington National Cemetery, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Explore/Tomb-of-the-Unknown-Soldier>.

85. For an expanded view of these developments in the Philippines and South Korea, see Hal Brands, *Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 150–160.

19. Weinberger’s Legacy

1. Powell, *My American Journey*, 25.

2. Those who have compared Cold War secretaries of defense describe Weinberger’s style as “laissez-faire management” and “decentralized ... hands-off management.” Charles A. Stevenson, *SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense* (Washington,

DC: Potomac Books, 2006), 67 (first quote); Richard A. Stubbing, *The Defense Game: An Insider Explores the Astonishing Realities of America's Defense Establishment*, with Richard A. Mendel (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 393 (second quote).

3. The triumphalist literature on how Reagan ended the Cold War is immense. Examples include Paul Kengor, *The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006) and Francis H. Marlo, *Planning Reagan's War: Conservative Strategies and America's Cold War Victory* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012). There are other interpretations. James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Viking, 2009) gives Reagan credit, but believes his genius was to see the opportunity to end the Cold War by negotiation. Books that highlight the impact of other figures, forces, and events as also responsible for ending the conflict include James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), and Brands, *Making the Unipolar Moment*.

——— NOTES ON SOURCES ——— AND SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

THIS HISTORY RELIES IN GOOD PART on six major primary source collections. The first is the official records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the secretary's principal assistants, Record Group (RG) 330 (shortened to *OSD Records* in the endnotes and photo credits). Within this group of records the secretary's files are divided into Top Secret and Secret and Below collections. Materials in them are organized on a numeric and numeric/topical filing system, which are identified in this volume's endnotes as folder titles. This subset of the RG 330 records, comprising many hundreds of boxes, capture the broad range of policy documentation sent to and from the immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense. As such, they represent the top tier of DoD files. Individual OSD officials and offices below the level of the secretary and his major assistants retired their own records as part of RG 330. The OSD records for the Reagan administration are in the process of being transferred to the National Archives.

The records of President Reagan and his National Security Council Staff, at the Reagan Library in Simi Valley, California, were the second major source for this study. These records are well known and often used by researchers of national security policy. A third source is the Institutional Files of the National Security Council in Washington DC, which supplement the Reagan NSC Records, especially for accounts of meetings of the council and related documentation. The fourth important source is the extensive Caspar Weinberger Papers at the Library of Congress. This extremely well-organized collection covers all of Weinberger's long career but contains a large segment on his time as secretary of defense. The records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both in RG 218 and the papers of Chairman General John W. Vessey, USA, at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, together were the book's fifth and sixth principal sources.

Oral histories, including those conducted by the OSD Historical Office staff, the Reagan Library, and other institutions such as the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, are another valuable source. The OSD Historical Office

maintains bibliographical, chronological, and subject files related to the secretary of defense. These records include DoD official reports, press briefings, news briefings, an extensive file of newspaper articles for the Weinberger years, the daily Defense Digest, and other documents. Online collections of newspapers supplemented the digest.

Four volumes of the Department of State's documentary series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, that cover the first Reagan term were published in time to be used in this book. These were the two volumes on the Soviet Union from January 1981 to March 1985, a volume on the first Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I), and the Falklands/Malvinas War volume. Two other useful official collections are the edited volumes of the *Public Statements of Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense*, a facsimile collection prepared by the OSD Historical Office, and the volumes in the *Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan*.

Anyone engaged in primary research knows that the internet has become a powerful research tool. Online collections are usually easy to use and are expanding the scope of their coverage, but as yet they are not a substitute for research in collections at depositories. Of special mention are Gale's Declassified Records System and the equally important Digital National Security Archive, both of which contain declassified documents from the Reagan White House and executive agencies such as the Departments of Defense and State. Another official online source is the Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services' Electronic Freedom of Information Act Reading Room, which provided valuable documentation.

The history of Reagan administration, including the part played by Caspar Weinberger at the Department of Defense, has benefited from a large body of memoirs, official U.S. government histories and secondary monographs. These were used extensively and are listed in the bibliography.

Manuscript Collections

Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (RG 330)

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, and National Archives II, College Park, Maryland

Accession Number	Description
330-83-0102	1981 official records (secret and below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
330-83-0103	
330-83-0104	
330-83-0143	1981 official records (top secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
330-83-0144	
330-83-0145	
330-84-0002	1982 official records (secret and below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
330-84-0003	
330-84-0004	
330-85-0023	1983 official records (secret and below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
330-85-0024	
330-85-0025	
330-86-0041	1982 official records (top secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. 330-86-0042 is accessioned at the National Archives in Top Secret Subject Decimal Files, series ID 25778133.
330-86-0042	
330-86-0043	
330-86-0045	Top secret policy files 1981–1983, 1981 general files
330-86-0046	1984 official records (secret and below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
330-86-0047	
330-86-0048	
330-86-0069	1983 official records (top secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

- 330-87-0023 1984 official records (top secret) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
- 330-90-0033 Official records maintained by the Secretary of Defense for period 1981–1987 originally in Secretary of Defense’s vault.

Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218)

National Archives II, College Park, Maryland

218-92-0030 Official Files of General Charles David C. Jones, 1978–1982

218-92-0031 Official Files of General John W. Vessey, 1982–1985

Presidential Records of Ronald Reagan

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

Executive Secretariat, National Security Council Records

NSC Meetings Files

NSC Planning Group Meetings Records

National Security Study Directives

National Security Decision Directives

Agency File

Country File

Subject File

NSC Weekly Reports to the President

Papers of Caspar Weinberger

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Parts II and II, Department of Defense, 1976–1991

Papers of General John W. Vessey, USA (ret.)

National Defense University, Washington, DC

Personal papers of General Vessey

Photo Sources

Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (RG 330)

National Archives II, College Park, Maryland

Credit line shortened to *OSD Records*

Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office Photo Collection

Washington, DC, and <https://www.flickr.com/photos/osdhistory/albums>

Credit line shortened to *OSD/HO Photo Collection*

Papers of Caspar Weinberger

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Credit line shortened to *Weinberger Papers*

White House Photography Collection

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