HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE TEST OF WAR
1950-1953
The Test of War, the second volume in the planned comprehensive History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, follows the evolution of OSD from the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 to the end of the Truman presidency in January 1953. Like the first volume in the series (The Formative Years, 1947-1950), the present one focuses on the secretaries of defense, their staffs, and OSD’s administration of the Pentagon and examines, beyond OSD and the Department of Defense, the larger framework of national security organization and policy that involved the White House, Congress, and other agencies of the government.

As the central event of this period, the Korean War tested the mettle of officials and institutions throughout the national security establishment, but nowhere more acutely than in the E-ring offices of the Pentagon leadership. The Korean-era secretaries of defense—Louis Johnson, George Marshall, and Robert Lovett—confronted a maze of problems relating to strategy, budgets, manpower, weapons development, and service roles and missions. Operating under wartime pressures while attempting to manage a department only recently created and still undergoing major adjustments, they faced a formidable agenda made even more difficult by domestic political and economic constraints that narrowed the options available to them.

In a narrative rich in both documentary detail and broad-brush perspective, The Test of War assesses how well the secretaries met these challenges. Success or failure depended not only on their effectiveness in managing the Pentagon bureaucracy, in particular their interaction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the still parochial-minded military services, but also on their relationship with Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and a contentious Congress unhappy over the firing of MacArthur, the pace of mobilization, and the progress of the war generally.

Korea, of course, was the flash point for a much wider struggle unfolding during this

Continued on back flap
time, the effort by the United States to contain the expansionist activities of the Soviet Union and communism. As the conflict in the Far East dragged on seemingly indefinitely, officials in Washington turned their attention increasingly to Europe and the strengthening of the Western alliance. Much of the book deals with the shaping of NATO and the related subject of military assistance.

In a thoughtful conclusion, The Test of War observes that the precedents established in these seminal years—the beginnings of a military-industrial complex, the changing strategic formulations that allowed for reliance on nuclear as well as conventional weapons, the sharp debate over European vs. Asian priorities, and, above all, the staunch and expensive commitment to containment—would influence national security policy and the U.S. defense effort for the remainder of the century.

DORIS M. CONDIT received her A.B. and M.A. degrees from George Washington University. She has held various historical and research positions with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Historical Division, The Johns Hopkins University, American University, and the American Institutes for Research. Mrs. Condit is the author of or collaborator on numerous military-political studies relating to war and conflict, including Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict (3 vols.), and Modern Revolutionary Warfare—An Analytical Overview.
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Foreword

This volume is the second in the series planned for the History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This series is intended to present a scholarly, objective, and critical history of OSD with primary focus on national security policy and decisions relating thereto.

Volume II presents the Washington background of the Korean War and other momentous events—international and domestic—from the perspective of the highest levels of government. It is concerned with what the Truman administration, and especially OSD, JCS, and the military services, were doing in response to these events. It seeks to weave together strategic planning, force programming, budgetmaking, creation of military forces, direction of the Korean War, collective security efforts, and military assistance, and to assess the impact of all of these phenomena on OSD and the Department of Defense. If there seems to be much stress on controversy and differences of opinion in detailing the process of making policy and strategy decisions, it should be borne in mind that planners and policymakers are normally concerned with unsettled questions that inevitably provoke prolonged discussion, argument, and dispute. Such examination of process may help provide perspective and historical awareness to those who must make decisions today and in the future.

The early stages of war or periods of prolonged international tension are the real test of defense policies because of the high level of uncertainty and the limited military resources usually available to implement policy and strategy. The emphasis in this volume, therefore, is properly on the first year of the war and the early grappling with collective security and military assistance. For a better understanding of this early period, adequate attention to the background and setting is indispensable. Much significant information not previously available is presented in this volume.

Military operations in Korea are treated only to the extent necessary to understand plans and strategic and political decisions. The space devoted to
military operations in Korea and Indochina varies with their significance in
the larger context of events. But because detail is necessary to establish the
essential discipline of the subject, the author has sought as far as possible to
let the facts tell their own story, to say how and why things happened. But she
has not shirked the historian's duty of indicating conclusions to which the
evidence seems to point.

The author, Doris M. Condit, holds A.B. and A.M. degrees from the
George Washington University and served as a historian with the Historical
Division of the U.S. Army Engineer Corps, the Operations Research Office of
The Johns Hopkins University, and the American Institutes for Research. She is
the author of a number of political-military studies, including *Case Study in
Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II* and *Modern Revolutionary
Warfare—An Analytical Overview*.

This publication has been reviewed and its contents declassified and
cleared for release by concerned government agencies. Although the manu-
script itself has been declassified, some of the official sources cited in the
volume may remain classified. This is an official publication of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, but the views expressed are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

ALFRED GOLDBERG
Historian, OSD
This second volume of the History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) covers the period from June 1950 to January 1953. It treats mainly the problems confronting the secretary of defense and his department as a result of the North Korean invasion of South Korea and President Truman's decision that the United States should go to the aid of the South Koreans. The Korean War raised strategic questions that had to be addressed immediately. The secretary of defense and other U.S. officials groped to create a coordinated policy that would meet a range of possible perils. President Truman stated the broad outlines of policy in July 1950: The United States would fight in Korea, build up overall U.S. strength, and create a worldwide collective security network.

The United States adhered to this basic policy throughout the Korean War years in the face of other fateful changes in the international scene. The Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in November 1950 multiplied strategic and tactical difficulties and created a dilemma over the possible escalation of the war. Although armistice talks began in July 1951, the Chinese Communists and North Koreans refused to complete a mutually acceptable agreement, thus confronting the administration with the question of how to win militarily without escalating the conflict. Meanwhile, limited military operations in Korea continued for two more years, causing many casualties and further complicating already formidable U.S. domestic and international problems. If nothing seemed certain at the beginning of the war, little could be taken for granted during its later stages. In the end, the death of Stalin and internal Soviet affairs may have had more to do with ending the war than any U.S. actions.

The beginning of war in June 1950 confronted the three-year-old Department of Defense with an immediate challenge to fight and to prepare for other anticipated contingencies. The United States undertook to revitalize and rearm NATO and to find a way to bring still-occupied West Germany into the service
of Western European defense. In Asia, the Korean War intensified concern about the security of Indochina, establishment of a new peaceful relationship with Japan, and creation of a collective security network in the Pacific. Military assistance became a worldwide undertaking of the Department of Defense. Although no atomic weapons were used in Korea, the wartime period saw great growth in nuclear technology, both in the United States and the Soviet Union.

Under wartime pressures, the secretary of defense truly became the president's deputy for military affairs. As a member of the National Security Council and a major actor in the determination of U.S. policy, he also played a key role in international affairs, particularly in NATO. Through his power over the Defense budget, he was the arbiter of problems between the military services, including the critical controversy over military roles and missions that erupted once again in the FY 1953 budget battles. It was also his duty to maintain a proper balance of civil and military power within the Department, not an insignificant problem in view of the sometimes conflicting roles of the military department secretaries and the chiefs of staff and the resistance of the military services to OSD control.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense grew in size and importance in response to the rapid increase in the growth and complexity of defense problems. The country's need for military forces caused Marshall to elevate the manpower function to the assistant secretary level. The imperative of collective security and a much-enlarged military assistance program greatly enhanced the role of the secretary's assistant for international security affairs. Wartime experiences led to the recasting of other elements of OSD, particularly the logistical and research and development functions.

The present work is concerned with policy and the decision-making process. At the level of the secretary of defense, the interaction between military, diplomatic, and political policy and action increased markedly and became more complex and significant during these years. The development of U.S. national security policy depended on a close and cooperative relationship between the Departments of State and Defense, such as prevailed during Marshall's and Lovett's terms as secretary.

The large number of topics addressed in this volume made it desirable to adopt a thematic approach. The opening chapters set the stage, and subsequent chapters are grouped topically, beginning with those covering the Korean War and other events in Asia. Later chapters deal with the relationship of strategic plans and programs to Defense budgetary developments, NATO matters, military assistance, nuclear weapons, and internal organizational problems. Despite the brief span of time covered by the volume and the large number of subjects it considers, there are some areas of Defense interest that
are not covered in any detail: overseas base rights and construction problems, logistics and industrial mobilization matters, intelligence, and Latin American and Middle Eastern affairs. Some of these subjects may be treated by later volumes in this series.

What makes a Defense history of 1950–53 of particular concern almost half a century later is that the United States is still grappling with many of the same problems it faced then. The East–West confrontation still exists. Questions of European defense and NATO viability continue to be persistent and vital. Korea remains divided between North and South, and the United States maintains a military presence in Korea and Japan.

While Southeast Asia has diminished as a focus of U.S. interest, Japanese rearmament has become a major question for both the Japanese and the Americans. U.S. ties with Australia and New Zealand have tended to loosen, but the underlying need for cooperation in the face of future military danger remains real. The most dramatic and positive achievement seems to be the rapprochement with the People's Republic of China, a prime military antagonist during the Korean War. Not only are many of the questions the same or similar, but there is still a deep perplexity over how to deal with them. How much military strength the United States needs and how much it can afford are as vital questions today as in 1950–53. That earlier period also illuminates the relationship between defense policy and domestic support for the administration. For an understanding of the genesis of the national defense problems and ideas that confront the nation today, the Korean War period is seminal.

* * * * *

This work has observed certain conventions. Abbreviations have been used to save space; any doubts may be resolved by consulting the glossary, although each abbreviation is explained the first time it occurs. Painstaking efforts have been taken with statistical tables, but it is possible that they may not agree with other tables found elsewhere. It is probably wise to view statistical tables as indicators of effort rather than as absolutes. Every effort has been made to avoid technical terms or to explain them at first use.

The research entailed in this undertaking was an immense task, made easier by the help of many persons. I particularly want to thank the resourceful and knowledgeable archivists and librarians in the Military Reference Branch of the National Archives and Records Administration, the Harry S. Truman Library, and the Pentagon Library. In addition, a number of fellow historians shared documents and graciously pointed the way to additional materials. These included Roger M. Anders of the Department of Energy; Helen M. Bailey and Walter S. Poole of the JCS Historical Division; Robert J.
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I am deeply indebted to the many government officials of the period who, despite the burden of their daily schedules, shared their memories in interviews with the author. They made the documentary trail come alive with anecdotes and opinions that had never previously found their way onto paper. I am especially grateful to Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, General J. Lawton Collins, George M. Elsey, William C. Foster, Henry Glass, Nathaniel H. Goodrich, W. Averell Harriman, Robert LeBaron, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Marx Leva, Robert A. Lovett, Wilfred J. McNeil, Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols, John H. Ohly, and General George V. Underwood, Jr. The volume leans heavily on these first-hand accounts of events.


I have been the fortunate recipient of much help and support from colleagues and friends in the OSD Historical Office. Harry B. Yoshpe, who initiated work on Volume I in this series, was a valued friend and giver of information. Steven L. Rearden, author of Volume I, with whom I shared many perplexities and problems, was a constant source of useful advice and encouragement. Richard M. Leighton and Robert J. Watson, who respectively are writing the two volumes that follow this one, have leavened friendship with sage counsel and sensible solutions to problems. Maurice Matloff and Max Rosenberg have read and commented helpfully on various chapters. Samuel A. Tucker offered invaluable advice in identifying and locating files
and papers still within the Pentagon, as well as reading and criticizing draft chapters. To Alice C. Cole, Stuart I. Rochester, and Roger R. Trask, I am especially grateful for their hard work in reading and commenting on the substance and form of the entire volume. Debra O. Langdon helped to prepare the bibliography. Gloria M. Morgan provided much-needed and appreciated administrative support. To Ruth E. Sharma, whose patience and good will were exemplary, I owe a great debt of gratitude for the careful and precise typing of numerous drafts.

Special recognition is due two persons intimately involved with this work. I am deeply indebted to Alfred Goldberg, OSD historian and the general editor of this series, for the chance to write this volume, for his penetrating and perceptive insights, and for his skill in bringing the volume to publication. And to my husband, Kenneth W. Condit, who has borne with such grace the cross of a second historian in the family, go my greatest thanks for his unending patience, rectitude, and wise advice whenever I asked.

DORIS M. CONDIT
Contents

I. Prelude to War ........................................... 1
   The Perception of Danger ................................ 2
   A Reexamination of Policy: NSC 68 ....................... 6
   A Catalyst of Decision .................................... 10

II. The Role of the Pentagon ............................... 13
   The Secretaries of the Military Departments ........... 16
   The Office of the Secretary of Defense ................ 17
   Preparations for War .................................... 28
   First Months of War ..................................... 31
   September 1950: A New Team ............................ 34

III. The North Korean Attack .............................. 41
   A Divided Korea ......................................... 41
   Combating Aggression .................................... 47
   The United Nations Command ............................. 55
   Finding U.S. Troops for Korea ........................... 58
   Policy in Pursuit of Events ............................. 62
   Defeat of the North Koreans ............................. 65

IV. The Chinese Entry into the War ....................... 71
   Early Views of Chinese Intentions ...................... 71
   The Northern Borders ................................... 73
   Enemy Sanctuary and MacArthur's Mission ............... 77
   Continuing the UN Ground Offensive .................... 81
   Response to Defeat ..................................... 83
   The Question of a Cease-Fire ............................ 87
   The Possibility of UNC Withdrawal ...................... 91

V. A Policy of Limited War ............................... 97
   A New Toughness ........................................ 98
   Across the 38th Again .................................... 99
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IX. Formosa: A Reversal of Policy</th>
<th>173</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neutralization and Assistance</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of the Chinese Intervention in Korea</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Policy: NSC 48/5</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC 128: The Failure to Find an Offensive Mission</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X. Japan: A New Relationship</th>
<th>187</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situation in June 1950</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A State-Defense Agreement</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of Chinese Intervention in Korea</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toward a Peace Treaty</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security in the Pacific</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Treaty Problems and Policy</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Start on Rearmament</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XI. Indochina: The Threat in Southeast Asia</th>
<th>205</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect of the Korean War</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moves to Stem the Tide</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Differences and NSC 124/2</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declining Fortunes</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. A Budget for Korea—FY 1951</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Basic Budget and First Supplemental</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Long Term: NSC 68</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Second Supplemental</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Final Supplement</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII. A Budget for Rearmament—FY 1952</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Beginnings</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the Chinese Intervention</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Service Requests</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fiscal Year 1952 Budget</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too Much or Too Little?</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Outcome</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV. A Stretchout Budget—FY 1953</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for Immediate Expansion</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Status of Mobilization: NSC 114/1</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Force Levels for FY 1952 and FY 1953</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completing the Military Program: NSC 114/2</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovett’s FY 1953 Budget Request</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman’s Decision to “Stretch Out”</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fight in Congress</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV. The Last Truman Budget</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Continuing Problem: Korean Combat Costs</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of Programs: NSC 135</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reappraisal of Objectives and Strategy</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1954 Estimates</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovett’s Review of Service Requests</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1953 Supplement and FY 1954 Budget</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI. NATO: The Defense of Europe</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Organization in Mid-1950</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning for NATO Defense</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Rearmament</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New York Meeting</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall, Moch, and the Pleven Plan</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadlock and Compromise</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The December Meetings</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII. Building a NATO Structure</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Challenges to NATO</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Adjustments</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1952 Reorganization of NATO</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two New NATO Members</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain and Yugoslavia</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NATO Military Command</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII. Increasing NATO Strength</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NATO Defense &quot;Gap&quot;</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempts to Close the Gap</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Requirements</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO's Military Status</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The German Contribution</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory, Defeat, and Resurrection</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX. Organization for Military Assistance</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration in June 1950</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Changes</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mutual Security Act of 1951</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further Reorganization</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions in Washington</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX. Growth of Military Assistance</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of the Korean War</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing a FY 1952 Request</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The FY 1952 Appropriations</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Budget for FY 1953</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Proposal for FY 1954</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXI. Implementing Military Assistance</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations through June 1951</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Quest for Deliveries in FY 1952</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battles over Priority</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offshore Procurement</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Legacy of Military Assistance</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXII. OSD Nuclear Responsibilities</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentagon Arrangements</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of Atomic Information</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment, Custody, and Use</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding the Atomic Weapons Stockpile</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Guided Missiles</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production of Nonnuclear Components</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Thermonuclear Test</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIII. The Search for Greater Efficiency</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Inner Office</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money, Legislation, and Foreign Military Matters</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Importance of Manpower</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Policies</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Information Function</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Mobilization</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Munitions Board Dilemma</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Research and Development Board</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Contents

| XXIV. The Civil-Military Dimension | 513 |
| The Military | 516 |
| The Service Secretaries | 523 |
| Lovett's Report on Unification | 525 |
| XXV. Conclusion | 533 |

### List of Abbreviations

- Notes: 543
- Note on Sources and Selected Bibliography: 659
- Index: 685

### Charts

1. Office of Secretary of Defense, 23 May 1950  
   - faces 18
2. Channels of Command in Korea, July 1951  
   - 118
   - 313
4. NATO After April 1952  
   - 346
5. Key NATO Military Personnel, January 1952  
   - 364
6. Organization for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, June 1950  
   - 398
7. U.S. Coordinating Organization for Military and Economic Assistance, Mid-1951  
   - 403
8. U.S. Organization for Mutual Security Programs in European NATO Countries, 1952  
   - 408
9. Office of Secretary of Defense, 15 October 1952  
   - 510

### Tables

1. Ammunition Supply  
   - 160
2. Strength of Forces Authorization Before and After North Korean Invasion  
   - 225
3. Development of FY 1951 Strength and Force Levels  
   - 238
4. FY 1951 End Strengths Authorized and Budgeted  
   - 240
5. FY 1951 Appropriations  
   - 241
6. Development of FY 1952 Defense Budget  
   - 252
7. Development of FY 1952 Strength and Force Levels  
   - 255
8. FY 1952 Appropriations  
   - 259
9. Development of FY 1953 Strength and Force Levels  
   - 278
10. Development of FY 1953 Defense Budget  
    - 279
11. FY 1953 Basic Appropriation  
    - 283
12. FY 1953 Appropriations  
    - 284
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Development of FY 1954 Strength and Force Levels</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Proposed FY 1954 Budget</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>The Gap: DC-28 Requirements Less Planned Contributions</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>TCC/SCS Recommendations</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>NATO Force Goals Accepted at Lisbon</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>End CY 1953 NATO Strength Goals Compared</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>FY 1952 Foreign Aid Programs</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>FY 1952 Mutual Security Appropriations</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Defense Action on Military Assistance</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Korean War Expenditures as Percentage of GNP and Total Government</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Photographs follow pages 130 and 418.*
History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

The Test of War, 1950–1953
CHAPTER I
Prelude to War

Not quite three years had elapsed since the creation of the Department of Defense when the North Koreans surged across the 38th parallel into South Korea in the predawn hours of 25 June 1950 in what was to be the start of a three-year war. In Washington it was the afternoon of 24 June, a quiet summer Saturday. President Truman was away from the capital, visiting his family home in Independence, Missouri; Secretary of State Dean Acheson was relaxing at his farm in Maryland. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, accompanied by General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had returned to Washington only that morning after a visit to General Douglas MacArthur in Japan. While Bradley, who was sick, went home to bed, Johnson spent a few hours at the Pentagon that afternoon. Neither man was aware of the stark act of aggression 12,000 miles away that overnight would stir the nation from its summer doldrums.1

First word of the invasion of South Korea arrived in a United Press bulletin from Seoul, Korea, broadcast over Station WRC in Washington at 8:49 p.m. The United Press Bureau in the capital, which had released the bulletin to its clients, immediately queried the State Department and General Bradley about the report, but neither knew anything. The United Press also notified the president’s Kansas City office of the event. The State Department received the first official news in a coded cable from Ambassador John J. Muccio in Seoul only at 9:26 p.m.2

As reports of the North Korean onslaught reached Washington, startled State Department and military officials on duty immediately sought further information from Korea. Around 10:00 that evening Secretaries Acheson and Johnson were notified; shortly after, Acheson called Truman. While the State Department planned to seek the support of the United Nations to stop the aggression, the Army set up a communications network to the Far East.
Although Johnson and Bradley carried out a scheduled trip to Norfolk the next day, they returned to confer with the president that Sunday evening in the first of a series of meetings that would mark a major turning point in U.S. national security policy.5

The Perception of Danger

The strength and constancy of the North Korean drive deep into South Korea convinced U.S. leaders that a serious Communist challenge to the West had begun. It was a conclusion that accorded with their perception of events since 1945.

The Truman administration and a growing number of Americans in June 1950 saw the USSR, despite its participation on the Allied side in World War II, as a threat to the United States and the world. As Louis Johnson told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the time, “Soviet intentions must be judged from their actions. They do not permit complacency.” U.S. officials remembered that at the end of World War II Soviet troops had occupied Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and that with Soviet aid local Communist parties had soon transformed these countries into Soviet satellites. Albania had declared itself a “people’s republic” in January 1946 and joined the Cominform in 1950. In early 1948 a Soviet-supported coup brought Czechoslovakia into the Communist bloc. In Eastern Europe, only Yugoslavia—whose Communist government under the World War II leader Tito (Josip Broz) had broken with the Kremlin in 1948—remained independent in 1950. For the rest, Soviet domination was so complete that Winston Churchill’s famous reference to an “iron curtain” having descended over Eastern Europe seemed more real than symbolic.5

Efforts to extend Communist control over other adjacent non-Communist countries had also alarmed the West. Soviet control or domination of northern Iran was only narrowly averted in 1946. That year also Communist guerrillas in Greece, with support from nearby Communist nations, began a three-year war to gain control of that country. Turkey also believed itself to be in danger. In divided Germany, where the prewar capital, Berlin, although in the Soviet zone, was under four-power control, the Soviets imposed in mid-1948 a complete blockade of the city’s surface transportation links to the West, making necessary an airlift to supply its western zone.

The Truman administration had also been concerned about Communist advances in Asia. When the long civil war in China ended in late 1949 with the defeat and flight to Formosa (Taiwan) of the Nationalist forces of Chiang
Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)* and the victory of the Communists led by Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), the Soviets immediately tried to expel Chiang’s representative from the UN Security Council. When this effort failed, the Soviets began a boycott of the council. On 14 February 1950 Moscow signed a 30-year treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance with Peking. In Malaya, the Philippines, and Indochina, widespread guerrilla warfare flared after World War II, with Communist support or leadership of these movements. A new government in Indonesia seemed vulnerable to a Communist takeover. In North Korea a Communist government tried by propaganda, provocation, and guerrilla tactics to subvert the unstable non-Communist government in South Korea. Indeed, Defense Secretary Johnson told two congressional committees in early June 1950 that he considered the problems in the area of China even more difficult than those of Europe.6

Although the postwar perception of the Soviet Union as an unfriendly adversary rather than an ally had been gradually accepted by most Americans, they hoped that the United Nations would be able to maintain international order in the face of this potential menace, sparing the United States large military commitments. President Truman, pushing to balance the budget and reduce the huge wartime debt and worried about the possibility of inflation stemming from the pent-up demand for consumer goods, pursued a policy of retrenchment. As a result, the U.S. armed forces, which had reached a peak strength of 12 million during World War II, were hastily demobilized and defense appropriations were radically trimmed.7

The Truman programs to counter Soviet moves were generally reactive and preventive but constituted a significant expansion of the American concept of security. In early 1947, when the United States took over from a nearly bankrupt United Kingdom the responsibility for helping Greece and Turkey to stand against Communist pressures, Truman announced a doctrine of aid to countries threatened by such aggression. The United States supplied economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey and sent a military mission to Greece. In June 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall publicly offered U.S. aid to help restore the economies of war-torn Europe, including the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries in his proposal. The Soviets, however, forced the Poles and Czechs to withdraw their acceptances, an act that British Prime Minister Clement Attlee later called a “declaration of the ‘cold war’.” With the 1948 crises in Czechoslovakia and Berlin at hand, Congress appropriated more than $6 billion for worldwide assistance, earmarking $4 billion in Marshall Plan funds for the Western European nations.8

* Chinese names are spelled as they appear in documents of the time; the pinyin system of transliteration is given in parentheses after the first appearance of the name.
Alarmed by the unsettled international situation, the United States took a bold and unprecedented peacetime step, signing on 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty, a 12-nation mutual defense pact. In July 1949 Congress approved the treaty and later appropriated $1.3 billion for military assistance, of which $1 billion was for Europe. It also approved $5.7 billion for economic aid, including more than $4.7 billion for the Marshall Plan countries. By mid-1950, however, despite this assistance, Western European economies still lagged behind their prewar levels. Moreover, the weak state of NATO defenses lent credence to the widely held view that a Soviet attack on Western Europe would achieve substantial early success.9

Having successfully countered Communist moves in Iran, Berlin, and Greece, the Truman administration kept U.S. forces at a modest strength. Determined to pay off the $247 billion public debt and balance the government’s books, Truman held the total Pentagon request for FY 1949, covering 1 July 1948 through 30 June 1949, to $13.2 billion in new obligational authority; when Congress added $822 million for extra Air Force procurement, the president refused to spend the money. In early 1949 Truman limited the FY 1950 Department of Defense (DoD) request to $14.3 billion in new obligational authority, overriding military protests that the amount would not support even current strength levels and the plea of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal for at least $16.9 billion.10 Replacing Forrestal with Louis A. Johnson in the spring of 1949, Truman reduced the military budget ceiling for FY 1951 to $13 billion and, even after the successful Soviet atomic explosion in August 1949, raised the request to only $13.4 billion. When Congress appropriated $14.35 billion for FY 1951, including $851 million extra for the Air Force, Truman impounded the extra money. These sums, small when compared with World War II budgets, were still huge by prewar standards; in any case, Truman had no intention of allowing the United States to “default through bankruptcy.” Neither had the Congress. Prior to June 1950 there developed no congressional groundswell for any major increase in military spending.11

As a result of Truman’s actions, U.S. troop levels remained low, although far higher than before World War II. In 1947 Truman had advocated allowing the draft to lapse, but the Czechoslovakian and Berlin crises of 1948 led him to ask for a new Selective Service Act of two years’ duration, making 19- through 25-year-old men liable for 21 months’ service and setting the maximum strength of U.S. armed forces at slightly over 2 million, a historic high for peacetime. The president’s attempt to secure universal military training, however, proved highly unpopular and he eventually withdrew the proposal. In mid-1950 total U.S. military strength approximated 1,460,000. Although Johnson claimed in March that the Army was “stronger today than
at any time since the end of the war," all but 1 of its 10 divisions were understrength and lacking in equipment. Defending an administration request for a three-year extension of the draft in early June 1950, Johnson pointed to the need to maintain a position of readiness and an alert posture because of international tensions, the Soviet atomic explosion, and the aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union.12

The administration's reluctance to embrace a large U.S. military buildup despite the troubled state of the world reflected its belief that a large rearmament program might be provocative, that it would undoubtedly have inflationary effects, and that the U.S. atomic monopoly could offset Soviet strength in conventional forces. When the USSR exploded its own atomic device in August 1949, in advance of most predictions, the U.S. monopoly ended.13 Apprehension about the pace of Soviet nuclear development mounted in late January 1950, when the British government informed the Truman administration that it planned to charge Dr. Klaus Fuchs, a German-born nuclear physicist working in the British atomic program, as a Soviet agent. Because Fuchs had had access to U.S. information on nuclear weapons—including a theoretically possible fusion or hydrogen bomb believed to be far more powerful than the atomic bomb—Washington officials worried about the extent of his revelations and the possibility that the Soviet nuclear program might be more advanced than they had previously thought.14

The Fuchs crisis, which broke publicly on 2 February 1950, occurred at a time of growing fear in the United States over Communist subversion. Trials of persons accused of subversive activities or spying for the Soviets had already occurred. After Secretary of State Acheson publicly defended Alger Hiss, a former State Department official who was convicted in January 1950 of perjury concerning his Communist connections, many believed the government to be riddled with Communists. This fear provided the lightning rod for vicious political attacks on Acheson and on administration policies; many persons linked "communism in government" with the "loss of China" to Mao Tse-tung. Acheson fought the demands of the congressional "China Lobby" for U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek to help him regain the mainland. Republican Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin became a national figure by manipulating fears of an internal Communist threat; other Republican leaders, including Ohio Sen. Robert A. Taft, supported or tolerated McCarthy's attacks on the Truman administration. In Congress the bipartisan approach to foreign policy faltered, and Truman remained vulnerable to the charge of being "soft on communism" for the rest of his term in office.15

On 31 January 1950, Truman took two important steps in response to the new Soviet atomic capability. First, he ordered development of a thermonuclear bomb to the testing stage. Second, he directed the secretaries of state and
defense to reexamine U.S. objectives and plans in the light of the Soviet atomic breakthrough. After Fuchs's arrest, Johnson in late February urged the president to "proceed forthwith on an all-out program" to develop the H-bomb, including the means for its production and delivery. Although appalled by the costs, Truman on 10 March declared the project of the "highest urgency" and ordered planning for production should the H-bomb prove feasible. On 8 June he approved construction of a facility that could produce material needed for the H-bomb but which would also be useful for expansion of the A-bomb program should the H-bomb fail. He had not yet made up his mind about the policy review that he had ordered, now known as NSC 68.16

A Reexamination of Policy: NSC 68

The men who prepared NSC 68 included Paul H. Nitze, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, who chaired the group; Maj. Gen. Truman H. Landon (USAF), who represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Maj. Gen. (USA Ret.) James H. Burns, who represented Secretary Johnson.17 In February 1950, during the course of the review group's work, George F. Kennan—one of the State Department's Russian experts, and at the time the department's counselor—in a paper for Acheson expressed doubt that the cold war had "suddenly taken some drastic turn to our disadvantage." He felt that current U.S. policies were generally valid, although military emphases were disproportionately prominent, and advocated ending U.S. strategic dependence on the atomic weapon, even if this meant "a state of semimobilization, involving some form of compulsory military service and drastic measures to reduce the exorbitant costs of national defense."18

In the end, NSC 68 presented an alarming view of the international scene. It pictured the Soviet leadership as intent on retaining absolute power in all areas under its control, extending its authority and eliminating effective opposition, dominating the Eurasian land mass, and subverting or destroying its principal enemy, the United States. Possessing an atomic capability in addition to conventional armed forces far larger than required to defend their national borders, the Soviets commanded a "great coercive power for use in time of peace." While the Soviets probably did not "intend deliberate armed action involving the United States at this time," NSC 68 observed that war could still occur through miscalculation or misinterpretation.19

The Joint Chiefs judged that if war began in 1950 Soviet forces would probably overrun most of Western Europe, drive toward the oil regions of the Middle East, consolidate their gains in the Far East, strike by air against the
United Kingdom, launch air and sea attacks in the Atlantic and Pacific, and use atomic weapons on selected targets. Looking ahead, the study forecast that conditions would deteriorate still further; U.S. intelligence estimated that the Soviets might possess 10 to 20 atomic bombs by mid-1950 and a stockpile of 200 by mid-1954. The year 1954 was therefore a critical date, since "delivery of 100 atomic bombs on targets in the United States would seriously damage this country."²⁰

NSC 68 emphasized that for the United States to "survive and flourish" it needed to maintain a healthy international community and contain the Soviet system "by all means short of war." This required reducing Soviet control and influence and forcing Soviet adherence to generally accepted standards of international behavior. NSC 68 expressed the fear that, without sufficient military strength to guarantee national security and make containment credible, the United States would be reduced to a "policy of bluff." The report viewed the current U.S. atomic superiority as a mixed blessing, since a successful atomic strike on the Soviet Union probably would not cause the USSR to surrender or prevent it from occupying Western Europe, while use of atomic weapons might prove "morally corrosive" to the American people and at best only gain time to develop general military superiority. "The risks we face," NSC 68 averred, "are of a new order of magnitude."²¹

Considering how to meet the Soviet threat, NSC 68 rejected three options—continuance of the current situation, reversion to a policy of isolation, or resort to preventive war. Rather, it recommended building up the free world's political, economic, and military strength, including conventional U.S. forces, to a level sufficient to support foreign commitments and protect against disaster. If war could be avoided, such military strength would allow renewed political and economic initiatives. Above all, NSC 68 stressed, the United States must complete its military buildup while it still possessed a powerful atomic deterrent.²²

To a large extent NSC 68 reaffirmed the conclusions that Kennan had drafted for NSC 20/4, approved in 1948. Like the earlier report, NSC 68 held that, short of war, the United States should seek to reduce Soviet power and influence in perimeter areas and encourage satellite independence, foster attitudes among the Soviet people that might modify Soviet governmental behavior, and create situations to compel acceptable Soviet behavior in the international arena. In peacetime, the United States should develop a deterrent military readiness that could be maintained indefinitely, assure the nation's internal security, maximize its economic potential, increase where possible the economic and political stability and military capability of non-Soviet nations and strengthen their pro-U.S. orientation, place maximum strain on the Soviet power structure, and inform the American public of the threat.²⁵
The major difference between NSC 68 and NSC 20/4 was the degree of military buildup envisioned. Whereas NSC 20/4 had felt that the risk was sufficient to “warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation,” NSC 68 found it “imperative” to have a “much more rapid and concerted build-up” of U.S. and free world strength. Compared with current defense budget ceilings in the neighborhood of $13 billion, Nitze’s group privately believed that it might require annual defense budgets of $40 billion to thwart the Soviet design for world domination. Short of war, this policy was to “force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.” NSC 68 stressed the achievement of U.S. objectives by the “strategy of the cold war, building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used.”

Secretary Johnson undoubtedly agreed with the NSC 68 delineation of the Soviet threat, but its emphasis on large-scale rearmament was unpleasant news to a man staking his political reputation on military economy. At a stormy meeting with Acheson on 22 March, Johnson complained of not having had sufficient time to read and digest the report and irascibly asserted that at the moment he would agree to “nothing” in the study draft. When the document was completed, Acheson signed it but doubted that Johnson would do so. In the Pentagon, however, the departmental secretaries and the Joint Chiefs endorsed the report before it reached Johnson. The secretary scratched his signature across the page, and NSC 68 went to Truman on 7 April. Five days later Truman referred it to the National Security Council. He wanted to know the implications of the study’s conclusions, the specific programs envisioned, and, most importantly, their cost.

Prior to the North Korean attack, Johnson and Truman had their qualms about NSC 68. They were not alone. Even before the paper went to the president, an assistant secretary of state questioned the economic assumptions, arguing that the military balance was actually tilting toward the United States and that the nation’s economic capacity far surpassed that of the Soviets. He feared that a large-scale military effort might bring on a depression and a national “disaster.” Another assistant secretary of state believed that the public would react negatively to a huge arms race and predicted that the country would tire of the effort. Charles E. Bohlen—like Kennan an experienced hand in dealing with the Soviets and currently at the U.S. embassy in Paris—thought the Soviet regime’s primary objective was to maintain itself in power, extending its ascendancy abroad only when it could be done without risk. Pointing out that the U.S. atomic monopoly had not deterred Soviet aggressiveness, Bohlen questioned whether a conventional military buildup would do so or, indeed, whether a start toward rearmament might not, at least initially, “hamper rather than help in the cold war.”
Drawing back from the prospect of large-scale military expenditures, he suggested greater emphasis on the research and development of new weapons.27 Later in April, Ambassador Alan G. Kirk cabled from Moscow that although the Soviet regime was "steering a course as close as possible to full-scale war short of actually precipitating it," he believed that the Kremlin was unready for global war and would avoid a showdown until it attained "overwhelming superiority of force."28

An NSC ad hoc committee that included representatives from seven agencies in addition to State and Defense addressed the questions about NSC 68 programs and costs. Johnson designated General Bradley and General Burns to represent Defense.29 Meeting for the first time on 2 May, the committee soon discovered that its 11 members had almost as many opinions about NSC 68. The Council of Economic Advisers thought the U.S. economy could sustain substantial new programs but would be limited by major economic and social problems. The National Security Resources Board, considering it possible that the Soviets might attack before 1954, wanted a strong civil defense program and an increase in its strategic materials stockpile objective from $3.8 billion to $6 billion. The Bureau of the Budget representative, on the other hand, questioned the NSC 68 estimate of Soviet strength, the existence of a military gap, and the Soviets' ability or intent to strike in 1954. He suggested that a large-scale U.S. mobilization would become increasingly costly and be "tantamount to notifying Russia that we intended to press war in the near future."30

Unsurprised by the disparate views of the NSC ad hoc group, Johnson directed the Pentagon to develop and cost a military program. On 25 May he asked the JCS to estimate the military requirements for NSC 68 and the anticipated military deficiencies if current programs were kept constant. He also asked the Defense comptroller to calculate the cost of remediying both U.S. and foreign equipment deficiencies. The secretary further requested a Defense-wide analysis of a military buildup for the years 1951–55. Although Johnson wrote that the NSC 68 costing studies were of "urgent importance," he directed that they not interfere with the regular budget process. Meeting with high Pentagon officials on 7 June 1950, Johnson said that he did not consider it sound to try to reach maximum military strength by 1954; rather, he thought it only realistic to assume that the president would hold the FY 1952 military budget ceiling to approximately $13 billion.31

Still unapproved on the eve of the Korean War, NSC 68 delineated more completely than ever before the broad post-World War II concept of national security that would dominate American policy. Between 1945 and 1950 the United States had given evidence of its expanded national security horizons through its policies and actions in many areas of the world—Iran in 1946,
Greece and Turkey in 1947, the Middle East in 1948, Germany and the Berlin airlift in 1948–49. The North Korean assault in June 1950 immediately presented the Truman administration with the fateful choice of whether or not to go to war to prevent the extension of Communist power by force of arms. A decision to act would translate the national security concept expressed in NSC 68 into policy and action on an unprecedented scale and further commit the United States to its expanded global role.

A Catalyst of Decision

When the North Koreans attacked on 25 June, the president did not yet have answers to his request for specific programs and costs. Subsequent conjecture has provided no clear answer as to whether or to what extent the NSC 68 conclusions would have been implemented had the Korean War not occurred. Before Korea the secretary of defense apparently did not consider a sizeable military buildup likely, especially not in the immediate future. But the North Korean invasion made Johnson’s position untenable.

Flying back from Independence, Missouri, on Sunday, 25 June 1950, Truman vividly recalled the events that had led to World War II, remembering, as he later wrote, “how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead.” Certain that a North Korean success would embolden Communist leaders to attack countries even closer to the United States, and that “no small nation would have the courage to resist,” Truman feared that any failure to react would ultimately mean “a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war.” In Europe, indeed, U.S. allies feared that they might be next. As one British member of Parliament later put it, people “almost universally assumed that Korea exemplified a new Soviet technique of war by proxy which might be applied at any moment somewhere in Europe.”

The North Korean attack brought about a growing consensus within the U.S. government. “For the first time,” one official remembered, “there was a judgment at the top level of government that the Soviet Union might be ready to resort to overt military aggression outside of Eastern Europe.” As Acheson testified before a congressional committee on 2 August 1950, the assault on South Korea served “notice . . . that the international Communist movement

* The administration’s efforts to implement NSC 68 following the start of the Korean War are dealt with in Chapters XII through XV. Dean Acheson (Present at the Creation, 374) later doubted that “anything like what happened in the next few years could have been done had not the Russians been stupid enough to instigate the attack against South Korea and opened the ‘hate America’ campaign.”
will use . . . the force of arms to achieve its purposes." Johnson also repeated the warning, claiming that the true significance of the North Korean attack was that the Communists acted even at the "risk of starting a third world war." For the three-year-old Department of Defense, the North Korean invasion presented a first challenge to a great trial by arms.55
CHAPTER II

The Role of the Pentagon

To meet the North Korean challenge in June 1950, the United States had to rely on a Department of Defense that was still in an embryonic stage. The stormy battles of the early years of unification had abated, even if all the wounds had not yet healed, but strong-willed interservice competition for men, money, weapons, and missions still persisted, as did some forms of resistance by the military services to the authority of the secretary of defense and OSD. Still, the role of the secretary of defense within the national security structure had been more completely delineated, and Louis Johnson had achieved much greater success than James Forrestal in imposing the secretary’s authority on the Pentagon. Soon the imperative demands of war would call forth a larger measure of unity and cooperation from the services.

The military establishment that undertook the direction of the Korean War in mid-1950 had been shaped by the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendments. At its head, the secretary of defense functioned as the president’s principal assistant in all matters relating to the Department of Defense; his most important powers derived from his control of the military budgets. The 1949 amendments had further enhanced the power of the secretary by eliminating an earlier provision that powers not specifically granted to the secretary of defense should be retained by the service secretaries. Moreover, the service secretaries had lost their status as Cabinet members and their places on the National Security Council (NSC). Thus, the Department of Defense was the only executive department in the Pentagon, and its secretary the only Cabinet-level official and NSC member. Finally, the amendments had created the post of deputy secretary and authorized three presidentially appointed assistant secretaries.¹

Although the secretary of defense exercised “direction, authority, and control” over the departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force, his authority was
still limited by the law's provision that they were to be separately administered by their respective secretaries. The secretary of defense could not transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate the services' combatant functions without specific congressional approval; nor could he impair their functions through control of military personnel or expenditure of funds. No longer able to report directly to the president or the director of the budget, the service secretaries had the legal right, after first informing the secretary of defense, to go directly to Congress with any "proper" recommendation. The law specifically denied the secretary of defense the right to establish a military staff other than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although military personnel could serve as his assistants or aides.

In addition to the Department of Defense and the Department of State, the national security structure included three other major organizations created by the National Security Act of 1947. At the top of the structure, the president chaired the National Security Council, an interdepartmental body with four other statutory members in 1950—the secretary of defense, the vice president, the secretary of state, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). Established to advise the president on coordinating the military, industrial, and civilian mobilization in time of war, NSRB had as its chairman in mid-1950 W. Stuart Symington, the former secretary of the Air Force, and included the heads or representatives of such executive departments and independent agencies as the president designated, including the secretary of defense. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), created to coordinate U.S. intelligence activities, reported to the NSC; its director usually attended council meetings.

One of the goals in creating the new national security structure had been to bring a large, unwieldy, and technologically complex military establishment within an organizational framework readily amenable to control by the president as commander in chief and by Congress. A single overall department, with a secretary of defense reporting to the president and responsive to Congress, constituted a major step toward this end. Anticipating these changes, Congress had revamped its own committee structure early in 1947, replacing in each house the separate committees on military and naval affairs with a single committee on armed services. As a result, the military departments had to defend their authorization requests before the same committees in the House and Senate. In 1949 the House and Senate appropriations committees combined their military and naval subcommittees into single defense subcommittees and dealt with the first unified military budget, that for FY 1950. Looking back, General J. Lawton Collins, Army chief of staff from 1949 to 1953, felt that the unification of the congressional committees was "possibly the best thing that ever happened to achieve real service unification."
Louis A. Johnson, big, energetic, aggressive, and flamboyant, by training and practice a lawyer and politician, presided over the Pentagon as secretary of defense in June 1950. Remembered by one close subordinate as a man who would "call a spade a damn shovel," Johnson made few real friends among his new associates at DoD. His Air Force secretary later observed that he was "pretty arrogant with everybody except the President." Having served as assistant secretary of war from 1937 to 1940, Johnson possessed experience in military matters, but he probably owed his appointment in March 1949 to his strong political connections and fundraising services on behalf of Truman's 1948 presidential campaign. Obviously ambitious, Johnson apparently thought that the Defense post might serve as a steppingstone to the presidency; he intended to leave his mark on the Pentagon. As one Truman biographer later wrote, "...Louis Johnson, two hundred pounds of power, competence, acerbity, wile, and bumptiousness, hit the Pentagon like a thunderstorm." Johnson took over for his own use the somewhat more imposing offices occupied by the secretary of the army. Enthusiastically embracing the lowered defense spending decreed by Truman and determined to impose order on the military services and end their divisive fighting, Johnson moved within a month of his arrival to cancel construction of the Navy's $100 million supercarrier USS United States and to support the building of B-36 bombers for the Air Force, thus doubly offending the Navy.

Not only did Johnson move quickly in 1949 to establish control over the military services, but he sought to ensure control over DoD relationships with other departments, notably the Department of State. To prevent what he considered "end runs" by the services, Johnson consolidated within his own office State-Defense liaison concerning "major matters of interest within the politico-military field," an arrangement that Acheson and the State Department considered obstructive. State-Defense relations were strongly affected by the intense aversion that Johnson and Acheson felt for each other. Moreover, the two men disagreed on policy matters: Acheson viewed Europe as indispensable to the security of the United States; Johnson advocated a policy that emphasized Asia and, particularly, support for non-Communist Asian governments such as Chiang's Nationalist regime on Formosa. After the March 1950 blowup between the two men over NSC 68, Acheson made no secret of his disdain for Johnson. His conduct, Acheson felt, was "too outrageous to be explained by mere cussedness"; he became convinced that Johnson was mentally ill. While publicly both men denied the feud, the reality was quite different.

The only person in the Pentagon reputed to be able to "talk turkey" to Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen T. Early, had been press secretary to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, special assistant to President Truman, and vice president of Pullman, Inc., before coming to the Pentagon
in the spring of 1949. Early provided Johnson with political and personal advice and was generally well liked in the Pentagon. One service secretary called him a “superb human being,” and Johnson publicly stated that Early was a source of “great consolation, strength and guidance” who made the secretary’s own job more bearable.8

_The Secretaries of the Military Departments_

The role of the service secretaries under Johnson declined both because of the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act and Johnson’s direct and forceful exercise of authority. During the less than 18 months of his incumbency there were three secretaries of the Army and two secretaries each of the Air Force and Navy—a total of seven. Four secretaries resigned during the first 13 months of Johnson’s tenure. The first Army secretary, Kenneth C. Royall, resigned in April 1949, shortly after Johnson arrived. When the Navy secretary, John L. Sullivan, left in May, there followed a major, Navy-inspired congressional investigation of allegations against Johnson and the Air Force and the eventual ouster of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis E. Denfeld. In April 1950 Air Force Secretary W. Stuart Symington, whose relations with Johnson had become increasingly rancorous, departed from the Pentagon. That same month Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, who had replaced Royall only a year earlier, also resigned. Although one or two of these resignations were apparently in the making before Johnson’s arrival, it may be inferred that the high incidence of departures was a measure of Johnson’s generally troubled relationship with his service secretaries.9

As a result of the shuffling, two of the secretaries of the military departments were new on the job when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., not quite 38 years old and the youngest of the three secretaries, previously had been director of the Bureau of the Budget. He became the third secretary of the Army on 12 April 1950, a mere eight years after entering the Army as a second lieutenant during World War II. As budget director, Pace had worked directly with President Truman and, as one Defense official recalled, seemed “strong as horseradish, just as firm as anybody could be.” Potentially, Pace had influential sources of support, but in June 1950 he was still finding his way and learning his Pentagon job.10

Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews, a 63-year-old banker, lawyer, and corporation executive from Nebraska, was in June 1950 the oldest military secretary in age and service. As a friend of Louis Johnson and a loyal Democrat who had helped Truman in the 1948 presidential campaign,
Matthews possessed solid political credentials but had little knowledge of Navy affairs when he assumed office on 25 May 1949. Viewed as an outsider and often referred to as a “rowboat secretary,” presumably in reference to his Nebraska origins, Matthews was immediately caught up in Johnson’s cancellation of the Navy’s supercarrier and went through a difficult and damaging fight leading to Admiral Denfeld’s departure. It was Matthews who in the fall of 1949 recommended as the new chief of naval operations Admiral Forrest P. Sherman—a man who was to be widely admired for returning the Navy to an even keel. Matthews’ biographer judged that he had become an “average” secretary by June 1950 but had irretrievably lost the Navy’s confidence.  

When Matthews left in mid-1951, Dan A. Kimball, under secretary in June 1950 and reputed to have the “knack of getting along with nearly everyone,” took his place. Knowledgeable about Navy matters, Kimball was an advocate of the supercarrier and sympathetic to the admirals’ position in the 1949 fight. During the Korean War he saw to it that the Navy got a new start on supercarriers. Moreover, in recommending Admiral William M. Fechteler as the new chief of naval operations to replace Admiral Sherman, who died suddenly in June 1951, Kimball judiciously chose a man who had not been involved in the “Revolt of the Admirals.” A strong leader, Kimball gained credit, along with Sherman, for restoring Navy confidence and maintaining its integrity.  

Thomas K. Finletter, second Secretary of the Air Force, was a 56-year-old lawyer who had been picked by Truman over Johnson’s objections. Sworn in on 24 April 1950, Finletter had served as a special assistant to the secretary of state in 1941–44, as chairman of the president’s Air Policy Commission in 1947–48, and as minister in charge of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to the United Kingdom in 1948–49. Regarded as cold in manner but highly intelligent and an “independent thinker,” Finletter was already a vigorous advocate of air power.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense

To assist him in overseeing the service secretaries and their departments, Johnson relied on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which, generally speaking, encompassed all those Defense offices and agencies not part of the three military departments. Many OSD elements were prescribed by law: the secretary of defense and deputy secretary; the three assistant secretaries, of whom one was the comptroller; the Munitions Board (MB), the Research and Development Board (RDB), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)—each with a chairman; and an Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC). The
Military Liaison Committee (MLC) to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which had a statutory chairman, had been created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and its amendment. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 created a statutory position in OSD that was used for the position of assistant to the secretary of defense for foreign military affairs and military assistance.  

Four organizations within OSD had been established by the defense secretary rather than by statute: the Personnel Policy Board, the Civilian Components Policy Board, the Office of Medical Services, and the Office of Public Information. In addition, Johnson's executive secretary, his special assistants, the Staff Council, and the Management Council were nonstatutory entities directly attached to the secretary's immediate office.

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

Expecting to rely heavily on the three assistant secretaries of defense provided by the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, Johnson retained men who had been Forrestal's assistants to fill two of these important new posts. Wilfred J. McNeil, a wartime naval reserve officer who had risen to flag rank and had been Forrestal's long-time associate, was the OSD comptroller, with the rank of assistant secretary. Marx Leva, a lawyer and wartime naval officer who had been Forrestal's loyal assistant, became Johnson's assistant secretary of defense for legal and legislative affairs. To become assistant secretary for administrative and public affairs, Johnson brought in a fellow member of the American Legion and old friend, Paul H. Griffith, who had served previously in the War Department.

The OSD comptroller's office in mid-1950 had four divisions headed by men handpicked by McNeil. As assistant and later deputy comptroller for budget and McNeil's deputy for day-to-day operations, Lyle A. Garlock played an important role, his competence and effectiveness allowing McNeil to be the "outside man." Below these division heads McNeil had a number of able and spirited younger men on whom he relied for ideas and first-hand reporting. McNeil and his staff of 100 in mid-1950 helped make the secretary of defense an increasingly potent force throughout the department.

A McNeil initiative that proved invaluable during the Korean War—Title IV of the 1949 amendments—gave the secretary of defense the power to control the rates and amounts of obligation of service funds and to require the services to set up uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures. To reorganize the handling of common-user items and common-service industrial- or commercial-type facilities, Title IV also empowered the secretary of defense to require the services to establish working capital funds. The new system in
effect created a business relationship among the various services, each one making purchases just as in the civilian economy. McNeil felt that the establishment of such a purchaser-seller relationship would improve Defense functioning and lower costs.\textsuperscript{17}

By inclination and training careful with both his own and government money, McNeil enjoyed success in dealing with Congress, particularly the members of the appropriations subcommittees. Congenial, candid, and upright, McNeil had earned widespread congressional respect and friendship while playing an important role under Forrestal. After some initial doubt, Johnson understood that this Forrestal holdover was a natural to aid in a Defense economy program. In turn, McNeil’s own opinion of Johnson improved as time went by. Looking back later, McNeil thought that within six months of coming into office Johnson had started to do “a pretty good job” although his grandstanding tendencies “probably diminished his stature.”\textsuperscript{18}

Whereas McNeil was generally held in high esteem, Griffith as assistant secretary for administrative and public affairs had difficulty earning respect for his performance. Some OSD colleagues felt that his principal role was as Johnson’s “intimate buddy” and “personal troubleshooter.” Johnson himself praised Griffith’s “loyalty, integrity, and ability.” Under Griffith a staff of 150, headed by a director of administration, Ralph N. Stohl, provided OSD with such basic functions as personnel, budget and accounting, office services, and security. There was also a small civil defense liaison staff.\textsuperscript{19}

Younger than either McNeil or Griffith, more liberal than either in political outlook, and steadfast in admiration for Forrestal, Marx Leva established a “very early and a very good relationship” with Johnson and received strong backing from him. When some partisans accused Leva of having too many Republican lawyers on his staff, Johnson told him to continue to hire the best lawyers he could get and promised to “protect your flanks.” Publicly, Johnson placed Leva in the class of the “extremely able and grand lot” working in his office.\textsuperscript{20}

Leva’s office in mid-1950 employed 56 persons in two major divisions. General Counsel Felix Larkin headed the Office of Counsel; Rear Adm. Harold A. Houser, the Office of Legislative Liaison. In the spirit of unification, Leva tried to see that military officers in his office did not work solely on affairs related to their own service but also on matters relating to other services. Looking back later, Leva felt he had had a good deal of success with this arrangement. Congressional matters held paramount importance for Leva’s

\textsuperscript{4} Leadership in civil defense matters shifted from the military to the National Security Resources Board in March 1949.
James H. Burns, a retired Army major general who had earlier served with Johnson in the War Department and had worked extensively on lend-lease and other programs during World War II, also held a position of considerable importance. In August 1949, Johnson made Burns, in whom he had complete trust, his consultant on politico-military matters, a position without administrative responsibilities. Simultaneously he established under Najeeb E. Halaby an Office of Foreign Military Affairs (OFMA) which also handled NATO matters. At this time Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer represented Johnson in discussions with the State Department on a new program of military assistance, and shortly thereafter he became the OSD director of military assistance. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 provided for four presidentially appointed positions; on Johnson's suggestion, Truman nominated Burns to one of these posts. In November Johnson made Burns his principal assistant for foreign military affairs and military assistance and placed under him the two offices headed by Halaby and Lemnitzer. This was a major step toward the institutionalization of the position that in 1953 became the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Burns's office held the major responsibility for Defense-State liaison. Without affecting the military departments' basic relations with State, Johnson in August 1949 set up within OFMA a State Liaison Section to consolidate the exchange of documents and information, particularly in the political-military field, formerly a function of State liaison officers in the three military departments. Customarily Burns and top OFMA staff members, joined by JCS operations deputies, met on an informal weekly basis with high State Department representatives, usually including the director of the Policy Planning Staff. When Congress approved the military assistance program in the fall, Johnson ordered that all relevant DoD dealings with other departments, except for certain overseas operations, would be "to and through my office," that is, through Lemnitzer as OSD director of military assistance. Burns's office also represented Johnson on the staff of the National Security Council. Relatively small, considering its far-flung responsibilities, Burns's total staff consisted of 71 civilians and military in mid-1950.

For Burns, in poor health with a bad heart condition, life under Johnson was not easy. The secretary wanted to save money, did not favor foreign involvement, especially in Europe, and apparently did not find the idea of NATO or military assistance particularly agreeable. Halaby, strongly anti-
Johnson, perceived the secretary as a man with “no sense of humor, totally devoid of humility, and more obsessed with power the longer he stayed in office” and on his way to wrecking the Defense Department. Halaby—described by one informed observer as “a bit arbitrary, a bit arrogant, very ambitious”—was not entirely trusted by Johnson, who eventually maneuvered him out of the Pentagon. Lemnitzer also had his problems; years later he still felt keenly the extreme frustration of serving as Johnson’s representative on interdepartmental committees.

Burns, too, could be angered by Johnson’s rudeness to subordinates. On one such occasion, Lemnitzer dissuaded Burns from completing a letter of resignation he had begun to write. As Lemnitzer later recalled, Burns was indispensable—“the fellow that could quiet and talk to the Secretary and extract a decision . . . . a catalyst, without the likes of which we couldn’t have gotten anywhere with the Secretary.” Halaby agreed with Lemnitzer on Burns’s importance, his objectivity, and his independence. Burns’s success was no doubt founded on the mutual affection he and Johnson had for each other, a friendship that may have been tested but was never ended.

STATUTORY STAFF AGENCIES

Whether Secretary Johnson had in mind any particular organizational design or any set of guiding principles for shaping OSD is not clear. Perhaps the plainest purpose that emerged was a determination to retain for the secretary maximum power of decision. Consequently, he was reluctant to delegate authority, particularly to the chairmen of two major statutory staff agencies—the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board. These were two of the five agencies that Johnson regarded as “primary . . . within their respective spheres of activities.” Four were created by law—the Munitions Board, the RDB, the JCS, and the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. The fifth was the Personnel Policy Board, a nonstatutory agency. The first three of these agencies employed 1,461 persons in mid-1950, or about 60 percent of all OSD personnel, civilian and military.

The four-member Munitions Board (MB) consisted of the chairman, Hubert E. Howard, and one under or assistant secretary from each of the three military departments. The largest single agency in OSD, it had a mid-1950 staff of 706 military and civilians. The board’s statutory functions related to the procurement, production, and distribution of materiel for the armed services, all in support of JCS plans and subject to the secretary’s “authority and direction.” Dealing with matters on which there were major service differences and rivalries, the board was often hard pressed to reach decisions.
The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act attempted to resolve this problem by transferring the power of decision from the board to the chairman. Disinclined to vest full authority in the chairman, Johnson limited his power of decision to those instances when the other three board members were not unanimous. In addition to serving the secretary's purposes, this action may also have been intended to placate the military services, which consistently opposed giving full power to the chairman.28

The Research and Development Board (RDB) included seven members—a chairman and two representatives (one military and one civilian) from each of the three military departments. It had a staff and two divisions, one for programs and one for planning. Meeting approximately once a month, the board advised the secretary on the status and continuing adequacy and trends of scientific research relative to national security. It was supposed to map out an integrated military research and development program, formulate policy for military research in relation to other agencies, advise the Joint Chiefs on the possible implications of research for military strategy, and coordinate the work of the military departments. It could initiate, eliminate, or change the emphasis of the services' programs and review their budgets, but it could not direct or control their internal administration of research and development. With the JCS, the Research and Development Board shared direction of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG), an agency set up in 1948 to yield an impartial, supra-service scientific and technical evaluation of weapon systems.29

The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act had granted the RDB chairman, under the authority of the secretary of defense, the power of decision. As with the Munitions Board, Johnson limited that power to instances where the service representatives were not unanimous, although he made the RDB chairman his principal assistant and deputy in all DoD research and development matters. The board's service composition, however, guaranteed that any exercise of authority involved negotiation and compromise.30

RDB committees with cognizance over technical fields of interest or types of weapons (as, for example, guided missiles, aeronautics, and electronics) performed most of the technical work. Many committees also had subordinate panels. Both committees and panels consisted of military and civilian part-time representatives, totaling about 1,500 persons in the spring of 1950, all but 280 serving without compensation. Chaired by William Webster, the RDB in mid-1950 had a permanent full-time staff of 315 civilians and military.31

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of a chairman and the three service chiefs. The 1949 amendments that created the post of chairman gave him precedence over all other military officers in rank, but he was to exercise no military command over the Joint Chiefs and to have no vote in their
deliberations. The chairman served as the JCS presiding officer, provided an agenda for meetings, and informed the secretary of defense, and when appropriate the president, of issues about which the Joint Chiefs could not agree. General Omar N. Bradley, the first statutory JCS chairman, served until August 1953. The three service chiefs in mid-1950 were General J. Lawton Collins, the Army chief of staff; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, the chief of naval operations; and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Air Force chief of staff. Both Collins and Vandenberg remained in office until mid-1953; following Sherman's death in July 1951, Admiral William M. Fechteler became chief of naval operations.32

The National Security Act made the JCS responsible for specified duties to be carried out subject to the "authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense," either of whom could assign them additional duties. They prepared strategic plans and provided strategic direction for U.S. military forces, produced joint logistic plans and assigned logistic responsibilities to the services, established unified commands in strategic areas, reviewed major materiel and personnel requirements, formulated policies for the joint training and military education of the armed forces, and provided U.S. military staff representation at the United Nations. These statutory functions were further delineated by a 1948 "Key West Agreement" reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by the president, and issued by the secretary of defense. Specifically, the agreement defined JCS functions as including, "subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense," the "general direction of all combat operations." By law the Joint Chiefs had a Joint Staff of not more than 210 officers appointed in approximately equal numbers from the three services; actual strength in mid-1950 totaled 450 civilian and military personnel.34

The Joint Chiefs had the responsibility for advising the secretary of defense, the NSC, and the president. Like the service secretaries, they could, after notifying the secretary of defense, take matters directly to Congress. These duties and prerogatives allowed varying interpretations of their exact position within the Defense organization and of their precise relationship to the secretary. Although Johnson was not a man to quibble when it came to delineating his own powers and had been known to refer to "my" chiefs of staff, their precise relationship to the secretary and OSD remained unsettled in some respects throughout the Korean War years.35

The fourth statutory staff agency assisting the secretary of defense—the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)—had been created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which placed the control of

* See Chapter XXIV for a further discussion of this question.
atomic energy matters under the five-member civilian commission. The law vested ultimate control over military use of atomic weapons in the president and established a congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to watch over the entire program. The Military Liaison Committee (MLC), required to make appropriate recommendations to the AEC and inform it of Defense activities, also reported to the military on AEC actions or nonactions that might impair military interests, surveyed national requirements, coordinated Defense activities, and recommended program priorities and changes. It acted as a staff adviser to the secretary of defense and the military secretaries and maintained close liaison with the JCS and the Munitions Board.\(^5\)

Originally composed of six military men, the MLC operated directly under Secretary of Defense Forrestal, who in April 1948 added a civilian chairman to be his “personal adviser and deputy” for atomic matters, and made each service’s appointments of members subject to the secretary’s concurrence. He also gave the MLC a broad grant of authority to resolve interservice differences, consult with other government agencies, and exercise responsibilities on behalf of the entire Defense establishment. After passage of the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act in October 1949, the president appointed the MLC chairman, who received a salary and status on a par with the chairman of the Munitions Board. Administering the oath of office to Robert LeBaron, Secretary Johnson told him that no job in the Pentagon was “more important than yours.” LeBaron, who remained in office until 1954, had a small staff consisting in mid-1950 of 39 military and civilian members.\(^6\)

Johnson gave the committee wide latitude to make recommendations on all matters of “major policy relating to military applications of atomic energy” and to act for the secretary. The military services, however, remained responsible for their individually supported research and development projects, and they collectively provided coordination and training in the handling and use of atomic weapons.\(^7\)

### NONSTATUTORY BOARDS AND OFFICES

Forrestal and Johnson set up nonstatutory agencies in OSD to take care of additional functions that did not seem appropriate for assignment to existing staff agencies. These agencies offered certain advantages since the secretary could appoint or remove individuals, change their duties, delegate or with-

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* This was accomplished through the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), a tripartite agency that reported separately to each of the three service chiefs.
hold authority, or even abolish the agencies without congressional approval. Since such offices were wholly creatures of the secretary, they gave him less concern about control than did the statutory agencies. Four nonstatutory agencies or offices played important staff roles in Johnson’s OSD—the Personnel Policy Board, the Civilian Components Policy Board, the Office of Medical Services, and the Office of Public Information.

The Personnel Policy Board (PPB) was created in early 1949 to study and develop uniform policies throughout the military establishment for both military and civilian personnel activities, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and create a central authority for interdepartmental concerns. Still, some personnel matters remained within the province of other OSD agencies: The Munitions Board considered those relating to military contractors and suppliers, manpower mobilization requirements, and Selective Service calls; the Joint Chiefs handled military training and education responsibilities, determined military strength requirements, and allocated personnel among the services. The Personnel Policy Board consisted of a civilian chairman and an under or assistant secretary from each of the military departments. In August 1949 Johnson made the board responsible for personnel policy but delegated to its chairman the authority to act for the secretary—with full power of decision—in matters falling under the board. In June 1950 J. Thomas Schneider, a lawyer and businessman, chaired the board on a full-time basis. PPB had a staff of 38 civilians.

Johnson established the Civilian Components Policy Board (CCPB) in May 1949 to develop overall policies and coordinate military service plans and programs related to the organized reserves and the national guard, which together had a strength of more than 2,500,000 in mid-1950. The board was to eliminate competitive service activities, review and coordinate their policies and programs, and support the Defense Department’s strategic and logistic plans under basic personnel policies established by the Personnel Policy Board. The CCPB consisted of a civilian chairman appointed by the secretary of defense and 18 other members, 6 from each service, including an under or assistant secretary, a regular military officer, and 4 representatives from the reserves or national guards. In mid-1950, Edwin H. Burgess, vice president and general counsel of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, served as the unpaid, part-time chairman.

The Office of Medical Services evolved from the recommendation of a committee in 1949 to establish a medical “director general” with full authority to set up and control DoD medical policies, standards, and programs. The committee considered this a step toward unification and the

* The Navy had no national guard organization.
more efficient utilization of scarce medical personnel without creating a single medical service. In May 1949 Johnson established an OSD Medical Services Division and granted the recommended authority to its director, who could be either civilian or military. That autumn the division became the Office of Medical Services, with Dr. Richard L. Meiling as its director; by mid-1950 it had a staff of 23 civilian and military personnel.40

Johnson charged the medical services director with broad responsibilities throughout Defense, but the military departments remained responsible for their own medical programs. As of 1 July 1950, health care for civilians came under Meiling, with the services’ surgeons general conducting the field programs. The Office of Medical Services supervised a program of joint medical publications and exercised broad policy and administrative review over various unified laboratories, institutes, and boards. Giving priority attention to the fighting forces, Meiling’s office emphasized joint use of all service medical facilities. Studies went forward, meanwhile, for an extensive blood procurement program, a health program for women in the armed forces, and further unification of medical services. Problems persisted, however, because this OSD policy agency had no control over service medical programs.41

A similar problem of divided authority plagued the Office of Public Information (OPI), the fourth nonstatutory agency, created by Forrestal on 17 March 1949 as a single consolidated OSD office with a director to develop and establish public relations policies and practices on a Defense-wide basis. Forrestal intended OPI to be the sole Defense agency for public information in the capital area except for congressional information, and he forbade the services to maintain public relations staffs in Washington except those needed to guide and supervise field installations. OPI responsibilities included press, radio, television, photograph, and newsreel services; accreditation of correspondents; analysis of public information; and security review and clearance of manuscripts and other materials.42

Although Forrestal’s establishment of a consolidated office seemed a wise move and later had Johnson’s support, it was widely viewed within the Pentagon as a “punitive and restrictive” attempt to end military service leaks. Following service and press protests, Johnson in June 1949 restricted OPI clearance review to matters “classified for security reasons.” In March 1950 the service secretaries recommended that Johnson restore most Washington operations to the services. An April study by the Defense Management Committee, on the other hand, recommended strengthening the new office. Although Johnson took no official action, OPI status declined because he generally bypassed the agency in his own dealings with the media, and Deputy Secretary Early doubted the value of unifying the function.43 Operat-
ing under Osgood Roberts as acting director and with a staff of 222 civilian and military personnel in mid-1950, most assigned from the services, OPI remained weak and largely unavailing in its efforts to provide centralized control over all Defense public information activities.\textsuperscript{44}

**THE INNER CIRCLE**

In mid-1950, Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, serving as Johnson's executive secretary, managed the secretary's immediate office with a staff of 48 persons. Johnson authorized Allen to issue directives on approved policy matters within OSD's jurisdiction, an authority he also granted Early, the three assistant secretaries, and the chairmen of the five primary staff agencies. Some special assistants also worked directly out of Johnson's immediate office, including Louis H. Renfrow, an old Johnson friend known for his jovial manner, and James C. Evans, who handled matters related to racial integration in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{45}

Also closely attached to the secretary was the Defense Management Committee, which Johnson established in August 1949 to help him provide for the greater economy and efficiency that he hoped would be the hallmarks of his administration. General Joseph T. McNarney (USAF), chairman of the committee and Johnson's "direct representative," was a highly regarded officer who had already helped Johnson to abolish a large number of committees and boards. Composed of service representatives at the assistant secretary level or higher, the committee reported directly to the secretary.\textsuperscript{46} Johnson accorded the committee a broad mandate: It could form subsidiary agencies as necessary and could "direct the Departments and Agencies independently to undertake work under its monitorship" whenever facilities were available. Only on matters of major policy did the committee have to get secretarial approval.\textsuperscript{47} As of May 1950, the Defense Management Committee estimated that it could save up to a billion dollars annually—an expectation that Johnson firmly shared.\textsuperscript{48}

The Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC), originally established as the War Council in the National Security Act and renamed in the 1949 amendments, was the most important of the secretary's advisory bodies. It consisted of nine persons—the secretary and deputy secretary of defense, the three service secretaries, the JCS chairman, and the three chiefs. The law stated that the council was to advise the secretary of defense on "matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces and . . . consider and report on such other matters" as he might direct.\textsuperscript{49} While Forrestal had used the council mainly to debate issues, Johnson was perhaps less interested in AFPC views than in his
own AFPC role. The law made him the AFPC chairman with the power of
decision, a right that Johnson regarded as crucial—"therein was the power of
the Secretary of Defense to unify." While Johnson considered the AFPC
useful, he did not clearly define its functions before the start of the Korean
War. The council met weekly and on special occasions; by May 1950 so many
people were attending AFPC sessions that Johnson complained he was unable
to discuss "highly confidential matters." Accordingly he limited attendance to
22 officials, but a larger number often still sat in. Only after the start of the
Korean War did the AFPC begin to play a more substantive role under Johnson,
particularly in early budget considerations.

Perhaps as a consequence of the AFPC's deficiencies, the service secre­
taries had begun to meet jointly before mid-1950. Forrestal had convened his
army, navy, and air force secretaries biweekly in a grouping known as the
Committee of Four. Johnson dropped this practice, but Pace, Finletter, and
Matthews felt that periodic consultation would help them to settle interservice
disputes and better advise the defense secretary. After discussing the matter
before the AFPC, Johnson reinstated the separate secretarial meetings, but he
did not attend. By June, the three secretaries conferred regularly.

In May 1949 Johnson instituted a lesser body—the Staff Council—to
inform him on "important matters of interest" and to advise him on matters
not important enough to be considered by the AFPC. Chaired by the deputy
secretary, the Staff Council included the heads or representatives of most OSD
offices and staff agencies.

Although Johnson may have seemed autocratic within the Pentagon, he
was careful to keep the president well informed, even on relatively small
matters. Truman undoubtedly liked to know what was happening in the
Pentagon, but he may have felt that sometimes Johnson told him more than he
wanted to hear. Once Johnson received the president's approval, however,
woe to the man in the Pentagon who crossed the secretary, particularly when
the issue involved what Johnson perceived as encroachment on his turf.

Preparations for War

President Truman had acquired a comprehensive knowledge of the
mobilization process through his chairmanship of the Senate Special Commit­
tee Investigating the National Defense Program (better known as the Truman
Committee) during World War II. The Korean War, however, on a much lesser
scale and unfolding incrementally, presented different problems. Initially,
there was much uncertainty about the requirements for men and materiel, and
changes in programs occurred frequently as the fortunes of war fluctuated.
There was little doubt, however, about the need for coordination and cooperation among all agencies prosecuting a war effort. Once U.S. forces joined battle in Korea, Truman moved quickly to ensure interdepartmental collaboration. Intent on making greater use of the National Security Council, the president on 6 July 1950 instructed all NSC members to forward proposals related to Korea through the council rather than directly to him, so that all major officials might be kept informed. Subsequently, he directed a monthly check on the status of all NSC projects.54

The president directed the council to meet more frequently and in small groups where discussion would not be inhibited. He limited attendance to the five statutory NSC members and only six others—Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, presidential special assistant W. Averell Harriman,* former NSC executive secretary and current presidential consultant Sidney W. Souers, JCS chairman Omar N. Bradley, CIA director Walter Bedell Smith, and NSC Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr. Other officials could attend only with the president’s approval. In the absence of the president, the secretary of state would preside over the Thursday afternoon meetings.55

To improve preparation for NSC meetings, Truman on 19 July directed the secretaries of state, defense, and treasury, the NSRB chairman, the CIA director, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff each to nominate one person to serve on a senior staff headed by the NSC executive secretary. Burns wanted Johnson to nominate Maj. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding, the current Defense representative on the NSC staff; the service secretaries, on the other hand, wanted Johnson to nominate one of their number. Although Johnson wrote “not at this time” across their memorandum, he apparently changed his mind after discussing the matter at the White House. In the end he named Finletter as his own representative and Rear Adm. E. T. Wooldridge as the JCS representative on the NSC Senior Staff.56

The president also revived the NSC Special Committee on Atomic Energy, to which he had appointed the secretaries of state and defense and the AEC chairman in February 1949. This committee had subsequently recommended U.S. development of a thermonuclear bomb.57 On 25 August 1950 Truman reinforced its authority, directing it, as a first step, to consider all atomic matters affecting the three departments, so that “everybody interested will know exactly what is going on.” In its staff deliberations, Robert LeBaron, MLC chairman, normally acted for the secretary of defense, while the three senior military MLC members constituted the committee’s military advisers.58

* Harriman later became a statutory NSC member when he was appointed to the newly created post of director for mutual security in late 1951. In December 1950, when Truman created the post of director of defense mobilization, his appointee to that position, Charles E. Wilson, was added to the list of NSC attendees.
The president underscored his new determination to bolster NSC coordination of U.S. policy by his more regular attendance at the more frequent meetings. In its 33 months of existence before the start of the Korean War, the council had held 57 meetings, averaging 1.7 per month; in the remaining 31 months of the Truman administration, it held 71 meetings, an average of 2.3 per month. More important, whereas Truman had gone to "fewer than a dozen" of the 57 meetings before Korea, he presided at 61 of the 71 meetings during the war. 59

While Truman gave national security policymaking more personal attention and infused new order into NSC procedures, he also sought better coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization through the National Security Resources Board. On 9 July 1950 Reorganization Plan No. 25 transferred the functions of the board to its chairman, Stuart Symington, and the board became advisory to him. 60 But whereas Symington advocated large-scale economic mobilization early in the war, Truman originally envisioned only a limited national industrial mobilization, preferring an incremental approach in the hope and expectation that the war could be contained in extent, time, and intensity. Not only was there the enormous expense involved, but the economy, already running close to capacity, had little slack to absorb a large defense effort. 61 Although Symington set up committees and issued a profusion of analyses and reports, basic programming lagged, military requirements constantly changed, and by mid-September 1950 the NSRB coordination effort faltered. Symington apparently continued to believe Truman would broaden NSRB functions and powers, but the president proved unwilling to do so and for all practical purposes bypassed the NSRB in mobilizing for the Korean War. 62

Setting the broad guidelines of U.S. policy on 19 July 1950, the president asked for more money for defense spending, a $5 billion increase in taxes, and authority to increase defense production and regulate the civilian economy. Congress gave him the defense money and the tax increase. Furthermore, the Defense Production Act of 1950 (PL 81-774), signed on 8 September, allowed the president to assign priorities, allocate materials and facilities, requisition property for defense production, regulate consumer credit, make or guarantee defense production loans, negotiate long-term contracts for scarce materials, and impose wage and price controls until 30 June 1951. By Executive Order 10161 of 9 September 1950 Truman delegated priority and allocation authority to an agency in the Commerce Department, the National Production

* In the spring of 1951 Symington became the administrator of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation; the NSRB continued in a weakened role until its abolition in 1953.
The Role of the Pentagon

Authority, under Manly Fleischmann, and created an independent Economic Stabilization Agency under Eric Johnston to oversee voluntary restraints on wages and prices.\(^6\)

Within days of the start of the Korean War, Congress extended for one year the Selective Service Act of 1948 and authorized the callup of reserve and national guard forces for 21 months' active service—thereby bringing back to duty many veterans who had only recently served in World War II. On 30 June Congress raised Army strength to 837,000 men and provided for a 502,000-man, 70-group Air Force with 24,000 aircraft. In July it suspended for 4 years all previous ceilings on the authorized strengths of the military services and extended all existing enlistments for 12 months, thus retaining in service some 372,000 persons slated to leave within the next year.\(^6\) In early September Congress provided for a so-called “doctors draft.” But despite Johnson's urging, it refused to agree to Truman's politically unpopular request for universal military training, causing the president in late August 1950 to withdraw his plan.\(^6\)

First Months of War

Within the Pentagon, Johnson moved cautiously after the Korean War started. He had to condition himself to a new set of circumstances that demanded expansion rather than contraction of the military establishment, where the emphasis would be on spending rather than on economizing. Moreover, the major decisions on the direction of the war would come from the president and the National Security Council, somewhat circumscribing Johnson's role and requiring that he function within a framework that placed a premium on interdepartmental cooperation. Recognizing the need for greater cooperative efforts, Johnson began to take steps toward that end both inside the Pentagon and with other departments.

In July 1950 Johnson regularized the meetings of the three service secretaries as The Joint Secretaries and sought their advice more frequently. On 11 July he authorized the military departments to build up their civilian personnel strength to the FY 1951 level but said that any further increases would have to be justified. A week later he gave the various departments and agencies authority to prescribe overtime work but told them to make no general announcement.\(^6\)

With a Military Air Transport Service and a Military Sea Transportation Service already in operation, Johnson on 23 August established a policymaking Military Traffic Service for coordination within the continental United States of commercial transportation—land, air, and water—for the entire
Department of Defense. As its director, Johnson appointed E. Grover Plowman, the U.S. Steel Corporation's vice president for traffic, who was succeeded within a few months by Kenneth L. Vore.67

The friction between Defense and State meanwhile came to a head early in July 1950, when Paul Nitze, director of State's Policy Planning Staff, complained about the difficulty in securing "speedy and clearcut decisions on matters involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service departments, and the office of the Secretary of Defense." At a meeting with Acheson and Harriman on 12 July, Johnson acknowledged that Burns alone could not handle all the complex State-Defense liaison relationships and agreed to allow such liaison without specific clearance from Burns. Johnson's agreement to Harriman's suggestion that the three men should dine together once a week pointed up the unusual affability of this meeting. Despite these efforts, Acheson later observed that State-Defense relations were at their lowest ebb in September 1950.68

Johnson also regularized relations between the Defense Department and the Treasury. Because of problems in Korea, he agreed on 13 July to formalize a "working relationship" between the two departments and made McNeil's office the official point of contact with Treasury for the entire Department of Defense.69

Once the Korean War started, Johnson wanted Pentagon officials to cut down on public pronouncements. On 3 July 1950 he told the AFPC members that he had canceled all his own speaking engagements for the next few weeks to avoid any public discussion of Korea, and he asked the service secretaries and chiefs to do the same insofar as possible. The council agreed that all OPI press releases should be general in nature. By the end of July, however, the military department secretaries asked Johnson and Early to lift the ban on speeches. On 7 August Early circulated the State Department's "information objectives for the rest of 1950," the first of which stated that U.S. foreign policy was "designed to maintain and to defend the peace."70 Apparently Navy Secretary Matthews felt that this statement allowed him to advocate "instituting a war to compel cooperation for peace . . . . We would become the first aggressors for peace."71 When internal OSD speech clearance procedures unfortunately failed, Matthews's speech of 25 August in Boston created a public furor, but the major blame fell on Johnson when some accounts attributed the notion to him. Although Matthews was contrite and Truman proved forgiving, it was one more embarrassment that Johnson did not need at the time.72

* Matthews remained as Navy secretary until the following summer, when Truman appointed him U.S. ambassador to Ireland.
By September 1950 the Korean War had doomed whatever political aspirations Johnson may have had. Moreover, his maladroit dabbling in extra-Defense matters had irritated the president, who noted that his defense secretary had an "inordinate egotistical desire to run the whole government" and had managed to offend every member of the Cabinet. Shortly after joining Truman's White House staff in late June 1950, Harriman reported that he had overheard Johnson congratulate Republican Senator Taft for a speech criticizing Truman and calling for Acheson's ouster. Afterward, Harriman said, Johnson suggested that if Acheson could only be removed, Johnson would see to it that Harriman became secretary of state. The White House found this story "almost incredible" despite Harriman's reputation for the "absolute truth."

Johnson's relations with Congress also were deteriorating. Although the earlier stringent ceilings on defense appropriations and spending had been Truman's policy, Johnson had carried out the cuts so enthusiastically that the onus fell on him when it appeared that they had been excessive. Johnson's arrogant manner and the abrasiveness of his early appearances before congressional committees had alienated some members. Also, Defense economies had reached far beyond the Pentagon, and congressmen had received constituent complaints about the effects on local interests. Then, when the North Koreans badly mauled the U.S. troops during the opening months of the war, Johnson became a press scapegoat, and public and congressional attitudes soured further. Critics recalled his flamboyant remarks that he was converting military "fat into muscle" and that, if the Soviet Union attacked, American military forces would be ready to respond almost immediately.

Truman nonetheless publicly supported his defense secretary. When asked on 3 August about a congressman's suggestion that both Acheson and Johnson should resign, Truman responded with some heat to reporters, telling them that neither man would resign "as long as I am President." On 31 August Truman told newsmen that Johnson had not "embarrassed" the president. But it did seem that the defense secretary had become a political liability, especially with the approach of the midterm elections. Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of the late president, obviously spoke for many when she wrote Truman in a personal letter, "I can not tell you how the feeling against Secretary Johnson is building up."

By early September Truman had decided to ask for Johnson's resignation when he came for his regular weekly meeting, but the president did not raise the matter on 5 September when Johnson brought with him Secretary Matthews. With press stories suggesting his imminent departure, Johnson received the bad news from the president on Monday, 11 September, in an off-the-record meeting that left Johnson unable to talk and the president
feeling "as if I had just whipped my daughter, Margaret." Although Truman initially granted Johnson's request for a few days to think it over, the president called Early on 12 September to urge that Johnson resign immediately and recommend George C. Marshall as his successor. Resigning forthwith himself, Early gathered a small OSD group to help compose a letter of resignation for Johnson to take to the Cabinet session that afternoon. Still hoping for a reprieve, Johnson took the unsigned letter with him, but when the two men met alone, Truman told the reluctant and distraught Johnson that he would have to sign. Leaving office on 19 September 1950, Johnson returned to his law offices at Steptoe and Johnson in Washington.76

September 1950: A New Team

With Johnson's resignation in hand on 12 September, the president called George C. Marshall, whom he regarded as "one of the most astute and profound" men that he had ever known, to tell him that "what they had been talking about" had been completed.77 Not only did Marshall stand high in Truman's esteem, but he was famed throughout the country as the "organizer of victory" in World War II. As chief of staff, he had restructured the U.S. Army and created the unity of command in the field essential to victory. At the same time, Marshall had learned much about establishing and maintaining an effective relationship with Congress. By his fair dealing, strength, and intellectual force he had also won the admiration of Allied leaders.78 In 1945–46 Marshall served Truman as his special representative in China, attempting to reconcile the warring Nationalist and Communist factions before concluding that it was a hopeless task. As Truman's secretary of state from January 1947 to January 1949, Marshall earned the plaudits not only of the president but of State Department insiders for his skills in organizing and rationalizing the policymaking process. Dean Acheson, who succeeded Marshall at State, spoke of him with admiration. European allies were heartened by Marshall's nomination as secretary of defense.79

In accepting Truman's offer of the Defense post, Marshall warned Truman that he feared that the political far right in Congress still blamed him for Chiang's defeat and might use his confirmation hearings to attack him and thus hurt the president. Appreciative of Marshall's concern, Truman was undeterred, but the results were as Marshall had anticipated. Senator Taft opposed Marshall's appointment, particularly since it would strengthen the position of Secretary of State Acheson. Sen. William E. Jenner declared during the hearings that Marshall was "not only willing, he is eager to play the role of a front man for traitors" and asked how the Senate could confirm "an
unsuspecting, well-intentioned stooge, or an actual coconspirator with the most treasonable array of political cutthroats ever turned loose in the executive branch of our Government.\textsuperscript{80} Revolted by such diatribes, Congress passed the enabling legislation,\textsuperscript{9} and the Senate confirmed Marshall, 57 to 11, on 20 September. He was allowed to retain his army commission and his retirement pay of $18,761, and received $3,739 as secretary of defense, the two emoluments together equaling $22,500, the pay of a Cabinet officer at that time. Sworn in on 21 September 1950, the new secretary still thought of himself as "General" Marshall and preferred to be so addressed.\textsuperscript{81}

Overnight, State–Defense relations changed from extremely difficult to extraordinarily open. To Acheson's embarrassment, his "revered and beloved former chief" insisted on observing every known rule of protocol. The older and more famous Marshall walked on the left side of Acheson, the senior Cabinet officer, entered cars from the street side and sat on the left, stepped aside for Acheson to pass through doors first, and waited for Acheson to speak first at meetings. Nor was this mere form; cooperation was just as real when it came to substance. "For the first time," wrote a relieved Acheson, the two secretaries and their top advisers "met with the Chiefs of Staff in their map room and discussed common problems together." There were to be many such meetings.\textsuperscript{82}

Marshall immediately demonstrated the intense interest in manpower policies that had characterized his years in the Army. Taking advantage of the fact that the law did not specify functions of two of the assistant secretary posts, Marshall decided to change the resigning Griffith's post to an assistant secretaryship for manpower and personnel. In a move that proved initially controversial, he nominated Anna M. Rosenberg, an expert on labor matters with wide government experience, to the job. This was Marshall's only major change in OSD organization and personnel.\textsuperscript{t} The two other assistant secretaries—McNeil as comptroller and Marx Leva for legal and legislative affairs—remained with Marshall.

Marshall's personal style in the Pentagon differed from that of Johnson. Warm and friendly in social situations, Marshall at work tended to be aloof and sometimes forbidding; even with close associates he maintained a certain distance, addressing them by their last names only. He made a point of not strolling the halls, and few were the subordinates who dropped into his office for an informal chat. Marshall had long since learned to control his strong

\textsuperscript{9} The National Security Act of 1947, sec 202 (reaffirmed in PL 81–216, 10 Aug 49) prohibited the appointment as secretary of defense of anyone who had within the previous 10 years been on active duty as a regular commissioned officer. Special enabling legislation thus had to be passed to allow Marshall to undertake the secretaryship.

\textsuperscript{t} For more on this matter and on other changes in OSD, see Chapter XXIII.
temper, but luckless ones were chilled by the ice of his demeanor. If not easily approachable, Marshall possessed, as some Pentagon intimates discovered, a dry wit and a kind, even fatherly, side. In any event, he inspired respect and hard work. Writing of the general’s earlier days as secretary of state, Acheson noted that Marshall’s presence was a “striking and communicated force. His figure conveyed intensity, which his voice, low, staccato, and incisive, reinforced. It compelled respect. It spread a sense of authority and of calm. There was no military glamour about him and nothing of the martinet.” At 69 and after a long bout with ill health, an aging Marshall was not at his peak in September 1950, but too much could be made of this. As Col. Marshall Carter, who became the executive to the secretary, recalled Marshall’s performance, “he was intensely practical, oriented to getting things done. . . . Things just started to happen, he made things go.”

Marshall helped ensure a smooth administration by bringing Robert A. Lovett into the Pentagon as his deputy secretary of defense. Educated at Yale and Harvard, Lovett at 55 was a man of much experience and attainment. After service as a naval aviator in France during World War I, he joined the firm of Brown Brothers, Harriman and Co., where his international banking experience broadened his horizons. Lovett served as a special assistant to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (December 1940–April 1941) and as assistant secretary of war for air (April 1941–December 1945), during which time he was a strong advocate of U.S. air power. He was considered to have been “one of Forrestal’s oldest and most intimate friends” and had a wide circle of friends in the government. Lovett returned to banking after the war but came to Washington again in 1947 to serve as under secretary of state under Marshall. With Marshall away on trips for long periods and ill during the latter part of his tenure, Lovett spent much time as acting secretary of state and played a major role in developing U.S. foreign policy. In January 1949 Lovett again went back to his New York office.

When Marshall agreed to become secretary of defense in September 1950, Lovett once more left his banking connection to join his friend and mentor in the Pentagon, where, as he later recalled, he “felt completely at home.” Appointed by Truman on 28 September and sworn in on 4 October, Lovett served as Marshall’s deputy until 16 September 1951, carrying the major burden of administration. “Lovett carries out the policies I have announced,” Marshall told a journalist. “He is in complete charge of operations.” In the Pentagon Lovett became Marshall’s alter ego.

A weary Marshall wrote Truman on 1 September 1951 that he wanted to leave and recommended Lovett to succeed him. To Lovett, Marshall said that there was no choice, that he would have to become the secretary. Following Marshall’s retirement on 12 September 1951, the Senate confirmed Lovett on
14 September, and he was sworn in as secretary on 17 September. Hanson Baldwin of *The New York Times* wrote that a “better appointment could not have been made.” When Lovett’s tenure ended on 20 January 1953, there could be little doubt that he had succeeded in measuring up to the president’s expectations.

No one could have satisfied Truman without being “decisive, specific, frank,” as Marshall once described Lovett; he also operated with discretion and a selflessness rooted in impeccable motives and an absence of personal ambition. Beyond these attributes, Lovett was also a sophisticated administrator who realized that an operation as large as Defense would inevitably have things go wrong “no matter how talented the people . . . and no matter how good their intentions.” Under attack by Congress, Lovett did not look for “somebody to hang” but worked to avoid recurrences of mistakes. Beyond being tough and determined, he was also friendly, unassuming, gregarious, and remarkably witty. His pithy remarks were memorable and quotable: On dealing with an impossible situation, he was apt to mutter, “To hell with the cheese, let’s get out of the trap.” After a long and apparently unpleasant medical examination at Walter Reed Army Hospital, he wryly told his luncheon companions that he was convinced that the Army Medical Corps was “dedicated to the proposition that they can too make both your ends meet.” When Prime Minister Churchill, at a British embassy stag dinner party, asked Truman how they would answer to St. Peter when called to account for the atomic bombing of Japan in World War II, Lovett defused a possibly tense situation. Quickly intervening, he lightly asked the prime minister how he could be sure that he and the president would both be in the same place for judgment. Churchill took the cue, Acheson and others joined in the quick turn of tone that had been offered, and the evening was saved.

An unfailing grace underlay Lovett’s style of bringing people willingly if gradually to his own position. In the Pentagon he preferred to proceed toward unification by cooperation. Even when strong positions were taken—and strong words exchanged—he tried to keep the disagreement on a professional level. Philosophically there was little if any difference between Marshall and Lovett as to the military’s role. In their view, evident as much from their actions as their statements, each military service and department had an appropriate mission to fulfill, as each proved every day during the Korean War. Nor did they believe the revolutionary new atomic weapons should be under the control of any one service. No one service was paramount; the ideal was a proper balance of forces. Furthermore, Lovett, like Marshall, perceived the Defense Department and the military services as part of the larger government. While they no longer faced “dividing up a scarcity” of funds or equipment or forces as in Forrestal’s and Johnson’s days, neither Marshall nor
Lovett saw military requirements as overriding other governmental needs except in an emergency. Rather, in Lovett's own words, they aimed for a good defense "cruising speed," adaptable to various contingencies. The military budgets during the Marshall–Lovett years, allowing for the pressures of the war, consistently reflected this philosophy. As to the secretary's relations with Congress, Lovett found much cause for comment, if not complaint. Writing to a colleague in December 1951, Lovett listed 11 major congressional committees and 14 subcommittees "of primary interest to the Department of Defense." The secretary of defense, Lovett later mused, "cannot and should not be in operations . . . but when a problem comes up . . . the Congress turns instinctively to the civilian head of the Department when they are looking for a sacrificial goat to offer on the altar of public opinion. It is a natural thing." Changing metaphor, he continued: "They don't have to stuff him at all. They can just take him right up there and kick him around. That is one of the occupational hazards." Even this, he took with considerable grace.

Lovett's deputy, William C. Foster, had formerly headed the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA), created in 1948 to implement the Marshall Plan for Europe. Encouraged by Lovett, Marshall, and Truman to accept the Pentagon post, Foster found that his technical, engineering, and business background in many ways complemented Lovett's strengths. A graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Foster had spent 24 years with a steel products company, rising to its presidency. He had served in the War Department during World War II and as under secretary of commerce from 1946 to 1948 before going to ECA. Foster took the oath of office on 24 September and remained with Lovett to the end of the Truman administration.

Foster's role at Defense was that of a true deputy, since Lovett gave him full power to deal with all matters in the secretary's absence. On arrival in the Pentagon, Foster's first assignment was to represent the secretary at the NATO meeting in Ottawa. As Lovett had under Marshall, Foster functioned much like a general manager, handling, among other tasks, the preparation of the defense budget in conjunction with the OSD comptroller. As Foster later recalled, the job was enough to keep him busy "7½ days a week." Lovett, however, retained decision over all policy matters, keeping a sure hand on the helm. The association of the two men, although a new one, was quite amicable, but it did not have the remarkable rapport of the Marshall–Lovett relationship.

For the new and untried Office of the Secretary of Defense the Korean War was indeed a time of testing. By contrast with OSD, the military services, even the new Air Force, had proud traditions and many years of experience as
organizational entities. Only a few years before they had fought and won a
great war. That OSD grew in size during the Korean War was in response to the
larger demands made on it. That it grew in stature and power may be
attributed in large part to the strong, positive, and respected leadership of
Marshall and Lovett and their key assistants.
East Asia—1950
CHAPTER III

The North Korean Attack

The North Korean onslaught across the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950 touched off a great international conflict of three years' duration. The first five months witnessed the initial North Korean success, the U.S. decision to come to the aid of South Korea, the organization of a United Nations Command to combat the aggression, and the defeat of the North Koreans. The first of a series of clearly defined phases of the Korean War, it ended in late November 1950.

A Divided Korea

A tangle of political, economic, and strategic interests had historically involved both Eastern and Western powers in the affairs of the Korean peninsula. A shared boundary and superior strength had allowed the Chinese to dominate Korea for centuries. When China was forced to give way in Korea to the Japanese after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, the peninsula became a pawn in Russo-Japanese relations, a phase that ended with the Japanese victory over the Russians in 1904–05. Formally annexing Korea in 1910, Japan maintained its ascendancy through World War II.

At the Cairo Conference in 1943, the United States, Great Britain, and China agreed that upon Japan's defeat Korea should become "free and independent" after a "period of apprenticeship" under a four-power trusteeship. Stalin acceded to this arrangement in May 1945. At the Potsdam Conference in July, in anticipation of Soviet entrance into the war against Japan, the Americans and Soviets discussed a line of demarcation for future Soviet air and sea operations in Korea. They did not delineate ground or occupation zones, since, as Truman later wrote, they did not expect either
Soviet or U.S. ground forces to enter Korea in the near future.1 After the
Japanese surrendered on 2 September 1945, Korea was to be jointly occupied
by the United States and the Soviet Union until a democratic government
could be established. The United States hoped to receive the Japanese
surrender in Korea as far north as possible, thus limiting the Soviet-occupied
area, but geography and time restricted the ability of U.S. forces to reach the
north. By agreement, Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel surrendered
to the Soviets, those south of the line to U.S. forces. This division of Korea left
the capital Seoul, its port of Inch'on, and the southeastern port of Pusan in
U.S. hands.2

In September 1945 U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) under Lt. Gen.
John R. Hodge assumed control of military and civil affairs. Civil responsibil­
ities were handed over to the Koreans in September 1946, with U.S. personnel
as advisers. The South Koreans established an Interim Government in May
1947, and the United States provided substantial assistance. Although Wash­
ington disapproved the establishment of Korean army and navy forces, it
agreed to arm the Korean civil police and supported a Department of Internal
Security with a constabulary and coast guard. Toward the end of 1947 the
constabulary numbered between 18,000 and 20,000 men equipped with
captured Japanese weapons and trained as infantry. Although the constabulary
was intended to be a reserve force for the national police, the two groups had
sharp political differences and sometimes fought each other.3

In the northern part of Korea after the end of World War II, Communist­
trained Korean exiles returned from the Soviet Union and created a central
government known as the Interim People's Committee, under the leadership
of Kim Sung Chu, who called himself Kim II Sung after a heroic anti-Japanese
resistance leader. Incorporating a range of Korean parties, this government
purported to be democratic, but Korean Communists controlled it. By
mid-1946 the Soviets had reduced their forces to 10,000 men and created a
well-trained and -armed North Korean people's militia, which by September
1947 had an estimated strength of 125,000.4

In an effort to establish an international trusteeship for all of Korea, a
Joint U.S.–USSR Commission negotiated sporadically, but by September 1947
it was clear that no accord was possible.5 By then also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concluded that the United States had no particular strategic interest in
maintaining either troops or bases in South Korea. Viewing U.S. troops in
Korea as a "military liability" in the event of an Asian war, the Joint Chiefs
concluded that such troops could be better used elsewhere and that an early
withdrawal would avoid later embarrassment.6 With Soviet–American negoti­
tions stalemated, Secretary of State Marshall decided to seek a withdrawal of
troops through the United Nations. The Soviets called for all foreign troops to
leave the peninsula. Fearing that the weak southern zone would be easy prey for the North Koreans after a total withdrawal, the United States sponsored a resolution providing for UN-supervised elections in both Korean zones by the end of March 1948, to be followed by the formation of a single government for Korea and the withdrawal of all occupation forces. The UN General Assembly approved the resolution in November 1947, but in the spring of 1948 the Soviets refused entrance to the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, established in November 1947 to supervise the elections. The United States then decided to go ahead with elections in the south and to form a Korean government. 7

The utter weakness of the prospective South Korean government made its relationship to the United States particularly significant. NSC 8, which Truman approved on 8 April 1948, evidenced the administration's uncertainty and indecision about Korea. It sought a middle course, neither abandoning Korea nor guaranteeing its security, but calling for provision of such support as was practicable and feasible, including military and economic assistance, a diplomatic mission, and, if appropriate, a military advisory group. To allow the 20,000 U.S. troops still in South Korea to leave by the end of 1948, the United States would expand, train, and equip the Korean constabulary to meet all security needs short of overt aggression by North Korean or other forces. In any event, NSC 8 specified that the United States should not become so "irrevocably involved" in Korea that it could be caught in a war situation. 8

The UN Temporary Commission on Korea supervised the 10 May 1948 election in South Korea and certified its results. In July the newly elected Korean National Assembly approved a constitution and elected Dr. Syngman Rhee, a strong anti-Communist patriot, as president. On 15 August the Republic of Korea (ROK) came into being. With the U.S. military occupation thus ended, Truman sent a special representative, John J. Muccio, with the personal rank of ambassador, * to negotiate with the Koreans the terms of the U.S. troop withdrawal scheduled for 15 January 1949. The United States considered the newly elected government entitled to be regarded as the government of all Korea in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution of November 1947. 9

Meanwhile, similar developments occurred in the North, where the Soviets installed a government in P'yongyang. On 9 September 1948 the North Koreans established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which the USSR immediately recognized and hailed as a government for all Korea. There were now two governments in Korea, each claiming the right to rule the

* Muccio officially became the U.S. ambassador after the United States formally recognized the Republic of Korea on 1 January 1949.
whole country. While continuing military assistance to the People's Republic, the Soviets announced they would remove all of their troops by the end of 1948.  

In accordance with NSC 8, the United States began to build up South Korean strength before withdrawing U.S. forces. In August 1948, Hodge signed an interim military agreement with the Rhee government providing for the turnover of security responsibility as fast as possible. The United States agreed to support a constabulary of 50,000 men that would become the nucleus of a South Korean army and established a Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) under Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts. In mid-September U.S. troops began their withdrawal, but violent domestic unrest shortly thereafter, especially guerrilla warfare and mutinies in the constabulary, much of it Communist instigated, threatened to topple Rhee's government. Alarmed by the increased turmoil in South Korea and the effect of the success of Mao's Communist forces in China, Rhee asked that U.S. forces remain until order was restored. Ambassador Muccio also advised Washington to delay the U.S. troop departure.

Although the U.S. Army wanted to continue the troop pullout, it bowed to State Department wishes and in November 1948 directed General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE), to retain in Korea one reinforced regimental combat team of not more than 7,500 men. On 12 December the UN General Assembly—while recognizing Rhee's as the only lawful Korean government and establishing a permanent seven-nation UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) to work for Korean unification—urged the early removal of all occupation forces. The situation became embarrassing to the United States when, two weeks later, the Soviets announced their complete troop withdrawal. MacArthur, although pessimistic about the South Koreans' ability to cope with any combination of invasion and Communist-led internal disorder, believed that they would soon be able to assure their internal security absent external attack. In January 1949 he recommended 10 May 1949, the first anniversary of the South Korean elections, as an appropriate date for the U.S. troop withdrawal. Shortly thereafter he indicated that the South Korean army should be so organized as to demonstrate its peaceful purpose and thus scotch claims that it was a threat to the North.

The State Department's fears for South Korea's survival intensified when the CIA predicted in February 1949 that a U.S. troop withdrawal under current conditions would probably lead to a North Korean and possibly a Chinese Communist invasion. The CIA recommended postponing the troop removal until early 1950. In March 1949, however, the administration, while reaffirming the broad objective of NSC 8 to establish a "united, self-governing,
and sovereign Korea,” decided in NSC 8/2 to remove its remaining 7,500 troops by 30 June 1949. It would continue political, economic, technical, military, and other support; regularize the existing U.S. Provisional Military Advisory Group; intensify training of the South Korean army (formerly constabulary), coast guard, and police; and build up equipment and supply stockpiles. It would increase the supply basis for the ROK army from 50,000 men to its actual strength of nearly 65,000, including some air detachments. The United States agreed also to support a 35,000-man national police force and a small coast guard, but no navy or separate air force.\textsuperscript{15}

U.S. policy toward Korea, as expressed in NSC 8/2, continued to reveal the ambivalence that had characterized it since 1945. The administration, strongly prompted by the military, did not want to tie down U.S. forces in Korea nor to undertake the responsibility and expense of arming the South Koreans to defend themselves against external aggression. The question remained, what to do in the event of an attack. Speaking to the National Press Club in Washington on 12 January 1950, Acheson declared that the U.S. defensive perimeter in the Pacific ran through the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines and that there could be no U.S. guarantee against aggression for other areas in Asia and the Pacific, which, if attacked, would have to place “initial reliance” on their own resistance and “then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.” Although Acheson called this a force which “so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on,” it was certainly a still untested force.\textsuperscript{16}

In accordance with NSC 8/2, American troops left Korea on 29 June 1949 under UN observation, USAFIK disbanded as of midnight of 30 June, and the interim military agreement automatically ended. The ROK army, which one U.S. officer declared “could have been the American army in 1775,” along with the police and coast guard, took over responsibility for South Korean security. On 1 July 1949 the provisional U.S. advisory team became the permanent U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG), under the continued leadership of General Roberts. Serving as part of the American Mission in Korea under the administrative control of Ambassador Muccio, it maintained liaison with MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo. Authorized a strength of 472 officers and men at the end of 1949, KMAG was planning in June 1950 to reduce this number.\textsuperscript{17} U.S. assistance to South Korea, as Secretary Johnson later testified, amounted to $444 million in economic and $56 million in military aid between 1945 and June 1950.\textsuperscript{*} The Truman administration allocated slightly more than $10 million in grant military aid

\textsuperscript{*} This was under the Surplus Property Act of 1944. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 provided for military assistance beginning in FY 1950.
for FY 1950 and planned to support a ROK army of 84,000, but both Roberts and Muccio believed that Korea needed at least $20 million. Less than $1,000 worth of this military aid actually reached Korea before mid-1950.

As the fateful last Sunday of June 1950 approached, South Korea had approximately 95,000 men in an eight-division army. The earlier ROK decision to expand beyond the U.S. support base of 65,000 had created major equipment gaps and serious interference with the KMAG training program. Unit training was further disrupted in 1950 because the ROK army, having fought 542 counterguerrilla operations in the last half of 1949, had two divisions almost constantly engaged in guard or antiguerilla duty. Although there was no U.S. commitment to support a Korean air force, the Rhee government had created a small force that by June 1950 consisted of approximately 1,800 officers and men with 14 liaison and 10 trainer aircraft. The 6,000-man coast guard possessed about 58 serviceable vessels. Both services had a few KMAG advisers, but the efforts of Roberts and Muccio to obtain more U.S. advisers and equipment, including aircraft, had not succeeded. In all, the South Korean armed forces totaled approximately 103,000 men in June 1950. In addition, the South Korean national police—with a strength of 48,000, motley equipment, a few assigned U.S. advisers, and control divided between the national and provincial governments—had to cover the eight mainland provinces and the islands of Cheju-do and Ullung-do.

Although the South Koreans believed that the North Koreans had more than 300,000 men under arms, the U.S. embassy in Seoul estimated the figure to be about 103,000, and the CIA set their strength at 98,500. After the invasion, U.S. sources placed North Korean strength at between 90,000 and 100,000 men, organized into approximately 7 divisions and 5 brigades. Well-trained and armed by the Soviets, the North Koreans had heavy armor, artillery, and high-performance aircraft.

In numbers alone, the South Korean forces were relatively close to, or slightly greater than, the northern forces. As for effectiveness, Muccio considered ROK troops, except for their lack of air strength, to be superior in “training, leadership, morale, marksmanship and . . . small arms equipment.” Muccio thought that, given some measure of air defense and heavy artillery, they would be reasonably equal if not superior to the North Korean, but not Soviet or Chinese, forces. The CIA estimated that the North Koreans, with superiority in armor, heavy artillery, and aircraft, could reach “limited objectives in short-term military operations against southern Korea, including the capture of Seoul.” In the long term, the North Koreans would have to depend on increased Soviet support, which would be forthcoming if requested. Believing that regular Soviet or Chinese Communist military units
would join in only as a last resort, the CIA questioned whether North Korea could gain effective control over all of South Korea. In the absence of an overt attack, it thought the current North Korean program of “propaganda, infiltration, sabotage, subversion and guerrilla operations” would not succeed if U.S. aid to South Korea continued.21

Meanwhile, both North and South Korea were playing a dangerous game along the 38th parallel. More than 400 North Korean armed forays across the border occurred in the second half of 1949; some resulted in heavy casualties. By mid-1950 five South Korean divisions were busy guarding the border. To complicate matters, the South Koreans also precipitated some border incidents, many occurring when they attempted to take and prepare defensive positions along the 38th parallel or even north of it. Although the South Koreans were excitable and at times provocative, UNCK field observers reported on 24 June 1950 that the ROK forces were organized defensively along the 38th parallel and in no position to carry out a large-scale attack. Furthermore, they lacked the equipment for aggressive action; the United States was not even preparing them to repulse an attack against their own territory. If such an attack came, KMAG officers estimated that supply would be on a “bare subsistence basis,” with full-scale, defensive operations supportable for about 15 days. Apparently few South Koreans or KMAG personnel doubted that an attack would eventually come.22

**Combating Aggression**

Although the South Koreans had long been apprehensive, the North Korean attack, at about 4:00 a.m. on Sunday, 25 June 1950 (Korean time), proved unexpected, partly because of the many earlier “false starts.” Invading in four major drives across the 38th parallel, including amphibious landings on the east coast, the North Koreans used approximately 6 infantry divisions and other army and border constabulary units, supported by about 100 tanks, heavy artillery, and 100 to 150 combat planes. Concentrating in the west, their forces quickly captured Kaesong, pushed toward Uijongbu about 17 miles from Seoul, and before the day ended made air attacks on Kimpo airport near Seoul and reportedly flew over Seoul.

Late on 25 June the North Korean government broadcast a claim that South Koreans had invaded north of the 38th parallel and that the North

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*It was 3:00 p.m. Saturday afternoon, 24 June, in Washington. To account for time differences between Korea and Washington, 13 hours must be added to Washington’s Daylight Savings Time and 14 hours to Eastern Standard Time. Because MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo operated on daylight time, 14 hours must be added to EDT. Dates are based on the place of action.*
Korean army was “putting up stiff counter-operations.” While the five lightly armed and surprised South Korean divisions fell back before the invaders, Ambassador Muccio termed the North’s claim an attempt to “clothe their naked aggression . . . with patently absurd charges.” The United Nations observers in South Korea regarded the situation as serious, with the possibility of “full-fledged war.” In Washington, Secretary Johnson, who received the news Saturday night, 24 June, delegated responsibility to act on behalf of the Department of Defense to Secretary of the Army Pace. Shortly after midnight, the Army set up a command post to serve as a clearinghouse for messages from and to the State Department, the military services, and the Far East. From Independence, Truman approved State Department advice to place the matter before the United Nations.

On 25 June Truman, recalling unhappily the dire history of appeasement in the days before World War II, returned to Washington. Meeting the president’s plane, Johnson and Acheson discussed with Truman the possibility of U.S. involvement. John Foster Dulles, later to preside over many crises himself as secretary of state and at the time in the Far East as a consultant to Acheson on Japan, advocated the employment of U.S. force if necessary, under UN aegis. From Moscow, the U.S. Embassy cabled that the North Korean attack represented a “clearcut Soviet challenge” and recommended support for the South Koreans. State Department intelligence asserted that there was “no possibility that the North Koreans acted without prior instruction from Moscow” and emphasized the blow to U.S. prestige if South Korea fell. Acheson believed Soviet involvement almost a foregone conclusion and that it would be necessary to “steel ourselves for the use of force.”

The UN Security Council, with Soviet representative Jacob Malik still boycotting the sessions,† at about 6:00 p.m. on 25 June adopted (9 to 0, with Yugoslavia abstaining) a resolution calling for the immediate end of hostilities in Korea, the withdrawal of the North Korean forces above the 38th parallel, and the assistance of UN members in carrying out the resolution. The major question before the president was what to do if North Korean forces ignored the UN resolution.

Flanked that evening by the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries, Johnson joined Acheson and four other State Department officials for dinner with the president at Blair House. At the time, the secretary of defense seemed

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* A cogent argument against the theory that the Soviets ordered the attack was made as early as the spring of 1951 by a former member of the U.S. military government in Korea (see Wilbur W. Hitchcock, “North Korea Jumps the Gun,” in Norman A. Graebner, ed., Nationalism and Communism in Asia: The American Response, 97–109).

† Malik had been boycotting the Security Council meetings since January 1950 as a protest against its refusal to seat the Chinese Communist regime in place of the Chinese Nationalists.
The North Korean Attack

less concerned about Korea than Formosa, which he thought more important to the United States. Thoroughly worried about the Korean situation, Acheson had several recommendations he had hammered out with the military earlier in the day. He suggested to Truman that MacArthur be directed to send to Korea military supplies over and above those in the regular military assistance program, that U.S. aircraft cover the evacuation of U.S. dependents from Korea, that further aid for Korea be considered, that the Seventh Fleet move from the Philippines to Formosa to prevent any attack on or from that island, and that aid to French forces in Indochina be stepped up.

Since the Joint Chiefs as a body had no recommendations, Johnson asked each of the chiefs and service secretaries to speak individually. The chiefs generally supported the actions that Acheson had suggested; General Collins in addition wanted MacArthur to send a survey group to Korea. Believing that the Soviets did not want all-out war, General Bradley and Admiral Sherman felt that Korea was as good a place as any to stop adventurism. General Vandenberg agreed that the North Koreans should be stopped, but he warned that, if the Soviets intervened, Russian jets would operate from much closer bases than the Americans. Secretary Pace and General Bradley questioned the advisability of using U.S. ground forces in Korea and Johnson opposed such use. Agreeing that MacArthur should send military supplies to Korea, Johnson frowned on any real delegation of presidential authority to the Far East commander. In what may have been a remarkable presiment of the future, he counseled that MacArthur's instructions should be detailed, "so as not to give him too much discretion."

Truman agreed to authorize MacArthur to send supplies and a survey group to Korea, use U.S. air to protect supply deliveries and cover the evacuation of U.S. dependents, move fleet units from California to Hawaii, and send the Seventh Fleet to a new base in Japan but without any final decision as to its mission. He told the Air Force to plan—stressing that the order was only for planning purposes—to "wipe out all Soviet air bases in the Far East." He instructed the State and Defense Departments to surmise where the next Soviet action might be expected. The president directed that U.S. action be confined for the moment to Korea and to the United Nations, and he warned the conferees against any public comments or press leaks.

Monday, 26 June, saw "rapid deterioration and disintegration" in South Korea; its National Assembly appealed to the United States and the United Nations for help. Reporting that the North Korean invasion was "well-planned, concerted and full-scale," with South Korean forces "taken completely by surprise," the UN Commission on Korea thought the conflict was

* On Indochina, see Chapter XI.
assuming major proportions. Evacuating female employees and dependents, Ambassador Muccio worried about bringing out the rest of the embassy staff.\textsuperscript{52}

These developments created a bleak background that evening for the president's second Blair House meeting, when he approved four additional steps proposed by Acheson. Truman waived all restrictions on U.S. air and naval operations below the 38th parallel to give South Korean forces full support and a chance to regroup. Beyond Korea, he increased U.S. military forces in and accelerated military aid to the Philippines, and he increased aid and ordered a strong military mission sent to Indochina. He also approved Acheson's proposal to order the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack against or from Formosa. Pleased with this move, Johnson stated that he agreed with the recommended actions, and he hoped that these steps would settle the Korean problem. But no one was confident of the outcome. Collins thought the situation very serious, and Bradley worried that if U.S. troops went into Korea the United States would lack forces to meet its other commitments without mobilization. Truman broached the probable need for funds and mobilization, and in a solemn mood said, "I don't want to go to war."\textsuperscript{55}

With Acheson and Johnson, the Joint Chiefs, and the service secretaries present, Truman met with congressional leaders on Tuesday, 27 June, to brief them. With few exceptions, the congressional reaction was supportive, and the president released a public statement about the situation. In the afternoon the House approved, 315 to 4, a bill extending the Selective Service Act for one year, with a special provision allowing the callup of all reservists; the next day the Senate followed suit, 70 to 0. With the Soviet representative still absenting himself, the UN Security Council on 27 June adopted (7 to 1)\textsuperscript{*} a second U.S.-sponsored resolution recommending that all UN members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." The UN resolution adopted the U.S. decision taken earlier; Acheson later wrote that some U.S. action, "said to be in support of the resolution of June 27, was in fact ordered, and possibly taken prior to the resolution."\textsuperscript{54}

The situation in Korea continued to deteriorate. Brig. Gen. John H. Church, whose survey group had become the GHQ Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM), reached Korea about 7:00 p.m. on 27 June and tried to rally Korean defenses along the Han River. With three ROK divisions no longer existing as organized units and the KMAG advisers still

\textsuperscript{*} To demonstrate its independence, Yugoslavia voted against the resolution; Egyptian and Indian representatives, lacking instructions, abstained. The Indians later supported the resolution; Egypt did not. The United States on 3 July took the view that it was satisfied with benevolent neutrality on the part of Yugoslavia and would not press for open support.
The North Korean Attack

unaccounted for, Church reported to MacArthur that U.S. ground forces would be needed to drive the North Korean invaders back to the 38th parallel. By the evening of 28 June the central front had caved in and Seoul and Kimpo airfield were in North Korean hands. At Muccio's urging, Rhee and other South Korean leaders left Seoul and tried to reestablish the South Korean government at Taejon.35

Early on 28 June in Washington, Acheson sent Johnson a draft policy statement indicating that, although the decision to commit U.S. air and sea power in Korea had been taken "in the full realization of a risk of war with the Soviet Union," it did "not in itself constitute a decision to engage in a major war" with the Soviets if their troops intervened in Korea. In that event, Acheson felt, U.S. forces should defend themselves and report to Washington. Johnson sent this message to the Joint Chiefs, who were already thinking in terms of increases in naval forces but did not want to commit U.S. ground troops.36

The National Security Council met that afternoon in the White House, with the Joint Chiefs and service secretaries again present. Directing a review of all policy dealing with areas along the Soviet perimeter and an analysis of possible Soviet moves, Truman also agreed with Acheson that the Pentagon should study U.S. military capabilities to meet any emergency. The president observed that he did not want to abandon Korea unless a new military situation elsewhere required him to do so. It was noted that after only two days of operations in Korea, U.S. air power was experiencing difficulties because of the distance between U.S. bases and the operational zone, bad weather, enemy camouflage, and the prohibition on going north of the 38th parallel to destroy enemy bases or pursue enemy aircraft. The president remarked that the last problem might be considered later.37

Events on Thursday, 29 June, hastened the full involvement of U.S. forces in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were now considering whether MacArthur should be authorized to extend air and naval operations above the 38th parallel into North Korea if necessary to avoid losing South Korea. However reluctantly, they were also moving toward the commitment of U.S. ground troops to provide for communications and transportation service—and for combat if necessary—to protect the southeastern port and airfield of Pusan. Recognizing that such a move would require presidential authorization, Johnson asked Truman to meet again with his advisers. The meeting was scheduled for 5:00 p.m. that day.38

After Johnson read a proposed JCS directive to MacArthur, Acheson supported the use of air operations above the 38th parallel so long as they did not approach the international borders of North Korea; he showed no aversion to the proposed assignment of U.S. ground forces, which he regarded as a
limited commitment. More cautious, Truman stated that air and naval operations above the 38th parallel should be allowed only to destroy munitions supplies. Stressing that U.S. operations in Korea were to restore peace and maintain the South Korean border, the president had reservations about Acheson's proposed policy in the event of Soviet intervention in Korea. Truman thought a defend-and-report order, essentially Acheson's suggestion, might be acceptable as a directive to MacArthur, but he did not want any public disclosure of its contents. He did not want the United States so deeply committed that contingencies elsewhere could not be met. State and Defense agreed to rewrite the directive. Truman also decided to direct MacArthur "to make a full and complete report" on the Far Eastern situation.39

The council discussed two other important matters. The Soviets had that day refused a U.S. request to intercede in Korea, referring in their answer to the "principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea." The People's Republic of China (PRC) meanwhile denounced the U.S. support of South Korea. Acheson interpreted these two communications to mean that the Soviets would not themselves intervene, but that they might use the Chinese Communists. More encouraging was the increasing number of offers of assistance from other UN members. The president wanted to accept all offers to ensure that the response in Korea had as much UN representation as possible.40

By 7:00 p.m. Johnson and Acheson had agreed to a new directive for MacArthur, sent later that evening. It authorized the general to use U.S. naval and air forces to provide the "fullest possible support" for South Korean efforts and to employ U.S. Army forces for essential service support and to ensure "retention of a port and air base" at Pusan. MacArthur could extend air and naval operations into North Korea against purely military targets if essential to his mission or to avoid unnecessary casualties. But he was directed to take special care to avoid operations near the North Korean borders with Manchuria and the Soviet Union. The order also repeated the U.S. decision to neutralize Formosa. Finally, MacArthur was told to take defensive measures, not to aggravate the situation, and to report to Washington if Soviet forces intervened.41

By the time these orders went out from Washington on 29 June, it was already the morning of 30 June in Korea, where MacArthur was considerably ahead of his Washington colleagues in more than time. Earlier that morning and despite poor weather, MacArthur had led a high-ranking group of 14 officers on a visit to Korea. During the trip there, he had ordered Far East Air Forces (FEAF) headquarters to attack North Korean airfields. Arriving in Suwon, about 20 miles south of Seoul, MacArthur met with General Church, Ambassador Muccio, and President Rhee, then drove to the south bank of the
Han River, where the disorganized South Koreans were rapidly retreating from the already-lost Seoul. Church could account for only 8,000 South Korean troops that morning but expected to locate 25,000 by evening. As for Americans, Church had his own ADCOM group, Roberts's KMAG, and 33 men from an antiaircraft battalion that had arrived that day and had seen immediate action. By the end of his visit, MacArthur decided that U.S. ground forces were needed if South Korea was to be saved; he so informed Washington. 42

MacArthur's message arrived in Washington before 1:00 a.m. on 30 June. He requested authorization to send in a U.S. regimental combat team and to build to a strength of two divisions in preparation for an early counteroffensive. In a teletype conference with General Collins at 4:00 a.m. (Washington time), MacArthur held firm to his recommendation. When Pace informed the president, Truman immediately authorized the use of the regimental combat team but not the two-division buildup.43

At another meeting with the Blair House participants early that morning, Truman informed them of what he had done. Because of the unavailability of U.S. troops for a quick buildup in Korea, he seemed inclined to accept a Chinese Nationalist offer of 33,000 troops from Formosa. Acheson, however, feared that the Nationalists' involvement might trigger Chinese Communist intervention in Korea or Formosa, and the Joint Chiefs expressed reluctance to divert U.S. transport and equipment to the Nationalists' use. Accepting these objections, Truman decided to grant MacArthur "full authority" to use in Korea the U.S. ground forces under his command in Japan. The president also approved a naval blockade of North Korea. The die was cast, with the apparent approval of all concerned, in a meeting that lasted about half an hour.44

Johnson and other key administration officials joined the president again at 11:00 a.m. on 30 June to meet with congressional leaders. Describing the steps being taken in Korea, Truman stressed that the United States had acted under the auspices of the United Nations. While most of the senators and representatives seemed to approve, Sen. Kenneth Wherry questioned the president's legal authority to send ground troops to Korea without consulting Congress, and Sen. Alexander Smith suggested that the administration obtain a supporting congressional resolution. The press release Truman read at the meeting and issued later that day mentioned operations against specific military targets in North Korea and the imposition of a naval blockade, but it dealt less than frankly with the decision to commit U.S. ground troops to the defense of South Korea: "General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units." Secretary Johnson showed no such reticence, however, when he talked with New York Times reporter Harold B. Hinton, who filed a story clearly indicating the scope of the decisions.45
In four steps—the decision on 25 June to give equipment to the Koreans and to use U.S. air and naval forces to ensure the safe evacuation of Americans from Korea; on 26 June, to use U.S. air and naval strength below the 38th parallel to support the South Korean army; on 29 June, to allow U.S. air and naval operations north of the 38th parallel; and on 30 June, to use U.S. ground forces in Korea and to blockade North Korea—the United States committed itself to a difficult and treacherous Asian ground war that was to last more than three years. Testifying a year later before congressional committees, Johnson stated that the impetus to use U.S. forces had come from the secretary of state. The military, Johnson noted, had pointed out the difficulties and limitations of military action, but they had "neither recommended it nor opposed it."

This commitment of the United States to full-scale combat in Korea must be regarded as one of the most fateful decisions in U.S. and world history after 1945. The evidence assembled and analyzed by scholars who subsequently subjected the events to meticulous inspection serves primarily to emphasize the complexity of the background against which the decisions were made. It is clear that many factors influenced the president and contributed to the decisions at each stage in the tense days between 25 and 30 June.

Perhaps of most immediate effect were the powerful, nearly irresistible pressures for a swift response to the frantic pleas for military succor from the Korean government and MacArthur. U.S. security and foreign policy considerations—concern for the U.S. world leadership role—obviously weighed heavily. More subtle but equally compelling were domestic pressures that inclined the administration toward intervention. Truman and Acheson had been subjected to harsh and growing criticism of their Far East policy for several years before the Korean War. These criticisms centered on the China policy—the "loss of China," the failure to support Chiang Kai-shek and Formosa, the Communist threat elsewhere in Asia. Republican senators—chiefly Robert A. Taft, William P. Knowland, Kenneth Wherry, Joseph R. McCarthy, and William Jenner—had propagated a "soft on communism" issue, accusing the President of appeasement and foreign policy failures. This political assault had put Truman increasingly on the defensive and probably contributed to the administration's taking measures, such as tightened internal security, to demonstrate its awareness of subversive danger from within as well as from without. By late June 1950 the McCarthy campaign against the internal Communist danger was in full cry, requiring the administration to defend itself against accusations that were generally lacking in substance but potentially damaging politically.

The domestic political atmosphere, then, had to be very much on the mind of the president and his advisers, especially Acheson, during these early
days of the Korean War. It is reasonable to assume that it was one of the factors that the administration weighed in the balance in making decisions. While there is no specific evidence that it directly influenced any decision, its effect, even if only unconscious, may well have been considerable. To have failed to go to the aid of South Korea would undoubtedly have unleashed a torrent of criticism that might well have reached political crisis proportions. It would no doubt have given rise to accusations of the "loss of Korea." In light of these possible serious political consequences for the administration, it would have been difficult for Truman to resist the direction in which his instincts and events were taking him anyway—toward intervention.

Truman was thus on firm political ground in making the decisions that led to full U.S. involvement in the Korean War. It is clear that he had the support—the enthusiastic endorsement—of Congress, the press, and the public. The Republican opposition approved the president's actions while still blaming the administration for not having acted more forcefully in the past. In light of the state of both international and domestic affairs at the time, it is hard to conceive that Truman could have decided other than he did between 25 and 30 June.

Nonetheless, the United States made the commitment to Korea without clear answers to questions concerning immediate and long-range objectives, particularly with regard to maintaining or ending the division of Korea at the 38th parallel, reacting to possible Soviet or Chinese Communist intervention, or responding to a Soviet military initiative elsewhere. Nor did U.S. leaders know precisely how, acting in support of the UN resolutions of 25 and 27 June, to bring about a truly multinational effort in Korea.

The United Nations Command

Fighting a war under the United Nations required new and uncharted procedures. By 4 July the State Department proposed a unified command that would fly the UN flag and be headed by a U.S. officer who would periodically report to a UN special committee that would review offers of assistance and advise the UN Security Council. Johnson and the Joint Chiefs, however, disliked the idea of a UN committee that might want to exercise operational control of forces in Korea. With this feature removed, Truman approved the plan,* and the UN Security Council adopted it on 7 July.47

* Although drafted in the State Department, some department officials found the final UN resolution regarding command in the Korean War "defective" since it merely called on the U.S. president to designate the UN commander rather than clarifying the president's authority in the chain of command by making him the commander and calling on him to designate a deputy.
There could be little doubt that MacArthur—already Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) for the occupation of Japan, Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) for all U.S. military forces in the area, and the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East (CG USAFFE)—would become the UN commander in chief. Truman approved the choice on 8 July, and the Joint Chiefs informed MacArthur on 10 July. He immediately established a United Nations Command (UNC) with headquarters in Tokyo and on 12 July assigned to the Eighth U.S. Army, then on occupation duty in Japan, responsibility for ground operations in Korea. Subsequently, its commander, Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, set up his headquarters in Korea (EUSAK) and assumed command over U.S. and, with the approval of President Rhee, South Korean troops. MacArthur was directed to emphasize the United Nations aspect of his command and to submit action reports to the UN Security Council. Johnson and the Joint Chiefs objected, however, when the Department of State prepared the initial report in Washington. After this, UNC headquarters prepared and submitted semimonthly reports, which, after JCS review, went in turn to the secretary of defense, the Department of State, and, finally, the UN Security Council.

Although the United Nations Command initially included only South Korean and U.S. troops, Truman wanted the armed forces in Korea to be "truly representative of the United Nations." Because of the mix of military and political factors, both Defense and State were to review all offers, and all decisions were to be made in Washington. In OSD, Deputy Secretary Early, who led a determined effort to get the State Department to involve other countries, enthusiastically applied Truman's policy. The British immediately offered naval forces, explicitly limiting their use to Korea and excluding any participation in the U.S. effort in Formosa; by 30 June, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand had also offered naval or air forces. The United States quickly accepted all these contingents for the UNC. By this time, however, only 7 of the 47 countries that favored the two UN resolutions of 25 and 27 June had offered military assistance to Korea. Many UN members apparently hoped for a quick end to the Korean affair, and, indeed, the British and Indians were trying, futilely, to get the Soviet Union to mediate.

On 7 July the secretaries of the military departments informed Johnson that they wanted at least "symbol troops" from Britain, France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and Canada; they also felt that there should be some Asian forces and they hoped in particular for Indian troops. Johnson shared their sentiments and conveyed them to Truman. Six days later, the service secretaries told Johnson they felt it imperative for the other UN member nations to send ground troops; otherwise Americans might become reluctant to support NATO. With the UNC not faring well in Korea, the need for Allied help was
more than symbolic, but only two more small offers—of one ship by the French and 30 officers by the Bolivians—came at this time. 53

Less enthusiastic than either Johnson or the service secretaries about international military contributions of units differing in language, training, and equipment, the JCS advised Johnson on 14 July that U.S. acceptance of further military offers should hinge on military usefulness and that they wanted to be consulted in each instance. They listed the United Kingdom, Australia, Pakistan, New Zealand, and Canada as possible providers of ground units. 54 Johnson told the Joint Chiefs he would consult with them on all offers, but he noted the president's desire to accept all national contingents, which he fully supported. In fact, Johnson had already agreed to accept an offer the Joint Chiefs had rejected on military grounds. Meanwhile, he asked the JCS to provide general criteria for acceptability, to name all countries from which offers could be utilized, and to indicate the feasible size of the contribution. 55

In response, the Joint Chiefs stipulated that they wanted contributions of approximately 1,000 men organized into an infantry battalion, with combat and service support, full equipment, 60 days' level of supply, and sufficient English-speaking personnel to avoid communications problems. Transportation should be provided by the parent nation or a contributing UN nation; logistic support, by the parent nation or by the United States on a reimbursable basis. Similar terms applied to naval forces. Accepting these criteria, Johnson also supported a JCS recommendation against any U.S. undertaking to organize, train, and equip an international unit composed of individual volunteers from nations unable or unwilling to support a national unit. 56

Seeking Johnson's agreement to encourage "maximum direct participation" by all UN members, * Acheson on 24 July spelled out somewhat different procedures. He believed tenders of assistance should be made to the United Nations, then communicated to the U.S. Government, which would arrange the specific details with the proferring government. The United States should accept all offers of assistance, even if unusable, Acheson urged Johnson, but State would try to get proposals modified to a usable form. Further, the United States should not solicit military units unless they were to be employed in the combat area. 57

By late July there were seven offers of ground forces ranging in size up to a brigade. Concerned about the possibility of accepting assistance that might not be used and fretting that the United States might acquire some embarrassing future obligations, Johnson on 31 July asked the Joint Chiefs to comment

* The UN secretary general on 14 July had sent a second request for aid to the 53 UN members then supporting the UN resolutions on Korea.
on Acheson's proposed procedure, but he did not have time to act on their 8 September response before his resignation. The new secretary, Marshall, did not disagree with Acheson but reiterated the JCS view that Allied military assistance should come immediately, conform as closely as possible to the JCS general criteria, and carry no commitment on combat employment.58

In practice, the JCS criteria had to be modified. On 7 August the Joint Chiefs significantly changed one condition by providing that a unit as small as a company might be accepted. Although both Johnson and Marshall wanted to maintain the principle of reimbursement for U.S. supplies, this too was changed at State's insistence.59 The United States waived or reduced some payments and allowed the use of U.S. grant aid for equipping national forces for service in Korea. These steps helped make the Korean defense an international effort.60

By 5 January 1951, 16 nations other than the United States and South Korea—Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom—had sent or agreed to contribute military units to South Korea's defense. All except South Africa sent ground forces, the United Kingdom in significant numbers; at least 10 nations also sent naval and/or air forces. British and Australian ground forces arrived in August and September 1950, the Turkish in October; all three forces were involved in combat action by early fall. The last contingent to arrive, the Colombian, came in June 1951. By mid-November 1951, military units of all contributing countries, except Cuba, had seen action in Korea. Many acquired outstanding combat records, with, unfortunately, accompanying casualties. In addition, Denmark, India, Norway, and Sweden—and also Italy, not yet a UN member—contributed medical units. By the end of the war, 22 other UN members and 5 nonmembers made offers that for one reason or another were not implemented.61

The United Nations Command in Korea, symbolically at least, betokened a United Nations effort, but the U.S. component remained by far the largest, providing as of November 1951 more than 50 percent of ground forces, 83 percent of naval forces, and 98 percent of air forces. South Korean contingents constituted approximately 43 percent of ground forces, 9 percent of naval, and less than 1 percent of air forces. Other UN nations provided about 6 percent of the ground forces, 8 percent of naval forces, and 1 percent of all air forces.62

Finding U.S. Troops for Korea

Involvement in the Korean War quickly revealed U.S. shortages, particularly in ground forces. In June 1950, the Army had 10 divisions—4 in the Far
East under MacArthur, 1 in Germany, and 5 in the continental United States. The occupation forces in Japan were under strength and not combat-ready; the troops in Germany were indispensable there. Most of the divisions in the United States were under strength and one division was considered unsuitable for service in Korea. Collins wanted to keep the 82d Airborne Division at home and “intact for emergency use anywhere.”

On 30 June the president gave MacArthur permission to use all the divisions under his command; Washington initially thought that the U.S. forces already in Japan might suffice. Truman also agreed when MacArthur on 2 July asked for a marine regimental combat team with its attached air unit. However, when MacArthur on 5 July requested shipment of an infantry division, an engineer special brigade, and an airborne regiment for operations to take place between 20 July and 10 August, the Joint Chiefs asked him to estimate his total needs. Meanwhile, the U.S. forces so hastily thrown into battle met the enemy for the first time on 5 July at Osan, about 30 miles south of Seoul, and took a severe mauling over the next few days. Bradley told the NSC on 6 July that there were only about 25,000 South Korean and 13,000 U.S. troops in Korea to fight approximately 90,000 North Koreans.

Reassessing the situation on 7 July, MacArthur told the Joint Chiefs that his forces controlled the air and sea, but the ground war was going poorly. The aggressive and well-trained North Korean force, well equipped and excellently led, had shown “superior command of strategic and tactical principles.” Once the enemy was stopped, MacArthur intended to exploit U.S. air and sea power and make an amphibious strike behind the mass of the enemy’s ground forces. To do this, he needed 4 to 4 1/2 full-strength infantry divisions, an airborne regimental combat team, and an armored group with full artillery and service elements. The Army would have to provide approximately 30,000 men from the United States. Naval and air forces, currently adequate, would probably have to be augmented later, although MacArthur had already supported a Far East Air Forces request for 700 additional planes. MacArthur also warned that intervention by either the Chinese Communists or Soviets would create a new and unpredictable situation.

MacArthur’s request made clear the imperative need to augment U.S. forces. Bypassing Johnson, Truman sent White House aides to the Joint Chiefs to get some idea of the numbers. When Johnson discovered this, he called in the Joint Chiefs and immediately forwarded their request for 108,500 more men to the president without comment. After discussing the requirement at the Cabinet meeting on 7 July, Truman authorized Defense to exceed the military personnel budget ceilings, to use the draft, and to accept reservist volunteers; eventually he approved MacArthur’s request. The requirements for 4 to 4 1/2 divisions could be met by using 3 U.S. divisions still in Japan and sending approximately 1 1/2 divisions from the United States.
On 9 July MacArthur drastically increased his requirement, asking for the immediate dispatch of four divisions from the United States. The North Korean force, MacArthur indicated, seemed to have Soviet leadership and technical guidance combined with some Chinese Communist ground elements. Even holding the southern tip of Korea was "increasingly problematical." The following day, MacArthur asked that Eighth Army's four understrength divisions be built up to full war strength, and he raised his request for a Marine regimental combat team to a division.67

MacArthur's requests, which Collins viewed as "perfectly legitimate and warranted," had in 10 days' time raised the military requirement for U.S. ground forces in Korea from 2 divisions to 8 or more, thereby creating a major dilemma. Meeting MacArthur's needs would strip both Japan and the United States of troops and leave nothing to bolster Europe's defenses or meet any other contingency. To ignore MacArthur's needs would cast doubt on the ability of the United States and the UN to enforce the UN mandate in Korea.68

While the Joint Chiefs studied MacArthur's 9 July request, Truman sent Generals Collins and Vandenberg to the Far East for a firsthand look. Arriving on 13 July, they found MacArthur confident that the North Korean advance could be halted and the battlefield stabilized, although he was uncertain when or where. Once that occurred and he received his reinforcements, he planned to launch a counteroffensive, including an amphibious operation, to cut off enemy forces. He wanted to interdict North Korean supplies from Manchuria and Vladivostok by daily bombing attacks and noted that the tunnels and bridges of those supply routes offered "a unique opportunity" for the use of the atomic bomb. He envisioned cutting off Chinese Communist reinforcements by operations in North Korea rather than by advancing into Manchuria and speculated that he might have to occupy all of Korea.69

Above all, MacArthur, who before the 25 June attack had viewed Korea as strategically unimportant to U.S. interests, now spoke of the vital importance of meeting the Communist challenge. "We win here or lose everywhere," MacArthur told Collins and Vandenberg; "if we win here, we improve the chances of winning everywhere." He reiterated his need for eight infantry divisions. Collins warned that it was not realistic to expect four more U.S. divisions, although the earlier requests would probably be met. With U.S. resources scarce, Collins told MacArthur's staff not to get "too grandiose." Reporting later to Johnson and Truman, Collins observed that the South Korean and U.S. forces could probably maintain a bridgehead around Pusan, and he urged sending U.S. reinforcements promptly.70

Washington was already planning to send certain available separate regiments and regimental combat teams to Korea and to further expand the U.S. armed forces. On 13 July Truman informally approved an Air Force recall
of reserves, and the Joint Chiefs, who had already received their 108,500-man increase, asked for an additional 115,000. On 18 July they requested a third increment. Johnson supported the requests, which would raise U.S. armed forces’ strength from approximately 1.5 million to more than 2.1 million. Truman approved the new strengths on 19 July.71

As UNC forces continued their grim retreat in South Korea, there was growing fear in the United States that MacArthur’s forces might actually be pushed off the peninsula. Acutely aware of this, the president decided that he must report to Congress and the nation. Administration leaders had been considering such a report since at least 30 June, when Senator Wherry had questioned the president’s authority to send troops to Korea. Although the president decided not to seek a congressional resolution approving his action—one of the few matters on which Acheson and Johnson agreed—Acheson had strongly urged a report in early July, and the president’s personal speechwriter had prepared a draft. Johnson, on the other hand, wanted the president to delay until they knew what legislation and how much money would be needed—a position Truman himself favored. However, as the situation steadily worsened and MacArthur’s troop requests arrived in rapid succession, congressional and public support became vital. Between 15 and 18 July Marx Leva represented Defense in a hectic team effort with State and the White House to prepare the president’s message.72

On 19 July Truman spoke by radio and television to the American people, and in a separate message detailed to Congress the course of Korean events and the initial U.S. steps taken on behalf of the United Nations. He emphasized three broad lines of action: The United States would send additional men, equipment, and supplies to MacArthur; it would rearm U.S. forces even beyond the needs of Korea; and it would assist other free nations associated with the United States to become strong. He announced that he had authorized strength increases, use of the draft, activation of National Guard units, and the callup of units and individuals from the reserves, and he recommended removal of the statutory limits on the size of the U.S. armed forces. He promised to submit an additional appropriation request to Congress within the next few days.73

Johnson immediately granted the secretaries of the military departments the necessary authority to call up the National Guard and the reserves, which together totaled more than 2.5 million, most of whom needed additional training before service in Korea. By 3 August the Army recalled 134 National Guard and 202 organized reserve units, with a total strength of about 70,000, planning to bring these units up to their authorized strength of 161,000 by recruiting civilian volunteers and recalling both active and inactive reservists. The Army also sent out draft calls for 100,000 more men, expecting to reach
900,000 by 31 October. The Navy and Marine Corps planned to reach a strength of approximately 541,000 by calling up some 91,000 from the organized reserve and, if necessary, the inactive reserve. The Air Force, calling up slightly fewer than 50,000 people, expected to reach a strength of almost 462,000.  

These additions required another increase in armed forces authorized strength, which, as approved on 10 August, provided ceilings of 1,081,000 for the Army, approximately 755,000 for the Navy and Marine Corps, and about 548,000 for the Air Force—a total of almost 2.4 million. A few days earlier, Congress had heeded Truman’s call to remove the statutory limitations on the size of the armed forces. By mid-August, approximately three full divisions and two regimental combat teams had been approved for movement from the United States to the UNC in Korea. These reinforcements began to arrive in Korea in late July; most reached there by the early fall. Together with the U.S. divisions in Japan, the surviving South Korean units, and some Allied troops, they provided MacArthur with the equivalent of the eight-plus divisions he had sought on 9 July.

Policy in Pursuit of Events

In addition to stabilizing the battlefield, the arrival of large-scale reinforcements would enable MacArthur to go ahead with his plan for an amphibious attack behind the enemy’s main lines, which would, if successful, place the UNC in a good position to destroy the North Korean armies. This possibility made more urgent a Washington decision on whether to allow MacArthur’s forces to cross the 38th parallel, under what conditions, and for what objectives. As early as 12 July, George M. Elsey, one of the president’s administrative assistants, noted that the Pentagon was making plans “without knowing whether our forces are to stop at the 38th parallel or continue north to the Manchurian Border.” On 17 July Truman formally requested NSC consideration of what U.S. policy should be when the invaders were driven back to North Korea.

Concerned about what military steps the United States should or could take if Soviet forces entered Korea, the president asked the secretary of defense on 29 June to study the problem. The Joint Chiefs informed Johnson on 10 July that it would be “militarily unsound” for large U.S. forces to fight in Korea if major Soviet forces entered the war, that it would be better to minimize the U.S. commitment there and prepare to execute general war plans, including full-scale mobilization, rather than engage in combat in an
area of "slight strategic importance," one chosen by the Soviets, where the outcome would not be decisive. In complete agreement with the Joint Chiefs, Johnson on 20 July sent their assessment to the NSC. Declaring that only the president could decide to execute war plans, State held that the situation needed to be evaluated. Believing that the USSR would enter the Korean War within six months, Symington and the NSRB wanted the United States to participate, consistent with U.S. war plans, in any UN action while simultaneously beginning to mobilize and trying to gain international support. The NSC tried to resolve the differences, but with the Soviets remaining out of Korea the council eventually dropped the paper (NSC 76).

How the United States should respond to Soviet moves elsewhere became part of the larger study ordered by the president on 28 June, a review of U.S. policies pertaining to all the countries on the European and Asian perimeters of the Soviet Union. The initial draft of NSC 73 took a relatively optimistic view of Soviet intentions in Korea but a pessimistic view of the outcome should Soviet intentions prove less benign than anticipated. The Joint Chiefs took issue with the study's emphasis on Soviet intentions rather than capabilities. They thought that if the Soviets initiated attacks elsewhere that could be related to the Korean situation, it portended general war and the United States ought to mobilize.

Subsequent drafts responded to the course of events during July and August, eventually taking a less foreboding view of Soviet intentions as the USSR showed no indication of intervening in Korea or taking action elsewhere. Reflecting the uncertainties and pressures of this period, the fourth draft was limited to contingencies occurring within the next two or three months, leaving NSC 68, still under review, to propose basic long-term programs. Although the Joint Chiefs continued to take a more pessimistic view of the Soviet danger, the final version reflected the subtle changes that had occurred in the U.S. perception of Soviet capabilities and intentions. The JCS assessment of a "greatly increased" risk of Soviet resort to general war was tempered to "may have been increased." The study deemed the use of USSR satellite forces alone, either in Europe or Asia, or the use of Chinese Communist forces against Formosa or in Korea, as immediate possibilities. It supported a rapid U.S. buildup to a high level of constant military readiness and suggested a number of possible American reactions to Soviet moves. Should the Chinese Communists intervene in Korea, the United States was to avoid a general war, continue UNC military action in Korea as long as there was a reasonable chance of success, extend that action to include air and naval action against the Chinese mainland, and review U.S. military commitments. With neither Johnson nor Acheson entirely satisfied, the NSC on 24 August
adopted the paper with minor amendments (NSC 73/4) as a "working guide" but deferred all final decisions on U.S. reactions until the event was "certain to occur."80

By this time the military situation seemed less ominous and U.S. officials began to address the possibility that North Korean forces could be driven back to the 38th parallel. In both State and Defense there were conflicting views on how to proceed should this occur. Military leaders tended to believe that MacArthur should cross the 38th parallel, defeat the enemy, and occupy North Korea in support of a free, united, and independent Korea—provided that the United States mobilized its strength to cover other strategic areas, the Soviet Union did not intervene in Korea or elsewhere, and the United Nations formally changed its war objective to seek Korean unification and independence.81 The secretaries of the military departments, however, worried that any goal of unifying Korea implied the "expulsion from Korea of the Communists as an organized political and military force" and a U.S. and UN military commitment to carry it out, actions beyond current official U.S. or UN policy. In response to the secretaries' request, Johnson on 29 August asked for an urgent review of the question.82 NSC 81 was the result.

In NSC 81, State and Defense planners compromised, stating that no final decisions on future military action in Korea could yet be made but that there was a legal basis for limited UNC operations north of the 38th parallel to "compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces." Air and naval operations had been allowed north of the 38th parallel from early in the conflict; now amphibious, airborne, or ground operations would be permitted. But the conclusions were hedged. MacArthur was to proceed north of the 38th parallel only if no major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces had entered Korea, announced their intention to enter, or threatened to counter UN operations militarily in North Korea. No UNC operations were to extend close to the Manchurian and Soviet borders of Korea. "Not in any circumstances" were other than South Korean units to be used in the northeast province or along the Manchurian border. The paper also dealt in some detail with military actions to be taken or avoided in the event of various types of Chinese or Soviet intervention, considered a possible UNC occupation of North Korea, and offered some principles to govern UN action in Korea in the posthostilities phase.83

In general agreement with the NSC 81 draft, the secretaries of the military departments suggested that MacArthur be required to obtain Washington's approval before launching any major ground operations above the 38th parallel. The Joint Chiefs, skeptical that the front could be stabilized above the 38th parallel, thought that the North Koreans might be broken south of the 38th parallel but that subsequent operations, presumably of a guerrilla
character and handled by South Korean forces, would have to "take place both north and south of the 38th parallel." Eager to get U.S. forces out of South Korea as soon as possible, they wanted any UN occupation of Korea limited to the principal cities in South Korea and ended speedily. They understood that MacArthur and Rhee had agreed that the South Korean government, on its return to Seoul, would grant a general amnesty, call for a general election, and set up a single government for all Korea. At the NSC meeting on 7 September, Acheson, Johnson, and Bradley concurred that MacArthur should come to Washington for a final decision. The council thereupon adopted NSC 81 subject to some redrafting.\textsuperscript{84}

On 11 September Truman approved NSC 81/1, the revised report, which declared there was a legal basis for UNC operations north of the 38th parallel and that such operations would be authorized provided there was no major Soviet or Chinese Communist intervention, but advance presidential approval would have to be obtained. Decisions concerning the northern boundaries altered the prohibition against operations "close to" those borders to one forbidding operations extending "across" them and diluted the earlier flat prohibition against the use of non-Korean units in the far north, stating that "it should be the policy" not to use them.\textsuperscript{85}

As for the ultimate political objective of military operations, NSC 81/1 concluded that the United States should vigorously advocate UN adoption of three principles for the posthostilities period: unification of Korea arranged by Korean representatives chosen in free elections under UN auspices; reestablishment of the South Korean government in Seoul as the "only lawful government in Korea"; and, finally, UN assistance in helping Korea deal with the economic, social, and political problems attending unification.\textsuperscript{86}

MacArthur was to plan for a possible occupation of North Korea and the reorientation of its people; in case of an occupation, he was to consult with the South Korean government, assume a posture of "liberation rather than retaliation," and exercise a stabilizing influence. The United States was to withdraw its forces as soon as practicable after organized North Korean operations ended. Despite an apparent tilt toward unification rather than a mere return to the 38th parallel as the goal, NSC 81/1 did not change official U.S. policy on this point, which awaited UN Security Council action. What happened would depend on whether MacArthur's planned counterstrike would succeed.\textsuperscript{87}

\textit{Defeat of the North Koreans}

After the first clash with U.S. troops on 5 July the North Koreans pushed the U.S. and ROK troops of Eighth Army down toward Pusan at the base of the
peninsula. Not until early August could the Eighth Army establish the "Pusan perimeter," a line in the form of an inverted "L" protecting this key port. When the North Koreans began a general offensive on 1 September, they breached the perimeter at several points and were repelled only with great difficulty. The original plan for an amphibious landing in July or August delayed, MacArthur decided on an amphibious landing of two divisions, with a subsequent airborne drop, to take place on 15 September at Inch’on, near Seoul on the west coast of Korea. If successful, it would place the United Nations Command astride the South Korean road and rail net.

The selection of Inch’on as the site for an amphibious landing was sharply questioned because it seemed to many, including Admiral Sherman, chief of naval operations, that the site possessed "every conceivable geographical natural handicap." Although these obstacles alarmed many military leaders, MacArthur thought they helped ensure strategic surprise. Inch’on would succeed, he told Collins and Sherman, and "save 100,000 lives." The Joint Chiefs wavered; Johnson supported the operation. Truman also agreed. The JCS informed MacArthur on 8 September that they approved the Inch’on landing.

Ironically too late for the departing Johnson, the landings on 15 September proved as successful as MacArthur had envisioned. As Johnson claimed a few weeks later, MacArthur "hit our enemies 'where they ain't' . . . [and] changed the course of the Korean campaign in a matter of hours." UNC forces of the independent X Corps under Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond captured Inch’on on 16 September. By 22 September they had taken Kimpo airport, secured the south bank of the Han River, and overrun Suwon airfield. Walker’s Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan perimeter and joined the Inch’on force on 27 September. Seoul was in UN hands on 28 September, and MacArthur restored the government of Syngman Rhee to its capital city the next day. UNC forces were now close to or at the 38th parallel. MacArthur currently had approximately 198,000 ground combat troops, including 113,500 Americans, 81,500 South Koreans, and some 3,000 British and Filipinos. Of 14 North Korean divisions, only an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers escaped above the 38th parallel, but these included much of the enemy high command and most senior officers. The North Koreans were also desperately building up new units.

* Tactical surprise would be impossible because the rocky, shoal-laden approach to the harbor required a daylight landing and Wolmi-do, a rugged fortified island in the channel, would have to be taken before Inch’on could be attacked. At high tide, the only time when there would be enough water for the landing craft, Inch’on lacked beaches and its seawalls rose 12 feet or more out of the water. Any delay would strand the landing craft, since the harbor became a mud flat at ebb tide. High tides, furthermore, occurred only rarely. If the landing did not come off on 15 September, the next high tide would not occur until 11 October, by which time rough waters would make the Inch’on approach extremely dangerous.
This rapid turnabout in the fortunes of the UNC forces compelled the administration, sooner than anticipated, to make a decision about fighting beyond the 38th parallel. Following NSC 81/1 guidance, the Joint Chiefs drafted formal instructions concerning the 38th parallel. State concurred, with the proviso that the Rhee government be restored only in South Korea, leaving the political future of North Korea for UN determination. With the president’s approval, the Joint Chiefs on 27 September authorized MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel provided there was no major Chinese Communist or Soviet threat. UNC forces were not to cross the Manchurian or USSR borders in the north, and “as a matter of policy” non-Korean ground forces were not to be used in the areas bordering those international boundaries. No UN naval or air power was to operate against Manchuria or Soviet territory. MacArthur was to submit his plan for approval.

The JCS directive specified that if major Soviet units became involved—either openly or covertly north of the 38th parallel or openly south of that line—MacArthur was to assume a defensive posture and report to Washington. He was not to discontinue UN air and naval operations north of the 38th parallel because of the presence of Soviet or Chinese troops, but if either country announced an intent to reoccupy North Korea and gave warning, “either explicitly or implicitly, that their forces should not be attacked,” he was to refer the matter at once to Washington. If major Chinese Communist units intervened in South Korea, either openly or covertly, UNC action would continue as long as there was “a reasonable chance of successful resistance.” If small Chinese or Soviet units operated covertly south of the 38th parallel, action was to continue.

Submitting on 28 September a broad general plan for moving north of the 38th parallel sometime between 15 and 30 October, MacArthur indicated that he would use Walker’s Eighth Army to attack in the west, drive north across the 38th parallel, and seize the North Korean capital of P’yongyang. Almond’s X Corps from Inch’on was to be sealifted around southern Korea in order to make an amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. It would remain independent of Eighth Army but make juncture with it after landing. He had no current indication, MacArthur noted, of any entry of major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces into North Korea.

In response to a JCS request, Marshall obtained Acheson’s and Truman’s endorsement of MacArthur’s plan. Meanwhile, Marshall penned a personal note to MacArthur saying that Eighth Army should not announce that ROK divisions would stop and regroup before crossing the 38th parallel, since it was the “evident desire” of the United Nations not to have to vote on crossing the 38th parallel but to deem that MacArthur had “found it militarily necessary to do so.” Marshall added, “We want you to feel unhampered
tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel." MacArthur cabled back the next day, "Parallel 38 is not a factor in the mil employment of our forces. . . . Unless and until the enemy capitulate I regard all of Korea open for our mil operations." Marshall apparently made no further response.96

On 1 October MacArthur broadcast the first UNC message calling on the North Koreans to lay down their arms but received no reply.97 Meanwhile, the UN General Assembly changed its objectives by approving on 7 October a Western-sponsored resolution calling for the establishment of conditions of stability in all Korea, elections throughout Korea under UN auspices, creation of a unified, independent, and democratic government for all Korea, and the country's economic rehabilitation. It invited "all sections and representative bodies" throughout Korea to cooperate in restoring peace, holding elections, and establishing a government. The resolution asked for the early removal of all UN forces except those needed to ensure stability and hold elections, and it created a seven-member United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) to replace a previous commission in setting up the new government and rebuilding the country.98 When MacArthur transmitted the UN resolutions to the North Koreans on 9 October, calling on them to surrender and cooperate with the United Nations in establishing "a unified, independent and democratic government" of Koreans, Kim Il Sung in a radio address declared that the North Koreans had no intention of surrendering.99 This response left it up to MacArthur to proceed with military action to enforce the UN decree. Although the UN resolution did not state that MacArthur would "impose" a single unified and democratic government over all Korea, Acheson later acknowledged that its language was ambivalent.100

The Joint Chiefs became concerned that their 27 September directive did not adequately cover actions that MacArthur should take in the event of a sudden Chinese Communist intervention. On 6 October they asked Marshall to obtain Truman's approval for a directive specifying that if major Chinese units intervened openly or covertly "anywhere" in Korea without prior announcement, the UNC commander should continue to fight as long as his forces had a "reasonable chance of success." In any event, he was to get Washington's authorization before attacking targets in Chinese territory. These instructions, which hinted at a possible widening of the war, were extremely important because they became the operative ones when the war expanded. With State Department and presidential approval, the JCS sent the new directive to MacArthur on 9 October.101

* The Korean question went to the General Assembly since the Soviet delegate had returned to the Security Council on 1 August and would veto any resolution unfavorable to the North Koreans.
That day Eighth Army moved across the 38th parallel. After initial hard fighting the North Koreans fell back, and by mid-October Walker was ready to assault P'yongyang, while his ROK troops spread into central and eastern North Korea, seizing Wonsan on 11 October. Heavy mining of Wonsan's harbor and beaches delayed X Corps, still independent of Eighth Army. Its units that sailed from Inch'on assembled ashore at Wonsan between 25 and 28 October, while the units shipped from Pusan landed at Iwon between 29 October and 9 November.102

The climactic events of the month after Inch'on provided the inspiration for a meeting between Truman and MacArthur at Wake Island on 15 October. The initiative for the meeting came from Washington, where Truman's staff persuaded him that a face-to-face meeting with MacArthur, whom he had never met, could have positive results—politically and otherwise. The threat of Chinese intervention and the other political and military uncertainties provided additional incentive for Truman. Neither Acheson nor Marshall accompanied the president to the meeting.103

At Wake, high optimism prevailed. MacArthur told the president that he did not think the Chinese Communists would intervene but that if they did they would be defeated. He expected organized resistance in Korea to be over by Thanksgiving, and he hoped that he would be able to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas, leaving two U.S. divisions and the UN forces there until elections were held. The general strongly supported a Japanese peace treaty and a Pacific collective security pact. The meeting ended on a cordial note, and the participants departed happily, without any presentiment of the dark clouds ahead. In Washington, the Pentagon began to consider cutbacks in Korean supplies and replacements and redeployment of troops from Korea to Europe.104

Back in Tokyo, MacArthur on 17 October drew a new operational line from Sonchon to Songjin across North Korea, approximately 40 miles from the Chinese border and almost 100 miles from the Soviet border. South of this line all UNC troops could be used without restriction. Walker's troops took the North Korean capital of P'yongyang on 19 October, a UNC airborne landing north of P'yongyang succeeded on 20 October, and UNC forces crossed the Chongchon River on 24 October. Walker then sent his Korean troops toward the Yalu River on the northern boundary of North Korea.105 On 24 October MacArthur authorized the use of any and all troops to secure all of North Korea, cautioning only that non-Koreans should be replaced as feasible.

* Marshall reportedly advised Truman against bringing MacArthur back to Washington in view of the political problems such a visit might entail; Acheson disapproved of Truman's going to Wake Island. See Roy K. Flint, The Tragic Flaw: MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs, and the Korean War, 355-56; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, 456.
by Korean units. When the Joint Chiefs remonstrated, the general answered that his order was a matter of military necessity, that the JCS instructions of 27 September had labeled the use of Koreans-only a "matter of policy," and that Marshall's letter of 29 September provided the "necessary latitude for modification." In any case, MacArthur stated, the subject had been covered at the Wake Island conference. Nothing more was said. On 26 October one Korean unit reached the Yalu, and, as Walker commented a day earlier, "Everything is going just fine."“

While Eighth Army in the west planned for each of its units to go as far as it could "without regard to lateral contact," Chinese Communist troops attacked the ROK II Corps the night of 25 October, and within days the corps disintegrated. On 31 October Walker ordered his commanders to limit their pursuit and restore defensive positions, and he managed to save a bridgehead over the Chongchon. In the next week, the Chinese virtually destroyed an entire battalion of the U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment. After MacArthur called him to account for stopping, Walker pointed out on 6 November that the Korean II Corps had collapsed, the U.S. I Corps was under heavy attack, and ammunition supplies were limited to one day of fire in his forward area. In light of the "new factor of organized Chinese Communist forces," Walker planned to resume the offensive only after he had secured his right flank, marshaled attack troops, and restored his supplies. MacArthur said no more. That same day the Chinese mysteriously withdrew into the hills.

Operating to the east of Eighth Army, General Almond's ROK troops, moving toward the Changjin reservoir, also met Chinese resistance for the first time on 25 October. Almond himself interrogated some Chinese prisoners and notified MacArthur. The 1st Marine Division, which moved out on 30 October to relieve the South Koreans on the road to the reservoir, also met heavy resistance and suffered the effects of a sudden severe drop in temperature. Concerned about the division's vulnerable position, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, its commander, concentrated his men despite orders to move north rapidly, thus exercising, as General Collins put it, "sound tactical judgment" that was to save his troops. On Almond's left, U.S. units of the Seventh Division encountered Chinese Communist resistance on 8 November but continued north to reach the Yalu on 21 November, marking the farthest northern advance of any U.S. units in the war.

The North Koreans were a spent force. But the Chinese Communists were another matter, and the possibility of their large-scale intervention was uppermost in the minds of all concerned with the Korean problem, especially Secretary Marshall. The first phase of the war was over; it seemed likely that a new and more dangerous one was beginning.
CHAPTER IV

The Chinese Entry into the War

From the beginning State and Defense officials had feared that Chinese Communist intervention could transform the Korean War into a major East-West conflict. Anticipating this possibility, the president on 24 August approved NSC 73/4, which held that "in the event of the overt use of organized Chinese Communist forces in Korea" the United States should not allow itself to be drawn into a general war with the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, if the Chinese did intervene, and the UN forces had "a reasonable chance of successful resistance," the United States should continue and extend military action to include authority to engage in air and naval operations against the PRC outside Korea. NSC 81/1, approved on 11 September just before the Inch'on landing, reaffirmed these provisions and added one more—that the UN Security Council condemn the PRC for intervention. Future U.S. actions would be determined by what the Chinese did, and no one could predict their intentions. The uncertainty remained even after Chinese units attacked UNC troops on 25 October 1950, since the Chinese troops disappeared soon after this engagement.1

Early Views of Chinese Intentions

Washington had been trying for months to fathom PRC intentions. James R. Wilkinson, the U.S. consul general at Hong Kong, reported on 22 September that he had received reliable evidence that the Chinese Communists would not get involved in Korea and might limit further aid to North Korea. When Chinese Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Chou En-lai stated publicly on 30 September that the Chinese would not "supinely tolerate seeing their neighbours being savagely invaded by imperialists," Wilkinson
interpreted the remark as made for internal Chinese consumption. Likewise, American officials tended to downplay Chou En-lai's assertion on 5 October to Indian Ambassador Kavalam Madhava Panikkar that the PRC would fight if UNC, especially U.S., forces crossed the 38th parallel; Panikkar was known to be highly sympathetic to the Chinese Communists and to view the United States as a warmonger. To avoid reliance on Panikkar as the only channel of communication with the PRC, U.S. diplomats attempted to contact the Chinese directly, but the latter refused to have even informal conversations.

Analyzing the bellicose pronouncements of the Chinese, the CIA on 12 October conceded the possibility of full-scale Chinese intervention in Korea but felt it "not probable in 1950" unless the USSR opted for global war. Direct Soviet intervention in Korea seemed even less likely unless Moscow decided on general war. In CIA eyes, the risk of general war existed, but how likely it might be remained a matter of speculation. Although Wilkinson reported on 13 October that Peking had reacted to the UNC crossing of the 38th parallel by warning again that the Chinese would not "stand idly by" while the United States invaded North Korea, he noted that informed observers in Hong Kong considered Chinese Communist engagement in Korea unlikely. A 14 October report from Burma spoke of "feverish activity" in Peking and the massing of half a million Chinese troops near the Manchurian–Korean border, but it was only one among many widely varying accounts and appeared to have little effect in Washington. Observers saw the PRC actions largely as part of a war of nerves, and the State Department inclined toward the theory that Chinese intervention, if it occurred, would be limited and covert in nature.

At this time MacArthur did not believe the Chinese would enter Korea in force. At his meeting with Truman at Wake Island on 15 October, he suggested to the president that his plan to secure all of Korea would prove a "tremendous deterrent to the Chinese Communists moving south..." Not only was intervention unlikely, but it would not be decisive, and UNC forces no longer feared Chinese intervention. MacArthur thought that the risk to the PRC was too great for it to intervene. Of 300,000 Chinese Communist troops thought to be in Manchuria, he felt that at best only 50,000 to 60,000 could cross the Yalu River, at which time they would be extremely vulnerable. When Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk told MacArthur privately that the PRC had threatened to enter the war if UNC forces crossed the 38th parallel, MacArthur was surprised. If the Chinese did declare war on the United States, he thought they would have assurances of Soviet support and would have to be treated with the "utmost seriousness."

The Wake Island conference appeared to have the unfortunate effect of simultaneously allaying U.S. apprehensions concerning possible PRC intervention while reinforcing Chinese fears that the Americans were planning
aggression against them. The absence from the meeting of both Marshall and Acheson, the two key Washington figures who might have engaged the general in more probing analysis, lost the opportunity to create a firmer basis for understanding between MacArthur and Washington. The most constructive result of the Wake Island meeting on the PRC question was a decision that the United States would do all it could to reassure the Chinese. On 17 October Truman stated publicly that the United States sought "no territory or special privilege . . . [and had] no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place in the Far East or elsewhere." The United States would continue to observe the integrity of the northern international boundaries of North Korea—but not, as it turned out, without considerable difficulty.

The Northern Borders

While ground operations were contained south of the 38th parallel before the Inch'on breakthrough, U.S. naval and air forces had authorization to operate north of that line after 29 June 1950 provided they remained "well clear" of the international boundaries separating North Korea from Chinese or Soviet territory. Truman upheld the restriction when Secretary of the Air Force Finletter suggested an overflight of Soviet territory in early July. On 27 July Acheson proposed that aerial reconnaissance in Korea be authorized up to the Yalu River in the west and to the limit of the naval blockade in the east. With presidential agreement, Johnson transmitted this authority to the JCS on 2 August, noting that the naval blockade extended to the Korean-Soviet border on the east coast and cautioning that reconnaissance flights should "stay clear of and not overfly the frontier of Manchuria and the Soviet Union." The limitation also applied to U.S. strategic air operations in North Korea. When U.S. aircraft on 12 August bombed the North Korean port of Rashin (Najin), approximately 17 miles from the Soviet boundary, Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews complained to General Burns in the Pentagon that the operation would upset the Soviets and did not conform to the directive to stay clear of the Soviet boundary. News stories and reports suggesting the raid was directed against the Soviet Union caused State to fear a Soviet military entry into North Korea or other retaliatory measures. Despite presidential approval of the operation, State pressed for Defense to consult with it before future bombings of Rashin or any other place close to the northern borders. Denying that there had been a frontier violation, Johnson on 21 August claimed that Rashin's petroleum storage plant made it a purely military target, and he suggested that worrying about Soviet views or newspaper opinions would place "in question practically all military features
of our Korean operations." Although Johnson granted the importance of political considerations, he opposed political supervision of military operations as long as they were conducted "within the terms of the over-all decision" and with military commanders held responsible for the outcome. "Once war operations are undertaken . . .," Johnson wrote, "they must be conducted to win." 11

While the Air Force withheld further attack on Rashin pending review of its military importance, the Joint Chiefs on 5 September reaffirmed its value as a military target, and two days later Johnson and Bradley asked Truman to approve renewed bombing. Worried about the international impact—particularly since a Soviet officer had been identified as the pilot of an attacking enemy aircraft shot down in the Yellow Sea—Truman wanted Johnson and Acheson to discuss the matter before bringing it to him. Consequently the Joint Chiefs temporarily suspended all attacks on Rashin.12 Meanwhile, the Soviets took to the UN Security Council charges made by the Chinese of U.S. air attacks on targets inside Manchuria. When Air Force investigations confirmed the accuracy of the charges, Acheson consulted the president and found him "inclined strongly" to the State Department position against any military operations anywhere near the international borders.13

After MacArthur's success at Inch'on and the subsequent collapse of North Korean forces, the need for a UNC strategic bombing offensive diminished. On 26 September the Joint Chiefs cabled new instructions to MacArthur, rescinding their earlier strategic target objectives and limiting targets in Korea to tactical objectives. In their 27 September general directive to MacArthur, the JCS stipulated that during his forthcoming ground offensive there would be no air or naval action against Chinese or Soviet territories.14

The northern borders became a real issue in October, when the Soviets claimed that U.S. aircraft had attacked their territory. At State's request, Deputy Secretary Lovett asked the Joint Chiefs to direct MacArthur to make an inquiry, which proved the accuracy of the Soviet charges.15 U.S. diplomats apologized in the United Nations, and Lovett took up with the JCS Acheson's suggestion to draw a more explicit line for air operations in northern Korea. Despite new Chinese charges to the United Nations on 26 October of eight violations of PRC territory by U.S. planes between 15 and 25 October, the Joint Chiefs on 1 November rejected the idea of a more explicit operational line. Lovett informed Acheson on 4 November 1950 that Defense had decided that no further directive was needed.16

Possible UNC violation of Korea's international borders was all the more important because, although days had passed since Chinese units first engaged UNC troops on 25 October, no one yet knew whether the PRC planned to give limited, possibly covert, aid to the North Koreans, or to mount a full-scale
action. Reporting to Truman on 1 November the presence of between 15,000 and 20,000 Chinese troops in North Korea, CIA director Walter Bedell Smith thought that the Chinese were concerned about their border and wanted to establish a *cordon sanitaire* to protect the important hydroelectric complex along the Korean side of the Yalu River that provided power to Manchuria. In the State Department, however, a more pessimistic view began to emerge. Reports from Hong Kong indicated that the top PRC leaders had decided to fight in Korea, and further reports of military activity in China seemed to confirm the information. By 3 November State’s Office of Chinese Affairs believed the PRC might intervene even without Soviet backing and called for U.S. and UN reassurances concerning the inviolability of the Chinese–Korean border and protection for legitimate Chinese interests along the Yalu. The British and Canadian governments also expressed concern.

In Korea, UN forces were feeling the full effect of the first Chinese attacks and the first severe winter weather; moreover, enemy fighter planes had begun to contest UN air supremacy. On 1 November the first Russian-built MiG-15 jets appeared, much superior to available U.S. propeller planes. MacArthur now did not rule out the “distinct possibility” of full, open intervention, but he believed a more or less covert and limited degree of Chinese activity more likely. Indeed, the Chinese activity level still seemed to be low-scale, as only 35 prisoners had been taken. On 5 November MacArthur notified the UN that Chinese forces were “presently in hostile contact” with the United Nations Command.

Given MacArthur’s views and the great importance Washington attached to the inviolability of the northern borders, Lovett was taken aback when Finletter informed him early on 6 November that MacArthur had ordered the Far East Air Force to launch an intensive two-week bombing attack against North Korean targets, excluding Rashin and the large hydroelectric complex along the Yalu but including all bridges crossing the frontier river. UN aircraft were to keep south of the international border, attack close targets only under visual conditions, and destroy the Yalu bridges on the Korean side. The air offensive was to begin at 0300 on 7 November in Korea—in the early afternoon of 6 November, Washington time.

Rushing to the State Department, Lovett found Acheson and Rusk concerned that MacArthur’s air operation would abrogate a U.S. agreement to consult the British before taking any UNC action involving Manchuria. Planning to follow up MacArthur’s 5 November report by asking for a UN resolution condemning Chinese intervention, State felt that precipitate action along the border might alienate UN allies. If UNC air attacks spilled over into Chinese territory, the Sino–Soviet treaty might even bring the Soviets into Korea. Lovett doubted that any bombing results would be worth the risks.
When Marshall agreed to postpone the attack unless there developed a threat to troop security, Lovett told Finletter to get the Joint Chiefs to stop the operation until Truman, then in Kansas City, could be consulted. The president, willing to approve MacArthur's order if there were "an immediate and serious threat to the security of our own troops," thought postponement in the best U.S. interest and inquired about MacArthur's reasons for the order. The Joint Chiefs then directed MacArthur to postpone all bombing within five miles of the Manchurian border until further instructions and asked for his reasons for bombing. 22

MacArthur's panicky reply stunned Washington: "Men and materiel in large force," he reported, were "pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria," placing his troops in jeopardy and even threatening the "ultimate destruction" of his command. With the enemy cleverly moving at night and air interdiction of little use because of the restricted geographical area, MacArthur claimed that his only recourse was to destroy the bridges and installations supporting the enemy's advance and that every hour of delay would be "paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood." He was suspending the strike "under the gravest protest" and asked that the president reconsider lest there be a "calamity of major proportion." When Bradley read this message to Truman over the phone, the president approved the bombing. 24 After further discussions among Marshall, Lovett, and Acheson later on 6 November, the Joint Chiefs told MacArthur to proceed if the action was essential to UNC safety, but they specifically exempted the Yalu hydroelectric complex. Pointing out to MacArthur that it was vital to keep the fighting localized and that utmost care should be taken to avoid any violation of Manchurian territory and air space, they asked for a report on any hostile action from Manchuria and for a new estimate of the situation. 21

On 7 November MacArthur replied in a far calmer tone that there were organized Chinese ground units in Korea of unknown but sufficient size to capture the initiative in the west and to slow the UNC offensive in the east. He thought that they would be used and reinforced "at will, probably without any formal declaration of hostilities." The situation might well make a UNC advance impossible and a retreat necessary. Bombing along the northern border was his only recourse, but he did not intend to destroy the hydroelectric installations or to violate Manchurian or Siberian territory. In two further cables on 7 November, MacArthur renewed his plea for more men and materiel and raised a question concerning the increasing numbers of hostile planes being met in combat in North Korea. Based in Manchuria, they crossed the border to attack UN aircraft and when pursued quickly fled to the "complete sanctuary" of Manchurian air. "The effect of this abnormal condition," MacArthur declared, "upon the morale and combat efficiency of both air and
ground troops is major." But this time the general proposed no remedy and merely requested instructions. 25

Marshall appreciated MacArthur's very real problems. In a warm, "very personal and informal" message on 7 November, the secretary reassured the general that everyone in Washington, including the president, was anxious to support him to the utmost. Noting that the "extremely grave international problem . . . could . . . easily lead to a world disaster," Marshall asked MacArthur if he thought the Yalu hydroelectric complex was the "dominant consideration" of the Chinese. MacArthur replied the next day, expressing the view that the Chinese were not worried about the hydroelectric complex. Then, in the grandiloquent style he often affected, the general invoked history and psychology to expound at some length on his belief that Chinese culture and character had changed, becoming increasingly nationalistic and aggressive. Although PRC interests currently paralleled Soviet ones, MacArthur thought the Chinese—involved not only in Korea but also in Tibet and Indochina*—had the same lust for the expansion of power that had animated all would-be conquerors. 26

In the Pentagon, MacArthur's answer seemed high-flown and patronizing, and Marshall's staff resented what it termed his "idiot treatment" of the secretary. Marshall's response was brief: He thanked MacArthur but said that he had "misunderstood" the query, which was addressed to the events of the past week. "Don't bother to acknowledge this," Marshall ended. 27

**Enemy Sanctuary and MacArthur's Mission**

Whatever the nature of the personal relationship between Marshall and MacArthur, the secretary gave the general full support. Following MacArthur's 7 November message about hostile aircraft operating from the safe sanctuary of Manchuria, Marshall sent Finletter and Vandenberg to the State Department to discuss taking the problem to the United Nations. 28 Marshall was also prepared to ask the NSC to accept a policy of "hot pursuit" that would allow U.S. planes to follow their attackers across the Yalu "for a prescribed and limited distance." On 8 November, Finletter and Rear Adm. E.T. Wooldridge, representing Marshall and the Joint Chiefs respectively, told the NSC Senior Staff that MacArthur and the Pentagon might soon "take the position that it would be necessary to permit United Nations air action into Manchuria in order to prevent the flow of men, materiel, and other supplies." But Finletter did not think that such air action would be decisive, and the CIA representa-

* See Chapter XI.
tive pointed out that the use of UNC air power in Chinese territory might well bring on full-scale intervention by the large Chinese forces thought to be in Manchuria. According to the official CIA estimate these numbered 700,000, of which 200,000 were regular field forces.

To a JCS request for comments on the possible reexamination of the UNC mission and how to deal politically with the Chinese intervention, MacArthur replied on 9 November that his current authority to use air power everywhere in Korea would allow him to stop enough Chinese from crossing the Yalu to deny victory to the enemy. He expected to secure all of North Korea by a drive to the border in mid-November and thought any change in his mission would be a fatal indication of weakness and destroy UNC morale. MacArthur compared a British proposal to stop short of the northern boundary of Korea to the 1938 Munich agreement that left Czechoslovakia "impotent"; he recommended "no weakening at this crucial moment" and wanted to press forward to complete victory. The United States, he said, should seek a UN resolution condemning the Chinese invasion. For the time being, the Joint Chiefs agreed with MacArthur. Doubting that the enemy could drive UNC forces from Korea or that global war was imminent, even if its risk was higher, they recommended to Marshall that the United States try to solve the problem politically through the United Nations, plan for the possibility of global war, and keep MacArthur's mission under review. Preparing for an NSC meeting that afternoon, Marshall concurred. At this point, MacArthur had authorization to keep pushing northward in Korea.

With Truman absent, Acheson presided at the NSC meeting on 9 November and suggested a discussion of enemy intentions and a suitable U.S. response. Reporting that MacArthur was still out of contact with the enemy and that two days of aerial reconnaissance had revealed nothing, Bradley assessed the current situation. If the Chinese wanted only to protect the Yalu power complex, U.S. assurances might help; if they wanted to fight a war of attrition in Korea, U.S. resources would be committed indefinitely and, should global war ensue, the United States might lose. If the Chinese wanted to drive UNC forces off the peninsula, they would need Soviet help, which would lead to World War III. CIA director Smith stood firm on his agency's estimate that the Soviets did not want to involve their own troops in a general war and that they might be pleased to see U.S. and PRC forces at war, but he wondered whether the Chinese would agree to be their pawn. When Acheson pointed out the absence of a U.S. political commitment to the conquest of all Korea, Smith thought that either standing pat or drawing back would have serious political consequences, while going forward would be difficult.

Political reactions aside, Bradley regarded MacArthur as overly optimistic in believing that air power would enable him to expel the Chinese already in
Korea (1950-51)
Korea. The Soviets had recently given the PRC 200 to 250 aircraft, and more Chinese troops could easily cross the Yalu once it froze. Even holding a line in Korea would mean a lot of casualties, and Bradley wondered how long UNC forces could remain in their current positions without attacking the Manchurian bases. The Joint Chiefs, he stated, thought a step of this magnitude required a UN decision.\textsuperscript{52} Deeply concerned, Marshall apparently felt it premature to change UNC objectives. It worried him that MacArthur’s wide dispersion of UNC forces in northeastern Korea left them vulnerable and that the U.S. forces there were 20 percent below full strength, with South Koreans filling the American ranks. He also remarked that South Korean divisions would have to be created to take the place of UNC troops once the latter left Korea. Bradley thought MacArthur’s deployments might be an effort to occupy the country in order to hold elections; in any event MacArthur would probably try to hold a line around the all-weather port of Hungnam.\textsuperscript{53}

Searching for a possible solution, the council considered whether another line in Korea might be better than the current one from a military standpoint. Despite the fact that a UNC retreat would be politically unpopular and demoralizing to the South Koreans, Bradley emphasized that a line as far south as possible could be better defended. Marshall again pointed out that winter weather would make the Yalu River boundary militarily meaningless. Acheson, however, felt it was a politically desirable line, since it would allow UN elections to be held at once in all of Korea. If a 20-mile demilitarized buffer zone extending across the Yalu were established, Acheson thought it might reassure the Soviets, force the Chinese out, and permit the holding of elections. But he feared that the Chinese would then demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and equal North and South representation in the new government, steps that recent history suggested would soon lead to an all-Communist government. Finally, Acheson agreed that MacArthur’s directive should not yet be changed; he should be free to operate without bombing Manchuria. State should follow up its diplomatic initiatives and try to establish direct communications with Peking, and the NSC Senior Staff should continue to study the matter.\textsuperscript{53}

Following the NSC meeting, Acheson and the president gave public speeches intended to assuage Chinese fears. The United States joined five other nations in asking the UN Security Council to call on all states to refrain from assisting North Korea and affirming UN policy to keep inviolate the PRC frontier with North Korea and to protect legitimate Chinese interests, but the council merely debated the proposal. Meanwhile, the Chinese notified the United Nations they were sending a delegation to charge the United States with aggression; they rebuffed every U.S. attempt to talk with them.\textsuperscript{55} The Indian Ambassador to Peking, Panikkar, reported that Soviet planes would
attack U.S. aircraft bombing Manchuria. The British pressed for a large buffer zone in the north and, despite the recent loss of two American B-29 bombers to Manchurian-based enemy aircraft, they and others opposed any action such as hot pursuit that might bring on full-scale war.\textsuperscript{56} On 17 November the British refused to endorse any violation of the Manchurian border and suggested delaying the coming UNC offensive. At the same time they tried to get in direct touch with the PRC. Clearly, if the United States allowed its pilots to enter Manchurian air space, it could expect little support from countries that felt such action might provide the excuse for full-scale Chinese or even Soviet intervention.\textsuperscript{57}

In mid-November MacArthur was still busy preparing for the postponed UNC ground offensive. Air attacks to take out the Yalu bridges and destroy the area between the UNC lines and the northern border began on 8 November, while MacArthur built up supplies for his ground forces. As late as 17 November the general believed there were only 25,000 to 30,000 Chinese soldiers in Korea, although his headquarters intelligence had earlier estimated up to 77,000 as well as an enlarged enemy capacity for behind-the-lines guerrilla warfare. Once the UNC offensive started, MacArthur hoped to drive all Communist forces north of the Yalu within 10 days. UNC troops would stop at the boundary and release all prisoners, and Eighth Army would go back to Japan. If he could succeed in the few weeks before the Yalu froze, MacArthur thought the Korean campaign would end and that the Chinese would be satisfied to have demonstrated their aid to the North Koreans and their ability to engage in a major conflict. If the UNC offensive did not succeed and the Chinese continued to pour across the Yalu, MacArthur felt that he would have no choice but to bomb key points in Manchuria and “the fat would be in the fire.” Such a prospect alarmed Washington.\textsuperscript{58}

\textit{Continuing the UN Ground Offensive}

Deeply troubled, General Burns suggested to Marshall on 14 November that an emergency conference be held with MacArthur. Dubious, Marshall told Burns to discuss the possibility with the State Department. After State reacted negatively, Burns told Marshall on 17 November that continuing the current military objectives in Korea seriously risked U.S. involvement in a world war. Even if military objectives in Korea could be gained without global war, Burns thought the United States might be worse off on the Yalu line than on a more southern one. It was not reasonable, Burns felt, to expect MacArthur to “recommend a change in military objectives from complete victory to partial victory”; that responsibility belonged to Washington.\textsuperscript{59}
Meanwhile, Marshall, reading the daily reports in from the Far East, learned on 20 November that the enemy had organized a strong-points defense of key terrain features in the area between the UNC front and the Yalu. The lack of enemy activity, Marshall read, resembled "similar withdrawals . . . in the past . . . [that] preceded definite offensive action." On 21 November Burns reminded the secretary of the absence of firm decisions regarding possible Chinese–Soviet retaliation, a neutralized zone, and limiting MacArthur’s orders. 40

Joined by Lovett and the Joint Chiefs on the afternoon of 21 November, Marshall met with Averell Harriman and with Acheson and other State officials to discuss continuation of the UNC offensive in the face of the Chinese entry into Korea and the possibility of a large-scale intervention. To Marshall’s gratification, Acheson supported maintaining MacArthur’s current military directive, which called for the pursuit of enemy units north of the 38th parallel and their destruction as a military force, or, if large Chinese forces appeared, continuation of the mission as long as success seemed possible. Acheson still wanted to consider a demilitarized zone on the south side of the Yalu. The Joint Chiefs also thought it militarily advantageous to hold at a line along the high ground 10 to 25 miles south of the Yalu rather than at the river’s edge. Marshall, who had earlier held some doubts about the establishment of a neutral zone along the northern borders, suggested that the appropriate time to make such a proposal would be after a UNC military success. 41 Consulted a few days later, MacArthur argued that the PRC would view a drawback as weakness. 42

The meeting of 21 November in effect confirmed the decision to proceed with the UNC ground offensive, now scheduled for 24 November; no further discussion of the matter occurred at the NSC meeting on 22 November. 45 In Korea the Chinese remained quiet, unexpectedly freeing 27 wounded U.S. prisoners. On 24 November the CIA estimated that the Chinese meant to continue their current holding operations in North Korea, maintain or increase their strength in Manchuria, and obtain UNC withdrawal from Korea by intimidation and diplomacy. If UNC forces remained, the Chinese would increase their undeclared operations, but there was insufficient evidence to determine whether they would take full-scale offensive action. The CIA believed the Soviets would continue to provide planes and equipment, technical advisers, and possibly "volunteers."

The Eighth Army began its offensive in the west on 24 November, while the still independent X Corps in the east prepared to move west on 27 November to lend assistance. After an easy advance on 24 and 25 November, Eighth Army ran into numerous enemy counterattacks on 26 November; X Corps, moving into position that day, also encountered substantial resistance.
Well-equipped with artillery, mortars, and aircraft, the enemy executed “skillful infiltrating movements” and concentrated his heaviest attacks against South Korean troops. Eighth Army believed that more than 100,000 Chinese troops were in Korea and that a general enemy offensive was under way. With both Eighth Army and X Corps beginning to withdraw, MacArthur’s message on 28 November shocked Washington: All hope of localizing the Korean conflict could now be “completely abandoned.” Estimating enemy strength at 50,000 North Koreans and 200,000 Chinese, MacArthur warned that his command faced “an entirely new war” under conditions “beyond its control and its strength.” He was going on the defensive.45

Response to Defeat

On hearing MacArthur’s distressing news, General Burns immediately suggested to Marshall that the president should seek every means to unify the country, starting by meeting with Democratic and Republican leaders. Although Marshall did later take up the suggestion with Truman, the president made no immediate decision.16 Marshall called an AFPC meeting on 28 November to discuss possible air and ground reinforcements for MacArthur. General Vandenberg thought that the formidable Soviet MIG-15, now in action in Korea, could be handled by F-84 and F-86 planes, currently being unloaded in Japan. But since General Collins still wanted to retain the 82d Airborne Division in the United States, no ground reinforcements would be available before the spring of 1951. Marshall asked the JCS and the secretaries for their views on the situation.17

The radically changed circumstances in Korea would obviously impose a greater demand for resources. Assuming that U.S. action would continue under the UN aegis, the service secretaries accepted Collins’s advice that a UNC line could be held somewhere in North Korea and recommended to Marshall that the United States should carry out its UN obligations, localize the war in Korea, and avoid a general war with the Chinese Communists. No UNC ground troops should be sent to the Chinese mainland, use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea would be inadvisable, and holding the Soviets responsible for the PRC offensive would be politically unwise. The United States should try to get other nations to increase their contributions to Korea, build up NATO strength, and accelerate the U.S. military buildup.18

With the secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs present at an NSC meeting also held on 28 November, Marshall read aloud the secretaries’ memorandum. He emphasized the importance of avoiding a general war with the Chinese Communists and agreed that U.S. military
strength must be built up. Troubled by the gap between MacArthur’s forces in northeast Korea and the Korean coast, Marshall assumed advanced UNC forces would be withdrawn and regrouped, but he still felt it inadvisable to interfere with the field commander. He defended MacArthur’s offensive as a reconnaissance in force necessary to ferret out Chinese intentions. Less sanguine than Collins about holding a line in Korea, Marshall wanted to find a way to “withdraw with honor.”

Although the Joint Chiefs opposed a general war with the PRC, they still advised against changing MacArthur’s directive, at least for the next day or two, since the Chinese offensive might be limited. They did not want to send more U.S. ground units to MacArthur; barring the cutoff of X Corps in the northeast or Soviet intervention, Collins thought MacArthur could hold a line. When Truman asked about defense against Chinese air strikes, Vandenberg stated that MacArthur would either have to strike at the Chinese airfields or move UNC aircraft out of Korea to Japan, a step that would seriously limit ground support of UNC troops. The Joint Chiefs did not recommend an air strike across the border “at this time.”

Acheson, too, felt the situation exceedingly dangerous; with the possibility of general war increasing, he wanted the Korean action ended. UN forces should engage in air operations in Manchuria only if “essential to save our troops,” he insisted, and no Chinese Nationalist soldiers should be used in Korea. He advocated additional political, economic, and covert activities against the Chinese Communists and wanted to charge them with aggression. UNC troops should therefore establish a defensible military line in Korea and hold it, so that any new enemy attack would then represent a clear case of aggression. The president came to no decisions, but the NSC clearly felt that time was running out.

A growing irritation with MacArthur became manifest during the 28 November meeting. Acheson was unsure that MacArthur understood his directive and asked how to explain to him that the main objective was now to end the war in Korea so that “real dangers” in other areas, particularly Western Europe, could be met. Vice President Barkley asked why the general had promised his troops they would be home for Christmas; why had he not recognized the situation facing him? Bradley suggested that MacArthur might have been trying to reassure the Chinese that UNC troops would leave. Truman stressed the need to support the general in public. Marshall finally concluded that “we would have to ride around” the embarrassment.

The next day MacArthur proposed using Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea, pointedly remarking that their use now would neither cause the Chinese Communists to enter Korea nor deprive Formosa of defenders. The Joint Chiefs deferred consideration of his request. That same day, Truman
directed Marshall to see that all instructions to MacArthur from the JCS were "processed through the Secretary of Defense to the President personally."

MacArthur did not help his standing in Washington when, in response to a JCS query of 30 November, he strongly defended the disposition of X Corps in the northeast and its relationship to Eighth Army. The concept of uniting the two elements in a "practically continuous line across the narrow neck of Korea," MacArthur wrote, was not feasible. The line was too long, UNC forces were too weak, and the Taebaek mountains, running north to south in Korea, created logistical problems and split the front. MacArthur declared that X Corps was currently threatening enemy supply lines and diverting 6 to 8 enemy divisions from attacking Eighth Army, a claim that irritated the Joint Chiefs and which Bradley later spoke of as "insulting." In another message that same day, MacArthur stated that, despite UNC air interdiction efforts, the Chinese were still building up in Korea and Eighth Army would have to continue to "replace to the rear" He now thought that the enemy wanted to destroy UNC forces completely and to take all of Korea. Still concerned over the growing gap between Eighth Army and X Corps, the Joint Chiefs asked MacArthur that evening to consider extricating the exposed elements of X Corps and coordinating his two forces to prevent their being outflanked. Adding a last sentence to this message, Marshall told MacArthur to ignore the entire region northeast of the Korean waist unless the safety of his command was involved. The message, however, was not an explicit directive.

The changed situation soon had effects elsewhere. In the United Nations, Gen. Wu Hsiu-chuan, representing the People's Republic of China, addressed the Security Council on 28 November and demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Formosa and Korea. Two days later the council rejected the PRC draft resolution. Meanwhile, the Soviets vetoed the U.S.-favored six-power resolution to reassure Peking and call upon all states to refrain from assisting North Korea.

U.S. allies, already jolted by the threat of a greatly expanded conflict, were further dismayed by Truman's remarks at a press conference on 30 November. When a reporter asked whether use of the atomic bomb in Korea was under active consideration, the president in an ill-advised moment responded affirmatively, although he stressed that he did not want to use it. His answer created an international uproar and, in Acheson's words, brought British Prime Minister Clement Attlee "scurrying across the ocean a few days later" to consult with Truman. On the afternoon of 30 November Acheson observed to Lovett that unless the Chinese were stopped in Korea, no U.S. diplomatic moves would work. He wanted to meet with Marshall.

The next day Marshall, Lovett, the service secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs met with Acheson, who expressed concern about the "virtual state of panic"
among U.S. allies and the need to restore confidence among friendly nations in both Europe and Asia. To this end, he asked whether the military could establish and hold a line in Korea, perhaps as a prelude to a UN cease-fire resolution or even a withdrawal. Marshall, Bradley, and Collins believed it would be difficult since X Corps still had to regroup and the possibility of enemy air attacks had to be considered. General Nathan F. Twining, the Air Force vice chief of staff, thought that if the Chinese mounted mass air attacks against South Korean ports the United States would have to retaliate against Chinese airfields. Admiral Sherman agreed but thought the Soviets might then join in further air attacks. In the event of active Soviet support for the Chinese, Bradley and CIA director Smith feared the UNC would have to leave Korea and would probably be engaged in a general war; Collins thought the United States might have to consider threat or use of the atomic bomb as a last resort. Bradley and Sherman agreed that the UNC would be fortunate if it could get a cease-fire and return to the 38th parallel; Collins concurred but thought the time had not yet come. Marshall felt that such a move would indicate great U.S. weakness. Earlier in the meeting, he agreed that Collins should go to Korea immediately to take a firsthand look.

Lovett summarized the group's consensus: Korea was not a decisive area, and "while the loss of Korea might jeopardize Japan and perhaps bring about its eventual loss, Western Europe was our prime concern." For political reasons, the United States should try to hold on in Korea, regrouping its troops and stalling for time to work out a cease-fire or a truce, even if it ultimately involved the abandonment of Korea. For the next several months withdrawal from Korea remained a constant possibility, waxing and waning as UNC military fortunes surged or receded.

When Marshall, Bradley, and Acheson met with President Truman the evening of 2 December, Walker's Eighth Army was retreating down the western side of North Korea, its right flank shattered and its 2d Division no longer fit for combat. In the east, Almond's X Corps had begun to withdraw toward Hungnam on the coast. Pessimistic about the military outlook, Marshall was deeply troubled about the political price of a cease-fire and the cost in casualties of any UNC evacuation under air attack. Questioning how in good conscience the United States could abandon the South Koreans, he sought a way to save both UN troops and U.S. honor. With this dilemma unsolved, the group decided to wait until after the visit of Prime Minister Attlee a few days later and Collins's report from Korea. Marshall suggested asking Attlee to propose a settlement.

By Sunday, 3 December, the UNC estimated its battlefront casualties for
30 November and 1 December alone at more than 11,000 men. Together Eighth Army and X Corps had 107,000 U.S. troops plus South Koreans and other UN contingents to confront an estimated 26 Chinese divisions in Korea supported by an additional 200,000 troops in the rear. MacArthur expected Eighth Army to withdraw below the 38th parallel to Seoul, while X Corps attempted to reach the Hamhung area near the port of Hungnam. Reporting that his troops were physically and mentally worn out, MacArthur pronounced his directives completely outdated and asked for "political decisions and strategic plans . . . adequate fully to meet the realities involved."58

**The Question of a Cease-Fire**

A three-hour State-Defense conference held in the Pentagon the morning of 3 December, although inconclusive, confirmed the gloomy prospect. After a military briefing by Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, the Army deputy chief of staff for operations and administration, Acheson speculated about a cease-fire and possible terms. Although the United States might move back to the 38th parallel under a cease-fire, Acheson doubted that the PRC would accept less than a full UNC withdrawal from all of Korea. The Chinese might even demand U.S. withdrawal from Formosa, a UN seat, and a voice in the Japanese peace treaty negotiations.† Although they desired to avoid war with Communist China, the Joint Chiefs thought the political price of a cease-fire very high, but without one it was uncertain whether MacArthur's forces could get to beachheads on the coast. Sherman spoke against a cease-fire as self-defeating in the long run. Ridgway also felt strongly that the UNC should not abandon the South Koreans but fight as long as possible.59

All of the military, even those accepting the need for a cease-fire, felt strongly that Peking should pay for its surprise attack on the UN Command. Acheson, however, felt that retaliation was a prescription for disaster. Once agreeing to a cease-fire, the United States could not go back on its word. General war with China should be avoided since many U.S. allies might "quit us and deal with the Soviet Union." The military crisis had to be solved in a way that would preserve Allied unity in the United Nations.60

Although Marshall viewed the Allied attitude in the United Nations as "illogical, amounting almost to bad faith," he counseled his Defense col-

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*MacArthur later claimed that total UNC losses in the entire Yalu campaign were relatively light: 7,337 killed, wounded, or missing in Eighth Army; 5,638 in X Corps (Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 374).
†See Chapter X.
leagues to recognize the reality of the current situation. If the United States had to make a UN proposal for a cease-fire, Marshall believed it should provide for a line on the 38th parallel. Such a proposal should be made quickly, since the Chinese could overrun South Korea as soon as MacArthur’s troops went into beachhead positions. But while agreeing that MacArthur should be authorized to move to such positions, Marshall did not want to bar other choices. He remained concerned about the South Koreans. Following the Pentagon meeting, Marshall, Acheson, and Bradley briefed the president. With his agreement, the Joint Chiefs concurred in the concentration of UNC troops into beachheads; preservation of forces was to be MacArthur’s primary consideration.\footnote{54}

Despite Acheson’s apparent advocacy of a cease-fire proposal, a number of State Department officials, meeting with Acheson on 4 December, agreed with George Kennan’s view that the worst possible time to negotiate with the Soviets was in the midst of seeming defeat. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted the apparent dejection of U.S. military leaders and stressed the need for a military stand in Korea that would shore up the U.S. diplomatic position in Europe and the Far East. Admitting later that he had lost faith in MacArthur by this time, Acheson telephoned Marshall to see if they could resolve to find “a place to hold and fight the Chinese to a standstill.” While willing, Marshall wanted to see first whether MacArthur could extricate X Corps; he did not want to dig UNC troops into a “hole without an exit.”\footnote{62}

The secretaries of the military departments took an opposite position from Acheson’s, urging Marshall to evacuate UNC forces if they were pursued south of the 38th parallel and, with UN approval, to blockade China and bomb Chinese communications lines. The Joint Chiefs were now ready to accept a cease-fire on the 38th parallel if that could be arranged without unacceptable concessions. If not, they wanted to fight until forced out, provided the UN denounced the PRC aggression. They also suggested a naval blockade of China and the bombing of Chinese communications as possible military reprisals.\footnote{65}

The international concern over the debacle of UNC forces in Korea and the heightened threat of an expanded war with China came to a head in the Truman–Attlee summit meeting that began on 4 December. At this and subsequent sessions Attlee spoke for a point of view strongly held not only by the British government and its opposition, but also by the French, other European countries, and most of the UN. The Truman administration, on the other hand, lacked substantial political support both internationally and domestically; indeed, it was under intense attack from political opponents who damned the administration’s policy in Asia as weak and vacillating and viewed the British as appeasers of the Chinese Communists. Under the pressures of these political attacks and widespread demands for punishment
of the Chinese, Truman and Acheson, even had they been so disposed, could not allow themselves to be persuaded by Attlee.

Worried by more than possible use of the atomic weapon, Attlee wanted to persuade the Americans to end the hostilities with the Chinese. The war, he maintained, threatened to expand dangerously and absorb U.S. energies, leave Europe open to attack, and strengthen the Sino-Soviet bond. Becoming involved in war with the PRC seemed to be "handing the game over to the Russians," Attlee told Truman, Acheson, and Marshall. Not entirely unsympathetic toward Peking and eager to create a China independent of the Soviets, the British favored a cease-fire "without strings" in Korea and viewed some concessions to Peking as reasonable. Formosa traditionally belonged to whatever Chinese controlled the mainland; a seat in the United Nations would at least make the PRC approachable and possibly more amenable; and a major Chinese Communist role in the Japanese peace treaty negotiations was not necessarily alarming. Attlee did not know what settlement Peking might demand in Korea.

Conceding the dangers involved in any enlargement of the conflict, Acheson viewed Attlee's concessions as likely to make an aggressor "increasingly aggressive." Marshall told Attlee that the loss of Formosa would be a step toward liquidation of the U.S. position in the Pacific. Ready to accept a cease-fire at the 38th parallel in Korea, the Americans would concede no more, preferring to fight even if they were eventually pushed out. They would be no worse off in future negotiations and would have at least demonstrated U.S. faithfulness to friends in difficult times. By the final session with Attlee on 8 December, Collins had returned from Korea. He believed that X Corps could be safely evacuated and joined with Eighth Army and that the combined force could then hold a bridgehead position around the southern port of Pusan for an undetermined period.

Between 4 and 8 December the British and Americans discussed other aspects of the war with great candor and some friction. When Attlee complained that MacArthur directed UNC forces without consulting other UN partners in Korea, Marshall staunchly defended the general, explaining the joint State–Defense control system over MacArthur and pointing out that the British had been consulted on such questions as possible air action against Manchuria. The Americans showed little sympathy for the British idea of an Allied committee to run the war, and Bradley even offered to assist dissatisfied Allies in withdrawing troops. The president asserted that he would continue in charge of the action in Korea unless the United Nations changed the arrangement, and he seized the moment to say that, if UNC troops were bombed, "every airfield in sight" would be hit in retaliation.

In the end, the need for Anglo–American unity in the face of the common
danger prevailed. The United States had discarded any idea of unifying Korea by force and the British were now ready to agree that the UNC should stay in Korea until driven out if cease-fire negotiations failed; publicly the two allies declared themselves ready to pursue the UN mission and to negotiate for the purpose of solving the Korean problem on the basis of a “free and independent” Korea. They reaffirmed their intention to increase their military strength and proceed with plans for the collective defense of Europe. On the subject that had ostensibly brought Attlee to Washington, the communiqué stated that the president hoped never to use the atomic bomb and desired to keep the British “informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.” The British accepted the U.S. position on Formosa but remained convinced that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations.68

Although the British and Americans had agreed they would not propose a cease-fire in the United Nations, the British indicated during the Washington discussions that they would support one if its conditions seemed reasonable. Would the Americans? In Korea, all elements of X Corps had reached Hungnam but still had to be evacuated to Pusan and regrouped before rejoining Eighth Army, where they would come under General Walker’s command; the retreating Eighth Army was just north of the 38th parallel and had reached the third of nine successive planned lines of defense.69 The matter of a cease-fire had become a pressing concern when the NSC considered it on 11 December because 13 Arab-Asian nations planned to propose a UN resolution on the subject. On the one hand, a cease-fire would create military problems by ending air reconnaissance north of the 38th parallel and affecting U.S. naval operations; on the other hand, Marshall feared that U.S. opposition to the resolution might be interpreted as rejection of a peaceful solution of the Korean problem. In the event of a cease-fire, therefore, he wanted a large UN commission in Korea, with free access to both sides of the lines, to keep track of what was going on. The president approved an NSC recommendation that the United States should consider a cease-fire that would avoid placing MacArthur’s forces at a military disadvantage and preclude political concessions.70

Marshall was annoyed, however, when, in setting forth specific terms for a cease-fire, the Joint Chiefs pointed out to him that it would probably prevent the attainment of the UN objective of a free and united Korea. Forwarding the JCS views to Acheson, Marshall wrote that he understood that the Joint Chiefs were not advocating “a continued fight for the conquest of North Korea.”71 On 14 December the United States supported passage in the UN General Assembly of an Arab-Asian resolution that called for the creation of a three-man commission to examine the basis for a cease-fire. Any U.S.
ambivalence on the issue ended on 22 December, when the Chinese rejected the resolution, claiming it had been “illegally adopted” because the PRC had not participated in the UN proceedings. Two days later Chou En-lai charged that the U.S. invasion of North Korea had “obliterated forever” the 38th parallel as a line of demarcation and declared that any peace terms had to provide for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, settlement of Korean affairs by the “Korean people themselves,” removal of all U.S. “aggression forces” from Formosa, and a Chinese Communist seat in the United Nations. The UN cease-fire effort was in effect over. 72

The Possibility of UNC Withdrawal

While efforts in the UN centered on a cease-fire, the United States had to deal with the urgent demands from the battle area. The Far East situation became even more complicated for Marshall when MacArthur, who had long since moved his U.S. divisions from Japan to Korea, requested on 19 December that four recently called-up National Guard divisions be sent to Japan. There was no question that U.S. troops were needed in Japan to guard against a possible Soviet attack, but the National Guard divisions would not be combat-trained before June 1951, and there were competing claims for them in the United States and Europe. Recognizing both Japanese vulnerability and the difficulty of sending more divisions to the Far East, Marshall again asked in the AFPC whether there was any way for the United States to “withdraw from Korea with honor.” Dean Rusk, who had been invited to attend by Marshall, spoke strongly against a voluntary U.S. withdrawal. Claiming that U.S. forces in Korea represented only 10 percent of all American forces and viewing the total U.S. casualties in Korea since the start of MacArthur’s November offensive as not excessively heavy, he felt that UNC forces had been outmaneuvered, not seriously defeated. Rusk thought a voluntary U.S. withdrawal would not only abandon the South Koreans but destroy respect for U.S. military power, enhance Chinese Communist prestige, and create a “chain reaction of defeatism and disillusionment both nationally and internationally.” 75

Of the service secretaries, only Finletter backed Rusk. Of the Joint Chiefs, Sherman believed withdrawal militarily desirable, while Vandenberg supported the removal of ground forces from Korea and the conduct of air and sea operations against China. Bradley, who viewed withdrawal from Korea as a matter for decision at the highest U.S. or perhaps UN levels, did not think MacArthur should retreat farther south unless the enemy showed a “serious indication” of moving south of the 38th parallel. No Pentagon official
proposed sending MacArthur the National Guard divisions. Pointing out that MacArthur's orders placed the security of Japan above Korea, Bradley felt that MacArthur could send one or two divisions from Korea to Japan without critically affecting the Korean situation.\textsuperscript{71}

At Blair House on the evening of 26 December, Truman asked Marshall, Acheson, Bradley, and a few others present to consider whether a military position could be held in Korea, now that X Corps had been safely evacuated from Hungnam. Rejecting the idea of a UNC withdrawal, Acheson repeated Rusk's earlier arguments and favored staying in Korea and testing Communist strength. He questioned MacArthur's directives and said he was unable to understand why MacArthur had sent all his troops to Korea. Conceding that the many orders had caused some confusion, Marshall agreed they should be rewritten as necessary. Marshall remained anxious about the defense of Japan and the difficulty of getting troops out of Korea should enemy air attacks start.\textsuperscript{75}

In a new directive on 29 December the Joint Chiefs informed MacArthur that the Chinese appeared to have the "capability of forcing United Nations forces out of Korea" but that he could expect no substantial reinforcements. They recommended he hold a line somewhere in Korea and deflate the enemy's military and political prestige if this could be done without high losses. They directed MacArthur to defend along his planned successive defense positions, damaging the enemy as much as possible. If UNC forces had to retreat to the Kum River line just north of Taejon and the Chinese again threatened massive attacks, MacArthur could expect an order to withdraw to Japan. The Joint Chiefs asked for his comments, particularly in view of his "continuing primary mission of defense of Japan for which only troops of the Eighth Army are available."\textsuperscript{76}

The general's answer on 30 December was later characterized by Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney—his staff officer, friend, and biographer—as "probably MacArthur's most important single comment on the Korean war."\textsuperscript{77} Asserting that a military estimate of the Korean situation depended on political and military policies not yet formulated, MacArthur suggested that if the United States or the UN recognized "the State of War which has been forced upon us by the Chinese authorities," retaliatory measures might include blockade of the Chinese coast, destruction of Chinese industrial capacity by air and naval attack, use of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea, and attacks by Chinese Nationalist forces in Formosa against the mainland. He judged that the Soviet reaction to such steps would essentially depend on their view of their strength relative to that of their prospective opponents. Agreeing that everything possible should be done to secure Europe, MacArthur felt that the acceptance of defeat elsewhere would "insure later defeat in Europe itself."
He recommended against a UNC withdrawal from Korea because combat there pinned down Chinese Communist resources and protected other Asian areas, including Japan, which should have the National Guard divisions. If there were to be no U.S. reinforcements, no use of the Chinese Nationalists, and no military measures against the PRC, MacArthur agreed that the JCS directive for a "successively contracting defense line" outlined the only possible way to accomplish a UNC evacuation. He felt a decision for complete withdrawal could wait until UNC forces retreated to the beachhead.78

In Korea, meanwhile, uncertainty prevailed. Since early December 1950 there had been a relative lull in the fighting, giving UNC forces breathing time. A change in commanders followed General Walker's death in a jeep accident on 23 December. General Ridgway, MacArthur's own choice, succeeded Walker. This appointment had important consequences, for MacArthur was willing to give Ridgway, unlike Walker, a free hand: "Do what you think best, Matt. The Eighth Army is yours." Ridgway's revitalization of the demoralized Eighth Army is one of the classic achievements of recent military history. He had little time before meeting the first test, however, for the Chinese launched their "Third Phase Offensive" on 31 December. Prudently retreating, Ridgway evacuated Seoul on 4 January 1951 and eventually fell back to the fourth prepared defense line. Eighth Army finally contained the attack, and by 10 January the enemy offensive had spent itself. Nonetheless, the repeated retreat of UN forces and the second loss of Seoul left South Korean troops dispirited and convinced they would eventually be abandoned.79

Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs gave MacArthur no encouragement when they informed him on 9 January 1951 that, if he could stabilize the UNC position in Korea, two partly trained National Guard divisions could be sent to Japan; if not, troops evacuated from Korea would have to serve for Japanese defense. Washington would expedite a program for arming Japanese security forces and make an effort to intensify an economic blockade of China. MacArthur was to continue to defend Korea in successive positions and inflict maximum damage on the enemy, subject to the primary consideration of his troops' safety and his basic responsibility for Japan. He was to evacuate Korea when he thought it necessary to avoid severe losses of men or materiel.80 Consideration of the retaliatory measures against the PRC mentioned by MacArthur would have to await further developments.

Requesting clarification on 10 January, MacArthur strongly implied that the JCS directive was self-contradictory since he had "insufficient strength to hold a position in Korea and simultaneously protect Japan." Existing forces could hold a beachhead line in Korea but not without losses, and the term "severe" was subject to interpretation. He agreed that evacuation from Korea would eventually become necessary but argued that from a military viewpoint
his "tired" and "embittered" troops should be withdrawn as rapidly as possible. He asked whether the current goal of U.S. political policy was to "maintain a military position in Korea—indeed, indefinitely, for a limited time, or to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished?" If there were overriding political considerations, MacArthur ended, Eighth Army could hold for "any length of time up to its complete destruction."81

Reactions in Washington varied. Acheson saw the issue in black and white: The general was trying to avoid any blame if things went wrong, unduly pressuring to widen the war to include the PRC, and "incurably recalcitrant and basically disloyal to the purposes of his Commander in Chief." General Collins felt "considerable sympathy" for MacArthur. The Joint Chiefs had also sought clarification of U.S. political objectives only to be confronted with questions about military capabilities; MacArthur, Collins later wrote, had "pointed up his dilemma—and ours."82 Secretary Marshall later described this period as the lowest point of the war; MacArthur's suggestion of a possible breakdown of troop morale concerned him greatly. Knowing that Ridgway had also voiced some worries about South Korean troop morale, Marshall felt this might really be a turning point and again wanted an independent view.83

When Marshall took MacArthur's message to Truman, the president called an NSC meeting for 12 January. At the meeting, Truman agreed that Collins and Vandenberg should go to Korea and that another message should be sent to MacArthur repeating Washington's desire to hold the line in Korea as long as possible before withdrawal. The president further agreed that MacArthur should see a JCS working paper that tentatively listed 6 national military objectives with regard to Communist China and Korea and 16 actions to be considered under certain circumstances—including 3 of MacArthur's earlier suggestions.84 This paper, which Marshall sent without concurrence to the National Security Council, became NSC 101 and was further studied but never approved.85

Despite Marshall's warning that personal letters to theater commanders were "dangerous," the president also decided to reassure MacArthur personally.86 Using a State Department draft, Truman on 13 January sent MacArthur a review of the basic U.S. goals in Korea and asked for the general's views on the maximum effort his forces could reasonably be expected to

* Acheson later claimed (Present at the Creation, 516) that Marshall and Bradley "joined me in urging the President that he—rather than the Chiefs of Staff, with whom General MacArthur would argue—should send him a third message." Available sources indicate that Marshall and Bradley wanted to separate the military and political messages to MacArthur but are silent as to who they thought should send the political message. The NSC minutes, as indicated in the text, would lead one to believe Marshall did not favor the president sending the message himself.
make. The message was not a directive, Truman wrote, but simply to explain "something of what is in our minds." The letter pleased MacArthur, particularly Truman's statement that, in the worst event of a forced UNC withdrawal, the United States would "not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified." When Collins and Vandenberg arrived in Tokyo, MacArthur was still unhappy about the lack of reinforcements but told them that, finally, he had his directive to remain in Korea indefinitely. As Collins wrote later, he also told them "with some emotion, that his command should not be held responsible for the defense of Japan while required to hold in Korea." On 19 January Collins returned to Washington believing that Eighth Army was "in good shape and improving daily" under Ridgway, who expected to be able to hold for at least two to three months.
As 1951 began Marshall faced some of the most complex and demanding challenges of his career. Not even the urgent and seemingly overriding exigencies of the Korean War could engage all of his attention. The "Great Debate" over U.S. national security policy, launched by Senator Taft and Herbert Hoover, with the prime issue the administration's accordance of strategic priority to Europe and the stationing of American troops in Europe under NATO, reached its climax in the early months of 1951.* It required the combined efforts of the president, Acheson, Marshall, Eisenhower, and Bradley to turn back the assault on administration policy. Marshall devoted his best efforts to upholding the administration position in support of NATO and proved especially effective in his testimony before joint committees of Congress on 15 February.

In Korea, the United Nations Command was in a desperate situation in January 1951, again fleeing south, pushed by a Chinese enemy far stronger and more dangerous than the North Koreans. Elsewhere, both in Asia and Europe, the Korean War exacerbated U.S. problems and fed fears of possible Soviet actions and general war. Ridgway would shortly turn around the military situation in Korea, but the overall problem of how to settle the conflict would remain. MacArthur wanted all-out victory in Korea even at the cost of enlarging the war, while the State Department hoped to limit the damage to UNC forces and U.S. prestige in order to retain the confidence and support of U.S. allies and regain the diplomatic initiative. It was a troubled time.

* See Chapter XVII.
A New Toughness

Even as Washington officials debated in late 1950 the question of a possible UNC withdrawal from Korea, actions that would eventually improve the U.S. political position were occurring in the United Nations. After the Chinese Communist rejection of the first UN cease-fire overture on 22 December and their launching of a new military offensive in Korea on 31 December, the UN Cease-Fire Group proposed on 11 January 1951 a halt to hostilities followed by withdrawal of all non-Korean forces, eventual holding of elections, and immediately after agreement on a cease-fire, establishment of a Sino-Soviet-Anglo-American body to settle Far Eastern problems, including the status of Formosa and the Chinese UN seat. Truman decided to support this plan, which obviously included issues he would have preferred not to address, and realistically accepted the likelihood of strong political criticism at home; he was aided immensely when both Moscow and Peking refused the offer. Complaining that the proposal was meant "merely to give the United States troops a breathing space," the Chinese on 17 January demanded that a general Far East settlement precede negotiations for a Korean cease-fire.1

With Defense agreement, the State Department decided to ask for UN condemnation of Chinese aggression in Korea and for further assistance from all UN members. Introducing on 20 January a resolution affirming that the People's Republic of China was "engaged in aggression in Korea," the United States reassured the other countries that passage of the measure would not authorize any extension of general hostilities to, or the bombing of, mainland China. On the other hand, the United States and the UNC reserved the freedom to bomb any Manchurian airfields from which large-scale air attacks on UNC troops in Korea originated or to counterattack if the Chinese attacked UN forces outside Korea.2 Detecting indications that the PRC was having second thoughts on the earlier cease-fire resolution, the British and other Allied nations demanded ameliorating changes in the U.S. text, Arab-Asian nations pushed a rival resolution, and the Soviet Union mounted a rejection effort. Nonetheless, the United States managed to get its resolution of condemnation approved by the UN General Assembly on 1 February.3

Simultaneously, the military situation in Korea improved a great deal. Ridgway ordered a limited UNC counterattack on 15 January 1951 and then launched a larger operation on 25 January, recapturing Inch'on on 10 February and making gains of approximately 10 to 30 miles elsewhere. Seoul was almost within sight. Despite a new Chinese and North Korean offensive on the central front in mid-February—aimed as usual primarily against the South Korean troops, who were initially routed—Eighth Army parried the assault after heavy fighting and counterattacked on 21 February. By the end of
the month and for the first time since the Chinese offensive started in November 1950, the UNC held a solid, relatively stable line across Korea. By early March 1951, Ridgway was poised to move again. Although the U.S. stance on the fighting front toughened, Washington did not want to commit more forces to Korea, partly because it had so few trained troops to send and partly because it intended to send divisions to Europe. Ridgway received replacements for U.S. casualties but no additional troops. The 82d Airborne Division remained in the United States, use of the Chinese Nationalists was politically impossible, and there was little hope for additional support from other UN countries. Washington did not better its offer of two National Guard divisions for Japan if the Korean line were stabilized. Although the South Korean government urged arming some 500,000 South Koreans, the Joint Chiefs agreed with MacArthur that U.S. arms could be better used to supply Japanese police reserves. As a result, there was no increase in ROK strength at the time.

Similarly, Washington maintained all the existing restrictions on bombing. On 15 February, when MacArthur again requested permission to bomb Rashin and the JCS agreed on military grounds, Marshall initially concurred. But after discovering that Acheson opposed the attack because of continuing political and international risks, Marshall talked with Bradley, and the JCS turned down MacArthur for the time being on political grounds. On 26 February MacArthur asked authority to destroy the entire North Korean power complex, including the Yalu River plants, but the JCS, fearing possible infringement of Manchurian air space, denied the request on 1 March. At the same time, in discussions with UN allies the United States still held to its right to bomb Manchurian airfields or to counterattack under provocation from China.

**Across the 38th Again**

With Ridgway's Eighth Army moving north, the 38th parallel once again became an issue. Technically, MacArthur possessed the authority to proceed north of the 38th parallel, but the political advisability of the move remained questionable. In February 1951 the State Department suggested that any cease-fire should be accepted on the line of the 38th parallel as "best suited to the U.S. and UN interest," although it would lead to a status quo ante settlement. Even if Chinese and North Korean forces withdrew north of the 38th parallel without a cease-fire, State felt that the main body of UNC forces should remain in South Korea, although "with freedom to patrol or thrust into a zone, say 20 miles north of the 38th parallel" in order to keep the enemy off balance."
At a JCS–State meeting on 13 February Bradley raised the question of U.S. political objectives in Korea, since Ridgway now had a capability for any required actions short of a major UNC move north of the 38th parallel. With the 38th parallel of no military consequence, a decision to cross it, he felt, should hinge on political considerations. State, however, wanted the decision to be militarily based; although "no agreement short of the 38th parallel would be politically acceptable," the current line could be accepted if it proved "militarily advantageous." The difficulty in resolving the issue reflected the uncertainty, both political and military, that prevailed in the administration. State and Defense agreed, however, that there should be no public commitment not to cross the 38th. When asked about a possible crossing at a press conference on 15 February, Truman stated that it was a strategic matter in the hands of the theater commander. Nonetheless, with Allied governments insisting on full consultation before UNC forces again moved across the 38th parallel, Acheson asked Marshall on 23 February for Defense comments on a draft State memorandum for the president contending that although establishment of a "unified, independent and democratic Korea" remained the U.S. and UN political objective, a general UNC advance above the 38th parallel was undesirable and that a new directive for MacArthur was needed.

Seeking advice on the State memorandum within the Pentagon, Marshall found that Burns and the service secretaries generally agreed with Acheson, while the Joint Chiefs thought State's approach "unsound." As long as the political objective remained a unified Korea, the JCS felt that there should be no change affecting MacArthur's disposition of forces "either north or south of the 38th parallel as best to provide for their security." Accepting their position, Marshall suggested to Acheson on 1 March the urgent necessity to set out U.S. political objectives and to inform the president that MacArthur would report to the JCS and request instructions before proceeding north of the 38th parallel. From Dean Rusk, Frank Nash of Marshall's office learned that the State memorandum was intended to help "firm up" the president's thinking. The two officials agreed that Harriman might read the memorandum and related documents in preparing to brief the president, while the question of the 38th parallel would be handled in the context of an NSC review of U.S. policy in the Far East.

The issue of the 38th parallel became a matter of growing public notice after Ridgway's forces recaptured Seoul on 14 March. Ridgway had publicly stated two days earlier that he felt the United Nations would have a major victory if UNC forces ended the war in control up to the 38th parallel. Replying to a United Press question on 15 March, MacArthur declared that crossing the 38th parallel involved "more fundamental decisions" than were...
within his authority or responsibility as a military leader, but he added that any decision could not "ignore the heavy cost in Allied blood which a protracted and decisive campaign would entail." Asked at a press conference that day whether UNC forces would be allowed to advance beyond the 38th parallel, Truman repeated that the decision to cross remained one for the field commander to take. South Korean President Rhee, alarmed by the reluctant tone of these pronouncements, immediately proclaimed in a radio address his own firm conviction that UNC forces should not only cross the 38th parallel but should proceed to the Yalu River.14

Rhee's concern was well founded. While the UN allies agreed on the desirability of a united, independent, and democratic Korea, they had little desire to achieve that goal by continuing the attack beyond the 38th parallel. Kennan advised Acheson that a second advance would only "invoke trouble": If the Chinese could not stop the UNC troops, the Soviet Union might intervene. With Ridgway's fortunes rising, it seemed to Acheson a good time to start a new cease-fire initiative; on 19 March he presented Marshall, Lovett, and the JCS with a plan involving a presidential announcement.15 Following their meeting, State initiated discussions with other governments, including all those with military forces in Korea, to obtain their agreement. Notifying MacArthur on 20 March that State was planning a presidential statement to the effect that the UN was now prepared to discuss a settlement in Korea, the Joint Chiefs asked what authority the general might need for the next few weeks in relation to the 38th parallel. MacArthur asked only that "no further military restrictions be imposed."16

Although no change in directive authority had been made, the new international discussions had some effect on the UNC's freedom to cross the 38th parallel. As Acheson noted, MacArthur had authority to cross the parallel, but the absence of a common point of view on policy became clear the next day when a British government minister publicly stated that there would be no general UNC advance across the parallel without full intergovernmental consultation. In Korea, where the Eighth Army had reached a line just south of the 38th parallel, Ridgway informed MacArthur on 22 March that he planned to push just north of the 38th parallel but would advance slowly and carefully, with the objective of destroying enemy troops and materiel rather than seizing territory. MacArthur approved without referral to Washington but told Ridgway not to move north of the 38th parallel in force until he had specific authorization to do so. Ridgway moved out on 22 March, steadily approaching the parallel.17

On 23 March Acheson gave Truman a draft of the proposed presidential cease-fire statement, noting that arrangements might be completed in time to issue it the following week. Truman took the matter under advisement, but it
seemed clear that the announcement was imminent. Unfortunately, it was at this precise moment that MacArthur, as he left Tokyo for a trip to Korea (24 March Far East time), issued a statement pointing out Chinese weakness in the face of UNC forces, even though the latter’s operations had been highly restricted, and declaring that an expanded UNC effort would “doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.” Acknowledging the fundamental questions to be political, MacArthur stood ready on his authority as military commander to confer with the enemy commander to try to find “any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea . . . might be accomplished without further bloodshed.”

MacArthur’s statement spoiled any presidential initiative and confused U.S. allies. Meeting with Acheson and other State officials late that night (still 23 March, Washington time), an exasperated and angry Lovett thought that MacArthur should be relieved at once. When Lovett and others conferred with the president the next day, Truman directed that his order of 5 December 1950* requiring Washington clearance of all public statements by government officials and military commanders be called to MacArthur’s attention. Further, MacArthur was to inform Washington of any enemy response to his statement. Truman later wrote that MacArthur’s public appeal to the enemy “left me no choice—I could no longer tolerate his insubordination.” At the meeting on 24 March, however, the president said nothing about dismissal.

In Korea, Ridgway’s offensive went well, and UNC forces stood roughly along the 38th parallel by the end of March. After taking fearful punishment, enemy units escaped into North Korea to a strongly fortified position along the south side of the “Iron Triangle,” the American name for an important enemy resupply and staging area in the central area north of the 38th parallel. Here the enemy was known to be preparing for another offensive, but whether Ridgway would be allowed to cross the 38th parallel remained unclear. At a press conference on 27 March, Marshall stated that any general troop advance across that line would be solely a political decision. On 29 March the president indicated that MacArthur could still cross the 38th parallel but that the political situation would to a large degree control the final answer. Also on 29 March the Chinese broadcast their reply to MacArthur’s offer—they found it insulting and promised to redouble their military efforts.

Having reached the 38th parallel, Ridgway planned to keep the enemy off balance and to take UNC forces to a new line—Kansas—just north of the parallel. Flying to Korea on 3 April, MacArthur instructed the Eighth Army

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* Sent to MacArthur on 6 December.
commander to make a strong fight for Kansas but to limit and control any advance beyond it. On 5 April UNC forces began the attack, and by 9 April they were on or drawing near the Kansas line. Ridgway wanted to make a final UNC advance into North Korea to the more northerly Utah and Wyoming lines to create a salient that would help him dominate the Iron Triangle. If the enemy launched a strong offensive, Ridgway planned a fighting withdrawal through successive defense lines. This was the battlefield situation when Ridgway learned on 11 April of his appointment to take MacArthur's place.  

Recall of MacArthur

The culminating event leading to the president's dismissal of General MacArthur occurred on 5 April, when Joseph W. Martin, Jr., the Republican minority leader in the House of Representatives, read on the House floor a letter that the general had written to him on 20 March. Its final paragraph spelled out MacArthur's policy disagreement with the Truman administration:

> It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomatic [diplomats?] there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.  

The letter to Martin once more clearly revealed MacArthur's reluctance to subordinate his personal policy preferences to those of the commander in chief. To be sure, like many commanders in the field, he had experienced his share of frustration at the hands of Washington, dating back at least to the early days of World War II; to him, it probably seemed more than his share. But unlike most other field commanders, he seemed to find it difficult to accept these frustrations as deriving from the broader demands of national policy and to subordinate his personal views and ambitions. In the end, his failure to abide by specific and repeated military restrictions proved his undoing.

* Ridgway later wrote that his first intimation of his changed status came when a newspaperman greeted him with the statement, "Well, General. I guess congratulations are in order." First asking the newspaperman to explain and then, after getting no answer, turning to Secretary Pace, Ridgway reported that Pace "gave me no sign that he had heard what had been said." (Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, 220.)
MacArthur’s letter impelled the president to take immediate action. As Truman told his staff later, he thought MacArthur would be regarded as “a worse double-crosser than [Civil War General George B.] McClellan. He did just what McClellan did—got in touch with minority leaders in the Senate. He worked with the minority to undercut the Administration when there was a war on.” 25 Coming as it did during the stressful period of the Great Debate over U.S. foreign policy, the reading of MacArthur’s letter to the House by Martin could not help but infuriate the president. It was the latest and most intolerable of MacArthur’s indiscretions.

When the president asked Marshall, Bradley, Harriman, and Acheson to meet with him on Friday morning, 6 April, to discuss what he should do about MacArthur, the responses varied. Bradley, deeply upset, apparently gave Truman the impression that he favored recall, although he wanted to consult with the Joint Chiefs. 26 Acheson, who already viewed MacArthur’s 24 March battlefield statement as “a major act of sabotage of a Government operation,” felt there was “no doubt what General MacArthur deserved; the sole issue was the wisest way to administer it.” But he realized that Truman needed the “carefully considered advice and unshakable support of all his civilian and military advisers” to survive the political storm that would ensue. The president should give Marshall and Bradley time to discuss the matter. 27

For Marshall, the issue was not only extremely difficult but also distasteful. Marshall and MacArthur had never been friends; the exchange of letters in the fall of 1950 had indicated that. Marshall was also affronted by the general’s intrusions into political affairs. But MacArthur had had a brilliant Army career. Son of a famous soldier, he had been first in his 1903 class at West Point, a brigadier general at the age of 38, and Army chief of staff from 1930 to 1935. After leading U.S. forces to victory in the Pacific in 1945, he served with extraordinary success as “proconsul” of Japan. At 71, the UNC commander had become an almost legendary figure to many Americans. Marshall was the only general senior to MacArthur. Precisely because the two men had often been regarded as competitors, the recall of MacArthur was bound to place Marshall in an embarrassing position, and the extreme Republican right wing in Congress, supportive of MacArthur, would exploit the matter to the fullest. To relieve a successful commander could even have repercussions on the Korean battlefield. It is also not unlikely that Marshall felt some sympathy for MacArthur. 28

In any event, at the 6 April meeting with Truman, Marshall temporized,
saying that he felt they should move cautiously and needed time to reflect further. He raised the possibility that the general’s dismissal might even result in a congressional delay of military appropriations. Truman asked that all records bearing on the MacArthur issue be brought to Marshall’s attention and told the group to meet without him to discuss the matter. They did, that afternoon. Marshall, joined by Bradley, asked Acheson if they could not call MacArthur back to Washington for discussions before any final decision. Acheson thought this a “road to disaster”—MacArthur at home, eloquent and “in the full panoply of his commands,” would “gravely impair the President’s freedom of decision.” Marshall backed down.

When the same group met again with the president the next morning, Truman agreed to defer any decision until after the weekend and asked Marshall for a final JCS judgment “based on purely military considerations.” Back in the Pentagon and still searching for a less explosive outcome, Marshall and Bradley drafted a possible letter to MacArthur pointing out the “difficult position in which he was placing the government.” Meanwhile, Truman consulted House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Chief Justice Fred Vinson, both of whom urged caution, while Vice President Barkley, in the hospital, agreed to whatever the president decided. On Sunday, 8 April, Truman met alone with Acheson, who advised him to continue “his very wise course of not disclosing the trend of his thoughts until all recommendations were in and he was ready to decide and act.”

While Marshall waited in his Pentagon office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met for almost two hours on Sunday afternoon before finally agreeing that the president was “entitled,” as Collins later put it, to “have a commander in the field whose views were more in consonance with the basic policies of his government and who was more responsive to the will of the President as Commander in Chief.” Reporting to Marshall, the “sad and sober” chiefs individually indicated their concurrence with Truman’s intention to dismiss MacArthur. Instructing Bradley to present the JCS views to the president at the Monday morning meeting, Marshall offered the chiefs no inkling of his own thoughts. Rather, as he later testified, he was influenced by the JCS opinion. At the Monday morning meeting on 9 April, with Harriman and Acheson “very emphatic” in their recommendation for recall, Marshall finally added his own concurrence.

At Truman’s direction, Bradley drafted MacArthur’s relief order, dated 10 April, which the president signed Monday afternoon. Since Army Secretary Frank Pace was then in Tokyo, Marshall ordered him to proceed to Korea, where he could be informed through diplomatic channels rather than Army communications (thus precluding premature revelation) and instructed to deliver the order personally to MacArthur. Pace flew to Korea as ordered but
because of a power failure did not get the second message in time. Hearing that the story had leaked to reporters, the White House called a press conference at 1:00 a.m. on 11 April to announce the electrifying news of MacArthur's recall. In Tokyo, Mrs. MacArthur, informed by an aide who had heard the word on the radio, told the general—who may have had a premonition of the recall—the afternoon of 11 April. MacArthur left Tokyo on 16 April, reaching Washington on 19 April; Marshall and the Joint Chiefs met him at the airport. Some 300,000 people lined the streets to hail him.\textsuperscript{53}

MacArthur addressed a joint session of Congress that same day, and then went on to a series of tumultuous and emotional greetings throughout the nation. From 3 to 5 May he testified at hearings of the combined Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, laying out his fundamental differences with the Truman administration on issues of national strategic policy. MacArthur's testimony, as well as that of administration witnesses, was reviewed for security and quickly made available to the public.\textsuperscript{54}

MacArthur did not view either his letter to Representative Martin or his battlefield message of 24 March to the enemy as legitimate reasons for recall. He did not believe that these communications went beyond the bounds of his authority or privilege, he had not considered it necessary to clear these releases with Washington, and he did not see that they had undercut the president's policies and plans. Nor did he understand why he had been recalled. On the issue of Korea, MacArthur testified that, although he agreed with the president's initial decision to act, he had been operating in a policy vacuum. He claimed that the limited war sought by the administration was indeed appeasement and would forfeit Asian trust, encourage communism, and require continuing "sacrifice of American blood." As a UN supporter, MacArthur wanted Allied aid in Korea to continue; he rejected any thought of a U.S. ground war in China and said he had never advocated use of atomic weapons in the Far East. He was bitter, however, about the limitations placed on conventional air power and the failure to approve the actions he wanted to take against China, which he felt would force the PRC to the peace table. MacArthur said he believed that the Joint Chiefs supported him on this point.\textsuperscript{55}

On the larger issue of the East-West struggle, the general saw communism anywhere in the world as the enemy of the United States. Once the United States undertook to contest communism in Korea, MacArthur asserted, it had to win that war or the problem would spread; win, and one could "diminish the possibility of a third world war." MacArthur did not think war with the Soviets inevitable; they would act according to their assessment of their relative strength and their current success using political and other means.
Without a "short and honorable conclusion" in Korea, MacArthur warned, the United States would face further losses of lives and the "complete degradation and sacrifice of our moral tone." MacArthur declared his high opinion of Secretary Marshall, but his testimony also implied that the civilian side of the administration was blocking a military victory in Korea.\(^56\)

At Truman's direction, Marshall met with Acheson and the Joint Chiefs to prepare for the hearings. Privately, Marshall turned for advice to an old and trusted adviser, sending his executive, Marshall Carter, to see Bernard Baruch, the well-known "confidant of presidents," who was, however, not in Truman's favor. Baruch advised Marshall to be extremely careful, warning that the Republicans would attempt to discredit both Acheson and Marshall in order to embarrass the administration. Baruch told Marshall not to appear to attack the general but simply to explain the reasons for his relief and to disclaim any responsibility for the manner in which it had been carried out.\(^57\)

Marshall testified from 7 to 14 May, paying tribute to MacArthur, a "brother Army officer, a man for whom I have tremendous respect as to his military capabilities and military performances and from all I can learn, as to his administration of Japan." But Marshall stressed that MacArthur's 24 March battlefield call for a cease-fire had cost the United States a chance to negotiate a settlement of the Korean conflict, and he made plain his personal disapproval of the general's public criticism of the president's policy. MacArthur had disobeyed the president's order to clear all statements, and the general's letter to the minority leader had triggered the president's decision to act.\(^58\)

As for MacArthur's implication that the Joint Chiefs had agreed with him on Korean policy, Marshall brought out the "basic differences of judgment between General MacArthur, on the one hand, and the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand." These inherent differences between MacArthur and Washington were the cause of MacArthur's recall, not any violation of orders concerning military operations. Although sharing MacArthur's sensitivity to battlefield casualties, Marshall stressed that a field commander's views were limited, whereas the government had to balance U.S. interests and objectives in one area against those in other areas. The recall resulted, Marshall suggested, because of strong doubts that MacArthur could be trusted any longer with "making decisions that normal command functions would assign to a theater commander." Once the president decided on MacArthur's recall, Marshall felt that it should take effect immediately, but he indicated no approval of the manner in which it was carried out.\(^59\)

Marshall diagnosed U.S. policy alternatives as three—to accept MacArthur's plan to extend the war, to withdraw completely from Korea, or to continue the fight on a limited basis. To accept MacArthur's proposal, the
secretary held, would inevitably lose Allied cooperation, jeopardize the whole policy of collective defense, and hazard a general war—risks greater than any possible gain. On the other hand, quitting Korea without a fight would "violate our promise" and "sacrifice" the South Koreans. To continue the fight in Korea on a limited basis, especially if the UNC could in the process destroy the enemy's elite armies, seemed to Marshall the best way to reach a satisfactory basis for negotiations. It would avoid general war, retain U.S. allies, and generally improve the situation. Marshall advised patience, telling the senators the East-West struggle had "no quick and decisive solution . . . short of resorting to another world war." U.S. policy sought to "contain Communist aggression in different fashions in different areas without resorting to total war." 40

Marshall's seven days of testifying were long, tiring, and repetitious because he was asked the same questions over and over. Unfriendly senators such as Bourke B. Hickenlooper, William F. Knowland, Harry Cain, and Styles Bridges interrogated him about the relative importance of Europe and the Far East to the United States. They badgered Marshall with questions intended to place him on the defensive about his earlier roles as the president's representative in China and as secretary of state. 41 Vigorously defending the administration's policies, Marshall effectively countered MacArthur's call for victory at any cost and set the stage for the Joint Chiefs, Acheson, and others who had yet to testify. Although the hearings were troublesome, they gave the administration a chance not only to justify its actions to the American people but also to communicate what it wanted the Chinese and the Russians to hear. 42

By the end of June 1951, when oral testimony finally concluded, the public may have been somewhat confused, but it at least knew that the policy alternatives presented in such black-and-white terms by General MacArthur were in fact exceedingly complex, risk-laden, and expensive. The divided joint Senate committee did not write a final report, but 8 of its 26 members filed a report in August highly critical of the administration. By that time, much of the passion with which Americans had reacted to MacArthur's recall seemed to have spent itself. 43

Ridgway and Military Policy

While Marshall defended the administration's policies in Washington, Ridgway took over in Tokyo, personally and officially directing his commanders not to do anything that would extend the conflict. These repeated cautions reflected Ridgway's fears that rash actions in the field might cause the war to
spread beyond Korea and lead to World War III. He told his air and naval commanders not to operate along the borders of North Korea within a 3-mile range of China or a 20-mile range of Soviet territory.14

The situation with Eighth Army was a little different. Marshall and Truman had approved General Collins's recommendation of Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet to replace Ridgway in Korea. Immediately appointing Van Fleet Eighth Army commander, Ridgway assigned him the mission of repelling aggression against "so much . . . [South Korean territory] as you now occupy." Eighth Army forces were not to advance in strength farther north than the Wyoming line except on Ridgway's orders, and he also wanted to be informed prior to any major advance beyond the more southern Utah line. Ridgway decided, despite his full confidence in Van Fleet, "a courageous and competent field commander," to approve his principal tactical plans only after personally consulting both Van Fleet and his corps and division commanders. As the new CINCUNC, Ridgway gave his Eighth Army commander far less leeway in directing the Korean ground action than MacArthur had given Ridgway.15

Van Fleet took command of the Eighth Army on 14 April, only eight days before the start of a most intense and protracted enemy assault, during which he was forced to fall back from the Kansas–Wyoming line, while more than 330,000 Chinese drove toward Seoul. By the end of April Eighth Army had retreated approximately 35 miles to a so-called "No Name" line that stretched from roughly 5 miles north of Seoul across the peninsula, where, with major air support, it maintained itself and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. The Chinese finally fell back in early May, still unbeaten.16 U.S. intelligence reported about 542,000 Chinese troops in Korea, while the North Korean Army now numbered almost 200,000. Another 750,000 Chinese were in Manchuria. Against these forces, Van Fleet had about 270,000 U.S. and Allied troops, plus almost 235,000 South Koreans. Told by Ridgway to retain the initiative, Van Fleet directed divisional patrolling north of the UNC lines and planned a general offensive.17

The possibility of Soviet intervention in Korea or attack against Japan also claimed Ridgway's attention. On 17 April he asked for authority to move UNC forces from Korea to Japan in the event of a Soviet attack. Agreeing in principle, the Joint Chiefs authorized him to plan but not to begin a major withdrawal from Korea without specific approval and not to plan to use any non-U.S. forces outside of Korea. On 27 April Ridgway responded that a UNC withdrawal from Korea would depend on Eighth Army's successful southward retreat and thus the only forces available to defend Japan would be those already there at the time of attack.18

Ridgway worried also about the increased capabilities of enemy air in
Korea. On 27 April he asked for discretionary authority to strike Chinese air bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula in the event of a major enemy air strike in Korea and for immediate authority to conduct air reconnaissance over air bases in those areas. Actually, the authority Ridgway sought, despite British objections against leaving such a decision to the field commander, had been approved by the JCS, Marshall, and Truman some weeks earlier, but it had not been communicated to MacArthur lest he use it to justify premature action and enlarge the war. With Lovett and Acheson agreeing, the Joint Chiefs sent the authority to Ridgway the next day along with another strong warning. Air reconnaissance was to be surreptitious and at high altitudes; any retaliatory air attack on Chinese territory, they told Ridgway, should be made only if “time and circumstance do not permit reference to the JCS.”

The recurrent question of increased arming, equipping, and training of South Korean forces to substitute for U.S. units came up again in April. After MacArthur’s departure, the South Korean government renewed its request for U.S. support of 10 additional South Korean divisions, but Ridgway, like MacArthur earlier, and for the same reasons, was opposed. Again the Koreans were put off.

The problem of formulating a directive that would be mutually acceptable to Washington and the theater commander had plagued both parties since the beginning of the Korean War. Differences over the content and interpretations of directives had played no small part in MacArthur’s strained relations with Washington and his eventual dismissal. Returning once more to the task, the Joint Chiefs sent Ridgway on 1 May a new presidentially approved directive that combined a number of existing directives. The new version repeated most of the missions defined in earlier ones and continued injunctions against violating Russian or PRC territory. It gave overriding priority to defending Japan and maintaining the security of forces in Korea. In a significant change, the directive allowed no general advance beyond the Kansas–Wyoming line without prior approval, although deeper limited moves were authorized. This change reflected the prevailing opinion, shared by the Joint Chiefs and Ridgway, that most signs and circumstances pointed more to an eventual political than military solution in Korea. The prospect of a greater intensification of the war that would draw in more Chinese troops and place a greater strain on the United States and its allies did not appeal to the Joint Chiefs. They told Ridgway that he was to report to them immediately for instructions if the enemy military leaders asked for an armistice in the field.

Ridgway, who had just sent to Washington his own preferred version of a directive, including authority to send ground troops across the Manchurian and Soviet borders if necessary and freedom to use the two National Guard divisions in Japan, was not pleased. Much like MacArthur earlier, Ridgway
viewed his UNC objective to clear enemy forces out of all Korea as beyond his capabilities in view of the limitations on forces and the restrictions against advancing beyond the Kansas–Wyoming line. Like MacArthur, he saw the admonition to safeguard his UNC forces in Korea as antithetical to his CINCFE mission to defend Japan. The requirement for JCS approval before an evacuation of Korea and the prohibition on using non-U.S. forces outside of Korea seriously curtailed his freedom to act. He was dismayed not to have received clear authority for air reconnaissance over Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula. On 11 May his representatives arrived in Washington to discuss the matter with the Joint Chiefs. At this point, however, U.S. policy was close to being set.  

**U.S. Policy Defined: NSC 48/5**

In May, U.S. policy in the Far East was being clarified in Washington in the light of the greatly improved situation in Korea and Ridgway’s assumption of the theater command in Tokyo. Redefining policy involved revision of NSC 48/2, approved in December 1949, well before the start of the Korean War. Under consideration were such questions as another crossing of the 38th parallel, possible actions against the Chinese Communists, and settlement of the conflict. A State Department paper sent to the NSC in March 1951 took positions against forced unification of Korea, against widening the war, for separating U.S. military and political objectives, and for allowing UNC forces to operate within limits across the 38th parallel.  

On 27 March, shortly after MacArthur’s call to the enemy ended the president’s planned initiative for a cease-fire, the Joint Chiefs informed Marshall that they doubted the military advantages of an armistice without an overall political settlement, since the Chinese would simply gain a needed rest from combat while UNC troops would have to remain in Korea in event of renewed attack. They recommended that an armistice deal solely with Korea, end all armed operations there, establish a demilitarized zone behind which each side would withdraw, provide for UN supervision, and prohibit the introduction of new military units or war equipment—all these provisions to continue in effect until a permanent political settlement transpired. Furthermore, the armistice should not prejudice the U.S. position with regard to the Soviet Union, Formosa, or the Chinese seat in the United Nations. Marshall felt that these JCS demands were excessive and impinged on political matters. Forwarding the JCS memorandum to State on 31 March, Lovett as acting secretary noted that he agreed generally with its conclusions except for those political questions that the two departments might discuss separately.
The improved UNC military situation in Korea in the spring of 1951 prompted the JCS to make further policy recommendations to Marshall. With reference to the Soviet Union, if the Soviets precipitated a general war, the Joint Chiefs advised Marshall in April, UNC forces should be immediately withdrawn from Korea and redeployed. If Soviet “volunteers” entered Korea in sufficient strength to threaten UNC forces, the latter should withdraw and the United States should mobilize for general war. If the Korean conflict remained unchanged, the JCS recommended continuing the military action until conclusion of a satisfactory political settlement. Marshall submitted the JCS memorandum to the president and the NSC for consideration.\textsuperscript{56}

Revised policy paper NSC 48/3 proposed to continue Korean military action until conclusion of an acceptable settlement that would “as a minimum, terminate hostilities, end the aggression, and provide against its resumption.” This formula generally satisfied the service secretaries, but the Joint Chiefs complained that it was not comprehensive enough to allow them to develop required military policies. Paul Nitze at State thought they were raising “one of MacArthur’s principal contentions.”\textsuperscript{57} At a meeting on 2 May, Marshall maintained that, beyond ending all hostilities in Korea, a minimum settlement should deny to the Communists all Korea south of the 38th parallel, restore Rhee’s authority there, provide for a ROK military buildup sufficient to deal with renewed North Korean or Chinese aggression, and permit when deemed possible the eventual withdrawal of U.S. and other UNC forces. Nor should any settlement preclude an eventual political arrangement under UN aegis leading to a “united, independent and democratic Korea.” With Truman not yet ready to act, there would be a new draft utilizing Marshall’s suggested wording.\textsuperscript{58}

When the NSC met to discuss NSC 48/4 on 16 May, the Joint Chiefs were still dissatisfied. They wanted the stated objective to call for an end to the hostilities, a staged withdrawal of all non-Korean forces, a South Korean military buildup to “deter or repel” a renewed North Korean aggression, and the establishment of a northern border so located as to facilitate South Korea’s defense but in no case south of the 38th parallel.\textsuperscript{59} During the discussion, Vice President Barkley questioned why, if the long-term objective was to unify all Korea, the current objective called for the rescue of South Korea only. When Acheson remarked that unification of all Korea had never been a military objective, General Collins pointed out that Ridgway’s orders were still to eject the aggressors from all of Korea and that his complaints derived from his lack of an adequate force to do so. Modification of Ridgway’s directive had to await approval of the new policy statement. After the NSC adopted the paper with the JCS-proposed revisions, Truman approved it as NSC 48/5 on 17 May.\textsuperscript{60}
Following the JCS-proposed alterations, NSC 48/5 stated that the United States should strive by political means for a free and united Korea without jeopardizing U.S. positions on the Soviet Union, Formosa, or the Chinese seat in the United Nations. It also affirmed that if the current minimum U.S. objectives, essentially those stated by the JCS, could not be achieved, military action should continue. The United States should solicit increased Allied support, develop South Korean military strength as fast as possible, and through UN agencies help Korea politically and economically.61

NSC 48/5 also clarified U.S. policy toward the PRC. The overall objective was to "detach China as an effective ally of the USSR and support the development of an independent China which has renounced aggression," but meanwhile the United States should "deflate Chinese Communist political and military strength and prestige by inflicting heavy losses on Chinese forces in Korea." If the Chinese attacked outside Korea, the United States was to expedite planning for a possible naval and air blockade of the China coast, military action against Chinese targets outside Korea, and operational assistance for possible Chinese Nationalist operations. U.S. efforts to secure Allied support for these moves were to continue. In addition, the United States should encourage anti-Communist Chinese elements both in China and outside, stimulate differences between Peking and Moscow and within the Peking government, continue U.S. economic restrictions against China, oppose a PRC seat in the United Nations, and persuade the United Nations to impose political and economic sanctions.62

NSC 48/5 admonished against extending Korean hostilities either into China or into a general war with the Soviet Union. If Soviet "volunteers" came into Korea and threatened UNC safety, the United States should consider withdrawing and preparing for general war. If general war with the Soviet Union occurred, the United States should withdraw UNC forces from Korea and redeploy U.S. forces.63 At last there was a U.S. policy for ending the Korean conflict consistent with UNC military capabilities.

**Military Operations and Directives**

Ridgway now had to deal with further changes in his mission. With NSC 48/5 approved, the Joint Chiefs on 31 May amended, with the advice of Ridgway’s emissaries, the earlier directive to which he had objected. While safeguarding UNC forces, Ridgway was to inflict maximum losses on enemy forces in Korea so as to “create conditions favorable to a settlement” as outlined in NSC 48/5. The new directive eased the restrictions on his use of air and naval operations by allowing an approach to within 12, rather than 15,
miles of the Manchurian and Soviet borders. Ground forces could reach a line “passing approximately through” the Hwach’on reservoir area north of the 38th parallel in east central Korea. The directive repeated the instruction to notify Washington immediately if the enemy requested an armistice.

The new, more northern line for ground operations took into account the tactical situation in Korea, where on 16 May an estimated 21 Chinese divisions had attacked, mainly along a 25-mile line from Ch’unch’on to the Hwach’on reservoir in the east, while a lesser enemy force strongly probed along a 40-mile axis in the west. Although South Korean divisions once again retreated in disorder with large losses of equipment, Van Fleet was able to plug the gap, and three days later Eighth Army counterattacked, surprising the enemy and inflicting heavy casualties. At the end of the month the army was approximately back to the Kansas line; by mid-June, it reached the Kansas-Wyoming line, which Ridgway wanted held, with limited forays to punish the enemy.

Early in June, during this advance by UNC forces, Marshall visited Korea and Japan. He wanted particularly to greet and encourage Ridgway who, according to Marshall Carter, was probably “the single officer in the whole military establishment that the secretary most admired.” Marshall felt that Ridgway, through his valor and astuteness, had restored the UNC military position in Korea. The two leaders discussed various matters of military policy, presumably including military operations, manpower, Ridgway’s directive, and the possibility of negotiations.

By this time negotiations were a real possibility. The JCS pondered the wisdom of restricting UNC ground operations while the enemy was in disarray, and on 20 June they sought Ridgway’s advice. Concerned about any compromise of the Kansas-Wyoming line, Ridgway wanted Van Fleet to move at least 20 miles north to allow for a 10-mile outpost line of resistance and for a possible 10-mile demilitarized zone later. On 26 June, however, Van Fleet told Ridgway that the advance would be costly. At this point the Joint Chiefs, with Ridgway’s agreement, undertook to revise the 31 May directive, separating his U.S. (CINCFE) and UN (CINCUNC) functions. This last major restatement of Ridgway’s directive came on 10 July.

The CINCUNC directive had few changes. Tactical ground operations were authorized throughout Korea, but no UNC forces were to cross into Manchuria or Soviet territory. Ridgway was to submit recommendations for the development of dependable South Korean military units. As CINCFE, Ridgway was to support UNC operations in Korea and provide air and naval defense for Formosa and the outlying Pescadores Islands against a Chinese Communist attack. He could continue aerial reconnaissance over a limited area of China. In the event of a Soviet attack in the Far East, the defense of
Japan was his "overriding mission." If U.S. forces outside Korea came under attack, he could react in self-defense but could not retaliate against Chinese or Soviet territory without Washington's specific approval. However, he was to plan for possible retaliatory action against mainland China, as provided by NSC 48/5.69

At this point, with negotiations for a cease-fire finally commencing, the UNC had cleared all of South Korea except for a small western area, and it had made some territorial gains above the 38th parallel in the east. To achieve even this, a UN army of more than 550,000 men—composed of 7 U.S. and 10 ROK divisions, 4 brigades, 1 separate regiment, and 9 separate battalions—had suffered some 78,800 U.S. casualties (21,300 killed), a number of Allied casualties, and 212,554 Korean casualties (21,625 killed). Of more than 469,000 Korean civilian casualties, some 170,000 had died. Opposing the UNC, there stood approximately 459,000 enemy troops in 13 Chinese armies and 7 North Korean corps.* Another 743,000 Chinese reserves waited in Manchuria, while the UNC troop limit had about been reached. Despite tremendous losses, the Chinese armies had achieved worldwide prestige in the Korean fight and remained capable of offensive action.70

Toward the Negotiating Table

On 30 May, following Eighth Army's return to the Kansas line, Ridgway suggested to Washington that the next 60 days would offer "optimum advantages" for diplomatic negotiations. Indeed, overtures to the Soviets had already been made, and a first unofficial talk between George Kennan, then on leave from the State Department, and Yakov Malik, the Soviet Union's permanent representative to the United Nations, coincidentally occurred on 31 May. The two men met alone at Malik's Long Island summer house, but nothing tangible resulted from this meeting. At a second meeting on 5 June, Malik indicated that the Soviets "wanted a peaceful solution . . . of the Korean question—and at the earliest possible moment." He recommended getting in touch with the Chinese and North Koreans. By mid-June the United States was discussing possible negotiations with other Allied powers but still could not make direct contact with Peking.71

The secret Soviet-American discussions became public on 23 June, when Malik, in a UN-sponsored radio broadcast generally critical of U.S. policy, said that the Soviet people wanted to settle the Korean question and that talks

* A year later U.S. estimates placed enemy ground strength in Korea in July 1951 at 509,000—277,000 Chinese Communist and 232,000 North Korean troops.
should begin on a cease-fire and armistice providing for withdrawal from the 38th parallel by both sides. On 25 June, the first anniversary of the war, Truman publicly announced U.S. readiness to "join in a peaceful settlement in Korea now." Most Allied nations now seemed hopeful about the possibility of a negotiated peace. From Moscow, U.S. Ambassador Alan G. Kirk reported that the Soviets were serious and that the Chinese were also behind the move. He thought that Peking was finding the Korean War "bloody and expensive" and harmful to its overall economic program; the Soviet approach had both served their own peacemaker role and offered the Chinese opportunity to save face.

How to reach the Chinese and the North Korean governments in the absence of diplomatic channels posed a problem. Since the United States did not officially recognize either government, it wanted to exclude certain political questions, such as Formosa, from the talks. Chinese forces, furthermore, were supposedly "volunteers" for whom only their military commander could presumably speak. The United Nations, with a PRC delegation still there, seemed to Acheson the "worst of all places to conduct discussions." Therefore, he suggested that Ridgway initiate the move, and the president agreed. Ridgway broadcast a Washington-drafted message to the enemy on 30 June (Korean time).

The next day, in a message approved by Truman, Acheson, and Marshall, the Joint Chiefs informed Ridgway that the major U.S. military concern was to end the Korean fighting, assure against its resumption, and provide for UNC security. Also, it was of the greatest importance to arrange military terms acceptable to the United States over a long period in the event that a political settlement could not be reached. The minimum U.S. armistice position was to confine the settlement to Korea, end hostilities there, establish a demilitarized zone across Korea, require ground forces to remain in position or be withdrawn to the rear, and allow replacement but no introduction of new air, ground, or naval units or personnel. Equipment levels could be increased only for health and welfare purposes. A mixed UNC-Communist military armistice commission was to be created to supervise the execution of terms. Ridgway could adopt more advantageous positions initially, but the JCS enjoined him not to demand so much that world opinion might become unfavorable, not to engage U.S. prestige to the point that he could not retreat to minimum terms later, and not to let the talks break down unless he failed to obtain minimum terms.

Although the possibility of an end to the Korean fighting generally pleased the UN allies, the South Koreans were dismayed at the prospect that Korea would not be reunited. Their ambassador in Washington had already indicated his keen resentment at being excluded from the periodic State
Department briefings for the contributing Allied countries, * and Acheson feared that the South Korean reaction might jeopardize UNC forces. ** On 30 June the Rhee government demanded that armistice terms include a Chinese withdrawal to Manchuria, North Korean disarmament, UN prevention of third party support for North Korea, South Korean representation in any international meeting relating to Korea, and the barring of any plan in conflict with Korean sovereignty or territorial integrity. President Rhee, who saw himself as the only legitimate head of government for all Korea, was greatly agitated, and only visits by Ambassador Muccio and Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet persuaded him, at least for a time, to accept the realities of the situation.***

On 1 July Chinese General Peng Teh-huai and North Korean General Kim Il Sung replied to Ridgway that they were “authorized . . . to suspend military activities and to hold peace negotiations” and suggested meeting at Kaesong on the 38th parallel, rather than on the neutral ship that Ridgway had proposed. Opposed to immediate suspension of military activities, Ridgway argued that the meeting should be delayed. Washington agreed that military operations should continue but told Ridgway to go ahead with the meetings. On 3 July Ridgway notified the Chinese and North Koreans of his agreement to meet at Kaesong on 10 July or earlier and proposed that liaison officers meet in advance. The enemy agreed. There was no decision to stop fighting except in the immediate zone of the talks, but at least the two sides appeared ready to begin negotiations toward a cease-fire. **** The formal armistice talks began on 10 July 1951. Although the possibility of an armistice seemed auspicious, Ridgway believed the enemy capable of launching another attack at any time.*****

* The South Korean ambassador attended his first State Department briefing with the other ambassadors on 3 July 1951.

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CHAPTER VI

Fighting But Talking

Even before the Korean armistice negotiations began in July 1951, Secretary Marshall had decided to step down. Long in poor health and fatigued by his year in the Pentagon, Marshall left office on 12 September 1951.1 As Lovett took the helm, the overriding concern continued to be Korea. During the course of the alarmingly slow military negotiations at Kaesong there persisted a troublesome warfare of little movement that produced a lesser but still high rate of casualties and allowed the enemy to strengthen defensive fortifications and build up supplies. The growth of the enemy's air power in both quantity and quality posed a particular threat. These uncertain circumstances required the United States to keep under review the courses of action it might have to take in the event of an armistice, no armistice, or even a breached armistice.

The Start of the Talks: An Agenda

The first formal meeting of the armistice negotiators took place on 10 July 1951 in Kaesong—Korea's ancient capital located northwest of Seoul close to the 38th parallel and the first major South Korean city to fall to the North Korean attackers. Responsible to General Ridgway, Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy led the UN negotiating team.* On the enemy side, although North Korean Lt. Gen. Nam II was the chief delegate, Chinese Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang seemed to be the controlling voice.†

* The original UN negotiating team also included Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes (USA); Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie (USAF); Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke (USN); and Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup (ROKA).
† The additional members of the original enemy team included Chinese Lt. Gen. Tung Hua and North Korean Maj. Gens. Lee Sang Cho and Chang Pyong San. According to General Nam, the correct names of their two armies were the "People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" and "The Chinese People's Volunteers."
From the start, the Communists sought to exploit the situation to extract maximum propaganda advantage. Pictures of UN jeeps entering Kaesong bearing the agreed-upon white truce flags appeared in Asian papers above captions describing their "surrender." Enemy guards ordered UN envoys about and refused Western press representatives entry until Ridgway threatened to stay away. U.S. negotiators encountered animus, arrogance, and rudeness. Believing the Communists viewed civility as a sign of weakness, Ridgway urged Joy to be tough. In this disagreeable atmosphere, UN negotiators endured two years of dreary, exasperating, and repetitious talks. As Ridgway observed, it was "nearly enough to make men welcome a return to battle." Only at the lower staff levels was the atmosphere less grim; here, Communist colonels acted "more down to earth and practical." Sometimes, they even smiled.5

The enemy negotiators were subject to strict control by their governments, as were the UN emissaries, whose orders came from the U.S. government acting as the agent of the United Nations. Every formal statement made by Joy or the other UN negotiators was carefully approved in advance in Korea and Tokyo and often in Washington as well. Adding comments and recommendations, Ridgway daily sent summary analyses and verbatim accounts of meetings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At weekly or more frequent meetings, JCS and State representatives studied and discussed these papers. On important matters, Marshall or Lovett met with Acheson and the Joint Chiefs and submitted recommendations to Truman for approval. In fact, the UNC negotiators took no major step without the president's approval. Sensitive to the need to act in concert with U.S. allies, who wanted an end to the war, Washington intended to continue the Korean talks if at all possible and was prepared to make concessions if necessary. The UNC representatives led by Joy, on the other hand, believed that the road toward peace could be more quickly traversed by the adoption of more forceful and uncompromising positions. This fundamental difference of view between Washington and the theater persisted throughout the negotiations.6 Whatever their personal beliefs, however, the negotiators faithfully obeyed orders from Washington.4

The first item of business at Kaesong was to prepare an agenda for the talks. The Communists proposed a five-point agenda and insisted that it include two points—the 38th parallel as the line of demarcation between the two Korean sides and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. On 16 July the enemy

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5 On 3 May 1952 Joy exclaimed in his diary, "The JCS for once seem to be our side!" (See Allan E. Goodman, ed. Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference. 396.) Collins records that State officials meeting with the JCS usually included two or three from a group including Charles E. Bohlen, U. Alexis Johnson, H. Freeman Matthews, Livingston Merchant, Paul Nitze, and Dean Rusk.
finally conceded that the military demarcation line item could be listed without reference to the 38th parallel, but they persisted on the withdrawal issue. They were unwilling to capitulate on this issue because UNC withdrawal would leave South Korea easy prey to the enemy, discussion of withdrawal would alarm and frighten the South Koreans and possibly lead them to act rashly, and troop withdrawal was primarily a political issue to be discussed only at a higher governmental level. On this last point Marshall strongly supported the JCS view that the matter was inappropriate for military negotiators but that there should be no delay in high-level negotiations for a political settlement immediately following an armistice. Although Acheson concurred, he noted pragmatically that any political settlement would require Communist agreement, and therefore he stressed the need to achieve a military armistice that would be acceptable over a long period.

The troop withdrawal issue became aggravated to the point that Ridgway was ready to break off the talks. Then on 25 July the Communists offered to drop foreign troop withdrawal in return for a vaguely worded fifth item on the agenda. The UNC team agreed, and on 26 July the two sides adopted an agenda of five points, the first of which had been fulfilled and the last of which was so broadly stated as to be almost meaningless:

1. Adoption of an agenda.
2. Fixing a military demarcation line between the two sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities.
3. Concrete arrangements for the achievement of a cease-fire and armistice, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervising organization to oversee the plan.
4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.
5. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.

In accepting the agenda, the UN delegation made it clear that it made no advance commitment to any specific agreement regarding the items. It had taken 16 days to reach an accord on the agenda.

**A Military Demarcation Line**

With the agenda settled, the Communist negotiators again proposed the 38th parallel as the line of demarcation, arguing that it was of historic importance and that each side would have to withdraw about equally from the
irregular battlefield line to get back to the 38th. The next day, 27 July, Joy advanced the idea that there were actually three "zones of military significance"—air, sea, and ground, none based on the 38th parallel. He argued that the end of UNC air, sea, and ground hostilities would represent a far greater concession than a cease-fire by the enemy ground forces in Korea. Joy then proposed a demarcation line generally favorable to UNC forces, with a 20-mile-wide demilitarized zone. Ridgway did not think the enemy was surprised by the refusal to accept the 38th parallel as the boundary.9

On 28 July Nam II scornfully rebuffed Joy for his "completely absurd and arrogant statement" regarding the demarcation line and asked, "for what actually have you come here?" Joy in turn rebuked Nam II for a "rhetorical question so inappropriate, so irrelevant and so discourteous as to be unworthy of a reply." Still, he replied at length. When Nam II refused to change his position, a deadlock ensued, and on 10 August the two delegations actually confronted each other across the table for more than two hours without speaking. Ridgway wanted to break off negotiations, but Washington preferred that the onus of a negotiating failure fall on the Communists. Alleging that the UNC had bombed the negotiating site at Kaesong, the Communists halted negotiations entirely on 23 August.10

From almost the beginning of the talks difficulties over Kaesong's neutral status exacerbated the disagreement at the negotiating table. The constant maneuverings of Communist and UNC troops around the perimeter of the neutral zone increased the chances of its violation. Enemy trucks bearing white flags drove through the neutral zone, and an enemy company once passed in sight of UN negotiators in their Kaesong quarters. Kaesong's closeness to the enemy supply line, against which thousands of UNC air sorties occurred, made the UNC vulnerable to claims of air violations of the neutral zone. Over a two-month period the Communists alleged almost 200 air violations, creating the need for constant UN investigations and denials. Communist charges of an incident on 10 September, however, turned out to be accurate and there was a UNC apology.11

Ridgway wanted to end Kaesong's status as a neutral zone, but Washington ordered him to wait for a Communist response. Even though the Communists offered to resume negotiations at once, Ridgway remained unwilling to hold any more talks in Kaesong unless directly ordered to do so.12 Although sympathetic to his position, Washington was resolved to avoid a permanent rupture in the talks, even if it meant continuing to meet at Kaesong or conceding some modification of the UN demarcation line. Ridgway and the negotiators, on the other hand, wanted to hold firm.15

The differences between Ridgway and Washington reflected a growing divergence of views concerning the value of an armistice. Marshall, the Joint
Chiefs, and State—as well as Ridgway—thought in August that the Chinese would drag out the negotiations as long as possible in order to improve their military position. At an NSC meeting on 29 August, Marshall informed Truman that commanders in Korea expected a Communist attack within days. By late September, however, Ridgway indicated that, with the approach of winter and a currently unfavorable enemy military situation, the Communists needed an armistice more than the UNC. "Time works to their disadvantage," he cabled Washington. Truman sought to clarify the matter by sending Bradley and Charles E. Bohlen of the State Department to the Far East.

In October Bohlen reported that UNC forces had high morale, were well supplied, and were deployed in a good position well forward of the Kansas line. Despite growing enemy air strength, particularly MIG-15s, UNC commanders saw little evidence of a general enemy offensive in the near future. It was not necessary to hurry the talks, Bohlen thought; indeed, there might be justification for "stringing them out, even in endless debate as to site," but he recommended against their complete rupture. Rather, the UNC should continue its efforts, Ridgway should not be forced to return to Kaesong, and a new UN demarcation proposal should be made.

Ridgway's strong stance paid off, for the Communists proposed enlarging the neutral zone and moving the conference to Panmunjom. With UNC agreement, the full negotiating teams convened for the first time in two months on 25 October. Joy accepted a North Korean proposal to send the demarcation question to a subdelegation to prepare recommendations for the delegations, and work began that afternoon. The UNC proposed a new line of demarcation, not very different from their earlier offer. The Communists refused it because, they contended, it would require a disparate number of withdrawals by their side and they did not want Kaesong to be in either the UNC or the demilitarized zone—but they no longer referred to the 38th parallel as their line. Unimpressed by the enemy's lack of reference to the 38th parallel, Ridgway remained determined that Kaesong be in one of the two zones. On 6 November, however, the JCS advised him to accept the Chinese-North Korean line in the Kaesong area provided the enemy agreed to conclude work on all agenda items within a given time.

The major differences over demarcation included the location of the line and the demilitarized zones, the withdrawals required on both sides, and whether Kaesong should be placed in one of the two demilitarized zones, which the Communists opposed. On 8 November the Communists made a new offer to fix the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone on the basis of the existing line of battle. Ridgway believed it would be a major mistake to accept this proposal, but he was prepared to trade Kaesong for a final demarcation line that would follow the actual line of contact as of the
effective date of an armistice.\textsuperscript{19} With Lovett and Truman both preferring the JCS position of 6 November, Ridgway was instructed to press for early settlement of agenda item 2 on the basis of the current line of contact, but with the understanding that such agreement would remain valid only for a specific time, possibly 30 days, while negotiations continued on the remaining agenda items.\textsuperscript{20}

Despite misgivings, the UNC negotiators at a plenary session on 27 November ratified agreement on item 2. Both sides accepted the principle that the military line of contact would become the demarcation line and that the current line would become final without any change if they signed an armistice within 30 days.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Ground Operations}

Once the two sides decided to begin negotiating, the nature of further military operations in Korea became more uncertain. When Lovett asked about the possible use of atomic weapons in Korea, the Joint Chiefs thought that they should be considered only in the event of a military disaster, and Ridgway was so notified in August 1951. Meanwhile, Ridgway and Van Fleet decided against any attempt at large-scale offensive ground action. To cut down on any enemy buildup and to keep him off balance as well as to maintain Eighth Army’s fighting edge, they agreed early in July that Eighth Army should undertake a series of small-scale operations to straighten the Kansas–Wyoming line. They eliminated Kaesong as a target because it was still the armistice conference site.\textsuperscript{22}

In late July Van Fleet decided to move against an area in the Taebaek mountains where North Koreans in control of the hills around a circular valley area known as the “Punchbowl” were harassing UNC forces. The summer campaign began on 18 August and was marked by heavy fighting; it was 5 September before Eighth Army took the aptly named Bloody Ridge, somewhat southwest of the Punchbowl, and completed the operation. Three days later Van Fleet moved out again, attacking three nearby peaks, later poignantly dubbed Heartbreak Ridge, which his forces took on 13 October. The operations cost approximately 6,400 UNC casualties, including many South Koreans and a number in the French component, and inflicted an estimated 40,000 North Korean casualties. These operations removed the sag in the Punchbowl area and shortened the eastern segment of the Eighth Army line across Korea.\textsuperscript{23}

Between 3 and 23 October Van Fleet’s troops mounted three attacks against the Chinese in the west, actions in which the South Koreans made an
excellent showing. When the assault ended on 23 October UNC casualties numbered about 8,500, with enemy losses estimated at over 51,000. Truman’s concern that the operation had created a bulge in the UNC line across Korea was allayed by Lovett’s assurance that the danger was not great.24

When the armistice talks resumed at Panmunjom on 25 October 1951, only two days after the end of Van Fleet’s costly line-straightening operations, Ridgway preferred not to proceed with further planned offensive operations. On 12 November he directed Van Fleet to assume an “active defense” posture and to limit action to the taking of defensive terrain and outpost positions, using not more than one division. In November the major Eighth Army operation was a 2-day attack to move forward 2 miles on a 7-mile front.25 The 27 November 1951 agreement on the demarcation line was then immediately and almost universally perceived as a de facto cease-fire. Indeed, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden asked Lovett in Rome whether an armistice had been achieved.26

Casualties became an important public issue in late November, for in the 4½ months since the start of the armistice talks the UNC suffered almost 60,000 killed, wounded, or missing, including more than 22,000 Americans. Whatever the validity of the UNC claim that the enemy lost almost four times that number—some 234,000—in the same period, the American people were in no mood to accept more casualties. Even before the armistice talks began, the public desire for peace had fostered the hope and belief that the war was almost over. There was no real taste for fighting for hills that would probably revert to the enemy after the armistice was signed.27

After U.S. press accounts in late November stated that UNC troops had been ordered not to fire except in self-defense, the president denied the story, but the truth was more complex. Van Fleet had issued instructions to ensure that every soldier understood that fighting would continue until the final armistice was signed. But he had also directed Eighth Army, while preparing for combat in the event of “unduly prolonged” negotiations, to reduce operations to the minimum needed to maintain its current position and to avoid unnecessary casualties. Ridgway felt that Van Fleet had exceeded his authority; still he pointed out to the JCS on 30 November that casualties “could scarcely be . . . justified” because the demarcation line agreement stipulated that any additional ground taken in the 30-day grace period would be relinquished.28 Meanwhile the Chinese and North Koreans used the grace period to fortify their lines with underground bunkers and intricate fortifications. By the beginning of 1952 it was clear that any further UNC ground action would entail heavy costs.29

Beyond ordering the South Koreans to stamp out guerrilla activity in the rear lines, Van Fleet planned no major offensive action in January 1952. In
February Ridgway vetoed plans for limited operations as too costly, and in March he permitted offensive action only as necessary for reconnaissance and counteroffensive measures. After Van Fleet got qualified approval for a limited attack in April, he postponed it indefinitely. Introduction of a liberal policy of troop rotation improved Eighth Army morale, but unit effectiveness dropped because of the replacement of battle-wise troops with inexperienced soldiers.\textsuperscript{50}

Both UNC and Communist battle losses decreased but did not disappear. UNC casualties, which had reached 20,000 in October 1951, dropped to 11,000 in November, 3,000 in December and again in January, and below 2,500 per month from February through April 1952. Enemy losses, probably always overestimated, were placed at 80,000 in October 1951 and 50,000 in November, 20,000 a month in December and January, and in a range of 11,000 to 13,000 a month from February through April 1952.\textsuperscript{51}

During the same period UNC strength increased marginally to more than 637,000, despite a slight decrease in U.S. forces. The increase came from the addition of almost 60,000 South Korean troops and an increase in the small Allied contribution. Estimated Chinese strength rose from 377,000 on 1 November 1951 to 642,000 by January 1952; North Korean strength apparently remained fixed at about 225,000. By the end of April 1952 the enemy had available 82 divisions, well equipped with armor, artillery, and ammunition, and much improved in combat efficiency.\textsuperscript{52} Nonetheless, Ridgway doubted that they would attack. Their forces were defensively deployed, they had spent the winter building defensive installations, and there were no prisoner reports of an impending attack. Still, at an NSC meeting in April, when the president inquired about the possibility of an extended offensive, General Bradley agreed it was important to take into account the growing enemy capability to launch a new ground threat.\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{A Challenge to Air Superiority}

From the time the Chinese entered Korea in late 1950, they operated their aircraft back and forth across the Yalu River, while the UNC prohibited its planes from following them across the river boundary, thus granting the enemy a sanctuary. With a rapid buildup of Chinese air strength in the early spring of 1951 and increasing enemy air activity, both Marshall and the Joint Chiefs wanted to authorize "hot pursuit," which would have allowed UNC planes to follow attacking enemy aircraft "across the Yalu for a prescribed and limited distance." When Acheson pressed the Allied governments for support, however, they refused. The United States dropped the matter for the moment.
but maintained that in the event of a massive enemy air assault it would take whatever action was necessary to safeguard UNC troops. The JCS drafted an order for UNC air retaliation beyond Korea in the event of a large-scale enemy air attack launched from outside Korea. The president approved the order, but the JCS did not send it to MacArthur; they sent it to Ridgway shortly after he assumed command.34

On 19 April, the day MacArthur returned to Washington and addressed Congress, Air Force Secretary Finletter, a strong advocate of air power, brought the problem of the enemy's continuing buildup before Lovett and the Army and Navy secretaries. Air intelligence estimated that with the addition of 300 to 400 Russian planes the Chinese air force had increased to a total of 700 to 800 aircraft, including 250 jet-propelled Russian MIGs. In addition, the Soviets had about 3,700 planes in the vicinity of the Korean border. Against this array the UNC could count on 1,185 planes, including Navy and Marine air. Finletter thought that U.S. planes were superior to and better handled than the enemy's and could contain a surprise Chinese air attack. But he believed that U.S. air would suffer serious damage in such an engagement and not be able to prevent later Chinese air attacks; if the Chinese augmented their air force, the danger would increase.35

Although Finletter agreed to obtain Allied concurrence before retaliation against enemy air bases, he wanted the United States to reserve its freedom of action and questioned the reactive nature of U.S. policy. He argued that the American people thought UNC air control in Korea "almost complete" and that they should be informed of the current danger and of plans to retaliate only after an enemy attack. The Army and Navy secretaries sided with Finletter, but the Joint Chiefs were divided, and Bradley agreed with Collins that the "proper committee of Congress" should be informed first.36 Marshall drew up a draft of a public statement that, if mass enemy air attacks occurred, the United States would be "forced to take immediate action to protect our forces," including hot pursuit and destruction of the enemy's air bases, planes, and supporting facilities. State reacted negatively and drafted a paper that merely indicated the possible necessity of countermeasures. The administration took no action.37

In May Ridgway requested 10 more U.S. air groups, and in mid-June he asked Finletter to support this request and another one for additional antiaircraft battalions, radar equipment, and airfield construction funds.38 Writing Marshall on 19 June, Finletter claimed that the Chinese currently had 1,000 aircraft, of which some 400 were jets, including the advanced MIG-15s.

* See Chapter V.
† For the budgetary fight to increase air strength at this time, see Chapter XIV.
Although the UNC now had 1,418 planes, Finletter wanted to get more tactical aircraft to Ridgway, if necessary diverting them from NATO or other military assistance countries. He asked Marshall to discuss with Acheson the possibility of a public statement, or to allow Air Force officials to do so. Three days later Finletter sent Marshall a Far East Air Forces (FEAF) estimate that the Chinese air force would be quantitatively equal to the UN force by 1 December 1951 and equal in combat effectiveness by 1 April 1952 unless FEAF were augmented. But with the agreement in July 1951 to hold armistice talks, Finletter’s idea of a public statement and ultimatum seemed untimely.

At the start of cease-fire negotiations in Korea, Ridgway expanded UNC air operations in order to hold down an enemy buildup. Noting considerable activity around the North Korean capital of P’yongyang, he proposed on 21 July to mount an all-out air strike against military targets in that city after first warning the inhabitants. Lovett and Bradley both opposed the attack, and Truman agreed it should be postponed. When Ridgway protested, the president approved the strike, specifying no advance warning and no unusual publicity. The 30 July air attack on P’yongyang did not produce the major results that Ridgway had hoped for, and he raised the possibility of bombing Rashin, a principal enemy supply base. The Joint Chiefs persuaded Marshall that visual bombing would preclude violation of the international borders, and the president gave the go-ahead. On 25 August, 35 B-29 bombers struck Rashin in a highly successful attack. By the end of August Ridgway felt that, rather than additional ground forces, he needed at least one more F-86 wing and one more B-29 wing.

Eager to augment Ridgway’s air power, Lovett asked Finletter in October whether additional B-26 bombers (an old plane out of production, the B-26 was still useful in interdiction work in Korea) could be sent to the Far East. Finletter replied that plans to increase the number of B-26s in the Far East from 140 to 216 could not take place until the following summer because of parts shortages. Meanwhile, the B-29 bombers, carrying the burden of the interdiction work, were too slow for their jet fighter escorts and were experiencing heavy losses from the enemy’s jet planes. By the fall of 1951 it was clear that the enemy’s MIG-15 was superior to all U.S. planes but the F-86 Sabrejet, a day interceptor that approached the MIG-15 in performance but was inferior to the Soviet plane in rate of climb and combat ceiling and had only limited utility in bad weather or at night. However, the F-94 Starfire interceptor fighter overcame the last two difficulties.

Faced with the need for more air units for Korea and a shortage of trained F-86 crews, Finletter was unwilling to solve the problem by sending combat-weary pilots back to Korea. In late December he recommended to Lovett that they send an all-weather F-94 wing from the Air Defense Command.
Moreover, he suggested withholding 75 F–86 aircraft from the United Kingdom and another 75 from Canada for shipment to Korea. Finally, to augment the three B–29 wings in the Far East and the two wings currently on alert for movement to that area, Finletter proposed sending still another B–29 wing, even though the transfer would interfere with Strategic Air Command training.\(^{14}\)

In discussions with Pace and Kimball on 10 January 1952, Finletter stated his belief that Lovett and the service secretaries would all be vulnerable if armistice negotiations failed and UNC forces did not have the shield of additional air power.\(^{15}\) On 6 February the Joint Chiefs notified Lovett that one war-strength F–94 squadron would be sent to Korea that month and 60 F–86 planes would be purchased from Canada at the rate of 10 per month. With these and 12 more F–86s per month from U.S. production, the Joint Chiefs expected that by June the Far East Command would have two full-strength F–86 wings backed by a 50-percent war reserve. They viewed the two wings of B–29s already alerted for Korea as sufficient augmentation. Since these arrangements constituted what was currently practicable, Lovett had to be satisfied.\(^{16}\)

By the spring of 1952, Finletter estimated Chinese air strength at approximately 1,700 planes, including 900 jets, mainly MIG–15s—"a serious threat." The F–86 was proving more than a match for the MIG–15, with only 23 F–86 planes lost through January 1952 compared with 166 MIG–15s claimed. Overall, the score was less favorable, with U.S. losses of 402 planes compared with the enemy's 349. Part of this disparity derived from the enemy's unwillingness or inability to use planes for interdictory operations or close support of ground troops; the United States had lost 296 aircraft in interdiction operations and 65 in close support. While enemy air power posed a potential threat, Finletter could still claim unchallenged UNC control of the air over the battlefield.\(^{17}\)

Review of U.S. Options in Korea

In this context of continuing disarray in the armistice talks, persisting battle casualties, and the growth of enemy air capability, the administration undertook to review again U.S. policy for Korea. On 13 July 1951, only three days after the cease-fire talks started, the Joint Chiefs wrote Marshall that they thought it would be "necessary to increase military pressure on the enemy" if the talks should fail, but they did not want to involve the United States in a general war with Communist China. They recommended the nation should increase the scale of operations in Korea: support covert operations against
China and Korea; expedite Japanese defense preparations; and press U.S. allies to support such steps as political and economic pressure on China, additional forces for Korea, and a naval blockade of mainland China. They thought Ridgway should not only increase the scale of military operations but be allowed to advance at least to the neck of the North Korean peninsula. Air attacks should be permitted against all North Korean targets, including Rashin and the Yalu River installations, and hot pursuit of hostile aircraft should be allowed, "to include destruction of enemy planes after landing, and neutralization of opposing antiaircraft fire."  

Refraining from comment, Marshall on 18 July sent the JCS memorandum to Truman, who in turn discussed it with Marshall and Acheson. If an armistice came in Korea, State believed it should be followed by political discussions leading to a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem on the basis of the UN goal of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, but without involving other Far Eastern questions.  

With minor reservations, the JCS, the secretaries of the military departments, and Marshall accepted this position.  

The Joint Chiefs rejected State’s position that if the armistice talks in Korea did not succeed, any ensuing U.S. military and political actions should be related to possible enemy moves. They considered this position as "not only unsound but so dangerous militarily as possibly to jeopardize the security of the United Nations forces in Korea": it would limit Ridgway’s freedom of action and greatly increase the risks because of delays inherent in the many consultations State anticipated having with Allied nations. Rather, the Joint Chiefs wanted the measures advocated in their 13 July memorandum initiated without delay. The service secretaries supported the JCS position. Writing Acheson on 4 September, Marshall agreed with all the earlier JCS recommendations except hot pursuit. Because of its far-reaching implications and the need for further refinement and clarification before adoption of such a policy, Marshall reserved his own position and sent the JCS views on hot pursuit to the NSC for consideration.  

With State and Defense unable to agree on what to do if the armistice talks failed, more questions surfaced and positions shifted within the Pentagon. Some OSD officials worried that the JCS proposals had not taken account of U.S. objectives, particularly in view of the potential heavy casualties that might ensue, and feared that "violent American [domestic] reactions" might follow any breakdown in the cease-fire talks. Some Defense officials thought that overall policy, not just the matter of hot pursuit, should be reviewed in the National Security Council. On 13 September Lovett told Acheson that he felt the entire issue required further study. The secretaries of the military departments jointly wrote Lovett on 25 September that they now disagreed with the JCS recommendation to increase the scale of ground operations,
Johnson swears in James H. Burns as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, December 1949. Witnesses are Frank Pace and Stephen Early.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff—Generals Bradley, Vandenberg, and Collins and Admiral Sherman, 1950.
President Truman, Vannevar Bush, and Louis Johnson, 19 May 1950.

Assistant Secretaries of Defense Marx Leva and Wilfred J. McNeil on 12 September 1950, first anniversary of their swearing-in.
Meeting of the UN Security Council on 27 June 1950.

Lovett, French General de Lattre de Tassigny, and Marshall, September 1951.
Amphibious craft at Inch'on.

U.S. Army gun crew in action in Korea, July 1950.
Troops of the 7th Division advance toward 38th parallel, April 1951.

Korean refugees flee southward from 38th parallel, April 1951.
USS Valley Forge operating off Korea, July 1950.

F-86 Sabrejets on patrol duty over "MIG Alley" in northwest Korea.

The Dai Ichi building, Tokyo, Headquarters, Far East Command.
F-84 Thunderjets over North Korea.

Air Force evacuation plane takes off with wounded as Army mobile gun stands guard.
U.S. Army tanks in P'yongyang, North Korea.

Battleship *Missouri* in action against Chong Jim, North Korea, 21 October 1950.
Infantrymen of the 5th Regimental Combat Team move up for attack on Chuk-Chon mountain, Korea, August 1950.

U.S. Navy underwater demolition team at Wonsan, North Korea, October 1950.
Defiant Chinese Communist prisoners strip and discard clothing.

Troops of 25th Infantry Division firing on enemy positions three miles south of 38th parallel, March 1951.
General Mark W. Clark and North Korean General Nam Il sign armistice agreement, 23 July 1953.

President Syngman Rhee of South Korea with Generals Partridge, Van Fleet, and Ridgway.
provided the enemy made no military move after termination of negotiations. But they advocated getting prior Allied agreement for hot pursuit and asked for study of the possible use of tactical atomic weapons against suitable North Korean targets.  

By the end of September 1951 the enemy air buildup had convinced both Ridgway and Lt. Gen. Otto P. Weyland, commanding general of FEAF, that hot pursuit was undesirable under any conditions; Bradley labeled it "rushing into a hornets' nest." Later, the Joint Chiefs deleted hot pursuit from their 13 July recommendations. They thought, however, that it might become necessary to use U.S. air forces to attack certain Chinese air bases if enemy air activity seriously jeopardized U.S. forces in Korea. The JCS still thought that if the armistice talks failed, Ridgway should be given considerable latitude in his operations—allowed to increase ground pressure and no longer restricted to the neck of the North Korean peninsula. They did not mention use of atomic weapons.

Aware that their recommended measures would probably enable Ridgway to maintain pressure but not to take decisive action, the Joint Chiefs warned Lovett that additional U.S. forces would probably be required should the talks at Panmunjom fail. They asked for NSC determination of U.S. objectives in Korea in the event of no armistice. On 9 November Acting Secretary of Defense William C. Foster sent their memorandum, with his concurrence, to the NSC, where, in connection with an already initiated study, it became part of the NSC 118 series.

Finletter and the Army and Navy secretaries reviewed a draft NSC paper, and on 10 December Pentagon officials met with the president. Still dissatisfied after the meeting, Finletter wrote Lovett that although the United States had decided to make every possible concession to get a cease-fire, an armistice would actually worsen its military position. If foreign combatants remained in Korea, the Chinese could easily build up their strength; if foreign troops withdrew, the Chinese could reenter from Manchuria at any time, while it would be very hard to put UNC forces back in Korea. In addition to other measures, Finletter warned that special air actions and use of the A-bomb would have to be considered. The National Security Council was already addressing these issues.

On 11 December Lovett called for the views of the JCS and the service secretaries on the current NSC draft report of NSC 118/1, which expressed the goals of U.S. policy in Korea in much the same way as NSC 48/5. Ultimately, according to the draft report, the United States was to seek, by political rather than military means, a united, independent, and democratic Korea. Currently, it was to try to reach a Korean settlement that would end the hostilities, establish South Korean authority below a northern boundary located gener-
ally not south of the 38th parallel, provide for the staged withdrawal of non-Korean forces from Korea, and permit a South Korean military buildup sufficient to "deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression." The United States should avoid any extension of the conflict into general war with the Soviet Union or China, and continue military action until an armistice was signed.

If the armistice negotiations succeeded, NSC 118/1 recommended that the United States try to establish a UN commission to negotiate a political settlement; maintain existing economic and political sanctions against China; urge UN countries to keep their forces in Korea as long as required; and train and equip South Korean forces to assume increasing defense responsibilities. The UN nations fighting in Korea should also warn the Chinese and North Koreans that "military action without geographic limitation" would result if they renewed the aggression.

If the armistice talks clearly failed, NSC 118/1 called for expanding the U.S. mobilization effort, enlarging the scale of Korean military operations, removing all restrictions against advances or attacks in Korea except for areas within approximately 12 miles of the USSR borders, and allowing U.S. air attacks on air bases in China if specifically authorized by the president. Unresolved disagreement between State and Defense led to the inclusion of two versions of another measure: State called for joint enforcement of a complete trade embargo against China; Defense, for a naval blockade of China or, failing that, joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all shipments to China.57

When the NSC discussed the paper on 19 December, the major point of contention concerned the Allied warning about breaking the armistice. NSC 118/1 argued that if necessary the United States should act unilaterally to make it clear that future aggression in Korea would be punished by military actions "not necessarily . . . limited in geographic scope or in methods of warfare employed."58 Acheson felt the language inappropriate for a public warning, and he opposed a unilateral U.S. warning. The Joint Chiefs also disliked the statement's implied threat to the Soviets and its "too rigid commitment of future U.S. action under unknown circumstances." As a result, the NSC significantly altered the sentence by removing its last phrase concerning methods. Even so, the statement was not meant to control the language of a future warning.59

Acheson thought that Ridgway should consult Washington before increasing the scale of operations or beginning any major ground advance in Korea and that the State Department should have an opportunity, time permitting, to inform key allies before any unilateral U.S. air attacks on Chinese air bases. Lovett did not object. As for a possible embargo or blockade of China, Lovett
told the NSC that the Joint Chiefs and service secretaries both preferred a blockade, but when he suggested studying the probable effectiveness of a trade embargo versus a blockade, Acheson declared that the real problem was British opposition to a blockade. The revised draft carried both the State and Defense versions.\(^6\)

The NSC did not debate two further provisions. In case the enemy indefinitely delayed the armistice talks while building up militarily, the United States was to increase political and economic pressures gradually and execute measures planned in the event of a clear failure of negotiations. Whether or not there was an armistice, NSC 118/1 continued the standing instructions to Ridgway for use in the event of massive enemy air attacks against the UNC in Korea. If Soviet “volunteers” entered Korea in sufficient numbers to threaten UNC safety, the United States was immediately to consider withdrawing its forces from Korea and placing itself in the best possible posture for general war.\(^6\)

Truman approved the revised draft, NSC 118/2, on 20 December. It remained in effect as a statement of policy throughout the remainder of the Korean conflict, a 19-month period of uncertainty as to whether there ever would be an armistice.\(^6\)

\textit{Item 5}

By the time Truman approved NSC 118/2, the 30-day period for completion of an armistice had almost expired. When the period lapsed on 27 December, the negotiators at Panmunjom had not completed agenda items 3, 4, and 5, and item 2, the military line of demarcation, remained subject to revision. With work on items 3 and 4 lagging, Joy proposed on 31 January 1952 that the delegations discuss agenda item 5, recommendations to the countries involved. The enemy delegation agreed, and the first meeting on this subject took place on 6 February.\(^6\)

In preparation, Ridgway had told Joy in early December 1951 that item 5 should be worded broadly, to the effect that the governments involved should consider calling a political conference. The Joint Chiefs instructed Ridgway on 24 December not to specify the form of discussion or the participants in the final statement of item 5.\(^6\) Korean political questions could be addressed through a UN commission composed of a number of interested countries rather than the belligerents alone. Ridgway could agree to naming North Korea and the PRC on the one side, with South Korea and the United Nations on the other, but Washington took the position that the Soviet Union should not be separately named since, as a UN member, it was already included. On
5 February 1952 the Joint Chiefs reminded Ridgway that the statement should suggest that governments deal with these matters at a higher-level political conference or by some other political means. On 6 February the Communist negotiators proposed holding a political conference within three months of an effective armistice—with North Korea and the PRC on the one side and the concerned UN countries on the other—to consider the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and other external matters related to peace in Korea. The proposal seemed very close to Ridgway's instructions, and he wanted to act quickly. On 9 February the UN negotiators submitted a statement that clearly limited any political conference to purely Korean issues. When Nam II objected repeatedly during the next week, however, the UN side prepared to drop this limitation. Then, before it could introduce a new proposal, the enemy delegation on 16 February offered a political conference that would settle the questions of foreign forces' withdrawal and "the Korean question, etc." The new enemy statement met Washington's needs. The next day the UN negotiators formally accepted the Communist proposal, with the understanding that the recommendation would be sent to the United Nations as well as South Korea, that foreign forces were non-Korean forces, and that the "etc." did not refer to any non-Korean matters. Essentially completed between 6 and 17 February, the resolution of item 5 was the brightest spot in the armistice negotiations. Now the negotiators had to turn back to the difficulties of item 3.

**Item 3: Concrete Arrangements**

With the 27 November 1951 agreement on the military demarcation line, talks had begun immediately on item 3, arrangements for carrying out the armistice. Although Ridgway wanted detailed and firm instructions and deplored the UN practice of granting concessions during the talks, which he felt led to enemy pressure for further concessions, he found it difficult to get final orders. When Lovett, like Acheson, thought it would be hard, if not impossible, to negotiate at Panmunjom sufficiently ironclad terms to police a Korean armistice. Aerial observation or the free movement of observer teams would be necessary to safeguard UNC troops from an enemy buildup, but it was unlikely the Communists would accept such arrangements. Furthermore, with major enemy bases located in Manchuria, Lovett thought the concept of full inspection in Korea might be meaningless. In his view, a public warning by
the Western powers might be a more effective deterrent to renewed aggression. A warning, however, required prior agreement on retaliatory steps. Meeting Anthony Eden in Rome on 27 November 1951, Lovett, Acheson, and Bradley found the British foreign minister sympathetic but wary of anything beyond bombing Communist airfields above the Yalu. When Bradley said Ridgway needed some form of security against the Communists, such as a blockade, Eden said he would have to check with his government. 70

At Panmunjom on 27 November, Nam II proposed that both sides stop fighting the day the armistice was signed and withdraw from the demilitarized zone within 3 days and from the rear of the other side to their own side of the demarcation line within 5 days. No armed forces should enter the demilitarized zone or attack it. Finally, both sides should name an equal number of representatives to form a joint commission to make specific armistice arrangements and oversee implementation. Struck by Nam II's failure to mention inspection, the UN negotiators countered with a plan calling for a cease-fire within 24 hours of the armistice, creation of an equally and jointly manned commission to carry out the armistice terms, and a demilitarized zone with no armed forces except as specifically and mutually agreed, with governance by the two military commanders according to the military armistice agreement. The enemy accepted these points the next day. But the UN plan also proposed that there be no increase in military forces, supplies, equipment, or facilities by either side; free access throughout Korea for the military armistice commission and its joint observation teams; and a withdrawal of each side's armed forces "from the territory controlled by the other side." 71

Nam II argued at subsequent meetings that it was unnecessary to specifically prohibit increases in military personnel or materiel or to claim free access throughout Korea for observers, since the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea would obviate any need to worry about these particulars. In any event, he declared, the UN principles exceeded the scope of the military armistice talks and showed the need for a higher level conference. He asked for clarification of the last point, the withdrawal of each side's armed forces from the other's territory. The suggested UNC phrasing was intended to allow UNC retention of certain islands off the coast of North Korea during an armistice period. If the Communists agreed to this point, UNC negotiators could agree with all of their proposals for item 3 insofar as they went. But the UNC representatives claimed that the heart of item 3 was the principle of joint inspection, which meant joint observation teams located at ports, airfields, and key points throughout Korea and joint aerial observation of Korea. 72

On 3 December Nam II proposed that neither side bring into Korea any military forces, weapons, or ammunition "under any pretext." Since the Communists excluded any rotation whatsoever of troops or replenishment of
supplies and equipment, the measure would effectively end the UNC presence in Korea. Nam II also proposed, as Ridgway summarized it, formation of a neutral nations supervisory body to conduct "necessary inspection, beyond the demilitarized zone, of such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides, and to report to the Joint Armistice Commission the result of the inspection." Although Nam said that this proposal incorporated the reasonable portions of the UN principle and had to be taken as a whole, it evoked many UN questions, particularly whether the Communists meant for the supervisory body to be independent of the proposed military armistice commission.

Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs found the Communist proposals promising and told Ridgway on 5 December to "prevent any regression." They doubted that even enemy acceptance of the UN proposals would ensure UNC safety if the Communists later breached the armistice, and they explained that the outcome of Lovett’s and Acheson’s discussions in Rome could make a difference. The JCS might still reconsider item 3: therefore Ridgway was not to take any irrevocable position.

By 7 December four basic issues under item 3 remained to be resolved—personnel levels and equipment stocks, offshore islands, the neutral nations’ supervisory body, and rehabilitation of facilities. On these issues, Lovett and the JCS agreed with Acheson that Ridgway would have to be considerably more flexible. Rotation of personnel was nonnegotiable, but Ridgway could as a last resort concede control of the offshore islands and accept mutually agreed neutral observer teams provided they were responsible to the military armistice commission. Lovett was also willing to concede rehabilitation of Korean facilities except for airfields and even that could be referred to Washington if it became the final obstacle to an agreement. The Joint Chiefs formally instructed Ridgway on 10 December.

Ridgway viewed the airfields issue as the key question. On 18 December he asked for final positions that the UN negotiators could announce at times of Ridgway’s choosing. He advised against extension of the pending 30-day time limit. The Joint Chiefs pointed out that a prolonged armistice would require terms that could be enforced over the years and that the chief deterrent to renewed aggression would be an Allied warning of retribution against China. Ridgway was not to announce any position as final and should agree to a 15-day extension of the 30-day time limit. He was to remain firm on rotation for as many personnel as he needed and on the location of neutral observer teams and their relationship to a military armistice commission. He could yield on the effective date of the armistice, aerial observation, and replenishment of military equipment and supplies except combat aircraft. At his
discretion, he could accept the rehabilitation of a number of airfields; no fields, old or new, should be permitted to accommodate jet aircraft. 77

Before the end of December Joy reported that he had reached the authorized final position and would take a firm stand. In early January 1952, Ridgway informed Washington that, if the enemy was allowed to reinforce his air strength in North Korea while UNC air strength could not be effectively increased and atomic weapons were not authorized, the UNC could not successfully retaliate against any post-armistice attack and the planned Allied warning would have little meaning. 78

When Winston Churchill, once again prime minister, visited Washington for talks in January 1952, discussion centered on the retaliatory steps that might be taken if the enemy later breached an armistice. Lovett explained that the United States would limit any retaliatory bombing to transportation and air concentrations, and Bradley said there was no plan to use the atomic bomb, particularly since there were no suitable targets in Korea, but both men still thought there would have to be a blockade of the China coast. Although the talks ended without any consensus on the precise retaliatory means to be used, the Americans apparently felt there was sufficient agreement to permit Ridgway to omit from the armistice terms the prohibition on airfield construction or rehabilitation if that became the last impediment to peace. Meanwhile, he should try to settle all other outstanding issues. 79 On 25 January the Communist negotiators accepted a UNC proposal to omit the reference to airfields; later they conceded UN retention of five additional islands, leaving troop rotation as the major issue. 80

By the end of February the UNC had dropped its demand for rotation from 75,000 to 35,000 men per month, while the Communist negotiators had finally raised the number to 30,000. They would consent to 35,000 only if the UN side accepted 5 ports of entry per side rather than the 12 it wanted. At the same time the enemy delegates made additional demands: acceptance of the Soviet Union as a member of the neutral nations commission, extension of the armistice terms to areas beyond the Korean peninsula, and permission for neutral observers to inspect UNC military equipment and weapons without restriction. They also refused to report the location of their major forces to the military armistice commission or to guarantee not to redeploy such forces to increase their offensive capability. Believing that the enemy thought they could afford to talk indefinitely, Lovett told Truman early in March 1952 that there was no way to tell whether the talks would succeed. 81

In mid-March the UN negotiators agreed to accept the Communist positions on ports of entry and on notification and redeployment of military forces if they in turn would agree to gather no military intelligence during inspection and to limit the armistice to the Korean peninsula. Other than the
airfields question, only the matter of the Soviet Union’s nomination as a neutral nation remained unresolved. On 19 April the two sides finally agreed to send item 3 back to a staff officers group. But this time the issue was joined with the discussions on prisoners of war under item 4. On 28 April Joy offered to concede the airfields issue if the Communists agreed, first, not to demand that the Soviet Union be on the neutral nations’ supervisory commission under item 3 and, second, to accept the UN position on the prisoners of war under item 4. On 2 May Nam II accepted the offer provided there could be a “reasonable compromise” on the prisoners of war. With item 3 no longer a major point of contention in the armistice talks, everything now depended on the prisoner of war negotiations.
CHAPTER VII

The Prisoners of War

By the time the UNC negotiators offered the package deal on 28 April 1952 to complete the Korean armistice, the prisoner of war issue had become a critical element in the negotiations. Both sides had captured and held great numbers of prisoners. The enemy reported capturing more than 65,000 UNC and South Korean soldiers in the first nine months of the war, and UNC camps held approximately 137,000 enemy prisoners by January 1951. The variety of backgrounds and the diverse political views held by the captives in the UNC camps created complications. Some of the prisoners thought to be North Korean soldiers or guerrilla infiltraters turned out to be captured South Korean troops who had been impressed as “volunteers” into the North Korean armies, while others were South Korean civilians caught in roundup operations. Moreover, each group in the UNC camps included pro- and anti-Communist prisoners. After the Chinese Communists entered the war, the UNC discovered that it held a diverse ideological mix of Chinese prisoners—Communists, non-Communists, and even former Chinese Nationalist soldiers.

The Major Issue—Repatriation

It was inevitable that repatriation would become the central issue when the negotiators at Panmunjom took up agenda item 4 on 11 December 1951. The Communists insisted on an all-for-all exchange in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which provided for the mandatory repatriation of prisoners of war. South Korea had signed the convention. The United States had not ratified the convention and North Korea was not a signatory, but both countries had pledged to observe its provisions pertaining to prisoners of war.
Within the administration achievement of a consensus on the matter of repatriation came only after prolonged discussion and debate over a period of more than six months in 1951 and 1952, involving State, Defense, Ridgway, and the president. The basic issue dividing State and Defense was forcible repatriation of prisoners, and both changed and refined their positions more than once. Early in the negotiations the JCS and the Army firmly supported voluntary repatriation although aware of some of the disadvantages. But the Defense view changed during the fall of 1951 to greater readiness to accept an all-for-all exchange if the Communists rejected the one-for-one proposal.

The Americans soon found themselves in an agonizing dilemma. Their overriding aim, especially in the view of Ridgway, his successor, General Mark W. Clark, and the UNC negotiators at Panmunjom, was to secure the return of all U.S. and ROK military and civilian prisoners held by the Communists. At the same time, they could not countenance returning to the enemy by force prisoners—North Korean, South Korean, and Chinese—who did not want to be returned to Communist control. Recalling World War II experience, *Truman and his advisers believed that application of the Geneva Convention principle of all-for-all exchange, as the Communists insisted, would mean condemning thousands of anti-Communist prisoners to imprisonment or death. On the other hand, insistence on a one-for-one exchange could mean a prolonged delay in any exchange, thereby affecting the lives of the U.S. and ROK prisoners.*

Ways of accomplishing the desired end were debated within Defense and among DoD, State, and the president. The president and the State Department considered it particularly important to retain the moral and material support of as many of the nations of the world as possible for U.S. war and peace efforts. Throughout this period and after, UN and Allied nations brought strong pressures to bear on the administration to take more accommodating positions in armistice negotiations and to end the war quickly—pressures that doubtless influenced the administration's deliberations on prisoner of war policy. No less important, changing circumstances in Korea, at the armistice talks, and in Washington greatly affected the attitudes among the American decisionmakers on this emotion-laden issue. Within Defense, in particular, most discussion participants changed positions at one time or another. It required many months of appraisal and reappraisal of all aspects of the issue before the JCS could inform Ridgway, himself given to doubts and equivocation, on the subject of the president's final word on prisoner exchange. And

* After World War II, in keeping with agreements with the Russians, the Western Allies forcibly returned large numbers of prisoners of war formerly held by the Germans to the Soviet Union, where many of them are believed to have been executed or imprisoned.
The Prisoners of War

this final statement could not be truly final; more than a year of exasperating and mutually recriminatory talks ensued before Panmunjom adjustments were made.

In preparation for the armistice talks, Truman on 30 June 1951 approved instructions to Ridgway to exchange prisoners on a one-for-one basis with minimum delay. Since such an exchange would have left many prisoners in UNC camps because of the disparity in numbers held by each side, the Joint Chiefs suggested to Marshall that prisoners not be repatriated unless they gave full consent. Acknowledging the arguments against voluntary repatriation—it was contrary to the Geneva Convention, might establish a poor precedent for future wars, would feed Communist propaganda, and might even create an excuse for breaking off the armistice talks—the Joint Chiefs nonetheless felt their modified approach to be justified. Beyond the humanitarian considerations, voluntary repatriation would confirm the UNC promises of safety and asylum, establish UN reliability and compassion, and enhance future U.S. psychological warfare effectiveness. Acheson argued with Marshall that the JCS proposal “might jeopardize the prompt return” of prisoners held by the Communists and that it conflicted with the Geneva Convention. To avoid injustice to certain classes of prisoners who were likely to be killed on their return to their homeland, Acheson proposed use of paroles and suggested that the two departments work out a solution. In the Pentagon, Lovett presumed that the one-for-one stance was a negotiating position and believed that an all-for-all exchange of prisoners would cost the United States very little militarily. He asked the Joint Chiefs on 25 September to think about the advisability of an overall exchange if the one-for-one approach failed. With Ridgway also in favor of an all-for-all exchange, the Joint Chiefs prepared a new draft directive in November.

Reviewing the new draft, State altered its position. Although the welfare and return of UNC soldiers from enemy camps remained the overriding consideration, State wanted to consider further whether to return UNC-held prisoners who had committed criminal acts before their capture. Because of a moral obligation to enemy soldiers who might be subject to reprisal on their return, Ridgway should seek to avoid the forcible return of such prisoners. State's concern reflected Truman’s own intense interest in the question. The president considered an all-for-all exchange basically unfair in view of the disparate numbers held by the two sides; and the idea of forcing prisoners to return to death or slave labor repelled him.

Meeting on 5 December, the Joint Chiefs and State officials hammered out their differences. The ensuing directive of 10 December in essence told Ridgway to defend vigorously a one-for-one exchange of prisoners as long as possible but, if necessary, to agree to an all-for-all exchange provided the
exchange procedure took into account the wishes of individual POWs. This odd position undoubtedly reflected the ambiguity in the minds of most of those involved in its formulation. The proposal was dependent on Communist submission of a list of their UNC and ROK prisoners “conforming satisfactorily to our best estimates of those they hold.”

At Panmunjom on 11 December the enemy negotiators proposed that each side release all its prisoners of war to the other side as soon as the armistice was signed. The UNC negotiators, on the other hand, asked for an immediate and full exchange of prisoner lists and “early regulated exchange of prisoners of war on a fair and equitable basis.” The JCS directed Ridgway to seek also the exchange of UN civilians and South Korean government personnel held in enemy camps. When Ridgway doubted his ability to exact these terms, the JCS told him to make a strong effort and authorized him to use his own formula of an all-for-all exchange based on a one-for-one exchange of UNC-held against enemy-held prisoners, to be followed by delivery of all additional UNC-held prisoners of war desiring repatriation.

On 18 December the enemy and UNC negotiators finally exchanged prisoner lists. The Communists claimed to hold only 11,559 prisoners of war—7,142 South Koreans, 3,198 Americans, and 1,219 other UNC soldiers. By comparison, UNC records showed 11,500 Americans missing in action, while the South Koreans claimed that the enemy held 88,000 of their troops and civilians. In October Ridgway had estimated a maximum return of 6,000 UN and 28,000 South Korean troops, plus some civilians. At Panmunjom, UNC representatives remonstrated that the lists released to them contained huge discrepancies and did not account for many Americans and South Koreans known to have been captured.

By the same token, the UNC list disappointed the Communists, since its total was lower than the UNC had previously reported to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. This discrepancy resulted from the removal of some 2,000 soldiers originally listed twice, the escape or disappearance of a number of enemy soldiers, and the discovery and subsequent reclassification as civilian internees of some 37,500 South Koreans impressed into the North Korean army. Compared with the Communist list, however, the UNC list was lengthy, containing the names of 95,531 North Koreans, 20,700 Chinese, and 16,243 impressed South Koreans retained in POW status—in all, more than 132,000 names.

With the UNC delegation inquiring about some 50,000 unlisted persons and the Communist delegation demanding explanations for a claimed shortage of some 44,000, further meetings failed to bridge the gap. The Communists denied the validity of the UNC recategorization of the South Koreans or of anything that in any way indicated a policy of voluntary repatriation.
Concerning the 50,000 unlisted South Korean troops, they reported that it was their "policy to educate POWs and release them directly at front," apparently straight into their own armies. A majority of the 50,000, they asserted, had been so released, while others had died in UNC raids or of illness or had deserted. They refused to allow Red Cross representatives to visit their camps or to agree to an early exchange of the seriously sick and wounded. The two sides spent Christmas 1951 fighting over numbers. After a long UNC discourse on the missing 50,000 UN and South Korean soldiers, the chief Communist delegate on agenda item 4 insultingly suggested there was no need to worry since "they must have gone home a long time ago. No small number of them must be fighting in your rear for liberation of South Korea."

Ridgway now prepared to use the compromise plan, basically an all-for-all exchange with no forced repatriation. When the Communists did not instantly reject the idea of exchanging civilians, Rear Adm. R.E. Libby, the senior UNC representative on the item 4 subdelegation, proposed on 2 January 1952 a prisoner exchange frankly based on voluntary repatriation. The fierce enemy reaction caused reevaluation of this proposal; clearly the Communists would not accept the voluntary concept. On 15 January the Joint Chiefs reminded Ridgway that it would be necessary to inform the president before breaking off the talks, and that it was possible the government's stand might be modified.

On 3 February the Communist negotiators offered a variation of an all-for-all exchange. Washington gave Ridgway permission to drop all demands for the return of enemy-held ROK civilians who had not lived south of the 38th parallel, and the enemy negotiators also made some concessions. But the UN negotiators did not depart from the principle of voluntary repatriation, even though they changed the term to a possibly more acceptable "no forced repatriation." Whatever the choice of words, however, free versus forcible repatriation remained the key issue separating the two sides.

State and Defense meanwhile reviewed the question. At a meeting on 1 February, Lovett and Acheson agreed to persist in the demand for no forcible repatriation, to develop a plan for releasing prisoners who would be endangered by repatriation, thus confronting the Communists with a fait accompli, and to send State–Defense recommendations to the president. Subsequently, Lovett expressed doubt about the positions taken, Admiral Fechteler withdrew his previous concurrence, and General Vandenberg firmly opposed the proposals.

At a second State–Defense meeting on 7 February, State maintained its opposition to forcible repatriation but thought Defense was showing a "clear disposition to agree to return all prisoners of war," including, if necessary, the reclassified South Koreans. In fact, however, Lovett, Foster, and Finletter
remained uncertain. Following the meeting, Acheson sent Lovett a State-
prepared draft of a joint memorandum for Truman declaring that the United
States would refuse to use force to return UNC-held prisoners of war whose
lives were likely to be seriously endangered by repatriation. The policy was to
be so implemented as to minimize jeopardy to either enemy-held UNC
prisoners or the armistice talks, and key allies were to be consulted. Lovett's
first reaction was noncommittal.18

Meeting with Truman and Acheson on 8 February, Lovett said that because
of continuing internal Defense differences over the policy he did not want to
sign the joint memorandum. He did not want to make such an important
decision without even knowing how many Chinese or North Koreans in UNC
camps would actually have to be returned forcibly. He asked "whether or not
the risk of loss of the three thousand U.S. POW's [in enemy camps] and the
possibility of a breakdown in the truce and a consequent enlargement of
conflict did not, in fact, carry with it a greater moral responsibility than any
we owed to Communist POW's who had been shooting at us only a short time
ago." Accepting Acheson's position against forcible repatriation as more
realistic than the earlier State stand of limiting repatriation to those who
accepted it voluntarily, Lovett also recognized that considerable flexibility
would be allowed in the procedures for carrying out the policy. He felt that
substantial agreement between State and Defense might yet be reached as more
evidence became available.19

After further discussions, Truman approved Acheson's position against
forcible repatriation, asserting that the United States would "have to accept
the risks." Hoping the number of prisoner refusals would be low, Truman
agreed to leave the method of separating them to the military. Lovett asked the
president not to take any final policy position until State consulted key allies,
and Acheson agreed to this. Finally, Truman told Lovett to direct Ridgway to
continue to oppose forcible repatriation and to take steps to "identify and
withdraw in some fashion" the POWs who would not return unless forced to
do so. Lovett told DoD officials that the president was intent on this course
and that it would take a strong case to change his mind.20

In a meeting later, Acheson agreed with Lovett that Truman wanted to
begin identifying and withdrawing prisoners but not to take an irrevocable
stand in doing so. From Tokyo, Ridgway had expressed his opposition to
cover screening, but if it had to be done he wanted to do it quickly and in
daylight, segregating those prisoners opposed to repatriation. He attacked the
idea of releasing prisoners unwilling to return as a subterfuge likely to destroy
all chance of getting back enemy-held UNC soldiers and perhaps even of
reaching an armistice. Although willing to trade off airfields for voluntary
repatriation, Ridgway saw no indication that the enemy would agree. Con-
vinced that negotiations would ultimately be broken off if the UN negotiators did not consent to forcible repatriation. Ridgway on 27 February 1952 urged that the authorities in Washington send him a "final position on the POW question now."

Meeting with Truman and State and Defense officials that day, Lovett finally assented to a policy of no forcible repatriation. A message drafted by State and approved by Lovett, Acheson, and Truman informed Ridgway that he already had his final position. The screening procedure could be done openly, and he was to remove from POW status but retain in UNC custody those prisoners who would resist returning to Communist control. After Ridgway prepared revised prisoner-of-war lists he should then inform the Communist negotiators of UN willingness to have an all-for-all exchange. These orders went forward despite the outbreak of violence in the UNC camps.

**Screening, Violence, and Propaganda**

In the early days of the Korean War, the UNC had kept its prisoners of war in stockades scattered throughout South Korea. After the Chinese became involved, the UNC moved the camps south and concentrated them around the port of Pusan. Since the camps were a security hazard, Ridgway removed most prisoners to the small island of Koje-do off the southern tip of Korea as soon as he stabilized the front in early 1951. Selected only because no better place could be found, Koje-do was a barren, mountainous 150 square miles, crowded with some 200,000 inhabitants and refugees and lacking suitable flat land or space for prisoner dispersal. The UNC originally built 32 compounds, each group of 8 surrounded by a barbed wire enclosure. By the fall of 1951 they held over 130,000 North Korean and 20,000 Chinese prisoners and were so overcrowded that there was little space between enclosures. Some 9,000 U.S. and South Korean troops, mostly the latter, many of poor caliber, served as guards.

With only limited UNC control over the compounds, Communist prisoner leaders took over, easily communicating with each other, establishing strict internal discipline, terrorizing non-Communist prisoners, holding trials, and meting out punishments including death. Nonetheless, despite sporadic violence in the fall of 1951, much of it the result of enmity between the North Korean prisoners and the South Korean guards, Ridgway thought the guards could manage. A first screening in late 1951 went forward without undue incident. In early 1952, however, massive resistance developed when Ridgway began a more thorough screening of the Koje-do prisoners. On 18 February more than a thousand prisoners armed with homemade weapons attacked
U.S. troops entering one compound. In the ensuing violence the toll was high: 1 U.S. soldier killed, 38 UNC soldiers wounded, 77 prisoners killed or mortally wounded, and 140 injured. Enemy negotiators at Panmunjom immediately denounced the "thorough fabrication of what you call 'voluntary repatriation'."21

In response the UNC moved some of the prisoners to two other islands, Pongam-do and Cheju-do, increased the guards at Koje-do, and installed a new commander, Brig. Gen. Francis T. Dodd. Unrest on Koje-do nonetheless escalated, and on 13 March South Korean guards responded to stones hurled by North Korean prisoners by firing without orders. Ten prisoners were killed outright and 28 were wounded, 2 of whom later died. The Communist negotiators formally protested the "barbarous massacre."22

Despite the heated Communist reaction, when talks returned to the staff level on 16 March, Ridgway found the enemy representatives willing to accept the principle of voluntary repatriation for a large number of their captives who had originally resided in South Korea. But they would not discuss Chinese prisoners held in UNC camps. They expected the return of around 132,000 prisoners in all.26 When a UNC officer unguardedly indicated that the total might be as high as 116,000, the Communists suggested an immediate screening, and UNC negotiators felt a cautious optimism.27

The UNC designed the rescreening that began on 8 April to encourage returns, but it soon became apparent that the results would not please the enemy negotiators. Of the 106,376 screened, only 31,231 (28,421 prisoners and 2,810 civilians) were willing to return voluntarily. Even by adding to the repatriation figure some 44,000 Koje-do prisoners who had refused to be screened and some 12,000 in the Pusan prison hospital who had not yet been interviewed, the UNC could not meet the Communists' expectation. Ridgway himself estimated that only 70,000 would want to return.28 When told the figures on 19 April, the enemy negotiators were unwilling to consider them. After they unilaterally ended the staff officer executive sessions on 25 April, Ridgway felt that negotiations were rapidly approaching a deadlock.29

In this context the UN representatives on 28 April proposed to combine all outstanding issues from agenda items 3 and 4, conceding the enemy demand for airfield rehabilitation in return for acceptance of the UN positions on the prisoner of war and on Soviet exclusion from the neutral nations' supervisory commission. As part of this "final and irrevocable effort," some 70,000 UNC-held prisoners of war would be exchanged for approximately 12,000 enemy-held prisoners. On 2 May the Communist negotiators offered to accept the proposal if the UNC would agree to exchange 132,000 for 12,000. On 7 May the two sides agreed to open plenary sessions at Panmunjom.
The Prisoners of War

Ridgway and Truman issued public statements in support of the UN package proposal, while Acheson and Lovett prepared to make comments to the press.\textsuperscript{30}

These plans came to an abrupt halt on 7 May when the unscreened prisoners in Koje-do compound 76 captured the UNC camp commander, General Dodd, tried him for his "crimes," and later pressured him to bargain the terms of his release with his successor, Brig. Gen. Charles F. Colson. Ridgway told Van Fleet to take "all necessary action" to free Dodd. To secure Dodd’s release on the evening of 10 May, Colson agreed to issue a statement made to order for enemy propaganda:\textsuperscript{41}

\ldots I do admit that there have been instances of bloodshed where many prisoners of war have been killed and wounded by UN forces. I can assure you that in the future the prisoners of war can expect humane treatment in this camp according to the principles of International Law. I will do all within my power to eliminate further violence and bloodshed.\textsuperscript{42}

General Mark W. Clark, who had arrived in the Far East on 7 May 1952 to replace the departing Ridgway,\textsuperscript{*} lost no time in denouncing the agreement, strengthening the garrison on Koje-do, and replacing Colson with Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner. Eventually Clark transferred responsibility for prisoners from Van Fleet to a new command, the Korean Communications Zone. Meanwhile Boatner moved civilians off Koje-do, reorganized the staff, rebuilt smaller and stronger compounds, and moved forcefully against prisoner defiance of authority. On 10 June UNC troops entered compound 76, which was openly preparing for battle, and cleaned it out after a 2 1/2-hour fight, transferring the prisoners to the smaller compounds. The casualties included 1 American speared to death and 14 hurt, 31 prisoners killed, and 139 wounded. After other compounds gave in without major resistance, searchers found large caches of homemade weapons. Although small-scale incidents continued, the camp was thereafter under better control and the screening could be completed.\textsuperscript{53}

The Koje-do incident damaged U.S. prestige throughout the world. At best, it indicated apparent carelessness and incompetence; at the worst, it seemed to confirm Communist charges of brutality in the prison camps. Indirectly, it seemed to reinforce earlier Communist charges of UNC use of germ warfare, made when Malik spoke at the United Nations of "toxic gases" fired from UNC guns. North Korean and Chinese radio broadcasts had claimed that the United States was firing artillery shells filled with bacterial agents and

\textsuperscript{*} Ridgway succeeded Eisenhower as NATO supreme allied commander in Europe.
dropping infected flies, snails, and rodents from planes. Ridgway called the charges “fallacious,” and Acheson termed them “entirely false.” Lovett advised Truman on 5 March 1952 that some counteraction was called for, since friendly sources saw the charges as having an impact even beyond China.34

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai warned on 8 March that U.S. pilots invading China with bacteriological weapons would be treated as war criminals. The Chinese claimed that the United States was spreading cholera, typhus, and bubonic plague by planes and testing germ warfare weapons on prisoners of war at Koje-do. The Chinese embassy in India mounted a major anti-American effort among scientists and intellectuals. Soviet newspapers also devoted much space to these themes, in an anti-American campaign that George Kennan, then U.S. ambassador in Moscow, termed unequaled in “viciousness, shamelessness, mendacity and intensity.” The North Koreans ignored a World Health Organization offer to help control plague, and both the North Koreans and the Chinese refused Red Cross offers to investigate their charges. Believing the Communist propaganda might be intended to justify such an attack on the United States or its allies, Finletter recommended to Lovett that the United States counter the enemy propaganda, continue its own biological and chemical warfare programs, and develop defensive measures.35

The issue came to a climax on 5 May when the enemy produced “confessions” by two captured U.S. fliers that they had dropped “germ bombs.” New charges of poison gas use soon followed. An indignant Lovett told the press on 16 May that the allegations were utterly false and that anyone who claimed UN or U.S. use of bacteriological warfare or poison gas “lies in his teeth.” The president also denied the charges. Ridgway, in Washington on his way to replace Eisenhower as NATO commander, reaffirmed to Congress that the UNC had never used germ or gas warfare. Anticipating a worldwide intensification of the propaganda campaign by the Communists in June, when Malik was slated to become chairman of the UN Security Council, the United States proposed a UN resolution calling for full investigation of the germ warfare charges by the International Committee of the Red Cross and by international scientists. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution.36

As Boatner moved to reassert control over the prisoner compounds on Koje-do in June, Communist propaganda began to switch from emphasis on germ warfare to the theme of UNC “atrocities” against the prisoners of war. The international reaction was severe. Without informing Acheson, Truman told Lovett on 11 June to invite representatives of five neutral nations to investigate the POW situation. Lovett immediately consulted the Department of State, which extended invitations to India, Indonesia, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Pakistan. Although Truman was anxious for a neutral nations' review, only Pakistan accepted, and the idea faded away.\textsuperscript{37}

Whatever else the effects of Communist propaganda, it made the lives of the UN negotiators miserable. When open sessions resumed at Panmunjom on 8 May, they became simply a propaganda forum. Admiral Joy cabled Clark that it would be far better to suspend negotiations than to continue meeting daily at the insistence of the enemy, and thus displaying UNC weakness.\textsuperscript{38} The Joint Chiefs rejected the notion, since events at Koje-do had “confused and unsettled public attitudes” and a unilateral breakoff might undermine domestic and international support for the American position. Leaving Korea on 22 May to take up new duties as superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, Joy once more recommended strongly to Clark suspension of the plenary sessions until the Communists accepted the U.S. position. Nonetheless, although U.S. public opinion was becoming impatient with the stalemate at Panmunjom, the State Department felt that Allied opinion in favor of continuing the talks had to be taken into account.\textsuperscript{39}

On 23 May, however, when Joy's successor, Maj. Gen. William K. Harrison, experienced the “bitter denunciation” of the Communist negotiators, he immediately proposed a four-day recess. Admitting that this action violated the “spirit or apparent intent” of Washington’s instructions, Clark defended it as necessary and desirable. Daily sessions resumed on 27 May despite Harrison’s opposition. On 31 May Clark reported that he and the UNC negotiators unanimously agreed that the “only hope for an armistice on present terms lies in convincing the Communists that our position is firm and final.” Reading the cables, Lovett realized that a decision would soon have to be made. But not yet. There were, in fact, some diplomatic indications that the Chinese might settle for 100,000 returnees. The Joint Chiefs cabled Clark on 5 June that Allied confidence in the UNC screening was so shaken by the Koje-do episode that he should not suspend the talks; Harrison could meet every three to four days instead of daily.\textsuperscript{40}

With Boatner in control on Koje-do, the UNC finished the prisoner screening on 27 June. The final figures showed that, of 169,944 enemy soldiers and civilians, 83,722, or not quite half, wanted to go home. This included almost two-thirds of the North Koreans but less than one-third of the Chinese soldiers. Although the number desiring repatriation was higher than the earlier 70,000 estimate, it remained to be seen whether it was high enough to satisfy the enemy. Several rechecks helped little, since the number of returnees dropped to 82,900, including only 6,400 Chinese. To avoid future problems over the South Korean civilian internees it held, the UNC released
nearly 27,000 of them beginning on 30 June. But as June ended Washington had not decided how or when to inform the enemy negotiators of the screening results.\footnote{1}

**Recessing the Negotiations**

Despite Harrison's belief in early July that some progress was being made, the enemy delegates indicated on 6 July that they expected the return of approximately 110,000 persons, including all of the 20,000 Chinese in UNC hands—a view that made the latest screening results potentially "explosive." On 11 July the Joint Chiefs told Clark he could give the enemy negotiators the round figure of 83,000 returnees, including 6,400 Chinese, and offer a post-armistice validation by an impartial agency.\footnote{2} A week later, enemy negotiators asserted that they expected the return of 116,000 prisoners, including all 20,000 Chinese. On 25 July they asked for open plenary sessions. UNC delegates agreed, but Washington wanted to avoid use of the meetings for abusive propaganda and gave Clark authorization to seek seven-day recesses. The delegates met only four times during August, but staff officers met daily and by 29 August had completed a 63-article armistice, all agreed to except for 2 articles relating to the repatriation of prisoners. Nonetheless, Lovett had little hope of an armistice, since, as he noted, the Communists could have had one at any time during the past year.\footnote{3}

Although the UNC negotiators officially adhered to the terms of the 28 April 1952 package deal, there were tremendous political pressures on the Truman administration to find an acceptable end to the unpopular war. Meeting jointly, State and Defense officials considered numerous alternatives. However, when State proposed in August that the president publicly offer an immediate armistice with the exchange of all prisoners desiring repatriation,\footnote{4} Clark objected that the enemy might counter with a percentage exchange that would leave many UNC soldiers in enemy camps.\footnote{5} He suggested offering various alternatives for solving the prisoner-of-war question and then recessing to allow time for analysis; if on reconvening the enemy rejected every proposal and offered none of his own, Harrison should be authorized to recess the talks indefinitely. At that point, Clark felt, the military aspects of negotiations would be substantially concluded, and the
question of peace in Korea might logically be removed from the UNC. At a meeting with JCS representatives on 2 September, State officials showed little enthusiasm for Clark’s plan.\(^4^5\)

The idea of a presidential statement was revived when President Miguel Aleman of Mexico suggested that each side return the prisoners desiring to go home and send the unrepatriated prisoners to UN countries agreeing to take them. State proposed to combine Aleman’s plan with a presidential proclamation asking for an immediate cease-fire, followed by specific proposals at Panmunjom offering a face-saving way to avoid the no forcible repatriation issue.\(^4^6\) Pentagon officials did not like the new approach, and Clark thought State’s plan would leave the prisoner issue basically unresolved while releasing the enemy from all military pressure.\(^4^7\)

When Acheson supported his department’s proposal and Lovett sided with other Defense officials against it, the issue became more acute. Lovett, Foster, and returned UN negotiator Admiral Libby visited the White House on 15 September. Libby bitterly told the president that in his seven months’ experience at Panmunjom he felt he was dealing with people with the “quality of talking animals” and that “equitable compromises or concessions were not to be expected.” Lovett added that Defense felt State’s suggestion was unwise and that they unanimously supported Clark’s position. Lovett felt strongly that a presidential proposal would be seen as weakness and fail to move the Communists. Truman said that he would not make such a proposal and that Harrison should be authorized to walk out at Panmunjom after making one more overture, with no further meeting until the Communists had made a constructive offer. He assured his visitors that pressure in Korea would have to be increased. The president also authorized the release of 11,000 more prisoners found to be South Koreans caught up in UNC dragnets, an action acceptable to both State and Defense. The meeting seemed to give Defense all it had asked.\(^4^8\)

The Joint Chiefs prepared a new draft directive for Clark, but State representatives, while agreeing to recess the talks indefinitely, refused to drop the idea of a presidential proposal. The Joint Chiefs asked Lovett to help, and on 17 September Lovett, Fechteler, and Libby met with the secretary of state. Acheson argued that a presidential initiative for a cease-fire would not breach the 28 April package proposal and would considerably enhance the U.S. position in the UN General Assembly; if the Communists refused, the UNC could resolve the question of the nonrepatriates by simply releasing them as political refugees. Lovett disagreed. He thought State’s proposal altered the package deal and that the U.S. position in the General Assembly was “perfectly sound without making such an offer.” If the Communists, still
facing UNC military force, would not accept the proposal on prisoners, Lovett warned that they “undoubtedly would never do so without military pressure.”

On 24 September Truman held a meeting in the White House to consider the problem. Acheson declared that State and Defense had no major differences on what to do next in Korea and that they agreed that the principle of no forcible prisoner return was inviolate. He thought it time for the UNC to reiterate its negotiating position in the armistice talks and to recess if the Communists proved obdurate. There probably would be adverse consequences. For one thing, the UN might want to establish a commission to handle the prisoner question. The United States would have to oppose this and work to maintain Allied support for its position. Furthermore, in the heat of the current U.S. presidential campaign, the administration could be subject to criticism for apparent indecision. U.S. policy, Acheson said, was to achieve an armistice on the terms already put forward; if an armistice came, “there will undoubtedly be strong pressure domestically to weaken our position in Korea while we are not certain there will be similar pressures on the Chinese Communists.” If there was no armistice, could the UNC “increase the pressure without unacceptable casualties?”

The president declared that he was not willing to do “anything in the world” to get an armistice; the purpose of an armistice was to get peace, but not if it left the Communists free to take over elsewhere. The Pentagon representatives defended the idea of making a final proposal, recessing indefinitely if the Communists would not accept, and increasing military pressure to induce acceptance. They pressed for an armistice that would finally resolve the prisoner of war issue and still protect UNC forces on the battle line.

The president made his decision. Harrison would make a final proposal, the enemy negotiators would have about 10 days to consider it, and the UNC would prepare to do what seemed necessary. At Acheson’s suggestion, nothing was to be said to imply an ultimatum. In answer to specific points, Truman confirmed that the question of repatriation was to be dealt with in the military armistice and not to be deferred to a political conference. Military pressure on the enemy was to begin immediately if they refused the package.

In accordance with new instructions and Truman’s personal message to Clark expressing the hope that the UN proposal would be “presented with the utmost firmness,” Harrison offered the final plan on 28 September. He suggested five different procedures for exchanging prisoners, each without resort to forcible repatriation and including verification of the individual prisoner’s intent. He then asked for a recess until 8 October to give the enemy
negotiators a chance to analyze the offer. Nam II found nothing new in the proposal but agreed to the recess, meanwhile urging the UNC delegates to reconsider.\textsuperscript{52}

On 8 October Nam II rejected the UNC proposal, saying it was “still run through by your unreasonable demand of forcible retention of war prisoners.” After a long statement, Harrison indicated that the UNC delegates would not come to the talks “merely to listen to abuse and false propaganda.” He was calling a recess, but not ending the negotiations. After nine months spent in futile negotiation of agenda item 4, the UNC negotiators would be willing to meet again whenever the Communists had a written proposal that could bring about an honorable armistice. Despite protests by the North Koreans and Chinese, Washington held firm. Although the words “indefinite recess” were never officially used at Panmunjom, the 8 October meeting was the last during the Truman administration. The only contact from then on would be between liaison officers. As secretary of defense, Lovett did not see the Korean War ended by negotiation. The question was whether he would see it concluded by military pressure.\textsuperscript{55}
CHAPTER VIII

The Final Round

The major argument that underlay the proposal of the Department of Defense in the fall of 1952 to make a final offer on the prisoner of war issue and then recess the Panmunjom talks was that such action, coupled with increased military pressure, appeared to offer the best chance of forcing the Communists to accept an armistice and acquiesce in the U.S. position on prisoner repatriation. In support of this policy, Lovett declared at the State–Defense meeting on 17 September 1952 that the UNC was prepared to maintain military pressure on the enemy in Korea indefinitely. So while the armistice talks seemed to drag on endlessly, the fighting in Korea also continued, at a heavy cost in lives, greatly intensifying the frustration and bitterness in Washington and probably in Peking.

The Protracted War

During the fall of 1952 the intractable nature of the ground war clearly demonstrated the high cost of relying on UNC ground forces to maintain the required pressure on the enemy. Earlier, in April, Ridgway was able to shrug off the Communist troop buildup as more defensive than offensive in nature. In May there occurred only small-scale operations—probes, patrols, and raids. But by June actions had begun to grow perceptibly in size and number although engagements were still confined to fighting over relatively minor terrain features. In July, the UNC estimated opposing ground forces at 947,000–267,000 North Koreans and 680,000 Chinese—almost a doubling of their troop strength since the start of armistice negotiations. The limited tactical objectives of the summer and fall—known by such names as Bunker Hill, Old Baldy, Capitol Hill, Outpost Kelly, and Jackson Heights—became for
the UNC forces "a savagely contested, seemingly endless struggle for control of another hill." Concerned by the increased enemy activity, Van Fleet decided to improve his defensive line in an operation expected to take 5 days, involve 2 battalions, and cost about 200 casualties. Approved by Clark on 8 October 1952, the day the Panmunjom talks recessed, Operation SHOWDOWN lasted over a month, involved 2 divisions, and cost 9,000 UNC casualties, the heaviest in a year. Although the Chinese lost an estimated 19,000 men, Clark, upset about the UNC's "heavy and excessive casualties," told Van Fleet there were to be no repetitions. With the advent of cold weather in late November, the fighting subsided; each side stocked supplies and sent out patrols and probes. The winter months through February 1953 remained generally quiet, although participants in any given small unit action might not have thought so.

Because Washington was unwilling to accept the heavy casualties resulting from large-scale ground action, the UNC relied on air power to exert the pressure necessary to induce the enemy to accept an armistice. For this purpose, continuing control of the air over Korea remained a first priority. Increasing enemy air strength had been causing concern for a long time. By June 1952 the Chinese had a 22-division air force consisting of 1,830 aircraft, including about 1,000 jets; the Soviets, potential foes, had approximately 5,360 planes in the Far East. After June, the combined force stabilized at about 7,000 aircraft, a "vastly overwhelming theoretical air superiority." Still, the Chinese and North Koreans had relatively few expert pilots and continued a mainly defensive air strategy. By mid-September Lovett happily noted that the monthly U.S. aircraft production rate exceeded a year's losses in Korea from all causes. The much-improved F-84G Thunderjet fighter-bomber was beginning to replace the F-84E in the Far East Air Forces, and the modified F-86F, "the most suitable fighter-bomber employed in Korea," would replace the F-86A Sabre in 1953. Better planning, training, and management and the construction of more modern airfields also increased Air Force operational capability.

One continuing problem was interservice friction over close support operations. The Navy and Marine Corps planes, controlled by on-the-spot observers and accustomed to operations within a confined area, seemed to ground commanders to give more effective support than Air Force planes. Although 30 percent of all offensive sorties during the last two years of the war were for close support, the Army was never completely satisfied with the Air Force effort, and the Air Force seldom felt the ground targets worth the planes and crews lost.

Air interdiction operations constituted an important element in the use of military power to bring the enemy to the negotiating table. From May 1951 through May 1952, UNC attempts to cut the enemy's lines of communication
from its supply base in the north to the battlefront in the south proved less effective than expected against both roads and railroads as the enemy learned to counter the attacks. Aerial interdiction continued but on a reduced scale because of high losses.~

To increase pressure on the enemy, UNC air expanded its attacks in May 1952 to include important target complexes. In June Air Force and Navy planes struck the North Korean hydroelectric power complex, with telling results and no air casualties. When the British complained about lack of prior consultation, Acheson apologized, Clark accepted a senior British officer on his staff, and thereafter the Americans notified the British beforehand of such operations. Some congressmen asked why the power complex had not been attacked earlier. On 10 July FEAF prescribed a new “air pressure” policy aimed at making the war more costly for the enemy and reinforcing the UN negotiating position at Panmunjom by the maximum selective destruction of enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel. Such operations during July–September proved expensive in UNC planes, however, as the enemy concentrated flak and searchlights against the attacks.~

Beginning in October, UNC planes made the Communist armies a major target; massed fighter-bomber groups sought out and attacked troop and supply positions in and near the battlefront and far to the enemy’s rear. “Choke” operations in December 1952 and January 1953 created bottlenecks and destroyed accumulated equipment and transport. Although no one type of air operation proved a military panacea, the Joint Chiefs notified Lovett in November 1952 that UNC air superiority had largely prevented a major enemy buildup of supplies; combined with the naval blockade of North Korea, it had denied a still greater increase in enemy troops and helped Eighth Army to maintain itself against stronger enemy forces. Moreover, air power undoubtedly represented the best means currently available that “might impel the Communists to agree, finally, to acceptable armistice terms.”~ It was clear by the end of the Truman administration, however, that air power alone could not end the war and that the United States was unwilling to pay the price in lives that much enlarged ground operations would entail.

*The Ammunition Problem*

During the very period when military pressure was expected to play an important role in bringing the Communists to terms at Panmunjom, reports of artillery ammunition shortages increased noticeably. Ammunition expenditure rates had always been high in Korea, especially after Van Fleet took over in May 1951. Even after negotiations began in July and combat tapered off,
heavy artillery usage continued, and shortages had occurred during the battles late that summer. The use of artillery ammunition peaked in October. That month Lovett, becoming alarmed by the situation, asked Pace for information about shortages but went no further, since the Army was fully empowered to handle ammunition procurement. Van Fleet’s extraordinarily high ammunition usage, however, threatened to deplete ammunition reserves in the theater, then set at 75 days of supply. In October Ridgway requested and received an increase in the authorized theater stock level to 90 days; in December he authorized Van Fleet to raise the reserve level in Korea from 30 to 45 days.10

As Lovett well knew, ammunition for Korea came mainly from leftover and refurbished World War II ammunition stocks, which were large but unbalanced—plentiful for some rounds and short for others. Before Korea, there had not been money to rehabilitate and balance the stocks, while new production was suspended because of the size of the stockpile. The services made deliveries of ammunition to Korea in 1950, in fact, by drawing upon supplies intended for countries receiving military assistance and by limiting shipments to U.S. forces in Europe and elsewhere. This created a global problem for the Army. Even after Congress appropriated new funds for ammunition in January 1951, plants needed 18 to 24 months to start up again. Large amounts of new ammunition could not be expected before late 1952.11

With Ridgway plainly worried about ammunition usage rates in Korea by early 1952, Van Fleet that spring made a 20-percent cut in interdictory fire, which constituted two-thirds of all Eighth Army fire, although both men agreed that heavy use of ammunition helped to keep down the UNC casualty rate. Then suddenly enemy fire jumped from approximately 1,200 rounds across the front in February 1952 to 3,300 rounds in April and 6,250 in June. In July Van Fleet ordered that 155-mm. shells, now very scarce, should be used only on the most remunerative targets during quiescent periods.12

When Lovett became aware in February or March 1952 of a shortage in five types of ammunition (105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers and 60-mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-in. mortars), he directed his special assistant for production expediting, Clay Bedford, to investigate. Bedford’s discovery that administrative action consumed five months of production lead time and that delivery schedules seemed overly optimistic disconcerted Lovett, but Pace and Collins assured the secretary that the Army was accelerating production. By mid-April 1952, however, Bedford learned that currently scheduled production could barely meet, and in some cases would not meet, Eighth Army requirements under current usage rates if the war lasted two more years.13 A major steel

* This was a planning term defined as the average number of rounds a given type of weapon was expected to fire daily, computed on the basis of World War II experience.
strike in June and July seriously threatened the production of steel casings for ammunition and aggravated the problem before it was settled."

In July Lovett learned of the large increase in enemy artillery fire and again asked Pace for information about ammunition stocks. When Pace blamed the ammunition shortage mainly on the lack of funds,† Lovett consulted with Defense comptroller McNeil and sent Pace a strongly worded note on 15 August. Asserting that money had been more than ample and putting the blame on the Ordnance Corps, Lovett told Pace that he should get the facts and make it "difficult or impossible for the empty and evasive excuse of 'no funds available' to be given to you, as Secretary, to divert attention from a failure to get production." Unrestricted and very heavy use of all types of ammunition during the heavy ground fighting in Korea during the fall made the situation increasingly serious.‡

With high Army officials still maintaining that lack of funds was the basic cause for the ammunition shortage, Lovett agreed on 7 November to ask for a $50 million supplement to the current budget, but he told Pace that the Army needed to place contracts at once for the still unobligated $1.75 billion available for ammunition. When Army officials continued to plead money problems, Lovett placed ammunition procurement on a mobilization basis and gave Hugh Dean, who had replaced Bedford, the "full authority of his office on a liberal interpretation basis to take such action as he deems necessary to overcome both supply and production deficiencies." Lovett wanted current production emphasized without regard to longer range concerns, usual procurement practices, or minor price differentials.¶

On 21 November, Lovett asked Clark for a report on the ammunition situation and his recommendations. Believing that he owed Clark an explanation, Lovett in a personal letter three days later went into more detail on the Army's "sorry showing" and outlined the steps he had recently taken. Clark, who felt he had just received "the first firm indication" that Washington appreciated the ammunition supply problem, replied to Lovett that the 90-day theater stock level would be adequate for all except one item, providing the stocks were actually on hand. He considered the current situation critical in seven categories: 105-mm., 155-mm., and 8-in. howitzers; 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars; 155-mm. guns; and fragmentation grenades. Clark told Lovett that he had had to restrict firing rates and that the shortages had

* See Chapter XXIII.
† Much later, Pace claimed that in the fall of 1950, in response to General MacArthur's announcement of the war's expected end by Christmas 1950, he had cut ammunition production by a quarter and "I could not get that ammunition [production] back up." (Statement, Pace, in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., The Truman Presidency: Intimate Perspectives, vol II of Portraits of the Presidents, 151.)
THE TEST OF WAR

prevented launching a major ground offensive, seriously curtailed limited
attacks, and caused worry even in small-scale defense operations. His field
commanders wanted to fire ammunition at greater rates, and their inability to
do so had brought them higher casualties. Clark urged increased U.S.
production.16

Lovett directed the Army to place $57 million in a fund to be used only
for accelerating ammunition programs approved by Dean. The latter explored
the possible use of World War II ammunition stocks in the possession of
wartime allies, and the Army converted some battalions in Korea to weapons
using less critical ammunition.17

Although these actions helped, even more important, increased produc­
tion began to yield results by November 1952. As Lovett later recalled,
ammunition production "bulged" that month and continued to improve
rapidly thereafter. By Christmas, only the 81-mm. mortar round was below
the "safety level" of 60 days of supply in the Far East theater. For the five
categories where Lovett considered shortages particularly serious, the stock
level in the Far East theater grew steadily in terms of days of supply.18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition Supply</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>(days of supply on hand in theater)</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>60-mm. mortar</th>
<th>Max Authd</th>
<th>27 Nov 52</th>
<th>25 Dec 52</th>
<th>13 Feb 53</th>
<th>25 Mar 53</th>
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<tr>
<td>81-mm. mortar</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>112.3</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2-in. mortar</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>90</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155-mm. howitzer</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>91</td>
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</tbody>
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In April 1953, shortly after the changeover in administrations, Collins
testified that ammunition was "pouring off the lines right now." The full
authorized rates could be fired in Korea, and the Army was beginning to build
up a general reserve.19

Just as the production of ammunition became more plentiful, congress­
ional investigators, seeking to make political capital out of the shortages,
tried to fix responsibility on the departed Truman administration. Returning
home for retirement in early 1953, Van Fleet fueled the controversy by
claiming that there had been serious and critical shortages for the entire 22
months he was in Korea; at times, he said, the "stockpiles in Korea went to
zero behind the line." Lovett, now out of office, took a more measured view.
although he agreed that at times there had been shortages in five particular rounds and that sometimes the shortages had been critical. Bradley and Collins, on the other hand, contradicted Van Fleet's claims and Collins spoke of the "many inconsistencies" in Van Fleet's testimony. According to Collins, the ammunition available in Korea was adequate for Van Fleet's mission despite difficulties in its distribution within Korea. The shortages, Collins maintained, had not been in Korea, but in the theater reserves, the general reserve of the United States, and the supplies needed for U.S. missions in other areas of the world. Clark, too, took a position that discounted Van Fleet's allegations.

The welter of conflicting testimony makes it difficult to assess the effect or even the extent of the ammunition shortage. That Van Fleet wanted more is true; that at times he may have used too much is possibly also true. That the use of more ammunition would have made a major difference in the UNC military fortunes in Korea seems doubtful, since political and military objectives rather than ammunition supply determined the nature and extent of UNC offensive operations. It is debatable, in fact, whether lack of ammunition affected the tactical situation in any except limited and short-term situations. The shortage, however, held the potential for great danger, both militarily and politically, especially if the enemy launched a major offensive, and as such it fully warranted Lovett's strong actions.

Finding Substitute Troops

With the armistice negotiations recessed after 8 October 1952 and military operations in Korea stalemated, the prospect of ending the war any time soon by either negotiation or military action seemed dim. As the conflict dragged on, Lovett and others in the Pentagon began to think of how to extricate some or all of the American troops. Since U.S. forces could not simply be withdrawn—in such an event Chinese and North Korean soldiers were likely to pour down the peninsula and conquer the South—it became a question of what could be substituted for U.S. divisions. The Allies would not augment their forces to any major extent; deployment of Chinese Nationalist troops remained unlikely; any use of Japanese forces would be repugnant to the Koreans.

One source for a substitute fighting force that was available and eager to play an enlarged role was South Korea itself. Initially, 30,000 South Koreans had been given three weeks of training, placed in the ranks of the first four U.S. divisions to reach Korea, and thrown into the fighting in 1950. As the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA), approximately
13,000 South Koreans continued to serve in U.S. units even after the first desperate days. Many other South Koreans joined or were drafted into their own armed forces. The United States supported only a small South Korean navy, marine corps, and air force, but it financed a Republic of Korea army (ROKA), which with Rhee's consent fought under UNC command, up to a ceiling of 250,000 men and 10 divisions. When Truman approved this level of support in November 1950, Marshall questioned the ability of South Korea to maintain so large an army. Indeed, its early combat record—it faltered in the face of the Chinese offensives in late 1950 and again in April 1951—left much to be desired.

U.S. policy (NSC 48/5, May 1951) called for the development of dependable South Korean military units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength to take a major share of the UNC burden. But the size of the forces and the rate of buildup came under frequent review, in large part because of the volatile and unstable political and economic conditions in South Korea. President Rhee, bent on reunification of the two Koreas under his leadership, pressed for creation of a huge South Korean Army that he claimed would allow the withdrawal of U.S. troops. He opposed the start of the armistice talks in July; in September he suggested terms obviously unacceptable to the enemy and subsequently hinted that his government might not observe the terms of any armistice. Rhee's aggressive and intransigent attitude on most issues relating to the war and unification caused Lovett and Acheson concern about the consequences of equipping him with a large military machine that might defy UNC control and pursue an independent military course. Still, there seemed to be no feasible alternative to South Korean manpower, and a steady buildup of ROKA continued.

The woeful South Korean economy, violently disrupted by the war and wracked by high inflation, could not hope to support a large military establishment without heavy U.S. assistance. The potential cost to the United States of such a burden, together with the extensive economic assistance afforded South Korea, influenced U.S. consideration of underwriting the cost of a continuing expansion of the ROK military. The political and economic uncertainties created a dilemma for U.S. policymakers that continued even after the armistice was signed.

As the armistice talks opened in July 1951, U.S. advisers began a program of upgrading and training of the ROK army. Van Fleet believed that training and a dependable and able South Korean officer corps were the army's greatest needs; he also recommended that South Koreans should officer ROK divi-

* From 60,000 to 100,000 other South Koreans served in the Korean Service Corps, acting as laborers for UNC units.
visions. Nonetheless, U.S. KMAG advisers remained at all training bases and at all ROKA headquarters levels from army to battalion, performing supervisory functions close to those of command. In November the U.S. Army augmented KMAG by 800 spaces, to a total of 1,800 officers and men. In March 1952 Ridgway approved giving the 10 South Korean divisions the full U.S. artillery complement of 4 battalions, and by January 1953 half the ROK divisions had received their artillery.25

By early 1952 Ridgway expressed concern that his control over South Korean forces might be ended once an armistice was negotiated, since his authority rested simply on Rhee's July 1950 letter to MacArthur, which limited UNC command to the duration of hostilities. Although Ridgway urged negotiation of a formal agreement, Truman followed State–Defense advice to depend on U.S. military and economic leverage. Increased U.S. anxiety about possible South Korean adventurism seemed justified because Truman, in approving NSC 118/2 on 20 December 1951, had sanctioned a policy of developing and equipping sufficient South Korean military forces to "deter or repel a renewed aggression by North Korean forces alone" and to assume eventual responsibility for South Korea's defense.26

The Joint Chiefs advised Lovett in January 1952 that they believed the most appropriate ROKA mission for the immediate future would be only to resist and delay the advance of any North Korean attack until external forces could arrive, while those South Korean forces currently being trained might relieve U.S. troops after an armistice "if and when practicable." Although this post-armistice mission was much more limited than that envisioned in NSC 118/2, the JCS considered it "more in consonance with ROK capabilities." Taking into account also the heavy U.S. materiel commitments elsewhere, the JCS recommended for FY 1953 planning purposes a 16,000-man, 50-vessel South Korean navy; an 8,000-man, 1-division marine corps; and a 4,000-man, 46-plane air force. They proposed to maintain the South Korean Army at its current level of 250,000 men and 10 divisions.27

When the Armed Forces Policy Council met on 8 April, Navy secretary Kimball, back from a Far East trip, reported that Van Fleet wanted to train 20 ROKA divisions. Surprised and somewhat embarrassed, Pace replied that a 10-division increase had never been reported through channels. In response to a query from Washington, Ridgway also disclaimed knowledge of such a request and emphatically disagreed with Van Fleet, who had already made his position public in a magazine interview. Although Washington made no change at that time, a need soon developed for manpower to fill out additional South Korean artillery and tank units and to provide for 10 additional infantry regiments suitable as possible expansion cadres. In early
May Ridgway asked for logistical support for over 360,000 ROKA spaces, but still within the 10-division framework.  

General Clark, who replaced Ridgway in May, favored expansion of the Korean army. Following the prisoner-of-war emergency at Koje-do and a South Korean constitutional crisis, he asked in mid-June for approximately 19,500 men to form 6 more regiments and a bulk allotment of 92,100 spaces to provide for trainees, patients, interpreters, general prisoners, and others for whom the Koreans had no separate arrangements. On 23 June he requested two more ROK army divisions and an increase in logistical support troops. Worried about shortages in artillery equipment and ammunition, the Joint Chiefs in late June recommended holding the ROK army to 10 divisions and 250,000 combat personnel.

Support for a sizable increase in South Korean forces came soon from the service secretaries who, pointing to "staggering differences" between the cost of a U.S. soldier abroad and a "local native fighter," asked Lovett on 8 July whether sufficient consideration had been given to replacing Western troops. Requesting JCS comments on 30 July, Lovett succinctly noted that the idea was to replace U.S. troops, not just to train additional local forces. In August General Collins, apparently convinced that the South Koreans were developing into "good fighters," approved Clark's request for the 92,100 bulk personnel allotment and supported his request for two more South Korean divisions. Having achieved this much, Clark followed up with additional requests to increase the ceiling for KATUSA personnel to 28,000 and the ROK marine corps to 19,800. The South Korean government also wanted to enlarge its air force.

On 26 September the Joint Chiefs reversed their earlier position, recommending to Lovett a 12-division ROK army with 6 separate regiments, an enlarged ROK marine corps, a combined army-marine strength of 463,000, and a KATUSA increase to 28,000. Lovett, however, did not approve the request immediately, for the JCS had also indicated that equipping enlarged South Korean forces would impair other programs: delay by two months the delivery of critical items to NATO countries, Japan, and Southeast Asia; extend

* Rhee provoked the crisis on 24 May 1952 by placing Pusan under martial law and arresting on treason charges some of his political opponents in the National Assembly. The crisis prompted widespread criticism, and on 2 June Truman wrote Rhee asking him to defer further such action. Rhee, however, held fast to his demands. During June he secured a constitutional amendment from the National Assembly prescribing popular election of the president and vice president and a second legislative chamber, thereby assuring his reelection and his greater ability to cope with the assembly.

† McNeil later put the cost of initial equipment for a U.S. division at about $175 million, for a South Korean division at $40 million. He figured the cost of a South Korean division operating in combat at $100 million a year, compared with a U.S. division at $200 million to $300 million.
by two months the 50-percent equipment ceiling on U.S. units in the United States; cause further delays in military assistance shipments; and possibly force continuation of reduced ammunition allotments for U.S. and ROK training. Nonetheless, a larger South Korean force seemed the most feasible answer to demands to reduce U.S. manpower in Korea. Pace and Assistant Secretary of Defense Anna Rosenberg supported a larger ROK force. Lovett strongly recommended the ROK increase, estimated to cost about $431 million, to Truman on 25 October. The president's approval on 30 October set a 12-division, 6-regiment ROK army limit and an overall army–marine manpower ceiling of 463,000.

At the request of General Collins, Clark in the meantime had sent to Washington a plan, about which he had serious doubts, for reducing the U.S. manpower ceiling by 50,000 and allowing the phased withdrawal of 4 (including 2 U.S.) UNC divisions from Korea during 1953–54 and for assumption by ROKA of responsibility for the entire front line by mid–1954, at the earliest. The plan assumed that the military stalemate in Korea would continue and that a 20-division ROK army with a manpower ceiling of more than 639,000 (including 104,200 noneffectives) would be on hand by August 1953. Pointing out that the U.S. Army lacked funds for the ROK increases and would have to divert equipment from other programs, particularly military assistance, Pace asked Lovett on 17 November for basic decisions on force goals, priorities, and fiscal support for South Korean forces. Lovett knew that the JCS had doubts about the complete substitution of local for U.S. divisions because they had already told him on 29 October that—despite lower costs, potential savings of U.S. casualties, and public relations benefits—U.S. forces in Korea had to be kept at "levels commensurate with the threat to U.S. security interests in that area." They referred primarily to Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines. On 5 December Lovett asked for JCS comments on Clark's plan, but, with president-elect Eisenhower on record in support of more ROK divisions, the Joint Chiefs did not formally respond until the new administration took office.

End of the Fighting

Truman's 30 October 1952 decision to increase ROK forces by two divisions reflected increasing U.S. awareness that any new UNC military initiative in Korea at current force levels would be expensive and possibly counterproductive. A JCS committee had already calculated that, if the armistice talks broke down, 11 more U.S. divisions, 54 more ships, 22½ more air wings, and the use of atomic weapons would be required to clear Korea of
all enemy forces. Unhappy with this forecast, the Joint Chiefs sent the study back for review and in September asked Clark for advice.\textsuperscript{35}

In his reply on 29 September Clark blamed the failure thus far to reach an armistice agreement on the inability of the UNC to exert sufficient military pressure on the enemy, but he doubted that he could win a military victory in Korea given his available forces and the probable losses. To compel the enemy to accept an armistice on UNC terms, Clark thought it would be necessary to bomb targets in China and Manchuria and to impose as well a naval blockade of China, possibly mounting a major ground offensive, including an amphibious assault. In October Clark notified the JCS that his plan for a drive to the Wonsan–P’yongyang line would require 3 more U.S. or UN divisions, 2 South Korean divisions, 2 Chinese Nationalist divisions, 12 artillery battalions, and 20 antiaircraft battalions. Clark also urged giving serious consideration to the use of atomic weapons, particularly against air bases in Manchuria and North China. In the Pentagon, however, Pace advised Lovett that a major military offensive in Korea was unrealistic in terms of money, forces, and equipment and would completely undermine all efforts to reduce U.S. manpower requirements. He pressed for a decision on future ground operations in
No decision was made, however, pending the outcome of the presidential election. Eisenhower's victory confirmed the extent of the war's unpopularity with the public. Keeping a promise made during the campaign, Eisenhower visited Korea in early December but predictably showed no interest in a renewed ground offensive.

After the election, Collins informed Clark that the Joint Chiefs would consider his views on the use of atomic weapons. Although the United States was already stockpiling small atomic bombs capable of delivery by tactical aircraft, the Truman administration opposed their use. The Joint Chiefs continued to feel there were no sufficiently rewarding targets inside Korea. Furthermore, there remained a tacit U.S. agreement to consult the British prior to using atomic weapons in Korea.

Late in 1952 the Indian government pressed for a UN resolution on prisoner repatriation. Defense objected to it because of the absence of sufficient guarantees of UNC troop safety and for the disposition of nonreturning prisoners of war. Nonetheless, Allied support for the resolution persisted. On 24 November, however, the Russians suddenly denounced the Indian resolution. Then on 3 December, with U.S. support, the UN General Assembly passed the resolution as revised to meet U.S. concerns. Affirming that force should not be used against the prisoners, it set procedures for their return and declared that the fate of those prisoners still unwilling to go back after a period of consideration should be decided by a political conference and implemented by the United Nations. The Chinese and the North Koreans flatly rejected this version. Then more riots erupted in the prisoner-of-war camps in Korea, and UN support again declined for the U.S. position on no forced repatriation.

By the end of 1952 no new initiatives remained open to the "lame duck" Truman administration. Utterly frustrated by the course of the armistice negotiations, Lovett and Truman also had no success in their efforts to bring about a truce through force. The next steps would have to await the coming of the new administration.

Eisenhower as president played an even more dominant role in Pentagon affairs than had Truman. More familiar with European problems than Truman, Eisenhower seemed both more sympathetic to the Europeans and simultaneously less concerned about European reactions to Korea, where he was

* In mid-1951 the JCS had considered the possibility of using atomic weapons "if necessary to prevent disaster to our forces in the Far East" and endorsed a recommendation for testing the feasibility of providing tactical atomic support of ground operations. In late September and early October U.S. forces carried out several simulated atomic strikes during a limited UNC ground offensive. See James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The Korean War, vol III of History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pt 2, 613-14.
ready to take a tougher line even while seeking an honorable armistice. When a new Communist ground and air buildup in the neutral negotiating zone of Korea threatened UNC positions in February 1953, Clark received permission to abrogate the neutrality agreement and to strike Kaesong in the event of an enemy attack. Unwilling to approve a large-scale UNC ground offensive, Eisenhower seemed inclined to increase military pressures by other means and stood ready to explore the use of atomic weapons in Korea, particularly the new small tactical bombs. If the Europeans objected, Eisenhower suggested that they might be asked to provide more troops for Korea. 43

Approval for a large increase in South Korean forces proceeded by stages over a period of four months in 1953. Soon after taking office Eisenhower accepted a JCS recommendation for an immediate 2-division increase in the South Korean army to a total of 14 divisions. In response to requests from Clark, supported by the Joint Chiefs, the president approved in May an immediate buildup to 16 divisions and an ultimate 20 divisions for the ROK army with U.S. support levels of 655,000 men, plus a 23,500-man marine corps, a 9,000-man air force, and a 10,000-man navy. 44

The death of Premier Joseph Stalin on 5 March 1953 created a political void in Moscow that apparently diminished Soviet interest in continuation of the Korean War. A major break in the armistice impasse came on 28 March when the Chinese and North Korean military commanders, Peng Teh-huai and Kim Il Sung, accepted a UNC offer to exchange sick and wounded prisoners and suggested the renewal of truce negotiations. On 30 March Premier Chou En-lai endorsed both ideas and proposed a solution to the prisoner-of-war problem similar to the Indian UN resolution. On 1 April Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov publicly approved the Chinese suggestion, and Eisenhower accepted the Communist proposal. Between 20 April and 3 May, in Operation LITTLE SWITCH, the UNC handed over 6,670 sick and wounded prisoners of war and civilian internees and received 684 enemy-held prisoners in exchange. 45

When armistice talks resumed on 26 April, the Eisenhower administration continued to insist on no forcible return of unwilling prisoners, but the president did not wish to prolong the negotiations indefinitely. When the talks appeared to be stalemated again in May, UNC air attacks on North Korean dams caused floods and damaged rail lines and farm crops. Clark planned to maintain a strong ground defense, carry out a limited offensive, and make heavy air attacks on critical targets. The enemy also initiated and intensified ground action throughout May. 46

With NSC 118/2 more than a year old, Eisenhower began a review of U.S. policy on possible courses of action if the talks failed. The question of using atomic weapons came up again prominently during the policy deliberations,
particularly since Eisenhower thought that several North Korean airfields would provide good targets for testing their effectiveness. The Joint Chiefs believed there were no especially good atomic targets in Korea; they thought a large number of atomic weapons would be needed if action had to be taken outside of Korea. On 19 May they wrote that ending the war by military means would require a coordinated ground drive toward the narrow waist of Korea north of P'yongyang, air and naval operations against China and Manchuria, and "extensive strategical and tactical use of atomic bombs." The NSC made no decision but agreed on 20 May to adopt the JCS recommendation as a general guide if "more positive action in Korea" was required. Determined to convince the enemy of U.S. resolve to conclude the war, Eisenhower let it be known—in India, China, and Panmunjom—that the United States would "move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons" and not necessarily confine hostilities to the Korean peninsula.

UN allies continued to pressure the United States to conclude an armistice, especially after Chou En-lai's apparent acceptance of the general principles of the Indian resolution. Despite Rhee's objections, the UNC negotiators on 25 May made a new armistice offer closely related to the Indian version—a five-nation custodial commission to accept both Chinese and Korean nonrepatriates, safeguards against prisoner coercion, a 90-day period for explaining to and persuading prisoners, and finally a political conference with a 30-day time limit to deal with disposition of nonrepatriates, or alternatively, reference of the matter to the UN General Assembly. At Panmunjom on 4 June the Communists basically agreed to everything except the UN role, offering a complete draft of a prisoner-of-war accord. On 8 June the delegates signed an agreement on item 4 that implicitly accepted the principle of no forcible repatriation. Work started immediately on revising the demarcation line and marking the boundaries of a demilitarized zone.

While the final touches were being put on the armistice, the enemy launched his heaviest attack in two years, concentrating on South Korean troops. Eisenhower once again brought up the possibility of using tactical atomic weapons in Korea, but Collins discounted their value. Although the president maintained that their use would be tactically effective and hold no implication of mass killing, he emphasized that he was "just exploring the problem orally" and in no sense making a decision. On 16 June the two sides in Korea agreed on the demarcation line. By 18 June the military situation stabilized as Communist attacks subsided.

Agreement on a final settlement was still jeopardized by President Rhee's open hostility to any truce plan that did not provide for Chinese Communist withdrawal from North Korea, that permitted foreign Communist custodial forces on Korean soil, or that turned over Korean nonrepatriates to a neutral
state. Despite U.S. efforts to reassure him, Rhee ordered his troops to release non-Communist North Korean prisoners of war from the prisoner compounds, and 25,000 escaped on the night of 17–18 June. Escapes continued on a reduced scale over the next few days while UNC troops brought in from recent heavy fighting tried to cope. The possibility of clashes between U.S. and South Korean forces at the compounds caused much concern in the theater and in Washington. By the end of the month, only 8,600 of the 35,400 North Korean nonrepatriates remained in UNC custody, and Eisenhower remarked that the United States seemed to have acquired "another enemy"—although he admitted the United States had recently considered the release of prisoners.53 The Communist negotiators, apparently convinced of UNC connivance in the escapes, did not walk out of the talks, but on 20 June they did ask how the armistice terms could be carried out if the UNC could not control the South Koreans.54

While the Americans reasoned with a stubborn Rhee, Chinese Communist forces again attacked ROK units on 24 June. Attesting to the intensity of the fighting, UNC forces expended 2.7 million artillery rounds in June, more than in any other month of the war, and Eighth Army suffered more than 23,000 casualties, mostly among the South Koreans. UNC estimates placed enemy fire at approximately 12 percent of its own rate and enemy casualties at over 36,000. On 29 June Clark replied by letter to the Communist protest of 20 June, and on 8 July the Communists, although not completely satisfied, agreed to resume talking. When the negotiators returned to Panmunjom on 10 July, two years after their first meeting, the main problem was to convince the enemy that Rhee would honor an agreement without the UNC promising to use force against him. But after several days of meetings, the enemy seemed to be stalling, presumably to see how far his new military offensive would get.55

Beginning on 6 July, the Communist offensive forced UNC troops to fall back. When some South Korean units retreated beyond their ordered limits, U.S. units had to fill the gaps in the line; it was 16 July before the South Koreans could return to the line they were supposed to occupy. The enemy had penetrated six miles, cut off and disorganized many ROK units, and forced the use of nine U.S. and ROK divisions to stop his advance and regain some ground. Firing more than 375,000 rounds, enemy artillery achieved its greatest volume in the last month of the war, while the UNC returned more than 2 million shells. UNC casualties in July amounted to almost 30,000; Communist losses were estimated at over 72,000. There were still more than a million Chinese and North Korean troops in Korea, and they seemed ready to continue the war indefinitely.56

When the negotiators met again on 19 July the enemy’s assault was slowing, and Communist delegates proceeded with the remaining tasks—to
revise the line of demarcation, define the demilitarized zone, plan for the exchange of prisoners, form the various commissions, and conclude the truce arrangements. The final line was near the 38th parallel but geographically easier to defend than the 38th parallel boundary; it involved somewhat greater territorial concessions on the part of the North Koreans than of the South. General Harrison and General Nam II formally and silently signed the armistice at Panmunjom at 10:00 a.m. on 27 July. General Clark and a ROKA representative countersigned it that afternoon. Ground activity had already stopped, and artillery fire and air sorties ended at 10:00 p.m.\(^{57}\)

Some loose ends remained. On 27 July the UN allies signed a joint policy statement—over which State and Defense had labored for more than two years—promising retaliation if the Communists renewed their attack in South Korea. It was not issued immediately, however, for fear that Rhee might deliberately provoke renewed enemy action; Clark finally included it in his 7 August summary report to the United Nations.\(^{58}\)

The two sides exchanged prisoners of war in August and September 1953 during Operation BIG SWITCH. Each side delivered to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission those who wanted to go home—more than 75,000 (including 5,640 Chinese) from the UNC camps and more than 12,000 (including 3,597 U.S.) from enemy camps. The two sides then delivered nonreturning prisoners to the commission, which held them for 120 days. Of 22,604 enemy nonrepatriates (including 14,704 Chinese), 628 decided to go home, 86 went to India, 51 escaped or died in custody, and 21,839 were sent back to the UNC, which simply released them.\(^*\) Of 359 UNC nonrepatriates, 2 (of 23) Americans and 8 Koreans changed their minds and returned home, 2 Koreans went to India, and 347 were sent back to the enemy command.\(^{59}\)

After three years of devastating war, Korea remained divided in July 1953 roughly along the 38th parallel, the line that had divided it since the end of World War II. In North Korea, wasted by aerial attack, estimated military casualties numbered over 500,000, while millions of civilians had fled to South Korea or vanished. In South Korea, casualties were estimated at approximately 300,000 military plus about a million civilians; Seoul was about 50 percent destroyed, and some 5 million persons, about a quarter of the population, were destitute and homeless. The last 4 of the 20 ROK army divisions were activated at cadre strength before signing of the armistice. The U.S. Senate and the ROK National Assembly in January 1954 approved a bilateral mutual defense treaty, signed on 1 October 1953, effective 14 November 1954.

Of the other major participants in the Korean War, the Communist

* The Koreans returned to South Korean control; the Chinese went mainly to Formosa.
Chinese were thought to have sustained between 1 and 1.5 million casualties, among them many highly trained troops. American losses included 33,629 dead, 92,134 wounded, 21 nonrepatriates, and 24 still listed as missing as late as September 1954. Charges of collaboration made against enemy-held U.S. soldiers resulted in investigations of about 500, a few convictions of misconduct, and a national debate that produced a new Code of Conduct for U.S. prisoners of war.

The Military Armistice Commission, responsible for overall supervision of the demilitarized zone, met on 28 July 1953 in an initial atmosphere of harmony, but accusations of violations soon surfaced and became recurrent. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its inspection teams stationed at the 10 ports in North and South Korea also began work but could not prevent a renewed Communist military buildup. A political conference, provided for in the armistice, met between 26 April and mid-June 1954 in Geneva, Switzerland, but it achieved no tangible results toward Korean unity. The problem of how to unite Korea remained unsolved.
CHAPTER IX

Formosa: A Reversal of Policy

Even before the Korean War, the fate of the island of Formosa had become a major political issue in the United States. In June 1950 the island was under the control of Chiang Kai-shek, recently defeated and driven from mainland China by the Communists under Mao Tse-tung. Long a part of China, the island had been ceded to Japan after the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–95. At the Cairo Conference in November 1943 the United States had promised the return of the island to the Chinese Nationalist government, and in 1945 the Nationalists reoccupied Formosa. At the beginning of the Korean War, in the absence of a formal peace treaty with Japan, both the People’s Republic of China (Communist) and the Republic of China (Nationalist) claimed Formosa.¹

The dispute over Formosa forced the United States to reappraise the island’s role in U.S. security policy in the Pacific. From late 1949 on, Formosa became an important issue that steadily engaged the time and attention of the Department of Defense. Even those officials who saw Chiang’s government as weak and corrupt preferred Chiang to Communist control over the island.² Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had declared in 1948 that a Communist Formosa would be “seriously unfavorable” to American interests, they rejected then and in 1949 the use of U.S. military forces to prevent such a takeover.³ Shortly before the end of 1949, alarmed at the prospect of Communist domination of East Asia, the JCS were moved to recommend a “modest, well-directed and closely supervised program” of military aid for the Nationalists on Formosa.⁴

At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 29 December, Secretary of State Acheson opposed sending military aid, arguing that because of deep-seated internal problems no short-term assistance was likely to save the island from the Communists. Looking to the long term, he wanted the United States to ally itself on the side of Asian nationalism, strengthen mainland China’s neigh-
bors, and wait until Sino-Soviet differences created an opportunity to detach the PRC from Soviet domination. In Acheson's view an independent China, even if Communist, would be much preferable to an isolated Chinese Nationalist Formosa. The president supported Acheson, publicly declaring on 5 January 1950 that the United States had no territorial designs on Formosa or other Chinese lands; sought no special rights, privileges, or bases on Formosa; would have no military involvement in the Chinese civil conflict; and, while continuing economic aid, would provide no further military aid or advice to the Chinese on Formosa. The Nationalists would have to purchase any military items they might want, subject to U.S. approval. On 12 January Acheson's speech to the National Press Club did not include Formosa within the U.S. defensive perimeter in the Pacific.

This U.S. policy, which implied that Formosa was ultimately expendable, became a major political issue, particularly in Congress, where a powerful group of Republicans and some Democrats looked on the "loss of China" in 1949 as evidence of foul play or at least poor judgment on the part of the Truman administration. The "China Lobby" of politicians, commercial interests, and other groups supported the Chiang Kai-shek government to the hilt and kept Formosa in the forefront of debate over U.S. Far Eastern policy. President Truman thus had to reckon constantly with the domestic political repercussions of his Formosa policies. Within the administration Louis Johnson and Dean Acheson were at loggerheads over the matter. Johnson gained support for his position of helping Chiang during his visit to Japan in June 1950, when General MacArthur presented him with a paper contending that in enemy hands Formosa would constitute a strategic salient, an "unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender," in the center of a U.S. line sweeping from the Aleutians through Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. MacArthur pressed for a U.S. survey of military aid requirements for Formosa but did not suggest using U.S. military forces to save the island.

Neutralization and Assistance

Acheson's long-range China policy became one of the first casualties of the Korean War. Viewing the North Korean attack as a "clear-cut Soviet challenge" and with advisers such as George Kennan warning that Formosa might be the next target, Acheson proposed at the first Blair House meeting on 25 June that the U.S. Seventh Fleet be used to prevent both a Chinese Communist attack on the island and a Chinese Nationalist attack on the mainland. But he did not want the United States to "tie up with the Generalissimo." The president approved Acheson's proposal the next night.
Truman also rejected Chiang's offer of 33,000 troops for Korea, accepting Acheson's argument that the Nationalist troops were needed to defend Formosa and that their deployment to Korea might provoke Chinese Communist intervention there.8

On 27 June the president publicly declared that PRC control of Formosa would constitute a direct threat to U.S. forces in the Pacific area and that consideration of the island's future status would have to "await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."9 Reacting quickly, Peking pointed out that Truman's latest statement contradicted his earlier declaration. Premier Chou En-lai, calling on Chinese to unite and take back Formosa from the "American aggressor," on 6 July condemned the U.S. stance. The Indian ambassador to Peking, Kavalam Modhava Panikkar, reportedly thought that the Chinese Communists were preparing to attack Formosa, and the Soviet ambassador in Peking was reported to have toasted the island's "early liberation."10

George Kennan, who believed that the Chinese Nationalists could not repel a Communist assault on Formosa and that State should avoid incurring later charges of inhibiting U.S. military preparations, suggested on 17 July that Acheson warn the president and the Pentagon that the island's fall would damage the United States politically and that U.S. forces would have to be used in its defense. In a special message to Congress on 19 July, Truman tried to calm the Chinese Communists. He emphasized the U.S. neutralization policy for Formosa and declared the United States desired no territory or special privilege, preferring a peaceful settlement of all Formosan questions.11

In the UN the United States was drifting toward diplomatic isolation on the issue of Formosa. Unlike the Americans, the British and some other nations recognized the PRC, construed the Cairo declaration to mean the return of Formosa to whatever Chinese government controlled the mainland, and sought to give Nationalist China's UN seat to the PRC. Nations currently urging the Soviet Union to end its UN boycott and help restore peace in Korea seemed quite ready to meet the Soviet demand to seat the PRC.12

In the meantime, the United States moved to make it easier for the Nationalists to purchase U.S. military equipment, including tanks and jet aircraft.13 The Joint Chiefs advised Johnson on 27 July that loss of the island would be "seriously detrimental" to U.S. security and urged approval of grant military assistance and dispatch of a military survey mission to Chiang.14 Acheson agreed, provided that Chiang's forces were strengthened only to serve as a defensive backup for the Seventh Fleet. Truman approved.15

In response to a MacArthur request for immediate shipment of ammunition to the Nationalists, Truman allocated more than $14 million in MDAP funds for Formosa, and the Department of State approved a $9.8 million
Defense program, with a special priority rating directly below that for Korea. In September a U.S. military survey mission, under Maj. Gen. Alonzo P. Fox from MacArthur's headquarters, recommended arming Chiang's forces for the defense of Formosa. The first delivery in response to MacArthur's request was loaded by the end of October, but the items in MacArthur's list constituted the only materiel sent to Formosa in 1950. Washington took no final action in 1950 on the Fox recommendations.

Meanwhile the growing Chinese Communist threat against Formosa tested U.S. policy. Chiang's government, reportedly deeply resentful of U.S. restrictions it had accepted on 28 June 1950, raised several questions about what it could do to defend itself prior to an actual attack. Johnson and Acheson concurred in the Nationalist plan to continue air and naval reconnaissance, provided there was no armed offensive action against the China mainland, and agreed to Nationalist communication with the Seventh Fleet. Acheson declined, however, to raise questions with the British about the shipment of military supplies from Hong Kong to Communist areas, and Johnson went along. As for the defense of the offshore islands, Johnson concurred with MacArthur and the JCS that there should be no U.S. responsibility for areas beyond Formosa and the Pescadores. The offshore islands were thus strictly a Nationalist responsibility.

On 14 July the Nationalists asked permission to bomb airfields and troop concentrations on the China mainland as a defense measure against purported Communist preparations to attack Formosa. Acheson responded with an emphatic no, but the Joint Chiefs pointed out to Johnson that the Chinese Communists could transport an estimated 200,000 mainland troops to Formosa and had already announced their intent to capture the island. Noting the high political cost that Acheson had placed on Formosa's loss, they recommended that the president allow Nationalist forces to mine mainland staging waters and attack amphibious concentrations directed against Formosa. MacArthur agreed, and Johnson forwarded the request to Acheson and Truman, who referred it to the NSC. Acheson did not object to mining but considered preventive bombing attacks unacceptable.

At this point MacArthur's visit to Formosa complicated the situation. While he was on the island on 31 July and 1 August, the Nationalists tested the U.S. policy of neutralization by launching an attack in mainland waters. The world press suggested that by dealing directly with Chiang Kai-shek MacArthur had rejected neutralization and opted for a more aggressive approach.

Despite a caution against doing so from Army Secretary Frank Pace, Johnson decided to push the president to allow preemptive Nationalist attacks on amphibious concentrations if positive intelligence warned of an imminent assault on Formosa or the Pescadores. But Truman was unwilling to entrust
MacArthur with such an important decision and firmly rebuffed Johnson. 

On 14 August the JCS directed MacArthur that, in the event of a Communist attack on Formosa, the U.S. defense would be confined to "practicable" actions that did not commit any U.S. forces to the island itself. By this time, as it turned out, MacArthur no longer thought that the PRC planned to invade Formosa. 

MacArthur precipitated another incident of both domestic and international import when he sent a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars to be read at their convention on 28 August. Leaked three days earlier to the press, the message received wide publicity. It contradicted some fundamental aspects of U.S. policy and implied that not defending Formosa was the position of "those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific." Since the United States was urging on the United Nations the president's pronouncement that the United States had "no designs on Formosa," the MacArthur message was especially inopportune and politically embarrassing. Learning of the message on 25 August, Acheson had a copy sent to the president, who saw it as a contradiction of his policy. When the president told Johnson to order MacArthur to withdraw the message, Johnson tried to temporize. An impatient Truman called the Pentagon and dictated the words of the order to Johnson, who sent it shortly after 5:00 p.m. Johnson's behavior undoubtedly further damaged his standing in the administration. 

Effects of the Chinese Intervention in Korea

Disliked by Johnson, U.S. Formosan policy did not please Acheson, either, but for different reasons. The secretary of state considered it interim policy, and he did not want to make long-term commitments about such questions as the Chinese seat in the United Nations, continued recognition of the Nationalists as the government of all China, and especially U.S. support for a Nationalist return to the mainland. These issues, Acheson thought, should be settled eventually on the sole basis of "overall U.S. interests" and not on the basis of commitments to the Nationalists. On 25 August he even offered to place the Formosa issue before the UN after Chou En-lai complained to that organization that U.S. "aggression" prevented the PRC from liberating the island. This offer reflected Acheson's desire to close the "considerable gap" over Formosa between the United States and its friends in the UN. On 31

* MacArthur later wrote that Harriman cautioned him early in August 1950 about Truman's "extreme dislike" for Chiang Kai-shek and said that Johnson "was on his way out because the President suspected him of being on too friendly terms with the Generalissimo." (Douglas MacArthur, "Mr. Truman Yielded to Counsels of Fear," U.S. News and World Report, 17 Feb 56.)
August Truman called the Seventh Fleet’s presence in the Formosa Strait “flank protection” for UNC forces in Korea and averred that the Formosan situation was “one for settlement.”

At the same time a far different long-term view of Formosa was beginning to crystallize in the Pentagon. The JCS recommended to Johnson on 8 September that the United States not agree to any UN proposal on Formosa that might enhance the Soviet military position in the Far East or open the way for a PRC takeover of the island. Johnson left office in mid-September still at odds with Acheson on U.S. policy for Formosa.

The attack on Tibet at the end of October by the Chinese Communists and mounting evidence of their possible intervention in Korea gave greater urgency to the Formosa question, and increased the likelihood of UN consideration. Acheson told Secretary Marshall on 11 November that State would support a UN General Assembly resolution to establish a commission to study the Formosan question; he promised that State “would leave the way open” for UN action against the PRC and for the use of Formosa as a base for operations against the Chinese Communists if they attacked. Marshall asked Acheson to defer action until Defense views were available and suggested an NSC review of Formosan policy.

On 24 November Acting Secretary of Defense Lovett strongly recommended to Acheson the JCS view that the UN resolution would have disadvantageous effects because it “would neutralize Formosa strategically” and restrict U.S. freedom of action. If politically necessary, the resolution could be accepted with certain deletions that would eliminate these effects. After the massive Chinese Communist attack in Korea a few days later, Acheson told Marshall that the UN study was deferred, that JCS views would be considered, and that State concurred in the need for an NSC policy review. Acheson asked Marshall to ascertain JCS views on whether denial of Formosa to the PRC would meet U.S. military strategic needs; if not, he wanted to know what the additional requirements were. If diplomatic and economic measures could not meet security needs, Acheson wanted a JCS opinion on the use of U.S. military force.

When British Prime Minister Clement Attlee came to Washington in early December to discuss the Korean situation, he expressed little sympathy for retaining Chiang in power on Formosa. The British acknowledged that the United States could not consider recognizing the PRC but thought that in return for a cease-fire in Korea the Americans would be well advised to drop Chiang, accept the Chinese Communists into the United Nations, and yield Formosa to them. The Americans felt these steps would constitute a reward for aggression. Marshall pointed out that it would be intolerable to abandon Formosa to an enemy power, thus splitting the U.S. defensive island chain and
"taking a step to liquidate our position in the Pacific." President Truman indicated that sacrificing Formosa was politically unacceptable to the administration. Essentially, the two nations agreed only on trying to settle the Formosan question peacefully.  

In response to a request from Marshall to reevaluate previous views on Formosa, the Joint Chiefs reiterated that neutralization would benefit the PRC and weaken the U.S. strategic position in the area. In the event of a full-scale war with the Chinese Communists, it would be desirable to have Formosan ports and airfields for U.S. use. Furthermore, Chinese Nationalist forces on the island would be the "only visible source of manpower for extensive guerrilla operations in China and a possible invasion of the mainland." Should diplomatic and economic measures not suffice, the chiefs now declared, the United States ought to be prepared to use naval and air forces to safeguard Formosa.

On 9 January 1951 the JCS rejected MacArthur's December proposals to use Nationalist troops in Korea, establish a naval blockade of China, make naval and air attacks on Chinese mainland industrial centers, and allow Nationalist diversionary attacks on the mainland. But three days later, their position on Formosa evolving with events, they recommended to Marshall three new measures: a military training mission and increased military assistance for Chiang; "all practicable covert aid" to any effective Nationalist guerrilla forces in China; and removal of restrictions on provision of logistical support to Nationalist operations against the Communists. These proposals came before the National Security Council as NSC 101, but with State opposed to several provisions, particularly Nationalist operations against the mainland, the council asked for more study on 17 January. Unsatisfied, Marshall wanted the council to come to grips with China policy, weighing UN support for the United States against U.S. security needs.

As the Korean battlefield situation began to improve, the Joint Chiefs looked less favorably on military involvement in Formosa, and on 30 January they told State representatives that their objective was primarily to "deny the island to a hostile government." A week later the Joint Chiefs dropped their recommendation to allow Nationalist operations against the mainland on the premise that the United States should do "nothing to spread the war outside Korea." With State and Defense more in agreement, the NSC dropped consideration of the 101 series; so long as the war in Korea did not spread, neutralization of Formosa by the Seventh Fleet would continue. If Formosa were attacked, however, the United States expected the Nationalists to assist in its defense. On 28 February the Joint Chiefs told MacArthur the Nationalists might retaliate in the event of a clearly identified Communist air or sea attack against the island. The JCS endorsed immediate U.S. retaliation with prior
approval from Washington if the Chinese Communists attacked American forces outside of Korea. 54

Truman's dismissal of MacArthur on 11 April thrust the Formosan question prominently into the public debate on national strategy and policy. In his address to Congress on 19 April, MacArthur argued that the loss of Formosa would endanger the entire U.S. defense line in the Pacific. In addition to other measures, he advocated removal of restrictions on Nationalist operations and U.S. logistical support for those operations. Testifying before Senate committees on 3 May, MacArthur claimed that Nationalist forces should have been used in Korea once the Chinese Communists attacked and that the failure to do so had cost thousands of UNC lives. 55 Four days later Marshall rebutted these charges, not only expressing doubt about the Nationalists' military effectiveness but testifying that MacArthur's recommendations would have forfeited the friendship of U.S. allies and risked war with mainland China and perhaps all-out war with the Soviets. The secretary stated his support of U.S. policy to "deny Formosa to Communist China and to oppose the seating of Communist Chinese in the United Nations." 56

Review of Policy: NSC 48/5

Beyond the public glare, Marshall, Acheson, and others had meanwhile been reviewing overall U.S. policy in the Far East, as expressed in NSC 48/2, approved on 30 December 1949. In a March 1951 study of Nationalist military effectiveness, the JCS concluded that Chiang would have great difficulty maintaining himself on Formosa for a year without Seventh Fleet's protection. As for overt Nationalist operations against the mainland, the JCS believed that U.S. support was indispensable but would likely be unavailing in terms of achieving ultimate success. For the time they recommended that the Nationalists be equipped austerely and trained for an eventual campaign against the PRC. 57

When the NSC on 2 May took up the question of Formosa in a draft of NSC 48/3, it seemed to Acheson that the Joint Chiefs were leaning toward providing an unlimited increase in U.S. aid to the Nationalists and holding Formosa for an "indefinite period or forever." Acheson preferred to limit U.S. assistance to support only defense of the island but saw the possibility that a mainland resistance movement "might make use of the Nationalist resources

* These were intensification of the economic blockade of China, naval blockade of the China coast, air reconnaissance of China's coastal area and Manchuria, and by implication, at least, bombing north of the Yalu.
on Formosa." He remained flexible on an ultimate settlement, stating that the island should be kept "out of the hands of an unfriendly China, not out of the hands of a friendly China." Marshall expressed no views at the time.\textsuperscript{38}

At the final NSC discussion of a revised text for NSC 48/4 on 16 May, Lovett suggested inserting the word "non-Communist" in the statement, "Detach China as an effective ally of the USSR and support the development of an independent [non-Communist] China which has renounced aggression." Acheson demurred, saying that although he hoped ultimately for a non-Communist China, he would be satisfied, at least temporarily, to get a "Titoist China opposed to the Soviet Union." The president agreed with Acheson, the council adopted NSC 48/5, and Truman approved it the following day.\textsuperscript{59}

NSC 48/5 retained the Seventh Fleet's mission to neutralize Formosa as long as required by U.S. security interests. It encouraged such political changes in the Nationalist regime as would "increase its prestige and influence in China proper." U.S. military and economic assistance to the Nationalists was intended to aid them in defending the island and participating in possible defensive or offensive operations against Chinese Communist aggression outside Korea. NSC 48/5 offered no long-term U.S. commitment to support the Nationalists, to defend the island beyond the mission of the Seventh Fleet, or to help Chiang Kai-shek return to the mainland. While it reiterated U.S. recognition of the Nationalists as the legal government of all China, it also advocated actions on the mainland that might eventually undermine Chiang's role—development of a non-Communist leadership, influencing leaders and people to reorient their Communist government, and the fostering of an indigenous resistance against the PRC. These activities represented State's hope of finding a "third force" around which dissidents in China might rally and within which Nationalist forces might eventually find a role.\textsuperscript{40} This hope proved impossible of achievement.

A direct means by which to implement NSC 48/5 guidance on Formosa was through the military aid process.\textsuperscript{41} A U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) under Maj. Gen. William C. Chase, sent to Formosa in the spring of 1951, became one of the chief instruments for controlling the Nationalists' use of U.S. assistance.\textsuperscript{42}

On the basis of the Fox survey report of September 1950, Defense set up a FY 1951 military assistance program of $71.2 million, but no materiel deliveries beyond the original MacArthur request were made through mid-1951. Although the military assistance program for FY 1952 was cut to

\* The Nationalists proved adept at putting their economic house in order, and in 1952 adopted the principle of a balanced budget, winning Lovett's praise for demonstrating how aid could lead to "self-help."
approximately $190 million from the $237 million recommended by Defense, combined military-economic assistance for the Nationalists amounted to around $300 million, the largest aid program on a per capita basis. Still, at the end of 1951 the cumulative total of all deliveries amounted to less than $25 million.  

As it turned out, despite efforts to use the aid package as a lever to promote policy objectives, the military assistance program in this period proved strangely counterproductive. The large programs planned nourished the Nationalists' hope of returning to the mainland but did nothing to encourage emergence of a "third force" within mainland China, which was the U.S. preference. The United States intended that "every penny . . . [be] properly and effectively used," but the lack of deliveries no doubt weakened General Chase's ability to recommend reforms to the Nationalists, who interpreted the slow deliveries and the effort to find a third force on the mainland as indications of U.S. disfavor.  

By the fall of 1951, U.S. strategy choices had narrowed considerably. The Korean armistice talks were foundering, no third force leadership could be found in China, and Communist operations had decimated mainland guerrilla groups and left the mainland populace fearful and passive. Weak as they were, the Nationalists on Formosa seemed to be the only card in the U.S. hand.  

Still not satisfied with U.S. policy as expressed in NSC 48/5, the Joint Chiefs on 24 October 1951, reacting to a proposed UN consideration of the Formosan question, wrote what Frank Nash, assistant for international security affairs, described to Lovett as the "strongest of many strong JCS memoranda on the subject." For the foreseeable future, the JCS wanted Formosa denied to any Communist power and its government oriented to the United States. International consideration of the island's final status should be delayed until peace and security had returned in the Pacific. The JCS wanted the United States to support a friendly Chinese regime on Formosa, develop its military potential, and "place due emphasis on the well-being and wishes of the Chinese Nationalist population." U.S. security interests in Formosa, the chiefs concluded, were sufficient to override Allied political concerns, and the United States should if necessary act unilaterally to maintain its military position on the island.  

When Lovett transmitted the JCS views to State, he suggested a reexamination of NSC 48/5, but State was unwilling. Another opportunity for reappraisal came in late 1951 when CIA director Walter Bedell Smith, worried about the "waning" U.S. assets in the Far East, wrote Lovett on 11 December that both the Chinese mainland guerrilla forces and the Nationalists on Formosa needed to be "strengthened, built up, and used within the immediate foreseeable future" if they were to be of any benefit to the United States. He
suggested rotating Nationalist troops to the Korean front and using them for raids against the mainland from the offshore islands. But even though Truman on 20 December approved a policy of using covert operations against mainland China if the Korean armistice negotiations were indefinitely delayed or failed, the president specifically declared that NSC 48/5 still expressed U.S. Formosan policy.

Smith again wrote Lovett on 30 January 1952 to report that Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), soon to assume responsibility for defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, agreed with the CIA’s views. The Joint Chiefs, too, were in basic agreement with Smith. On 4 March they wrote Lovett that, because of Formosa’s major importance to U.S. security interests, the United States should deny it to any Soviet-allied Chinese regime, take unilateral action if necessary to retain it as a base for possible U.S. military operations, continue Seventh Fleet protection until the Nationalists could assume its defense, and develop the potential of a friendly Chinese regime on the island. U.S. military aid for defensive purposes and for possible future overt offensive action should be continued, the JCS said, but organized Nationalist units should not be used for covert activities in the Far East. Frank Nash thought that Smith’s points were inadequately treated in NSC 48/5 and that the JCS views were not fully consistent with it; on 22 March Defense submitted the JCS opinions for examination.

\textit{NSC 128: The Failure to Find an Offensive Mission}

When the council took up the JCS views as NSC 128 on 2 April, Truman emphasized that policy on Formosa was subject to debate. Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster urged immediate review of the JCS paper, but the president, following Acheson’s advice, directed that State and Defense, with a CIA representative present, study the paper. It soon became clear that State was willing to arm and train the Nationalists for a future offensive role but did not want to define that role or to change the current U.S. policy against Nationalist operations on the mainland. The JCS, on the other hand, wanted to continue Seventh Fleet’s mission to defend Formosa from attack but no longer to stand in the way of Nationalist operations.

While Defense and State views remained divergent, the possibility of a PRC assault on the offshore islands began to look serious, and the two departments agreed to the Nationalist defense of the islands, if the Nationalists so chose. The United States would give no direct aid but would allow the use of limited amounts of materiel already supplied. The defensive mission of the Nationalist Chinese was thus broadened. In the Pentagon on 15 July, the
Armed Forces Policy Council considered expediting the readiness of the Nationalist divisions for possible use in Korea, and in August the JCS formally stated that the Nationalist divisions could be trained and ready within months of receiving the necessary equipment.  

Lovett took the matter of using Nationalist forces in Korea to the president, who authorized further interdepartmental study. Many of the earlier arguments on the subject came up again: It would be more expensive than training more South Korean divisions, introduce a new language and communications problem, irritate U.S. allies, engender South Korean resentment, possibly end the peace talks, and become a political issue in the 1952 presidential campaign. While State apparently had little objection to arming and training Nationalist divisions for offensive operations, it still did not want to agree to any specific operation, including their use in Korea. Lovett, on the other hand, seemed averse to spending large sums of money on Nationalist divisions unless they had a specific mission. At a White House meeting on 24 September, Truman spoke of the Formosan question as politically sensitive and thought the main value of the Nationalists was their potential threat to the China coast rather than their employment in Korea. By this time the Nationalist government also held the view that its own interests lay in defending Formosa and increasing pressure against the Chinese mainland until it could be recaptured.  

The administration did not complete work on NSC 128, and NSC 48/5 remained in force. The mission of the Seventh Fleet remained unchanged—to defend Formosa and the Pescadores against Chinese Communist attack and to restrain the Nationalists from attacking the Chinese mainland. Thus, during the Truman administration the JCS never realized their desire to utilize Nationalist forces in offensive operations.  

In the meantime, deliveries for the large-scale military assistance program lagged and did not pick up substantially until the end of 1952. Total deliveries for 1950 and 1951 amounted to less than $25 million; almost as much arrived between January and June 1952, when cumulative total shipments reached $47.8 million. By the end of December 1952 the total amounted to $104.3 million, with approved programs of more than $376 million for fiscal years 1951 through 1953. The scale of this assistance made it clear that the Nationalists were to be trained and equipped to an extent that did not preclude possible future offensive operations.  

When Eisenhower became president in January 1953, he interpreted the Truman order to the Seventh Fleet as requiring the "United States Navy . . . to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China," and in February he rescinded the order. At that time Chiang promised to consult with the U.S. government before making any sizable attack on the mainland. Later he gave
the United States base rights on Formosa, and in 1954 the two governments concluded a mutual defense treaty. Formally, at least, the policy of neutralization ended with the change in U.S. administrations.57

The Formosa issue and the events of the Korean War shaped the course of U.S. relations with the two Chinas for the next two decades. The bitterness, suspicion, and distrust of the years of fighting carried over into the postwar period and prevented the establishment of normal relations between the United States and the PRC. On two occasions—in 1954 and 1958—the United States overtly supported the Nationalists when the Chinese Communists threatened hostilities against Formosa. The Defense Department stand on the strategic importance of Formosa to the United States position in the Pacific and the consequent imperative to deny it to the PRC remained a basic element in U.S. Pacific policy. The perception of the PRC and communism as a threat to other parts of East Asia profoundly affected U.S. policy throughout the area, especially in Japan and southeast Asia. In particular, this perception of the PRC helped drive the United States into a deepening involvement in Indochina and eventually into another unwanted war.
CHAPTER X
Japan: A New Relationship

With the fate of Formosa uncertain and the Chinese mainland in the unfriendly hands of Mao Tse-tung, Japan took on a vital strategic significance as the anchor in the U.S. defense line in the Pacific running from the Aleutians to the Philippines. Perhaps as much as any other factor, the threat to Japan posed by the North Korean attack compelled U.S. action in June 1950. As Robert Lovett remarked in retrospect, Soviet intentions in the Far East pointed "a dagger at the heart of Japan," and Korea could not be permitted to fall to communism. In turn, the war in Korea forced the United States to review its relationship with Japan.¹

Situation in June 1950

Defeat in World War II was costly to the Japanese. They lost Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores to China and the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. The United States occupied the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and became the UN trustee for the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands. In June 1950 Japan itself remained under Allied occupation, nominally supervised by an 11-nation (later 13-nation) Far Eastern Commission headquartered in Washington and a 4-power Allied Council in Tokyo. The Soviets were represented in both organizations. Actual occupation authority resided in General MacArthur as Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo.²

The July 1945 Potsdam declaration—approved by the United States, Great Britain, and the Chinese Nationalists*—provided that postwar Japan would be occupied until a new order of peace, security, and justice was established in

* Chiang Kai-shek was not present at Potsdam; he sent approval by wire.
the world and "convincing proof" existed that the Japanese could no longer make war. Disarmed, occupied, and demilitarized, the Japanese in 1947 adopted a constitution renouncing maintenance of a military establishment and the use of force, apparently reflecting the sentiment of the people. As early as March 1947 General MacArthur publicly suggested signing a peace treaty with Japan and ending the occupation, declaring that its people were ready for responsible democratic government. The State Department's attempt to call a peace conference at that time failed, however, because of disagreement, particularly by the Chinese and Soviets, on matters of procedure and substance.  

Official U.S. policy, set forth in NSC 13/2 (1948) and 13/3 (1949), stated that the United States should avoid pressing for a treaty but should be ready to act whenever the Allies could agree on procedure. The United States meanwhile should prepare the Japanese for independence and seek preliminary Allied agreement on a treaty that was to be "as brief, as general, and as non-punitive as possible." Moreover, the United States should reduce its occupation forces in Japan and minimize their psychological impact; whether such forces would remain after a treaty would depend on then current conditions. The United States would retain facilities on Okinawa and certain other outlying islands for the long term and develop Yokosuka naval base in the Japanese home islands, anticipating its post-treaty "retention on a commercial basis." Japanese internal security forces were to be strengthened. U.S. aid, it was expected, would advance the country's economic recovery and there were to be "no further industrial reparations removals from Japan and no limitation on levels of Japanese peaceful productive capacity."  

This expression of policy did not entirely satisfy either State or Defense. Acheson favored an early treaty as a way of freeing the Truman administration to concentrate on its European commitments and permit Japan's transformation into a U.S. political and economic ally. Secretary of Defense Johnson sided with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who thought a treaty premature. They expressed concern over the continued availability to U.S. forces of bases in Japan, aggressive Soviet expansionism, and the risk of losing Japan.  

The JCS and Johnson held to these views in spite of Acheson's request for JCS reassessment of the question in October 1949. NSC 48/2, on 30 December 1949, deferred formal decision on a Japanese treaty, but in February 1950 President Truman asked State and Defense to prepare a new paper for the National Security Council on the subject. General MacArthur remained firm in support of the immediate negotiation of a treaty.

Further talks did not resolve the differences between the two departments. In an effort to proceed, Acheson on 18 May 1950 appointed John Foster Dulles, a respected international lawyer with support in the Republican Party, to head a State Department study group on the Japanese question.
A State–Defense Agreement

Fully occupied with Korea after 25 June, Johnson delegated supervision of Japanese treaty matters to his assistant for foreign affairs, James H. Burns. Dulles, believing that the outbreak of the Korean War made a treaty more necessary than ever, proceeded, with Acheson's and Truman's approval, to prepare a draft which State sent to Johnson. When Dulles telephoned Johnson on 3 August to talk over the paper, the secretary asserted that with a war on he had no time to discuss a peace treaty for Japan; moreover, he claimed, Dulles's draft did not conform to the views of either the JCS or MacArthur. Johnson said that MacArthur had reversed his original position and had sent him a second memorandum on the subject. Dulles replied that he had seen MacArthur's most recent memorandum and that the treaty draft did accord with MacArthur's position in the second memorandum. The treaty draft gave the United States the "right to maintain in Japan as much force as we wanted, anywhere we wanted, for as long as we wanted." When Dulles asked how the Pentagon could ask for more, Johnson agreed that, if this were the case, State and Defense could "get together and go places."

Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, working under Burns, and John M. Allison, deputy to Dulles, headed a small State–Defense committee, and interdepartmental agreement seemed nearer when MacArthur reported that he liked the Dulles draft. In late August, however, the Joint Chiefs were still reluctant to agree to a treaty and viewed Japan's full independence as far in the future. If negotiations for a treaty were politically necessary, they wanted the occupation continued, specific conditions included, and the treaty not signed until a favorable settlement of the Korean War. In any event, they deemed Dulles's current draft inadequate to safeguard U.S. security interests and therefore unacceptable.

Although Johnson conveyed the JCS position to Acheson and the president, he offered to have Magruder help iron out the differences and agreed that the two departments could list principles to govern negotiations rather than bicker over specific language. Allison and Magruder prepared such a list and a draft report, both satisfactory to the JCS; on 7 September 1950 Johnson and Acheson signed a joint memorandum to Truman.

The joint memorandum marked the first State–Defense agreement on a Japanese treaty. It provided that the United States should proceed with preliminary negotiations, but the treaty should become effective only when U.S. interests dictated and "in no event" before the Korean War's favorable conclusion. The treaty was to deny all Japanese resources to the Soviets and guarantee that no unacceptable foreign forces would be allowed south of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands; continue the U.S. strategic trusteeship over
the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands; and provide exclusive U.S. strategic control over Marcus Island, the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan, and the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north. The treaty would not prohibit Japanese self-defense, would provide for at least initial garrisoning in Japan of forces under a U.S. military command, and would specify that the United States could maintain armed forces in the country "wherever, for so long, and to such extent as it deems necessary," with specific terms of their relationship to the Japanese to be handled in a separate bilateral agreement. As one State Department officer wrote, the "brutally frank terms" of the memorandum represented State's concession to the military.\(^{14}\)

Truman approved the joint memorandum on 8 September and sent it to the National Security Council, where it became NSC 60/1. In September the president publicly stated that he had authorized informal discussions with other governments on a Japanese peace treaty, and by October State was holding preliminary conversations with representatives of the countries on the Far Eastern Commission, including the Soviet Union.\(^{15}\) In November State circulated its views that a peace treaty should recognize Korean independence and provide for U.S. administration of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and for great power disposition of Formosa, the Pescadores, South Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. There were to be no reparations, and U.S.-Japanese cooperation was to be maintained pending the creation of alternative security arrangements. Defense meanwhile completed a draft of a separate U.S.-Japanese mutual security treaty, which the State Department and General MacArthur began to review early in November.\(^{16}\)

**Effect of Chinese Intervention in Korea**

The massive Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in late November created a crisis in planning for Japan. State and Defense agreed that the attack increased the possibility of general war and heightened Japan's vulnerability, but they disagreed on a course of action. The military believed that the Korean crisis dictated continuation of the occupation, while State chafed under the restrictions of the joint memorandum. On 13 December Acheson wrote Marshall asking for Defense opinion on concluding a peace treaty before the Korean War ended, committing U.S. forces to the defense of the Pacific island chain, returning the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to Japan, and exploring a Pacific pact. He proposed sending a mission immediately, headed by Dulles and with Defense representation, to discuss a treaty in Tokyo.\(^{17}\)

Defense reactions varied. MacArthur again supported an early peace conference and the restoration of Japanese sovereignty, but he viewed the
possible return of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands as strategically "unthinkable." Initially negative toward immediate negotiations, the Joint Chiefs met with State Department officials on 3 January 1951 and agreed to the commitment of substantial U.S. defense forces to the Pacific island chain and to discussions of a possible Pacific pact with U.S. allies. State in turn was to try to secure continued U.S. strategic control over the Ryukyus and Bonins. The JCS still worried about the effect of a Japanese peace treaty on the Korean situation and whether it might provoke overt Soviet action against Japan. Nonetheless, after discussing the matter, Marshall and Acheson on 9 January advised Truman to amend the terms of the 7 September 1950 agreement immediately.

Affirming U.S. willingness to commit a "substantial armed force" to the defense of the Pacific island chain and to join a security arrangement with Pacific island nations, Truman appointed Dulles his special representative as peace negotiator, but without authority to make any final U.S. commitments. Accompanied by Army Assistant Secretary Earl D. Johnson, General Magruder, and Col. C. Stanton Babcock as Defense representatives, Dulles left for Tokyo on 22 January. The Joint Chiefs no doubt welcomed the understanding that a peace settlement would come into effect only after the exchange of ratifications, a process that presumably offered an opportunity to control the timing.

In early 1951 the great debate over foreign policy, and in particular the dispatch of U.S. divisions to Europe as part of the NATO forces, was coming to a head. So too was the matter of providing U.S. reinforcements for Japan, which had been almost denuded of U.S. troops since the start of the Korean War. The Joint Chiefs had rejected MacArthur's initial request for four National Guard divisions to bolster Japanese security, but on 29 January they offered to send two divisions in March, with no public announcement because of fear of adverse effect in Europe, where the NATO countries eagerly awaited a strong American military presence. However, when it became apparent that sending troops to Japan might make the Soviet global threat seem more immediate and therefore might help rather than hurt the administration's case in the congressional debate over troops for Europe, Truman approved the shipment of the two divisions on 23 February, and Marshall saw to the issuance of a public announcement prior to his appearance before a congressional committee. The two divisions actually reached Japan in April.

The Dulles mission, which arrived in Tokyo on 25 January, succeeded in reaching a general agreement with the Japanese, who were greatly encouraged because the U.S. terms were much more generous than expected. Despite Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's fears of resurgent Japanese militarism, he was receptive to the proposed security arrangement with the United States but
preferred, because of the Japanese public's attitude and the antiwar clause in the country's constitution, to incorporate it in a separate administrative agreement subject to approval by executive action alone. Yoshida also informally agreed to continued U.S. use of Japan as a base for the duration of the Korean War. These agreements, as Dulles pointed out, were subject to U.S. negotiation with its allies.

On visits to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, Dulles found little sympathy for the proposed Japanese settlement. The Philippine government wanted $8 billion in reparations and a guarantee that the Chinese Nationalists would retain Formosa, a move the Filipinos thought far more important to their security than a Pacific pact. The Australians opposed guaranteeing Formosa to the Nationalists, and neither Australia nor New Zealand would accept a nonpunitive Japanese treaty without specific and adequate security assurances from the United States. Dulles proceeded to negotiate a draft mutual security pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS).

Following Dulles's return to Washington, Acheson decided that the single Pacific pact idea should be dropped in favor of separate U.S. security arrangements—with Japan, with the Philippines, and with Australia and New Zealand. As he wrote Marshall in early April, the Japanese peace treaty and Pacific arrangements had political significance in the upcoming Australian elections and in persuading the British to accept a treaty not prohibiting Japanese rearmament. Acheson also suggested that Truman should make a public statement.

In the Pentagon, the Army, Navy, and Air Force secretaries preferred the original idea of a general Pacific pact and recommended to Marshall a bilateral agreement with Japan; they opposed a presidential statement. The Joint Chiefs did not object to the notion of several security pacts but wanted a presidential statement to reflect certain of their views. They wanted the U.S.–Japanese security arrangement and the peace treaty to come into effect at the same time, preferred an informal trilateral arrangement rather than a formal pact with Australia and New Zealand so as to avoid demands for coordinated planning, and suggested dealing individually with other security problems in the Pacific. Concurring in the JCS position, Marshall also informed Acheson of the service secretaries' admonition against a presidential statement. Dulles redrafted a planned presidential statement to Marshall's satisfaction, and Truman released it on 18 April. It noted the progress already made on security arrangements in the Pacific and indicated that the United States would move ahead on separate agreements with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia and New Zealand. The timing was fortuitous, for the Japanese peace treaty had apparently received a setback because of General MacArthur's recall.
Toward a Peace Treaty

The dismissal of MacArthur on 11 April stilled the strongest pro-treaty voice inside Defense. Shocked by MacArthur's firing and worried about the possible adverse effects, Dulles debated whether to continue with negotiations. Persuaded by strong assurances of support from Truman and Acheson, Dulles returned to Tokyo in mid-April to reassure the Japanese that no major change in U.S. policy was contemplated and to inform them of the difficulties posed by the Allies.

The joint Chiefs remained strongly opposed to an immediate treaty. Given the president's determination to move forward, they accepted early signing of a treaty, but they wanted it to come into effect only later, certainly not before U.S. garrison divisions were in place in Japan and the bilateral security treaty and its implementing administrative agreement were operative. They still disliked Dulles's draft treaty with Australia and New Zealand. Sending the JCS views to Acheson, Marshall promised a final Defense position later. An obviously angered Dulles cabled from Tokyo that any delay would be "disastrous to U.S. prestige in Asia" and that, if Defense resisted, State should appeal to Truman. Meeting with Dulles, Earl Johnson, the Joint Chiefs, and the service secretaries on 25 April, Marshall tried to effect an accommodation; he felt that the Korean situation could be stabilized so that some U.S. troops could be returned to Japan and that the United States should proceed with the treaty.

Pushing hard for a settlement, State on 27 April initiated planning to take over certain nonmilitary functions in Japan currently handled by the occupation authorities. General Ridgway protested directly to Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs objected that such planning would magnify security risks and diminish U.S. military authority. Although there was some feeling in OSD that the Joint Chiefs might be overreacting, Marshall strongly urged Acheson not to diminish Ridgway's authority in Japan, to confine planning to Americans and U.S. government agencies in Washington, and to implement no plans until after the end of Korean hostilities and further Department of Defense consideration. Undoubtedly aware of JCS sensibilities, Acheson acceded, at least temporarily.

A major problem in the spring of 1951 was getting consent to a nonpunitive treaty from the wartime Allies, particularly the British, who still wanted a "war guilt" clause, some reparations, and limits on Japanese rearmament. The British also thought the Chinese Communists should

* In July 1951, with the peace treaty imminent, Acheson renewed the request and transfer planning resumed.
participate in the treaty and be given Formosa, while the Soviets should get South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. A compromise Anglo–American version of the treaty, readyed in early May, appeared less benevolent than Dulles's earlier draft. It provided for Japanese renunciation of all claims to Formosa, as well as South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, but with no final disposition of those islands. Neither Chinese government was to sign the peace treaty; the Japanese were to decide later with which one to make peace separately. The Allied right to reparations was recognized in principle, and Japan was to negotiate compensation separately with the various countries. The draft recognized Japan's "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense."

Once the British accepted the treaty draft on 21 June Acheson was anxious to move ahead. But the Joint Chiefs, reiterating a number of previous concerns, now held that the treaty should not come into force until U.S. ratification was completed, clearly indicating, Marshall wrote Acheson, that they objected to its "coming into force as between Japan and any of the Allied powers until after the date of its ratification by the United States." Aware that this meant giving the United States, in effect, "unlimited control over the actions of its sovereign allies," Marshall suggested that the president decide the matter. While Marshall testified before a congressional committee on 29 June, Lovett reported to Truman that Marshall felt that State's advice on the treaty should be "pretty nearly controlling." Since the current draft provided that the treaty was not to come into effect until nine months after Japanese ratification, Lovett reported that Marshall thought that Dulles had already accomplished a great deal. The president ruled in favor of the treaty as it stood.

Still unhappy after reviewing the latest draft of the treaty, the Joint Chiefs wrote Marshall that there was no assurance that the bilateral security treaty would come into effect simultaneously; Lovett wrote State that he shared their concern. On 20 July State circulated a semifinal Anglo–American treaty draft and an invitation to a concluding conference to all states that had been at war with Japan. Although there seemed to be little initial enthusiasm for the peace treaty, even among the co-sponsoring British, only Burma, India, and Yugoslavia refused to attend the conference. Even the Soviet Union accepted.

**Security in the Pacific**

The Japanese peace treaty was almost ready for signature, but much work remained on the subsidiary security treaties and agreements. As drafted in early February 1951 and revised in July, the security treaty gave the United
States the right to station land, sea, and air forces in and about Japan and denied that right to any third power. The security treaty would come into effect when ratified and would expire when the U.S. and Japanese governments felt that area peace had been adequately provided for otherwise. It also called for a separate administrative agreement on stationing U.S. troops in Japan.

Despite previous coordination, the Joint Chiefs complained to Marshall on 17 July that the proposed security treaty was inadequate in not providing specifically for U.S. use of Japan as a base for military operations whether or not such operations were under UN aegis and in not granting permission for UNC forces to support Korean operations through Japan as long as necessary. Marshall obtained Acheson's assurances that the peace treaty and other security treaties would go into effect simultaneously. By 2 August the two departments had agreed on the text, including some changes by the Japanese. On 11 August Lovett formally accepted the language of the security treaty and concurred in State's plan to publish it only just before the peace conference.

No State-Defense understanding existed, however, on the administrative agreement that was the key to the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. The Pentagon, in fact, was still studying a draft prepared in Tokyo in February 1951 and acceptable to the Japanese. On 15 August State informed Marshall that the Defense delay made it doubtful that an administrative agreement could be signed by the time of the peace conference in early September. The Joint Chiefs wanted a complete revision of the document, insisting that it be signed concurrently with the peace and security treaties; that it give the United States the unilateral right to appoint a U.S. supreme commander over all U.S. and Japanese forces in the event of an emergency; and that Japan grant the United States exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all U.S. troops, civilian employees, and dependents remaining in Japan.

In OSD, Assistant Secretary Daniel Edwards advised Lovett against supporting a demand that carried the "flavor of that extraterritoriality which is so obnoxious to oriental peoples" and would preclude Japan's return to full sovereignty. Lovett sent the JCS views to State as an expression of the purely military point of view, with the idea of working out adjustments. State officials, however, found the JCS recommendations utterly unacceptable because they demeaned Japan and betokened a military philosophy that would make it impossible to carry out U.S. "diplomatic policy toward Japan, to say nothing of the rest of the Far East." Such fundamental differences could not be readily reconciled, and the two departments remained at odds over the U.S.-Japanese administrative agreement.

Concerning the trilateral ANZUS security treaty, the Joint Chiefs opposed
anything that suggested combined military planning, especially a proposed
Pacific council that might ally itself with other regional organizations such as
NATO and involve the United States in endless interregional planning. They
therefore wanted to require unanimous consent by all ANZUS treaty parties
before other Pacific nations could be invited to join—a view in direct conflict
with that of the Australians, who preferred broad arrangements with Euro­
pean states having Pacific interests and other international security groups.
Eventually, after meeting with Defense representatives, Dulles agreed to
demote the Pacific Council to a simple “council” to consider “matters
concerning the implementation of this treaty” and limited the consultative
relationship to Pacific countries. Acheson later claimed that these concessions
were “a consolation prize” given the Joint Chiefs for losing the fight to delay
the peace treaty. In August 1951 the ANZUS treaty was finally ready for
signature.44

As for a security pact with the Philippines, the Joint Chiefs recommended
against a formal treaty since the United States had already guaranteed that
country’s security and defense, stationed U.S. armed forces there, and
provided military aid. However, a month before the scheduled Japanese peace
conference, the Philippine government, distressed at the lack of American
support for its $8 billion reparations claim against the Japanese, strongly
protested U.S. “discriminations.” Acheson then proposed to Marshall a
separate security treaty with no provision for bilateral military consultations
and leaving undisturbed the “particularly advantageous” U.S. military
arrangements.45 The service secretaries wanted “positive assurance” that the
Filipinos would sign the Japanese peace treaty, but the Joint Chiefs offered no
major objections. Dulles soon found, however, that the Philippine govern­
ment wanted the same kind of formal consultation that had been accorded the
Australians. Although State inserted a new provision to this effect in the treaty,
Acheson assured Lovett that it was devised to avoid setting up a council similar
to that in the ANZUS treaty. Seeing “no objection . . . from a military point
of view,” General Bradley decided not to convene the JCS to consider the
matter.46

Differing views between State and Defense on the meaning and intent of
the three mutual security pacts surfaced again in August in reaction to some
remarks Dulles drafted for presentation by Truman at the forthcoming San
Francisco peace conference. Dulles’s emphasis that security in the Pacific had
been put on a collective basis aroused General Bradley’s fear that the “United
States could become so entangled in collective security as to limit its freedom
of action.” The military wanted the right to act in the Pacific area without
formal multilateral consultations, and they wanted the president’s speech to
accord with their view that there was “no present authorization for suggesting
a form of Pacific NATO.” In a speech at San Francisco, Truman described the three security treaties as “regional arrangements for the common defense against aggression” and “initial steps toward the consolidation of peace in the Pacific,” but he did not suggest creating in the Pacific the complex structure of multinational bodies and joint planning that characterized NATO.

The Pacific security treaties did not guarantee that the United States would automatically go to war in the event another signatory was attacked, since they provided only that each party would act to meet the common danger “in accordance with its Constitutional processes.” Nonetheless, as Frank Nash told Lovett, there was a feeling that the United States was “setting forth a new program of security in its broadest sense for the free nations of Asia and the Pacific.” The security treaties would ensure against any future aggression from within the treaty area, assuage fears of a rearmed Japan, and provide for the use of force in the common interest to repel external aggression. With the Philippine–United States Mutual Defense Treaty signed in Washington on 30 August 1951 and the ANZUS Treaty signed on 1 September in San Francisco, the stage was set for the Japanese peace conference.

The San Francisco conference opened on 4 September, with more than 50 nations in attendance, to consider a peace treaty that had grown to 21 pages from the original 8-page Dulles draft. Proposing rigorous procedural rules that would allow no alteration of the treaty’s text, Acheson and Dulles planned to forestall any Soviet moves for a “wrecking” operation. Once the conference adopted the rules, there was little the Soviet bloc could do; the Soviet, Polish, and Czechoslovakian delegates walked out. On 8 September, 49 countries signed the treaty; later that same day the United States and Japan signed their bilateral mutual security pact.

Although Marshall, about to retire, had played a major role in bringing about Defense acceptance of a Japanese treaty while the Korean War was still going on, neither he nor Lovett attended the conference. Instead, Nash represented the Defense Department. Marshall passed on to military officials Acheson’s warning just before the conference began that U.S. defense agencies should be alert to the “increased risks.” When Acheson, surprised by the Soviets’ lack of aggressiveness at San Francisco, suggested that they might be preparing for a “large scale offensive in Korea,” Marshall warned Bradley that the Joint Chiefs should give the matter “very serious consideration.”

Post-Treaty Problems and Policy

Marshall’s successor, Lovett, well understood that the signing of the peace treaty and the Pacific security pacts did not complete the work required for
the transformation from U.S. occupation to Japanese sovereignty. Many matters in which Defense had a strong interest still had to be settled—Japan's choice in recognizing a Chinese government, completion of the U.S.-Japanese administrative agreement, ratification of the peace and security treaties, and the treatment to be accorded Japan before the peace treaty came into force. On all of these questions there were fundamental differences between State and the JCS. In addition, the attitude of the Japanese constituted a key new element in the evolving relationship.\(^5^2\)

Although the Japanese ostensibly were free to choose which Chinese government to recognize, the Joint Chiefs opposed Japanese rapprochement with Communist China, for which there appeared to be support in Japan. Fifty-six U.S. senators advised Truman in mid-September that the "wrong" Japanese decision would damage the peace treaty's chances of U.S. ratification. The British favored Japanese recognition of Communist China, and when Yoshida appeared to waver, the United States promptly applied diplomatic pressure.\(^5^3\) In November 1951 the Japanese opened a Government Overseas Agency on Formosa, the highest form of diplomatic recognition available to them at that time. The next month Yoshida assured the United States that Japan would establish normal relations with the Nationalist Chinese as soon as the peace treaty was ratified.\(^5^4\)

Earlier, in October, the Japanese began to demonstrate their post-treaty independence quite clearly, when Yoshida indicated that he wanted U.S. military authorities to release many requisitioned buildings, and in particular to move General Ridgway's Tokyo headquarters from the prestigious Dai Ichi building, across from the Imperial Palace. When a State Department spokesman in Japan publicly affirmed that the building would be returned to the Japanese after the occupation ended, the matter became an issue between State and Defense.\(^5^5\) After Ridgway protested strongly that the change would weaken his position, Bradley took the issue directly to Lovett and Defense notified State on 23 November that, insofar as it was concerned, the Dai Ichi question had most definitely not been decided.\(^5^6\)

After San Francisco, Defense regarded as a pressing objective the conclusion of an administrative agreement implementing the terms of the U.S.-Japanese mutual security treaty. Dulles rejected a JCS-revised text as "unsatisfactory" because it treated the Japanese "as defeated enemies and as orientals having qualities inferior to those of occidentals." State and the JCS remained at loggerheads over the issue of exclusive U.S. criminal jurisdiction.\(^5^7\) Finally,

\(^*\) The Japanese and Nationalist Chinese governments signed a bilateral peace treaty at Taipei, Formosa, on 28 April 1952, a few hours before Japan regained sovereignty under the San Francisco treaty.
in mid-January 1952 Truman approved negotiation of the administrative agreement as an executive agreement, accepted a current draft as an initial U.S. position, and ruled against any U.S. discrimination between European and Japanese governments on the matter of criminal jurisdiction. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk began negotiations with the Japanese on 29 January. 58

State planned to solve the problem of criminal jurisdiction by applying the NATO formula to Japan. Lovett, however, argued that this meant using a procedure not yet ratified by the United States; moreover, it would give Japan more power over U.S. forces than that exercised by some European allies. Indeed, with conditions varying widely from country to country in Europe, there was no clear NATO precedent. State and Defense finally agreed that the United States should have exclusive criminal jurisdiction in Japan until ratification of the NATO accord or the lapse of one year after the signing of the administrative agreement. After either of these events the Japanese could request reconsideration. Pleased with the idea of parity with NATO, the Japanese eventually accepted this formula. 59

Lovett supported the JCS position that Ridgway as CINCFE should have sufficient authority to carry out his operational duties in the event of an emergency. The January 1952 State–Defense draft provided, at JCS insistence, that if hostilities occurred or threatened, the United States would establish a combined U.S.–Japanese command and designate its commander. 60 Japanese resistance to such an explicit arrangement eventually resulted in a statement calling for the two governments merely to consult on what to do. Once again the two countries postponed detailed planning for a collective security arrangement; they signed the administrative agreement on 28 February. 61

Defense welcomed completion of the administrative agreement since the Senate already was considering the peace and security treaties, ratified by the Japanese in November 1951. On 20 March 1952 the Senate approved both of these treaties, and in April it confirmed as U.S. ambassador Robert Murphy, a man known for his ability to deal with both diplomatic and military issues. When the peace treaty, the mutual security treaty, and the administrative agreement with Japan went into effect on 28 April the U.S. occupation ended. Soon even its most noticeable symbol disappeared when General Mark Clark, who replaced Ridgway in May, decided to leave the Daiichi building and move to new quarters at Pershing Heights. When the building reverted in June, Yoshida’s “Japanese man in [the] street” could appreciate the symbolic change. 62

U.S. policy had to adjust to the new relationship with Japan. In mid-February 1952 Lovett had agreed with the State Department to send to the president a State draft for interim policy guidance. Contending that Japan was of “such vital strategic importance” to the United States that hostile forces
should not be permitted to control any part of its territory, the study, which became NSC 125, called for Japan's "voluntary and strong commitment" to joint action with the United States and the free world. Defense, however, wanted NSC 125 to specify that Japan should maintain a complete embargo on exports to the Chinese mainland; State believed that trade controls could be limited to strategic materials. In August Lovett agreed that Japan should embargo all U.S.-controlled items as long as the Korean War continued, but that multilateral pacts would determine export controls thereafter. The NSC immediately adopted the paper, and the president gave his formal approval to NSC 125/2 on 7 August 1952.

Declaring that the United States "would fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any part" of Japanese territory, NSC 125/2 sought a Japan capable of its own defense, contributing to area security, and acting as an industrial source of supply for the free world—a U.S. ally, a partner in all Pacific security and economic arrangements, and a UN member. The United States would assist Japan to develop its military industrial capacity and to create a military force able to defend against external aggression and participate in Pacific area defense. Meanwhile, sufficient U.S. forces were to be maintained in and around Japan so that, combined with Japanese forces, they could defend the country. According to this final Truman administration statement of policy on Japan, the United States would continue to base in that country the forces needed for the Korean War.

NSC 125/2 did little to resolve the problem of the Ryukyu, Bonin, and other islands, for which, according to the Japanese peace treaty, the United States could propose a UN trusteeship, meanwhile possessing full right to exercise the power of administration over each territory and its inhabitants. The administrative agreement continued to reserve U.S. rights. In formulating NSC 125/2, State had wanted the United States to make a goodwill gesture to Japan by returning the islands and obtaining necessary military rights by an agreement. Lovett, on the other hand, had supported the JCS position to leave the islands' status unchanged. NSC 125/2 reconciled the two positions by stating that the United States would pursue "long-term military requirements" in accordance with later State–Defense recommendations. The issue was not to be resolved for many years. The Japanese, with strong ties to the islands, were openly hostile to the arrangement.

A Start on Rearmament

From the Defense viewpoint, the paramount post-treaty question concerned Japanese rearmament, and Yoshida himself considered it unthinkable
to leave the country "sovereign and naked."

On 8 July 1950, with U.S. occupation divisions leaving for combat in Korea, MacArthur had authorized the Japanese government to establish a Japanese National Police Reserve (JNPR) of 75,000 men. Activated a month later and consisting of four army-like divisions equipped with light weapons, the JNPR constituted the only real Japanese security force. The national government controlled it directly, and, despite a generally negative public reaction, the JNPR did not lack applicants. The country had no air force, and the Japanese Maritime Safety Board operated only a small coast guard, whose sole armament consisted of the individual crew members' side arms.

After the Chinese intervened in Korea in late 1950, MacArthur proposed to equip the four JNPR divisions with heavy arms equivalent to those of the U.S. Army. The Joint Chiefs concurred and further recommended that the U.S. Army equip six additional JNPR divisions in FY 1952. In OSD, Burns pointed out the dilemma—giving heavy weapons to the JNPR clearly contravened Allied occupation policy, but the Japanese right of self-defense seemed "basic and inalienable." He eventually recommended the JCS position to Marshall, who agreed and asked Acheson's views in February 1951. Fearing that unilateral U.S. rearmament of Japan would forfeit international support for the Japanese peace treaty, alienate the Japanese, and provide a possible pretext for Soviet intervention, State suggested stockpiling the necessary military equipment in Japan until after the peace treaty. Marshall and the JCS agreed to the proposal, and Truman approved on 3 May.

The Army now had the authority to stockpile equipment in Japan for the four existing JNPR divisions but not to release it to them without State or "highest government level" approval. Defense was also to plan and budget for, but not to stockpile, equipment for an extra six JNPR divisions. After the San Francisco conference in September, and with Japanese security apparently threatened by increased tension in the Far East, Lovett supported the JCS desire to allow Ridgway discretionary power to release the stockpiled equipment. State objected to the proposal because the peace treaty had not yet been ratified; it suggested keeping the equipment at U.S. bases, where Japanese personnel could train. U.S. allies agreed to this plan, and Acting Secretary Foster told the Joint Chiefs on 5 December that they might quietly initiate JNPR training in heavy weapons.

Viewing world conditions as extremely critical, the JCS advised Lovett that Japanese rearmament should be based on little expectation of warning before an attack on Japan. Japanese security would be the "overriding mission" of U.S. forces in the Far East, while Japanese forces would cooperate, support UN policies and actions, help defend the country from external aggression, maintain internal security, and assume more responsibility for
their own defense. To support this larger military role, the JCS recommended the expansion of the JNPR into a 10-division force with a strength of 300,000 and the creation of a small navy and air force. U.S. military assistance would begin in FY 1954. The Joint Chiefs proposed establishment also of a central, cabinet-level Japanese defense agency under civilian control. 74

The current plan to provide the JNPR with U.S. equipment called for fairly large Defense expenditures. Army funds provided slightly over $228 million for the Japanese stockpile in fiscal years 1951 and 1952 and military assistance appropriations were to be used in FY 1954, but there was a gap in FY 1953. With Ridgway strongly in favor of the program, Lovett in December 1951 approved the inclusion of $300 million additional for the Japanese program in the Army’s FY 1953 budget. 75 By the time the peace treaty came into force in April 1952, the United States had turned over to the JNPR light equipment from the stockpile worth more than $350 million. 76 In July General Clark asked for authority to give heavy weapons to the police reserve, but Japan was by this time a sovereign nation and there was no statutory basis for authorizing the transfer. 77 Truman did, however, approve a JCS proposal that as commander in chief he should authorize the loan of heavy equipment to the Japanese without financial responsibility for loss or damage, and its release began in August 1952. 78

By mid-1952 the JNPR still consisted of approximately 75,000 men, organized into four lightly armed divisions that Clark considered capable of operating only at battalion level. As Lovett reported to Truman, Defense hoped to extend the force to 110,000 men by 1953, to 6 divisions by 1954, and to 10 divisions by 1956. 79 The Joint Chiefs claimed in July 1952 that they attached the highest importance to helping Japan redress the Far Eastern military imbalance and relieve U.S. forces. In August NSC 125/2 viewed the Japanese development of a “balanced, 10-division ground force and appropriate air and naval arms” as a first step. 80 Japan had already agreed to increase JNPR strength to 110,000 men and to accept U.S. heavy military equipment, but actual strength did not approach 100,000 until the following spring. 81

In August 1952 the Japanese met another U.S. military objective by creating a new agency, the Security Board, * which operated directly under the Japanese cabinet. The board, limited to maintaining peace and order in the country and protecting lives and property, directed the JNPR, renamed the Hoantai or Security Force, and a small sea arm. 82

The Keibitai or Maritime Security Force shared the same mission as the ground forces and included the vessels that had formerly operated under

* In this volume, Japanese military agencies have been referred to by the names given them by Prime Minister Yoshida in his memoirs.
the old Maritime Safety Board. Marshall and the Joint Chiefs had long wanted to arm the Japanese coastal patrol boats, and in late August 1951 Truman had agreed with Marshall that a Japanese-manned, American-officered, coast guard–type organization operating in waters contiguous to the Japanese islands would offer no valid basis for a charge that Japanese naval power was being revived. When the peace treaty became effective in April 1952, Yoshida himself pointed out that there were only 45 patrol boats to guard a 9,000-mile coastline and requested the loan of U.S. vessels. To provide a legal framework, Congress passed a special law in July, and in November 1952 the two governments signed an agreement providing for the loan of 18 frigates and 50 landing ships. The actual transfer, however, did not occur until the spring of 1953.

No Japanese air force came into existence during Lovett's tenure, although the JCS in December 1951 had called for an initial air force of 2 squadrons, eventually growing to 27. General Clark had also wanted a Japanese air force, defensive in nature and closely integrated with the Far East Air Forces, to counter Communist air power, which he considered the greatest single threat to Japanese security. Indeed, Soviet overflights of Japanese territory were increasing in occurrence and apparent seriousness. Between 28 September and 25 October 1952 there were 14 Soviet overflights by jet-type aircraft, 2 of them deep penetrations. Clark lacked Japanese-based aircraft capable of engaging the Soviet planes. On 30 October the Joint Chiefs recommended inclusion of equipment for 27 Japanese squadrons in the FY 1954 military assistance program, but not until March 1953 did they tell Clark that they felt the nucleus for an air force should be established and discussions with the Japanese government should proceed.

Although the effort to rearm Japan seemed slow to many Americans, some Japanese felt the United States was pushing too hard. With vivid memories of World War II, they feared that rearmament would create economic burdens, reestablish a military caste, and still be insufficient to cope with a real Soviet threat. Viewing large-scale rearmament as "completely out of the question" and willing to move only very gradually, Yoshida appeared "wobbly" to the Americans. On the other hand, the Japanese saw the Americans as part of the problem, providing inadequate information on U.S. policies and objectives and lacking the spirit of genuine mutuality. Yoshida's political opponents taunted him with the charge that rearmament would make the Japanese the "tools of American imperialism and aggression."

Despite this negative aspect, U.S.-Japanese relations seemed vastly improved by January 1953 when Lovett stepped down as secretary of defense. The Korean War, then 31 months along, had hastened the end of the occupation and the restoration of Japan's sovereign status, also bringing to the
country some measure of economic prosperity. U.S. security treaties with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and the Philippines provided a basis for collective security in the Pacific area. By subordinating JCS reservations and fears to the political realities of the day, Marshall and Lovett had been instrumental in effecting these changes. There was still much to be done before Japan could become the strong, peaceful, and democratic country that was the U.S. goal, but it was now mainly up to the Japanese themselves to find the way. The United States hoped that the Japanese would increasingly assume their own self-defense and be able to aid in the defense of the Pacific area. Lovett obviously felt that a start had been made, reminding the Japanese ambassador in late August 1952 that U.S. forces in Japan plus the JNPR divisions would make an attack on Japan "expensive if not foolhardy." In any event, between September 1950 and January 1953, Marshall and Lovett, accepting and orchestrating rather than initiating changes, had helped to create a revolution in Japanese–American relations and set a new course for the future.
CHAPTER XI
Indochina: The Threat in Southeast Asia

Just as the outbreak of the Korean War changed U.S. policy on Formosa and facilitated a peace treaty with Japan, it also affected U.S. policy on Indochina, where the French were in the fourth year of a bitter struggle against the Communist Viet Minh movement led by Ho Chi Minh and supported by Communist China. Although the French in early 1950 granted Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam a measure of independent status as Associated States of the French Union, most of the Indochinese people believed the French intended to retain control over their entire country, and few in Vietnam supported the French wholeheartedly in the ongoing battle to save the northern Vietnamese area of Tonkin from the Viet Minh.

The United States viewed Indochina as the "most strategically important area" of Southeast Asia and "subject to the most immediate danger." Arguments advanced in support of these assumptions, which quickly became generally accepted as conclusions, centered about the need to contain the advance of communism in Asia by the Chinese and the Russians. Indochina constituted an indispensable part of the line of containment against communism in the Pacific that stretched from Japan through Formosa and the Philippines. It was the strategic key to Southeast Asia, where Thailand, Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia would be ripe targets for Communist expansion if the Viet Minh triumphed. This chain reaction, according to the "domino theory," could have a powerful psychological impact on India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, adversely affecting U.S. security interests in those areas. And finally, Indochina had great strategic and economic importance because of its location astride one of the great sea crossroads of the world.⁴

Both the State and Defense departments fully understood that political and racial factors complicated the French role in Indochina and had to be
taken into account in formulating U.S. policy. These factors derived largely from the colonialism whose demise in Asia and Africa the United States had been encouraging since the end of World War II. The Indochinese people wanted independence and an end to French domination. These nationalist, racial, and colonial elements had to be given heavy weight in any calculations of U.S. policy toward Indochina. It followed logically that the United States, while supporting the French in the struggle against the Viet Minh, would favor independence for the Indochinese states, eventual French withdrawal, and establishment of effective local defenses against Viet Minh aggression.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with State's assessment of the strategic importance of the Southeast Asian mainland to the United States and that Indochina's fall would undoubtedly lead to the fall of neighboring countries. They recommended quick implementation of military aid programs for the area but urged, in view of the earlier U.S. experience with the Chinese Nationalists, that aid be carefully controlled and integrated with political and economic programs. Because the French military needs were acute, the JCS proposed sending interim assistance to Indochina and establishing a small U.S. military aid group there immediately.\(^2\) These views and those of the State Department came under consideration by the NSC in the spring of 1950. Approving Southeast Asia policy in NSC 64 on 24 April 1950, President Truman directed State and Defense to prepare a program to protect U.S. security interests in Indochina.\(^3\)

The Joint Chiefs soon urged an even more forceful U.S. position, including U.S. assumption of Western leadership in helping the Southeast Asia area, and they again affirmed the pressing need for early U.S. military aid to Indochina. Only a few steps were taken toward implementing NSC 64, however, before the Korean War started.\(^4\) Despite recommendation for a $23.5 million economic program and a $17 million military assistance program, the president in May 1950 authorized only $750,000 in economic and $10 million in military assistance. First deliveries began in June 1950.\(^5\)

**Effect of the Korean War**

The Korean War had immediate impact on U.S. assistance to Indochina. On 27 June 1950 Truman announced acceleration of military aid to the area and allocated an additional $5 million. On 8 July he raised the total amount to $31 million. The U.S. program was to supplement rather than replace French assistance, help the three Associated States achieve internal security, and strengthen the French Union Army's resistance to Communist subversion and aggression. Acknowledging that future events, in Korea or elsewhere, might
make it necessary to divert U.S. aid from Indochina, Secretary of State Acheson declared that the United States would meanwhile give the "strongest support possible." A U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) under Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink began arriving in Saigon in late July.6

U.S. officials also took a sharper look at the activities of the Chinese Communists, who began a major program in April 1950 to equip and train the Viet Minh and appeared ready to intervene openly. Early in July the Joint Chiefs suggested that, if the PRC gave overt military assistance to the Viet Minh, the United States should increase its military aid to the French, consider providing air and naval assistance, and ask the United Nations to make forces available to resist the Chinese aggression. A joint State–Defense survey mission, headed by John F. Melby of the State Department and including a military group under Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine (USMC), recommended on 6 August an increase in U.S. military assistance, citing the threat of the Chinese Communists and the Viet Minh and the apparent inability of the French to control the situation. Donald R. Heath, who became minister to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in late June, strongly supported the recommendation of the survey mission.7

By mid-August 1950 the situation had grown increasingly serious, and State considered possible political concessions by the French, including a date for independence of the Associated States, that might gain the "spontaneous cooperation" of the Indochinese peoples.8 Nonetheless, Indochina was still viewed as primarily a French problem. NSC 73/4, approved by Truman on 24 August,9 recommended, in the event of an overt Chinese attack in Indochina, that the United States join with the British in supporting France and the Associated States and accelerate and increase U.S. military assistance, but avoid a general war with the Chinese.9

Although U.S. plans called for a total of $133 million for Indochina in the regular and first supplemental FY 1951 military assistance appropriations, the Joint Chiefs noted that U.S. aid would increase the military capabilities of the French Union Forces but would not enable them to defeat the Viet Minh. Alarmed that a French loss could jeopardize the U.S. military position in Asia, the JCS recommended taking bolder political measures and expediting additional military aid. Moreover, the French should plan for operations acceptable to the United States and within U.S. aid capabilities, form separate national armies in the Associated States, and hold military talks with British and U.S. commanders in the Far East regarding coordination of operations. The JCS also wanted the French informed that under existing circumstances no U.S. armed forces would be committed in Indochina.10 Concurring

* See Chapter III.
generally,' Defense Secretary Johnson forwarded the JCS views to Acheson. In early September Acheson warned the French of limits on U.S. military assistance and of the need for a coordinated plan; he proposed tripartite military talks. In September and October the French suffered serious reverses along the Chinese border. Lacking manpower, leadership, and adequate military intelligence, they were overextended and unable to counterattack, reinforcing doubt about their ability to remain in the northern area. Claiming that they could no longer meet their military commitments to both NATO and Indochina, the French told the Americans of their need for more U.S. military equipment—but no U.S. divisions 'for the moment.'

With some Pentagon officials worried that the French might 'quit cold,' the Americans sought to keep the French and Indochinese forces viable long enough to allow them to catch up with the Viet Minh in strength. During conversations in Washington in October, Defense Secretary Marshall told French Defense Minister Jules Moch that Indochina would have top priority on all military assistance shipments, and in fact a priority equal to that for Formosa was granted on 23 October. Over JCS opposition and even at the "expense of the Korean pipeline," Marshall decided to send 30 much-wanted B-26 aircraft. The JCS received approval for a FY 1951 military assistance program of $133 million for the French and the Associated States on 23 October, and shipments began almost immediately. The United States also indicated willingness to make funds available to increase military production in France. By the end of January 1951 about $50 million in U.S. military equipment had been shipped to Indochina, and some Americans considered the aid as possibly decisive in enabling the French to hold on.

Seeking a greater voice in the employment of its military assistance in Indochina, the United States became steadily more involved in Vietnam. State and Defense agreed that the French should signal the waning of colonialism in Indochina by making political and economic concessions and creating national armies. The trend toward greater U.S. involvement was such that John Ohly, the State Department's deputy director of military assistance, wrote Acheson that the United States seemed to be supplanting the French in Indochina and that failures were beginning to be attributed to the Americans. Not only might the United States be "on the road to being a scapegoat," but he felt it was dangerously close to direct intervention.

Shortly after the Chinese Communists attacked in Korea in late November 1950, the Joint Chiefs recommended to Marshall that for the long term the United States should try to establish conditions in Indochina requiring no foreign armed forces, press the French to provide eventual self-government "either within or outside of the French Union," support UN membership for
the Associated States, and encourage a regional security arrangement for Southeast Asia. For the short term, the United States should ensure that the French retained primary responsibility in Indochina. U.S. military assistance was to be limited to logistical support and tied to an “overall military plan prepared by the French, concurred in by the Associated States of Indochina, and acceptable to the United States.” Further increases in military assistance were to depend on French moves to create greater popular support.

If the Chinese Communists should attack in Indochina, the JCS recommended that the United States support France and the Associated States by all means short of using American military forces or becoming involved in a general war with Peking. If the French appeared ready to abandon the war in Indochina, the United States would have to reconsider its policy. Some U.S. officials doubted, however, that the United States would intervene militarily even in that event. On 20 December Marshall sent the JCS paper to the National Security Council, which considered it later during work on NSC 124.

**Moves to Stem the Tide**

The French were willing to grant greater independence to the Indochinese states as long as they remained within the framework of the French Union. In November 1950 the French increased the Associated States’ responsibilities while continuing financial aid. They retained their base rights in Indochina, continued to maintain a number of their own administrators, and restricted the three states’ freedom in foreign affairs. Even the French agreement to establish in 1951 a national Vietnamese army under the supreme command of Emperor Bao Dai seemed suspect to the Vietnamese since it would be responsible to the French High Command. The French also increased their 1951 budget for Indochina and considered sending more troops from home.

Hoping to achieve greater cohesion and unity, the French on 7 December 1950 named General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny to two posts—commander in chief of the French Union Forces and high commissioner in Indochina. Despite French concessions, Asians still saw Indochina as under tight French control. Bao Dai was not an effective ruler, there were rivalries within his government, and some friction between it and de Lattre. Finding a local leader around whom public support would rally proved extremely difficult. Almost despairingly, U.S. Minister Heath told Washington in early 1951 that the enemy leader, Ho Chi Minh, was the “only Viet who enjoys any measure of national prestige.”

Both French and Indochinese officials felt that U.S. aid held the key to
containment of the Viet Minh. When he visited Washington in late January 1951, French Premier René Pleven proposed to Truman, Acheson, and Marshall that permanent procedures be established for coordination and cooperation in the Far East among the United States, Britain, and France. Before responding to de Lattre’s current demands for French reinforcements, the French government needed to know what the United States could supply. Plans for a four-division Indochinese national army were dependent on U.S. funding of about $70 million, almost half the cost. The French wanted to obtain the use of a U.S. aircraft carrier and asked whether the United States would send men and materiel to help them to fight, or, if the Chinese attacked, to get out of Indochina. Truman told Pleven that, “barring unforeseen developments,” the United States would expedite deliveries on currently planned aid programs. Marshall ruled out a new carrier, but he promised that restrictions limiting use of the Langley (recently transferred to France) to the Mediterranean area would be lifted, allowing its employment in Asian waters. Truman refused to provide an additional $70 million for the national army and said that no U.S. forces would be committed to Indochina, but he declared that the United States would, if possible, assist in evacuating the French if the Chinese invaded.

Meanwhile, U.S. military assistance programs for Indochina mushroomed, reaching more than $210 million for FY 1951 by the end of March 1951, with plans for a $170 million program in FY 1952. Having given Indochina priority over all other military assistance countries at the end of 1950, the United States had shipped or was ready to load by 31 March 1951 more than $79 million in equipment. In March the French government decided to send de Lattre the troops he requested. But the Viet Minh, having developed large-size regular military units and relying on strong Chinese logistical support, presented a growing military threat that the French feared they might not be able to contain even with reinforcements.

Preparing in May for military talks with the British and French later in the month in Singapore, the JCS thought that, despite U.S. aid, the Viet Minh would conquer most of Tonkin if Chinese logistical aid continued and French strength was not augmented further. They suggested accelerating U.S. military assistance deliveries, helping to train the national armies, and planning for emergency evacuation aid, but again underlined the primary French responsibility in Indochina. Approved by the president on 17 May, NSC 48/5 reemphasized U.S. determination not to commit troops to Indochina but to provide military assistance, encourage internal autonomy and social and economic reforms, and promote international support for the Associated States. The Singapore talks developed no concrete tripartite arrangements for operations in Indochina. If Tonkin was the key to Southeast Asian security, the French alone remained responsible for its defense.
The administration of U.S. economic aid in Indochina in this period further complicated Franco-American relations. The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which managed this effort to strengthen the fragile Indochinese governments, bypassed the French and dealt directly with the Associated States. The French resented the publicity for American programs and disregard of their own efforts. Objecting specifically to large-scale U.S. classes in the English language and the size of the U.S. mission in Saigon, the French feared Indochina might become a U.S. zone of influence. Heath reported that these views, held by a majority of French civil officials, and probably by de Lattre also, were potentially harmful to future efforts. Heath told Washington in mid-June 1951 that the general remained determined to let nothing "interfere with his formula for Franco-Vietnamese solidarity" or Vietnam's retention in the French Union.26

By the end of June Heath himself pointedly reiterated that U.S. policy should still be to "supplement but not to supplant" the French in Indochina. Noting that only French arms and resources were keeping Indochina from collapsing, Heath made a number of suggestions for improving Franco-American relations. He was instructed to reassure de Lattre and did so with apparently good results.27 The Truman administration considered this an opportune time for the general to visit the United States, an invitation he had long sought. When de Lattre came to Washington in September, he emphasized that, rather than limiting Indochinese independence, as many Americans seemed to assume, the French were trying hard to promote the independence of the Associated States, at huge expense spending a billion dollars a year for a war in which French losses already amounted to 98,000 men, including 30,000 killed.28

Pointing out that the same Vietnamese who made a "Grade A parachutist in the governmental forces would make a fanatical communist guerrilla if Ho Chi Minh had reached him first," de Lattre hoped for increased and speedier deliveries of promised U.S. military equipment. Conferring with Lovett on 20 September, de Lattre emphasized Indochina's importance in the fight to save Asia from communism and the U.S. responsibility to supply Indochina as well as Korea: "I am your man just as General Ridgway is your own man. Your own spirit should lead you to send me these things without my asking." Assuring de Lattre that the United States regarded him as a "comrade in arms," Lovett pushed the military services to accommodate French requests and got their promise to ship most of the critical items by the end of the year. Although de Lattre later upset the State Department by publicly claiming that his visit had changed U.S. policy toward Indochina, his major success lay in getting the Pentagon to try to accelerate already programmed aid.29

In Vietnam the situation seemed to be getting worse at the end of 1951.
Under Bao Dai and Prime Minister Tan Van Huu the Vietnamese government remained internally divided, unrepresentative of most Vietnamese, and unable to attract new leaders. In October 1951 the Viet Minh attacked in the northwest, weathered a counterattack, pinned French forces down at Hoa Binh, and reinfiltrated the recently cleared Tonkin Delta area. The French public, for its part, keenly resented the costs and casualties sustained in Indochina. In December Ambassador David Bruce cabled from Paris that the French might greet a proposal to quit Indochina "with a sense of emotional relief." By this time too, General de Lattre, sick and reportedly despairing of victory, had left Indochina, a loss that to Americans had appalling political and military implications.

De Lattre died in January 1952, and in April Jean Letourneau became high commissioner while simultaneously continuing in Paris as minister of state in charge of relations with the Associated States. The new military commander, General Raoul Salan, believed the French could hold out provided the Chinese did not enter in force. In February the French skillfully retreated from Hoa Binh but were humiliated by their failure to hold the base after high-cost battles.

In the face of continuing setbacks, the French in December 1951 requested immediate military conversations with the British and Americans on concerted action to be taken if the Chinese entered Indochina in force. Agreeing to the meeting, the JCS recommended to Lovett that in the event of overt or major "volunteer" Chinese intervention the United Nations should act and the United States should consider air or naval action but commit no ground forces. In the event of either UN or U.S. action, operations might have to include an air and naval blockade of the China coast, concurrent action against selected Chinese targets, and the use of Chinese Nationalist forces.

With representatives of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand present as observers at the Washington tripartite meeting in January 1952, the French, British, and American delegates recommended that their governments warn Peking that any aggression in Southeast Asia would bring three-power retaliation not necessarily confined to the area of aggression. Unable to agree on specific retaliatory steps, they turned the question over to a five-power ad hoc committee including the Australians and New Zealanders. The talks left the French without any firm assurances as to what would be done if the Chinese entered Indochina before issuance of a warning.

The ad hoc committee's deliberations were also inconclusive. The British believed that a coastal blockade of China or attacks on mainland military targets would invite Chinese Communist action against Hong Kong, while the French thought such actions would divert forces from Indochina; both wanted retaliation confined to the immediate area of the attack in Indochina.
or along the China border. The British and French also wanted a combined Allied command. Apparently, the conferees did not discuss the possible use of atomic weapons. They agreed on only one point—the inadvisability of using Nationalist forces from Formosa on the Asian mainland. Since the British and French representatives seemed to be speaking from firm governmental positions, it was clear that U.S. policy would have to be reconsidered. The three nations had agreed to a warning but not on any steps to take if the warning was disregarded.

Policy Differences and NSC 124/2

Much as with the warning to the Chinese Communists in Korea, a divergence of views developed between State and the JCS over the proposed warning about Indochina. Given that the United States did not want to risk general war or use atomic weapons, State demanded to know just what military steps might be taken if Peking ignored a warning, while the Joint Chiefs asked for a political assessment of Indochina’s importance before they could suggest military options. This clash of views, which affected policy discussions for a long time, intensified in February 1952 during the formulation of NSC 124. The draft report proposed that, if Chinese Communist intervention jeopardized retention of the Tonkin Delta area, the United States should support a French request for immediate UN action and participate in any collective international efforts to support the French.

The Joint Chiefs felt the draft NSC 124 had not addressed the “political importance of the fall of Indochina” in its wider dimensions and opposed the report’s recommendations. They believed that area-limited reactions would be indecisive and last indefinitely, thought a successful counteraction would have to include operations against the Chinese mainland, and questioned whether the UN would call for hostilities against Peking. If the United States had to act unilaterally, the political, economic, and military costs would be tremendous—and the decision would strongly affect future U.S. global strategy. If the United States could not retaliate directly against China, the JCS recommended that Americans accept the loss of Southeast Asia and limit their reaction to aiding a forced French–British evacuation of the area.

Disturbed, the State Department shifted the report’s emphasis to what, in any case, it perceived to be actually the greater danger in Indochina—increased subversion and a French pullout. Although Lovett sympathized with the JCS desire for political guidance, he supported Acheson’s views on the likely deterioration in the Indochinese situation. At an NSC meeting on 5 March, Lovett thought it “very sensible” to consider more logistical assistance
for the French effort, even to the extent of $1 billion to $1.5 billion per year, but he noted that this could come only at the expense of aid to other areas. The council thereupon directed its staff to consider possible courses of action in the event of overt Chinese aggression or continued worsening of the situation. Meanwhile, the French appeared to be weakening in their determination to remain in Indochina.

In April 1952 the Joint Chiefs wrote Lovett that Southeast Asia could not be saved if the Chinese Communists attacked. Effective control of the Tonkin Delta area by the French and the Associated States remained the key to successful defense. The JCS favored air and naval action against the source of aggression but opposed using U.S. ground forces on the Southeast Asian mainland. If things became worse without Chinese intervention, the JCS had no major objections to State's proposal to continue and intensify existing courses of action. The Army, Navy, and Air Force secretaries, on the other hand, disliked a plan that they felt would only preserve the status quo; they wanted the United States to tie all future expanded support to a clear-cut French declaration to withdraw by a given date. Frank Nash supported the idea of a firm French commitment to leave, and Lovett suggested to Acheson that the two departments reconcile their differing points of view.

When Lovett, Acheson, and other officials of the two departments met on 12 May, the JCS continued to maintain that military steps should be taken against China itself if Peking ignored a warning and invaded Indochina. But Acheson’s doubts that he could get British or French agreement on retaliatory measures lessened enthusiasm for a warning. On the other hand, absent PRC intervention, State thought it very much in the U.S. interest that the French stick it out in Indochina even if things worsened. Acheson stressed the need to encourage the French to meet their Indochinese responsibilities, through more U.S. logistical support if necessary.

When Lovett, Acheson, and Bradley met with the president on 19 May to prepare for a tripartite foreign ministers meeting later that month, Truman agreed that the United States should favor further development of the national Indochinese armies, additional U.S. assistance, and issuance of a warning to China against further aggression in Southeast Asia. Acheson, Truman said, should also seek agreement on Allied actions to be taken should the warning be ignored. The United States was to avoid discussing internal changes in Indochina except possible financial support for the national armies. At the tripartite meeting in Paris in May the French noted that their creation of 40 Vietnamese battalions, some of which had already performed well in combat, demonstrated local support, and had probably decreased the chance of Chinese intervention by lessening "the propaganda value to them of having white Europeans to attack."
On a visit to Washington in June, however, French Minister Letourneau expressed doubts about achieving military victory in Indochina since the Chinese would increase their aid or even intervene if the French began to win. Only an overall Far Eastern political settlement offered hope of a solution in Indochina. If the French forces could bottle up the Viet Minh in remote, less populated areas, it would give the Associated States breathing room to acquire the political and military strength that would allow the French to withdraw and the indigenous governments to take over. Barring PRC intervention, Letourneau believed that forces on hand could hold the Tonkin area; if the Chinese invaded in force, the French would leave. He did not ask for British or American soldiers. 16

At this time French Union Forces in Indochina consisted of about 74,000 troops from metropolitan France and 50,000 African and Foreign Legion troops plus Indochinese volunteers. By comparison, the national armies numbered about 150,000, organized into 40 Vietnamese, 6 Cambodian, and 6 Laotian battalions. Half had “practically no” French officers and the rest only limited numbers. Some units had already fought well, and indigenous soldiers were taking most of the casualties. Further progress in doubling the Vietnamese national army by the end of 1954, Letourneau thought, would be less dependent on money or materiel than on finding qualified personnel. Letourneau found the Pentagon sympathetic to his needs. 17 The United States, already providing approximately a third of the cost of supporting Indochinese operations, agreed to increase its assistance. 18

With Acheson publicly optimistic that the tide was “moving in our favor” in Indochina, a new version of NSC 124, based on Truman’s 19 May decisions, neared completion. The JCS concurred in the new document, merely noting the dearth of U.S. forces to meet manifold commitments. Pace and Finletter informed Lovett that they did not believe the United States could support forces sufficient to fight local wars and also carry out the NSC 68 plans for rearmament. They therefore wanted to hold the Soviets responsible for any local wars in which satellite troops participated and to include them in any joint warning. Dissenting strongly, Navy Secretary Kimball admonished that the inclusion of Russia in a warning would “speedily put us in a position of initiating general war over insufficient cause.” 19 These comments and the secretarial differences were apparently kept within Defense.

In the NSC discussion on 25 June Deputy Secretary Foster asked the council to note the service secretaries’ views that the French should be urged to reduce their participation in the affairs of the Associated States. Truman approved NSC 124/2 the same day. Dealing with all of Southeast Asia, this report remained U.S. policy for the region throughout the rest of the Korean War period. 20
NSC 124/2 restated the U.S. objective of preventing Southeast Asian countries from falling into the Communist orbit. Although calling for vigorous opposition to Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia, it considered an overt attack less probable than continued subversion. The United States should seek international agreement—with at least France, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—to a joint warning against aggression in the area, contingent on prior Anglo-French agreement to specified courses of retaliatory action, including a naval blockade of mainland China.51

NSC 124/2 proposed that if the Chinese Communists moved openly against Burma or Thailand, the United States participate, to the extent its worldwide commitments would allow, in a UN or international military action against Communist China. If the Chinese invaded Malaya or Indonesia, the United States was to take appropriate military action against the PRC and assist in defending the attacked country either as part of a UN action or in conjunction with other friendly governments. Even in the absence of Chinese aggression, NSC 124/2 indicated U.S. willingness to provide some form of economic, technical, or military assistance to threatened countries.52

Concerning Indochina, NSC 124/2 offered a number of recommendations: continued U.S. promotion of international support for the Associated States; * assurances to the French of U.S. regard for their efforts and sacrifices in Indochina; and recommendations to Congress for aid for France. Moreover, the French ought to reduce their participation in internal Indochinese affairs while recognizing their continuing primary responsibility for Indochinese security. The United States would support a wide variety of political, military, and economic programs designed to achieve the desired ends. In the absence of Chinese intervention, NSC 124/2 called for increased U.S. aid on a high-priority basis and opposition to any French withdrawal.53

If the PRC forces intervened either openly or covertly in Indochina, NSC 124/2 recommended U.S. support for immediate UN warning and action, without geographic limitation. For defense of Indochina and the interdiction of enemy lines of communication, including those in China, the United States would provide the major interdiction forces, with France and the Associated States providing the ground forces. If appropriate, the United States might take additional measures, including a naval blockade of mainland China in conjunction with the French and British, covert operations on the Chinese mainland, and use of Chinese Nationalist forces in Southeast Asia, Korea, or mainland China. With French-British agreement and Allied assistance, the United States would take air and naval action against all suitable Chinese

* By January 1953 Vietnam was recognized by 34 nations.
military targets except those close to Soviet borders. Lacking such agreement, NSC 124/2 declared, the United States should consider acting alone.54

Carrying out the steps called for in NSC 124/2 in the event of Chinese intervention in Indochina suggested the possibility of quick U.S. involvement in a general war with China. Thus, U.S. policy in June 1952 was a far cry from that of August 1950 (NSC 73/4) or May 1951 (NSC 48/5).

Many of the actions proposed in NSC 124/2 depended on getting the French and British to participate if the PRC attacked despite an Allied warning.55 French, British, Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. military representatives met in Washington in October 1952 to determine collective military capabilities for action if the Chinese disregarded an Allied warning. They concluded that a combination of measures—including a full sea blockade and air action against suitable military targets in China—would have the best prospect of stopping aggression. Again the use of atomic weapons was apparently not considered. Although there appeared to be considerable military agreement, this was illusory since the British still claimed that the contemplated measures were beyond Allied capabilities and the French believed that retention of Tonkin might be jeopardized by the dispersion of forces for use directly against China.56 As Acheson noted earlier, the British and French feared that U.S. “impulsiveness . . . might draw them into a war with China.”57 Lacking Allied agreement concerning possible action, the matter of a warning became moot, at least during the Truman administration. The most tangible result of the October conference was U.S. agreement to set up a liaison mechanism for coordinating five-power military planning in Southeast Asia.58

**Declining Fortunes**

In Indochina General Salan planned an offensive for the autumn of 1952 provided he could get sufficient airlift to transport three paratroop battalions simultaneously. Before Salan could strike, however, a Viet Minh offensive threatened the French hold on Tonkin, including areas contiguous to Laos. Forced to withdraw to Na San, the French, although isolated, flew in equipment, supplies, and reserves and made a strong defense.59

Eager to help Salan carry out his planned offensive operation and defend against Viet Minh attacks, Lovett pushed for a quick response to French requests for equipment. To alleviate shortages of spare parts and ammunition for ground troops, the United States shipped supplies on an emergency basis. The Pentagon also applied special priorities to send 50 C-17 transport planes for French airborne battalions, withdrawing 29 from other military assistance
areas and lending 21 USAF aircraft. Twice during the fall the U.S. Air Force sent mechanics to Indochina to assist in maintenance of U.S. aircraft types. By mid-December, however, Lovett’s office had to face the possibility that U.S. participation in Indochina might have to be broadened yet further.

At the end of the Truman administration, the forces of the French Union were still at Na San, patrolling extensively, while their weakened reserves in the Tonkin Delta carried out pacification tasks. Although the fall operations had cost the enemy heavy casualties, the Viet Minh were still able to assume the initiative, not only in Tonkin but also in Annam, the central part of Vietnam. The French believed that the Viet Minh, despite heavy losses, would continue the campaign in northwest Tonkin in order to penetrate and overrun Laos, possibly the most difficult part of Indochina to defend and strategically valuable since it would provide a new Viet Minh frontier with China and Thailand. Military operations since October 1952 forced a general recognition of Viet Minh strength and the importance the Chinese placed on their success. No one expected an early French victory.

In both Indochina and France, the military situation had severe political repercussions. Few Indochinese among a war-weary and skeptical populace supported the efforts of either the French or their own governments. Friction continued between Bao Dai, his government officials, and the French. In France, many members of the government and the public generally thought the price of the Indochina effort too high. Even with U.S. aid amounting to approximately 45 percent of the total, the French estimated their cost for 1953 at about $820 million. There were 73,000 metropolitan French in the 123,000-strong French Union Forces, constituting a sizable portion of the 460,000 troops currently facing about 400,000 Viet Minh (including 160,000 Viet Minh “regulars”). Despite a NATO resolution of 17 December 1952 stating that the defense of Indochina deserved the support of NATO members, the French were eager to free themselves from Indochina so that they could deal with the question of German rearmament. Viewing the Indochinese struggle as more in the interest of the free world generally than of France alone, the French wanted their allies to share a much greater part of the burden in Indochina.

With the French obviously disenchanted, the question of Indochina

* The French projected a total 1953 cost at the equivalent of $1.68 billion, of which they expected direct U.S. end item aid of $340 million to Indochina and a Vietnamese contribution of $100 million. Of the $1.24 billion left, the French “counted on” overall U.S. economic and military aid to France of about $430 million, leaving $820 million for the French to foot. Combined U.S. economic-military aid to France and Indochina would thus amount to about 45 percent of the total cost.
† See Chapter XIX.
loomed larger for U.S. policymakers, who considered increasing U.S. assistance for a planned 40-battalion expansion of the Vietnamese national army, assuming some direct role in training the local armies, and inducing the French to send conscripts to Indochina, this last a most delicate proposal not likely to be entertained. Particularly, the United States wanted to be "taken further into the confidence of the French Government in the matter of the conduct of military and political operations in Indochina." On 19 January 1953, his last full day in office, Deputy Secretary Foster directed the JCS to consider the possibility of broadening U.S. assistance to Indochina, particularly through training indigenous forces and maintaining U.S.-supplied equipment.65

Military assistance had burgeoned during 1952. In February Lovett had agreed to purchase $200 million of French-ordered equipment in FY 1952 for use in Indochina. He also acquiesced in placing major U.S. military assistance contracts in France to help the French support both the Indochina effort and their increased responsibilities in NATO. By the end of December 1952, some $775 million had been programmed under FY 1950 through FY 1953 military assistance appropriations and over $127 million under Lovett's special February agreement. Defense placed Indochina in the same priority category as Korea for military assistance in March 1952. Just over $334 million in equipment had been delivered or shipped to port by the end of 1952.66

Indochina seemed to be the key not only to Southeast Asia but also to the viability of the European alliance, because the impact of the Asian war affected the French contribution to European defense and created problems for the other members of NATO. But since large military assistance programs had come into general disfavor with the U.S. public and Congress, it was not possible in late January 1953 to make a firm commitment to the French for the coming U.S. fiscal year. Although President Eisenhower, in his first State of the Union message on 2 February 1953, linked the U.S. effort in Korea and the British and French struggles in Malaya and Indochina as part of the "same calculated assault that the aggressor is simultaneously pressing," he essentially repeated long-accepted policy.67

The U.S. commitment in Indochina grew prodigiously during the Korean War, with most of the burden of support falling on the Department of Defense. The bold onslaught of the Chinese Communists in Korea and their backing of the Viet Minh in Indochina confirmed U.S. perception of the PRC as an aggressive and expansionist power bent on dominating East Asia. Fear that the fall of Indochina would lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia to communism provided much of the motivation for the growing U.S. involvement in Indochina. The determination to deny Indochina to the Communists would require ever greater U.S. engagement in the peninsula, and eventually,
more than a decade later, the ultimate step of committing American troops to battle in Vietnam. Beginning in 1953 the new administration would have to make further decisions about the U.S. role in the struggle for Indochina, for, while Acheson and Lovett had increased the U.S. stake in that country, they had also apparently kept U.S. options open. Although it appeared that the United States could still disengage itself from Vietnam, each successive commitment would draw it closer to the vortex in which it would eventually be engulfed.
The Korean War created an urgent and constantly growing demand for men and materiel that had to be met immediately. The FY 1951 budget, submitted only months before 25 June 1950 but not yet passed by Congress, became obsolete almost overnight and had to be augmented by a series of supplemental appropriations throughout the fiscal year. The massive expansion of military forces was not entirely for Korea. A large part of the money went for the buildup of American forces in the United States and Europe, and additional enlarged appropriations were for military assistance to countries threatened by Communist aggression, particularly NATO Europe, Indochina, and Formosa. These measures derived from the administration's assessment that it had to face the threat of attack on both Western Europe and the United States as well as in Asia if the war spread beyond Korea.

In response to the almost daily changes in the fortunes of war in Korea and the growing demands for larger forces elsewhere, the military services and the Joint Chiefs found themselves engaged in what must have seemed an endless process of revision of force requirements and appropriations requests. The tight lid that Truman had imposed on the budget for the preceding four years blew off in spite of the president's continuing cost-consciousness and efforts to reduce the size of Defense requests. The net effect for FY 1951 was the creation of a military establishment more than twice as large and a level of Defense appropriations more than three times as high as in any of the pre-Korean War years.

The Basic Budget and First Supplemental

Although it was only six days before the start of FY 1951 when the Korean War began, Congress had not yet passed the year's basic budget
appropriation. Trying to meet President Truman's defense ceiling of $13 billion, Secretary of Defense Johnson had requested only $13,394 billion in new obligational authority, and the Bureau of the Budget had recommended only $13,078 billion, including $873 million of unused obligational authority from the previous fiscal year. This amount was to provide for an Army of 630,000 men and 10 understrength divisions; a Navy of 239 major combat ships, 2 Marine divisions at 36-percent strength, and a Navy–Marine end strength of approximately 461,000; and an Air Force of 48 groups and 416,000 men. Overall military strength on 30 June 1951 was to be approximately 1.5 million.

Testifying before a House appropriations subcommittee on 12 January 1950 in behalf of the FY 1951 budget, Johnson had emphasized the benefits of the administration’s economy drive. Pointing to his success in reducing Defense expenditures, he claimed that “we are securing more defense per dollar appropriated.” Although committee members questioned U.S. military capabilities, they also appeared pleased with the idea of saving money. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University, who had participated as the unofficial JCS chairman in preparing the FY 1951 budget, favored a few additions to Johnson’s budget, mainly for aviation, and estimated their cost at a few hundred million dollars, less than a 2-percent increase. In April 1950 Johnson submitted an additional request for $300 million for air and naval aircraft procurement and $50 million for naval destroyers and small antisubmarine ships. With the United States fighting in Korea, Congress allowed immediate DoD use of FY 1951 funds even though it had not yet appropriated the money. The appropriation act, PL 81–759, signed on 6 September 1950, provided $13,278 billion, including the $873 million left over from the previous year. But by this time the budget’s force limitations had already been exceeded.

With the services clamoring for more funds after the start of the Korean War, Johnson told the assembled secretaries and chiefs at a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council on 3 July 1950 not to ask Congress individually for additional funds. Further FY 1951 requests were to be made on the basis of an approved balanced program for the three services.

On 6 July General Bradley gave Johnson the first formal JCS request for a military augmentation, followed quickly by two more requests on 13 and 18 July. The three incremental increases totaled 615,000—204,000 for the Army, 258,000 for the Navy and Marine Corps, and 153,000 for the Air Force. By 19 July the president and Johnson had approved all three requests. Also, on

* The fiscal year at this time began on 1 July and ended the following 30 June.
† Groups were later redesignated wings.
14 July Johnson authorized the services to spend, at an accelerated rate, FY 1951 funds in advance of normal apportionment procedures.8

In two weeks time, the U.S. military establishment, with an actual strength of about 1,460,000 men on 30 June 1950, went from a planned FY 1951 end strength of approximately 1.5 million to an approved figure of slightly more than 2.1 million effective as soon as possible, an increase of some 41 percent.9

<table>
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<th>Basic FY 1951 Budget</th>
<th>Apvd as of 19 Jul 50</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>630,000</td>
<td>834,000</td>
<td>32.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy and Marines</td>
<td>461,000</td>
<td>718,000</td>
<td>55.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>416,000</td>
<td>569,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>2,121,000</td>
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This explosion of requests for more than 600,000 men precipitated demands for additional training, equipment, and supplies. Combat in Korea required battle-ready Army and Marine divisions, Navy ships, and Air Force wings and squadrons. The Joint Chiefs sent a complete set of FY 1951 force requirements to Johnson on 18 July.10 They asked for substantial enlargement of FY 1951 forces—an Army of 11 divisions; a Navy of 911 vessels, including 282 major combat ships and 12 carrier air groups; a 2-division Marine Corps with increased strength for both divisions; and an Air Force of 58 wings.11

Although the Korean War was going badly for the retreating U.S. forces in mid-July, Johnson maintained a ceiling on a supplemental FY 1951 budget request intended to pay for the expansion. He regarded $10.5 billion as the maximum figure since the president stated publicly on 19 July that he would ask for approximately $10 billion. On 21 July McNeil reported to Johnson that the $10.5 billion package prepared by the secretaries and chiefs provided for a buildup of forces for both Korea and elsewhere, but he thought the total inadequate since it did not contain sufficient money for naval aircraft, shipbuilding, and construction. McNeil submitted and Johnson approved a supplemental for precisely $10.6 billion. Sending it to the Bureau of the Budget with McNeil’s reservations, the secretary added that, if necessary, he would submit further requests.12

Still cautious, Truman told Director of the Budget Frederick J. Lawton not to put “any more money than necessary at this time in the hands of the
Accordingly, the supplemental request, submitted to Congress on 24 July, was trimmed to fit within the $10.5 billion ceiling, with most of the cut made in Air Force military personnel. It included $3.064 billion for the Army, $2.648 billion for the Navy, $4.535 billion for the Air Force, and $240 million for establishment-wide activities (contingencies and emergency fund). For this supplemental, which amounted to almost 80 percent of the original FY 1951 request, Truman requested authority to transfer 10 percent from one appropriation to another to provide for flexibility and orderliness in the buildup of forces both for Korea and the minimum desired 1952 forces, with first priority going to Korea.

A subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations heard Johnson's statement and testimony the day after submission of the supplemental. Sensitive to his image as an economy-minded defense secretary, Johnson sought to convince Congress that previous budget cuts had not compromised the battleworthiness of U.S. forces. Pointing to Congress's own expressed interest in economy, the secretary emphasized that he had sought to eliminate "unnecessary overhead, with a simultaneous improvement in the combat potential of the Armed Forces"; he claimed that "over-all combat potential . . . was at a higher level on June 25—the day the Republic of Korea was invaded—than had been the case at any time since postwar demobilization was completed." Johnson noted that for the United States the Korean conflict was a test of supplying troops at long distance and that logistical difficulties and slow progress could be expected. Nonetheless, he insisted that the military establishment provided a sounder mobilization base for expansion than the United States had ever had.

When Johnson finished his statement, George H. Mahon, chairman of the House subcommittee, propounded two major questions. He wanted to know whether the $10.5 billion supplemental was enough for the emergency and whether the country was facing the "beginning of world war III." Johnson responded quite simply that he expected Defense would probably have to ask for additional funds for naval aircraft and Army and Navy public works. He suggested that $10.5 billion might be more than needed if matters went well in Korea or inadequate if they did not. Speculating that the current course of events might be "but the beginning of larger things," Johnson assured the representatives that the figures were the soundest that the Pentagon could currently determine and suggested that Mahon check with each of the services. Mahon did. In turn, he called on Secretary Pace and General Collins, Secretary Matthews and Admiral Sherman, Secretary Finletter and General

* This authority later made it possible to "lend" military assistance funds included in the first supplemental to the military services (see below and Chapter XXI).
Vandenberg, and finally General Bradley. All agreed that, with the provisos already mentioned, the amount requested was appropriate and proper. But they did not foreclose, as Bradley put it, the possibility that "we may have to come back later and ask for more." 16

The congressional climate was such that it would have been hard not to ask for more. On 28 July McNeil informed Johnson that House Appropriations Committee members viewed the supplemental request favorably except for its omission of such items as public works and naval aviation. He reported that Rep. Harry R. Sheppard thought Johnson should "fix them now or you'll regret it and be subject to a lot of criticism later." Actually, the Army and Navy military construction programs were already prepared. 17 Further, Navy and Air Force representatives had met and agreed on modernizing naval air "to approximately the same degree which would be accomplished by the Air Force." This meant raising the amount for naval air in the supplemental request by about $1.2 billion. 18 On 29 July McNeil wrote the Bureau of the Budget that Johnson had decided to send an additional request for $950 million for naval aircraft, plus $85 million for Army military construction, $90 million for Navy public works projects, and $55 million for contingencies. Of this total request for $1.16 billion, the BoB allowed all but $4 million of Navy public works, and Truman sent Congress a new request for $1.156 billion on 4 August 1950. 19

Congress combined the two presidential requests, one for $10.487 billion and the other for $1.156 billion, totaling $11.643 billion. At DoD's request, the Senate added another $86 million for an Air Force research and development facility and for Army and Navy medical care. In Public Law 81-843 of 27 September 1950 Congress provided the total $11.729 billion, of which more than 60 percent was for procurement of major military items. Together with the $13.278 billion in the basic FY 1951 budget, Defense now had some $25 billion at its disposal. 20

The Long Term: NSC 68

Although the first FY 1951 supplemental appropriation provided funds for supporting the forces being sent to Korea, it was in fact a stopgap measure, formulated in response to an emergency situation without being closely related to larger national security considerations. In the summer of 1950 U.S. policymakers still sought an appropriate response to what they perceived as the Soviet challenge without wreaking havoc on the U.S. economy. The most recent statement of basic long-range U.S. national security policy was the still unapproved State–Defense document of 7 April 1950 known as NSC 68,
programs and costs for which were being developed when the Korean War began.

For the Truman administration, at least, the aggression in Korea ended any doubts that the Soviets were embarking on a highly dangerous course of adventurism, one whose consequences were unpredictable. On 27 July 1950 Truman told the National Security Council that "despite our preoccupation with the developments in Korea," it was necessary to look ahead to the next four or five years. Believing such planning to be urgent, the president directed the council to respond to NSC 68 by 1 September 1950.

Even before the Korean War the joint Chiefs had projected the need for an enlarged U.S. military force by mid-1954 (viewed in NSC 68 as the year of maximum danger from the Soviet Union and its growing nuclear stockpile)—a 12-division Army, a Navy of 324 major ships, and a 69-wing Air Force. The joint Chiefs gave Johnson a "flash estimate" of these 1954 requirements on 17 July. McNeil's budget division on 19 August revised its previous figures and tentatively projected military expenditures ranging between $22 billion and $33 billion in each of the fiscal years from 1951 through 1955, for a total of $150 billion. Other costs, such as military assistance, the atomic energy program, and contingencies, added close to $37 billion in expenditures for the five-year period. When the NSC Senior Staff and the ad hoc committee working on NSC 68 considered the program on 22 August, however, they doubted its adequacy. The group proposed extending the president's deadline by two weeks, and OSD and JCS representatives agreed to revise the military program and cost estimates.

Johnson prodded the Joint Chiefs on 24 August about the adequacy of military projections to meet NSC 68 requirements. On 1 September the Joint Chiefs dramatically expanded their mid-1954 goals, recommending an 18-division Army, a 1,161-ship Navy, a 2½-division Marine Corps, and a 95-wing Air Force. They raised mid-1954 strengths to 1,353,000 for the Army, 887,000 for the Navy and Marine Corps, and 971,000 for the Air Force—a total of 3,211,000. To reach these 1954 levels and fight in Korea would require immediate increases in FY 1951 goals to a 17-division Army of 1,261,000, a 1,026-ship Navy with 675,918 sailors, a 2-division Marine Corps with 166,155 marines, and a 70-wing Air Force of undesignated personnel strength.

If accepted, the projected FY 1954 goals under NSC 68 would entail a tremendous increase in Defense spending on top of Korean requirements. The services indicated they would need almost $214 billion in obligational authority, from a high of $53.3 billion for FY 1951 to a low of $35.3 billion for FY 1955, presumably a period of stable force levels. The estimates did not include the costs of atomic energy, guided missiles, or foreign aid programs.
Because of the urgency for a projection of total costs, McNeil’s office prepared a long-term Defense budget on 5 September by simply adding up the individual service figures.  

Although taken aback by the cost estimates, which quadrupled the original FY 1951 budget, Johnson realized both the reality of the threat and the president’s concern, and he intended to act. Still, he wanted assurances that the figures had been sufficiently reviewed by the services and his own office. “It’s easy,” he noted at an AFPC meeting on 5 September, to “add on five billion, maybe more.” Worried about program duplications and the programs still not included, Johnson wanted the Pentagon to have its house in order before releasing the figures, even though they were supposed to go to the NSC staff the next day. Deciding on an internal review, Johnson directed that the services individually and the Joint Chiefs as a group check the service budgets against the NSC 68 force requirements. The three departmental secretaries were to do the same, both individually and collectively as the Joint Secretaries. Their decisions would then go to McNeil and General Joseph T. McNarney, who would work with the service budget officers on program refinements and have ready an agreed budget no later than the morning of 12 September for a final discussion by the AFPC. The approved program would go to the NSC by noon that day. The president accepted Johnson’s proposed timing.

The tightness of the schedule testified to the pressures on Defense planning during the Korean War years. But on the positive side, the interservice fights and the frustrations that had marked the previous five years diminished greatly, in large part because of the availability of more money to the services. The problems of the fall of 1950, serious as they were, related to growth and momentum.

Following Johnson’s oral instructions at the 5 September AFPC meeting, the secretaries and chiefs the same day set up a six-man committee to review the services’ cost estimates. Meeting again on 7 September, they examined their committee’s work, adjudicated differences, and signed a seven-page memorandum of agreement. Pace later referred to these joint meetings as among the “most worth-while sessions” he had attended during his government service. However, by the time the secretaries and chiefs met with Johnson on 12 September, cost estimates had risen to $260 billion for military items during the five fiscal years 1951 through 1955. Alarmed, Johnson wanted to know whether they were prepared to recommend this amount to the president and the NSC and to support it before Congress.

The secretaries and the chiefs strongly affirmed their estimates as realistic and even minimal. According to Collins, it was the first time since World War II that they had “gotten together, Secretaries and Chiefs alike, and arrived at
what I regard as a realistic approach to the problem . . . from a military point of view.” McNeil and McNarney, both fiscally conservative, also backed the new service cost estimates. McNeil thought them “close enough” to give the president a clear picture, and McNarney viewed them as necessary to carry out U.S. overseas commitments.  

Despite the virtually unanimous Pentagon support for the NSC 68 estimates, Johnson, still concerned, believed that the possibility of higher costs would be politically unpopular and would unlock “the door to increasing commitments in Europe.” The secretary, who had been asked to resign by Truman the day before, stressed that loyalty to the White House required that the figures remain absolutely secret while the president decided whether to forward them to the NSC. Truman sent the new JCS force requirements and the tentative Defense cost estimates to the NSC without delay.  

When George Marshall succeeded Johnson as secretary of defense on 21 September, it was apparent that the nation’s security policy had taken a radically different course from that of the five years following World War II. The Pentagon stood to gain more money and forces from the change, but it also faced potential problems. NSC 68 authors, who saw the current North Korean aggression as a Soviet-inspired adventure, advocated that the United States take a more active stance to deter or, if necessary, to defeat further Soviet or Soviet-instigated challenges. U.S. military forces might also conceivably be committed in places other than Korea. To assume such obligations, military strength had to be built up, but it would take time to transform money into trained combat soldiers and military equipment.

It was clear that the $25 billion already appropriated to meet immediate Defense needs for FY 1951 would be inadequate. Furthermore, planning for FY 1952, started in early 1950, had to be reformulated in the light of Korea. The size of these budget requests, moreover, depended not only on Korea but also on pending policy decisions concerning the overall nature of the Soviet threat and the U.S. strategy for meeting it.

Secretary Marshall and his deputy, Robert Lovett, were well aware of all these considerations, as well as of the various factors that underlay policy and made defense spending in peacetime unpopular. Historical U.S. aversion to large peacetime military forces was reinforced by Truman’s innate economic conservatism and the widespread fear in the administration that too large a U.S. military budget would create economic upheaval and give the enemy a victory without a fight. The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) thought that although the recommended buildup did “not approach full mobilization it would impose severe strains on the economy” and a need for “a wide range of direct wage, price and allocation controls, as well as a greatly expanded tax program . . . by the end of this year in order to stave off spiraling
inflation." Money spent for defense would also affect some domestic programs adversely and cost the president political support. Furthermore, Marshall knew that MacArthur's brilliantly successful amphibious attack at Inch'on on 15 September already suggested to many that the tide may have turned in Korea, that NSC 68 fears might be overblown, and that military spending could in fact be limited. Truman gave Marshall eight days of grace to get his thoughts in order, rescheduling consideration of NSC 68 from 21 September, the day Marshall took office, to 29 September.

Marshall requested comments and recommendations on the NSC 68 programs from the service secretaries, the chiefs, and the acting chairman of the Munitions Board. Of the total NSC 68/1 cost estimate of $287 billion for five years, the military program alone, now revised and including one year of Korea, would absorb some $235 billion, or $260 billion after adding military assistance, atomic energy projects, and contingencies. Pace, Matthews, and Finletter commended NSC 68/1 as an excellent presentation, and when the Joint Chiefs generally approved it, Marshall forwarded their comments to the NSC.

Meanwhile, Marshall sought the advice of James H. Burns, his assistant for foreign military affairs and military assistance. Burns agreed in principle with a military buildup, but he was "worried about the size of the proposed appropriations, their effect upon the American economy and the American way of life and the possibility that these great expenditures will not be supported over the 5 year program by the American public." Noting that the NSC 68/1 military cost estimates had been prepared at a time of uncertainty in Korea when judgments had undoubtedly been affected by conditions of the moment, Burns suggested, 13 days after Inch'on, that Marshall ask the NSC staff to restudy the five-year program within a $200 billion limitation, exclusive of the cost of Korea.

The National Security Council met on 29 September to consider both NSC 68 and the programs contained in NSC 68/1. Cautioning that the programs and estimated costs for NSC 68 were not yet final, the president suggested the council endorse NSC 68 policy and "work out the details as the programs are developed." Although Truman was willing to grant more time for study, Marshall was ready to accept the NSC 68 conclusions immediately. NSRB chairman Symington stressed the greatly broadened scope of the new NSC 68 plan and pointed out that they should move quickly since the defense and stockpiling programs would take 142 percent of current materials production.

At this point the president emphasized that the Soviet threat could be met only by the collective action of many nations. He wanted every agency to be informed about U.S. policy and to deal uniformly with other governments. The National Security Council adopted, with minor changes, the conclusions
of NSC 68* as a "statement of policy to be followed over the next four or five years." The next day, 30 September, the president approved in NSC 68/2 the policy conclusions of NSC 68 and directed they be implemented. Thus the policies first proposed by the Departments of State and Defense in April 1950 became official three months after the start of the Korean War, at a time when that war seemed nearly over.11

The president did not approve the specific NSC 68/1 implementing programs, which were to be revised for NSC reconsideration not later than 15 November. To review the scope, timing, and costs of the military program, Marshall turned to Lovett and assigned McNeil, McNarney, and Burns to help him. Sending out instructions for the review, Lovett stated on 5 October that in every instance the JCS programs of 1 September would be compared with their NSC 68 estimates of 17 July, actually prepared before the Korean conflict started.11

When the Joint Chiefs briefed Lovett on 10 October, they generally held firm to their 1 September force goals for both 1951 and 1954. While Lovett continued to hear briefings on specific programs throughout October, it was uncertain whether the DoD cost estimates for NSC 68 would have to be revised.12 When General Collins raised the question at an AFPC meeting on 17 October, Lovett pointed out that NSC 68/1 military requirements would take about 20 percent of the national income, and he wanted to be sure of Defense needs. Rather than simply adding up service estimates, Lovett hoped to arrive at a lower figure by setting "priorities of danger and priorities of need." When Collins asked for a directive on what this would mean, Lovett said he was not yet ready but gave examples of "adjustment downward."15

During this same AFPC meeting Marshall explained his approach to Defense readiness. At the 29 September NSC meeting he had told the president that of all the NSC 68 conclusions the three of most concern to Defense dealt with the maximization of the U.S. economic potential, the strengthening of non-Communist nations' orientation toward the United States, and the development of a level of military readiness that could be "maintained as long as necessary." Emphasizing the last of these goals, Marshall had expressed his concern over the maintenance of congressional and public support. Now, on 17 October, in the relative privacy of the Armed Forces Policy Council, Marshall stated that he was not interested so much in scaling down JCS requirements as in implementing them so that they would last. He wanted U.S. expansion efforts under NSC 68 predicated not on anxieties of the moment but on a long-term politically and economically feasible basis, one that Congress and the public would continue to support.11

* See Chapter 1 for discussion of NSC 68 conclusions.
By 1 November McNeil's office produced a revised estimate for the NSC 68/1 military program, reducing expenditures for the total five-year program to $131 billion for U.S. armed forces alone and lowering total budget expenditures for all NSC 68/1 programs to $190.6 billion. The McNeil estimate would cut an anticipated five-year U.S. budget deficit from more than $100 billion to $42 billion. But even these lower military costs for NSC 68/1 caused concern. At an AFPC meeting on 14 November, Lovett pointed to strong congressional criticism—including that of the pro-military chairman of the House Committee on the Armed Services, Carl Vinson—over the military's use of manpower, particularly reserves, and the cost of military programs. Lovett feared that the high manpower requirements of NSC 68/1 could not be reached without calling on veterans and married men or lowering physical standards. Beyond these potential political problems, Lovett felt the Pentagon had to balance its need for men against its need for materiel. Meanwhile, the immediate task was to bring into accord with NSC 68 the planning for the imminent second supplemental appropriations request for FY 1951.

The Second Supplemental

In mid-November 1950 Defense work on a second budget supplement for FY 1951 was approaching a climax. The costs of Korea were already high in terms of both men and materiel. On 31 July the Joint Chiefs had written Johnson that the Army, currently authorized 834,000 men, needed an additional 247,000 for a new FY 1951 end strength of 1,081,000. The secretary and the president had approved the new strength and authorized the Army to induct National Guard units. In addition to the Army augmentation, some increases in the Navy and Air Force brought the armed forces' authorized FY 1951 end strength to 2.4 million, compared with the 2.1 million provided in the first supplemental budget.

In a lengthy memorandum of 24 August, Secretary Pace had pointed out to Johnson that the Army based its estimates for the first supplemental appropriation on maintaining four divisions in Korea, whereas it would "soon be supporting the equivalent of eight." Since the rapid Army expansion required reactivation of many installations and the equipping of new units, Pace feared that the Army would run out of both regular and first supplemental FY 1951 funds in five major areas between the end of September and mid-December 1950. He also complained that, unknown to Congress, it had been forced to implement unfunded programs, an obvious reference to the Army's arming and equipping South Korean and other troops. Urging Johnson to bring these facts to the president's attention and secure authority for a
second supplemental request for FY 1951 funds, Pace enlisted the support of
the Navy and Air Force, which were experiencing similar problems.17 When
Johnson and Pace discussed the subject with Truman, however, the president
decided he could not submit another supplemental request before mid-
November. Meanwhile, the Army received emergency interim support in
September through the use of military assistance funds.18

On 13 September, just before leaving the Pentagon, Johnson directed that
planning begin for a new supplemental FY 1951 request to cover the forces
and buildup authorized since submission of the requests leading to the first
supplemental. With the new budget request to be submitted in November,
Johnson noted that McNeil’s office would have to work closely with the three
military departments and the Bureau of the Budget.19

The Joint Chiefs sent Marshall on 22 September new recommendations
very close to their 1 September goals and based on the joint JCS-secretarial
decisions of 7 September. The chiefs accepted the budgetary assumption that
the Korean War would end by June 1951; meanwhile first priority in FY 1951
would go to Korean operations. By 30 June 1951 the Army was to have 17
divisions and 1,263,000 troops, with all overseas units and half of the
U.S.-based units equipped at 100-percent and the remainder at 85-percent
strength. The Army was to expedite the purchase of modern equipment so
that all its active units could be equipped not later than mid-1952 and it could
establish war reserve stocks of major items by mid-1954. The Joint Chiefs set
the end strength of the Navy at 322 major combatant ships, 12 carrier air
groups, and 689,000 sailors; the Marine Corps would have a strength of
166,000 men. Naval combat units would be manned at an overall average of
85 percent of war complement; amphibious forces in the Far East and the two
Marine divisions were to be at 100-percent strength and fully equipped. For
the Air Force, the chiefs recommended an end strength of 70 wings and
688,000 personnel. The Strategic Air Command and all units deployed
overseas would be “combat effective,” but other tactical units would remain at
“less than desired effectiveness levels.” By 30 June 1951 armed forces
strength would exceed 2.8 million men.50

The JCS goals for FY 1951 now came close to, and in some instances
exceeded, the NSC 68 goals for FY 1954 set before the war started, and they
took a long stride toward meeting the far higher FY 1954 goals proposed on
1 September. Marshall approved the FY 1951 recommendations on 27
September, but only for the purpose of preparing and submitting budget
justifications. One of the factors that Marshall had to face, of course, was cost.
To a basic FY 1951 budget and first supplement that amounted to about $25
billion, the new JCS recommendations would add more than $20 billion.51

Meanwhile, the success of UNC arms in Korea following the Inch’on
landing brought into question the necessity for such large military outlays. The president himself hoped that the DoD estimates could be materially reduced. Army Secretary Pace feared as much, writing Marshall on 10 October that the improved situation in Korea might make the BoB and Congress less receptive to the next supplemental request. Of immediate concern, he called attention to Army actions taken “without the specific and advanced authorization of the Congress.” Receiving no answer from Marshall, Pace wrote directly to Truman on 1 November, asking for official approval of the Army actions in equipping South Korean troops. The president approved Pace’s memorandum on 4 November, but Marshall’s office thought that the Army secretary had handled the matter “considerably out of appropriate channels.” Assuring Marshall and Lovett that such matters would be “properly processed in the future,” Marshall’s executive, Col. Marshall S. Carter, tersely brought the real problem to their attention: “The Army is broke and needs supplementary appropriations to cover the Korean support already given and . . . anticipated future support.”

The Joint Chiefs on 9 November urged Marshall to approve immediately their 22 September recommendations for FY 1951 force requirements since these would not be reduced by possible future changes in FY 1952 force proposals. Lovett, however, orally directed the chiefs to review FY 1951 program objectives; although he mentioned no ceiling, he clearly intended a reduction. On 13 November the chiefs stated that they had reduced force, materiel, and personnel requirements to meet Lovett’s general objectives. They removed one Army division and two Air Force wings, decreased aircraft procurement, and eliminated the modernization and rehabilitation of certain reserve industrial plants. Reduction of estimates for acquisition and construction of real property and for research and development would follow.

Thanking the chiefs at the AFPC meeting on 14 November, Lovett said that the new figures for FY 1951 and FY 1952 should be called a “revision” rather than a cut. He was, however, still unhappy with the small JCS reduction in the $20 billion supplemental request for FY 1951. Lovett thought costs were “far out of line,” and he pointed out that even highly supportive congressmen might be unenthusiastic about a $20 billion request. He wanted to avoid having a budget ceiling imposed and preferred to work it out in the Pentagon.

Lovett, moreover, took exception to the statement in the 13 November Joint Chiefs’ memorandum that they had reduced requirements to meet objectives stated by him. Writing that their statement with regard to his role “might well be misleading,” Lovett spelled out on 17 November the objectives he had earlier presented orally. To achieve a realistic DoD budget based on military needs, Lovett believed that force strengths should be feasible and that
men should be inducted only as weapons became available. He thought the JCS should view FY 1951 and FY 1952 estimates as an interim program to meet international commitments and maintain a reasonable long-term military posture and that they should emphasize the development of industrial capacity ready to produce. Stating that his position would be subject to radical change should the international situation worsen, and welcoming the JCS review of 13 November as a "good approach to the problem," Lovett thought there were still many areas that could stand improvement—that is, be cut.57

When the Joint Chiefs responded on 19 November, they maintained their earlier position on FY 1951 force levels. Although they wanted to arrive at a "reasonable compromise," they saw FY 1951 and FY 1952 as the base years for future programs and did not want the levels lowered. If, after considering the risks, program objectives still had to be reduced below those of 13 November, the chiefs offered some possibilities, including a reduction of about 5,500 in Navy end strength. But the tentative cost attached to their 19 November program was still approximately $20 billion, and they warned that lesser programs would increase U.S. risks. Sending the JCS recommendations to the NSC without concurrence on 20 November, a dissatisfied Lovett noted, in a memorandum also initialed by Marshall, that the department would continue its review.58

Both Marshall and Lovett were by now aware that a larger war might well erupt in Korea. An unsigned but closely held memorandum of 18 November addressed to Marshall apparently reflected the secretary's worries. The author feared the imminence of an enlarged war in Korea and questioned the adequacy of the current U.S. "twilight mobilization." The memorandum suggested NSC review of NSC 68 and the possibility of undertaking a "higher order of mobilization of men and materiel at the present time." Marshall's concern was evident, for he noted on the paper that it should be held for use in connection with an NSC memorandum that he was planning to prepare.59

The possibility of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea troubled the State Department as well as the Pentagon, and important support for the JCS estimate of FY 1951 requirements came from the director of State's Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, who recommended to Acheson that the NSC put forward whatever amount was acceptable to Defense, "presumably... a figure of the order of magnitude of $15 billion." Subtracting the $25 billion already appropriated for FY 1951 in the basic and first supplemental appropriations, this meant support for a $20 billion second supplemental, although Nitze found it "appalling" that so much money was needed for a relatively small increase in strength. At a White House meeting on 22 November the NSC advised the president that "without prejudice to normal budgetary review of the cost estimates" it found the proposed military program for FY 1951
generally consistent with NSC 68/2 objectives. Cuts were still possible, even probable, depending on the situation in Korea.

Following NSC action, the Pentagon centered its attention on revising the second supplemental FY 1951 budget, as the Bureau of the Budget initiated two days of hearings. Using the JCS strength and force figures, BoB personnel came up with a new estimate of approximately $10.9 billion, only slightly more than half the original service request but sufficient, they claimed, to provide for modernization of the active forces and some war reserves. However, when the Chinese Communist offensive in Korea caused MacArthur's forces to begin a massive retreat, there was an equally massive retreat on budget cutting in Washington. At an NSC meeting on 28 November, Marshall agreed to trim some items but felt there should be no cuts in either Defense armament or personnel.

Following a series of OSD meetings with the military departments, with BoB representatives present as observers, the $10.9 billion BoB estimate was increased by $5.9 billion to provide for additional weapons, war reserves, facilities and equipment, a broader production base, and additional public works needed to accommodate the expanded Defense forces at home and overseas. As McNeil later pointed out, the size of the request could have been either $10 billion or $20 billion, depending on decisions as to when the active forces should be provided with modern equipment, the extent of additional procurement for war reserves and the number of desirable as contrasted with necessary items which would be included. To hold the budget down, he attested, many desirable administrative projects had been eliminated. Still, McNeil declared, it was the first supplemental request since 1945 to be based on military requirements rather than a dollar ceiling.

The second FY 1951 supplemental estimate that Lovett officially sent to the BoB on 30 November provided for practically all the strength and force goals recommended by the JCS in November. The total request was for $16.844 billion, including $51 million for OSD, with the emphasis on equipment—$4.5 billion of the $9.2 billion Army share was for major procurement, $1.6 billion of the $3 billion Navy and Marine Corps budget, and $2.5 billion of the $4.6 billion for the Air Force. The BoB and the president approved immediately.

Transmitting the DoD request to Congress on 1 December, Truman emphasized the grave nature of the situation. While the Chinese might have been "misled or forced into their reckless attack . . . to further the imperialist designs of the Soviet Union," their action threatened world peace, forcing the United States and other free nations to expand their military forces very rapidly. Truman supported the second supplemental request as an immediate means of augmenting the armed forces and the rate of military production.
### Table 5

**Development of FY 1951 Strength and Force Levels**

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<td>688,186</td>
<td>651,095</td>
<td>651,095</td>
<td>651,000+</td>
<td>971,000</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>788,381</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Strength</td>
<td>1,453,544</td>
<td>1,506,605</td>
<td>2,120,818</td>
<td>2,806,735</td>
<td>2,759,644</td>
<td>2,764,122</td>
<td>2,754,073</td>
<td>3,211,000</td>
<td>3,341,029</td>
<td>3,243,055</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Lighter-than-air ships or squadrons.

*Man-year strengths.

*Raised to 1,081,000 on 10 Aug 50.

*"R" indicates reduced manning level for all or given number.

Note: The table is based on data from OSD, JCS, NSC, and congressional sources available in the OSD Historical Office. The basic budget for FY 1951 proposed a slightly higher manpower end strength than was the actual case on 30 June 1950 and adjusted some force levels. After the start of the Korean War the JCS recommendations of 18 July were covered by the first supplemental FY 1951 appropriation. Considerations relative to a long-term buildup and disagreement over final FY 1951 goals resulted in separate JCS recommendations of 1 September, 22 September, 13 November, and 19 November 1950. On 24 November the NSC, reacting to the Chinese Communist intervention, adopted increases in FY 1951 goals based on various JCS recommendations, the second supplemental budget request seems to have funded the November force level recommendations. On 14 December the NSC accepted that FY 1952 levels should be reached as soon as practicable, thus accounting for the fact that some actual force levels on 30 June 1951 (e.g., 18 Army divisions) were higher than the FY 1951 goals approved on 24 November 1950. Meanwhile, the fourth FY 1951 budget supplement provided for further changes in strength and force levels (see Chapter XIII).
These steps would allow a quick increase in mobilization if the situation grew worse or a leveling off if the situation improved. In any event, the country had to be prepared to “endure a long period of tension.”

Within an hour of receiving the president’s budget request, Congress began hearing witnesses. Leading off for Defense, Marshall asked Bradley to review the military situation worldwide, for in the secretary’s opinion the problem included not only Korea but “pretty much the entire world.” After Bradley finished, Representative Mahon asked Marshall, “Is this all the money you think . . . we should appropriate at this time?” After Marshall agreed that it was, Mahon also asked General Bradley and each member of the JCS the same question; each thought it the best estimate that could be given at that time. But Mahon was persistent; he still wanted to know why Marshall did not need “additional funds which would get us in shape more quickly for an all-out shooting war?”

Reminding the congressmen that he was no newcomer to military matters, Marshall pointed out that money did not solve everything. In World War I, for example, overlarge appropriations for aircraft production had created confusion, little production, and a long period of recrimination. For the current crisis Marshall wanted to acquire money and personnel only as quickly as they could be efficiently utilized. Without a structure to train, equip, and handle new troops, too large manpower increases would result in waste. Marshall felt that the country’s first priority should be to create the assembly lines and tooling necessary for a future expansion of production. Even if general war seemed likely in the next few months, he considered this emphasis on production the best way to go.

Marshall’s reluctance to accept massive appropriations derived partly from the hope that there would be no all-out war and partly from a pragmatism born of long experience. If the country plunged into large-scale mobilization and there was no general war, Marshall pointed out to Mahon, there would be serious psychological and financial repercussions. On the other hand, Marshall worried about delay in establishing a “well-laid foundation and base for a very rapid mobilization if that becomes necessary.” As Lovett later asserted, the country was used only to “full-out mobilization, which was war, or none at all, which was peace”; in advocating a partial mobilization, Defense was seeking to avoid the feast-or-famine approach to military preparedness.

Three weeks of testimony by Marshall, Lovett, McNeil, and other DoD officials reassured Congress about the Defense position on mobilization. It

* Lovett overlooked the partial mobilization that occurred prior to Pearl Harbor, from May 1940 to December 1941. Full mobilization for World War II did not occur until after 7 December 1941.
provided $16.795 billion for the armed forces, now expanding to a new FY 1951 end strength of almost 2.8 million men. Truman signed PL 81–911 into law on 6 January 1951. So far, Defense had received $41.8 billion of new obligational authority for FY 1951. Reviewing the unsigned 18 November 1950 memorandum about the possibility of Chinese intervention, Marshall noted on it that the second supplemental FY 1951 budget represented a speedup of the mobilization, with the personnel strength planned to be attained by 1954 virtually on hand by July 1951.

A Final Supplemental

Even before Marshall could send the second FY 1951 supplemental request to the president, the reverses in Korea dictated a further increase in FY 1951 force levels. On 24 November 1950 the JCS recommendations of 1 September for a 17-division Army, a 1,026-ship Navy, and a 70-wing Air Force by mid-1951—i.e., 1 more division, 2 fewer ships, and 2 more air wings—were approved. Then, on 14 December, the president approved NSC 68/4, including the achievement of FY 1954 force levels “as rapidly as practicable.” Marshall called for estimates for a new FY 1951 supplemental which was inextricably connected with work on the FY 1952 budget. The fourth FY 1951 supplemental* provided another $6.38 billion for the services when Truman signed PL 82–43 on 31 May 1951.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Basic Appropriation</th>
<th>First Supplement</th>
<th>Second Supplement</th>
<th>Fourth Supplement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>834,000</td>
<td>1,269,000</td>
<td>1,552,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>387,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>684,000</td>
<td>735,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>166,000</td>
<td>204,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>416,000</td>
<td>568,000</td>
<td>651,000</td>
<td>850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,507,000</td>
<td>2,120,000</td>
<td>2,764,000</td>
<td>3,541,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Korean War thus required more than doubling the strength of U.S. armed forces. FY 1951 appropriations for this purpose totaled $48.2 billion in new obligational authority, equaling all Defense appropriations for the four fiscal years 1947 through 1950.

* The third FY 1951 appropriation did not include military funds.
# Table 5
## FY 1951 Appropriations
### New Obligational Authority
(in billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Appropriation</th>
<th>FY 1951 Appropriation Act</th>
<th>First Supplemental</th>
<th>Second Supplemental</th>
<th>Fourth Supplemental</th>
<th>Total DoD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>$13,278</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.729</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.795</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.880</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DoD</td>
<td></td>
<td>$48.182</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Department</th>
<th>FY 1951 Appropriation Act</th>
<th>First Supplemental</th>
<th>Second Supplemental</th>
<th>Fourth Supplemental</th>
<th>Total DoD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$19.360</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.481</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DoD</td>
<td></td>
<td>$48.182</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Major Category</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Inter-deptl</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>$4.083</td>
<td>$2.338</td>
<td>$1.931</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$ 8.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations &amp; Maintenance</td>
<td>5.048</td>
<td>2.856</td>
<td>3.199</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Proc &amp; Pdn</td>
<td>8.238</td>
<td>5.993</td>
<td>8.612</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(2.846)</td>
<td>(7.094)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(10.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships &amp; harbor craft</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.698)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.784)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>(8.017)</td>
<td>(2.449)</td>
<td>(1.518)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(11.984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acq &amp; Constr Real Prop</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>1.456</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Components</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Mobilization</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment-wide Activities</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>1.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$19.360</td>
<td>$12.481</td>
<td>$15.896</td>
<td>$0.444</td>
<td>$48.182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures do not add in all instances because of rounding.

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\[ ^a \] Table EISD-059 OASD(C). 17 Aug 54, OSD Hist. Later EISD reports give slightly varying figures; figures used in this volume, unless otherwise indicated, reflect those used during the period.

\[ ^b \] Ibid.

\[ ^c \] Table EISD-117 OASD(C). 7 Jan 53, OSD Hist.
Of the four FY 1951 Defense appropriations, the first, for approximately $13.3 billion, was what the department would have needed—or would have had to make do with—if the Korean War had not occurred. The first supplemental, for some $11.7 billion, increased Defense funds by 88 percent and represented the military’s first guess on how much it would cost to ready the standing forces for combat and to expand the services. Had the war ended with the defeat of the North Koreans in the fall of 1950, it seems likely that the Truman administration would have asked for very little more, if any, for Korea and that Lovett’s reduced second supplemental request would have sufficed—or again been reduced—to pay for some degree of buildup under NSC 68. The Chinese Communist intervention in Korea changed everything. The second supplemental request, for $16.8 billion, was to meet a much larger threat both in Korea and possibly worldwide. This money provided for more than doubling the strength of the armed forces within a 12-month period and for making a start on procurement of equipment for a buildup. Work on the final FY 1951 supplemental of $6.38 billion went forward in tandem with the regular FY 1952 request. The three supplementals added 262 percent to the original appropriation.
In planning for FY 1952, the Pentagon had to carry forward simultaneously two major programming efforts that influenced each other and interacted increasingly during the evolution of the budget. The short-term needs of the Korean War demanded high priority and immediate attention. The volatile nature of the war, the constant threat of its enlargement, and the uncertainty of its duration greatly complicated efforts to rationalize requirements and to effect a balance between short- and long-term needs. The longer term programs, based on the national security requirements prescribed by NSC 68, attempted to look four or five years ahead to meet the Soviet challenge. This effort to develop annual budgets that would permit optimum use of resources to meet both the demands of Korea and the larger threat of war elsewhere was representative of the complexities of planning and programming for the nation's security in a period of great stress and uncertainty.

In any one fiscal year the Department of Defense normally dealt with not one but three budgets. Thus, in January 1950, when work began on the FY 1952 budget, DoD was also administering the FY 1950 budget and presenting the FY 1951 budget to Congress. With the coming of war in June 1950, the FY 1951 budget underwent an enormous upheaval that required three supplemental appropriations, the last on 31 May 1951. The budget for FY 1952 also took on an entirely new dimension because of the war and, as with the FY 1951 budget, was greatly affected by the long-term program requirements developed under NSC 68. Budgeting remained in a state of flux during the entire first year of the Korean War. Not until June 1951, when the battle lines in Korea became stabilized and the prospect of armistice talks became a real possibility, could the administration take a new look at military requirements and impose better controls over appropriation requests and expenditures.
Preparation of the FY 1952 budget started long before the Korean War. On 23 January 1950 Secretary Johnson prescribed a schedule for submission of a final budget. A month later he told planners to assume that the armed forces would be maintained in FY 1952 at approximately the level planned for 30 June 1951—a 1.5 million-man defense force. A tentative estimate of 10 May set the new obligational authority for FY 1952 at $13.7 billion. Work on NSC 68, currently going forward, was not supposed to interfere with the development of the FY 1952 budget, as Johnson informed civilian and military leaders on 25 May.

Given the administration’s strong emphasis on economy, it was not surprising that, even after the start of Korean hostilities, the Joint Chiefs did not recommend, except for the Air Force, programs much higher than those submitted for the basic FY 1951 budget. Following a meeting on 3 July, they proposed for FY 1952 a 10-division army with an end strength of 655,000, a 707-ship (281 major) Navy and a 2-division Marine Corps with 586,000 sailors and marines, and a 58-group Air Force with a mid-1952 strength of up to 505,000. The estimated cost of this 1.7 million-man program ranged between $16.3 billion and $18.3 billion. This proposal was soon outdated, for on 11 July Johnson told the chiefs to defer final recommendations on FY 1952 force requirements until FY 1951 changes could be determined. On 10 August, with Korea looming ever larger, he informed both civilian and military leaders that further work on the FY 1952 budget should await revised goals for FY 1951 and an approved preliminary military program for NSC 68.

Preparation of the NSC 68 military program, covering a four- to five-year period, included planning for some kind of military increase for FY 1951 and later. Meanwhile, to meet the needs of Korean fighting, the approved FY 1951 end strength for U.S. armed forces rose to 2.1 million in July 1950 and to 2.4 million in August. On 1 September, as part of the long-range NSC 68 program, the Joint Chiefs projected FY 1952 end strengths of 1.348,000 men for the Army, 700,000 for the Navy, and 162,000 for the Marine Corps, but gave no strength figure for the Air Force. By mid-1952 the Army was to reach 18 divisions, the Navy 1,109 ships, including 355 major vessels, and the Air Force 78 wings.

In one of his last actions as secretary of defense, Johnson on 13 September directed resumption of preparation of the FY 1952 budget concurrent with work on what was to become the second supplemental FY 1951 request, with final DoD determinations to be made early in November. The Joint Chiefs asked on 22 September that both the FY 1952 budget and the second supplemental FY 1951 request be “increments of the phased build-up”
toward NSC 68 force levels for mid-1954. They increased FY 1952 end strengths to about 3.1 million—1,350,000 for the Army, 712,00 for the Navy, 170,000 marines, and more than 863,000 for the Air Force.7

Secretary Marshall approved the Joint Chiefs’ FY 1952 recommendations of 22 September for purposes of budget planning only; he wanted to hear the NSC discussions and talk with the president before making a final decision.8 Meanwhile, with UNC forces doing well in Korea, Lovett pressed the chiefs to consider reductions. On 13 November they dropped the overall strength level from 3.1 million to 2.8 million for FY 1952, cutting all services. They increased Air Force wings from 78 to 84 (combat and troop carrier) but reduced naval and Marine forces.9 The Army would keep only 16 of 18 projected FY 1952 divisions and drop to a mid-1952 strength of 1,244,000. Even so, the JCS estimated the cost of the FY 1952 program at only slightly under $40 billion, tripling the $13.7 billion May estimate and more than doubling the July projection.10

These figures became part of the five-year NSC 68 estimates sent to the National Security Council. When the council met on 22 November, it made no decisions for FY 1952.11 Several days later the massive Chinese attack on UNC forces in Korea—in George Kennan’s words, a time of “major failure and disaster to our national fortunes”—brought into question all previous budget planning.12

**After the Chinese Intervention**

At an NSC meeting on 28 November, Lovett reversed his earlier position and questioned the continuance in FY 1952 of the policy of establishing a minimum mobilization base and building forces that could be maintained indefinitely. Worried that the war might spread and become much more intense, he suggested a substantial acceleration of the proposed rate of mobilization for men, materiel, and readiness to provide in FY 1952 as much as possible of the required forces. In view of the rapidly changing situation in Korea, the president and the council made no decisions that afternoon.13

Work on the NSC 68 programs advanced to the point that the NSC expected to consider the matter of mobilization at its meeting on 14

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* All Army units overseas and half of those in the United States were to be at 100-percent readiness, the rest at 85 percent. Marine forces were to be at full war strength. The JCS recommended an overall naval manning level of 75 percent of war complement, lower than the 85 percent of the previous year, but noted that this might be raised later. Air Force readiness was at “combat effective” levels for the Strategic Air Command and all overseas units; others would be below “desired effectiveness levels.”
December. Although the military program was still incomplete on 8 December, increases could be expected. For on 6 December the Joint Chiefs had concluded and the NSC Senior Staff had agreed that the wisest course of action was to reach by mid-1952 manpower and force targets recommended for mid-1954.\(^1\) Leon Keyserling, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, thought that the speeded-up military program would require comprehensive planning and direct controls over critical materials, prices, and wages, but that it was feasible. Although it would cut 1950 production levels by more than 33 percent for civilian housing, 60 percent for automobiles, and perhaps 100 percent for radios and televisions, Keyserling thought that the peak effort would absorb less than 5 percent of the total labor force and about 25 percent of total national output.\(^*\) He believed the country could maintain this higher but still limited military effort indefinitely.\(^15\)

Marshall recognized the difficulty in steering a clear and reasonable course. He worried not only about the Korean fighting but also that Soviet reactions might frighten U.S. allies in Europe and discourage NATO plans for an integrated European defense force. He informed Truman on 11 December that to temper demands in Congress for full mobilization he had disclosed to one of its committees that the president might declare a national emergency.\(^16\)

On 13 December, when Truman and administration officials met with congressional leaders, Marshall emphasized the constraints limiting the expansion of U.S. military power. Describing the proposal to accelerate troop buildup and materiel procurement by two years, Marshall explained that he wanted to establish a flexible military base that would permit the country to expand its military force if necessary, maintain a plateau of strength, or even cut back.\(^17\)

For this two-year speedup the JCS submitted the previous FY 1954 requirements, to be met by 30 June 1952: an 18-division Army of 1,353,000 men; a Navy of 1,161 ships, 14 carrier air groups, 725,000 sailors; a Marine Corps of 162,000 men; and a 95-wing Air Force of 971,000 men. Concurring, Marshall forwarded these recommendations on 14 December for consideration at the NSC meeting that day.\(^18\)

The estimated costs for this NSC 68 military program totaled $169.1 billion for the five fiscal years 1951 through 1955. These funds were to modernize and equip the active forces in the 3.2 million-man defense force, assuming that the force goals would be continued through FY 1955. An additional $40 billion to $45 billion would be required for mobilization and war reserves, distribution by years to be made after decision on the rate of

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\(^*\) By comparison, he noted that World War II military needs absorbed 17 percent of the labor force and 42 percent of national production.
procurement. Altogether, the estimated total ranged between $209.1 billion and $214.1 billion for the five years, not too far beyond the price tag that Burns had suggested to Marshall months earlier. The sum of $31 billion was specified for FY 1952, but costs for continued fighting in Korea would be additional because of the planning assumption that Korean combat would be over by 30 June 1951. 19

When the NSC met on 14 December 1950, Marshall declared his general agreement with the NSC 68/3 programs. 20 He noted, however, that the Pentagon had not yet applied detailed studies of production facilities and materials to the military program and its cost estimates, and he pointed out that the mobilization and war reserve costs would be additional. Lovett declared it well within U.S. capabilities to raise and equip the proposed forces but wondered whether there would be sufficient materials and facilities available if, on top of a $31 billion FY 1952 military program, the country also attempted to procure the war reserves in FY 1952.

Although Marshall and Lovett worried about economic limitations, NSRB Chairman W. Stuart Symington declared that “whatever the military wants, the economy can stand.” Seconding Symington’s position, Keyserling questioned whether the proposed defense buildup met the NSC 68/3 description of the emergency; he thought a much larger program possible, particularly in view of what had been done in World War II and the currently stronger U.S. economic base. This premise came into question, however, when Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder pointed out that unemployment and idle factories left considerable slack in the economy in 1940, while the 1950 employment and production levels were far higher so that less readily available capacity for munitions production existed.

Regardless of the situation in Korea, both Marshall and Lovett clearly resisted the idea of a speedier buildup at the 14 December meeting. Marshall expressed particular concern that, if the mobilization and procurement of war reserves proceeded all at once, production would peak and then drop, whereas spending the $40 billion for such equipment over a period of several years would avoid the problem. The secretary believed the Joint Chiefs would prefer the latter course and he himself favored it. Influencing Marshall’s position was the rapid obsolescence of military equipment. But even more important, buying reserve equipment on top of an already expanded military program would decrease civilian production and lower civilian morale; he therefore thought it necessary to compromise on the course to follow when there had been no disaster such as Pearl Harbor to create a willing disposition

* The programs were military, foreign military and economic assistance, civil defense, stockpiling, information, intelligence, and internal security.
to sacrifice. Besides, Marshall was fairly sanguine about the adequacy of an armed force of about three million. Although the authorized number of combat divisions remained small, Marshall felt that the independent regiments and civilian components provided a nucleus for a future force strength of 47 to 50 divisions.

Truman said little during the NSC discussion, but he had some definite ideas about not upsetting the economy. Noting that the men at the table had managed the World War II effort, Truman saw no need for undue alarm. Acheson, however, felt that the current danger to the U.S. position "couldn't be greater" and that it "would not be too much" if the United States had all the troops the military wanted, all the materiel the European allies wanted, all the equipment for the reserves, and a system for full mobilization. Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer pointed out the absence of a list of military requirements; he did not want to cut back civilian production until war orders were ready to take up production capacity—to do so would be the fastest way to destroy civilian morale.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the president approved an amended NSC 68/3 "as a working guide for the urgent purpose of making an immediate start." Subsequently issued as NSC 68/4, the document began by noting that the June invasion of South Korea had lent greater urgency to the problems dealt with in NSC 68 and that the Chinese Communist intervention had "created a new crisis and a situation of great danger." Briefly describing the seven programs annexed to NSC 68/3, NSC 68/4 noted that they were not final but represented the start of a major national security effort. To prevent military disaster and provide support for U.S. foreign policy, the United States had to create a mobilization and production base that would allow rapid expansion to full mobilization and advancement of mid-1954 military goals to mid-1952. At JCS request, NSC 68/4 explicitly warned that if Korean hostilities did not end by 30 June 1951 or if the world situation worsened, a military force of 3.2 million men would not suffice. The report also made clear that such a force could not "absolutely secure" the United States against attack by air or unconventional means, defeat the probable enemy, or thwart aggressive Soviet actions along the periphery of the Soviet Union—although it could act as a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

On 14 December the president also directed that the secretaries of state and defense jointly review U.S. political and military strategy "with a view to increasing and speeding up the programs." This joint review meant keeping the NSC 68 series under active consideration, a desirable procedure since the 14 December decisions did not provide for implementing a number of important elements of U.S. military policy. Beyond moving ahead on troop strength and rearming, Truman left the matter of war and mobilization
reserves subject to study and later decision and maintained a policy of partial mobilization even during the period of greatest peril in Korea.

Speaking to the nation over radio and television on 15 December, the president promised to continue the U.S. effort to uphold UN principles and effect a peaceful settlement of differences with the Soviets, including the war in Korea. He ruled out appeasement or surrender to aggression and promised to build up U.S. and Allied defenses. To prevent inflation, he would ask for further tax increases, reductions in federal nonmilitary expenditures, and selective price and wage controls. To oversee these many activities, the president appointed Charles E. Wilson, president of the General Electric Company, to head a new Office of Defense Mobilization. Truman also named a former Florida governor, Millard Caldwell, as federal civilian defense administrator and planned to ask for federal funds to help the states and cities with civil defense preparations. Citing the bravery shown by U.S. troops in the face of reverses in Korea, Truman invoked the nation's "courage and determination." The next day he proclaimed a national emergency.  

New Service Requests

With the decisions to increase U.S. military forces and create a rapidly expandable production base, DoD immediately needed to prepare an additional budget request for FY 1951. So far, Congress had appropriated $41.8 billion in new obligational authority for FY 1951, but Korean requirements and the perception of increased worldwide danger demanded more funding. Informing Director of the Budget Lawton on 20 December that Defense would need approximately $10 billion additional for FY 1951, Lovett indicated that the request for FY 1952 might be around $60 billion. On 6 January 1951 Marshall called for new DoD budget estimates, directed an in-house review of current and additional programs, and ordered the development of new programs. Estimates for additional FY 1951 funds and the FY 1952 budget were both due on 18 February.  

By 18 February, however, the Korean situation had improved greatly. Isolated American troops had been safely extricated, Ridgway had taken the offensive with the Eighth Army, and U.S. leaders could reasonably believe that UNC forces would be able to secure their positions in Korea. Despite these improved conditions, the military services submitted budget estimates that reflected December fears rather than the new, more hopeful outlook. The first

* Not to be confused with Charles E. Wilson, the head of General Motors Corporation, who later became secretary of defense.
departmental estimates amounted to an astounding $104 billion divided between the final FY 1951 supplement and the FY 1952 budget. Before their presentation to Marshall on 18 February, the services reduced the amount to $101.1 billion, with $28 billion for the last FY 1951 supplement and $73 billion for FY 1952, including $12.7 billion for public works. Lovett later referred to these early estimates as "letters to Santa Claus."26

After discussions with the secretaries of the military departments, Lovett on 20 February set up a tridepartmental committee of high-ranking officials to review the estimates and bring the service budgets in line. The committee first identified three types of costs—those attributable to Korean combat consumption through FY 1951, those associated with establishing and maintaining the forces approved for FY 1952, and those representing other procurement costs. Ostensibly, the first costs would be included in the final FY 1951 supplement; the second, in the FY 1952 budget request; and the third would be candidates for removal from the budget. Since the $101.1 billion budget had included $26.5 billion for war reserves—$17.4 billion for the Army, $3 billion for the Navy, and about $6.1 billion for the Air Force—the third category was by no means minor. Lovett kept close watch on the work of the committee.27

Within days the committee arrived at a preliminary estimate of $9.6 billion for the FY 1951 final supplement, a considerable drop from the earlier $28 billion estimate and more in line with Lovett's earlier $10 billion estimate. When informed, however, the House Appropriations Committee did not take kindly to this amount. As a result, the review continued, and the amount that Marshall finally requested and which Truman submitted to Congress on 3 April 1951 was for only $6.42 billion to support forces and programs that could not otherwise be funded in FY 1951. By that time Defense had requested still another increase in manpower, and the last FY 1951 supplemental appropriation request provided for over 1.5 million soldiers, some 939,000 sailors and marines, and 850,000 airmen. Of the Army's $2.9 billion share of the supplemental, almost 45 percent was for the additional increase in end strength; the Navy planned to use more than 30 percent of its $1.6 billion share for aircraft construction and procurement; and the Air Force put 36 percent of its $1.9 billion share into aircraft and related procurement.28 Congress gave the services $6.38 billion for a total of $48.2 billion in FY 1951 appropriations, including about $5 billion for war reserves.29

The Fiscal Year 1952 Budget

When the president submitted the fourth FY 1951 supplemental request on 3 April, the FY 1952 budget was three months late and Congress was
annoyed. Earlier, on 8 March, with neither request in hand, Representative Mahon had lectured an OSD witness, Brig. Gen. Robert S. Moore, McNeil’s special assistant, on Defense tardiness. The House Appropriations Committee, Mahon told Moore, was “not going to be subjected to a last-minute stampede to appropriate a lot of money about which we know nothing.” Moore’s answer illuminated the complications of the budget process that beset the Pentagon. Work on the FY 1952 budget had been well under way when the Korean conflict began in late June 1950, Moore reminded Mahon; after making up the first supplemental FY 1951 budget in July 1950, the FY 1952 budget estimates had to be “thrown in the waste basket.” Together with the second FY 1951 supplemental, a new start on FY 1952 got under way, but it had to be revised many times as the base was continually broadened and new decisions in December 1950 required a complete revision. At the time of Mahon’s complaint, the Pentagon was still six weeks from completing its work, although General Moore did not say, and perhaps did not know, that.

The services’ February 1951 estimate of $101.1 billion for the rest of FY 1951 and FY 1952 combined had, after the removal of $12.7 billion for military public works and $6.4 billion for FY 1951, left $82 billion for FY 1952. Marshall’s office considered this amount, which included money for a 12-month stockpile of war reserves, excessive and unattainable. Lovett referred the FY 1952 budget estimate to the tridepartmental committee, which worked on it for about two months, but the services would accept few major reductions.

On 9 April the OSD and BoB representatives countered with a proposal for a $49.3 billion budget for FY 1952, slashing the $82 billion estimate by 40 percent. They lowered service requests from $32.6 billion to $19.4 billion for the Army, $21.7 billion to $12.1 billion for the Navy, and $27.3 billion to $17.4 billion for the Air Force, while earmarking $0.465 billion for OSD. When these McNeil–BoB proposals went out for review, it did not take long for the services to seek restoration, although they were relatively restrained. Army asked for restoration of only $2.8 billion, the Navy, $5.7 billion, and the Air Force, $5.6 billion. The services objected instantly when McNeil’s staff and the BoB remained firm and allowed only small restorations.

A major issue was the strength the armed forces should maintain in the face of the planning assumption that all fighting in Korea would end by 30 June 1951. Following a JCS request for more manpower in FY 1952, the president on 12 January 1951 approved an increased FY 1952 end strength of 3,462,205. On 6 April the JCS asked that the planning date for the end of conflict in Korea be extended to 31 December 1951; Marshall approved but only on condition that the FY 1952 budget not be changed. By this time the Army was asking for approximately 100,000 more spaces, a step opposed by
the BoB, which also wanted to reduce the Navy by 60,000 and the Air Force by 72,000. On this issue, the BoB staff lost. As finally submitted to Congress, the FY 1952 budget provided for an Army strength of 1,550,000, a Navy of 805,000, a Marine Corps of 175,516, and a 1,061,000-man Air Force, for a total strength of almost 3.6 million. These new figures exceeded by approximately a quarter million men the total forces just provided in the final FY 1951 supplement.

The FY 1952 budget controversy actually centered less on personnel than on the amount of procurement necessary to supply the armed forces with modern equipment. The BoB contended that the Army and Navy had received enough financing in FY 1951 to modernize and equip their authorized units and that most of their new 1952 procurement would be for war reserves. Both these services, according to the BoB, expected to reach NSC 68 objectives (except for naval air) by mid-1952. The Air Force would not be able to reach its goal of 95 wings by March 1953 and lacked any appreciable amount of war reserves, its rate of expansion being generally geared to the ability of the aircraft industry to provide components, particularly electronics and jet engines. To reduce requests for FY 1952 funds, BoB recommended deep cuts in service procurement of aircraft, ships, ammunition, and Marine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Requests Budget Obligational Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R&amp;D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DoD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures are from BoB budget tables.

* According to the OSD Comptroller's office (Table OASD(C), "Resume of Action on FY 1952 Budget Requests," RG 330, ATSD & DepSecDef files, [ca 16 Apr 51], "1952 Budget Tables" folder), the amount recommended for OSD was $0.7 billion, making the total $49.6 billion; in all other amounts, the tables used by the national security branch of BoB and by the OSD Comptroller's office agreed.
Corps equipment as well as cuts in civilian component programs and levels of training and operation.

Essentially, BoB analysts contended that it was not feasible to meet NSC 68 requirements by the new target date of mid-1952. The analysts estimated that actual deliveries of goods and services in July 1951, the first month of FY 1952, would total $2.5 billion and would have to increase (on a straight line projection) to $15 billion in June 1952 in order to reach the required $103 billion figure for FY 1952. Based on World War II experience, they calculated that actual June 1952 deliveries might reach $4.8 billion. "It is obvious," they wrote, "that the proposed build-up . . . is substantially out of phase with what might reasonably be expected."

When Lovett heard the final service claims on 17 and 18 April, he decided that the McNeil-BoB staff proposal for a $49.3 billion FY 1952 budget had "cut from the fat into the bone," as he later told Congress. Lovett therefore reinstated about half of the cuts in service requests for restoration—$1.4 billion to the Army, $3.0 billion to the Navy, and $2.5 billion to the Air Force. Most of the money was for equipment—aircraft and related items for the Air Force; aircraft and ships for the Navy, including a supercarrier named the USS Forrestal* to replace the USS United States, canceled in 1949; and quartermaster, ordnance, engineer, and signal items for the Army. Lovett's action exemplified his policy of concentrating budget funds in areas where procurement was the most difficult and the lead times longest. For items such as aircraft, which took 18 months or more to produce, the services needed FY 1952 money for immediate obligation because, as Lovett put it, "manufacturers only put out orders to their suppliers and subcontractors to the extent they have firm orders on their books."

Restoring almost $7 billion to the services, Lovett wrote Lawton on 19 April that Defense would require $56.3 billion in new obligational authority for FY 1952—$20.8 billion for the Army, $15.1 billion for the Navy, $19.9 billion for the Air Force, and $0.55 billion for OSD. These amounts would provide for the NSC 68/4 forces approved on 14 December 1950 and for additional facilities, tools, and tooling to broaden the production base. They would also help to modernize the military forces, keep the supply pipeline going, and begin procurement of reserve items. Lovett informed Lawton that

* The supercarrier had been authorized (but no money appropriated) by PL 3 (82 Cong, 1 sess, 10 Mar 51), which also gave the Navy authorization to build 500,000 tons of new ships and to modernize 1 million tons of existing fleet. The Navy let the supercarrier contract for the USS Forrestal (named by joint congressional resolution of 30 July 1951) on 12 July 1951; its estimated completion time, originally 36 months after keel-laying, was later reduced to 29 months after keel-laying, or December 1954. (Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964, 267; US Dept Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense . . . January 1 to June 30, 1952, 152–53.)
he expected to make a few adjustments in the FY 1952 military program later; in addition, Defense would probably need funds beyond the $56.3 billion to continue the Korean combat beyond 1 July 1951.  

Truman asked Congress for $56.2 billion for FY 1952 on 30 April 1951. With a military public works requirement estimated at $4.5 billion to be added later, the total DoD request amounted to $60.7 billion in new obligational authority. Although the final FY 1952 request was considerably less than the services' original proposals, it included both the $31 billion for FY 1952 under NSC 68/4 and a good start on the $40-45 billion for mobilization and war reserves for the entire five-year period (FYs 1951–1955) in that program. The president approved that month detailed FY 1952 materiel programs for Korean combat and U.S. training needs through June 1952, for modern equipment for the active and reserve forces, and for stock levels and war reserves.

Too Much or Too Little?

When Lovett submitted the budget on 19 April 1951, Under Secretary of the Air Force John A. McCone wrote Marshall that OSD reductions in proposed FY 1952 aircraft procurement programs would require many cuts, particularly in provisions for extra plant capacity, tools, and tooling. To attain a 95-wing program as soon as practicable, the Air Force had planned to expand aircraft production from the current 200 planes per month to 1,100 units by December 1952 and to maintain that level through 1953, after which it would lower the rate to 300 units per month. Unless the Air Force was assured of being able to submit a supplemental FY 1952 request by September 1951, McCone thought it might have to reprogram from 1,100 units to a steady level of 700 units per month, to be maintained through 1953 and into 1954.

Lovett reminded McCone that the FY 1952 budget was supposed to provide only those aircraft necessary to modernize the 95-wing program, not war reserve aircraft or those in excess of unit equipment and test needs. The budgeted aircraft were to be fully financed through December 1953, with delivery schedules looking toward more than a thousand per month. Meanwhile, the rate of air buildup and production schedules would await review of NSC 68 policies and programs.

While the Air Force saw the FY 1952 budget request as considerably less than it wanted, the president viewed the Defense budget in quite another light. Before submitting the military budget to Congress, Truman made known his concern about its size and impact at a meeting on 27 April of officials from Defense, BoB, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Defense Production
lA-DU, 7
Devdopmcnt of' FY 19S1 Strt'nRth and Fort'e I.evds

JCS Rec
7 Jul SO

JCS Rcc
1 Sep SO

JCS Rcc
22 Sep SO

JCS Rec
1.:\ Nov SO

JCS Rec
6 Dec SO

JCS Rec
'5 Jan SI

Basic
Budget
.:\0 Apr ';1

Split
JCS Rcc
16Jul ';1

l.evels
Approved
27 Jul SI

JCS Rec
IS Aug 51

Levels
Approvcd
Approvcd
18/29 AUK 51 Fall SI

Apvd Forl'es
()hjcctivcs
.:\0 Jun 52

Anual
Slrcnglhs
.:\0 Jun S2

20
18
110

20
18
110

1,620,000 1,575,000

U94,693

Army
Divisions,
RegtslRCTs
AAA bns.
Other bns.
End strength

10
12
6B
50
655,000

18
17
83
150
1,348,000

18
18
83

16
IS
78

I.350,000

1,244,000

-

18
18
100
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18

-

+3
+ 17

-

1,416,000 I,S50,000

I,SS2,000

18
18
100
150
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+ 17
US2,OOO'

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(18)
117
(ISO)
1550,000

Navy
Carriers, all classes.
Ballieships
Cruisers .
Destroyers
Submarines '
Other active ships,
Total ships.
Air units:
Carrier groups
Other squadrons.
ZP airships/sqdns
MC squadrons
MC divisions.
MC end strength
Navy end strength.
Total strength.

18
1
15
172
75
426
707

24(IR)
3(R)
17
216
95
754
1,109

24(IR)
3(R)
17
216
95
7S4
1,109

23(IR)
2(R)
15
216
85
699
1,040

10
12
13
13
47
37
48
48
44
44
44
44
16
22
23
23
2
2(R(
2+ IRCT
2+ lRCT
9S,66S
162,000
170,045
143,114
490,IS6
700,000
712,000
666,798
58S,821
862,000
882,045
809,912

27
3(R)
19
248
100
764
1,161

+1

-

+ 100R)
+ 19

1,161

14
49
44
27
2+ lRCT
162,000
175,205
725,000
810,000
887,000
985,205

27
4(R)
18
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764
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+1

+ 100R)
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14
+4
+2
53
44
2/3 wing
27
+ 2/3 wing
21/3
+2RCT
2+ lRCT
+2RCT
204,029b
17S,S16
236,126
236,126
805,000
859,888
805,000
857,390
980,S16
1,096,014
1,009,029
1,093,516

-

+4
+2

27
4(3R)
19
248
110(1OR)
783
1,191

(27J
4(R)
(18)
[248J
110(10R)
783
[1,190J
18
5S
27
[3)
Open
for
review

29\2 tempi
4(3R)
19
243
105(IOR)
776
1,176

16
16
S3
53
4(sqdns)
4(sqdns)
3 wings
3 wings
3
3
236,000
23S,320
23S,320(est)
818,000(est)
820,000
820,000
1,056,000 1,055,320
1,053,320(est)

-

Air Force
Combat wings,
Trp carrier wings.
Separate squadrons
MATS & tep carrier
squadrons . .
End strength.
Total Strength
Armed Forces, .

:I.

b

~.

Toward
95 wings

52
6
14

69
9
25

69
9
25

75
9
25

80
15
28

20
488,651
or 504,754

22

22
863,246

28
748,000

30
971,000

1,061,000 1,061,000

3,095,291

2,801,912

3,211,000

3,462,205 3,591,516

1,729,472
or 1,745575

-

138 by
end 1954

-

Including cadets.
Marshall approved the Marine Corps manpower increase on 10 July 1951, the extra battleship in lieu of one cruiser on 11 July 1951.
"R" indicates reduced manning level for all or given number.

Note: The table is based on data from OSD, JCS, NSC, and congressional sources available in OSD Historical Office.

80
15
29
30
1,061,000

"Possible
80
Expansion"
15
Plus
to 138
combat wings
principle
by mid-54
of incr.
1,200,000
1,061,000

1,061,000

3,620,029

3,845,516

80
15

80
15

973,350

973,474

3,737,000 3,603,670

3,621,487


Administration, and the National Production Authority. He impressed on them the importance of managing available funds to minimize the possible inflationary effect on the economy.46

Congressional concern about the size of the FY 1952 budget came later, for when Lovett testified on 7 May members of a House appropriations subcommittee inquired about its sufficiency. Lovett agreed that the $56.2 billion Defense request would be inadequate if the country had to fight a general war in 1952, a possibility he did not rule out. But he opposed mobilizing 12 million to 14 million men, a step he thought would hinder the production of the necessary equipment for rearmament. Nor did he want more money for procurement, for he thought it might clog procurement channels, increase the current 18 to 20 percent inflation rate in the cost of hard goods, and still not yield more finished items.47

Lovett did want the services to have sufficient funds to give firm contracts for long-lead-time items. He also sought money for facilities, basic materials, and machine tools and tooling to create the desired industrial mobilization base, for which he thought the FY 1952 budget included more than 50 percent of the needed funds in most areas. Lovett admitted that he had often scratched war reserves in favor of future production facilities in the FY 1952 budget, but he thought some war reserves, such as ammunition, should be on hand. The FY 1952 military program, he estimated, would absorb about 20 percent of the nation’s production—not enough “to win a war . . . far from it,” but still enough to “protect us . . . [while] we go from the 20 percent of national production to approximately 50 percent of national production which we used in World War II.”48

An NSC meeting on 6 June discussed the close linkage between the state of the civilian economy and the Korean War’s absorption of materiel. Lovett and Admiral Sherman estimated that losses in Korea approximated the equipment for six divisions, valued at about $1.5 billion. Nonetheless, rather than increase requirements, Lovett preferred to extend production schedules and raise production goals. Assuring him that the civilian economy could support the military requirement, Wilson urged not waiting too long; furthermore, if the NSC 68 military program through FY 1953 did not suffice, Wilson stood ready to curtail the civilian economy and funnel more materials and production into military end items. When Lovett pointed out that the forthcoming review of NSC 68/4 was intended to provide the answers Wilson sought, the latter repeated that his office could respond quickly if it only knew the actual military requirements. Silent during this exchange, Truman concluded the discussion by amending his directive for a joint review of NSC 68 policies and programs to provide that it be a continuing one.49

Questions of possible budgetary insufficiency soon gave way to those of
FY 1952 Budget

oversufficiency. By the time that Marshall, busy earlier with the congressional hearings on MacArthur’s removal, testified on 18 July, the Soviets had called for peace in Korea, negotiators had begun to meet, and a quick armistice seemed likely. Thus some members of Congress expressed less concern over military sufficiency than over taxpayer annoyance. George Mahon greeted the secretary by telling him that there was “much feeling among the people generally and among the Members of Congress that the military people do not conserve manpower and dollars as well as they should.” Mahon questioned whether the FY 1952 military buildup should be slowed down or its emphasis changed.50

Marshall, who earlier had warned against excessive funding for Defense, now found himself defending the Pentagon budget against deep cuts. He expressed dismay that a single Soviet action such as their Korean peace initiative could achieve “an attitude of relaxation, of a let-down in our defense program on the part of the American people.” Viewing U.S. susceptibility to Soviet overtures as tragic, Marshall was adamant that U.S. policy should not be changed “every time the Kremlin decides on some new front.” It was important, he told the House committee, to “appear before the world as determined, implacably determined, to get ourselves in such a strong position that the Kremlin will not dare to upset the peace of the world.”51

Marshall thought the $56.2 billion defense budget for FY 1952 struck a happy medium. If war in Korea continued, the money would suffice. If the fighting ended, the FY 1952 budget would provide a chance to meet U.S. commitments for European rearmament and to build up U.S. strength in an orderly fashion—more Army divisions without a large manpower buildup, naval increases of a specialized type, and possibly “larger considerations in connection with the air.” Pointing out that he had fought the dangers of a too rapid buildup in November and December 1950 when Congress thought he was asking for far too little for FY 1951, Marshall in July 1951 fought against a precipitate reduction.52

Despite Marshall’s objection, the House cut more than $1.5 billion from the FY 1952 military budget before sending it to the Senate. Here, however, time worked in favor of the Pentagon, as the Korean armistice talks, begun on 10 July 1951, ran into difficulties and public euphoria changed to caution. As the hearings wore on, the senators, their outlook affected by the fluctuation in the war, became less concerned with saving dollars and more interested in maintaining or augmenting U.S. military preparations. Lovett estimated that materiel losses in continued Korean fighting might run between $4.7 billion and $5.9 billion for FY 1952, amounts not included in the current budget. In addition, the military services, particularly the Air Force, would require more than $5 billion additional to improve their state of readiness.55
Marshall's earlier reference to "larger considerations in connection with the air" underscored the lag in the Air Force buildup despite the authorized increase from 48 wings in mid-1950 to 95 wings by mid-1952. When Finletter testified before the Senate subcommittee in August, the Air Force had 87 wings but only 787,000 of its authorized FY 1951 end strength of 850,000. As the Bureau of the Budget had acknowledged in its earlier analysis of the FY 1952 DoD budget, the services had progressed unevenly, and the Air Force lacked "any appreciable amount of war reserve." The Senate hearings disclosed that the FY 1952 budget did not contain financing for almost 2,000 aircraft needed for the 95 wings.\(^1\)

Anxious over the apparent lag in air power, the Defense subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations met on 20 August with Lovett, McNeil, Bradley, the service secretaries and chiefs, and other DoD officials for a roundtable discussion. They agreed that the Pentagon should prepare a $5 billion supplemental bill in which all three services would share, but with the Air Force getting the major portion. The proposed supplement was not to increase force levels for FY 1952 but rather, as General Vandenberg put it, to allow the Air Force to "move into the expanded program . . . with the least possible delay, without loss of lead time."\(^5\) The Air Force prepared a supplemental budget estimate, and the Senate added $5 billion for Air Force and Navy air expansion to the DoD request, with the proviso that all of it could be obligated but only $0.5 billion spent in FY 1952. This additional money would be placed in a national emergency fund under the control of the secretary of defense.\(^6\)

**The Outcome**

Despite these moves, the congressional appropriation for FY 1952 was less than the $56.2 billion requested by the president. The House voted $54.6 billion in new obligational authority in August 1951, the Senate's additions raised this to $58.1 billion in September, but the final congressional compromise in October provided $55.5 billion—including approximately $1 billion more for additional aircraft procurement—on the basis that additional money could not be "providently expended." Having submitted its FY 1952 budget late, Defense had to live for 3½ months on continuing congressional resolutions, the $55.5 billion in new obligational authority becoming final only on 18 October, when the president signed PL 82–179.\(^7\)

The president's request for military public works funds underwent a similar reduction. The House reduced the request for $4.6 billion to $4.2 billion, the Senate further cut it to $3.8 billion, and it was only slightly
### TABLE 8

FY 1952 Appropriations
New Obligational Authority
(in billions)

**By Appropriation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriation</th>
<th>Amount (in billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic 1952 Appropriation Act</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Supplemental Appropriation Act (Military Public Works)</td>
<td>3.890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act</td>
<td>1.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total DoD</strong></td>
<td><strong>$60.436</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**By Department**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Amount (in billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$21.626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>16.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>22.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>0.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total DoD</strong></td>
<td><strong>$60.436</strong></td>
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</tbody>
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**By Major Category**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Inter-deptl</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations &amp; Maintenance</td>
<td>5.439</td>
<td>3.470</td>
<td>3.638</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Proc &amp; Pdn</td>
<td>8.675</td>
<td>7.801</td>
<td>12.760</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>29.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(3.786)</td>
<td>(11.049)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(14.879)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships &amp; harbor craft</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(1.786)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(1.940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>(8.494)</td>
<td>(2.229)</td>
<td>(1.694)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(12.417)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acq &amp; Constr Real Prop</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>2.174</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Components</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.717</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>1.499</td>
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<td>Industrial Mobilization</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.152</td>
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<td>Establishment-wide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>0.899</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>1.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>$21.626</strong></td>
<td><strong>$16.098</strong></td>
<td><strong>$22.265</strong></td>
<td><strong>$0.446</strong></td>
<td><strong>$60.436</strong></td>
</tr>
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Note: Figures do not add in all instances because of rounding.

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*a* Table FAD-182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, 3, OSD Hist.

*b* Table EISED-117 OASD(C), 7 Jan 53, OSD Hist. Later EISED reports give slightly varying figures; figures used in this volume, unless otherwise indicated, reflect those used during the period.

*c* Ibid.
increased to $3.9 billion in the second supplemental appropriation, * PL 82–254, signed on 1 November.  

The only other military funds made available for FY 1952—$1.4 billion, less $368 million earmarked for FY 1953—came in PL 82–431, the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, signed on 30 June 1952, the last day of the fiscal year. These funds provided for such ongoing operations as pay, maintenance and operations costs, and civilian relief in Korea; they were not supposed to replace equipment losses in Korea, add to the strength of the armed forces, or facilitate a future increase in strength.  

With a total of $60.4 billion in new obligational authority available for FY 1952, the armed forces received more appropriated funds than in any year since the end of World War II. Although the sums of money were vast, there were heavy demands to be met, including replacement of combat losses, expansion of the production base, and buildup of war reserves. The cost of these requirements was compounded by a continuing inflation. As the battle over the FY 1952 budget wound down, it was already apparent that the struggle over the FY 1953 budget would also be hectic, perhaps as complicated and difficult to negotiate as its two predecessors.

* No funds went directly for the military services in the first FY 1952 supplemental, which included money for stockpiling strategic and critical materials.
When President Truman called the FY 1953 budget his “biggest headache,” complaining that he had “never had as much difficulty getting the budget in shape,” he no doubt had in mind the Defense budget. Much of the difficulty centered on determining the size, composition, and rate of buildup of the military forces and the industrial mobilization—matters that the FY 1952 budget had never resolved. As the Department of Defense considered the FY 1953 budget in the summer of 1951, it was plagued by the same uncertainties that had been unsettling the budget process since the beginning of the Korean War a year before. The war raged on even though armistice talks were under way. A buildup of enemy air strength threatened UNC air superiority, and there was no immediate prospect of withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula. The possibility of other East–West confrontations continued to cast a long shadow over U.S. policy deliberations and the development of military programs. In this atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty, decisions had to be made on the extent and timing of economic and military mobilization for the rest of FY 1952 and for FY 1953.

Requests for Immediate Expansion

Even before passage of the FY 1952 defense budget by Congress, the services were already pressing strongly for further expansion. In June 1951 the Air Force wanted to increase its authorized FY 1952 force level of 95 wings (including 15 troop carrier wings) to 138 combat wings plus additional troop carrier units. The Army wanted to raise its authorized FY 1952 combat strength of 18 divisions by 3 new divisions, 2 to replace National Guard divisions sent to Japan and 1 armored division for Europe. The Navy desired
more ships, 4 new carrier air groups, and a buildup from 2½ to 3 Marine divisions. After AFPC discussion on 20 June 1951, Marshall postponed a decision on FY 1952 forces, calling for additional review by the services.²

Further consideration was necessary because the services could not agree on priorities for the expansion they wanted. The Army and Navy considered the Air Force program excessive and a threat to their own requests for additional forces since Congress would undoubtedly take a hard look at these proposals coming on top of the already high FY 1952 appropriation request. Accordingly, General Collins and Admiral Sherman joined in recommending on 16 July substantial augmentations for the Army and the Navy, with end strength of 1,552,000 for the Army, 859,888 for the Navy, and 236,126 for the Marine Corps. Rejecting Vandenberg’s proposals, Collins and Sherman stated they would agree to what was “reasonable and within capability of attainment.”³

Vandenberg still wanted 138 combat wings for the Air Force—76 strategic and 62 tactical and air defense—plus troop carriers. He argued that the threat implicit in a “growing Soviet long-range air force and constantly increasing stockpile of mass destruction weapons” required a U.S. force that would provide a maximum deterrent, minimize the calculated risk, and yield the most combat power in the event of general war—and only the Air Force could meet these needs. Asking for priority over Army and Navy requests, Vandenberg sought authorization for the 138-wing force, and sufficient money in FY 1952 and FY 1953 to permit an orderly buildup to full strength by mid-1954. Strongly supporting Vandenberg, Secretary Finletter wrote Marshall that the Air Force proposal was feasible and even conservative, urged a quick go-ahead because of the long lead times in aircraft production, and asked for some 330,000 more men to reach a strength of 1,390,000 in 1954. Finletter could not yet provide a detailed cost breakdown, but he did state that a supplemental appropriation would be needed in FY 1952. When weeks passed without JCS agreement, Lovett on 7 August told the Joint Chiefs either to “narrow their area of disagreement” or to ask the defense secretary to resolve the matter.⁴

The Status of Mobilization: NSC 114/1

While State and Defense were still working on the joint review of U.S. policy and strategy ordered by Truman in June, the president on 12 July asked for a status report on NSC 68/4 programs by 1 August and a report recommending revisions or modifications by 1 October. When completed, the status report and review would become part of the NSC 114 series, successor to the NSC 68 series as the prime statement of national security policy and the underlying basis for FY 1953 budget planning.⁵
Work on NSC 114 affected internal Pentagon relationships. On 21 June Colonel Carter privately told Lovett that it was "at least embarrassing" that the OSD representative on the NSC staff knew less about certain JCS views than the State Department's representatives. Marshall subsequently informed the Joint Chiefs of his "desire" that Frank C. Nash, who had replaced Finletter in February 1951 as the Defense representative on the NSC Senior Staff, be included in State-JCS conversations. Because this new arrangement still left the service secretaries outside the policy review process, they asked Lovett on 23 June whether it would be appropriate to discuss participation in the process by their representatives. Lovett quickly set up an OSD steering committee, including representatives of the Joint Secretaries, to assist the Defense members of the NSC Senior Staff.

The Joint Chiefs notified Lovett on 27 July that NSC 68 policies, objectives, tasks, and assumptions remained valid except for the assumption that Korean hostilities would end by the already-passed date of 30 June 1951. Not optimistic about the outcome of the armistice talks, they noted that the international situation in general had clearly deteriorated since December 1950, making some increase in approved military force levels necessary. Arrears in the production of many items would delay meeting the July 1952 target date for rearming U.S. military forces, although most items would be available by the end of December 1952. Military assistance items would probably lag beyond their target date of 1 July 1954. The Joint Chiefs assured Marshall that it was "vital"—a word stronger than "critical" in the JCS lexicon—to U.S. national security that a maximum effort be made to meet the two target dates. These views had already been considered in the work on NSC 114, which was in draft form when the Joint Chiefs wrote the secretary.

The drafting of NSC 114 also revealed differences between Acheson and Marshall and within the Pentagon over the speed and scope of the rearmament effort. Describing the situation to Acheson on 31 July, Paul Nitze, Director of State's Policy Planning Staff, asserted that Marshall—and others in the Pentagon who had "lived through the bleak days of miniscule military budgets" before World War II—viewed the current large Defense budget as a "one shot" effort. If all the money were spent in a massive immediate rearmament undertaking, end items would be available faster but production lines would have to shut down. Nitze thought Marshall, Lovett, and McNeil all preferred to extend production over a longer period, a procedure that would permit incorporation of improved weapon designs and avoid large stockpiles of obsolete weapons. The JCS as well as his own office, Nitze wrote, gave more

* These included tanks, antiaircraft equipment, tactical radios, motorized equipment, heavy construction equipment, electronics equipment, certain types of ammunition, and spare aircraft engines.
emphasis to the need for a faster buildup of weapons in hand, to deter war or "to be ready, and in time, should war come."^{9}

Nitze argued that a stretched out program would delay Allied rearmament and noted that the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Council of Economic Advisers believed the U.S. economy could tolerate a much greater effort. State, CIA, and the Joint Chiefs regarded current free world strength as "grossly inadequate" to deal with Soviet or Soviet satellite aggression. State and CIA held that the United States, already in a period of considerable danger, needed to attain adequate preparedness before growing USSR capabilities reduced U.S. atomic superiority. Nitze thought the necessary money for an enlarged and more urgent program could be obtained.^{10}

In the Pentagon, the Joint Secretaries had reservations about the NSC 114 draft, believing that it required further study and ought to be considered in the Armed Forces Policy Council before DoD reached a final position.^{11} Although the JCS agreed with the paper's assessment of the current risk—that the United States and its allies were "already in a period of acute danger" and that it was vital to reach NSC 68 objectives as soon as practicable—they did not agree with all portions of the draft and complained of insufficient time for study. Frank Nash also felt the need for more time to consider the issues.^{12}

Acting for Marshall, Lovett asked for a delay at the NSC meeting on 1 August, saying that he thought the draft conveyed some "erroneous impressions" and did not accurately reflect what had already been accomplished. While granting a week's extension to present a "truer and a more favorable" picture, Truman demanded results. He pushed Lovett to appoint a high-ranking official to "ride herd" on the rearmament program and emphasized that the ODM needed to know military materials requirements.^{13} To satisfy the president, Lovett met with DoD officials on 4 August to discuss what could be done to speed up military programs.^{14} After further discussion at an AFPC meeting on 6 August and with time running out, Defense submitted to the NSC staff some suggestions that were substantially incorporated into the NSC 114 draft.^{15}

The revised draft, NSC 114/1, presented a gloomy picture of the current world situation. Korea demonstrated Soviet willingness to risk global war to a degree "greater than foreseen in NSC 68." Already strong in conventional arms, the Soviets would acquire by mid-1953 the atomic stockpile previously predicted for 1954. The report pictured the Soviet Union as seriously concerned about U.S. and Western rearmament and highly sensitive to U.S. bases overseas or to any rearming of the former Axis countries of Germany and Japan. Should the Kremlin fail in frustrating Western rearmament, NSC 114/1 warned, the "danger of Soviet preventive action will become acute."^{16}

In terms of strength in being, NSC 114/1 viewed the United States as probably worse off in relation to the Soviet Union than before the Korean War.
The paper pointed out, as Lovett wished, that the FY 1952 military budget had been submitted to Congress only in late April 1951 and that available funds had been used to get long-lead-time items started and to expand the production base. However, a variety of manufacturing and other problems had created delays.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to producing end items, the U.S. mobilization effort was to create a rapidly expandable production capacity that could support combat and mobilization requirements if a total war occurred on or after 30 June 1952. NSC 114/1 reflected confidence that the economy could sustain new programs and satisfaction that economic controls and high civilian production had temporarily reversed the inflation of the early period of mobilization.\textsuperscript{18}

Advising that the services expected to meet the approved force and personnel levels for FY 1952, NSC 114/1 pointed out that the main problem was in the materiel program, especially for long-lead-time items. Only the Army, and then solely for initial equipment, would be "fully equipped and substantially but not fully modernized" by the end of June 1952. If the Korean conflict ended immediately, the report estimated that the Army could sustain operations for a global war in early 1953; if the fighting lasted through December 1951, Army readiness would be delayed until late 1953. Modernizing equipment and accumulating minimum war reserves for the Navy would take until 1953 or 1954. The 95-wing Air Force would be substantially in being but only partially equipped with late-model aircraft by mid-1952; wing modernization would occur between December 1952 and June 1954, although most air wings would be able to fulfill their missions before then.\textsuperscript{19}

NSC 114/1 concluded that the acute danger to the United States would last until NSC 68 rearmament objectives had been attained and that the current U.S. effort was inadequate for many critical, long-lead-time items. Without taking a position on current schedules for readiness, the report declared that the president should direct all departments and agencies to increase their efforts to secure military equipment and establish an adequate mobilization base.\textsuperscript{20}

When the NSC considered the report at its meeting on 8 August 1951, the president observed that it seemed "in very good shape" and asked Lovett if he agreed. With two minor corrections, Lovett did. After remarkably little discussion, the council adopted NSC 114/1 and Truman approved its conclusions. In addition, the president directed the NSC to establish a unit that would regularly review the status of all national security programs.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{New Force Levels for FY 1952 and FY 1953}

With NSC 114/1 completed, Lovett wanted a decision from the divided Joint Chiefs on any further military buildup for FY 1952 and joined in their
discussions to help effect a compromise. Vandenberg accepted an Army increase "in view of the situation in Korea" and, although still unconvinced of the merit of the Navy's proposal, agreed to a naval increase subject to the imminent review of force levels for FY 1953. On 15 August the JCS recommended FY 1952 increases of 3 divisions and 17 antiaircraft battalions for the Army within its currently authorized end strength of 1,552,000. If the Korean War continued beyond December 1951, the Army would need to replace battle casualties with about 68,000 new men. The Navy was to be increased by 1 battleship, 10 submarines at reduced war complement, 19 minor combat ships, 4 carrier air groups, and 2 antisubmarine air squadrons. The Marine Corps would add two additional regimental combat teams to round out a third division and additional air squadrons to complete a third air wing. The Joint Chiefs also requested new FY 1952 end strengths for the Navy and Marine Corps of 857,390 and 236,126 respectively, a total of almost 1.1 million. They asked for an Air Force end strength of 1,200,000 and a possible expansion to 138 combat wings by mid-1954.22

Excluding FY 1952 costs for Korean operations, the Japanese occupation, and additional procurement funds that might be needed later, the Joint Chiefs estimated that the increases would require a FY 1952 supplemental budget of almost $5 billion—$86 million for the Army, $557 million for the Navy and Marine Corps, and $4.3 billion for the Air Force. Their FY 1952 recommendations, moreover, did not imply approval of force levels for subsequent years.23

Reviewing these JCS recommendations, Marshall and Lovett worried about their possible effect on manpower levels. However, Assistant Secretary Rosenberg supported the Army's requirement for more men if Korean hostilities continued beyond December, and she gave qualified approval of the Navy and Marine Corps strength requests. The Air Force had entered FY 1952 almost 273,000 men short of its approved strength figure, mainly because of its lack of facilities to house and train them, and Rosenberg deferred a recommendation on its strength. On 18 August Lovett notified the Joint Chiefs that Marshall had agreed to ask for presidential approval of increases in forces for the Army and Navy but approved the Air Force increase only in principle. Currently unwilling to consent to FY 1952 manpower increases, Marshall planned an immediate review of the Navy and Marine requests but denied the Air Force manpower increase for the time being. All FY 1952 manpower figures would be reexamined in the light of FY 1953 requirements. Lovett also agreed that the adjustments and increases would require supplemental FY 1952 appropriations.24

Approving Marshall's decisions on 29 August, Truman in the next few weeks increased FY 1952 Army end strength by an extra 68,000 troops
needed for hostilities in Korea past December, thus authorizing a force of about 1.6 million. He also raised naval and Marine manpower to 820,000 and 236,000, respectively. With the Air Force held at 1,061,000, the authorized FY 1952 armed forces end strength now reached more than 3.7 million, a figure that was to be reviewed again in the course of preparing the FY 1953 budget. As it turned out, no additional FY 1952 money was forthcoming for these increases in force levels and manpower; the Army and Navy had to manage the expansion within their allotted funds.

Air Force expansion and the national mobilization rate remained the two major issues left for resolution in the FY 1953 program. Formally requesting FY 1953 force and strength recommendations on 9 August, Lovett reminded the Joint Chiefs to bear in mind that Defense had been “building towards forces that could be maintained both manpower-wise and materiel-wise for so long as a period of tension may exist.” If they felt it necessary to deviate, Lovett asked them to justify the need when they submitted their FY 1953 recommendations on 10 September.26

Having compromised on the FY 1952 strengths and still convinced of the need for larger forces in being in the event of intercontinental and nuclear war, the Air Force pressed strongly for 138 combat wings plus 25 troop carrier wings (which it now called “air cargo groups”). Units would be phased in only as personnel, installations, and equipment became available. Of the 138 combat wings, 113 were to be combat ready by the end of June 1953, with Manning levels providing for 30 to 90 days of combat operations. The Air Force asked for FY 1953 end strength of 1.2 million. The Air Force manpower request was actually low; had it been computed on the same Manning basis as the currently authorized 95-wing Air Force, the 138-wing force would have required 1.75 million men, a number that Vandenberg admitted would have a “shocking impact” on U.S. manpower resources. Even accepting lower degrees of readiness for commands having no D-Day mission and generally limiting the expansion to flying units, the Air Force would still lack sufficient manpower if war broke out and would have to make a “superhuman effort” for an extended time. The Air Force needed more units and men, Vandenberg told Rosenberg, because it could not currently fulfill its assigned role in U.S. defense.27

Since the Air Force goals would cut into Army and Navy requirements, the interservice dispute quickly resurfaced. Rejecting Air Force suggestions to drop 3 divisions from the Army and 1 battleship, 10 submarines, 4 carrier air groups, and numerous smaller units from the Navy, the two senior services felt that the Air Force should manage with 119 rather than 138 combat air wings and 17 rather than 25 troop carrier groups. The Army and Navy wanted the Air Force to support more tactical air and fewer strategic and air defense
Given these serious differences, it was not surprising that the Joint Chiefs let slip by Lovett’s target date of 10 September for submission of FY 1953 force levels. On 12 September Vandenberg notified the JCS that he would send his recommendations to Finletter for direct submission to the secretary of defense. An apologetic Bradley informed Lovett that the Joint Chiefs could not resolve their differences, chiefly over the number of B-36 groups for 1953 and 1954, and would send him the individual service requests. When Lovett replied that the Joint Chiefs should either submit an agreed position or request higher level decision, Bradley personally returned the secretary’s memorandum. On 17 September the Joint Chiefs prepared a memorandum asking Lovett for a decision from a higher level on FY 1953 forces. The next day, Lovett and Bradley agreed that a JCS reply should be delayed until after Lovett had met with the chiefs to discuss the matter.

To break the deadlock, Lovett asked a trio of service representatives to try to adjust the differences and a 14-man panel to provide answers to five questions he thought crucial to the FY 1953 force strength decision and Senator Brien McMahon’s current demands for an all-atomic Army, Navy, and Air Force. Lovett wanted to know whether tactical atomic weapons would be ready for use by 1953 or 1954, whether they would replace or reduce the need for strategic bombing capabilities, whether guided missiles with atomic warheads would be effective weapons in 1953 or 1954, whether the proposed Defense requirements constituted the proper use of resources, and whether the Air Force was justified in demanding such a large expansion in heavy bomber wings.

Two days later the panel replied that it thought that prototype or even operational tactical atomic weapons could be available by mid-1953, but that tactical air weapons would supplement rather than replace strategic air weapons in the near future. It was also reasonable to expect two guided missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads to be in production before mid-1953 and possibly two more by mid-1954. However, the need for tactical and strategic aircraft would not be reduced in FY 1953, although missiles might have some effect in FY 1954. Finally, the panel disagreed with the Air Force request to increase heavy bomber wings from 6 to 12 in FY 1953 since it considered medium bombers both tactically and strategically effective. Lovett had his answers.

On 26 September the Joint Chiefs submitted their force recommendations...
for FY 1953 to Lovett: for the Army, 21 divisions with 5 at reduced strength; for the Navy, 1,191 ships but only 16 of the 18 carrier air groups it wanted; for the Marine Corps, 3 divisions and 3 air wings; and for the Air Force, 126 combat wings and 17 troop carrier groups. Of the 126 combat wings, 57 would be strategic, 29 air defense, and 40 tactical; 16 would not reach combat readiness in FY 1953.\textsuperscript{54} Two days later the JCS recommended manpower strengths for FY 1953. The Army, only recently granted a FY 1952 end strength of 1,620,000, was to be reduced by mid-1953 to 1,596,000 but would have to be augmented if Korean hostilities extended beyond June 1952. The Navy was expected to increase its FY 1952 end strength of 820,000 to 853,220 by mid-1953, while a small increase from 236,126 to 245,180 was recommended for the Marine Corps. The Air Force, with an authorized FY 1952 end level of 1,061,000, was to reach 1,220,000 by the end of FY 1953.\textsuperscript{55}

When Lovett took the force recommendations to the White House on 2 October, the president simply initialed the memorandum. Three days later he approved the recommendations for budget planning purposes only; as Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster warned the services, the president’s action was not to be “construed as final approval.”\textsuperscript{56} Although the Air Force continued to try to get the 126 combat wings increased to 138, the JCS refused and formally reaffirmed to Lovett on 11 October their force and strength recommendations of late September.\textsuperscript{57} 

\textit{Completing the Military Program: NSC 114/2}

In July the president had ordered two followups to NSC 68/4—a status report on programs that the NSC adopted as 114/1 on 8 August and a report recommending revisions or modifications, to be ready by 1 October. In preparing for the latter report—NSC 114/2—Lovett asked the JCS on 20 August to state the “objectives and minimum tasks” to be fulfilled by their proposed FY 1953 forces, the extent to which the military program would meet national security needs, any factors limiting the program, and their comments on any related aspects. On 6 September the secretary called on OSD to submit by 15 September program costs and impact studies based on the new force levels.\textsuperscript{58} When the JCS force recommendations did not arrive until 26 September it delayed these studies and the overall military program, without which NSC 114/2 was incomplete. Lovett sought and received Truman’s agreement to extend the time for the Defense input to 17 October.\textsuperscript{59}

On 11 October the Joint Chiefs reported that they intended their recommended force levels to provide a base for rapid expansion, maximum deterrence to enemy aggression, and a “reasonable assurance of victory” if
But they displayed a lack of assurance by stating also that the force levels would be insufficient for war. Such uncertainty and ambiguity were all too common in planning and programming during this period.

Because the Air Force had several D-Day missions, including air defense and strategic air warfare, the JCS thought the Air Force should emphasize strength in being, while the Army and Navy should maximize "sustaining power and mobilization potential." The JCS anticipated that forces might remain at the FY 1953 level through mid-1957 unless major changes occurred in the Korean War or the world situation. Assuming the end of hostilities in Korea by mid-1952, no general war during FY 1953, timely FY 1953 appropriations, and supplemental FY 1952 funds to pay for materiel consumed in Korea, the Joint Chiefs expected the Army to have 18 trained but not fully equipped combat divisions by mid-1952 and 21 by 1 March 1953. A satisfactory minimum level of Army war reserve equipment, however, would not be reached until 1954. The Navy would have its end FY 1952 forces in operation on 30 June 1952, but modern equipment and a minimum level of mobilization reserves would not be totally available until sometime in calendar years 1953 and 1954. The Air Force would not be fully equipped and modernized until FY 1955.

The JCS told Lovett that to meet his dictum to maintain desired manpower and materiel levels over a long period, units scheduled for combat would be fully organized, manned, trained, and equipped, while noncombat personnel would be held to the minimum necessary for effective support. All Army overseas combat units and half of the general reserve would have 100-percent manning levels; the rest of the general reserve and reduced strength units, about 80 percent. Navy submarines, Marine divisions, and Marine air wings would be at 100 percent of war complement, but the average fleet manning level would be based on 80 percent of officer and 90 percent of enlisted rates. Air Force flying units were to be ready for combat operations and generally equipped for 90 days, with key combat units at war strengths. The JCS report also included service cost estimates of $116.2 billion for the next two years, of which $64.2 billion was for FY 1953, with shares of $21.5 billion for the Army, $16.2 billion for the Navy, and $26.5 billion for the Air Force.

Informally checking, McNeil learned that the Office of Defense Mobilization thought such large budget figures for FY 1953 would create unduly high expenditures that year. As a result, OSD reviewed the effect of a plan that essentially continued FY 1952 approved programs, and Lovett sent forward a military blueprint for NSC 114/2 that incorporated a FY 1953 Defense budget estimate of only $45 billion. OSD thought that this amount would allow the services about $105 billion to spend in the three fiscal years 1952–1954, a sum it deemed sufficient to fully equip the forces, allow expansion of the
production base, and provide a substantial amount of mobilization reserves. Even so, the Joint Chiefs stated a requirement for $50 billion additional for war reserves, although not all for FY 1953. Otherwise, the military program for NSC 114/2 generally incorporated the language from the 11 October 1951 JCS memorandum, including the FY 1953 force levels.\textsuperscript{11}

The NSC 114/2 report that went to NSC members on 12 October reiterated the basic U.S. strategy of creating a military shield and behind it developing "the political, economic and social strength of the free world." It saw USSR military capabilities as formidable compared with those of the free world. The Soviets already possessed significant strength in atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, sufficient economic strength to sustain a major war effort, and large, well-equipped ground forces capable of overrunning Europe, the Near East, and Southeast Asia. Soviet air power could support their ground forces and might achieve initial surprise in an atomic strike on the United States. Soviet air and submarine attacks might detract from the value of Britain and Japan as U.S. bases. The Soviets lacked only adequate naval forces and shipping for large overseas amphibious operations. NSC 114/2 anticipated that the USSR would gain in strength over the United States in the next few years; by mid-1953 it might have a number of long-range, two-way bombers able to strike the United States and cripple its retaliatory power. Currently, the West was perhaps four years away from being able to defend Western Europe in case of attack, although by mid-1953 it might be possible to hold important strategic positions.\textsuperscript{12}

Given U.S. atomic superiority, NSC 114/2 thought the Soviets less likely to initiate general war than to exploit local opportunities. General war would become more likely when they possessed sufficient atomic capability, particularly when they had reached a point where they could seriously damage U.S. industrial targets and hinder U.S. retaliation. With both sides having atomic capabilities, an adequate civil defense would help to "prolong the period when we possess potent deterrents to war."\textsuperscript{13}

NSC 114/2 also saw the Soviets facing constraints and more affected by U.S. actions than many believed. It acknowledged that there might come a time when the Soviets would agree to accommodation with the West; if so, the United States and the West might possibly take the initiative in seeking peaceful solutions. However, until Soviet power and influence were reduced to acceptable limits, the Western task of creating a shield against possible Soviet aggression was of even greater urgency than before.\textsuperscript{14}

State's Policy Planning Staff agreed with the Pentagon's assumption that general war would not come in FY 1953 and that mobilization should continue on a limited basis, including the deferral of the $50 billion for war reserve stocks. But the staff expressed disappointment that, despite the growing Soviet
threat and a recommendation to accelerate national security programs, NSC 114/2 projected a FY 1953 military program that stretched out the U.S. buildup. State planners were also troubled by delays in military assistance programs, and they viewed the need for a national civil defense program as compelling. Nitze emphasized to Acheson on 17 October the negative effects on the conduct of foreign policy of a stretchout of the U.S. military buildup.\textsuperscript{15}

While the JCS tended to regard the NSC 114/2 assessment of future Soviet capabilities as somewhat overdrawn, it seemed more realistic when the second Soviet atomic test, announced by the White House on 3 October 1951, was shortly thereafter followed by a third Soviet explosion.\textsuperscript{16} Whereas NSC 114/2 considered that the Soviets might be able by 1953 to retard the U.S. ability to retaliate after an attack, the Air Force believed that they already possessed that capability provided they used most of their stockpile in a surprise attack. State’s Policy Planning Staff believed the critical question for NSC decision was whether or not to accelerate the U.S. military buildup.\textsuperscript{17}

When the NSC met on 17 October, Truman felt that time was getting short for preparation of the FY 1953 budget, while the NSC Senior Staff wanted more time to reappraise the policies and programs in the light of the new Soviet atomic explosions. Other considerations had to be taken into account. Acheson pressed for more military assistance deliveries to Europe, and the director of civil defense, Millard Caldwell, sought support for his program. When Truman declared that the military did not seem to appreciate adequately the significance of civil defense and that he wanted to “do something” for it, Lovett replied that it faced a wall of “hopeless public apathy.” Even the civil defense director agreed that Congress was not interested.\textsuperscript{18}

The council recommended using the various NSC 114/2 programs for preliminary FY 1953 budget planning and holding Defense to its $45 billion estimate. Although the rate of military buildup dominated the NSC discussion, the participants appeared less troubled about its size than its cost, beginning with Truman’s concern over the “immense amount” of money involved in NSC 114/2 programs. Since Congress would not grant Truman’s request for a tax increase,\textsuperscript{*} Secretary of the Treasury Snyder expected deficits of possibly $6 billion in 1952, $10 billion in 1953, and $12 billion in 1954.\textsuperscript{19}

Lovett emphasized to the NSC that OSD’s $45 billion estimate was provisional and arbitrary and that the actual FY 1953 budget might be higher or lower. ODM director Wilson, who only that summer had worried about the possible inadequacy of the U.S. rearmament effort, was uneasy about the

\* In 1950 Congress had heeded Truman’s urging to raise income taxes (PL 81–814) and to impose an excess profits tax (PL 81–909), and these steps had led to a $3.5 billion surplus in FY 1951. In October 1951 Congress was willing to give Truman only $5.7 billion of his requested $10 billion tax increase (PL 82–183).
impact of the proposed DoD program and disturbed to learn that it did not include atomic program expansion costs. Wilson viewed a speedup of military production as possible, but it would take the country "close to a full war footing," with all the problems of cutbacks, dislocations, and unemployment. Strongly disagreeing, CEA chairman Keyserling saw a gap between the urgency of the purported threat and the adequacy of the program proposed to meet it. Welcoming a reappraisal, Jack O. Gorrie, the acting NSRB chairman, suggested that the military program would require extending the period of military service from two to three years and lowering physical standards.

Following the NSC discussion, Lovett agreed with Acheson and Gorrie that the NSC Senior Staff should reevaluate the policies and programs in the NSC 68 and 114 series and that the president should authorize FY 1953 budget planning on the basis of NSC 114/2 programs. The military program was to be prepared within the $45 billion estimate, leaving the $50 billion requirement for reserve stocks for further consideration. Approving the NSC actions on 18 October, Truman specifically noted Lovett's caveats and directed that $45 billion would not constitute an upper or lower limit but merely provide a point of departure for preparation of the Defense budget.

Lovett's FY 1953 Budget Request

Among the numerous assumptions and guidelines for FY 1953 budget planning that Lovett had conveyed on 2 October, two had special significance. First, on the assumption that FY 1953 would be a "year of armed peace with world tensions," U.S. forces were to be ready for combat at any time, but the budget would not take account of combat operations during FY 1953. Second, Korean combat operations should be expected to continue until 30 June 1952 and combat costs would be excluded from the FY 1953 budget. Any extra Korean costs occurring in FY 1952 would presumably be covered by a supplemental appropriation.

As the NSC discussion of 17 October revealed, the cost of the FY 1953 military program was a dominant concern. Although Lovett emphasized the tentative nature of the $45 billion estimate, the services thought it, in fact, a ceiling. Indeed, as early as 18 October the Air Force feared that it would fail to get its desired $7 billion supplemental for FY 1952 or $26.5 billion appropriation for FY 1953. On 29 October when Lovett formally called for

* Although Keyserling kept his remarks at the NSC meeting to a minimum and spoke in a measured way, he was sufficiently exercised about the lag in the defense program to send the president privately on 2 November 1951 a 2<em>p</em>age amplification of his views. See US Dept State, <i>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951</i>, 1:245-54.
budget estimates by 20 November, he referred to the figure as only a benchmark but directed the services to develop their budgets within $45 billion and allocated $14.5 billion to the Army, $13.0 billion to the Navy, $17.0 billion to the Air Force, and $0.5 billion to OSD. Any additional amounts were to be shown and justified separately. That same day McNeil asked each military department to prepare six budget estimates—first, for the allocated amount; then with additions of $0.5 billion, $1 billion, $2 billion, and $3 billion; and finally, a full requirements estimate.54

Less money and the tightening of OSD spending controls seemed to be the watchword. Newspaper articles in November, including a New York Times piece by Hanson Baldwin, speculated on an expected cut in Defense expenditures and at least a tentative administrative budget ceiling of $45 billion. In AFPC discussions of 20 November, Deputy Secretary Foster stated the figure was “merely a benchmark,” but Secretary Finletter saw it as a ceiling, and Admiral Fechteler asserted that it was a ceiling to the people who had to prepare the budget. Since the issue involved Pentagon relations with President Truman, the BoB, and Congress, General Collins called for continuing top-level policy guidance.55

“Neither a floor nor a ceiling,” McNeil described the $45 billion budget estimate at a 23 November staff meeting. He also pointed out that total military expenditures in FY 1953—not appropriations, but the money actually spent—would be about $55–57 billion. For the first time during the Korean War, the military procurement backlog was catching up, and expenditures suddenly threatened to exceed new obligational authority. The BoB calculated that with foreign military assistance and the atomic energy program, national security expenditures would exceed $62 billion; the addition of nonmilitary costs would bring total government spending to around $82 billion. With FY 1953 yearly receipts estimated at about $72 billion, there loomed a $10 billion government deficit even with a $45 billion Defense budget. If military requirements for raw materials created drastic cutbacks in civilian production, tax receipts might drop and raise the deficit even further. Meanwhile, Congress remained opposed to any further increase in individual or corporate taxes. With less than $20 billion available for all nonmilitary government programs, including some $14 billion for mandated statutory expenditures, the BoB doubted that it could reduce spending by $500 million even from the remaining $5.5 billion in programs.55

The military services clearly found a $45 billion FY 1953 Defense budget unacceptable. Submitting the required budget estimates on 21 November, Secretary Kimball reported that the Navy and Marine Corps needed almost $18 billion for a minimally adequate program and that Lovett’s allocation of $13 billion fell far short of meeting program objectives. The Army wanted
$20.5 billion rather than the allocated $14.5 billion; the Air Force asked for $26.7 billion, not $17.0 billion; $5 billion was needed for military public works; and only the OSD budget remained within its allotted $0.5 billion. Estimates for these full requirements budgets totaled almost $71 billion. Furthermore, with $14 billion projected for military assistance and nothing yet specified for an expanded atomic energy program, the total for national security remained unsettled.56

Realizing the futility of forwarding to Truman the full requirements budget, Lovett on 6 December urged the service secretaries to revise the estimates. He pointed out that reserve stock requests had reached absurd proportions; for example, the Army wanted 13,900 tanks but lacked the manpower to handle half that number. Conceding that $45 billion might be a "little low," Lovett warned the secretaries to "wring the water" out of their current estimates or be "drowned by the Congress in it."57 At a Sunday meeting on 11 December, when Lovett and his Defense advisers met with representatives of the BoB, ODM, and the Office of the Director for Mutual Security, it became clear that a $71 billion budget was out of the question. Moreover, McNeil's office and BoB analysts had presented a FY 1953 budget totaling $42.6 billion in new obligational authority, excluding public works. Under such pressure the services cut their requests to $58.3 billion, and at OSD conferences held between 12 and 15 December both sides compromised and Lovett made his final decisions.58

On 17 and 21 December Lovett submitted to Lawton a DoD budget request for $51.9 billion in new obligational authority for FY 1953—$0.5 billion for OSD, $15.5 billion for the Army, $14.5 billion for the Navy, and $21.4 billion for the Air Force. In addition, Lovett expected to ask for $3.5 billion for FY 1953 military public works. Although substantially reduced from the services' $71 billion, Lovett's budget remained considerably above OSD's earlier figure of $45 billion. The secretary also estimated that Defense expenditures would reach $49 billion in FY 1952 and nearly $66 billion in FY 1953.59 As Lovett wrote Lawton, the proposed budget would continue the policy of building a rapidly expansible mobilization base, finance certain reserve stocks, and support and equip the forces the NSC had recommended on 17 October—a 21-division Army, a 1,191-ship Navy, a 3-division Marine Corps, and an Air Force of 143 (126 combat) wings by the end of FY 1954 if possible. The budget necessarily reduced FY 1953 end strengths below the JCS-recommended levels: to 1,586,000 for the Army, 835,875 for the Navy, 243,730 for the Marine Corps, and 1,090,000 for the Air Force.60

* This was an agency recently established under Averell Harriman to handle, among other things, military assistance matters. See Chapter XIX.
At a meeting on 19 December, Lawton told Lovett and Foster that $2 billion further should be cut, mostly from the Navy, but the budget director sought far greater economies yet. With total government budget requests for FY 1953 reaching $100 billion against Truman's absolute ceiling of $83 billion, Lawton needed to cut $17 billion, and Defense seemed a prime candidate for the ax. Since stated military requirements appeared realistic, he thought the president would have to choose between approving FY 1953 funds for them and postponing expenditures by extending the period for meeting the requirements. Pointing out to Truman that DoD also wanted a FY 1952 supplemental, Lawton noted that Lovett's current expenditure estimates would create deficits of $15 billion in 1952 and between $10 billion and $29 billion in FY 1953. Lawton doubted that Defense could actually spend at the forecast rate and thought it more realistic to expect a $6 billion deficit in 1952 and a $17 billion one in 1953. Believing Lovett's budget proposal incompatible with a policy of limited mobilization, Lawton asked Truman whether the government should change its policy or the Pentagon should reduce its budget.61

Truman's Decision to "Stretch Out"

Already troubled, Truman recognized that Lawton's question reached to the heart of the budget problem. The president also feared that the military program would divert critical materials from U.S. industry and private consumption and require rigid controls. At a White House meeting on 28 December attended by Acheson, Snyder, Wilson, Harriman, and DoD officials, Truman expressed his deep concern that the military budget might well ruin the U.S. economy and give the Kremlin the "fruits of a hot war victory without having to fight it." The president thought it best for the country to stretch out the military buildup, and he set an outside limit of $60 billion for all military and military assistance expenditures in FY 1953.62

Obviously, Truman's expenditure limit would have an immediate impact on the FY 1953 Defense budget. He asked everyone to speak "frankly to this vital subject," since this would be their only opportunity. In sympathy with Truman's goals, Lovett supported the decision, seeking only to assure that military production rates would continue to rise even under a stretchout. Pace, Kimball, and Finletter also spoke, but none opposed the president's stated limitations. Bradley, too, accepted the president's judgment. With this apparent Defense agreement, it remained for Lovett and Lawton to work out the FY 1953 DoD budget adjustments.63

When the BoB markup of Lovett's $51.6 billion budget came the next day, it provided $41.6 billion, plus $2.5 billion for public works, military pay increases, and all other items of proposed legislation—a grand total of $44.1
billion in new obligational authority for all purposes in FY 1953. Long-lead-time items were the heavy losers in the BoB markup. The Army cut of $2.3 billion included almost $2.2 billion for procurement. Of $2.9 billion in Navy cuts, $2.0 billion was in aircraft and related procurement, shipbuilding, and ordnance. The Air Force lost $4.8 billion, $3.8 billion in aircraft and other procurement. In addition, the BoB had lowered military strengths.64

After feverish Pentagon activity over a New Year’s holiday, Lovett agreed to ask for restoration of $1.4 billion to the Army, $1.7 billion to the Navy, and $4.3 billion to the Air Force, in this last instance requesting more for aircraft and related procurement than he had originally. Sending a revised FY 1953 DoD request for $49 billion to the president on 4 January 1952, Lovett estimated that combined defense and military assistance expenditures would not exceed $44 billion in FY 1952 or $60 billion in FY 1953. However, the secretary asked to be allowed to combine the FY 1953 figure with $26.5 billion of still pending FY 1952 expenditures, for a total of $86.5 billion in expenditures for the 18-month period from 1 January 1952 to 30 June 1953. He also asked that funds be made available to the Pentagon expeditiously and that the military departments, with the secretary’s approval, be allowed to adjust amounts within the total figure. By juggling figures in this fashion, Lovett thought he could manage a $49 billion FY 1953 budget that would allow a steady buildup of production facilities. Although BoB personnel, including Lawton, worked directly with Defense officials during the preparation of this request, Lovett apparently had no indication of their position on individual items.65

To reach Lovett’s $49 billion budget, the military services would have to accept further reductions in manpower and forces. As eventually worked out, Army strength was reduced to 1,552,000 and Air Force strength to 1,061,000 for the end of FY 1953. The Army dropped 1 armored division from the previously planned 21 divisions, cut 7 antiaircraft battalions, and reduced the strength of a number of its units. Of the 126 combat wings authorized for the Air Force, 30 would not become combat effective in FY 1953. Navy forces and strengths remained unchanged in this second budget, but the Navy had already suffered the loss of two much-wanted carrier air groups in the original forces program for FY 1953 and faced delays in getting modern equipment. Lovett viewed the proposed forces as providing a “minimum mobilization base.”66 These FY 1953 changes also eventually required reductions in the FY 1952 program to bring it into line.67

* Army strength for the end of FY 1952 was reduced to 1,575,000 and Air Force strength to 973,550. The armored division and seven antiaircraft battalions cut from FY 1953 Army forces were also removed from 1952 force strengths. Cutbacks of 2 naval carrier air groups and 2 naval air squadrons—and an increase of 1 cruiser—were also made effective for FY 1952. The FY 1952 force objective of the Air Force returned to 80 combat wings and 15 troop carrier groups (wings).
### Table 9
Development of FY 1953 Strength and Force Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army Rec Sep 51</th>
<th>Navy Rec Sep 51</th>
<th>AF Rec Sep 51</th>
<th>JCS Request 28 Sep 51</th>
<th>Lovett Request 17 Dec 51</th>
<th>Lovett Request 4 Jan 52</th>
<th>Lovett Request 31 Dec 52</th>
<th>Actual 31 Dec 52</th>
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<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21(5R)</td>
<td>21(R)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20(6R)</td>
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<td>Regts/RCRs</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18(2R)</td>
<td>18(2R)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18(13R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAA bns</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>117(44R)</td>
<td>117(44R)</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>113(83R)</td>
<td>1,552,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other bns</td>
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<td>181</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,523,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>End strength</strong></td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,596,000</td>
<td>1,586,000</td>
<td>1,552,000</td>
<td>1,523,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Carriers, all classes</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29[2 temp]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
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<td>3(R)</td>
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<td>4(3R)</td>
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<td>Cruisers</td>
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<td>Destroyers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>110(10R)</td>
<td>110(10R)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110(10R)</td>
<td>110(10R)</td>
<td>110(10R)</td>
<td>103(10R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other active ships</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>[715]</td>
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<td><strong>Total ships</strong></td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,116</td>
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<td><strong>Air units:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Carrier groups</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Other squadrons</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>ZP airships/sqdns</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>MC sqdns/wings</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2-1/3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MC end strength</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>245,180</td>
<td>243,730</td>
<td>243,730</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Navy end strength</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>853,220</td>
<td>835,875</td>
<td>835,875</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total end strength</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,098,400</td>
<td>1,079,605</td>
<td>1,079,605</td>
<td>1,033,698</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat wings</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>138[25R]</td>
<td>126(16R)</td>
<td>Toward</td>
<td>126(30R)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trp carrier wings</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17(1R)</td>
<td>143 wings</td>
<td>17(1R)</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Separate squadrons</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>by mid-54</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>MATS squadrons</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>End strength</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,220,000</td>
<td>1,220,000</td>
<td>1,090,000</td>
<td>1,061,000</td>
<td>957,603</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Strength</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,914,400</td>
<td>3,755,605</td>
<td>3,692,605</td>
<td>3,514,453</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The table is based on data from OSD, JCS, NSC, and congressional sources available in OSD Historical Office. "R" indicates reduced manning level for all or given number.
TABLE 10
Development of FY 1953 Defense Budget
New Obligational Authority
(in billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Lovett Estimates 11 Oct 51</th>
<th>Lovett Request 17 Dec 51</th>
<th>BoB Markup 29 Dec 51</th>
<th>Lovett Request 4 Jan 52</th>
<th>Truman Approval 5 Jan 52</th>
<th>% of Service Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$21.5</td>
<td>$15.2</td>
<td>$12.9</td>
<td>$14.3</td>
<td>$14.2</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DoD</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military public works, etc.</td>
<td>$3.5</td>
<td>$2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures are from BoB budget tables.

Alarmed by the scale of the budget reductions, the Joint Chiefs on 4 January 1952 sent Lovett a terse message stating that the period of 1954 was "most dangerous" for U.S. security and that the reduced FY 1953 budget would postpone to 1956 the achievement of a U.S. military capability to meet the threat. Although Lovett immediately gave the JCS message to Truman, the president sent Congress on 21 January a Defense request for $48.6 billion in new obligatory authority for FY 1953. A separate request later for $3.5 billion covered military public works, pay increases, and all other items of proposed legislation. The president estimated that Defense would spend about $51 billion in FY 1953.

Even before the president sent the budget request to Congress, the BoB began to make adjustments in the combined Defense–military assistance expenditure limitation. On 5 January 1952 Lawton telephoned McNeil that the combined $44 billion FY 1952 limit would be lowered to $43 billion and the combined $60 billion FY 1953 limit to $58 billion, with a $50 billion Defense share. McNeil thought that Defense needed a $52.5 billion share and told Lawton that the Pentagon would find it hard to justify the lower figure to Congress "with conviction." Declaring that military assistance required a larger share, Lawton explained equivocally that the $58 billion total was "not intended to void the $60 billion expenditure limitation [but that] ... the aggregate of expenditures might be about the $58 billion level." When Truman granted Lovett's request to combine the remaining FY 1952 expenditures with what was now called a "less than $60 billion" FY 1953 expenditure limit, the
total figure was set at $85.6 billion, with a Defense share of $75.6 billion. On 10 January Lovett allocated the money to the services on a quarterly basis, for the 18-month period. The final expenditure figures would have to be adjusted again depending on the appropriation for FY 1953. This promised to be another battle.

The Fight in Congress

In his annual budget message to Congress on 21 January, Truman pointed to Defense as the largest single item in the budget. He estimated total government expenditures would reach $85.4 billion in FY 1953, more than in any year since World War II. With tax receipts estimated at only $71 billion and the public debt expected to reach its ceiling of $275 billion by 1 July 1953, Truman wanted a "pay-as-we-go" policy and asked Congress to give him at least the shortfall in his earlier request for additional taxes. But Congress, as it turned out, preferred to make budget reductions.

The House Committee on Appropriations heard testimony from Lovett, McNeil, and other Defense officials beginning on 22 January. Because 1952 was a presidential election year, Congress wanted to reduce the DoD budget and adjourn before the national party conventions in July. Appalled by the losses in Korea, confused by truce talks that did not end the fighting, and frustrated by a Cold War that appeared endless, the American public disliked the nation's "militarization" and questioned money spent to rearm a Europe that it regarded as less than wholly committed to defending itself. And members of Congress, whether Democratic or Republican, were in no mood to ignore the public will. Appropriations Committee Chairman Clarence Cannon made it very clear that he wanted to be "in the black at the end of the fiscal year instead of in the red" and that Defense was the major area for savings.

After taking 8,765 pages of testimony, the House Appropriations Committee reported a bill of $44.4 billion, cutting almost 9 percent from Truman's $48.6 billion request. Army cuts of $1.7 billion came mainly in procurement and production; Navy cuts of $1 billion reduced aircraft and shipbuilding, including the second supercarrier; and Air Force cuts of $1.5 billion took a toll in aircraft procurement, maintenance and operations, and military personnel. The House of Representatives upheld every committee cut and eliminated another $0.5 billion, mostly in Army and Air Force requests, bringing the appropriation down to $43.9 billion.

Lovett in February viewed Truman's $48.6 billion Defense request as the "very thin edge of an acceptable calculated risk." On 24 April he asked the
Senate to restore approximately $3.6 billion of the $4.7 billion House cut, for a total of $47.5 billion, and later he sought an additional $0.5 billion for increased military pay costs. On 4 June the president submitted a reduced FY 1953 military public works budget of about $3 billion to the House, which treated it as a first FY 1953 supplemental budget request. The total of these two requests came to $51 billion. Despite Lovett's testimony in late April that further cuts would come out of military “bone and sinew,” that the Joint Chiefs thought the current request provided inadequately for national security, and that, by contrast, the current Soviet military budget was the largest since World War II, the senators remained committed to a Defense cut. Rather than settle for a “minimum order of national security,” Lovett argued that he would “take the budget deficit every time at this stage of international tensions.”

Backing Lovett, the secretaries of the military departments sought restoration of money for specific service needs. Asserting that the House bill would put off the creation of a 126-combat-wing Air Force to July 1957, Finletter asked the senators to restore the deleted aircraft procurement money plus enough to assure 126 combat wings by mid-1955. Kimball tried to save the Navy's most modern airplanes and its number one priority item, a second supercarrier, the Saratoga. Pace stressed that 81 percent of all Korean battle casualties came from the Army, which needed a minimum strength of 1,552,000 and even more manpower if the war continued past mid-1952. Reminding Congress that the Army had 20 divisions with an average strength of 17,236 and might face a 175-division Soviet force that was equivalent to 83 divisions of 17,236 men each, Pace wanted $1.14 billion restored to the Army.

Defense officials were equally upset by a $46 billion limit the House had set on FY 1953 Defense expenditures. Its author, Rep. Howard W. Smith, claimed that his amendment would save money, help balance the budget, and enable Congress once again to control the federal budget. Enthusiastically supporting Smith, Rep. Frederic R. Coudert, who had earlier advanced a similar idea, asserted that passage of Smith's amendment would assure that the Pentagon would “no longer rule the nation.” A coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats provided a House majority vote of 220 to 131 to pass the amendment, which limited the full use of both new and previously appropriated money.

To the Pentagon the $46 billion congressional limitation on expenditures appeared seriously damaging. Lovett estimated FY 1953 expenditures in the range of $52 billion, including deliveries of many long-lead-time items ordered under earlier appropriations. In fact, Defense Production Administrator Manly Fleischmann expected FY 1953 to become the “first year of
visible and substantial accomplishment in the field of munitions production.” Some senators seemed to think that previously appropriated money was sitting in the Treasury and would not be affected by Smith’s $46 billion expenditure limitation. It fell to Lovett to explain that this was not true. Since it was already too late to achieve major savings in the first half of FY 1953, the services would have to make drastic reductions in the second half, canceling important contracts on which partial payments had already been made and losing some equipment nearly completed and ready for delivery. Even if the limitation order were later rescinded, Lovett feared that Defense contractors might become unwilling to deal with a department “subject to such violent fluctuations.” In his words, the amendment threatened the “whole doctrine of this country . . . to substitute machinery for men in fighting.” He likened the limitation to amputating an arm to save the cost of a coatsleeve.”8

Following Lovett’s testimony, the Senate Committee on Appropriations eliminated the expenditure limitation. But the committee’s final report of 27 June recommended a Defense appropriation of only $43.4 billion, compared with the $43.9 billion in the House bill, most of the cut coming in Air Force procurement and maintenance and operations. The Senate approved a total of $44.1 billion, giving the Air Force $668 million more, some of this money as unfinanced contract authority for which funds would have to be appropriated later.9

The results of congressional conferences, approved by voice vote on 5 July, eliminated both the House spending limitation and the Senate grant of contract authority. The Senate’s restitution of funds was generally upheld, and the Navy received authority to proceed with its second supercarrier, using funds on hand. PL 82–488, signed by Truman on 10 July, granted Defense $44.3 billion in new obligational authority. In all, Congress had cut the president’s request by close to 10 percent, with the Army the big loser.80

The military public works budget, treated as the first FY 1953 supplement, followed close on the heels of the basic bill and demonstrated the congressional temper even more emphatically than the first bill. From the president’s request of $2.99 billion on 4 June, the House cut $806 million. When DoD requested restoration of $210 million, the Senate Committee on Appropriations removed over $2 billion more, leaving a mere $141.4 million, and the Senate approved a bill for only $143.4 million. After the congressional conference agreed to restore most of the money cut by the Senate, Congress approved almost $2.3 billion. On 15 July the president signed PL 82–547, an appropriation that cut his original request by about 23 percent.81

* The principal argument against the Smith amendment was that Congress was acting improperly in seeking to limit retroactively the use of money already appropriated.
TABLE 11
FY 1953 Basic Appropriation
New Obligational Authority
(in billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>President's Request 21 Jan 52</th>
<th>Apvd by Congress 5 Jul 52</th>
<th>% Reduced</th>
<th>% of Services' Orig Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$14.200</td>
<td>$12.240</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>13.200</td>
<td>12.265</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>20.700</td>
<td>19.388</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay request</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DoD</td>
<td>$48.566</td>
<td>$44.302*</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Discrepancy due to rounded figures.

The Department of Defense under Lovett received no further funds. In one of his last official acts, Truman submitted on 10 January 1953 a second supplemental FY 1953 request of $1.2 billion for Defense personnel pay. Congress did not act until after the new administration took office and then simply authorized the services to transfer $1.07 billion from already available appropriations (PL 83-11). Although the Korean War still dragged on in the Far East, the time of easy money for the Pentagon had clearly passed.

The earmarking of almost 44 percent of all FY 1953 Defense funds for the Air Force affirmed a greater emphasis on air power, albeit the buildup was stretched out. This emphasis may be viewed as the normal progression toward the balanced military forces planned under NSC 68 and NSC 114, since the Air Force had fallen behind the other services in attaining approved force strength, primarily because of delays in procurement of aircraft. At the same time, and of greater significance for long-term strategy and programs, the policies that shaped the FY 1953 budget—the stretchout of the military buildup and the priority on air power—clearly foreshadowed the "New Look" of the Eisenhower administration.
### Table 12

**FY 1953 Appropriations**  
New Obligational Authority  
(in billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Appropriation</th>
<th>New Obligational Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1953 portion of Urgent Deficiency</td>
<td>$0.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic 1953 Appropriation Act</td>
<td>$44.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Supplemental (Military Public Works)</td>
<td>2.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Supplemental</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total DoD</strong></td>
<td><strong>$46.961</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Department</th>
<th>New Obligational Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$13.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>12.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>20.588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>0.550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total DoD</strong></td>
<td><strong>$46.961</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Major Category</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Inter-deptl</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(3.276)</td>
<td>(10.510)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(13.811)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships &amp; harbor craft</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.624)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(0.674)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>(2.661)</td>
<td>(1.416)</td>
<td>(1.240)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(5.317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acq &amp; Constr Real Prop</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>2.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Components</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>1.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Mobilization</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment-wide Activities</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>$13.194</strong></td>
<td><strong>$12.628</strong></td>
<td><strong>$20.588</strong></td>
<td><strong>$0.550</strong></td>
<td><strong>$46.961</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures do not add in all instances because of rounding.

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a Table EISED-054 OASD(C), 25 Jun 54, OSD Hist.  
b Ibid.  
c Table EISED-117 OASD(C), 7 Jan 53, OSD Hist, includes $1.2 billion for personnel costs requested in the second supplemental FY 1953 but never received. As a result this category has been reduced by $786 million for the Army, $203 million for the Navy, $185 million for the Air Force, and $26 million from interdepartmental establishment-wide activities.  
d No new money; $1.07 billion from already available Defense appropriations authorized for obligation during FY 1953.
CHAPTER XV
The Last Truman Budget

The initiation of work on the FY 1954 budget followed hard on the presentation of the FY 1953 budget to Congress in January 1952. This last Truman budget was an exercise in uncertainty, for immediately after its submission to Congress in January 1953 it became subject to reassessment and change by a new administration.\(^1\) In his last year in office, President Truman nevertheless wanted to develop a tight budget for FY 1954 that would assure the continuity of adequate, effective, and affordable military forces for the United States.

In the Pentagon, Lovett and the military services recognized that the continuing large Defense requirements would encounter serious funding difficulties. The debates in Congress over the FY 1953 Defense budget and the cuts in appropriations augured that, barring a major new international crisis, the Pentagon would find it more difficult to secure money. In the FY 1952 and FY 1953 budgets Lovett had supported appropriations for many long-lead-time items, and the military services already had in hand from the FY 1951–52 budgets huge amounts of unexpended funds that would carry over for several more years. These funds would help tide the services over during the anticipated straitened, more austere postwar years. From the standpoint of the administration and Congress, the large carryover of funds made possible smaller military appropriations for FY 1954 and thereafter.

Coming at a time of continuing great uncertainty about the war in Korea and world conditions in general, the FY 1954 budget preparation brought to the surface a profusion of underlying issues. The inherent conflict between OSD and the military services manifested itself in sharply different analyses and interpretations of military capabilities, resources, and requirements, with the budget requests the ultimate resolution. OSD frequently considered service and JCS estimates of force requirements and funds for Korea and other...
programs too high and even exaggerated. Lovett and his top aides—Foster, McNeil, Rosenberg, and Nash—had to find an accommodation between the powerful pressures for more men and money from the services and the no less powerful pressures from the administration and Congress to keep a tight lid on spending.

The military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff faced the necessity of striking a balance between the requirements for the Korean War and those for other major claimants to resources—European defense, the Strategic Air Command, and continental defense. The administration and OSD, continually assuming an early termination of hostilities, preferred to fund combat costs in Korea by supplemental appropriations late in the fiscal year or in the next year's budget. Consequently, the military had to meet the war's demands for manpower and money from already available resources, sometimes to the detriment of other programs. This juggling of resources disturbed the military, who kept insisting that the war be funded on a regular fiscal year basis, moving the war's termination date year by year. This difference over the war's termination date and the timing of funding of war costs occasioned sharp exchanges between OSD and the services during consideration of the FY 1954 budget. In the end, Lovett often found it necessary and desirable to compromise differences, at times restoring manpower levels and money and at other times insisting on reductions in estimates.

**A Continuing Problem: Korean Combat Costs**

One of the first issues encountered in preparation of the FY 1954 budget—how to pay for current Korean combat costs—revealed the difficulty of reconciling military requirements with budgetary policy. The basic DoD budget for a given year generally included the costs for personnel and normal maintenance and operations in Korea, but it did not provide for replacement of equipment consumed in combat. Since combat consumption rates were unpredictable, it seemed sensible to include them in a supplemental budget, meanwhile allowing the Korean combat forces priority on all available materiel and other resources. The services had been put out when Congress did not provide sufficient supplemental FY 1952 funds to replace the items used in Korea. Two Even worse from the JCS standpoint, the basic budget for FY 1953, greatly reduced from the original service estimates, was supposed to cover only part of the FY 1952 Korean combat cost and could include no funds for such costs in FY 1953.

Considering it impractical to assume the war would end by 30 June 1952, the JCS on 16 January asked Lovett to assume for planning purposes that
Korean hostilities would "continue through any fiscal year then being considered," subject to quarterly review. Thus, for the FY 1954 budget, combat would be assumed to continue to 30 June 1954. Assistant Secretary Rosenberg, however, advised Lovett that such an assumption would strongly affect FY 1953 manpower planning for the Army and Marine Corps, both of which had large numbers of ground troops in Korea. Under the current "no combat" assumption, the two services had to absorb the combat pipeline (which provided rotation and casualty replacements for Korea) within their authorized strength; if hostilities were assumed to continue to 30 June 1953, the services would undoubtedly require additional strength. Since lead time for training took at least six months, the services needed to know immediately whether or not to provide for a combat pipeline in FY 1953. Rosenberg told Lovett she needed advice from the Joint Chiefs since their views would affect planning for the April draft call.

Responding to Rosenberg's questions, the Joint Chiefs informed Lovett on 15 February that they did not want the services to absorb the combat pipeline within authorized FY 1953 strengths; to do so would adversely affect Army and Marine Corps readiness and, to a lesser degree, that of the Air Force. Moreover, the services would need to continue the combat pipeline for six months after the end of hostilities, diminishing it gradually thereafter. The JCS recommended FY 1953 strength increments of 92,000 soldiers, 19,954 marines, and 65,000 airmen, a total of almost 177,000, and increases in service expenditure ceilings to meet these requirements. Thus, more than four months before the start of FY 1953, they notified Lovett that in view of these recommendations, a supplemental budget would be necessary.

Supporting the JCS recommendations, Secretary of the Army Pace pointed out that the lack of agreed manpower levels for FY 1953 would cause trouble in planning the FY 1954 budget. He urged Lovett to renew his efforts to secure an early NSC decision on planning assumptions, including force levels and the continuation of Korean hostilities. Late in March Lovett told Rosenberg that the president had approved the FY 1953 estimates on the basis of "no hostilities in Korea" and that he understood a supplemental appropriation might become necessary if the war continued.

By late May it was already too late to help the services in the first half of FY 1953 because of the lead times involved. To provide trained personnel for the combat pipeline in the second half, Rosenberg wanted Lovett to take the matter to the National Security Council. Drafting a memorandum for Lovett's signature, Rosenberg asked McNeil for costing advice and support. Early in June the Joint Chiefs renewed their request for adoption of the assumption that Korean hostilities would "continue through any fiscal year being considered" and requested Lovett's approval of the assumption that combat would
continue at least until mid-1953. At an AFPC meeting on 10 June, concerned
Pentagon leaders asked Foster for immediate action to avoid interruptions in
the procurement of materiel and personnel for the combat pipeline. Immedi­
ately after the meeting, Foster turned to McNeil for recommendations.9

On 17 June McNeil made the case against an increase in authorized force
levels, a supplemental FY 1953 budget request, or even the use of available
funds for a manpower increase. Since the value of military equipment
currently on order plus funds available for further purchases equaled
"perhaps twenty times the Korean requirements." McNeil felt that the
Pentagon should not ask for more money. Since it would cost almost $1 billion
for a 177,000-man augmentation, and even a modest increase of 44,000
soldiers and 7,000 marines would add $281 million, McNeil wanted the
services to use planned mobilization reserves to meet combat needs and
replace them later, a course more or less followed during the previous two
years. While such action would delay building to full mobilization reserve
requirements and involved some risk, he suggested that there would soon be
a pool of over 500,000 fully trained veterans, many with recent battle
experience. By not increasing strengths, Defense would avoid the additional
manpower cost and have money to sustain high production levels for a longer
time. With Congress determined to hold down military expenditures McNeil
told Rosenberg that he wanted these factors brought out clearly.10

In responding to Foster, McNeil followed the same argument he had used
with Rosenberg. Pointing to a current carryover of about $58 billion in
unexpended funds in addition to the expected new FY 1953 funds, McNeil
considered it inadvisable to ask for more money. He recommended that the
services use basic FY 1953 funds for combat operations continuing through
30 June 1953, just as they had done the year before. Agreeing, Lovett signed
a directive to the service secretaries and Joint Chiefs on 24 June.11

Still, the secretary had reservations about McNeil’s argument on strength
levels. In Lovett’s view, the armed forces were supposed to attain in FY 1953
a “level of operational readiness recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
approved by the National Security Council.” Hostilities beyond June 1952
would divert military manpower, reduce readiness below the approved levels,
and thus potentially limit military effectiveness. Since veterans could not be
recalled to duty except in an all-out emergency, Lovett thought that McNeil’s
argument that discharged veterans were available as a mobilization potential
constituted “a change in concept as to the composition of the nation’s ready
forces.”12

Following Rosenberg’s recommendation, Lovett on 2 July forwarded the
problem for NSC consideration, suggesting that the final number be deter­
mined only after the principle was established. This request, which became
known as NSC 134, "Implications of Continued Hostilities in Korea," limited NSC consideration to the combat personnel pipeline, although Lovett seemed ready to consider a change in the assumption regarding Korean hostilities to cover the entire Defense program. Both the service secretaries and the JCS apparently misunderstood his position. 13

Pressure from the services brought the larger issue to a head in the summer of 1952. On 9 July Pace reminded Lovett that the 30 June 1952 planning date for the end of the war had already passed, and asked him to obtain approval for the 92,000-man Army increase, the necessary additional money, and the expenditure authority. Navy Secretary Kimball and Marine Corps Commandant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., now wanted an increase of 13,768 for a Marine Corps combat pipeline. Finletter wrote Lovett that the Air Force was covering current Korean combat needs in expectation of a supplemental FY 1953 budget.14 The Joint Chiefs blamed a two-year delay in materiel combat readiness on the "imposed unrealistic planning assumptions regarding the cessation of hostilities in Korea, coupled with the attendant delay in not being able to budget in advance for the materiel consumed there."15

On 31 July Pace wrote Lovett about the war's high consumption of mobilization reserve supplies, many items of which were at "dangerously low levels." If general war began, Pace claimed, the "Army could support no more combat operations than the equivalent of those in Korea." Blaming these results on a "budgetary policy which, as you know, the Army has never considered sound and which I now regard as imperative to be changed," Pace urged that the Army be allowed to prepare a FY 1953 supplemental budget and include combat support in the FY 1954 budget.16

Reacting strongly to Pace's memorandum, Lovett replied that the Army had previously accepted the deferred financing of Korean combat usage and that neither Pace nor Collins had ever raised the issue with Truman at White House budget conferences. Apparently forgetting the JCS request of January, Lovett reminded Pace that it was only in June that the Joint Chiefs had recommended the inclusion of Korean combat needs in new budgets. He felt there were serious objections to accepting the assumption that "we will be at war two years from now." Insisting that the Army did not lack money, particularly since it had ended FY 1952 with $1.4 billion not even obligated, Lovett informed Pace that what the Army needed was more production of equipment. "Against the background of facts so far presented to me," Lovett found "the 'no funds' excuse offered to you and to me . . . tiresomely threadbare."17

Without agreement in the Pentagon, NSC 134 languished. Hoping to settle the matter within Defense, Foster requested a delay in NSC consider-
ation. At DoD request the council eventually canceled NSC 134. For the FY 1953 budget, the official planning date for the end of combat in Korea remained 30 June 1952 long after that date passed, and the problem of handling Korean combat costs remained an unresolved issue between the services and the defense secretary.18

Status of Programs: NSC 135

By September 1952 the Pentagon was deeply involved in the policy review preceding the FY 1954 Defense budget. Continuing the reappraisal of national security policy and strategy as developed in the NSC 68 and NSC 114 series, Truman had earlier asked for submission of program status reports on 1 August and an assessment of FY 1954 programs by 1 October. Once these were finished, the budget could be completed. Despite the logical progression of steps that Truman outlined, the work proceeded more or less concurrently. In fact, on 28 June the president directed that FY 1954 military service budgets be submitted to Lovett on 2 September and be based on currently approved strength figures. Every effort was to be made to meet commitments and missions within this strength. Lovett was to submit the Defense budget estimate to the BoB by 1 November, only one month after completion of the NSC assessment, and Truman planned to make a final decision by 1 December.19

To prepare a status report on the military program, later incorporated in NSC 135, Lovett asked the services to appoint representatives and charged McNeil and Frank Nash, his assistant for international security affairs, with seeing to the report's completion. By 26 July they had a draft ready. It indicated that as of 30 June 1952 the Army temporarily exceeded its approved strength of 1,575,000 and had reached its FY 1952 force objectives. The Navy had a total of 1,176 combatant ships against its approved force objective of 1,191 ships, but it had 2 more heavy carriers than programmed, the result of special authorization to keep 4 in the Far East. Its 16 carrier air groups and the 3 Marine air wings were all in being, and both Navy and Marine manpower approached approved FY 1952 end strengths. The Air Force, slightly over its 30 June 1952 manpower objective of 973,350, had activated 80 combat and 15 troop carrier wings. Under the president’s approved FY 1953 budget, the Air Force did not expect to reach 126 combat wings until 30 June 1955.20

Readiness levels varied widely in mid-1952. Depending on the unit, the Army rated its divisions as having from 95 to 111 percent of their personnel on hand; Navy on-hand ratings ranged from 68 to 91 percent; the Marine Corps was at almost 100 percent; and the Air Force varied from 77 percent to
100 percent. Unit training uniformly ranked somewhat lower. The services generally rated equipment on hand as high and modernized equipment on hand as low.21

Given these circumstances, the services and the Joint Chiefs qualified the military capability to carry out NSC 114/2 missions. The Army thought it could support combat operations during the first several months of a general war only at the level of Korean War operations; if that war continued after general war started, the total number of troops in action would drop initially because of new pipeline demands. Inability to perform all Army missions derived from insufficient reserve stocks, an inadequate mobilization base, and low strength and readiness in the General Reserve. The Navy and Marine Corps rated their ability to initiate D-Day tasks as good and improving, but their ability to sustain and expand initial plans would remain unsatisfactory until they received funds to stockpile sufficient war reserves. The Air Force felt that it possessed a very limited capability to defend the Western Hemisphere and only a limited capability to carry out a strategic offensive. If Korean combat continued during a general war, the Air Force would be hard pressed to defend European lines of communication or to contribute to NATO or Far Eastern defense. Its capabilities would improve under a continued buildup.22

The services and the Joint Chiefs agreed that the Korean War had led to some positive results: It had increased manpower strength, provided battle training, improved military doctrine and techniques, and furthered the production and testing of new weapons. At the same time, the war had so “dangerously depleted or exhausted” equipment reserves from World War II that, even with increased production, there was a net drain on reserve stocks. The Army claimed a $1.8 billion shortage in hard goods and reported that if fighting continued it could not restore its pre-Korea position during FY 1953. The Air Force claimed an attrition rate of 790 aircraft per year, compared with 80 per year prior to Korea. The JCS again contended that the failure to budget in advance for Korean combat usage had delayed materiel combat readiness by approximately two years. Korean requirements, they asserted, also accounted for lagging military assistance deliveries to allies, a retardation in the reserve programs, and some “strategic maldeployment” of U.S. forces.23

Fully aware of the military tendency toward “worst case” presentations, McNeil and Nash regarded the evaluation as overly pessimistic and suggested modifications to Lovett. They felt that the Air Force capability to defend the Western Hemisphere should be upgraded from very limited to limited and that the Army’s assessment of its initial ability to support general war operations only at the level of Korea should be modified to indicate that this level included the support necessary to meet a possible major Chinese offensive.
Regarding these alterations as minor and not involving questions of substance, Lovett accepted them.\textsuperscript{24} McNeil and Nash also proposed that the report omit assertions about materiel attrition and retardation in reaching materiel readiness since the examples were inaccurate. Lovett forwarded the status report with the suggested changes, telling the services and the Joint Chiefs that he would include their claims only if they supplied adequate supporting data.\textsuperscript{25} On 29 August the Joint Chiefs agreed to the deletion of their two-year materiel retardation contention but otherwise supported the Army and Air Force claims. Rejecting the claims, Lovett disputed the accuracy of the Army figures and asserted that the Air Force had received 5 new planes, generally of far superior caliber, for every combat loss, the net increase exceeding 2,000 aircraft.\textsuperscript{26}

The differences between the services and the secretary demonstrated that the increase in military strength that had occurred between mid-1950 and mid-1952 could be viewed in two ways. On the one hand, the new numbers appeared small in comparison with the perceived threat and the military responsibilities; on the other hand, they showed a reassuring growth. Armed forces strength had risen from fewer than 1.5 million in mid-1950 to more than 3.6 million in mid-1952. The Army had gone from 10 to 20 divisions; the Navy had expanded from 618 to 1,176 active combat ships and from 9 to 16 carrier air groups; the Marine Corps had increased from 2 to 3 divisions and from 2 to 3 air wings; and the current Air Force strength of 80 combat wings and 15 troop carrier wings approximately doubled the 42 combat and 6 troop carrier wings of 1950. The strategic wings, the Air Force’s prized offensive force, had risen from 21 to 37. Although not all military units had fully modern equipment, a large number of U.S. factories were tooled up for future production. If general war occurred, the effort might appear puny. Measured against the limited war in Korea, however, the rearmament achievement seemed impressive.\textsuperscript{27}

The final military status report, joined to the other reports in NSC 135, came up for consideration at an NSC meeting on 3 September. When Acheson declared that he was “scared to death to have so many copies of so vital a document around,” Lovett echoed his fear, and the president directed the return of all copies to the NSC. The business of the day then became NSC 135/1, the reappraisal of past programs.\textsuperscript{28}

\textit{Reappraisal of Objectives and Strategy}

By 3 September NSC 135/1 had already been under informal discussion in Defense for some months. Commenting in July on an early draft, the service
secretaries told Lovett that it inadequately reflected increases in the free world’s relative strength; they expressed concern about its generally defeatist tone. They suggested measures for reducing Soviet power without greatly increasing the risk of all-out war, chiefly through political and psychological operations. Questioning the paper’s view that the United States should develop a “greater capacity . . . to commit appropriate military forces for limited objectives,” they doubted that any additional U.S. forces should be created and asked for increased flexibility in the use of free world forces.29

By late August 1952, a reworked NSC 135/1 reaffirmed the basic goals and policies developed earlier in the NSC 20, 68, and 114 series. It pointed to the fundamental problem that although U.S. and Allied military readiness had vastly improved, Soviet bloc strength, particularly atomic, had also substantially improved—to such an extent that U.S. vulnerability to direct attack, already serious, would probably become critical within a few years. Barring preemptive action, there seemed little likelihood of stopping Soviet atomic growth. To deter the USSR from risking general war and to reduce its opportunities for local aggression and political warfare, the free world had to maintain sufficient overall strength, especially strategic offensive forces that could inflict great damage on the USSR. Substantial improvements in civil defense could help the United States absorb an initial Soviet atomic attack and still strike back.30

NSC 135/1 encouraged the use of U.S. economic resources to buttress free world strength and stability and urged the continuation of the U.S. policy of a limited mobilization. It stated that the country should accept a degree of vulnerability to attack and avoid undue emphasis on defensive measures at the expense of U.S. offensive capability. It also cited the need to commit military forces or materiel aid to combat local aggression and subversion in vital areas such as the Middle East and Far East. If it was important to deter the start of general war, it was also important to avoid losing any crucial lesser battles in the Cold War.31

There was criticism of NSC 135/1 in the Pentagon. Although the Joint Chiefs favored an expeditious military buildup and for the most part approved the report, they looked with less favor on the possible use of U.S. military forces in local wars, which might lead to deployments that could diminish readiness for general war. Rosenberg warned Lovett that the decreasing U.S. manpower pool would not substantially improve before 1960.32 The secretaries of the military departments responded individually, agreeing on the need for collective action to deter local aggression.33

For the NSC meeting on 3 September, Lovett prepared to deal with the objection of Jack Gorrie, chairman of the National Security Resources Board, that NSC 135/1 unduly favored offensive over defensive capabilities; Gorrie
wanted a major national effort to correct the imbalance. Warning Lovett that Gorrie was raising a major issue, the DoD representative working on NSC 135/1 suggested that U.S. offensive military forces capable of destroying enemy atomic weapon carriers and bases at the source might constitute both the best deterrent and the best defense. He wanted Lovett to resist any effort to set impracticable goals for the defense of the United States.34

At the NSC meeting Lovett complained that the draft had too belligerent a tone and might even hold the "connotation of preventive war." As for Gorrie's suggestions about continental defense, Lovett thought that there might not be even an hour's warning in case of an actual attack and noted that World War II had shown that about 75 percent of attacking aircraft would reach their targets. The cost of an absolute defense of critical U.S. target areas would be prohibitive, and no amount of effort would enable the passive defense agencies to operate "with maximum efficiency." More worried about suitcase bombs than an overt Soviet attack, Lovett did not think the civil defense problem should be allowed to delay completion of NSC 135/1. With Acheson and Harriman generally in favor of the report, the council referred NSC 135/1 back to its senior staff for revision. The following day the president directed Acheson, Lovett, and Harriman to reexamine U.S. resource allocation.35

A revised text of 17 September reaffirmed that, short of provoking war, the United States should initiate measures to diminish Soviet control and influence and to "foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system" to the extent that the Kremlin would observe "generally accepted international standards." Even at the risk of general war, the United States should seek to block expansion of Soviet power. Responding to DoD criticisms, the report accepted the services' suggestion for collective security in areas beyond the Soviet bloc and called for encouragement and assistance in regional defense and the development of indigenous forces, including consideration of the use of U.S. resources in collective military action. The new phrasing, according to Charles Bohlen, amounted to a "considerable watering down of the earlier wording," bringing NSC 135/2 in line with existing policy.36 Although the Joint Chiefs were now satisfied, the service secretaries objected that the report completely precluded unilateral U.S. action. The NSC Senior Staff agreed that it had not meant to preclude unilateral action under all circumstances.37

At an NSC meeting on 24 September, Foster indicated the Pentagon's general approval of NSC 135/2. Acheson, although pleased with the report, urged strengthening of the provision for possible unilateral U.S. action, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, where it had proved difficult to achieve satisfactory collective security arrangements. The council adopted NSC 135/2 with Acheson's change, and the president formally approved the final version as NSC 135/3 on 25 September.38
The NSC meeting ended efforts within the Truman administration to improve civil defense. When Gorrie again brought up the matter, particularly in terms of a continental early warning system, Foster thought the cost estimates greatly understated. Truman considered the matter of "greatest importance," but the potential cost obviously disturbed him, and he merely asked Defense to make a new cost survey. The administration took no significant decisions on civil defense thereafter. Accordingly, it remained for the Eisenhower administration to grapple with the difficult problem of continental defense.  

FY 1954 Estimates

Before the president approved NSC 135/3, Lovett had already received the services' military budget estimates for FY 1954. On 11 March 1952 the JCS had recommended a 21-division Army with an end strength of 1,596,000 soldiers, a 1,200-ship Navy of 850,000 sailors, a 3-division, 3-air-wing Marine Corps of 248,797, and an Air Force consisting of 126 combat wings, 17 troop carrier wings, and 1,220,000 personnel. They based these FY 1954 strengths on the given assumption that Korean combat would end by 30 June 1953. Approving the force levels for budgetary purposes, Lovett reduced the FY 1954 proposed manpower strengths to those currently approved for the end of FY 1953: an Army of 1,550,000, a Navy of 835,875, a Marine Corps of 243,730, and an Air Force of 1,061,000.  

In the FY 1954 budget guidelines sent out on 7 April, Lovett stated as the primary objective the maintenance of a high state of readiness for approved peacetime forces and improvement of their mobilization potential while preserving a strong national economy. The military services could assume no combat consumption in FY 1954. In July the JCS set FY 1954 manning levels* consistent with the previous year's. But in August, RDB Chairman Walter G. Whitman wrote Lovett that "total force requirements cannot be reduced at this time on the basis of new weapons and techniques." He

* All Army units were to be manned at full strength except for 5 divisions, 2 regiments, and 44 antiaircraft battalions at approximately 80-percent strength. The average fleet manning level was to be 80 percent of officer and 90 percent of enlisted wartime complements, with fleet marine forces and submarines at approximately 100 percent. Naval aviation units were to have the "minimum adequate pilot level" but not to reach wartime complements, while shore personnel were to be kept to the minimum necessary to support active units. In the Air Force, the strategic bomber, reconnaissance, and fighter units, along with necessary supporting elements, were to be at peace strength with a 25-percent crew augmentation. Air defense units in the United States, Alaska, and the northeast approach were to be at peace strength augmented to provide 24-hour per day alert capability. All air defense units not on 24-hour alert, military air transport squadrons, tactical air units, and all other units were to be at peace strength.
emphasized that the development of a "strong capability for effective *delivery* of the A-bomb to check an initial Soviet attack is a matter of highest urgency."41

Submitting the Navy’s FY 1954 budget estimate on 2 September, Kimball termed minimal the Navy’s request for about $15.5 billion; it conformed “in spirit and letter” with Defense guidelines and Navy program objectives. Finletter claimed that the basic Air Force budget of $17.1 billion accepted "very substantial and possibly dangerous risks," with most equipment and supplies provided on a peacetime basis, no provision for reserve aircraft, and only limited quantities of guided missiles, ammunition, and petroleum products to be procured. The Air Force said it accepted the risk because it understood the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs favored doing so. Finletter also included a $2 billion incremental budget, primarily for procurement of about 1,400 reserve aircraft and additional ammunition and petroleum products, and a second $2 billion increment for "highest priority requirements" if war occurred on or after 30 June 1954. Despite the tone of austerity, the Air Force based its budget on a FY 1954 end strength of 1,087,000, rather than Lovett’s planning figure of 1,061,000.42

The Army based its request for $16.2 billion in new obligational authority on Lovett’s strength guidelines and on continuing the FY 1953 force level of 20 divisions rather than 21 as recommended by the Joint Chiefs. Surprisingly, it also included a second lower budget based on its belief that any new Army appropriation would be held to approximately $12 billion, an amount which, according to Acting Secretary Bendetsen, would necessarily mean a reduced Army strength and entail major risks. However, since the Army provided no backup for the smaller budget, McNeil finally decided that he would have to use the larger figure.43 Concurring with the analysis of Rosenberg’s office that the Army should be told to man 21 divisions with fewer personnel—a move "designed to forestall" a later Army request for more men for the twenty-first division—Lovett asked Pace to submit revised FY 1954 budget estimates based on 21 divisions and an end strength of 1,487,000, with priority on units currently needed for operations and emergency war plans.44

Pace contended that the lowered strength would adversely affect the Army’s ability to meet its NATO commitments and approved FY 1955 plans. He defended the request for 20 divisions and pointed out that the original decision to form a twenty-first had been based on an Army strength of 1,596,000. Lovett countered on 21 October: He appreciated the "splendid cooperation" of Army representatives during the manpower review process and agreed to 20 Army divisions, but he reduced the Army’s FY 1953 end strength to 1,519,000 and kept the FY 1954 end strength at 1,487,000.45

Thoroughly alarmed, Pace and Collins went to Lovett the next day to discuss
this "critically important" question. The Army wanted to use 1,552,000 as a FY 1954 beginning, ending, and average strength, and Lovett agreed to reconsider during the budget hearings he was about to begin.46

By this time all the services knew they were in for another budget fight, since McNeil's office, working with BoB representatives, had reduced the overall DoD budget request from $50.5 billion to $36.5 billion. The OSD–BoB estimate allowed only $10.5 billion for the Army, about $10 billion for the Navy and Marine Corps, just under $15 billion for the Air Force, and about $1 billion for OSD.47

**Lovett's Review of Service Requests**

Lovett began a week-long review of the FY 1954 service budgets on 27 October, offering each service a chance to present rebuttals. Flanked by McNeil, Rosenberg, and other OSD staff members, Lovett met personally with each service's secretary, chief of staff, and other officials. The BoB representatives who attended all these sessions generally did not participate in the discussions.48

When the Air Force asked for restoration of a FY 1954 end strength of 1,087,000, Rosenberg cited specific instances where manpower reductions of 25,000 could be logically and efficiently made. Lovett subsequently kept the FY 1954 end strength at 1,061,000.49 Finletter asked for the return of money for aircraft and related procurement and an additional $2 billion for procurement of war reserves, chiefly aircraft, in order to achieve parity with the other services on reserve equipment. Lovett thought this request posed the question of U.S. dependence on war reserves versus working production lines, and he postponed a decision until he had heard all the services and could apply a common policy. In the end, he allowed $138 million for spare aircraft engines and $347 million for war reserve aircraft but stipulated that both programs were of low priority and would be the first abandoned if the president or Congress demanded an adjustment. In all, Lovett allowed $7 billion for aircraft and related procurement. He also eventually returned almost $400 million of about $700 million cut from Air Force maintenance and operations by the OSD–BoB staff, despite his declaration that OSD–BoB field studies had uncovered "gross inadequacies of the Air Force inventory systems and stock control records."50

Meeting with Lovett on 28 October, Pace reiterated the position he had taken earlier—that the OSD–BoB staff estimate of $10.5 billion for the Army should be raised to $14.6 billion and an additional $329 million added to allow the Army to return to a strength of 1,552,000. On this point Rosenberg
indicated that her recommended strengths did not include provision for continued combat in Korea during FY 1954, but if combat did continue there would have to be a separate request to Congress. The Army end strength for FY 1953 was held to 1,519,000 while that for FY 1954 remained at 1,487,000.51

One of the Army's problems with the FY 1954 budget related to its competition with the Air Force for the procurement and operation of helicopters. In the two years following the creation of the Air Force in 1947, most Army air units had been transferred to the Air Force, and the two services had agreed that Army organic aircraft would consist of fixed-wing planes weighing no more than 2,500 pounds and helicopters of no more than 4,000 pounds to perform essentially noncombat missions in forward battle areas. After the Korean conflict began, the Army became increasingly dissatisfied with these limitations, and on 2 October 1951 Secretaries Pace and Finletter signed a special memorandum of understanding that removed all weight restrictions on organic Army aircraft, defined as fixed-wing utility aircraft (light) and rotary-type aircraft used as integral component elements within a combat zone extending 60 to 75 miles to the rear of the battle line. Army aircraft were not to duplicate such Air Force functions as providing close combat support, assault transport, or troop carrier airlift, but they could move supplies, equipment, and small units within the combat zone. The Army's desire for more and larger machines, particularly helicopters, led to further dissension that remained unsettled at the time of the FY 1954 budget decisions.52

Since the question went beyond a simple matter of duplication, Lovett wanted the two services to resolve the dispute before he made a final decision on the budget. In meetings held with Deputy Secretary Foster in October 1952, Pace and General Collins and Finletter and General Vandenberg worked out their differences amicably. They agreed that Army fixed-wing aircraft would be limited to 5,000 pounds, subject to secretary of defense review at the request of either service secretary. They expanded the Army combat zone to an area extending 50 to 100 miles behind the front lines, within which the Army could transport supplies, equipment, personnel, and units. On 4 November 1952 the Army and Air Force signed a second memorandum of understanding incorporating these provisions.53 Meanwhile, with negotiations going smoothly, Lovett granted the Army not quite $2.6 billion for procurement and production of materiel, including aircraft, in FY 1954.54

The Navy requested restoration of only $2.1 billion in its FY 1954 budget, less than half of the $5.4 billion cut by the OSD–BoB review staff—an action

* These included planes for local liaison, artillery spotting, and courier duty.
that may have occasioned Lovett’s observation that the Navy budget seemed the best of the lot. Nonetheless, the secretary’s review of the Navy request lasted from 29 to 31 October and generated a series of issues. The Navy’s FY 1954 end strength had also been cut, and it wanted an end strength of 814,000 rather than 810,000. However, when Rosenberg expressed doubt that a 0.5-percent reduction in manpower would have a major effect on Navy efficiency, Kimball conceded the point.55 The big issue for the Navy lay in the OSD-BoB reductions in naval aircraft and ships. It asked Lovett to restore $358 million of the more than $1.2 billion cut in shipbuilding so that it could replace World War II ships at a steady rate and thus avoid a sudden surge in shipbuilding activity. FY 1954 funds were to be used only for aircraft carriers and destroyers. Believing that the Navy should be free to determine priorities within approved force levels and an approved general level of shipbuilding activity, Lovett restored the full $358 million, thus allowing a total Navy shipbuilding program of approximately $1 billion per year for FY 1953 and FY 1954.56

When it came to aircraft, however, Lovett had doubts about Navy practices. The OSD-BoB staff had removed more than $1.6 billion for aircraft and related procurement, and the Navy asked for the return of $835 million, including $700 million for aircraft. Paradoxically, the Navy expected the new planes to have only a very short life as first-line items; at least one model was scheduled to become obsolescent and second-line before delivery. The OSD-BoB staff wanted the Navy to reprogram and use saved funds for procurement of newer model aircraft in FY 1954. It also questioned 500 first-line aircraft scheduled to go to naval reserve units. The Navy contended that its distinction between first- and second-line aircraft was sound, based on the premise that the introduction of a new, improved enemy aircraft automatically created a requirement for a better U.S. replacement model. This did not mean that the newly obsolescent model would not be used in exactly the same way as when it was classified first-line. As Lyle Garlock of McNeil’s staff wryly observed, the Navy used second-line aircraft like first-line—except that it did not count them as assets when asking for budget funds.57

Navy aircraft procurement practices disturbed Lovett because they invited congressional questions about waste. Furthermore, the Navy policy of declaring almost new aircraft to be second-line might mean that the Navy would never meet its requirement for 2,989 first-line fighters, even though it would receive about 5,800 jet fighters between July 1952 and December 1955. Lovett also questioned whether the Navy plan to equip reserve units with first-line aircraft—something the Air Force did not do—was a device to acquire additional first-line aircraft for the Regular Navy in case of mobilization. Although Kimball assured Lovett that no subterfuge was involved, the latter
called it "sheer waste" to declare 18- to 24-month-old aircraft second-line and directed the Navy to reprogram at a level of about $350 million, half of what it wanted. The Navy was also to cut back on aircraft about to become second-line and to expedite the acquisition of new high-performance planes.58

When Lovett reconsidered the matter on 31 October, the Navy reported that the restoration of only $350 million would eliminate 547 aircraft from its original proposal, including 158 high-performance craft. Lovett then agreed to restore $350 million plus sufficient money for 93 of the high-performance planes. The Navy also accepted McNeil's suggestion that in case of slippages in old-model aircraft schedules it should reprogram the freed money for new-model planes and stretch out the production of obsolescent aircraft. Lovett's final decision returned to the Navy about $432 million of the $700 million that it had requested. In all, the Navy received approval to procure approximately 1,900 aircraft—some 700 fewer than it felt it needed to buy annually to maintain a "sustaining procurement program."59

Sending the budget request to the BoB on 1 November, Lovett commended the joint review conducted by members of the BoB and McNeil's staff and recommended that the practice be continued. The detailed estimates, he pointed out, had been determined at conferences that also included the service secretaries, the military chiefs, and other DoD officials. For FY 1954 Defense requested approximately $41.1 billion in new obligational authority. Including various amendments and additions through 13 December, the request rose to almost $43 billion. By this time also, with renewal of bitter fighting in Korea, it became necessary to raise the FY 1954 Army and Marine Corps end strengths.60

**FY 1953 Supplement and FY 1954 Budget**

Since neither the current FY 1953 budget nor Lovett's FY 1954 budget provided for continued combat in Korea, war costs remained a problem. There were also unbudgeted FY 1953 personnel costs resulting from congressionally authorized expenditures for combat and mustering-out pay and a military pay raise. On 8 November 1952, in accordance with Lovett's earlier promise that he would consider the war costs after the FY 1954 budget had been decided, McNeil asked the service secretaries for their supplemental FY 1953 estimates, assuming that existing combat consumption rates would continue through 30 June 1953. He requested justification for the estimates, reminding the service secretaries of the current congressional preoccupation with economy.61

The preparation of the FY 1953 supplemental budget estimates followed upon weeks of hard fighting in Korea and resulted in immediate upward
## Table 13

### Development of FY 1954 Strength and Force Levels

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JCS Recs 11 Mar 52</th>
<th>Lovett Planning Figures 1 Nov 52</th>
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* "R" indicates reduced manning level for all or given number.

* Excludes approximately 2,000 USMA cadets; the cadets were excluded also in the 1 Nov 52 figure.

* Lovett's 1 Nov 52 budget request was later changed to support an Army strength of 1,540,000 and a Marine Corps strength of 248,612, both figures adopted by Truman in his 9 Jan 53 budget. See Ltr ActgSecDef to DirBoB, 15 Dec 52, RG 330, ATSD and DepSecDef files, "FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.
adjustments of FY 1953 end strengths for both the Army and the Marine Corps. The Army asked for an increase of 30,500 and received 27,000, for a FY 1953 end strength of 1,546,000. The Marine Corps was granted an increase of 2,624 men, for a new FY 1953 end strength of 246,354. In December 1952, Defense asked for a supplemental FY 1953 budget of $1.278 billion, with the negative outcome previously discussed. 62

The supplemental budget request for FY 1953 brought the planning assumption for termination of Korean combat to 30 June 1953, but the possibility that the conflict might not end even by that date worried the Joint Chiefs. On 10 December they asked Lovett once again to change the planning guideline, to assume that Korean combat would continue to mid-1954 or to the end of any fiscal year being considered. They also wanted him to provide in the FY 1954 budget for Korean fighting into FY 1954. 63

The Defense budget request for FY 1954 came under severe scrutiny in the BoB, which marked it down to $38.848 billion, with cuts distributed among the services. DoD rebutted the cuts before the director of the budget and subsequently at a meeting with the president in late December. 64 Truman restored more than $2.4 billion of the BoB reduction, including $967 million for the Army, $870 million for the Navy, and $601 million for the Air Force. In the last-minute budget review, the Navy and Air Force both lost manpower for FY 1953 and the Navy for FY 1954. 65

Submitting the administration's last budget to Congress on 9 January 1953, Truman proposed about $41.3 billion in new obligational authority for the Department of Defense in FY 1954. His budget continued the policy of "placing principal reliance on the capacity to expand production lines rather than on the accumulation of large stocks of military end items." It provided funds for the operation, training, and maintenance of an active strength force of 3.6 million on a peacetime basis; procurement to equip and modernize the forces; research and development programs; and essential military construction. 66

The proposed military budget contained funds for 20 of 21 authorized Army divisions, a 1,200-ship Navy with 16 carrier air groups, and a Marine Corps with 3 divisions and 3 air wings. It continued the 143-wing goal (126 combat and 17 troop carrier) of Air Force expansion, with funds to allow it to operate 133 wings by the end of June 1954. It did not include materiel costs for the Korean War, for which the administration considered that additional FY 1954 funds would be needed, particularly if combat continued past

* See Chapter XIV.
† Given variously in his budget message and the budget as $41.2 billion, $41.3 billion, and $41.5 billion (Budget of the United States, 1954, M12-14, A–3, 554). OSD used $41.3 billion (table FAD–182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, OSD Hist).
December 1953. The product of prodigious labor in the Pentagon, this budget came under challenge almost as soon as the Eisenhower administration took office. Finding ways to reduce it significantly, however, did not prove an easy task, and to that extent, at least, Lovett succeeded in his quest for all possible economies.67

Of the total $72.9 billion U.S. Government budget that Truman submitted for FY 1954, the $41.3 billion Defense portion accounted for 56 percent of new obligational authority. Truman estimated that actual expenditures for national security—including the military services, international security and foreign relations, atomic energy, defense production and economic stabilization, civil defense, and merchant marine activities—would reach $57.3 billion in FY 1954, 73 percent of all governmental expenditures. Despite tax increases in 1950 and 1951, the government's deficit had continued to grow, but not as much as had been feared. After a surplus in FY 1951, there was a $4 billion deficit in FY 1952, and Truman expected deficits of $5.9 billion in FY 1953 and $9.9 billion in FY 1954. As an outgoing president, he offered no specific recommendations but made it abundantly clear that the “course of prudence and wisdom would be to continue to strive for a balanced Budget and a pay-as-we-go policy in our rearmament program.”68

For the three fiscal years 1951 through 1953 the president had asked for approximately $163.7 billion for the Department of Defense, and Congress had appropriated $155.6 billion, about 95 percent. The total FY 1952 request for $62.2 billion was met by congressional appropriations of $60.4 billion in new obligational authority, or over 97 percent, an amount in constant dollars still unsurpassed 35 years later. Yet the pattern of appropriations showed that the DoD budget had peaked. In FY 1953 the president requested a total of $53.2 billion for Defense, far less than it wanted, and Congress provided less than $47 billion, about 88 percent. In his last budget—for FY 1954—Truman asked only $41.3 billion in new obligational authority for Defense and forecast a further decline in later budgets to a plateau that might range between $35 billion and $40 billion annually.69 While this fell far below the level of FY 1952, it still would be three times the size of budgets that had immediately preceded the Korean War. Indeed, bigger budgets for U.S. defense would be a long-term legacy of the North Korean attack of 25 June 1950.

The Korean War budgets—FY 1951 through FY 1954—responding to many and varied political and military initiatives by the United States, permitted in large measure the implementation of the military buildup proposed for NSC 68. The coming of the war greatly weakened the arguments of elements in the administration—the Council of Economic Advisers, BoB, and Treasury—that would probably have sought to resist or contain the implementation of NSC 68, and undercut their position on a balanced budget,
low taxes, and minimal inflation. After 25 June 1950 and until the last year of the war few officials in Washington argued against more money for defense. The issue was one of degree rather than direction.

Strong congressional and tacit public support for larger defense appropriations reflected concern to meet the requirements of the fighting in Korea, desire for a response to the Soviet Union—more than ever viewed as a continuing menace to the United States—and a perception of the positive role to be played by the United States in bringing about a more stable and peaceable world order. As the ultimate expression of strategy and policy, the budgets made clear the great changes in the international political and military

### Table 14

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<th>By Department</th>
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<td><strong>Total DoD</strong></td>
<td><strong>$41.286</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>By Major Category</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Interdept</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
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<td>$3.433</td>
<td>$3.560</td>
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<td>Aircraft</td>
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<td>(2.037)</td>
<td>(6.131)</td>
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<td>(8.319)</td>
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<td>Ships &amp; harbor craft</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(1.055)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(1.060)</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>(1.255)</td>
<td>(1.308)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(4.859)</td>
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<td>Acq &amp; Constr Real Prop</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>0.700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian Components</td>
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<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.209</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
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<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.060</td>
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<td>Industrial Mobilization</td>
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<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.500</td>
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<td>Establishment-wide</td>
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<td>0.034</td>
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<td><strong>$16.778</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1.031</strong></td>
<td><strong>$41.286</strong></td>
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Note: Figures do not add in all instances because of rounding.

Source: Table EISED–117 OASD(C), 7 Jan 53, OSD Hist.
intentions of the United States. There was no turning back thereafter from collective and bilateral security commitments that required the maintenance of large U.S. military forces abroad and promised military assistance to dozens of nations that might become the objects of aggression. The Korean War budgets clearly augured that for the indeterminate future the United States would maintain a far larger peacetime military establishment than ever before in its history. These budgets gave substance to the revolution in U.S. foreign policy begun by the Truman Doctrine.
CHAPTER XVI

NATO: The Defense of Europe

The swift American response to the Communist attack in Korea did not signify a change in American strategic priorities; it was an immediate response to a challenge that could not be ignored. The Truman administration, supported by majority opinion in the country, continued to accord the defense of Western Europe a priority second only to that of the United States itself, for it viewed the Soviet threat to Europe as the primary threat to U.S. security. This judgment influenced the decision to limit the military response in Korea and contributed to the undertaking of rearmament programs far beyond the immediate needs of the Korean War. Although the buildup of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during these years did not convey the same high sense of immediacy and excitement as the battles and campaigns in Korea, strategically it outranked Korea and imposed a major and competing claim on American resources of men, money, and materiel.¹

The North Korean attack, presumably concurred in and supported by the Soviets, shook Western Europe as it did the United States. It cast doubt on the view held by many Europeans that postwar Soviet actions in Eastern Europe sprang from a determination to create a safety barrier of Communist states across the historic invasion routes to the Soviet Union and that, having secured such a protective ring, the Soviets would not resort to overt military aggression against Western Europe. The immediate U.S. response in Korea reassured Europeans that the United States would not passively accept aggression against a country under the UN aegis, but the Western European governments were fearful of Soviet intentions and painfully aware of their own weakness. Their economies, still fragile in mid-1950, could not support an adequate military defense without help from the United States. The
The Defense of Europe

Brussels Treaty, a five-nation,\* 50-year alliance against aggression, had been signed on 17 March 1948, but the Western Union Defense Organization it established had only limited forces in being. Despite the signing of the far more inclusive 12-nation\† North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 and the subsequent beginning of U.S. military aid to Europe, Western Europe's ability to defend itself against aggression was far from certain.\(^2\)

The difficulties facing NATO in creating an effective defense of Western Europe, as with all coalition efforts, reflected the sharply different national interests and concerns among the major powers involved. Resolution of the most important issue—German rearmament—required finding a mutually acceptable compromise with the French, who greatly feared the resurgence of their old and hated enemy and dreaded the possible hostile reaction of the Soviets to such a move. The French also sought to promote the concept of an integrated European army and political structure, motivated at least in part by the desire to ensure control of a rearmed Germany within such a framework. The British, traditionally averse to participating in European political institutions, disliked the French proposals and preferred working through a NATO structure that would involve the United States and Canada. Raising the forces for Europe's defense and the respective contributions remained a constant problem, while the Europeans gave special attention to the role to be played by the United States—the size of the contingent it would send to Europe and the military assistance it would provide to NATO countries.

In the second half of 1950, State and Defense, although immersed in the problems of the Korean War, had to cope with the urgent necessity to get NATO going. Their efforts met with a large measure of success by the end of 1950 because of their awareness of the issues that had to be confronted, their patience, and their willingness to compromise when necessary. In these matters, the State Department took the lead. Within DoD, Marshall and Lovett generally succeeded in modifying the sometimes overly rigid positions taken by the JCS and the services. Because of their mutual respect and ability to work well together, Acheson and Marshall played the key roles in shaping policy on NATO and in fashioning the compromises that produced agreement among the NATO countries on the issues that engaged their attention during this period.

* The five were the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
† The 12 were the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Canada, and the United States. The treaty (Art. V) says that an armed attack on one nation "shall be considered an attack against them all" and that each member will assist the attacked parties.
Early NATO organization largely followed that of the existing Brussels Treaty Organization and its Western Union Defense Organization. The North Atlantic Treaty established a North Atlantic Council (NAC), consisting of the foreign ministers of member states; it held its first meeting in September 1949. Chaired by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the council established two important subordinate committees. The Defense Financial and Economic Committee, composed of finance ministers meeting irregularly but with a permanent working staff, provided advice on the financial and economic resources needed for a buildup. The Defense Committee, consisting of defense ministers and responsible for preparing unified NATO plans, was headed in mid-1950 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson.

The Defense Committee oversaw a further elaboration of committees and groups. The Military Committee, chaired by General Bradley and including the chiefs of staff of NATO nations, prepared policy guidance and military recommendations for the Defense Committee. Military Committee representatives from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States served as a Standing Group for the Military Committee, and they or their deputies met regularly in Washington. Five regional planning groups, each with an American representative or "consulting member," were responsible for developing specific regional defense plans and reported to the Standing Group. A Military Production and Supply Board, headed in June 1950 by its U.S. representative, Munitions Board Chairman Hubert E. Howard, had a permanent working staff and reported to the Defense Committee.

As it turned out, the officials who filled most key NATO positions held responsible posts within their own countries and could devote relatively little time to Alliance matters. In May 1950, to help deal with the multiplying problems, the North Atlantic Council established a body—the Council Deputies—to represent the foreign ministers and sit permanently in London. Charles M. Spofford became the deputy U.S. representative to the North Atlantic Council and chaired the Council Deputies, who held their first meeting on 25 July, one month after the outbreak of the Korean War. Although the selection for this important position of a lawyer little known in diplomatic circles initially aroused some misgivings, Spofford later earned high praise for the "tact and ability with which he discharged his sometimes invidious role of being international Chairman and at the same time, the head of the United States Delegation." Spofford's role raised questions in DoD about the extent of his authority over matters that DoD considered strictly military. State intended that Spofford serve not only as chief U.S. representative to NATO in Europe and as an ex officio member of all NATO committees but also as chief
representative in Europe for Mutual Defense Assistance. Defense maintained that Spofford’s role should be more carefully delineated, particularly with reference to his responsibilities in military matters, where the Joint Chiefs wanted his authority limited and that of Defense representatives adequately recognized.7

A State–Defense compromise in December finally settled the matter. Ambassador Spofford was not to be referred to as the “Senior United States representative to NAT Overseas,” but he remained ex officio an advisory member of all U.S. delegations to NATO bodies with freedom to deal with all NATO committees and receive from all delegations current and full information “exclusive of detailed military planning.” The agreed terms of reference maintained Spofford’s right to assure political–economic–military coordination among all U.S. representatives to NATO and to provide coordinated advice to Washington, but they did not include a provision that all U.S. delegations should receive their instructions through him. Although these interdepartmental differences dragged on for almost five months, Spofford performed his duties effectively.8

Planning for NATO Defense

More serious than organizational problems for the fledgling alliance was the weakness of its European members. Even before the North Korean attack, the United States had taken a major step to help the individual countries to rearm. In October 1949—one month after the first North Atlantic Council meeting—Congress appropriated $1.3 billion for military assistance. This included $1 billion for Europe, of which Congress made release of $900 million contingent on the president’s approval of NATO “recommendations for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area.” On 6 January 1950 the North Atlantic Council approved a strategic concept that stressed the defensive mission of Alliance forces. At least initially, the major responsibility for reacting against an aggressor in Europe would devolve on the United States for strategic air operations, the United States and the United Kingdom for protection of ocean lines of communication, and the European powers for ground forces, harbor and coastal defense, and tactical air and air defense operations. On 27 January Truman accepted the NATO defense concept, and the U.S.–European bilateral agreements necessary for the start of U.S. military aid were signed.9

Following approval by the North Atlantic Council of the strategic concept, the Standing Group directed the five regional planning groups to prepare area defense plans against a Soviet attack, both for a near-term
emergency and for 1954. The Standing Group chose 1954, soon to be designated in NSC 68 as the expected date for Soviet acquisition of a large stockpile of atomic bombs, because, in the words of the NATO history, it was "sufficiently far ahead for long-range planning, but not too remote to make plans unrealistic." By the spring of 1950 the NATO Defense Committee had under consideration a detailed four-year Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) that envisioned defensive positions along the line of the Rhine-Ijssel in the east, the Italo-Austrian Alps and the Isonzo River in Italy in the south, and, if possible, along the Kiel Canal and northern Norway in the north. The plan required 90 divisions plus 7 brigades and 252 battalions of ground troops, almost 1,100 combat ships, and 8,800 aircraft. Although the JCS viewed the force requirements as unattainable by 1954, the plan provided for the integrated defense of the entire Western European area. The Defense Committee approved it on 1 April 1950 as a "first approximation" of the forces needed to defend Europe, asked for revisions based on a more realistic assessment of available forces, and requested the member nations to state what military strength increases they planned to make.  

At the fourth North Atlantic Council meeting in May, the foreign ministers voted unanimously to drop the use of separate national forces, which might be balanced individually but not necessarily as a whole. They urged their governments to help create "balanced collective forces" for the whole North Atlantic area, even while taking national needs into full consideration. 

At this time, the Alliance had on the continent 1,000 aircraft and about 14 divisions of uneven quality and strength; indeed, one British military commander thought that only the 2 U.S. divisions in Germany were combat ready. By comparison the Soviets had about 25 divisions and 6,000 aircraft stationed in forward areas, with many more divisions and aircraft in the Soviet Union. However, Soviet units possessed a highly centralized command structure, NATO divisions came under no unified authority and were not well deployed for defense. Moreover, some European powers, such as France, were being drained by colonial wars; any suggestion of German rearmament was met with skepticism. 

* Presumably many more aircraft from the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada would have been available if needed.
† These 1950 estimates accorded with some later U.S. estimates of Soviet strength. On 16 January 1952 General Joseph T. McNarney testified that the Soviets had in East Germany alone 20 divisions of about 14,000 men each, highly mechanized and with about 90 percent of a U.S. division's firepower. On 26 March 1952 General Alfred M. Gruenther testified that, of a total of about 175 Soviet divisions averaging about 12,000 men each (and which they could increase to about 300 divisions within 30 days of mobilization), the Soviets kept 30 in Eastern Europe during 1951 and 1952. Gruenther thought they could make about 8,000 of their 20,000 aircraft available in Europe. In the same period, he noted, Soviet satellites increased their divisions from 59 to 65. The 1950-52 estimates were too high, for later analyses found that many of the Soviet divisions consisted only of cadres or were not first-line units.
CHART 3
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
JUNE 1950

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
(Foreign Ministers)
Council Deputies
London

DEFENSE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
(Finance Ministers)

DEFENSE COMMITTEE
(Defense Ministers)

MILITARY COMMITTEE
(Chiefs of Staff)

MILITARY PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY BOARD

STANDING GROUP
(US-UK-France)

PERMANENT WORKING STAFF

PLANNING BOARD FOR OCEAN SHIPPING

FIVE REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS

NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
CANADA—UNITED STATES
WESTERN EUROPE
NORTHERN EUROPE
SOUTHERN EUROPE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN
threatened NATO unity; and there were no American or British pledges of additional troops for Europe. The major improvement seemed to be that, as Acheson later noted, "where we were naked we began to admit it."  

Although the MTDP fixed the line of the Rhine–IJssel as the major defensive position for 1954, it was more realistic in the early summer of 1950 to think in terms of a series of successive NATO withdrawals from Germany and perhaps even France, should defense positions become untenable in the face of a Soviet attack. In June the North Korean assault not only caused NATO to confront the inadequacies of European defenses but raised American and European fears that those defenses might suddenly be tested. On 13 July the service secretaries, together with the Joint Chiefs, advised Secretary Johnson that the United States should increase its forces in Europe and send additional military equipment to help other countries expand their forces. Johnson urged Truman to consider the recommendation favorably.

The National Security Council was already discussing steps to cope with further Soviet action, and the Joint Chiefs were planning immediate increases in U.S. forces, both for Korea and for general rearmament. After discussions with Johnson, Acheson, and Harriman, Truman approved a proposal to provide $4 billion to $6 billion extra for FY 1951 military assistance on the understanding that the other NATO countries would greatly expand their military efforts. By early August the NATO Council Deputies agreed to report European responses to a U.S. request for military increases. They also considered another U.S. request—that the Alliance agree to an initial high-priority production program in Europe for equipment as quickly as additional funds became available. Meanwhile, the NATO Standing Group and the JCS tentatively lowered the MTDP requirement for 90 divisions by 1954 to 67% divisions, but they anticipated that actually only 56% could be provided.  

When the NATO Council Deputies asked Johnson, as chairman of the Defense Committee, for further recommendations for strengthening the Alliance’s military posture, the secretary turned to his Pentagon advisers. Bradley asked for the buildup of NATO forces, accelerated production of European military equipment, improved mobilization procedures and training programs, and more effective national military services. Munitions Board Chairman Howard, worried about equipment deficiencies, recommended giving higher priority to the development of specific production programs and an improved process for release of U.S. military aid funds. The Joint Chiefs agreed on the overriding importance of production, since deficiencies existed everywhere. They also recommended studying whether the Alliance should accept new members, including West Germany and Spain, encompass Austria within its sphere of protective interest, and increase Italy’s military capabilities. The service secretaries wanted Johnson to tell Spofford that the
United States was "prepared to undertake an aggressive war for peace," that Americans demanded an all-out endeavor and expected a similar approach by Europe. 18

It is possible that some of these ideas were aired at the luncheon Johnson held for Spofford and others on 18 August 1950. Officially, however, Johnson confined himself to recommending only the purely military suggestions, since he had agreed with Acheson to restrict guidance to U.S. representatives in NATO to matters accepted by the two departments, and the question of admission of non-NATO countries into the Alliance had not been resolved. As a result, the Council Deputies agreed to ask the Defense Committee to indicate specific areas of national inadequacy in matters of military service, mobilization, and training. 19

The responses from the NATO countries to the U.S. call for increases in European national defense forces by mid-1951 disappointed Spofford and the State Department, who estimated that the nations proposed to spend only an additional $3.5 billion over three years, whereas Europe could probably afford to spend an extra $10-12 billion in that period. By comparison, the United States planned to commit about $4.5 billion in military assistance to NATO countries for FY 1951 alone. 20

On the other hand, the U.S. response did not indicate any immediate increase in American forces in Europe. The JCS told Johnson on 18 August that the Far East would absorb most current U.S. manpower increases but that the greater part of these would probably be available for worldwide deployment if Korean hostilities ended or open hostilities with the Soviet Union began. It was up to the Europeans to augment European defense forces. Spofford defended the U.S. position before the Council Deputies by pointing out that the United States was undertaking a very substantial defensive effort and planning a large increase in the assistance program. Although Europeans might fear the effect of large defense expenditures on their economies, he warned that economic recovery would be futile without the strength to deter aggression. Spofford asked the NATO deputies to consider whether the member countries had provided adequate forces to defend Western Europe collectively. By 3 September the deputies concluded that the total planned military effort was insufficient. 21

Pentagon officials saw no basis for determining the numerical adequacy of the European responses since the NATO MTDP was still incomplete. Johnson agreed that pressure on the countries should be maintained, but he also thought any attempt to precipitate an immediate showdown might boomerang. In fact, the Pentagon found satisfactory the proposed 23 new European divisions. Provided the augmented U.S. military aid program could support the increases, James H. Burns's Office of Foreign Military Affairs and
Military Assistance felt the country answers should be accepted as satisfactory. Johnson informed Acheson on 12 September that Defense welcomed the country increases proposed for mid-1951 as a first step.22

The possibility of military increases exposed the absence of a centralized NATO military organization. British Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, then chairman of the Western Union Commanders in Chief Committee, considered an effective military organization a prerequisite to adequate use of military equipment.23 The French went much further, coupling their decision to implement an additional defense program of 2,000 billion francs and 15 new divisions within two years with a demand for a NATO organization "oriented in all branches pursuant to a common directive." They wanted to establish an executive body having the broadest possible authority. Already feeling that the war in Indochina was "draining life blood" from France, the French espoused what they termed the "fairest possible distribution" of financial burdens through the establishment of a NATO common fund, to which the United States could contribute, and the institution of a common budget for NATO military expenses. They called for more British and American troops in Europe, a unified military command, and the creation of a World War II-type Combined Chiefs of Staff to determine general strategy and serve as a general staff. They also called for the end of all duplication of functions between the Brussels Pact and NATO countries.24

In London the Council Deputies set up a special group to study the nonmilitary aspects of the French proposals and sent their military suggestions to the Defense Committee. In Washington, the French proposals were far from popular. The United States had called for immediate enlargement of NATO military forces on a national basis; the French claimed that such efforts would only result in waste. The Truman administration also wanted to maintain unilateral control over the U.S. military assistance program, which operated on a country-by-country basis, rather than place such funds in a common pool managed by an international organization, as the French preferred. Moreover, the common fund approach was highly unlikely to find a favorable hearing in the Congress. Rather than undertake a major and complete overhaul of the entire NATO system, U.S. policymakers preferred to focus more narrowly on the organizational needs of the Alliance military effort.25

**German Rearmament**

In considering the defense of Western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion, Europeans—the French in particular—wanted a strong initial stand along a line placed "as far east as possible," preferably along the Elbe River
which ran through East Germany. This line, farther east than most U.S. military authorities thought realistic, raised questions about mustering sufficient NATO troops to defend it without resort to German units. Even before the Korean War the Joint Chiefs believed that a viable defense of Europe required the participation of still-occupied West Germany. Once the fighting in Korea started, the JCS wanted the French, still powerfully animated by feelings of revanche against the Germans, to agree to modify restrictive controls on West German industry, accept early German rearmament, and authorize a small force of 5,000 West German federal police. Assenting only to the need for a small police force, the State Department considered discussion of German rearmament untimely. When the JCS position came before the NSC on 6 July, shortly after the North Korean attack, Truman stated that consideration of German rearmament was premature but agreed to study the matter.

The logic of a German contribution to European defense became more compelling. The Alliance needed German industry and manpower, and it was apparent that without the willing help of the Germans an eastern NATO defensive line could not be defended. Under current planning, a defense along either the Rhine or the Elbe would require 56 divisions in place and on a full war footing within 30 days of the outbreak of hostilities. If all the increments planned for 1 July 1951 came into being, they would not quite reach this number. As Ambassador David Bruce cabled from Paris, it would be “ridiculous” for European nations to make the sacrifices for a full defensive effort and leave the Germans free to manufacture consumer goods for their own internal consumption and foreign export. Even worse, if the Germans failed to participate on NATO’s side, the Soviets would undoubtedly find their own way to utilize German resources against the West. From Moscow, Ambassador Alan G. Kirk observed that the loss of Germany to the Soviets would be “far more dangerous for the French” than a rearmed West Germany.

Acheson later said his “conversion to German participation in European defense was quick.” Korea and the need for a forward defense in Europe, which would require German forces, had persuaded him. On 31 July he told Truman that the question was “not whether Germany should be brought into the general defensive plan but rather how this could be done.” The State Department, Acheson continued, was thinking about the creation of a European or North Atlantic army, made up partly of national contingents and partly of recruits, acting under a central command. German troops would thus become part of a European system rather than constituting a national military force. Truman directed Acheson to proceed with this planning.

At the same time Acheson also began to consider an increase in U.S. troops for Europe and new Alliance command arrangements. At a meeting
with Truman, Harriman, and Johnson, Acheson suggested that the time had come for direct U.S. participation in new NATO military activities, with the United States taking responsibility for a unified command and placing additional American forces in Europe. Disturbed by the pressure for immediate action, Johnson at first demurred but informed Acheson the next morning that General Bradley agreed. Discussing the matter with Truman again on 10 August, Acheson said it would be taken up with Defense in an orderly fashion, although "some strong differences of opinion" might result.\(^5\)

On 16 August State proposed to Defense that NATO establish a European defense force that would receive political guidance from the Council Deputies and strategic guidance from the Standing Group reorganized as a World War II-type Combined Chiefs of Staff. State recommended a single commander, an American; an integrated international staff, including Germans and Americans; and field forces consisting of national contingents, including German units integrated at the division level. A central organization also headed by an American would manage the production and procurement of major military items. State asked DoD for its early concurrence or comments so that the matter could be referred to the president quickly.\(^6\)

Defense did not entirely agree with State's plan, which Johnson referred to as a "substantial modification" of its previous position on Germany. Noting that the NSC was still pondering the problem, Johnson observed that the Joint Chiefs, who were still studying Alliance defense organization, thought it premature to consider the matter in NATO. At an NSC meeting on 24 August, however, Acheson pressed for decisions before the start of a major series of international meetings. The French, British, and American foreign ministers would meet on 12 September, the North Atlantic Council on 15 September, and the Defense Committee, for the first time since the beginning of the Korean War, in October. Noting the growth of East German military capability, Truman discussed the departmental differences with Acheson and Johnson on 26 August and directed that they give him written answers providing agreed State–Defense answers to a number of questions.\(^7\)

Responding to the president, the Joint Chiefs wrote Johnson on 30 August that they were willing to commit additional U.S. forces to the defense of Europe if European forces were also increased. They supported the concept of a European defense force with German participation but thought German forces should enter at once on a national basis rather than on an "other than national" basis as Truman proposed. They believed that a supreme commander for the European defense force should be named eventually and a combined staff created immediately. Americans should hold NATO leadership positions such as supreme commander and chairman of a strengthened Military Production and Supply Board, and the Standing Group should be
gradually transformed into a combined chiefs of staff. To invigorate the Alliance, the Joint Chiefs advocated controlled rearmament of West Germany and its admission to NATO, Spanish membership in NATO, and U.S. full participation in all regional planning groups.\textsuperscript{35}

The JCS thus fully supported German rearmament and participation in NATO defense but did not at the time officially link these actions to a U.S. contribution. During the State–Defense review process that followed, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany John J. McCloy returned to Washington to support Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s request to create a central West German police force and the offer of German participation in a European army if the Allies would replace the occupation with a contractual arrangement. McCloy argued that a West German police force and a West German military contribution to NATO would meet European needs and German desires and preclude enemy utilization of German strength.\textsuperscript{34} In underlined changes to the draft reply to the president, the Joint Chiefs now linked German participation in a NATO force to further U.S. contributions and recommended to Johnson that

\begin{quote}
. . . an American national be appointed now as Chief of Staff and eventually as Supreme Commander . . . but only upon the request of the European nations and upon their assurance that they will provide sufficient forces, including an adequate German force, to constitute a . . . command reasonably capable of fulfilling its responsibilities.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

Concerning additional U.S. troops for Europe, Acheson later recalled that Truman had stated on 31 August that he had no intention of sending more troops to Europe. The U.S. hesitancy caused uncertainty among Europeans and within the North Atlantic Council. On 7 September the Joint Chiefs recommended a total U.S. force in Europe of “about 4 infantry divisions and the equivalent of 1 1/2 armored divisions, 8 tactical air groups, and appropriate naval forces . . . in place and combat ready as expeditiously as possible.” The JCS declared that it was “now squarely up to the European signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty to provide the balance of the forces required for the initial defense.”\textsuperscript{36}

Johnson and Acheson signed a joint reply to the president’s questions on 8 September. They recommended that a European defense force be created under NATO, specified the U.S. forces to be sent to Europe as soon as possible, and recommended that Americans occupy key NATO positions. They made every effort to ensure German participation by linking the U.S. effort to European acceptance of Germany into the new defense force. Acheson later thought the linkage was a mistake, but he apparently did not question it at the time. Satisfied with the recommendations, Truman sent the letter for imme-
inate NSC review. After NSC concurrence, pro forma under the circumstances, the president on 11 September approved the joint response as NSC 82. On 9 September Truman, reversing his position of 10 days earlier, made public his decision to send additional troops to Europe, relating the extent and timing to the "degree to which our friends match our actions."57

The New York Meeting

The question of West Germany’s rearmament and admission into NATO became central in deliberations on the creation of NATO’s military forces. For the French, in particular, the proposal to admit the Germans into full partnership in the Alliance seemed a bitter pill to have to swallow. The French people and government harbored suspicion, distrust, and outright hatred of Germany and adamantly opposed German participation in the Alliance at this time. Suspicion also characterized the French attitude toward the Anglo-Saxon powers, for Paris suspected British motives on the continent and feared that there would emerge a loose but dominant grouping of the United States, Britain, and Germany, with France relegated to a subsidiary role. This fear was reinforced by the initial U.S. linkage of its own efforts in Europe to acceptance of Germany into NATO. Moreover, the French did not feel confident that the United States would remain a full partner in the Alliance over the long term.

These fears and suspicions dominated French attitudes during the months of debate on the German question among the NATO nations in 1950–51. As the foremost proponent of bringing the Germans into NATO, the United States had to find ways of arranging an accommodation between the French and the Germans, who kept increasing their own demands for more favorable terms as the price for rearming. It required a great deal of diplomatic maneuver and compromise by State and Defense officials. In the end, changing international circumstances had perhaps the greatest weight in resolving the issue.

When the British, French, and American foreign ministers met in New York on 12 September, preparatory to the North Atlantic Council meeting three days later, the central themes were how to defend NATO and the role West Germany might play. Because the French government had rejected German participation in the Alliance, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman did not want the matter referred to the council. Anticipating political abuse at home for even having offered to increase French military forces without a firm U.S. commitment of additional financial and materiel aid, the French government sought a detailed U.S. reply to its earlier organizational proposals. British foreign minister Ernest Bevin neither supported nor opposed the U.S. proposal for German participation in the Alliance but eagerly sought the appointment of a NATO supreme commander.58
Acheson had little negotiating room, for Defense described itself as "uncompromising" in its view that increased European forces, German participation, and an integrated force under a NATO supreme commander in return for full U.S. participation constituted a nonnegotiable package. As Acheson reported to Truman, Schuman and Bevin had firm instructions and their governments seemed unable to grasp the full significance of the momentous U.S. decision to commit its forces in peacetime to the defense of Western Europe. The French and British, Acheson noted, seemed willing enough to accept what the United States offered but "were reticent about their contributions; and had flatly refused to face in any way the question of German participation." Bevin told Acheson, however, that the British agreed in principle to German participation and that the next step should be discussions with the Germans. 39

When the North Atlantic Council met on 15 September, the French still opposed German inclusion in a European defense force even though the other NATO members seemed prepared to agree, at least in principle. Schuman himself may have been amenable, but his government allowed him no latitude. At an impasse, the council decided to invite the defense ministers to join their discussion. 40

Prior to arrival of the defense ministers, the foreign ministers on 18 September moved toward greater accommodation with West Germany. They proposed to relax some occupation controls if the Germans accepted certain economic and financial commitments. They also agreed to review Allied restrictions on industries, allow an immediate rise in steel production, and terminate the state of war with Germany as soon as possible without altering the status and rights of the occupying powers. Although the foreign ministers refused Adenauer's request for a 25,000-man national German police force, they permitted a Laender-based [state-based] force with an initial strength of 30,000 men that would be at the central government's disposal. They agreed to increase and reinforce Allied forces in Germany, to study the problem of German participation in an integrated European defense force, and, most importantly, to guarantee German territorial integrity by treating an attack against Berlin or the Federal Republic of Germany "as an attack upon themselves." But they reached no decision on allowing German military units within a European army. 41

Acheson felt that the participation of the defense ministers in the New York discussions might help persuade the French, particularly the French defense minister, Jules Moch, a Socialist whose son had been garroted by the Germans for underground activities during World War II. Moch had reportedly threatened to resign his post if German participation was accepted, an action that probably would have brought down the French government. The
Americans hoped that the British defense minister, Emanuel Shinwell, also a Socialist, might influence Moch. The new U.S. defense secretary, George Marshall, due to be sworn in on 21 September, was also expected to exert a salutary influence, since Moch admired the American general.\textsuperscript{12}

When the tripartite meetings resumed on 22 September with the arrival of the defense ministers, Schuman stated that the French would discuss German troop units for NATO after the creation of a strong central European force and completion of the materiel program; any immediate decision for German inclusion would be premature and dangerous. He confirmed, however, that the French did not mean waiting until the entire Medium Term Defense Plan had been achieved. Moch suggested that NATO should consider other major problems—completing the defense plan by 1952 rather than 1954, strategic deployment of Allied forces in Germany, the types of equipment to be produced, and plans for financing. Before the ministers discussed German military participation, Moch declared, they should consider how to accomplish the MTDP and the matter of German participation in the initial, nonmilitary phases of defense preparation.\textsuperscript{13}

Shinwell responded by pointing to the inadequacy of Western defenses, the absolute need to accept the U.S. offer of troops, the imperative of defending east of the Rhine, and the necessity for some organization within Germany to provide for order in case of attack. Moreover, Western countries would be psychologically affected if the Germans did not share in the burden of their own defense. Marshall agreed with Shinwell on the military situation and timing and stated that the administration would have trouble getting defense appropriations if it could not assure Congress that all available German resources would be used to defend Europe. Schuman reported that the French government did not categorically reject the possible use of German units but needed nine months for discussions and sounding out public opinion before considering the matter.\textsuperscript{14}

When the three defense ministers met alone during the afternoon recess, Marshall hoped to achieve some concession, however small, from Moch. The secretary apparently concluded that pursuit of immediate French agreement to an ultimate goal was poor tactics and risked French alienation and total failure; getting Moch to agree to certain specific measures, on the other hand, might commit the French to the ultimate goal. To Marshall’s pleasure, both Shinwell and Moch accepted some lesser steps that the Joint Chiefs had suggested to Marshall.\textsuperscript{15}

At the ninth and final session of the tripartite talks on 23 September there appeared to be a ray of hope for French acceptance of German participation as Moch seemed willing to try to get French agreement. Since the French parliament would not meet until 17 October, Marshall postponed the Defense
Committee meeting until 28 October. The basic question of German participation remained unresolved, but the Americans were optimistic. Even Acheson felt that Moch had changed his position. Meanwhile, the United States took steps toward making a further concession to meet the European desire for a supreme commander who would act as a rallying point for action. With U.S. policy committed to the eventual appointment of such a commander, State and Defense agreed to speed up the timetable. On 25 September Truman said that the man he expected to designate would want an actual command and forces in being; he promised to appoint him as soon as NATO assurances and commitments were "on the line."

The North Atlantic Council concluded by noting the shortfall in collective national defense efforts and stating that NATO needed to establish as soon as possible an integrated defense force, but it did not mention German combat units. The defense force would have a supreme commander with sufficient authority to ensure effectiveness and an international staff representing all contributing nations. The council meeting made it clear that the supreme commander should be designated as soon as adequate national forces were assured.

The council asked the Defense Committee to recommend the steps necessary to establish an integrated defense force, the peacetime powers to be accorded the supreme commander, the geographical limits of his command, and the method and timing of national force contributions. The Defense Committee was to consider any further authority required by the Standing Group, any changes or simplifications needed in the existing NATO military structure, and the channel through which the council should provide political direction to military agencies. The council also requested that the Defense Committee recommend how, from a technical viewpoint, Germany could make its most useful contribution to European defense without the establishment of a German national army or general staff. The problems that the foreign ministers had failed to resolve either in the tripartite talks or in the North Atlantic Council meeting they now dropped into the lap of the defense ministers and their chairman, Secretary Marshall.

*Marshall, Moch, and the Pleven Plan*

Back in Washington, Marshall prepared for the delayed but increasingly important Defense Committee meeting. Proposing to handle the German question through a unilateral U.S. proposal at the meeting, Marshall instructed a Pentagon working group to draft a U.S. position on an integrated European force for NATO, which was "not to be contingent on German participation but
adaptable to her inclusion." Meanwhile, a separate State–Defense working group, including the Joint Chiefs, considered the U.S. proposal for German participation.51

The State–Defense group quickly concluded that Germany's most useful contribution to European defense would be to provide the means for establishing a more eastern defense line. They saw active German participation as essential to the defense of West Germany and agreed that there should be an early German commitment to NATO, including military units, to assure German assistance and preclude any later lapse into neutrality. The group recommended that German military units enter NATO as balanced ground divisions with German commanders, to be integrated with non-German units at corps and higher levels. To safeguard against renascent German militarism there would be a number of specific conditions, including prohibition of a German national army and general staff and limitation of the German contribution to no more than one-fifth of the divisions in the total NATO force.52

Marshall found the paper failed to propose a specific approach and thus offered no basis for successful negotiations with the French. He wanted more detailed and practical arrangements for incorporating German units into a European defense force, even suggesting the possibility of initially placing German platoons in U.S. divisions. Advising Marshall on 11 October that too many details would make the proposal appear to be a "flat United States demand," Acheson suggested that Marshall stand firm on the previous U.S. proposal for a NATO defense force that included German units, since it had been supported by all nations except France. Ambassador Bruce reported that the French cabinet could not reach a decision on the Germans and stressed Moch's "temperamental aspects" but doubted he would resign.53

On 13 October the Joint Chiefs submitted a revised draft of the State–Defense paper that Marshall had disliked, including a suggestion that if the Defense Committee deadlocked, the United States might propose attaching West German battalions and smaller units to U.S. forces in Germany. What they really wanted, however, was a West German contribution in the form of ground divisions, perhaps 10 to 15 but not exceeding one-fifth of the readily available Allied divisions. Unless agreement on German participation came now, the JCS recommended a U.S. reexamination of its plans in the event of war with the Soviets, "including the magnitude and extent of the United States contribution to the defense of Western Europe."54

On the same day the JCS also wrote Marshall that the first implementing step toward a European defense force should be the immediate appointment of a supreme commander, who should participate fully in its formation. Privately and later in writing the Joint Chiefs recommended to Marshall the
selection of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the
Allied forces in Western Europe during World War II and currently president
of Columbia University. They recommended issuance of a basic directive for
the supreme commander, provision for his headquarters and an international
staff, designation of the national forces to be placed under him, provision of
operating funds for the following year, formation of German units and their
incorporation into the integrated forces, and commitment of additional
peacetime and mobilization forces. The JCS thought that the Council Deput­
ties, as the highest civilian NATO body in continuous session, should give
political guidance to the Standing Group, which in turn would pass it on to the
supreme commander. They repeated their conviction that a German contri­
bution and U.S. support for a NATO defense force should be linked. 55

Acheson did not want to mention publicly a precise number of German
divisions for fear of intensifying the emotional issue, or to make any decision
on possible alternative or intermediate plans. Increasingly concerned over the
JCS linkage of a German contribution to American support for the European
defense force, he suggested that it might be better to leave the matter open for
reexamination. Marshall approved a U.S. position rewritten to incorporate
Acheson's suggestions. On 19 October Truman asked Eisenhower to visit him
at the White House on his next trip to Washington. 56

In preparation for the Defense Committee meeting in Washington, a
strongly worded State Department briefing paper advised Marshall that Moch
was growing even more bitter on the subject of German participation, to the
point that he would resign from the government if necessary. The paper
suggested that Marshall emphasize the safeguards being worked out for German
participation and lay the "rather terrifying military situation on the line in a
most forceful manner." If the French wanted to move the NATO defense line
as far east as possible, this would require active German participation. 57

Meeting with Marshall on 16 October, Moch posed the possibility that a
rearmed Germany would eventually side with the Soviets as the most
powerful force in Europe. The French, Moch felt, would turn down the
German rearmament proposal at the Defense Committee meeting on 28
October; he asked Marshall to postpone the German issue and name a supreme
commander who would study the problem and make recommendations.
Agreeing on the need for a supreme commander, Marshall made it clear that
the United States required an answer to the German problem by 28 October,
particularly if appropriation of further funds for Europe were to be defended
before Congress. He reminded Moch that without German help NATO would
have to place its defensive line west of the Rhine. 58 Moch found this
unacceptable but suggested no alternative course. At preliminary meetings
with representatives of the defense ministers on 18 and 19 October, Lovett
discovered that Moch's attitude reached down to the French working level, although some of the French military seemed to accept the need for German military units in NATO.\(^{59}\)

The Americans also learned that Schuman had under consideration a new plan, originally conceived by Jean Monnet, the brilliant originator of the idea for a European Coal and Steel Community,* for German participation in a European army. Addressing the French Assembly on 24 October, Premier René Pleven made public the plan's main elements—the simultaneous pursuit of two related lines of activity, one within and one outside of NATO. As explained by Moch, within the Alliance all existing plans to create forces and increase production would continue, including the French offer to commit 20 divisions by 1954. The supreme commander would be appointed at once, his terms of reference and geographic authority agreed upon, and all available and future combat troops placed under his command. Outside the Alliance, the new European Assembly, to be created under the European Coal and Steel Community, would have a European defense minister responsible for a new experimental NATO force. This force would be composed of French cadre units, into which equal numbers of French and German soldiers would be assigned, up to an initial strength of 100,000 men, but with no German formations above company or battalion level. Trained and operational units would eventually be reassigned to the NATO supreme commander.\(^{60}\)

The Pleven Plan, hurriedly conceived and unclear in many particulars, dismayed Marshall, Acheson, and the president. Time would be lost in waiting for the European Coal and Steel Community plan to become effective and for the establishment of the proposed new European Community political structure. The French also wanted to finance the new arrangement through a common budget, and working this out was certain to be time-consuming and politically difficult in the United States. The political effect on Germany was sure to be disastrous, since the French plan appeared to consign the Germans to permanent military inferiority. The relationship of the Pleven Plan's European army to a NATO army was also unclear. Would it duplicate NATO's need for country forces, funds, and supplies and thus increase country costs? When could a German contribution be expected?\(^{61}\)

Marshall was bothered and ambivalent as the date for the NATO Defense Committee meeting approached. He wanted a German contribution but sympathized with the French feelings about Germany; indeed, he still felt that

\* On 25 May 1950 France invited six governments to join in a plan to place Franco–German production of coal and steel under a common higher authority. Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg accepted; the United Kingdom refused. The pact was signed on 18 April 1951. Although this proposal became known as the Schuman plan, Jean Monnet was its originator, as he also was of what became known as the Pleven Plan.
a wiser U.S. approach would have included a series of small steps, allowing more time for French deliberations. General Bradley regarded the Pleven Plan as "entirely impractical," and several defense ministers expressed to Marshall displeasure with the plan's delays and ambiguities. When Shinwell termed it "military folly and political madness," Marshall stated he was unable to "penetrate the miasma" of the French plan; he reiterated this point to both the Portuguese and Dutch defense ministers. 62

At a meeting on 27 October, Marshall and Moch reportedly enjoyed a "friendly, relaxed and informal" conversation but found no area of agreement. Answering the secretary's criticism of a combined French-German army, Moch referred to it as experimental and emphasized that there was theoretically no limit to the number of German soldiers as long as there were no German divisions. Noting his complete agreement with Pleven and Schuman, Moch said that he considered the new plan to be a logical step toward the acceptance of international authority in Europe. When Marshall asked about the plan's practicality, Moch had no reservations. 63

**Deadlock and Compromise**

When the NATO defense ministers met in Washington on 28–31 October, Moch strongly defended the Pleven Plan, pointing out that the new European force's units would be as available to NATO as national units, that German units would be integrated and armed more quickly under the French than the U.S. plan, and that France planned to integrate all European forces for NATO into a single army after the transition period. When other defense ministers objected that the Pleven Plan would forfeit the U.S. troops that were tied to a German contribution, Moch indicated that even so the French government would not accept the U.S. plan. 64

Trying to mediate the differences and avoid criticism of the French plan, Marshall stated that the United States recognized that German rearmament constituted more of a threat to Europe than the United States. Nevertheless, any plan adopted by the committee would have to be militarily realistic and assure adequate NATO defensive capability. When the disagreement persisted, Marshall suggested referring the problem back to the Military Committee for study.65

The Defense Committee took up several other important agenda items, including the creation under NATO of an integrated European defense force, already favorably considered by the Military Committee. Assuming a satisfactory solution to the German problem, the United States was prepared to move ahead on the European defense force and to designate a supreme commander.
In fact, when the NATO defense ministers and chiefs visited the White House on 30 October, Truman told them that a high-ranking general would be made available for appointment as supreme commander. At the time, Eisenhower was in Washington in expectation of a call. The next day, however, Marshall informed the defense ministers that absent a decision on German participation, it would not be possible to make arrangements for the final form of the command and structure of the integrated NATO force. He proposed again that they send the problem back to the Military Committee without action. 66

The postponement of appointment of a supreme commander for Europe, although not inconsistent with the U.S. position that the German question had to be resolved first, came the day after Truman's apparent promise to make an appointment and evoked strong reactions from Shinwell and Moch. It may be inferred that the postponement was intended to prod the Alliance members, and particularly the French, to take positive action on German rearmament and a role in NATO.

Shinwell insisted that the Defense Committee needed to achieve some success and urged a recess to seek a solution. To Moch's charge that the United States had changed its stand on the immediate naming of a supreme commander, Marshall replied that he had instructed U.S. representatives on the Standing Group and the Military Committee to refrain from raising the German issue solely to be helpful and allow time for French discussion and consideration. Moch—who in a highly unusual move had Mme. Moch sit directly behind him and advise him at the meeting, thus separating himself from the French military men, who were known to be reconciled to the necessity of a German contribution to the NATO force—was now increasingly at odds with his fellow defense ministers. One by one, they deplored French intransigence, criticized French plans, and showed the gravest concern over their failure to reach agreement. 67

Between sessions, Marshall stopped at the White House to apprise Truman of their progress. At the afternoon session the defense ministers decided to postpone further discussion of the integrated NATO defense force, the supreme commander, and German participation until their next conference. The October meeting was over. 68

The U.S. postmortem noted that the Defense Committee had agreed on objectives for military training and mobilization procedures, the importance of standardizing NATO equipment, creation of a standardization agency under the Standing Group, and the number and types of forces each country should provide. Ten days before the defense ministers meeting, on 18 October, the Joint Chiefs had recommended, and Marshall had concurred in, 1954 NATO force goals of $98\frac{1}{2}$ divisions, 558 major combat vessels, and 12,997 aircraft. The force goals adopted by the defense ministers were lower than those
recommended by the JCS—95\(^1/2\) divisions, * 556 major combat vessels, and 9,212 aircraft. To many, the achievements seemed small compared with the failures. Many smaller nations, particularly Denmark and Norway, felt the big powers had ignored their interests and security needs. As the North Atlantic Council had earlier delegated the thorny questions of a NATO defense force and German participation to the Defense Committee, the latter now turned them over to the Council Deputies and the Military Committee.^{69}

While Acheson felt that the Defense Committee’s failure proved the impossibility of combining the U.S. proposal for a NATO defense force with a German contribution, he also thought the current French position unsound. Moch’s attitude shocked him. When Ambassador Bruce discussed the situation with the French prime minister, Pleven said that the French people would not tolerate any reconstitution of a German national army. He did promise to handle Moch, to try to conciliate the Germans, and to permit French delegates to discuss in the Military Committee and the Council Deputies any plan relating to a German contribution. When the Council Deputies met on 13 November, a revised French proposal still called for German units to be integrated into a European army under a non-NATO European defense minister and European assembly and financed by a common budget. But the French agreed to the formation of German regimental combat teams approximately one-third the size of a division and to some immediate preliminary measures. They also promised no undue delay in forming a federated European army and no discrimination against Germany. Beyond these points the French would not move.^{70}

Washington was not swayed by the latest French proposal. Burns felt the only significant shift from the original Pleven plan was the acceptance of German regimental combat teams. He advised Lovett on 14 November that the U.S. position should not be compromised. State was also disappointed with the French concessions, although Acheson surmised that French actions stemmed from their doubts about British motives and U.S. dedication to NATO in the long term. U.S. policymakers remained unsure of the underlying purpose of the French proposals.^{71}

In Europe, meanwhile, the French public began to accept the notion of their former enemy contributing to NATO, while paradoxically the Germans appeared to turn against it. After the Ambassadors in Paris and London, Bruce and Lewis W. Douglas, met with McCloy and Spofford in London, they advised Acheson on 16 November that adequate room existed for a French–American compromise. They felt that German contingents should enter NATO on equal terms and that transitional agreements would probably be necessary.

* The plan was to have 49\(^1/4\) divisions available on D-Day, 79\(^1/4\) on D + 30, and 95\(^1/4\) by D + 90.
Believing that the French would accept "something close to the American plan" if it could be done without the political embarrassment of Moch's resignation, Spofford wanted to split the military and political arrangements. Essentially, he suggested a trade—French support for the U.S. military plan, including German national units of regimental combat team size, in return for U.S. support of the French effort to work out the necessary European political institutions for a federated European army.  

Burns suggested to Lovett on 17 November that the Spofford proposal was "fairly satisfactory," and by the next day there was an agreed State–Defense position. Spofford was to accept German units smaller than divisions for the initial development phase, with the understanding that such units would become divisions whenever the new NATO force headquarters so decided. Any German recruitment, registration, and training functions not performed by the new supreme commander were to be carried out by a West German federal agency controlled by the Allied High Commissioners. The United States, in turn, accepted the French plan to create European political institutions and a European army whose units would eventually be integrated into NATO, but it was unwilling to wait for these developments to occur before integrating German units, including, if necessary, German divisions, into NATO forces. Still, the French were to have time to "sell their federated structure to Germany and other interested Europeans." Both State and Defense felt that many extremely complicated matters would become simpler after appointment of a supreme commander, development of a command structure, experience in working with the Germans, and possible changes in the political climate in France.  

When Spofford put forward the U.S. proposal in general terms at the Council Deputies' meeting on 20 November, the Dutch member proposed creating a high commissioner in NATO rather than a European defense minister. Four days later the French representative welcomed U.S. support for the French political plan but argued that Spofford had failed to link the steps toward a German contribution and European confederation, define a precise basis for attaining European integration, or agree to German regimental combat teams. The French at this time also rejected the Dutch suggestion of a NATO high commissioner. On 27 November the French deputy continued his resistance and another deadlock ensued.  

Two profound fears agitated the French. On the one hand, fear that the Germans had reached a "trading position" and were raising the price for cooperation moved them toward action; on the other hand, fear that German rearmament might provoke the Soviet Union held them back. Of the two possibilities, the latter seemed more formidable since Moscow had already reacted sharply to the NATO discussions. At the October meeting in Prague of
the Eastern European foreign ministers, the Soviets demanded a treaty of peace with Germany, unification of East and West Germany by means of an all-German council, and Allied agreement not to rearm Germany. After the Defense Committee met, the Soviets sent notes to the three Western occupying powers, declaring that measures to revive the German army in West Germany would not be tolerated. On 3 November Moscow asked for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four occupation powers to discuss carrying out the Potsdam agreement to demilitarize Germany.76

As Acheson later wrote, the U.S. proposals produced "not only division within the alliance but a massive attack from the opposition." He appealed to Schuman to end the standoff, citing the "dangerous drift of German opinion" and the bad news from Korea, where the Chinese Communists were driving back UNC troops. By 3 December Spofford reported from NATO that the French were being far more flexible.77

During the visit to Washington from 4 to 8 December of Clement Attlee, Truman, Acheson, and Marshall assured the British prime minister that despite the impact of the Korean War, Europe was still the primary U.S. concern and the Soviets the major enemy. The United States, they emphasized, remained determined to proceed with NATO, settle the questions in dispute with the French and Germans, and increase the forces available for NATO's defense. Attlee wanted more American troops in Europe and a U.S. military leader appointed as supreme commander as quickly as possible. The British reluctance to become involved in European political institutions was reflected in their opposition to the French plan for a European army under non-NATO political aegis. To get British support for the U.S. position, Acheson was ready to promise an American commander. At the meeting on 6 December he asked Marshall pointedly whether "all of the President's advisers" would recommend that Truman name a supreme commander if the French difficulty was removed and the Spofford proposal approved.78

Marshall hedged his reply. Two days earlier, the Joint Chiefs had informed him that the U.S. military buildup had to be increased and accelerated to meet obligations in the Far East and under NATO and that it was imperative to augment European defense capabilities by increasing effective European forces in being and utilizing the German war potential. They stood ready to consider the appointment of a supreme commander whenever there was agreement on German rearmament. Marshall had already recommended these views to Acheson.79 The service secretaries, on the other hand, had urged the appointment of an American commander for NATO forces at the earliest possible moment without attaching any strings. Marshall replied to Acheson that the Defense Department would go ahead with the appointment provided a "reasonable basis" existed.80
To reach such a basis required compromise. Earlier, Ambassador Bruce had suggested that, if the United States gave visible, public evidence of its strong support for the French concepts, Paris might agree to the immediate start of a NATO army with German participation. Burns warned Lovett against such a "horse-trade" lest the United States appear to be co-sponsoring the French plan and "indirectly urging" small European countries to join the French. On 6 December, however, at the meeting with Attlee, Acheson favored sending a letter of support which the French cabinet much desired, and Marshall strongly endorsed this as the only way to break the deadlock. Attlee's acceptance of the Spofford proposal assured U.S. consent to the immediate appointment of an American as supreme commander.81

As a result of these agreements, the United States offered its letter of support to Schuman on 7 December. It expressed U.S. backing for European integration and a French conference of interested European powers to consider implementation of the French proposals. It also promised that, if invited to attend, the United States would assist in bringing the conference deliberations to a successful conclusion. The letter provided the French government with the reassurance it felt it needed to get the necessary political and public support for an agreement to German rearmament. In accepting the formation of German regimental combat teams under NATO, the French apparently compromised their hopes for a European army.82

The December Meetings

The letter to Schuman, with its related understandings between the two governments, broke the deadlock over German rearmament, thus opening the way to agreement on the fundamentals of creating a NATO military establishment. On 9 December, the Council Deputies concurred in the Military Committee's report on the political aspects of German rearmament and recommended that NATO invite the occupying powers to discuss with the Germans the question of their participation in the defense of Western Europe.83

The Council Deputies endorsed recommendations calling for Germany to provide militarily acceptable and effective units instilled with a European rather than a narrowly nationalistic outlook. German units would enjoy full equality with all others, but safeguards against German militarism would continue until the Allies felt it safe to discard them. German unit size would not at first exceed the regimental combat team, but conditions and the new supreme commander's views would eventually determine how the units should be used. German air units were permitted for the defense of West Germany and support of its ground units but would be part of NATO's air
forces. The occupying powers, the supreme commander, and German authorities would together plan to raise and initially train German forces. NATO agencies were to recommend the extent of German armament production, with safeguards exercised by the occupation authorities. The German defense administration, still not determined, would be civilian and subject to Allied control even if the occupation ended. There should be no German defense ministry or general staff.84

The Military Committee met in London on 12 December and recommended to the Defense Committee a report on the creation of an integrated European defense force within NATO, the establishment of a supreme headquarters, and the reorganization of the military structure. The next day the Military Committee and Council Deputies met together and approved, formally and jointly, a political report on the German contribution and a military report that continued to limit the German strength to one-fifth of the Allied strength in NATO. Forwarded to the Defense Committee, these two reports comprised a single document entitled "German Contribution to the Defense of Western Europe." These London actions set the stage for Defense Committee and North Atlantic Council meetings in Brussels.85

Despite Marshall's leading role in these matters, the secretary did not want to leave Washington because of the critical situation in Korea; he decided to send Army Secretary Frank Pace to Brussels in his place. As Burns's office informed Pace on 9 December, Truman supported the creation of a defense force in Europe and, with European agreement, would appoint an American as the NATO supreme commander. Pace was also told that Marshall believed that these two points represented the U.S. political objectives; Marshall considered the conditions under which the United States approved the integrated force and appointed the supreme commander to be military considerations subject to agreement between him, the JCS, and General Eisenhower. When Pace and Acheson were satisfied that conditions in Europe allowed the United States to proceed, the Defense Committee and the NATO Council could make the appropriate announcements.86

On 14 December Marshall and Lovett met with Eisenhower to discuss his appointment as NATO supreme commander. Eisenhower expressed concern about what he considered efforts by the British and the U.S. Navy to keep North Sea and Mediterranean forces outside his NATO command. Marshall and Lovett assured him that the Joint Chiefs supported placing all U.S. forces in the area under him in case of need. Although Eisenhower had earlier made clear his expectation that a sizable NATO force would be available before his appointment, he now took a more realistic attitude. Lovett's felicitous remark, that the supreme commander would be the person around whom Europe could rally, proved appealing. Even more than size, Eisenhower wanted a
quality army made up of well-trained, well-equipped, ready units capable of quick expansion. If the Europeans demonstrated a wholehearted effort, Eisenhower felt the United States might well send in 10 divisions. Although he thought that the Germans held the key to a successful European defense, Eisenhower told Marshall and Lovett that they should not be allowed to think they held the upper hand; when the Germans saw NATO's strength swell, he believed they would want to join. At the end of the meeting, Lovett believed that Eisenhower was reassured and ready to accept the appointment. 87

As the NATO meetings neared, the French and Germans seemed to waver over German rearmament. The French still feared provoking the Soviets, to the point of hesitating to put into effect the decisions on Germany. 88 The German people, for their part, were diffident about rearmament and had reached no consensus. Some Germans had become pacifists in reaction to two great German military defeats in less than 30 years; many feared that rearmament would bring few advantages while imposing many dangers; and practically all Germans reacted negatively to the tone of the NATO discussion and its implications of German inferiority. In late November 1950, Adenauer told the High Commissioners Council that the German people would not accept the sacrifices entailed in participating in the defense of Germany and Western Europe until their complete freedom was in prospect. 89 The British thought the Germans would probably rebuff any NATO offer. In preparation for a formal approach to the Germans, Acheson in mid-December asked about the availability of U.S. military equipment for them. Lovett replied that he expected to have sufficient equipment to train approximately 10 German combat teams by late summer 1951 and warned against appearing "overly anxious." Noting the Germans' increasing insistence on their own terms, Acheson told McCloy it was premature for the Germans to take any position on participation in NATO defense before they had been consulted. 90

Whatever problems remained, the Brussels meetings on 18–19 December went precisely as planned. With Pace chairing the sessions, the Defense Committee approved the reports on German participation and NATO military organization. 91 The North Atlantic Council, meeting jointly with the defense ministers, approved the two reports of 18 December. When Acheson suggested that the council might wish to name the supreme commander, the members responded with enthusiasm. Moch immediately and graciously recommended the name "in the minds of everybody—General Eisenhower." With little more discussion, the council asked the United States to make the designation. The next morning the council agreed to formalize its unanimous agreement to Truman's designation of Eisenhower by having the foreign and defense ministers sign the document and by asking each government to confirm separately the designation. 92
With creation of the defense force and the naming of the supreme commander, the overriding need was for a troop buildup. Acheson suggested that each member nation immediately place under Eisenhower the ready forces earmarked for NATO, as the United States intended to do with its forces in Europe. * Because of the obvious inadequacy of these forces for the tasks ahead, Acheson requested, first, that the NATO countries increase their strengths, as the United States planned to do, and, second, that member nations follow the U.S. lead in increasing their production of arms and supplies and establishing a European counterpart to the newly appointed U.S. director for defense mobilization. The council took no further action on these suggestions, but the Brussels meeting had done its work well; the deadlock was broken and NATO was moving forward.  

Acheson reported to the NSC on 21 December the steps that NATO had taken. The High Commissioners in Germany were to inform the Germans of the acceptance in principle of German regimental combat teams in NATO but not to press them on the issue of rearmament, since relations with the West German government had to be put on a more permanent basis. When Marshall asked about the French attitudes, the secretary of state reported that both Schuman and Moch had been “very good.”  

But the two secretaries, who had played the key roles in shaping U.S. policy on NATO and in fashioning the compromises that had led to Eisenhower’s appointment as SACEUR, knew well that further serious obstacles and challenges remained to be dealt with.

* In a personal letter of 19 December 1950, Truman placed all U.S. forces in Europe at Eisenhower’s disposal. (Ltr Pres to Eisenhower, 19 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, III:604–05.)
Establishment of a military command and the naming of Eisenhower as supreme commander constituted a bold start toward a NATO military structure. Still, Europeans generally and the French in particular, harboring serious fears that the Soviets might retaliate, sought tangible assurances of U.S. commitment. At the same time, they hoped for a relaxation of East-West tension that might render less imperative the difficult and costly rearmament effort contemplated. For its part, the United States had to cope also with the greatly enlarged and intensified war caused by the Chinese intervention in Korea.

At the start of 1951, this intricate state of affairs was further complicated by two challenges that brought into question the viability of the whole North Atlantic concept. The first challenge, a new Soviet offer to discuss a settlement of East-West differences, suggested the possibility of peaceful rapprochement. The second, a debate in Congress, brought into question the Truman administration’s right to send troops to Europe and created doubt as to the strength of the American commitment to NATO. Both events threatened to erode the administration’s efforts to create a strong alliance. Fortunately, NATO weathered these problems, and in the next two years it reorganized the structure of its civilian agencies, made its military commands functional, and enlarged its geographic scope. Marshall and Lovett played principal roles in U.S. efforts to expedite these changes.

Two Challenges to NATO

On 3 November 1950 Moscow demanded a conference of the four occupying powers to discuss the 1945 Potsdam agreement to demilitarize Germany.
This indication of Soviet opposition to West German rearmament was seen in Washington as part of a complex Soviet design, including a propaganda campaign against the United States, to disengage the Federal Republic of Germany from the West. On 30 November, East German Premier Otto Grotewohl called for a meeting of East and West German delegates as a first step toward German reunification, a goal intensely desired by all Germans.  

In West Germany, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer proceeded cautiously, for he faced a dangerous situation. He did not consider Allied occupation troops capable of meeting a Korea-type invasion of an unarmed West Germany. The Chinese intervention and UNC retreat in Korea increased the sense of imminent danger in West Germany, and Adenauer, as he later wrote, was shocked that "broad sections of the population were seized by paralysing fear." The chancellor played for time, telling Grotewohl on 15 January 1951 that before any meeting could take place there would have to be guarantees of personal freedom and security for Germans in the Soviet zone and a dissolution of the East German People’s Police. Bypassing Adenauer, the East German Volkskammer (parliament) made a direct approach to the West German Bundestag, which held to Adenauer’s preconditions.

NATO’s clear need for German forces and the Soviet overtures gave Adenauer a stronger bargaining position from which to negotiate terms for West German cooperation with NATO. On 14 January he stated publicly that the Germans would not rearm until the West agreed to give financial support, change the occupation status, grant Germans equality with other national units in a combined defense force, and provide protection in the event of East–West rapprochement. Reacting negatively to these terms, the British and French favored responding positively to the Soviet call for a Big Four conference on the German question. Public opinion impelled the governments in both countries to meet Moscow at least halfway, particularly after the Soviets on 20 January accused both France and Britain of pursuing unfriendly policies and violating their wartime treaties of alliance with the Soviet Union. The prospect of East–West detente was attractive. It would provide relief from the threat of war, diminish the financial drain of rearmament, and permit indefinite deferral of German rearmament.

U.S. officials viewed the Soviet call for a Big Four conference in a different light. Marshall, Acheson, and Truman considered it a Soviet “spoiling operation.” Nonetheless, taking account of European attitudes, the United States agreed to talks, insisting that the conference agenda include not only the German question but also the larger question of worldwide international tensions. Although the Soviets would not agree to this, representatives of both sides eventually met in Paris to prepare for a meeting of the Council of Foreign
Ministers. The first exploratory meeting took place on 5 March, and agreement on an agenda seemed possible by the end of the month. At this juncture the Soviets demanded the addition of questions concerning NATO and U.S. bases in Europe and the Near East. The West refused, the Russians persisted, and after 74 meetings the talks ended on 21 June without an agreed agenda. The talks allayed European fears of an immediate Soviet attack, but they also revealed the extent of Soviet animus and distrust and made it clear that European security would depend on NATO’s success.

Perhaps more critical for the Truman administration than these Soviet diplomatic ploys was the challenge at home to its European commitment. On 20 December 1950 former President Hoover launched the “Great Debate” in a television speech in which he criticized European failure to support U.S. policies, questioned the continuance of U.S. aid for Europe, and suggested a “Western Hemisphere Gibraltar” from which the United States could rely on sea and air power to hold the Atlantic Ocean, including Great Britain, and the Pacific Ocean along the line of Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines. Denying that this stance was isolationist, he saw it as necessary to “avoid the rash involvement of our military forces in hopeless campaigns.” Sen. Robert A. Taft, a potential contender for the Republican presidential nomination, quickly took up the attack, arguing that the United States was not legally obligated under the NATO treaty to send troops to Europe and that in any case the president needed congressional authority to do so. On 8 January 1951 Sen. Kenneth S. Wherry introduced a Senate resolution providing that no U.S. ground forces should be sent to Europe before Congress adopted a “policy with respect thereto.” Truman, who had just designated Eisenhower as NATO’s first supreme commander, fully intended to provide him with more American forces. The president did not think he needed congressional approval to dispatch troops, publicly stating that “I don’t ask their permission, I just consult them.” In the Senate, even bipartisan Republicans who supported U.S. troops for Europe expressed concern over the constitutional issue between the two branches of government and the president’s unyielding posture.

On 23 January the Senate referred the Wherry resolution to the combined Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations. While some bipartisan Republican senators, including Arthur H. Vandenberg, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and H. Alexander Smith, searched for a compromise, the Truman administration sought to avoid a confrontation. On 29 January, when the Joint Chiefs advised augmenting the two U.S. divisions in Europe by one armored and three infantry divisions, Truman approved but directed that the recommendation not go beyond the JCS.
When Eisenhower returned from a tour of European capitals in late January, he told Truman and the Cabinet that NATO needed 10 or 12 U.S. divisions as part of a force of 50 to 60 divisions and derided the idea that such a force would be provocative. It would be sufficient to defend Europe successfully, he held, but far too small to attack the Soviets, and the Russians knew it. At an informal joint congressional meeting on 1 February, the general stressed NATO’s importance to U.S. safety and its need for U.S. equipment, leadership, and patience. For several hours that afternoon, Eisenhower answered Senate committee questions, steadfastly maintaining that the Soviets could be deterred and that he was confident enough of achieving Alliance unity to be “willing to devote the rest of my life to try to make it work.” In particular, Eisenhower did not want limitations on the number of U.S. divisions for Europe.

Secretary Marshall, first to testify when the Senate committees’ joint hearings opened in mid-February, offered a contrast to Eisenhower’s personal and emotional appeal. Arguing that greater U.S. strength in Europe would deter aggression and help keep friendly governments in power, thus aiding U.S. security, Marshall urged augmenting U.S. ground strength in Europe. He revealed, with Truman’s permission, the plan to send four more divisions to Europe. The small size of the planned augmentation took a great deal of wind out of the sails of the opposition; indeed, some senators questioned whether a total of six U.S. divisions could reestablish European morale. Marshall replied that there were no plans to send more and that the real problem would be to create those four divisions. Nonetheless, he opposed congressional limitation on the final number, saying that too high a figure might give the Europeans too much bargaining power and one too low might destroy U.S. flexibility.

The Senate committees also heard Acheson, Bradley, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as administration witnesses and 32 others, including Hoover, Wherry, and General Lucius D. Clay, who had been both commanding general of U.S. military forces in Germany and military governor of the U.S. Zone. On 14 March the committees reported out two substitute versions of Wherry’s resolution—Senate Resolution 99, which required only Senate action, and an identical Senate Concurrent Resolution 18 that required House action—neither of which would have the force of law. Both versions approved Eisenhower’s appointment, agreed that the United States should supply a “fair share” of NATO forces, asked for JCS certification that other NATO countries were also doing their share, and requested the president to consult Congress before sending any U.S. troops abroad. After an acrimonious debate, by a vote of 49 to 43 on 2 April the Senate accepted an amendment offered by Sen. John

* In December 1950 Eisenhower had hoped for 20 U.S. divisions.
L. McClellan that limited to four the number of additional U.S. divisions to be sent abroad "without further congressional approval." Other attempts to tighten the resolutions or give them the force of law failed. Finally, on 4 April, the second anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate passed Senate Resolution 99 by a vote of 69 to 21; the concurrent resolution also passed, but by only 45 to 41. Obviously, despite the troubling constitutional issue, a majority of senators supported the administration's European policy. 12

Although Congress clearly manifested its desire to have a voice in any future increase of U.S. troop strength in Europe, Truman never accepted its right to do so. When asked how he felt about sending more troops to Europe without obtaining prior congressional approval, the president replied that the "Senate and the House have always been consulted in any major policy, and that situation will develop in the usual manner." 13 The ambiguity of the answer was probably deliberate.

How Marshall felt about the debate is unknown. Recalling the occasion later, Acheson wrote that Marshall's testimony on 15 February had been delivered with "devastating effect." Eisenhower, on the other hand, found General Clay's testimony "so much more effective and convincing . . . than Marshall's, Bradley's, or any of the others that I cannot escape the fervent wish that he [Clay] were our Sec. Defense." Eisenhower's surprising judgment may have reflected his disappointment at the limitations on U.S. troop support for Europe. 14

Marshall had told Eisenhower in March that Defense would try to send the four additional U.S. divisions in 1951. Upset by press reports that six divisions would be the extent of U.S. support, Eisenhower did not see, as he wrote to Harriman in Washington, "how we can find, in fearful limitations of this character, any real inspiration for the European populations." It was clear that Eisenhower had misgivings the U.S. troop restriction could imperil his NATO mission. Apparently he felt also that Marshall had compromised too far. 15

Organizational Adjustments

With NATO about to embark on a major buildup of military forces, questions of structure inevitably arose to engage the attention of member countries. Now that the organization would have to begin functioning on a large scale, it became apparent that changes would have to be made to accommodate different views, not least those of the U.S. State and Defense Departments. Defense was averse to any major adjustments until NATO became operational, and the Joint Chiefs opposed any reorganization of the
military structure that might diminish their role or that of the United States. The State Department, on the other hand, saw a need for changes.

In the fall of 1950, a Canadian proposal boldly addressed the matter of ministerial representation in NATO by suggesting abolition of both the Defense Committee and the Defense Financial and Economic Committee and inclusion of the defense, finance, and foreign ministers, and occasionally prime ministers, in a single council. The current Military Representatives Committee would then become a permanent "Defense Committee" composed of the NATO chiefs of staff or their representatives, and the Standing Group would act as the proposed Defense Committee's steering and executive agency and provide the channel for political guidance to the military commands. The plan did not impress Marshall, since he doubted that NATO's problems derived from its organization and felt that the Alliance should emphasize the creation of the defense forces.16

At the December 1950 meeting in Brussels, the North Atlantic Council did not adopt the Canadian proposal, but it authorized two major organizational changes. It replaced the Military Production and Supply Board with a new, upgraded Defense Production Board (DPB), responsible directly to the Council Deputies. The new board, headed by a chairman under whom all country delegations worked, had a "coordinator" with a separate international staff, which paralleled in Europe the role of the newly created U.S. Office of Defense Mobilization.17 Under this new organization, William L. Batt, chief of the American DPB delegation, represented Marshall on NATO military production matters. On Marshall's recommendation in January 1951, Truman appointed William R. Herod, president of the International General Electric Company in New York, as Coordinator of Defense Production. Marshall noted that Herod's NATO responsibility would be "second only to that of the Supreme Commander."18

The second organizational change reflected complaints of the smaller countries that the three-nation Standing Group determined too many important matters. The Military Committee therefore established a permanent Military Representatives Committee (MRC), composed of representatives of the military chiefs, to meet in the Pentagon in Washington, where the Standing Group convened. The new MRC representatives came from all NATO countries except Iceland, which had no military forces, and Luxembourg, which was represented by Belgium. As the MRC's steering and executive agent, the Standing Group also undertook certain tasks previously performed by the three regional planning groups being replaced by Eisenhower's NATO command and established a liaison office in London to work with NATO agencies operating there.19

Despite these changes and Marshall's desire to avoid a major NATO reorganization, the impetus for a more complete overhaul remained strong. By the
end of January 1951 Marshall and the DoD stood alone in support of the status quo. State pressed Lovett for Defense reconsideration, advancing a plan to maintain both the Defense Committee and the Defense Financial and Economic Committee—but in advisory roles. The North Atlantic Council would be the senior body of NATO, with its members representing governments. Instead of having all ministers as members of the council, as in the Canadian proposal, State suggested that each government individually determine the membership of its national delegation and that there be one yearly plenary council meeting attended by all cabinet-rank representatives in NATO.20

When Lovett asked for Defense comments, the service secretaries advised postponing NATO reorganization until Eisenhower’s new military headquarters and the Defense Production Board began to function fully. The Joint Chiefs disliked the State Department proposal because it increased the powers of the Council Deputies, and they contemplated the possibility that Charles M. Spofford, the U.S. deputy, responsible only to Acheson, might give directions to the secretary of defense. They preferred the Canadian proposal, which would elevate Defense influence by including defense ministers in the council and making Spofford a representative of Marshall as well as Acheson. They adamantly opposed changes in the Military Committee, Military Representatives Committee, and Standing Group. In particular, they did not want the Standing Group, in which the United States played such a major role, to be controlled by a committee that might reduce American influence to “that which would be exercised by a small power.” The Joint Chiefs pointedly noted that they had not been consulted about NATO military reorganization, a matter they considered within their purview.21

Lovett reasserted to Acheson in February Marshall’s view that reorganization should wait until NATO became fully operational. If it proved politically necessary to move ahead, Lovett suggested modifying the Canadian proposal and making no change in the three NATO military bodies. He was willing to replace the Defense Financial and Economic Committee with a new finance and economic board. Lovett also agreed to incorporate the Defense Committee in the North Atlantic Council, where the defense ministers would join the foreign ministers—a development he felt especially desirable to ensure full consideration of military matters. With the Council Deputies then empowered to act for both the foreign and defense ministers when the council was not in session, Defense would send Spofford a representative to assist him with his new duties. Lovett also supported U.S. military leaders in opposing relocation of NATO agencies from London to Paris.22

Lovett’s letter influenced State to seek a compromise, at least to include finance or other ministers in the council. Opposed to further dilution of council membership, Burns cautioned Lovett against any compromise on
what he considered the main point—"Acheson and Marshall together in the Council as co-members will give real strength to NATO." After further discussions, however, Lovett agreed to the inclusion of other ministers on the understanding that council membership would be limited to foreign and defense ministers, with other ministers present only as required. He also agreed to locating a new Financial and Economic Board in Paris. In turn, State assented to keeping NATO's military structure unchanged. Although Defense was not displeased with these organizational developments, Burns wrote Spofford on 27 April that he was "glad to see the end in sight." 23

In early May the Council Deputies approved a revised Canadian proposal that kept the military organization intact. With defense and finance ministers incorporated into the North Atlantic Council, the U.S. secretary of defense moved from a secondary to a primary NATO role. Spofford, now representing Marshall as well as Acheson in the Council Deputies, wanted Marshall to have confidence in the organization and the people and immediately offered the secretary's representative the title of vice deputy. 24 Lovett accepted the JCS view that the vice deputy should be a civilian but insisted, over JCS objection, that he should have a small military staff and, over State objection, that he should have a separate communications link to the Pentagon. 25 Finally, in mid-November 1951 Defense designated Daniel K. Edwards, who had briefly replaced Marx Leva as assistant secretary of defense for legal and legislative matters, as vice deputy U.S. representative, North Atlantic Council. 26

The 1952 Reorganization of NATO

When the reconstituted North Atlantic Council met in September 1951 at Ottawa— with the foreign, finance, and defense ministers all present—the large number of participants made it difficult to get business accomplished. Never altogether happy about the 1951 NATO reorganization, State now was convinced that other arrangements had to be made. In November Harriman, reporting to the Rome council meeting as chairman of the NATO Temporary Council Committee (TCC), * stated the need for organizational tightening, and the council directed a study by the Council Deputies. The TCC report of 17 December recommended appointment of a NATO director-general to head an international staff and carry out council decisions. The report did not recommend the removal of NATO agencies from London, since Harriman knew that Winston Churchill, again British prime minister, strongly opposed the move. 27

The JCS reacted lukewarmly to the TCC's organizational recommenda-
tions but did not oppose another NATO reorganization, provided it did not change the military groups. OSD comptroller McNeil, who believed that NATO needed to give greater consideration to financial matters at all levels, supported the reorganization. On 15 January 1952 Lovett informed Acheson that Defense thought that NATO should be recast to provide a capable and effective civilian organization to support its growing military force. State had already proposed to the Council Deputies a reorganization plan that included abolition of the Council Deputies, the Defense Production Board, and the Financial and Economic Board. A permanently functioning North Atlantic Council under a secretary general was to be created, and all NATO civilian agencies, including those in London, were to be located in or near Paris. Although Defense was not altogether satisfied with the proposal, Lovett concurred in the State Department position.

The reorganization approved at the Lisbon council meeting on 25 February essentially incorporated the U.S. proposal to concentrate all NATO civilian activities in a single headquarters, the North Atlantic Council, which would have an integrated international secretariat under a secretary general, as well as permanent country representatives heading national delegations of advisers and experts. Remaining in permanent session, the council would assume the functions of all abolished agencies and take over the annual review task begun under the Temporary Council Committee. Three times a year the council would hold meetings of foreign, defense, or finance ministers as required, or even heads of government, at its permanent headquarters in or near Paris, under an annually rotating chairmanship. The secretary general would be the council’s vice chairman and preside in the chairman’s absence. NATO’s military organization would remain unchanged, and both the Standing Group and the Military Representatives Committee would continue in Washington. Liaison arrangements between the military agencies and the council were to be strengthened.

The Lisbon meeting finally settled the troublesome problem of the site for NATO headquarters. Since the British wanted the new secretary general to be a Briton, they accepted the quid pro quo of Paris as the site of NATO headquarters. The Americans in turn agreed to the appointment of Sir Oliver Franks, the British ambassador to the United States, as secretary general. When Franks refused the position, the Americans maintained that the caliber and reputation of the new secretary general were more important considerations than nationality, while the British gave the impression that the United States should support any new candidate they offered. The agreement of Lord Ismay, then secretary of state for commonwealth relations, to take the position ended the embarrassment. Lovett expressed his approval since he thought Ismay favorably disposed to the United States.
CHART 4
NATO
AFTER APRIL 1952

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Paris

Chairman (changes annually)
Vice-Chairman/The Secretary General

SECRETARY GENERAL
Paris
INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT

MILITARY COMMITTEE
Washington

STANDING GROUP LIAISON OFFICE
Paris

COUNCIL COMMITTEES
Paris

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC

CANADA - U.S. REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP

CHANNEL COMMITTEE
CHANNEL COMMANDS
The new centralized organization under Ismay came into effect on NATO's third birthday, 4 April 1952. Spofford, the deputy U.S. representative and chairman of the Council Deputies, resigned to return to private law practice, while his staff moved to Paris to work under William H. Draper, Jr. Already handling major U.S. responsibilities for mutual security in Europe, Draper became also the U.S. permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, representing the secretary of defense in both roles. However, Draper's military assistance responsibilities had brought him into conflict with other Defense elements in Europe, and Lovett refused to concur in Draper's instructions, a situation not resolved until July.

Both Marshall and Lovett had to deal with much organizational restructuring in NATO, mainly directed toward centralizing and strengthening its civilian apparatus. Generally, both secretaries sought to minimize change; when it became unavoidable, they tried to maintain control over those matters that were Defense responsibilities within the United States. The need to find an accommodation with State on these points led to a complex give-and-take relationship between the two departments, which became evident again in the events leading to the admittance of Greece and Turkey to NATO membership.

**Two New NATO Members**

Located at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea and bordering on the Soviet bloc, Greece and Turkey occupied a pivotal geographic position for the future military defense of Western Europe. Potentially, the two countries could provide the West with bases and manpower to help form a barrier against a Soviet thrust toward the oil-rich Arab states of the Middle East. Despite Greece's position on the flank of a potential Soviet drive westward, U.S. military men thought Turkey had more strategic importance. Determined that neither country should fall under Communist domination, the United States had been supplying assistance to them for several years.

By 1950 U.S. aid amounted to approximately $886 million, the major part going to Greece to relieve economic suffering and combat a Communist-led guerrilla war that had begun in 1946. U.S. military equipment and a Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) played a major role in helping Greece to overcome the pro-Soviet People's Liberation Army of Greece (ELAS) by the fall of 1949. Cooperation between the United States and Turkey also became closer. Following the visit of Army Chief of Staff General Collins to Turkey in March 1950, the chief of the Joint American Military Mission for

* See Chapter XIX for a discussion of this problem.
Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT), Maj. Gen. H.L. McBride, began to advise and assist in Turkish military planning.\textsuperscript{45}

The U.S. intended that its aid to help defeat the Greek guerrillas benefit Turkey as well as Greece, but neither country was offered a formal security guarantee. The United States wanted to enable the Greek military establishment to maintain internal order and thus avoid Communist domination of the country. In Turkey, the U.S. sought to strengthen the Turkish armed forces to ensure the country's continued resistance to Soviet pressures and ability to stand against a Soviet invasion should it occur. Military aid was also intended to provide for possible U.S. strategic operations from Turkey in the event of conflict with the USSR.\textsuperscript{50}

By May 1950 the United States was prepared to proceed with construction of several air bases in Turkey, an action supported by Secretary Johnson. The Turks, keenly aware of the vulnerability of their position on the Soviet border, pressed for a formal security guarantee in the form of a regional defense arrangement, preferably through membership in NATO, that would include the United States.\textsuperscript{57}

In pursuing such an arrangement, the Turks sought to strengthen their defensive alliance system. In a mutual assistance treaty signed in 1939 and reaffirmed in 1949, France and the United Kingdom had pledged to come to Turkey's aid in the event of attack, but realistically the Turks could expect little more than token military support. Talk of a possible Greek–Turkish–Italian alliance that might more closely link Greece and Turkey to NATO remained indefinite. On 19 July 1950, after the start of the Korean War, President Truman publicly stated that the United States had "taken action to bolster the military defenses of individual free nations, such as Greece, Turkey, and Iran." In approving NSC 73/4 on 24 August, Truman decided, in the event of a Soviet or satellite attack on Greece or Turkey, to accelerate military assistance and send such forces as could be spared without imperiling U.S. security. But the Turks considered nonbinding public statements and nonspecific secret policy decisions unsatisfactory substitutes for formal guarantees.\textsuperscript{58}

The State Department in August asked for Defense views on Turkish membership in NATO, with its implications for future similar requests from Greece and possibly Iran. The service secretaries opposed such membership as contrary to NATO's concept and purpose and an unduly complicating factor in its operation.\textsuperscript{59} The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, recommended support for immediate associate status in the Alliance for both Greece and Turkey and reconsideration of the question of full membership when NATO defenses became more developed. They wanted no formal Mediterranean regional pact or country assurances but did not object to informal French–British–American pledges to Turkey that a Soviet attack against Turkey would probably
start a global war and that the Allies would act accordingly. Johnson supported
the JCS view. In discussions with State, however, Pentagon representatives
made it clear that Defense opposed any specific U.S. commitment for
additional military assistance at the expense of higher priority obligations
elsewhere. 40

In September 1950, when Acheson raised the question of associate NATO
status for Greece and Turkey with the British and French foreign ministers,
they agreed to place the matter before the North Atlantic Council meeting. On
16 September the council approved a U.S. proposal to offer associate status to
Turkey and later to Greece if Turkey accepted. Both countries agreed in early
October. 41

When Marshall became secretary of defense in late September, he asked
the Joint Chiefs to consider the proposed association of Greece and Turkey
with NATO and to present their views on military strategy in the Mediterra­
nean area. The JCS pointed out that U.S. plans called for a strategic offense in
Europe and a strategic defense in the Middle East and the Far East. Turkey
should therefore be strong enough to deter a Soviet or satellite attack, or at
least to offer serious defense, and to deny the Soviets a Black Sea exit. The
Joint Chiefs wanted the Greeks to develop enough military strength to delay to
the maximum the advance of Soviet bloc forces. They hoped that both
countries would provide the Allies with military bases and support, undertake
guerrilla warfare in overrun areas, and coordinate plans with friendly neigh­
bors. On 10 November Marshall approved the JCS recommendations as
guidance for NATO military planning. 42

Both the Greeks and Turks found their associate NATO status unsatisfac­
tory. The Turks were particularly disappointed with their junior position and
reluctant to grant further U.S. military concessions without receiving formal
security guarantees. In the United States, Greece and Turkey became a political
issue in February 1951 when Thomas E. Dewey, the 1948 Republican presi­
dential candidate, publicly advocated full NATO membership for the two coun­
tries. Many senators agreed with him. In March Acheson informed Marshall that
the advantages of a U.S. security guarantee for Turkey and Greece currently
outweighed the disadvantages, and he asked for Defense views. 43 In the belief
that Eisenhower favored membership, * the service secretaries joined with the
Joint Chiefs in recommending to Marshall early NATO membership for both
countries. Concurring on 14 April, Marshall wrote Acheson that the United
States should propose and support such membership. 44 Full membership for
Greece and Turkey became official U.S. policy before the end of May. 45

* On 2 April 1951 Eisenhower said that he felt SHAPE's mission did not include the Middle East
although he was concerned about those areas.
Mediterranean Area—1950
At the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ottawa in September, the United States obtained the council's consent to invite the two countries to join NATO. The enlargement of the area of the NATO security guarantee, however, required a change in the Alliance charter. After the Council Deputies signed a new protocol on 22 October, the United States tendered an invitation on behalf of NATO. On 18 February 1952, during the council meeting at Lisbon, the formal accession took place. Greece and Turkey had their security guarantee; NATO had 14 members and its area extended from the Western Hemisphere to the Caucasus along the border of the Soviet Union.

The accession of Turkey to NATO membership brought it to the fore in planning for the defense of southeastern Europe and the Middle East. The Turks, on the occasion of Eisenhower's visit to Ankara in early March 1952 to discuss possible command arrangements, seemed to view the new relationship as more with the United States than NATO. The Supreme Allied Commander appeared impressed by their military spirit, readiness to cooperate, and grasp of NATO problems.

Since NATO membership gave Turkey its desired security guarantee, the Allies had no hesitation in asking the Turks to take on increased regional burdens. Indeed, British support for the inclusion of Turkey had hinged on Turkish willingness to join some arrangement for Middle Eastern defense. Viewing Turkey as the only significant military power in the Middle East, the Americans welcomed Turkey's desire to play a greater role in stabilizing and securing the area. On a visit in the summer of 1952, Frank Nash, who had replaced Burns as Lovett's assistant for international security affairs, asked the Turks whether, if attacked, they would be willing to fight in other Middle Eastern areas. While willing to join an Allied defensive effort in the Middle East, the Turks clearly preferred not to deploy their forces outside of Turkey.

Nevertheless, the Turks played a helpful role in the U.S. and NATO attempt to organize a Middle East defense organization intended to include the Arab states. Turkish leaders, strongly anti-Communist but pragmatic, in 1952 were also agreeable, with U.S. support, to a rapprochement with the Communist but non-Soviet bloc country, Yugoslavia. A Greek–Turkish–Yugoslav pact of friendship resulted from this effort in early 1953. With this evidence of area cooperation, the southeastern flank of NATO appeared somewhat less vulnerable. Indeed, Turkey viewed the tripartite pact as simply a step toward Yugoslav adherence to NATO itself, a development that might occur whenever the attitudes of member states and Yugoslavs would permit.

With Turkey in NATO, the United States prepared to discuss a number of direct measures requiring Turkish assistance, including wartime denial to Soviet ships of a Black Sea exit via the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by the possible peacetime mining of the Turkish Straits with special devices that
would offer no danger to peacetime navigation. During discussions in 1950, the Turks had thought the project militarily desirable but feared their vulnerability to retaliation without a security guarantee. The British worried that the mining might violate the Montreux Convention of 1936 governing the Straits, of which they, the Soviets, and the Turks were all signatories. At the time, the Americans were concerned that the Turks might exploit Soviet hostility to extract a U.S. security commitment or that the Soviets might demand changes in the convention. In March 1951 Burns recommended to State a U.S. Navy suggestion to stockpile mines and component equipment and review the question later. Although the subject came up again in 1952, no further operational steps occurred during Lovett's time.

Turkey's NATO membership also brought a review of U.S. military operating rights and facilities in the country. The United States had already supported the construction of seven air bases, including a large airfield capable of supporting strategic air operations. By mid-1952 these bases were ready or under construction. Although the Air Force wanted to use the airfields, particularly the large one at Adana, before as well as after the start of an attack, no arrangements had been made. State still considered the matter politically sensitive in mid-1952, but Secretary of the Air Force Finletter felt he needed a usage agreement to justify to Congress Air Force expenditures in Turkey. When Finletter raised the issue with Turkish authorities in September 1952, the State Department feared possible Turkish demands for stationing U.S. Air Force units in Turkey. Nonetheless, Finletter recommended that State negotiate base rights, and Lovett asked Acheson to do so on 6 January 1953. Since the Turks seemed amenable and it was probable that the Soviets believed an agreement already existed, State acquiesced in seeking both pre- and post-strike operating rights. No negotiations occurred, however, until after Lovett left office, and even then they proceeded slowly despite apparent Turkish receptiveness.

With augmented status and greater responsibilities in their area, the Turks wanted more aid to support a much enlarged military force. U.S. military assistance had already helped the Turkish armed forces to grow both in numbers and quality. In mid-1950, when Turkey had 3 armies of 19 divisions with a total strength of approximately 235,000 men, the United States believed the Bulgarians alone could attack and occupy most of Thrace before the Turks could stop them. At the time General McBride viewed conditions in the Turkish force as alarming. Ignoring the Turkish desire for new, fully motorized and mechanized—if untrained—units, McBride and his replacement in the fall of 1950, Maj. Gen. William H. Arnold, emphasized instead such steps as deactivating less efficient units, increasing the number of noncommissioned officers, reducing the gendarmerie, frequent and realistic
inspection, using American field training teams, and building up equipment stocks only as trained forces could utilize them. By mid-1952 Turkish forces numbered about 375,000 men, with 500,000 trained reserves, and were considered capable of defending against any Communist satellite attack without outside help.\(^5\)

By this time, however, Congress was unwilling to increase mutual security appropriations, and greater Turkish demands could only be met at the expense of other claimants. The Turks, believing that they had accepted greater strategic responsibilities, contributed more military power, and made a larger financial sacrifice than countries receiving two or three times as much U.S. assistance, were irritated when they received compliments but not the amounts of aid they desired. Planned U.S. military assistance programs\(^*\) of $162 million for FY 1951 and $232 million for FY 1952 and a contemplated FY 1953 program of $233 million did not satisfy the Turks.\(^6\)

As a member of NATO with considerable responsibility in the Mideast, Turkey expected considerate treatment and, particularly, consultation on all matters of direct interest, which unfortunately did not always occur. The United States could not convince the Turks that increased military assistance could not be made available. In the view of one American diplomat who served in Turkey, these failures of communication, although small, significantly clouded U.S. relations with a ready and willing ally.\(^5\)

**Spain and Yugoslavia**

The U.S. perception of a greater Soviet threat in Europe during the Korean War years spurred efforts to acquire additional military strength on the side of the West from two heretofore outcast countries—Spain and Yugoslavia. Neither was a likely candidate for NATO membership. Spain, still under the dictatorship of the fascist Falangist government of General Francisco Franco and far to the political right of NATO members, remained virtually isolated from the rest of the Western world, its support of Nazi Germany during World War II still unforgiven, particularly by France and Great Britain. Yugoslavia, a Communist country far to the left of NATO nations, under the leadership of Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), had until lately been a Soviet satellite. In 1948 it had been expelled from the Cominform for unfriendliness toward the Soviet Union and violation of Marxist theory and practice. Both Spain and Yugoslavia had large but poorly equipped military forces that might, for reasons of survival, fight on the side of the West against a Soviet attack.

\(^*\) The Turks also received U.S. economic aid, although on a declining scale by FY 1952.
The potential importance of Spain as a bastion of last resort in Europe if the Soviets overran Germany and France had attracted the attention of the JCS before the Korean War, but strained relations between the United States and Spain had precluded any steps toward a rapprochement. A UN resolution in 1946 barred Spain from all UN activities and urged member nations to withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Spain; the United States complied but maintained a chargé d'affaires in Madrid. Moreover, President Truman expressed a strong personal aversion to Franco.58

In May 1950 the Joint Chiefs advised Secretary Johnson that, if general war broke out, Spain might be the "last foothold in Continental Europe for the United States and its allies" and strongly recommended military cooperation with the Spanish. Truman thought the JCS opinion "decidedly militaristic," and even after the outbreak of the Korean War the State Department, with some cause, looked on Spanish participation in NATO as a potential source of "dissension and controversy among our allies."59 Johnson prodded the president to give Spain some assistance under the terms of the transfer provision of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, but Truman did not favor the idea. Signing the FY 1951 General Appropriation Act on 6 September, the president viewed as optional its provision of $62.5 million for a loan to Spain.60

In November, however, the United States voted to revoke the UN resolution of 1946. Although Truman remarked at the time that it would be a "long, long time before there is an Ambassador to Spain," he named Stanton Griffis to the post in late December. By early 1951, when the JCS recommended NATO membership and U.S. military assistance for Spain, State had edged closer to the Defense position but wanted time for preliminary political negotiations. Secretary Marshall recommended "more of a sense of urgency" in the U.S. attitude toward Spain. General Eisenhower, eyeing Franco's 20 divisions, told Truman and the Cabinet on 31 January that he could use such help for his NATO forces. Two days later, Truman approved an immediate approach to Spain and some military assistance.61

Receptive to the U.S. overtures and aware of the improbability of an invitation to join NATO, Franco told Ambassador Griffis that, if properly armed, his country would participate in defending Europe against an attack, with or without a formal pact. The French and British took an unfavorable view of negotiations with Spain and insisted that they be consulted before any U.S. discussions. Defense opposed exploratory military conversations with the French and British as premature, but Acheson declared such discussions essential. Marshall and the JCS yielded, but talks in late June failed to remove the objections of the two countries. Congress meanwhile carried over into the next fiscal year the $62.5 million for a Spanish loan.62
In the Pentagon, both the secretaries of the military departments and the JCS asked Marshall to ensure that if Spanish membership in NATO was delayed the United States would make other military arrangements with Spain. The president approved this Defense position as U.S. policy (NSC 72/6). It remained policy for the rest of the Truman administration.64

In July 1951 Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, chief of naval operations—in one of the last official acts of his career—held military discussions with Franco in Madrid and thus paved the way for further talks. In late August a military team under Maj. Gen. James W. Spry, USAF, began technical discussions in Madrid; it submitted a report to the JCS on 2 November.64 During this period the United States reassured the French and British that the Spanish negotiations were indeed of extreme importance to Western European defense. Meanwhile, Congress appropriated $100 million for military, economic, and technical assistance to Spain in FY 1952 for use at the president's discretion.65

Events did not augur well for an early agreement between the two countries. The popular Stanton Griffis resigned, adding to Spanish public uncertainty about U.S. policy. General Eisenhower was quoted as opposing Spain's admission to NATO. When asked about this remark by newsmen, Truman said that he had "never been very fond of Spain," and then amended his comment to mean the Franco government, thus provoking outrage in the Spanish press and prompting a letter from Franco. Furthermore, the new U.S. ambassador, Lincoln MacVeagh, did not present his credentials until late March 1952.66

In response to the military team's report, the Joint Chiefs informed Secretary Lovett on 16 January 1952 that they wanted to establish a Joint U.S. Military Group (JUSMG Spain) to begin military negotiations and to use the $100 million appropriation for U.S. military projects in Spain. Deleting the last recommendation because military assistance funds could not legally be used for U.S. construction abroad, Lovett sent the JCS views to State. With State's concurrence, Acting Secretary of Defense Foster on 24 March approved both the appointment of a temporary JUSMG (Spain) and, for planning purposes, a JCS list of U.S. military requirements in Spain. Under Maj. Gen. August W. Kissner, USAF, the group began talks in April, while a U.S. economic team also entered into negotiations with the Spanish—both sets of talks preliminary to formal government-to-government negotiations.67 In essence the talks would determine how much assistance would be needed to acquire the right to develop and use bases in Spain.

Of the $100 million appropriated for Spanish assistance, the Joint Chiefs in February 1952 proposed using only $12 million for military end items and the remaining $88 million for economic aid to support military objectives.
They wanted to apply $78 million in counterpart funds* generated by U.S. economic aid to development of military bases in Spain. Of a planned three-year base construction program of approximately $400 million, the first year's share of $130 million would also require $52 million from regular Air Force and Navy funds. Lovett approved in March a package deal jointly developed by JCS, State, and OSD officials, but Secretary Finletter proved unenthusiastic about using regular Air Force funds, and the Spanish were dubious about releasing the counterpart funds for U.S. base construction. The Joint Chiefs felt that if Spain would not release at least $50 million in counterpart funds, it would be undesirable to spend the $100 million appropriation. In June, the Mutual Security Act of 1952 extended the availability of the $100 million into FY 1953 and added $25 million† as a minimum mandatory expenditure for economic, technical, or military assistance to Spain.⁶⁸

Although the entire extra $25 million went for military equipment for Spain, making a total of $37 million in military assistance, plus $88 million in economic aid, the Spanish viewed the $125 million total as far too small, and negotiations came to a standstill. Madrid apparently found offensive not only the amount offered in comparison with aid to other countries, but also the U.S. insistence on maintaining American forces on Spanish soil during peacetime.⁶⁹ Ambassador MacVeagh recommended adding $30 million to the U.S. offer and assuring Spain of continued support of its defense efforts. In the Pentagon, Nash advised Lovett in early August that while assurances could be given, the United States had to be able to use Spanish military facilities in peacetime also and that the $125 million figure was a maximum for FY 1953. In October MacVeagh assured the Spanish of U.S. support over a period of several years and expressed hope for closer association between the two countries. The reaction seemed favorable.⁷⁰

The amount of the U.S. military aid package, however, remained undetermined. Apparently believing that they might be called on to undertake missions elsewhere in Europe, the Spanish indicated to General Kissner that their military aid requirements came close to $1.4 billion. Kissner recommended in late summer 1952 that Spain be assigned certain defense tasks and granted $440 million in military aid over a period of years. In November Lovett went along with the JCS view that the $440 million figure accorded with U.S. objectives but that it was premature to assign specific defense tasks. Then in December Madrid proposed that construction of U.S. bases in Spain

* Counterpart funds were created in local currencies by foreign governments in payment for commodities sent under U.S. economic assistance programs. A percentage of these funds was reserved for U.S. use in the countries involved.
† The $125 million total was in addition to the $62.5 million loan.
and the equipping of Spanish forces by the United States proceed "on a parallel basis" and that use of the bases in time of war be a matter for prior consultation between the two governments. Neither of these propositions was acceptable to the United States. However, by late December the two countries had negotiated a military aid package for FY 1954 of $85 million.\(^1\)

In January 1953 Truman agreed that the United States must show good intent by raising the Spanish share in the FY 1954 military assistance program from $31 million to $85 million, but the Franco government was not informed of this change. An agreement finally signed on 26 September 1953 gave the United States the right to establish naval and air bases on Spanish territory and provided military and economic aid. The Korean War years thus set the stage for effective bilateral military cooperation with the Spanish, but another generation would pass before Spain would be admitted to NATO.\(^2\)

As with Spain, U.S. rapprochement with Yugoslavia evolved slowly and fitfully. By mid-1950 the United States had provided some limited economic aid, but mutual suspicion still persisted between the two countries.\(^5\) Although Tito had not requested U.S. arms and Yugoslavia currently could not qualify for grant military aid, fear of a Soviet-assisted attack against Yugoslavia impelled Truman in November 1949 to approve NSC 18/4. This report envisaged that the United States would furnish arms to the Yugoslavs in an emergency if they requested them and it was feasible. The United States consulted its allies but did not inform Tito of the decision. While the American officials did not know Yugoslav requirements, they knew that the country’s conglomeration of arms was largely obsolete and in need of maintenance and repair.\(^7\)

The advent of the Korean War increased U.S. concern over Yugoslavia’s vulnerability to Soviet bloc pressure or attack. In August 1950 the Truman administration secured an amendment to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 permitting military assistance to additional countries. Reaffirming the policy of providing military aid but no military forces to Yugoslavia in the event of Soviet aggression, the Joint Chiefs recommended immediate coordination of planning with France and the United Kingdom and use of Defense funds to stockpile the necessary supplies until military aid was decided upon. With State not averse to stockpiling, French, British, and American representatives met in October to review Yugoslav military requirements and to locate sources of materiel. Unable to ascertain Yugoslav needs, the tripartite report, completed in October, approved in principle sending older military equipment and forwarded an initial program for governmental consideration.\(^5\)

A severe drought and declining economic conditions seriously affected Yugoslavia in the summer of 1950. When Belgrade asked in October 1950 for $100 million in U.S. aid, half for food and half for industrial raw materials,
Marshall, seriously concerned that Yugoslav unrest might affect the military situation in Europe, urged immediate U.S. action. Within weeks, State and Defense officials put together a stopgap program of $33.5 million, including, with Truman's approval, $16 million of military assistance funds for food rations for the Yugoslav armed forces. In December 1950 Congress approved $38 million for food for Yugoslavia. Thus within two months of the Yugoslav request the Truman administration made available food grants of approximately $70 million.

Although State had earlier seemed amenable to stockpiling military equipment for Yugoslavia, it wanted a complete NSC policy review and Allied consultation before approaching Tito about military assistance. The JCS advised Marshall that without military assistance Yugoslav resistance to attack would probably be short lived. Tito therefore should be approached concerning his requirements and stockpiling begun on a priority equal to NATO's, but the United States should remain uncommitted and no deliveries should be made before aggression occurred.

In early 1951 the Joint Chiefs informed Marshall that they favored acceptance of the October tripartite report but that no FY 1951 military assistance funds should be diverted to Yugoslavia unless an overriding priority were assigned. They recommended a FY 1952 program of $160 million to provide for handling and transport of equipment for the Yugoslav stockpile. Marshall generally concurred but thought events might lend greater urgency to the JCS plan. Publicly, Tito was still saying that he would not yet ask for Western arms, but in fact his representative had been in Washington and seemed open to the possibility. With indications of Soviet shipments of heavy equipment to satellite military forces and concentrations of Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops along the Yugoslav border, Tito responded to a U.S. invitation and in late December 1950 submitted a list of Yugoslavia's most urgent requirements.

The State Department strongly supported sending arms to Yugoslavia, and on 31 January 1951, after a tour of the NATO countries, Eisenhower told Truman and the Cabinet that he favored giving arms to the Yugoslavs in the event of war. Lovett, however, had wondered whether Defense could provide the arms that Tito wanted since they were already in short supply. The Joint Chiefs suggested diverting some FY 1951 MDAP funds—later set at $77.5 million—to create a stockpile of equipment. Lovett then agreed that Tito should be advised of the immediate availability of a small amount of captured and surplus equipment.

* The services prepared two lists of equipment for delivery; the initial shipload sailed on 1 May in a Yugoslav vessel that arrived on 20 May.
The specter of a Soviet-inspired attack caused concern in Washington that Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey—which together had more troops than General Eisenhower was apt to command in NATO for quite some time—might be overrun one by one. On 14 February, with reference to a possible attack against Yugoslavia, Acheson publicly called attention to Truman's earlier statement that any new aggression in the world would "strain the fabric of world peace to a dangerous extent." The ominous signs convinced Tito of the need for greater cooperation with the West. Addressing the discontent of some Yugoslav Communists over his increasingly pro-Western orientation, Tito told a political conference in February that the country would remain Communist but would have to accept his policy of working with the Western nations, which had helped by sending food. Tito reminded his audience that the country's safety was enhanced by Western statements that an attack on Yugoslavia would result in a larger conflict. Claiming he had not yet asked for Western arms, Tito said he would do so if he considered an attack inevitable.

During an NSC review of U.S. policy on 7 March, Marshall pointed out that it would probably take six months after a decision to send military equipment before delivery could be made to the Yugoslavs. Reaffirming U.S. interest in helping the country remain independent of Soviet domination, the NSC agreed that the United States should expedite economic assistance, try to determine Yugoslav military requirements, act in conjunction with the NATO nations to facilitate Yugoslav arms purchases, provide direct grant assistance including military items, and inform Tito that he could count on Western materiel support if attacked. For this last purpose the United States was to establish a special stockpile as rapidly as possible and plan for "appropriate military support." In the event of hostile guerrilla actions by Eastern bloc countries, the United States should support action through the UN, consult and act with its allies, and deliver such military equipment as Belgrade requested and the JCS recommended. Against an overt attack on Yugoslavia, the United States should take all the above measures, implement its military support plans, and prepare for the "increased threat of global war." There was no mention of use of American military forces; the United States sought no bases. In summary, the new policy, inconclusive on the matter of U.S. operational support, definitely promised military supplies in the event of an attack on Yugoslavia, with an immediate commitment to such support. Truman approved this policy in NSC 18/6 on 12 March; no further formal change in policy toward Yugoslavia occurred during his presidency.

In early April the tripartite working group of the previous year reassembled to see what equipment could be supplied to Yugoslavia by the British, French, and Americans. Chaired by Brig. Gen. George H. Olmsted, the OSD director of military assistance, the committee agreed that the need for
assistance had increased and that the West should supply some military equipment as soon as possible after joint consultations.\(^{84}\)

At the end of April Burns told State that Defense needed to hold technical talks directly with Yugoslav military authorities. Following extended conversations, Col. Gen. Koca Popovic of Yugoslavia and Brig. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, USA, representing the JCS, on 13 June 1951 signed a memorandum of agreement—not binding on the governments—specifying a second list of arms for shipment. Popovic indicated that the Yugoslav government planned to request U.S. military assistance formally and to conclude the necessary bilateral agreement; he assented in principle to early technical and operational planning staff conferences. Despite Tito’s expressed aversion to a military alliance with the West or involvement in NATO, he eventually agreed to exploratory military talks with U.S. officials late in 1952.\(^{85}\)

On 28 June 1951 Belgrade made a formal request for military assistance, and bilateral technical talks began on 7 August, with Olmsted serving as chief of the Joint MDAP Survey Mission. Since Tito insisted that the talks be held in Washington, the mission had little chance to observe conditions in Yugoslavia. The survey mission report, submitted in September, indicated that Yugoslav forces could utilize $88.6 million in U.S. military assistance during FY 1951 and $746 million during FY 1952 and FY 1953, amounts well in excess of previous recommendations. The report recommended immediate approval of the FY 1951 figure and approval of the FY 1952 and FY 1953 figures subject to revision. Citing their bad experience with Soviet military advisers, the Yugoslavs did not want to allow another foreign mission in Yugoslavia, but the United States remained adamant on this point. The two nations finally signed the agreement on 14 November.\(^{86}\)

Despite Yugoslavia’s apparent importance, its priority for military assistance equipment remained the same as that for NATO, with the result that, of a total of $90.9 million in military assistance programmed for Yugoslavia in FY 1951, only $9.1 million had been shipped by the end of December 1951. But by December 1952 the military assistance program for the three fiscal years 1951–53 had reached $444 million; nearly $114 million worth of supplies had already been sent or was in depots awaiting shipment.\(^{87}\)

Granting the unlikelihood of Yugoslav adherence to NATO, the United States desired improvement in Belgrade’s relationship with its three NATO neighbors—Greece, Italy, and Turkey. Nonetheless Italo–Yugoslav relations remained poor because of the Trieste issue, which was not resolved until 1954.* Yugoslav relations with Greece and Turkey improved considerably

* The Italian Peace Treaty of February 1947 divided the Free Territory of Trieste, a part of Italy between 1919 and 1947, into two zones—a northern one administered by the British and Americans and a southern part administered by the Yugoslavs. In March 1948, while Yugoslavia
after Tito in the summer of 1952 declared his willingness to cooperate with them for mutual defense. In late 1952 the Yugoslavs held military talks with the Greeks and then the Turks, and the three nations signed a five-year treaty of friendship and collaboration at Ankara in February 1953.88

Although Spain and Yugoslavia were not invited to join NATO during the Korean War period, they did draw considerably closer to the West. Without the benefit of formal pacts, there was an end to their isolation from the West and some reason to believe that the two countries might be counted on to fight against Soviet aggression.

The NATO Military Command

While the United States searched for additional Allies to assist in the defense of Europe, the NATO military structure had to surmount major problems in its evolution after 1950. The Alliance faced a formidable task of organizing the three integrated commands—for Europe, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean—authorized by the NATO Council in December 1950. At that time, only the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Eisenhower, was appointed. Both Europeans and Americans felt that if anyone could create an effective defense force, Eisenhower was the man to do it. Marshall looked on Eisenhower as “rather unique in the world.”89

For chief of staff for Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Eisenhower immediately selected Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, a brilliant director of the JCS Joint Staff and the Army’s current deputy chief of staff for plans and operations. With Gruenther and several other U.S. officers, soon to be joined by representatives from other NATO nations, Eisenhower began work on SHAPE’s organizational and command problems. SHAPE occupied temporary quarters at the Astoria Hotel in Paris until moving to its permanent site near Versailles in June 1951.90

Viewing NATO as the “last remaining chance for the survival of Western civilization,” Eisenhower in January 1951 visited the military and political leaders of the NATO countries and Germany. Returning to Washington at the end of January to report to Truman and address Congress, Eisenhower told the president, Marshall, and the Cabinet that he wanted to create a “combined

was still a Cominform member, the Allies declared the arrangement unworkable and wanted all of Trieste returned to Italy. The outraged Yugoslavs refused to release Italy from the peace treaty. After Yugoslavia left the Cominform, the Allies were embarrassed by continued Italo-Yugoslav disagreement but could not go back on their declaration. Despite Tito’s offer to settle all outstanding issues with the Italians in September 1951, the matter continued as a major problem until late 1953, when the Allies abandoned the idea of restoring all of Trieste to Italy.
spiral of strength" by building European confidence through the creation of a strong and unified NATO military organization. He wanted 10 to 12 U.S. divisions plus additional troops from NATO nations and from other countries also if they offered help freely and unconditionally. He urged that U.S. arms be produced "exactly as if we were going to war."91

Back in Europe, Eisenhower faced the immediate problem of devising a headquarters and command organization into which the disparate NATO forces could fit and function efficiently. Writing Marshall on 12 March, Eisenhower reported that his command problem was "more complicated than it was in World War II because of the increased number of nations, and . . . [because] economic and political factors enter into everything we do." Personal and national aspirations, rigid views, and mutual suspicion created problems among the staff. In addition, Eisenhower observed to others, there was still "no budget, not even for housekeeping."92

For the deputy supreme commander of SHAPE, Eisenhower chose the redoubtable Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery, the famous and often difficult British World War II leader who had headed the Commanders in Chief Committee of the Western Union Defense Organization.9 Contrary to the fears of those who felt that Montgomery would be a fractious and scene-stealing rival, Eisenhower found him "a fine team-mate . . . thorough, painstaking, and, surprisingly enough, . . . patient."95 British Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders and French Admiral André Lemmonier became deputies for air and sea respectively. None of the deputies, Eisenhower wrote Marshall, had any command functions; theirs would be "tasks of an administrative, advisory, consultative, and preparatory nature, involving contacts both with my own staff and with the governments of NATO." Supporting Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs instructed their Standing Group representative to back his plan.94

On 2 April Eisenhower formally activated SHAPE and its central and northern commands, while a southern command remained under consideration. Personally taking responsibility for Allied Forces Central Europe, Eisenhower named two French officers, Marshal Alphonse Juin and Vice-Adm. Robert Jaujard, as commanders in chief of its land and naval forces and an American, Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, as commander of its air forces. British Admiral Sir Patrick Brind became commander in chief of Allied Forces Northern Europe and also headed its naval force, while an American had charge of air, and Danish and Norwegian officers commanded their respective national land forces. Allied Forces Southern Europe, established in June 1951, came under

* On 20 December 1950, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Powers decided to merge the military organization of Western Union into NATO.
U.S. Admiral Robert B. Carney, who also commanded its naval forces, while an Italian and an American became chief of land and air forces respectively. 95

After Eisenhower assumed his duties as SACEUR, he looked for an intermediary through whom he might frequently but indirectly communicate with the president, finally settling on Harriman, at that point Truman's special assistant. 96 Obviously disturbed by the relief of General MacArthur in the spring of 1951, Eisenhower wrote Harriman on 12 May that the newspapers were saying a "great deal about soldiers necessarily clearing with higher authority in advance anything they may have to say on matters lying outside their own professional concerns." Eisenhower complained that, although he was expected to generate enthusiasm in Europe and become involved in more than just military matters, he saw no way that he could ever clear his remarks beforehand with 12 different NATO governments. As a result, he declared to Harriman, he would "keep still, in every language known to man." Harriman encouraged him to speak out. 97

It is difficult to estimate whether or to what extent Eisenhower's feelings about his own possible vulnerability affected his feelings toward Marshall, whose congressional testimony on troops for Europe he had found less than reassuring. Marshall, for his part, expressed strong feelings of esteem and affection for Eisenhower. In September 1951 Marshall wrote that he could not leave office without telling Eisenhower of his "tremendous admiration for the job you have done and are doing in Europe." When Eisenhower responded warmly, Marshall was deeply moved: "It is difficult for me to express the feeling of appreciation I have for your appraisement of my services." 98 After Lovett succeeded Marshall, the connection between SACEUR and the secretary of defense became less personal and close. Despite Lovett's desire to cooperate, further organizational problems and delays in getting U.S. military assistance equipment to NATO created an undercurrent of friction at the official if not personal level.  

Eisenhower, impressively successful in his role of SACEUR, was looked on in Europe, according to a State Department view, as the "personal embodiment of NATO itself" and a "leading U.S. spokesman, and to some extent ... a roving U.S. Ambassador." When Eisenhower left SHAPE at the end of May 1952 to run for the presidency, Truman designated General Ridgway to succeed him as SACEUR. 99

The attempt to establish two other NATO supreme commands on the same level as Eisenhower's, one for the Atlantic and another for the Mediterranean, produced no positive results in 1951. Rather, the problems that emerged threatened to strain Anglo-American relations. In accordance with the De-

* See Chapter XIX.
CHART 5
KEY NATO MILITARY PERSONNEL
JANUARY 1952

STANDING GROUP

LT. GEN. PAUL ELY (FR)
A.C.M. SIR WILLIAM ELLIOT (BR)
V. ADM. JERAULD WRIGHT (U.S.)

(Permanent Representatives of Chiefs of Staff)
Washington

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)
GENERAL OF THE ARMY EISENHOWER (U.S.)

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
FIELD MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY (BR)

DEPUTY (AIR)
AIR CHIEF
MARSHAL SAUNDERS (BR)

DEPUTY (NAVY)
VICE ADMIRAL LEMMONIER (FR)

Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces
Northern Europe (CINCNORTH)
ADM. BRIND (BR)
Oslo, Norway

Commander-in-Chief
Allied Land Forces
Central Europe (CINCLANDCENT)
GEN. OF THE ARMY JUIN (FR)
Fontainebleau, France

Commander-in-Chief
Allied Air Forces
Central Europe (CINCAIRCENT)
LT. GEN. NORSTAD (U.S.)
Fontainebleau, France

Flag Officer
Central Europe (FLAGCENT)
V. ADM. JAUJARD (FR)
Fontainebleau, France

Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH)
ADM. CARNEY (U.S.)
Naples, Italy

Commander
Allied Land Forces
(COMLANDNORWAY)
LT. GEN. TAGEN-MANSTEEN (NOR)
Oslo, Norway

Commander
Allied Land Forces
(COMLANDDENMARK)
LT. GEN. MOLLER (DEN)
Copenhagen, Denmark

Commander
Allied Air Forces
(COMNAIRNORTH)
MAJ. GEN. TAYLOR (U.S.)
Oslo, Norway

Commander
Allied Naval Forces
(COMNAVNORTH)
ADM. BRIND (BR)
Oslo, Norway

Commander
Allied Land Forces
(COMLANDSOUTH)
LT. GEN. de CASTIGLIONE (IT)
Verona, Italy

Commander
Allied Air Forces
(COMAIR SOUTH)
MAJ. GEN. SCHLATTER (U.S.)
Naples, Italy

Commander
Allied Naval Forces
(COMNAVSOUTH)
ADM. CARNEY (U.S.)
Naples, Italy
cember 1950 request of the North Atlantic Council, Truman nominated Admiral William M. Fechteler for the position of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) early in February 1951. Routine approval was expected, but Winston Churchill bitterly attacked the Attlee government’s acceptance of a second U.S. supreme commander. Attlee’s promise to reconsider was followed by a heated British public debate centering on a charge that dismayed Eisenhower—that the United States was “seizing positions of authority” in NATO.100

With Defense concurrence, the State Department instructed Spofford on 9 March to delay NATO action on Fechteler’s appointment even if the British did agree. At the same time, the Americans tried to find a compromise solution.101 The British wanted to hold a military position in NATO equal to Eisenhower’s—if not SACLANT, certainly Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean. But by now a Mediterranean command appeared to be in conflict with Eisenhower’s planned organization of his southern command, which would include the U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean. The Americans suggested downgrading SACLANT’s title to commander in chief and appointing a British Supreme Allied Commander Middle East over a command separate from NATO. This did not satisfy the British, and Eisenhower wanted any compromise plan to clearly delineate the responsibilities of adjacent NATO commands. At Acheson’s suggestion, Lovett agreed to discussions with the British, but the meetings in May proved inconclusive.102

In July 1951 Lovett went along with the JCS on proceeding with the appointment of the American SACLANT, but Admiral Sherman’s sudden death that month led to Fechteler’s elevation to the post of chief of naval operations. Although Vice Adm. Lynde D. McCormick became the U.S. nominee for SACLANT, the British asked for a delay in his appointment to avoid any notion that Fechteler had been personally objectionable to them. Besides, they still wanted to pair the announcement of an American SACLANT with that of a British supreme commander for some other post in NATO.103

By midsummer 1951 doubts arose about the proposal to create a Supreme Allied Command Mediterranean. Although Marshall believed that Eisenhower had designed SHAPE’s southern European command under Admiral Carney “to be adaptable to any Mediterranean Command as may be agreed in the future,” in fact naval forces in the Mediterranean were already operating under Eisenhower. Furthermore, the French also thought that they should have the principal NATO command in the Mediterranean. Further complications emerged as the possibility of Greek and Turkish membership in NATO increased.104

With troubles growing in Egypt and Iran, it seemed possible that the Mediterranean command might be superseded by a Middle East Command. Setting up such an organization, however, proved no easier than creating one for the Mediterranean. Even at the risk of further deferring the appointment
of SACLANT, the NATO Standing Group thought advances should be made first to Turkey and Egypt. Angered at the British, the Egyptians refused even to discuss the possibility of joining a Middle East command, and both the Greeks and Turks were determined, once they joined NATO, to come under Eisenhower. An attempt to set up a Middle East organization separate from NATO under the auspices of seven nations—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa—also failed. By the end of 1951, the Middle East Command idea was stillborn, the Mediterranean Command proposal languished, and SACLANT still had not been appointed.

In November 1951 in London Admiral Fechteler assured Churchill, newly returned to office as prime minister, that under the Atlantic Command proposal his government would retain authority over British home waters. Although Churchill indicated that his main objection to the plan had been removed, he still saw no necessity for an overall NATO commander in the Atlantic. Visiting Washington in January 1952, Churchill, according to Acheson, waxed eloquent about the need for a British supreme commander over "that Western sea whose floor is white with the bones of Englishmen." Only after careful maneuvering by the Americans did he finally consent to let NATO go forward and appoint an American SACLANT. The Supreme Allied Command Atlantic was established by the end of January 1952, with headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia. An advance planning staff began to replace the old North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group, and Admiral McCormick took on his new duties as SACLANT on 10 April. Like Eisenhower, McCormick reported directly to the Standing Group and could communicate directly with the countries supporting him. Unlike Eisenhower, SACLANT had no permanently assigned forces, although he could hold training exercises. In any case, NATO finally had its second supreme commander.

The establishment of SACLANT left unsettled the question of how to organize the Mediterranean area or where to fit in Greek and Turkish forces after their formal acceptance into NATO in February 1952. At the Lisbon conference, in February, an interim agreement placed their land and air forces under Eisenhower within Carney's southern European command. In August, Carney set up a subordinate command for these new forces, with headquarters in Turkey and an advance post in Greece. Naval arrangements for the Mediterranean remained undecided, although the Military Committee was to propose a definite solution at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

Even though the British and Americans agreed on the need for an overall NATO naval commander in the Mediterranean, they still disagreed on the

* Talk of a Middle East Defense Organization continued for another year but to little avail.
specifics. The British wanted a separate area command, with a British commander in chief, if not a supreme commander, reporting directly to the Standing Group. The Americans viewed the Mediterranean as SACEUR's southern flank and wanted a commander subordinate to Eisenhower; privately, they feared that an independent British commander might not be fully responsive to him. The two powers resolved the matter at the end of 1952 by setting up under Eisenhower a subordinate NATO command to control Allied naval forces and secure the Mediterranean. Admiral The Earl Mountbatten became commander in chief of Allied Forces Mediterranean and opened his headquarters at Malta in March 1953. The command arrangements remained complicated since the French, Italian, Greek, and Turkish naval forces under Mountbatten were also responsible for certain national tasks, while the U.S. Sixth Fleet—the chief element in Mediterranean defense—remained under Carney. Although the British got a NATO commander in chief, the problem of organizing the Mediterranean seemed to have been solved more to U.S. than British satisfaction.109

Of the original five NATO regional planning groups, three were replaced by commands under SACEUR and one by SACLANT, while the fifth survived all the changes. The Canada–United States Regional Planning Group worked in Washington under the direction of the chiefs of staff of Canada and the United States, submitting its plans for North American defense to the NATO Standing Group for approval. One other special NATO military entity also came under the Standing Group. The Channel Committee, established in late 1950, included the naval chiefs of staff of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In February 1952, a Channel Command was set up directly under the Channel Committee. Jointly led by two British officers, one serving as the Allied commander in chief and the other as the Allied maritime air commander in chief—compensating to some extent for Churchill's agreement to an American SACLANT—the Channel Command would have the wartime responsibility of maintaining control of the Channel and the North Sea areas, protecting sea lanes of communication, and supporting operations by SACEUR and SACLANT.110

Thus, during the Korean War years NATO's military organization took form only after much labor and the resolution of serious Anglo–American differences over command arrangements. OSD officials felt that strong Anglo–American ties and basic common interest would prevail, and they did.111 By the end of 1952 Lovett could feel considerable satisfaction that the issues surrounding NATO's military structure were substantially settled. But there still remained the problem of raising the military forces that would provide the ultimate deterrent to aggression against Western Europe.
CHAPTER XVIII

Increasing NATO Strength

At the start of 1951 NATO had a new supreme allied commander but grossly inadequate forces. Beyond sending more troops to Europe, the Truman administration needed to find ways to support the efforts of NATO members to raise, equip, and maintain military forces without ruining their economies or arousing disruptive internal political opposition. And the strength of Germany, so recently the feared and hated enemy of World War II, had to be brought into NATO's service. The realization of these goals would come only after years of intense deliberation and negotiation among the countries involved. The experience afforded the United States an object lesson in the trials and tribulations to be encountered in fashioning an effective coalition in peacetime.

The NATO Defense "Gap"

When General Eisenhower officially opened Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) on 2 April 1951, two days short of the second anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, he commanded fewer than 15 combat-ready divisions and 1,000 operational aircraft. Authorized by the five Brussels Treaty powers to take over the responsibility of the Western Union Commanders in Chief Committee, Eisenhower also inherited plans developed by the three NATO regional planning groups that SHAPE had superseded, including a Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) with a target date of 1 July 1954. Originally drafted by the Standing Group and approved as a first approximation of requirements by the NATO Defense Committee in April 1950, the MTDP, revised as DC-28, had been approved by the Defense Committee and sent to the North Atlantic Council on 28 October 1950. Essentially a plan
to raise and maintain indefinitely a given force, DC-28 projected a military buildup sufficient to deter an attack or, if one occurred, to permit establishment of a strong European defense line. Although the member governments agreed on the MTDP in late 1950, many had doubts about its cost.\textsuperscript{2}

When Eisenhower outlined his strategic concept to the president and the Cabinet in late January 1951, he described Western Europe as the narrow neck of a bottle whose wide base was the Soviet Union. If the Soviets attacked Europe, the narrow neck would become the center of resistance. Viewed in this fashion, Europe had two flanks, one in the North Sea area and the other in the Mediterranean, both of which would have to be heavily armed. If the Soviets attacked in the center, Eisenhower planned to "hit them awfully hard from both flanks"; with sufficient NATO strength, the center would hold, and the Soviets would turn back. But the forces that Eisenhower wanted and the requirements for DC-28 far exceeded what the NATO countries felt they could afford to raise. As Eisenhower soon learned, the United States would not provide more than six divisions. By the spring of 1951, the Standing Group gave the highest priority to closing the gap between forces required and forces offered.\textsuperscript{3}

Reviewing the DC-28 requirements in late May, the JCS phased them for the start of combat (D-Day), 30 days later (D+30), and 90 days later (D+90). Comparing these figures with the planned country force contributions, the JCS identified the extent of the gap for Marshall and recommended that certain countries, including the United States, contribute additional forces to make up the deficiency (see TABLE 15 below).\textsuperscript{4}

The cost of creating and supporting the proposed NATO forces caused much concern and study in Washington. It seemed to General Bradley that Europe wanted the United States to "foot about 90 percent of the total bill." Lovett advised Bradley in May that prior to submission of a U.S. proposal for additional force commitments by member countries it would be necessary to make a thorough economic and financial feasibility study of the plan.\textsuperscript{5} Meanwhile the International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC)\textsuperscript{*} conducted a full-scale study of European production and financial capabilities, total costs, and probable deliveries of U.S. military assistance. As a report for Marshall from the OSD Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs noted, a decision on the amount of U.S. assistance would be the prime factor in solving the NATO military gap.\textsuperscript{6}

Using cost figures compiled by McNeil's office, General Burns informed Marshall and Lovett on 20 June that a four-year NATO defense buildup (including Germany) from FY 1951 through FY 1954 would require $72 billion, of which Europe might provide between $37 billion and $43 billion.

\* For an explanation of ISAC and its functions, see Chapter XIX.
Viewing the projected European contribution as optimistic, Burns estimated the unfilled cost as somewhere between $30 billion and $40 billion. Of this, the United States had already financed about $12 billion in previous military assistance programs, leaving approximately $18-28 billion still unfunded. An ISAC report indicated that the NATO program might succeed if the United States could persuade the Europeans to contribute more, cut military requirements by $8 billion or $9 billion (where this could be done without sacrificing military objectives), and raise U.S. military assistance programs for FY 1953 and FY 1954 by approximately 30 percent.7

Burns recommended that Marshall "support the attainment of our European military objectives" since any other course would undermine Eisenhower and Western European defense. In accord, Marshall declared at an ISAC meeting on 21 June that the United States should either back Eisenhower or "frankly give up supporting him." Believing that the United States would have to supply at least $17 billion in assistance in the next two years, the secretary agreed with Acheson that they should put the matter to the president. Four days later Truman verbally approved the JCS force recommendations for NATO.8
Truman further agreed that the Europeans should be asked to increase their forces to complete the NATO objective planned for 1954. This also raised the U.S. obligation; beyond the six divisions scheduled for Europe by the end of 1951, in the event of war in 1954 the United States would send seven more divisions by D+90. Truman also sanctioned increases to 22 tactical air wings, 1,400 active front-line aircraft, and 509 naval vessels of all types. In the event of an attack on Europe, the U.S. portion of NATO strength was expected to reach 13 percent of ground forces, 15 percent of tactical air forces, and 25 percent of naval requirements. The president approved notifying Congress of the need to continue the current high level of military assistance for Europe for two more years. With these decisions, the United States fashioned its initial position on completing the DC-28 defense plan; an offer of U.S. troops and aid could be made.9

Informing the Joint Chiefs of the president’s decisions and sending them the ISAC evaluation of their force plans, Marshall left to their judgment whether modifications should be made. On 28 July the Joint Chiefs provided the Standing Group with somewhat altered recommendations on tentative forces; Lovett also sent revised costing figures.10 By mid-August the Standing Group had prepared its position and planned to send it, with the comments of the NATO Military Representatives Committee, to the member countries for review during September. The Standing Group was to prepare a final military report for consideration by the NATO Military Committee in October so that the plan could go to the North Atlantic Council by the end of the year.11

Further actions had to await Eisenhower’s assessment of required strength. Although Col. Royden E. Beebe, director of the OSD Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs, told Lovett in July 1951 that he believed Eisenhower would be “forced to go along” with the JCS plan, SHAPE’s requirements, sent to the Standing Group in mid-August, derived from a plan that differed from the DC-28 plan. Eisenhower proposed a forward strategy with a strong defensive zone east of the Rhine, a major German contribution, and a substantial allocation of Atlantic naval forces in direct support of European land forces. Although satisfied with 46 D-Day divisions, Eisenhower wanted reserve ground forces available within 30 rather than 90 days of the start of hostilities.12 This last provision had great significance for the Europeans, who were depending on 90 days of grace to mobilize their reserves. The two plans did not vary greatly in numbers of divisions, but SACEUR’s timing made the gap larger. DC-28 requirements for 95 1/2 divisions on D+90 left a gap of 12 divisions; Eisenhower’s demand for 97 divisions by D+30, when only 67 1/4 would be available, left a gap of almost 29. If German forces did not supply some of the missing divisions, the onus would fall on the NATO nations. As Frank Nash remarked to Marshall, the United States was beginning to see
Increasing NATO Strength

"some of the complexities of satisfying General Eisenhower's requirements without imposing undue burdens on the contributing countries." 15

The NATO gap posed serious procedural and psychological problems. The different plans had to be so combined that one document could be considered at the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council meetings later in the year. Furthermore, the European nations had to accept the economic costs of a greater effort. Realizing that cost analyses prepared by the United States alone or by the Standing Group would not necessarily induce the Europeans to increase their production and mobilization efforts, the United States decided to support a NATO costing exercise. 14 At the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ottawa in September 1951, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, representing Lovett, reported on the status of the U.S. defense effort and urged each government to review its own military production and manpower decisions in relation to overall Alliance requirements. Reacting to the American pressure, the council on 19 September created a special Temporary Council Committee (TCC) to reconcile ends and means. 15

On receiving country comments, the Standing Group revised the MTDP force requirements, taking into account Eisenhower's desires. At Rome in November, the Military Committee referred to the defense ministers the Standing Group plan, now somewhat altered and labeled MC 26/1. The new plan for 1954 gave Eisenhower 46 D-Day divisions and 98 (ready and reserve) on D + 30; it also set requirements for 1,394 naval vessels (642 large) and 9,285 aircraft. Despite the extent of these goals, the Joint Chiefs considered MC 26/1 most austere but still a plan, with "force requirements . . . based strictly upon military factors." 16

Meeting alone on 26 November, the defense ministers approved without change a U.S. resolution requesting that the Temporary Council Committee consider MC 26/1 and that member nations speed up work on the 1952 portion of the plan. It was clear that all military requirements would receive a rigorous new review in light of the nonmilitary considerations that had brought the TCC into being. 17

Attempts to Close the Gap

Charged with finding a way to balance NATO security requirements against the "realistic politico-economic capabilities of member countries," the TCC planned to attack the problem by lowering military requirements and raising country contributions. 18 With all NATO nations represented, the TCC was headed by an Executive Board of the British, French, and American members—Hugh Gaitskell (soon to be replaced by Edwin Plowden), Jean
Monnet, and Averell Harriman, the elected chairman. There were two major TCC working groups—the Screening and Costing Staff (SCS), consisting of representatives of all member nations, which worked on military matters; and the Temporary Economic Analysis Staff, to provide economic and financial data. The TCC would review recommendations from the Executive Board, which came to be known as “The Three Wise Men.”

Believing the Screening and Costing Staff of paramount importance, Lovett named the chairman of the OSD Management Committee, General McNarney, to serve as the U.S. representative. With McNarney as its director-general, the SCS had power to review MTDP requirements, recommend economy measures, prepare a cost estimate, and suggest modifications over a wide range of national activities. Coordination between the TCC and the Department of Defense came under Beebe’s Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs. At Harriman’s request, Lovett created another channel between OSD and the TCC in the person of Col. George A. (“Abe”) Lincoln, appointing him a special assistant to the secretary of defense and assigning him as defense adviser to Harriman. Lincoln, a versatile and experienced planner, had worked earlier in 1951 on a military assistance costing exercise.

Acting quickly, the TCC sent all member countries questionnaires on military factors and on political and economic factors. The countries found the questions specific, probing, and unsettling; even the United States refused to divulge certain military information. Some State Department officials interpreted the Pentagon’s disinclination to defend the dollar amounts of future U.S. military assistance before its allies as a refusal to recognize that U.S. decisions could be affected by the NATO relationship and commitments. Nash thought that Lovett and Harriman should have a “heart-to-heart” talk on the matter. In early November Lovett sent Pace to Paris to meet with the TCC Executive Board. Pointing out that the United States was furnishing the major part of Alliance equipment and had a higher proportion of its population serving in the armed forces than any other NATO country, Pace indicated that the Alliance could not expect more than the six U.S. divisions promised by the end of 1951 and that the Strategic Air Command would not be available to NATO in event of war until its primary mission of counterattack against the enemy homeland had been completed. Despite these caveats, Lincoln described the discussion as “highly satisfactory to all present.”

By mid-December 1951, when the final TCC report was ready, actual forces under Eisenhower numbered 35 divisions, almost 3,000 aircraft, and 700 naval vessels. McNarney’s Screening and Costing Staff proposed a revised

* See Chapter XXI.
† These figures are from Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 102. Estimates in November 1951 placed SHAPE forces at 24 D-Day divisions, 44 D + 30 divisions, and 1,580 aircraft at the end of
Increasing NATO Strength program based less on MC 26/1 and its progressive buildup to 1954 than on Eisenhower's preference for an immediately effective, combat-worthy force with considerable deterrent value. As a result, McNarney emphasized 1952 divisions for SACEUR at the general expense of the 1954 buildup envisioned in MC 26/1. The only exception was an increase in air power for 1954.\(^{25}\)

**Table 16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TCC/SCS Recommendations</th>
<th>CY 1952</th>
<th>CY 1953</th>
<th>CY 1954</th>
<th>1954 Variation from MC 26/1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions (M + 30) ......</td>
<td>54½</td>
<td>69½</td>
<td>86½</td>
<td>- 11½</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major combat vessels (M-Day)*</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>- 240</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft (M-Day) ..........</td>
<td>4,230</td>
<td>7,005</td>
<td>9,965</td>
<td>+ 680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* M-Day was the date on which mobilization was to commence and might or might not be the same as D-Day, the commencement of hostilities.

The TCC recommended adoption of its 1952 goals as firm, while it termed those for 1953 and 1954 “provisional” and “planning” goals, respectively. Not only had the SCS lowered 1954 force requirements, it had also made large-scale cuts in military costs. There still existed, however, an equipment gap of about $10 billion that would necessitate increased U.S. military assistance.\(^{26}\)

The TCC success, as one U.S. diplomat wrote, owed much to the remarkable understanding of international political-military-economic relationships shown by the Three Wise Men and McNarney and particularly to their willingness to devote themselves entirely to this first NATO review.\(^{27}\) Eisenhower hailed the effort as a “truly monumental piece of work” and hoped the countries would immediately start to meet the recommended goals for 1952. Some Pentagon officials happily beheld NATO as being “on the threshold of securing a physical deterrent military force in Europe, not just on paper but with helmets on and rifles ready.” However, the member countries had to react and the report needed final adjustments before the next North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon in February 1952.\(^{28}\)

In January 1952 the Joint Chiefs advised Lovett that they felt the TCC/SCS strength figures constituted “essentially a limited time-phased capabilities approach” to NATO medium term requirements. Less than pleased that the

TCC questioned the validity of 1954 as the target date for meeting requirements, the Joint Chiefs reported that they were studying whether the SCS figures for 1952 and 1953 would actually result in a balanced force in 1954. The NATO Military Committee subsequently found that the TCC/SCS forces were not militarily balanced, agreed that MC 26/1 represented the "magnitude and the balance of forces required," and wanted every effort made to keep the forces in balance.29

On 15 January Lovett recommended to State acceptance of the SCS force plans for 1952 and 1953 as a basis for committing U.S. forces to NATO and sending military assistance, although he upheld the JCS on the need for study to see whether SCS force levels would meet NATO defense requirements. Nash advised Lovett that the U.S. comments of 22 January on the TCC report reflected the positions of all major Defense elements except for the JCS insistence on 1954 as the year of attainment of MTDP requirements.50

To reach the recommended strengths, the TCC on 8 February proposed $2.42 billion in additional national expenditures, but the countries had committed themselves to only half that amount. Later that month the TCC warned that up to a quarter of the divisions and a tenth of the aircraft for 1952 might not be realized. Eisenhower reacted quickly and vigorously; he wanted to know exactly what forces he would be assured of getting by the end of 1952. The Standing Group proposed as a matter of "urgent military necessity" goals of 26 M-Day divisions, 53\% M + 30 divisions, and 3,940 aircraft for the end of 1952—slightly less than the TCC/SCS figures.51

At the Lisbon meeting in February, Lovett and Acheson labored to find a formula that would enable the Europeans to accept the budget increases necessary to support the 1952 NATO forces.52 The council adopted the following "firm" 1952 goals, "provisional" 1953 goals, and "planning" 1954 goals (see Table 17 below).53

Although somewhat below the TCC/SCS ground and air figures for the end of 1952, the Lisbon ground force goals for 1954 reached or exceeded the committee's goals. The council accepted McNarney's aircraft figures as 1953 and 1954 goals and markedly increased naval strengths. The United States was to contribute 5\% of the M-Day divisions and 7\% of the M + 30 divisions for both 1952 and 1953, and 6\% and 9\% divisions, respectively, in 1954. The Lisbon goals included no German divisions for 1952 but incorporated 6 in both M-Day and M + 30 figures for 1953 and 8 in M-Day and 12 in M + 30 figures for 1954. No forces were included for Greece and Turkey, not formally accepted into NATO until the Lisbon conference. The council also adopted a TCC recommendation for an annual NATO review of the sort just concluded.54

A triumph of high hopes and expectations, especially for the Americans, the Lisbon conference promised far more than it could ever deliver. Many, if
not most, of the European foreign and defense ministers no doubt suspected or believed that the force goals were beyond attainment. Still, they went along with Lovett and Acheson while privately warning that the economies of their nations could not, and the people would not, bear the heavy burden entailed. Nevertheless, the goals adopted at Lisbon served a useful purpose in putting a brave public face on the intentions and capabilities of the Alliance. And even if the goals were soon recognized as beyond reach, for a time they served as a spur to efforts to provide SHAPE with more and better forces.

**Infrastructure Requirements**

On 24 February 1952 Acheson cabled Truman from Lisbon that only two problems remained, one of which was infrastructure. This term referred to the air and naval bases, fuel storage facilities, signal communications, and other installations necessary for NATO’s military forces to function. U.S. officers unofficially shortened the definition to “public works to support operational plans.” By the end of 1951 infrastructure requirements were becoming critical to the further growth of NATO forces. Airplanes without gas storage facilities or airfields, troops without barracks, and military units without adequate communications had little military value. Both Eisenhower and the TCC were emphatic on the primary importance of infrastructure requirements.35

Since not all facilities could be constructed or paid for at once, NATO divided the infrastructure program into projects for a given time period, usually a calendar year. Once such a program “slice” was approved, host countries had to acquire the necessary land and let construction contracts. The five Brussels Pact countries contributing to Western Union developed the first slice, including 35 tactical airfields, signals communications, and an

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>End CY 1952</th>
<th>End CY 1953</th>
<th>End CY 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground divisions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36½</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M + 30</td>
<td>51½</td>
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<td>M-Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>M + 180</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>848</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft (M-Day)</td>
<td>4,067</td>
<td>7,005</td>
<td>9,965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**TABLE 17**

NATO Force Goals Accepted at Lisbon

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Increasing NATO Strength
international military headquarters—all to be completed in central Europe by the end of 1951. Of the $90 million cost, France contributed over 45 percent, the United Kingdom about 27 percent, and the Benelux countries about 27 percent. When SHAPE became operational under Eisenhower in April 1951, facilities became a command problem, and Lovett directed the service secretaries to work out a general U.S. policy on infrastructure.\footnote{56}

By June a Joint Secretaries’ subcommittee working under Assistant Secretary of the Army Karl Bendetsen prepared a draft report stating that the European NATO countries should pay for all infrastructure costs, including those required for American troops, although to secure important facilities without delay the United States might have to share some of the cost. Even so, the maximum U.S. share was to be limited to its proportional use of facilities and would not include any land costs. Fearing that prolonged negotiations over payment might delay the construction of much-needed facilities, Eisenhower and SHAPE questioned the Bendetsen plan.\footnote{57} After negotiations with Eisenhower and other U.S. officials in Europe and discussions in Washington, Lovett—who felt that mainly the Europeans should pay for the program—approved a compromise position that would provide for some U.S. financing, particularly of air bases for U.S. use.\footnote{58}

Work on the second-slice program began after Eisenhower’s statement in May 1951 of SHAPE’s urgent 1951 requirements. Marshall underlined the seriousness of the situation in early September when he noted the inadequacy of European facilities to receive the additional U.S. divisions scheduled to arrive in 1951. At the September meeting in Ottawa, the North Atlantic Council supported Eisenhower’s program up to 11 new tactical airfields and 10 extensions, at a cost of approximately $221 million.\footnote{59}

The Ottawa agreement put the Europeans at a disadvantage since it not only continued to exclude consideration of host country contributions of land and existing utilities but also accepted that when NATO no longer needed the installations, the host countries might have to compensate the Alliance for the residual value and economic benefit from new facilities. At the Pentagon’s insistence, SACEUR was to have freedom in deploying his forces, and all infrastructure installations were to be built to a minimum common SHAPE standard yet to be developed.\footnote{60} If the United States needed or wanted a higher standard than the common infrastructure, it alone would pay the additional cost. Representing Lovett at Ottawa, Pace agreed that the United States, which had not contributed to the first slice, would shoulder slightly over 48 percent of the second-slice costs. Canada and the five Brussels Pact countries would pay the remainder. As finally set, the U.S. share of the common infrastructure for the second slice amounted to $106.4 million, while France and the United Kingdom bore costs of $47.6 million and $39.2 million respectively.\footnote{61}
At the time of the TCC review in late 1951, estimated NATO infrastructure requirements through 1954 amounted to $7.5 billion—$6.9 billion for SACEUR alone—and the inadequate infrastructure was acknowledged as a major impediment to the creation of a useful NATO defense force. In December SHAPE based its program for calendar year 1952 on MC 26/1 military requirements rather than the lower TCC/SCS goals and called for construction of signals installations and war headquarters and the new or further development of 140 tactical airfields. For the first time the program included airfields in north central and south central Europe, but the emphasis remained as before on France, the proposed location of one third of the new fields.

The United States accepted the proposed program, but the British and French dug in their heels, and SHAPE finally agreed to defer certain airfields and facilities. At Lisbon in February 1952 the North Atlantic Council referred consideration of the third slice to an international committee including Lovett as the U.S. representative. Patiently, Lovett led the 10 involved NATO nations to agreement on a $425.6 million program that would build 55 new tactical airfields, improve 27 more, and construct new communications facilities and war headquarters—all to be completed in 1952 or 1953. In addition, 25 new airfields and 10 airfield extensions were to be built in West Germany. Lovett approved a U.S. share of $182 million, or 42.8 percent, somewhat less than the previous year. France and the United Kingdom agreed to pay $56 million each, or slightly over 13 percent apiece, leaving 7 other NATO nations with the remaining 31 percent.

The nations did not accede readily to such large third-slice costs. Lovett and Acheson had to agree to provide $500 million in additional U.S. economic and military assistance to enable the French to sustain their NATO and other military responsibilities. To make the heavier load acceptable to the British, Lovett proposed that in FY 1953 the Defense Department buy additional British materials and supplies to ensure a dollar flow that would cover $28 million, half of Britain's infrastructure cost; with much difficulty, this was eventually done.

In the spring of 1952 the United States estimated that the cost of the fourth slice might reach $650 million, including $370 million of postponed third-slice requirements. Reviewing the SHAPE program for 1953, the JCS had doubts about its size and whether all elements qualified as common infrastructure, a view that became the U.S. position. The United States also felt that infrastructure projects in Greece and Turkey, included for the first time, should be deleted from the program and executed nationally with U.S. help. By the time the NATO annual review got under way in the fall of 1952, Defense proposed U.S. support for a $400 million program—including
SACEUR’s requirements and, for the first time, SACLANT’s—with a maximum U.S. share of 40 percent. Meanwhile, cost overruns of 33 percent in the second slice and 10 percent in the third slice had to be considered.¹⁹

At the Paris meeting in December 1952, the North Atlantic Council approved a $473 million fourth-slice program but it agreed to finance only a first increment of $230 million, of which a 40-percent U.S. share would be $92 million. Although General Ridgway, like Eisenhower earlier, insisted that the infrastructure program would have to be provided even at the expense of other programs, NATO did not plan to finance the second-stage increment of $243 million until the council’s spring 1953 meeting. Meanwhile, SHAPE estimated that further infrastructure needs in the years 1954 to 1956 would cost $700 million.²⁰

NATO’s failure in late 1952 to provide all the fourth slice struck the U.S. military establishment as an indication of Europe’s diminished sense of urgency in preparing to defend against Soviet attack. Progress in infrastructure construction was also disappointing, although in large part anticipated because of the delays in second-slice financing. By the end of December the first-slice program was complete, but the 1952 airfield program and signals projects were far behind schedule.²¹ Adding to the general difficulties, the annual review of 1952 uncovered further military problems.

NATO’s Military Status

The successful Lisbon meeting in February 1952 scarcely ended before work on the second NATO annual review began in both the Standing Group and the DoD. The Standing Group was planning to send the countries a new 1953–55 NATO program for comment, and it appeared from the start that 1953 goals could not realistically be expected to exceed those accepted at Lisbon. As Nash wrote the secretaries of the military departments and Joint Chiefs on 31 March, the Lisbon force levels for 1953 and 1954 represented the maximum they were likely to get. Privately, Nash told Foster that the goals would have to be reduced by at least 25 percent.²² Nash’s well-founded pessimism was fed by a study prepared in McNeil’s office that showed a $16-18 billion Alliance shortfall, mainly in major military equipment, that would have to be made up if the Lisbon force goals were to be met. Apparently not particularly upset by the disclosure, McNeil suggested to Lovett that the information might help him to determine the “validity and practicability of the SG force recommendations.” By late April the Standing Group had prepared firm 1953 goals for the original NATO countries plus Germany and preliminary figures for Greek and Turkish force contributions. In the process
they lowered Lisbon M-Day ground and air requirements and raised naval requirements. Still high, the new Standing Group goals, subsequently known in revised form as MRC 12, reached toward MC 26/1 goals and represented military requirements, not country capabilities.53

In full support of a balanced service approach and of using military requirements as the basis of NATO force goals, the Joint Chiefs told Lovett in May that “each Service, NATO-wide, should achieve in any given year approximately the same percentage of the over-all NATO Service requirements until 100 percent is reached by all three Services.” Greek and Turkish forces should be integrated into the MC 26/1 plan and the status of German forces clarified. In general pessimistic about attaining the Standing Group goals for 1953, the Joint Chiefs doubted that U.S. military assistance, even if it could be maintained at current levels, would be sufficient. They warned Lovett that, in accepting the force goals, the United States must make it “absolutely clear” that it was not committed to providing all the armament needed to reach NATO objectives. Nonetheless, as Nash’s office quickly suggested to Lovett, the Joint Chiefs still clearly supported the Standing Group’s infeasible goals, even though the problem would likely become worse after 1953, when maintenance and replacement requirements would add to costs.54

OSD cast about for other views. McNeil’s office, deeply involved in the costing effort, doubted that NATO countries could maintain the forces projected for 1953 and 1954. Pace and Finletter thought that strength goals should be based on country capabilities rather than military desirability and hoped that new tactical atomic weapons would eventually provide the necessary additional firepower. Kimball, on the other hand, defended the use of military requirements at this early stage in the annual review process. He doubted that atomic weapons would permit lowering conventional force requirements and believed the JCS correct in assuming that the new weapons, plus all of the planned conventional forces, would be needed just to “prevent the overrunning of a large portion of Europe in the opening phases of a war.” In June 1952 the Joint Chiefs reaffirmed that they considered the general period of 1954 to be very threatening to European security; they recommended that U.S. military assistance be extended beyond FY 1954, that Alliance efforts be increased, and that the yearly buildup toward the military requirements of the MTDP be continued.55

Meanwhile, Foster on 23 May 1952 sent Acheson the Standing Group goals and the JCS comments as the basis for an initial U.S. position. In his reply, Acheson found the force goals economically beyond reach and proposed that the force plan assume that NATO resources in FY 1953 and FY 1954 would be at least $8 billion less than the cost of the forces the JCS wanted. To do otherwise than base the U.S. position on a “militarily sound
forces plan capable of approximate achievement," could be construed as a U.S. commitment to send more military equipment, would discourage realistic planning and negotiation, and would affect the force balance. In full accord with Acheson's position, Lovett immediately instructed Bradley to inform the Standing Group that although the United States considered the group's plan militarily acceptable, it had serious reservations as to its feasibility. In early August 1952 Foster established a special ad hoc committee under Army Brig. Gen. Donald P. Booth to prepare comprehensive recommendations on NATO's 1953–55 force goals.57

By late September the Booth committee provided Lovett with a Defense proposal for the initial U.S. position on the 1952 NATO annual review. It recommended 1953 ground and air goals generally lower than either the provisional Lisbon goals for 1953 or the Standing Group goals.58

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<th>Table 18</th>
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<td>End CY 1953 NATO Strength Goals Compared</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions (M–Day)</th>
<th>Lisbon</th>
<th>MRC–12</th>
<th>Booth Cte</th>
<th>Country Replies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Without Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>36½</td>
<td>37½</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57½</td>
<td>39½</td>
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<tr>
<td>Divisions (M + 30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>72½</td>
<td>65½</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>With Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>98½</td>
<td>84½</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Combat Vessels (M–Day)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Without Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Combat Vessels (M + 180)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Without Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>747</td>
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<tr>
<td>With Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>760</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft (M–Day)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>7,005</td>
<td>6,373</td>
<td>5,454</td>
<td>5,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>6,777</td>
<td>5,747</td>
<td>6,151</td>
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Looking two years ahead, to the end of 1955, and guided by the Defense view that atomic development allowed "no material change at this time in force requirements," the Booth committee recommended that NATO achieve 62½ divisions, 411 major combat ships, and 9,350 aircraft for M–Day.* Although Booth himself considered the 1955 goals probably higher than NATO could attain, the committee did not think its figures were really

* These figures included 8 German, 10½ Greek, and 13 Turkish divisions; and 878 German, 200 Greek, and 354 Turkish aircraft. Ships were not shown by nationality.
increasing NATO strength

"militarily safe goals"; rather, they were an "approximation of the most effective balanced collective strength" achievable within the NATO countries' economic limitations and without increases in U.S. aid. The Booth goals were dictated chiefly by economic considerations and "balanced by the pattern of MC 26/1."59 The service secretaries accepted the Booth committee goals. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were less enthusiastic, and even though they approved the report's policy guidance and force goals, they strongly endorsed the committee's recommendation for a reappraisal in 1953. Recommending the report to Acheson in mid-October, Lovett made it clear that the question of military balance should be included in the 1953 reappraisal. With Acheson's concurrence, the Booth committee report became the initial U.S. negotiating position for the 1952 annual review.60

After submitting his report in Washington, Booth led a sizable Defense team to Paris to work as part of a task force under Ambassador Draper. The Military Representatives Committee had already approved the Standing Group goals and forwarded them as MRC 12 to the North Atlantic Council. Draper's task force argued for the U.S. goals, analyzed country submissions, and helped prepare a NATO position.61 But the initiative and drive of the previous year could not be recaptured. As reported by a U.S. representative, "the difference from TCC in personnel, institutional arrangements, attitudes and atmosphere is as night from day."62 The French wanted detailed information about U.S. force strengths and military expenditures and favored pooling all NATO productive and financial resources under a central authority. The Americans realized the French plan would have to be approved by the president and Congress and considered it a French bargaining position, but it provoked them.63 The British argued that ultimately the development of new atomic weapons and tactical techniques would reduce requirements for conventional forces and justify a slower pace of rearmament.64

In Washington, Pace and Finletter and some members of Congress shared the British view on new weapons to a degree. * The Joint Chiefs did not feel that conventional forces could be safely reduced in the next several years; the Research and Development Board and Ridgway agreed, at least through 1954. Meeting informally with North Atlantic Council members in September 1952, General Bradley tried to dispel their "wishful thinking" about new weapons.65

Securing NATO agreement on firm force levels for FY 1953 and provisional goals for FY 1954 was an uphill battle. Draper and his colleagues found growing resentment of U.S. insistence on setting firm NATO goals for 1953. In late 1952 many Alliance members felt that the Soviet threat was abating, and

* See Chapter XXII.
they disliked American pressures for additional and possibly unnecessary military expenses. Defense representatives in Paris perceived the Europeans as viewing the United States as militaristic, "preparing more to win a war against the USSR than to prevent a war." In the face of this growing opposition, the Americans first lowered and then decided not to present the Booth goals as the U.S. position. Ridgway recommended that NATO utilize its resources to improve existing units, strengthen support forces, and increase logistic support rather than create new units lacking adequate backing. Unable to reach agreement, the Paris council endorsed the Ridgway concept and extended its annual review into the spring. As a result there were therefore no approved NATO force goals for 1953 when the Truman administration left office.66

One reason for the Paris conferees' coolness toward new 1953 goals was their belief that the 1952 goals set at Lisbon had been nearly met. The 1952 M-Day goal of 25 divisions had been achieved. For M + 30, however, the force fell short of the goal of 51 1/2 divisions by about 10 percent because of deficiencies in personnel, training, equipment, and support. M + 180 naval forces, although adequate in number, had some imbalance in types and a serious shortage of minesweepers. Of the Lisbon goal of 4,067 aircraft by the end of 1952, only 3,273 were available, and of these only 2,072 met MRC 12 standards. In U.S. eyes, NATO still lacked a modern air force, needed more ground divisions, and fell short in certain classes of naval vessels. Ridgway pointed out to the council the extent of the force deficiencies and asked that his remarks be made public. Not receiving permission, he first appealed to Lovett and then solved the problem by incorporating the information in an address that was made public.67

To a large extent, the positions on NATO adequacy reflected different attitudes about Soviet intentions, with Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs more pessimistic than the Europeans. Despite the larger forces in being at the end of 1952, American optimism had moderated by the end of the Truman administration. With many Alliance members apparently unable or unwilling to create the forces the United States considered necessary for an adequate defense, Lovett and Acheson saw the inclusion of German troops in NATO as the best hope left.68

The German Contribution

Efforts to devise an arrangement that would bring West Germany into the NATO defense orbit had been under way since the NATO meeting in December 1950. The "Brussels formula" adopted then involved three steps—discussion
of the military aspects of a German contribution between the Allied High Commissioners in Germany and West German government representatives; French-initiated talks on the creation of a European army through which German units might be brought into NATO; and examination by the occupying powers and West Germans of a new contractual relationship to replace the occupation. Although these steps were to be approached simultaneously and separately, they were so linked that a favorable outcome depended on the successful conclusion of each.

In January 1951, when talks began with the West Germans in Bonn, the Allies had already made clear that they wanted German forces placed within a NATO structure, limited in size to 20 percent of Alliance forces, and with German air units directly under SACEUR. In Washington, both Defense and State hoped for a West German contribution of almost 200,000 men, formed into 12 regimental combat teams by the end of 1951; the Joint Chiefs wanted 30 regimental combat teams by the end of 1952. Marshall felt that West German forces were "militarily, politically and psychologically essential" to a NATO defense of West German territory.

The Germans seemed less than anxious to create a large military force with its attendant expenses and dangers without political compensations. The discussions started to move only after Eisenhower publicly stated in early February that German participation was not essential to NATO's military progress. But by May the Bonn military talks stalled. Burns advised Marshall to obtain Eisenhower's views on whether he wished to participate in military discussions on German rearmament. Writing Eisenhower on 7 May, Marshall said that the complex political aspects of the matter should not be allowed to delay prompt development of a German military program.

Eisenhower concurred with Marshall, but he thought military decisions, such as the initial size of German military units and their level of integration into NATO, so inseparable from political factors that he "should not voice an opinion at this time" and asked to be informed about JCS views. As a result, Marshall pushed ahead in early June, when the so-called Bonn report (sometimes called the Petersberg report) of the Allied High Commissioners on the German military proposals was ready. Approving JCS procedures for handling the report, Lovett directed Burns's office to prepare a military assistance program for Germany and informed Acheson of Defense plans to get an answer from the occupying powers by early August. No matter how delicate French sensibilities might be, Lovett wanted to avoid any delays in going ahead with German rearmament.

The Bonn report confirmed the controversial nature of the German position. Accepting many of the safeguards spelled out at Brussels, the Germans rejected the regimental combat team concept as militarily inefficient
and wanted immediate 10,000-man divisional units. They considered the Allied prohibition on heavy armored units inequitable and wanted to create armored divisions, which they deemed the most efficient. They demanded their own defense ministry, civilian in character, under the control of the Bundestag, to administer their military effort. In general, they rejected any Allied control that did not apply to all NATO forces equally. With these caveats, the Germans offered a force of 100,000 men for 1951 and 250,000 men by the end of 1952, providing for 12 armored divisions, 20 air wings, and 242 light naval vessels and small submarines. The High Commissioners estimated that the initial nonrecurrent cost of German rearmament would be $4.76 billion, plus $0.53 billion as an annual recurring cost, with the Germans able to contribute about $1.43 billion annually.

The Pentagon took a favorable and even enthusiastic position on the Bonn report. Both the Joint Chiefs and OSD wanted the German military contribution immediately, whatever the final political decision on a European army. Beebe advised Burns and Marshall against letting the French concept of a European army block any "practical" German program. Keenly aware of the powerful pressures within Defense to achieve German rearmament without delay, Marshall had supported that position; he still favored it.

In State, however, feelings were mixed. The French-sponsored conference on a European army had begun its Paris sessions on 15 February 1951, with five nations participating: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The Netherlands eventually decided to join with these countries in forming a European defense force. The other NATO countries, including the United States, sent observers to the conference but did not become part of the European army. With the Paris conferees showing some agreement by June 1951, the French did not want the German military proposals reviewed before the successful conclusion of their own conference.

McCloy, who returned to Washington for discussions in early June convinced that the Germans would make no military contribution until they received substantial military and political equality, urged Defense and State to reach agreement on the timing of German rearmament. He supported the European army as a means of bringing German forces into NATO. Ambassador Bruce wrote Beebe that the French and Germans were currently showing a "cooperative spirit" and that there was a "distinct possibility of being able to 'marry' the best features of the two reports." Beebe saw to it that both Marshall and Lovett read Bruce's letter.

Despite the reactions of McCloy and Bruce and clear hints from State that the United States might have to change its position on the European army concept, the Pentagon remained firmly opposed to delaying German rearmament until the French could set up a European army. When review of the Bonn
Increasing NATO Strength

report was postponed at least until receipt of a report from Paris, Beebe suggested to Lovett on 21 June that Marshall ought to take the position that the United States favored the European army in principle but that its creation should be postponed until a less critical time. When McCloy repeated that the French would "come around" if the European army were accepted and insisted that this was the only way to make progress toward a German contribution, Defense officials were not impressed. Lovett informed the Joint Chiefs the next day that the United States should "prevent any delay on the Bonn Report because of the European Army discussions." Marshall stood firm even after Eisenhower early in July responded affirmatively to the idea of a European army primarily as a training and administrative organization rather than a field army and suggested calling it the "European Defense Forces." Although Marshall viewed West German rearmament within NATO as an immediate need and the French-sponsored European army as at best a long-range objective, Defense had to yield to political realities. At a State–Defense meeting on 16 July, Acheson stressed the necessity of giving strong U.S. support to the European defense force concept in order to get French backing for the start of West German rearmament and training. He thought the whole matter could be solved in 60 days if "all NATO members would buckle down." Marshall raised the question of European willingness to make "real sacrifices," and suggested that Acheson present his ideas in writing to the president and the NSC.

In a memorandum for the president, Acheson proposed that the United States support the European army provided that it was part of Europe's common defense and appropriately related to NATO, responded to SACEUR's military needs, and would not delay a German military contribution. He recommended that Germany, with a new, enhanced status and as a key contributor to Western defense, should be admitted to full NATO membership. The provisions for Germany's immediate rearmament and membership in NATO encouraged Defense to accept the new policy. On 30 July, after Eisenhower had agreed, Lovett and Acheson signed the memorandum. The National Security Council adopted the paper as policy (NSC 115), and the president approved it on 2 August. That month Lovett designated Nash and Karl Bendetsen to represent Defense in consultations with State on the German question and later assigned additional staff.

The third aspect of the negotiations concerned a change in the West German contractual relationship which would bring the Allied occupation to an end. After the December 1950 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, the Allied High Commissioners and West German government representatives held exploratory meetings in Bonn. By 9 August 1951 the Allied High Commission had ready an early report reviewing German atti-
tudes, the major Allied and Allied–German disagreements, and recommendations for new arrangements. Meeting in Washington in September, the French, British, and U.S. foreign ministers agreed to negotiate understandings with the West Germans for inclusion of a “democratic Germany, on a basis of equality, in a Continental European Community, which itself will form a part of a constantly developing Atlantic Community.” By late September the decisions made by the foreign ministers at their Washington meeting had been presented to Chancellor Adenauer along with a proposal for negotiations to follow. 84

Changing the German contractual relationship involved many prickly issues. For example, Adenauer wanted a West German security guarantee within the basic contractual agreement, an arrangement the Joint Chiefs feared might later bind the United States in undesirable ways. They preferred a separate affirmation of the September 1950 tripartite declaration that the Allies would treat any attack on West Germany or Berlin as an attack upon themselves. Acheson accepted the Defense formula but could not resist pointing out the JCS inconsistency in simultaneously supporting German membership in NATO with its formal security guarantee. 85 The president resolved another problem on 19 October 1951 when he signed a joint congressional resolution terminating the state of war between Germany and the United States. France and the United Kingdom had already done this, and 26 other nations followed suit in 1951. By the end of October, the stage was fast being set for a German settlement. 86

By mid-November, the Allied High Commission for Germany had a new report and draft of a general contractual agreement ready for meetings of the French, British, and U.S. foreign ministers in Paris. After meeting alone on 21 November, the three ministers the next day welcomed German Chancellor Adenauer, the first time since the start of World War II that the Allies had met with a German minister on terms of equality. The four men approved the draft agreement, subject to final confirmation by their governments. It was to be signed and published only after agreement on a German military contribution to NATO through a European force and completion of separate conventions governing subordinate contractual issues. 87 This entailed considerable work, for it involved such technical yet emotional matters as the status of Allied forces left in Germany after the occupation ended, German logistical and financial support for those forces and any future European defense force, and the continuation of security safeguards against a possible revival of German militarism. 88

The Pentagon held strong opinions in direct conflict with French views on prohibiting German manufacture of munitions. With the NATO countries unable to meet all of their munitions requirements, the Joint Chiefs favored making the maximum practicable use of German industry, and Lovett
concurred. Acheson sympathized with the Pentagon position, but he and Lovett discovered in November at the NATO meeting in Rome that agreement on the issue would be difficult. The French wanted specific prohibition of German manufacture of heavy weapons and suggested reexamination of the matter only after the European Defense Community (EDC)—the name given to the European army concept—came into existence. Eventually, the Germans indicated that they neither wanted nor expected to produce such weapons; in January 1952 McCloy thought the matter had become academic.

Meanwhile, the Paris negotiations on the European Defense Community proceeded slowly. The Joint Chiefs complained that an interim report produced in July failed to provide a "sufficient basis . . . for the raising of German contingents at the earliest possible date." Since Eisenhower's direct liaison with the Paris conferees had helped to keep the negotiations moving, both Lovett and the Joint Chiefs wanted him to develop a plan that would "insure an immediate German contribution." The foreign ministers meeting in Washington in September reaffirmed support of the major powers for a European Defense Community, and Adenauer backed the concept when he met with the Allied ministers in Paris on 22 November. At the NATO meeting in Rome beginning on 24 November, the Benelux ministers showed alarm over the direction taken by proposed arrangements for EDC, fearing French or German domination of such an institution. They preferred to work through NATO, believed that formation of EDC would lessen U.S. interest in Europe, and worried that financing the organization through a central budget could create trouble for them. On 26 November Lovett agreed with Acheson and other U.S. representatives that the United States must know by 15 January 1952 whether EDC could be successfully organized. The council requested that NATO and EDC agencies prepare to correlate their respective obligations and relationships.

Work on the EDC treaty progressed in January 1952 as the larger NATO nations tried to reassure the Benelux countries and urged the six EDC nations to reach agreement. But all the while the small countries still feared big-power dominance, the French continued to worry about a renewal of German strength, and German public opinion wavered despite Adenauer's vigorous support of EDC. In approving the European army concept by a 56-percent majority vote on 8 February, the Bundestag demanded the end of all discrimination against Germany. In Paris eight days later the French National Assembly gave EDC a 53-percent endorsement but stipulated the maintenance of restrictions and limitations on Germany, the retention of British and American military forces in Europe, and an Anglo-American guarantee against German secession from the EDC force. With the diplomatic situation touchy, Lovett again sent Nash to represent him during meetings of the foreign
ministers in London in February. There was little progress until Adenauer joined the group.96

The German chancellor accepted a proposal that the NATO and EDC councils should meet and consult jointly. Not yet ready to discuss costs, he acquiesced to publication of the TCC figure of DM11.25 billion* as Germany’s initial yearly contribution to European defense. He agreed also that Germany should not produce certain war materials and suggested including Germany as part of an EDC forward zone in which such materials would not be produced for strategic reasons—a move that would avoid any obvious discrimination against Germany. Eventually the Allies and Germans agreed that annexes to the EDC treaty would prohibit German production of certain heavy equipment, such as complete aircraft or even certain components. As for atomic weapons, Adenauer promised, in a separate letter signed on 27 May as part of the final agreement, that the Federal Republic of Germany would legislate against the “development, production and possession of atomic weapons.” No restrictions on German munitions manufacture, therefore, appeared in the contractual agreements.97

Victory, Defeat, and Resurrection

At the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon in February 1952 the member countries showed a spirit of resoluteness that gave Lovett and Acheson hope of early success in getting German troops into NATO. After the council on 22 February adopted a resolution approving the establishment of EDC and recommended making NATO and EDC arrangements reciprocal, final approval of EDC seemed near. In March, however, the Soviet Union opened a new drive for a German peace treaty based on reunification, neutralization, and limited rearmament—an approach that appealed to many French and Germans. The Allies answered by demanding all-German elections and the formation of an all-German government as prerequisites to negotiations, but by April it was unclear whether the EDC treaty and the contractuals could be kept linked together. Faced with the possibility that the Germans might demand going ahead with the contractuals if the EDC treaty was “hopelessly bogged down,” Acheson wanted to set 9 May as the deadline date for signing both sets of treaties; this would barely allow enough time for Congress to consider the treaties before it adjourned in July.98

* This figure included DM6.8 billion for the costs of Allied forces, DM1.0 billion for Berlin, policy, etc., and DM5.45 billion for West German military forces. In U.S. money, DM11.25 billion equaled approximately $2.7 billion per year.
Lovett saw eye-to-eye with State on the necessity to conclude the negotiations, but he had to face questions about dividing the revised first-year German defense contribution—DM10.2 billion (about $2.45 billion)—between EDC and the Allied forces remaining in Germany. Defense officials assumed that, of the total amount, about two-thirds would go for Allied costs, and the rest for U.S. costs. Bendetsen and McNeil, particularly, were determined that the Germans should pay the actual cost of U.S. expenses, and in May Lovett sent them, as well as Nash, to Europe to help negotiate. After discussions between the Defense contingent and State Department negotiators, the Americans proposed allowing DM5.8 billion for EDC-related expenses, including construction costs, and DM4.4 billion for Allied costs, including a U.S. share of only DM2.2 billion—a total of about DM12.4 billion. 99

Anxious to conclude the negotiations, Acheson did not want to haggle over a U.S. share that he believed would be adequate, and he thought the Germans should not be asked to pay more than the Lisbon figure. Nonetheless, the foreign ministers, meeting on 24 May, failed to agree. Then on 25 May the Soviets sent a threatening note to the Federal Republic of Germany that rallied the Germans to Adenauer's support. That same day, as Nash soon reported, he settled the German defense contribution, with its U.S. share, completely satisfactorily. 100

After the ministers found a way to guarantee the French against German secession from the European defense force, the negotiations concluded successfully on 25 May. The parties signed the contractuals, including dozens of documents, in Bonn on 26 May. Except for a limited range of rights reserved to the Allies in Berlin and West Germany, including the stationing of forces and certain emergency powers, West Germany received a status of equality. Moving to Paris, the representatives of the six EDC negotiating nations signed the 19 documents involved in the EDC treaty on 27 May. This agreement, in which the United States did not participate, provided for the common political institutions, armed forces, and budget that the French wanted. It allowed the Germans to organize modified divisions with a wartime strength of approximately 15,000 men and accepted the corps, consisting of 3 to 4 such divisions, as the level of national integration. Finally, the United States joined the other nations in signing a protocol extending NATO defense commitments to the European Defense Community, thus giving Germany a security guarantee without making that country a member of NATO. 101

With the signing of the EDC documents Acheson thought he saw the "beginning of the realization of an ancient dream—the unity of the free peoples of Western Europe." To Lovett and other Pentagon officials it seemed that NATO would at long last get the 12 German divisions necessary to provide
a margin of safety against a Soviet attack on Europe. The only step left was ratification of the various agreements. The U.S. Senate on 1 July approved the German contractuals and the NATO protocol and ratification followed. U.S. hopes for quick ratification of the contractuals by the other states rose when the British approved them on 1 August, but the French and Germans still had to act. Washington also hoped that the six EDC nations would ratify the treaty promptly. On 10 August, when these nations formally inaugurated the European Coal and Steel Community in Luxembourg, ratification appeared in sight. 102

While work continued in Europe on steps to implement the political and military institutions created by the EDC treaty, Lovett pushed ahead in Washington to speed the formation of West German divisions as soon as the ratifications occurred. As an occupied territory, Germany had been ineligible to receive military assistance on any basis, but the United States had begun an emergency German stockpile program in FY 1951. About $462 million was programmed and supply action amounting to $435 million was initiated by mid-1952, but the program's priority was low and less than $50,000 worth of equipment had actually been shipped to U.S. storage in Europe. 105 In May 1952 Lovett asked for JCS recommendations for organizing military assistance in West Germany, and planning for this continued throughout the summer and fall. 104 After the Germans became eligible for reimbursable military assistance on 18 July the Joint Chiefs recommended they be declared eligible for grant military assistance. But French and German failure to ratify the contractuals delayed matters, and the United States meanwhile allotted more money to the stockpile. 105

The failure of the Germans and French to ratify the agreements in a timely fashion generally nullified OSD's advance preparations. Fearful of a Soviet attack and distressed over the continued division of their country, the Germans debated the value of the treaties. In the Bundestag both treaties on 6 December fell 40 votes short of the two-thirds necessary for ratification. The Germans finally ratified the contractuals in March 1953, but they did not act favorably on the EDC treaty until 1954. In France, the fear of German rearmament seemed to outweigh all other considerations. The French parliament first deferred debating the German contractuals and the EDC treaty until after the Germans approved; then the political opposition, led by former Premier Edouard Herriot, precipitated the French equivalent of the U.S. "great debate." Finally in late August 1954, with the EDC treaty already ratified by four of the six signers and receiving favorable consideration in Italy, the French National Assembly rejected both the contractuals and the EDC treaty. 106

* The Schuman plan had been ratified in December 1951.
The French defeat of its own EDC proposal created a crisis in European relations that led to a nine-power conference during the early autumn of 1954, at which the six EDC treaty signers, joined by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, considered how to proceed. At a subsequent four-power conference in October 1954, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States adopted and signed a protocol ending the occupation in West Germany. On 23 October the Federal Republic of Germany received an invitation to join NATO. In November the United States initiated discussions with the Germans and offered to supply grant military aid on a basis comparable to that given other European nations, with deliveries to follow the usual signing of a bilateral agreement and the German accession to NATO. At this time the stockpile begun in 1951 held some $453 million in equipment, thus assuring the possibility of rapid deliveries. On 9 May 1955 Germany formally joined NATO, and in December 1955 it ratified the bilateral agreement with the United States. Almost three years had passed since the Truman administration had left office.

In September 1950 Acheson had pointed out to the Europeans the "absolutely unprecedented" peacetime steps the United States was prepared to take—"to place substantial forces in Europe, to put these forces into an integrated force for the defense of Europe, to agree to a command structure, to agree to a supreme commander, to join in a program for integrating European production." In the view of the Defense Department, all these steps were worthwhile if they led to a German contribution to NATO. Yet when Lovett stepped down as secretary of defense in January 1953, he realized that the 12 German divisions for NATO were still a distant goal. The delay must have seemed utterly frustrating to the man who, with Marshall and others, had worked so hard in Defense to devise a response to the larger threat they perceived in the Korean attack.

Some students of NATO and European affairs have not found the three-year delay in German entry into NATO or the death of the EDC idea altogether negative. Since Europe was not attacked during the interim, the delay at least allowed time for the NATO countries to come to terms with the idea of Germany's rearmament. Concerning the EDC concept, one scholar has suggested that "without the earnest of European cooperation provided by the French, a reinvigorated American isolationism might have fulfilled the Allies' worst fears about U.S. intentions toward Europe." In destroying the EDC idea, the French may indeed have dismissed a system difficult to implement, duplicative and expensive to operate, and potentially disruptive to the NATO

* The Western Union powers also agreed to amend the 1948 five-power Brussels treaty and to create under it a seven-nation Western European Union that would include Italy and West Germany.
Alliance. The French denial of the plan has also been seen as having forced the United States to retain its troops in Europe, thus helping to sustain that “complete revolution in American policy” forged during the Truman years. Yet others complain that the long stationing of U.S. forces overseas had major disadvantages and led to continuing friction within the Alliance. Still, it is reasonable to assume that the many years of peace enjoyed by Europe since 1950 owe a great deal to the security arrangements that Marshall and Lovett did so much to help create.
CHAPTER XIX

Organization for Military Assistance

The rearmament of Western Europe and fulfillment of NATO force programs rested on the vital bedrock of U.S. military assistance. As Secretary Johnson told Congress in support of the original program, "to the two great measures of our dynamic foreign policy—the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty—we must now add the essential military aid to meet the grave deficiencies in the equipment with which they [our allies] are attempting to guard the boundaries of the North Atlantic community." Not only did military assistance represent the "best possible way to increase the security of the United States," he maintained, but it "would have been essential to our military security even if there had been no pact." Outside of Europe, other countries needed assistance so that they could, in the words of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, "participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense."¹

The 1949 act included NATO Europe in Title I; Greece and Turkey in Title II; and Iran, South Korea, the Philippines, and the "general area" of China in Title III. Although Congress provided for both reimbursable and grant aid, the law placed such restrictions on the former that, in fact, most military assistance was grant aid.¹ The act also set certain preconditions for U.S. military aid. Each recipient country had to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States; in the case of the NATO countries, a NATO defense plan also had to be approved by the United States before most of the Title I funds could be released. These requirements made it certain that State and Defense would have central roles in administering the program. Because military assistance also affected U.S. economic assistance in important ways, the Economic

* These restrictions were later liberalized. Reimbursable aid was handled in the same way as grant aid except that the United States received payment.

395
Cooperation Administration (ECA) became a third party to the program. A far-flung program, new to the U.S. peacetime experience and due for vast expansion soon after the start of the Korean War, military assistance involved extremely complex problems of coordination and greatly increased the responsibilities of the secretary of defense.\(^2\)

**Administration in June 1950**

In June 1950 the military assistance program operated under Truman's Executive Order 10099 (27 January 1950), which delegated to the secretary of state most of the power given to the president under the 1949 act, including final authority to approve country programs and to allocate appropriated funds. The order directed the secretary of state to "advise and consult" with the ECA administrator and the secretary of defense. Acheson conferred most of his derived powers on a special assistant, Director of Mutual Defense Assistance James Bruce, who occupied the highest of four positions authorized by the 1949 act. John H. Ohly served as deputy director, also a statutory position, and as acting director after Bruce resigned shortly before the start of the Korean War. Ohly, as a special assistant to the secretary of defense from 1947 to 1949, had overseen the development and presentation of the Pentagon's first military assistance program. Keenly alert to the new program's far-reaching impact on foreign, military, and economic affairs, he remained a key figure in the foreign assistance field throughout the Korean War years and for a number of years after.\(^5\)

The two additional statutory positions established in the act were in the ECA and the Department of Defense, the latter position held by James H. Burns, Secretary Johnson's assistant for foreign military affairs and military assistance. To him reported Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who as first OSD director of military assistance had worked under Ohly to develop the original military assistance program. An outstanding Army officer with wide experience in Europe during World War II, Lemnitzer later became Army chief of staff, JCS chairman, and NATO SACEUR. Lemnitzer's close and harmonious relations with Burns and Ohly proved of great advantage when it became necessary to speed up military assistance. When Lemnitzer left Washington in the fall of 1950 for a command in Korea, he was replaced first by Maj. Gen. Stanley L. Scott, an Army combat commander, and somewhat later by Maj. Gen. George H. Olmsted. In the summer of 1951 Frank C. Nash replaced Burns.\(^4\)

Defense, State, and ECA used two interdepartmental committees to recommend policies, provide operational direction and coordination, and adjust interagency differences in the military assistance program. A Foreign
Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC), with representatives from the three agencies, operated through working groups that prepared papers for its consideration. Chaired by the State Department representative, usually Ohly, the FMACC met weekly or oftener to try to resolve issues collectively. Unresolved differences were supposed to go to a Cabinet-level steering committee composed of the secretaries of state and defense and the ECA administrator, but it apparently never met.  

Within each country receiving military assistance the organization for administering the program mirrored the tri-agency arrangement in Washington. Representing the State Department, the U.S. ambassador directed the implementation and coordination of the program. Generally, the ambassador delegated these functions to a full-time special assistant for military assistance, usually a career foreign service officer. The ECA chief of mission advised the ambassador about the effect of military assistance on the country’s internal economic condition and its U.S. economic aid program. A Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) * represented the Department of Defense on the embassy staff. The senior military officer, usually a general officer of considerable experience, served as the adviser to the ambassador on military assistance matters. Together or with their staffs, the ambassador, the ECA mission chief, and the MAAG head were commonly referred to as the “country team.”  

The advent of the MAAGs, their continually increasing size, and the difficulties of administering a new program frequently created problems within the various embassies. Often large in relation to the regular embassy staff, the MAAGs by October 1950 included more than 1,300 military and civilian personnel in the European NATO countries plus Greece and Turkey, and housekeeping arrangements were no minor problem. The privacy of military communications versus the right of ambassadors to see all messages became a sensitive issue. Conflicts resulted, since the ambassadors’ special assistants were sometimes high-handed in dealing with senior MAAG officers, and experienced general officers seldom cared to work with special assistants who might be well qualified but lacked the authority to make immediate decisions. Such tension often had repercussions in Washington, where both Lemnitzer and Ohly “spent a great deal of time worrying about” effective management of the country-level organizations.  

Regional coordination of military assistance programs in NATO Europe came through the European Coordinating Committee (ECC), which consisted in June 1950 of Lewis Douglas, the U.S. ambassador to the Court of St. James’s, who served as chairman; W. Averell Harriman, the ECA special representative

* In some areas, U.S. military groups with a different title already functioning for training or for earlier aid programs carried out the military assistance program.
CHART 6
ORGANIZATION FOR THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
JUNE 1950

THE PRESIDENT

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF STATE
ECA ADMINISTRATOR

FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE STEERING COMMITTEE – FMASC

FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE – FMACC

EUROPEAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE – ECC

DEFENSE Overseas Representatives for MDAP in Europe The Ambassador to the U.K.*
SECRETARY OF STATE
ECA Special Representative in Europe

DIRECTOR, Office of Military Assistance
DIRECTOR, Mutual Defense Assistance
ECA Director, Program Relations

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
European Coordinating Committee

U.S. AMBASSADORS TO:
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP (MAAG)

EMBASSY STAFF
ECA COUNTRY MISSION

EXISTING MILITARY MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADORS TO:
Greece, Iran, Philippines, Turkey, Korea

ECA MISSION WHERE ESTABLISHED

WASHINGTON LEVEL

EUROPEAN REGIONAL LEVEL

COUNTRY LEVEL

*Committee Chairman
–MDAP Policy and Program Control
Defense and ECA have separate lines of command and administrative control for their own separate responsibilities which are not shown on this chart.
in Europe (succeeded on 28 June by Milton Katz) located in Paris; and General
Thomas T. Handy, Commander in Chief, United States European Command
(CINCEUR), with headquarters in Heidelberg, who had been designated the
military representative for military assistance in Europe (MILREP). The three
men met as necessary in London, where a small executive directorate under
Col. Charles H. Bonesteel carried out the ECC’s day-to-day functions.8

As CINCEUR Handy headed what was nominally a JCS unified command
but which in June 1950 consisted essentially of U.S. Army forces. He was also
the senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representatives, Europe—an
agency composed of the three commanders in chief of the U.S. Army, Navy,
and (after 20 November 1950) Air Force commands in Europe—which served
as the U.S. element in NATO defense planning. In military assistance matters,
Handy reported to the JCS for certain particulars, including all MAAG
activities, and to the secretary of defense for all other operations and
activities. He discharged his MILREP responsibilities mainly through the Joint
American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG), located in London under Maj.
Gen. A. Franklin Kibler. JAMAG provided staff support for U.S. participants
involved in NATO military planning and U.S. military assistance and directed
the day-to-day functioning of the latter program in Western Europe.9

The June 1950 organization for administering mutual defense assistance
thus consisted of a trio of U.S. agencies—State, Defense, and ECA—operating
under a complicated system for joint coordination at each of three levels—in
Washington, the recipient countries, and Europe as a region. Despite the
complexity of the system, it possessed a practicality that may be readily
grasped from a brief review of the process. The first step in creating a military
assistance program for a NATO country was to ascertain its military deficien­
cies in meeting NATO requirements; this involved cooperation between
national representatives and the U.S. country team to produce an agreed
deficiency list. This list went forward for regional level review to JAMAG,
which, with the help of the MAAGs and U.S. elements in NATO, checked it for
conformity to NATO plans and U.S. guidelines and the possibility of inter­
country help. The pruned but still tentative list then went to Washington,
where the services reviewed and priced it. Subsequently, Defense, FMACC,
and the Bureau of the Budget further reviewed and perhaps cut it. After the
president approved the program, he included it in a military assistance budget
for congressional consideration.10

Although the United States expected to fill most military assistance
requirements by sending U.S.-produced items, some items could be better
produced in Europe with U.S. help. The 1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Act

* Outside of the NATO area few countries possessed the capacity to produce sophisticated
weapons, and U.S. equipment was provided.
provided for such aid through an "additional military production" (AMP) feature, under which certain essential items such as machine tools could be sent to Europe. Never large, the AMP program increasingly gave way to other procedures during the Korean War period. In any case, once AMP aid was approved, the responsibility for carrying out such projects normally rested with the ECA.\textsuperscript{11}

Within Defense, the military services were the operating agents for military assistance, but the secretary of defense and his office directly oversaw the Pentagon's implementation of the program. Given an approved program and appropriated funds, the services provided the necessary equipment either by initiating orders for new production or by sending already available service stocks. Most early deliveries were of readily available, used items that the services determined to be either "excess" or "reserve." The latter, considered part of the services' mobilization reserves, had to be replaced with new equipment bought with military assistance funds, but items excess to the reserve requirement could be sent without charging military assistance funds except for the cost of repairs, modifications, and transportation. The 1949 law limited this practice to a total of $450 million in terms of the original gross cost, but Congress increased this to $1 billion by late 1951.\textsuperscript{12}

As Lemnitzer recalled, the services saw military assistance as a way to modernize their own equipment stocks and, with implicit congressional consent, charged the MDAP program high prices for reserve items and repairs to excess equipment. After these abuses became obvious, the secretary of defense set a pricing formula that limited the charges. As the Korean War progressed, used equipment became less available for military assistance, and the services had to purchase new items. They did not set up a separate channel for purchase of military assistance items but integrated them with regular military procurement.\textsuperscript{13}

**Organizational Changes**

By the start of the Korean War small quantities of equipment had actually been delivered and training programs had begun, but the military assistance program proceeded with only a moderate sense of urgency, and the adequacy of the organizational structure was unclear. State saw a need for greater centralization and executive strength, particularly in Europe, which had a special need for intercountry coordination and stronger support of U.S. representatives in NATO. Because European countries feared that enlarging their military forces would drain off the economic resources needed to house, feed, and clothe their populations, Washington wanted to coordinate military
assistance and the economic aid program to avoid harming national economies during the quickened NATO military buildup after the start of the Korean War. The likelihood of expanded future military assistance programs, in Europe and elsewhere, also made it desirable to strengthen the FMACC in Washington.

After June 1950 a growing number of officials and agencies evinced interest in foreign assistance matters, chief among them Harriman, who had returned from Europe to become the president’s special assistant. The Treasury Department also desired formal inclusion in the FMACC process. Congress soon increased military assistance funds fourfold, and policy and operational problems multiplied. Overworked FMACC staff members became “utterly fatigued.”

While concerned officials discussed the organizational problem, Truman in late September asked Budget Director Frederick Lawton to examine the situation. After two months of studies by a number of agencies, Lovett concurred in a revised organization subject to JCS concerns that nothing should infringe on their own or others’ statutory duties. On 19 December Lawton sent the president a memorandum of understanding signed by Defense, State, ECA, and Treasury, and Truman approved it the same day. The memorandum provided that the director of mutual defense assistance in State should be replaced by a much strengthened director for international security affairs, who would speak for the department and its secretary on NATO as well as military assistance matters and take the lead in interdepartmental coordination. Thomas D. Cabot, a Boston banker and insurance executive, filled the new position; Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston lawyer who later joined Lovett’s staff, was named deputy director. In the Pentagon, Secretary Marshall on 11 January 1951 appointed Burns his assistant for international security affairs and established under him a new Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs headed by Air Force Col. Royden E. Beebe, Jr.

The memorandum of understanding replaced FMACC with a Committee on International Security Affairs (ISAC), consisting of senior staff representatives and responsible for both mutual defense assistance and NATO matters. Cabot chaired ISAC, which included General Burns and representatives of Harriman, the ECA, and Treasury. In general, the reorganization left the existing machinery and responsibilities for management and coordination of military assistance matters unchanged. DoD retained primary responsibility for “determining the military character of international programs, for developing and implementing the end item and military training programs and for developing U.S. determinations as to military requirements in the formulation

* See Chapter XX.
of programs for military production abroad.音乐 Cabot, as the State Department representative, retained authority for final approval of military assistance programs and the allocation of military assistance funds.17

While the Washington reorganization proceeded during the winter of 1950–51, regional coordination in Europe also came under review. The essence of the ECC organization was the State–ECA–Defense triad of Ambassador Douglas, Ambassador Katz, and General Handy, meeting in London. Beginning in the summer of 1950 the role in military assistance matters of Ambassador Charles M. Spofford, the deputy U.S. representative to the North Atlantic Council, became an issue between DoD and State.

The terms of reference originally proposed for Spofford in July 1950 recommended that he serve as U.S. representative for mutual defense assistance in Europe and that the ECC executive directorate become part of his permanent staff. Because Spofford was Acheson's deputy in NATO, some Pentagon officials feared that State intended to diminish the military role in Europe by transforming the ECC from a three-agency executive coordinating committee for military assistance into an advisory committee to Spofford.18

In November 1950 State proposed to replace Douglas with Spofford as the State Department member and ECC chairman, to make the ECC executive directorate part of Spofford's permanent staff, and to name Spofford the U.S. representative for mutual defense assistance in Europe. Both the Joint Chiefs and the OSD Office of Military Assistance objected to what seemed to them insertion of an "additional echelon" between Secretary Marshall and General Handy. Assured that State intended no changes in the MDAP system and that Spofford's role would not differ from Douglas's. Defense agreed to Spofford's chairmanship of the ECC and the assignment to him of the ECC executive directorate. On 16 December Truman approved Spofford's new role and the addition of NATO matters to ECC's area of concern.19

As spelled out in March 1951 by ISAC, Spofford had responsibility for general political guidance and overall coordination on political, economic, and military matters; Katz, for economic mobilization activities, U.S. economic assistance programs, and coordination of ECA missions; and Handy, for coordination of the U.S. military end item and training programs and guidance of the country-level MAAGs. William L. Batt, the senior U.S. representative to the NATO Defense Production Board, advised the ECC on matters related to NATO industrial production, and a senior U.S. liaison officer from SHAPE consulted on matters related to NATO military planning.20

The reorganization of 1950–51 was, admittedly, not a perfect solution. Whatever the improvements involved in the establishment of a broader-based ISAC, departmental adjustments, and the ECC's increased membership, coordination problems remained extremely complex. Eisenhower's impatience
CHART 7
U.S. COORDINATING ORGANIZATION FOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
MID-1951

THE PRESIDENT

FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE STEERING COMMITTEE (FMASC)

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
HARRIMAN

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MARSHALL

SECRETARY OF STATE
ACHESON

ECA ADMINISTRATOR
FOSTER

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
SNYDER

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (ISAC)

ASSISTANT TO HARRIMAN
GORDON

ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BURNS

DIRECTOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
CABOT

ASSISTANT TO ECA ADMINISTRATOR
HALABY

ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
HEBBARD

PUBLIC INFORMATION COMMITTEE (PIC)
ADAMS

POLITICO-MILITARY GROUP (PMG)
BEEBE

FOREIGN AID COMMITTEE (FAC)
SCOTT

DEFENSE PRODUCTION GROUP (DPG)
VAN ATTEN

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC GROUP (FEG)
VAN ATTEN

EUROPEAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE (ECC)

U.S. MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN EUROPE
HANDY

U.S. DEPUTY
SPOFFORD

U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (ECA)
KATZ

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DEFENSE PRODUCTION BOARD (DPB)
BATT
pointed up the shortcomings. In May 1951 he wrote Marshall that Europeans were complaining of "unreasonable" delays in the U.S. military assistance program. He cited long waits for U.S. plans and specifications and reported that Spofford, Katz, Batt, and various U.S. ambassadors had reinforced these criticisms. The general expressed his "uneasy feeling" that the complaints might be justified; he felt that Cabot and Burns in Washington had failed to take prompt action. Eisenhower thought that the situation created the impression of a lack of U.S. efficiency and seriousness and provided other nations an excuse for not fulfilling their NATO obligations. Conceding that Burns's office might not always have acted as expeditiously as possible, Marshall replied that the program had proceeded in a generally satisfactory manner and was currently being "attacked with vigor." Apparently still not satisfied, Eisenhower discussed the matter with Harriman, Spofford, and Katz during the summer of 1951 and agreed to take a more active coordinating role, particularly with the ECC. In September the general charged a section of the SHAPE office with keeping him informed on all aspects of U.S. overseas aid.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951

Eisenhower's criticisms prompted greater attention to organizational matters in Washington. The ECA was to expire in 1952 and a decision had to be made about its future. Closer to Defense was the matter of ISAC's handling of the coordination function. An interdepartmental Executive Group, set up in the early spring of 1951 to help prepare the presentation of the administration's legislative request to Congress for FY 1952 foreign assistance, showed awareness of difficult organizational problems. Col. George A. Lincoln, Marshall's representative, informed Lovett that the Washington troubles were "as much men and administration as directives and organization." At the end of May Lincoln reported to Marshall that ISAC was still "logically the agency to undertake the task of integration and coordination." Neither Acheson nor Marshall favored shifting responsibility for coordination outside of State, and the administration's proposed budget authorization specifically recommended that State continue to furnish leadership for the entire program. The administration offered no recommendation for any major organizational change.

When the Senate quickly expressed dissatisfaction with the current organizational arrangements, Marshall reacted negatively to the prospect of more change, reflecting a general Pentagon attitude that the current ISAC

* The budgetary issues considered in this proposal are discussed in the following chapter.
organization was just beginning to work as intended. Dismissing overseas complaints as the “inevitable congenital reaction from people in the field,” Marshall declared to the Senate committee that Defense had no objection to the current operational procedures for foreign aid. Bradley echoed Marshall’s position; his major interest was to see that Defense should retain under any reorganization the functions it currently exercised.26

In the end, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, signed on 10 October 1951, both met the Senate’s desire for a centralized, separate organization and granted most of what Bradley wanted. Section 506a of the act gave the secretary of defense “primary responsibility and authority” for determining country requirements, integrating military assistance with regular service procurement, supervising equipment usage and training programs, and delivering end items. The secretary of defense was to determine priorities in procurement, delivery, and allocation of equipment; the president was to continue to apportion funds.27

Terminating ISAC, the act centralized responsibility for “continuous supervision and general direction” over all U.S. foreign assistance programs—military, economic, and technical—in a Cabinet-level director for mutual security, placed in the Executive Office of the President. However, by excluding NATO matters from his duties and by specifying that nothing should infringe on the powers of the secretary of state, the new act in effect left primacy in NATO affairs to Acheson. Unlike Cabot, a sub-Cabinet officer who reported to the secretary of state, the new director for mutual security became a statutory member of the National Security Council and reported directly to the president. He also headed the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), which took charge of economic assistance when the ECA was terminated at the end of 1951, six months ahead of schedule. Truman appointed Harriman to the director’s post on 31 October and delegated to him in Executive Order 10300 most of the president’s responsibilities under the new act. The president directed the secretary of defense to exercise his responsibilities under the act subject to Harriman’s coordination, direction, and supervision, and to keep Harriman fully informed.28

Turning over direction of the day-to-day economic aid operations in the Mutual Security Agency to a deputy director, Harriman established a separate staff in the Office of the Director for Mutual Security (ODMS) to supervise the entire program. Key members on the staff included Lincoln Gordon, assistant director first for program and later for policy and planning, and Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., assistant director and counsel and later chief of staff. Harriman also drew on former ISAC personnel, including Ohly, who, after being detailed from State to ODMS, joined its staff in June 1952 as assistant director for program.29
Although Harriman did not have much greater legal authority over military assistance than his predecessors, his personal stature, his closeness to Truman and other high officials, and his Cabinet status and NSC membership made a difference in terms of the "real authority" that he could exercise. Even though the secretary of defense retained primary responsibility for administration of military assistance under both the Mutual Security Act and Executive Order 10300, there was, in Tannenwald's words, "just no question that somebody was being put between the president and the departments involved—the statute required it." Harriman's organization thus had the effect of constraining the authority and influence of the Pentagon.

Many Defense officials found the situation difficult to accept; changing conditions, new personnel, and increasing administrative complexities enhanced the possibility of misunderstanding and friction. While Lovett and Harriman may never have been at odds, differences occurred at the working levels of their offices. Tannenwald later noted that "the latent hostilities never became open conflicts. But the problems were there, make no mistake about it." Still, looking back, Ohly remembered an "extraordinary degree of cooperation and mutual respect" among the departmental representatives who "together, informally and very much as peers," tried to work out solutions to their problems.\(^{51}\)

**Further Reorganization**

At the end of 1951, the tide of organizational adjustments in Washington and some expected changes within NATO seemed certain to alter military assistance arrangements in Europe, although at least for the time being the regional system was supposed to remain in effect. Presumably the European Coordinating Committee remained the final authority for regional coordination, but reform was in the offing. Spofford intended to leave NATO after its forthcoming reorganization. Katz had resigned, and a representative from the Mutual Security Agency would take his place. Although General Handy remained MILREP and CINCEUR, Eisenhower as SACEUR exerted increasing influence on the U.S. military assistance program. His power derived not only from his own extraordinary prestige but from the terms under which he had gone to Europe, for Truman had given him direct operational control over all U.S. forces in Europe to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of his NATO mission.\(^{52}\)

By the end of 1951 the key military assistance agency under Handy, Kibler's Joint American Military Advisory Group, had more than two years of experience and was vital to regional coordination. U.S. military men became
concerned over JAMAG's possible removal from London, since they believed the issue of relocation could become a question of control. Eisenhower wanted JAMAG to be located in or near Paris, headquarters for both SHAPE and the administration of the U.S. economic program in Europe. Handy, Kibler, and Spofford, however, argued that JAMAG could operate best by remaining in London, where Spofford was still functioning. In December Eisenhower conceded the point, at least temporarily, but he remained convinced that JAMAG's performance could be improved.33

Reorganization began with the early phasing out of Spofford's responsibility for military assistance and Truman's selection on 12 January 1952 of William H. Draper, Jr., as the U.S. Special Representative in Europe (SRE). An investment banker and corporation executive, Draper had previously served under General Clay in Germany and as under secretary of the army from 1947 to 1949. With regard to the overseas assistance programs in Europe, he now held a position much superior in station to Spofford's, for he was responsible directly to the president. Draper was to direct European regional activities of the Mutual Security Agency and supervise the military and economic assistance programs in Europe.34

Draper's scope went beyond Harriman's to include NATO affairs. When the planned reorganization of the North Atlantic Council occurred on 4 April, Draper replaced Spofford in the enhanced role of U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, again responsible directly to the president. Assuming responsibility for both NATO and the mutual security program, Draper represented four U.S. Cabinet officers in Europe: For NATO policy affairs, he acted for the secretary of state; for general supervision of the economic assistance program and coordination of all mutual security programs, the director for mutual security; for certain financial matters, the secretary of the treasury; and for all NATO and military assistance activities involving OSD, the secretary of defense. Frederick L. Anderson, a retired Air Force general, served as Draper's deputy, with the personal rank of ambassador.35

With the dismantling of Spofford's London office in the spring of 1952, Lovett moved Daniel Edwards to Paris as Draper's deputy for defense affairs, with responsibility for NATO matters only. Edwards resigned that summer, and Lovett appointed Luke W. Finlay, a former Standard Oil of New Jersey executive, to the post.36 Draper's office had some 89 persons dealing with military assistance matters.37

Defense officials tended to view their relationship with Draper's office as somewhat unclear on military assistance matters. Lovett's channel passed through Handy and the ECC, of which Draper was to become the new chairman; the ECC executive directorate was already in Paris under him. In the
general confusion, ECC meetings, which had been infrequent, were now simply not convened. Under these conditions Kibler's JAMAG seemed increasingly important to the military, who viewed their continued control of it as crucial. Its fate became steadily more entwined, however, with the larger problem of finding a new military organization for U.S. forces in Europe, one which could operate more effectively to administer the many diverse U.S. defense functions overseas. 38

Lovett had come under heavy congressional attack, not only because of problems related to military assistance, but also because of stories of delay, duplication, and waste in the construction of bases in Europe and North Africa. By the end of 1951, the secretary felt that the solution for many of these problems lay in bringing the three U.S. commands in Europe—the U.S. European Command, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Command, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe—under a unified command with a single commander to consolidate the logistical effort. Lovett's choice for commander was Eisenhower. 39

In January 1952 Lovett sent William D. Pawley, a former ambassador acting as the secretary's special assistant, to talk with Eisenhower about the possibility of taking on the additional role. The general thought placing U.S. and NATO commands under one person might prove detrimental to both positions. He turned over the question to General Handy, Admiral Carney, and General Norstad, the three top U.S. commanders in Europe, who did not succeed in presenting an agreed solution. 40

Meanwhile the JCS had informed Eisenhower on 8 February that all logistical and administrative operations of joint concern should be integrated under a single U.S. commander—either Eisenhower or his U.S. deputy—with command authority over all U.S. forces. Eisenhower countered on 14 March by suggesting the creation of a new U.S. military representative in Europe (US MILREP) as a counterpart to Draper in his role as U.S. special representative. This new official, responsible to both the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of defense and senior to the three U.S. commanders in chief in Europe, would have directive authority but no operational control over U.S. forces in Europe. He would be subordinate to SACEUR but hold no position within the SHAPE command structure. 41

Eisenhower's proposal did not meet the requirements of either Lovett or the Joint Chiefs for a U.S. unified commander, and it soon became even more palatable when Draper let it be known that he thought the proposed US MILREP should be responsible to him as the U.S. special representative. Although Eisenhower apparently had no objections, the Pentagon's reaction was strongly negative; Lovett reportedly remarked that there was to be no secretary of defense in Europe. 42
When the possible move of JAMAG to Paris again came up in early April, many in the U.S. military establishment saw Draper's growing power as a threat. Draper's desire to have both the JAMAG offices and the proposed US MILREP located in the same building with him, combined with his contention that the latter report to him, made military authorities fear lest JAMAG itself be completely absorbed. Handy wanted to maintain JAMAG as a military organization and opposed its move to Paris until establishment of the US MILREP.13

Reactions in Washington

With these issues having emerged in Europe, Lovett carefully examined Draper's terms of reference when Defense formally received them on 24 April. The new terms, based on Draper's becoming permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council as well as U.S. special representative in Europe, had been drafted in Harriman's office and provided that Draper would act for Lovett for military assistance matters in Europe and for NATO matters. Within this general responsibility, Draper would "coordinate and supervise military assistance programs and related activities of US MILREP." These terms created waves of protest in the Pentagon. The Joint Chiefs declared that such terms would interpose a civilian element between the defense secretary and the established JCS military command structure in Europe. They wanted Draper to act for the secretary only on military assistance functions "other than those relating to Section 506a of the Mutual Security Act of 1951." The JCS proposed that he coordinate with, not supervise, US MILREP. The Army, Navy, and Air Force secretaries were equally adamant that Lovett should have a direct line of authority to the proposed US MILREP.14

Although Nash spent hours with Harriman's representatives trying to clarify the situation, the best he could get was elimination of the word "supervise" and an understanding that the matter of coordination between Draper and the new US MILREP would be included in the latter's terms of reference. Although Nash recommended approval, Deputy Secretary Foster decided to await the JCS views.15

Eisenhower, incensed by the services' inability to agree on the matter, wanted Lovett, if necessary, to create the new organization himself. In the meantime, both Eisenhower and Draper believed that the lack of coordination in Europe was costing valuable time and money. When Colonel Beebe asked Draper directly about his future relationship with JAMAG, Draper said that he would consult with both JAMAG and the proposed US MILREP, not interfere with their military recommendations, and report his own views to Lovett.
Noting that JAMAG in London could hardly play a strong role while NATO and other activities operated from Paris, Beebe believed it necessary that JAMAG move to Paris soon. Nash wanted JAMAG to move immediately, and Foster agreed.\footnote{46}

On 9 May Bradley notified Lovett that the Joint Chiefs thought that Eisenhower should establish a separate U.S. joint staff, headed by a deputy with no other U.S. or NATO responsibility, to administer military matters of joint service concern that required coordination in Europe. Since Eisenhower was resigning as SACEUR to run for president, there was need for immediate action.\footnote{47} This time, Eisenhower agreed to accept responsibility for U.S. military matters of a joint nature. He wanted the area of operations to coincide with his NATO command and his new authority to be “commensurate with responsibilities assigned.” Eisenhower assumed that the new U.S. headquarters would be set up in or near Paris, and he expected his and Draper’s deputies to achieve full day-to-day coordination.\footnote{48}

On 23 May the Joint Chiefs, with Lovett’s concurrence, reaffirmed Eisenhower in the position of U.S. military representative in Europe (US MILREP) and authorized him to establish a separate U.S. joint staff under a deputy receiving maximum delegation of authority. They favored Handy because of his previous experience as MILREP. The Joint Chiefs delayed a final decision on the geographic area but asked that Eisenhower act immediately to avoid leaving the problem to General Ridgway, who would take over as SACEUR on 30 May. Accepting Handy as Deputy US MILREP, Eisenhower on 29 May submitted for approval Handy’s letter of instructions and terms of reference.\footnote{49} The Joint Chiefs, however, considered the terms too broad and sent back revised ones. Eisenhower thereupon informed Lovett and the JCS on 30 May that he would not assume the responsibilities of US MILREP and had suspended all arrangements. Ridgway inherited the problem.\footnote{50}

Although Ridgway found no consensus on the matter when he sounded out the U.S. commanders and advisers in Europe, he and Handy both favored the Lovett–JCS solution in which the NATO SACEUR also became a U.S. unified commander. Ridgway told the Joint Chiefs on 11 June that the move would also help Lovett to achieve “maximum economy” in the European theater.\footnote{51}

After discussing the matter separately with Eisenhower and Ridgway, the Joint Chiefs informed Lovett on 30 June that Ridgway should be appointed U.S. unified commander with the title of United States Commander in Chief, Europe (US CINCEUR), with the three U.S. commands in Europe under him. He would also assume the functions of the other major U.S. military agencies in Europe. JAMAG personnel would provide the nucleus for US CINCEUR’s staff. In addition, Ridgway was to be responsible for administering
such military assistance activities in Europe as had been assigned to Defense
and was to coordinate with Draper on military assistance and other joint
logistical or administrative tasks.\(^{52}\) Asking for Truman's approval on 7 July,
Lovett pointed out that as US CINCEUR, Ridgway would command all U.S.
forces in all NATO areas but not, except in emergency, in areas outside of
NATO. He would establish a U.S. headquarters under Handy as Deputy US
CINCEUR, with an extensive delegation of authority. Truman approved
immediately.\(^{53}\)

With this decision reached, Lovett finally concurred in Draper's terms of
reference as U.S. special representative in Europe. Lovett accorded Draper the
right to act for the secretary of defense in the "over-all coordination and
supervision of Mutual Security Program activities," while Ridgway was to
administer the military aspects of the program for Europe and to control and
administer those military agencies engaged in such activities. In addition,
Ridgway would coordinate U.S. joint logistical and administrative matters,
including military procurement abroad, negotiations for base rights, and
construction of bases. Lovett expected full coordination between Ridgway
and Draper, but he stipulated that any unresolved issues should be submitted
to him in Washington.\(^{54}\)

When Ridgway assumed his duties as US CINCEUR on 1 August 1952, the
military assistance organization in Europe seemed to be clarified. In a
departure from the original plan, however, Deputy US CINCEUR Handy
moved not to Paris but to Frankfurt, where he set up a headquarters including
a military assistance division staffed by former JAMAG personnel. Handy
remained in Frankfurt until almost a year after the end of the Korean War.\(^{55}\)
Lovett's office was generally satisfied with its relationship with Draper’s
office.\(^{56}\)

Despite the troublesome internal and interdepartmental problems, by the
end of Lovett's tenure as secretary of defense the administrative apparatus for
military assistance was far superior to the weak, almost experimental organi-
zation of the first years of the program. Within the Pentagon, working
arrangements between the secretary's office, the military services, and the JCS
generally had been ironed out. By great personal effort, Nash had helped forge
a strong OSD working team and a cooperative relationship with Harriman's
office. At the regional level, the Pentagon's relationships with Draper, the
NATO organization, and the U.S. commanders and agencies in Europe were
more clearly delineated and operating with less friction. Moreover, the MAAGs
now had some practical experience on which to draw. Although some
organizational problems undoubtedly still remained when Lovett left office in
January 1953, a sound foundation for the future had been constructed.
The Korean War radically affected the attitude of the Truman administration toward military assistance and NATO. Fear of Soviet military initiatives elsewhere, particularly in Europe, lent great urgency to the rearming of Allies and friendly countries. The initial sum appropriated for the first Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP)—$1.314 billion for FY 1950, of which $1 billion was for NATO Europe—and the $1.222 billion in new obligational authority for FY 1951 requested of Congress on 1 June 1950, only 24 days before the North Korean invasion, overnight seemed utterly inadequate. Calculations of the maximum support that public opinion and Congress would allow for military assistance were suddenly revised in the context of a more threatening world environment. The initial disposition of Congress and the public to support administration measures for military assistance gave way in time to doubts and opposition, but the basic thrust persisted, raising the military assistance program to levels never contemplated before the Korean War and giving it an unexpectedly lasting institutional status.¹

Congressional committee hearings on the military assistance request for FY 1951, beginning on 5 June 1950, gave no hint of the ultimate size of the program. Pointing out that without U.S. aid NATO troops would lack equipment and European economic stability would be seriously threatened, Secretary Johnson testified that the small programs planned for FY 1951 would only partially overcome the "dangerous disparity in strength between the armed east and the disarmed west." Greece needed equipment to deal with the continued threat of guerrilla outbreaks, while Iran, Korea, and the Philippines had to contend with threats of external Communist aggression. Asia, Johnson informed the senators, required help to combat Communist guerrillas in Indochina and to build up a constabulary for maintaining internal security in Indonesia. Envisioning the need to continue military assistance for
three or four more years, Johnson guessed that the following year's request would be no more than that for FY 1951 and that the program's cost would thereafter drop.²

When George Marshall—at the time holding no official position—appeared before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 7 June, he acknowledged that the Mutual Defense Assistance Program might encourage the Soviets to act quickly, before Europe was militarily secure, but he thought the greater danger lay in sitting "idle and impotent." Soviet-American reconciliation could only come, Marshall said, if the West spoke from genuine strength and high resolve. The currently requested MDAP appropriation would provide only a minimum defense capability, but he thought it sufficient to have a deterrent effect.⁵

Effect of the Korean War

The North Korean attack only 18 days after Marshall's testimony hastened congressional action to authorize and appropriate money for FY 1951. Signed by Truman on 26 July, the enabling legislation (PL 81-621) extended the military assistance program for one year and authorized a FY 1951 appropriation. Specifically, the act increased grant aid coverage to all NATO members,¹ and changed from 5 to 10 percent the amount of money which the president might transfer between the various titles. Truman could thus use up to 10 percent of the funds to assist, if necessary, any non-NATO country in Europe whose location made it strategically vital to NATO defense and U.S. security. This critical provision made it possible to give assistance to Yugoslavia, which had broken with the Soviet bloc in 1948 and was subject to tremendous pressure from the Soviets. The law not only increased the original $450 million limitation on the use of excess equipment to $700 million but eased some of the onerous restrictions on reimbursable aid and allowed the provision of more industrial equipment for European military production. Six weeks later Congress appropriated the requested $1.2 billion in the General Appropriation Act of 1951 (PL 81-759).¹

Planning for increased military assistance had meanwhile begun immediately after the initial shock of the Korean War had been absorbed. General Lemnitzer in OSD and John Ohly at State agreed in the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC) that military assistance should be greatly increased, but neither had fixed on an exact amount. Taking the

* The first act restricted grant aid to NATO members applying for such assistance before 6 October 1949: Portugal, Canada, and Iceland, which had not requested aid before that date, were now eligible.
initiative with McNeil on 14 July, Lemnitzer wrote that despite the lack of
detailed programs it was important to get started on production of long-lead-
time items and recommended a supplementary FY 1951 request of $4 billion.
He based this figure on a four-year estimate of $17 billion to equip NATO
forces by July 1954 and $3 billion to arm other friendly countries. From this
$20 billion total he then subtracted $8 billion, an optimistic estimate of what
the NATO countries could provide for themselves, to reach a requirement for
$12 billion in U.S. military aid. Dividing that by three years rather than four
in order to allow for production lead time, Lemnitzer arrived at his $4 billion
supplemental request. Burns endorsed the amount on the premise that it
would be "building up an Arsenal of Democracy which could be used to
supply our own forces or those of our allies as circumstances justify." Lemnitzer
did not disagree with this position; the new program would
increase the U.S. production base, while any MDAP equipment would be
available to U.S. forces up to the time of shipment to another country.

Working intensively, FMACC used $4 billion as a tentative discussion
figure. Both the specific figure and the timing of the decision were crucial.
The United States intended to ask the NATO countries to make a vastly
expanded military effort and needed to be able to give them some idea of the
U.S. help they might expect; in turn, their willingness to arm would help
support the administration's request to Congress. By 21 July Defense and State
agreed that an increased MDAP program of $4 billion to $6 billion should be
presented to the president. Meeting with Truman, Acheson, and Harriman that
day, Johnson proposed $4 billion for military materiel alone and suggested
that some part could be used to finance European manufacture of military
equipment. In approving the proposal, Truman emphasized that he was
creating a negotiating position with the NATO countries and that the $4-6
billion figure was subject to change.

At Johnson's insistence the lower figure prevailed, and after conferring
with the services Lemnitzer outlined a tentative division of the money.
Accepting his suggestions, Truman on 1 August requested a $4 billion
supplemental FY 1951 MDAP appropriation from Congress, including $3.5
billion for the European countries in Title I; $193 million for Greece, Turkey,
and Iran in Title II; and $303 million for Title III Asian nations. Treating the
situation as an emergency, Congress agreed to consider the request in the
supplemental bill for regular FY 1951 military funds, without a separate
authorization bill, and eventually appropriated $4 billion. On 27 September
Truman signed PL 81-843, which also gave him specific authority to transfer
military assistance equipment to Defense use if necessary.

At the end of September 1950 the total funds available for military
assistance since its inception amounted to more than $6.5 billion dollars, but
the administration considered the sum insufficient to prepare an adequate
NATO defense by 1954. "In no cases under MDAP," Lemnitzer told Lovett in
October, "are we providing all the equipment needed. We are working in the
area of deficits." 10

Preparing a FY 1952 Request

How to get a better measure of the extent of the deficits proved difficult
during a period of rapid changes in anticipated requirements. When Truman
approved NSC 68/2 on 30 September, at a time of high optimism for a quick
end to the Korean War, U.S. officials thought that a total of $21.7 billion would
cover overseas aid for the five-year period 1951 through 1955, including
$16.7 billion for military assistance. But the massive Chinese intervention in
November ended any possibility of shifting U.S. military equipment from
Korea to Europe, reinforced fears about Europe's vulnerability, and under-
scored the problems to be faced if Europe were attacked. In a Washington
atmosphere of deep pessimism, the FMACC agreed by early December that the
total five-year foreign aid requirement might come to $33.4 billion, including
$25.1 billion for military assistance. After further NSC review, Truman on 14
December approved the cost estimates included in NSC 68/3 as a working
guide for the purpose of immediate action. 11

Of the $25.1 billion military assistance requirement for creation of a
viable European defense by mid-1954, $5.2 billion had been appropriated in
FY 1951, leaving a balance of approximately $20 billion. To allow time to
produce complicated military equipment, however, Defense needed much of
the money as soon as possible. Secretary Marshall asked for $6.6 billion for
military assistance in FY 1952. The tentative breakdown—$5.8 billion for the
NATO countries and a German stockpile; $270 million for Greece, Turkey, and
Iran; and $560 million for Asian countries—derived from an OSD study
prepared with the help of the military services, the JCS, and the NATO
Standing Group. The FMACC and the Bureau of the Budget approved these
figures for inclusion in the president's 1951 annual budget message, which
carried a single figure of $10.956 billion for military assistance, economic aid,
and an expanded international information program. 12

Informing the Joint Chiefs on 27 December of the president's approval of
a $6.6 billion military assistance budget request for FY 1952 and of the
planned breakdown between titles, Lovett directed them to keep to the given
figure unless they had good reason for a change and to develop a supplemental
$250 million program. On 7 February 1951, however, the Joint Chiefs
recommended increases of over $1.6 billion, raising the total FY 1952 request
to $8.2 billion. They assigned more than $6.3 billion for Title I alone,* including $250 million for a German stockpile and $300 million for Spain. Even so, the country allocations seemed woefully inadequate compared with MAAG-reported deficiencies—$2.3 billion against $15.1 billion needed for France and $475 million against almost $3 billion required for the United Kingdom. Adding amounts for Yugoslavia and a Middle East contingency fund to Title II, the JCS request for this area exceeded $654 million. For Asia, including Japan, the JCS asked for $1.17 billion, and for Latin America $80 million. Of the $8.2 billion total, the Joint Chiefs assigned more than half as an Army responsibility. Despite the JCS recommendations, Marshall apparently did not press at this time for increases in the agreed-upon $6.6 billion for FY 1952.13

By mid-March Defense and the other agencies involved in the military and economic aid programs were preparing a joint budget presentation to Congress. Fully aware of the obstacles that threatened a request for foreign aid funds centering on European needs, Marshall agreed with Acheson and ECA Administrator William C. Foster that a high-level, full-time interdepartmental executive group should be established to prepare a bill that would integrate the requests for economic, military, and technical assistance. Marshall’s representative was Col. George A. Lincoln.† Separate from the International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC), the Executive Group members worked intensively, often in conjunction with ISAC and Harriman’s office, from their first meeting on 20 March for the two-and-a-half months it took to ready the presentation for Congress.14

Lincoln soon discovered that Lovett was disturbed both by the time needed to prepare the combined foreign assistance budget for Congress and by the Bureau of the Budget’s desire to hold extensive hearings of its own. The delay, Lovett feared, might lead to congressional confusion between the military assistance and regular Defense appropriations requests. He also considered it inadvisable to combine economic and military assistance totals, as Harriman and others wanted, and preferred the figures to be shown separately for each title. Defense did not want its military assistance funds thrown into a larger pot from which those funds might be diverted to other uses.15

* The Joint Chiefs based their Title I NATO recommendations on a version (DC 28) of the NATO Medium Term Defense Plan that did not list force requirements by countries. The total requirement was adjusted according to a complex and ingenious JAMAG formula, which estimated individual country requirements to equal the planned total, weighted them according to their importance, subtracted on-hand or funded equipment, and distributed the deficiencies. The United States was to supply 60 percent of the total net equipment deficiencies for FY 1952–54—24 percent to be funded in FY 1952, 24 percent in FY 1953, and 12 percent in FY 1954.
† The ECA representative was initially C. Tyler Wood and later Najeeb E. Halaby, while Col. Charles H. Bonesteel, III, USA, represented Acheson and acted as the group’s informal chairman.
Lincoln felt that Congress would also ask questions about the program's accomplishments, continuing requirements, probable duration, total cost, coordination, and relationship to U.S. objectives. The Executive Group thought it might find some answers by comparing NATO resources with the requirements for the Medium Term Defense Plan (DC 28). Its study indicated large deficits, but Lincoln was appalled by the unreliability of the data. Telling Lovett and Bradley that there was no specific responsibility in the Pentagon or elsewhere for estimating the cost of NATO plans (except force requirements) on a unilateral U.S. basis, Lincoln urged Defense to accept the responsibility. Meanwhile, the Executive Group study suggested that the total cost of equipping the necessary NATO forces would be about $43 billion, and it seemed likely that there would be a $15-20 billion production gap and a $15-20 billion financial gap by mid-1954 if U.S. military assistance remained as planned under NSC 68/3. Lincoln's briefing upset Bradley, who was convinced that Congress would demand some positive results before appropriating more funds.  

Lincoln informed Lovett on 17 April that the Executive Group anticipated serious opposition in the congressional hearings. For some time Defense officials had been growing increasingly apprehensive about congressional attitudes toward military assistance. The deficiencies of the program—shortfalls in commitments, expenditures, and shipments; inadequate or incorrect data on requirements and costs; and a general appearance of disorganization and uncertainty—had reinforced prejudices already held by some in Congress against the program. The sacking of General MacArthur, following shortly after the "great debate" on troops for Europe, had created a new national uproar, further intensifying these prejudices. It ensured also that congressional attention would focus once again on foreign and military policy and the administration's emphasis on Europe. The entire spring of 1951 was a period of congressional turmoil, public confusion, and administration apprehension. It seemed certain to Defense officials that Congress would require hard and accurate information about the military assistance program and specifics about costs and the duration of the program. It would not accept generalities and platitudes.  

Without clear supporting evidence, Lovett believed that the FY 1952 military assistance request would be "slaughtered" by Congress. He directed McNeil to prepare separate cost estimates for NATO and Germany, while Marshall directed the JCS to prepare a "strategic reassessment of the Medium Term Defense Plan." Lincoln informed SHAPE of the two ongoing efforts in the Pentagon, as well as of a concurrent review by ECA of European financing and production capabilities. 

On 27 April 1951, well before completion of the OSD studies, Lovett,

Charles A. Coolidge, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legal and Legislative Affairs), 1951-52.

Meeting of the Joint Secretaries. *Seated:* Matthews, Pace, Finletter; *standing:* Edward T. Dickinson, assistant to the Joint Secretaries.

Marshall, Truman, and Acheson bid farewell to General Eisenhower on his departure for Europe, January 1951.

30 U.S. F-84 Thunderjets turned over to the Italian Air Force at Brindisi, Italy, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
Loading tank for shipment under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 1952.

Mutual Defense Assistance Program training of Allied military personnel.

Marshall and Acheson in a lighter moment.
Truman with Bradley and Ridgway, new Supreme Allied Commander Europe, May 1952.


William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1951-53.

President Truman and Assistant Secretary Anna Rosenberg with members of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, in the White House Rose Garden, 1951.

Women directors of the services—Capt. Joy B. Hancock, USN, Col. Mary A. Hallaren, USA, Col. Katherine A. Towle, USMC, and Col. Mary Jo Shelly, USAF.
Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense, 1951–53.
Eisenhower at ceremony upon retirement from Army prior to running for president, June 1952.

Churchill visits Lovett at the Pentagon, January 1952.
Joint Chiefs of Staff—Collins, Vandenberg, Bradley, and Fechteler, 1952.

John D. Small, chairman of the Munitions Board, with members and staff, November 1952.
Outgoing and incoming secretaries—Lovett and Charles E. Wilson with their deputies and service secretaries, December 1952.

Lovett presents certificate of appreciation to K.T. Keller, Director, Office of Guided Missiles. Present are Bradley, Foster, and Nichols, January 1953.
First test of U.S. Army's atomic cannon, Nevada, May 1953.


U.S. Navy aircraft carrier launches Regulus missile.
Cabot, Foster, Harriman, and the Executive Group met with Budget Director Lawton and other BoB personnel to consider the FY 1952 program. While Lovett won his point that military and economic aid should be shown separately, he was surprised at the extent of the BoB challenge to more money for military assistance. Questioning the need for any new obligatory authority, the BoB declared that if the proposed FY 1952 MDAP program passed, the backlog of unexpended funds would reach $8 billion by 30 June 1952. Lovett's arguments—that increasing U.S. production rates of long-lead-time items would rapidly accelerate deliveries and expenditures, while a favorable turn of events in Korea could release equipment for military assistance deliveries—fell on deaf ears. Lawton considered the current budget requests so questionable that he did not want Defense to make even informal congressional contacts.

BoB, furthermore, wanted to know what effect the nonexpenditure of funds (indicating the nondelivery of military equipment) would have on NATO defense plans and whether Defense had considered giving a higher delivery priority to NATO. The inquiry revealed clearly that no matter how large the appropriations for military assistance, U.S.-produced materiel generally was drained off for the Korean battlefield or for U.S. rearmament and did not go to military assistance recipients. Tongue in cheek, Lincoln wrote Lovett on 1 May 1951 that he gathered that "the subject of munitions allocation as between U.S. military programs and MDAP is considered a difficult one within the Department of Defense." The day before, in a memorandum for the record, he mused: "When MDAP was born, the worries were over unwisdom in expenditure of funds. Now the worry is over getting any appreciable portion of the funds expended."

McNeil's costing study backed Lovett's position that the current lag in military assistance expenditures did not obviate the need for FY 1952 funds. Even allowing for increased European production, Canadian military assistance to Europe, and delivery of all U.S. military assistance programs through FY 1952, the study revealed a 1954 NATO equipment gap ranging from a minimum of $10.5 billion, with no provision for Germany, to a maximum of $18.4 billion, including $4 billion for Germany. Lincoln thought McNeil's study the best of all U.S. attempts to date to cost NATO defense plans despite the fact that it lacked figures for Norway and Portugal, was based on already unrealistic September 1950 prices, and did not include post-1954 maintenance costs. After adding the missing country estimates and adjusting for inflation, Lincoln thought it "reasonably optimistic" to speak of an apparent deficiency on the order of $15 billion, with Germany costing another $4 billion. Although the new study convinced Lincoln that the program was manageable, Lovett wanted a field review of the figures and sent the study to U.S. leaders in Europe and to the U.S. element in SHAPE.
On 15 May Lincoln briefed the BoB on the completed costing studies, but not until 22 May did Defense learn that BoB had held the combined FY 1952 foreign aid program to $8.5 billion, including $6.25 billion for military assistance.\textsuperscript{22} The president incorporated these amounts into his 24 May request to Congress. Meanwhile, the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs warned Lincoln that the Pentagon could expect "long and troublesome" hearings.\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{FY 1952 Foreign Aid Programs (in billions)}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & Economic & Military & Total \\
Title I Europe & 51.728 & 55.240 & 56.968 \\
Title II Middle East & 0.125 & 0.415 & 0.540 \\
Title III Asia & 0.375 & 0.555 & 0.930 \\
Title IV Latin America & 0.022 & 0.040 & 0.062 \\
\hline
 & $2.250 & $6.250 & $8.500 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textit{The FY 1952 Appropriations}

Aware of growing congressional resistance to appropriating money for foreign assistance, Nathaniel H. Goodrich, OSD assistant general counsel, had earlier thought it would be a good idea to "get the important committees in the House and the Senate to go to Europe and take a look for themselves before they considered the legislation." Goodrich later recalled that Marx Leva liked the idea, as did others, including Eisenhower. Members of the House committees on appropriations, armed services, and foreign affairs went to Europe in June 1951, and in July a smaller group of senators visited France, England, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Germany. When the senators asked Eisenhower in Paris whether the United States was not carrying a disproportionate load in Europe, the general answered that he had originally gone to Europe "thoroughly convinced that America was making a great sacrifice. However, my European friends told me: 'You provide the gun but we are providing the man.'" In Eisenhower's eyes, Congress was dealing with matters that would "determine the future for a good many days."\textsuperscript{24}

Marshall invited the touring representatives and senators to the Pentagon for luncheon discussions upon their return from these trips, but congressional doubts remained strong. Marshall contended that the military assistance program would be needed even if the Korean War ended suddenly, while
Bradley warned that any reduction in the $6.25 billion request would seriously affect NATO by leaving some units without the necessary equipment. But some senators still thought they could reduce the request by 10 percent. Sen. Brien McMahon wrote Marshall asking whether he had considered the possible use of tactical atomic weapons to defend Europe. Marshall assured McMahon that the capabilities and limitations of future improved weapons were well known but that sufficient defense forces would be required in any event to keep attackers from overrunning prepared launching installations. With or without the new weapons, the planned FY 1952 military assistance program fell "short of providing the total means required to do the job," but it was precisely adapted, Marshall asserted, to a buildup that would "in time provide the military strength to defend Europe."  

Despite the efforts of Marshall and the administration, Congress reduced the overall $8.5 billion request, finally authorizing not quite $6 billion for military assistance. Beyond creating a new organization to coordinate and control all foreign aid programs," the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (PL 82-165), signed on 10 October, contained provisions allowing the president to transfer up to 10 percent of the funds under any title of the act to other titles and to transfer 10 percent of all Title I funds between military and economic assistance. It also increased by another $300 million, thus raising to $1 billion, the amount of excess equipment that might be supplied as military assistance.

To conform with the authorizing legislation, the Pentagon revised its FY 1952 appropriation request. It also asked Congress for $44.5 million to liquidate prior years' contract authority and for reappropriation of $816.7 million in unobligated and lapsing balances from earlier appropriations. Lovett, who testified on 8 October, urged appropriation of the full amounts, declaring that Congress could not have given a "more thorough 'going-over'" to any legislation.

Following immediately on the heels of the authorization act, the House on 11 October appropriated almost $7.5 billion for all foreign aid and reappropriated, as requested, the lapsing balances from former years. The Senate reduced the amount by about 5 percent and added $100 million for military, economic, or technical aid to Spain, to be used at the president's discretion. Congress voted on 20 October, and Truman signed PL 82-249, the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1952, on 31 October. The bill cut the president's request for $6.25 billion in military assistance by about 8 percent, his request for $2.25 billion in economic aid by 36 percent. But for the persistent advocacy of the Defense establishment, it is likely that the cuts would have been greater.

* See Chapter XIX.
Table 20
FY 1952 Mutual Security Appropriations
New Obligational Authority
(in billions)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>President Budg Msg 15 Jan 51</th>
<th>JCS Recs 7 Feb 51</th>
<th>President Request 24 May 51</th>
<th>Congress Authorized 10 Oct 51</th>
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Note: Figures do not add in all instances because of rounding.

With the 1952 funds finally appropriated four months into the fiscal year, Nash asked the director for mutual security for interim permission to allow the services to begin immediate supply action. But unlike FY 1951, when funds had been made instantly available on the basis of emergency conditions, formal program changes were now required. On 16 January 1952 the Joint Chiefs proposed a new division of funds, giving priority to equipping already activated or committed forces. Of $4.2 billion scheduled to be spent for materiel for Title I countries, they recommended amounts ranging from $2.1 billion for France to $156 million for Yugoslavia.29 The large allotments to France and Indochina reflected the Joint Chiefs’ concern about France’s role in NATO and the growing anxiety about the fate of Indochina. Nationalist China also fared well, but in the Middle East no countries other than Turkey, Greece, and Iran received aid, evidence of the disinclination of the JCS to become further involved in that region.

At the same time the JCS took a somber view of the failure to receive the $8.2 billion they had originally requested for FY 1952, predicting significant delays in fulfilling the year’s program objectives. They asked Lovett to oppose especially any use of the transfer provision that would shift funds from military to economic assistance.30

JCS anxiety was well founded. Since September 1951 Truman had been alarmed over a mounting economic crisis in Europe. The large British defense
effort—which reduced the production of exportable items and required large imports of raw materials, thus generating strong inflationary pressures, a substantial dollar deficit, and a major decline in foreign exchange—created a loss of confidence, a flight from sterling, and the prospect of national insolvency. If the United States wanted the British to maintain their defense effort, economic aid in some form had to be provided. In addition, France was experiencing many of the same troubles as a result of its Indochina burden. At the president’s request, ISAC had prepared a detailed report on Europe’s economic woes. One remedy that became a more important option when Congress drastically reduced FY 1952 economic aid was the use of the transfer provision.\(^5\)

On 2 February 1952 Harriman asked Truman to transfer $478 million from military to economic assistance funds—$300 million for the United Kingdom, $100 million for France, and $78 million for Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. The Joint Chiefs' opposition to the transfer stemmed from reluctance to lose any more sums from an appropriation they considered already inadequate. They believed such a transfer would make it even more difficult to provide equipment for NATO forces, rendering achievement of the 1954 target date for NATO rearmament improbable. After further discussion, Bradley agreed with Lovett that the transfer was "justified from the military point of view," since the transferred funds would enable those countries to continue defense production and thus bring about "at least as great, and probably a greater military defense contribution" than the sending of an equivalent dollar amount of U.S. military equipment. Informed of Bradley's assent, the president approved the transfer on 4 February.\(^6\)

The transfer of almost half a billion dollars from the military assistance program made it necessary to reprogram the remaining funds for European countries, and the Joint Chiefs recommended doing so on a prorated service basis. Lovett agreed to this on 1 March and also to several shifts of funds, including an increase of $30 million for Indochina. With a new FY 1952 appropriation—even after some subtractions—a total of $11.5 billion had been made available for military assistance.\(^7\)

Having the money in hand did not guarantee smooth functioning of the program. The reduction in FY 1952 funds required transfers and adjustments in procurement and production and computation of force and equipment plans for the individual countries. Since commitment of funds for procurement lagged badly, Congress became increasingly reluctant to appropriate additional large sums. The Joint Chiefs and the military services found themselves continually in a volatile situation in which most of the components of the military assistance process—money, requirements, production, and delivery—always lagged behind schedule and were subject to frequent
change. Such an atmosphere could not help but leave Defense with a sense of uncertainty about military assistance programs.

### A Budget for FY 1953

In June 1951, when Marshall and Acheson advised Truman that support of NATO would create a continuing high demand for U.S. military assistance after FY 1952, the president authorized them to so inform Congress. By August administration estimates of NATO and German defense costs through FY 1954 reached $72 billion, a figure considerably higher than the estimate in NSC 68/3 or considered by Lincoln for the FY 1952 budget. In the fall of 1951 ISAC established that $18.7 billion of the $72 billion total would be needed for military assistance in FY 1953 and FY 1954, while another $2.1 billion would be required to help European countries perform their share of rearmament. Of the $20.8 billion in military aid and defense support for Europe, ISAC thought the FY 1953 Title I program should include $14 billion for immediate letting of contracts for long-lead-time items.51

By contrast, OSD carried a one-line item of only $5 billion for all military assistance in FY 1953, a figure that Lovett conceded was arbitrary and subject to change but which represented all he thought Congress would grant. Truman doubted that the public shared his own sense of urgency about military assistance and suspected they would not support a larger amount.55 The Joint Chiefs considered the $5 billion figure inadequate in the face of military equipment deficiencies, which they computed as exceeding $27 billion worldwide—more than $23 billion for Europe alone—for the fiscal years 1953 and 1954. Lovett sent the JCS deficiency requirements to Harriman for submission to BoB, but at a BoB meeting on 11 December the $5 billion OSD projection for military assistance won out. In the face of congressional economy calls and the program’s general unpopularity, the administration did not push for an increase in military assistance. Moreover, BoB projected increases in U.S. budget deficits from $6 billion at the end of June 1952 to $13 billion a year later and then continuing upward, possibly creating further inflationary pressures.56 Such an economic condition would, of course, threaten what Leon Keyserling at an NSC meeting called the “plush” standard of consumption in the United States.57

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* ISAC reached the military aid figure of $18.7 billion by subtracting from $72 billion (1) estimates of U.S. aid in the amount of $11 billion already budgeted, (2) Canadian aid of $1 billion, and (3) gross European expenditure estimates of $11.5 billion during 1951–54. These last estimates were admittedly on the optimistic side. German rearmament requirements would possibly raise the $72 billion total to $76.8 billion.
The chances of securing congressional approval of a large military assistance appropriation diminished further because of the continued existence of a large backlog of unexpended funds from previous appropriations and the president’s limitation at a meeting on 28 December 1951 of FY 1953 defense expenditures to $60 billion, including $8 billion for military assistance. * Theoretically, the expenditure ceiling did not limit appropriation requests, but in practice Congress was unlikely to appropriate new money for military assistance if the backlog of unspent money exceeded the $8 billion expenditure limitation. Still another factor likely to affect the FY 1953 military assistance budget was Truman’s policy of stretching out military spending and programs over a longer period.38

Stressing his commitment to Eisenhower, the president twice declared on 28 December that he intended to give NATO forces an equal priority with U.S. divisions once Korean needs were met. Lovett pointed out that a lower rate of expenditures in FY 1953 would mean less new equipment, but he thought slippages in raising country forces would lower European requirements and offset the shortfall. In any event, he felt, and the president agreed, that U.S. production rates would not be the limiting factor for NATO forces.39

The Joint Chiefs warned Lovett in January 1952 that holding the FY 1953 military assistance budget to the previous year’s level would mean that the NATO Medium Term Defense Plan could not be achieved by 1954 and would leave materiel deficiencies of approximately $20 billion, an amount too large to be made up in FY 1954. Nevertheless the president asked Congress for only $7.9 billion for both economic and military assistance in FY 1953.40 This meant, as Foster informed the JCS, that military assistance budget planning would have to be held to a ceiling of $5.4 billion. Furthermore, after subtraction of handling, transportation, and certain other costs, only $4.65 billion remained for the military end-item and training programs, of which $1 billion was to be allocated for offshore procurement in Europe.41

Within Defense the restrictions on funds intensified a problem that was larger than the simple allocation of deficits among programs. A major issue was how the deficits would be allocated by service, especially as between the Army and the Air Force, for the Navy program was small. The Air Force, lagging behind the other services in efforts to attain the projected force goals for itself and for the NATO countries, wanted what the Army and Navy considered a disproportionate share of military assistance funds. Bradley, Collins, and Fechteler thought the Army should get 54 percent and the Air Force 32 percent, while Vandenberg reversed the percentages, assigning only

* See Chapter XIV.
† See Chapter XXI.
29 percent to the Army and 57 percent to the Air Force. The Joint Chiefs even disagreed on asking for Lovett's decision. Bradley, Collins, and Fechteler wanted immediate approval of their program; Vandenberg thought the secretary should wait for Eisenhower's recommendations.12

As the Army-Navy proposal would allow each service "to progress toward the ultimate force requirements in approximately the ratio of unfilled requirements," Nash recommended to Lovett that he accept it. On 9 February Foster approved but said that Eisenhower's views should be taken into account. Eisenhower recommended that FY 1953 funds be used first to equip all forces begun under previous programs, including both combat and service support elements. Next, he thought, money should go to equip the forces recently agreed on at Lisbon. Any remaining Title I funds should be spent to reach 1954 NATO force goals. In effect Eisenhower seconded the Army-Navy balanced forces concept.13

On 6 March Truman submitted a special congressional message in support of his $7.9 billion FY 1953 request for the Mutual Security Program, of which $5.425 billion was for military aid. Asserting that the program would "yield far larger returns, in terms of our own security, than if the same amount were used for our own defense establishment," Truman claimed that the question about the amount was whether it was too small. The Joint Chiefs carefully pointed out to Lovett that the president's budget request covered only 17 percent of the total military equipment deficiencies.14

If Truman and the Joint Chiefs viewed the FY 1953 request for mutual security funds as inadequate, Congress saw things differently. When Bradley testified that $5.4 billion was less than the $7 billion average monthly cost of World War II, the congressional committees were not impressed. Once again they questioned the amount of money still unobligated and unexpended from previous appropriations, complained of military waste, and deplored the folly of deficit spending. Defending the bill before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Lovett emphasized the soundness of the request and insisted there was no leeway in the figures. The national economy could sustain the cost, and national security demanded it. Lovett defended the services' ability to obligate and expend funds efficiently and predicted that almost all of the military assistance funds available would be obligated by 1 July 1952 and that only $5.5 billion of a total of $16.8 billion available through FY 1953 would still be unexpended at the end of FY 1955. This shortfall, he explained, was inevitable given the time lag between letting of contracts and actual delivery of end items.15

Despite these arguments, the House Committee on Armed Services reduced the FY 1953 foreign aid authorization request by a billion dollars
when it reported out a $6.9 billion bill, and the House itself reduced this to less than $6.2 billion. The Senate, acting on its own committee's recommendation of $6.9 billion, authorized a little over $6.7 billion. A conference committee divided the difference between the two versions to reach a compromise authorization of $6.45 billion, an amount passed by both houses. This included not quite $4.6 billion for military assistance, a cut of about $800 million. On 20 June Truman signed the enabling legislation (PL 82-400). The authorization allowed unexpended balances from previous appropriations to remain available for another year, provided at least $25 million for military and economic aid to Spain, and gave the president the authority to use as much as $20 million in assistance funds for any country without regard to eligibility, up to a maximum of $100 million.

In considering appropriations for FY 1953, Congress made a further large cut in funds, despite the pleas of Lovett, who testified in early June that about $1.1 billion in military assistance funds had been obligated the previous month, a figure based on service estimates. When the amount proved to be only $351 million, some congressional members charged that they had been misled. Both Lovett and Foster were annoyed and embarrassed by this additional demonstration of what they considered ineptitude or manipulation by the military services. At best, it appeared that they did not have control of the situation. Although the services made frantic efforts to commit large sums in June, it was too late. Congress allowed just over $6 billion for all FY 1953 foreign assistance, including the $4.2 billion for military assistance, a cut of 22 percent from the $5.4 billion Truman originally requested and more than 7 percent below the amount authorized. Signing the bill on 15 July, the president called the appropriation inadequate and charged that it had been politically manipulated to give an "illusion of economy"; it actually meant "less fire power and less air cover" for the free world.

Asking the Joint Chiefs to recommend program cuts made necessary by the lowered appropriation, Foster suggested that they use as a basis the current NATO Standing Group force goals subject to change during the NATO annual review in the fall. Although the Joint Chiefs rejected the use of this lower force basis rather than the accepted Lisbon goals, they split again over dividing the Title I programs. The Air Force wanted to reduce Navy funds by $16 million and Army funds by $222 million in order to provide 11 additional fighter squadrons. As a result, the JCS asked Lovett to decide the distribution of Title I funds after considering the differing service views. They agreed, however, in opposing any transfer of Title I funds from military aid to economic (defense support) aid unless it was directly related to the production of military end items, and they were given an opportunity to consider it further. The Joint Chiefs also agreed on allocations for countries in Titles II, III, and IV.
The whole issue of NATO force goals remained in abeyance for the rest of Truman's term. What was clear at the end of the year, as revealed in opinion polls, was the increasing unpopularity in the United States of foreign aid, including military assistance. The high point of congressional support for large military assistance appropriations had passed, as work on the proposed FY 1954 budget would soon confirm.

**A Proposal for FY 1954**

By July 1952 the administration had fixed on a $7.5 billion ceiling for the entire FY 1954 Mutual Security Program, with a maximum of $5.9 billion for the military assistance portion. Although the normal budget process was to be followed, with the usual review of policies and programs, Lovett was to submit by August an initial proposal that Truman might use in his State of the Union message in January 1953 and in discussions with President-elect Eisenhower.\(^5^4\)

Because time was short and the 1952 NATO annual review would not take place until later, the initial budget proposal was to be prepared entirely in Washington, without field consultation. Harriman suggested that an appropriate breakdown of the $5.9 billion military assistance proposal would include $4.4 billion for Europe, $560 million for the Near East, $1.12 billion for the Far East, and $20 million for Latin America. Of the Far Eastern share, $500 million was to be allocated to Japan if it could be absorbed; otherwise, the $5.9 billion total was to be reduced. OSD forwarded these details to the JCS on 11 July and suggested using MRC 12 force goals, a refinement of the earlier NATO force goals, as the best available basis for U.S. programming of Title I funds.\(^5^5\) The Joint Chiefs generally agreed with Harriman's suggested title breakdown, but they again disagreed among themselves on interservice apportionment and asked Lovett for a decision. Favoring the balanced approach to equipping NATO forces, the Army and Navy chiefs wanted to assign only $1.125 billion to Title I air programs, while the Air Force claimed
to need $1.625 billion to reach a proportionate force level in 1956. Despite their continuing argument over Title I materiel, the Joint Chiefs agreed that the $5.9 billion budget ceiling for FY 1954 could not meet the military requirements for all areas of the program, and their recommendations were conditional on the NATO annual review.\textsuperscript{56}

Given the president's timetable, Foster tentatively approved the Army-Navy position and authorized the Air Force to submit data for the extra $500 million it wanted, but he delayed making a final decision. Quickly prepared by the military services and supported by the JCS on the basis of the MRC 12 force goals, the initial FY 1954 military assistance budget request went to Harriman's office in August and from there to the BoB.\textsuperscript{57} Although Defense limited its basic request to the ceiling figure of $5.9 billion, it submitted separate requests for more than $1.2 billion in additional money—$500 million for the Air Force, $298 million for ammunition and unit equipment for the Army, $100 million for naval escorts and minesweepers for the Navy, $100 million for a Middle East emergency stockpile fund, and $233 million for the U.S. share of NATO infrastructure costs. Much of this additional program fell into the category of possible offshore procurement. Total Defense submissions for FY 1954 funds thus amounted to approximately $7.1 billion.\textsuperscript{58}

When Ohly sent the Pentagon's military assistance proposals to BoB on 18 November, he raised a number of questions while recommending holding the total amount to $5.6 billion. Unhappy that the FY 1954 budget had failed to take into account large deficiencies in the non-NATO requirements of the British, he also considered the French situation sufficiently grave to require Cabinet-level review. Unless the United States supported a French buildup greater than German rearmament under NATO, he foresaw the possibility that the French might withdraw from Indochina and scuttle the European Defense Community treaty, thereby keeping Germany out of NATO and creating a deep schism in Western European ranks. He supported the use of military assistance to help the French in Indochina, regarding the war there "in many respects . . . as crucial, and perhaps more crucial, to the free world than the war in Korea." In general, Ohly thought that sending sophisticated weapons to countries unable to maintain and operate them independently would eventually make those countries dependent on U.S. aid for a long period. He viewed the large program for the Chinese Nationalists as a mistake unless their purely defensive mission was changed, and he believed the Japanese could not use more than $300 million in the face of popular disapproval of rearmament.\textsuperscript{59} Ohly supported the use of military assistance money for offshore procurement, thus emphasizing the economic aspects of military assistance.

On 17 December Lovett learned that BoB was cutting military assistance
to $4.2 billion, largely because of the anticipated huge amount of unspent FY 1953 funds. The bureau disallowed the Air Force's $500 million program, the extra naval ships, Army ammunition reserves, a Spanish program, and the Middle East stockpile. It severely cut funds for Japan and practically eliminated those for Latin America. Like Ohly, BoB viewed MRC 12 NATO force goals as unrealistically high in the light of expected European troop shortfalls and held that higher U.S. production rates in 1953 would make early funding of long-lead-time items less urgent. Unlike Ohly, BoB saw no requirement for additional offshore procurement in Europe.

In the Pentagon, Ohly's letter alarmed Nash; he feared that reductions in end-items and training would cut those programs by almost $2 billion, while more offshore procurement would increase DoD burdens. Defense also expressed concern about the drastic cuts in the Japanese program and Middle East stockpile. Pessimistic after the BoB cut in December, Nash's office felt a $4.2 billion budget request for FY 1954 military assistance would undoubtedly end up as a congressional appropriation of $3.2 billion or less, an "unacceptable" prospect. Diagnosing the FY 1954 budget problem as the result of having set unrealistically high NATO force goals, McNeil nonetheless agreed that the request should be kept sufficiently large to avoid its emasculation by further congressional cuts. In blunt terms, this meant a military assistance request of at least $5.2 billion in order to maintain some assurance of a $4.2 billion appropriation.

After Foster held strategy conferences with McNeil, Nash's people, Harriman, and others, Defense presented the case for restitution to Lawton on 20 December. After a second meeting two days later, the group met with the president. In these meetings Foster and Harriman defended a total FY 1954 military assistance budget of almost $5.7 billion. They sought to reinsert more than a billion dollars for Title 1 items, including money for the special Air Force program, ships, Army ammunition, and German and Spanish requirements. Foster argued that a $5.7 billion military assistance program could support an offshore procurement program of not more than $1.2 billion. To reach the $1.5 billion that Harriman and Ohly wanted, another $350 million would have to be added to the military assistance budget.

Although OSD thought that Truman favored the BoB position, he restored all the requested funds except for the additional $350 million. Defense now expected its FY 1954 budget request for military assistance to be in the neighborhood of $5.7 billion. On 9 January 1953, in a final annual budget message to Congress, the president again listed a one-line, estimated FY 1954 foreign assistance budget of $7.6 billion in new obligational authority. That same day Harriman's office notified the Pentagon that it was assigning only $5.16 billion for military assistance, not including two separately listed
programs of $120 million for Spain and $200 million for infrastructure. Furthermore, within a Title I allotment of $3.8 billion, $1.5 billion was to be used for offshore procurement. OSD took issue and the argument remained unresolved when Lovett left office on 20 January. It did appear, however, that Defense had succeeded in maintaining a considerable margin of safety against possible future congressional cuts. The issue awaited decision by President-elect Eisenhower.

The military services, JCS, OSD, the president, and Congress occupied ascending rungs on a ladder representing a range of decisions on military assistance requirements and costs. Between the often “worst-case” requirements and costs stated by the military and the known disposition of Congress to cut requested funds, OSD and the president had to find a formula that would bridge the gap. This was especially difficult for the secretary of defense, who had to defend military requests before the BoB and the president and impose the latter’s budget decisions on the military.

Marshall and Lovett frequently found themselves forced to make hard choices between competing demands for money and materiel. Pressured by the Joint Chiefs and the services from one side to meet the requirements of the U.S. military establishment first, and by Harriman and the mutual security people from the other side to speed up and increase foreign military assistance, they had to find ways of apportioning scarce resources equitably. On occasion, they overruled or modified JCS positions; on other occasions they opposed the demands of Harriman and his staff. It was a thankless task, earning them criticism from all sides, including Congress and the public. Under the circumstances, it was impossible to satisfy everybody, for it was a case of attempting too much with too little.

Experience during World War II and in the State Department during 1947–49 had given Marshall and Lovett an informed perspective of the international scene that predisposed them to favor collective security. Only a decade earlier Marshall, then U.S. Army chief of staff, had acquiesced in the transfer of scarce Army weapons and equipment to Britain, not without misgivings, because he accepted the overriding necessity of keeping Britain in the war against Germany in order to give the United States time to arm. Both men had supported U.S. lend-lease, which from 1941 on had armed many of the nations of the world in the struggle against Germany and Japan. In 1950–51 Marshall and Lovett fully understood the logic of arming allies and friends against the possibility of Soviet aggression in Europe and elsewhere. Their support of military assistance was thus wholehearted, tempered only by the more urgent demands of the Korean War and other high-priority U.S. programs.

The Korean War reversed the emphasis of U.S. foreign assistance, which
earlier had been more heavily weighted toward economic than military aid. Whereas the military assistance appropriation for FY 1950 ($1.3 billion) was about one-third the size of that for economic aid, in the three following years military assistance appropriations totaled about $15 billion as against $6 billion for economic aid. This trend continued only briefly after the Truman administration left office, and nonmilitary aid soon reached parity or better. The sudden influx of dollars for military assistance during 1951–53, however, represented an additional and complicating factor at a time when the Department of Defense also had to cope with the difficulties of equipping troops for the war in Korea and rearming U.S. troops generally. These circumstances, in turn, created major problems in implementing the military assistance programs and translating appropriated dollars into equipment in the hands of allies.
CHAPTER XXI

Implementing Military Assistance

The rapid and enormous increases in military assistance programs and appropriations after the start of the Korean War compounded existing problems and created new ones for the secretaries of defense. Since U.S. mobilization began in earnest only in December 1950, production and delivery of military equipment lagged far behind schedule during most of the rest of the war. Moreover, the military services frequently and legally mixed military assistance funds with regular military funds in procurement programs, thus creating additional problems in allocation of finished items. Much concerned with the needs of the Korean battlefield and U.S. rearmament, the services consistently accorded themselves priority over military assistance in allocating new equipment. This practice was difficult to condemn, for the demands of battle exercised a powerful compelling influence. The State Department and later the Office of the Director for Mutual Security, more responsive than the services to the needs of recipient countries, particularly in Europe, frequently exerted pressure to speed up military assistance deliveries. The secretaries of defense thus found themselves caught between strong and conflicting demands.

Statutory delegations of authority over military assistance matters to other departments and agencies circumscribed the role of the secretaries of defense in their oversight of the program within DoD. The State Department, the Office of the Director for Mutual Security, and the military services all had powerful voices in the making of policy and the operation of the program. Often lacking the power of final resolution, Marshall and Lovett had to negotiate and seek consensus in military assistance matters, frequently resorting to exhortation, particularly with the services, on such matters as the obligation and expenditure of funds and deliveries of materiel. Operating under volatile conditions and requirements, the secretaries of defense found
it impossible to meet the demands of foreign recipients and the ambitious goals set for the U.S. programs and consequently suffered the blame and harassments evoked by these failures.

Operations through June 1951

Although the original FY 1950 appropriation became law in October 1949, it was late January 1950 before the NATO countries signed the necessary bilateral agreements and Truman approved NATO's concept of an integrated defense, thus releasing the major part of Title I funds. But before the money could become available to the Department of Defense, it had to obtain approval for its detailed programs from the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC). Consequently, most FY 1950 money became available for obligation only when the fiscal year was almost over. By 30 June 1950 DoD reported that of the $1.3 billion FY 1950 appropriation, it had initiated supply action on approximately $478 million in materiel programs* and that it had shipped to port about $68 million in equipment, including excess stocks. Referring to FY 1950 deliveries in terms of measurement tons† rather than dollar cost, General Lemnitzer reported to a Senate committee that by the end of July 1950 the Title I countries of Europe had received over 95,000 tons of equipment plus 170 aircraft and 2 destroyer escort vessels; Greece and Turkey in Title II, almost 93,000 tons; and Iran, Korea, the Philippines, and countries in Southeast Asia, almost 12,000 tons and 58 aircraft. All told, deliveries amounted to 200,000 measurement tons plus aircraft and naval vessels.¹

Despite a brave public face, Lemnitzer privately became seriously concerned over the rate of deliveries once the Korean combat began, and he urged Secretary Johnson to speed up shipments. On 10 July Johnson emphasized to the secretaries of the military departments the need to accelerate MDAP deliveries, reminding them that they had received most of their FY 1950 MDAP funds and could also use some of the still-unappropriated funds in the regular $1.2 billion FY 1951 request.² Army Secretary Pace did not see how the Army could possibly meet the new Korean requirements and simultaneously supply MDAP equipment. Although Korea was an MDAP country, the Army had suspended MDAP shipments and was supporting the campaign there through regular service shipments that did not count as MDAP deliveries. Korea's priority under current conditions constituted only a temporary

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* On 2 August 1950 Lemnitzer claimed that Defense had obligated more than $950 million by 30 June 1950; Defense later reported having obligated more than $1 billion by that date.
† A measurement ton is usually reckoned at 40 cubic feet for cargo freight.
deviation, the Armed Forces Policy Council decided, from the principle that the services had to meet both their regular and MDAP commitments.⁵

In August Pace admitted that the Army’s performance had not been as good as he wished or intended to make it, but he pointed out to Johnson that substantial MDAP deliveries under the FY 1950 program could not be expected until late in the calendar year. Even repair of Army excess items took six to nine months because of slowdowns in delivery of spare parts.⁴ Late and inadequate military assistance deliveries, as Lemnitzer reported to Johnson earlier, occurred because current and expected production rates of U.S. industry could not satisfy the triple requirements of Korean operations, U.S. rearmament, and military assistance. The primacy of Korean needs was incontestable, and except in special cases where the JCS intervened, the services met MDAP requirements only after meeting U.S. operational, training, and reserve requirements. Acting on a suggestion from Lemnitzer, Johnson asked the JCS to establish a general supply priority for MDAP equipment and to set up the machinery and procedures for allocating critical items in short supply.⁵

Reviewing the priorities problem, the Joint Chiefs asserted that their Joint Munitions Allocation Committee should handle the matter and agreed to add Lemnitzer as a nonvoting advisory member. In October they assigned first priority to operations in Korea, followed by other JCS-determined operational requirements and minimum U.S. national security requirements. Military assistance deliveries received second priority, with NATO countries taking preference. The JCS recognized, however, that political and foreign policy considerations might override the strict application of their priority system, which Secretary Marshall approved on 7 November.⁶

Two special cases had already arisen. On 14 September the Joint Chiefs concluded that Formosa’s supply priority should be “above all military assistance programs other than those in direct support of operations in Korea,” and a month later they recommended the same priority for equipment going to the French in Indochina. On 29 December the JCS recommended placing Indochina at the very top of priority two and including Formosa with the NATO countries. Still, all MDAP shipments remained in priority two.⁷

The Army had additional problems. In September 1950 Pace informed Johnson that price increases were forcing cuts in MDAP procurement, including spare parts needed for equipment already overseas, and that he would have to use FY 1951 MDAP money to cover the deficit. He was assured of assistance when the need arose.⁸ At the same time, regular Army requirements outran the appropriations, and Lemnitzer, at the suggestion of John Ohly, then MDAP deputy director, asked the FMACC about a temporary “loan” of available MDAP funds to get regular Army procurement started. Believing that the loan would speed up the letting of contracts and thus help expand the
U.S. industrial base and produce quicker military assistance deliveries in the long run. Ohly suggested that State immediately make available to the Pentagon MDAP funds already tentatively earmarked for the Army MDAP program plus an additional $1.2 billion of FY 1951 MDAP funds. Since the Army would use the money mainly for interchangeable items, it could repay the military assistance program later with Army-funded items or, for items not common to both programs, by transferring regular funds received later.\(^9\)

On 28 September, after approval by the president, Marshall authorized Pace to go ahead.\(^10\) This allocation, plus another of more than $800 million for medium and light tanks, gave the Army authority to use almost $2 billion in FY 1951 MDAP funds for its own needs only a few days after submission of the official Defense request. Lemnitzer thought the speed with which the money became available would “permanently silence the critics of the present MDAP organization.” This prediction proved inaccurate, but the agreement demonstrated the ability of State and Defense to cut through red tape in time of need. The Air Force received a similar advance somewhat later.\(^11\)

Absorbed in Korean War matters, it was 8 December before the Joint Chiefs recommended to Marshall that most of the $4 billion supplemental MDAP FY 1951 funds be used for materiel.\(^7\) They also warned that deliveries of MDAP materiel would be slow—the Korean War had already absorbed available equipment and further deliveries would have to come from new production subject to long lead times.\(^12\)

Of the $5.2 billion appropriated for MDAP in FY 1951, approximately $5.0 billion became available to Defense by the end of the fiscal year on 30 June 1951. Of this amount, DoD had obligated $4.4 billion but spent only $896 million. Adding FY 1950 and FY 1951 funds together for a total of more than $6.5 billion, Defense had received for use $6.2 billion, of which it had placed contracts for over 88 percent ($5.5 billion) but spent only 15 percent ($946 million).\(^13\) Reporting to Senate committees on 27 July, Marshall did not emphasize dollar amounts but stressed the 1.6 million measurement tons that had been sent abroad—including more than 4,500 tanks and combat vehicles, 2,900 major artillery pieces, and 19,000 general purpose vehicles—plus 900 aircraft and more than 190 naval vessels and small craft. Marshall indicated that these deliveries, which included excess equipment, had completed about

\(^*\) In Title I the JCS recommended that France receive the largest grant—$1.184 million—while $420 million was to go to the United Kingdom, $378 million to Belgium and Luxembourg, $324 million to the Netherlands, $247 million to Italy, $335 million to Denmark, Norway, and Portugal, and $200 million was to start a stockpile for a possible West German army. They allowed $400 million for additional military production and $10 million for administration. In Title II the JCS recommended $96 million for Greece, $83 million for Turkey, and $15 million for Iran. They did not divide $270 million in Title III assistance at that time. Training for all countries came to $15 million, and there was $25 million for contingencies.
Implementing Military Assistance

80 percent of the FY 1950 program and had made a good start on the FY 1951 program. He expected Defense to complete FY 1950 deliveries by the end of December 1951 and the FY 1951 program, with the exception of some long-lead-time items, by the end of December 1952.\(^{14}\)

**The Quest for Deliveries in FY 1952**

By the end of December 1951 the receipt of new FY 1952 appropriations of more than $5.7 billion swelled the cumulative funds for military assistance to almost $12.3 billion, less adjustments of about $800 million, for a total of about $11.5 billion. At this halfway point in the fiscal year, State had allocated to Defense $9.6 billion, of which the services had obligated 71 percent ($6.9 billion) but had spent less than 19 percent ($1.8 billion). (See Table 21.) Only $1.6 billion in end items, including excess stocks, had been shipped. Obviously, completed country deliveries did not even begin to fulfill the programs for fiscal years 1950 and 1951, let alone FY 1952.\(^{15}\)

In February 1952 Ohly informed Nash of his concern about the Pentagon’s “extremely low obligation rate.” Fearing that failure to obligate all FY 1952 funds might lead Congress to cut the FY 1953 budget request, Nash asked for a speedup in the allocation of funds to Defense and assured Ohly that the services expected to obligate large amounts in relatively few contract awards. Complaining about frequent program adjustments, Nash wrote that each one involved “re-examination of program procurement plans in every item affected and a recommencing of the entire process of procurement negotiation on the eve of anticipated date of award.” Nash saw another potential problem in the large amount of money earmarked for overseas procurement, where it might take longer to negotiate contracts, and even then items might eventually have to be reprogrammed for U.S. procurement.\(^{16}\)

Although Nash defended the services against outside criticism of their performance, Lovett took up the matter with the secretaries of the military departments in March, asking them to correct a performance “below what it should be.” Relying on service assurances, Lovett informed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 19 March that except for $300-400 million DoD would obligate all military assistance funds by the end of June 1952.\(^{17}\) For March, the services reported obligations of almost $1.2 billion, the largest to date.\(^{18}\) During April Lovett continued to exhort the secretaries in personal conversations and at AFPC meetings, but Nash’s staff remained dubious about reaching the June goal.\(^{19}\) April obligations for the three services totaled an incredibly low $3.1 million. Exasperated, Lovett warned Finletter that the Air Force could not continue to operate on the premise that military assistance
was established and is continuing primarily to extend the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces." During May the services obligated only $351 million, but in June they reported an astounding $2 billion.26

By the end of June 1952 a considerable statistical improvement had occurred. Of the $11.5 billion three-year cumulative total, $11.4 billion had been allocated to Defense, of which $11.05 billion (97 percent) had been obligated. Ostensibly, the services had achieved a major victory since they had placed about $5.6 billion under obligation during FY 1952, but only the most liberal interpretation of obligations by the services made the June figure possible. Although Nash appeared relieved and gratified, Harriman's office was wary, and Ohly later termed the June obligational record a "spectacular triumph in the area of legerdemain" by the services rather than a meeting of all legal contractual requirements. It is unknown to what extent deobligations subsequently occurred, but they may have been considerable since monthly obligations averaged only $67 million for the ensuing five months, whereas those for the first five months of 1952 had averaged about $437 million.21

Whatever the success in obligating FY 1952 funds, cumulative equipment deliveries—based on total three-year expenditures of slightly more than $3.2 billion, or about 28 percent of appropriated and allocated funds—fell well below U.S. and foreign expectations. For the rest of Lovett's term, deliveries remained the central deficiency in the military assistance program. A year earlier, in July 1951, the JCS had recommended that the secretary take urgent measures to accelerate deliveries. But when Marshall asked in late August about giving the military assistance program a higher priority rating, the Joint Chiefs declined, and in October reaffirmed it as a secondary priority. To produce more materiel for military assistance, they suggested expansion of U.S. production and increased offshore procurement.22 At the president's request, Lovett took no action on these suggestions. When Acheson pointed out at an NSC meeting on 17 October that military assistance deliveries lagged far behind schedule, Lovett stated that there were no more excess U.S. stocks to send, that it would take time to get new production, and that, furthermore, the European countries were not complaining. On 23 October Lovett sent the president a review of the delivery problem.24

Already aware of the problem, the president verbally instructed DoD officials during a visit by Eisenhower to Washington in November 1951 to see that NATO's equipment needs were met. When the NATO Temporary Council Committee recommended in early December that NATO establish its own system of priorities for MDAP end items, the United States agreed, since it would help in relating MDAP deliveries to country military capabilities. SHAPE subsequently prepared priorities for army and air force units, and in time SACLANT prepared a naval priority list.24
At a Cabinet meeting on 21 December Truman expressed impatience at the failure to get military equipment into the hands of U.S. allies. He asked for special attention to Western European defense and reiterated that Eisenhower was to have the same priority as U.S. divisions for equipment except for the overriding priority for Korea. The president pointedly remarked that the military services were "contracting for MDAP but taking the end items for themselves, if it suited them." Lovett considered the remark unfair but promised to do all possible to meet the targets; by April 1952 he had come to the same conclusion as the president. For the present, he informed the services of Truman's view that "those who would have to fight first should get equipment first." On 9 January 1952 Truman put his oral directive into writing. Materiel in current inventories or produced in 1952 was to be available for military assistance subject only to the needs of Korea or other JCS-determined active combat areas and to the limits of appropriated funds. The president directed Lovett and Harriman to work out the details of a new allocation policy. 25

High expectations in recipient countries and implied U.S. promises, particularly in NATO, also aggravated delivery problems. The Temporary Council Committee had estimated that it would require U.S. expenditures of $9.8 billion for Europe alone during FY 1952 and FY 1953 to provide sufficient military assistance deliveries to achieve the force goals later approved at the NATO Lisbon meeting in February 1952. Worldwide, the requirement was for a two-year MDAP expenditure of $12 billion, $3 billion each six months, more than tripling the expenditures of the July–December 1951 period. 26 On 21 January 1952 Truman projected expenditures of $4 billion in FY 1952 and $8 billion in FY 1953. At the time, foreign aid experts considered $4 billion "unduly optimistic" for FY 1952; they saw $3.2 billion or $3.3 billion as closer to the mark. 27

Whether the expenditure of $4 billion was absolutely necessary in FY 1952 was not altogether clear. When Nash's staff could not determine if all the needed U.S. equipment could be supplied for the TCC-planned 1952 NATO units, he asked what effect delivery arrears had thus far had on NATO growth. At the end of February 1952 a JAMAG study indicated there had been no delays in activating NATO units up to December 1951 but that it was becoming increasingly difficult to achieve satisfactory combat readiness. At the start of 1952 European NATO countries had the equivalent of 44½ divisions in existence, but only 11 were reasonably combat effective, while 13 suffered to some degree from lack of equipment. JAMAG thought future delivery failures would have an increasingly adverse effect. 28

By March 1952 Lovett realized that both Truman's $4 billion expenditure figure and the $3.2 billion one were unrealistic. Using new service estimates
in congressional testimony, Lovett lowered the expected FY 1952 MDAP expenditures figure to $2.7 billion. Harriman’s staff considered this lower figure a “tremendous blow” since it fell short of target figures already below what they deemed necessary for the planned forces in Europe. By April Lovett’s $2.7 billion figure itself appeared unrealizable, and $2.3 billion seemed more likely. Noting that expenditures had not varied much from November 1951 to April 1952, Harriman’s office concluded that Defense had failed to take “vigorous steps to carry out the President’s directives.”

Aware of the growing criticism from Harriman’s office, Lovett exhorted the services at AFPC meetings, by directives, and through his Office of Military Assistance to speed up expenditures and deliveries. Nevertheless, at the end of April 1952, with but two months left in the fiscal year, the services still needed to expend another $1 billion to keep Lovett’s $2.7 billion promise for FY 1952. Since newly allocated equipment items took from 45 to 60 days to go through the delivery system under the most favorable conditions, Defense would have to effect immediate shipment and then instantly process the documents to meet the deadline. On 1 May Lovett again asked the service secretaries to hasten expenditures and outlined several possible actions. As a final option he suggested that the services might include as expenditures finished materiel waiting in depots for shipment to port whenever port storage or shipping space became available. This would create additional outlays and thus help to make a better statistical showing.

Even with such exceptional measures, total MDAP expenditures for FY 1952 amounted to slightly under $2.3 billion. Though this figure far exceeded the total of $946 million spent before FY 1952, it did not spare Defense from severe criticism, since the Pentagon still had $8.2 billion left in appropriated and allocated funds before receiving FY 1953 money. FY 1952 outlays of less than $2.3 billion also meant that the next year’s expenditures would have to be at the extraordinary level of $9.7 billion to reach Truman’s promise of $12 billion in expenditures for the two years. At the same time, Defense estimates of probable FY 1953 spending were falling, not rising. Although Lovett in March 1952 had projected to Congress a $7.7 billion MDAP expenditure level for FY 1953, Defense officials spoke in terms of $6 billion by April and of $5 billion by August. Within weeks, the estimates sank to $3.7 billion, and even this came under question after the president’s decision in October to augment South Korean forces.

The problem did not appear to have an easy solution. Military assistance users had little chance of obtaining U.S.-produced materiel in competition with higher priority claimants. The Air Force had diverted military assistance aircraft to Korea and the Air Training Command, and the Army had suspended all military assistance shipments of mortar and artillery ammunition except to
Implementing Military Assistance

Indochina. Searching the records of the Army Allocations Committee, Nash verified the insufficiency of equipment to meet requirements, and in August 1952 he told Lovett that U.S. industrial output could not satisfy military requirements.\(^{46}\)

Nash's worries increased when he discovered that the value of actual MDAP shipments fell well below the expenditures rate, and on 26 August he asked McNeil to investigate. The comptroller's office reported that the higher expenditure figure resulted mainly from advance and progress payments on contracts, but the situation was extremely complicated. In some cases, indeed, expenditures had not even been recorded.\(^{57}\) Whatever the reasons, the low rate of MDAP expenditures in FY 1952 and the slower rate of deliveries projected for FY 1953 placed Defense in an embarrassing predicament. Closely watching the disappointing trend of deliveries, Harriman had urged Lovett and Foster in July 1952 to seek remedies. One of his own correctives called for higher priorities for military assistance equipment, particularly for Europe.\(^{58}\)

**Battles over Priority**

The competition for military equipment among a large number of powerful claimants focused greater attention on the establishment of priorities for allocation of U.S. munitions production. With Harriman arguing the case for larger and speedier military assistance shipments to the NATO countries and exerting pressure on Defense to make a better showing, the machinery and methods for making allocations came increasingly into question. The JCS and the military services, occupying a central position in the process, were reluctant to accept changes that might diminish their dominant role in setting priorities, allocating equipment, and according delivery preference to U.S. units over military assistance recipients.

When Truman in January 1952 directed Lovett and Harriman to work out an allocation policy to provide adequate equipment for the NATO forces that would fight first in the event of war, Lovett immediately asked the services to carry out the president's directive. The Navy, with a relatively low MDAP commitment, reported that it could comply without materially affecting its own goals. Pace expected the Army to fill Eisenhower's needs by the end of 1952 except for electronics equipment, combat vehicles, and ammunition, but he feared that the new policy might affect the planned activation of the Army's own forces and its ability to respond in case of global war. Finletter told Lovett that the Air Force had integrated military assistance into its priority system, thus placing NATO requirements on a par with USAF direct contribu-
tion units. What caught Lovett's eye, however, was that the Air Force also planned to accord its strategic and air defense forces priority over NATO and other military assistance requirements, justifying its action as "fully in consonance" with the president's directive to equip first those who would fight first.lovett felt uneasy about the effect of the president's directive, particularly if European countries did not clearly understand the overriding priority to be given to Korea and other combat areas. Nash wrote Harriman to this effect in early February, and Lovett planned to explain the caveat at the Lisbon meeting later that month.t0 To Harriman's request for detailed delivery information on a monthly basis, Lovett replied that the figures were not available and that quarterly reports would have to suffice. He thought use of monthly figures in NATO would be counterproductive and advocated a "broad brush treatment" when discussing future equipment deliveries.t1

Determined that there be no misunderstanding about U.S. intent to maintain control over U.S. resources, Lovett asked the Joint Chiefs for their proposal for putting a NATO priority system into effect. Such a system, he thought, should at least ensure that equipment went only to units in being and with sufficient manning and training to warrant deliveries. Agreeing with the secretary, the Joint Chiefs spelled out their criteria and reminded Lovett that NATO commanders and the Standing Group could only make "recommendations concerning the relative priority needs of the major NATO commands."t2

In March the Joint Chiefs presented Lovett with a new priority policy to meet the president's January directive. They gave top preference to UN and U.S. forces engaged in Korean operations or in other JCS-determined active combat areas, currently Indochina. Second priority included all U.S., NATO, and German forces scheduled for D-Day operations in NATO areas; strategic air warfare operations; air defense and antiaircraft defense of the United States and Canada; and minimum support and training requirements for those forces. Third priority went to all other U.S., NATO, and German forces for deployment in or embarkation to operational areas by D + 30 days, including service support; approved increments of Japanese defense forces; and high priority requirements for Austria, Yugoslavia, Formosa, and Spain. Three lower priorities accounted for all other claimants. The Joint Chiefs specified that no equipment was to be furnished any foreign country at a rate greater than it could be profitably utilized, and they acknowledged the need for flexibility in operating the priorities system.t5

Approving with only minor changes both the JCS criteria for NATO priority recommendations and their priority categories. Deputy Secretary Foster forwarded them to Harriman on 31 March. t1 Harriman, who wanted to speed up military assistance shipments to NATO, immediately raised questions
about relative priorities of U.S. and NATO forces, seeking justification for the preference accorded certain U.S. forces. Still, he felt that the JCS recommendations represented real progress and asked for Lovett’s earliest comments so that they could prepare a priorities statement for Truman.  

When Lovett sent Harriman’s questions to the Joint Chiefs, they reminded the secretary that they had intended their recommendations as general policy guidance. Holding to their original categories, the JCS defended the high priority for certain U.S. forces not assigned to Europe or NATO as essential to U.S. and NATO security and consistent with equipping first those who would fight first. They agreed, however, that U.S. air defense and antiaircraft defense forces in the second priority should be limited to those units scheduled to operate at the outbreak of hostilities. Minimum training requirements were to be included in the same priority band as the force they supported. Lovett replied to Harriman along these lines on 21 May.

When Harriman continued to question priorities for some categories of D-Day to D + 30 forces, Lovett supported the Joint Chiefs in their refusal to consider changes. Still unconvinced, Harriman reluctantly agreed on a report to the president. Finally, on 11 October, more than nine months after Truman’s original request, Harriman and Lovett signed a letter that generally adhered to the JCS views.

Despite the delay, completion of a U.S. system of military priorities proved timely since SACEUR and SACLANT priority lists were of little value. Nash found that they made little distinction among competitive claims and placed most units in the top priority band. Since Harriman’s staff and the State Department shared this view, the JCS priorities system remained the major basis for allocating military assistance end items.

Earlier, Lovett and Foster had decided to examine the Pentagon machinery for allocating new weapons production. In the fall of 1951 Nash had asked his predecessor, General Burns, to come back from retirement to examine the Pentagon’s procedures. Nash endorsed Burns’s recommendation that a high-level committee be established for that purpose, but General McNarney opposed the proposal as unnecessary. In August 1952 Lovett definitely decided against bringing in a high-level official to deal with allocation but still pondered whether to establish a council in his office.

The creation of a high-level OSD group to review military priorities and allocations had much appeal. Not only did Lovett want OSD staff members to have a more direct connection with the process, but an OSD council would provide an appropriate forum for Harriman’s participation without letting him get into the real process of deciding specific deliveries. Despite the JCS position that lagging deliveries resulted from lagging production rather than failure of the priorities or allocations machinery, Lovett established on 4
October a Munitions Allocation Council to advise and assist him in discharging his statutory duty to set "priorities in the procurement, delivery and allocation of military equipment." Chaired by Foster, the seven-member civilian council included Nash, McNeil, Munitions Board Chairman Small, and the service under secretaries, with a standing invitation to Harriman, who attended the first meeting on 14 October. At this session Nash explained that the council would not change current Defense allocation practices but instead would deal with broad policy questions.

Although the Munitions Allocation Council came into being because of repeated complaints about deliveries, it actually provided little more than a forum for discussion of issues. After a few meetings, Harriman was disenchanted. When military assistance expenditures for the first six months of FY 1953 (July–December 1952) reached only $1.6 billion—a yearly rate of $3.2 billion—Harriman prepared a long memorandum in January 1953 for the next secretary of defense. He recommended reorganization of the council with a strong staff and a high-level director empowered to take action and with review by the director for mutual security of staff work prior to meetings. This document, signed at the end of both his and Lovett's term in office, reflected Harriman's deep disappointment at the slowness of military assistance deliveries.

**Offshore Procurement**

Continuing difficulties in delivery of sufficient U.S.-produced items to military assistance recipients persuaded Harriman's office to make strenuous efforts to procure large amounts of military goods abroad. Normally, U.S. forces stationed abroad engaged in some local procurement, mainly for perishable items. The practice was expanded to include hardware items in the United Kingdom following talks between Truman and Churchill in January 1952 and as a result of an agreement between Lovett and Ismay at Lisbon in February. But all these programs utilized regular Defense appropriations rather than military assistance funds. Prior to mid-1951, little direct contracting with European suppliers for military assistance items occurred, although neither the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 nor the Mutual Security Act of 1951 contained preclusive "Buy American" provisions. By mid-1951, however, an offshore procurement program (OSP) for military assistance seemed to promise not only faster deliveries of materiel, lower transportation costs, a larger NATO production base, and a lessening of demands on U.S. plants, but also a means of increasing European countries' dollar credits and solving some of their economic and financial problems. Some American
Implementing Military Assistance

Implementing the program proved immensely complex. Special offshore procurement agreements had to be reached before contracts could be let, and decisions had to be made on whether to let contracts directly with foreign firms or through foreign governments. Many European producers needed help in getting machine tools, dies, drawings, and other equipment for production lines; Harriman’s permission had to be obtained to include such costs in the program. Pricing problems arose because U.S. law allowed a rate only 10 percent higher than the American price, even though the latter might not be truly comparable. European firms objected strongly to the standard renegotiation clause in U.S. contracts, and a blanket exemption had to be worked out with the U.S. Renegotiation Board. Arrangements had to be made for the method and currency of financing and payment, and in some cases preproduction loans had to be concluded. Foreign taxes were also a problem; Lovett’s decision that no military assistance funds should be used to pay such taxes resulted in long negotiations with foreign countries. As Nash informed Lovett in April 1952, it had required seven months to arrive at a “position where contracting officers were free to devote their full attention to the technical aspects of contract placement.” Despite congressional impatience, however, he urged Lovett to maintain an “orderly method of doing business offshore” in order to protect against waste and fraud.

The military services generally preferred to keep contracts within the
United States, where they were closely meshed with regular procurement contracts and administration was easier. Domestic production also permitted greater security against intelligence leaks or sabotage and better control over production lines. Offshore procurement diverted funds from U.S. plants and to some extent affected both the steady growth of production and the ability of plants to expand in event of need for full mobilization. In March 1952 Under Secretary of the Air Force Gilpatric protested to Lovett that any further diversion of military assistance funds from U.S. aircraft production to offshore procurement in FY 1952 or FY 1953 would adversely affect both regular and military assistance programs from January 1953 through 1955. Some officials speculated that the Army was so anxious to keep its production lines moving with military assistance funds that it might stall offshore procurement indefinitely. With contracts let by mid-April for only $34 million of an approved program of $618 million in offshore procurement, the Munitions Board wondered whether the services were just ineffective or refusing to “carry through with the spirit of top level policy.” By the end of June 1952, however, OSD reported that a total of $443 million in OSP contracts had been placed under the FY 1952 MDAP program, plus $177 million under the French Lisbon program. Six months later, the FY 1952 program total had reached $639 million.

Meanwhile, in reaction to plans to increase the offshore procurement program to $1 billion in FY 1953, both OSD and the military services felt that an offshore level of $600 million to $700 million would be quite sufficient. In October 1952, however, Harriman and Draper told Defense officials that this amount fell below the minimum needed to keep the European NATO countries going. Harriman directed Defense to place more than $1.2 billion in MDAP contracts with European plants during FY 1953.

The French in particular needed a larger offshore procurement program to help defray the costs of their share of NATO forces and infrastructure. Disappointed at the low level of U.S. support and confronted by inflation, soaring costs for Indochina, and an overwhelming 1.400 billion franc budget, the French felt they would have to cut their NATO military production unless they received more help. In March 1952 Pleven asked the United States to purchase tanks, armored cars, radar equipment, naval vessels, and aircraft through offshore procurement.

In the Pentagon, Lovett’s special assistant, William Pawley, wrote the secretary that he doubted the near-collapse of French heavy industry and suggested that possible offshore procurement of items on the Pleven list

* The larger sum included $155.3 million for France, $65.3 million for the United Kingdom, and $138.7 million for Italy.
Implementing Military Assistance

Implementing Military Assistance

should form the basis of a quid pro quo for use in future negotiations. However, after Acheson informed the French that the United States would make every effort to provide offshore procurement to maintain the “maximum output of items most needed for Indochina and NATO,” Lovett expressed doubt that there were many “quids” left. In May, when the French provided a new, $623 million list of items they planned to cancel unless the United States assumed the contracts, U.S. military and economic representatives in France reduced the list to $243 million and then Washington pared it to $186 million.

Visiting Washington in June, French Minister of State Jean Letourneau pushed for more than $500 million in U.S. economic and military support for FY 1953. The United States informally agreed to make an additional allotment of $150 million in FY 1953 military aid for Indochina. DoD wanted to include this amount in the $500 million program, but Harriman’s office insisted that the agreement meant an increase in the FY 1953 figure to $650 million.

Meanwhile, the administration made no decision on the Pleven list. When the French protested Defense cuts in the list, Foster claimed the entire $186 million list would have to be funded within the $650 million total for FY 1953. By August Pleven was concerned that the $186 million might simply vanish into thin air. In OSD, Olmsted recommended a total French aid package of not more than $500 million in all FY 1953, with the Defense share held to $200 million. Anticipating reduced appropriations, Harriman’s Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee recommended on 7 October a total of only $525 million in economic and military aid for France. In approving this figure, Harriman stipulated that the $255 million military assistance portion (later reduced to $217.5 million) should be procured in France. While the military tended to resent this as a transfer of funds from a military assistance program to an economic aid program, Deputy Secretary Foster, with his long background in the Marshall Plan program, understood well the difficult problems that the U.S. cut augured for a French government that earlier had made public a $650 million U.S. support level. Maj. Gen. George J. Richards, the MAAG chief in Paris, believed, however, that the French would accept the lower figure.

Nash directed that negotiations begin immediately for $99 million in offshore ammunition contracts. The French and U.S. staffs in Paris began work within a week, but no contracts followed, partly because French prices were high and French companies had technical difficulties in producing U.S.-type ammunition. Visiting Pleven in December 1952, Lovett went to great lengths to explain U.S. contracting problems, but he also conceded deficiencies at home. Although U.S. representatives agreed later in December to procure French-type ammunition, no contracts were signed during Lovett’s tenure.
Assistance to the British also became a matter of urgency during Lovett's time in office. The United States provided relatively little economic assistance to Britain during fiscal years 1950 and 1951 and planned none for fiscal year 1952. Since Britain seemed able to meet most of its own military needs, U.S. military aid for fiscal years 1950 through 1952 amounted to less than $762 million. By the fall of 1951, however, it seemed clear that financial difficulties would force the British to cut their NATO defense programs in order to reduce dollar outlays for raw materials and allow the production of exportable items that would gain dollar credits. In January 1952 the United States decided to supply the British with $300 million in FY 1952 economic aid. The tentatively planned program for FY 1953 provided about $600 million in economic aid and approximately $300 million in military aid. After congressional cuts in the FY 1953 foreign aid budget, the United States adjusted the British program to approximately $400 million in economic aid (defense support) and about $360 million for military assistance. Used for offshore procurement, military assistance would enable the United Kingdom to earn dollar credits.

Hoping that contracts could be placed quickly, the British government in March proposed U.S. purchases of Centurion tanks, fighter aircraft, and other items. In June the United States decided to buy, as a top priority item as soon as FY 1953 funds became available, 535 British Centurions for delivery to Holland and Denmark as U.S. military assistance. Harriman approved the program in September, and by the end of the year DoD placed contracts worth $90 million for tanks and related ammunition, undoubtedly one of the fastest transactions made during FY 1953. By the end of February 1953, however, FY 1953 offshore procurement in the United Kingdom had reached only $98.5 million.

In the meantime, the United States sought to expand offshore procurement elsewhere in Europe. At the time of the Centurion proposal, the British had also offered to sell aircraft; later they sent a detailed proposal for a $200 million U.S. purchase of 740 aircraft for use by NATO forces. Because the French also sought to sell aircraft, the NATO Defense Production Board studied the matter. By the summer of 1952, the board and NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay proposed a complicated deal that included part of the Pleven proposal and called for production of 1,700 aircraft and spare parts for which the United States was to pay $225 million in military assistance funds, while seven European NATO countries would pay $175 million and take delivery of the aircraft. The United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium were to produce the aircraft; together with Denmark and Norway, they would be the future users. In July the Americans agreed to commit the $225 million provided that the other countries would indeed participate.
In Washington, the aircraft proposal reopened questions about offshore procurement. Air Force leaders criticized the aircraft proposal as political in nature. Moreover, it did not provide for adequate spare parts and ground support equipment, and was overly optimistic about prices and deliveries. Unwilling to procure “these foreign aircraft,” the Air Force wanted Draper’s office in Paris to perform the task. Lovett and Nash meanwhile pressured Finletter to support the program. At a September meeting in Paris that McNeil and Nash both attended, Draper’s office consented to reduce the number of aircraft from 1,700 to 1,100 in order to provide money for adequate spare parts and logistical support, and Under Secretary Gilpatric reluctantly agreed that the Air Force would undertake procurement provided several conditions were met. Nash called the meeting “bloody but useful” and reported that OSD would continue its support for the program. Easing the burden on military assistance funds, Harriman’s office agreed that $75 million should be a defense support (economic aid) contribution, making the military share of the $225 million package only $150 million.

On this basis, U.S.-British procurement negotiations began before the end of 1952, and by the spring of 1953 the British share increased from $63 million to more than $159 million for 465 planes. On 19 January 1953, his last full day in office, Foster authorized placing a firm contract with the French for 140 aircraft at $52 million—an offer raised in the spring of 1953 to cover 225 aircraft at a cost of more than $86 million. As Lovett and Foster left office, the Ismay-Batt aircraft proposal was still in the nature of an experiment.

Although it had been thought that U.S. and European ammunition deliveries would yield a 60-day combat reserve for U.S.-type weapons in NATO, at the end of 1951 ammunition and explosives loomed as the most serious of NATO’s military deficiencies. Without even considering future German requirements, planners expected the ammunition gap to reach $839 million by mid-1952, $2.27 billion by mid-1953, and $5.34 billion by mid-1955. The situation did not improve during 1952, when the combined effect of exceedingly heavy ammunition expenditures in Korea and the domestic U.S. steel strike caused the suspension of shipments of artillery and mortar ammunition to all military assistance recipients except Indochina. Should war break out in Europe between July 1952 and June 1953, Army studies revealed that there would be shortages for 18 months in five critical types of U.S.-produced ammunition. European plants lacked the capacity to produce U.S.-type ammunition, could not produce sufficient European-type

* Aircraft were to be selected on the basis of recommendations by Air Force evaluation teams, OSD directives would prescribe specifications and terms of purchase, foreign governments would perform all contract administration, and U.S. acceptance of aircraft would be based on their acceptance by the country that produced them.
ammunition, and needed an additional plant investment of approximately $1.45 billion to meet wartime requirements.\textsuperscript{85} Pointing to the seriousness of the situation and the time needed to expand European production capacity, in June 1952 Foster urged on the Mutual Security Agency an immediate start, with financing by the individual NATO countries and, if it became necessary, help from defense support funds.\textsuperscript{86}

Meanwhile, the United States tried to expand European ammunition production through the use of military assistance funds for offshore procurement, letting almost $200 million in contracts for the purpose in FY 1952. FY 1953 priority commitments included $99 million for ammunition procurement in France and $16 million for ammunition in the Centurion tank program in the United Kingdom. In addition, DoD accepted further offshore procurement of approximately $200 million of ammunition in Europe, bringing the FY 1953 total for this item to more than $300 million.\textsuperscript{87}

By the fall of 1952, however, there was danger that offshore procurement might be regarded as a panacea for many European economic problems. Fearing possible political repercussions from high levels of unemployment in Italy, Harriman asked Foster to take "prompt and vigorous action, and if necessary by resort to extraordinary procedures," to place additional offshore contracts in Italy. Shortly thereafter Acheson wrote Lovett that State was thinking in terms of $207 million.\textsuperscript{88} Defense considered the amount excessive and the Army, which had difficulty finding Italian producers able to bid within 110 percent of U.S. prices, the legally permissible differential, refused to waive the restriction unless ordered to do so. Harriman again urged Foster to place at least $150 million in such contracts by March, plus contracts for the $26 million Italian share of the aircraft program. At the end of December 1952, however, FY 1953 offshore procurement in Italy amounted to only $42 million.\textsuperscript{89}

With Harriman and Draper present, the Pentagon's Munitions Allocation Council on 8 January 1953 agreed to accept Draper's recommendation that bids be solicited from all European countries on the total amount of offshore procurement contracts authorized and the Italians then be given an opportunity to meet the most acceptable bids up to $150 million. If the procedure failed to yield $150 million in Italian contracts, DoD was to consult with Harriman to see whether premium prices should be paid in order to achieve the goal.\textsuperscript{90} By March 1953 offshore procurement contracts in Italy for FY 1953 reached only $57 million; in May they totaled $145 million, and a contract followed late that month for $32 million for approximately 50 jet aircraft. Fears about the effect of delays dissipated when the Italian election in June returned to power the pro-NATO Christian Democrats.\textsuperscript{91}

Lovett and other OSD officials found themselves in the unenviable position of being pressured on the one side by Harriman and on the other by
the military services. Of the large $1.2 billion offshore procurement program planned for FY 1953, Defense had officially placed only $178 million in contracts by the end of January 1953 when Lovett left office. By mid-1953, however, combined offshore procurement contracts for fiscal years 1952 and 1953 had reached $2.2 billion, of which the Army handled approximately $1.3 billion. Recipients included 15 European countries, with France receiving contracts for $1.1 billion, almost half of the two-year total; the United Kingdom, $452 million; and Italy, $367 million.92

The Legacy of Military Assistance

By January 1953 more than three years had passed since the first military assistance appropriation, and it was possible to assess some of the program's achievements, failures, and problems.

The training area, which received less than 2 percent of the total funds, showed few major problems and substantial accomplishments.93 With the start of military assistance, the MAAGs had quickly initiated training programs to instruct European personnel in the operation and maintenance of U.S. equipment. In the first year of military assistance 12,100 foreign students attended U.S. military training courses, 8,200 in the United States and 3,900 in U.S. installations in Germany.94 By the end of 1952 almost 21,800 foreign nationals—14,200 from Europe, 5,400 from the Middle East, and 2,200 from Asia—had completed courses, either in the United States or overseas; another 5,000 were attending courses. It was hoped that trained persons would in turn be able to teach others in their own country. To continue the military training mission, there were 137 U.S. mobile teams, with 45 more being readied. In early 1953 General Handy felt that European training, which he believed had equal importance with the provision of materiel, had improved greatly since the start of the program.95

By contrast, at the end of 1952, after three years of military assistance operations, the materiel program in which OSD was so heavily involved had a record of limited achievement. Of the $15.6 billion appropriated, approximately $14.3 billion was available to the Pentagon, of which the services had obligated almost $12 billion. But total expenditures—including the training program, administrative costs, and various preproduction expenses, as well as end items—amounted to only $4.8 billion, or less than 34 percent of the money available to Defense. In fact, less than $4 billion worth of equipment, or about 28 percent, had actually been shipped to port, including $554 million of excess stocks not charged to the program.96

Although Eisenhower and Ridgway had ample justification for their concern about the slippage of military assistance deliveries, by the end of
1952 NATO strength, excluding Greek, Turkish, and German forces, had made substantial but mixed progress toward development of a combat-worthy force. Lisbon goals for the initial combat forces had been met, but the M + 30 force objective of 50-plus divisions had slipped by 4½ European divisions. Of those divisions in existence, 10½ were considered not up to combat standard, and only the British had totally met the force goals in numbers and effectiveness. Nash could not determine the extent to which lack of U.S. deliveries might have caused the slippage. U.S. investigation indicated that equipment lags had not prevented the activation of any European units during 1952 but might in some instances have retarded training and had indeed kept some units from reaching combat effectiveness.95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 21</th>
<th>Defense Action on Military Assistance</th>
<th>(in billions of dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1950</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriated by Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 50</td>
<td></td>
<td>$1.3140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1951</td>
<td>[5.2225]</td>
<td>Available to DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 50</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.1431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 51</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.2365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1952</td>
<td>[5.7440]</td>
<td>Obligated by DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustments</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.8017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.4788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 51</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.6161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 52</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.4241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1953</td>
<td>[4.2198]</td>
<td>Expended by DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustments</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.6570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 52</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.2883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 53</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.5001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The delivery gap centered on certain items. Army items in short supply in Europe included Centurion tanks as well as U.S.-produced antiaircraft equipment, medium artillery and ammunition, recoilless rifles, mortars, and communications equipment. U.S. military men viewed ammunition reserves
in Europe as dangerously low and believed the cause lay in low production rates and the higher U.S. priorities for Korean and Indochinese needs. In general, naval goals for the end of 1952 were reached, although there were some shortages in electronics equipment, minesweepers, and ammunition. Air Force deficiencies included radar and communications equipment, support equipment, personal flying equipment, and T-33 aircraft—critical items in the United States as well as in Europe.98

From Europe Eisenhower had emphasized the insufficiency of military assistance deliveries, but Lovett knew that the next administration would find itself as concerned with other military assistance problems. Perhaps the most persistent and difficult problem that Lovett had to face involved balancing military assistance requirements against the needs of the U.S. military services. Truman had been aware that, beyond genuine war claims, the services used the MDAP program to help reequip their own forces. Not without reason, the services had initially viewed the program as a means of disposing of obsolete excess and reserve equipment and of upgrading their own equipment by buying better replacements; after the start of the Korean War they tended to see strong military assistance claims as a threat to their own rearmament. Notwithstanding the war's demands, the services sent almost $4 billion of military equipment to other countries by the end of December 1952, most of this after June 1950. This was no mean feat in view of the low level of U.S. military production at the start of the conflict.

Lovett's office continually had to arbitrate the claims of adherents of unilateral U.S. rearmament and of those favoring collective rearmament. The issue was not necessarily clear, for there were serious questions raised about U.S. dependence on collective security. Could recipient countries rearmed at the expense of U.S. forces be relied on to help the United States in time of need? Conversely, did U.S. military assistance imply a guarantee of military support should recipient countries become involved in war? The questions were clear, the answers more elusive.

Stockpiling arms for a future West German army—which the Defense Department strongly favored—remained a matter of conjecture in the face of the French and German failure to ratify the European Defense Community treaty by the end of 1952. Moreover, the high cost of a conventional NATO defense discouraged many Europeans, with some looking to atomic weapons as the quick, easy, and cheap way to create a proper deterrent. Neither Europe nor the United States had yet faced the full implications of such a policy. On the other hand, whatever the decision on use of atomic weapons, how much stretchout of military assistance for conventional rearmament was safe?

The military assistance programs also raised policy questions involving social, political, and economic effects in Europe. Did political expediency
justify the use of less efficient foreign producers for offshore procurement? Would the provision of technologically sophisticated weapons to countries lacking a strong production base lead to their long-term dependence on the United States? Was it wise to give military assistance to anti-Communist countries that were also undemocratic? Despite the eagerness of many governments to receive U.S. military assistance, the rearmament thus supported might be sowing the seeds of U.S. unpopularity abroad. No one seemed to know precisely how to address these potentially unfortunate ramifications.

Both the questions and the problems indicated the magnitude of the U.S. effort and the nature of the achievement. Certainly no European defense effort sufficient to provide even a minimal deterrent could have been conceived and built at this time without U.S. military assistance. Created in 1949, the U.S. military assistance program, whatever its shortcomings, was of sufficient size and accomplishment, along with its older partner program of economic aid, to lend credence to Truman's claim on leaving office that it would stand as one of the "dramatic and historic accomplishments in the twentieth century struggle for peace and decency for mankind."
CHAPTER XXII

OSD Nuclear Responsibilities

The secretary of defense possesses no responsibilities of greater import than those for nuclear weapons. During the Korean War years he dealt with all major questions of national nuclear policy, both as a member of the National Security Council and of its Special Committee on Atomic Energy, which also included the secretary of state and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). On the international scene, the secretary of defense served as one of the U.S. representatives on the Combined Policy Committee (CPC), which also included British and Canadian members and set policies for tripartite cooperation.

The Korean War greatly increased U.S. apprehension about Soviet and Chinese intentions, thereby contributing powerfully to the decisions for a major buildup of the U.S. military establishment and particularly the intensified emphasis on procuring and deploying atomic weapons. The war seemed to vindicate Truman's decisions in January 1950 to explore development of an H-bomb and to expand the production of atomic weapons, and it focused attention on the adequacy of these programs. The growing number and diversity of atomic weapon programs and the pressures from many sides created a number of critical policy issues, particularly concerning custody, deployment, and use of atomic weapons, expansion of programs, and exchange of nuclear information with foreign countries. OSD and the Atomic Energy Commission clashed directly and frequently over these issues.

The unstable and threatening international situation and the overall expansion of U.S. military power had the effect of strengthening Defense's voice in policy matters and reinforced the military's aggressive efforts to enhance its atomic weapons role. The AEC saw itself as the defender of civilian control over atomic energy against military assaults seeking to capture significant elements of its functions. Fighting a defensive battle against a much larger and
more influential foe, the AEC eventually had to yield some of its operations to DoD, but it continued to assert the principle of civilian control. President Truman, the arbiter of the issues between the AEC and the military, wholeheartedly believed in civilian control of atomic energy, but he found it necessary to permit the enlargement of military participation in atomic policy and operational matters.

If the Department of Defense sought an expanded role in atomic matters, the most fervent and forceful advocacy of the most far-reaching proposals for expansion of nuclear forces came from the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), Sen. Brien McMahon, who crusaded with missionary zeal almost until the day of his death in July 1952. To Secretary Lovett's question of how much was enough, it seemed clear that McMahon's answer was that there could never be enough.

**Pentagon Arrangements**

Although the AEC had responsibility for developing, refining, producing, and storing atomic weapons as well as for developing the far more powerful fusion-type hydrogen bomb, the Department of Defense participated importantly in such programs at many levels. The Joint Chiefs of Staff set military requirements for nuclear weapons and advised the president and secretary of defense concerning their use. The military services had the mission of delivering weapons on target when and if the president so ordered. They also performed research and development work to improve existing delivery systems and develop new ones. Through the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), the services helped to maintain AEC-held atomic weapons. Exercising overall policy direction within DoD, the secretary could turn to the Atomic Energy Committee of the Research and Development Board for review of service plans for research and development and to the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission (MLC) for information on AEC views and actions and for recommendations on general policy questions.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 had established the MLC as a liaison organization, but the AEC tended to view it as a pro-military voice seeking a larger role for the military services in atomic energy matters. Determined to resist such intrusion, the AEC criticized the MLC's handling of the liaison function. To neutralize this criticism, the MLC chairman, Robert LeBaron, suggested that the AEC commissioners be kept informed of military developments. In December 1950 Lovett invited the commissioners to attend OSD morning briefings, but this gesture apparently did not succeed in relieving the tension in the AEC–Defense relationship.¹
To define MLC authority more fully, Marshall on 17 January 1951 gave the committee a new directive reaffirming its responsibility as his principal agency in atomic energy matters and enjoining it to keep the AEC "fully informed of all atomic energy activities of the Department of Defense." Marshall further enlarged LeBaron's role by appointing him to act as "Deputy to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Matters" whenever he was specifically representing the secretary or the department with external agencies, and "Coordinator and Staff Advisor for Atomic Energy Matters" within the secretary's office. Following Marshall's directive, LeBaron began submitting periodic reports on DoD activities to the AEC, but this action also failed to improve the MLC's standing with the commission.

Intervention at times by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, especially Senator McMahon, further complicated DoD and MLC affairs. In February 1952, for example, McMahon complained to Lovett about the MLC chairman's low Pentagon status, eighteenth in rank below the secretary, and the relatively low rank of the committee's military members, most of whom were one- or two-star officers. McMahon planned to offer an amendment to make the MLC chairman an assistant secretary of defense for atomic energy and to create similar positions in the military departments. This plan provided that the committee would then consist of the new assistant secretary of defense as chairman, the three new service assistant secretaries, and three military representatives of "not less than" three-star rank.

Responding diplomatically, Lovett expressed "considerable reservation" about McMahon's plan. He pointed out that LeBaron already had access to the secretary equal to that of other principal assistants, as well as direct contact with the secretaries of the military departments. Lovett noted that he personally kept much closer control over atomic energy matters than over other matters under principal assistants, and handled actions himself because of their sensitivity. Since the current military MLC members included each service's senior atomic energy officer and one of its senior operations officers, Lovett thought that appointment of three-star officers would confront the services with the problem of finding qualified high-ranking men. Furthermore, he assured McMahon, frequent discussions in the Armed Forces Policy Council gave the secretary of defense a balance of military and civilian advice on atomic energy matters.

Since Lovett was sensitive to congressional opinion, it was probably not wholly coincidental that he issued a new MLC directive on 8 March, less than a month later, making the chairman his "principal advisor and assistant . . . on the political, economic, and scientific aspects of atomic energy matters." LeBaron's power of decision remained limited to matters on which the committee could not reach unanimous agreement, and dissenting members could still appeal his decisions. In view of criticism of MLC from the scientific and academic communities, particularly among those who opposed the thermonuclear project, program supporters considered it obligatory that Lovett back LeBaron fully. The secretary, however, took no further steps to elevate LeBaron's position. 6

Exchange of Atomic Information

At the international level, Defense had to deal with significant questions concerning the exchange of atomic information among the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, questions which seriously affected relationships. The British and Americans had cooperated closely during World War II to develop an atomic bomb, agreeing in 1943 at Quebec not to use the bomb against each other and to obtain mutual consent before using the bomb against, or giving information to, a third party. With Canada, they set up a tripartite Combined Policy Committee (CPC) to perform certain duties such as the allocation of materials and facilities for a mutually agreed program. At Quebec in September 1944 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed to full collaboration in developing military and commercial uses of fissionable material after the war. 7 Apparently unaware of either Quebec agreement, 8 Congress in 1946 passed the Atomic Energy Act, which severely restricted the exchange of atomic information with any nation. Representatives of the three powers, with Lovett participating as acting secretary of state, resolved this contradiction in January 1948 when they agreed on a modus vivendi to last until the end of 1949. It allowed limited exchange of scientific and technical information and provided a means for allocating available ore among the countries. The Combined Policy Committee continued to meet, its

* Acheson wrote that he learned of the Quebec agreements in February 1946; he briefed Senators Vandenberg and Hickenlooper sometime that summer. James Forrestal evidently learned of the agreements in July 1947, shortly before he became first secretary of defense. The United States never officially confirmed the 1943 agreement.
† The CPC in January 1948 agreed on nine basic areas for exchange of information: declassification, health and safety, isotopes, fundamental properties of elements, long-range detection, reactor materials, extraction chemistry, natural uranium reactors, and research experience with low-power reactors.
three U.S. members including the AEC chairman, secretary of state, and secretary of defense.\textsuperscript{9}

The strict limitations on information exchange in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 proved extremely troublesome. Although the administration did not want to help the British produce atomic weapons, it reacted positively in September 1948 when the British requested a substantial broadening of the information exchange. Congress refused to expand the limits prescribed in the act but did agree to an extension of the modus vivendi.\textsuperscript{10} Members of Congress, including the JCAE, became more receptive to greater tripartite cooperation after the first Soviet atomic explosion became public knowledge in September 1949. Their opposition stiffened again with news of the arrest of Klaus Fuchs in England in February 1950. Secretary Johnson proposed suspension of tripartite talks pending development of a U.S. policy acceptable to both the executive and legislative branches. In April an interim allocation of raw atomic materials was effected by an exchange of letters between Acheson and the British ambassador. Convinced that any expanded information exchange required amendment of the Atomic Energy Act, Johnson remained an obstacle to increased tripartite cooperation until his departure in September.\textsuperscript{11}

In September 1950 the U.S. members of the CPC tried to resolve a number of issues plaguing the tripartite relationship and, specifically, to respond to a British request for ore. AEC Chairman Gordon Dean, who thought the British plan to produce atomic weapons a waste of time and materials, suggested that the United States acquire the British plutonium output for weapon fabrication and in return supply the British with atomic weapons. General Bradley favored this arrangement but doubted that the British would stop their production effort completely. Dean's suggested arrangement would require amendment of the Atomic Energy Act, an unlikely event in the near future. Johnson agreed to Acheson's suggestion that Defense propose recommendations for a U.S. position on British–American cooperation on atomic weapons, and the JCS asked the MLC to prepare a draft.\textsuperscript{12}

The MLC proposed basically an exchange of British plutonium for finished U.S. atomic weapons plus limited U.S. information. Eager to persuade the British to forgo weapons manufacture, the Joint Chiefs agreed to the MLC proposition.\textsuperscript{13} Sending the Defense plan to the other U.S. members of the CPC on 31 January 1951, Secretary Marshall hoped for an interagency consensus that would permit the three nations to proceed to formal agreement. He specifically noted, however, that an extension of cooperation or information exchange should "include adequate security provisions, and remain within the limitations of pertinent legal authority." Marshall was aware that Dean wanted to amend the Atomic Energy Act to allow more cooperation.\textsuperscript{14}
The AEC drafted an amendment allowing the commission to give other nations any material or information that the commission, with NSC consent, determined would promote U.S. security. Arguing that decisions on information exchanges should be made by the president, some DoD officials feared that the proposed amendment would result in release of too much information and still not permit the desired weapons for plutonium trade. On the surface, Defense and AEC objectives seemed to be close, but LeBaron thought the commission wanted an "outright exchange of data," whereas Defense wanted a quid pro quo and a strictly military exchange. After the defections to the Soviet Union of British diplomats Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess in the late spring of 1951, the Joint Chiefs supported LeBaron, and the Pentagon position hardened. When Dean, at a meeting with Lovett and LeBaron in June, again asked for DoD support of the amendment, Lovett expressed his fears about British security. Dean found the situation ironic, since he thought that the Defense-favored plan to give the British finished atomic weapons would involve giving the British both weapons and U.S. technical knowledge. According to Dean, Lovett was shocked by this possibility.

While Lovett and Dean debated broadening the information exchange, the British indicated that they desired a "completely reciprocal exchange" of certain kinds of atomic information and formally requested help in testing a British atomic bomb the next year. Meeting with the U.S. members of the CPC on 24 August, Lovett displayed uneasiness at the possibility that helping with the British test would disclose information on U.S. weapons and thus go beyond existing law. Unless the test could be modified, he felt that DoD would have to withdraw its support. Dean agreed to make a counterproposal on the British test and again sought Defense support for the amendment, offering to exclude weapon information specifically. Both Lovett and Acheson thought Congress would refuse to ease security limitations, but the meeting ended with Lovett seemingly more inclined toward Dean's request. At a CPC meeting three days later, Lovett informed the British that assistance in their test would have to be conducted within the framework of existing U.S. law.

British security problems continued to worry LeBaron, as he wrote Marshall on 29 August after a trip to London. LeBaron thought that the British scientists who had most damaged security had defected for "mental reasons and other conditions that develop after they are in the job" and that governments lacked the analytical tools to screen these "complexities in

* MacLean had been head of the American department of the Foreign Office and British secretary of the Combined Policy Committee in 1947–48; Burgess had been second secretary of the British Embassy in Washington from August 1950 to May 1951. Both men fled on 26 May 1951, and the announcement came on 7 June. Their defection followed that of Dr. Bruno Portecorvo, like Fuchs a member of the Harwell atomic research establishment in England.
human character”; he thought there could be unknown potential defectors in the U.S. program as well.¹ Two days later he recommended that Defense withdraw its weapons-for-plutonium offer.¹⁹

In an informal communication to State and the AEC in mid-September, Bradley and LeBaron thought it most desirable that DoD handle atomic weapon matters, including information, “through existing military channels.” They opposed sponsorship of any changes in the Atomic Energy Act by the administration and wanted to be certain that information exchanges would “on balance add to our military position.” The two Soviet atomic explosions that followed did nothing to allay Defense fears. Noting the rapid Soviet progress, LeBaron wondered whether it represented their good fortune or “security leaks from the U.S. program.”²⁰

Lovett became increasingly concerned that a weapons-for-plutonium exchange would disclose too much information. On 18 September he informed the Joint Chiefs that he proposed to withdraw the Defense offer and to insist on handling future information disclosures on atomic weapons or operations through “direct military channels” rather than through the CPC. With JCS agreement, Lovett on 12 October formally notified Acheson that Defense did not consider the time propitious for legislative changes expanding cooperation with foreign governments in atomic matters and was withdrawing the weapons-for-plutonium offer. By year’s end the British, in turn, refused the U.S. counterproposal for testing their bomb; they carried out their test in Australia in early October 1952.²¹

The AEC redrafted its proposed amendment to extend the range of the modus vivendi, to allow limited exchange of information on technical matters underlying weapons development, and to set up a series of safeguards. It specifically excluded from the exchange any information related to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons. Grant of a foreign request would require the unanimous approval of the commission, AEC certification of the recipient nation’s security standards, an NSC recommendation in writing, the president’s approval, and 30 days notification to the JCAE.²²

With LeBaron protesting that the commission was acting unilaterally and that its amendment failed to safeguard vital information, Foster notified the NSC on 1 October that Defense wanted prior interdepartmental agreement before accepting the AEC proposal. Tensions mounted when OSD discovered that the Senate had ignored the Pentagon in its consideration of the AEC amendment. The House asked for DoD advice only on the day of its vote; after

* Indeed, Fuchs’s arrest in February 1950 had led to the disclosure of the American spy ring of Harry Gold, David Greenglass, Morton Sobol, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, all of whom were convicted. The Rosenbergs were found guilty in March 1951 of conspiracy to commit wartime espionage and executed in June 1953; Greenglass, Gold, and Sobol received prison terms.
discussion in the Armed Forces Policy Council, Defense decided it was useless to object. The AEC amendment became law on 30 October. The Joint Chiefs were deeply disturbed. When Foster sent Dean a formal protest on 2 December, he got back a detailed rebuttal. DoD officials, particularly LeBaron, thought that Dean had carefully planned with Senator McMahon to bypass Defense.

In general, the Joint Chiefs viewed extensions of cooperation that helped another nation's atomic energy position as basically incompatible with U.S. security interests. They felt that no other Allied nation had the resources to make a significant contribution to the atomic strength of the West; rather, other efforts would result in competition for ores and increase the risk of disclosure to the enemy. Still, on 20 November they proposed certain exceptions to Lovett. If the U.S. members of the CPC and the president unanimously approved, they thought the exchange of certain intelligence information and "carefully circumscribed scientific and technical data," but not weapons information, should be allowed. They also wanted permission—after securing the approval of the president as commander in chief but without NSC or congressional approval—to exchange weapons information essential for combined operations and to make an actual exchange of fissionable or weapon materials. Foster agreed and ordered the drafting of standby legislation. In June 1952, however, Lovett cautioned against any steps that might be construed as lessening the security of atomic information and materials, and in October he rejected a LeBaron-JCS request to forward the draft legislation.

After President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill agreed in January 1952 to explore the questions further and Dean indicated willingness to liberalize information exchanges, LeBaron remained unsympathetic. Trying to reopen the matter in late August, Dean pointedly asked whether the United States should compete or cooperate with the British and whether DoD, State, and the AEC should cooperate in an appraisal of the British security system. Lovett replied in October that on this matter he doubted the "wisdom of, or the need for any joint effort" with the AEC. It was ironic that some British officials apparently sympathized with Lovett's position. It was even more ironic that, preparing to tighten security procedures, Lovett could utilize the AEC amendment, which, as LeBaron observed, actually offered "better protection" than the modus vivendi. Accordingly, on 12 December Foster asked the U.S. members of the CPC to consider making all atomic information exchanges subject to the procedures of the AEC amendment.

* The United States had agreed in 1951 that physical security standards in Canada and the United Kingdom were comparable to its own. The problem was personnel security.
The whole issue of intergovernmental exchange of atomic information bespoke the deeply different philosophies of AEC and Defense, their divergent views on what national security required, and the increasing DoD fear that leaks of research secrets were fueling the Soviet program. In these aspects of what seemed a classic civil-military confrontation, the civilian secretary of defense was a determined defender of military security, all the more so as he perceived the political and military pitfalls that awaited the Department of Defense should additional U.S. atomic secrets be lost. Further liberalization of the Atomic Energy Act thus did not occur until 1954, under a new administration.  

**Deployment, Custody, and Use**

The Department of Defense stated requirements for nuclear weapons; and its operational forces, primarily the Strategic Air Command, stood ready to deliver them. Whether to use such weapons, however, remained the sole prerogative of the president. Defense helped to service atomic weapons, but it controlled no stockpile of ready weapons. Title or ownership remained by law in AEC hands; only the president could order the commission to hand over weapons or fissionable materials to the military.  

With the outbreak of war in Korea and heightened fears of a far greater conflict, military men wanted to deploy nonnuclear atomic bomb components to forward areas, so that in an emergency it would be necessary to bring in only the nuclear assemblies. In July 1950 the Joint Chiefs requested approval to store nonnuclear components abroad, and in August they proposed transfer of nonnuclear assemblies to aircraft carriers fitted to carry and maintain bombs. The president approved both requests, including transfer of nonnuclear components to the carrier *Coral Sea*. Later he agreed to nonnuclear transfers to additional carriers such as the *Franklin D. Roosevelt* and the *Midway*. AEC concerns about not being consulted on transfers of nuclear weapon components may have been allayed when Marshall in December established a procedure for sending Defense requests for atomic weapon transfers to the NSC Special Committee on Atomic Energy and stated that he would keep it informed of major transfers of weapons. In June 1952, the Joint Chiefs sought a progressive increase in the number of overseas locations for nonnuclear assemblies. Truman, who had strong misgivings, told Lovett in August that he would not approve forward deployment to areas where political stability or security measures were uncertain.

That same month Lovett asked the Joint Chiefs for their advice on the possible deployment of nuclear components to locations where nonnuclear assemblies were already in place. The JCS had rejected a similar proposal the year before. Answering this request, the Joint Chiefs divided. The Navy wanted to stock its carriers with complete assemblies, but the Air Force claimed that it did not have sufficient nuclear components for its own requirements. Just before leaving office in January 1953, Lovett asked for further JCS study. When several months later the Joint Chiefs agreed on the desirability of having assembled weapons, the secretary of defense and the president approved. Until then, the Joint Chiefs had been generally satisfied with storing nonnuclear components in aircraft carriers and at a few overseas locations and depending on delivery of nuclear components after the need arose.

The transfer of nonnuclear or even nuclear components for forward deployment raised less of an issue between the AEC and the Pentagon than the question of which should have overall custody of nuclear weapon stockpiles in the United States. The custody issue, indeed, occasioned a major inter-agency struggle as increasingly the JCS asked for military custody and control of at least part of the nuclear stockpile. Meeting with the MLC in March 1951, AEC chairman Dean seemed surprised to learn that military personnel had been "performing functional surveillance on the entire stockpile, including nuclear components, for some time." Concerned that AEC custody was an "empty concept," Dean believed that proper spheres of AEC-Defense responsibility should be established. He thought that Truman's decision in April to transfer a number of complete atomic weapons to the Air Force ended civilian control over part of the nation's war reserve. That summer DoD and AEC reached an agreement on managing the storage sites, but it was not immediately implemented and in any event did not solve the custody issue. In December the Joint Chiefs told Lovett that they found the current system of "divided responsibility . . . inimical to the best interests of the United States"; they wanted Defense to have direct custody of sufficient weapons to "assure operational flexibility and military readiness for use." When Lovett took the matter to Truman in late January 1952, the president turned to the NSC Special Committee. Dean held to the line that the AEC should retain all fissionable material for peaceful purposes; weapons lent to the military in emergencies still belonged to the AEC. Offended by the JCS claim that divided responsibility harmed U.S. interests, the commission officially stated in May that its plans for transferring atomic weapons in an emergency had been tested and that it had trained military personnel in its field service and stockpile activities. However, the AEC stood ready to discuss Defense custody provided the commission retained control over part of the
In June State supported placing some part of the weapons stockpile in the complete custody of the military, but only if DoD accepted proposed decisionmaking procedures on use of the atomic bomb. From now on, the two issues proceeded hand-in-hand.\textsuperscript{57}

U.S. policy prescribed that only the president could make a decision on use of atomic weapons. After the Korean War began, however, the NSC Special Committee began to consider what procedures should be followed in making such a decision. By late April 1951 a draft study, based mainly on a State Department paper, concluded that the president would want the prior views of the JCS chairman, the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, and the AEC chairman. The study stipulated that the Joint Chiefs should initiate or review any recommendation for use, explain the factors they considered, and identify the specific weapons to be employed. The president would then meet with the NSC Special Committee and the JCS chairman; if time allowed, the president would also consult with congressional leaders, other government departments, and appropriate foreign officials. Should the president decide to act, he would then direct the AEC chairman to give the armed forces a specific number of weapons, with the secretary of defense taking custody.\textsuperscript{58}

Replying to Marshall’s request for comments, the Joint Chiefs expressed both serious concern about an “undesirable and unnecessary” study and their determination to “record their non-concurrence.” They objected to having such a procedure imposed on their communication with the president and to interposition of the NSC Special Committee between the president and themselves. They conceded the president’s need for advice from the secretary of state, but not from the AEC chairman; they thought that security precautions precluded consultation with Congress and other groups. The Joint Chiefs asked Marshall to oppose any study on procedures to be followed in deciding on the use of atomic weapons. Marshall did not approve the current study, thus halting at least temporarily NSC consideration of the issue.\textsuperscript{59}

Confident of their competence to participate in decisions on use of atomic weapons, the AEC commissioners took the position that the MLC had neglected to inform them of all Defense activities concerning atomic energy and had thus failed to fulfill its statutory duties. LeBaron stood ready to review and improve MLC liaison activity. On the procedures issue, he believed that it had been on a “merry-go-round” with Marshall and the Joint Chiefs. In October 1951 he recommended that Lovett explore the subject with Bradley and examine JCS views on the “exact nature and scope of the unilateral military responsibility for the use of atomic weapons.” Although he recognized that the president would decide “when they should be initially used,” LeBaron believed that where and how were matters for the military to determine. Truman, he hoped, would support the Defense view.\textsuperscript{40}
On 3 November Lovett told Bradley that he felt the time had come to clarify Defense and AEC responsibilities. A month later the Joint Chiefs stated that, once the president had decided to use atomic weapons, the JCS should determine "where, how, in what numbers, and in what types . . . under the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces." LeBaron thought the JCS paper an "excellent statement" of Defense interests and recommended that Lovett and Bradley discuss it with Truman. But the president wanted the advice of the NSC Special Committee before considering the matter.11

Neither Acheson nor Dean would concede the JCS position; both upheld the NSC right to advise the president on the matter of use. In June 1952 the State Department declared that the role of the JCS as the president's principal military adviser was not at issue; the fact was that the president desired additional advice because of the political implications of decisions on use. State thus supported having "a reservoir of finished weapons in the complete custody of the military" but only if the decision to use such weapons was made under the procedures that it advocated. Acheson then resubmitted the procedures study in a slightly revised version and, with Truman's approval, called for a meeting.12

With Bradley in attendance, the NSC Special Committee on 17 June accepted the major elements of the procedures study; it also approved in principle military custody of a portion of the atomic weapons stockpile.13 In August the committee settled on a draft of "Agreed Concepts" giving it official sanction to advise the president on atomic weapon decisions involving production objectives, preparatory deployment, and use. The paper also stated that Defense "should have custodial responsibility for stocks of atomic weapons outside of the continental United States and for such numbers . . . in the continental United States as may be needed to assure operational flexibility and military readiness for use." The AEC would retain custody of the remainder. With Bradley's concurrence, Lovett voted in favor, and on 10 September the president approved the concepts as the basis for more detailed plans for implementation.14

In October 1952 LeBaron supported an Armed Forces Special Weapons Project study that recommended DoD custody of both nuclear and nonnuclear components overseas, aboard ship, and in the United States except for weapons undergoing quality control. While the AEC would retain legal title to all fissionable material, the study called for it to have actual custody of no more than 5 percent of the weapons stockpile.15 To satisfy JCS concern over divided responsibility, Lovett was prepared to ask the president to transfer all current and future atomic weapons in the stockpile to DoD custody, with accountability vested in the secretary of defense. But Acheson joined Dean in opposing such a move, and on 12 January 1953 Lovett asked for JCS
reconsideration. Replying on 11 March, after Lovett had left office, the Joint Chiefs again requested full DoD custody of all atomic weapons, but the NSC decided to postpone the transfer. In June, near the end of the Korean War, President Eisenhower approved transfer of custody to and deployment of nuclear components by the military to match the number of nonnuclear components. While the war inevitably had the effect of expanding the military role in deployment and custody of atomic weapons, it did not alter the principle of civilian dominance, particularly in the matter of possible use.

**Expanding the Atomic Weapons Stockpile**

The Soviet explosion of an atomic device in August 1949, followed by the North Korean attack in June 1950, created mounting demands for expansion of the atomic weapons stockpile. Senator McMahon, chairman of the JCAE, became a powerful spokesman for large-scale increases in atomic weapons, probably spurring administration officials into more far-reaching and earlier action than they might otherwise have taken.

While the AEC directed development and production of fissionable materials, Defense stated requirements for weapons. In 1947 the Joint Chiefs had established weapon goals through 1952; in May and June 1949 they set new goals through 1955, taking into account the increasingly efficient use of fissionable material. Before the Korean War, however, with ore supplies limited, the JCS expressed military requirements in terms of the amount of fissionable material the AEC could be expected to produce rather than in terms of actual military needs. Essentially two approaches to expansion were possible: reduce the raw materials needed to produce a weapon or find more sources of raw materials. The former approach was obviously preferable from the standpoint of economy since the greatest part of the cost went for fissionable materials. Moreover, not only would a smaller, more efficient bomb save money, but it would allow delivery by lighter planes, guided missiles, and artillery, expanding the roles of all the military services. By June 1950 AEC technological breakthroughs had begun to make possible large-scale expansion in production of the numbers and kinds of atomic bombs. However, the ores needed to produce plutonium and uranium 235, both involved in manufacturing the bomb, remained in relatively short supply, limiting production rates despite the technological advances.

Congress appropriated more than $2 billion for AEC programs under the FY 1949 and FY 1950 budgets. Following the Soviet atomic explosion in August 1949 and the decision to expand the fissionable materials program, Truman in January 1950 requested $600 million for FY 1951. In March
Secretary Johnson asked the JCS to reexamine long-range military atomic requirements in conjunction with work on NSC 68.¹⁹

At the same time, Senator McMahon complained to Johnson that “somewhat less than one-fortieth” of U.S. military spending since 1945 had gone for atomic weapons, exclusive of the means of delivery,* and asked whether he and the Joint Chiefs thought this adequate. When Johnson replied that neither he nor the Joint Chiefs could make a categorical judgment, McMahon demanded a straightforward answer and declared the question the most important on military policy of his senatorial career.⁵⁰ Prodded by yet another inquiry from the senator, Johnson, on the basis of an MLC–JCS draft, guardedly stated on 1 June 1950 that AEC production currently met the stated JCS requirements but not all possible contingencies. Adequacy could not be “judged with finality,” and Johnson thought the currently planned program consistent with available ore resources and overall U.S. defense expenditures.⁵¹ A few days later, Truman approved the construction of the first two reactors at the Savannah River (South Carolina) plutonium plant, asking for an additional $260 million. In September 1950, the third month of the Korean War, Congress appropriated almost $1 billion for an increased AEC budget for FY 1951 and later added $260 million in the first FY 1951 supplemental.⁵²

Questioning both the nature and adequacy of the planned expansion, McMahon asked LeBaron on 28 June 1950 whether anyone had requested the AEC to estimate how much it could increase the weapons stockpile at several levels of higher spending. When MLC and AEC officials appeared before McMahon’s committee on 21 July, Gordon Dean testified that the commission had been and was currently meeting the stated JCS requirements. Pointing out that the AEC was “off the hook,” LeBaron warned Johnson that the Pentagon was in a vulnerable position since the McMahon committee wanted to know the “yardstick that has been used in measuring these requirements. This is the adequacy of effort question.”⁵³

Although the Joint Chiefs believed that there was no “absolute weapon,” they argued that a stockpile of atomic weapons was “essential to the security of the United States as adjuncts to military forces in being.” On 1 August they advised Johnson that atomic production should be sharply accelerated. Johnson agreed and forwarded the JCS views to the president; then on 3

* From FY 1947 through FY 1952, the Air Force spent $25 billion, the Navy $17 billion, and the Army $13 billion—a total of $54 billion—on all programs related to atomic weapons. In 1952 alone this effort involved 440,000 military personnel, 220,000 civilians, and approximately $16 billion. (Memo ChMLC for DirJtStaff JCS, 15 Apr 52, w/enc. RG 330, “Congressional and Legislative” folder; ltr LeBaron to CHAE, 6 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 4”T 1.6 (A-Bomb); ltr SecDef to Rep Clarence Cannon (ChCte on Appropriations), 4 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 4”T 1.6.)
August McMahon asked Truman to double the current schedule. At Johnson's suggestion, Truman agreed to a joint AEC–Defense study of expansion and its national defense implications. With McMahon's prodding a report was ready by mid-September. It recommended no changes in FY 1953 objectives but sought an expanded commission program to meet new JCS goals set on 12 September for a much larger stockpile of bombs and fissionable material to be on hand by 1956. Although these goals were based mainly on military requirements, the Joint Chiefs were still influenced by what they believed the AEC could reasonably produce. Both the Munitions Board and the service secretaries thought the proposed expansion feasible, and on 18 September Johnson and Dean submitted the report to the NSC.

On 19 September, his last day in office, Johnson wrote McMahon that he thought the record now showed Defense support for the "production of the greatest number of atomic weapons that can be made available." McMahon wrote Marshall on 21 September that the JCAE believed a very large expansion of the U.S. atomic effort was necessary; the new secretary replied that the proposed program "seemed to cover all the available possibilities." Accepting the joint AEC–Defense draft report, the NSC Special Committee proposed roughly to double already authorized programs for both fissionable materials and atomic weapons at an estimated cost of almost $2.5 billion over six years. Although uranium ore remained in limited supply, the proposed program would meet the higher JCS requirements; it was also seen as consonant with NSC 68, reasonable in cost, feasible in schedule, consistent with the current rate of U.S. mobilization, and without significant negative impact on other programs. With the secretaries of the military departments in agreement, Marshall gave his approval to the report in the NSC.

On 9 October Truman approved the new expansion program recommended by the NSC Special Committee, cautioning against any public disclosure before completion of current consideration of NSC 68. When the Chinese intervened in Korea, the president requested and soon received an additional $1.06 billion AEC appropriation in the second supplemental FY 1951 request. Congress also added $59 million in the fourth FY 1951 supplemental, making the total AEC appropriation for the year more than $2.3 billion.

Despite these actions McMahon continued to express dissatisfaction with atomic progress and requested further details on military readiness. The Joint Chiefs objected for security reasons and, with the president's agreement, Marshall refused the senator on 2 April 1951. Responding to McMahon's suggestion that they consult informally on the matter, Marshall invited the senator to lunch on 5 July. Speaking at some length of the need to build "literally thousands and thousands" of atomic bombs to maximize U.S.
By this time conflicting views on further expansion had emerged in the administration. The AEC remained officially neutral, but Dean had considered the president's October 1950 expansion decision as the "maximum feasible program without exorbitant or unreasonable expenditure in the light of supplies of ore foreseeable at this time." Director of the Budget Lawton questioned the cost, necessity, and feasibility of further expansion. Indicating that AEC research had succeeded both in increasing the fissionable material output from existing capacity and reducing the amount of fissionable material required per atomic bomb, Lawton asked whether or not "ultimate war aims place a limit upon the extent of the use of atomic bombs."65

Undeterred by such questions, McMahon and the JCAE urged consideration of increases of 50, 100, 150 or more percent and thought it possible to procure all the ore wanted "provided we are willing to pay the price." McMahon also pressed for answers to new, tough questions about tactical atomic weapons.65 Attempts by Marshall and the JCS to blunt the effects of the senator's persistent demands did not work. Addressing the Senate on 18 September 1951, McMahon challenged the administration's adherence to costly conventional rearmament, a policy that he felt posed intolerable choices—military safety with economic disaster or economic safety with military disaster. Calling for the creation of an atomic army, navy, and air force, McMahon wanted $6 billion per year spent on atomic preparedness. By contrast, less than $1 billion had actually been spent in FY 1951. Congress had just appropriated $1.14 billion for FY 1952, with Truman currently seeking another $273 million.66

At Lovett's first Pentagon press conference as secretary of defense on 25 September 1951, he sought to counteract one widespread impression created by McMahon's speech—that tactical atomic weapons were about to supplant conventional ones. Urging reliance on "proved, tested, and available" weapons, Lovett declared that there was no "new, inexpensive, or magic way to win wars in the near future." Tactfully adding that Senator McMahon was "pointing the way to long-range objectives," Lovett won a generally good press.67 Still, Lovett and the Joint Chiefs supported a limited increase in fissionable materials production when they testified before the JCAE on 1 October. Lovett thought that getting a "good quick start" on atomic weapons might help to avoid a general war and prove to be the "cheapest insurance we ever bought as a nation."68 The White House announcements on 3 and 22
October of the second and third Soviet atomic explosions may have hastened congressional approval of two FY 1952 supplemental appropriations for the AEC—one for $266 million and another for $200 million, bringing the FY 1952 total to about $1.6 billion.69

A chain of events aggravated the expansion issue and further strained the uneasy triangular relationship among Defense, AEC, and the JCAE. In September 1951 LeBaron’s handling of a study on possible expansion in which he construed the AEC–Defense relationship as one of contractor and buyer irritated the AEC. Early in October the commission stated that it would have to be assured of high priorities for skilled manpower and critical materials before decisions on an expansion program could be made.70 Later in the month, the JCAE asked Defense and the AEC to complete within three months a plan to maximize the role of atomic energy in U.S. defense. The Joint Chiefs on 17 October adopted new goals requiring a major expansion of plutonium and uranium 235 production. Two days later LeBaron told Lovett that the JCS should state their “actual military requirements,” and he expressed serious concern that AEC stockpile schedules had not been met recently.71 Probably spurred by the third Soviet atomic explosion, McMahon called for an immediate, minimum production increase of 200 percent or more in both plutonium and uranium 235. Lovett replied that Defense would cooperate on a report for the JCAE and hoped by the end of the year to have a preliminary estimate of weapon requirements in terms of military need alone.72

AEC and Defense meanwhile began to study the possibility of an expansion program based on the interim JCS requirements of 17 October and the larger increase that McMahon proposed. Viewing the latter program as overambitious, the majority of AEC commissioners found the JCS intermediate program generally feasible but declined to recommend any expansion—less because of their concern over priorities than their desire to ensure an NSC discussion of the major questions involved. Lovett, on the other hand, was willing enough to argue the case in the NSC Special Committee but did not want to accord the AEC program special priority above military construction projects.73 Endorsing the JCS-recommended program to the NSC on 11 December, Lovett thought the president might well ask, “How much is enough?” Although he thought that the Joint Chiefs should never claim that a specific atomic stockpile would ensure U.S. safety and that any error should be “on the side of too much rather than too little,” Lovett added the caveat—“within our economic capabilities and the over-all defense effort.” Because of the AEC–Defense differences and the JCAE pressure, the NSC Special Committee presented all arguments orally to the president before submission of the formal proposal.74

At the White House meeting on 16 January 1952, when Lawton and ODM
Director Wilson joined Acheson, Dean, Lovett, and the president, tensions became apparent. Acheson had shown support for Defense, but costs worried Lawton, and Wilson expressed great concern about the heavy demands for equipment and critical materials for the program.\(^4\) To help with the Defense briefing, Lovett took with him General Hoyt Vandenberg, the Air Force chief of staff. They argued that in an emergency the military would require atomic weapons for U.S. defense, strategic operations in NATO, and large-scale tactical operations. Lovett stressed the "colossal savings" that atomic weapons would produce: The explosive effect of 1 ton of TNT costing $1,700 could be obtained from fissionable material costing only $23. He saw "almost limitless possibilities" for the future military use of fissionable materials. The JCS proposal to increase plutonium production by 50 percent and oralloy production by 150 percent took into account these possibilities, Lovett told Truman, and would create larger stockpiles of atomic weapons at earlier dates. Its impact on the U.S. economy would come mainly after completion of the conventional arms buildup.\(^5\)

The president wanted to know whether current disarmament negotiations might lead to an agreement with the Soviets. Acheson thought it highly unlikely and indicated his strong support of Lovett’s position. Dean reported that, although the AEC commissioners did not particularly favor the proposed expansion, they were not against it provided the issues were thoroughly explored. Intrigued by the possibility of substituting atomic for conventional weapons at some future time Wilson resolved his doubts and declared the program feasible. Finally, Truman pronounced his verdict: "We will do it."\(^6\)

Following the president’s decision, Lovett could give McMahon the report he had asked for; in fact, LeBaron had already nudged Lovett to act "before Senator McMahon’s concern and sense of responsibility reach a boiling point." In the report handed to the JCAE on 17 January, AEC and Defense agreed that McMahon’s expansion proposal was feasible but unrealistically high since it would not produce many more weapons than the 50/150- percent JCS plan in the next few years but would have a considerably greater impact on the economy. After several subsequent meetings with the AEC, the Joint Chiefs, and Lovett, McMahon still believed that the United States was going neither far enough nor fast enough with its atomic weapons program.\(^7\)

Certainly availability of ore no longer inhibited expansion. Even before LeBaron informed Lovett in April 1952 that the AEC did not seem to realize it was committed to doubling its procurement objective to 12,500 tons per year by 1961, Lovett had asked the NSC to explore the possibility of raising the goal to 15,000 tons annually. In September, when the AEC concurred in an annual goal of 12,500 tons to be reached as soon as possible, ore was coming from the Belgian Congo, Canada, and the United States, while South Africa,
Australia, and Portugal seemed to be promising future sources of supply. State and DoD agreed to the 12,500-ton annual goal as an interim target pending AEC study of the feasibility of a 15,000-ton goal.79

Money rather than the supply of ore was the key to the 1952 expansion. Although the administration lowered its $5.4 billion estimate for the undertaking, first to $4.6 billion (an AEC estimate) and then to $4.2 billion, not every senator was as anxious as McMahon to increase the AEC appropriation by even the reduced amount. The NSC reconfirmed the need for the expansion program, but Congress cut the regular AEC FY 1953 budget request by $174 million to $1.138 billion and provided slightly less than $3 billion in the first supplemental FY 1953 appropriation to take care of the expansion, making a total of about $4.1 billion.80 Even so, Dean assured Lovett in September 1952 that the commission could undertake the expansion program. With more than $8 billion appropriated for the AEC in the three fiscal years 1951 to 1953, DoD felt reasonably sure that there would soon be a sufficiency, even a surplus, of atomic weapons. By the end of 1952, in fact, LeBaron had less concern about the AEC expansion program than about the availability of military vehicles to deliver the atomic weapons.81

Development of Guided Missiles

The prospect of having more atomic weapons proved a powerful stimulant to guided missile research and development. The key remaining problems in mid-1950 were development of warheads light enough to be fitted to the missiles and the overall organization and direction of the competing missile programs of the military services.

From the end of World War II there had been high hopes of rapid progress in guided missile development and keen service competition in development efforts. But with money short, development expensive, and testing rudimentary, the era of guided missiles still remained just around the corner in 1950. The services were designing some missiles, including almost all those for air defense, to carry conventional warheads; other missiles, mainly offensive, were to carry atomic warheads. The services planned some missiles to cover thousands of miles; others were for short ranges, 100 or perhaps 200 miles. But in June 1950 not one guided missile was operational.82

The guided missile program suffered from too many cooks—the Research and Development Board to review and coordinate service programs, the Munitions Board to see that industrial capacity met military requirements, the JCS to adjust service requirements. In the case of atomic warheads, the RDB committee on atomic energy dealt with technological questions, the MLC
represented DoD policy interests, and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project represented Defense in operational matters with the AEC. In August 1950 Under Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball recommended that the secretary of defense establish an OSD director of guided missiles to coordinate all RDB, Munitions Board, and JCS positions. The secretaries of the military departments proposed establishing a DoD board for guided missiles. Marshall rejected the idea of a board, believing that it would infringe on JCS prerogatives and interfere with existing DoD machinery, but finally assured that Kimball's plan would involve no organizational duplication and not bypass any of the OSD statutory boards, he agreed to appoint a director to provide competent advice in managing the various guided missile programs.83

Truman took an active role in selecting the guided missiles director, personally recommending to the secretary of defense Kaufman T. Keller, chairman of the board of Chrysler Corporation. Keller, who planned to remain with Chrysler and to work part-time in the Pentagon without pay or expense money, wanted only a small staff and a knowledgeable and efficient full-time military deputy, preferably Kenneth D. Nichols, an Army major general with long experience in the atomic weapons project and an experienced operator in military circles. Nichols accepted appointment after Keller agreed to his stipulation that both of them should be present at all meetings concerning guided missiles.84

Although Nichols had earlier recommended an agency for guided missiles operating directly under the president, the situation in 1950 did not allow for anything so grandiose. Accordingly, Keller and Nichols took an entirely different approach in drafting a charter for the new office. As Nichols later recalled, they made Keller's role completely advisory: "About the only authority he had was to give orders to me." In real terms, however, Keller needed no other authority, since McNeil issued a directive barring the services from spending any money for production of guided missiles without the written approval of the secretary of defense, and Keller had made it evident that he would leave if the secretary did not accept his recommendations. Concentrating on production, Keller made first-hand inspections and determined, in conjunction with the services, which missiles were ready for manufacture. After fully coordinating the matter with all agencies, Nichols drafted recommendations for the secretary of defense, and Keller reviewed and edited the drafts. Often the two men went to see Truman (for whom Keller felt he worked despite his appointment by the secretary of defense) to tell him what they planned to present to Marshall or Lovett. Keller's recommendations generally had Truman's blessing before they reached the secretary, whose usual response was simply to sign the necessary directives. According to Nichols, Lovett considered this an efficient system.85
In mid-December 1950, only two months after he began his Pentagon duties, Keller reported to Marshall that the first definite production schedules would be ready in early 1951; a series of recommendations for the acceleration of specific programs soon followed. In July 1951 Keller reported to Truman that, although there was "progressive improvement," tangible results were scarce. Eight missiles were in some stage of production, but he could not predict when they would be ready for use. Keller thought that the actual work should continue in the military services, where approximately 15,000 in-house and contractor personnel were involved with guided missiles. By late summer 1951, Keller had recommended—or, as old Pentagon hands termed it, "Kellerized"—17 missiles for continuation or acceleration of research or for pilot production. By the end of 1951 he had reviewed 22 primary guided missile programs for potential usefulness, fulfilling Lovett's expectation that Keller's "practical judgment backed by unusual production experience" would considerably accelerate the missile program. His recommendation for pilot production of the Army's tactical Redstone missile, for example, gave the German scientists under Wernher von Braun at Huntsville, Alabama, their first opportunity to build real rockets in the United States. Keller remained in the Pentagon through Lovett's term and subsequently until September 1953.

Guided missile research and development gradually expanded during the Korean War years. Compared with $369 million spent on missile research and development before July 1950, the government spent $159 million in FY 1951, $255 million in FY 1952, and $275 million in FY 1953. Under the impetus of Keller's recommendations, the obligation of Defense funds for guided missile procurement soared, rising from $73.5 million before July 1950 to $471 million in FY 1951 and to $646 million and $765 million in the following two years. It seemed clear that guided missiles would become a vital part of the future atomic arsenal.

Production of Nonnuclear Components

As long as aircraft remained the delivery system, the problem of fitting the atomic weapon to the system was relatively simple, according to LeBaron. But approval of guided missiles for full production, as well as other developments, threatened to make the marriage of warhead to delivery vehicle more complex. Some Pentagon officials felt that the AEC did not have the capacity

to handle an immediate large-scale program for adapting atomic warheads to special DoD weapons; they also criticized the work of some AEC contractors. The prospect of having more nuclear than nonnuclear assemblies for particular weapons caused additional concern.90

In July 1951 LeBaron proposed an AEC–Defense survey to determine the extent to which the services could participate in designing, developing, and fabricating nonnuclear components. The commission readily agreed, and a joint group began work in November. However, the AEC representatives resented the Pentagon's view of the commission as a Defense contractor, and the working group dissatisfied LeBaron.91 When the joint working group failed to develop a proposal acceptable to DoD, Foster, taking up a suggestion by Secretary of the Navy Kimball, formed an ad hoc Defense committee to prepare a Pentagon position. The committee proposed that Defense eventually take over the development and manufacture of nonnuclear components from the AEC, a plan the AEC rejected in March 1952.92

In April, however, Dean told the Defense group that while little could be gained by giving sole responsibility to DoD, the AEC was willing for the services to take a primary interest in specific projects from time to time. Dean's suggestion did not satisfy LeBaron, who still thought the commission should produce only nuclear components and leave to the military services such technical problems as hardware, electronics, and marriage to vehicles. Lovett termed the situation a "fruitful source of irritating troubles" but refrained from any immediate action.93 In May Dean suggested assigning development, production, and stockpiling of nonnuclear components for new weapons to whichever agency could best accomplish the task. The DoD ad hoc committee hailed the proposal, and by mid-June the two agencies seemed near agreement.94

In September Le Baron switched tactics. He recommended to Foster and the secretaries of the military departments that DoD desist from seeking authority for development and manufacture of nonnuclear components. He now believed that changing circumstances, particularly the AEC's own probable unhappiness with large-scale munitions production, would eventually bring about the transfer of the responsibility to Defense without the latter having to push for the transfer. Privately, he told Foster that the AEC commissioners were warming to the notion of the changeover.95

The test came in October 1952 when Foster informed Dean that the Army wanted to take over production of nonnuclear components for the atomic artillery shell. Readily assenting, the AEC further suggested on 15 December that the Navy might want to produce another gun-type bomb. The changeover did not actually take place until after Lovett left office.96 President Eisenhower approved the transfer on 21 February 1953, and the AEC and Army
concluded an agreement on 5 June. By the end of 1953, the AEC also agreed that Defense should produce nonnuclear components for implosion as well as gun-type weapons.97

The Thermonuclear Test

In late January 1950, when the British first informed the United States of the pending arrest of Klaus Fuchs, the question of whether to proceed with U.S. development of a thermonuclear bomb had not yet been decided, but some work had been under way for several years. Since Fuchs had had access to U.S. scientific findings on the subject, American officials feared that he could have passed them to the Soviets, who might be far ahead on the road to an H-bomb. With these thoughts no doubt a factor, if not directly addressed in discussions, Truman directed the AEC on 31 January to continue work to determine the H-bomb's technical feasibility; the scale and rate of effort were to be decided jointly with Defense. Necessary ordnance developments and a delivery system were to go forward concurrently.98

On 24 February Johnson informed Truman that he supported the JCS request for “all-out development” of the bomb and its means of production and delivery. The NSC Special Committee also considered the matter of the greatest urgency. Truman approved on 10 March, directing the AEC and Defense jointly to recommend the level of preparation, particularly for the production of tritium, considered essential to the new bomb but perhaps not available in sufficient quantity. Johnson and the AEC chairman proposed and secured Truman's approval on 8 June of construction of two heavy-water reactors for tritium production.99

The AEC faced major problems in carrying out Truman's directive. It had no immediately promising leads to development of a thermonuclear bomb. Furthermore, some nuclear scientists continued to oppose the crash program, notably J. Robert Oppenheimer—“father” of the A-bomb, chairman of the AEC General Advisory Committee, head of an ad hoc panel on military objectives for atomic energy, and member of the RDB committee on atomic energy—who thought the effort wasteful and infeasible. Even some of those working on the “superbomb,” such as Enrico Fermi and Hans Bethe, were either dubious about or deplored its development. Edward Teller, a controversial figure in the scientific community but a man of unremitting drive, was

* Barton J. Bernstein contends that Truman's decision to accelerate the development of the H-bomb was essentially made some weeks before the 31 January 1950 meeting. See "Truman and the H-bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1984), 15–16. If Fuchs's arrest did not affect Truman's decision, it certainly confirmed it.
the physicist most determined that the United States should proceed on a crash basis; in time he was to be regarded as the “father” of the H-bomb. Teller acquired backing from natural allies outside the AEC—Senator McMahon; William L. Borden, head of the JCAE staff; Lewis L. Strauss, formerly an AEC commissioner and later AEC chairman; and Defense, where Air Force officials and LeBaron lent powerful support. 100

By the spring of 1951 there were still no concrete results to justify Teller’s enthusiasm, and the president agreed with AEC and Defense advice that work on a thermonuclear reaction should proceed simultaneously with “promising developments” in fission weapons. 101 At this point, the thermonuclear program finally moved on to a more promising course. In March Teller and Stanislaw M. Ulam, who had prepared the theoretical mathematical analyses for the thermonuclear bomb, presented separate schemes for proceeding. Teller’s plan, further refined by others, quickly led to a “new super,” whose principles were tested in early May 1951 at Eniwetok, where the “first small thermonuclear flame ever to burn on earth” eviscerated a 300-foot tower and a concrete shelter. Meeting in Princeton six weeks later to review the test results, scientists considered the principle of a fusion reaction proven and viewed the mechanism for the new super as promising. Oppenheimer, now convinced that the work could succeed, called the process “technically so sweet that you could not argue about that.” While the scientists regarded other approaches as feasible, the new super seemed the most promising, and the conferees quickly agreed on a program expected to lead to its full-scale test in fall of 1952. The Princeton conference marked the start of a new period of confidence. 102

Despite the successful test, Teller found progress at Los Alamos too slow and eventually left. Seeking support from McMahon and Defense, Teller wanted a second AEC laboratory established at Livermore, California, where Ernest O. Lawrence was engaged in his pioneering work in high-energy physics. Although Lovett indicated in March 1952 that he saw “no reason for adverse criticism of the immediate effort,” he believed that all approaches in both thermonuclear and fission research ought to be pursued and concluded that the research and development base should be broadened. He therefore favored leaving the thermonuclear program at Los Alamos and establishment of a second laboratory as soon as possible. 103

Others in the Pentagon, including Air Force Secretary Finletter, fully supported the second laboratory. After a briefing by Teller, the service secretaries on 19 March asked Lovett to persuade the NSC Special Committee to recommend acceleration of work on thermonuclear weapons. LeBaron backed them strongly. Meanwhile, a new technological development reduced the requirement for tritium and made a program speedup more feasible. 104 On
28 March Foster advised Acheson and Dean that the NSC should consider intensifying and broadening the H-bomb effort, and on 1 April Teller spoke with the same three officials about the second laboratory proposal. There now seemed little doubt that a second laboratory would be established. Although ill with cancer, McMahon wrote Truman on 30 May urging him to set quantity requirements for H-bombs and expand production efforts, a proposal the president transmitted for NSC consideration. In July the AEC established a second laboratory at Livermore, and in September it began operation.  

The DoD relationship with the JCAE worsened after the onset of McMahon's illness and his death on 28 July 1952. His successor as chairman, Rep. Carl Durham, wrote Lovett on 3 July of the committee's intense interest in the possible future relationship between tactical atomic weapons and hydrogen weapons and the defense of Western Europe and asked for a "full and documented" report on Defense concepts, capabilities, and plans. The Joint Chiefs viewed the request as an intrusion into their most secret war plans; Lovett followed their suggestion to withhold the report but invited informal discussion. This tactic of deflection did not work. The committee was thoroughly annoyed, particularly since it had discovered in The New York Times a summary of the findings of a classified study previously denied it. Although Lovett wanted to maintain a good working relationship with the committee, he did not change his position but rather offered to try to "compose differences of opinion."  

While the JCAE wanted to reinforce the thermonuclear effort, others viewed the program as "dangerous to world peace." As the time for an actual H-bomb test neared, these opponents spoke out again. From the first, Oppenheimer had seen the thermonuclear bomb as a weapon of destructive power vast enough to threaten the very survival of life on the planet. Some members of the State Department panel of consultants on disarmament, including Oppenheimer, argued strongly for postponement, claiming that a U.S. test would actually aid the Soviet development effort as well as hurt arms limitation attempts, unsettle free nations, make U.S. policy seem less flexible, and preempt a decision that should be left for the next administration. With the thermonuclear test scheduled to take place at Eniwetok just before the presidential election in November, Dean asked for Lovett's views. Indulging in drollery, Lovett claimed to be the Washington official with the "least knowledge of political implications"; he told Dean to "stick to schedule . . . selected by non-political men for a non-political purpose." Only a few days in the month were suitable for the test, and Dean proposed going ahead. On 10 September Truman approved the NSC Special Committee's recommendation to proceed on schedule.  

The political implications of the test nevertheless worried Truman, and
he let it be known that he would welcome a postponement if it could be justified on technical grounds. None appeared. In early October Truman told Lovett that Gordon Dean should try to prevent any test before the election. When Lovett approached Dean, the AEC chairman mentioned using military channels, but Lovett knew that this avenue would leave a documentary trail, which Truman wanted to avoid. When it became clear that no good reasons could be found for postponement, Dean so informed the president. Truman wrote later that he then told Dean to "forget politics and hold the test on whatever date weather conditions would be most favorable."

Meanwhile the administration decided on minimal publicity for the test. On 9 September AEC and Defense jointly issued a brief announcement of the forthcoming test. To some in State the time seemed propitious to approach the Soviets for a general settlement of outstanding issues, yet there was also the possibility that the Soviets might stall and thus delay the U.S. test indefinitely. On 9 October, when the NSC Special Committee discussed the idea of a test moratorium, neither Acheson nor Dean was particularly supportive and Lovett strongly opposed a delay. He wanted the proposal dropped and any papers on the subject destroyed. A State Department account of the meeting reported that Lovett was troubled that such ideas "might very well be traced back to fellows like Dr. Oppenheimer whose motivations in these matters were suspect" and warned of "some adverse developments with respect to Oppenheimer." The NSC Special Committee dropped the idea. The United States notified the British and Canadians, made no further formal advance public announcement, and observed maximum security restrictions.

The MIKE test shot on 31 October (Washington time) produced a thermonuclear detonation with awesome results. Almost a thousand times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, the shot blew away the entire island of Elugelab, leaving only a huge crater in the coral. The AEC laboratory at Los Alamos, designer and builder of the thermonuclear device used in MIKE, was elated. Not only did the test confirm that the hydrogen bomb was feasible, it also gave promise that full-scale production of H-bombs might soon be possible. By the same token, as LeBaron wrote, the magnitude of the explosion raised "many questions of national policy."

After the tests, Lovett believed that the government should remain silent about the results because a public announcement would impede investigation and punishment of future breaches of security. Nonetheless, Truman approved a brief AEC statement that world threats to peace and the absence of effective arms control made it necessary to continue development efforts, but the United States hoped to utilize nuclear energies for the "productive purposes of mankind."

Shortly after the MIKE shot Lovett decided, against informal JCS advice,
to address again the question, still in the NSC Special Committee, of expanding the H-bomb effort. Writing the NSC on 26 November concerning the U.S. manned aircraft capability that would be available in 1954 to deliver H-bombs in the event of an emergency, he promised that DoD would review and restate military requirements for H-bombs in the light of the recent test results. LeBaron pointed out to Foster that with military characteristics of the H-bomb still uncertain, the Joint Chiefs would have to set official require­ments on the basis of judgment alone.\textsuperscript{115}

Meanwhile the service secretaries—who earlier had feared that the Soviets would develop the H-bomb first—now voiced their dismay about its potential effects. Unlike Lovett, they wanted a presidential statement—preferably a joint one by the outgoing Truman and the incoming Eisenhower and possibly Congress—to publicize the awesomeness of thermonuclear power and cultivate a public demand for effective international control. Foster informally took the subject to the White House, and after Truman agreed that some sort of report would be appropriate, Finletter drafted a statement. When representatives of Defense, State, AEC, and the White House discussed the draft on 30 December, Acheson labeled it a “horrendous statement” that would frighten the public and adversely affect U.S. foreign relations. Finletter argued that the president could not remain silent on the issue, and Charles Murphy, the president’s special counsel, thought some report politically necessary, possibly as a part of the president’s forthcoming State of the Union message. Foster reported division in DoD, with the service secretaries wanting a public statement and Lovett opposed. Acheson came around to Murphy’s view.\textsuperscript{116}

In his State of the Union address on 7 January 1953 Truman reviewed the dramatic, seven-year transformation from the atomic to the thermonuclear age. Stating that Soviet capabilities and the lack of arms constraints forced the United States to continue developing nuclear weapons, the president som­berly noted that nuclear weapons gave man the power to “extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, . . . and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations.” Declaring such a war “not a possible policy for rational men,” Truman promised that the Soviets would find Americans “eager to reach understandings.” Since nuclear power would be “with us all the days of our lives,” the president hoped it would be harnessed to improve human existence, but he declared that the United States meanwhile would have to sustain a “long hard test of strength and stamina.”\textsuperscript{117}

In ignoring Lovett’s advice against making a public statement, the president followed his own instinct to set the record straight. That the challenge he passed to the incoming administration and the American people
was a formidable one, there could be no doubt. On 12 August 1953, fewer than 10 months after the MIKE shot, the Soviet Union exploded what was apparently a thermonuclear device, and on 23 November 1955 it dropped a true superbomb from an aircraft. While the contending military forces in Korea fought their battles with weapons of the past, there was occurring at the same time a quantum leap in the development of terrible weapons for the future. Indeed, the nuclear weapon advances of this period provided the theoretical and practical basis for the emphasis on nuclear forces embodied in the "New Look" policy of the successor Eisenhower administration.
The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 brought Louis Johnson's campaign of retrenchment in the Department of Defense to an instant halt. Overnight the Pentagon reversed its course. The pressure for less turned into a drive for more. Caught up in the painful throes of an expanding war during the less than three months of his tenure after 25 June, Johnson found himself publicly blamed for the initial defeats of the outnumbered U.S. forces in Korea, his political hopes for the future shattered, and his position undermined by the president's distrust.*

When George C. Marshall succeeded Johnson in September 1950, he immediately recruited Robert A. Lovett as deputy secretary. Both men wanted an OSD staff that would give them fast, informed advice and through which they could set policy and monitor operations. In Marshall's view, efficiency meant keeping the staff small and limiting its activities to policy issues. He did not seek drastic organizational change; indeed, he found the current OSD organization generally satisfactory and accepted some "growing pains" as inevitable.¹

The New Inner Office

On assuming office Marshall brought to the Pentagon Col. Marshall S. (Pat) Carter, who had helped him earlier at the State Department, to create the counterpart of a general staff secretariat to provide central control of communications. Taking over the necessary OSD administrative sections and working through the various military aides in OSD, Carter organized the Executive

* See Chapter II.
Office of the Secretary (EXOS), as desired by Marshall. Serving both as its
director and as Marshall’s executive officer, Carter alone from March 1951
could use the signature line, “For the Secretary of Defense,” in official
correspondence. When Lovett took over as secretary in September 1951, he
retained his own executive, Marine Corps Col. Carey A. Randall, but otherwise
left EXOS undisturbed. An astute administrator with a sharp wit, Carter
advised Lovett to set a policy of limiting his public speeches, statements, and
appearances, counseling the new secretary that “exceptions to the above
should be based only on very intimate personal contacts which you do not feel
free to avoid . . . [such as] a quiet dinner with Mrs. Lovett . . . .” Carter
had a deputy and by the spring of 1952 he also had three assistant directors;
one of them, Col. George V. Underwood, Jr., who had been with Marshall in
China in 1946–47, took over when Carter left in the fall of 1952.

Carter held strong views on the proper functioning of OSD. He admon­
ished staff officers on one occasion that their job was to “advise your chief
what he ought to do, not to ask him what you ought to do.” Carter instructed
the staff to consider all possible solutions to a problem and to propose a single
action for approval or disapproval. Underwood, with similar high standards,
saw the primary EXOS mission as assuring that “formal official actions in the
name of the Secretary of Defense are fully coordinated, consistent with
policy, and of a quality, importance and timeliness befitting the signature."

As central coordinating point, EXOS was generally considered a success­
ful operation under Marshall and Lovett, but it irritated some OSD officials,
whose resentment derived from various sources—conflict of personalities, a
feeling that a screen had been inserted between them and the secretary, and
the fact that a largely military staff was handling the screening. With Marshall’s
and Lovett’s support, however, the EXOS staff continued to act as the
secretary’s “hands.” It increased from 58 military and civilian full-time
personnel at the end of 1950 to 87 at the end of 1952.

The director of administration, Ralph N. Stohl, headed an office that took
care of numerous OSD administrative matters. J. Robert Loftis, Stohl’s assistant
for administration, supervised four divisions—personnel, budget and finance,
office services, and security. Other assistants under Stohl had responsibility
for administrative security and special security programs, interdepartmental
administrative services, and what was left of the military responsibility for
civil defense.” Stohl’s office increased from 150 persons at the end of June
1950 to 198 at the end of 1952.

* The Office of Civil Defense was set up under the National Security Resources Board on 1 March
1950; it became independent by the president’s executive order of 1 December 1950, with former
Florida Governor Millard F. Caldwell confirmed as the first head of the Federal Civil Defense
Administration on 16 January 1951.
The Staff Council provided a major vehicle for coordinating OSD staff work under Marshall and Lovett. Generally the deputy secretary met with officials at the assistant secretary or lower levels. In July 1951 Marshall revised the council’s organization, limiting its membership to only 11 officials beyond Lovett as chairman, although he could designate others. Marshall also directed EXOS to furnish the council with a secretary to ensure that staff action followed the council’s decisions. After Lovett became secretary, Deputy Secretary Foster met with the council each Friday morning to discuss recent developments and to resolve differences. Few doubted the council’s usefulness; officials not included in its membership eagerly sought invitations.

The focus of the Defense Management Committee under General Joseph T. McNarney changed after the start of the Korean War from searching “with a fine tooth comb” for economies within a shrinking Defense Department to fostering efficiency during expansion. To strengthen the committee’s role, Secretary Johnson broadened its scope and designated staff members from the comptroller’s office as the nucleus of a permanent OSD management engineering group. In October Marshall formed a management division under Comptroller Wilfred McNeil, who was to assume the Defense Management Committee’s duties when it came to an end.

Concentrating on OSD organization, materiel support, and manpower controls, McNarney felt by June 1951 that his committee had succeeded in its purpose. Its achievements included organizing OSD manpower and personnel functions, reviewing and realigning the functions of the Munitions Board and other OSD offices, establishing offices to manage expanded functions such as transcontinental transportation and insurance (e.g., workmen’s compensation and public liability on defense contracts), and reducing from 18 to 11 the offices reporting directly to Marshall.

In October 1951 Lovett decided to establish the Defense Management Committee on a permanent basis. He retained McNarney as chairman until the general retired at the end of January 1952, when Under Secretary of the Army Karl R. Bendetsen became acting chairman. In June Lovett replaced the Defense Management Committee with a Defense Management Council consisting of Deputy Secretary Foster as chairman and the under secretaries of the three military departments.

Money, Legislation, and Foreign Military Matters

In three principal areas that had the potential for confusion, OSD managed the considerable growth of the Korean War period in a generally orderly fashion. McNeil tightened his already firm grip on the comptroller’s
office during battles over the wartime budgets. Although Marx Leva resigned as the assistant secretary for legal and legislative affairs in May 1951, the office underwent only minor organizational changes during the war. Except for the troublesome military assistance program, an administrative and operational headache, the Office of Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, under James H. Burns and later Frank Nash, coped well during the period with its greatly expanded responsibilities.

Supporting McNeil’s efforts to gain greater OSD control over the management of Defense funds, Marshall on 27 September 1950 directed the secretaries of the military departments to name an assistant secretary or under secretary responsible for fiscal management and to appoint departmental comptrollers and deputy comptrollers. Delegating to McNeil the authority to “take all necessary action and issue all necessary instructions in the area of comptroller functions and organization,” Marshall gave him functional control over comptroller activities of the services. In December McNeil set up an Advisory Council on Accounting Policy and Financial Procedures composed of representatives from his office and the services. By the end of June 1951 military accounting systems were improving and five working capital funds had been established, simplifying business procedures and encouraging the economical use of facilities. In other changes, McNeil established a Fiscal Management Staff under W. Carl Blaisdell, and an Economic and International Security Estimates Division under William H. Mautz to help cost NATO and military assistance matters and to keep the comptroller abreast of important economic problems.

McNeil initiated a significant innovation around the end of 1950 by bringing in BoB examiners to participate directly in the preparation of the annual Defense budget request. He later recalled that Defense had “sold the President on the idea of allocating 30 or 40 people from the Bureau of the Budget” for this purpose. He remembered that BoB officials had been afraid they “would be seduced . . . but we reassured them that they would have ‘keys to the safe’ and know whether we were trying to hook them or not.” The procedure yielded dividends, since BoB personnel obtained an early and intimate view of the military’s thinking, while Defense gained time in budget preparation. The budget “markups” became a joint BoB–OSD product, “with BoB personnel reserving the right to make their own recommendations to the president, which they always did.”

McNeil’s highly personal management style roiled some Defense officials. Some high Army and Air Force officers, for example, felt that McNeil, a wartime Navy officer, favored his former service too much. Others disliked his tendency to seek first-hand information through direct contacts within the services rather than accepting information passed along through official
channels. Marshall's Executive Office, which McNeil openly disliked, resented his "end-around plays and . . . his own little secret contacts." Nonetheless, his office maintained a commendable efficiency throughout the Korean War years, managing its expanded functions and the far larger Defense and military assistance budgets with a staff increase of only 30 percent—from 100 persons in June 1950 to 130 at the end of 1952.

Looking back shortly after leaving office, Lovett felt that at least one reason for the increased ability to identify areas of excessive Defense cost lay "in the introduction in the Department, largely under the stimulus of McNeil, of the corporate form of operation." McNeil had his own personal rule for discovering excessive costs, which he called the "40 percent effort" and defined as the human failing that made planners ask for that much more than they needed. To correct the situation, he felt that mixed groups of civilians and military, with high-powered staffs, needed to review and analyze all plans and schedules that translated strategic military plans into actual military programs. The comptroller's office was unquestionably effective in trimming service requests for funds.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legal and Legislative Affairs also handled a vastly expanded volume of work during the Korean War years. When Marx Leva left in May 1951 Marshall named Daniel K. Edwards, a lawyer who had served two years as mayor of Durham, North Carolina, as assistant secretary. To succeed Felix Larkin, the able general counsel who left in August 1951, Marshall brought in the energetic and incisive Roger Kent. In the fall of 1951 Lovett sent Edwards to represent Defense at NATO, and Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston lawyer, came from the State Department to the Pentagon as Edwards's successor. Generally liked and respected, Coolidge managed the office with finesse and skill.

By the spring of 1952 Coolidge had reorganized his office, with Roger Kent as general counsel no longer heading a division but operating directly from the assistant secretary's immediate office. Three divisions—Legal Services under Nathaniel H. Goodrich, Legislative Services under John G. Adams, and Legislative Liaison under Rear Adm. Harold A. Houser—handled the major business of the office. The increased workload during the Korean War period resulted in a 60-percent expansion in legal and legislative personnel—from 56 to 90 persons—between mid-1950 and the end of 1952.

After the start of the Korean War, the Pentagon's role in international affairs and military assistance became markedly greater and more influential. To accommodate this considerably enlarged responsibility, OSD had to make organizational adjustments that added to the power and prestige of the function. In keeping with the government-wide restructuring of mutual defense assistance matters at the end of 1950, Marshall on 11 January 1951
appointed Burns assistant to the secretary of defense for international security affairs. At the secretary’s direction Burns added an office for North Atlantic Treaty affairs, headed by Col. Royden E. Beebe, Jr., USAF, to the existing offices for foreign military affairs, then under acting director Capt. Albert C. Murdaugh, USN, and military assistance, under Maj. Gen. Stanley L. Scott, USA. 21

Burns resigned in the summer of 1951 and was replaced by Francis (Frank) Nash, a lawyer and professor of law at Georgetown University. Nash had previously served Secretary of the Navy and then Secretary of Defense Forrestal, for whom he had handled disarmament problems at the United Nations. Since early 1951 he had been Marshall’s representative on the NSC Senior Staff and enjoyed a close rapport with the secretary. Highly regarded within the Pentagon, Nash was also well liked by State Department and Mutual Security personnel. John Ohly remembered him as having a “wonderful personality, great negotiating skill, and superior intelligence; . . . a strong friend to have in the military establishment.” 22 At least for a time, Nash continued also as the Defense member of the NSC Senior Staff. On 3 November Lovett named Nash also as his assistant for international security affairs and appointed Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA, as Nash’s deputy. At that time Lovett defined the position as including matters relating to military assistance, foreign military affairs, North Atlantic Treaty affairs, politico-military matters, and the administration of occupied areas. 23

Major offices under Nash in the spring of 1952 included the Office of Military Assistance, headed by Maj. Gen. George H. Olmsted; the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, under Rear Adm. H.P. Smith; and the Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs under Colonel Beebe. In July, by transfer from the Munitions Board, the Office of Foreign Economic Defense Affairs, headed by Navy Capt. Wakeman B. Thorp, also came under Nash. Helping with Nash’s NSC duties, Charles P. Noyes served as deputy representative to the NSC Senior Staff, and Townsend W. Hoopes was an assistant for NSC affairs. Later in 1952 Najeeb E. Halaby joined Nash as deputy for European mutual security affairs. From a total staff of 81 persons in mid-1950, Nash’s office grew to 198 at the end of 1952. 24

The Importance of Manpower

During a long military career, George Marshall had become increasingly convinced that people were the single most important factor in the military establishment. As he later reflected, on taking office as secretary of defense this strong conviction was intensified by “tremendous pressures regarding
manpower . . . from no less than five different offices in the Defense Department. Moreover, 11 different agencies and some 115 field organizations had personnel responsibilities. Marshall saw the need for a single OSD office to manage manpower—one that would centralize administration, assure effective utilization of human resources, and establish policies to ensure equitable treatment of personnel throughout the services. An opportunity soon occurred when the resignation of Assistant Secretary Griffith left a vacancy for Marshall to fill.25

Searching for a highly qualified assistant secretary, Marshall decided on Anna M. Rosenberg, a recognized expert in labor relations who had previously served in government posts under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Impressed with her credentials, Marshall was especially pleased with her support for universal military training, a program long dear to his heart but still not adopted by Congress. Surprising even Lovett, Marshall recommended Rosenberg to Truman, who immediately gave her a recess appointment subject to Senate confirmation. She was sworn in on 15 November in Marshall's office.26

The appointment, generally well received by the public, ran into trouble when broadcaster Fulton Lewis, Jr., and others charged that Rosenberg had supported a Communist-front organization.27 Congress began an investigation, and on Leva's advice Marshall assigned Felix Larkin to shepherd the confirmation through the Senate. The Armed Services Committee found the charges "completely without foundation" and voted 13-0 to recommend confirmation. On 21 December the Senate as a whole confirmed Rosenberg by voice vote.28

Anna Rosenberg was a lively and impressive personality, the only Pentagon official Marshall addressed by first name. The secretary quickly gave her broad authority to coordinate all Defense policies on military manpower and civilian personnel,29 transferring to her office in April 1951 all Munitions Board functions relating to manpower, industrial relations, and labor supply. In May he abolished the Personnel Policy Board and appointed its chairman, J. Thomas Schneider, director of personnel policy under Rosenberg; in June he abolished the Civilian Components Policy Board, recreating it under Rosenberg as the Reserve Forces Policy Board.† Marshall and Lovett also established a number of citizens' committees to report through Rosenberg, including, in August 1951, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS).30

To help manage these expanded responsibilities, Rosenberg selected an

* Later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation found another Anna Rosenberg who had actually supported the organization in question.
† This board later became statutory as a result of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 9 July 1952 (PL 82-176, sec 257).
able executive, Col. James F. Collins, USA. Rosenberg traveled frequently within the United States and made four extensive overseas inspection tours, visiting most major U.S. military installations. After each trip she took actions to remedy problems she had discovered. By mid-1952 her Pentagon office had six major offices: manpower requirements, manpower utilization, manpower supply, industrial relations, armed forces information, and personnel policy. By the end of the year, Rosenberg’s staff numbered 327 full-time civilian and military employees.

Much of Rosenberg’s work concerned the amelioration of personal hardships created by the huge expansion of the armed forces. In August 1950 Congress had authorized quarters’ allowances for families of enlisted men (PL 81–771), and Rosenberg’s office sponsored and supported a flow of legislative proposals to further improve the conditions of service life. The Veterans Readjustment Act provided the same benefits for men serving in the Korean War as for World War II veterans. The Combat Duty Pay Act of 1952 awarded $45-a-month additional compensation, equal for all services, to men not receiving other incentive pay who were subject to hostile fire for six or more days per month. In early 1952 Rosenberg sought to have military pay raised by 10 percent, emphasizing that the cost of living had already increased well beyond that. Congress provided a 4-percent pay raise and increased allowances by 14 percent in the Career Compensation Act of 1952 (PL 82–346). It also continued until mid-1953 the $100-a-month bonus for volunteer medical personnel (PL 82–410).

With Marshall and Rosenberg at the helm, advocacy of universal military training took on new life. In October 1950 Marshall considered the suggestion that Defense might be able to “avoid a tremendous political problem” and “a severe reaction from the American public” by asking for a Selective Service Act amendment rather than for a universal military training law. But he did not go this route. With Rosenberg coordinating the action, Marshall presented to Congress on 10 January 1951 a Defense plan combining a system of universal military training with several draft changes, including a lowering of the minimum draft age from 19 to 18 years and extension of the service period from 21 to 27 months. After five months debating and substantially altering the bill, Congress finally sent the Universal Military Service and Training Act (PL 82–51) to Truman, who signed it on 19 June.

The act separated training and service into two programs—a temporary draft for service and a permanent program of training. It continued the service draft to mid-1955, increased the period of service to 24 months, established a total military obligation of 8 years, dropped the draft age to 18½ years when all men 19 or over had been called, and made 4 months of basic training mandatory before anyone could be sent overseas. Following Rosenberg’s
earlier advice, Marshall in April 1951 had directed that all new enlistees or draftees be proportionally divided among the services on a qualitatively equal basis. In July he went further, establishing an Armed Forces Examining Stations Policy Board under Rosenberg and giving her responsibility for developing policies to assure equal qualitative distribution.37

Despite Marshall’s belief that the new act was a “step of historic significance,” it did little more for universal military training than establish an independent five-member National Security Training Commission to plan for a future program that Congress might approve. Desiring to keep universal training separate from the Korean combat, DoD proposed initiating a program in FY 1953 with 60,000 18-year-olds who would receive 6 months’ training and then go into reserve units. Working closely with Pentagon officials, the National Security Training Commission in October 1951 recommended a 60,000-man pilot project that would eventually grow into an 800,000-man program, with the cost of the full program estimated at $4.2 billion for the first year and $2.2 billion annually thereafter. But strong popular feelings against universal training, especially during peacetime, made Congress consider limiting the plan to volunteers only. Although the service secretaries and chiefs and the president approved the idea of volunteers, Congress rejected an implementing measure in March 1952. The rejection went largely unlauded, even in Defense, where the services were not keen to take on an additional and massive universal training program while fighting a war, and Lovett, now secretary, apparently viewed universal training as having more social than military value.38

By setting a total military obligation of eight years, the Universal Military Training and Service Act assured a continual flow of manpower into the various National Guard and reserve organizations of the services. At the same time, the Pentagon had a heavy responsibility to correct conditions that had occurred during the early Korean War callup of reserve components, when thousands of combat veterans of World War II, some of whom had even been in the inactive reserves, had been called back to duty. Their military skills made them particularly desirable, but they experienced a second uprooting from civilian life and faced double jeopardy, while others who had not served at all stayed home. Public complaints were numerous and loud. Called-up reserve units also generally lacked modern equipment, had unit and individual training deficiencies, and needed reorganization. To prepare Army reserve divisions for Korean combat required 9 to 12 months. The Air Force also found extensive reassignment and training necessary within individual reserve units and often aggravated unit problems by transferring key personnel; more than seven months elapsed from callup until the first Air Guard wing saw combat in May 1951.39
Marshall moved early to cope with the problems of the reserve forces. In October 1950 he appointed a special committee headed by Edwin H. Burgess, then chairman of the OSD Civilian Components Policy Board, to study the issue and recommend necessary policies. The committee, which included civilians as well as regular and reserve officers, refused to do away with the state-controlled National Guard or Air National Guard and recommended continuation of all components of the reserve system. It called for the creation of highly placed reserve offices in each service and a Reserve Forces Policy Board in OSD; proposed a ready, standby, and retired classification within all reserve components; and set across-the-board standards for pay and allowances, promotions, and separation. Approving the report in April 1951, Marshall asked the service secretaries to prepare detailed programs for Congress and told Burgess that the study was “one of the outstanding accomplishments” of Defense unification.

Rosenberg pointed out to a congressional subcommittee in April that fairness required sending home quickly the reservists who had previously seen combat, particularly those from the inactive lists. Of a total of more than 2.7 million reservists on the rolls on 31 July 1951, some 731,000 were on active duty, the Korean War peak. This number fell as the services made strong efforts to release them—to about 508,000 by 30 June 1952 and approximately 407,000 by the end of that year.

Meanwhile, in June 1951 OSD submitted a reserve bill based on the Burgess committee’s recommendations. After a year’s consideration, Congress finally passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act, which Truman signed on 9 July 1952. This legislation reaffirmed the existence of seven reserve components—the National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve—and created in each the categories of ready, standby, and retired reservists. The Ready Reserve—which was not to exceed 1.5 million persons and included all members of the National Guards and ready reserve units—was subject to immediate recall in time of war or national emergency either declared by Congress or proclaimed by the president. Ready reservists not on active duty in the armed forces could apply for standby status if their previous service qualified them. Standby reservists were liable for active duty only when Congress declared a war or national emergency. Even retired reservists with long service could be called to active duty in time of war or in a national emergency declared by Congress. This legislation, while not without problems, went a long way toward bringing about order and equity in reserve affairs.

* The Navy had no national guard.
Marshall also directed Rosenberg to exercise control over the seemingly insatiable service requests for manpower, a major responsibility after the president in April 1951 asked Defense to limit requirements and monitor utilization of all military and civilian personnel. In July 1951 both military and civilian DoD personnel in the Washington area came under a ceiling. Wherever possible, the services replaced combat-qualified men in noncombatant assignments with women in uniform, men of limited combat capability, or civilians. The replacement program went slowly because of difficulties in hiring civilians and the failure of service efforts to recruit women, but DoD curbed the rate of growth.43

Rosenberg felt that Lovett’s inauguration of comprehensive OSD reviews of manpower requests for FY 1953 significantly strengthened her hand in controlling service demands for manpower. Her office first provided detailed and uniform policies and guidelines for all service requests; then her staff joined with McNeil’s staff and BoB representatives to review the service programs—and ultimately to reduce military manpower goals by more than 178,000. DoD did not review civilian manpower requests as thoroughly and allowed an increase of 147,000 for all of Defense. For FY 1954 Rosenberg’s office recommended a reduction of 154,000 in military manpower and anticipated greater efficiencies in the use of Defense civilians.44

The Korean War hastened progress in the integration of blacks in the armed services previously initiated by President Truman. While the Air Force adopted the goal of integration early, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army lagged behind in 1950. Korea brought about a drastic change in Marine Corps outlook and practice. In the August battles for the Pusan perimeter, the Marine Corps for the first time assigned large numbers of individual black servicemen as replacements. From that time on the 1st Marine Division detailed large numbers of black marines throughout its units. Its commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, asserted that they “did everything, and they did a good job because they were integrated, and they were good people.” By March 1951 almost half of all black marines belonged to integrated combat units in Korea. In December the Marine Corps commandant announced a general corpswide policy of integration.45

Integration proceeded more slowly in the Army, where many high-ranking tradition-bound officers resisted it. When the Korean War began, blacks still served mainly in segregated units. During the fall of 1950 many were assigned as individual replacements to understrength white units in Korea. Although the results of these experiments proved encouraging and the Army training divisions generally were integrated by March 1951, almost 90 percent of black soldiers in the Army still served in segregated units.46 Rosenberg emphasized that integration was necessary if black manpower was to be used effectively.
At her urging, on 2 April 1951 Marshall ordered all the services to use the same selection standards and to share low-scoring draftees proportionately, thus rejecting the Navy's discriminatory selection standard and the Army's argument that its high proportion of poorly qualified men made segregated units necessary. In the view of historian Morris MacGregor, this change constituted the "single most significant contribution of the Secretary of Defense" to the integration of the armed forces.\(^4\)

In May 1951, General Ridgway, who viewed separation of the races as "un-American and un-Christian" as well as inefficient, recommended the elimination of all-black units and a percentage integration of all Army units in the Far East. In June he discussed the matter with Marshall during the secretary's visit to Korea and Japan. In Washington Rosenberg pressed Secretary Pace for affirmative action. Approving Ridgway's proposal of 1 July, the Army stipulated that integration should be spread over a 6-month period, with black strength limited to 12 percent, or 10 percent in combat infantry units. In Korea some all-black units were split up and their members reassigned, while other black units received whites, the exchanges generally occurring during normal rotation periods. By the end of October, Eighth Army had integrated 75 percent of its infantry units; by May 1952, with 100-percent integration achieved, "the Army began to experience the fruits of racial harmony." Meanwhile, in December 1951, the Army ordered all major commands to prepare integration programs, and a year later General Collins ordered Army integration everywhere.\(^18\)

Army and Marine Corps units in Korea proved the advantages of integration for combat. Counting a unit as segregated when it had more than 50 percent blacks, the Air Force had placed 95 percent of its blacks in integrated units by the end of 1950; in mid-1952 there was only one segregated unit left. By the end of 1952, the Navy had officially opened all jobs, ratings, and schools to qualified personnel, but blacks were still clustered in the Steward's Branch and generally found promotions slow. Although much undoubtedly remained to be done, the integration achieved in the military services during the war represented major progress in social change; by the end of 1954 there were no all-black units in the armed forces. Rosenberg thought the campaign had "effectively strengthened the defense effort."\(^19\)

Efforts to attract women volunteers during the Korean War met with little success, despite Rosenberg's belief that, when only men were being drafted, "women should insist upon and assume some equality of sacrifice." Although Congress lifted a 2-percent ceiling on women in the armed forces, the services could not meet recruitment goals, and in November 1951 an intensive recruitment campaign began. The Army opened 228 Army jobs short of combat duty to women officers and permitted enlisted women to enter 19 of
32 Army career fields. Women could enter 28 of 62 ratings in the Navy and 34 of 44 Air Force career fields. But the services rarely promoted women to the higher ranks, and they wanted female recruits mainly to release qualified men for combat duty. Between June 1950 and December 1952 the number of women in the services rose from slightly more than 22,000 to more than 47,000, but the figures actually represented a small net percentage decline to 1.5 percent of the armed forces. While the services continued to seek women replacements, asking for 59,500 by June 1953, actual female strength fell slightly.50

Looking back in early 1953 on her service under Marshall and Lovett, Rosenberg felt that her office had spared "no effort . . . to meet the basic objectives" in the field of Defense manpower and personnel. Where it had not fully achieved these objectives, she felt it was not from any lack of resolve. OSD colleagues generally admired what one termed a "first-rate performance."51

Medical Policies

Once U.S. troops entered into battle in Korea, the OSD Office of Medical Services under Dr. Richard L. Meiling immediately assumed a larger and more important role. Following several additions to Meiling’s functions, Marshall on 2 January 1951 abolished the office and replaced it with an Armed Forces Medical Policy Council to be headed by a civilian doctor and to include the surgeons general of the military services and three civilian medical professionals. Meiling served as chairman of the council until 1 July 1951 when Dr. W. Randolph Lovelace II replaced him; Dr. Melvin A. Casberg succeeded Lovelace on 1 January 1952. During the war, the council had a maximum staff of only 24 military and civilian employees.52

As the principal OSD agency for medical and health policy, the council could issue directives in the secretary’s name on policy matters within its jurisdiction. Appeals from the council’s decisions could be made through a service secretary to the secretary of defense. The chairman had authority to take action on approved council plans, programs, and policies. Forbidden to engage in any administrative or operational duties for which an agency already existed, much of the council’s work consisted of coordinating the interests of peripheral agencies, both inside and outside the Pentagon, * having direct or indirect concerns with military medicine.53

* Outside agencies included the National Security Resources Board, Central Intelligence Agency, Veterans Administration, Bureau of the Budget, State Department, U.S. Public Health Service, American National Red Cross, National Research Council, and Atomic Energy Commission.
Once fighting began in Korea, it became absolutely essential to meet the urgent requirements that ensued, most immediately for blood plasma. A program for blood plasma went into effect on 1 July 1950, and on 20 July Secretary Johnson designated the American National Red Cross the official collecting agency for the armed forces. In addition, World War II stocks of blood plasma were reprocessed. Despite heavy continuing demands, particularly for whole blood, and some difficulties in the collection process, Dr. Casberg later reported that no shortage of blood plasma ever occurred in Korea.51

The need for hospital beds also claimed immediate OSD attention. In June 1950 the military services had a ceiling of 37,377 beds, including 19,734 occupied by military patients. In expectation of war casualties, Johnson late that summer lifted the ceiling, agreed to suspend admission of any more Veterans Administration (VA) patients to military hospitals, approved renovating and activating additional hospital facilities, and reopened or prepared to reopen three Army hospitals closed earlier. The services maintained and increased their joint usage of facilities. By 30 June 1951, OSD had authorized 88,800 beds, of which 47,564 were occupied by military patients.55 Plans for further hospital expansion went forward actively in early 1951, and progress occurred in standardizing all service medical records and forms in order to make interservice utilization more efficient.56

The war brought to the fore the problem of treating long-term, severely injured patients, for whose care military hospitals were not particularly well equipped. Traditionally, military patients remained in military hospitals after war service until completion of definitive care, but plans made in 1949 called for the early discharge of such patients. In August 1950 Johnson announced a policy of providing hospitalization for military patients until it became apparent that the patient could not return to military duty.57 At Truman’s direction, planning began for the utilization of VA hospitals for men being separated from military service but still requiring long-term care. With the president’s approval, Marshall in February 1951 authorized the first patient removals from military to VA hospitals, where it was anticipated that better, more specialized treatment would be available. By mid-1952 this program freed 3,541 beds in military hospitals, with substantial savings of military funds.58

The most pressing medical problem in 1950 was the shortage of doctors, dentists, nurses, and other professional medical staff. While appeals went out for nurse volunteers, DoD met an immediate requirement for doctors and dentists that summer by sending active-duty medical officers overseas and bringing in some medical reservists. This procedure raised questions of fairness, since many of the approximately 6,300 active medical officers and
30,000 reserve physicians had seen military service in World War II, while many physicians more recently educated at public expense had little or no military service. With volunteers lagging, Defense supported a draft of doctors. The so-called “doctors draft” bill, PL 81-779, signed on 9 September 1950, authorized the drafting of physicians, dentists, and other medical specialists up to age 50, except for members of reserve units. The draft system essentially called those with least service first, and draftees were not to receive the $100 monthly bonus provided volunteers. The law also allowed the secretary of defense to transfer medical officers between the military services if both the officer and the service agreed.

Special doctor registrations took place in October 1950 and January 1951. With volunteers wanting, Marshall in April asked for the draft of 15,422 physicians, beginning with 4,868 in July. Truman approved a draft of physicians starting in July 1951, but OSD canceled August and September calls when an adequate number of volunteers responded to meet service needs. Dentists were drafted in the spring of 1952.

During the Korean War, there were about 3.7 physicians per 1,000 troops, fewer than in World War II. Nonetheless the administration claimed that the armed forces were receiving the “best medical care known in military history.” Statistics supported the claim. Casberg pointed out that the rate for death by disease alone had dropped from 7.5 percent during the Civil War and 0.06 percent in World War II to 0.05 percent, while deaths from combat wounds had fallen from 14 percent and 4.5 percent to only 2 percent. Moreover, 85 percent of the wounded in Korea returned to active duty compared with only 77 percent in World War II. The use of large helicopters to evacuate patients quickly, advances in surgical and medical procedures, and better management of medical resources contributed to bringing down the combat death rate.

The Information Function

The Korean War made possible a resurgence of the public information function in the military services, largely negating the effort by Secretary Forrestal in 1949 to centralize the function in OSD. A tremendous public demand for information about the armed forces provided the military services with an eagerly seized opportunity to expand the scale and scope of their information activities both in the field and in Washington. In the summer of 1950 Deputy Secretary Early sanctioned a large increase in public information staffs by the services. The OSD Office of Public Information (OPI) saw its role eroding and its resources diminishing; after an initial spurt in personnel it decreased from a strength of 264 in 1951 to 150 by the end of 1952.
The decline of OPI and its powers may be attributed to the aggressiveness of the military services in taking advantage of a wartime atmosphere and to the relative indifference of Forrestal's successors to the organization and control of the function, except for security review of public statements. Marshall and Lovett apparently devoted little time and thought to the problems of the Office of Public Information. The position of director of OPI remained vacant from February to December 1950, when Marshall appointed Clayton Fritchey, a well-known newspaper editor, to the post. When Fritchey left for a White House post, Lovett appointed Andrew Berding as director on 1 July 1952. Osgood Roberts, who remained in OPI throughout the war as acting director or deputy director, provided continuity during interregnums.\(^{64}\)

Primarily because of problems with General MacArthur's public statements on government policy, Truman in December 1950 ordered government officials to cut down on their public speaking and clear all statements beforehand with State and Defense. Marshall decided to handle the clearance procedure through his own office, and on 30 December Lovett delegated the authority for setting clearance policy as well as security review to the OPI director. When Truman reasserted the requirement for policy clearance after General MacArthur's recall in April 1951, Lovett called existing procedures to the attention of OSD officials, and in July he formalized the OSD security review functions.\(^{65}\)

Congress sought to curtail the overlapping OSD and service efforts by cutting public relations funds. In 1951 it limited funds for FY 1952 to just under $11 million, almost $5 million less than requested; the following year it set the FY 1953 limit at approximately $5.6 million, almost 50 percent less than the previous year. Although these limits applied to all services worldwide, enforcement was difficult because the services could evade the limits by transferring funds and functions. In OSD, on the other hand, Berding claimed at the end of 1952 that his office had about half as many people as in the spring of 1949 and operated on a budget of $550,000, covering "everything by the strictest of accounting procedures." Forced to eliminate some OPI functions, Berding foresaw that the services would regain a high degree of autonomy in public information.\(^{66}\) It was clear by 1953 that unification of the public information function had not succeeded.

National Mobilization

Initially the Korean War required only a limited industrial mobilization, and Truman hoped to keep it small, but once the Chinese intervened he had to expand the effort and control it more tightly. In mid-December 1950 he
declared a national emergency and established the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) within the Executive Office of the President. Naming Charles E. Wilson, president of the General Electric Company, as ODM director, Truman gave him responsibility for overseeing the entire preparedness effort, including the Economic Stabilization Agency and the Commerce Department’s National Production Authority. In January 1951 Truman also established a Defense Production Administration to exercise general management of the military production program subject to Wilson’s “direction, control, and coordination.” Truman invited Wilson, who was generally sympathetic with the goal of keeping mobilization as limited as possible, to attend Cabinet and NSC meetings. The secretary of defense, meanwhile, became a member of the Defense Mobilization Board under Wilson.

Although the mobilization rose to a much higher level beginning in December 1950, it did not approach the scale of the World War II effort. Still, the economy inevitably felt its effect. Wilson feared that military expenses, which had ranged between 4.6 percent and 6.2 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in fiscal years 1947–49, would take 20 percent in the first year of the war. To mitigate the mobilization’s impact, he planned to control the use of raw materials, expedite industrial production, and keep down inflation.

In January 1951 Economic Stabilization Administrator Eric Johnston decreed a general price-wage freeze in critical defense areas with some price rollbacks later, thus irritating both labor and industry. In April the president asked Congress for additional stabilization power and a two-year extension of the authority granted him for one year in the Defense Production Act of 1950. Responding in July, Congress extended the act for only one year, enlarging some powers and limiting others, and created a Small Defense Plants Administration to encourage small businesses to participate in military production. In 1952 Congress extended the president’s authority to control prices, wages, and rents in critical defense areas until 30 April 1953 but ended his authority to control consumer credit on 30 June 1952.

Truman’s difficulties with Congress over his stabilization powers were further compounded by the 1952 steel strike. When the union contract had expired in December 1951, the steel companies and unions disagreed on new terms, and Truman prevailed on the workers to remain at their jobs while the Wage Stabilization Board studied the matter. When the board recommended higher wages, better fringe benefits, and a union shop, the companies refused unless they received a large price increase, which Truman was unwilling to grant. Disagreement over this matter led to Wilson’s resignation as ODM director in March 1952. The unions rejected a company counteroffer and voted to go on strike on 9 April. With Lovett and others warning of the
damage such a strike would do to the military buildup. Truman on 8 April directed the government to take over the steel mills while negotiations with the workers continued—a move he considered well within his “implied” constitutional powers.” Chief Justice Fred Vinson privately supported the president’s action. The companies sought legal redress, and on 2 June the Supreme Court voted 6 to 3 in their favor. The workers then struck. After a sizable wage boost, a price increase, and the loss of 20 million tons of steel production, the strike finally ended on 24 July. As Lovett publicly declared, the strike accomplished what “no form of bombing” could have done—stopping all production for nearly two months in 380-odd steel plants.71

The limited scale of the mobilization helped contain the threat of runaway inflation. Compared with a 45-percent military consumption rate at the peak of World War II, national defense expenditures never exceeded 14 percent of the GNP, well below Wilson’s prediction of 20 percent for the first year. The lower rate resulted partly because of the slow production start at the beginning of the conflict. Still, DoD military expenditures (not appropriations) as a percentage of GNP more than doubled between the peacetime year FY 1950 and the wartime year FY 1953; for all national defense expenditures, the percentage tripled.72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 22</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean War Expenditures as Percentage of GNP and Total Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in billions)</td>
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### DoD Military Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Expenditures (in billions)</th>
<th>% GNP</th>
<th>% Total Govt</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>111.891</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>19.764</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>38.897</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>43.604</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>40.326</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### National Defense Programs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Expenditures (in billions)</th>
<th>% GNP</th>
<th>% Total Govt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>130.189</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>22.471</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>51.1</td>
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<td>1952</td>
<td>44.037</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>50.412</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>46.986</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*National Defense” includes activities of DoD and other agencies primarily related to national defense, but not veterans’ benefits and services.

The Truman administration did a creditable job in holding the overall rise in the consumer price index during the Korean War to about 14 percent over 1947–49. However, the military budget experienced a much larger percentage increase.

* In August 1950 the president had ordered the Army to take over and operate railroads when workers threatened to strike; he returned the railroads to their owners in May 1952.
increase—up to 28 percent—in the wholesale cost of metals and metal products that composed so large a part of weapons manufacture. Beyond the use of direct controls, Truman's frugality also held down inflation. Congressional enactment of the tax increases he called for in 1950 resulted in a $3.5 billion surplus on 30 June 1951; the partial congressional response to his 1951 request for increases held the FY 1952 deficit to $4 billion. However, congressional failure to increase taxes further led Truman in January 1953 to project deficits of $5.9 billion in FY 1953 and $14.4 billion in FY 1954.74

The Munitions Board Dilemma

From its inception in 1947 the Munitions Board was plagued by a military challenge to civil authority, perhaps all the more vigorous and stubborn because of the perception by the services that the board's supervision of procurement policy could diminish their procurement responsibilities. This apparent threat to military control of a major function involving a large share of the service budgets remained a constant source of friction between the civilian chairman of the board and its military members throughout the Korean War.

The reluctance of Marshall and Lovett to endow the chairman of the board with adequate powers to exercise authority over the services reflected their lack of confidence in the statutory boards. This reluctance no doubt derived also from the secretaries' disinclination to force major changes that the military strongly opposed. As a result of the continuing indecision and dissension within DoD, the Munitions Board did not play an effective role in the industrial mobilization for the Korean War.

The sheer size and complexity of the military supply system also contributed to the problems of management. In April 1951 the Army supply program included approximately 700,000 items; the Navy program, about 779,000; and the Air Force program, more than 600,000. To equip and maintain a single soldier overseas required more than five tons of supplies and equipment, and by 1953 the initial equipment for a division cost approximately $175 million.75

In June 1950 the board had three major directorates—industrial programs, military programs, and military supply—under which some 21 councils, commissions, boards, and offices operated. That summer the Munitions Board Cataloging Agency formally became the central government-wide authority to develop a uniform and more efficient Federal Catalog System for literally millions of military supply items.76

The chronic difficulty of recruiting highly qualified people for top government posts manifested itself in Marshall's search for a replacement for
Hubert Howard as Munitions Board chairman. After a wide search, Marshall in November 1950 sent Truman the name of John D. Small, a Naval Academy graduate and New York businessman who had headed the Civilian Production Administration for a time. After Senate confirmation, Small began revamping the Munitions Board staff, seeking to replace the three military officers who headed the directorates with five experienced civilians as vice chairmen."

The Munitions Board grew in size and responsibilities during 1951. In early February it established regional councils to coordinate military procurement and construction in the field, and in March Lovett directed that the councils have full-time civilian chairmen to represent Small and Rosenberg and other OSD agencies on ODM-established interagency regional committees."

Within the Munitions Board difficulties in reaching decisions persisted in 1951, since three of the four board members were assistant or under secretaries of the military departments who acted as both claimants and judges for their own service requests and often joined forces against the chairman. In late May 1951 Lovett asked the service secretaries to limit their board representatives to policy determination and general supervision and leave detailed actions to the chairman and his staff. The secretary tried to clarify and amplify his views in a directive in July which stated that it was Defense policy to have three basically independent military supply systems of maximum possible uniformity, but only one service was to buy common-use items whenever that was most efficient. The Munitions Board held the primary responsibility, in collaboration with the military departments, for prescribing implementation of procurement and supply policies."

Despite Lovett’s efforts, Small’s relations with the military services deteriorated. The services agreed that the secretary of defense, through Small, had the power to establish policies, but they emphasized that the Munitions Board was only a planning agency, whereas they held full operational authority. The Air Force, in particular, seemed to question Small’s power to direct any Air Force subordinate to do anything. The military departments felt strongly that Small and his staff of businessmen were “not competent to make executive decisions” and that the chairman could not make final decisions in the face of unanimous service opposition."

Small’s position became increasingly tenuous. When the services united against him he lacked the power to decide policy matters; without service cooperation he could not enforce such decisions as the board made. Departmental secretaries had the right to depart from Munitions Board policies, the services made little effort to educate field personnel concerning policies, and practically no enforcement took place. The widely dispersed military procurement operations aggravated the problem. Furthermore, in both the Air Force
and the Army procurement came under the military chain of command, and even the civilian assistant secretaries had little control over such matters. Small wanted to wield the power of decision even over the opposition of all the other board members, a power that previous secretaries had refrained from conferring on board chairmen. Choosing a conservative course in the spring of 1952, Lovett allowed the Munitions Board more participation in and control over procurement regulations but still did not give Small the final power of decision.

The situation attracted the attention of Congress, which looked into Munitions Board activities. In the fall of 1950 and again in 1951, Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson's Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee blamed the Munitions Board, despite low pre-Korea levels of stockpile funding, for materials shortages, particularly in rubber, wool, tin, and tungsten. Other congressional committees investigating problems, duplication, and waste in military procurement also criticized the Munitions Board. Lovett responded to further congressional complaints about production bottlenecks by bringing in from industry an unpaid special assistant in December 1951 to work with Small and the military services to help overcome delivery lags and by setting up a small outside group to review Defense business management procedures.

In January 1952 McNeil warned Lovett and Small of a barrage of criticism, fortunately mostly off-the-record, by members of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. Convinced that the military departments had inspired the assault, McNeil felt that the Munitions Board had done a reasonably good job in many areas. It was in trouble, McNeil wrote Lovett, for the "very simple reason that junior officers . . . on the staff are in an almost impossible position critically to analyze and review the recommendations of senior officers of their respective services." Exploring further at Lovett's request, McNeil reported that the congressmen felt the secretary of defense would "bear the responsibility for what happened within the Department of Defense." Believing that Lovett had power to assign responsibilities and to give the Munitions Board chairman greater powers of decision, they felt, as McNeil put it to Lovett, that its chairman was the secretary's man.

The Munitions Board also figured prominently in the investigation of federal supply management by the Bonner subcommittee of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. By March 1952 the subcommittee, highly censorious of the military procurement record, was ready to consider new legislation and, if necessary, to extend the powers of the secretary of defense. Lovett believed, however, that he had adequate

* This became the Committee on Government Operations on 4 July 1952.
authority without new legislation. Concerned that if Lovett testified to this effect he would be asked why he had not delegated more power to the Munitions Board chairman, Assistant Secretary Coolidge warned the secretary on 10 April that congressional reactions "could be most damaging to our whole unification effort and to you personally." By late May 1952 the Pentagon was studying intensively the Bonner subcommittee's report, which accused the military departments, particularly the Air Force, of maintaining or creating separate supply systems for common-use items. The Munitions Board generally agreed with the report. Citing five years of "disappointing experience," the subcommittee's majority concluded that the defense secretary needed a "stronger and clearer legislative mandate for military unification" and recommended the creation of an assistant secretary of defense for supply who, "without hindrance by the departmental representatives," could work out a program to improve and integrate the military supply systems. One subcommittee member, however, pointedly noted that the secretary already possessed the power to resolve the problem and questioned why he had failed to do so.

In mid-June representatives of McNeil's and Coolidge's offices recommended that Lovett give the Munitions Board head the power of decision, even if this step might "also entail the selection of another Chairman." They also suggested resolving the board's military staffing problem by obtaining a presidential directive authorizing the secretary of defense to control the appointment or promotion of military officers serving in OSD. The OSD officials recommended that Lovett see Truman personally about this last proposal, lest the president's own military aides "sidetrack or scuttle it." Loath to interfere in military promotions, Lovett refused to pursue the idea. He had still not made up his mind how to resolve the Munitions Board problem when he followed a long workday with three-and-a-half hours before the Bonner subcommittee the night of 24 June. Lovett testified that, although the secretary of defense possessed adequate legal authority to make the organizational changes necessary for efficiency even in the face of service challenges, he planned to use such authority only when a military department's practices clearly impaired effectiveness—a course of action that might take more time but which over the long run, he judged, would make Defense a "much more virile and effective organization than if I were continually cramming things down the throats of the military Departments." At that time OSD civilian chiefs either filled in the officers' fitness reports and left them for a higher-rank officer of the same service to sign, or they wrote letters to be attached to formal fitness reports. In either case, civilian views might or might not be taken into account in the formal rating. In the spring of 1955 President Eisenhower made the civilian supervisor responsible for both completing and signing the single fitness report.
Lovett’s doubts about giving more authority to the Munitions Board chairman grew in part out of his perception that the services viewed supply functions as an integral extension of their command responsibilities and their statutory right to separate administration. Lovett wanted the large Defense apparatus to have unified, centralized policy direction and decentralized operations. Furthermore, he was uncertain that supply centralization, which already accounted for 75 percent of purchases by dollar amount, was good per se. Bigger orders did not always result in lower prices. Decentralization, in fact, often resulted in “a high degree of integration of the user and designer, purchaser and producer.” Nonetheless, he admitted the need to improve the Munitions Board operation, and he conceded that the board would not be adequate under full mobilization. Some of the congressmen told him they considered it already inadequate under partial mobilization.

Lovett felt that no one action, such as the creation of a new assistant secretary of defense or the grant of sole power of decision to the chairman, was the answer; he wanted to look more closely at the board’s current functions and composition. He recognized that restrictions on the board went too far and that it lacked clear authority in many areas, but he thought it “equally clear that a slashing change in the procurement responsibilities of the Military Departments would . . . be most unwise.” In any event, he preferred to move slowly, carefully.

Reviewing Lovett’s testimony the next day, Coolidge thought the secretary had made damaging admissions and would be in a “very weak position” if he failed to act at once to remedy the Munitions Board’s defects and give its chairman the sole power of decision. Although both Lovett and Foster associated the board’s failures with Small personally, Lovett on 29 July issued a new Munitions Board charter giving the chairman the power of decision on all matters falling under the board’s jurisdiction.

During the same period, the Munitions Board became the secretary’s primary staff agency for implementing section 638 of the Defense Appropriations Act of 1953, which provided that the services could spend no money for procurement, supply, or distribution except under regulations approved by the secretary of defense. Previously, the services had separately promulgated such regulations. In September 1952 the secretary of defense established the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, applicable to all of the services.

Meanwhile, further organizational changes in the Munitions Board had the net effect of diminishing rather than enhancing Small’s responsibilities. By the spring of 1952 he had four major officials under him—John C. Houston, Jr., as executive vice chairman; Harold R. Austin as vice chairman for production and requirements; Nathaniel Knowles, Jr., as vice chairman for materials; and Rear Adm. Morton L. Ring as acting vice chairman for supply
management. On 29 July Foster transferred most of the functions of the Office of International Programs from Houston to Nash's Office for International Security Affairs. Then, as a result of the Cataloging and Standardization Act (PL 82-436, 1 July 1952), Foster in September established a new Defense Supply Management Agency, headed by Rear Adm. J.W. Fowler. Also in September, in accordance with the Military Construction Act (PL 82-534, 14 July 1952), Lovett transferred Munitions Board responsibilities for public works and family housing to a separate director of installations reporting to the secretary of defense.

The Munitions Board staff grew from 706 (588 civilians and 118 military) in June 1950 to 896 a year later, but with the divestiture of so many of its functions in 1952 it dropped to 553 (458 civilians and 95 military) by the end of that year. Not only materials and production problems but the constant changes in and inherent weakness of the board's organization, the divergent interests of OSD and the military services, and the secretary's apparent lack of confidence in its chairman contributed to Munitions Board difficulties during the war.

The Munitions Board experience demonstrated the variety of organizational pressures that could plague the secretary of defense. When one asks why Lovett did little to improve the situation, one must bear in mind the constraints he faced. Established by statute, the boards could not be abolished without congressional action. Although Congress urged changes, Lovett sidestepped the issue because of uncertainty about what specific changes to sponsor and doubt that change would result in long-run improvements in operations. To reorganize the board when he had little time left in office would have superimposed the burden of change on already troublesome problems. Since the board form of organization was proving weak, one could suggest that Lovett should at least have moved quickly and decisively to find a chairman better able to lead the board. But, as under previous secretaries, the choice of candidates for this onerous and modestly paid position was limited. Even if such a person had been found, there would have been, after mid-1952, less than seven months for him to learn and undertake an extraordinarily complicated job. Furthermore, a dominant chairman might well have inflamed rather than damped down service-OSD friction. Hence, it is not hard to understand why Lovett opted to hold off and save his recommendations for reform for a later secretary of defense.

The Research and Development Board

The deficiencies inherent in the board system, so strikingly manifested in the experience of the Munitions Board, also afflicted the Research and
The Search for Greater Efficiency 507

Development Board (RDB) during the Korean War. There also the basic
problems centered on the powers of the chairman and the extent of the
board’s authority over the military services, which habitually sought maxi­
mum independence of OSD.

Under regulations in 1950, the RDB chairman could make a final decision
only when the other six board members, representing the military services,
were not unanimous. He could take executive action on any issue when he
judged that it did not require, or time did not permit, formal board action.
However, a board member could challenge the chairman’s decision by
appealing through his service secretary to the secretary of defense.96

In February 1951 Marshall redefined the RDB charter, allowing the board
to issue directives in the secretary’s name to implement its policies and
decisions; the chairman retained the power of decision when the board was
not unanimous. Nevertheless, the scientific community viewed the board as
having “too little (or no) authority and insufficient information” to deal with
the large-scale scientific needs created by the Korean War. Some observers saw
the board’s system of committees and panels, composed mainly of part-time
people, as unable to “analyze the problems and see the whole picture.” To
provide advice and guidance at another level, the president established a
Science Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization; Oliver E.
Buckley, former president of Bell Laboratories, became its chairman in April
1951. The new committee met only a few times a year, however, and played
little part in the redirection of scientific matters during the Truman
administration.97

Walter G. Whitman succeeded William Webster as RDB chairman on 1
August 1951. On leave from the chemical engineering department at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Whitman had seen World War II
service with the War Production Board, explored the concept of a nuclear­
powered aircraft, and served on the RDB committee on fuel and lubricants
and the AEC’s General Advisory Committee. A strong and aggressive admin­
istrator, Whitman nonetheless once told a congressional committee that the
RDB job was “too big for only one man.” Since he did not want to be “carried
out on a stretcher,” Whitman established an internal nine-man policy group to
prepare for the monthly board meetings by examining the work of the various
RDB committees and panels, taking into account JCS and Munitions Board
advice, and developing programs for the board’s consideration.98

* In 1951 the statutory board consisted of Webster and later Whitman as chairman plus Army
Under Secretary Archibald S. Alexander, Navy Under Secretary Dan A. Kimball, Air Force Under
Secretary John A. McGone, Army Maj. Gen. Ward H. Maris, Rear Adm. Maurice E. Carts, and Air
Force Maj. Gen. Gordon P. Saville. The military men headed their services’ research and
development effort. By May 1952 RDB membership included Whitman as chairman. Army
Over time Whitman realized that organization alone could not resolve certain issues, particularly those concerning the chairman's relations with the military services and the touchy matter of duplication in service efforts. Like the chairman of the Munitions Board, Whitman felt keenly his lack of real control over the services. He particularly sought for himself authority over service budgets for research and development and the right to delete unproductive or duplicative programs, matters on which the full board currently held final authority. In March 1952 he asked Lovett for a new charter giving the RDB chairman sole power to make recommendations on these two matters. Congressional criticism that the current situation fostered service duplication reinforced Whitman's position. In early April 1952, for example, John Taber, the powerful senior minority member of the House Committee on Appropriations, complained that Whitman was "surrounded" by service representatives and not "allowed to make any decision or to do anything which would put this set-up in order."  

Over the objections of the military, Lovett finally decided to approve a revised charter; in May 1952 he granted the RDB chairman the authority he sought. While Whitman viewed the new charter as granting him, functionally if not actually, a "second hat as an Assistant Secretary of Defense," service representatives regarded the new grant of authority as inconsistent with the National Security Act. Soon after Lovett left office, Whitman suggested that Congress change the legislative framework to clarify the RDB chairman's powers, particularly to give him more choice in the selection of board members. Looking back, however, he thought that Lovett's charter had provided the means for operating in a "reasonably satisfactory" way.  

During the Korean War period, Defense obligation funds for direct costs of research and development rose from $525 million in FY 1950 to $987 million in FY 1951 and $1,287 million in FY 1952, an increase of almost 150 percent. These sums were only a small portion (about 3 1/2 percent) of the total military budget. Despite the significant expansion of funds and work, the RDB staff declined from 315 in mid-1950 to 272 at the end of 1952.  

Reviewing in early 1953 his RDB experience, Whitman thought that the failure to develop long-range integrated planning for DoD research and development "under the direct leadership of the Secretary of Defense" was the greatest deficiency in the RDB process. The RDB committees paralleled the interests of the armed forces, and they included many military officers deeply committed to current fields of research. The board thus tended to focus on established military interests rather than "radically new conceptual
ideas" that might lead to major breakthroughs. The situation did not bode well for what Whitman judged the dominant U.S. military need in the next 5 to 10 years—an adequate defense, including a U.S. retaliatory capability, against a Soviet nuclear attack. Because future security depended on the effective prosecution of research and development, Whitman felt that the secretary of defense needed to act immediately to tackle the long-range need.105

The difficulty in long-range planning, Whitman believed, was compounded by the RDB chairman’s lack of direct contact with the Joint Chiefs, who seemed too involved in the Korean War to think about long-term problems and too deficient in scientific thinking and outlook to deal with highly technical matters. Whitman, in fact, had once suggested that, to make a start, Lovett should establish a small planning team under the deputy secretary of defense, including the JCS chairman, the Munitions Board chairman, and the RDB chairman. Lovett, however, did not act on this recommendation, and Whitman continued to worry in 1953 about “applying proper selective emphasis” in research and development.106

Marshall’s and Lovett’s efforts to achieve administrative and operational efficiency within the Defense establishment went hand in glove with Truman’s larger effort to control inflation and maintain the nation’s economic health while fighting a war. Truman’s careful scrutiny of overall military costs, curtailment of other government programs, imposition of economic controls, and efforts, even though only partially successful, to raise taxes had a generally beneficial effect. The Korean War effort stimulated the U.S. economy while adding less than $14 billion to the public debt by mid-1954, a fact the Eisenhower administration was pleased to discover.105

The small wartime increase in the public debt was, however, no indicator of the war’s cost in terms of dollars. McNeil in 1955 estimated that the direct costs of the Korean War amounted to $18.1 billion, of which $2.3 billion was for military personnel, $12.4 billion for supply and ammunition, $1.6 billion for transportation costs, and $1.8 billion for support costs in the continental United States and Far East Command. McNeil’s estimate was the informed guess of a knowledgeable person, but even he could have no idea of the precise figure since federal accounting systems did not separate Defense expenses for Korean combat from those for other military expenses.106

Two other sources outside the Department of Defense estimated the military cost of the war for fiscal years 1951–53 at $29.3 billion and $54 billion. For all national security costs, the first estimate set the price at about
$79 billion, still excluding interest costs or veteran benefits; the second estimate of $164 billion included interest and veteran benefits. 107

The end of the Korean War in July 1953 did not bring about a settlement of East–West differences. As a result, Defense expenditures did not return to the rates of fiscal years 1948–50 (4.8-6.0 percent of GNP and 32.7-37.0 percent of government expenditures) but continued at a level of 9.9 to 10.7 percent of GNP (from a high of 12.1 in FY 1953) and 61.5-63.2 percent of all federal spending during fiscal years 1955–57. 108 The continuation of such large defense expenditures in peacetime made departmental efficiency a matter of ongoing concern.

As Marshall and Lovett had discovered, however, creating a sound and efficient Defense organization was no easy task. Military mobilization was extremely complicated. The vastness of the effort, the interrelated and competitive nature of many military programs, the swift pace of technology, and the impact of military needs on the civilian sector made for enormous complexity. By degrees rather than by large, sweeping strokes, nudging here and pushing there, Marshall and Lovett worked to effect change and improvement. They achieved demonstrable if incomplete success in moving the department farther along the road to unification in the form of greater centralization of power in OSD.

More thorough changes in the direction of centralization occurred shortly after Lovett left office and may be attributed chiefly to Lovett’s spadework. That Marshall and Lovett did not seek to bring about more substantial changes while in office stemmed from several considerations. Their preoccupation with the war and other persistent demands left them little time or inclination to initiate innovations that would require significant additional attention, including preparation of legislative proposals and testimony before congressional committees. Moreover, their short tenures probably deterred them from undertaking a large-scale reshaping of OSD and the department. It remained for a new administration, headed by a president of great military prestige and commanding widespread public support, to implement some of the important reforms that Lovett recommended as his term drew to a close.
Progress toward armed services unification, or more accurately cooperation, desired by sponsors of the original legislation establishing the Department of Defense, hinged largely on the achievement of an effective working relationship between DoD’s civil and military elements. Finding the appropriate line between civil and military authority remained elusive because of the imprecision or absence of statutory language, overlapping bureaucratic jurisdictions, and the inconsistencies resulting from frequent leadership changes.

At the beginning of the Korean War DoD was an unfinished creation, still in the process of evolution toward a more coherent and cohesive organism. The first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, had never succeeded in gaining the full confidence of President Truman, for which he paid a price in his efforts to establish effective control over his own department. Originally, Louis Johnson had a good rapport with Truman and demonstrated his loyalty to the president’s policy in his unceasing efforts to cut the costs of defense. Awareness within DoD that Johnson was the president’s man and had his support helped the secretary to attain a greater measure of control over and compliance from the military services than Forrestal had achieved. When the Korean War destroyed Johnson’s public credibility and made him a political liability, Truman found it advisable to fire him.

George Marshall, who enjoyed the admiration and respect of the president, retained Truman’s confidence throughout his tenure. A towering military figure, greatly respected by both civil and military authorities, Marshall achieved an effective orchestration of the two elements within the Pentagon without a major organizational reform. Lovett also refrained from large-scale organizational change, but he concluded as he left office that civil authority and control over the military needed to be reinforced. Still, despite the
broadened responsibilities of the military services during these wartime years, Marshall and Lovett maintained overall civilian control within the Pentagon and established a foundation for further advances in such control.

Like other department heads, the secretaries of defense played the dual and often ambivalent roles of the president's man and the representative of departmental interests. Their prestige and power within DoD depended in no small part on their ability to secure the resources desired by the military services. Their status with the president depended on their willingness and ability to carry out his policies. Marshall and Lovett generally succeeded in finding a middle course between the president's desire to keep defense costs down and the military services' demands for money; they benefited greatly in this regard from the huge increases in the military budget during the Korean War that provided the armed forces with much but never all that they wanted. They succeeded in holding money and manpower requests from the military services to reasonable levels, making the deep cuts, and thereby allowing the president and Congress to deal with realistic DoD budgets and not the "wish lists" originally submitted by the services. This intensive budget review, in which McNeil played a key role, was one of the most time-consuming, stressful, and vital services rendered by the secretaries.

The president gave Marshall and Lovett an unusually free hand in running the military establishment. According to Lovett and Deputy Secretary Foster, the president did not play politics with Defense. He left to the secretary and the deputy secretary the appointment of Pentagon officials. Moreover, the White House consulted them on the appointment of officials even at the assistant secretary level in the military departments. They could see the president at the White House any time on a half-hour's notice, and Truman came to the Pentagon occasionally to meet with them and the Joint Chiefs. Lovett spoke of Truman's attitude toward Marshall and himself as "so trusting, so forthright, so heartwarming."1

Because so many foreign policy decisions depended on military considerations during this period, the secretary of defense exercised greater influence over such decisions than in peacetime. Johnson had too little political capital left during his wartime tenure to benefit from the changed circumstances. But Marshall and Lovett enjoyed great respect and attention in the policymaking role, their status further enhanced by their experience at the State Department, where they had served from 1947 to 1949 as secretary and under secretary respectively. Their intimate relationship with Secretary of State Dean Acheson fostered the close and influential working connection with State that Johnson had rebuffed so cavalierly and foolishly. Not until the Kennedy and Johnson administrations of the 1960s did a secretary of defense exert as much influence over foreign policy decisions as did Marshall and
Lovett. Their breadth of view and confidence afforded more than adequate sanction for overruling on occasion the more narrowly military and sometimes parochial judgments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services. Thus Marshall sided with the State Department against the JCS on the timing and some of the provisions of the Japanese peace treaty, and he rejected JCS pressures for increases in military assistance funds in the FY 1952 budget. Lovett overruled the proposals of the Military Liaison Committee and the JCS in 1952 for legislation to permit certain kinds of exchanges of information on atomic matters with foreign countries.

Because of the increasing exercise of legislative oversight of Defense matters, the congressional relationship became of greater importance to OSD. As the appropriations committees of the two houses of Congress delved more deeply into the Korean War DoD budgets, the burden on the secretary of defense and his principal assistants to maintain good relations with Congress grew. Johnson, Marshall, and Lovett spent a significant part of their time testifying at congressional hearings and conducting other business with legislators and their committees. It is likely that they devoted more of their workday to congressional matters than the 14 percent that Forrestal spent.2

The congressional demands on the secretaries' time diminished their capacity to manage the department and forced them to rely more heavily than they might have preferred on their staff, the JCS, and the service secretaries for advice and assistance. OSD and the military services maintained large staffs for the express purpose of dealing with congressional matters. McNeil maintained a special liaison staff of his own to handle budget business with the appropriations committees. Moreover, virtually all elements of OSD and military service staffs became involved to some degree or other in matters pertaining to Congress. Access to Congress by the military services provided them with opportunities to "end run" OSD, lobbying on behalf of their own interests contrary to OSD positions.

The pressures of the war tended to discourage any disposition to make sweeping changes in DoD organization. Even so, Marshall and Lovett continued the progress, in a modest way, toward interservice cooperation and integration of functions begun by Forrestal and Johnson. A number of functions were integrated at the interservice or OSD level, including supply management, military housing, technical information, parachute testing, and use of commercial transportation in the continental United States.3 The vital significance of coordinating communications intelligence led to the establishment in 1952, by presidential order, of the National Security Agency, which came under the direction of the secretary of defense, the designated executive agent for foreign signals intelligence and the communications security of the government.4
The Military

The creation of the integrated structure for national security affairs and the growing power of the secretary of defense inevitably brought civilians—primarily the secretary, his deputy, and the assistant secretaries—increasingly into matters that had been largely the domain of the military. The primary areas in which tension between civil and military authority became manifest were roles and missions, centralized direction of military operations, the budget, manpower controls, procurement, and foreign military assistance—all matters of the most intense concern to the services. The basic issue was where to draw the line between the realms of the military and the civilian leadership, which, of course, included the president and the secretary of state as well as the secretary of defense. In particular, and increasingly, this had to do with the trend toward greater direction from Washington of military operations and tactics in the field. During the Korean War the military, especially General MacArthur, complained about the incursion of civilian authority into strategic and tactical matters they viewed as a military preserve.

The disputes between Washington and MacArthur that finally led to his dismissal in April 1951 centered on the limits of the field commander's authority. MacArthur interpreted directives and guidance from all levels in Washington—Army, JCS, the secretary of defense, and the president—in ways that afforded him wider latitude of action and expression than intended. In part, this may be attributed to the ambiguity, vagueness, or contradictory nature of such guidance. The confusion and uncertainty in Washington in making policy and in wording directives during the extremely hectic months from June 1950 to April 1951 gave the general ample opportunity to indulge his own inclinations and preferences on strategy and tactics. His military initiatives were secondary considerations in the decision leading to MacArthur's dismissal. In Truman's mind, MacArthur's principal transgression was the public airing of views on U.S. strategy and policy contrary to those of the president, an act of insubordination that also had damaging domestic and international political repercussions. Truman—and in this belief he had the support of Acheson, Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs—regarded such statements by MacArthur as improper and unwarranted intrusions by a military commander into political matters beyond his province. Although MacArthur professed that he was simply exercising his right to express views on military matters, he obviously ignored direct orders from his commander in chief to clear such statements with Washington before issuing them.

The MacArthur dismissal damaged the Truman administration politically and fed the growing disillusionment of the American public with the Korean War. Because of Defense's staunch support of the president's decision, it also
suffered, especially in Congress, from the storm of criticism against the administration. Had anyone other than George Marshall been secretary of defense at the time it is likely that even greater criticism would have been visited on the department.

The removal of MacArthur from command in the Far East represented an extreme in the disputes over policy and action that have frequently characterized relations between field commanders and higher authority. MacArthur’s successors, Ridgway and Clark, also protested and opposed decisions from Washington, including priorities for forces, armistice negotiations, bombing policies, and prisoner-of-war policies.

In Europe, Eisenhower, shortly after becoming SACEUR, found himself at odds with Washington on such important issues as the size of American force contributions to NATO and military assistance programs. As Eisenhower’s successor at SHAPE, Ridgway again had occasion to take issue with Washington. Efforts to compose the diverse and often opposing interests of the United States and the rest of NATO led to strong and sometimes intense differences between SACEUR and Washington.

The incidence and intensity of differences between Washington and the field commanders appears to have been greater during the Korean War years than during World War II. Certainly the major theater commanders of World War II, Eisenhower and MacArthur, especially the latter, had disagreements with the higher command and the political authorities, but with lesser domestic political repercussions than during the Korean War period. The limited political and military objectives in Korea imposed greater strains on military commanders than did the unconditional surrender objective of World War II. Limitations imposed by civil authorities on the scope, intensity, and objectives of operations often compounded problems in the battle area and added to the normal friction in relations with Washington. The conclusion of armistice negotiations required two years of the most frustrating and bitter disputation instead of a few days as in World War II. The burden of both fighting and negotiating under often constricting and sometimes ambiguous conditions prescribed by Washington fell entirely on the theater commanders and their subordinates. Inevitably the more narrowly focused views and purposes of the theater commanders clashed with the global view of higher authority.

Fighting a war with a host of allies entertaining different and changing political and military objectives created further strains and complications for the U.S. defense effort. In South Korea the Rhee government sought the complete defeat of North Korea and the unification of the two countries—goals that the United States and the UN abandoned after the Chinese Communists entered the war in November 1950. By contrast, the UN, and particularly the allied countries fighting in Korea, sought to impose restraints
on the United States, to keep the war limited, and to terminate it as soon as possible. These differences had important military consequences as the DoD and the field commanders found themselves buffeted from all sides and amid these crosscurrents having to make decisions and choices that affected vital air and ground military operations. Field commanders experienced confusion, frustration, annoyance, and cynicism. Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, writing in 1954, no doubt voiced the sentiments of many U.S. military men: "War without allies is bad enough—with allies it is hell!"

Despite the enlarged OSD civilian role, the military services retained much power within the Defense establishment. Although seemingly reduced to providing support for the unified commands, the services enjoyed remarkable success in holding onto many functions and prerogatives, exercising leverage through continuing control within their own organizations of the military essentials—money, men, materiel, research and development, choice of weapons, and, above all, the assignment and promotion of personnel.

The service chiefs remained key figures within the defense structure, functioning as military heads of their services, executive agents of the JCS, members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, and members of the JCS—in which last role they were principal military advisers to the president, the secretary of defense, and the NSC. They reported to their departmental secretaries on matters within the scope of the secretaries' authority. Through the JCS they exercised strategic direction over all elements of the armed forces, and, as executive agents, individual chiefs of staff exercised operational control over unified commands on behalf of the JCS. The services retained administrative and logistical control over the component commands of the unified commands. Moreover, unified commanders had little voice in the preparation of statements of requirements for the component commands; the force and materiel programs prepared by the services seemed often based on considerations that had more to do with the overall interests of the services than with the operational needs of the combat commands. Consequently, the preferences of the services for particular kinds and quantities of units and weapons might not accord with the preferences of the unified commands. Thus, the Air Force gave top priority to strategic bombers even though unified commanders and the other services wanted more tactical fighters and transports. The Army sought guided missiles and atomic weapons even as combat commanders called for more divisions and tanks. The Navy continued its quest for a strategic atomic mission through continued development of supercarriers and larger carrier aircraft, sometimes at the expense of other operational needs.

In strategic planning, supposedly the realm of the JCS and the unified commands, the military services continued to play a large role. Their
headquarters staffs dominated the joint military planning and decisionmaking process through their review of JCS plans and the assignment to the Joint Staff of officers whose first loyalty was to their services. The pull of service remained dominant even as the Defense structure became larger and more complex, and allegiance to service above other entities remained the norm.

The military services frequently united in opposing the growing centralization of power in OSD and any exercise of greater operational control by OSD over the military, as in the Municions Board and the Research and Development Board. They consistently opposed structural and procedural changes that threatened their power and influence. Forced to yield on occasion to strong secretaries such as Johnson, Marshall, and Lovett, they often found ways to evade secretarial authority and control.

Relations between the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs improved after the departure of Johnson in September 1950. As a former Army chief of staff, Marshall fully appreciated the accomplishments and contributions of the Joint Chiefs and generally supported them. "I frankly doubt," he told the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations in May 1951 during the MacArthur hearings, "that this Government will ever [again] be so fortunate as to have such a collection of experience at one time in the Chiefs of Staff."6

When Lovett succeeded Marshall, the close and cordial association between the secretary and the Joint Chiefs continued, but on a somewhat different basis. Lovett, despite his high War Department position during World War II, lacked the military background to elicit JCS deference comparable to that accorded Marshall, and his affable temperament contrasted notably with Marshall's stiffer, more formal style. Moving around the Pentagon more than Marshall, Lovett often joined the chiefs in the secure JCS meeting room, known later as the "tank," and frequently saw them in his own office. Even so, General Collins never felt that he got to know Lovett on a personal basis, although he had "considerable admiration for him as a man." In retrospect, Collins felt that Lovett "never had any great influence on the thinking of the JCS." General Carter, director of the OSD Executive Office under both Marshall and Lovett, felt that, although there may have been differences between the secretaries of defense and the Joint Chiefs on occasion, there were no real quarrels. In his view, "General Marshall, and Mr. Lovett too, respected the military position of the Joint Chiefs and their military advice." They, in turn, respected the secretary's position. Lovett commented shortly after he left office that there was "never any question" of the Joint Chiefs disputing the line of authority.7

The JCS structure and procedures remained the same during the period. When the defense secretary sent a matter to the Joint Chiefs for consideration,
they generally assigned it to one of three, high-level JCS committees for strategic plans, logistic plans, and intelligence matters. The relevant committee assigned the question to a joint staff group for research and preparation of a paper which made its way back through the responsible JCS committee to the Joint Chiefs for consideration. The processing of papers became a problem during the Korean War period since the number of questions submitted for JCS review multiplied and no real machinery existed for separating the important from the less important queries—thus creating a logjam which severely taxed the staff and the individual chiefs. Lovett once estimated that more than a third of JCS papers concerned “ordinary routine administrative matters,” including such questions as what agency should operate the services’ coffee-roasting plants.

Since the joint staff system tended to preserve individual service views, any real reconciliation of such views had to come from the Joint Chiefs themselves, who had the power to compromise issues and make concessions. Beyond the JCS, the secretary of defense, with the help of his OSD staff, had responsibility for passing judgment on JCS recommendations and decisions, but OSD did not necessarily have full access to JCS information. Through their control of the flow of the information to OSD and the service secretaries, the service chiefs could do much to shape the nature and direction of policy on important issues. Jealous of their role as military advisers to the president, the chiefs maintained that as members of the JCS their deliberations and internal papers were privileged and available to OSD only with their consent. On occasion they apparently decided not to inform OSD about certain matters. From the standpoint of OSD officials, this “standoffishness,” as Frank Nash called it, created an “iron curtain” shutting out OSD and its staff agencies and consequently hindering OSD operations. Nash complained that “trying to pierce the corporate veil” of the Joint Staff was a most difficult job; yet he saw it as the “most important task” in developing fully coordinated Pentagon positions on major issues.

An important channel of information between the Joint Chiefs and OSD, General Bradley as chairman presided at JCS meetings, although by law he had no “vote,” a restriction that Lovett felt diminished the position. Strictly speaking, the Joint Chiefs did not vote, arriving at their conclusions through discussion. When the Joint Chiefs completed their deliberations, Bradley, who met with the secretary often, informed him, usually in writing, of their recommendations or disagreement, commenting freely and discussing the matter verbally with the secretary. Although Bradley briefed the president often, he generally left it to Marshall or Lovett to inform the president and NSC of formal JCS recommendations and his own concurrence or non-concurrence.
Since the secretaries of defense preferred to receive a unanimous JCS recommendation, they frequently asked for further JCS review when split decisions occurred. One result, General Vandenberg noted, was that the chiefs felt a "powerful pressure from above" to reach agreement. Negative public attitudes about interservice squabbles also influenced them to resolve their differences. Vandenberg felt that the search for unanimity sometimes went too far, failing to allow sufficient opportunity for individual chiefs to present differing sides of arguments or for responsible superiors to hear them. He also thought that the need to compromise made some interservice log-rolling unavoidable. His negative assessment, some time after the JCS disagreement in the fall of 1951 over the Air Force budget share, made clear that he and Finletter were never truly satisfied with the compromise, each believing that U.S. national security was being jeopardized. Although General Collins and Admiral Fechteler opposed the Air Force's strategic view, they agreed that strongly held positions often reflected true conviction, not simply service loyalty.11

While the secretary of defense might seek JCS unanimity, that did not mean he would necessarily agree with their opinion or recommendation. Since the Joint Chiefs were supposed to give military advice, and the secretary had to take into consideration political, budgetary, international, and other factors, disagreement was sometimes inevitable. In the 1951 budget argument, for instance, the Air Force disagreement with a balanced rearmament policy at least forced a review of the policy. The pressures on the secretary of defense from the military services could be powerful and at times unrelenting, as Forrestal had experienced to his dismay and as Johnson, Marshall, and Lovett learned for themselves. General Collins later wrote in another context that being secretary of defense was the "toughest job in Washington" after the president's. With insight born of experience, he added, "No Secretary of Defense worthy of his great responsibilities is ever likely to be popular with . . . the Chiefs of services."12

The JCS executive agent system for unified commands attracted particular attention from Lovett. The problem with the system arose from the inherent conflict between the two roles played by the service chief. In his usual role as chief of staff, he reported to his departmental secretary; in his role as a JCS executive agent, however, he reported directly to the Joint Chiefs and thence to the secretary of defense and the president, thus bypassing the service secretary. Since many activities carried out by a JCS executive agent had major significance for his military department and its secretary, bypassing them often produced misunderstanding and discord. This proved to be true for Army Secretary Pace and General Collins. The general felt that he spent a great deal of time keeping the secretary informed, but Pace was "outspokenly unhappy"
with the lack of information on Army operations in Korea. A key issue in point, the prisoner-of-war disorders on Koje-do,* caused Pace public embarrassment before a congressional committee because of his lack of knowledge about the situation. If he had to accept ultimate responsibility, Pace wanted to have commensurate authority and to be fully informed. 15

In the summer of 1952, when Lovett wanted to make the Army the executive agent for construction activities in the U.S. European Command, Pace took issue with him. Joint commanders, he told Lovett, did not report to the Army secretary but to the Army chief of staff. As Army secretary, Pace asserted, he exercised neither "command or administrative direction" nor held any responsibility or authority. Since the "contrary . . . [was] widely believed," he found himself in the position of having an "'implied responsibility' with no authority." Pace made it clear that, although he personally supported the idea of a single construction agency in Europe, he did not want the Army to undertake the responsibility. 14 Rejecting Pace's argument, Lovett told him that he did not believe that the Army secretary had no responsibility for a JCS command for which his chief of staff was the JCS executive agent. When Lovett decided to make the Army secretary himself the executive agent for the construction program, Pace agreed grudgingly, only on the condition that he have "full, complete, clear authority" with certain stipulations spelled out. 15

Pace's complaints caused Lovett to ask his staff to look into the legal aspects of the matter. In August 1952 the assistant secretary for legislative and legal affairs, Charles Coolidge, told Lovett that he was "troubled by the legality of the method by which the JCS presently handle unified commands." Unaware of the 1948 Key West agreement, Coolidge found no adequate authority for the exercise of such command functions by the JCS or the Army chief of staff. Sending Coolidge's memorandum to General Bradley, Lovett wrote that the study confirmed his "grave doubts" as to JCS procedures and suggested that Bradley might "wish to consider the matter as well as corrective steps." Bradley's staff group pointed out that President Truman twice had approved the unified command plan, but it suggested that the question of designating the service secretaries rather than the service chiefs as executive agents might be given further study. Coolidge later acknowledged that the Joint Chiefs were "exactly within the letter and scope" of their instructions but he still thought they should have no command function. 16

Lovett persisted in his determination that the Army oversee a construction agency in Europe, and in October Pace felt "forced to admit, reluctantly," that the secretary of the army should be designated the executive agent. Lovett

* See Chapter VII.
decided on action; on 3 December 1952, Deputy Secretary Foster designated
the secretary of the army "as the Executive Agent of the Department of
Defense" for construction matters in Europe, thus establishing a precedent.\textsuperscript{17}

While the secretary’s exercise of power seemed to settle the immediate
problem, the whole question of working relationships between the military
heads of the services and their departmental secretaries remained unclear. The
law did not make the Joint Chiefs military advisers to the service secretaries,
and when a chief assumed his JCS role, it seemed that he was outside his
secretary’s jurisdiction. However, the area was a cloudy one. Compatible
personalities or mutually perceived service needs might well foster close and
cordial ties, but a service secretary had no legal or inherent right to
information concerning JCS matters.\textsuperscript{18} As Finletter later testified, the Air Staff
usually informed him of problems and asked for his advice, but this was an
"act of grace" on their part. The separation and independence of the JCS
seemed so great that Frank Nash thought they had autonomy for all practical
purposes. In fact, he noted, the secretary of state regularly thanked the
secretary of defense for the cooperation of the Department of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, as though they were separate entities.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{The Service Secretaries}

As against the secretaries of defense and the service chiefs, the secretaries
of the military departments had lost both power and prestige in the 1949
amendments to the National Security Act, which, Marshall thought, had
downgraded the status of the service secretaries unduly. Their diminished
stature was brought home to him painfully at a banquet when he saw the
secretaries "seated down on the floor while the Chiefs of Staff were sitting up
at the head table."\textsuperscript{20}

The service secretaries strongly resented their diminished roles. Finletter
wanted to restore the military departments as executive departments with
Cabinet status, make the deputy secretary of defense junior to the service
secretaries, and eliminate command authority from the JCS. Kimball espoused
the traditional Navy viewpoint that OSD was too large and should be reduced
and that the service secretaries should be NSC members and probably Cabinet
members. Pace wanted Cabinet membership and, in some instances, the
privilege of attendance at NSC meetings.\textsuperscript{21}

Marshall and Lovett frequently asked the three secretaries for advice on
such critical matters as budgets, guided missile programs, NATO reorganiza-
tion, military assistance, atomic weapons, and the Japanese peace treaty. In
June 1951 Marshall told Truman that he would obtain the views of the Joint
Secretaries on important NSC matters, but since they were not a statutory body he would not necessarily send the council their comments. Moreover, Marshall declared, he would express his own views as secretary of defense at NSC meetings only after considering the recommendations of both the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Secretaries.  

Lovett agreed with Marshall's position on the value of the civilian secretaries' views, becoming convinced that the group was the "important vehicle for operation and decision." When Lovett took the question of the JCS deadlock over the future size of the Air Force to the Joint Secretaries in the fall of 1951, Kimball felt that this action brought the secretaries back into full participation in policymaking. Finletter also became convinced of the value of the meetings, in part because he saw the secretaries, unlike the military chiefs, as "expendable" and thus able to make "unpopular decisions." Pace agreed with Lovett that the Joint Secretaries as a group were "far more useful and effective in composing differences and in developing the basic policy and in serving as a follow up system than the Armed Forces Policy Council."  

In September 1952 Lovett formalized the Joint Secretaries as the Joint Secretaries Group, including in its membership the secretary and the deputy secretary of defense. The joint advice of the service secretaries and of Foster, Lovett wrote, "is of great value . . . in exercising the direction, authority and control over the Department of Defense." Lovett promised to give the group's formal written views "appropriate consideration . . . in the same manner as views presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."  

Some Defense officials thought the addition of the secretary and deputy secretary of defense to the Joint Secretaries Group strengthened it considerably and created a body that, although nonstatutory, seemed "clearly superior in authority to the JCS." Lovett, however, did not intend to create an alternate Joint Chiefs of Staff; he sought rather a "board of directors" for DoD that would spend time on the larger problems of unification. As he commented later, the Joint Secretaries Group was a place "where real trust and esteem existed between the members," the agency through which "the supervisory responsibility of the Office of the Secretary of Defense was largely exercised in my term of office." Lovett felt that "this small organization, basically informal, operated in many ways in lieu of the Armed Forces Policy Council." The Joint Secretaries Group brought the service secretaries more directly into OSD policymaking and represented an assertion of civil authority.  

OSD officials hoped the Armed Forces Policy Council would operate as a "top-level forum where civilian and military thinking would blend on problems of national policy and forward planning"—indeed this had been the congressional intent. When Marshall became secretary in 1950, he quickly
reduced the number of regular attendees at AFPC meetings from 22 or more to the 9 statutory members. Lovett also kept the attendance limited and the atmosphere informal—there were no formal agenda or minutes.26

AFPC members seemed to have difficulty in defining their role in relation to the NSC or the JCS. Occasionally a secretary and chief of one service joined to promote that service's special interest. Sometimes it seemed that the Joint Chiefs wanted to settle questions among themselves and freeze out the service secretaries. Out of irritation, Finletter once recommended the removal of service chiefs from AFPC membership. Frequently there was little time to prepare for AFPC meetings; often they dealt with trivial matters. One OSD official felt that perhaps only one of every three AFPC meetings during Lovett's time could be described as "meaningful."27

Marshall and Lovett evidently found it more effective to deal with the Joint Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs separately than with the Armed Forces Policy Council. From the two smaller groups, they could generally expect written communications presenting positions and recommendations based on substantial staff work. Two sets of specific written recommendations for consideration must have seemed preferable to the more diffuse and often inconclusive discussions in the AFPC.

The Korean War arrested only temporarily the decline in the stature of the service secretaries. Marshall and Lovett relied on the service secretaries for assistance in many matters that OSD could not deal with expeditiously under the pressures of war and rearmament. But with the end of the war and the expansion of OSD powers and structure under the Eisenhower administration, the service secretaries once more found their positions declining in importance and influence. Few service secretaries in later administrations ever achieved the levels of influence of the Korean War secretaries.

*Lovett's Report on Unification*

The growing pressures of overseeing the operation of an expanding and ever more complex Department of Defense focused Lovett's attention increasingly on the structure of the establishment. In the summer of 1952 he initiated studies of organization and unification under the direction of Assistant Secretary Coolidge. These studies would contribute to the preparation of an end-of-term report requested by the president.

In his report to Lovett in September, Coolidge saw the achievement of a civilian-military balance as "probably the most difficult and delicate problem" in managing the Pentagon. Although the U.S. form of government made civilian control fundamental, Coolidge felt there had to be adequate military
staffing throughout the defense structure to assure that the president, the NSC, the defense secretary, and the service secretaries all received "proper military advice." Noting that the Joint Chiefs remained over-involved in daily operations at the expense of long-range planning, he faulted them also for lacking a necessary "broad, non-service point of view" and for bypassing the service secretaries under the executive agent system. Yet he saw the Joint Chiefs as a potent organization that would "probably function very effectively in war time" and warned against changes that would diminish their capacity to do so. Coolidge thought the secretary could recommend three steps for improving Defense functions: require the AFPC to discuss JCS decisions before they went to the National Security Council, direct the Joint Chiefs to establish a strong planning organization, and separate the individual chiefs from routine operational duties so that they could concentrate on JCS and AFPC matters.28

Coolidge opposed the use of military officers to staff the secretary's Executive Office. Even though he found the performance of the officers currently working there "beyond reproach," he counseled Lovett that "the theory is unsound, particularly because officers with natural service loyalties may sit in positions to select and slant what the Secretary sees." Coolidge thought a civilian at the assistant secretary level should manage the Executive Office, service the OSD councils and the secretary's staff meetings, establish and control OSD military manning tables, and direct all OSD administration. He recommended that the secretary of defense control efficiency ratings and promotions of officers assigned to OSD and suggested that the service secretaries should have more control over officer ratings and promotions within the military departments.29

Determined after the presidential election to arrange an "orderly turnover of every department of the government to assist the incoming administration to keep this nation a going concern," Truman invited President-elect Eisenhower to the White House to meet with key members of his administration. Lovett joined Truman, Acheson, Snyder, and Harriman for about an hour of discussion with an "unsmiling" Eisenhower (the election campaign had strained relations between Truman and Eisenhower) on the afternoon of 18 November 1952. After the meeting, Eisenhower and Lovett returned to the Pentagon for a briefing by the Joint Chiefs. Truman thought the president-elect was getting a first glimpse of the seriousness of the matters with which he would have to deal; Eisenhower himself thought he had learned little.30

Coincidentally, on the same day Lovett responded in a long and seminal letter to Truman's earlier request for suggestions of areas in Defense organization and administration where unification might be "profitably continued." The secretary, who had long since determined that he would leave government service no matter who the next president might be, had been pondering
what changes he should recommend to the president; the impending turnover of administrations provided additional incentive for taking stock of the first five years of Defense unification.

Inevitably, the Korean War influenced much of Lovett's thinking about DoD organizational changes. The war had reversed the years of retrenchment after World War II, forcing a vast enlargement of the military establishment. Particularly sensitive to congressional criticism of the size and performance of DoD, the secretaries of defense sought to set an example in OSD by keeping the staff small and limiting activities to the formulation and control of policy. Under Johnson, OSD personnel numbered 2,388 full-time civilians and military in June 1950. While the OSD workload grew enormously in support of a 140-percent increase in military strength, OSD personnel growth was restrained, rising in the same period about 30 percent, to 3,102 full-time persons (including 1,765 in the Munitions Board, RDB, JCS, and Defense Supply Management Agency) by the end of December 1952.

The war affected considerations of the future, for peace negotiations were stalled and no one could be certain whether the fighting could be wound down or might blaze up again. Aware of these uncertainties and their imponderable effects on the DoD, Lovett offered thoughtful and pragmatic recommendations "without any missionary zeal" in the hope his successor might profit from past experience.

Characteristically generous, the secretary began his letter to the president with a salute to the "remarkably high" quality of the military and civilian staff. Regarding unification as evolutionary, Lovett cited much already accomplished and much yet remaining to be done. From the Korean War experience he knew that in wartime a secretary's dollar control became "especially weak." He believed that the secretary should have a military staff to help him "handle the distribution of shortages in an efficient and direct fashion" in time of war.

Lovett particularly wanted to clarify the secretary's role in relation to the president, the JCS, and the military services. Because of the vagueness of the law concerning the relationship with the JCS, he believed that the president by "simple directive" or Congress by legislation should make it indisputable that the secretary was indeed the president's principal assistant in all Defense-related matters and that the Joint Chiefs constituted a DoD element subject to the secretary's direction. Although the secretary disavowed any problems in dealing with the JCS during his tenure, he saw a need for clarification of the relationship. Lovett also wanted to make explicit the secretary's authority to control and direct the three military departments. Viewing the services' statutory right to separate administration as a "straddle," Lovett told Truman that he had encountered problems in the field of supply, where "certain ardent
separatists occasionally pop up with the suggestion that the Secretary of Defense play in his own back yard." He suggested the assignment, with exceptions if necessary, of all DoD functions to the secretary, who could then assign or reassign such duties.

The secretary also thought the current law excessively rigid in prescribing the form and function of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board. This belief reflected the views of the service secretaries also, not one of whom had a kind word for the boards. Lovett implied that the boards ought to be abolished and their functions transferred to the secretary of defense, who would then establish OSD offices to function under additional assistant secretaries of defense. The change would have the effect of increasing the authority of the secretary of defense over logistical and research and development operations of the military services.

Believing the Joint Chiefs' functions also too rigidly prescribed and the JCS system inadequate to provide the secretary with proper military guidance, Lovett declared that "the problem of the proper set-up of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the most difficult and delicate one in the field of our national defense structure." Although the JCS organization was already overworked and too much involved in daily operations, Lovett noted that, since he was prohibited from having a military staff, he was forced to "flood the Joint Chiefs of Staff with all sorts of papers." Suggesting that it was time to put aside the fear of creating a general staff, Lovett posited two possible ways of meeting the situation. One approach would be to create a new "Combined Staff," composed of senior officers who had just completed terms as service chiefs of staff. This entity would operate through functional staffs—with a separate promotion system and accountable only to the Combined Staff, the secretary of defense, and the president—for overall military policies, strategic planning, military requirements, and logistic planning. Admitting that such a change might be disruptive and require further study, Lovett preferred another suggestion for a modified Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As an alternative, he proposed that the Joint Chiefs delegate to the vice chiefs most of their service-connected duties and confine themselves "exclusively to planning functions and the review of war plans in the light of new weapons and techniques." The JCS chairman's role should be strengthened by granting him a voice in deliberations, but he should have no power of decision. A strong planning division would constitute the principal JCS staff. Lovett recommended that all other JCS military staff functions be transferred to the secretary to "provide him with a combined military–civilian staff" to aid in resolving service conflicts over such problems as budget, manpower, procurement, and logistics. This staff would be responsible solely to the secretary and through him to the president, and the secretary would control
its efficiency ratings and promotions. Lovett believed that the Joint Chiefs should neither operate nor command except during time of war and then by direction of the secretary of defense and the commander in chief. Viewing the secretary of defense as the deputy to the commander in chief, Lovett recommended that, with the advice of the service secretaries and chiefs, the secretary of defense should establish unified commands and exercise authority over them.

Lovett's JCS recommendations went only slightly beyond the 1949 recommendations of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and others, urging deletion of specific JCS statutory duties from the National Security Act and the substitution of a "simple statement" that the Joint Chiefs should "act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense." These changes would have afforded the secretary the option to assign the Joint Chiefs specific duties and thus provided him with much greater flexibility and authority.

For the armed services, which were "all different," Lovett proposed a comprehensive organizational and functional study. Criticizing the overlapping functions of the seven Army technical services, Lovett was amazed that the system worked at all, let alone that it worked "rather well." Despite the possibility that reorganization of the technical services would be "no more painful than backing into a buzz saw"—a colorful phrase that was to become famous in Defense circles—Lovett believed the time for a change long overdue.

In other recommendations and comments, Lovett criticized the tendency to set up too many headquarters and committees as costly, wasteful of manpower, and cause of delay in taking action. He recommended keeping standing forces at a minimum, relying instead on trained reserves, and instituting Universal Military Training and Service. Deploiring the "apparent inadequacy of existing legislation to protect this country against traitors, spies, and blabber-mouthis," he asked for prompt action on this subject of paramount importance. Finally, he asked that additional duties be imposed on DoD only when absolutely necessary.

Lovett's 18 November letter—unclassified, informal, controversial, and filled with pithy, quotable statements—soon found its way into the public domain. A front-page article in The New York Times on 2 January 1953 was captioned "Lovett Criticizes Defense Machine as Weak in Crisis"; on 8 January the Pentagon released the original letter.35

Then on 9 January Lovett wrote a top-secret memorandum for the incoming secretary of defense dealing with classified matters and offering to

* Lovett had received a proposal from Under Secretary of the Army Karl Bendetsen on 22 October 1952 suggesting a functional reorganization of the Army and its technical services.
discuss them. Lovett's first concern this time had to do with security problems, specifically that industrial plants with unions dominated by "known communists" at the international level were making secret U.S. military equipment. The secretary warned that the situation currently provided an "enormous risk of . . . delivery of information to enemy agents," as well as the potential for sabotage and strikes during an emergency. 36

Lovett considered the National Security Council inadequate as a final forum for making national policy. Unlike Acheson, who felt that NSC usefulness reached its peak during the Truman years, Lovett thought the top officials had been unable to put in enough time on NSC matters, leaving too much work to NSC staff members. The secretary also considered the U.S. overseas apparatus for the mutual security program "over-organized," "over-manned," and "free-wheeling" to a possibly unwise degree. Looking at the international situation generally, he suggested that the effectiveness of U.S. control in Japan and the German Ruhr would provide a "convenient and reliable index" of future political and military problems, particularly with the Soviets. Finally, Lovett lamented the excessive amount of paperwork in DoD. 37

Both President Eisenhower and his defense secretary, Charles E. Wilson, proved receptive to Lovett's ideas, and the new administration set up a committee under Nelson A. Rockefeller to review Defense organization. It reported on 11 April 1953, and on 30 April Eisenhower submitted to Congress a message of his intent to reorganize DoD along with Reorganization Plan No. 6. The plan abolished the Munitions Board, Research and Development Board, Defense Supply Management Agency, and Director of Installations and invested the secretary of defense with their functions. It increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from three to nine and made the OSD general counsel a statutory position. The defense secretary had the full right to prescribe the functions of these new positions, as well as those of any other Defense employee or agency. 38

The reorganization transferred management of the Joint Staff from the Joint Chiefs to the JCS chairman and also gave him the right of approval over the selection of staff members. Appointment of the Joint Staff director was to be subject to the approval of the secretary of defense. While the JCS chairman got no vote, Eisenhower's plan relieved the Joint Chiefs of much administrative detail and opened the way for greater cooperation between the Joint Staff and OSD officials and civilian scientists and engineers. The plan became effective on 30 June 1953. 39

In his message transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 6 to Congress, Eisenhower notified it of his intention to make two additional significant changes. The secretary of defense would revise the Key West agreement to
provide for designation of military departments rather than chiefs of services as executive agents for unified commands. This placed the service secretaries in the direct chain of command and eliminated the authority of the Joint Chiefs to designate one of their own number as an executive agent. The second change approved by the president gave civilian officials responsibility for the efficiency reports of military personnel assigned to OSD. This was intended to give officers on duty in OSD more status within their own services, which had generally regarded such assignments as outside the mainstream of the service.  

It is ironic, perhaps, that Lovett—who had tried to get along without greater secretarial power and who so often expressed his desire to work within the existing system—provided the impetus for major changes toward greater centralization of power in the secretary’s hands, as had the reluctant Forrestal in 1949. Forced to operate during the Korean War within a system he came to view as defective, Lovett had managed, and generally well, to keep the department’s machinery oiled and working. Although the competition between the secretary and the military services, and among the services themselves, continued to plague DoD, the secretaries of defense and other OSD officials might justifiably have felt that they passed on to the next administration a department that had gone through its years of trial not only satisfactorily but creditably. If during the war years military influence had necessarily grown in some spheres, Lovett’s final report pointed the way to redressing any civil-military imbalance. Indeed it helped move the balance toward the civilian side.
CHAPTER XXV

Conclusion

It is arguable that the Korean War had as much to do with shaping the world of the second half of the 20th century as did World War II. The hard-line division of the world into two great armed camps, the unremitting political and military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the greatly increased reliance on nuclear weapons to deter war between the superpowers, the commitment of the United States to a long-term military presence in Europe and East Asia, and the maintenance of a greatly enlarged American military establishment and arms industry for the indefinite future—all of these enduring manifestations of cold war were created or intensified by the Korean War. Above all, the years 1950 to 1953 witnessed the full acceptance by the United States of its role on the world scene as the avowed and resolute protagonist of containment of the Soviet Union and communism.

The U.S. response to the Korean War and American perception of a greater Soviet threat took a number of forms. Particularly after the Chinese intervention in November 1950, the war provided a compelling rationale for adopting most of the policies and rearmament programs advocated in NSC 68. The Truman administration had no doubt that the Soviet Union had inspired the North Korean attack and that Soviet support of the North Koreans and Chinese Communists signaled further Soviet moves elsewhere. Apprehension over Soviet intentions in Europe came to overshadow the war in Korea in administration calculations and reinforced the political and military priority accorded the defense of NATO Europe. Growth of a Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons intensified the sense of threat in the West and lent greater impetus to U.S. nuclear arms programs and the development of delivery vehicles—bombers, missiles, and submarines.

Adherence in peacetime to a foreign alliance—NATO—represented the greatest foreign policy departure in U.S. history. Until the Korean War the
United States and, indeed, most of the European members, regarded NATO as a paper entity. Such military arrangements as existed for the defense of Western Europe against Soviet attack were clearly inadequate to the task. Paradoxically, a war in Asia—on the Korean peninsula—created immediately the perception of a greatly magnified Soviet threat to Europe and provided the incentive for transforming NATO into a true working alliance. The European NATO countries pushed for the establishment of a centralized military command and markedly increased and accelerated their commitment of military forces and resources to the coalition. The United States furnished dynamic leadership, providing the alliance with an American supreme commander and stationing substantial military forces on the continent for an indefinite period. Neither Truman nor Eisenhower looked on this as a permanent arrangement, yet almost four decades later the American military presence in Europe remained the ultimate guarantor of NATO.

The search for additional military power and strategic base areas to help contain the Soviet threat hastened the conclusion of a contractual agreement and eventually a peace treaty with Germany. That German divisions were indispensable to a conventional defense of NATO Europe proved a convincing argument for bringing West Germany into NATO and encouraging its rearmament. To strengthen NATO’s eastern flank and provide a possible opening toward a Middle East defense arrangement, the United States promoted the membership of Greece and Turkey in the group. It also forged new military ties outside of NATO with Spain and Yugoslavia.

As apprehension over a mounting Soviet and Chinese Communist threat intensified, U.S. commitment to international collective security and foreign economic and military assistance became stronger and went far beyond NATO. In East Asia, the crisis brought on by the Korean War and the conflict in Indochina underscored the strategic and economic value of Japan as a U.S. bulwark against Communist expansion and spurred the signing of a peace treaty earlier than the Joint Chiefs desired. Following the treaty, the United States signed mutual security pacts in the Pacific area with Japan, with Australia and New Zealand, with the Philippines, and eventually with South Korea.

Unlike Germany, which in time would provide the largest single national contribution to NATO’s ground forces, Japan rearmed only minimally, constrained by the provisions of its postwar constitution to maintain only a small self-defense force. Its continuing dependence on the United States for security allowed it to keep its defense costs at a very low level, thereby obtaining long-term economic benefits. Japan’s eventual rise to industrial superpower status began with the economic revival it experienced during the Korean War years when the country provided a convenient base for supply and maintenance of the U.S. and Korean forces fighting on the peninsula.
The Korean War put an end to any notion that the United States might be able to terminate or even diminish its military presence in foreign overseas areas. By the end of 1952 the Allied occupation of West Germany was nominal and that of Japan had ended, but the United States stationed even larger forces than before June 1950 in these countries to guarantee their defense against aggression. Moreover, the end of the fighting in Korea in July 1953 left South Korea still at risk from the implacably hostile and unpredictable North Koreans. This continuing threat from the North obliged the United States to maintain large forces in Japan and South Korea to deter renewed aggression.

The war brought about an immediate threefold increase in U.S. military assistance to NATO and other countries. Eventually the United States extended economic and military assistance to dozens of nations on every continent of the world. In Indochina the United States embarked on a program of military assistance to the French, and subsequently the South Vietnamese, that ended only a quarter of a century later. The military services had to use substantial resources of men and money to provide military assistance advisory groups in countries receiving aid and to train increasing numbers of foreign military in the United States. The Korean War thus sealed the U.S. commitment to an enduring policy of alliances and military assistance on a global scale.

By the end of the war its long-term effects on the U.S. military establishment were clear. As the military instrument of national security policy the Department of Defense became a major participant in the making of policy and the Pentagon was viewed worldwide as a symbol of American military might. Expenditures for defense (including atomic energy and other non-DoD activities) consumed two-thirds of the federal budget in fiscal years 1953 and 1954 and remained well above half for the remainder of the decade. Most evident, because of the direct impact on the public and the high visibility of the fighting in Korea, was the more than doubling of the size of the armed forces and the acceptance by the nation of the higher peacetime levels of strength for the indefinite future.

At the beginning of the Korean War, in June 1950, the strength of U.S. forces stationed in foreign countries had reached a post-World War II low of 281,000, about 20 percent of a total strength of 1,460,000. Three years later, as of 30 June 1953, a few weeks before the signing of the Korean armistice, 963,000 were posted outside the United States, some 27 percent of a total strength of 3,555,000. Troop strength abroad declined thereafter to fewer than 700,000 by 30 June 1955 but at the end of the decade still remained well above a half million. The largest concentrations were in Germany, Japan, and Korea. Large numbers of additional personnel were always en route to or from abroad, afloat on ships, in air squadrons, and in mobile activities temporarily operating on foreign soil. Moreover, during the decade after Korea, the
military services continued to employ more than a quarter million American
and foreign civilians (chiefly the latter) and oversaw as many as half a million
U.S. dependents in foreign countries. All told, the number of U.S. military
personnel and civilian employees and their dependents in foreign countries
averaged about 1.3 million during the decade.¹

Even while the Korean War was being fought with conventional forces
and the U.S. military buildup in Europe consisted chiefly of Army divisions
and USAF tactical air units, the U.S. intention to rely in the future primarily on
air power, nuclear munitions, and other advanced weapons received rein­
forcement. The war greatly quickened the powerful technological and indus­
trial impulses initiated by World War II, accelerating the research and
development of many weapons and related equipment and spurring new
projects. The emphasis on advanced technology to produce weapons that
could substitute for and minimize manpower requirements accorded with the
attitude of the American public toward military service in peacetime. The
continuing demand for large numbers of more potent weapons of increasing
complexity, together with foreign military assistance and sales and other U.S.
requirements, created a permanent market for a notably expanded peacetime
military industrial establishment.

The increased reliance on technology did not signify a major departure in
policy, for the Truman administration had been moving in this direction
before the Korean War, attracted by the prospect of deterring aggression at a
lesser cost in money and manpower than would be incurred by maintaining
the large conventional forces required to cope with the Soviet threat in Europe
and elsewhere. Within Defense, the military services divided sharply on the
issue, with the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps strongly opposed to the
priorities and force goals persistently advanced by the Air Force. For a number
of reasons—the overriding and more immediate requirements of the fighting
in Korea, the political rationale for stationing highly visible U.S. Army
divisions in Germany, the delays in aircraft production, and the lag in
procuring and training manpower by the Air Force—it became both necessary
and desirable to reduce the proposed Air Force wing strength and to stretch
out its buildup beyond the anticipated crisis year 1954. At the same time, the
large increase in production of nuclear weapons gave a further earnest of
intention to rely more in the future on strategic nuclear air power.

The paradoxical effect of the war on U.S. strategic policy became
increasingly evident. Although many strategic theorists concluded from the
experience that future wars would also be limited in nature, and therefore
conventional strength ought to be sustained at a high level, continuing
advances in the technology of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles would
vastly expand strategic nuclear capabilities and make the appeal of the nuclear
option ever more alluring. Facing the prospect of maintaining a peacetime military establishment twice the pre-Korea size and at 2½ to 3 times the cost, the Eisenhower administration readily embraced the concept of nuclear deterrence. The rapid buildup of the Strategic Air Command in the 1950s and the paramount priority accorded it reflected Eisenhower's commitment to what was called the "New Look." After a reassessment, Eisenhower reduced and stretched out the buildup of all of the services but retained the emphasis on air power and especially on strategic nuclear forces. During the remainder of the decade the Air Force would receive the lion's share of the military budget—approaching one-half of the total—and would exercise a telling influence on U.S. strategic planning.

The Korean War was not a test of U.S. capability on the scale of World War II; the partial mobilization required little more than a quarter of the military manpower raised in 1940-45 and a much smaller industrial mobilization. But the unity of purpose and effort that had marked the earlier war was conspicuously absent in 1950-53. Because it was a "police action," an undeclared war in a faraway and relatively unknown country, because its limited objectives did not include surrender by the North Koreans and later the Chinese, because it incurred disproportionately heavy casualties, and because it dragged on without prospect of either victory or termination, the war could not begin to command the unity of national purpose and wholehearted public support that World War II had evoked.

Already overburdened by the demands of fighting a war abroad and having to cope with a host of other exigent problems, the secretaries of defense soon found themselves caught up in some of the most bitter and divisive domestic political battles of 20th century U.S. history. The vitriolic, venomous fulminations of such ultrapartisans as Republican Senators McCarthy, Jenner, and Wherry far exceeded the bounds of legitimate criticism. Their arraignment of the Defense Department included DoD's military as well as civilian leadership and extended eventually even to allegations of conspiracy and internal subversion. The conduct of the war, its problematical outcome, and the heavy toll of American lives afforded other opposition elements opportunities to make political capital out of issues on which the administration was vulnerable. The firing of General MacArthur excited a storm of protest in which the secretary of defense and the department came under intense attack. Other aspects of Asian policy—in particular the administration's handling of the China question—also provoked vehement reaction. Some Republican leaders mounted a national campaign against the Truman policy according strategic priority to Europe and the decision to station U.S.
troops in Europe under NATO. Others condemned DoD for the dislocations caused by the partial manpower and industrial mobilization. Still others took the department to task for the lagging materiel procurement and production programs whose shortcomings they viewed as hampering the war effort and the provision of military assistance to allies.

Marshall and Lovett had to steel themselves to the charges and the criticism. Forced by the administration's own overriding political considerations to fight a limited war that would permit no clearcut victory and to honor vastly expanded U.S. military commitments throughout the world, they found themselves constantly seeking to adjust means and ends to changing policies and demands. Caught between the necessity to take action in volatile situations in Korea and elsewhere on the one hand and the policy constraints that often denied preferred or optimum responses on the other hand, the secretaries frequently received blame for outcomes that were beyond their control. Despite the persistent criticism and their own personal disappointments, they had much with which to be satisfied. Measured against the extraordinarily difficult circumstances of these years, the Department of Defense's performance in this first test of war under unification yielded a balance sheet in which successes clearly outweighed failures. However uneven the record in the eyes of critics, the efforts of Marshall and Lovett unquestionably strengthened the fledgling defense organization they inherited from Forrestal and Johnson and the security of the nation they had served so faithfully.
List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Antiaircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADCOM</td>
<td>Advance Command and Liaison Group (Korea)</td>
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<td>AEC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFPC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Policy Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSWP</td>
<td>Armed Forces Special Weapons Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>Additional military production</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>BoB</td>
<td>Bureau of the Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPB</td>
<td>Civilian Components Policy Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>Council of Economic Advisers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCFE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Far East</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United Nations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Combined Policy Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>Calendar year</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>Unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DACOWITS</td>
<td>Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPB</td>
<td>Defense Production Board (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>European Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELAS</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army of Greece</td>
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List of Abbreviations

EUSAK  Eighth U.S. Army Korea
EXOS  Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense
FEAF  Far East Air Forces
FMACC  Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee
FMASC  Foreign Military Assistance Steering Committee
FY  Fiscal Year
GNP  Gross National Product
ISAC  International Security Affairs Committee
JAMAG  Joint American Military Advisory Group
JAMMAT  Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
JCAE  Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff
JNPR  Japanese National Police Reserve
JUSMAPG  Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group
JUSMG  Joint U.S. Military Group (Spain)
KATUSA  Korean Augmentation to the United States Army
KMAG  United States Military Advisory Group to Korea
M-Day  Date on which mobilization is to commence
MAAG  Military Assistance Advisory Group
MATS  Military Air Transport Service
MB  Munitions Board
MDAP  Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MILREP  Military Representative
MLC  Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission
MRC  Military Representatives Committee (NATO)
MSA  Mutual Security Agency
MSP  Mutual Security Program
MTDP  Medium Term Defense Plan
NAC  North Atlantic Council
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC  National Security Council
NSRB  National Security Resources Board
ODM  Office of Defense Mobilization
ODMS  Office of Director for Mutual Security
OFMA  Office of Foreign Military Affairs
OPI  Office of Public Information
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense
PL  Public law
PMAG  Provisional Military Advisory Group
POW  Prisoner of War
PPB  Personnel Policy Board
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCT</td>
<td>Regimental Combat Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDB</td>
<td>Research and Development Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander Allied Powers</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCS</td>
<td>Screening and Costing Staff (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRE</td>
<td>Special Representative, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Temporary Council Committee (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCOI</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFFE</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces, Far East</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFIK</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces in Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMILREP</td>
<td>U.S. Military Representative in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSEG</td>
<td>Weapons Systems Evaluation Group</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Notes

The citations that follow refer to a wide variety of published and unpublished sources. Detail has been kept to a minimum without sacrificing essential information. Readers should consult the bibliography for complete information on the location of archival collections and for the full references (publisher and date of publication) to printed works.

For the period 1950–53, the Office of the Secretary of Defense used a subject filing system identified in the notes by the prefix "CD," followed by a sequence of numbers further specifying document location. When retired to the National Archives these files became part of Record Group (RG) 330, along with files of the staff agencies and all subordinate OSD offices except for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which maintained its own separate system. All of the above materials are housed in the Military Reference Branch of the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C. Files identified as "OSD Hist" are in the custody of the OSD Historical Office in the Pentagon.

I. PRELUDE TO WAR

1. Appointment calendar Louis Johnson, 24 Jun 50, OSD Hist; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 402; Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life: An Autobiography, 530; Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, vol II in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs II), 332.

2. EJL (E. John Long, Hist Off OSD), "Korean Crisis" (typescript), 13 Jul 50, OSD Hist.


5. These events, of course, have been the subject of much historical research and speculation. This chapter treats the unfolding cold war as viewed by U.S. officials at that time, as, for example, in First Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, US Cong, House, Cte on Foreign Affairs, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), H Doc 613, 2–4. The following works will give some idea of the vast literature and widely varying views on the subject and lead the reader to other sources: Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War,


16. Ltr Truman to Acheson, 31 Jan 50, *FRUS 1950,* 1:141–42; rept SpInsCCte to Pres, 31 Jan 50, ibid, 513–23, 513n1; Ltr Johnson to Truman, 24 Feb 50, ibid, 538–59; rept SpInsCCte to Pres, 9 Mar 50, ibid, 541–42, 542n1; US Cong, Joint Cte on Atomic Energy (JCAE), "The Scale and Scope of Atomic Production: A Chronology of Leading Events" (typescript), 22, RG 350, CD 471.6 (A–Bomb); Atomic Energy Commission, "A History of The Expansion of AEC Production Facilities" [AEC 1140] (typescript), 16; Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan.


II. THE ROLE OF THE PENTAGON


6. See, for example, notes ROC Amb to US, 13 Jun 50, conv with Paul Griffith . . ., 5 (95/50); Wellington Koo papers, Columbia Univ, New York, NY; notes ROC Amb to US, 50 Jun 50, conv with Louis Johnson . . ., ibid; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 349–55, passim.


20. Intervs with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77, 10–11 (quote), and 8 Mar 74, 34 (quote); testimony SecDef, 21 Oct 49, in House Cte on Armed Services, The National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy: Hearings, 618.


22. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al. 3 Aug 49, FRUS 1949, I:365–68; Halaby, Crosswinds, 49; memo SecDef for DepSecDef et al. 9 Nov 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecsMilDepts et al. 25 Nov 49, ibid; ltr Burns to Pres, 11 Jul 51, ibid; memo ExecSecOSD for SecsMilDepts et al. 6 Dec 49, ibid; PL 81–329 (6 October 1949).

23. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al. 31 Aug 49, Condit file, OSD Hist.

24. Paper [OFMA OISA OSD], "Comments on . . . Brooksing Report," [ca 1951–52], Condit file, OSD Hist; two memos SecDef for SecsMilDepts et al. 25 Nov 49 (quote) and 15 May 50, ibid; memo SecDef for ExccSecNSC, 8Jun 50, RG 218, CCS 534 NSC (9–25–47); Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1951, 75. Twenty-two persons are listed under ATSD and 49 under MDAP.

26. Intervs with Lemnitzer, 21 Mar 74, 42 (quote), and 4 Mar 76, 12–14 (quote); Halaby, Crosswinds, 49–50; itr Burns to Truman, 11 Jul 51, Condit file, OSD Hist.


35. PL 79–585 (1 August 1946); Rearden, Formative Years, 111–14; DoD Directive 1910, Military Liaison Committee, 15 Jan 48, OSD Hist.

36. PL 79–585 (1 August 1946); memo Forrestal for Donald Carpenter (ChMLC), 8 Apr 48, OSD Hist; DoD Directive 1910, Military Liaison Committee, 15 Jun 48, ibid; PL 81–347 (11 October 1949); PR 258–49 OPI OSD, 30 Sep 49, OSD Hist; Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1951, 75; OASD(PA), Department of Defense Fact Book, 1985, 37; Rearden, Formative Years, 111–14.

37. Rearden, Formative Years, 398, 437; DoD Directive, 26 Nov 49, w/memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 26 Nov 49, OSD Hist.


40. Memo Melvin A. Casberg (ChAFMPC) for George A. Wyeth (OSD), 9 Mar 53, w/paper on AFMPC, Condit file, OSD Hist; Official Register of the United States, 1950, 123; Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1951, 75; Rearden, Formative Years, 108-11.

41. DoD Directive, 12 May 49, OSD Hist; PR 198-50S OPI OSD, 5 Oct 50, ibid; memo Casberg for Wyeth, 9 Mar 53, w/paper on AFMPC, ibid; interv with Lemnitzer, 4 Mar 76, 18-19; Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1950, 29-32. The reduction in hospitals ordered on 1 February 1950 had been supported earlier by the Director of Medical Services and the Cooper committee (paper [Hist Off OSD], “Notes for 'Fiscal 1951 Report.' ” [ca early 1951], OSD Hist).

42. Memo Forrestal for SecArmy et al. 17 Mar 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; lecture ChDefMgmtCte at AFC, Ft Leavenworth, Kans, 8 Nov 50, 12, ibid.

43. Memo Johnson for SecSsMilDepts, 7 Jun 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo M-293-49 DirOPI for Press, 10 Aug 49, ibid; Itr Early to James H. McGraw, Jr., (President, McGraw–Hill Publishing Co.), 29 Sep 49, ibid; memrecd Wayne Althaus, 10 Feb 50, ibid; memo SecsSsMilDepts for SecDef, 17 Mar 50, cited in draft paper [Hist Off OSD], “Development of DoD Public Relations,” [ca 1958], ibid; briefing notes and diagrams [DefMgmtCte], [Apr 50], ibid; unsigned draft memo OSD, 17 May 50, ibid; extract mins DefMgmtCte, 18 May 50, ibid; Its William Frye to E. John Long, 20 Dec 50 and 2 Feb 51, ibid; draft memo DirOPI, 22 Dec 52, w/memo DirOPI for DirOLL OASD(L&L), 22 Dec 52, RG 350, CD 554 (Armed Services Committee); Rearden, Formative Years, 77-83.


46. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al. 10 Aug 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; PR 113-49 OPI OSD, 10 Aug 49, OSD Hist; DoD Directives, 12 May 50 and 2 Aug 50, ibid; Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . . July 1 to December 31, 1949, 45; Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . . July 1 to December 31, 1951, 75.

47. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al. 10 Aug 49, Condit file, OSD Hist.


49. PL 81-216 (10 August 1949).


51. Memo SecDef for SecsSs MilDepts et al. 4 May 50, RG 218, CCS 534 AFPC (12-2-47); AFPC agenda and “significant actions reports,” ibid; testimony John F. Floberg (AsNav(Air)), 29 Mar 53, OSD Cte on Department of Defense Organization (hereafter cited as Rockefeller Cte), “Hearings” (mimeo), 13, 39-40, OSD Hist.

550 Notes to Pages 28–32


53. Memo SecDef for USecDef et al, 5 May 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; addendum to agenda SecStfCouncii OSD, 11 Aug 49, RG 330, CD 122–1–4.

54. Memo George M. Elsey (AdmAsst to Pres) for SpICounsel to Pres, 7 Jul 50, Elsey papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef, 1 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 320.2.

55. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 7 Jul 50, Truman papers, President’s Secretary’s files: NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; Itr Pres to SecDef, 19 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen).

56. Ltr Pres to SecDef, 19 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); memo Burns for Johnson, 25 Jul 50, ibid; interoff memo Burns for Johnson, 1 Aug 50, ibid; Itr Johnson to Truman, 1 Aug 50, ibid; memo Secs Army, Navy, AF for Johnson, 29 Jul 50, with handwritten note by [nbl], RG 330, CD 334 (NSC); memo Burns for Marshall, 25 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 310.1.


58. Memo SecDef for Pres, 25 Aug 50, w/ltr Pres to ChAEC, 25 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 400.112; Itr SecDef to ChJCS, 5 Dec 50, w/intraoff memo L.W. Rogers (Asst to ChMLC) for Exec to SecDef, 1 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 400.174; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 314–15.

59. Agenda NSC mtgs and mins of attendance, NSC mtgs 58 through 128, both in Truman papers, PSF:NSC; Rearden, *Formative Years*, 121.


61. Statement ChNSRB to NSC, 6 Jul 50, *FRUS 1950*, 1:338–41; memo ChNSRB for ExecSecNSC, 5 Sep 50, ibid, 395–97; rept ChNSRB to NSC, 11 Jan 51, *FRUS 1951*, 1:7–18; memo ChNSRB for Pres, [nd], ibid, 2133, 33n22; five memos ExecSecNSC for Pres, 24 Nov 50, 29 [erroneously dated 24] Nov 50, 15 Dec 50, 25 Jan 51, 23 Feb 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.


64. PL 81–599 (30 June 1950); PL 81–604 (10 July 1950); PL 81–624 (27 July 1950); PL 81–655 (3 August 1950); *Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964*, 261; EO 10270 (6 July 1951); EO 10148 (27 July 1950).


67. *Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1950*, 51–52; lecture ChDefMgmtCte at AWC, 8 Nov 50, 12, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 15 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 400.12.


69. Ltr SecDef to SecTreas, 13 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).
70. Memo ActingSecAFPC for MbrsAFPC, 5 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 334 (AFPC); memo SecArmy et al for SecDef, 29 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 350.001; memo ExecSecOSD for Jt Secs, 7 Aug 50, w/enc, State, 3 Aug 50, Condit file, OSD Hist.

71. NY Times, 26 Aug 50, as quoted in Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, 96.


73. NY Times, 26 Aug 50, as quoted in Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, 96.


Notes to Pages 36–42


87. Intervs with Lovett, 7 Jun 76, 1, and 13 May 74, 8; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Lovett an Ideal Choice,” *NY Times*, 13 Sep 50; Edward B. Lockett, “‘There Is No Other Way But Strength,’” *NY Times Magazine*, 23 Sep 51, 12ff; *Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964*, 268; remarks Pres. 16 May 52, in *Truman Public Papers, 1952–53*, 339–41. Marshall was distressed by several instances of memory failure during congressional hearings, according to Acheson (*Sketches from Life*, 165).


92. Interv with Foster, 27 Feb 74, 3; memrcd Doris M. Condit re conv with Foster, 4 Nov 77, 5–6; interv with Lovett, 7 Jun 76, 12–13.

III. THE NORTH KOREAN ATTACK


(Korea 38th Parallel). Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 105, placed North Korean forces at 135,000.


22. Editorial note, ibid, 266; Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 73–75, 103–04, 112.

23. Five msgs USAmb Korea for SecState, all 25 Jun 50, FRUS 1950, VII:125–26, 129, 132, 132–33, 153–54; memo SecArmy for SecState, 21 Jul 50, with draft rept, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea 38th Parallel); Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:57, 64.


32. Three msgs USAmb Korea for SecState, all 26 Jun 50, FRUS 1950, VII:167–68, 169, 170; msg USRep UN for SecState, 26 Jun 50, ibid, 171–72; editorial note, ibid, 207.


34. Memcon Jessup, 27 Jun 50, FRUS 1950, VII:200–02; statement Pres, 27 Jun 50, ibid, 202–03; resolution UNSC, 27 Jun 50, ibid, 211; memo OffUSecState, 28 Jun 50, ibid, 212–13; msg USAmb Yugo for SecState, 28 Jun 50, ibid, 215–16; msg USAmb Yugo for SecState, 1 Jul 50, ibid, 280, 280 Note 5; two editorial notes, ibid, 207, 266; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 408–10; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:93–96; Goodrich, Korea: A Study, 109–14, 222. For a sympathetic view of the Indian attitude toward the Korean War, see Chester Bowles, Ambassador’s Report, 238–43.

35. Msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 28 Jun 50, FRUS 1950, VII:210–11; msg USChge Korea for SecState, 29 Jun 50, ibid, 220–21; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 411; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:97–99; Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 125–27, 133.

36. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 28 Jun 50, w/enc, FRUS 1950, VII:217; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:100–102.

37. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 29 Jun 50, Truman papers, President’s Secretary’s files:NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

38. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jun 50, with draft msg JCS for CINCFE, in [OJCS], comp, “Pertinent Papers on Korean Situation” (mimeo) (hereafter cited as “Pertinent Papers”), II:208–10, OSD Hist; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:105–06.

39. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 30 Jun 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.
Notes to Pages 52–58

42. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (subsequently cited as Appleman, South . . . North), 44–46; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 74, 77n51; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History, 325–33; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:110–11.
44. Editorial note, FRUS 1950, VII:255; msg JCS for CINCFE, 30 Jun 50, ibid, 263; msg JCS for CINCFE, 1 Jul 50, ibid, 271; Truman, Memoirs II, 343; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 412; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:118.
45. Paper George M. Elsey (Asst to Pres), [30 Jun 50], Elsey papers; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 413; editorial note, FRUS 1950, VII:257; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:119–21.
47. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 6 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Jul 50, ibid; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:135–36.
49. Msg CSGPO for CINCFE, 12 Jul 50, “Pertinent Papers.” II:239; memo ExecSecOSD for JCS, 29 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo SJCS for ExecSecOSD, 3 Aug 50, ibid; ltr ASecState(UNA) to SecDef, 13 Oct 50, ibid; ltr ASecState(UNA) to ATSD(FMA&MA), 13 Jul 50, w/enc, ibid.
50. Memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo SecDef for JCS, 17 Jul 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jul 50, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 2 Aug 50, ibid; ltr USecState to SecDef, 8 Aug 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Aug 50, ibid. There were 76 reports from the U.S. Government to the UN Security Council in the period 25 July 1950–31 August 1955 concerning action taken under the UNC.
53. Memo JtSecs for SecDef, 7 Jul 50, with Johnson’s note—”Mr. President, General Bradley and I concur,” RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo JtSecs for SecDef, 15 Jul 50, ibid; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef and DepSecDef, 13 Jul 50, ibid.
54. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Jul 50, ibid.
55. Ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 20 Jul 50, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 21 Jul 50, ibid; ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), 25 Jul 50, ibid; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:151–52.
56. Two memos JCS for SecDef, both 22 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); ltr SecDef to DepUSecState, 27 Jul 50, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 12 Sep 50, ibid.
57. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 24 Jul 50, ibid.
58. Paper SD/8/1020/Rev 2 [State], 27 Jul 50, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 31 Jul 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Sep 50, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 25 Sep 50, ibid.
59. Memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Korea); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 1 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); ltr DepUSecState for SecDef, 27 Sep 50, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 30 Sep 50, ibid; ltr ActingSecState to SecDef, 22 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (India); ltr SecDef to SecState. 27 Sep 50, ibid.
60. Ltr SecTreas to SecDef, 2 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo SecState for Pres, 6 Oct 50, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecTreas, 18 Oct 50, ibid; memo SecArmy for SecDef, 1 Nov 50, w/enc,
ibid; ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 15 Nov 50, ibid. The matter came up again in 1952: memo SecArmy et al for ATSDISA, 15 Feb 52; memo DepATSDISA for SecDef, 26 Feb 52, ibid; ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 4 Mar 52, ibid; ltr SecTreas to SecDef, 29 May 52, ibid; ltr ActingSecState to SecDef, 29 May 52, ibid; ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 18 Jul 52, ibid; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:167–68.

61. Tabulation OSD, 5 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); msg CINCFE for Dept Army, 2 Jan 52, ibid; ltr DepSecDef to ASecStateUNA, 6 Jan 52, ibid; memo ASecStateUNA for USRepUN, 10 Feb 53, FRUS 1952–1954, XV, pt 1: 760–67; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:172–75; Table II OSD, "United Nations Military Participation in Korea by Country and Service." 30 Nov 51, OSD Hist.


63. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:177, 180, 185; Collins, War in Peacetime, 80 (quote); Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 45, 55–57.

64. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:150, 178–80, 183; Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, 3–19; memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 7 Jul 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

65. Msg C57579 CINCFE for JCS, 7 Jul 50, "MacArthur" folder, OSD Hist; msg CD57066 CINCFE for JCS, 2 Jul 50, ibid.

66. Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:181–83; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 93–94; two memrcd Elsey, both 8 Jul 50, Elsey papers; PR 821–50 OPI OSD, 7 Jul 50, OSD Hist.


68. Collins, War in Peacetime, 78 (quote).


71. Memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Jul 50, with interoff memo ExecSecOSD for ASD(L&L), 20 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 384.5; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:186–88.


73. Spl msg Pres to Cong, 19 Jul 50, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 . . . ., 527–37; Pres's address to American people, 19 Jul 50, ibid, 537–42.

74. Memo Pres for SecDef, 19 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 370.01; memo SecDef for SecAF, 20 Jul 50, w/note: "Identical memoranda to Secretary of the Army and Secretary of the Navy," RG 330, CD 381.4; US Cong, House, Cte on Armed Services, Survey of Armed Forces Manpower Requirements, 1950, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), 21; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:189, 195, 200; memo ChMB for SecDef, 10 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 381.4.

75. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 10 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 111; ltr ChMB to DirSelectiveSv, 14 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 381.4; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:188, 192–201.


77. Memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef, 29 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Jul 50, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 20 Jul 50, ibid.

78. Briefing paper for SecDef, "Item 2 . . . . NSC 76," [ca 27 Jul 50], RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47); Red of Actions NSC, 27 Jul 50, action 323, ibid; annotated list, 22, w/memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 17 Feb 59, Condit file, OSD Hist.

79. Memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 11 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 320.2; two memos on NSC consultants' mtgs [State], both 29 Jun 50, in FRUS 1950, I:324–26, 327–30, 330n5; draft rept NSC 73, [1 Jul 50], w/note ExecSecNSC to NSC, 1 Jul 50, ibid, 331–38; memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

80. Memo Bohlen, 13 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, I:342–44; memo Kennan (Counselor State) for SecState, 8 Aug 50, ibid, 361–67; JCS revised draft, [ca 30 Jul 50], RG 330, CD 092 (Australia); briefing paper for SecDef, "Item 2 . . . . NSC 73/2," [ca 10 Aug 50], RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47); memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Aug 50, w/enc. RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo
ExecSec OSD for ExecSec NSC, 16 Aug 50; ibid; Rcd of Actions NSC, 10 Aug 50, action 337; RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47); briefing paper for SecDef, [ca 24 Aug 50], “Item 2 . . . . NSC 73/3,” ibid; rept 73/4 NSC, w/memo ExecSec NSC for Pres, 25 Aug 50, Truman papers, PSF NSC.

81. Memo JTSCs for SecDef, 24 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo execSec OSD for ExecSec NSC, 29 Aug 50, ibid.

82. Memo ExecSec NSC to NSC, 1 Sep 50, with NSC 81, FRUS 1950, VII:685–93; briefing paper for SecDef, “Item 2 . . . NSC 81,” [ca 7 Sep 50], RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47); Acheson, Present at the Creation, 452.

83. Memo ExecSec NSC to NSC, 1 Sep 50, with NSC 81, FRUS 1950, VII:685–93; briefing paper for SecDef, “Item 2 . . . NSC 81,” [ca 7 Sep 50], RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47); Acheson, Present at the Creation, 452.

84. Memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ExecSec NSC for Pres, 8 Sep 51, Truman papers, PSF NSC.

85. Rept NSC 81/1 NSC to Pres, [9 Sep 50], FRUS 1950, VII:712n3, 716.

86. Ibid, 720.


89. Sherman is quoted in Collins, War in Peacetime, 123; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:203–14; Collins, War in Peacetime, 116, 118–29 (126, quote); Acheson, Present at the Creation, 447–48.


92. Memo JCS for SecDef, 25 Sep 50, “Pertinent Papers.” II:271; ltr DepUSecState to SecDef, 27 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea 38th Parallel); msg SecState for ActingSecState, 26 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VII:785; ltr SecDef to Pres, 27 Sep 50, with handwritten note: “Approved 9/27/50 Harry S. Truman” and enc draft directive. RG 330, CD 092 (Korea 38th Parallel); msg JCS for CINCFE, 27 Sep 50, “Pertinent Papers.” II:274–76.


94. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 28 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea 38th Parallel); Appleman, South . . . North, 609–12.

95. Memo ChJCS for SecDef, 29 Sep 50, with handwritten note: “Approved by the President and Secretary of State at a luncheon meeting 29 September 50 at Blair House. G.C.M.” RG 330, CD 092 (Korea 38th Parallel); msg JCS for CINCFE, 29 Sep 50, in “Pertinent Papers.” II:278.

96. Msg SecDef for CINCFE, 29 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VII:826; msg C65304 CINCFE for SecDef, 30 Sep 50, “MacArthur” folder, OSD Hist.

97. The State Department initiated the UNC message, which Acheson, Marshall, and Truman approved. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 26 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VII:785–86, 786n1; msg CINCFE for JCS, 28 Sep 50, ibid, 796–97; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:238.


558 Notes to Pages 68-72

100. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 455.

101. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Oct 50, w/draft msg, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); intraoff memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for DepSecDef, 7 Oct 50, ibid; ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), 11 Oct 50, ibid; ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 7 Oct 50, w/handwritten note “Approved 10/8/50 Harry S. Truman,” FRUS 1950, VII:911-12, 911n1; msg JCS for CINCFE, 9 Oct 50, “Pertinent Papers.” II:286.


109. Appleman, South . . . North, 688, 736-37; Collins, War in Peacetime, 190-91, 193, 196; memo SJCS for SecDef, 18 Dec 50, with UNC rept, 16-50 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

IV. THE CHINESE ENTRY INTO THE WAR


3. Msg ActingSecState for USEmb India, 4 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, VII:874-75; msg ActingSecState for USAmb India, 4 Oct 50, ibid, 875-76; msg USAmb India for SecState, 10 Oct 50, ibid, 921. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, examines the Chinese decision to enter the Korean conflict from the viewpoint of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

4. Three memos CIA, 12 Oct 50, FRUS 1950, VII:933-38; msg USConGen Hong Kong for SecState, 13 Oct 50, ibid, 946; msg USAmb Neth for SecState, 17 Oct 50, ibid, 974; msg USAmb Burma for SecState, 14 Oct 50, ibid, 944; ltr Matthews (DeplJSecState) to Burns (ATSD(FMA&MA)), 19 Oct 50, ibid, 980-81.

5. “Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on 15 October 50,” comp by Omar N. Bradley ChJCS, ibid. 948-60 (quotes on 949, 953); memo ASecState(FE), [nd], ibid, 961-62 (quote); Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, 362; Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial


8. Memo ADirOFMA for Lovett, [nd but ca 13 Oct 50], RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); *Truman, Memoirs II*, 346–47; memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef, 28 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Louis Johnson for JCS, 2 Aug 50, ibid; msg JCS for CINCFE, 5 Aug 50, OSD Hist.

9. Memo Kenneth T. Young (OATSD(FMA&MA)) for Lovett, [ca 13 Oct 50), RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); *Truman, Memoirs II*, 365–67, 381–82; memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef, 28 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Louis Johnson for JCS, 2 Aug 50, ibid; msg JCS for CINCFE, 5 Aug 50, OSD Hist.


12. Memo ADirOFMA for Lovett, [nd but ca 13 Oct 50], RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef, 28 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Louis Johnson for JCS, 2 Aug 50, ibid; msg JCS for CINCFE, 5 Aug 50, OSD Hist.

13. Memo Kenneth T. Young (OATSD(FMA&MA)) for Lovett, [nd but ca 13 Oct 50), RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); *Truman, Memoirs II*, 365–67, 381–82; memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef, 28 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Louis Johnson for JCS, 2 Aug 50, ibid; msg JCS for CINCFE, 5 Aug 50, OSD Hist.

14. Memo ADirOFMA for Lovett, [nd but ca 13 Oct 50), RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); *Truman, Memoirs II*, 365–67, 381–82; memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef, 28 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Louis Johnson for JCS, 2 Aug 50, ibid; msg JCS for CINCFE, 5 Aug 50, OSD Hist.

15. Memo ChJCS for SecDef, 21 Aug 50, ibid; memo Lovett for JCS, 11 Oct 50, ibid; memo [Finletter) for Lovett, 12 Oct 50, ibid; memo ADirOFMA for SecDef, [ca 13 Oct 50], ibid.

16. Memo AdDirOfMA for Lovett, [nd but ca 13 Oct 50], RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Lovett for JCS, 11 Oct 50, ibid; memo [Finletter) for Lovett, 12 Oct 50, ibid; memo ADirOFMA for SecDef, [ca 13 Oct 50], ibid.

17. Memo DepUSecState for Burns, 10 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Lovett for JCS, 11 Oct 50, ibid; memo [Finletter) for Lovett, 12 Oct 50, ibid; memo ADirOFMA for SecDef, [ca 13 Oct 50], ibid.

18. Memo DepUSecState for Burns, 10 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Lovett for JCS, 11 Oct 50, ibid; memo [Finletter) for Lovett, 12 Oct 50, ibid; memo ADirOFMA for SecDef, [ca 13 Oct 50], ibid.

19. Memo DepUSecState for Burns, 10 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Lovett for JCS, 11 Oct 50, ibid; memo [Finletter) for Lovett, 12 Oct 50, ibid; memo ADirOFMA for SecDef, [ca 13 Oct 50], ibid.

20. Memo ChJCS for SecDef, 21 Aug 50, ibid; memo Lovett to Acheson, 21 Aug 50, ibid.

21. Memo JCS for SecDef, 21 Aug 50, ibid; memo Lovett to Acheson, 21 Aug 50, ibid.

22. Memo Finletter for Johnson, 7 Sep 50, ibid; memo Lovett for JCS, 11 Oct 50, ibid; memo [Finletter) for Lovett, 12 Oct 50, ibid; memo ADirOFMA for SecDef, [ca 13 Oct 50], ibid.

23. Memo Finletter for Johnson, 7 Sep 50, ibid; memo Lovett to Acheson, 21 Aug 50, ibid.

24. Memo Finletter for Johnson, 7 Sep 50, ibid; memo Lovett to Acheson, 21 Aug 50, ibid.


30. Msg JCS for CINCFE, 8 Nov 50, ibid, 1097-98; msg CINCFE for JCS, 9 Nov 50, ibid, 1107-10; memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Nov 50, ibid, 1117-21; Truman, *Memoirs II*, 378.

31. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 10 Nov 50, Truman papers, President’s Secretary’s files: NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.


36. Msg Bevin for Franks, 13 Nov 50, *FRUS 1950*, VII:1138-40; msg SecState for USEmb UK, 13 Nov 50, ibid, 1144-45; msg USRep UN for SecState, 14 Nov 50, ibid, 1156-57; msg USAmb Canada for SecState, 15 Nov 50, ibid, 1159-60; memcon DepDirOffNA, 16 Nov 50, ibid, 1161-62; Itr Acheson to Marshall, 16 Nov 50, ibid, 1163; msg Bevin for Franks, 16 Nov 50, ibid, 1172; msg USAmb Neth for SecState, 18 Nov 50, ibid, 1185.


40. Brief of FECOM telecon OSD, 19 Nov 50, initiated by Marshall, ibid; brief of FECOM telecon DepDirEXOS OSD, 20 Nov 50, initiated by Marshall, ibid; memo Burns for Marshall, 21 Nov 50, ibid.


42. Msg CoSUSA for CINCUNC, 24 Nov 50, ibid, 1222-24; msg CINCUNC for JCS, 25 Nov 50, ibid, 1231-33.

43. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 24 Nov 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

44. Msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 25 Nov 50, *FRUS 1950*, VII:1216-17; msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 24 Nov 50, ibid, 1218; NIE-2/1 CIA, 24 Nov 50, ibid, 1220-22; telecon TT4058 DeptArmy, 24 Nov 50, Condit file, OSD Hist.

45. Msg CX69811 CINCFE for DeptArmy et al, 25 Nov 50, Condit file, OSD Hist; msg CD69852 CINCFE for DeptArmy et al, 26 Nov 50, ibid; msg CX69909 CINCFE for DeptArmy et al, 27 Nov 50, ibid; msg CINCFE for JCS, 28 Nov 50, *FRUS 1950*, VII:1237-38; MacArthur,
Reminiscences, 372–73. Appleman, South . . . North, 768–69, later estimated Chinese forces in Korea at that time at 300,000 of which 180,000 faced Eighth Army.

46. Memo Burns for Marshall, 28 Nov 50, RG 350, CD 381 (Gen); intrasign memo DirEXOS OSD, [ca 29 Nov 50], ibid.


48. Memo SecArmy et al for SecDef, 28 Nov 50, RG 350, CD 092 (Korea).


55. Press conf, 30 Nov 50, Truman Public Papers, 1950, 727; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 472; quoted indirectly in memcon Amb at Lge, 1 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, VII:1276; memo Battle (SplAsst to SecState), 3 Dec 50, ibid, 1270–71.


57. Memo Battle, 3 Dec 50, w/memcon Amb at Lge, [nd], ibid, 1310–13.

58. Msg CINCUNC for JCS, 3 Dec 50, ibid, 1320–22; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:356–58.


65. Discussion of the Truman–Attlee talks in this and following paragraphs is based on the U.S. minutes of the first, second, fifth, and sixth talks, 4, 5, 7, 8 Dec 50, printed in FRUS 1950, VII:1361–74 (1365, quote), 1352–1408 (1403, quote), 1449–61, and 1468–79; memcon McWilliams (DirExecSect State), 5 Dec 50, ibid, 1382–86; memrec Battle, 7 Dec 50, ibid, 1430–32; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 481–85; C. [Clement] R. Attlee, As It Happened, 280–83.
Notes to Pages 89–98


67. Memo Battle (State), 7 Dec 50, ibid, 1431.

68. Communique, [8 Dec 50], ibid, 1476–79; memrcd Amb at Lge, 7 Dec 50, w/memrcd Arneson (SplAsst to SecState(AE)), 16 Jan 53, ibid, 1462–65; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 484–85.


71. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 12 Dec 50, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, VII:1528–31; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:382–84.


73. Memcon ASecState(FE), 19 Dec 50, w/annex, FRUS 1950, VII:1570–76.

74. Ibid; synopsis notes AFPC mtg, 19 Dec 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC Actions During the Korean War Buildup" folder.


81. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 10 Jan 51, ibid, 55–56; Whitney, MacArthur, 435–36.

82. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 515; Collins, War in Peacetime, 248–49.


85. Memo ActingExecSecOSD for ExecSecNSC, 12 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 15 Jan 51, w/draft NSC 1011, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:79–81; memo StateRep on NSC Staff, 19 Jan 51, ibid, 93–94; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 516.

86. Marshall is indirectly cited in memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 13 Jan 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.


V. A POLICY OF LIMITED WAR

Notes to Pages 98–101


2. Msg SecState for USMission UN, 13 Jan 51. FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:74–76; msg SecState for Certain Dipl and Cons Offices, 15 Jan 51, ibid, 83–85; msg SecState for USMission UN, 20 Jan 51, ibid, 109–10, 110nn1, 2; msg SecState for USEmb France, 20 Jan 51, ibid, 110–11; editorial notes, ibid, 115–16, 117.


5. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 5 Dec 50. FRUS 1950, VII:1411–12; ltr SecDef to SecState, 30 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:147; ltr SecState to SecDef, 23 Feb 51, ibid, 194–95; ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 31 Mar 51, ibid, 284; ltr SecState to SecDef, 26 Apr 51, ibid, 380–83; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 294–96; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:343–44, 391–93, 408–10.


7. Memo SecDef for Pres, 19 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo SecState for SecDef, 19 Feb 51, w/note SecDef to ChJCS, [20 Feb 51], ibid; memo telecon AsecState(FE), 1 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:201–02; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:452–56.

8. Ltr DepAsecState(FE) to DepSecDef, 4 Apr 51, w/memo [Dept State], 3 Apr 51, RG 350, CD 092 (Manchuria); msg SecState for USMission UN, 3 Apr 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:291–92; memcon AsecState(UNA), 6 Apr 51, ibid, 306–07; memcon DirPPS, 6 Apr 51, w/memo JCS to SecDef, 6 Apr 51, ibid, 307–09; memcon ActingOIC India–Nepal–Ceylon Affs, 7 Apr 51, ibid, 316–17.


11. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 23 Feb 51, w/enc draft memo, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:189–94.

12. Memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Feb 51, ibid, 203–06; ltr SecDef to SecState, 1 Mar 51, ibid, 202–03, 203nn2; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 1:465–64.


15. Memo F. Reinhardt (DirFE) for SecState, 17 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:241–43; memcon Nitze, 19 Mar 51, ibid, 246–47, 246nn1; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 517–18.


19. Testimony SecDef. 10 May 51, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, *Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings*, pt 1:483-84. It was not immediately clear that the MacArthur statement would abort the peace effort—see memcon DirNA, 30 Mar 51, w/enc, *FRUS 1951*, VII, pt 1:278-82; msg 1342 lJSRep UN for SecState, 29 Mar 51, ibid, 272-75; memcon Allen (EUR), 29 Mar 51, ibid, 275-77.


21. Testimony SecDef, 10 May 51, Senate Ctes on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, *Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings*, pt 1:483-84. It was not immediately clear that the MacArthur statement would abort the peace effort—see memcon DirNA, 30 Mar 51, w/enc, *FRUS 1951*, VII, pt 1:278-82; msg 1342 lJSRep UN for SecState, 29 Mar 51, ibid, 272-75; memcon Allen (EUR), 29 Mar 51, ibid, 275-77.


25. Collins, *War in Peacetime*, 282, indicates that Bradley told the Joint Chiefs late on 5 April 1951 that 'consideration was being given at the White House to the relief of General MacArthur'; the president is indirectly quoted in Elsey notes on MacArthur, 3, Ayers papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.


54. Memo JCS for SecDef, 27 May 51, RG 530, CD 092 (Korea); Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, pt 1:457, 469.
55. Ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 31 Mar 51, w/2 intraoff notes, [ca 28 and 29 Mar 51], RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Ltr SecDef to ChSenateCteArmed Services, 23 May 51, ibid.
57. Briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCstf?], 2 May 51, RG 218, CCS 334 National Security Council (9-25-47); memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Apr 51, *FRUS 1951*, VII, pt 1:387-88, 388n6; memo DirPPS for SecState, 2 May 51, ibid, 400-01.
58. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 3 May 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; draft substitute para SecDef, 2 May 51, RG 218, CCS 334 National Security Council (9-25-47); briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCstf?], 2 May 51, ibid.
62. Ibid, 36, 53-54.
67. Memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Jun 51, w/directives, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memrcd ChJCS, 10 Jul 51, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Jul 51, ibid; two msgs JCS for CINCFE, both 10 Jul 51, both in "Pertinent Papers," III:514-22; Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 402.
73. Memcon John R. Heidemann (FE), 29 Jun 51, ibid, 592-95; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 533-34.
VI. FIGHTING BUT TALKING

1. Ltr Harry S. Truman to George C. Marshall, 12 Sep 51, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951 . . . (hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers with year), 516.


6. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 20 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); ltr SecState to SecDef, 27 Jul 51, ibid.


8. Msg CINCUNC for JCS, 26 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:735–37. There are slight variations in the text of the five agenda items as given in Joy, How Communists Negotiate, 27; for his account of reaching agreement on the wording of item 1, see 18–29.


13. Msg 82092 JCS for CINCFE, 21 Sep 51, cable files, OSD Hist; msg JCS for CINCUNC, 21 Sep 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:927–28; msg JCS for CINCFE, 26 Sep 51, ibid, 963; telecon JCS and
State w/CINCUNC and staff, 25 Sep 51, ibid, 946–51; msg CINCFE for JCS, 26 Sep 51, ibid, 952–55; Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, pt 2:602.


33. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 24 Apr 52, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

34. Draft paper Exec to SecDef, w/handwritten corrections by SecDef, [ca Apr 51], Marshall papers, “MacArthur . . . Marshall” folder, George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Va; ltr DepASecState (FE) to DepSecDef, 4 Apr 51, w/memo [State], 3 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092
35. Memo SecAF for JtSecs, 19 Apr 51, w/proposed statement, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo SecAF for DepSecDef, 19 Apr 51, ibid.

36. Memo SecAF for JtSecs, 19 Apr 51, w/proposed statement, ibid, memo JtSecs for DepSecDef, 19 Apr 51, ibid; memo DirCS for SeeDd, 23 Apr 51, ibid.

37. Intraoff memo DirEXOS for SecAF, [ca 23 Apr 51], w/draft statement by Finletter and revision by Marshall, ibid, memo SecAF for DepSecDef, 19 Apr 51, w/draft statements marked “Gen. Marshall’s draft/Proposed Statement by Air Secretary Finletter” and “Acheson draft,” ibid.

38. Memo CINCE for SecAF, 15 Jun 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions During the Korean War Buildup” folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo SecAF for SecDef, 19 Jun 51, ibid.

39. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 22 Jun 51, w/msg VO 221, Weyland for SecAF, RG 330, CD 452.01; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 28 Jun 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.


41. Memo SecAF for JtSecs, 10 Aug 51, w/handwritten note—“Done by Gen Bradley/L” [Lovett], RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ATSD(lSA) for SeeDef, 4 Aug 51, ibid; FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:767n3; Schnabel and Watson, Korean War, pt 2:608-12.

42. Memo SecDef for SecAF, 12 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo SecAF for SecDef, 1 Nov 51, ibid; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 24 Oct 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

43. Memo SecAF for SecDef, 24 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea) ; memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Feb 52, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:667-68.

44. Ltr SeeDd to ChSenateCteArmedServices, 15 Mar 52, w/excerpts from speech SecAF, RG 330, CD 452.02.

45. Ltr SeeDd to ChSenateCteArmedServices, 15 Mar 52, w/excerpts from speech SecAF, RG 330, CD 452.02.

46. Ltr SeeDd to ChSenateCteArmedServices, 15 Mar 52, w/excerpts from speech SecAF, RG 330, CD 452.02.

47. Ltr SecDef to ChSenateCteArmedServices, 15 Mar 52, w/excerpts from speech SecAF, RG 330, CD 452.02.


56. Memo Wyeth for SecArmy et al., 7 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 129–1; memo SecAF for SecDef, 10 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingASecState(Fe) for SecState, 23 Dec [51], and handwritten note—“Practically everything SecAir recommends was approved 12/19 by NSC 118, FCN[Frank C. Nash],” ibid.

57. Memo ActingExecSecNSC for NSC, 7 Dec 51, w/draft statement [NSC 118/1], *FRUS 1951*, VII, pt 1:1259–63; deals with this and preceding paragraphs.

58. Ibid, 1261.

59. Memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Dec 51, ibid, 1357–59; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 20 Dec 50, w/statement, ibid, 1382–87; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 21 Dec 51. Truman papers, PSF:NSC.


62. Memo DepDirEXOS for [CS, 28 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); *FRUS 1951*, VII, pt 1:1382n1.


65. Msg CX60640 CINCUNC for JCS, 2 Jan 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg 91122 JCS for CINCFE, 4 Jan 52, ibid; msg 900075 JCS for CINCFE, 1 Feb 52, ibid; msg 900325 JCS for CINCFE, 5 Feb 52, ibid.

66. Msg C62999 CINCFE for JCS, 6 Feb 52, ibid; msg HNC 875 CINCUNC for JCS, 6 Feb 52, ibid; msg 900453 JCS for CINCUNC Adv(Korea), 6 Feb 52, ibid; msg C63198 CINCFE for JCS, 9 Feb 52, ibid; msg ZX25662 CINCFE for JCS, 9 Feb 52, ibid; msg C67670 CINCUNC for JCS, 28 Apr 52, 32, ibid.

67. Msg C63308 CINCFE for JCS, 10 Feb 52, ibid; msg C63307 CINCFE for JCS, 10 Feb 52, ibid; msg CX64309 CINCFE for JCS, 10 Feb 52, ibid; msg C63432 CINCFE for JCS, 12 Feb 52, ibid; msg C63731 CINCFE for JCS, 16 Feb 52, ibid.

68. Msg DA 901349 CoSUSA for CINCFE, 16 Feb 52, ibid; msg C63797 CINCFE for JCS, 17 Feb 52, ibid; msg C63854 CINCFE for JCS, 18 Feb 52, ibid; msg C64907 CINCFE for JCS, 19 Feb 52, ibid; msg C65907 (correction) CINCFE for JCS, 19 Feb 52, ibid; msg C67670 CINCUNC for JCS, 28 Apr 52, 32, ibid. See also final text of art IV, in Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, 531.

69. Msg C57217 CINCFE for JCS, 13 Nov 51, cable files, OSD Hist.


71. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 27 Nov 51, ibid, 1186–88; msg CINCFE for JCS, 28 Nov 51, ibid, 1194–95.

72. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 28 Nov 51, ibid, 1194–95; msg CINCFE for JCS, 30 Nov 51, ibid, 1206–08.

73. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 3 Dec 51, ibid, 1229–30.

74. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 4 Dec 51, ibid, 1234; msg CINCFE for JCS, 4 Dec 51, ibid, 1234–37; msg CINCFE for JCS, 4 Dec 51, ibid, 1237; msg CINCFE for JCS, 4 Dec 51, ibid, 1239–40; msg CINCFE for AdvHqUNC Korea, 5 Dec 51, ibid, 1240–43.
75. Msg JCS for CINCFE, 5 Dec 51, ibid, 1247.

VII. THE PRISONERS OF WAR

2. Memo Off Counsel OASD(L&L) for ASD(L&L), 12 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, pt 2:672–73, 675.
3. Memo Alan N. Alpern (Off Counsel OASD(L&L) for ATSD(ISA)), [5 Jun 52], RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo DepATSD(ISA) for ActingSecDef. [ca 23 Nov 51], ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Aug 51, ibid.
5. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); msg CINCFE for JCS, 27 Oct 51, *FRUS 1951*, VII, pt 1:1068–81; memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Nov 51, w/draft msg, ibid, 1168–71; ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 23 Nov 51, ibid, 1167–68.
7. Memcon U. Alexis Johnson (DepSciSecState(Fe)), 5 Dec 51, w/note, *FRUS 1951*, VII, pt 1:1243–45, 1244n4; msg JCS for Pres’s Naval Aide [for Pres], 7 Dec 51, ibid, 1276–78, 1276nn1,4; editorial note, ibid, 1296; msg 89172 JCS for CINCFE, 10 Dec 51, cable files, OSD Hist.
Korea for JCS, 18 Dec 51, ibid, 1366-72; msg JCS for CINCFE, 19 Dec 51, ibid, 1377-81, especially 1380.


10. Msg HNC 593 CINCUNC(Adv) Korea for CINCUNC, 19 Dec 51, cable files, OSD Hist; msg CX59780 CINCFE for JCS, 21 Dec 51, ibid; msg CINCFE for JCS, 20 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:1399-1400; msg CINCUNC for JCS, 22 Dec 51, ibid, 1402-03.


14. Msg CINCFE for JCS, 29 Dec 51, ibid, 1461-62; msg CINCFE for JCS, 30 Dec 51, ibid, 1469-70; msg C60583 CINCUNC for JCS, 1 Jan 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg Z18450 CINCUNC for JCS, 2 Jan 52, ibid.

15. Msg C60704 CINCUNC for JCS, 3 Jan 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg C61049 CINCUNC for JCS, 8 Jan 52, ibid; msg 0914132 CINCUNC for JCS, 9 Jan 52, ibid; msg 218450 CINCFE for JCS, 2 Jan 52, ibid.


17. Memrcd DepASecState(FE), 4 Feb 52, FRUS 1952-1954, XV, pt 1:32-34; memrcd DepASecState(FE), 8 Feb 52, ibid, 40-41.

18. Ibid, 42-43; memo SecState for Pres, [8 Feb 52], ibid, 44-45.

19. Memrcd SecDef, 8 Feb 52, w/encls, RG 330, CD 383.6 (1952).


27. Msg C66285 CINCUNC for JCS, 2 Apr 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg 66397 CINCUNC for JCS, 4 Apr 52, ibid; msg HNC 1120 CINCUNC for JCS, 4 Apr 52, ibid; msg C67292 CINCUNC for JCS, 21 Apr 52, ibid; Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, pt 2:756.

28. Msg C66649 CINCUNC for DeptArmy, 10 Apr 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg 67067 CINCUNC for JCS, 17 Apr 52, ibid; msg C66832 CINCUNC for DeptArmy, 12 Apr 52, ibid; msg C66864 CINCUNC for DeptArmy, 13 Apr 52, ibid; msg C67178 CINCUNC for DeptArmy, 19 Apr 52, ibid.
29. Msg C67292 CINCUNC for JCS, 21 Apr 52, ibid; msg HNC 1182 CINCUNC for JCS, 24 Apr 52, ibid; msg CX67500 CINCUNC for JCS, 25 Apr 52, ibid; msg C67539 CINCUNC for JCS, 25 Apr 52, ibid; msg CX67605 CINCUNC for USAmb Korea, 26 Apr 52, ibid; Schnabel and Watson. *Korean War*, pt 2:760.

30. Msg C67603 CINCUNC for JCS, 26 Apr 52, cable files, OSD Hist; msg C67677 CINCFE for JCS, 28 Apr 52; ibid; msg C67900 CINCFE for JCS, 2 May 52, ibid; memo ATSD(IS) for SecDef, 7 May 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, pt 2:761–68.


32. Msg C68366 CINCUNC for JCS, 12 May 52, 11, cable files, OSD Hist.


35. Msg 1861 USAmb USSR for SecState, 22 May 52, RG 330, CD 091.412; msg 673 Austin (USAmb UN) for SecState, 4 Apr 52, cable files. OSD Hist; msg 3003 USAmb India for SecState, 4 Apr 52, ibid; msg PD220 CIA for CoSUSA et al, 5 Apr 52, ibid; msg 772 SecState for USConGen Geneva, 11 Apr 52, ibid; msg 5200 USAmb India for SecState, 13 May 52, ibid; Chester Bowles. *Ambassador’s Report*, 224; Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, pt 2:809–15; memo SecAF for SecDef, 22 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.412.


37. Msg JCS for CINCUNC, 5 Jun 52, FRUS 1952–1954, XV, pt 1:509; memo ASecState(SE) for SecState, 14 Jul 52, ibid, 505–66; msg DA 912713 DeptArmy PSYWAR for CINCUNC, 3 Jul 52, cable files. OSD Hist; memo Pres for SecDef, 11 Jun 52; RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ATSD(IS) for DeptSecDef, 12 Jun 52, ibid; memo ATSD(IS) for SecDef, 20 Jun 52, ibid; memo ActingATSD(IS) for SecDef, 31 Jul 52, ibid; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, 655; Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, pt 2:816.

38. Msg C68350 CINCUNC for JCS, 12 May 52 (quote), cable files. OSD Hist; msg C68507 CINCUNC for JCS, 15 May 52, ibid; msg C68446 CINCUNC for JCS, 14 May 52, ibid.


40. Msg CX6895* CINCUNC for DeptArmy, 23 May 52, cable files. OSD Hist; msg CINCUNC for JCS, 31 May 52, FRUS 1952–1954, XV, pt 1:2”0–”4, especially 2”1; msg JCS for CINCUNC, 5 Jun 52, ibid, 510–14; memo DeptATSD(IS) for SecDef, 2 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, pt 2:825–30.

574 Notes to Pages 150–56


44. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 27 Aug 52, w/draft presidential statement, RG 330, CD 334 (State–JCS); msg ActingSecState for USEmb USSR, 27 Aug 52, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XV, pt 1:463–64; msg Kennan (USAmb USSR) for State, 28 Aug 52, ibid, 464–65; msg CINCUNC for JCS, 1 Sep 52, ibid, 467–70; msg 917260 JCS for CINCFE, 29 Aug 52, cable files, OSD Hist; memrcd SecDef, 15 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, pt 2:882–84.

45. Msg CINCUNC for JCS, 1 Sep 52, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XV, pt 1:470–74; memo State, 2 Sep 52, ibid, 477–83; memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 3 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 334 (State–JCS).


48. Truman and Libby are indirectly quoted in memrcd SecDef, 15 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); msg CINCUNC for JCS, 25 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 334 (State–JCS); Schnabel and Watson, *Korean War*, pt 2:897–99.


50. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 24 Sep 52, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XV, pt 1:532–38. The Defense argument was later elaborated in memo ChJCS for SecDef, 17 Nov 52, ibid, 648, and ltr SecDef to SecState, 18 Nov 52, ibid, 649–51.

51. Memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 24 Sep 52, ibid, 537–38.

52. Msg JCS for CINCFE, 25 Sep 52, ibid, 539–40; msg Pres for CINCFE, 26 Sep 52, ibid, 544; msg CINCUNC for JCS, 28 Sep 52, ibid, 545–48.


VIII. THE FINAL ROUND


Palmer, [Apr 53], before Senate Cte on Armed Services. Ammunition Shortages: Hearings (off-the-record remarks), 1-2, RG 330. CD 471; msg C59375 CINCFE for SecDef, 27 Nov 52, ibid.


21. Memo ASD(L&L) for SeeDef, 7 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 354 (AFPC); address SeeDef, 29 Nov 50, NY City, in Hist Off OSD, comp, Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Marshall, 1950–1951, 1:106-07, OSD Hist; memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 091.711 (Korea); memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 353; Hermes. Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 213, 541, 545.

22. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 13 Jan 51. Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 25 May 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 26 May 51, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 7 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 354 (AFPC).

23. Rept to NSC by ExecSecNSC [NSC 48/5], FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:53-54; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 May 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 26 May 51, ibid; ltr Dean Rusk (SecState(FE)) to SecDef, 6 Jun 51, w/msg USAmb Korea for SecState, 5 Jun 51, ibid; Hermes. Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 214–15.


27. Memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).


30. Memo JtSecs for SecDef, 8 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 353; memo ActingATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 25 Jul 52, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS. 30 Jul 52, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 31 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, "Korea" folder, National Archives, Washington, DC; memo SecDef for JCS, 14 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); testimony McNeil, 14 May 53. US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations. Department of Defense . . . Appropriations for 1954: Hearings, 83 Cong, 1 sess (1954), 444–45; Hermes. Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 342.

31. Memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 091.711 (Korea); memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Sep 52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 8 Oct 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Oct 52, ibid.

32. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 16 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Rosenberg (ASD(M&P)) for ATSD(ISA), 28 Oct 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers. "Korea" folder, is dated after the decision was made, but Rosenberg’s views were undoubtedly known in Lovett’s office before 25 October; ltr SecDef to Pres, 25 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 091.711 (Korea); memo SecDef for JCS, 30 Oct 52, ibid.

33. Msg DA 920585 CoSUSA for CINCFE, 9 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 091.711 (Korea); msg C57893 CINCFE for DeptArmy, 28 Oct 52, ibid; memo SecArmy for SecDef, 17 Nov 52, ibid.

34. Memo SecDef for JCS, 5 Dec 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 353; Hermes. Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 343–44.


39. Memo SecMilStfCte USDelegUN for SecDd, 7 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 334(UN); memo SecMilStfCte USDelegUN for SecDef, 14 Nov 52, ibid.


41. Memo SecDef, 12 Feb 53, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XV, pt 1:712–13; memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Feb 53, ibid; memo JCS for SecState, 14 May 53, ibid, 977–79; memo SecState to Pres, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 683–86; memo SecState to Pres, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 686; memo SecState for SecDef, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 690–91; resolution 610(VII) UNGenAssem, 3 Dec 52, ibid, 702–05; editorial note, ibid, 712; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 700–05.


43. Memo SecDef, 12 Feb 53, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XV, pt 1:769–72; memo SecState for SecDef, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 689–91; memo SecState for SecDef, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 686; memo SecState for SecDef, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 689–91; resolution 610(VII) UNGenAssem, 3 Dec 52, ibid, 702–05; editorial note, ibid, 712; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 700–05.


45. Memo SecState for SecDef, 24 Nov 52, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XV, pt 1:677–79; memo SecState to Pres, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 689–91; memo SecState to Pres, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 686; memo SecState for SecDef, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 689–91; resolution 610(VII) UNGenAssem, 3 Dec 52, ibid, 702–05; editorial note, ibid, 712; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 700–05.


47. Memo SecDef, 12 Feb 53, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XV, pt 1:769–72; memo SecState for SecDef, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 689–91; memo SecState for SecDef, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 686; memo SecState for SecDef, 26 Nov 52, ibid, 689–91; resolution 610(VII) UNGenAssem, 3 Dec 52, ibid, 702–05; editorial note, ibid, 712; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 700–05.


60. Table P28.1, *ProgRepts&Stats OASD(C)*, 4 Nov 54, OSD Hist; table 28.51, *ProgRepts&Stats OASD(C)*, 20 Apr 55, ibid.


IX. FORMOSA: A REVERSAL OF POLICY


2. For views on Chiang’s regime in China and later in Formosa, see Itr Min-Counselor USEmb China to DirFE State, 12 Jun 48, *FRUS 1948*, VII:294–98; memcon Allen B. Moreland (State rep w/Huber CongCte on FE tour), 5 Sep 49, *FRUS 1949*, IX:544–46; memo DirCA State for ASecState(FE), 20 Oct 49, ibid, 558–61; memcon SecState, 5 Jan 50, *FRUS 1950*, VI:258–63; Itr SecState to SecDef, 7 Mar 50, ibid, 316–17; memcon Dulles (Consultant to SecState), 25 May 50, ibid, 543–44.

3. Note Sidney W. Souers (ExecSecNSC) to NSC, 1 Dec 48, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Nov 48, *FRUS 1949*, IX:261–62; memo Souers to NSC, 4 Apr 49, w/memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 2 Apr 49, ibid, 307–08; note by Souers, 22 Aug 49, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Aug 49, ibid, 376–78.

Notes to Pages 174–76


6. News conf, 5 Jan 50, Truman Public Papers, 1950, 11–12; note Leffingwell (OMA OSD), 17 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP China); ltr SecState to SecDef, 14 Apr 50, ibid; internal memo [Douglas] MacArthur [III (RA State)] for Rusk (ASecStateFE), 5 May 50, RG 330, CD 537 (Four Powers); Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 357.


10. Ltr DepUSecState to ATSD (FMA & MA), 3 Jul 50, w/summary of recent Chinese Communist propaganda, RG 330, CD 091.412; msg USAmb India for SecState, 5 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 568–69; msg USAmb India for SecState, 9 Jul 50, ibid, 371–75; msg USAmb USSR for SecState, 12 Jul 50, ibid, 374–75.


12. Msg Bevin for Franks, 7 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, VII: 329–31; msg Douglas (USAmb UK) for SecState, 8 Jul 50, ibid, 331–32; msg SecState to USEmb UK, 10 Jul 50, ibid, 347–51; msg Douglas for SecState, 11 Jul 50, ibid, 361–62; msg Kirk (USAmb USSR) for SecState, 13 Jul 50, ibid, 370–71; memo McGhee (ASecStateFE) for SecState, 15 Jul 50, ibid, 372–73; msg Douglas for SecState, 14 Jul 50, ibid, 380–85.

13. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 12 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 210.681; memo SecNavy for SecDef, 13 Jul 50, ibid; intraoff memo ATSD (FMA & MA) for SecDef, 20 Jul [50], ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD (FMA & MA), 18 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 091.3; ltr ATSD (FMA & MA) to SecState(FE), 18 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 382; ltr SecDef to SecState, 19 Jul 50, ibid, 383; ltr SecState to SecDef, 24 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 091.3; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 27 Jul 51, ibid, mins 62d NSC mg, item 5, 27 Jul 50, Truman papers, President’s Secretary’s files: NSC (PSF: NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; memo ATSD (FMA & MA) for Sec to JtSecs, 31 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092.

14. Memo SecDef for JCS, 14 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 061.2; memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 391–94.

15. Memo [ExecSec NSC] for Pres, 27 Jul 50, Truman papers, PSF: NSC; memo ExecSec NSC for NSC, 3 Aug 50, w/enc, FRUS 1950, VI: 413–14; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 3 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 091.3.

16. Ltr Pres to SecDef, 25 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 091.5; FRUS 1950, VI: 414 n4; memo ActingDepDirMDA State for DirOMA, 18 Sep 50, ibid, 508.

17. Memo ActingDepDirMDA State for DirOMA, 15 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 501–03; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA, 31 Oct 50, ibid, 547–48; msg USChge China [Formosa] to SecState, 9 Nov 50, ibid, 552–53, 552 n2; msg SecState for USEmb China [Formosa], 21 Nov 50, ibid, 579; memo Richard E. Johnson (OCA State) for DirOCA, 8 Dec 50, w/enc, 7 Dec 50, ibid, 590–96; memo ACS G–3 for SecDef, 20 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); unsigned memo Army for DirEXOS OSD, 12 Jan 51, ibid.

18. Memo SecDef for JCS, 6 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); memo C58994 CINCFE for JCS, 7 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 571.

19. Msg SecState for USChge China [Formosa], 24 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, VI: 391; ltr SecState to SecDef, 29 Jul 50, ibid, 399–400; ltr SecDef to SecState, 2 Aug 50, ibid, 406; msg SecState for USChge China [Formosa], 14 Aug 50, ibid, 434–38.
580 Notes to Pages 176–79

20. Msg USChge China [Formosa] for SecState, 10 Jul 50, ibid, 373–74, 374n3; ltr SecDef to SecState, 17 Jul 50, ibid, 379–80; msg SecState for USEmb China [Formosa], 22 Jul 50, ibid, 387; memo JCS for SecDef, 21 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (China); ltr SecState to SecDef, 29 Jul 50, \textit{FRUS 1950}, VI:399–400; ltr SecDef to SecState, 2 Aug 50, ibid, 406; msg SecState for USEmb China [Formosa], 4 Aug 50, ibid, 419; ltr ActingSecState to SecDef, 28 Sep 50, ibid, 522–24, 524n3; msg SecState for USEmb China [Formosa], 26 Oct 50, ibid, 541–42; ltr SecDef to SecState, 15 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (China).

21. Msg USChge China [Formosa] for SecState, 14 Jul 50, \textit{FRUS 1950}, VI:375, 375n1; msg SecState for USEmb China [Formosa], 21 Jul 50, ibid, 385; memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Jul 50, ibid, 401, 401n1; memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jul 50, w/enc CINCFE msg C58994, 29 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); ltr SecDef to SecState, 29 Jul 50, ibid, 406; memo JCS for SecDef, 21 Jul 50, ibid, 385; msg SeeS tate for USEmb China [Formosa], 22 Jul 50, ibid, 387; memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Jul 50, w/ene CINCH msg C58994, 29 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); ltr SeeDef to SeeState, 29 Jul 50, ibid; ltr SeeState to SeeDef, 31 Jul 50, \textit{FRUS 1950}, VI:402–04, 404n2.


23. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 3 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); memo ExecSec to SecDef for JCS, 3 Aug 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Aug 50, ibid; memo ActingExecSec to SecDef for JCS, 18 Nov 50, ibid; msg SecDef for CINCFE, 4 Aug 50, \textit{FRUS 1950}, VI:423; msg CINCFE for SecDef, 5 Aug 50, ibid, 423–24; mins 63d NSC mtg, item 2, 3 Aug 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.


27. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Sep 50, \textit{FRUS 1950}, VI:491–92; ltr SecDef to SecState, 11 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); ltr ActingSecState to SecDef, 13 Sep 50, \textit{FRUS 1950}, VI:497.

28. For effect of Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet, see 3 msgs, USAmb India for SecState, 31 Oct and 3 Nov 50, \textit{FRUS 1950}, VI:545–47, 548–50, 550–51; ltr SecState to SecDef, 11 Nov 50, w/enc, ibid, 554–56; memo SecDef for JCS, 15 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); ltr SecDef to SecState, 15 Nov 50, \textit{FRUS 1950}, VI:573–74.


31. Memo SecDef for JCS, 20 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Formosa); memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Jan 51, \textit{FRUS 1951}, VII, pt 2:1474–76.

33. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 1:70–72; memo Rusk for SecState, 17 Jan 51, ibid, pt 2:1514–17; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 18 Jan 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

34. Draft memo PPS State, [6 Feb 51], FRUS 1951, VII, pt 2:1536–12, 1536n1; memrcd [PPS State], 6 Feb 51, ibid, 1566–68; memo for Rusk for SecState, 17 Jan 51, ibid, 1588; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 17 Feb 59, w/enc, OSD Hist.


37. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 21 Mar 51, w/excerpts from JCS study, 14 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 2:1598–1605; memo JCS for SecDef, w/enc study, 16 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); msg CINCFE for JCS, 23 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 2:1579–81.

38. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 3 May 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.


40. NSC 48/5 ExecSecNSC to NSC, 17 May 51, w/ annexes, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:33–63; memcon Merchant, 20 Apr 51, ibid, VII, pt 2:1641–43; memo DirPPS for SecState, 30 Apr 51, w/enc, RG 59, 5/P files, lot 64D565, NSC 101 series; editorial note, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 2:1671–72.

41. Msg Walter P. McConaughy (USConGen Hong Kong) for SecState, 8 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 2:1598–1605; memo Rusk for Merchant (DepASecStateFE), 7 Feb 51, ibid, 1582–83; msg JCS for CINCFE, 28 Feb 51, ibid, 1588; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 17 Feb 59, w/enc, OSD Hist.


43. Msg ActingSecState for USEmb China [Formosa], 27 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 2:1584–85; memo Cabot (DirISA State) for Scott (DirOMA OSD), 7 Mar 51, ibid, 1591; msg Rankin for SecState, 20 Apr 51, ibid, 1640–41; Itr Rankin to Rusk, 13 Aug 51, ibid, 1778–85; OMA Def, MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Department of Defense Operations (hereafter cited as MDAP: DoD Ops), Jul 51, 24, Jan 52, 2, OSD Hist; rept on NSC 128, DefMbrSrNSCStf to NSC 128 Steering Cte, 13 Jun 52, FRUS 1952–1954, XIV:66–70. The figure of ‘approximately $190 million’ [$188.8 million] for FY 1952 was reached by subtracting $71.2 million (FY 1951 military assistance) from FY 1951–52 total of $260 million.


46. Memcon C.B. Marshall (PPS State), 4 May 51, FRUS 1951, VII, pt 2:1652–53; memcon C.B. Marshall, 7 May 51, ibid, 1653–54; SE–5 [Intelligence Advisory Cte], 22 May 51, w/appendix, ibid, 1673–82; editorial note, ibid, 1716; NIE–32 [Intelligence Advisory Cte], 10 Jul 51, ibid, 1737–43; memo George Perkins (DepDirOCA State) for Merchant, 1 Aug 51, ibid, 1764–68; Itr Rankin to Rusk, 13 Aug 51, ibid, 1778–85; msg McConaughy for SecState, 15 Aug 51, ibid, 1787–89; msg McConaughy for State, 13 Dec 51, ibid, 1869–71; memo DirPPS for K.C.
X. JAPAN: A NEW RELATIONSHIP


3. On the question of the Japanese peace treaty, see FRUS 1947, VI:446ff; for General MacArthur’s views, see msg Atcheson (PolAd Japan) for SecState, 21 Mar 47, ibid, 452–53, and memo MacArthur, 21 Mar 47, ibid, 154–56; Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis, 245; John M. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland, 141, 154.


9. Memo Burns (ATSD [FMA & MA]) for SecDef, 7 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo Dulles for SecState, 19 Jul 50, *FRUS 1950*, VI:1243–44, 1244n1; memcon SecState, 24 Jul 50, ibid, 1255; ltr SecState to SecDef, 1 Aug 50, w/draft treaty, RG 330, CD 388 (Gen).


11. Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, 149–50; *FRUS 1950*, VI:1273n2; memo W.J. Sheppard (DepDirExecSect State) for W.G. Hackler (FE), 21 Aug 50, ibid, 1276; memo SecState for Jessup, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Aug 50, ibid, 1278–82.


13. Memo SecState for Amb at Lge, 22 Aug 50, ibid, 1278; memo DirNA for SecState, 29 Aug 50, ibid, 1288–90; memo MajGen Carter B. Magruder for SecDef, 30 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 388 (General); memo Magruder for SecDef, 6 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (General); memo DirNA for SecState, 4 Sep 50, *FRUS 1950*, VI:1290–93; ltr SecState to SecDef, 7 Sep 50, w/enc, ibid, 1293–96; memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (General); ltr SecDef to Pres, 7 Sep 50, ibid; Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, 150; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 434.

14. Ltr U.A. Johnson (DepDirA) to Sebald (ActingUSPolAd Japan), 14 Sep 50, *FRUS 1950*, VI:1303–04; memo SecState and SecDef for Pres, 7 Sep 50, ibid, 1293–96.

15. Memo Pres for SecDef, 8 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); news conf. 14 Sep 50. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 . . .* (hereafter cited as *Truman Public Papers* with year), 637–40; four memos Magruder for SecDef, 30 Sep 50 and 17, 23, 30 Oct 50, all in RG 330, CD 387 (Japan). For the “vigorous” reactions of other countries, including the Soviet Union, to the treaty draft, see Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, 151–53.


20. Memo ActingDirNA, 6 Jan 51, *FRUS 1951*, VI, pt 1:784–86, 784n2; ltr SecState to SecDef, 9 Jan 51, w/memo for Pres and draft ltr Pres to Dulles, [10 Jan 51], ibid, 787–89, 787n2, 788n3; memo DepSJCS for ActingExecSec OSD, 9 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan).

21. Ltr Pres to Dulles, [10 Jan 51], *FRUS 1951*, VI, pt 1:788–89, 788n3; ltr Allison (Dep to Consultant to SecState) to USPolAd SCAP, 19 Jan 51, ibid, 805–07, 806n1; memo Robert A. Fearey (NA), [7 Feb 51], ibid, 863–66; ltr Dulles to SecState, 6 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie*, 154.
22. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jan 51, w/note DepDirEXOS to DirEXOS, 26 Feb 51, ibid; memo DirEXOS for SecDef, 23 Feb 51, ibid; memo DepSecDef for ChJCS, 23 Feb 51, ibid; Poole, _1950–1952_, 452.

23. Memo Ferey, [nd, ca 6 Feb 51], _FRUS 1951_, VI, pt 1:861–63; memo Ferey, [7 Feb 51], ibid, 865–66; memo USCoul Ad SCAP, 10 Feb 51, ibid, 875–74; hr Dulles to SecState w/annexes, 10 Feb 51, ibid, 874–80; Yoshida, _Yoshida Memoirs_, 174, 250–51; Allison, _Ambassador from the Prairie_, 156–57.

24. Memo Fearey, [nd, ca 6 Feb 51], _FRUS 1951_, VI, pt 1:866–69; hr Dulles to SecState, 10 Feb 51, annex III, ibid, 876.

25. Memo Babcock for Earl D. Johnson (ASeeArmy), 26 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo Ferey, 17 Feb 51, _FRUS 1951_, VI, pt 1:169–72; draft treaty, 17 Feb 51, ibid, 172–75; memo Ferey, 17 Feb 51, ibid, 885–87; hr Dulles to F.W. Doidge (NZMinExternaIAffs), 18 Feb 51, ibid, 175–76; hr Dulles to MacArthur, 2 Mar 51, ibid, 176–78; hr SecState to SecDef, 5 Apr 51, w/draft memo for Pres, ibid, 183–85.

26. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 5 Apr 51, w/draft memo for Pres, _FRUS 1951_, VI, pt 1:183–85; hr SecState to SecDef, 6 Apr 51, w/enc, ibid, 187–89.

27. Memo JrSecs for SecDef, 10 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Apr 51, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 13 Apr 51, ibid; memo Dulles for SecState, 13 Apr 51, _FRUS 1951_, VI, pt 1:202–04; statement Pres, 18 Apr 51, _Truman Public Papers_, 1951, 234–35.


29. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 19 Apr 51, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Apr 51, _FRUS 1951_, VI, pt 1:989–93, 992n5; msg USPolAd SCAP for SecState (for Rusk and Allison), 22 Apr 51, ibid, 1003–06; memo ASeeArmy for SecDef, 24 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo Dulles for SecState, 25 Apr 51, w/memo of meeting, _FRUS 1951_, VI, pt 1:1019–21.

30. Ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(ISA), 27 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo ASeeArmy for ATSD(ISA), 2 May 51, ibid; msg DA 90239 DeptArmy for SCAP, 3 May 51, ibid; ltr [msg] CINCFE to SecDef, 6 May 51, ibid; ltr [msg] SecDef to [CINCFE], 8 May 51, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 14 May 51, ibid.

31. Memred K.T. Young (Asst to ActingDirOFMA), 16 May 51, ibid; memo Young for Carter (DirEXOS), 17 May 51, ibid; memo Young for DirEXOS, 18 May 51, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 18 May 51, ibid.

32. Memo Young for DirEXOS, 18 May 51, ibid; ltr SecState to SecDef, 22 May 51, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 28 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); ltr SecState to SecDef, 16 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Aug 51, ibid; ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 24 Aug 51, ibid.


35. Ltr Dulles to SecDef, 15 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); ltr SecDef to SecState, 28 Jun 51, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Jun 51, _FRUS 1951_, VI, pt 1:1155–59; ltr SecState to SecDef, 28 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo SecState for Pres, 28 Jun 51, _FRUS 1951_, VI, pt 1:1159–61; Acheson, _Present at the Creation_, 531.

36. Memo SecState for Pres, 28 Jun 51, _FRUS 1951_, VI, pt 1:1159–61, 1161n3; Lovett indirectly quoted in memocon SecState, 29 Jun 51, ibid, 1163–64; Acheson, _Present at the Creation_, 541.
37. Memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 13 Jul 51, w/enc [excerpt], FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1192–94; editorial note, ibid. 1266; memcon DepDirExecSect State, 13 Aug 51, ibid. 1266–67; Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, 167; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 541–42.

38. Draft agreement, 5 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:856–57; Itr Dulles to SecDef, 10 Jul 51, w/draft treaty, 10 Jul 51, ibid. 1186–88; draft treaty, 31 Jul 51, ibid. 1233–34.


40. Memcon Asst to ActingDirOFMA, 23 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 300–1–1; ltr SecState to SecDef, 24 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1223–24, 1223n1; ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 11 Aug 51, ibid. 1256–57.

41. Memo Henderson (OfChief OSD) for ASD(L&L), 13 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); ltr James E. Webb (ActingSecState) to SecDef, 15 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1272–73; memo Dulles for USecState, 10 Sep 51, ibid. 1344–47.

42. Ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 22 Aug 51, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1281–84 and notes.

43. Ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 22 Aug 51, w/enc, ibid. 1281–83; memo Allison for Rusk, 22 Aug 51, ibid. 1285–88; memo Dulles for USecState, 10 Sep 51, ibid. 1344–47.

44. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); ltr SecDef to SecState, 20 Jul 51, ibid; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 541, 687–88.

45. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Philippines); statement Pres, 18 Apr 51, Truman Public Papers, 1951, 234–35; memo ChJCS for ATSD(ISA), 16 Aug 51, with third draft presidential address, Dulles, 1 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); ltr SecState to SecDef, 2 Aug 51, ibid; memo DepDirEXOS for JCS, 2 Aug 51, ibid; Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, 166–67.

46. Memo JtSecs for SecDef, 8 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Aug 51, ibid; ltr Dulles to SecDef, 9 Aug 51, ibid; memo Asst to DirOFMA for DepSecDef, 10 Aug 51, ibid; memo ChJCS for DepSecDef, 10 Aug 51, ibid.

47. Third draft presidential address, Dulles, 1 Aug 51, ibid; memo ChJCS for ATSD(ISA), 16 Aug 51, ibid; memo Asst to DirOFMA for ATSD(ISA), 27 Aug 51, ibid; memo DirJtStfOJCS for ATSD(ISA), 29 Aug 51, ibid.

48. Memo Asst to DirOFMA for ATSD(ISA), 27 Aug 51, ibid; address Pres, 4 Sep 51, Truman Public Papers, 1951, 504–08.

49. Ltr ASecState(FE) to Sen H. Alexander Smith, 1 Apr 52, FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, pt 2:1223–24; memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 15 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan).


51. Memo DepDirEXOS for ChJCS et al, 31 Aug 51, w/memo SecState for Pres, 30 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); msg SecState for ActingSecState, 6 Sep 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1334–35; memo Marshall for Bradley, 7 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan). For Nash’s presence in San Francisco, see ltr Dulles to USecState, 10 Sep 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1344–47, especially 1346.

52. Ltr Dulles to USecState, 10 Sep 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1344–47; Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, 161–62; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 346–47.


56. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Nov 51, w/msg C56512 CINCFE for JCS, 3 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); ltr Dep US SecState to Acting SecDef, 14 Nov 51, ibid; memo Asst to Dir OFMA for Underwood (Exec to ATSD(ISA)), 19 Nov 51, ibid; interoff memo Dep ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 21 Nov 51, ibid; ltr Acting SecDef to Dep US SecState, 23 Nov 51, ibid.


58. Memo SecState and SecDef for Pres, 18 Jan 52, w/draft [extract], *FRUS 1952–1954*, XIV, pt 2:1095–1102; memcon SecState, 22 Jan 52, w/attach, ibid, 1110–12; memo [SecState] and Acting SecDef for Pres, 26 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan).

59. Memo Kreps (Dep Dir EXOS) for Sec Army et al, 29 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo [SecState] and Acting SecDef for Pres, 26 Feb 52, ibid; memo A SeeArmy for SecDef, 4 Mar 52, ibid.

60. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Nov 51, ibid; ltr Acting SecDef to Sec State, 14 Dec 51, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Jan 52, ibid; memo SecState and SecDef for Pres, 18 Jan 52, w/draft, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XIV, pt 2:1095–1102; memo Asst SecState(FE) for SecState, 9 Feb 52, ibid, 1147–49.

61. Msg C65132 Rusk for SecState, 8 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memcon Niles W. Bond (Counselor US Mission Japan), 18 Feb 52, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XIV, pt 2:1175–79; msg C63919 A SeeArmy for ATSD(ISA), 19 Feb 52, cables files, OSD Hist; memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo [SecState] and Acting SecDef for Pres, 26 Feb 52, ibid, memo A SeeArmy for SecDef, 4 Mar 52, ibid.

62. Memo State re State-JCS mtg, 6 Feb 52, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XIV, pt 2:1133–34; memo SecDef for A SeeArmy, 7 Feb 52, quoted in ibid, 1132n2; editorial note, ibid, 1216–17; memo Dir OFMA for Dep SecDef, 23 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, 339; Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, 132–33.


64. Ltr Acting Asst SecState(FE) to ATSD(ISA), 7 Feb 52, w/encl, ibid, 1138–40; memo Acting SecState and SecDef for Pres, 15 Feb 52, w/encls, ibid, 1159–65; ltr Acting SecState to Dep SecDef, 15 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 387 (Japan); memo Pres for Acting SecState and SecDef, 20 Feb 52, ibid; interoff memo Dir OFMA for Dep Dir EXOS, 28 May 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Far East); memo C. A. Sullivan (ISA) for ATSD(ISA), 10 Jun 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, ‘‘Japan’’ folder, National Archives, Washington, DC; memo Dir NA to A SeeState(FE), 10 Jun 52, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XIV, pt 2:1271–72; memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Jul 52, ibid, 1289–90; notes [extract] of SecState stfmtg, SM N–55, 5 Aug 52, ibid, 1295–96.


68. Memrcd Asst to DirOFMA OSD, 15 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo ASeeState(FE) for ActingSecState, 22 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:888–95; Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, 191.

69. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 15 Feb 51, w/draft memo SecDef for Pres. RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo ASeeState(FE) for ActingSecState, 22 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:888–95; interoff memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 23 Apr 51, w/lt SecDef to SecState, 26 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo ASeeState(FE) for SecState, 12 Mar 53, FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, pt 2:1392–94; Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, 182–84, 186.

70. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:884–85; memrcd Asst to DirOFMA OSD, 15 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 14 Feb 51, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 15 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:884; ltr ActingSecState to SecDef, 1 Mar 51, ibid, 898–900; memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); ltr ActingSecState to SecState, 20 Apr 51, w/draft ltr, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1001; ltr SecDef to Pres, 1 May 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo Pres for SecDef, 3 May 51, ibid.

71. Memo CoSUSA for ATSD(L&L), 17 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 18 Apr 51, ibid; ltr SecState to SecDef, 30 Apr 51, ibid; memo CounselOMA for DirOMA OSD, 29 Jan 52, RG 330, ISA files, "Japan" folder.

72. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Sep 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1349–50; ltr SecDef to SecState, 19 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); ltr ActingSecState to SecState, 28 Sep 51, ibid.

73. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); ltr SecDef to SecState, 6 Nov 51, ibid; memo DepDirNA for ASeeState(FE), 8 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:1395–97; ltr ActingSecState to ActingSecDef, 29 Nov 51, ibid, 1418–19; memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 5 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan).

74. Memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 8 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Nov 51, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Dec 51, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy); memo ActingSecDef for SecState, 31 Dec 51, ibid.

75. Msg DA 89795 CoSUSA for CINCFE, 17 Dec 51, OJCS files; disposition form DepAGoS G–4 Papers to CompArmy, 19 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); msg C59752 CINCFE for JCS, 20 Dec 51, Condit file, OSD Hist; msg DA 90318 CoSUSA for CINCFE, 22 Dec 51, OJCS files.

76. Memo Haydock (OASD(L&L)) for DepGenCounsel, 4 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Japan" folder; disposition form DepAGoS G–4 Papers to CompArmy, 19 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan).

77. Ltr DMS to SecDef, 20 Mar 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Japan" folder; memo Samuel Efron (AGenCounsel) OASD(L&L) for DepGenCounsel and DirOLS OASD(L&L), 8 Apr 52, ibid; memo Efron for ASD(L&L), 11 Jul 52, ibid, "Brief for Mr. Nash, OMA Activities . . ." folder; msg C51823 CINCFE, 12 Jul 52, quoted in memo JCS for SecDef, 21 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); msg SecState for USEmb Japan, 29 Jul 52, FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, pt 2:1291–92.

78. Memo ASD(L&L) for DirOFMA, 23 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memrcd ASD(L&L), 25 Jul 52, ibid; memo Smith (ActingATSD[ISA]) for SecDef, 25 Jul 52, ibid; ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 29 Jul 52, w/handwritten note, "Approved 7/31/52 Harry S Truman," ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 4 Aug 52, ibid; msg USAmb Japan for State, 14 Aug 52, FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, pt 2:1313–14.

79. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 29 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); memocon C. A. Sullivan (OFMA OSD), 20 Aug 52, FRUS 1952–1954, XIV, pt 2:1314–16; ltr CINCFE to USecArmy, 30 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

80. Memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Japan); NISC 125/2 par 7b(2), quoted in briefing paper [OMA OSD] for ATSD[ISA], [ca 14 Oct 52], RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "OMA Briefing File . . ." folder; msg 920166 JCS for CINCFE, 30 Oct 52, OJCS files.


XI. INDOCHINA: THE THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Rept State to NSC, 27 Feb 50, w/draft rept NSC 64, 27 Feb 50, US Dept State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), VI:744-47; memo ActingAsSecState(FE) for SecState, 7 Mar 50, w/memo DepAsSecState(FE) for AsSecState(FE), 7 Mar 50, ibid, 749-51; ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(FMA&MA), 7 Mar 50, ibid, 752. The Indochina war is variously dated from the French bombardment of Haiphong, which left 6,000 dead on 23 November 1946, or from 19 December 1946, when Ho made a surprise attack on the French.


5. Memo SecState for Pres, 17 Apr 50, FRUS 1950, VI:785–86; memo DirOMA OSD for DirMDAP State, 19 Apr 50, ibid, 787–89; ltr Pres to SecState, 1 May 50, ibid, 791; msg SecState for USEmb UK, 3 May 50, ibid, 792; rept USecState to ExecSecNSC, 15 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:397–400.

6. Memo SecState for Pres, 3 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, VI:835–36, 835nn1,2; ltr Pres to SecDef, 8 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Indochina); memo R.E. O’Hara (OASD(C)) for DirOMA OSD, 14 Jul 50, ibid; msg SecState for USLegn Saigon, 1 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, VI:833–34; JCS Hist Div, History of the Indochina Incident, 1940–1954 (hereafter cited as History of Indochina Incident) in The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs and the War in Vietnam, 186.


13. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 21 Dec 50, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 29 [dated 2H in error] Nov 50, ibid, 945–53.

Notes to Pages 210–13


25. Memo JCS for SecDef, 11 May 51, w/apps, RG 330, CD 092 (Indo-China); History of Indochina Incident, 211–12; rept ExecSecNSC to NSC, 17 May 51, w/enc NSC 48/5, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:53–63; ltr ATSD(ISA) to SecState, 17 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 337; conf rept Tripartite Mil Talks on SEAsia, Singapore, 15–18 May 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:64–71.


29. Memcon Gibson (PSA State), 14 Sep 51, ibid, 502–04; mins [State] mtgs 1 and 2 with de Lattre, 17 Sep 51, ibid, 510–11; mins mtg with de Lattre, 20 Sep 51, ibid, 517–21; msg SecState for USLegn Saigon, 26 Sep 51, ibid, 524–25; ltr SecDef to SeeState, 1 Oct 51, ibid, 525–26; memcon William W. Gibson (PSA), 12 Oct 51, ibid, 530–32; msg SecState for USLegn Saigon, 15 Oct 51, ibid, 532.


34. Msg USEmb France for SeeState, 22 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, VI, pt 1:571–72; memo SeeState for Pres, 29 Dec 51, ibid, 579–80; memred ATSD(ISA), [ca 26 Nov 51], RG 330, CD 334 (State–JCS); ltr SecDef to SeeState, 6 Jan 52, w/memo JCS for SecDef, “Indochina . . . . , 28


41. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Southeast Asia); Itr SecDef to SecState, 1 May 52, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Apr 52, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XIII, pt 1:113–17; memrcd DepDefRepSrNSCStf, 12 May 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Southeast Asia); memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Apr 52, w/enc 2, memo SecArmy, SecNavy, ActingSecAF for SecDef, 8 Apr 52, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XIII, pt 1:117–18.

42. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 21 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Southeast Asia); memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Apr 52, w/enc 3, draft memo 000, 3 Apr 52, *FRUS 1952–1954*, XIII, pt 1:119–24; Itr SecDef to SecState, 23 May 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Indochina).


51. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 25 Jun 52, w/statement of policy [NSC 124/2, 25 Jun 52], ibid, 125-54.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
56. Memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Aug 52, w/app, ibid, 184–86; msg ActingSecState for USEmb UK, 20 Aug 52, ibid, 210–11; rept Five-Power MilConf on SEA, Washington, 6–17 Oct 52, ibid, 230–32; memo DepDirStratPlans JtStaff OJCS for ChJCS, 23 Oct 52, ibid, 234–37; memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Nov 52, ibid, 239–42; History of Indochina Incident, 255–58.
60. Memo AGenCounsel (OASD(L&L)) for SupDiv OMA, 28 Aug 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Indochina" folder; memo DepAISD(ISA) for SecDef, 4 Sep 52, ibid; memo SecDef for SecAF, 5 Sep 52, ibid; memo SecDef for DirMS, 10 Sep 52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 12 Sep 52, RG 350, CD 091.3 (Indochina); ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 12 Sep 52, ibid; ltr SecState to DepSecDef, 25 Sep 52, ibid; memo ExecOffATSD(ISA) for DMS, 30 Oct 52, ibid; memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 3 Dec 52, ibid.
61. Msg USEmb Saigon for SecState, 5 Dec 52, FRUS 1952–1954, XIII, pt 1:308–09; msg Def 927003 DirOMA for ChMAAG Indochina, 20 Dec 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Indochina" folder; memo DepSecDef for SecAF, 20 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Indochina); msg SecState for USEmb Saigon, 22 Dec 52, US–Vietnam Relations, VIII:540; ltr DirOMA to ChMAAG France, 2 Jan 53, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Indochina" folder.
62. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 18 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Indochina); memo ExecOffISA for DepDefRepSNSCStf, 19 Dec 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Indochina" folder.
XII. A BUDGET FOR KOREA—FY 1951


2. Memo Lyle S. Garlock (AComp(Budget) OASD(C)) for ASD(C), 11 Apr 50, w/encls, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “FY 1951 Budget” folder; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 5 Jul 49, ibid; testimony SecDef, 12 Jan 50, US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951: Hearings, 81 Cong, 2 sess (1950), pt 1:45.


4. Ltr ASD(C) to DirBoB, 26 Apr 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “FY 1951 Budget” folder; table EISED-059, OASD(C), 17 Aug 54, OSD Hist.


6. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 111 (1951); memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Jul 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Jul 50, w/4 apps, ibid; memo SecDef for ChNSRB, 19 Jul 50, ibid; AF strengths modified by table [OASD(C)], [“Regular FY 1951 Budget, Suppl 51 Request, Total Fiscal 1951”], 22 Jul 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Fiscal 1951 Suppl” folder.

7. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 6 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 111 (1951); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 14 Jul 50, ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 19 Jul 50, ibid.

8. SecDef for SecArmy et al, 14 Jul 50, w/att, ibid.

9. Table P–22.2 DirMgtInfo OPS&Control OASD(C), 18 Apr 77, OSD Hist; table [OASD(C)], [1951 Budget info], 22 Jul 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Fiscal 1951 Supplemental” folder. Rounded figures given in memo SecDef for ChNSRB, 19 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 111 (1951).

10. Memo SecArmy, SecNavy, SecAF for SecDef, 15 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 111 (1951); memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 16 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 452.1 (1950).


17. Memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 28 Jul 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Supplemental Appro Jul & Dec 1950” folder.
18. Memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 27 Jul 50, ibid.
19. Ltr ASD(C) to DirBoB, 29 Jul 50, ibid; Ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 9 Aug 50, ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 13 Sep 50, ibid.
20. Intraoff memo Foster Adams (OASD(C)) for Nathaniel H. Goodrich (AGenCoun), 25 Sep 50, ATSD&DepSecDef files. “Fiscal 1951 Suppl” folder. Amount given as $11.72 billion in FAD–182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, OSD Hist; $11.724 billion in table [Alaska money removed], BudgetDiv OASD(C), 27 Sep 50, Condit file, OSD Hist; $11,728,594,000 in table EISED–059 [Alaska included], OASD(C), 17 Aug 54, OSD Hist.
22. Intraoff memo Glenn V. Gibson (OASD(C)) for DepSecDef, 11 Oct 50, w/JCS presentation for Lovett . . . , RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); table BudgetDiv OASD(C), rev 4 Aug 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “NSC 68” folder; table [BudgetDiv OASD(C)], rev 19 Aug 50, ibid.
25. Intraoff memo Ralph N. Stohl (SecAFPC) for DepSecDef, 1 Sep 50, w/memo JCS for SecDef, [1 Sep 50], RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions During the Korean War Buildup” folder.
26. Intraoff memo Stohl for DepSecDef, 1 Sep 50, w/table, “Flash Estimate . . . ,” BudgetDiv OASD(C), 5 Sep 50, ibid; transcript [AFPC] mtg [OASD(C)], [ca 5 Sep 50], ibid.
27. Transcript [AFPC] mtg [OASD(C)], [ca 5 Sep 50], ibid; memo SecAFPC for MbrsAFPC, 5 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 114.2.
28. Memo JtSecs and JCS, 7 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).
32. Memo SecDef for Pres, 12 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo DepExecSecNSC for AdHocCte on NSC 68, 12 Sep 50, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for NSCStf, 12 Sep 50, ibid.
33. Brief of Annex 10 of NSC 68, “Economic Implications . . . ,” w/intraoff memo William H. Mautz (DirEconDiv OASD(C)) for ASD(C), 23 Sep 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “NSC 68” folder.
34. Memo ActingExecSecNSC for NSC, 18 Sep 50, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47).
36. For overall costs of NSC 68, see briefing paper on NSC 68 mtg, 29 Sep 50, “Item 1 . . . .” RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47); for costs of military program, see table BudgetDiv OASD(C), rev 12 Sep 50, enc w/memo ExecSecNSC for NSCStf, 12 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).
37. Memo JtSecs for SecDef, 26 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Sep 50, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 28 Sep 50, ibid.
38. Memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 28 Sep 50, ibid.
39. Mins [ExecSecNSC], 68th NSC mtg, [ca 29 Sep 50]. Truman papers, President’s Secretary’s files: NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 2 Oct 50, ibid.
41. Rept ExecSecNSC to NSC, 30 Sep 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:400; memo DepSecDef for All Concerned, 5 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

42. Presentation for Lovett, JCS, 9 Oct 50, w/intraoff memo Gibson for DepSecDef, 11 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo Gibson for BrigGen D.P. Booth et al, 11 Oct 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 68" folder.


45. Table "Total Cost of National Security Programs . . .", ProgRepts&Stats OASD(C), rev I Nov 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 68" folder; table ProgRepts&Stats OASD(C), "Federal Budget Receipts, Expenditures, and Deficits," rev 1 Nov 50, ibid; memo for files ASD(L&L), 14 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 334 (AFPC).

46. Memo ChJCS for SecDef, 31 Jul 50, RG 330, CD III (1951); ltr SecDef to Pres, 31 Jul 50, ibid; tab B, FY 1951 Army Program Objectives, w/memo ASecArmy for ASD(C), 7 Sep 50, ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 13 Sep 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental Appro Jul & Dec 1950" folder; paper [OASD(C)], [Summary of Personnel Increases], [ca 19 Sep 50], ibid.

47. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 24 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 111; memo ASecArmy for ASD(C), 7 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 111 (1951).

48. Memo SecArmy for SecDef (through DepSecDef), 10 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 111 (1951); draft ltr Marshall to Sen Margaret Chase Smith (Ch Subcte on Ammo Shortages), 29 Apr 53, RG 330, ASD(C) files, "Ammunition April 1953" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

49. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et ai, 13 Sep 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental Appro Jul & Dec 1950" folder.

50. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Sep 50, w/encs, RG 218, CCS 370 (8--19--45). Since two requests had previously been submitted to Congress, the military labeled this the "third" request. Congress, however, combined the first two requests into one supplemental FY 1951 appropriation and the "third" request thus became the second supplemental appropriation. The confusion did not end there. Correcting themselves, Defense planners then called the next request also the "third" request, but the Congress confounded them again by passing the third FY 1951 supplemental without any Defense money before it got around to considering the Pentagon's request. Thus the second so-called "third" request was to become the fourth supplemental FY 1951 appropriation. There is no way to clarify this situation except by careful notice of dating and internal evidence in the documents.

51. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 27 Sep [50], RG 330, CD 111 (Gen); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 27 Sep 50, ibid; memo for files ASD(L&L), 14 Nov 50, 4, RG 330, CD 334 (AFPC).


53. Memo SecArmy for Pres, 1 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo Acting Exec Sec OSD for DirIntfoOCS, 10 Nov 50, ibid, ibid.

54. Intraoff memo Carter for DepSecDef and SecDef, 8 Nov 50, ibid; memo Carter for DepSecDef and SecDef, 9 Nov 50, ibid.


56. Memo for file ASD(L&L), 14 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 334 (AFPC).

57. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 17 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 111 (1951).

58. Memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Nov 50, w/encs, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); table PBA OSD, 19 Nov 50, ibid; memo DepSecDef for ExecSecNSC, 20 Nov 50, *FRUS 1950*, I:416.
Costs were figured by subtracting already appropriated funds from the total; the naval manpower reduction was determined by subtracting the 19 November figure from that given on 13 November.

59. Memo (unsigned, on DepSecDef letterhead), [Concern Over Chinese Communist Intentions], with two handwritten notes initialed by Marshall, 18 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68). In a telephone conversation on 10 November 1977 Lovett informed the author that he had not written the memorandum of 18 November 1950 and thought it sounded like something by an outside consultant (it was not unusual, he said, for typing to be done in his office using his letterhead). He did not remember ever seeing such a memo or having discussed it with Marshall. It was Lovett’s practice, furthermore, to sign or initial all papers seen by him; this memo does not bear such an endorsement.


61. Memo William F. Schaub (DepChfEstsDiv BoB) for DirBoB, 30 Nov 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 29 (incorrectly dated 24) Nov 50, 2, ibid.


64. Testimony at the budget hearings for the FY 1951 Second Supplemental shows that this budget was to provide for the JCS recommendations of 19 November 1950, particularly a naval strength of 683,872, a 68-wing Air Force, and a 16-division Army. See House Cte on Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951: Hearings, pt 1:79, pt 2:3, and pt 3:19.

65. Ltr DepSecDef to DirBoB, 30 Nov 50, w/enc, RG 330, CD 111 (1951); House Cte on Appropriations, Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951: Hearings, pt 1:23–24, 41, 59; memo DirBoB for Pres, 1 Dec 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Supplemental Appro Jul & Dec 1950” folder.


68. Testimony SecDef, 1 Dec 50, ibid, 18–19.

69. Ibid, 25.

70. Ibid, 20.


72. Initiated note on unsigned memo on DepSecDef letterhead, 18 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

73. Table EISED–059 OASD(C), 17 Aug 54, OSD Hist; memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Dec 50, w/enc, FRUS 1950, I:475–77; memo SecDef for Pres, 14 Dec 50, ibid, 474; ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 20 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 111 (Gen); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 6 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); House Cte on Appropriations, Fourth Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951: Hearings, 93, 301–02, 308; Senate Cte on Appropriations, Fourth Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1951: Hearings, 27.

XIII. A BUDGET FOR REARMAMENT—FY 1952

1. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 23 Jan 50, Condit file, OSD Hist. OSD sent tentative planning ceilings to the services on 1 March: three memos SecDef for [SecsMilDepts], 1 Mar 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget FY 1952” folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.
2. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 22 Feb 50, RG 330, CD 380 (Gen); chron on FY 1952 budget development [OASD(C)]. [9 Nov 50]. RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Budget History 1950–1953" folder.

3. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 25 May 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "$NSC 68$" folder.


5. Memo SecDef for JCS, 11 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 111 (1952); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 10 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

6. Memo JCS for SecDef, [1 Sep 50]. RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC Actions During the Korean War Buildup" folder.

7. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 13 Sep 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "Supplemental Appro Jul & Dec 1950" folder; memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Sep 50, RG 218, CCS 570 (8–19–45).

8. Two memos SecDef for JCS, both 27 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 111 (Gen).

9. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 320.2 (1950); memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Nov 50, w/apps, RG 330, CD 111 (1951).

10. Memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Nov 50, w/apps and tables, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); table OASD(C), "Comparison of Costs Under NSC 68," [nd], RG 350, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

11. Memo DepSecDef for ExecSecNSC, 20 Nov 50, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, 1:416–18, 418n1.

12. Quoted in Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 476.


14. Note ExecSecNSC to NSC, 8 Dec 50, US Dept State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), 1:425–26; memo SecDef for Pres, 14 Dec 50, w/memo ChJCS for SecDef, 6 Dec 50, w/enc, ibid, 474–77.

15. Rept ExecSecNSC to NSC, 8 Dec 50, w/memo ChCEA, 8 Dec 50, w/rept ChCEA, both encs as App B, ibid, 427–31.


18. Memo ChJCS for SecDef, 6 Dec 50, w/encs, FRUS 1950, 1:475–77; memo SecDef for Pres, 14 Dec 50, ibid, 474.

19. Table of Projected Costs Under NSC 68, [OASD(C)], 13 Dec 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 68" folder; memo ASD(C) for ExecSecNSC, 14 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

20. The account of the meeting and the following paragraphs is drawn from memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 15 Dec 50, Truman papers, PSF:NOSC.


22. Rept NSC 68/4 NSC to Pres, 14 Dec 50, ibid, 468–74, particularly 468–69; memo JCS for SecDef, 13 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).


25. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 20 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 111 (Gen); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 6 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).


27. Statement DepSecDef, 7 May 51. House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, pt 1:3, memo Lyle S. Garlock (OASD(C)) for DepSecDef, [22 Feb 51], RG 330, CD 111 (Gen); memo USecNavy, USecAF, ASecArmy for DepSecDef, 2 Mar 51, RG 330, (loose memo in box 292); memo Garlock for DepSecDef, 7 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 111 (Gen).

28. Table FAD-182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, 2, OSD Hist. US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, Fourth Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951: Hearings, 82 Cong, 1 sess (1951), 31-35, 302-05, 607-09; memo ASD(C) for SecArmy et al, 24 Mar 51, ibid. The House Committee on Appropriations initiated the reduction (ltr Mahon to DepSecDef, 23 Mar 51, w/enc, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files. "1952 Budget" folder).


33. Intraoff memo NatlSecBr BoB for DirBoB, 13 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 111 (1952).


35. Memo JCS for SecDef, 5 Jan 51, w/encs, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Jan 51, ibid; memo ASD(C) for SecsMilDepts, 13 Jan 51, ibid.

36. Memo JCS for SecDef, 6 Apr 51, w/handwritten note: "OK/G.C.M.," RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo DepDirEXOS for ExecSecNSC, 23 Apr 51, ibid. At that time, the Department of the Army wanted the planning assumption date to be extended to 30 June 1952 (memo ActingSecArmy for SecDef, 11 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea)).

37. Intraoff memo NatlSecBr BoB for DirBoB, 13 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 111 (1952); House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, pt 3:8–9, 28–29, 32, 479.

38. House Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, pt 1:45; Senate Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, 45, 717, 1490, 1493, 1495, 1498, 1673; mins [extract] [OASD(C)] AFPC mtgs, 26 Jun 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "AFPC Actions During the Korean War Buildup" folder; memo ASD(M&P) for DepSecDef, 26 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

39. This paragraph and the following one are based on intraoff memo NatlSecBr BoB for DirBoB, 13 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 111 (1952).

Notes to Pages 254–62

41. Ltr DepSecDef to DirBoB, 19 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 112.1; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 7 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114).
43. Memo CDs[25] [Lehrer?] OSD, 26 Jul 51, w/table, 26 Jul 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “NSC 68” folder; note ExecSecNSC, 8 Aug 51, w/rept NSC 114/1, FRUS 1951, I:127–57, particularly 132–33.
44. Memo USecAF for SecDef, 19 Apr 51, w/enc, RG 330, CD III (1952); for figure submitted by Lovett, see ltr DepSecDef to DirBoB, 19 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 112.1.
45. Memo DepSecDef for USecAF, 23 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 111 (1952).
49. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 7 Jun 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.
53. Senate Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, 1482, 1487–89, 1503, 1529–30; table C–13002 [OASD(C)], [ca 30 Jun 52], RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “1952 Budget Tables” folder; memo SecAF for SecDef, 25 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 111 (1952); memo SecArmy for SecDef, 26 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).
56. Memo Finletter for Lovett, 13 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 112.1 (1951); table, “Action on FY 1952 ... ,” Budget Div OASD(C), 19 Sep 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “1952 Budget Tables” folder; memo SecAF for SecDef, 29 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).
57. US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1953: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 11; table FAD–182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, 3, OSD Hist.
58. Table FAD–182 OASD(C), 24 Oct 60, 3, OSD Hist; Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964, 266.
59. US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appropriations, Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1952: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 2, 70, 71. The additional cost of Korean combat operations in FY 1952 was estimated at $5 billion (memo ASD(C) for ASD(M&P), 17 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68)).

XIV. **A STRETCHOUT BUDGET—FY 1953**

1. News conf Pres, 19 Jan 52, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–1953 ... (hereafter cited as [Truman Public Papers], with year), 60.
2. AFPC mins [excerpt] [OASD(C)], 20 Jun 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions During the Korean War Buildup” folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo SecAF for SecDef, 19 Jun 51, ibid.
3. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jul 51, w/encs, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).
4. Ibid; memo SecAF for SecDef, 16 Jul 51, ibid; AFPC mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], 7 Aug 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . .” folder.
5. Memo ExecSecNSC for SecState and SecDef, 7 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 12 Jul 51, w/directive, Pres to NSC, [12 Jul 51], US Dept State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951 (hereafter cited as FRUS with year and volume number), I:101–03.
6. Memo DirEXOS for DepSecDef, 21 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 22 Jun 51, ibid; memo Frank C. Nash for SecDef, 13 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Greece).
7. Memo Asst to JtSecs for Lovett, 23 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al, 30 Jun 51, ibid.
8. Memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 13 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Jul 51, w/routing slip 8258, ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Memo Asst to JtSecs for SecDef, 31 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114).
12. Memo JCS for SecDef, 31 Jul 51, ibid; paper [DefMbrSrNSCStf], ca 1 Aug 51, RG 218, CCS 354 NSC (9–25–47).
13. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 2 Aug 51, Truman papers, President’s Secretary’s files: NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
14. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 7 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo Nash for Lovett, “Possibilities of Stepping Up Military Program (NSC 114),” 7 Aug 51, ibid. The changes in NSC 114 are summarized in memo Bray (ISA State) for DirISA, 2 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, I:117–18.
15. AFPC mins [excerpt] [OASD(C)], entry of 6 Aug 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . .” folder; paper [DefMbrSrNSCStf], ca 8 Aug 51, RG 218, CCS 354 NSC (9–25–47).
16. Note ExecSecNSC, 8 Aug 51, w/rept NSC 114/1, Condit file, OSD Hist, and FRUS 1951, I:127–57, particularly 129–32. The military program is not printed in FRUS.
23. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); AFPC mins [excerpt] [OASD(C)], entry of 16 Aug 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . .” folder; memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).
24. Memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, [nd], RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo DepSecDef for JCS, 18 Aug 51, ibid.
25. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 29 Aug 51, ibid; memo DirEXOS for JCS, 30 Aug 51, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Sep 51, ibid; rept NSC 114/2, 12 Oct 51, 34, OSD Hist.
27. Memo CoSUSAF for JCS, 12 Sep 51, with AF Program Objectives FY 1953 (JCS 1800/168), RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 35.
28. Memo CoSUSAF for ASD(M&P), 7 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).
29. Memrcd Exec to DepSecDef, 18 Sep 51, w/table JS–3507/DS 51–1357, 13 Sep 51, RG 330, Lovett papers, “Lovett, 17 Sep 51 to 20 Jan 53” folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.
30. JtSecs mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], (ca 11 and 13 Sept 51), RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . .” folder; memo CoSUSAF for JCS, 12 Sep 51, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 35.

31. Memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 15 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo SJCS for ChJCS et al, 17 Sep 51, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 35; memo SJCS for ChJCS et al, 18 Sep 51, ibid.

32. AFPC mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], entry of 18 Sep 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . .” folder; memrcd DepSJCS, 18 Sep 51, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 35; memrcd Carey A. Randall (Exec to SecDef), 18 Sep 51, w/enc, RG 330, Lovett papers, “Lovett, 17 Sep 51 to 20 Jan 53” folder.

33. Ltr James R. Killian, Jr. (ChOSDPanel) to SecDef, 20 Sep 51, RG 330, Lovett papers, “Lovett, 17 Sep 51 to 20 Jan 53” folder.

34. Memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo R.F. Good (Navy) for Secretariat JCS, 25 Sep 51, RG 218, CCS 370 (8–19–45).

35. Memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); draft paper Lynch (OASD[M&P]), 9 Oct 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget 1953” folder.


37. Memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, 7 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Oct 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “NSC 68” folder.

38. Memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 20 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al, 6 Sep 51, ibid.


40. For discussion of JCS report here and in following paragraphs, see memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Oct 51, ibid.


42. Rept ActingExecSecNSC, 12 Oct 51, w/NSC 114/2, FRUS 1951, 1:182–92.

43. Ibid, 187–89.

44. Ibid, 184–92.


46. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo Col Kenneth R. Kreps (DepDirEXOS OSD) for ExecSecNSC, 17 Oct 51, ibid; memo Bohlen for SecState, 17 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, 1:234–35; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 16 Oct 51, ibid, 229–30.


49. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 18 Oct 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

50. Ibid; statement ChCEA, 16 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, 1:230–32.


52. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 2 Oct 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget—1953” folder; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 5 Oct 51, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

53. Memo ActingSecAF for SecDef, 18 Oct 51, w/memo DepDirBudget USAF for SecAF, 18 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 29 Oct 51, ibid;
Notes to Pages 274–81

memo ASD(C) for SecArmy et al, 29 Oct 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget 1953” folder; memo ASD(C) for SecArmy et al, 5 Nov 51, ibid.
54. NY Times, 11 and 20 Nov 51; AFPC mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], entry of 20 Nov 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . . .” folder.
56. Memo SecNavy for SecDef, 21 Nov 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget 1953” folder; memo ASecArmy for ASD(C), 30 Nov 51, ibid; table EISED–214 OASD(C), 28 May 52, OSD Hist; JtSecs mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], 6 Dec 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . . .” folder.
57. NY Times, 11 Nov 51; AFPC mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], entry of 20 Nov 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . . .” folder; memo [BoB], “Budgetary Implications . . . .” 16 Nov 51, w/table, RG 51, BoB Series 51.142.
58. Memo SecNavy for SecDef, 21 Nov 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget 1953” folder; memo ASecArmy for ASD(C), 30 Nov 51, ibid; table EISED–214 OASD(C), 28 May 52, OSD Hist; JtSecs mins [excerpts] [OASD(C)], 6 Dec 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . . .” folder.
59. Ibid; Table EISED–214 OASD(C), 28 May 52, OSD Hist; memo DirBoB for Pres, [nd, ca 19 Dec 51], RG 51, BoB series 51.14a. Lovett asked for $51.6 billion in hr SecDef to DirBoB, 17 Dec 51, ibid; he increased the Army request by $300 million, raising the total to $51.9 billion in hr SecDef to DirBoB, 21 Dec 51, ibid.
60. Ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 17 Dec 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef, “Budget 1953” folder.
61. JtSecs mins [excerpt] [OASD(C)], 20 Dec 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . . .” folder; memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 1 Dec 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . . .” folder; memo Asst to JtSecs for SecArmy, SecNavy, SecAF, 7 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 129–1.
62. Memrcd DepSecDef, 28 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 110.01.
63. Ibid.
64. Memo DirBoB for SecDef, 29 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 111 (1953); memo SecArmy for SecDef, 31 Dec 51, ibid.
65. Memo SecDef for Pres, 4 Jan 52, ibid; memrcd ASD(C), 3 Jan 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget 1953” folder; ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 17 Dec 51, ibid; memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 4 Jan 52, ibid.
66. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Apr 52, w/enc. RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 10 May 52, w/rept to NSC, ibid.
67. Proposed draft status rept [NSC 135] DoD, [ca 26 Jul 52], RG 330, CD 381 (Gen).
68. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 111 (1953).
69. Ltr SecDef to Pres, 4 Jan 52, ibid; memrcd ASD(C), 3 Jan 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget 1953” folder; memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 4 Jan 52, ibid.
70. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Apr 52, w/enc. RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 10 May 52, w/rept to NSC, ibid.
72. House Cte on Appropriations, DoD . . . . Appropriations for 1953: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 11–12; ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 5 Jan 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget 1953” folder; House Cte on Appropriations, DoD . . . . Appropriations for 1953: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 11–12; ltr SecDef to Sen O’Mahoney, 24 Apr 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget 1953” folder; ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 27 May 52, ibid; table EISED–085 OASD(C), 16 Nov 53, OSD Hist.
Notes to Pages 281–89  603

76. Testimony SecAF, 26 May 52, ibid, 570–71, 581, 606, 611, 617, 620–21, 623–24, 627; testimony SecNavy, 16 Jun 52, ibid, 1025, 1029, 1044, 1052; testimony SecArmy, 18 Jun 52, ibid, 1184–85, 1190, 1192, 1195; testimony USecArmy, 11 Jun 52, ibid, 889.


78. Ltr AdmIdPA to SecDef, 29 Apr 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Hearings on 1953 Budget” folder; paper [OASD(C)], 30 Apr 52, “Effect of a $46,000,000,000 Expenditure Limitation on the Department of Defense,” ibid; testimony SecDef, 30 Apr 52, Senate Cte on Appropriations, DoD Appropriations for 1953: Hearings, 195–243, particularly 215–17, 219–28, (224, quote), 235–43.


80. Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964, 270–71; table EISED-054 OASD(C), 23 Jun 54, OSD Hist; table EISED-085 OASD(C), 16 Nov 53, ibid.

81. Table EISED-085 OASD(C), 16 Nov 53, OSD Hist; table EISED-054 OASD(C), 23 Jun 54, ibid; ltr ActingSecDef to ChSenateAppropriationsCte, 1 Jul 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “1953 Budget” folder.

82. Table EISED-085 OASD(C), 16 Nov 53, OSD Hist; table EISED-054 OASD(C), 23 Jun 54, ibid; Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964, 276.

XV. THE LAST TRUMAN BUDGET


2. Memo ASD(C) for ASD(M&P), 17 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

3. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jan 52, ibid.

4. Memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, 11 Feb 52, ibid; memo DepDirEXOS OSD (for SecDef) for JCS, 11 Feb 52, w/3 intraoff memos, ibid.

5. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Feb 52, ibid; Marine Corps strength increase given in App A, “Implications of Continued Hostilities in Korea,” w/memo ASD(M&P) for ASD(C), 28 May 52, ibid.

6. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 4 Mar 52, ibid.

7. Memo ASD(M&P) for ASD(C), 28 May 52, ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Jun 52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for ASD(C), 10 Jun 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “FY 1954 Budget [McNeil file]” folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

10. Memo ASD(C) for ASD(M&P), 17 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

11. Intraoff memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 19 Jun 52, ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 24 Jun 52, ibid.

12. Memo SecDef for ASD(C), 2 Jul 52, ibid.

13. Memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 2 Jul 52, ibid; memo C.P. Noyes (DepDefRepSrNSCStf) for SecDef, 11 Jul 52, ibid.

14. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 9 Jul 52, ibid; memo SecNavy for SecDef, 15 Jul 52, ibid; memo ComdtUSMC for SecDef, 24 Jul 52, ibid; memo SecAF for SecDef, 17 Jul 52, ibid.

15. Memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Jul 52, ibid.

16. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 31 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 111 (Gen); memo ActingSecArmy for SecDef, 6 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

17. Memo SecDef for SecArmy, 15 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 111 (Gen).
18. Memo ATSD(ISA) for ASD(M&P), 22 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo DirEXOS for ExecSecNSC, 4 Dec 52, ibid; mins Staff Council [excerpt] [OASD(C)], [ca 19 Sep 52], RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “AFPC Actions . . .” folder.


20. Memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for SecArmy et al, 16 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef, 29 May 52, ibid; draft military status rept OSD, [ca 26 Jul 52]; RG 330, CD 381 (Gen).

21. Draft military status rept OSD, [ca 26 Jul 52]; RG 330, CD 381 (Gen).

22. Ibid, as amended by memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114).

23. Memo ExecSecNSC for ASD(ISA) and AS(D), 16 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 381 (Gen); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 21 Aug 52, ibid.

24. Memo ASD(C) and ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 16 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 114); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 21 Aug 52, ibid.

25. Memo ASD(C) and ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 16 Aug 52, ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 21 Aug 52, ibid.

26. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 135); memo SecDef for JCS, 9 Sep 52, ibid.

27. NSC 135, 6 Aug 52, Military Program (No 1), Condit file, OSD Hist. Note Marine Corps at 100 percent strength, even though only at 72 percent readiness.

28. Acheson indirectly quoted in memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 4 Sep 52, Truman papers, President’s Secretary’s files:NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; memo ExecSecNSC for All Holders NSC 135, 4 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans 135).

29. Memo JtSecs for SecDef, 8 Sep 52, RG 330, ISA files, “NSC 135 Status . . .” folder.

30. Based on briefing paper [DefRep or DefDepRepSrNSCStf for SecDef], [ca 3 Sep 52], “Item 3 (for Consideration)—NSC 135/1 . . .”, ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Aug 52, ibid; memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, 30 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans 135).

33. Memo USecArmy for SecDef, 2 Sep 52, RG 330, ISA files, “NSC 135 Status . . .” folder; briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCStf for SecDef], [ca 3 Sep 52], ibid; memo SecAF for SecDef, 2 Sep 52, ibid.

34. Memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 2 Sep 52, w/views ChNSRB on NSC 135/1, ibid; briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCStf for SecDef], [ca 3 Sep 52], ibid.


36. Memo DepDefRepSrNSCStf for ExecSecNSC, 8 Sep 52, w/revisions to NSC 135/1 proposed by DefMbr, RG 330, ISA files, “NSC 135 Status . . .” folder; memo DepDirEXOS OSD (for SecDef) for SecArmy et al, 17 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans 135); memo Bohlen for SecState, 22 Sep 52, FRUS 1952–1954, II, pt 1:134–35.

37. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans 135); memo JtSecs for SecDef, 23 Sep 52, RG 330, ISA files, “NSC 135 Status . . .” folder; briefing paper [DefRepSrNSCStf for SecDef], [ca 24 Sep 52], “Item 1—Reappraisal . . .”, ibid.

39. Memo SecDef for SecArmy, 24 Sep 52, ibid; memo Jack Gorrie (ChNSRB), [ca 24 Sep 52], ibid, 141–42; paper Paul Nitze and Carlton Savage (PPS State), 11 Nov 51, ibid, 182–84; note ExecSecNSC to NSC, 19 Jan 53, w/encl NSC 141, ibid, 209–11; memo Savage, 10 Feb 53, ibid, 231–34.

40. Memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 21 Mar 52, ibid.

41. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 7 Apr 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Jul 52, ibid; memo ChRDB for DepDeptDef, 13 Aug 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, “1952” folder. Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

42. Memo SecNavy for SecDef, 2 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 111 (1954); memo SecAF for SecDef, 2 Sep 52, ibid.

43. Memo ActingSecArmy for SecDef, “Transmittal . . .” 2 Sep 52, ibid; memo ActingSecArmy for SecDef, “Statements of Accumulated Risks,” Sep 52, ibid; memo ASD(C) for SecArmy, 29 Sep 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepDeptDef files, “FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)” folder.

44. Memo DirMnpwrRqmts ASD(M&P) for ASD(M&P), 25 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 111 (1954); intraoff memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, 5 Sep 52 (resubmitted), ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy, 5 Sep 52, ibid.

45. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 1 Oct 52, ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy, 21 Oct 52, ibid.

46. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 24 Oct 52, ibid; memo SecArmy for SecDef, 28 Nov 52, ibid.

47. Table EISED-088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OASD Hist.


49. Mins [OSD], “SecDef Review of AF FY 1954 Budget Request,” [ca 27 Oct 52], ibid; memo SecDef for SecAF, 5 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68); memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, 5 Nov 52, ibid.


51. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 24 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 111 (1954); mins [OSD], “SecDef Review of Army FY 1954 Budget Request,” [ca 28 Oct 52], RG 330, ATSD&DepDeptDef files, “FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)” folder; memo DirMnpwrRqmts OASD(M&P) for ASD(M&P), 7 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 350.05 (Briefing); draft ltr Garlock and McNeil (for SecDef signature) to Pres, [ca 17 Nov 52], RG 330, ATSD&DepDeptDef files, “FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)” folder; ltr ActingSecDef to DirBoB, 13 Dec 52, ibid; testimony ASD(C), 25 Feb 53, US Cong, House, Ctc on Appropriations, Department of Defense . . . Appropriations for 1954: Hearings, 83 Cong, 1 sess (1953), 47.


54. Ltr Lovett to Lawton, 1 Nov 52, w/encl, RG 330, ATSD&DepDeptDef files, “FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)” folder.

55. Table EISED-088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OASD Hist; mins [OSD], “SecDef Review of Navy FY 1954 Budget Request,” [ca 31 Oct 52], 1–5, RG 330, ATSD&DepDeptDef files, “FY 1954
66. Notes to Pages 299–309

Budget (McNeil file)” folder; memo B.D. Godbold (for DirMnpwrRqmts OASD(M&P)) for [illegible], 7 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 350.05 (Briefing).

56. Table EISED–088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OSD Hist; mins [OSD], “SecDef Review of Navy FY 1954 Budget Request,” [ca 51 Oct 52], 16–17, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef, “FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)” folder; ltr Lovett to Lawton, 1 Nov 52, w/encs, ibid.


58. mins [OSD], “SecDef Review . . . .” [ca 51 Oct 52], 50, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)” folder.

59. ibid, 1, 27–32; table EISED–088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 22 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 452.01. Almost all ($2.346 billion) of Lovett’s $2.355 billion budget item was accounted for by the $1.789 billion OSD-BoB staff estimate plus $135 million for guided missiles plus $422 million for aircraft.

60. Memo SecDef for DirBoB, 1 Nov 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)” folder; ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 13 Dec 52, ibid; ltr ActingSecDef to DirBoB, 13 Dec 52, ibid; table EISED–088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OSD Hist; memo Godbold (for DirMnpwrRqmts OASD(M&P)) for [illegible], 7 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 350.05 (Briefing); table EISED–088 OASD(C), 24 Dec 52, OSD Hist.

61. Memo ASD(C) for SecArmy, SecNavy, SecAF, 8 Nov 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget 1953” folder.

62. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 28 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 111 (1953); ltr ActingSecDef to DirBoB, 13 Dec 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “Budget 1953” folder; ltr Foster to Lawton, 19 Dec 52, ibid; ltr Foster to Lawton, 31 Dec 53, ibid.

63. Memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea).

64. ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 15 Dec 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)” folder; memo SecDef for Pres., 22 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 452.01; ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 22 Dec 52, ibid; memo ASecArmy for SecArmy, 22 Dec 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “FY 1954 Budget (McNeil file)” folder.


67. ibid, 563; ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 5 Feb 53, RG 218, CCS 344 NSC (9–25–47) sec 8.

68. Msg Pres to Cong, 9 Jan 53, US Budget, FY 1954, A6, M6–M7, M10; DoD estimates, ibid, 554.


XVI. NATO: THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE


Notes to Pages 310-15


5. Ismay, NATO, 1949–1954, 28–29; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 599.


8. Ltr Ralph J. Burton (BoB) to ATSD(FMA&MA), 12 Dec 50, w/draft terms, 8 Dec 50, RG 350, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ActingSecDef for JCS and CH:LB, 29 Dec 50, w/approved terms, 16 Dec 50, ibid.


14. Msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 26 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, III: 143–44; memo SecsMilDepts and JCS for SecDef, 13 Jul 50, ibid, 133–34; ltr SecDef to Pres, 14 Jul 50, RG 350, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).


17. Ltr USSecState to SecDef, 18 Aug 50, RG 350, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo SecDef for JtSecs et al, 14 Aug 50, ibid; memo Bradley (USRepS NATO) for SecDef, 17 Aug 50, ibid; memo USRepMPSB NATO for SecDef, 17 Aug 50, ibid.

18. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Aug 50, ibid; memo JtSecs for SecDef, 17 Aug 50, RG 218, CCS 092 W Eur (3–12–48) sec 55.

19. Memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 17 Aug 50, w/paper, RG 350, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for Asst to JtSecs, 22 Aug 50, ibid; ltr ChNADCeps to ChNADC, 2 Sep 50, ibid; ltr ChNADC to ChNASG, 12 Sep 50, ibid.


22. Memo Beebe for MacArthur (State), 51 Aug 50, w/draft msg, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Council of Ministers); memo Beebe for DirOMA OSD, 6 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr ChNADC to ChNAC, 12 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, III:288–89.


26. Memo JCS for SecDef. 1 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, III:172–74; msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 1 Aug 50, ibid, 168–72; memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Oct 50, w/encs, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 28 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, III:157; msg HICOG for SecState, 3 Aug 50, ibid, 180–82; msg USAmb USSR for SecState, 9 Aug 50, ibid, 192–94.

27. Brfgr paper on item 3 (NSC 71 and NSC 71/1) [DefRepSrNSCStffor SecDef], 6 Jul 50, RG 218, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47), sec 2; memo ExecSecOSD for JCS, 7 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 388.3 (Germany); memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 7 Jul 50, Truman papers, President’s Secretary’s files:NSC (PF: NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.


29. Ltr SecState and SecDef to Pres, 8 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, III:273n1, 273–78; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 440; statement, 9 Sep 50, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1950 . . . (hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers with year), 626.

30. For documents on British viewpoint, see pers msg BrSecState(FgnAffs) for USSecState, [4 Sep 50], w/enc. FRUS 1950, III:264–66; msg SecState for USEmb UK, 8 Sep 50, ibid, 271–72; Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945–1951, 804–11. For the French viewpoint, see msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 5 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, III:267–68; msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 7 Sep 50, ibid, 269–70; msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 7 Sep 50, ibid, 270; memcon Lucius D. Battle (SPLasst to SecState), 12 Sep 50, ibid, 285–88; msg SecState for USAmb UK et al, 14 Nov 50, ibid, 452–53. For details of the talks, see mins USDeleg, 12 and 13 Sep 50,
ibid, 1191–1223; mins private conf [Battle], 14 Sep 50, ibid, 293–301; msg SecState for Pres, 14 Sep 50, ibid, 301–02.

39. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 442–43; rept RAdm T.H. Robbins, Jr., for SecDef, 28 Sep 50, RG 350, CD 092–3 (NATO Council of Ministers); msg SecState for Pres, 14 Sep 50. FRUS 1950, III:301–02; msg SecState for Pres, 15 Sep 50, ibid, 1229–31; memcon Battle, [ca 15 Sep 50], w/enc, ibid, 305–08.

40. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 16 Sep 50. FRUS 1950, III:308–09; msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 17 Sep 50, ibid, 314–15; msg SecState for ActingSecState, 17 Sep 50, ibid, 316–20; msg SecState for ActingSecState, 18 Sep 50, ibid, 327–29; msg SecState for ActingSecState, 19 Sep 50, ibid, 330–32; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 20 Sep 50, RG 350, CD 091.7 (Europe).


42. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 23 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, III:338–40.

62. Memcon ADirOFMA, 19 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 300-1-1; memo ChJCS for SecDef, 27 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); Marshall indirectly cited in memcon Murdaugh (ActingDirOFMA), 27 Oct 50, re Shinwell, RG 330, CD 300-1-1; memcon Murdaugh, 27 Oct 50, re Portuguese Minister, ibid; memcon Murdaugh, 27 Oct 50, re s'Jacob, ibid.


65. Ibid; msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 31 Oct 50, ibid, 423-26, 426n3; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 8 Nov 50, ibid, 438-39. For CS plan, see DC 29 NADC, 26 Oct 50, ibid, 406-09, 406n1.

66. Memo, lCS for Sec Def, 18 Oct 50, w/appos, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 8 Nov 50, ibid, 438-39. DC 28 figures derived from memo lCS for SecDef, 28 May 51, w/appos, RG 21S, CCS OS (3-12-48) sec 82.

67. Memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for DepSecDef, 14 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); two msgs SecState for USEmb UK, both 14 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, III:450-53; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for DepSecDef, 17 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

68. Msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 16 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, III:460-61; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 16 Nov 50, ibid, 457-60; msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 17 Nov 50, ibid, 461n2, 465-67.

69. Memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for DepSecDef, 17 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); msg SecState for DepUSRepNAC, 18 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, III:471-72; memo Murdaugh for DepSecDef, 20 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany).

70. Msg DepUSRepNAC for USEmb Fr, 20 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, III:474-75; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 21 Nov 50, ibid, 475-79.

71. Msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 25 Nov 50, ibid, 482-85; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 27 Nov 50, ibid, 488-90; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 28 Nov 50, ibid, 493-95; msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 29 Nov 50, ibid, 496.

72. Mesg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 3 Dec 50, ibid, 514-15; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 482-83; msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 29 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, III:496; msg SecState for USAmb Fr, 29 Nov 50, ibid, 496-98; msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 30 Nov 50, ibid, 498-99; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 2 Dec 50, ibid, 508-11; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 2 Dec 50, ibid, 511-13; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 3 Dec 50, ibid, 513-14; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 5 Dec 50, ibid, 514-15.

73. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 482-83; msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 29 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, III:496; msg SecState for USAmb Fr, 29 Nov 50, ibid, 496-98; msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 30 Nov 50, ibid, 498-99; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 2 Dec 50, ibid, 508-11; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 2 Dec 50, ibid, 511-13; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 3 Dec 50, ibid, 513-14; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 5 Dec 50, ibid, 514-15.

79. Mins US 4th mtg Truman–Attlee convs, 6 Dec 50, ibid, 1750; memo JCS for SecDef, "Effect of Far East . . . . . ." 4 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (Truman–Attlee); memo JCS for SecDef, "European Defense Arrangements . . . . . ." 4 Dec 50, ibid; two ltrs SecDef to SecState, 4 Dec 50, ibid. A recommendation to increase U.S. military preparations had also been sent to the Secretary of State (see Marshall’s intraoffice note, 4 Dec 50, attached to memo JCS for SecDef, "Effect of Far East . . . . . ." 4 Dec 50, ibid).

80. Memo SecArmy, SecNavy, SecAF for SecDef, 4 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 092.7 (Korea); mins US 4th mtg Truman–Attlee convs, 6 Dec 50, *FRUS 1950*, III:1750.


82. Msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 5 Dec 50, *FRUS 1950*, III:523–24; msg SecState for lJSEmb Fr, 6 Dec 50, ibid, 525–26; msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 7 Dec 50, ibid, 527–28; msg DepUSRep-NAC for SecState, 8 Dec 50, ibid, 528–30.

83. Rept D–D/196 (final) NAC Deps, 9 Dec 50, ibid, 531–38, especially 537–38.

84. Ibid, 532–35.

85. Rept DC 24/3, NAMC to NADC, 12 Dec 50, ibid, 548–64; rept D–D/196 (final), NAC Deps, 9 Dec 50, ibid, 531–38; rept D/MC–D/2, NAMC, 12 Dec 50, ibid, 538–47, 538n1, 586n2; msg SecState for USEmb Belg, 8 Dec 50, ibid, 530–31.

86. Msg, SecState for USEmb Belg, 8 Dec 50, ibid, memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 12 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Beebe for Pace, 9 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo Murdaugh (for Burns) for Marshall, [nd, ca 9 Dec 50], RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO).


89. Brief of Bonn 319 in memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 20 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany); Ger reactions at msg of Council of Europe Assembly, in msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 25 Nov 50, *FRUS 1950*, III:485–88.


91. Ltr SecDef to SecState, 16 Dec 50, *FRUS 1950*, III:582; msg USAmb Belg for SecState, 18 Dec 50, ibid, 583–84.


94. Memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 26 Dec 50, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.

**XVII. BUILDING A NATO STRUCTURE**

1. Msg USAmb USSR to SecState, 4 Nov 50, US Dept State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950* (hereafter cited as *FRUS* with year and volume number), IV:902–03; msg SecState to USMission UN, 21 Dec 50, ibid, 920–21; msg HICOG for SecState, 7 Dec 50, ibid,
612 Notes to Pages 338–41


5. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department, 551.

6. Ibid, 553–55; msg SecState for USEmb Fr, 8 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:1058–60; note USAmb USSR to SovietFgnMin, 19 Feb 51, ibid, 1083–84; editorial note, ibid, 1086; msg USAmb USSR for SecState, 1 Mar 51, ibid, 1084–85; msg Philip C. Jessup (USRep Four–Power Exploratory Talks) for SecState, 5 Mar 51, ibid, 1087–89; msg Jessup for SecState, 28 Mar 51, ibid, 1111–12; memcon State, 29 Mar 51, ibid, 1112–17; msg Jessup for SecState, 31 Mar 51, ibid, 1118–19.

7. Msg Jessup for SecState, 3 Apr 51, ibid, 1120; msg SecState for Jessup, 13 Apr 51, ibid, 1124–26; note SecState to SovietFgnMin, [12 Jun 51], ibid, 1158–59; note SovietGovt to USGovt, 20 Jun 51, ibid, 1159–60; msg Jessup for SecState, 22 Jun 51, ibid, 1161–62, 1161n2.


15. Ltr Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 Mar 51. Eisenhower to Harriman (SPlAsst to Pres), 8 Mar 51; ibid, "Harriman" folder.
16. Memo DepSecDef for JtSecs and JCS, 8 Feb 51, w/encs D-D(51)+1 NACDepcs. 4 Jan 51, and D-D(51)20, App A, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo DepCanRepNAC for NACDepcs. 17 Nov 50, FRUS 1950, III:461-64; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 22 Nov 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr SecDef to SecState, 5 Dec 50, ibid.
17. Ismay, NATO: 1949–1954, 60. 128; memo AsSecArmy for DepSecDef, 3 Jan 51. RG 350, CD 092.3 (NATO DefPdnBd); memo AsSecArmy for SecDef, 5 Jan 51; ibid; memo DirONATA OSD for W. T. Van Allen (MB), 15 Jan 51, ibid.
18. Paper, "Activities in Europe Concerned with Materiel Support of NATO and MDAP," [ca Nov 51]. 29-30, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr DepSecDef to ViceDepUSRepNAC. 14 Dec 51, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 Feb 51, ibid; memo DirONATA OSF for SecDef, 3 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO DefPdnBd).
19. Ismay, NATO: 1949–1954, 35, 68; memo ChJCS for SecDef, 19 Oct 51. RG 350, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); rept DC 24/3 NAMC to NADC, 12 Dec 50, FRUS 1950, III:548-64, especially 551.
20. Memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 23 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr DirlSA State to DepSecDef, 31 Jan 51, ibid; two ltrs DirlSA State to DepSecDef, both 7 Feb 51, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JtSecs and JCS, 8 Feb 51, w/State's proposed US position, ibid.
21. Memo Asst to JtSecs for SecDef, 22 Feb 51, ibid.
22. Ltr ActingSeeDcf to SeeState, 24 Feb 51, ibid. and repeated in msg ActingSecState for DepUSRepNAC, 26 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 1:65-66; ltr DepSecDef to DirODM, 27 Feb 51, ibid, 67-68.
23. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 1 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr DirlSA State to DepSecDef, 31 Jan 51, ibid; two ltrs DirlSA State to DepSecDef, both 7 Feb 51, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JtSecs and JCS, 8 Feb 51, w/State's proposed US position, ibid.
24. Communique Spofford (ChNACDepcs), 5 May 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:156–59; ltr DepUSRepNAC to ATSD(ISA), 24 May 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).
25. Ltr ATSD(ISA) to DepUSRepNAC, 20 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Bradley for SecDef, 15 Aug 51, ibid; memo DirONATA for SecDef, 14 May 51, w/enc, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Aug 51, ibid; ltr Lovett to SecState, 2 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 1:232–53; memo A.R. Matter (ONATA) for ATSD(ISA), 14 Aug 51, RG 350, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).
26. Memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al, 14 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Underwood (EXOS) for Carter (DirEXOS), 13 Nov 51, ibid; ltr Foster to SecState, 15 Nov 51, ibid.
27. Final communiqué NAC 7th sess, 15-20 Sep 51, Ottawa, in Ismay, NATO: 1949–1954, 187-89; state background paper LIS D–3, 15 Jan 52, RG 350, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); prog rept Harriman (ChTCC) to NAC. 26 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 1:357–63, especially 359; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 23 Jan 52, w/US Comments on TCC Rept, 22 Jan 52, 17-18, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Lincoln (DefAdv to USRepTCC) for SecDef, 21 Dec 51, 5-6, RG 330. CD 092 (NATO Gen); msg Harriman for ECAdmtr, 15 Dec 51, RG 350, CD 092.3 (NATO DefPdnBd).
28. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092 (NATO Gen); memo ASD(C) for ATSD(ISA), 10 Jan 52, w/enc, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 15 Jan 52, ibid.
29. State background paper LIS D–3, 15 Jan 52, RG 350, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 23 Jan 52, w/US Comments on TCC Rept, 22 Jan 52, 17–18, ibid; memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 5 Jan 52, ibid; memo DepDirEXOS for SecArmy et al. 19 Jan 52, ibid.
31. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 625; msg SRE for ECAAdmr, 13 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO DefPdBld); msg SecState to UKFgnSec, 7 Mar 52, *FRUS 1952-1954*, V, pt 1:293–95; memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 7 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).
33. Ltr DepLJSRepNAC to SecDef, 15 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); msg DEPTO 1157 DepL'SRepNAC for SecState, 5 Apr 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, "Classified Cables . . . Pawley's . . ." folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; msg DEPTO 1159 DepL'SRepNAC for SecState, 4 Apr 52, ibid; editorial note, *FRUS 1952-1954*, V, pt 1:297.
39. Ltr DepUSecState to Burns, 18 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr Sec State to SecDef, 31 Aug 50, *FRUS 1950*, III:257–61; memo JtSecs for SecDef, 5 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).
42. Memo SecDef for JCS, 9 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Oct 50, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 10 Nov 50, ibid.
44. Memo JtSecs for SecDef, 29 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Apr 51, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Turkey); memo JCS for SecDef, 22 May 51, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 14 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen). For Eisenhower's views on 2 April 1951, see *FRUS 1951*, III, pt 1:507, editorial note.
45. Statement of Policy NSC [NSC 109] approved by President 24 May 1951, *FRUS 1951*, V:1148–51, 1148n1; NSC Staff Study [NSC 109], ibid, 1151–62; NSC 103/1 (Greece), approved by President 15 Feb 51, amended and approved by President 24 May 51, ibid, 485n2.
47. Msg 884 USAmb Turkey for State, 7 Mar 52, RG 59, 740.5/3-752; msg 1355 USAmb Turkey for State, 31 May 52, RG 59, 882.25/311-1252; memcon USAmb Turkey, 2 May 53, RG 59, 782.5 MSP/5-853.

48. MSG 994 USAmb Turkey for State, 31 Mar 52, RG 59, 780.5/3-3152; msg ActingAsstState(EUR), 6 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, Ill, pt 1:554-55; draft Anglo-US Agmt by UKRep SG NATO, [Jul 51], ibid, 559-61; rev draft State, 18 Jul 51, ibid, 563-64; msg ActingSecState for USEmb Turkey, 20 Sep 51, ibid, 576-77; ltr George C. McGhee to Nash, 18 Jul 52, w/memcon USAmb Turkey, 2 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Yugoslavia).

49. Ltr McGhee to Nash, 18 Jul 52, w/memcon USAmb Turkey, 2 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Yugoslavia); ltr USChge Turkey to USAmb-Desig Turkey, "Major Issues in U.S.-Turkish Relations," 13 Jul 53, RG 84, Ankara Emb files, lot 57F72, "400 Turkey—Effectiveness Armed Forces."

50. Msg USAmb Turkey for SecState, 22 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, Y: 1299-1300; msg USAmb Turkey for SecState, 12 Jan 51, ibid, 1353-54; ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(ISA), 31 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, Y: 1113-15.

51. Ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(ISA), 31 Jan 51, FRUS 1951, Y: 113-15; memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Turkey); ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(ISA), 15 Mar 51, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 1 Jun 51, ibid; memo SecNavy for SecDef, 27 Feb 51, ibid; ltr ATSD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 2 Mar 51, ibid; ltr DepUSecState to ATSD(ISA), 3 Apr 51, ibid; ltr DepSecDef to SecState, 9 Jun 52, ibid; msg 313 Ellsworth Bunker (USAmb Italy) for State, 21 Jul 52, RG 59, 782.5/7-2152; memcon USAmb Turkey, 2 May 53, RG 84, Ankara Emb files, lot 57F72, "322.2 Straits 1953."

52. Memo ASecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 2 Jun 52, RG 59, 711.56382/7-2252; memo ASecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 9 Oct 52, RG 59, 711.56382/10-952.

53. Memo ASecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 9 Oct 52, RG 59, 711.56382/10-952; memo SecAF for SecDef, 31 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Turkey); memo ASecState(EUR) for SecState, 8 Jan 53, RG 59, 711.56382/1-853; msg 979 USAmb Turkey for State, 7 Feb 53, RG 59, 711.56382/2-753; memcon USAmb Turkey, 2 May 53, RG 84, Ankara Emb files, lot 57F72, "322.2 Straits 1953;" ltr USChge Turkey to Amb-Desig Turkey, 13 Jul 53, ibid, "400 Turkey—Effectiveness Armed Forces."


55. Memo ChfJAMMAT, 28 Jun 50, FRUS 1950, V: 1275-77; memo OICTurkishAffs State, 25 Sep 50, ibid, 1322-24; memo ActingSecState to ExecSecNSC, 26 Jun 52, RG 59, S/S-NSC files, lot 63D351, "NSC 109 series;" msg Topol 47 USAmb Turkey for SRE, 21 Mar 53, RG 59, 782.5/3-2153.

56. Msg 642 USAmb Turkey for State, 21 Jan 52, RG 59, 611.82/1-2152; memcon USAmb Turkey, 24 Oct 52, RG 59, 782.5 MBE/11-652; msg 60 USChge Turkey for State, 30 Jul 53, RG 59, 611.82/7-3053; memo ActingSecState for ExecSec NSC, 26 Jun 52, RG 59, S/S-NSC files, lot 63D351, "NSC 109 series;" msg 60 USChge Turkey for State, 30 Jul 53, RG 59, 611.82/7-3053; ltr USChge Turkey to USAmb-Desig Turkey, 15 Jul 53, RG 84, Ankara Emb files, lot 57F72, "400 Turkey—Effectiveness Armed Forces."

57. Msg 60 USChge Turkey for State, 30 Jul 53, RG 59, 611.82/7-3053; ltr USChge Turkey to USAmb-Desig Turkey, 15 Jul 53, RG 84, Ankara Emb files, lot 57F72, "400 Turkey—Effectiveness Armed Forces."

58. Memo SecDef for Pres, 31 Dec 46, FRUS 1946, V: 1083-85; memo SecState for USRepUN, 30 Dec 46, ibid, 1090; ltr SecState to ChSenForeignRelationsCte, 18 Jan 50, FRUS 1950, Ill: 1549-55; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 7 Jul 50, Truman papers, PSF.

59. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Dec 47, RG 330, CD 1-1-55; memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Apr 49, RG 330, CD 6-1-55; memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 337 (Four Powers); memo JCS for SecDef, 3 May 50, FRUS 1950, Ill: 1560-61; ltr Pres to SecState, 16 Jun 50, ibid, 1562; rept NSC 72/1, SecState to NSC, 3 Jul 50, ibid, 1570-72.

60. Memo SecDef for Pres, 31 Jul 50, FRUS 1950, Ill: 1572-73, 1575n1; memrcd ActingDirBoB, 6 Sep 50, Frederick J. Lawton papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
616 Notes to Pages 354–57

61. Editorial note, FRUS 1950, III:1577; news conf, 2 Nov 50, Truman Public Papers, 1950, 697; news conf, 28 Dec 50, ibid, 762; memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Spain); memo ASeeState(EUR) for SecState, [25 Nov 50], FRUS 1950, III:1577–79; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 29 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Spain); notes Elsey, 31 Jan 51, 10–11, Elsey papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 2 Feb 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; rept NSC 72/4, 1 Feb 52, FRUS 1951, IV, pt 1:789–90.

62. Msg ActingSecState for USEmb Spain, 6 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, IV, pt 1:802–04, 804n4; msg USAmb Spain for SecState, 15 Mar 51, ibid, 807–09; three memcons State, 19 Mar 51, 30 Mar 51, 2 Apr 51, all in RG 330, CD 092 (Spain); ltr SecDef to SecState, 1 May 51, ibid; memo ASeeState(EUR) for SecDef, 14 May 51, FRUS 1951, IV, pt 1:816–17; ltr SecState to SecDef, 16 May 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Spain); memo for file E.S. Hartshorn, Jr. (OFMA OSD), 21 May 51, ibid; memo ASeeState(EUR) for SecState, 3 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, IV, pt 1:825–26.


64. Memcon [Chge] USEmb Spain, 29 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Spain); memcon JCS for SecDef, 7 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Spain); memcon JCS for SecDef, 7 Sep 51, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 10 Sep 51, ibid; mins USDeleg 5th mtg US, UK, Fr ForMins Washington, 13 Sep 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:1286; memcon DepASeeState(EUR), 19 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain); memo Ohly (Asst to DMS) for StateMbrMAAC, 21 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 091.5 (MDAP/Spain).

65. Memcon [Chge] USEmb Spain, 29 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Spain); news conf, 7 Feb 52, Truman Public Papers, 1952–53, 141, 144; ltr DepUSeeState to SecDef, 28 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Spain).

66. Memcon JCS for SecDef, 16 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain); memo DirOFMA for ATSD(ISA), 29 Jan 52, ibid; memo ChMAAC ODMS for All MAAC Mbrs, 2 Feb 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 24 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Spain); ltr DepUSeeState to SecDef, 11 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain); memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Spain); ltr SecDef to SecState, 12 Mar 51, ibid; memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 24 Mar 52, ltr DepUSeeState to SecState, 28 Mar 52; ibid; memo G.A. Wyeth (Asst to JtSecs) for SecDef, 15 Oct 52, w/enc papr ISA, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain).

67. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Spain); ltr SecDef to SecState, 4 Mar 52, ibid; memo SecAF for SecDef, 11 Mar 52, ibid; memo ActingSecDef for SecAF, 29 Mar 52, w/3 encs, ibid; memo ASeeAF for DepSecDef, 2 Apr 52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 5 Apr 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 May 52, ibid; MSA, Third Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, 31 Dec 52, 6–7.

68. Memrecd USEmb Spain, [ca 5 Jul 52], RG 59, 752.5/7–552; msg 41 USAmb Spain for State, 12 Jul 52, RG 59, 711.56352/7–1252; ltr Truman to Franco, 23 Jul 52, RG 59, 611.52/7–2352; msg 82 USAmb Spain for State, 25 Jul 52, RG 59, 711.56352/7–2552; memo 352 USAmb Spain for State, 30 Oct 52, RG 59, 711.56352/10–3052.

69. Memrecd USEmb Spain, [ca 5 Jul 52], RG 59, 752.5/7–552; msg 46 USAmb Spain for State, 12 Jul 52, RG 59, 711.56352/7–1252; ltr Truman to Franco, 23 Jul 52, RG 59, 611.52/7–2352; msg 82 USAmb Spain for State, 25 Jul 52, RG 59, 711.56352/7–2552; memo 352 USAmb Spain for State, 30 Oct 52, RG 59, 711.56352/10–3052.

70. Msg 46 USAmb Spain for SecState, 14 Jul 52, RG 59, 711.56352/7–1452; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 8 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Spain); memo USAmb Spain for SpMinFgnAffs, 6 Oct 52, RG 59, 711.56352/10–952; memo USAmb Spain for SpMinFgnAffs, 7 Oct 52, ibid; msg 362 USAmb Spain for State, 4 Nov 52, RG 59, 711.56352/11–452; memo 360 USAmb Spain for State, 4 Nov 52, ibid.

71. Memo DepASeeState(EUR) for DepUSeeState, 5 Sep 52, RG 59, 752.5 MAP/9–552, intraoff memo Wyeth for SecDef, 15 Oct 52, w/paper ISA, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Spain); ltr SecDef to SecState, 8 Dec 52, RG 59, 752.5/12–852; memrecd R.M. Barnett (OMA), 24 Dec 52, w/encs,
72. Memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 24 Jan 55, RG 330, CD III (1954); msg 572 USAmb Spain for State, 24 Jan 55, RG 59, 711.56352/1-2453; ltr ActingSecState to SecDef, 3 Feb 55, RG 59, 752.5MSP/2-353.

73. Memo DepUSeCState for ExecSecNSC, 31 Jan 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1560-61; msg SecState for USEmb Yugo, 1 Mar 50, cited, RG 59, 711.56552/1-2453; ltr ActingSecState for ExecSecNSC, 16 May 50, ibid, 1418-20.

74. Memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 24 Jan 55, RG 330, CD III (1954); msg 572 USAmb Spain for State, 24 Jan 55, RG 59, 711.56352/1-2453; Dept State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pub no 6416 (1957), 1:1060-98.

75. Memo ActingSecState for ExecSecNSC, 31 Jan 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1560-61; msg SecState for USEmb Yugo, 1 Mar 50, cited, RG 59, 711.56352/1-2453; ltr ActingSecState for ExecSecNSC, 16 May 50, ibid, 1418-20.


77. Memo ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1:1439-40; ltr SecState to ChScnForeignRelationsCte, 17 Nov 50, ibid, 1491-92; memo ExecSecNSC to Pres, 17 Nov 50, ibid, 1494-96; memo ActingSecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 30 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.

78. Memo ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1:1439-40; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Aug 50, ibid, 1:1441-44; memo ASeeState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 25 Sep 50, ibid, 1:1451-54; editorial note, ibid, 1482-83; ltr ATSD(FMA&MA) to DepUSecState, 30 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.

79. Memo ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1:1439-40; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Aug 50, ibid, 1:1441-44; memo ActingSecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 30 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.

80. Memo ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1:1439-40; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Aug 50, ibid, 1:1441-44; memo ActingSecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 30 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.

81. Memo ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1:1439-40; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Aug 50, ibid, 1:1441-44; memo ActingSecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 30 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.

82. Memo ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1:1439-40; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Aug 50, ibid, 1:1441-44; memo ActingSecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 30 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.

83. Memo ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1:1439-40; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Aug 50, ibid, 1:1441-44; memo ActingSecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 30 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.

84. Memo ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1:1439-40; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Aug 50, ibid, 1:1441-44; memo ActingSecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 30 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.

85. Memo ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1:1439-40; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Aug 50, ibid, 1:1441-44; memo ActingSecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 30 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.

86. Memo ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 20 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, IV:1450-51; memo DepDirMDA State for DirOMA OSD, 9 Oct 50, ibid, 1:1439-40; memo JCS for SecDef, 23 Aug 50, ibid, 1:1441-44; memo ActingSecState(EUR) for DepUSecState, 30 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 092 (Korea); memo ActingExecSecOSD for SecArmy, 31 Oct 50, ibid.
(Yugoslavia); ltr ActingASecState to SecDef, 6 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092 (Yugoslavia); memo JCS for SecDef, 19 Dec 52, ibid.

86. Ltr YugoAmb to SecState, 28 Jun 51, RG 59, 768.5/6-2851; editorial note, FRUS 1951, IV, pt 2:1838; memo CHJMDAPSurveyMission for SecDef, 24 Sep 51, w/enc, RG 330, CD 091.3 MDAP (Yugoslavia); msg SecState for USEmb Yugo, 9 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, IV, pt 2:1851-53; msg ActingSecState for USEmb Yugo, 30 Oct 51, ibid, 1856-58; editorial notes, ibid, 1840, 1862-63.

87. Memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 091.3 MDAP (Yugoslavia); OMA OSD, MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Department of Defense Operations, Jan 52, 21, Jan 53, 24.

88. Ltr McGhee (USAmb Turkey) to Nash, 18 Jul 52, w/memcon, RG 330, CD 092 (Yugoslavia); Stebbins, US in World Affairs, 1952, 422-23.

89. Ltr SecDef to SACEUR, 21 Dec 50, Eisenhower PPP, "Marshall" folder.

90. In memo ASD(C) for DepSecDef, [ca 24 Feb 51], RG 330, CD 370.21; McNeil criticized the initial reliance on too many U.S. personnel; Ismay, NATO, 1949-1954, 37-38, 70; SACEUR, Annual Report to The Standing Group North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2 Apr 52, 8.


92. Ltr SACEUR to Marshall, 12 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 370.21 (SHAPE); ltr SACEUR to Harriman, 24 Feb 51, Eisenhower PPP, "Harriman" folder; ltr SACEUR to Bradley, 30 Mar 51, ibid, "Bradley" folder.


96. Ltr SACEUR to Harriman, 24 Feb 51, Eisenhower PPP, "Harriman" folder. The correspondence between these two men corroborates that the arrangements Eisenhower discussed in the 24 February 1951 letter did in fact materialize.

97. Ltr SACEUR to Harriman, 12 May 51, Eisenhower PPP, "Harriman" folder; ltr Harriman to SACEUR, 18 May 51, ibid.


100. Msg SecState for DepUSRepNAC, 6 Feb 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:464-65; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 20 Feb 51, ibid, 474-75; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 22 Feb 51, ibid, 475-76; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 26 Feb 51, ibid, 477-79; ltr SACEUR to Harriman, 2 Apr 51, Eisenhower PPP, "Harriman" folder.

101. Msg ActingSecState for DepUSRepNAC, 9 Mar 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:488; draft rept State, [ca 14 Mar 51], ibid, 488-96; Walter S. Poole, 1950-1952, vol IV in The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 239-42.

102. Memo JCS for SecDef, 24 Apr 51, w/enc, RG 330, CD 092.5 (NATO Gen); ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 26 Apr 51, ibid; ltr SecState to SecDef, 9 May 51, ibid; memo CHJCS for DirONATA, 11 May 51, ibid; ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 12 May 51, ibid; editorial note, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:522-24; memcon DepDirGTL State, 10 Aug 51, ibid, V:162-63.

103. Memo CHJCS for SecDef, 13 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); msg SecState for DepUSRepNAC, 14 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:559; ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 17 Jul 51,
Notes to Pages 365–70

RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo DirONATA for DepCNO(Ops) and DirJtStf JCS, 7 Aug 51, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 20 Aug 51, ibid; memo ActingDirONATA for VCNO, 23 Aug 51, ibid; editorial note, *FRUS 1951*, III, pt 1:574.

104. Interoff memo Matter (for DirONATA) for SecDef, 18 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo DirONATA for SecDef, 14 May 51, w/NATO Summary Report, 13–14, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); msg USAmb Fr for SecState, 11 Jul 51, *FRUS 1951*, III, pt 1:556–58; working paper State, 28 Aug 51, w/encls, ibid, 568–74; editorial note, ibid, 574. Eisenhower pushed for a southern European command under Carney—see ltr SACEUR to Harriman, 1 Jun 51, Eisenhower PPP, "Harriman" folder.


108. Ismay, *NATO, 1949–1954*, 73; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 9 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

109. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 9 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Ismay, *NATO, 1949–1954*, 73.


111. Memo DirONATA for SecDef, 14 May 51, w/NATO Summary Report, 12, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

XVIII. INCREASING NATO STRENGTH


2. Briefing book State for SACEUR, [ca 1 Jan 51], *FRUS 1951*, III, pt 1:460–64, 461n3; memo Col Royden E. Beebe, Jr. (DirONATA) for DepUSRepSG NATO, 5 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); draft rcd [State–] JCS mg, 20 Feb 51, *FRUS 1951*, III, pt 1:58–64; paper (ISAC D–4/7a) [extract] ISAC State, [ca 20 Jun 51], ibid, 193–97, 193n1; memo ActingSecState for DepUSRepNAC, 17 Aug 51, ibid, 246–53, particularly par 9, 252.


4. Memo JCS for SecDef, 28 May 51, w/apps, RG 218, CCS 092 Western Europe (3–12–48) sec 82. Memo DirONATA for SecDef, 21 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe), states that the gap amounted to 438 naval vessels and 3,459 aircraft. Ltr AdmAsst in Pres Off to DirONATA OSD, 27 Jun 51, w/paper, "US Forces in Defense of Western Europe;" ibid, gives slightly
different divisional requirements figures but maintains the gap at 4, 11, and 12 divisions for the three time periods.


6. Ltr Lincoln Gordon (Econ Adviser to Spl Asst to Pres) to Burns (ATSD[ISA]), 7 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo DirONATA for SecDef, 14 May 51, w/NATO Summary Report, 6, ibid.

7. Memo Burns, Scott (DirOMA), and Beebe for SecDef, 20 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); ISAC paper (D–47a) [extract], ISAC State. [ca 20 Jun 51], \textit{FRUS 1951}, III, pt 1:193–97, 195n1.

8. Memo Burns, Scott, Beebe for SecDef, 20 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memcon Martin (DirOEurRegAffs State), 21 Jun 51, \textit{FRUS 1951}, III, pt 1:197–204; memo SecDef for ChJCS, 26 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).


10. Memo SecDef for ChJCS, 26 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Jul 51, w/encs, ibid; memo ActingSecDef for DepUSRepSG NATO [Vadm Jerauld Wright], 10 Aug 51, w/encs, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO).

11. Ltr ATSD[ISA] to DirISA State, 17 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); ltr DirONATA to SplAsst to CoS SHAPE, 6 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); msg ActingSecState for DepUSRepNAC, 17 Aug 51, \textit{FRUS 1951}, III, pt 1:248–53.

12. Intraoff memo DirONATA for DepSecDef, [ca 28 Jul 51], w/memcon JCS for SecDef, 28 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe). OSD knew some of the thinking in Eisenhower's headquarters—see memo DirONATA for DepUSRepSG Nato, 5 Jun 51, ibid, and memo ATSD[ISA] for SecDef, 25 Aug 51, ibid.


14. Ltr ATSD[ISA] to SplAsst to CoS SHAPE, 6 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO); ltr DirONATA to SplAsst to CoS SHAPE, 6 Sep 51, ibid; memo ATSD[ISA] for DepUSRepSG, 11 Sep 51, ibid.


19. Memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al. 15 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); rept C8–D/8 ChTCC NATO to 8th sess NAC Rome, 26 Nov 51, \textit{FRUS 1951}, III, pt 1:357–63; editorial note, ibid, 316; memo Gordon for SplAsst to Pres, 19 Sep 51, ibid, 279–80; interv with W. Averell Harriman by Doris M. Condit, 18 Jun 77, 5–6, OSD Hist.
20. Memo Acting SecDef for SecArmy et al, 15 Oct 51, w/encs, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); rept C8-D/8 ChTCC NATO, 26 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:357–63, especially 358, 360–61.

21. Memo Col G.A. Lincoln (Spl Asst to SecDef) for SecDef, 21 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Lincoln for SecDef, 31 May 51, w/paper, “Lessons from Preparation of MSP,” 30 May 51, Lincoln papers, “Chronological” folder, OSD Hist; interv with Harriman, 18 Jun 77, 6–7.

22. Memo DepDir EXOS (for SecDef) for SecArmy et al, 21 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO); memo ATSD (ISA) for SecDef, 29 Oct 51, ibid; ltr Jean Monnet (Acting ChExec Bur TCC NATO) to SecDef, 1 Nov 52, ibid; memo DepDir EXOS for JCS, 10 Nov 51, w/intraoff memo ExecOff ISA for DepDir EXOS, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Nov 51, w/encs, ibid.


24. Rept “The Politico-Economic Capability of the United States for Meeting Defense Requirements” [US response to the TCC questionnaire], 2 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Itr Acting SecDef to ChTCC NATO, 6 Nov 51, w/enc, ibid; msg Lincoln for SecDef (for Dir ONATA), 11 Nov 51, ibid.


26. Memo SecDef to SecState, 15 Jan 52, ibid; memo A SecArmy for DepSecDef, 31 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); costing study E&ISE OASD (C), 4 Apr 52, ibid; Poole, 1950–1952, 292–93.

27. Memo Acting SecDef for SecArmy et al, 15 Oct 51, w/encs, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); rept C8-D/8 ChTCC NATO, 26 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:357–63, especially 358, 360–61.
38. Memo ASecArmy for DepSecDef, [ca 19 Jul 51], w/6 encs, RG 330, CD 301–1–1 (Memorandum of Conversation); memcon Ernst, 19 Jul 51, ibid; revised paper, “US Participation in Financing of NATO Infrastructure,” 18 Jul 51, ibid; memo Ernst for DepSecDef, 26 Jul 51, ibid; memo Ernst for Nash, 26 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Itr ActingSecDef to SecState, 26 Jul 51, w/enc, ibid; memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al, 26 Jul 51, ibid.

39. Memo ASecAF for SecAF, 27 Sep 51, w/encs, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo DepDirEXOS for SecArmy et al, 6 Oct 51, ibid; memcon OSD, “Convs between SecDef and Fr Mins,” 10 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 101–1–1; pgm No 3, ODMS, 23, w(NSC 142 (Feb 53), Condit file, OSD Hist.

40. Memo DepDirEXOS for SecArmy et al, 6 Oct 51, w/memrcd ATSD(ISA), [nd], RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(ISA) for DirOLL, [18 Oct 51], ibid; msg Def 901870 ASD(C) for USAIRA Lisbon, 23 Feb 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Infrastructure” folder; msg AL0828 USL0 for ATSD(ISA), 11 Mar 52, ibid; briefing paper MS D–206/5 Def–MSA–State, 13 Mar 52, 3, RG 330, Lovett papers, “Classified Cables . . . Pawley’s . . .” folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

41. Briefing paper MS D–206/5 Def–MSA–State, 13 Mar 52, 8, RG 330, Lovett papers, “Classified Cables . . . Pawley’s . . .” folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for DirOLL, [18 Oct 51], RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo DepDirEXOS for SecArmy et al, 6 Oct 51, w/memrcd ATSD(ISA), [nd], ibid.

42. Memo Ernst for D.H. Grear et al, 8 Nov 51, w/draft paper State, [ca 8 Nov 51], RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memrcd Ernst, 8 Feb 52, ibid.

43. Memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 11 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (General); msg AL0625 USL0 SHAPE for ATSD(ISA), 12 Jan 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Infrastructure” folder; briefing paper MS D–206/5 Def–MSA–State, 13 Mar 52, 9, RG 330, Lovett papers, “Classified Cables . . . Pawley’s . . .” folder.

44. Memo Ernst for ATSD(ISA), 24 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Ernst for ATSD(ISA), 22 Jan 52, ibid; memo Ernst for ASD(C), 19 Feb 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Infrastructure” folder.

45. Msg SecState for State, 23 Feb 52, FRUS 1952–1954, V, pt 1:192–93 (with British pounds in text converted at rate of $2.80 per pound); Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 625; briefing paper MS D–206/5 Def–MSA–State, 13 Mar 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, “Classified Cables . . . Pawley’s . . .” folder; pgm No 3 ODMS, 23, w(NSC 142, Feb 53, Condit file, OSD Hist.


47. Ltr SecDef to UKSecState(Commonwealth Rels), 6 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(ISA) for ASD(C), 14 Aug 52, ibid; memo ActingATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 30 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 311.5; memo Robert E. O’Hara (BudgetDiv OASD(C)) for ASD(C) and subsequently sent SecDef and DepSecDef, 18 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

48. Msg Topol 763 ActingSecState for USAmb Fr, 21 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Sep 52, ibid; notes w/final rept Annual Review Ad Hoc Cte, [25 Sep 52].

49. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for ADIRPgmODMS, 22 Oct 52, w/paper, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Infrastructure” folder; memo Dep(Eur)MSA ISA for ASD(C), 21 Nov 52, ibid; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 5 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); pgm No 3 ODMS, 24, w(NSC 142, Feb 53, Condit file, OSD Hist.

51. Memo JCS for SecDef, 4 Mar 53, RG 330, CD 380 (Gen); pgm No 3 ODMS, 24–25, w/NSC 142, Feb 53, Condit file, OSD Hist.

52. Memo DepSecDef for SecArmy et al, 31 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, [31 Mar 52], ibid.

53. Memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 15 Apr 52, w/table, ibid; memo W.H. Mautz (E&ISE ASD(C)) for Nash, 18 Apr 52, ibid; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 May 52, w/comparison of SG force goals, ibid; ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 23 May 52, ibid.

54. Memo JCS for SecDef, 20 May 52, w/apps, ibid; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 May 52, ibid.

55. Memo ActingSecDef for JtSecs, ChMB, ASD(C), 23 May 52, ibid; memo Mautz for ASD(C), 29 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Force Levels); memo SecArmy and SecAF for SecDef, 2 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo SecNavy for SecDef, 9 Jun 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Jun 52, ibid.

56. Ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 23 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 May 52, ibid; ltr SecState to SecDef, 19 Jun 52, FRUS 1952–1954, v. pt 1:301–08.

57. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, [ca 20 Jun 52], RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo SecDef for Bradley, 20 Jun 52, w/enc, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 20 Jun 52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for ChJCS, 8 Aug 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 6 Aug 52, ibid.

58. Memo Booth for SecDef, 25 Sep 52, ibid; except for Lisbon goals, figures in table in text, page 382, are from memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 24 Nov 52, ibid. Several totals in the latter document were corrected for errors in addition. All 1953 goals included a German army contribution, and MRC–12 air goals included 279 German aircraft. Lisbon 1953 goals are from Poole, 1950–1952, pages 293 and 305, and include a German army and air force contribution but none from Greece or Turkey; compare with memo [na] for Nash, 18 Sep 52, RG 330. ISA files, Nash papers, "NATO Annual Review" folder.

59. Final Rept [DoD] Ad Hoc (Booth) Cte, [25 Sep 52], RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo Booth for SecDef, 25 Sep 52, ibid.

60. Memrcd Gerhardt (ONATA OSD), 24 Oct 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 14 Oct 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Oct 52, ibid; ltr SecState to SecDef, 14 Oct 52, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 16 Oct 52, RG 330. ISA files, Nash papers, "Annual Review" folder; memo SecDef for JCS, 24 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

61. Memo DepSecDef for SecArmy et al, 4 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(ISA) for ASD(C), 22 Aug 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for ASD(C), 20 Sep 52, RG 330. ISA files, Nash papers, "NATO Annual Review" folder; presentation on estimated force levels Col Brousseau (JAMAG), 24 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen), ltr Booth to Nash, 14 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen), ltr Booth to Nash, 26 Nov 52, ibid.

62. Ltr Martin to Dir EURRegnlAffs State, 12 Nov 52, RG 330. ISA files, Nash papers, "NATO Annual Review" folder.

63. Ltr Booth to Nash, 14 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo USMbrPlngTeam "D" SG NATO for DepUSRepSG NATO, 1 Oct 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, "1952" folder; note CPN [Charles P. Noyes? (DepDefRepSrNSCStf)] to DirONATA, 3 Oct 52, ibid; memo A.C. Davis (DepUSRepSG NATO) for Beebe (DirONATA), 1 Oct [52], ibid.

64. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef and DepSecDef, 18 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef and DepSecDef, 4 Sep 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 23 Sep 52, ibid; memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 17 Sep 52, 6, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "NATO Annual Review" folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 18 Nov 52, w/enc ib, RG 330, CD 350.05 (Briefing).

65. Memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 19 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 23 Sep 52, ibid; msg USPermRepNAC to State, 22 Sep 52, FRUS 1952–1954, v. pt 1:327–29.

66. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 18 Nov 52, w/11 encs (see especially No 3), RG 330, CD 350.05 (Briefing); memrcd DepDirONATA, 2 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 311.5; memo DepATSD-
the Secretary of State”), 16 Jul 51, ibid; memcon SecState, 16 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:836–38.
82. Memo SecState and ActingSecDef for Pres, 30 Jul 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:849–52; editorial note, ibid, 847–49. Memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Apr 50, RG 330, CD 9–4, 29, shows that JCS had wanted Germany in NATO for some time.
83. Ltr DepUSecState to DepSecDef, 15 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); ltr ActingSecDef to DepUSecState, 21 Aug 51, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 4 Oct 51, ibid.
85. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); hr SecDef to SecState, 7 Nov 51, ibid; msg SecState for OHICOG, 19 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 2:1555–57; msg SecState for Pres and ActingSecState, 23 Nov 51, ibid, 1609–11.
87. Memo SplConsultant to SecArmy for Col Samuels et al, 21 Nov 51, w/report HICOM/P(51)91, 17 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany); Acheson, Present at the Creation, 583; communique, US, UK, Fr, and WGer FgnMins, 22 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 2:1607–09; msg SecState for Pres and ActingSecState, 23 Nov 51, ibid, 1609–11; editorial note, ibid, pt 1:932–33.
88. Editorial note, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:980–81; memo SplConsultant to SecArmy for Samuels et al, 21 Nov 51, w/rept HICOM/P(51)91, 17 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany).
89. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); ltr SecDef to SecState, 25 Oct 51, ibid; memo ATSD(lSA) for SecDef, lea 24 Oct 51, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 7 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany).
90. Memo ASecArmy for SecDef, 5 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092 (Germany); memo WSM [Col Willis S. Matthews] for ChJCS, 28 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(lSA) for Matthews, 19 Dec 51, w/notcs ATSD(lSA), 28 Nov 51, ibid; msg HICOG for SecState, 3 Jan 52, FRUS 1951, III, pt 2:1614–17.
91. Background paper LIS D–5/1a State, [31 Jan 52], RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(lSA) for Matthews, 19 Dec 51, w/notcs ATSD(lSA), 28 Nov 51, ibid; msg HICOG for SecState, 3 Jan 52, FRUS 1951, III, pt 2:1614–17.
92. Memo SecState and ActingSecDef for SecState, 12 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Sep 51, ibid.
94. Msg USDeleg for ActingSecState, 29 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 2:1611–12; memo DirONATA for ATSD(lSA), 12 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); background paper LIS D–5/1a State, 1 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).
95. Msg SecState for ActingSecState, 29 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, III, pt 1:947–48; msg ActingSecState for USEmb Italy, 28 Nov 51, ibid, 947; editorial note, ibid, 962–63; background paper LIS D–5/1a State, 1 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).
96. Background paper LIS D–5/1a State, 1 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); Acheson, Present at the Creation, 608–10; Poole, 1950–1952, 288–90; editorial note, FRUS 1952–1954, V, pt 1:56–58.
97. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 611–12, 615–21; memo DepATSD(lSA) for DepSecDef, 20 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 357 (Four Powers); mins of mtg of FgnMins w/Adenauer. (see par 5).
626  Notes to Pages 390–95

24 May 52, FRUS 1952–1954, VII, pt 1:95–100, 95n1; ltr Chancellor FRG to SecState, 27 May 52, ibid, 167–68.


99. Ltr SecDefto SecState, 19 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); draft memo prepared by J.J. Binns for USecArmy, 22 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Germany” folder; msg 6971 USAmb Fr for SecState, 11 May 52, ibid; paper [OSD], “McNeil Formula,” 12 May 52, w/encs, ibid; memo USecArmy for SecDef, 15 May 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

100. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 9 May 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); Acheson, Present at the Creation, 643–47; msg 5 ATSD(ISA) for USecArmy, 25 May 52, ibid; memo USecArmy for SecArmy, 29 May 52, ibid; Stebbins, U.S. in World Affairs, 1952, 156–57; memo [Exec­ SecNSC) for Pres, 12 Jun 52, Truman papers, PSF:NSC.


104. Memo SecDef for JCS, 10 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Germany” folder; memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for JCS, 4 Jul 52, ibid; memo MemoSecDef for JCS, 4 Aug 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, “Military Assistance to Western Germany,” 17 Sep 52, w/4th draft plan, 16 Sep 52, ibid.

105. Ltr ActingSecDef to SecState, 13 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Germany); memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jul 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Aug 52, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 11 Aug 52, ibid; MDAP: DoD Opns, Jul 52, vii, Jan 53, 19, 24.


XIX. ORGANIZATION FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE


3. *First Semiannual Report on MDAP*, 23–25; EO 10099, 27 Jan 50, reprinted in ibid, 63–64; announcement 194 Dept State; [25 Nov 49], ibid, 64–65. For Acheson's high opinion of Ohly's judgment, see Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, 674, 678.


9. Ltr SecDef to CINCEUR, 25 Nov 49, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecsMilDepts et al, 25 Nov 49, ibid; JCS Hist Div, *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 20 Dec 77, 7; H.H. Lumpkin, "USCINCEUR & DEFREPNAMA" (ms), [ca 1961], 1–2, OSD Hist; *First Semiannual Report on MDAP*, 32.


13. Interv with Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer by Alfred Goldberg, Lawrence Kaplan, Doris M. Condit, 4 Mar 76, 6, OSD Hist; memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for ASD(C) et al, 10 Nov 52, w/paper SecMAC, [ca 10 Nov 52], RG 330, CD 142–1–1.


15. Memo DirBoB for Pres, 30 Sep 50, w/Truman's handwritten approval, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Gen); ltr DirBoB to SecDef, 5 Oct 50, ibid; memo DirOMA for DepSecDef, 12 Oct 50, ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(FMA&MA), 9 Oct 50, ibid; memo SecDef for Harriman, 11 Oct 50, ibid; memo Heneman for DepDirMDA State, 5 Oct 50, w/enc rev draft memo for Pres, 5 Oct 50, Ohly papers; memo DirOMA for DepSecDef, 12 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Gen).
628 Notes to Pages 401–05

16. Memo understanding State et al. [19 Dec 50], FRUS 1950, I:484–86; memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et al., 11 Jan 51, Condit file, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to SACEUR, 31 May 51, RG 330, CD 370.21 (SHAPE); Third Semiannual Report to Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, October 6, 1950 to March 31, 1951 (1951), 41–42.

17. Memo of understanding State et al. [19 Dec 50], FRUS 1950, I:484–86; Third Semiannual Report on MDAP, 42; ltr SecDef to SACEUR, 31 May 51, RG 330, CD 370.21 (SHAPE); ltr DirISA State to H. Christian Sonne, 19 Jun 51, w/paper on organization to administer MSA, 11 Jun 51, 5, Ohly papers; memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts et al., 11 Jan 51, ibid.

18. Memo ExecSecOSD for JCS, 25 Jul 50, w/terms ref, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for ASD(I&L), 10 Nov 50, ibid; ltr DepSecDef to DepSecState, 16 Nov 50, ibid; memo ATSD(FMA&MA) for SecDef, 28 Nov 50, ibid; memcon Beebe, 27 Nov 50, RG 330, 300–1–1 (1950 Dec) [green binder No 2, “Memoranda of Conversation”]; memo ActingSecDef for JCS, ChMB, 29Dec 50, w/enc, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).


20. Ltr SACEUR to SecDef, 12 May 51, RG 330, CD 370.21 (SHAPE); ltr SecDef to SACEUR, 31 May 51, ibid.


22. Intraoff memo Bell (ISA State) for Ohly, 23 May 51, w/draft paper. Ohly papers; ltr Cte on Present Danger to DepSecDef, 7 Jun 51, w/draft rept, 12–13, RG 330, CD 334 (Comte on Present Danger).

23. Memo George A. Lincoln (SplAsst to SecDef) for DepSecDef et al., 26 Mar 51, Lincoln papers, “Chronological File” folder, OSD Hist; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, 30 Mar 51, ibid; memcon Lincoln, [20 Apr 51], ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef et al., 24 Apr 51, ibid; memo Lincoln for SecDef, 31 May 51, w/rept, Lincoln to SecDef, 30 May 51, ibid.


Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency, 1945–1953, 220–21; ltr DirMS to SecState, 1 Nov 51, Ohly papers; memo Asst to DirMS for SecState et al, 2 Nov 51, ibid; deleg of auth DirMS, 31 Mar 52, ibid; memo DirMS Exec 18, William J. Sheppard (ExecAsstODMS), 29 Apr 52, w/memo DirMS, ibid; ltr Tannenwald to Historian OSD, 2 Feb ’79.


31. Comments Tannenwald, in Heller, Truman White House, 221; comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C–25–E–21. For examples of ODMS–OSD friction, see ltr Tannenwald to ATSD(ISA), 5 Nov 51, Tannenwald papers, “Military Assistance” folder, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; draft memo S. Efron for DirOMA, 19 Nov 51, ibid; memo ADirPgmODMS for DirOMA, 6 Feb 52, Ohly papers; memo Tannenwald for ATSD(ISA), 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).


36. Memos DirMS for Perkins (State) et al, 23 Jan 52, w/terms ref. 12 Jan 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Reorganization in Europe” folder; memo SRE, 17 Mar 52, ibid; msg 105027 DepSecDef for Batt, 29 Mar 52, RG 330, Lovett papers. “Classified Cables . . . Pawley’s . . .” folder; ltr ATSD(ISA) to Perkins (AsecState), 7 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); ltr ActingSecDef to SecArmy, 14 May 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo Ruffner (DepATSD(ISA)) for SecDef, 29 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Reorganization in Europe” folder; ltr SecDef to Finlay, 29 May 52, ibid.

37. Memo D.L. Van Syckle (OMA OSD) for ATSD(ISA), 19 Dec 52, w/encs, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Logistic Plng), memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 26 Dec 52, w/memo and MSP employment rept, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

38. Memo DirMS for Perkins (AsecState) et al, 23 Jan 52, w/memo on position of USSR in Europe, 12 Jan 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Reorganization in Europe” folder; ltr ATSD(ISA) to DirOffEURegAffs State, 1 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); Lumpkin, “USCINCEUR & DREFPNAME,” 3, 5–6.


40. Memo Pawley (SplaAsst to SecDef) for SecDef, 17 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 370; Lumpkin, “SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept,” 17–18, 23–44.

41. Lumpkin, “SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept,” 19, 21–23; msg 900687 JCS for USLO SHAPE (for Eisenhower), 8 Feb 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Reorganization in Europe” folder; msg 850 SACEUR for SecDef and ChJCS, 14 Mar 52, ibid.

42. Lumpkin, “SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept,” 49–50; memo Beebe for Historian OSD, 20 Mar 55, OSD Hist.

43. Lumpkin, “SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept,” 50–52; msg Sx 4226 Handy (CINCEUR) for AcoS G–3, 12 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Reorganization in Europe” folder.
44. Memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 18 Apr 52, w/enc, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Reorganization in Europe” folder; ltr ADir and Counsel ODMS to SecDef, 24 Apr 52, w/enc, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 2 May 52, w/enc, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo SecsMilDepts for SecDef, 29 Apr 52, cited in Lumpkin, “SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept,” 53.
45. Memo DirONATA (for Nash) for SecDef, [ca 8 May 52], RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo DirONATA for ATSD(ISA), 11 Jun 52, ibid; ltr ADir and CoS ODMS to SecDef, 18 Jun 52, w/enc, ibid; memo DepSecDef for ChJCS, 28 Jun 52, ibid.
46. Lumpkin, “SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept,” 53; memo DirONATA for SecDef, 2 May 52, w/handwritten note in margin, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).
47. Memo JCS for SecDef, 9 May 52, w/draft msg for Eisenhower, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); msg Polto 1184 SRE for SecState, 22 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Reorganization in Europe” folder.
49. Memo JCS for SecDef, 23 May 52, w/enc draft msg JCS for SACEUR, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); msg 1144 SACEUR for JCS, 29 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Reorganization in Europe” folder.
52. Memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Jun 52, w/draft msg for Ridgway, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe), memo Carter (for SecDef) for Draper, 15 Jul 52, ibid; memo Radm H.P. Smith (DirOFMA) for SecDef, 7 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Reorganization in Europe” folder.
54. Ltr SecDef to DirMS, 7 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo DirMS Exec 30, 29 Jul 52, w/enc terms of ref, RG 330, CD 092.2 (NATO Gen); memo SecDef for SRE and JCS, 15 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for USSRE, 15 Jul 52, ibid.
55. Lumpkin, “SACEUR/CINCEUR Concept,” 71, 73, 119; interoff control sheet N 473 Beebe, 11 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for SRE, 15 Jul 52, ibid; msg ALO 1375 Ridgway for JCS, 21 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Reorganization in Europe” folder; ltr SecDef to SACEUR, 22 Nov 52, ibid; msg DEF 925104 ATSD(ISA) for US CINCEUR, 30 Nov 52, ibid.

XX. GROWTH OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE


7. Ltr SecState to SecDef, 21 Jul 50, w/rev memo, 21 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 092,3 (NATO Gen); memcon SecState, 21 Jul 50, w/enc, *FRUS 1950*, III:136–37; msg DepUSRepNAC for SecState, 29 Jul 50, ibid, 162–63.


11. Memo DepExecSecNSC for AdHocCte on NSC 68, 13 Sep 50, w/estimates for MDAP State, ibid; memo DepDirMDA State for Matthews (DepUSecState), 4 Dec 50, w/enc, subsequently distributed by memo ExecSecNSC for NSCSrStf, 5 Dec 50, ibid; mins 75th mtg NSC, 14 Dec 50, Decision 1. Truman papers, President’s Secretary’s files: NSC (PSF:NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

12. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 27 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 091,3 (MDAP); memo DirOMA for SecDef, 22 Dec 50, ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(FMA&MA), 26 Dec 50, ibid; annual budget msg to Cong, 15 Jan 51, *Truman Public Papers, 1951*, 71.

13. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 27 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 091,3 (MDAP Gen); memo SecDef for JCS, 9 Nov 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Feb 51, w/apps, ibid; draft paper, “How Was MDAP ‘52 Program Built,” [Col George A. Lincoln (SplAsst to SecDef)], 3 Apr 51, Lincoln papers, “Chronological File” folder, OSD Hist; rev draft Lincoln, “Notes on the Relationships . . . .,” 3 May 51, 5, ibid.


15. Memo Lincoln for SecDef, 26 Mar 51, ibid; memrcd Lincoln, 26 Mar 51, ibid; memo Lincoln for SecDef, 30 Mar 51, ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, 3 Apr 51, ibid.

16. Draft II Lincoln for DepSecDef, “NATO Requirements for MTDP,” 11 Apr 51, ibid; memrcd Lincoln, 13 Apr 51, ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, 17 Apr 51, ibid; memo Lincoln for DirJtStfJCS, 20 Apr 51, ibid; memrcd Lincoln, 24 Apr 51, ibid.
632 Notes to Pages 418–23

17. Memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, 17 Apr 51, ibid; memrcd Lincoln, 17 Apr 51, ibid; memo DepSecDef for SecsMilDepts et al, 17 Apr 51, ibid.

18. Memrcd Miller (Asst to Lincoln), 18 Apr 51, re conv w/Gen Bradley, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 19 Apr 51, w/memo Lincoln for SecDef, 18 Apr 51, ibid; ltr Lincoln to Col R.J. Wood (SHAPE), 19 Apr 51, ibid; memrcd Lincoln, "mtg w/Gen Bradley," 19 Apr 51, ibid.


20. Draft notes [Lincoln] on briefing, 2 May 51, ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, "Briefing . . . on 3 May 51," 1 May 51, ibid; memrcd [on managing MSP] Lincoln, 30 Apr 51, ibid.

21. Paper, "Basic Data . . . Rearmament," [ca 8 May 51], ibid; interoff memo Lincoln for Burns, 10 May 51, w/memrcd on MTDP planning basis, 10 May 51, ibid; rev notes [on costing study] Lincoln, 9 May 51, ibid; ltr Lincoln to LtGen Cortlandt Schuyler, SHAPE, 9 May 51, ibid.

22. Memrcd Lincoln, 16 May 51, ibid; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef et al, 22 May 51, ibid.

23. Spl msg for Cong, 24 May 51, Truman Public Papers, 1951, 304, includes administrative expenses in Title I; memo Lincoln for DepSecDef, 16 May 51, Lincoln papers, "Chronological File" folder.

24. As Marshall's representative, Goodrich accompanied both congressional groups through Europe. See interv with Nathaniel H. Goodrich by Doris M. Condit, 10 Apr 84, 7, 8, 10, 28–35, OSD Hist; ltr Goodrich to Historian OSD, 29 Feb 84, w/comments, ibid; telecon Goodrich w/Condit, 16 Mar 84, Condit file, OSD Hist; testimony SACEUR, 9 Jul 51 (Paris), US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign-Aid Programs in Europe: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1951), 20.

25. US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, Mutual Security Act of 1951: Hearings, 82 Cong, 1 sess (1951), 35–68, 694; ltr SecDef to Sen Brien McMahon, 29 Aug 51, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe); memo DirOMA for SecDef, 24 Aug 51, ibid.


27. The new budget request and justifications were available to Congress at least as early as 18 September. See House Cte on Appropriations, Mutual Security Program Appropriations for 1952: Hearings, pt 1:5, 7–8, pt 2:747.


29. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DirMS, 8 Nov 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "1952 Budget" folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, [ca 10 Jan 52], RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jan 52, w/apps, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 15 Feb 52, ibid; memo William H. Mautz (OASD(C)) for Lyle S Garlock (OASD(C)), 10 Mar 52, w/paper, "Categorical Distribution. . . Mutual Security Assistance Program," 27 Feb 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, "NSC 114/2 (FY53)" folder; US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of 1952: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 567–68.

30. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jan 52, w/apps, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

31. Ltr ActingAdmrECA to DepSecDef, 22 Dec 51, w/paper, "Effect of Economic Aid in Support of UK Defense Program," RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP/UK); ltr DirMS to Pres, 2 Feb 52, w/encls, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); Ohly comments, 29 Oct 81, C–26–E–25–26, Condit file, OSD Hist.

32. Ltr DirMS to Pres, 2 Feb 52, w/apps and tables (see particularly table II, "Distribution of Economic Aid Title I"), RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo DepSecDef for Pres, 4 Feb 52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 15 Feb 52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for Pres, 4 Feb 52, w/handwritten note, ibid; ltr Pres to DirMS, 4 Feb 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, "Aid for France" folder.
33. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 13 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (Gen); memo Mautz for Garlock, 10 Mar 52, w/paper, 27 Feb 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files. "NSC 114/2 (FY53)" folder; Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of 1952, 567–68; memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Feb 52, RG 340, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo SecDef for JCS, 1 Mar 52, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 15 Mar 52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 3 May 52, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers. "MDAP Programs" folder; OMA OSD, MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Department of Defense Operations, Jun 52, 13.


36. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 28 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 110.01; annual budget msg to Cong, 21 Jan 52, Truman Public Papers, 1952–53, 74; memo ASD(C) for SecDef, 5 Jan 52, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files. "Budget–1953" folder.

37. Memo DepSecDef, 28 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 110.01.

38. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (Gen); annual budget msg to Cong, 21 Jan 52, Truman Public Papers, 1952–53, 7–77.


40. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Feb 52, w/encs, RG 330, CD 091.5 (Gen).

41. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, [ca 5 Feb 52], ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 9 Feb 52, ibid; ltr SACECR to SecDef, 28 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

42. Special msg to Cong on the Mutual Security Program, 6 Mar 52, Truman Public Papers, 1952–53, 179–90 (179, quote); memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (United Kingdom); memo Ferguson (DepDirPPS State) for Webb (USecState), 12 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, 1:261; paper Robert W. Tafts (PPS State), [12 Dec 51], ibid, 262–63; memo Robert M. Macy (BoB) for ADirBoB, 18 Dec 51, RG 51, BoB series 142.

43. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Feb 52, w/encs, RG 330, CD 091.5 (Gen).

44. Memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, [ca 5 Feb 52], ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 9 Feb 52, ibid; ltr SACECR to SecDef, 28 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

45. Memo DC for SecDef, 1 Feb 52, w/encs, RG 330, CD 091.5 (Gen).

46. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, [ca 5 Feb 52], ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 9 Feb 52, ibid; ltr SACECR to SecDef, 28 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).

47. Special msg to Cong on the Mutual Security Program, 6 Mar 52, Truman Public Papers, 1952–53, 179–90 (179, quote); memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (United Kingdom). To the figure of $5.5 billion given in the special message should be added $75 million placed in Title I for administrative and international security expenses, to reach $5.425 billion; see US Cong, Senate, Cte on Foreign Relations, The Mutual Security Act of 1952, 82 Cong, 2 sess (30 Apr 52), S Rept No 1490, 5, 25.

48. Memo DC for SecDef, 1 Feb 52, w/encs, RG 330, CD 091.5 (Gen).

49. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, [ca 5 Feb 52], ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 9 Feb 52, ibid; ltr SACECR to SecDef, 28 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.7 (Europe).


52. PL 82–400 (20 June 1952); memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for JCS, 10 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers. "FY 53 Programs" folder; briefing notes [OMA] OSD, "FY 53 Program . . . . . (ca 25 Jul 52), RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers. "Briefing Notes . . . . 25 July 52" folder.

Notes to Pages 427–34


51. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 24 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for JCS, 10 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “FY 53 Programs” folder.

52. Memo ChJCS for DepSecDef, 19 Jul 52, w/memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Jul 52, w/Apps A and B, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memrcd [OMA] OSD, [ca 25 Jul 52], RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Brief for Mr. Nash, OMA Activities . . . ” folder.

53. Memcon Najeeb Halaby (DepEurMSA ISA), 29 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 334 (Gen); memo DepACoS G–4 (FgnMilAid) Dept Army for DirOMA OSD, 4 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo DepSecDef for JCS, 29 Jul 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 12 Aug 52, ibid; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 14 Aug 52, ibid.

54. Memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for JCS, 11 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo ActingATSD (ISA) for SecDef, 11 Jul 52, ibid.

55. Memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for JCS, 11 Jul 52, ibid; memo ActingATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 11 Jul 52, ibid; briefing note, FY 1954 Program Proposed Programming Cycle, [ca 25 Jul 52], RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Briefing Notes . . . 25 July 1952” folder.

56. Memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jul 52, w/enccs, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo Nash for SecDef, 8 Aug 52, ibid.

57. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 9 Aug 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 30 Oct 52, ibid; ltr ADir(Pgm)ODMS to DirBoB, 18 Nov 52, 36, ibid; memo ActingDirOMA for DirMS, 26 Aug 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “MDAP Progress” folder; memo ADir(Pgm)ODMS for DirBoB, 16 Oct 52, w/enccs, ibid, “FY 1954 MSP” folder.

58. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for DirMS, 4 Nov 52, w/4 enccs, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “FY 1954 MSP” folder.

59. Ltr Ohly to DirBoB, 18 Nov 52, particularly 30–47, (33, quote), w/Annex A, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

60. Memo [ISA?], “BoB Markup,” [ca 17 Dec 52], RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “FY 1954 MSP” folder; table w/notes, FY 1954 MDAP Budget Reclama, [ca 22 Dec 52], ibid, “MDAP Progress” folder; ltr Ohly to DirBoB, 18 Nov 52, 36–37, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

61. Ltr ATSD(ISA) to ADir(Pgm)ODMS, 25 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); interoff memo Halaby for Nash, 24 Nov 52, ibid; memo [ISA?], “BoB Markup,” [ca 17 Dec 52], RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “FY 1954 MSP” folder.


XXI. IMPLEMENTING MILITARY ASSISTANCE


2. Memo DirOMA OSD for SecDef, 10 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Gen); memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 10 Jul 50, w/encls, ibid.

3. Memo SecAFPC for MbrsAFPC, 13 Jul 50, RG 218, CCS 334 (AFPC) (12-2-47) sec 6; memo ExecSec OSD for JCS, 20 Jul 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Korea).

4. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 16 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Gen).

5. Memo DirOMA for SecDef, 11 Aug 50, w/draft memo, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 18 Aug 50, ibid.

6. Memo JCS for SecDef, 12 Sep 50, ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(FMA & MA), 18 Sep 50, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 18 Sep 50, ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 7 Nov 50, ibid.

7. JCS Decision on 1966/46, 14 Sep 50, w/encl A, draft memo JCS for SecDef, [14 Sep 50], RG 330, CD 104–1 (1950); memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Oct 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Indochina); memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP China).

8. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 5 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Gen); memo DirOMA for SecDef, 8 Sep 50, ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy, 8 Sep 50, ibid.

9. Interv with John H. Ohly by Doris M. Condit, 28 Apr 77, 55–56, OSD Hist; Itr Acting SecDef to SecState, 20 Sep 50, w/intraoff memo ASD(C) for SecDef, [nd], RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Gen); comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C–24–E–14, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecArmy, 28 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Korea).

10. Memo Webb (Acting SecState) for Truman, 21 Sep 50, Ohly papers, OSD Hist; Itr Acting SecState to SecDef, 23 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Korea); memo SecDef for SecArmy, 28 Sep 50, ibid.


12. Memo JCS for SecDef, 8 Dec 50, w/apps, RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP Korea).


15. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 52, 6, 9, 14.

16. Memo Ohly for Nash (ATSD(ISA)), 4 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo Nash for Ohly, 11 Feb 52, ibid; MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 52, v.


18. MDAP: DoD Opns, May 52, 15.

19. Memo DirEXOS for ATSD(ISA), 22 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 400.12; memo ASD(L & L) for SecDef, 9 May 52, w/encl, 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo DirOMA for DepATSD(ISA), 14 May 52, RG 330, Isa files, Nash papers, "Allocations and Priorities" folder; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 21 May 52, ibid, "MDAP Progress" folder.

20. MDAP: DoD Opns, May 52, 15, Jul 52, 15; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 22 May 52, RG 330, Isa files, Nash papers, "MDAP Progress" folder; memo SecDef for SecAF, 27 May 52, ibid.

21. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jun 52, viii, 13, Jul 52, 14, Jan 53, 16; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 8 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C–26–E–29–30.
22. *MDAP: DoD Opns*, Jul 52, 14; memo JCS for SecDef, 10 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 380 (Gen); ltr SecDef to Pres, [ca 23 Oct 51], w/paper on Allocations Policies, Truman papers, President’s Secretary’s files-General (PSF-General), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

23. ltr SecDef to Pres, [ca 23 Oct 51], w/paper on Allocations Policies, Truman papers, PSF-General; memo [ExecSecNSC] for Pres, 18 Oct 51, Truman papers, PSF:NSC; memcon Lucius D. Battle (SplAsst to SecState), 18 Oct 51, US Dept State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951* (hereafter cited as *FRUS* with year and volume number), 1,238-40.

24. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 1 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); paper, “Questions or Assumptions; Military Aid . . . .”, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “MDAP Progress” folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 23 Jan 52, w/paper, “US Comments on TCC Report,” 22 Jan 52, 5, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al, 28 Dec 51, ibid; msg ALO 623 CoS SHAPE for SecDef. 12 Jan 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Allocations and Priorities” folder.

25. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 21 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); ltr Pres to SecDef, 9 Jan 52, ibid.


27. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 23 Jan 52, w/paper, “US Comments on TCC Report.” [22 Jan 52], 8, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); annual budget msg to Cong, 21 Jan 52, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952-53*, . . . (hereafter cited as *Truman Public Papers* with year), 74; memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 9 May 52, w/paper ODMS, 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

28. Memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 23 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (Gen); ltr DirJAMAG to ATSD(ISA), 28 Feb 52, w/enc, “Report on Effect of Slow Deliveries . . . .”, 28 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

29. Memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 9 May 52, w/paper ODMS, 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

30. Memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 9 May 52, ibid; memo DirOMA for SecDef, [14 Apr 52], w/handwritten note, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “MDAP Progress” folder; memo DirOMA for DepATSD(ISA), 14 May 52, ibid, “Allocations and Priorities” folder.

31. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 20 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Allocations and Priorities” folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 29 Apr 52, ibid, “MDAP Progress” folder; memrcd Dennis F. Aughavin (OASD(C)), 29 Apr 52, ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 12 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

32. Memo SecDef for SecArmy, SecNavy, SecAF, 1 May 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “MDAP Progress” folder.

33. Memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 21 May 52, ibid; *MDAP: DoD Opns*, Jul 52, v, 13. Figure of $8.2 billion arrived at by subtracting from $15.67 billion (total 1950-52 MDAP funds earmarked for DoD), $4.22 billion (1953 appropriation) and $3.22 billion (cumulative expenditures through June 1952), to equal what had not been expended by the end of June 1952.

34. ltr DirMS to SecDef, 26 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); ltr SecDef to DirMS, 2 Jun 52, ibid; memrcd Najeeb Halaby (DepEurMSA ISA), 1 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Annual Review).

35. Report [OMA], “European NATO Area and Western Germany, Highlight Summary,” [ca 18 Aug 52], 2, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files, “NSC 11/2” folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 26 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).

36. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 20 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen). For Air Force diversions of aircraft, see memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 15 Aug 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Allocations and Priorities” folder; briefing MajGen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., before the Munitions Allocations Council, 16 Feb 55, ibid, unlabeled folder.

37. Memo ATSD(ISA) for ASD(C), 26 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo ActingDirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 26 Aug 52, ibid; memo DepComp Dept Army for DepComp(Accounting Policy) OSD, 7 Oct 52, ibid; agenda Munitions Allocation Council, “Fourth Meeting . . . . on 8
January 1953," w/enc Tab A-7, memo ASD(C) for ATSD(ISA), 20 Dec 52, RG 530, ISA files. Nash papers, unlabeled folder.

58. Memo DirMS to DepSecDef, 17 Jul 52, w/enc, 17 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).
59. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 14 Jan 52, ibid; memo SecNavy for SecDef, 12 Feb 52, ibid; memo SecArmy for SecDef, 1 Feb 52, ibid; memo SecAF for SecDef, 1 Feb 52, ibid.
60. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DirMS, 4 Feb 52, ibid; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 14 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).

61. Ltr DirMS to SecDef, 4 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); msg ATSD(ISA) for Col George A. Lincoln, 7 Feb 52, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, "Allocations and Priorities" folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 11 Feb 52, ibid; interoff memo [Underwood] for DepDirEXOS, 14 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); ltr SecDef to DirMS, 15 Feb 52, ibid.
62. Interoff memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 28 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen); interoff memo LtCol S.W. Dziuban for ATSD(ISA), 31 Jan 52, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 30 Jan 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Feb 52, ibid.
63. Memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Mar 52, w/encl. RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).
64. Memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 31 Mar 52, ibid; ltr ActingSecDef to DirMS, 31 Mar 52, ibid.
65. Ltr DirMS to SecDef, 8 Apr 52, ibid.
66. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 11 Apr 52, ibid; memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for JCS, 12 Apr 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 7 May 52, ibid; ltr SecDef to DirMS, 21 May 52, w/enc, ibid.
67. Ltr DirMS for SecDef, 18 Jun 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 21 Aug 52, w/enc, ibid. ltr SecDef to DirMS, 8 Sep 52, ibid; memo SecDef for JCS, 16 Sep 52, ibid; ltr DirMS to SecDef, 7 Oct 52, ibid; ltr DirMS and SecDef to Pres, 11 Oct 52, w/enc, ibid.
68. Memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 20 Sep 52, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, "Allocations and Priorities" folder. memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 1 Oct 52, ibid; memo JCS for USRepSG NAMC, 31 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 092.3 (NATO Gen).
69. Memo Burns for Nash (ATSD(ISA)), 5 Nov 51, w/rept, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo ChMgmtCte OSD for SecDef, 17 Jan 52, ibid; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 14 Feb 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 11 Feb 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 11 Apr 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 11 Aug 52, w/handwritten note, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, "Allocations and Priorities" folder.
71. Memo JCS for SecDef, 15 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 20 Aug 52, ibid; ltr DirMS and SecDef to Pres, 11 Oct 52, ibid.
72. DoD Directive No 5156.1 [5105-5], 1 and 9 Oct 52; memo SecMAC OSD for DepSecDef, 16 Oct 52, w/mins first mtg of Munitions Allocation Council OSD, RG 330, CD 142-1-1.
73. MDAP. DoD Opns, Jan 53, 17; ltr DirMS to SecDef, 1 Jan 53, RG 550, ISA files. Nash papers, "Allocations and Priorities" folder.
74. Ltr Oscar Cox to Theodore Tannenwald (ADirODMS), 8 Mar 52, w/study, "Off-Shore Procurement Program . . . . . . ." 1 Mar 52, Tannenwald papers, "Military Assistance" folder. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo; ltr William L. Batt (MSA in London) to Nash, 10 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 470.8; memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 5 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 400.17, comments Ohly, 29 Oct 81, C-27-E-8-15; memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 5 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 400.17; memo VChStockpile&IntlProg MB for ChMB, 11 Jan 52, ibid; memo ChMB for UseArmy et al, 12 Jan 52, ibid; intraoff memo ChOPISA for DirOMA, 5 Feb 52, ibid; ltr ATSD(ISA) to Batt, 28 Apr 52, ibid; memo DirOIPISA for ATSD(ISA), 29 Apr 52, ibid.
75. Memo Roger Ernst (ONATA) for ATSD(ISA), 25 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 400.12.
638 Notes to Pages 445-47


58. Ltr Cox to Tannenwald, 8 Mar 52, w/study of “Off-Shore Procurement Program . . .” 1 Mar 52, 7, 13, Tannenwald papers, “Military Assistance” folder.

59. Memo UseCmry for ASD(ISA), 31 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 400.12; memo SplAsst to SecCmry for UseCmry, 31 Mar 52, ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 14 Apr 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for Gordon (ADirPgm) ODMS, 28 Apr 52, ibid; ltr ADirPgm) ODMS for ATSD(ISA), 15 May 52, ibid; memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 31 May 52, RG 330, CD 452.01.

60. Ltr ATSD(ISA) for ChRenegotBd, 14 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 400.12; intraoff memo DepDirEXOS for DirEXOS, 14 Dec 51, ibid; ltr SecDef to USAmb Fr, 8 Feb 52, ibid; ltr DepSecDef to ChRenegotBd, 11 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 400.17.

61. Memo Musto 247 W. John Kenney (DepDirMSA) for HICOG, 19 Mar 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, “Classified Cables . . .” folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al, 24 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo DepDirEXOS for ASecAF, 28 Mar 52, ibid; memo ATSD(ISA) for ADirODMS, 2 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (France); MDAP: DoD Ops, Mar 52, ix-x.

62. Memo ATSD(ISA) for UseCmry, 6 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo Sam Efron (CounselOMA) for ATSD(ISA), 21 Mar 52, ibid; memo UseCmry for ATSD(ISA), 14 Mar 52, ibid; memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al, 24 Mar 52, ibid; ltr SecDef to SecState, 4 Apr 52, ibid; memo USecCmry for ODMS, 2 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 400.12; memo DepSecDef for SecNavy, 30 Apr 52, ibid.

63. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 21 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 400.12, originally addressed to the SecDef and initialed by Lovett.

64. Memo UseCmry for SecDef, 11 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (France); memo ActingSecDef for UseCmry, 29 Mar 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for ATSD(ISA), 11 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 400.12.

65. Memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 14 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 400.12; memo ChfOIP MB for ATSD(ISA), 6 May 52, ibid; MDAP: DoD Ops, Jul 52, vii, 25, Feb 55, x, Mar 53, ix.

66. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Feb 52, with encs, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen); memo JCS for SecDef, 18 Jul 52, ibid; memo Leffingwell for DepSecDef et al, 16 Oct 52, w/enc, RG 330, CD 142-1-1; memo DirMS for ATSD(ISA), 15 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 091.3 (Gen).


68. Memo Pawley (SplAsst to SecDef) for SecDef, 14 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Gen); msg Niact 56”0 SecState for USAmb Fr, 24 Mar 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, “Classified Cables . . . Pawley’s . . .” folder; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 4 Apr 52, with handwritten note initialed by Lovett, RG 330, CD 091.5 (France); memo DirOMA for ATSD(ISA), 29 Apr 52, w/brief, 23 Apr 52, RG 330, ISA file, Nash papers, “Aid for France” folder.

69. Memrcd John F. Kiernan (OMA), 18 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (France); memo Acting ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 20 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Aid for France” folder; memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 19 Feb 53, ibid.


71. Memo ActingATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 20 Jul 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Aid for France” folder; memrcd DirEXOS, 21 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (France); ltr ChfMAAG France to ATSD(ISA) and DirOMA, 14 Aug 52, ibid; memocon Ridgway Knight (State), 28 Aug 52, ibid; memo DirOMA for A1SD(ISA), 25 Sep 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Aid for France” folder.

72. Memo Ohly for Nash (ATSD(ISA)) and [Harlan] Cleveland (ADir(Euro)MSA), 7 Oct 52, RG 330, ISA files, Nash papers, “Aid for France” folder; memo [ASD(ISA)] for SecDef, [ca 11 Mar 53],
ibid; memo DirMS for ATSD(ISA), 15 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (Gen); MDAP: DoD Opns. Mar 53, x–xi.
73. Memo DepSecDef for JCS, 14 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (Gen); memo JCS for SecDef, 3 Nov 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Nov 52, ibid; memo Cleveland for Ohly, 31 Dec 52, w/table, "Defense Support and Economic Aid for Western Europe . . . ." RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, "FY 1953 Programs" folder; memo ATSD(ISA) for DirOMA, 7 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 091.0 (France); ltr ChfMAAG Fr to ATSD(ISA) and DirOMA, 10 Oct 52, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, "MDAP Progress" folder.
74. Memo ATSD(ISA) for DirOMA, 7 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (France); Second Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, 30 Jun 52, 11–13; ltr ChfMAAG Fr to ATSD(ISA) and DirOMA, 13 Oct 52, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, "MDAP Progress" folder; memocon SecDef, 11 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 092.0 (France); MDAP: DoD Opns, Dec 52, xiv, Jan 53, xi, Feb 53, x, Mar 53, xi.
75. Memo ASecState(EUR) for SecState, 3 Mar 52, FRUS 1952–1954, VI, pt 1:865–67; testimony W. Averell Harriman, 14 Mar 52, Senate Cte on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of 1952: Hearings, 39–40; testimony William S. Batt, 26 Mar 52, ibid, 291–93; MDAP: DoD Opns, Aug 52, 23–24; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, [ca 7 Sep 51], RG 330, CD 091.3 (MDAP/UK); memo ATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 7 Sep 51, w/paper, ibid; msg Anthony Eden (UKForSec) for SecState, 10 Mar 52, w/paper, FRUS 1952–1954, VI, pt 1:868–70; memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 380 (Gen); First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, 31 Dec 51, 9–10.
77. Msg Tomus 224 MSA London for MSA Wash, 12 Mar 52, RG 330, Lovett papers, "Classified Cables . . . Pawley's . . ." folder; msg Tomus 258 MSA London for MSA Wash, 14 Mar 52, ibid; ltr ATSD(ISA) to ChSpIMissionUK MSA, [ca 20 Jun 52], RG 330, CD 400.12; memo DepMSSA ISA for DepSecDef, 26 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 470.8.
78. Ltr ATSD(ISA) to Dep(USSRE), 13 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 400.12; memo DepATSD(ISA) for ActingSRE, 18 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 470.8; memo DepATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 2 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 400.12; memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for SecArmy et al., 4 Dec 52, ibid; Third Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, 31 Dec 52, 3; MDAP: DoD Opns, Feb 53, x.
81. Memo ChFOIP MB for ChProcDiv OMA, 9 May 52, w/paper, "Relationship of United States and European Military Production," RG 330, CD 091.3 (Europe); ltr ActingDepDirMS to SecDef, 23 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 471; briefing note on relationship of end-item programming, [ca 25 Jul 52], RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, "Briefing Notes . . . 25 July 1952" folder; memo ADirPgm (ODMS) for ATSD(ISA), 29 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 451; memo Acting DirOFEDA ISA for DepEurMSA ISA, 26 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 091.5 (Europe).
82. Memo DepEurMSA ISA, 8 Aug 52, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, "MDAP Progress" folder; routing slip 0+05, 11 Aug 52, w/2 attached interoff memos, CD 452.01; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecAF, 15 Aug 52, ibid; ltr ExecSecOSSF to DepDirEXOS ONSD, 15 Sep 52, w/summary rcd.
5 Sep 52, ibid; ltr Halaby to Luke Finlay (DepSRE), 11 Sep 52, RG 330. ISA files, Nash papers, "Reorganization in Europe" folder; memo DepATSD(ISA) for DirMS, 4 Nov 52, w/paper, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers. "FY 1954 MSP" folder; memo DepSecDef for SecAF, 4 Dec 52, RG 350, CD 452.01; memo DepSecDef for SRE, 4 Dec 52, ibid; ltr DepSRE to DepSecDef, 15 Dec 52, ibid; memo USecAF for SecDef, 13 Nov 52, w/msg RL 1073 USecAF for ASecAF, 5 Sep 52, ibid; ltr ADir(Pgm) ODMS to ATSD(ISA), 20 Oct 52, ibid; testimony Nash and comments Lovett, 29 Mar 53. Cte on DeptDefOrg (hereafter cited as Rockefeller Cte), "Hearings" (mimeo), 31-32, OSD Hist.

83. MDAP: DoD Opns, Dec 52, xiii-xiv, Mar 53, x, xiii-xiv, Jan 53, ix, Mar 53, x; memo DepSecDef for SecAF, 4 Dec 52, w/encs, RG 350, CD 452.01; ltr ADir(Pgm) ODMS for ATSD(ISA), 20 Oct 52, ibid; ltr DepEurMSA ISA OSD to ADir(Pgm) ODMS, 31 Oct 52, ibid.

84. Memo ChfOIP MB for DirOMA, 5 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 471; memo ActingDirOFEDA ISA for DirONATA ISA, 24 Nov 52, w/staff paper, ibid; memo ActingATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 25 Jul 52, ibid.

85. Memo ActingSecDef for DepDirMSA, 19 Jun 52, ibid; memo George A. Chadwick (FgnAid-DivOIP MB) for DirOIP MB, 28 Apr 52, ibid; memo ActingDirOFEDA ISA for DirONATA, 24 Nov 52, w/staff paper, ibid.

86. Memo ActingSecDef for DepDirMSA, 19 Jun 52, w/memrcd. 12 Jun 52, and interoff memo DepATSD(ISA) for DepSecDef, 17 Jun 52, ibid; ltr ActingDepDirMS to SecDef, 23 Jul 52, ibid.

87. Ltr DepUSCINCEUR to ATSD(ISA), 19 Aug 52, RG 350, CD 400.12; ltr SRE to SecDef, 16 Sep 52, ibid; memo DirEXOS for ASD(C), 10 Nov 52, w/staff paper, RG 350, CD 142-1-1; memo ActingDirOFEDA ISA for DirONATA, 24 Nov 52, w/staff paper OFEDA ISA, [ca 24 Nov 52], 2, RG 350, CD 471.

88. Ltr DirMS to DepSecDef, 1 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 400.12; ltr SecState to SecDef, 5 Dec 52, ibid.

89. Memo DepEurMSA ISA for DepSecDef, 13 Dec 52, ibid; memo DirOMA for SpIAsst to SecState(MSA), 12 Dec 52, ibid; MDAP: DoD Opns, Dec 52, xiv-xv; ltr DirMS to DepSecDef, 23 Dec 52, RG 330, CD 400.12.

90. Mins of 4th mtg MAC, 8 Jan 53, RG 330, ISA files. Nash papers, unlabeled folder. For French ammunition procurement and feasibility of competitive bidding, see MDAP: DoD Opns, Mar 53, ix.

91. MDAP: DoD Opns, Mar 53, xii, Apr 53, x, give a combined FY 1952-53 total of $287 million of OSP contracts by 2 May 1953, from which a FY 1952 total of $141.9 million was subtracted (ibid, Feb 53, x); ibid, May 53, x, for aircraft contract.

92. MDAP: DoD Opns, Feb 53, x, Jun 53, 35.


95. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 53, 51; rept DepUSCINCEUR, [ca 18 May 55], in House Cte on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act Extension: Hearings, 399-400.

96. MDAP: DoD Opns, Jan 53, 14, 15, Jul 53, vi, 32; ltr ATSD(ISA) to ADir and CoS ODMS, 15 Jan 53, w/rept [OSD]. 8-10, RG 350, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 135).

97. Ltr ATSD(ISA) to ADir and CoS ODMS, 15 Jan 55, w/rept [OSD]. 1-5, RG 350, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 135); rept no 3, ODMS, NSC 142. Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1952, RG 330, CD 334; memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 23 Dec 52, w/briefing note on status of NATO forces . . . , ibid. Nash's earlier opinion is given in memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef, 4 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 201.

98. Ltr ATSD(ISA) to ADir and CoS ODMS, 15 Jan 55, w/rept [OSD]. 1-5, RG 350, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 135); memo ATSD(ISA) for SecDef. 25 Dec 52, w/briefing note on status of NATO forces. RG 350, CD 334.

XXII. OSD NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES


3. Memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 7 Mar 51, w/status rept No 1 to AEC, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A–Bomb); memo ChMLC for ChAEC, 14 May 51, w/status rept No 2 to AEC, RG 330, CD 319.1; ltr Thomas E. Murray (AEC Cmsr) to SecDef, 17 Mar 53, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A–Bomb); intraoff memo ChMLC for SecDef, 9 Jun 53, RG 330, CD 045.92.

4. Ltr ChJCAE to SecDef, 13 Feb 52, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Atomic Energy Act" folder.

5. Ltr SeeDef to ChJCAE, 11 Mar 52, ibid.

6. DoD Directive 20.15–1, 8 Mar 52, OSD Hist; memo William A.M. Burden (SplAsst to USecAF) for SecAF, 21 May 52, RG 330, CD 471.6.


8. Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions, 369–74; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 164–68; Walter Millis, ed, The Forrestal Diaries, 338.


14. Memo SecDef for ChCPC, 31 Jan 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 21 Dec 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Atomic Energy Act” folder.
15. Memo Kieffer for MbrsMLC, 10 May 51, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “CPC Policy 1950–51” folder; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al. 21 May 51, w/3 encs, FRUS 1951, 1:721–30; memo ExecSecMLC for AEC, 27 Mar 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Apr 51, w/memo JCS for MLC. 20 Apr 51, ibid.; memo [ChMLC?] for ASD(L&L), 30 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 51–1–35.
17. Memo ChMLC for SeeDef, 3 Jul 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for SeeDef. 26 Oct 51, RG 330, ibid.; memo ChMLC papers, “CPC Policy 1950–51” folder; diary entry ChAEC, 20 Jun 51, Gordon Dean “Diary,” DOE archives.
19. Memo ChMLC for SecDef, 29 Aug 51, w/notesc. RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo SecDef for JCS, 18 Sep 51, w/introff memo ChMLC for SecDef. 13 Sep 51, ibid.
20. Interoff memo Asst to ChMLC for Arneson, 17 Sep 51, w/draft paper, “Defense Views . . . . . . .” RG 330, ChMLC papers, “CPC Policy 1950–51” folder (draft paper only in FRUS 1951, 1:769–72, 769n1); ltr LeBaron to ChAEC. 14 Sep 51, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “CPC Policy 1950–51” folder; ltr ChAEC to William C. Foster (ActingSecDef), 27 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, 1:785–88; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 4 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb).
21. Memo SecDef for JCS, 18 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo SecDef for ChCPC, 12 Oct 51, ibid.; memo SecDef for ChMLC. 12 Oct 51, FRUS 1951, 1:776–77; ltr BrAmb Washington to SecState. 26 Dec 51, ibid., 798–99; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 321.
22. Ltr ExecDirJCAE to ChMLC. 29 Sep 51, w/AEC proposal. RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Atomic Energy Act” folder; memo ChMLC for SecDef. 20 Oct 52, w/paper, “Historical Review . . . . . .” 4–5, RG 330, CD 51–1–55; memo LeBaron for SecDef, 17 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 534 (Combined Policy Ctc).
23. Memo ChMLC for SecDef. 29 Sep 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo DepSecDef for ExecSecNSC, 1 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy); ltr SecDef to DirBoB, 29 Oct 51, ibid.; ltr ChAEC to SecDef, 1 Oct 51, w/2 encs, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Atomic Energy Act” folder; ltr ASD(L&L) to DirBoB. 19 Oct 51, ibid., PL 82–245 (30 October 1951) amended section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (FRUS 1951, 1:777n1).
24. Memo JCS for SecDef. 26 Oct 51, w/introff memo DirEXOS for ChMLC. RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); ltr ActingSecDef to ChAEC. 2 Nov 51, FRUS 1951, 1:784–85; ltr ChAEC to ActingSecDef. 27 Nov 51, ibid., 785–88; memo ChMLC for DepSecDef. 6 Dec 51, w/introff memo. RG 330, CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy).
25. Memo JCS for SecDef. 20 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy); memo ActingSecDef for ASD(L&L), 7 Dec 51, ibid.; memo SecDef for JCS, 21 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 515.5 (Gen Counsel); memo ChMLC for SecDef. 14 Oct 52, ibid.; memo ChMLC for ChJCS. 17 Oct 52, ibid.
26. Memo Arneson for SecState, 15 Jan 52, FRUS 1952–1954. II. pt 2 846–48; memo LeBaron for SecDef. 17 Oct 52, RG 330. CD 534 (Combined Policy Ctc); memo ExecSecNSC for SecState and SecDef, 28 Aug 52, RG 330. CD 550.05 (UK); memo SecDef for SecState and ChAEC. 6 Oct 52, ibid.
27. Memo ChMLC for SecDef. 14 Nov 52, RG 330. CD 550.05 (UK); interoff memo ChMLC for SecDef. 6 Dec 52, ibid.; memo ActingSecDef for USSecCPC. 12 Dec 52, ibid.; ltr LeBaron to Paul W. McDaniel (AFC). 27 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 534 (Combined Policy Ctc).


32. Intraoff memo ChMLC for SecDef, 28 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); Ltr SecDef to SecState, 29 Jun 52, ibid; memo ActingSecDef for JCS, 22 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 471.6; memo DepSecDef for JCS, 29 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo SecDef, 30 Jul 52, RG 330. Lovett papers, "1952" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.


34. Memo ChMLC for SecDef, 13 May 53, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo DirEXOS (for SecDef) for JCS, 14 Jan 53, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 8 Jun 53, ibid; Poole, *1950–1952*, 155–57; OATSD(AE), *History of Custody and Deployment*, 24.

35. Ltr SecDef to ChAEC, 8 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 385.2; OATSD(AE), *History of Custody and Deployment*, 21, 171. cites a joint memo MLCS–AEC for JCS, 26 April 1951, and reports that the JCS disapproved it without further explanation.


44. Memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al, w/enc, 3 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al, 8 Aug 52, w/handwritten note re Bradley’s concurrence, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 8 Aug 52, ibid; memo SecDef for Bradley, 30 Aug 52, ibid; memo ChjCS for SecDef, 4 Sep 52, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 8 Sep 52, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al, 10 Sep 52, w/Agreed Concepts, FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2:1010-13.
45. Memo ChjCS for SecDef, 10 Oct 52, w/AFSWP staff study, 30 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb).
46. Memo SecDef for Bradley, 21 Oct 52, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 7 Nov 52, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 21 Nov 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 7 Nov 52, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 21 Nov 52, ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 4 Sep 52, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al, 10 Sep 52, w/Agreed Concepts, FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2:1010-13.
47. Memo ChjCS for SecDef, 26 Sep 50, RG 330, ChjCS papers, “Fissionable Material Expansion Program 1949-1950” folder; memo SecDef for ChjCS, 29 Sep 51, w/draft paper, “A Chronological Listing . . . .” RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); ltr ChjCAE to SecDef, 8 May 52, w/paper, “The Scale and Scope of Atomic Production,” 4-5, 9-11, 22, ibid.
49. Ltr ChjCAE to SecDef, 10 Mar 50. RG 330, ChjCS papers, “Congressional and Legislative” folder; ltr SecDef to ChjCAE, 5 May 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 26 Apr 50, ibid; ltr ChjCAE to SecDef, 6 May 50, ibid; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 431.
50. Ltr ChjCAE to SecDef, 19 May 50. RG 330, ChjCS papers, “Congressional and Legislative” folder; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 31 May 50, w/draft reply, ibid; ltr SecDef for ChjCAE, 1 Jun 50, RG 330, CD 25-1-15.
51. Ltr ChjCAE to SecDef, 8 May 52, w/paper, “The Scale and Scope . . . .”, 22, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); intraoff memo ChMLC for SecDef, 11 Jul 50, ibid; editorial note, FRUS 1950, 1:565; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, 263.
52. Memrcd [OLL] on JCAE hearings, 22 Jun 50, 6 Jul 60, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Congressional and Legislative” folder; ltr ChjCAE to ChMLC, 28 Jun 50, ibid; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 24 Jul 50, ibid.
53. Memrcd [OLL] on JCAE hearings, 22 Jun 50, 6 Jul 60, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Congressional and Legislative” folder; ltr ChjCAE to ChMLC, 28 Jun 50, ibid; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 24 Jul 50, ibid.
54. Memo JCS for SecDef, 1 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo SecDef for Pres, 2 Aug 50, ibid; ltr ChjCAE to SecDef, 8 May 52, w/paper, “The Scale and Scope . . . .”, 23-24, ibid; transcript JCAE mtg w/Johnson and Bradley, 2 Aug 50, ibid.
55. Memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 7 Aug 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Fissionable Material Expansion Program 1949-1950” folder; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al, 8 Aug 50, FRUS 1950, 1:570; ltr Sen Henry M. Jackson (JCAE) to SecDef, 9 Aug 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Congressional and Legislative” folder; ltr ChjCAE to SecDef, 22 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 400.174; memo SecArmy et al for SecDef, 18 Sep 50, ibid.
56. Ltr ChjCAE to SecDef, 8 May 52, w/paper, “The Scale and Scope . . . .”, 25-26, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo LeBaron for JCS, 14 Sep 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Fissionable Material Expansion Program 1949-1950” folder; memo SecDef for ChMB, 14 Sep 50, ibid; memo DirStfMB for SecDef (attn LeBaron), 14 Sep 50, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al, 29 Sep 50, w/draft rept NSC for Pres, 4, ibid; memo SecArmy et al for SecDef, 18 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 400.174; memo SecDef and ChAEC for ExecSecNSC, 18 Sep 50, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 2 Oct 50, ibid.
57. Ltr Sec Def to ChJCAE, 19 Sep 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and Legislative," folder.
58. Ltr ChJCAE to Sec Def, 21 Sep 50, FRUS 1950, 1:576–77; Ltr Sec Def to ChJCAE, 26 Sep 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and Legislative," folder.
59. Memo ChMLC for Sec Def, 26 Sep 50, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Fissionable Material Expansion Program 1949–1950," folder; memo Exec Sec NSC for Sec State et al, 29 Sep 50, w/draft memo NSC/SpClTe(AE) for Pres, 6–8–9, ibid.
60. Memo Asst to DCS/OpsAE Hq USAF for Sec Def, 27 Sep 50, w/initial agreement of Finletter, ibid; memo CNO for Sec Navy, 27 Sep 50, w/signed agreement of Matthews, ibid; memo Sec Def for Exec Sec NSC, 29 Sep 50, ibid; memo Sec Armty for Sec Def, 29 Sep 50, RG 330, CD 400, 174.
62. Ltr ChJCAE to ChMLC, 4 Dec 50, w/ltr ChJCAE to ChAFRC, 4 Dec 50, ChMLC papers, RG 330, "Congressional and Legislative," folder; intraoff memo ChMLC for Sec Def, 19 Jun 51, w/"Log of Significant Events," entries 11 and 29 Dec 50, 12 Feb 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for CoS USAF, 17 Feb 51, ibid; ltr Sec Def to ChJCAE, 1 Mar 51, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and Legislative," folder; memo JCS for Sec Def, 27 Mar 51, ibid; memo ChJCS for Sec Def, 2 Apr 51, ibid; ltr Sec Def to ChJCAE, 2 Apr 51, ibid.
63. Ltr ChJCAE to Sec Def, 2 May 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); ltr Sec Def to ChJCAE, 18 Jun 51, ibid; ltr ChJCAE to Sec Def, 8 May 52, w/paper, "The Scale and Scope . . .," 26, 28, ibid; ltr Sec Def to ChJCAE, 20 Jun 51, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Congressional and Legislative," folder; ltr ChMLC to Exec Dir JCAE, 11 Jun 51, ibid.
64. Ltr ChJCAE to Sec Def, 8 May 52, w/paper, "The Scale and Scope . . .," 26–27 (quot), RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); ltr ChAFRC to ChJCAE, 22 Jun 51, ibid; memo Dir BoB for Pres, 21 Jun 51, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files (PSF), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
65. Ltr ChJCAE to Sec Def, 7 Jun 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); ltr ChJCAE to Sec Def, 21 Aug 51, w/memo J. K. Mansfield (JCAE) for ChJCAE, 15 Aug 51, FRUS 1951, I:158–63; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 54", 556–57.
66. Editorial note, FRUS 1951, I:772; ltr ChJCAE to Sec Def, 8 May 52, w/paper, "The Scale and Scope . . .," 27, 29, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964, 268.
68. Ltr ChJCAE to Sec Def, 8 May 52, w/paper, "The Scale and Scope . . .," 32–53, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb).
69. Editorial note, FRUS 1951, I:773–74, 782n2; Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964, 268. The president signed both bills on 1 November 1951.
70. Ltr Acting ChAFRC to Sec Def, 8 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for Sec Def through DepSecDef, 19 Oct 51, ibid; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 559–60, 562–63, 579–81.
71. Ltr ChJCAE to Sec Def, 1 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for Sec Def through DepSecDef, 19 Oct 51, ibid.
73. Ltr ActingChAEC to SecDef, 2 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al, 3 Dec 51, w/encls. RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Thermonuclear Weapons Program—Misc” folder; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 564–67; Ltr ActingSecDef to ChAEC, 3 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy); memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 13 Dec 51, w/background comment, ibid.

74. Memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 11 Dec 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for SecDef, 7 Jan 52, ibid; memo DepDirEXOS for DirEXOS, 15 Jan 52, ibid; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 572.

75. Memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef et al, 26 Dec 51, w/memo SecState for ExecSecNSC, 21 Dec 51, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Thermonuclear Weapons Program—Misc” folder; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al, 8 Jan 52, w/memo DirODM for ExecSecNSC, 7 Jan 52, ibid; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 11 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb).


77. Ibid; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 576–78. The president formalized his decision on 27 January 1952.

78. Ltr ChJCAE to SecDef, 11 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for SecDef, 12 Jan 52, ibid; response to JCAE resolution, ibid; Ltr ChJCAE to SecDef, 2 Apr 52, ibid; Ltr ChJCAE to SecDef, 8 May 52, w/paper, “The scale and scope . . .” 38, ibid; JCAE, “Hearings on Status of Atomic Energy Program” (typescript), 6 Feb 52, ibid; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 576–78.

79. Memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 8 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 091.33; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 23 Apr 52, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState and SecDef, 11 Jun 52, w/memo ChAEc for ExecSecNSC, 10 Jun 52, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState and SecDef, 18 Sep 52, w/memo ChAEc for ExecSecNSC, 16 Sep 52, ibid; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 3 Oct 52, ibid; rev agenda mtg USMbrsCPC, 9 Oct 52, w/rept, “Status of . . . Uranium Ore Production,” RG 330, CD 334 (Combined Policy Cte); mins mtg USMbrsCPC, 9 Oct 52, FRUS 1952–1954, II, pt 2:1026–52; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 551–52, 567.

80. Ltr ChAEc to ExecSecNSC, 8 May 52, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Thermonuclear Weapons Program—Misc” folder; Ltr Pres to ChSubctIndepOffs, Senate Cte on Appropriations, 28 May 52, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for Pres, 20 May 52, w/annexes, FRUS 1952–1954, II, pt 2:933–38; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 5 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964, 273.

81. Ltr SecDef to ChAEc, 20 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); Ltr ChAEc to SecDef, 8 Sep 52, ibid; memo ChMLC for DirOLL, 24 Dec 52, RG 330, ChMLC papers, “Congressional and Legislative” folder.

82. Memo ChRDB for SecDef, 28 Sep 49, RG 330, CD 11–1–33; memo ChRDB for SecDef, 9 Jun 50, RG 330, CD 470; memo SecDef for ChRDB, 27 Jul 50, ibid; interv with K.D. Nichols by Doris M. Condit, 17 Apr 84, 29–30, OSD Hist.

83. Memo ChRDB for SecDef, 28 Sep 49, RG 330, CD 11–1–33; memo USecNavy for SecDef, 21 Aug 50, RG 330, CD 470; memo ChRDB for DepSecDef, 16 Oct 50, ibid; memo SecDef for JtSecs, 17 Oct 50, ibid; memo SecDef for DepSecDef et al, 24 Oct 50, OSD Hist; interv with Nichols, 17 Apr 84, 31.

84. Memo SecDef for DepSecDef et al, 24 Oct 50, OSD Hist; PR 884–53 OPI OSD, 18 Sep 55, ibid; Ltr K.T. Keller (DirGuidedMissiles OSD) to Pres, 10 Jul 51, Truman papers, PSF; interv with Nichols, 17 Apr 84, 28–29, 37.


86. Memo Keller for SecDef, 11 Dec 50, RG 330, CD 470; memos SecDef for SecArmy and ASDC, 12 Jan 51 (re Nike), 20 Mar 51 (Corporal), 13 Apr 51 (Hermes A–3), ibid; memos DepSecDef for SecNavy and ASDC, 15 Jan 51 (Sparrow), 14 Jan 51 (Terrier), 20 [30] Mar 51 (Regulus), 27 May 51 (Rigel), 26 Jun 51 (Sparrow II and III), 2 Jul 51 (Petrel), ibid; memos
SecDef or ActingSecDef for SecAF and ASD(C), 20 Mar 51 (Matador), 30 Mar 51 (Falcon), 30 Mar 51 (Snark), 13 Apr 51 (Navaho), 13 Apr 51 (Bomarc), 16 May 51 (Rascal), ibid; memo ChRDB for SecDef, 4 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 111. "Talos, Meteor, Oriole, and Terrier (Navy), Hawk (Army), and others were reviewed and recommended later that year.

87. Ltr Keller to Pres, 10 Jul 51, w/rept. Truman papers, PSF.

88. Table OSD, "Funds for OSD Guided Missile Programs . . . ." 9 May 51, RG 330, CD 470; memo Keller for ChRDB, 9 Jan 52, ibid; ltr DepSecDef to Pres, 24 Jul 51, ibid; ltr ChAEC to SecDef, 1 Oct 51, w/testimony ChAEC before House Cte on Appropriations, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Atomic Energy Act" folder, PR 884-53 OPI OSD. 18 Sep 53, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 12 Nov 53, ibid; intrv with Nichols, 17 Apr 51, 41-44; York and Greb, "Military Research and Development." 19-20.

89. Table GM-12 ProjReps&Stats OSD, "Tentative Obligations for Guided Missiles Program—FY 1950 and Prior Through FY 1957," 4 Feb 57, RG 530, ASD(C) files, "House Hearings on Guided Missiles" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

90. Memo ChMLC for SecDef, 19 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for SecDef, 7 Feb 52, ibid; memo ChMLC for SecDef, 10 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (Mark 6 Weapons); memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 471.6.

91. Ltr ChAEC to ChMLC, 18 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); ltr ChMLC to ChAEC, 31 Oct 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy); memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 31 Oct 51, ibid; memo SecNavy for SecArmy and SecAF, 6 Nov 51, ibid; memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (May–July 1952).

92. Memo SecNavy for SecArmy and SecAF, 6 Nov 51, RG 330, CD 471.6 (Atomic Energy); ltr ActingSecDef to ChAEC, 5 Dec 51, ibid; memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 471.6.

93. Ltr ChAEC to USecAF, 14 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 471.6; memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Apr 52, ibid; intraoff memo DirEXOS for SecDef and DepSecDef, 28 Apr 52, w/Lovett’s handwritten note, ibid; intraoff memo DepSecDef, 14 May 52, ibid.

94. Ltr ChAEC to USecAF, 15 May 52, ibid; ltr USecAF to ChAEC, 3 Jun 52, Condit file, OSD Hist; informal mins [State] mtg NSCSpCte(AE) and ChJCS, 17 Jun 52, FRUS 1952–1954, II, pt 2:984-88, particularly 987.

95. Memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 22 Sep 52, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo ChMLC for DepSecDef et al, 22 Sep 52, ibid.

96. Ltr ActingSecDef to ChAEC, 2 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for SecDef, 19 Jan 53, ibid; memo ChMLC for SecAF, 24 Mar 53, ibid; memo USecArmy for SecDef, 7 Feb 53, ibid.

97. Ltr ChAEC to Pres, 6 Feb 53, RG 330, CD 385.2; memo ActingExecSecNSC for SecState et al, 21 Feb 53, ibid; ltr SecDef to ChAEC, 9 Mar 53, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo SecArmy for SecDef, 27 Jul 53, RG 330, CD 160; memo ActingChMLC for SecDef, 1 Dec 53, w/encs, RG 330, CD 471.6 (Atomic).


99. Memo ChMLC for SecDef, 10 Feb 50, RG 330, CD 16-1–17; ltr SecDef to Pres, 24 Feb 50, w/2 notes: (1) "This paper unanimously concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ONB [Omar N. Bradley’] and (2) "Original left with the President Feb 28, 1950 by L.J. [Louis Johnson]." ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState et al, 10 Mar 50, w/rept, ibid; memo
ExcsSecNSC for SecDef and ActingChAEC, 12 Jun 50, ibid; York, Advisors, 70; Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, vol II in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, 311 (subsequently referred to as Truman, Memoirs II); paper AEC 11'10, "A History of the Expansion of AEC Production Facilities." 16 Aug 63, 16, RG 326, Secretariat Collection, "History" folder, DOE archives.


101. Ltr ChMLC to SecDef, 11 Oct 51, w/annual rept MLC to SecDef (FY 1951), 14, RG 330, CD 319.1; memo ExecSecNSC for SecDef and ActingChAEC, 9 Apr 51. RG 330, CD 400.174; Bethe, "Comments on the History of the H-Bomb." 49-50, 53.


103. Ltr SecDef to ChJCAE, 9 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); Bethe, "Comments on the History of the H-Bomb." 49-50, 53.

104. Memo ActingSecArmy, ActingSecNavy, and SecAF for SecDef, 27 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954, 11, pt 2; 880-81; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 582-83; Fred Kaplan, "Scientists at War: The Birth of the RAND Corporation," American Heritage (June-July 1983), 62; memo ChMLC for ChJCS. [ca 27 Mar 52], RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo JCS for SecState, 15 Apr 52, ibid; York, Advisors, 129-30.

105. Memo ActingChJCAE to SecDef, 28 Mar 52, FRUS 1952-1954, 11, pt 2; 878-80; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 583; York, Advisors, 130-33; Ltr SecDef to ChJCS, 25 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for ChJCAE; [ca 27 Mar 52], RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo JCS for SecDef, 14 Apr 52, ibid; York, Advisors, 129-30.

106. Ltr ActingChJCAE to SecDef, 3 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo JCS for SecDef, 29 Jul 52, ibid; Ltr SecDef to ActingChJCAE, 22 Aug 52, ibid; Ltr ChJCAE to SecDef, 30 Aug 52, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef; 29 Aug 52, ibid; Ltr SecDef to ChJCAE, 26 Aug 52, ibid; memo JCS to ChMLC, 20 Aug 52, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Thermonuclear Weapons Program Miscellaneous" folder.

107. Memo William A.M. Burden (SplAsst to USecAF) for SecAF, 21 May 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChGC to ChAEC, 30 Oct 49, w/encl, FRUS 1949, 1:569-73.

108. Memo state panel of consultants on disarmament. [ca Aug-Sep 52], FRUS 1952-1954, 11, pt 2; 999-1008.

109. Memo SecDef, 8 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 400.112; memo ExecSecNSC for SecState and SecDef, 15 Aug 52, w/memo ChAEC for NSEcSpfCtAE, 15 Aug 52, ibid; memo Arneson for ActingSecState, 15 Aug 52, FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2; 989-91, 991n2; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 591.

110. Memo SecDef, 12 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo Col D.G. Williams (MLC) to SecDef, 12 Nov 52, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Thermonuclear Weapons Program Miscellaneous" folder; FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2; 1017-25.

111. Note: Arneson is indirectly quoted in memo SecDef for SecState, 29 Sep 52, FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2; 1017-25.

112. Ibid; Lovett is indirectly quoted in memo SecDef for SecState, 29 Sep 52, ibid; William L. orange, [ca 30 Dec 52], ibid; 1049-55; editorial note, ibid, 881-83.

113. Memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Nov 52, ibid; York, Advisors, 133-34; Truman, Memoirs II, 313-14; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 592-93.

114. Memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 12 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A-Bomb); memo Col D.G. Williams (MLC) for SecDef, 10 Nov 52, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for ChAEC, 12 Nov 52, RG 330, ChMLC papers, "Thermonuclear Weapons Program Miscellaneous" folder; FRUS 1952-1954, II, pt 2; 1017-25.
Notes to Pages 481–85

115. Memo Rainbow Team JtStratPlansGp JCS for BrigGen Matthews (JCS), 20 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 471.6 (A–Bomb); introaff memo DepDirEXOS for MLC, [ca 26 Nov 52], ibid; memo SecDef for ExecSecNSC, 26 Nov 52, ibid; memo ChMLC for DepSecDef, 28 Nov 52, ibid.


118. This is not to say that the Soviet explosions were as powerful as the U.S. tests. See York, Advisors, 87–96; Bethe, “Comments on the History of the H–Bomb,” 53.

XXIII. THE SEARCH FOR GREATER EFFICIENCY


10. Addresses ChDcmgMgmtCte, 8 Jan 51 and 8 Jun 51, ibid; *Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1951*, 43, 50–52.


13. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 27 Sep 50, OSD Hist; memo ASD(C) for SecArmy et al, 5 Dec 50, ibid.

14. Memos ASD(C) for SecsMiiDepts et al, 10 May 51 and 17 Aug 51, ibid; *Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1951*, 45–47; ltr Henry Glass to OSD Historian, 9 Apr 84, OSD Hist.


23. Memo SecDef for SecsMiiDepts, 3 Nov 51, OSD Hist; DoD Directive 20.08–1, 3 Nov 51.


25. Remarks SecDef, “. . . Visit of Mrs. Anna Rosenberg;” 10 Nov 50, OSD Hist; paper ASD(M&P), “Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities;” [Jan 53], ibid; *Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1951*, 43; ltr ASD(A) to Pres, [nd], Condit file, OSD Hist; ltr Pres to ASD(A), 8 Nov 50, ibid.

26. PR 1392–50 OPI OSD, 9 Nov 50, OSD Hist; PR 1408.50 OPI OSD, 15 Nov 50, ibid; background note on Rosenberg OPI OSD, [ca Jul 51], ibid; remarks SecDef, 10 Nov 50, ibid; interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77, 8, 36.


29. Interv with Robert A. Lovett by Doris M. Condit, 7 June 76, 11–12, OSD Hist; telecon Condit with Goodrich, 5 Apr 84, Condit file, ibid; memo SecDef for SecsMiliDepts et al, 4 Jan 51, OSD Hist.


31. Interv with Carter and Underwood, 22 Apr 77, 8; memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, 23 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 333; memo ASD(M&P) for SecDef, 8 Dec 52, ibid.

32. Paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," [Jan 53], 41–46, OSD Hist; memo ASD(M&P) for SecAF, 23 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 333; memo ASD(M&P) for SecAF, 24 Dec 52, ibid; memo ASD(M&P) for Gen Clark, 3 Dec 52, ibid; memo ASD(M&P) for SecArmy, 24 Dec 52, ibid.


36. Paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," [Jan 53], 8; PR 7–51S OPI OSD, 10 Jan 51, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to House Speaker, 6 Apr 51, ibid, PL 82–51 (19 June 1951).


38. PR 819–51 OPI OSD, 10 Jan 51 (quote), OSD Hist; memo ASD(M&P) for SecArmy et al, 22 Dec 51, w/enc, RG 330, CD 335; ltr ActingSecDef to DirBob, 29 Dec 51, ibid; paper OASD(M&P), "UMT Cost," 17 Jan 52, OSD Hist; paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," [Jan 53], 8; US Cong, House, Cte on Armed Services, Universal Military Training, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), H Doc 315, 20–21; interv with Lovett, 7 Jun 76, 17–18; interv with Leva, 10 and 14 Jun 77, 34–35; Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964, 271–72.


40. PR 1334–50 OPI OSD, 27 Oct 50, OSD Hist; George Beveridge, "Marshall Appoints Special Board to Map New Reservist Rules," Evening Star [Washington], 27 Oct 50; memo SecDef for SecArmy, SecNavy, SecAF, 6 Apr 51, w/enc, RG 330, CD 581.4; announcement 516–51 OPI OSD, 18 Apr 51, OSD Hist; ltr SecDef to E.H. Burgess (ChCivComponentPolBd), 13 Jun 51, ibid.

41. Statement ASD(M&P) before the House Armed Services Subctee on Reserve Policies, 18 Apr 51, OSD Hist; table P52.1, R12.0 DirStatsysOSD, 18 Jun 69, ibid; fact sheet 71–51S OPI OSD, 13 Apr 51, ibid; "Standard Policies on Reserves Asked," NY Times, 2 Jul 51; PR 867–51 OPI OSD, 28 Jun 51, OSD Hist; testimony ASD(M&P), [29 May 52], US Cong, Senate,
Cite on Armed Services, "Hearings of Long Special Subcommittee concerning H.R. 5426" (typescript), 12, ibid.

42. PL 82-476 (9 July 1952); Semiannual Report of the SecDef ... January 1 to June 30, 1952, 15-17; Semiannual Report of the SecDef ... January 1 to June 30, 1953, 69-75; paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities." [Jan 53], 6.

43. Paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," [Jan 53], 1, 10-11; memo ASD(C) for SecArmy et al, 30 Apr 51, w/statement Pres, 27 Apr 51, RG 330, ATSD&DepSecDef files. "Budget FY 1952 (McNeil File)" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md; Semiannual Report of the SecDef ... January 1 to June 30, 1951, 43-45; Semiannual Report of the SecDef ... January 1 to June 30, 1952, 18-20; statement ASD(M&P), "Testimony ... House Appropriations Committee." [May 52], 2-6. OSD Hist.

44. Statement ASD(M&P), "Testimony ... House Appropriations Committee." [May 52], 5-7; paper ASD(M&P), "Summary of Manpower and Personnel Activities," [Jan 53], 10-11.


46. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 432-34, 436. Memrec of telecon MacGregor and Condit, 5 Sep 86, Condit files, OSD Hist, explains that the 81 percent figure on page 434 of Integration of the Armed Forces should be 89 percent.

47. Memo SecDef for SecArmy et al, 2 Apr 51, OSD Hist; MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 394-96, 618-19 (quote).


53. Memo SecDef for SecsMilDepts et al, 2 Jan 51, w/directive, OSD Hist; memo DirMedSvsOSD for DepSecDef, 15 Nov 50, w/Tab A, RG 330, CD 632.


56. Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . January 1 to June 30, 1951, 28, ibid, January 1 to June 30, 1952, 27; memo DirMedSvsOSD for DepSecDef, 15 Nov 50, w/Tab A, 16-17, RG 330, CD 632; annual rept ChAFMPC OSD, 30 Jun 51, 159-61, OSD Hist; memo ChAFMPC


75. Memo DirOffProgRepts&Stats OASD(C) for DepSecDef, 24 Apr 51, RG 330, CD 381 (General); testimony ASD(C), 14 May 53, in US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, Department of Defense . . . Appropriations for 1954: Hearings, 83 Cong, 1 sess (1953), 444.


78. Memo DepSecDef for SecsMiliDepts et al, 8 Mar 51, w/enc. OSD Hist; memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al, 31 May 51, ibid; DoD Directive 250.01–1, 17 Jul 51; memo DepSecDef for SecsMiliDepts et al, 17 Nov 50, OSD Hist; memo SecDef for SecsMiliDepts et al, [28 Sep 51], w/DoD Directive 20.16–1, ibid.

79. Memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy, SecNav, SecAF, 31 May 51, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); memo ActingSecDef for SecArmy et al, 31 May 51, w/DoD Directive 250.01–4, OSD Hist; DoD Directives 250.01–1, 17 Jul 51, 250.11–2, 9 Aug 51; MB Orders 52–11, 10 Aug 51, 52–18, 16 Nov 51, OSD Hist.

80. Memo ASD(L&L) for AGenCounsel OSD, 9 Feb 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); memo AGenCounsel OSD for ASD(L&L), 15 Feb 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 29 Jan 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 15 Feb 52, ibid.

81. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 29 Jan 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 17 Jun 52, w/enc, ibid.

82. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 21 Feb 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 7 Mar 52, ibid; memo L. Niederlehner (CounselMB) for ASD(L&L), 12 Mar 52, ibid; paper [ASD(L&L)], "Outline of Proposed Report . . . .," [ca Sep 52], OSD Hist; memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 10 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel).

83. Ltr SecDef to Clay Bedford, 18 Dec 51, Condit file, OSD Hist; PR OP1 OSD, [ca 8 Sep 52], ibid; ltr SecDef for Strauss, 11 Dec 51, w/enc, ibid; statement DepSecDef, 29 Jan 52, in US Cong, House, Cte on Appropriations, Department of Defense . . . Appropriations for 1953: Hearings, 82 Cong, 2 sess (1952), 322; testimony SecDef, 20 May 52, Sen Cte on Armed Services, "Hearing held before the Preparedness Subcommittee (exec sess)" (typescript), 1:62–67, OSD Hist.

84. Memo ASD(C) for SecDef and DepSecDef, 24 Jan 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); memo ASD(C) for SecDef and DepSecDef, 28 Jan 52, ibid.

85. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 26 Mar 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 10 Apr 52, ibid.

87. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 17 Jun 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); memo GenCounsel OSD, Dir and DepDirFiscalMgmtStf OASD(C) for ASD(C) and ASD(L&L), [16 Jun 52], w/proposals, ibid; “New Efficiency Report Plan,” *Army–Navy–Air Force Journal* (9 May 1953).


91. Memos ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 25 Jun 52, 11 Jul 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 30 Jun 52, ibid; memrcd Condit, “Conversation with . . . Foster . . . .”, 4 Nov 77, 4; DoD Directive 5126.5, 29 Jul 52.

92. Paper [ASD(L&L)], “Outline of Proposed Report . . . .”, [ca Sep 52], RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); memo statement ASD(C) [for Rockefeller Cte], 29 Mar 53, 17, OSD Hist, memo ChMB for DirLL OASD(L&L), 24 Dec 52, w/MB memo, 17–19, RG 350, CD 354 (Armed Services Committee).

93. Memo DepSecDef for SecsMiliDepts et al, 29 Jul 52, Condit file, OSD Hist; memo ExecVChMB for DirDefMgmteteStf, 25 Apr 52, w/encs, RG 330, CD 354 (Munitions Board); *Official Register of the United States, 1952*, 104–09.

94. DoD Directives 5126.4, 10 Jul 52, 5126.7, 12 Sep 52, 5131.1, 20 Sep 52, 5131.2, 25 Sep 52; paper [ASD(L&L)], “Outline of Proposed Report . . . .”, [ca Sep 52], RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 11 Jul 52, ibid; *Semiannual Report of the SecDef . . . . January 1 to June 30, 1953*, 88.


99. Memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 14 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 334 (Research and Development Board); memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 26 Mar 52, w/enc, 25 Mar 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); memo ASD(L&L) for DepSecDef, 27 Mar 52, ibid; memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 10 Apr 52, RG 330, CD 334 (Research and Development Board); testimony Walter Whitman (ChRDB), 21 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, “Hearings,” 7–8.

100. Memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 15 Apr 52, w/enc, RG 330, CD 334 (Research and Development Board).


Notes to Pages 509–21


106. US Cong, Senate, Cte on Appropriations, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1954: Hearings, 84 Cong, 1 sess (1955), 140; memo Rudolph A. Winnacker (Historian OSD) for Tracy Voorhees, 18 Nov 59, w/enc, OSD Hist.


108. Table FAD–119 OASD(C), 24 Jan 66, OSD Hist.

XXIV. THE CIVIL-MILITARY DIMENSION

1. Interv with Robert A. Lovett by Doris M. Condit, 7 Jun 76, 16–17, OSD Hist; interv with William C. Foster by Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, 27 Feb 74, 4, 26–28, ibid; interv with Robert A. Lovett by Alfred Goldberg, Harry B. Yoshpe, 13 May 74, 24, ibid.


7. Interv with J. Lawton Collins by Alfred Goldberg, Roger R. Trask, Doris M. Condit, Steven L. Rearden, 2 Jul 81, 12, 47–48, OSD Hist; interv with Marshall S. Carter and George V. Underwood, Jr., by Alfred Goldberg, Doris M. Condit, 22 Apr 77, 5–6, ibid; comments Lovett (Vandenberg testimony), 21 May 53, Cte on DeptDefOrg (hereafter cited as Rockefeller Cte), "Hearings" (mimeo), 13, OSD Hist.


14. Intraoff memo ASD(C) for DepSecDef, 18 Jul 52, w/draft msg, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo SecArmy for SecDef, 18 Jul 52, ibid; memo SecArmy for SecAF, 22 Jul 52, ibid.

15. Memo SecDef for SecArmy, 30 Jul 52, quoted in Underwood, "Role of JCS in National Command Structure," 14–15; memo Acting SecArmy for SecDef, 11 Aug 52, RG 330, CD 092.2 (Europe).

16. Memo ASD(L&L) for SecDef, 8 Aug 52, RG 350, CD 092.2 (Europe); memo SecDef for ChJCS, 11 Aug 52, ibid; memo Chairman's SttGrpJCS for ChJCS, 13 Aug 52, w/encs, ibid; testimony Coolidge, 21 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 8.

17. Memo SecArmy for SecDef, 10 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 322 (EUCOM); memo DepSecDef for SecArmy et al, 3 Dec 52, ibid.


21. Testimony Kimball, 4 Apr 53, 11–12, testimony Finletter, 29 Mar 53, 14–16, testimony Pace, 29 Mar 53, 17, all in Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings."

22. Comment Lovett (Finletter testimony), 29 Mar 53, ibid, 33–34; memo [ExecSec NSC] for Pres, 28 Jun 51, Truman papers, President's Secretary's files: NSC (PSF: NSC), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.; memo JCSRepNSC for ChJCS, 29 Jun 51, RG 218, CCS 334 National Security Council (9–25–47). There is no record that the JCS disputed Marshall’s views on this procedure, although Collins later wrote (in Peacetime, 265) that for Marshall to refer a State Department memo to the service secretaries was an “unusual step” that, if regularly done, "would have tended to interpose them between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense." It was, in fact, common practice.


24. Memo SecDef for EXOS OSD, 8 Sep 52, Condit file, OSD Hist; comment Lovett (Finletter testimony), 29 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 34; memrcd DirEXOS, 15 Sep 52, Condit file, OSD; memo George A. Wyeth (ADir for Councils) for DepSecDef, 7 Nov 52, RG 330, CD 350.05 (Briefing).

25. Memo Hoopes for Nathaniel H. Goodrich (DepGenCounsel), 18 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); paper [ASD(L&L)], [Sep 52], "Outline of Proposed Report . . . ." OSD Hist; comment Lovett (Finletter testimony), 29 Mar 53, Rockefeller Cte, "Hearings," 31–32, 33–34.


27. Paper [ASD(L&L)], [Sep 52], "Outline of Proposed Report . . . ." 2, OSD Hist; paper Hoopes, [late 1952], ibid; memo Hoopes for Goodrich, 18 Sep 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); testimony Nash, 29 Mar 53, 35, testimony Finletter, 29 Mar 53, 15–16, testimony Floberg, 2 Apr 53, 13, 39–40, all in Rockefeller Cte. "Hearings"; memrcd Wyeth OSD, 10 Mar 53, OSD Hist; memo DepSecDef, 18 Nov 50, w/paper and note ["Hold for later consideration by me. GCM"]; RG 330, CD 381 (War Plans NSC 68).

28. Paper [ASD(L&L)], [Sep 52], "Outline of Proposed Report . . . ." 3–4, 8, OSD Hist; memo Coolidge for SecDef, 8 Oct 52, RG 340, CD 313.3 (General Counsel). Originally, Coolidge felt that Congress should give the JCS chairman greater powers, but he withdrew this recom-
mendation in October on the assumption that "energetic action by the SecDef, backed maybe by the President" could correct the situation.

29. Paper [ASD(L&L)] to SecDef, [Sep 52], "Outline of Proposed Report . . .", 5–6, 8, OSD Hist.


34. Two memos Coolidge for SecDef, both 23 Oct 52, RG 330, CD 313.3 (General Counsel); memo SecDef, DirBoB, SplCounsel to Pres for President, 10 Feb 49, RG 330, CD 12–1–1.


36. Memo Lovett for SecDef designate, 9 Jan 53, RG 330, Lovett papers, "Lovett 17 Sep 51 to 20 Jan 53" folder, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.

37. Ibid; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 733.
38. Ltr Nelson A. Rockefeller (ChCte on DeptDefOrgn) to SecDef, 11 Apr 53, w/rept, in Cole, Defense Documents, 127–43; msg Eisenhower for Cong, 30 Apr 53, ibid, 149–57; Reorgn Plan No 6, effective 30 Jun 53, ibid, 157–58.


XXV. CONCLUSION

The Military Reference Branch of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C., is the major repository for the official records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and its subsidiary offices for the years 1947–54. The OSD files, with the exception of those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and some interdepartmental agencies, are identified by record group number RG 330 and arranged under the appropriate OSD office. The central files of the secretary of defense for 1950–53 are organized under the “Correspondence Control Section of the Administrative Secretary.” Of this material, the author reviewed some 1,700 folders in 231 boxes. Most folders were identified by a CD number, based on a modified Dewey decimal and Navy records system; some had a subject written across the top. These records formed the core of the research in OSD files.

NARA also holds many additional RG 330 records. Records filed under the “Office of the Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs)” were important to this project, particularly the papers of Frank C. Nash, the assistant to the secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1951 to 1953. The records of the chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission were especially helpful in the chapter on nuclear matters. JCS records, identified as RG 218, were consulted throughout, as were the records of interdepartmental agencies under the control of the secretary of defense, contained in RG 334 and RG 374. Other record groups were also useful: RG 51 for Bureau of the Budget documents; RG 59 for Department of State records generally and RG 84 for foreign service post records, including the United Nations Mission; and RG 273 for records of the National Security Council.
NARA's Washington National Records Center (formerly Federal Records Center) at Suitland, Md., holds retired but not yet accessioned post-1954 records, including numerous OSD materials for the 1950–53 period which were retired with later collections sent to Suitland. Especially valuable were the files of Wilfred J. McNeil, the assistant secretary of defense (comptroller) until 1959, which were retired by the comptroller's office in 1965, and the papers of the assistant to the secretary of defense and the deputy secretary of defense, Henry E. Glass, which include many of the comptroller papers for the 1951–54 period. At Suitland also are papers of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (in addition to those in the National Archives) and certain Lovett papers that were particularly rewarding for this study.

The OSD Historical Office provided essential documentary collections and extensive topical reference files containing newspaper and magazine clippings, DoD budget tables, organization charts, memoranda, press releases, and directives. On the Korean War and armistice talks, a collection of incoming cables from the Commander in Chief, Far East (used by Marshall and Lovett) and an eight-volume JCS compilation, "Pertinent Papers on the Korean Situation," deserve special mention among the Historical Office holdings. Typescripts of the testimony of Pentagon officials at the 1953 hearings of the OSD Committee on Department of Defense Organization (Rockefeller Committee) yielded unusually frank views on OSD operations during 1950–53. Without the series of monthly OSD reports on MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program): Department of Defense Operations, checking the figures for military assistance might have proved impossible. The files of Col. George A. Lincoln offered insights into NATO and military assistance arrangements.

Of President Truman's papers at the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo., the collection most central to this study was the President's Secretary's File, which includes memoranda describing NSC meetings. In addition, the papers of presidential staff members Eben A. Ayers and George M. Elsey were enlightening for their revelations of Truman's thinking during the period of General MacArthur's dismissal. The Library also contains the papers of Dan A. Kimball, Frank Pace, Jr., Thomas K. Finletter, Frederick J. Lawton, and Theodore Tannenwald, Jr.

The papers of the secretaries of defense were less revealing than anticipated. Secretary Johnson's papers at the Alderman Library, University of Virginia, are sparse on the period of his Defense tenure. During research for this volume, the Marshall papers held by the George C. Marshall Research Foundation in Lexington, Va., were being utilized in the preparation of the final volume of Marshall's biography by Forrest C. Pogue, who was kind enough to allow review of some 1950–51 folders, particularly those relating
to the recall of General MacArthur. To various biographers and researchers, including the present one, Secretary Lovett maintained that he possessed no papers of use to the historian.

Classified papers of General Omar N. Bradley, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are at the United States Army Military Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; his unclassified papers are at West Point. The Pre-Presidential Papers in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans., contain diaries and correspondence relating to the general's duty as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in 1950–52.

The author benefited from materials contributed by a number of individuals. Robert J. Donovan sent copies of several key documents from the John Foster Dulles papers at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, and the Wellington Koo papers at Columbia University. Roger Anders, archivist at the U.S. Department of Energy, supplied excerpts from Gordon Dean's diary and the very useful manuscript, "A History of the Expansion of AEC Production Facilities," held in the Atomic Energy Commission Secretariat Collection (RG 326) in the DOE archives. Nathaniel Goodrich supplied a copy of his study on Department of Defense problems in the 1950s. Personal papers of John H. Ohly made available to the author were illuminating generally and a crucial source for the military assistance section of this work. Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols lent the author his study on "The Period of Atomic Scarcity, 1945–52," and General George V. Underwood, Jr., sent a copy of his manuscript on "The Role of the JCS in the National Command Structure."

Interviews listed in the bibliography are chiefly from the oral history collection of the OSD Historical Office. Other interviews came from the Harry S. Truman Library and the JCS Historical Division.

While many documents exist only in official repositories or private hands, many others are in the public domain and readily available. Robert H. Ferrell has selected and edited a body of Truman papers in Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman. Truman's public messages, speeches, and statements are available in the official Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman. Eisenhower's early papers have been selected and edited, first by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and later by Louis Galambos, in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower begins with January 1953. The Eisenhower Diaries, edited by Robert H. Ferrell, contains entries from the SACEUR period.

Department of State records are of critical importance in any rendering of Department of Defense history, and particularly during this seminal and busy period for national security policymaking. Among State's published records,
indispensable is the mammoth collection of papers in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, which contains numerous DoD documents; in 1987 the series was almost complete for the period 1950–54. The weekly *Department of State Bulletin* is a useful compendium of contemporary foreign policy and national security documents and information.

Among Department of Defense publications, *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978*, edited by Alice C. Cole and others (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978), contains documents and commentary on the evolution of DoD organization. The official reports of the secretary of defense and the secretaries of the military departments were published as the *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense* and the *Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force*, 1950–53. The OSD Historical Office compiles the public statements of the secretary of defense in bound volumes, a series that brings together a wide range of material from press conferences, interviews, speeches, and news accounts, much of it not available elsewhere. The *Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Johnson* fill six volumes; those of Marshall, four; Lovett, six. The periodically issued “Department of Defense Fact Sheet” provides limited but handy information about DoD organization and key personnel since September 1947. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division has prepared a number of histories covering JCS activities during 1950–53, several of which have been published. The three military departments and the U.S. Marine Corps have published extensively on their participation in the Korean War.

Congressional publications, notably committee hearings and reports, offer a wealth of information on a gamut of Defense affairs and national security issues during the period. The Committees on Armed Services in both the House and the Senate held authorization hearings for various budgets; the Committees on Appropriations in both chambers heard testimony on military assistance and Defense appropriations. During 1951 the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and on Armed Services held joint hearings on the issue of troops for Europe and on MacArthur's recall. Much testimony held in executive session during 1950–53 has since been published in *Historical Series* compilations issued by each house. Special panels, such as the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, conducted probes of Defense Department operations and published their findings. Congress has also published various reports and papers on Defense-related subjects prepared by such agencies as The Brookings Institution and the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, many of them relevant and instructive for the purposes of this study.
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Index

Acheson, Dean, 314; and atomic energy, 459, 461, 466, 472, 480, 481; and Communist aggression, 8, 10–11, 45, 48–49; and Formosa, 173–77, 181, 183; and Germany, 317–18, 325–26; and Indochina, 208, 209, 211, 214, 215, 216, 221; and Japan, 188–97, 201; and Johnson, 1, 5 (see also Johnson, Louis—relations with State); and Korea, 50, 51–52, 54, 57, 65, 73, 80, 85–86, 88, 92, 101, 132–33; and MacArthur, 51–52, 68, 82, 84, 92, 94n, 104, 105; and military assistance, 272, 396, 402, 404–05, 415, 417, 424, 438, 447, 450; and NATO, 329; and NSC 135, 294; and prisoners of war in Korea, 141, 144, 152; and relations with Defense, 34, 514; speech at National Press Club, 45, 174, 211

Adams, John G., 487

Adenauer, Konrad, 338

Air Force, U.S.: and FY 1951 budget, 226, 237, 241 (Table 5); FY 1952 budget, 251, 252 (Table 6), 253, 254; FY 1953 budget, 270, 274–75, 277, 279 (Table 10), 282, 283 (Table 11), 284 (Table 12), 302; FY 1954 budget, 295, 296, 297, 302; and military assistance, 427–29, 437, 440–42, 444, 449, 453; and NSC 68 goals, 228; readiness, 245n, 290–91, 292, 295n; strength, 224, 225 (Table 2), 234, 238 (Table 3), 240 (Table 4), 244, 245, 246, 252, 255, 258, 261–62, 266–67, 269–70, 275, 277, 278 (Table 9), 281, 287, 289, 290, 292, 295, 301 (Table 13), 304 (Table 14)

Air power, U.S., 51, 128–29

Air Training Command, 440

Aircraft, U.S., 156, 297

Aleman, Miguel, 151

Aleutian Islands, 174, 187

Allen, Leven C., Maj. Gen., 27

Allison, John M., 189

Almond, Edward M., Maj. Gen., 66, 67, 70

Ammunition, 157–61; procurement of, 159; production, by European countries, 449–50; shortages in Korea, 157–58, 159–60, 161; supply, 160 (Table 1); usage rates in Korea, 157–58

AMP (Additional Military Production) program, 400

Anderson, Frederick L., 407

Annan, 219

ANZUS Treaty, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 204

Appropriations, Department of Defense, 3, 4, 241 (Table 5), 262 (Table 8), 284 (Table 12)

Armed forces, U.S.: ceilings, 31; integration, 24, 493–94; strength, 3, 4, 31, 58–61, 62, 80, 83–84, 225 (Table 2), 238 (Table 3), 255 (Table
7, 278 (Table 9), 301 (Table 13), 535–36

Armed Forces Examining Stations Policy Board, 491

Armed Forces Policy Board: role of, 524–25

Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC), 17, 27–28, 83–91, 163, 224, 232, 235, 264, 288, 495; and atomic energy matters, 457, 462, 474; members, 518; and military assistance, 434–35, 437, 440

Armed Forces Reserve Act of 9 July 1952 (PL 82–476), 489n, 492

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), 24, 456, 466

Armed Services Procurement Regulation, 505

Army, U.S.: and FY 1951 budget, 226, 237, 241 (Table 5); FY 1952 budget, 251, 252 (Table 6), 253, 259 (Table 8); FY 1953 budget, 270, 274–75, 277, 279 (Table 10), 283 (Table 11), 284 (Table 12); FY 1954 budget, 296, 298, 302, 304 (Table 14); and military assistance, 427–29, 434, 436, 440–41, 446, 452; and NSC 68 goals, 228, 232, 245; and offshore procurement, 445, 449–51; readiness, 245n, 290–91, 292, 295; strength, 224, 225 (Table 2), 233, 234, 238 (Table 3), 240 (Table 4), 244, 245, 246, 252, 255 (Table 7), 261–62, 266–67, 269, 270, 275, 277, 278 (Table 9), 281, 287, 289, 290, 292, 295, 297–98, 301 (Table 13)

Arnold, William H., Maj. Gen., 352

Associated States. See Indochina

Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 456, 458, 459, 461, 463

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 29, 455–56, 460–61, 463–64; General Advisory Committee, 477; Special Committee on Atomic Energy, 29

Atomic weapons, 124, 166, 167, 168–69; A-bomb, 6, 85–86, 89, 131, 137; costs, 468n, 473, 475n; custody, 455–56, 464–67; delivery, 296; deployment, 463–64; exchange of information on, 458–63; H-bomb, 5, 6, 29, 477, 480; nonnuclear components, 475–77; and role of Joint Chiefs, 467–72 passim; Soviet, 5, 264, 271–72, 293, 467, 471, 482; stockpile, 455–56, 460–67, 470–72, 473; tactical, 268; tests, 272, 480, 482; tests, British, 460, 461; warheads, 268

Attlee, Clement, 3, 85, 86, 88–89, 178, 331

Austin, Harold R., 505

Australia, 213, 217, 218; and Japanese settlement, 192, 204

Austria: and military assistance, 442

Babcock, E. Stanton, Col., 191

Bao Dai, 210, 213, 219

Barkley, Alben, 105, 112

Baruch, Bernard, 107

Batt, William L., 342, 402, 404

Bedford, Clay, 158

Beebe, Royden E., Jr., 401, 410–11, 488

Belgium: and military assistance, 436n, 448

Bendetsen, Karl, 296, 378, 485, 529n

Berding, Andrew, 498

Beth, Hans, 477

Bevin, Ernest, 320, 321

Blacks in armed forces, 493–94

Blaisdell, W. Carl, 486

Boatner, Haydon L., Brig. Gen., 147, 148

Bohlen, Charles E., 8–9, 120n, 123, 294

Bone, Charles H., Col., 399, 417n

Bonin Islands, 187, 190, 191, 200

Bonner Subcommittee, 503–04

Borden, William L., 478

Bradley, Omar N., Gen., 1–2, 23, 197, 198; and atomic matters, 459, 461, 465, 466; and budget, 227, 258, 268; and Indochina, 215; and Korea, 49, 65, 78, 80, 86, 91, 100; and
Index

MacArthur, 84, 85, 104–05; and military assistance, 405, 411, 418, 421, 423, 425–26; and the Philippines, 196, 197; role as Chairman, JCS, 520; and unified commands, 522

Bridges, Styles, Sen., 108

Briggs, James E., Maj. Gen., 457n

Brind, Patrick, Adm. Sir, 362

Brink, Francis G., 208

Bruce, David, 213, 317

Bruce, James, 396

Brussels Treaty, 308–09; and Western Union Defense Organization, 309

Buckley, Oliver E., 507

Budget: FY 1951 first supplemental, 225–27, 241; FY 1951 fourth supplemental, 240 (Table 4), 242, 250; FY 1951 second supplemental, 235–40, 242; FY 1952, 243–44, 250–51, 252–54, 258–60 (Table 8); FY 1953, 261, 276, 279 (Table 10), 280–83, 284; FY 1954, 285, 302–04, 305; ceilings, 4, 9, 15, 33; NSC 68, 227–33, 246, 303; NSC 114, 270–71, 273; summary, 4

Bunker, Howard G., Maj. Gen., 457n

Bureau of the Budget (BoB), 9, 225, 237, 252–54, 274n, 302–03; and Defense budget, 486; and military assistance, 399, 416–17, 419–20, 424, 429–31

Burgess, Edwin H., 25, 492

Burgess, Guy, 460n

Burke, Arleigh A., Adm., 119n

Burma, 205, 217; and Japanese peace treaty conference, 194

Burns, James H., 6, 9, 20–21, 73, 81–82, 100, 396, 401, 404, 415, 443, 486, 488; and budget matters, 231, 232; and Japan, 189, 201; and NATO, 329, 370–71

Cabot, Thomas D., 401–02, 404–05, 419

Cain, Harry, Sen., 108

Cairo Conference declaration: re Formosa, 173, 175; re Korea, 41

Caldwell, Millard F., 249, 272, 484n

Cambodia, 205, 208, 216

Canada, 213, 342, 367, 414n, 419, 442

Cannon, Clarence, Rep., 280

Career Compensation Act of 1952 (PL 82–346), 506

Carney, Robert B., Adm., 363, 409

Caroline Islands, 187

Carter, Marshall S., Col., 36, 107, 114, 235, 263, 483, 484, 519

Casherg, Melvin A., 495, 496, 497

Cataloging and Standardization Act (PL 82–436), 506

Cease-fire, 86, 87–91, 99, 101–02, 151 (see also Korean War—armistice); and MacArthur statement, 101–02

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14, 44, 46–47, 72, 75, 77–78, 82; and Formosa, 182–83

Centurion tanks, British sale to U.S. of, 448, 450, 452

Chase, William C., Maj. Gen., 181–82

Chiang Kai-shek, 5, 173, 174–76, 177n, 180, 181, 184–85, 187n; offer to send troops to Korea, 175


China, People's Republic of, 126–29 (see also Korean War—Communist Chinese forces in); antigovernment resistance forces in, 182; blockade of, 88, 93, 113, 137; effect of intervention in Korea, 237, 242, 245, 248; entry into Korean War, 53, 71–96, 98, 113, 126, 190, 201, 209; and Formosa, 175–85; and Indo-China, 208, 210–11, 213–19

Chou En-lai, 71, 148, 169, 175, 177

Church, John H., Brig. Gen., 50, 51, 52–53

Churchill, Winston, 37, 137, 344, 366; and atomic matters, 458, 462; meeting with Truman, 444

Civil defense, 249, 272, 293–94, 295; Office of Civil Defense, 484n
Civilian Components Policy Board, 18, 25, 489, 492
Clark, Mark, Gen., 140, 147, 150–51, 159–60, 164, 165, 166, 171; and Japan, 199, 202, 203
Clay, Lucius, 407
Coe, Charles F., Rear Adm., 457n
Collins, J. Lawton, Gen., 14, 23, 490; and ammunition, 160–61; and atomic weapons, 86, 169; and budget: FY 1951, 226–27, 229–30, 232; FY 1952, 262; FY 1953, 274; FY 1954, 296–97; and integration, 494; and interservice problems, 520; and Korea, 49, 60, 83, 84, 89, 161, 171; and Lovett, 519; and MacArthur, 105; and military assistance, 425–26; and Pace-Finletter agreement, 298; on role of secretary of defense, 521; and trip to Far East, 94–95
Combat Duty Pay Act of 1952, 490
Combined Policy Committee (CPC), 455, 458, 459, 460, 462
Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), 114
Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (CINCEUR), 399, 406
Committee of Four, 28
Communist challenge to West, 2–3, 4, 5, 6, 8–9, 10–11, 106, 359. See also Korea—Communist intervention
Comptroller, OSD, 9, 18–19, 32; and Advisory Council on Accounting Policy and Financial Procedures, 486; Fiscal Management Staff, 486
Congress, U.S., 62; and OSD, 53. See also House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, U.S.
Coolidge, Charles A., 401, 487, 504, 505; and DoD organization, 525, 526; and role of JCS, 522
Coudert, Frederic R., Rep., 281
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 9, 230, 264, 303
Craigie, Laurence C., Maj. Gen., 119n
Czechoslovakia: at San Francisco Conference, 197
Dean, Gordon: and custody of atomic weapons, 464, 466; and exchange of atomic information, 459–60, 462; and nonnuclear components, 470, 476, 479; and weapons stockpile, 468–73
Dean, Hugh, 159
Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), 489
Defense Appropriation Act of 1953, 505
Defense Management Committee, 27, 485
Defense Management Council, 485
Defense Mobilization Board, 499
Defense Mobilization, Office of (ODM), 254, 264, 270
Defense Production Act of 1950, 499
Defense Production Administration, 254–56, 499
Defense Production Board, 342
Defense Supply Management Agency, 506
de Lattre de Tassigny, Jean, Gen., 210–13
Denfeld, Louis E., Adm., 16
Denmark: and military assistance, 456n, 448
Department of Defense: and atomic matters, 456, 460, 463, 471, 473; and Congress, 38; and Japan, 192, 193, 196; and military assistance, 395–97, 399–402, 404–06, 415–25, 430–34, 436–37, 440–41, 446–48, 450, 453; relations with field commanders, 517. See also Secretary of Defense, Office of; Service secretaries
"Doctors Draft," 31; and "Doctors Draft" bill (PL 81–779), 497
Dodd, Francis T., Brig. Gen., 146, 147
Douglas, Lewis, 397, 402
Dulles, John Foster, 48; and Japan, 188–93, 196–97
Durham, Carl, Rep., 479
Early, Stephen T., 15–16, 26, 56, 497
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), 395–96, 399–402, 404–05, 417–18; and Indochina, 212
Economic and International Security Estimates Division, 486
Economic Stabilization Agency, 499
Economy, U.S., 500 (Table 22)
Eddleman, Clyde D., Brig. Gen., 360
Eden, Anthony, 135
Edwards, Daniel K., 195, 344, 407, 487
Egypt, 365–66
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 150n; and atomic matters, 467, 476, 481; and Defense reorganization, 530–31; as field commander, 517; and FY 1951 budget, 224; and Formosa, 184–85; meeting with Truman, 526; and military assistance, 402, 404, 407, 409–11, 420, 425–26, 428, 431, 438–39, 441, 451, 453; and NATO forces, 340, 541, 549n, 558, 572, 574–75 (Table 16), 585; and officer fitness reports, 504n; and prisoners of war in Korea, 170; State of the Union message, 220; as Supreme Commander, NATO, 333–34, 360, 361–62; and use of atomic weapons, 167–69
Elbe River, 516–17
Elsey, George M., 62
Elugelab, 478
Erskine, Graves B., Maj. Gen., 208
European Coal and Steel Community, 392n
European Coordinating Committee (ECC), 397, 399, 402, 404, 406, 409, 445
European Defense Community (EDC), 389–90, 429, 453
Evans, James C., 27
Everest, Frank E., Maj. Gen., 457n
Executive Group: preparation of mutual security legislation, 417–19
Executive Orders: EO 10099, 396; EO 10161, 30–31; EO 10300, 405–06
Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 52, 75, 128, 157, 203
Fechteler, William M., Adm., 17, 23, 143, 151, 365; and FY 1953 budget, 274; and interservice problems, 521; and military assistance, 425–26
Federal Catalog System, 501
Fermi, Enrico, 477
Finlay, Luke W., 407
Finletter, Thomas K., 17, 29, 73, 75, 77–78, 91, 127–29, 131, 216; and Air Staff, 523; and atomic matters, 478, 481; and budget matters, 226, 262, 274, 276, 289, 297; and interservice issues, 298, 521; and military assistance, 437, 441, 449; and NSC 68, 231; and role of service secretary, 523–25
Fleischman, Manly, 31, 281
Foreign Economic Defense Affairs, Office of, 488
Foreign Military Affairs, Office of, 20, 488
Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance, Office of, 486
Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC), 396–97, 399, 401, 414–16, 434–35
Formosa Strait, 178
Forrestal, James, 4, 13, 24, 26, 27, 28, 458n, 497, 513, 575
Foster, William C., 38, 131; and atomic matters, 461, 462, 476, 481; and FY 1953 budget, 274, 288; and FY 1953 force recommendation, 269; and Formosa, 183; and Indochina,
216, 220; and Japan, 201; and military assistance, 410–11, 417, 419, 426–30, 441–44, 447, 449–50; and NSC 134, 289–90; and NSC 135, 294–95; and OSD organization, 485, 505, 506; and Pace-Finletter agreement, 298; and Spain, 355; and Truman, 514

Fowler, J. W., Rear Adm., 506


French Union Forces. See Indochina

Fritchey, Clayton. 498

Fuchs, Klaus, 5, 6, 459, 477

Garlock, Lyle A., 18, 299

Germ warfare. See Korean War


Gilpatric, Roswell, 446, 449

Good, Roscoe E, Rear Adm., 268n

Goodrich, Nathaniel H., 420, 487

Gordon, Lincoln, 405

Gorrie, Jack O., 273, 293–95

Gray, Gordon, 16

Great Britain: and Formosa, 175; and Indochina, 211, 213, 214, 217, 218; and Japanese peace settlement, 192–94, 198; and Malaya, 220; and military assistance, 417, 420, 422–23, 436n, 444, 446, 448–52; and NATO, 320–23

“Great Debate,” 97, 104, 339–41


Griffis, Stanton, 354, 355

Griffith, Paul H., 18, 19, 489

Gruenther, Alfred M., Lt. Gen., 312n, 361

Guided missiles: with atomic warheads (see Atomic weapons); development of, 473–75; Director of, OSD, 474

H-bomb, 455, 477, 478, 479, 481; test (MIKE), 477–82

Halaby, Najeeb, 20–21, 417n, 428, 488

Hallinan, Vincent W., 150n

Han River, 50, 53

Handy, Thomas T., Gen.: and military assistance, 399, 402, 406–07, 410–12, 451

Harriman, W. Averell, 29, 82, 177n; and budget matters, 276, 294; as ECA special representative, 397; and military assistance, 417, 419, 423–24, 428–31, 438–51; and Office of the Director for Mutual Security, 405–06, 407, 410–12; as president’s special assistant, 401, 404

Harrison, William K., Maj. Gen., 149, 151, 152–53, 171

Heath, Donald R., 208, 210, 212

Herod, William R., 342

Hickenlooper, Bourke B., Sen., 108, 458n

Ho Chi Minh, 205, 210, 212

Hoa Binh, 213

Hodes, Henry L., Maj. Gen., 119n

Hodge, John R., Lt. Gen., 42, 44

Hong Kong, 176, 213

Hoopes, Townsend W., 488

Hospitals, military, 496

“Hot pursuit,” 126, 130–31

House of Representatives, U.S.: atomic matters, 461

House Committees: on Appropriations, 226, 420, 503, 508; Armed Services, 233, 420, 426; Expenditures in the Executive Department, 503; Foreign Affairs, 420, 426

Houser, Harold A., 19
Index 691

Houston, John C., Jr., 505
Howard, Herbert, 21, 502
Hsieh Fang, Maj. Gen., 119

Iceland, 414n
Inch'on, 42, 66n, 67, 98
India, 205; and Japanese peace treaty conference, 194
Indochina, 413, 423, 429; French Union Forces in, 207, 208, 210, 216, 219; impact of Korean War on, 207; JCS support for UN membership, 209-10; joint State-Defense survey mission to, 208; possible role of UN regarding, 217; possible use of Chinese Nationalist forces in, 214; U.S. aid to, 207, 211, 216, 217, 219, 220, 422, 435, 440-42, 446-47; U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in, 208
Indonesia, 205, 217, 413
International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC), 401-02, 404-05, 417, 423-24, 445
International Security Affairs, Office of, 506
Interservice problems, 298, 518, 521, 536
Iran: and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 395; U.S. military assistance to, 413, 415-16, 422, 434, 436n
Ismay, Lord Hastings, 345, 444, 448
Italy: 1953 national elections in, 450; U.S. military assistance to, 420, 446n, 448, 450-51

Japan, 174, 205; air force proposal for, 203; and Allied Council, 187; defense of, 93, 99, 114-15; effect of Korean War on, 534; and Far Eastern Commission, 187, 190; and Formosa, 198n; membership in UN, 200; and military assistance, 417, 428-30, 442; and peace treaty, 69, 188-94, 200, 202, 203; and People's Republic of China, 198, 200; rearmament of, 200-04; Security Board, 202; U.S. Administrative Agreement with, 198-99; U.S. naval vessels for, 203; U.S. security treaty with, 190, 194-95, 198, 204
Japanese Maritime Safety Board, 201, 203
Japanese National Police Reserve (JNPR) (subsequently the Hoantai), 201, 202, 204
Jaujard, Robert, Vice-Adm., 362
Jenner, William E., Sen., 34-35
Johnson, Earl D.; and Japan, 191-93
Johnson, Louis A., 16, 23, 31, 33-34, 73, 74; and atomic energy matters, 6, 459, 468, 469, 477; and Communist aggression, 8; and Defense budget, 15; and FY 1951 budget, 224-30, 233-34; and FY 1952 budget, 244; and Formosa, 15, 174-76; and hospitals, 496; and Indochina, 209; and Japan, 188-89; and Korea, 1, 2, 11, 48-50, 51-52, 54, 56-57, 59, 61-62, 63, 65, 73; relations with Congress, 33; relations with State, 8, 15, 514; resignation, 178; and Truman, 28, 33, 513; and U.S. military assistance, 395-96, 413-15, 434-35; and Western European defense, 314-16, 318
Johnson, Lyndon B., 503
Johnson, U. Alexis, 120n
Johnston, Eric, 31, 499
Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG), 399, 406-07, 409-12, 417, 439
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 6, 8, 17, 21, 22-23, 49, 51; and atomic matters, 456, 460, 463; and atomic stockpile, 468-71; and atomic weapons custody, 464-67; and budget: FY 1951 budget, 222, 225, 233-36; FY 1951 supplemental, 233-36, 240; FY 1952 budget, 245n, 265-66, 267, 268; FY 1953 budget, 271, 278 (Table 9), 279, 285-88; FY 1954 budget, 285-87, 289, 292, 302;
Coolidge critique of, 526; executive agent system, 518, 521, 531; and FY 1952 force levels, 238 (Table 3), 255 (Table 7); and FY 1953 force levels, 262, 267–70, 278 (Table 9); and FY 1954 manning levels, 295, 301 (Table 13); and Formosa, 53, 173–80, 182–84; and Germany, 317, 318–19; and Indochina, 207, 209, 210, 213, 214, 215, 220; and Japan, 188–89, 191–95, 198–99, 201–03; and Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), 479; and JCS directives, 67, 68, 74, 76, 84, 92, 93–94, 109, 110–11, 113, 114–15, 127, 133–34, 141–42, 151–52; and Joint Staff, 530; and Korean War, 57–58, 61, 62–65, 67, 68, 70, 74, 76, 78, 84, 85, 87–88, 90–92, 93, 99, 100, 105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113–14, 116, 124, 128, 129–31, 133, 136, 141–42, 150, 151–52, 157, 163, 164–66, 167n, 168, 169; Lovett’s view of, 528–29; and military assistance, 399, 401, 409–11, 416–18, 422–29, 431, 435–36, 438–39, 441–43; and NATO, 343; and NSC 68, 246, 247; and NSC 114, 273n; and NSC 135, 290–95; relations with Secretary of Defense, 519; relations with service secretaries, 521, 523, 525; and research and development matters, 509; U.S. military representative in Europe (USMILREP), 399, 409–11; and Western Europe, 314, 318–19
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), 450, 457, 459, 470, 479
Joint Munitions Allocation Committee, 435
Joint Secretaries, 31, 264, 378, 523–24
Joy, C. Turner, Vice Adm., 119n, 122, 123, 133, 137, 149
Juin, Alphonse, Marshal, 362
Kaesong, 47, 117, 122
Katz, Milton, 399, 402, 404, 406
Keller, Kaufman T., 474, 475, 476
Kennan, George F., 6, 7, 88, 101, 115, 148, 150; and Chinese intervention in Korea, 245; and Formosa, 174–75
Kent, Roger, 487
Key West Agreement, 23
Keyserling, Leon, 424; and NSC 68, 246, 247; and NSC 114, 273n
Kibler, A. Franklin, Maj. Gen., 399, 406–07, 409
Kim Il Sung, 68, 117, 168
Kimball, Dan A., 17, 163, 216; and budget, 274, 276, 281, 289, 296, 299; and guided missiles, 474, 476; and role of service secretaries, 523–25
Kimpo airfield, 47, 51, 66
Kirk, Alan G., 9, 116, 317
Knowland, William F., Sen., 54, 108
Knowles, Nathaniel, Jr., 505
Koje-do, 145–46, 147–48
Korea, 212; invasion of South, 1, 2, 10, 41, 47–48, 307; and Congressional military appropriations, post-invasion, 414; division of, 41–46 passim; North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), 43, 65–70; pre-invasion status, 41–47; Provisional Military Advisory Group (KMAG), 44, 46, 47, 53; Soviet role in, 42–43; UN role in, 1, 42–44; U.S. assistance to, 45–46, 220, 307, 413, 434, 440; U.S. political objectives in, 78, 94; U.S. role in, 42, 43, 44–46
Korean War: air war: 74, 75, 109–10, 126–29, 156–57; airfields, 156–57; ’choke’ operations, 157; close support, 156; interdiction campaign, 60, 128, 156–57; reconnaissance,

Kurile Islands, 187, 189, 190, 194

Landon, Truman H., Maj. Gen., 6
Laos, 205, 208, 218; national army of, 216
Larkin, Felix, 19, 487, 489
Latin America: military assistance to, 417, 450
Lawrence, Ernest O., 478
Lawton, Frederick S.; and atomic matters, 470, 471, 472; and FY 1951 budget, 225; and FY 1952 budget, 249, 253; and FY 1953 budget, 275, 276, 277, 279; and military assistance, 401, 419, 450
Lay, James S., Jr., 29
LeBaron, Robert, 24, 29; and atomic matters, 456–58; and atomic stockpile, 468, 471–73; and custody of atomic weapons, 465–66; and exchange of atomic information, 458, 460–62; and nonnuclear components, 476; and thermonuclear test, 480, 481
Lemmonier, André, Adm., 562
Lemnitzer, Lyman L., Maj. Gen., 20; and military assistance, 396–97, 400, 414–16, 434–36
Lend-lease program, 431
Letourneau, Jean, 213, 216; and request for U.S. military and economic assistance, 447
Leva, Marx, 18, 19–20, 35, 61, 420, 486, 487, 489
Libby, R.E., Rear Adm., 143, 151
Lincoln, George A., Col., 374, 404, 417–20, 424
Livermore Laboratory, 478, 479
Lofitis, J. Robert, 484
Loper, Herbert B., Brig. Gen., 457n
Los Alamos, 478, 480
Lovelace, W. Randolph, II, 495
Loveltt, Robert A., 36–38, 187, 333, 334; and ammunition shortages, 158–59, 160; and atomic matters, 124, 457, 458, 460–62, 466, 470–73; and budget: 230, 233, 235–36, 239; FY 1951 supplemental, 237; FY 1952 budget, 245, 247, 219, 250–58 (Table 6); FY 1953 budget, 262, 264–65, 266, 269, 270–71, 272–74, 275–77, 279, 280–82; FY 1954 budget, 285–86, 287–90, 292–300, 302; and Communist propaganda, 148; and Congress, 515; and executive agents, 522; and Formosa, 178, 181–84; and guided missiles, 475; and Indochina, 212–21; and Japan, 194–204; and Joint Chiefs, 519, 520, 521; and Joint Secretaries, 523–25; and Korea, 74, 75, 86, 111, 130–31, 132–33, 134–35, 136, 151, 165; and MacArthur, 102; and manpower, 493; and military assistance, 401, 404, 406, 410–12, 416–19, 421–28, 431, 433, 437–46, 449–51, 453; and Munitions Board, 501, 503, 505–06; and NATO, 343–44; and Office of Public Information, 498; and organization, 485, 511, 513, 525, 526–30; as policymaker, 514–15; and president–elect Eisenhower, 526; and prisoners of war, 141–15; and Research and Development Board, 508, 509; and role of secretary of defense, 527; and thermonuclear test, 478, 479, 480; and Truman, 514; and unification, 515; view of NSC, 530
Luxembourg: and U.S. military assistance program, 436n
McBride, H.L., Maj. Gen., 348
McCarthy, Joseph R., Sen., 5, 54, 537
McCloy, John J., 319, 386
McCone, John A.: budget matters, 254
MacLean, Donald, 460n
McMahon, Brien, Sen., 268, 421; and atomic matters, 456, 457, 462, 467–72, 478
McNarney, Joseph T. Gen., 27, 312n, 443; and budget, 229–30; and Defense Management Committee, 486
McNeil, Wilfred J., 18, 35, 345, 514, 515; and budget: FY 1951 budget, 229, 230, 237, 239; FY 1952 budget, 253, 258; FY 1953 budget, 270, 274, 279, 280; FY 1954 budget, 286–88, 290, 291–92, 296–97, 300; and FY 1951 supplemental, 225, 227; and cost of Korean War, 509; and guided missiles, 474; and military assistance, 415, 418–19, 430, 441, 444, 449; and military force strength, 228; and Munitions Board, 503; and NSC 114, 263; and OSD management, 486–87
Magruder, Carter B., Maj. Gen., 189, 191
Mahon, George H., Rep.: FY 1951 budget, 226, 239; FY 1952 budget, 251
Malaya, 205, 217
Malik, Jacob, 48n, 115–16, 147–48
Manchuria, 73–76, 77–81, 98, 99, 110, 180n, 187. See also Korean War—sanctuaries
Manpower, 488–95
Mao Tse-tung, 5, 173, 187
Marcus Island, 190
Mariana Islands, 187, 190
Marine Corps, U.S.: and FY 1951 budget, 226, 237, 241 (Table 5); FY 1952 budget, 251–53; FY 1953 budget, 270, 274–75, 288; FY 1954 budget, 297; 1st Marine Division, 70; and NSC 68, 228, 244; readiness, 245n, 290–92, 295; strength, 224, 225 (Table 2), 234, 238 (Table 3), 240 (Table 4), 244, 245, 246, 252, 255 (Table 7), 261–62, 266–67, 269, 275, 278 (Table 9), 287, 289, 290, 292, 295, 300, 301 (Table 13)
Marshall, George C., 34, 35–37, 119; and atomic matters, 457, 459, 463, 465, 469, 470; and budget: FY 1951 budget, 230, 234, 236–37, 239–40; FY 1952 budget, 245–51, 257, 258; FY 1953 budget, 263, 266; and Congress, 515; and Formosa, 178, 180, 181; and Indochina, 209, 210, 211; and Japan, 190–96, 201, 204; and Joint Chiefs, 519; and Korea, 42, 58, 77, 80, 82, 83–84, 86, 87–88, 90, 91, 92, 94, 100, 102, 111, 127, 130, 333; and Lovett, 36–37, 37–38; and MacArthur, 67–68, 69n, 84, 89, 94n, 97, 104–05, 107–08; and manpower, 488–89, 493; and medical affairs, 496–97; and military assistance, 401–02, 404–05, 414, 416–18, 420–21, 424, 431, 433, 435–38; and Munitions Board, 501; and NATO, 322, 324, 325, 326–27, 328, 331, 340, 342–43, 385; and Office of Public Information, 498; and OSD organization, 483, 485–86, 511; as policymaker, 514, 515; and Research and Development Board, 507; and Ridgway, 114; and service secretaries, 523, 525; on Soviet policy at San Francisco Conference, 197; trip to Korea and Japan, 114; and Truman, 513; and unification, 515; and Universal Military Training, 490–91
Marshall Islands, 187, 190
Marshall Plan, 3, 4, 395, 447
Martin, Joseph W., Jr., Rep., 103
Matthews, Francis P., 16–17, 32n; and budget matters, 226, 231
Matthews, H. Freeman, 73, 120n
Mautz, William H., 486
Medical personnel shortage, 496–97
Medical Services, Office of, 18, 25–26, 495
Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP), 312, 322, 369–70, 372, 417n, 418, 425
Meiling, Richard L., 26, 495
Melby, John F., 208
Merchant, Livingston, 120n
Michelsen, Stanley R., Brig. Gen., 457n
Middle East: and Defense organization, 351; and tripartite pact, 351; and U.S. military assistance program 417, 422, 429–30
Military Air Transport Service, 31
Military assistance, 4, 314, 315, 316, 355–56n, 357–58, 359, 360, 370, 374, 381, 385, 392–93, 399, 402, 412, 452; coordination with economic assistance, 403 (Chart 7), 420 (Table 19); counterpart funds, 356n; evaluation of, 451–54; and procurement, Army Allocations Committee, 441; and role of Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), 397; and service secretaries, 410, 437
Military Assistance Office, OSD, 402, 440, 488
Military Construction Act (PL 82–554), 506
Military Liaison Committee, 18, 21, 23, 24, 456–59, 474–75
Military Representatives Committee, 342
Military Sea Transportation Service, 31
Military Traffic Service, 31–32
Mobilization, 230, 236, 239, 245–48, 256, 265, 276, 293, 498–501, 511; activation of National Guard (see Reserve forces)
Moch, Jules, 209, 321–22, 325–26, 327, 328
Monnet, Jean, 326
Montgomery, Viscount, Field Marshal, 316, 362
Moore, Robert S., Brig. Gen.: and budget matters, 251
Mountbatten, The Earl, Admiral, 367
Muccio, John J., 1, 43n, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 117
Munitions Allocation Council, 443–44, 450
Munitions Board (MB), 17, 21, 444, 446, 528; and atomic energy matters, 469, 473; organization, 502, 504–06; role of, 501–03
Munitions Board Cataloging Agency, 501
Murdaugh, Albert C., Capt., 488
Murphy, Charles, 481
Murphy, Robert, 199
Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee, 447
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 18, 20, 45, 395, 399–400, 444
Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), 400, 402, 413–15, 419, 433–36, 438–41, 446, 453; organization, 398 (Chart 6)
Mutual Security, 408 (Chart 8), 412, 426–28; appropriations, FY 1953 (Table 20), 422
Mutual Security Act of 1951 (PL 82–165), 404–06, 410, 421, 444
Mutual Security Agency (MSA), 405–06, 450
Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1952, 421
Mutual Security, Office of the Director for (ODMS), 275, 405, 433
Nam Il, 119n, 122, 134, 135–36, 171
Nanpo Shoto, 190
Nash, Frank C., 100, 351, 372–73, 380, 486, 488; and budget matters, 263, 264, 290, 291, 292; and Formosa, 182–83; and Indochina, 215; and JCS, 520, 523; and military assistance program, 396, 410–12, 422, 428, 430, 437–39, 441, 443–44, 447, 449, 452; at San Francisco Conference, 197
National Production Authority, 256, 499
National Security Act, 13, 14, 35; amendments—1949, 13, 16, 22; Title IV, 18–19. See also Comptroller, OSD
National Security Agency, 515
National Security Council (NSC), 8, 14, 20, 29, 30, 51, 62, 63, 78, 82, 84, 94, 100, 112, 132, 169, 530; meetings, 30, 231, 236, 237, 245, 246, 247, 256, 265, 272, 292, 294, 318, 359; Senior Staff, 29, 77–78, 246, 272, 273, 294, 488; Special Committee on Atomic Energy, 29, 463, 464, 466, 469, 471, 477–81
National Security Council (NSC) papers: NSC 8, 43, 44–46; NSC 13, 188; NSC 18, 359; NSC 20, 7, 8; NSC 48, 111–13, 131, 180, 181, 188, 211, 218; NSC 60, 190; NSC 64, 207; NSC 68, 6–10, 216, 227–31, 232, 244, 245–48, 262, 263, 269, 283, 416, 418, 424; NSC 73, 63, 71; NSC 73/4, 208, 218, 348; NSC 76, 63, 355; NSC 81, 64–65, 71; NSC 82, 320; NSC 101, 94, 179; NSC 114, 262, 263, 264, 283; NSC 114/1, 264, 265, 269, 271, 272, 291; NSC 115, 387; NSC 118, 131–32, 163; NSC 124, 210, 214, 216–18; NSC 125/2, 200, 202; NSC 128, 183–84; NSC 134, 289, 290; NSC 135, 290, 292–94
National Security Resources Board (NSRB). 9, 14, 30, 63, 293
National Security Training Commission, 491

Nationalists, Chinese. See Formosa

Navy, U.S.: and FY 1951 budget, 224, 226, 227, 237 (Table 5), 250; FY 1952 budget, 251-52 (Table 6), 253n, 259 (Table 8), 265, 267; FY 1953 budget, 269, 270, 274, 275, 277, 279 (Table 10), 280 (Table 11), 284 (Table 12), 285; FY 1954 budget, 294, 296-97, 298-300, 302, 304 (Table 14); and military assistance program, 428-30; forces, 312-14 (Chart 3), 315-16, 318-19, 328-29, 340-41, 370, 375-77, 380-84; "Gap," 369-77, 371 (Table 15); and Greece and Turkey, 347-53; and Indochina, 219; infrastructure, 377-80, 429; and military assistance, 399, 400-01, 405-06, 410, 414-15, 418, 423-25, 434-35, 439, 441-13, 446-47, 449-50; organization, 310-11, 316, 318, 341-47, 361-67 (see also Charts 3, 4, 5); and Spain, 353-61; Standing Group, 311-12, 416, 427, 442; Supreme Commander, 320, 321, 323, 324-25, 328, 331-32, 333-35; U.S. attitude toward, 307, 309; and Yugoslavia, 355-61

NATO Temporary Council Committee, 438-39

Norway: and U.S. military assistance program, 419, 436n, 448

Noyes, Charles P., 488

"New Look," 357

New Zealand, 192, 214, 215, 217, 218

Nichols, Kenneth D., Maj. Gen., 474

Nitze, Paul H., 6, 32, 112, 120n; and budget matters, 246, 262, 264, 272

Norstad, Lauris, Gen., 362, 409

North Atlantic Council (NAC), 310-11, 312, 315, 378, 390-91; reorganization of, 407

North Atlantic Treaty, 4, 395

North Atlantic Treaty Affairs, Office of, 401, 488

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 313 (Chart 3), 336 (Chart 4), 351, 364 (Chart 5); commands, 319-20, 321, 323, 328, 361, 362, 365-65, 366, 367; and Defense Committee, 312, 323; and Defense Production Board, 402, 448; and dispatch of U.S. troops to Europe, 191, 318, 559, 593-94; effect of Korean War on, 534; force goals, 328-29, 377 (Table 17), 380-84, 382 (Table 18), 428-30; forces, 312-14 (Chart 3), 315-16, 318-19, 328-29, 340-41, 370, 375-77, 380-84; "Gap," 369-77, 371 (Table 15); and Greece and Turkey, 347-53; and Indochina, 219; infrastructure, 377-80, 429; and military assistance, 399, 400-01, 405-06, 410, 414-15, 418, 423-25, 434-35, 439, 441-13, 446-47, 449-50; organization, 310-11, 316, 318, 341-47, 361-67 (see also Charts 3, 4, 5); and Spain, 353-61; Standing Group, 311-12, 416, 427, 442; Supreme Commander, 320, 321, 323, 324-25, 328, 331-32, 333-35; U.S. attitude toward, 307, 309; and Yugoslavia, 355-61

Offshore procurement program (OSP), 444-51

Ohly, John H., 488; and Indochina, 209; and military assistance, 396-97, 405-06, 414, 429-30, 435-38

Okinawa, 174, 188

Olmsted, George H., Brig. Gen., 359, 396, 447, 488

Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 477, 479, 480

Pace, Frank, Jr., 16, 48, 103n, 105-06, 159, 163, 165, 166-67, 298, 373, 374; and budget: FY 1951 budget, 226, 229, 231, 233-35; FY 1953 budget, 276, 281; FY 1954 budget, 287, 289, 290-97; as executive agent, 522; and Formosa, 176; and Indochina, 216; and integration in armed forces, 494; and military assistance, 434-36, 441; relations
with Army Chief of Staff, 521–22; and role of service secretary, 523–25
Pace-Finletter Agreement, 298
Pacific collective security, 69; and Pacific Council, 196; and Pacific military pact, 190–91, 192
Paik Sun Yup, Maj. Gen., 119n
Pakistan, 205
Panikkar, Kavalam Madhava, 72, 80–81, 175
Panmunjom, 123
Pawley, William D., 409, 446
Peng Teh-huai, Gen., 117, 168
Personnel Policy Board, 18, 21, 25, 489
Pescadores, 176, 184, 187, 190
Philippines, 174, 187, 205; and Formosa, 192; and Japanese peace settlement, 192; U.S. military assistance to, 413, 434; U.S. mutual defense treaty with, 196, 197
Pleven, René, 211, 326n, 329, 446–47
Poland: at San Francisco Conference, 197
Pontecorvo, Bruno, 460n
Popovic, Koca, Col. Gen., 360
Portugal, 414n, 419
Potsdam Conference Declaration on Japan, 187; and on Korea, 41
Princeton Conference, 478
Prisoners of war, 139–54; compounds, 145–50, 170; lists of, 142–43, 145; Operation BIG SWITCH, 171; Operation LITTLE SWITCH, 168; repatriation of, 139–45, 149, 167, 169; screening of, 145–46, 149, 150; violence, 145–46, 147
Public Information, Office of (OPI), 18, 26, 32, 496–97
Pusan, 42, 52, 65–66, 89
P’yongyang, 67, 69, 128
Quebec Agreements, 458n
Radford, Arthur W., Adm., 183
Randall, Carey A., Col., 484
Rashin, 73, 74, 128. See also Manchuria; Korean War—sanctuaries
Rayburn, Sam, Rep., 105
Redstone missile, 475
Renegotiation Board, 445
Renfrow, Louis H., 27
Reorganization Plan No. 6, 530
Reorganization Plan No. 25, 50
Research and development, 508
Research and Development Board (RDB), 17, 21, 22, 506, 507n; and Atomic Energy Committee, 456; Lovett’s view of, 528; review of guided missiles, 473
Reserve forces, 31, 50, 60–62, 91–92, 93, 95, 491, 492; and Burgess Committee, 492; National Guard, 61, 191, 235
Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), 489
Rhee, Syngman, 43, 44, 51, 66, 101, 117, 162, 164, 169–70
Richards, George J., Maj. Gen., 447
Ridgway, Matthew B., Gen., 95, 249; and armistice, 122, 133–34, 136, 137; and atomic weapons, 137; as field commander, 517; and integration, 494; and Japan, 193, 198, 199, 201, 202; and Korean cease-fire, 87; and military assistance, 411–12, 428, 451; and prisoners of war in Korea, 144–45; replacement for MacArthur, 93, 103n, 108–11; as SACEUR, 363; and South Korean troops, 163–64
Ring, Morton L., Rear Adm., 505
Index

Robert, Osgood, 27, 498
Robert, William L., Brig. Gen., 44, 45, 46, 53
Rockefeller, Nelson A., 530
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 458
Rosenberg, Anna M., 35, 165; appointment of, 489; and budget, 266-67, 286-88, 293, 297-98, 299; and manpower activities, 489-95
Royall, Kenneth C., 16
Ruffner, Clark L., Maj. Gen., 488
Rusk, Dean, 72, 88, 91, 100, 120n, 199
Russell, James S., Capt., 457n
Ryukyu Islands, 187, 190, 191, 200

Sakhalin Island, 187, 189, 190, 194
San Francisco Peace Conference, 196-98, 201
Saunders, Sir Hugh, Air Chief Marshal, 362
Sawyer, Charles, 248
Schneider, J. Thomas, 25, 489
Schuman, Robert, 320, 322
Science Advisory Committee, 507
Scott, Stanley L., Maj. Gen., 396, 488
Secretary of Defense, Office of (OSD), 12 (Chart 1), 17-28, 510 (Chart 9); and atomic matters, 455, 461; and budget matters, 237, 251, 270, 275, 285, 286; and Executive Office (EXOS), 483-84, 487, 526; and Joint Chiefs, 519-23; and personnel, 527; staffs, 515
Selective Service, 4, 31, 50
Senate, U.S.: and atomic matters, 461; ratification of Japanese peace and security treaties, 198-99
Senate Committees: on Appropriations, 258, 282; Armed Services, 106, 339, 340-41, 489, 503; Foreign Relations, 106, 339, 340-41, 426, 437
Seoul, 42, 51, 66, 93, 100
Service secretaries, 8, 13-14, 16-17, 28, 51, 56-57, 61, 64, 83, 88, 100, 130-31, 164, 314-15, 523-25
Shepherd, Lemuel C., Gen., 289
Sheppard, Harry R., Rep., 227
Shinwell, Emanuel, 522
Ships, U.S.: Coral Sea, 463; Forrestal, 253; Franklin D. Roosevelt, 463; Langley, 211; Midway, 463; Saratoga, 281; United States, 15, 253
Singapore, 211
Slessor, Sir John, Air Marshal, 518
Small Defense Plants Administration, 499
Small, John D., 444; and Munitions Board, 502, 505
Smith, Alexander, Sen., 53
Smith, H.P., Rear Adm., 488
Smith, Howard W., Rep., 281
Smith, Oliver P., Maj. Gen., 70, 493
Smith, Walter Bedell, 75, 78, 86; and Formosa, 182-83
Snyder, John W., 29, 247, 272, 276
Souers, Sidney W., 29
Southeast Asia (see Indochina): and military assistance, 434
Soviet Union, 52, 216, 414; effect on U.S. strategic planning, 230-31; 257, 264, 271-72, 293, 294 (see also Korea); Far Eastern policy, 187; and Japan, 190, 191, 194, 203; and MIG-15s, 75, 127, 128; military capabilities, 264, 271, 272, 295; and NATO, 337-39; and NSC 68, 230; and NSC 135, 293, 294; nuclear weapon stockpile, 533; at San Francisco Conference, 197; U.S. budget considerations of, 237, 257, 264
Spain, 353-54, 355; military assistance to, 355-57, 417, 420, 421, 422 (Table 20), 427, 429, 431, 442
Spalding, Sidney P., Maj. Gen., 29
Spofford, Charles M., 310-11, 315, 330, 344, 402, 404, 406-07
Staff Council, OSD, 28, 485
State, Department of, 81, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 127, 130, 141, 143-44, 150, 151; and atomic energy matters, 465, 466, 473; and Formosa, 175, 181-84; and Indochina, 205, 207, 209, 212, 214, 215; and Japan, 189-91, 193, 195, 196, 198-201; and military assistance, 395-96, 399-402, 415, 433, 436, 450; and NSC 68, 236; and NSC 114, 264; Policy Planning Staff, 6, 8, 271, 272; relations with Defense Department, 15, 20, 32, 35, 54 (see also Johnson, Louis—relations with State)
Steel strike, 158-59, 499-500
Stevenson, Adlai, 150n
Stimson, Henry L., 36
Stohl, Ralph N., 19, 484
Stokes, Marcus B., Jr., Brig. Gen., 268n
Stone, Charles B., III, Lt. Gen., 268n
Strategic policy, effect of Korean War on, 536
Strauss, Lewis L., 478
Sullivan, John L., 16
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), 438
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), 406, 409, 411, 428, 443
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), 361, 362, 402, 404, 407, 409, 418-19, 438, 443
Symington, W. Stuart, 14, 16, 30n, 63, 231, 247

Taber, John, Rep., 508
Taft, Robert A., Sen., 5, 34, 54, 339
Tan Van Huu, 213
Tannenwald, Theodore, Jr., 405-06
Teller, Edward, 477, 478, 479
Thailand, 205, 217, 219
Thorp, Wakeman P., Capt., 488
Tibet, 178
Tito (Josip Broz), 358, 359, 360
Tonkin, 205, 211, 216, 218, 219; Delta, 213, 214, 215
Treasury, Department of, 32, 303, 401

Trieste, 360n
Truman, Harry S., 152, 339; and atomic energy matters, 85, 456, 462, 463, 466-68, 472, 477, 480-81; and budget: 3, 4; FY 1951 budget, 223-25, 236, 240; FY 1951 supplemental, 250; FY 1952 budget, 254; FY 1953 budget, 261, 266, 269, 276, 279, 280, 283; FY 1954 budget, 302, 303; and China (PRC), 98; and civil defense, 272, 295; and Communist aggression, 10; conference with president-elect Eisenhower, 526; “Doctors Draft,” 497; and Formosa, 174, 176, 177, 181; and guided missiles, 474, 475; and Indochina, 207, 211, 215, 216; and industrial mobilization, 498-99; and Japan, 188-94, 197-99, 201-03; and Korea, 48-49, 50, 51-52, 53, 55, 59-61, 100, 130, 151, 152; and MacArthur, 69, 84-85, 88, 94-95, 102, 103, 105, 516; meetings with Attlee, 88-89, 331; and military assistance program, 396, 401-02, 405-07, 412, 414-15, 420-28, 430, 432, 434, 436, 439-41, 443-44, 453-54; and National Security Council, 50; and NSC 68, 246, 248, 249, 256, 262; and NSC 114, 265, 269, 272; and NATO, 319, 323, 328, 354, 372; and prisoners of war, 141, 144; special message to Congress, 175; and steel strike, 499-500
Turkey, 348, 351, 352-53; military assistance to, 415-16, 420, 422-23, 434, 456n, 452; and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 395; U.S. MAAG in, 397

Ulam, Stanislaw M., 478
Underwood, George V., Col., 484
Unified commands, 518, 522 (see also North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
United Nations, 3, 98, 140; Cease-Fire Group, 98; Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
(UNCURK), 68; Commission on Korea, 43, 49–50; and Formosa, 175, 178; General Assembly, 68, 90–91, 98, 167; policy on Korea, 517–18; propaganda against U.S., 148–49; seating of People's Republic of China, 177; Security Council, 48, 50n, 55, 80, 85; trusteeships in the Pacific, 187

UN Command, 55–58, 62, 64, 75, 80, 82, 99, 115, 149; air power, 156, 157; casualties, 86–87, 156; CINCUNC, 114–15; foreign military units, 56–58. See also Korean War

Universal military training and service, 31, 61–62, 490, 491, 529

Universal Military Training and Service Act (PL 82–51), 490, 491

U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), 409

U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (US CINCEUR), 411–12

U.S. European Command, 409

U.S. military representative for military assistance in Europe (US MILREP), 399, 406

U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Command, 409

U.S. Special Representative in Europe (SRE), 407

U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC), 234, 286

Vandenberg, Arthur H., Sen., 458n

Vandenberg, Hoyt S., Gen., 23, 49, 60, 83, 84, 91, 94–95, 143; and atomic matters, 472; and budget, 249, 256, 272, 273, 276; as Director of ODM, 29n, 499, 500

Wilson, Charles E. ("Electric Charlie"): and atomic matters, 472; and budget, 249, 256, 272, 273, 276; as Director of ODM, 29n, 499, 500

Wilson, Charles E. ("Engine Charlie"), Secretary of Defense, 530

Wilson, Roscoe C., Maj. Gen., 457n

Withington, Frederic S., Rear Adm., 29, 77

Women in armed forces, 494–95

Wonsan, 67, 69

Wood, C. Tyler, 417n

Wooldridge, E. T., Rear Adm., 29, 77

Yalu River, 69–70, 80, 82, 180n

Yokusuka Naval Base, 188

Yoshida, Shigeru, 191, 192, 198–200, 202n, 203

Yugoslavia, 351, 353, 357, 360; at Japanese peace treaty conference, 194; military assistance to, 414, 417, 422–23, 442